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DYNAMICS OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: BORDER DEMARCATION AND TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Donald R. Wong
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine particular elements of the Sino-Soviet dispute as a means of better understanding the divisive issues that confront the world's two most powerful Communist nations. Elements of enmity that shape, reinforce, and reshape the prevailing dispute are interlaced in a web woven out of historical grievances, ideological differences, competition for leadership of the world Communist movement, mutual mistrust, and international intrigue. This study concentrates on the enigmatic border issue, with special focus on that segment of the border which demarcates the frontier between Manchuria and the Soviet Far East.

In September, 1975, the Vice Premier and Minister of Public Security of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hua, Kuo-Feng, declared in a key speech:

> We should firmly implant in our minds the concept of holding out on the frontiers.[1]

Five months later, in February, 1976 he was unexpectedly (at least to Western China watchers) propelled into the number two position of the PRC hierarchy, that of Acting Premier, and two months later he was appointed Prime Minister and First Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. It is with this ominous backdrop that this study about the uncertain border, an area of controvertible jurisdiction between China and Russia, will be developed.

Immediately after the PRC victory in October 1949, a huge portion of the Eurasian landmass seemed to have been sealed off from the West, first by the Soviet's curtain of steel in Europe, followed by the PRC's curtain of bamboo in Asia. Within this closed society, the common frontier between the two countries was, to a large extent, bridged by a common ideology and the desire of these powers to consolidate their gains through an alliance of mutual and everlasting friendship. The Sino-Soviet border is one of the longest in the world; it begins at the China-Russia-Pakistan tripoint high in the Pamirs and extends almost randomly in a north-east arc across some of the most rugged, desolate, and varied terrain known to man, and finally terminates in the China-Russia-Korea tripoint near the Pacific coast. Geographically, the frontier can be divided into the three sectors of Sinkiang (western portion), Mongolia, (central sector) and Manchuria (Soviet Far East).[2]

The Manchurian sector historically has been the crossroads of the Far East, subject to numerous power struggles over the past six centuries between and among the Mongols, Han Chinese, Manchurians, Japanese, and Russians. Today demarcation of certain segments of the border continues to be clouded in uncertainty; some of the reasons can be attributed to the fact that they are imprecisely defined, questionably marked and, unilaterally interpreted.

The area under study is steeped in history. First it was the military exploits of the Golden Horde of Genghis Khan and his descendants (known in Russian History as the Tartars) that for over

two centuries, conquered, plundered, and ruled most of Eurasia. In the cyclic nature of history, the Mongol empire subsequently gave way to the Han Chinese whose Middle Kingdom, "mandate from Heaven" philosophy allowed it to establish a system of suzerainty beyond the great wall to a frontier line as far north as the Amur River estuary. In turn, the Tsarist expansion eastward to the Pacific met with the emerging power of a new "celestial empire," the Manchus (Ch'ing Dynasty, 1664-1911), and it was during this era that the Manchurian-Soviet Far East border evolved. Subsequently Japan, the Republic of China, and then the PRC became intimately embroiled over the border issue with Russia.

Border hostility between China and Russia has existed in varying degrees since the early 17th century when Tsarist Russia embarked on an accelerated expansion east of the Urals, taking them across Siberia to the Pacific Ocean and beyond. By 1727, the frontier separating the two empires stretched across the rugged and desolate "central" and "far eastern" frontier in a continuous, but somewhat hazy line. Since then, a number of agreements referred to by the Chinese as "unequal treaties" forced the line inward toward the core of China, allowing Russia's eastern front to expand and her frontier posts to gain strong footholds. When Mongolia, at the urging and assistance of the USSR, broke bonds with China and declared independence in 1921, the lengthy border became separated into two almost equal segments: one on the western side, the 1,850 mile long Sinkiang-Turkistan sector and another on the northeastern

side, the 2,300 mile long Manchurian sector which lies contiguous to the Soviet's Far East (Siberian) frontier.[3]

Although the Sino-Soviet border is bisected by the Mongolian ople's Republic (MPR) into the Sinkiang-Turkistan and Manchurian-Far East Siberian frontiers, the sector which separates outer Mongolia with China (previously known as inner Mongolia) can also be considered, for all practical purposes, the defacto Sino-Soviet border since the MPR is closely associated with, and dependent on the USSR for military and economic aid.

The Soviet Russians (USSR) and the Chinese (PRC), as well as their predecessors (the Tsars and Mandarins), have concluded a number of treaties, protocols, and other international agreements over the past three centuries in attempts to demarcate the boundary between the two countries, but certain segments of the border continue to be subject to diverse interpretation, irritation, and confrontation. This is not only because of imprecise language of the treaties/related agreements and inaccurate methods of marking the seemingly arbitrary boundaries, but also because of acts of nature which have caused portions of the river boundaries to shift course, exposing territory belonging to one nation to the claim of the other. Moreover, the PRC has frequently reminded the Soviets that Russia was guilty of encroachment on China's territory along the frontier as a result of unequal treaties, accepted by a weakened China, decimated by internal strife and humbled by foreign intervention.

This study is developed with the object of relating an historical narrative of the border's evolution with a general review of the

border conflicts occurring over the period of its establishment, and an analysis of the prospects for settlement of the border issue by the two powers. In essence, the particular objectives can be enumerated as follows:

a. Examine the Manchurian-Far East sector of the border in terms of existing treaties and related agreements to determine the evolution of the present boundary demarcation.

b. Examine the disputed segments of the frontier, particularly those which have involved armed conflict over the possession of various islands and to assess whether a peaceful settlement can be achieved through internationally accepted legal precedent involving the interpretation and definition of boundary demarcation.

c. Synthesize the border issue from the standpoint of both sides to assess its future role, if any, as an element in Sino-Soviet relations.

In development of the aforementioned objectives, the following assumptions were made:

a. Adequate information is available to develop and extend the ideas in support of the research objectives.

b. The border conflict between China and Russia will continue to be an international issue of substantive concern to the United States and, as such, it will be further subject to critical scrutiny.

The frontier clashes between the Muscovites and the Chinese in the 16th and 17th centuries, between the Japanese and the Soviets in the late 1930's, and between the PRC and USSR since the early

1960's are similar in the respect that armed conflict appears to have resulted from a common denominator, namely that of a border that was ill-defined and poorly marked. The border issue leaves unanswered, at least to the mutual satisfaction of both sides, the ownership of hundreds of islands and islets interspersed throughout the length of the various rivers that are part of the boundary. The rivers involved include portions of the Argun, Amur, Ussuri, and several less significant rivers. Although there have been some signs of initiative by the Chinese to be more reasonable on their demand that the USSR admit to the "unequal treaties" of the past, it is this author's view that the Chinese haven't forgotten that bitter history, and that the issue of unequal treaties will be an enduring element of discord. Regardless of whether or not China is willing to constrain herself on this point, she may acquiesce only as a matter of diplomatic expediency, until such time as it becomes advantageous to reopen the issue. This being the case, a careful review of the treaties and agreements related to the evolution of the border is a very substantial ingredient of this paper.

This study is organized into five chapters as outlined in the table of contents. The historical background of Chinese-Russian relations, which complement the chapters on "Demarcation of the Border thru Treaties" and "Border Disputes of the 1930's and 1960's is included in Annexes A (Page 102), B (Page 113), C (Page 131).

