Overwhelming Force, Indecisive Victory: The German Invasion of Yugoslavia, 1941

reportActive / Technical Report | Accession Number: ADA274019 | Open PDF

Abstract:

The purpose of this monograph is to determine the significant lessons that the German invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941 offers for modern campaign planners when considering operations in that part of the world. The monograph first reviews the history of the invasion in 1941. The monograph then analyzes the campaign from both the German and Yugoslav perspectives using modern operational design criteria. Lastly, the monograph analyzes the lessons to be learned by operational planners from this campaign that are relevant to the conditions that exist today in Yugoslavia. The monograph concludes that Germany, despite its effective military campaign and decisive victory in 1941, failed to create peace for Yugoslavia. Because it did not envision the full scope or uniqueness of the problems that existed in that region of Europe, Germanys victory turned indecisive. Yugoslavia, World War II, Balkans, War plans, Operational art, Campaign, Germany, German army, Yugoslav army.

Author(s):
Barefield, Michael R.
Author Organization(s):
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
Descriptive Note:
Monograph
Pagination:
0074

Security Markings

DOCUMENT & CONTEXTUAL SUMMARY

Distribution:
Approved For Public Release
Distribution Statement:
Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited.

RECORD

Collection: TR
Identifying Numbers
Monitor Series:
USACGSC/SAMS
 Subject Terms
Joint Capability Areas:
JCA_5_Command and Control; JCA_1.1_Force Management; JCA_1_Force Support; JCA_5.4_Decide; JCA_5.3_Planning; JCA_5.5_Direct; JCA_5.5.1_Communicate Intent and Guidance; JCA_5.4.3_Establish Rule Sets; JCA_4.6_Engineering; JCA_5.2_Understand; JCA_5.2.2_Develop Knowledge and Situational Awareness; JCA_4.6.1_General Engineering; JCA_5.4.5_Intuit; JCA_5.1_Organize; JCA_5.1.1_Establish and Maintain Unity of Effort with Mission Partners; JCA_1.2.3_Educating; JCA_1.2.5_Lessons Learned; JCA_4.1_Deployment and Distribution; JCA_1.2.1_Training; JCA_1.2.4_Doctrine; JCA_4.2.2_Inventory Management
Modernization Areas:
Autonomy
Communities of Interest:
Air Platforms
Descriptor(s):
*MILITARY HISTORY, *STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, *OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, *DESIGN CRITERIA, MILITARY OPERATIONS, MILITARY STRATEGY, COMBAT FORCES, YUGOSLAVIA, GERMANY(EAST AND WEST), POLITICAL REVOLUTION, BATTLES, ARMY, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), LESSONS LEARNED, DECISION MAKING
Field(s)/Group(s):
Military Intelligence, Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
Keyword(s):
*WORLD WAR 2, OPERATION 25, BATTLE MANAGEMENT
Report Date:
1993 May 13