How China Wins: A Case Study of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War

This thesis is an historical case study of the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. In February 1979, China, under Deng Xiaopings leadership, launched a ground war against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. After three weeks of combat using mainly ground forces, the Chinese secured their operational objectives, then quickly withdrew. Though the Peoples Liberation Army had an unimpressive showing against a smaller, but well-experienced force, China ultimately used the war to improve its strategic position. Chinas willingness to use a military action to further its political strategy bodes ominously for Chinas future inclination to use military force to protect its interests. The analysis here draws parallels and identifies discontinuities between the Chinese Communist Party CCP that waged the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and todays CCP. This case supports that China is still willing to use military force to achieve strategic ends, at costs and in ways unfamiliar to America, but logical when viewed through the correct lens.