Investigative procedures included a literature search of books, periodicals, newspapers, and Government publications; visits to various Federal and Department of Defense Agencies, and interviews with faculty members of several colleges and universities. The visits and interviews were particularly useful in obtaining an assortment of viewpoints concerning the border problem.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. Fay Willey and P. Brinkley-Rogers, "International, A New Chinese Puzzle," Newsweek, 16 February 1976, p. 34.

2. US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer, International Boundary Study, No. 64, 14 February 1966, "China-USSR Boundary," p. 1.

3. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

This chapter provides a brief overview of the legal aspects of international boundaries and discusses definitions and concepts related to various geographic and cartographic terms. This background is essential for those studying border disputes, as it encourages a clearer understanding of the problems that can and do arise in the interpretation of territorial/boundary issues by two or more interested parties.

There is some confusion concerning the difference between a boundary and a frontier. When used interchangeably, these geographical terms can cause misunderstanding especially when the territorial question involves legal technicalities. Basically, the former can be considered as a finite "line" that divides the contiguous territory of two or more nations into separate parts, whereas the zonal character of a frontier is not so finite, but has dimensions of breadth and depth. Consequently, when one speaks of the Sino-Soviet boundary, reference is made to a finite line that grids the territory between China and Russia. The frontier of either country, however, can be thought of as a zone or region that indicates in general terms where one state ends and another begins without fixing a precise limit.[1] Duncan Hall describes the international frontier in terms of power politics as the zone in which Great Powers expanding along their main lines of communications to the limits of their political and economic influence and defense needs, impinge

upon each other in conflict or compromise. In similar fashion, J. E. S. Fawcett described it as that territorial area where inward or outward pressure exists between two power systems.[2] Both descriptions can be applied to the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute.

International boundaries are usually stipulated in a legal document agreed to by both parties and may traverse land, rivers, lakes and other geographical terrain features, but they do not include sea coasts per se because the latter are territorial waters that belong to the State, hence they are national in nature, not international.[3]

Webster's unabridged dictionary, third edition gives the following definitions:

a. Boundary: Something that indicates or fixes a limit or extent: something that marks a bound (as of a territory . . .).

b. Frontier: A part of a country that fronts or faces another country. A typically shifting or advancing zone or region that marks the successive limits of settlement and civilization.

Types of Boundaries

In the most general of terms, boundary classification can be grouped in two categories, "natural boundaries" and "artificial boundaries." The first grouping lends itself to geographical features occurring in nature such as mountain crests, rivers, shorelines of lakes, and other definitive physical identifications. The second group refers to boundaries that are arbitrarily established according to mutually agreed criteria and marked by man-made

objects such as stone or wooden markers or monuments. Obviously, these classifications do not always provide for the most logical dividing point because a natural boundary may in fact divide the inhabitants of a particular frontier in an unnatural manner. Nevertheless, boundary classification can be best defined in geophysical terms, with the understanding that actual application should be subject to political, military, economic, demographic and ethnic considerations. The physical boundaries to be discussed include all natural types such as mountains, deserts, swamps, marshes, rivers, and lakes. By themselves, however, they are to be considered zonal boundaries until such time both parties agree to a more definitive dividing line.

Boundary Mountains

Mountains may consist of scattered hills or a mountain range of such altitude and ruggedness as to form a natural barrier, particularly in the early stages of the State's development. As a terrain feature, mountains are easily recognized, but in a frontier which contains numerous mountain chains, recognition and differentiation is more difficult especially if maps of the region are based on inadequate reconnaissance and topographic survey. One difficulty arises in the use of mountains is where peoples of the same language and culture live on both sides of the mountain. If the population is fairly dense, arbitrary use of the mountain crest as a boundary may seem natural and desirable to all but the inhabitants.[4] Moreover, identification of the watershed may or may

not follow or coincide with the crest of the mountain, thus complicating the issue especially when a mountain range is linked to a river as a continuous boundary.

Boundaries in Deserts, Swamps, and Marshes

Use of these geographical features in marking of boundaries is extremely difficult due to their zonal character. These features are found in the Manchurian border. In some cases they serve as effective barriers, but on the other hand, man-made reclamation projects or the discovery of oil or other minerals can alter the nature and usefulness of the geographical feature and thus create additional problems between the adjacent states. Nornally, artificial boundary markers have to be pressed into service when this type of terrain makes up the frontier to be divided.

Boundary Waters

The Sino-Manchurian-Soviet Far Eastern boundary consists, to a large extent, of various rivers as the boundary between the two states of China and Russia. This classification is not limited to rivers alone, but includes lakes, bays and territorial waters leading to the high sea. In this study, we are concerned about the rivers which serve as a dividing line between states, but not rivers which pass through both territories and across the river boundary itself.

Process in Marking of Boundaries

In discussing the problems that confront negotiators in the settlement of a frontier dispute, Boggs points out that two essential

steps are involved in the settlement and they are distinct and sequential. When a frontier controversy has been settled and the opposing countries proceed to define the boundary, the two steps brought into play are called "delimitation" and "demarcation." Unfortunately these two terms were treated in dictionaries as synonymous, but the dilemma that negotiators faced was the need for precise terms and it was Colonel Sir Henry McMahon who gave the terms the distinct meanings which have taken root in recent international usage. In his own words:

> "Delimitation" I have taken to comprise the determination of a boundary line by treaty or otherwise, and its definition in written, verbal terms; "Demarcation" to comprise the actual laying down of a boundary line on the ground, and its definition by boundary pillars or similar physical means.[5]

By the above distinction, delimitation of a boundary refers to the proceedings between states that determine a boundary line within the scope of the particular agreement such as a treaty, convention, or protocol. Delimitation may use any of the natural boundary types previously discussed such as the crest line of a particular mountain chain, the edge of a swamp, or the middle of a river, and it may also use an artificial line such as those referenced to a particular longitude or latitude. Demarcation, on the other hand, is the process that applies the terms of the verbal definition contained in the treaty or other act, to the physical marking of the boundary on the ground along the topographical conformations of the frontier to be separated by it.[6] Usually, a demarcation commission is jointly

formed to lay out the boundary and to identify points in the boundary where deviation from the treaty is necessary to satisfy specific local claims or to resolve errors of commission or omission discovered during the process of on-the-ground survey and demarcation.

Boundary waters such as rivers or lakes are physical features that are readily identifiable. Rivers are subdivided into those that are navigable or non-navigable; navigable rivers are often used as arteries of communications for both trade and travel. Rivers frequently separate neighboring communities, but they also serve as a source of common interest, such as for fishing, irrigation, power, or other domestic uses. As a result of this dependence, there is an inherent desire of each community to possess some form of control over the river. Lakes also pose peculiar problems of definition and demarcation because of their irregular shape. The extreme eastern portion of the Sino-Soviet border crosses one particularly large lake called Lake Khanka. Delimitation and demarcation of this lake followed a rather unusual pattern, as will be discussed later.

One technique for delimiting a river boundary that goes back in history to the Middle Ages is to place the boundary of each riparian state on its own bank. This makes the river itself neutral to be owned mutually by the two states. Another is to fix the boundary along only one bank, thereby transferring possession and control of the river to just one of the states.[7] Unless one of the border states is not seriously interested in the boundary river, the

latter method usually results from "coercive diplomacy" which terminates in so-called "unequal" treaties. This very point is often raised by Chinese spokesmen about the river boundaries separating the Sino-Soviet frontier.

Several other important techniques for establishing boundaries in lakes or rivers include use of "median" lines and navigable channels. (The term "thalweg" has gained wide use for the latter term.) A median line is easily conceived if the area to be divided is symmetrical, but lakes and rivers with their irregular shore lines are rarely so.

The delimitation methods that are applicable to rivers should, for clarity, not only differentiate between navigable and non-navigable rivers, but should also consider the peculiar characteristics of the river's water state, for example, whether it is a tidal or non-tidal river whose volume fluctuates with the season or whether the river freezes over for long periods of time. For non-navigable rivers, the principal of the median line to delimit the boundary is often satisfactory. For navigable rivers, the notion of the "thalweg" doctrine has been in use to varying degrees since the early 1800's. Thalweg refers to the middle of the navigable channel, or its principal channel if it has more than one. Cucwurah explains that:

> The doctrine of thalweg was devised primarily to modify and thereby remedy the inconveniences of the more ancient principle which required equal division of territory. In practice, it preserves to each riparian State equality of right in the beneficial use of the stream as a means of communications.[8]

In essence, the median line boundary of a river refers to the entire width of that river whereas the thalweg boundary refers to the main and usually the navigable channel of a river; the thalweg often divides the river unequally, while the median line divides equally. Thus, from a commerce and navigation standpoint, the decision to adopt one technique over the other would have to be evaluated on the specific merits of each case. From a territorial argument, adoption of the median line method has the advantage of dividing the area of a river equally; but, from a purely functional standpoint, it could be disadvantageous since the navigable (deepest) portion of the river may not necessarily coincide with the median line itself, but lie partly or totally on one side or the other. In international negotiations, use of the thalweg principle is gaining wider acceptance as a demarcation technique in resolving border disputes.

Another phenomenon associated with the use of river boundaries is a problem involving nature herself. Rivers over extended periods of time mature, and depending upon the various land formations it flows through, will meander according to the path of least resistance. This transformation causes river boundaries to shift, giving rise to unforeseen disputes over lost or gained land. "Accretion" is the term applied to a river that gradually and imperceptibly changes its course. Barring any specific agreement to the contrary, the concept stipulates that the boundary will follow with the change in the course of the river. The doctrine of accretion has been universally recognized in international law and by international practice.

"Avulsion," in contradistinction, refers to a sudden change in the course of a boundary river resulting from natural or artificial events. Although the event causes the river to abandon its old bed to create a new one, the resulting displacement of the channel does not alter the original boundary line. There is consensus by various authorities that avulsion does not vitiate the thalweg doctrine, and the boundary remains with the old abandoned channel even though no water may be flowing in it; furthermore, the boundary remains irrespective of any future changes in the new channel.[9] An important point States should consider in delimination of river boundaries is the need to mutually specify the status of such boundaries should accretion or avulsion occur.

Besides events that are manmade, the course of a river can also be changed by forces of nature, such as torrential rainfall, massive flooding, earthquakes, and similar environmental abnormalities. This sudden change (avulsion) is easy to document since the event occurs within a relative short time span. The distinction between avulsion and accretion, therefore, is based on the element of time, the latter applying to a river that gradually and imperceptibly changes its course. Naturally, there must be an understanding between contending parties concerning this point if future disputes are to be avoided should forces of nature cause the boundary to change.

The final aspect of river boundaries involves the allocation of islands of the river that either exist at the time of the treaty

or are subsequently formed by the gradual accumulation of alluvial deposits or by the separation of a piece of land from the shoreline by erosion or other natural processes. Under normal circumstances, sovereignty over the islands can be stipulated by reference to the terms outlined in delimitation of the boundary. On the one hand they can be allocated on the basis of their location relative to the median or thalweg line; on the other, they can be assigned by an alternative method, that is, to specify which State has sovereignty over which of the islands. As can be deduced from the above techniques, it is possible to have ownership of islands shift from one State to the other depending on the method of delimitation specified in the treaty.

Demarcation

Cukwurah considers the process of demarcation to be the crux of all boundary making and he quotes from Holdich's work on Political Frontiers and Boundary Making:

> . . . it is in this process that disputes usually arise, and weak elements in the treaties or agreements are apt to be discovered. Important features are found in unexpected positions, and a thousand points of local importance crop up which could never have been taken into account by the delimitators, whose definitions leave them unconsidered and unadjusted.[10]

Basically, the task should evolve around a joint team of technical experts using the best available data, maps, and related tools. Its prime purpose should be to fix the boundary line, according to the concept outlined in the treaty, and as closely as possible to conform

with the topography of the terrain. Related responsibilities of the demarcation team include the construction of necessary markers at mutually agreed sites, the appropriate identification of each marker by respective State, and the preparation of a comprehensive and detailed record of its work to be used as an addendum to the treaty itself, not only for historical purposes, but for future reference in the settlement of disputes. Lastly, there should be some provision made by both parties for the protection, maintenance, and repair of an established boundary. Although the inviolability of international boundaries is generally recognized in international law, it seems a wise practice to reaffirm this principle in boundary treaties. An example of such a provision from an agreement between the USSR and Czechoslovakia in 1956:

> Contracting Parties shall take measures for the proper protection of the frontier marks and shall bring to justice any person found guilty of moving, damaging or destroying a frontier mark.[11]

Summary

The essence of Chapter II has been a detailed review of the factors that should be considered in negotiation of boundary agreements. The availability of modern technology and international law will minimize some of the significant problems that faced the early Russian-Chinese negotiators in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries as well as those in the early 20th century; namely, problems of inaccurate maps, insufficient topographical information, and inadequate standards that could be mutually understood and agreed to.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. A. O. Cukwurah, The Settlemer. of Boundary Disputes in International Law, p. 11.

2. Ibid., p. 12.

3. Samuel W. Boggs, International Boundaries, p. 22.

4. Ibid., p. 23.

5. Ibid., p. 32.

6. Cukwurah, p. 28.

7. Ibid., pp. 45-47.

8. Ibid., p. 51.

9. Ibid., p. 58.

10. Ibid., p. 78.

11. Ibid., p. 84.

CHAPTER III

THE SINO-MANCHURIAN--RUSSIAN FAR EASTERN BORDER THROUGH TREATIES

On 31 December 1963, as Sino-Soviet belligerency was being exposed to the world, Premier N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR sent a message to various heads of governments which emphasized the precarious and potentially explosive question of territorial disputes between countries. He was obviously referring to the hostility developing between China and Russia when he said:

> I think that you will agree with me that if we try to pick out the questions which most often give rise to dangerous friction between states in different parts of the world, these undoubtedly will be territorial disputes, the problem of frontiers between states, mutual or unilateral claims of states to each other's territory. . . .[1]

He then went on to discuss the problem as being more than one of just "boundaries," but that it also included the question of "territorial claims" stating that:

> The question of boundaries or, to be more specific, of territorial claims and disputes is not new, of course. It has existed practically through the entire history of humanity and not infrequently caused sharp conflicts between states, mutual mistrust, and enmity among peoples.[2]

To fully appreciate the rationale behind Premier Khrushchev's statements concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute over their common boundary and of China's reported territorial claims requires an understanding of prior relations between the two countries--

relations that brought China and Russia to conclude a number of treaties that established the present border.

A brief summary of the historical developments that took place among the three contending states--China, Mongolia, and Russia--prior to 1689 is outlined in Annex A, (Page 102).

As mentioned previously, the rancor of the Sino-Soviet dispute revolves around many separate, interacting issues, hence each protagonist usually activates and emphasizes th se issues which best serves his interest at the time . . . internationally or domestically. Border polemics often involve charges and countercharges that stem from the present boundary, therefore, an appreciation of the treaties which formalized the frontier boundary is helpful for understanding the rationale behind the animosity that fuels this issue.

This chapter deals with the evolution of those treaties that delimited the Sino-Manchurian--Russian Far Eastern border (hereafter referred to as the Manchurian--Far Eastern border); a) Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689; b) Treaty of Kyakhta/Bur, 1727; c) Treaty of Aigun, 1858; and d) Treaty of Peking, 1860. In addition, various protocols supplementing these treaties are included.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk

The Tsar's instructions to the Russian mission concerned resolution of the border problem and consummation of a favorable trade agreement with China:

> All bloodshed must be avoided; in the event of a rejection of his proposals by the Chinese, he (Ambassador Golovin) was to make arrangements for another embassy to go to Peking. The Amur River was to be obtained in its entirety, if possible, as the boundary between the two countries. Failing this, compromise boundary lines were to be proposed along certain tributaries of the Amur--the Bystraia or the Zeia River. And if the Chinese still would not yield, as a last concession Albazin was to be designated as the border. Golovin was also instructed to arrange for a commercial agreement with China on as favorable terms as possible.[3]

Basis for the Manchu Emperor's instructions rested on two points: a) the strategic importance of the Heilungchiang territory (most of modern Manchuria) and its network of rivers, and b) Russian incursion into and occupation of Chinese frontier territory as well as lands belonging to vassal tribes. His guidance was emphatic:

> . . . if we do not recover this entire region, our people on the frontier will never have peace. . . . We shall grant them trade; if they do not agree, we shall not talk peace with them.[4]

Article I of the treaty delimited the Sino-Russian frontier in a northeast direction from the trijunction of the Shilka-Argun-Amur Rivers and Article II extended the delimitation from this same tripoint in a southwest direction along the entire length of the Argun river toward its source in the greater Khingsan Mountain Range:

> All territory on the left bank is under rule of the emperor of China (Khan of Han); all on the right bank will be included in the Empire of the Czar. . . .[5]

In this instance, facing upstream on the Argun, the left

bank becomes the south (Chinese) side and the right becomes the north (Russian) side. Article II is quite clear in its concept of delimitation; the Argun and Gorbitsa rivers not specifically mentioned, became neutral territory.

In early 1690, the memorial of the Treaty of Nerchinsk indicated that the Chinese should "demarcate" the boundary as established by the treaty. Monuments should be erected on the Gorbitza and elsewhere with the text of the treaty inscribed in five languages: Manchu, Chinese (Han), Russian, Latin, and Mongolian.[6]

However, one Chinese source implies that demarcation markers (stone pyramids) were inscribed with the treaty text:

> (Hsu Yuan-wen) . . . translated only a part of the original treaty . . . Although Hsu's translation was incomplete, it had been regarded as the complete Chinese version of the treaty for over one hundred years until a better translation by Hsi-Ch'ing appeared. This new version . . . supplies one important article of the treaty, namely that the region south of the Udi River should be left unsettled until a later time. . . .[7]

It should be noted that the original text, albeit ambiguous, was written in Manchu and not in Chinese (Han), therefore it is not clear whether or not the markers, if erected, were inscribed in all three oriental languages (Manchu, Chinese, and Mongolian).

Although Article I of the treaty implied that the two Governments would meet again to clarify the terms pertaining to the Ud River and the "Chain of mountains," no such meeting ever took place. Without clearer delimitation, the second step of

boundary making--demarcation--could not take place. The Treaty of Nerchinsk was to endure for almost 170 years before Russia made a move to clarify the issue.

Golder, comparing Russia with China, believes the importance of the Amur region was not fully appreciated by the delegates of either country. He cites Russia's lack of a clear and far reaching policy about the area and treating the district as another Siberian province; that is, Russia left it to take care of itself, usually at the whims of outlaws. China's blindness to the consequence of Russia's gaining a foothold on the Amur was reflected in her half-hearted diplomatic and military actions which she undertook only when forced to do so, and even then without accomplishing her work thoroughly.[8]

O'Brien argues that the Treaty of Nerchinsk actually won gains for the Tsar:

> . . . For the first time a peace with China recognized Russia's right to be in the Far East. The settlement disposed of many long-standing differences between the two powers. It established peace on a basis that was as permanent as the Russians chose to make it. Such an arrangement removed the probability of a two-front war at a time when Russian arms in the West had suffered serious reverses. . . .[9]

The protracted difficulties encountered in delimitation of the frontier underscored the importance both countries attached to the frontier question, particularly on the side of the Chinese, who saw the question of trade as a secondary issue. More than once negotiations were stalled with both sides threatening to

withdraw. At one point, the Manchu's display of force appeared to have influenced the Russians in backing down on their demands. This is understandable since the Russian forces were much smaller. Once the delimitation issue was finally resolved, other articles were added to the treaty that dealt with trade between the two countries, and procedures for the handling of fugitives. On 27 August 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed, and became the first such agreement between China and a Western nation. Prepared in Latin, Russian, and Manchu texts, it was agreed that the Latin version would be the official one.[10]

Considerable detail has been devoted to the Treaty of Nerchinsk (Also see Annex B, Note 1) because of the belief that it served as the basis for many of the subsequent Sino-Russian frontier treaties. From a territorial claims standpoint, the treaty retains a wealth of political intrigue not in spite of its age, but because of it.

The Bur Treaty

With the Nerchinsk treaty in operation, disruptions along the far east frontier continued to occur, but with less intensity. In late 1700, the Manchu Emperor, Kung-hsi, sent representatives to meet with Vlasov, the military commandant of Nerchinsk, to discuss frontier violations. It is uncertain what came of the meeting, but in 1723 a new Emperor ascended the throne--Yung-cheng. In early 1726, the new emperor sent an expedition to study the topography of the border east and west of the Selenginsk ostrog located just north of Kyakhta.[11]

Lo-Shu Fu reports that in April, 1727 the Chinese and Russians participated in a frontier conference;[12] this was probably a prelude to the Bur meeting. The Bur treaty (27 August 1727) delimited the boundary that approximates the present day border between Russia, western Manchuria, and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). Two boundary protocols were exchanged, one at Arbagaitu (12 October 1727) and the other near the Bur River (27 October 1727). The first protocol demarcated the boundary east of Kyakhta and the second, which is pertinent to this study, demarcated the boundary west of Kyakhta. From Kyakhta east to the headwaters of the Argun, 63 markers were erected to demarcate the boundary. These stone markers are often referred to as obos which, in Mongolian, mean man-made stone carin. Obos had been used for years to mark routes and serve as religious objects.[13]

The last six markers form the stretch of territory which demarcates the westernmost segment of the present day Sino-Soviet Manchurian--Far Eastern border. Demarcation specified in the treaty comes from Mancall's version:

> Boundary beacons.
> 58. In the steppe north of the abandoned Tarbag Dakhu beacon.
> 59. On the summit of Shara Ola, to the north near the Tsagan Ola boundary beacon.
> 60. On the summit of Borotologoi hill, north near the abandoned Tabun Tologoi beacon.
> 61. On the summit of a hill, to the north near the Soktu guard beacon.
> 62. On top of a mound to the north near the abandoned Irdyni Tologoi beacon.
> 63. On the summit of Abakhaitu hill, opposite the middle estuary of the Khailar, on the right (i.e., western) bank of the Argun river.[14]

The 58th marker establishes the tripoint of the USSR, PRC, and MPR.

The 63d marker joins the new frontier with the old frontier that was established by Article II of the Nerchinsk treaty. More specifically,

> the 63d boundary beacon was erected on the summit of Abagaitu (Abakhaitu) hill, which is situated on a sandbar on the right (i.e. west) bank of the Argun river, opposite the middle estuary of the Khailar.[15]

Precautions were taken by both sides to minimize surreptitious relocation of the markers from one point to another, by secretly burying paper placards with the description of the geographic demarcation points inscribed and secured to some wooden object. These placards were buried somewhere between each set of boundary markers.[16] However, no mention was made as to how the placards themselves would be maintained and controlled.

The Bur treaty represents a far superior technical job of boundary marking than the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Geographical terms were more precise and the demarcation commission was activated immediately to install the necessary markers.

The Treaty of Kyakhta

The Kyakhta Treaty, ratified by the Russian Tsar (Peter II) in June 1728, reemphasized, among other things, the strengthening of peace between the two Empires (Article I), a general reiteration of the Bur delimitation/demarcation (Article III), and agreement to delay the negotiations concerning the river Ud and places around it. (Article VII). Initially, the Chinese insisted that the Russian

Ambassador, Count S. Vladislavich, who had been sent to Peking with full power to settle all affairs, negotiate the Ud River question because Russian violations of the frontier had become an issue of concern to the Chinese. Vladislavich claimed to have received no instructions concerning the area in question from Moscow; furthermore, he claimed to have no authentic information about the land. The Chinese acquiesced to Russian persuasion. In addition to asking the Russian Ambassador to bring this matter to the attention of Empress Catherine I for resolution, the Chinese also sent a letter about this matter to the Russian Senate.[17] At the time, it was not known that Peter II had ascended the throne, nor would it be known that in three years he would be replaced by Anne, which may account for Russian inaction. The Treaty of Khyakta was recorded in Manchu, Russian, and Latin languages, but not in Mongolian, even though the Mongols were specifically affected. Article XI of the treaty indicates, however, that printed copies were widely distributed. (See Annex B, Note 2 for a comment on the historical events to 1858 [Page 125]).

The Treaty of Aigun

Since ratification of the Nerchinsk and Kyakhta treaties nothing had been done about demarcation of the "mountain chain" and settlement of the Ud River question. Even with the treaties, the northeastern frontier had been subject to frequent disturbances and violations. Russians would often go into the Amur area to trap game and demand tribute from the tribes in the area. By the mid-ninteeth century, Russian violations increased. The Manchus, taxed with more pressing

problems, failed to exert necessary control over the sparsely populated area. These irregularities resulted in a large part from ignorance of the country and loose interpretation of an extremely vague treaty. The Russians had thoroughly probed the Amur River to its estuary by the mid 1850's without serious Manchu opposition. To protect her Far Eastern interests from the persistent seafaring powers, Russia urgently needed a warm water port in the Pacific.[19] (See Annex B, Note 3 [Page 127] for additional details of the events prior to signing of the treaty.)

The Aigun treaty consisted of only three articles, but made generous concessions to Russia:

Article I: From the junction of the Argun/Amur River, in the direction of the Sungari River to the outlet of the Amur in the Pacific, the left (North) bank belongs to Russia and the right (South) bank belongs to China. From the Ussuri River to Betze (Poyseta "Bay") ocean, all the land east of this line will be in common custody. From the Amur, Sungari and Ussuri Rivers, navigation is restricted to Chinese and Russian ships; ships of other countries will be prohibited. The Manchu settlers living on the north bank of the Amur River, in the area south of the Zeya River to the vicinity of Holdoldzin, will be permitted to remain there in perpetuity under Chinese Administration (This area is often referred to as the "64 villages").

Russians must live in peace with these inhabitants. (No reference was made to ownership of the hundreds of islands in the Amur river, and since the treaty stipulated that the right

and left banks would delimit the boundary, the river became neutral territory.) Article III stated that the treaty would be written in Russian, Mongol, and Manchu, but none of these was stipulated as authoritative.[20] (Translated into English from the Chinese version)

Muraviev, the Russian negotiator, wanted both the Amur and Ussuri Rivers for boundaries, but was content to win the Amur and temporarily sacrifice the Ussuri at the risk of not getting either. In so doing, he recast the ambiguity of the Nerchinsk treaty into the Aigun treaty by agreeing to let the area east of the Ussuri be under joint custody until final settlement at some future time.

Moscow, having freed herself from burden of the Crimean War, continued her momentum in the Far East. Kept abreast of events in China through her embassy in Peking, she was able to track the diplomatic moves of both the Manchus and their barbarian seafaring advasaries, playing one against the other. In 1859, Muraviev was sent to Japan and to survey the Maritime province of the Ussuri; he located Vladivostok and hoisted the Russian flag. During this same period the Tsar sent General Nicolas Ignatiev to Peking with the mission of bringing the Maritime Province question to a satisfactory conclusion. The foreign powers responded to Manchu resistance with military responses; in 1860, when Peking came under attack, the Emperor fled, leaving foreign affairs to Prince Kung. Russia, taking advantage of her position, offerred to intervene and save the Ch'ing Dynasty

from humiliation, if not complete destruction. Prince Kung, his back to the wall, accepted Russian help with such gratitude that he agreed to move the frontier boundary line from the Pacific coast eastward to the Ussuri. Russia's objective was clear, it became a zero sum game in which China's loss was Russia's gain. Thus, riding on the crest of China's defeats, Russia was able to gain in two years of diplomatic maneuvering a prize that had eluded her for almost two centruies. Her role as a big brother and friend in time of need, brought Russia closer to an emasculated China anxious to seek sustenance and relief from the relentless inward and outward pressures.

The Treaty of Peking

Signed on 2 November 1860, the Treaty of Peking, together with the Treaty of Aigun, delimited the present day boundary of the Manchurian--Far Eastern segment of the Sino-Soviet border, and won for Russia the prized Maritime Province with its beautiful Vladivostok seaport, as well as the entire north bank along the course of the Amur River.

Article I, in conjunction with the Aigun treaty, delimited the new frontier starting from the tripoint formed by the confluence of the Shilka-Argun-Armur Rivers; it followed the downstream course of the Amur to its confluence with the Ussuri. Terms specified all land on the left (north) to Russia and the right (south) to China, confirming the concept in the Aigun treaty. From this confluence the border followed the Ussuri upstream

(southward) until it reached the Sungacha River, a tributary of the Ussuri. Following the Aungacha, it crossed the upper two-thirds of Lake Hanka, followed a series of artificial and natural boundary points, and ended approximately 20 lo or 13.2 miles upstream from the Tumen River estuary. Land east of the rivers went to Russia and land west to China (again leaving the rivers neutral). The Aigun treaty stipulation concerning the "64 villages" remained, but Manchu settlements in the "waste territory" of the modern day Martime Province would be prohibited once the boundary had been demarcated.[21]

Article III established a Demarcation Commission to survey and mark the border segment between the Tumen River and Lake Hanka; this was accomplished in the Additional Article to the Treaty of Peking of 16 June 1861. The Commission reviewed the entire boundary, with specific attention given to the irregular portion from Lake Hanka to the Tumen. Twenty wooden demarcation pillars were erected to conform to the delimitation concept of the treaty.[22]

The Additional Treaty of Peking

This treaty is sometimes referred to as the 1861 Treaty of Belinkhe, named after the location where the treaty was prepared (the Belenkhe River empties into the northwestern edge of Lake Hanka).[23] The Joint Commission surveyed the entire border from the Argun-Shilka-Amur confluence eastward to the Amur-Ussuri confluence, and southward to the Tumen River. According to the

Russian version of the survey, the team that worked the Amur-Ussuri section south to the Sungacha River was more concerned with a cartographic study rather than a physical survey (the Sungacha River is a tributary of the Ussuri and empties into the northeastern section of Lake Hanka). This probably accounts for the fact that maps depicting the demarcation of this area were exchanged without a written record of the demarcation. The team responsible for the Lake Hanka-Tumen segment of the line was more thorough since the boundary in this sector took on an arbitrary delimitation which combined the use of natural and artificial classification techniques. Wooden pillars were erected to identify the trace of the line across mountains, through forests and marshlands, and along rivers. A record of the demarcation proceedings supplemented hand-drawn maps with the boundaries marked in red.[24]

The Hunchuan Protocol

Many of the wooden markers erected on the eastern boundary in 1861 decayed in time from exposure to the elements. It was also discovered that the red line delimiting the border on the hand-drawn maps was in some places, imprecisely drawn. These deficiencies led to the formation of a joint commission to redemarcate the boundary between the Sungacha and Tumen Rivers. The survey (23 June to 2 October 1886) produced nine sets of written records to supplement 6 separate maps with the boundary drawn in red.

The commission accomplished the following: a) replaced the wood markers with stone, b) installed 23 secondary markers: relocated the position of two markers (O and H) to conform with locations identified on earlier maps, c) relocated boundary marker "T" closer to the mouth of the Tumen River (approximately 10.2 miles instead of 13 miles), and d) reconciled the written description of the boundary with the boundary drawn on the maps. (See Map 5 , Page 54).

The boundary marker "T" was reinstalled as a stone pillar on the east bank of the Tumen. The question of unhampered navigation of Chinese ships from the marker "T" to the estuary of the Tumen River was taken under consideration by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but a final decision was not reflected in the treaty. The treaty was written in Russian, Chinese and Manchu languages with the latter designated authoritative.[25]

HUNCHUN PROTOCOL MAPS 1886

MAP NO	SIGNED 1886	PORTION OF THE BOUNDARY THAT MAPS DEMARCATED FROM	TO	DISTANCE (Russian) VERSTS ***	SHAZENS
1	30 Jun	*Marker "T" on the east bank of Tumen River	**Sub-Marker #8 at Chanlin Pass	65.5	Note *
2	20 Sep	Sub-Marker #8	Marker "P" on the Mungychay	121	497
3	20 Sep	Marker "P"	Khubutu Estuary ard Suy Fun River	127	345
4	3 Oct	Khubutu Estuary	Marker "H"	75	54
5	3 Oct	Marker "H"	Marker "M"	77	250
6	28 Sep	Marker "M"	Estuary of the Baylenkhe River which empties into Lake Hanka	90	45
Supp'l 6 ****	1887	Marker "M" Marker "24" Marker "25"	24-Plateau turning 25-Shirokaya Pad 26-Baylinkhe River	46 9 2	440 100 300

*Note: *Marker "T" was relocated from approximately 13.2 miles to 10 miles from the Tumen River estuary. The Tumen River was not demarcated at this time.
**Protocol established 23 secondary markers, identified in sequence by Arabic numerals.
***One verst equals approximately 0.664 miles.
****Supplemental Map No. 6 clarified the line at three locations with additional secondary markers, 24, 25, and 26.

The Tsitsihar Treaty

The Tsitsihar Treaty, 7 December 1911, is interesting because Chinese versions of this document are not readily available since both the ROC and PRC do not recognize it.

The following information is based on a translation of the Russian version of the treaty. The agreement reportedly reconstructed the international boundary along the western Manchurian border, from border point #58 (Tarbaga-Bakhu) to border point #63 (Abagaytu) and thence down the Argun River to its confluence with the Shilka-Amur Rivers.[26] (See Map 2, Page 47). Six stone markers (#58-#63 inclusive) were relocated approximately 5 miles southward into Chinese territory. No reason was given as to why the southward shift was necessary.[27]

In addition, some 280 islands located in the Argun River were identified and mutually allocated (the record does not specify the demarcation technique used to allocate the island); of the 280 islands, Russia was awarded slightly more than half. The treaty also considered the gradual shift of the western part of the Argun River. As the river shifted (accretion) from east to west, approximately eleven islands were created between the old and new Argun River beds. Russia acknowledged the westward shift in the boundary, but stipulated that Russia would retain the eleven islands.[28]

According to the Russian version, the Chinese officially agreed to the treaty. The Russian Charge d' Affairs queried the Chinese in Peking:

> In the text of the act of agreement, signed at Tsitsihar, no provisions exist for further formal ways of ratification . . . and the only thing that remains to be done is setting of boundary markers in accordance forseen in the agreement.[29]

The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs responded (20 December 1911) by concurring with the Russian interpretation, thus giving the treaty official sanction.[30] The ROC and PRC, however, disclaim this treaty in favor of the Kyakhta Treaty of 1727.

The Tumen River Demarcation

During the Hunchun Protocol survey, the decayed wooden boundary marker "T" was destroyed and the position relocated southward to a point on the east bank, 10.2 miles from the Tumen River estuary. A stone pillar was erected to demarcate the Russian-Chinese border, but the remainder of the Tumen River was not demarcated.

The Tumen River identifies the China-Russia-Korea boundary and virtually isolates China from uninhibited access to the "Pacific" in her northeastern territories. This tripoint serves as a strategic "buffer" between China and the vital Russian port of Vladivostok. Originally, Russia's Muraviev in 1858 recognized that if the estuary of the Tumen River and nearby Posyeta Bay, with its excellent potential for harbor facilities, were left solely in Chinese hands, the British might have been attracted to the area and establish themselves in the immediate vicinity of Vladivostok.[31] It was probably with this thought in mind that Murviev pressed for the Tumen River boundary rather than one further north.

Navigation of Boundary Rivers

Not long after the USSR recognized the PRC and was herself about to pull Soviet troops out of Manchuria, the two countries met to work out an agreement related to navigation on their boundary rivers. Signed on 2 January 1951, the agreement established navigational policies for both countries. Article I is significant and deals with the boundary question:

> The vessels of both High Contracting Parties shall, without impediment and without being restricted by the delimited frontier line, navigate the principal channels of the boundary rivers, viz., the Hei-lung Chiang (Amur River), Wu-su-li Chiang (Ussuri River), O-erh-ku-na Ho (Hailar River), and Sung-a-ch'a Ho (Sungacha River). When navigating the Hsing-k'ai Hu (Lake Hanka), the vessels of both High Contracting Parties shall be permitted only to reach and not exceed the delimited frontier line.[32]

Consummated when China was in the throes of supporting the Korean War as well as in getting the country on its feet, the treaty appears to have minimized any thought of boundary disputes between the Communist neighbors. Reference to the Thalweg principle for navigational purposes "without being restricted to the delimited frontier," recasts the ambiguity of this problem back to the Nerchinsk/Aigun/Peking treaties which left the boundary rivers neutral. Furthermore, in Lake Hanka, neither the median line nor the thalweg technique was used to define navigational rights; instead, navigation was restricted to the artificial demarcation line established by the Treaty of Peking, in which one-fourth of the lake is open to the Chinese for navigation and the remainder to the Russians.

TREATIES AFFECTING MANCHURIAN--FAR EASTERN BOUNDARY

NO	NAME	DATE	BORDER ARTICLES	LANGUAGES OF TEXT	REMARKS
1	Nerchinsk	20 Aug 1689	I & II	*Latin Russian Manchu	First treaty between China and Western power. Terms of treaty ambiguous. Note: * Indicates authoritative text.
2	Bur	20 Aug 1727	Not Numbered	Latin Russian Manchu	Delimited northern border of modern Mongolia
3	Bur Protocol (Abagatuy Hill)	12 Oct 1727	Not Numbered	Latin Russian Manchu	Demarcated Mongolian sector west of Khyakhta to the Argun River.
4	Kyakhta	27 Oct 1727	III & VII	Latin Russian Manchu	Confirmed Bur Treaty and Protocol
5	Aigun	28 May 1858	I	Manchu Russian Mongol	Modified Treaty No. 1, brought border south to Amur River. Russia gained minimum of 170,000 sq. miles.
6	Peking	14 Nov 1860	I & III	*Manchu Russian	Modified Treaty No. 1, brought border from Pacific westward to Ussuri River. Russia gained minimum of 130,000 sq. miles.
7	Additional Article of Peking	28 Jun 1861		*Manchu Russian	Demarcated sector between Lake Hanka to the Tumen River. Surveyed entire river boundary.
8	Hunchun Protocol	2 Jun 1886	1-8 and six Protocols	*Manchu Russian Chinese(Han)	Redemarcated boundary between Lake Hanka and Tumen River. Substituted stone pillars for wooden ones. Made boundary more definitive.
9	Tsitsihar	7 Dec 1911	I and three Protocols	Manchu Russian	Redemarcated Protocol No. 3, moved boundary south approximately 5 miles. Allocated 280 islands in the Argun River. Russia gained approximately 350 sq. miles.
10	Navigation of Boundary Rivers	2 Jan 1951	Paragraphs 1-18	Chinese(Han) Russian	Stressed mutual navigation of Ussuri, Amur, Argun, Sungacha Rivers, and Lake Hanka to follow Thalweg principle without regard to Treaty border.


LEGEND
TREATY OF NERCHINSK 1689, CHINA AND RUSSIA
INITIAL CHINESE DEMAND
POSSIBLE CHINESE INTENDED SETTLEMENT
RUSSIAN VERSION OF SETTLEMENT
USSR
LENA RIVER
LAKE BAIKAL
AMUR RIVER
MANCHURIA

MAP NO. 1

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis, p. 33.

2. Ibid.

3. Bickford C. O'Brien, Russia Under Two Tsars 1682-1689, pp. 113-114.

4. Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820), p. 95.

5. Godfrey E. P. Hertslet, Treaties, Conventions, Etc., Between China and Foreign States, 3d ed, Vol. I., p. 5.

6. Fu, p. 100.

7. Ibid., p. 477.

8. Frank Alfred Golder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850: An Account of the Earliest and Later Expeditions, pp. 64-65.

9. O'Brien, p. 121.

10. Ibid., p. 117.

11. Fu, p. 149.

12. Ibid., p. 150.

13. US Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Vol. XI, Part 3, Book A, p. 17.

14. Mark Mancall, Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728, pp. 294-295.

15. Ibid., p. 291.

16. Ibid., p. 287.

17. Ibid., pp. 307-308.

18. Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia, pp. 140-142.

19. David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia, pp. 18-19.

20. Hertslet, p. 27.

21. US Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550-60, p. 132.

22. US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer, International Boundary Study, No. 64, pp. 10-12.

23. Ibid., p. 10.

24. US Department of State, International Boundaries of USSR, p. 3.

25. Ibid., pp. 18-21.

26. Ibid., p. 5.

27. US Department of State, International Boundary Study, No. 64, p. 13.

28. US Department of State, International Boundaries of USSR, p. 14.

29. Ibid., p. 15.

30. Ibid., p. 16.

31. Dallin, p. 22.

CHAPTER IV

BORDER DISPUTES--1930'S AND 1960'S

The Manchurian--Far Eastern boundary has long been subject to incidents of armed conflict since the first border clash between China and Russia in the mid-seventeenth century.

This chapter summarizes the "small wars" of the late 1930's and 1960's for the purpose of highlighting the events and circumstances that led to Russia's confrontation, first with Japan in the pre-World War II era and then with China some thirty years later over the same uncertain boundaries. Hopefully, the events that are developed and compared will serve as lessons for projecting whether or not this enigmatic border will likely endure as a potential source of conflict.

Key historical events of the intervening years between the Treaty of Aigun, 1858, and the Soviet-Japanese confrontation along the Manchurian border in the mid-1930's are outlined in Annex C.

The Manchurian--Far Eastern Small Wars and Border Problems

The 1936 Soviet-Outer Mongolia mutual assistance pact and increased Soviet military strength enhanced the combat capability of the Soviet-Mongolian forces that faced the Japanese Kwantung Army. The number and the degree of intensity of these "border wars" are reflected in Chart 1, Manchurian Border Disputes, 1932-1945, which is based on the "Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria"[1] (JSM).

The cyclical intensity of the border incidents between Soviet and Japanese forces (1932-1945) appeared to rise and fall according to the political needs of each country. The interaction between the USSR and Japan was not a simple one-on-one proposition; it involved a series of complex interrelationships in which the USSR, faced with the possibility of a two front war, resorted to a series of diplomatic maneuvers with Germany, China, and Japan, to gain precious time for improving her military capability, while defusing her troublesome eastern front. Japan's decision to attack south into China instead of north against the USSR, permitted the Soviets the opportunity of aiding China, and thereby tying up a huge portion of Japan's forces, reducing the threat of an all-out Japanese invasion of the USSR. Thus, the Soviet-Japanese border incidents often resulted from a combination of military and political reasons, but the rationale, at least from the local standpoint, frequently involved disputed boundary lines or ownership of unallocated islands which is the focus of this study.

A post-war analysis concluded that approximately 1,000 (Japanese estimate) to 1,850 (Soviet estimate) border disputes occurred during the period 1932-1945.[2]

Imprecise knowledge of just where the boundary lay was due to a combination of factors. For example, the Wushekou River, which flows in a northerly direction, was used to demarcate a portion of the Manchurian--Far Eastern boundary under the provisions of the Hunchun Protocol of 1886. In 1903, however, torrential rains caused a

portion of the river south of where it joins the Suifen River to shift its course westward into Manchurian Territory. The avulsion created shoal land between the old bed and the new river which the Manchurian peasants continued to cultivate until they were evicted by Russian troops. Since the protocol failed to specify how boundary changes such as this would be handled, each side made its own interpretation with the position of the stronger of the two, the Soviets, prevailing. Even the Manchukuoan regime's protest to the Soviets that the shoals were illegally occupied failed to settle the issue.[3]

The JMS study points out the quandry associated with western sector of the boundary (See Map 2). First, Obos 58 thru 63 had been erected among already existing religious cairns, and over a period of time the authenticity and exact location of the boundary Obos became questionable. The Russians dealt with this obvious difficulty by relocating the redesignating Obos; the effect of this unilateral redemarcation was to push the border south at Manchuria's territorial expense.[4] It is not clear whether the transplanting of Obos by either the Japanese or the Soviets occurred during the 1930's. Disagreement over the precise boundary accounts for the current dispute over this sector of the border and, as mentioned above in Chapter III, highlights the difference between the Kyakhta/Bur and the Tsitsihar demarcation treaties.

Moreover, according to the Japanese, the eastern boundary adjacent to the Maritime Province, southwest of Lake Khanka, was the site where Soviet troops crossed into Manchuria in June, 1934, to secure key points


115°
116°
117°
118°
50°
49°
U. S. S. R.
TO BORZYA
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ERENTSAB
OUTER MONGOLIA
OUTER MONGOLIA
MANCHURIA
MANCHOULI
ABAGAYTUY
ARGUN R.
MANCHURIA
LAKE HULUN CHIH
AREA SHOWN
U.S.S.R.
OUTER MONGOLIA
MANCHURIA
INNER MONGOLIA
KOREA
DISPUTED BORDER, MANCHOULI AREA
63 NUMBERED OBO
NUMBERING SYSTEM COMMENCES AT KYAKHTA, ENDS AT ABAGAYTUY
10 5 0 10 20 30
MILES
10 0 10 20 30
KILOMETERS
N
BASED UPON CHINESE WAR DEPARTMENT LAND SURVEY BUREAU MAP (CHUNGKING, 1943)

MAP NO. 2

in the vicinity of boundary markers #17 and #18. During this and other incursions several of the stone markers allegedly were transplanted westward into Manchurian territory, and resulted in a jagged boundary much different from the straight line (between markers Y, 17, 18, 19 and E) specified in the 1886 protocol.[5] (See Map 3)

In addition to the problems caused by imprecise or distorted boundary lines, the river boundaries had their share of incidents. The Amur Island incident erupted in May 1937 southeast of Blagoveshchensk due to a dispute over the ownership of a cluster of small islands. In this vicinity the Amur River widens with separate channels flowing north and south of the islands in question. To prevent Japanese observation of fortifications along the shoreline, the Soviets blocked the north channel; this led to minor skirmishes between Japanese and Russian forces, and encouraged the Soviets to strengthen their position by establishing a frontier post on one of the islands. The Japanese countered by occupying Bolshoi (Kanchatzu) island. H.L. Moore accounts for the ensuing dispute.

> . . . The Japanese held that the boundary lay along the bed of the river and that at that point in the river the bed was north of the islands, which therefore must belong to Manchukuo. Moscow claimed that the line was established by the treaty of 1860 with China and that while the islands were not mentioned specifically in it, the map attached, accepted by both sides in 1861, clearly indicated that the boundary lay south of the islands. A change in the river course did not, they claimed, change the frontier. . . .[6]

Negotiations over ownership of the islands proceeded through diplomatic channels, but ended without clear cut settlement.


131°
132°
AREA SHOWN
USSR
MANCHURIA
KOREA
SINO-SOVIET EASTERN FRONTIERS
X22
Xy
BORDER MARKER
HEIGHTS IN METERS
N
0 5 10 20 30 miles
0 5 10 20 30 kilometers
LINKOU
CHIHSI
MULENG R.
PANCHIEHHO
TURIY ROG
LISHUCHEN
YANGMULINTZU
LAKE HANKA
45°
CHINGCHANGKOU
PAMIENTUNG
X22
MANCHURIA
X2
USSR
XE
X19
SUIYANG
TUNGNING HSIEN
SUIFENHO
X18
X17
KAIPAIKOU
Xy
TUNGNING
POLTAVKA
44°
SANCHHAKOU
SUIFEN R.
TO TUMEN
TO VLADIVOSTOK
131°
132°

MAP NO. 3

Before long, the Lukuochiao incident brought Japan into full scale war with China, and the island controversy was used for propaganda purposes.

Naturally, the Soviets charged the Japanese with aggression, that is, trying to occupy the islands and conduct espionage along the river border. The Japanese press had a different explanation, namely that Stalin's purges had demoralized the Red Army in the Far East and created confusion in the Soviet Union, thus the island incident was a ruse to distract foreign attention from USSR's internal problems.

> In retrospect the importance of the clash seems to lie chiefly in its propaganda value, for the foreign press readily took up the Japanese theory of Soviet demoralization. Still, it is not entirely clear why so much was made of this particular incident. Ambassador Davies, in Moscow at the time, regarded it as sufficiently dangerous to call upon Litvinov and Shigemitsu and urge that the incident be localized. Ambassador Davies also reported in Mission to Moscow that later in 1938 he had been told by a Japanese official that the incidents were designed to test Soviet defenses.[7]

Numerous disputes occurred over the ownership of various islands in the boundary rivers during Japan's occupation of Manchuria, but the island group situated at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers merit special attention because of the usefulness they serve in illustrating the power-politics used by the Soviets to adapt circumstances for their own needs (See Map 4).

The main island "Heihsiatzu" is approximately 28 miles long and 5 miles wide. The northeastern portion lies across the Ussuri River and overlooks the important city of Khabarovsk. As will be recalled, the


134°
135°
AREA SHOWN
MANCHURIA
KOREA
DISPUTED BORDER,
HEIHSIATZU ISLAND
0 5 10 20 30
MILES
0 5 10 20 30
KILOMETERS
TO KOMSOMOLSK
49°
USSR
AMUR RIVER
TO BLAGOVESHCHENSK
KHABAROVSK
AMUR RIVER
HEIHSIATZU I.
USSR
KUANGFENGTAO
SUIYUAN
(KAZAKEVICH)
CHANNEL
TRANS-SIBERIAN RY
MANCHURIA
USSURI RIVER
USSR
48°
KHOR RIVER
MANCHURIA
MANCHURIA
USSR
TO VLADIVOSTOK
134°
135°

MAP NO. 4

north bank of the Amur and the east bank of the Ussuri were awarded to Russia and the south and west banks to China in the treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860). At the time of these treaties, the state of the rivers and their hundreds of islands was not specified, thereby giving them a "neutral" status. The Russians even erected a Boundary Marker "E" on the east bank of the Ussuri just below Khabarovsk which complied with the concept of delimitation outlined in Article I of the 1860 Treaty of Peking.

When incidents between Japanese and Russian troops began to intensify, the Soviets recognized the importance of Heihsiatzu Island which was situated not only at the strategic junction of the Amur and Ussuri, but afforded excellent observation along much of Khabarovsk City. The Soviets removed Marker E and proceeded to occupy and fortify the island. Manchukuoan protests in 1936 that the island was theirs brought a countercharge from Moscow that because the thalweg of the Amur ran along the west bank of the island, Heishiatzu rightfully fell within the Soviet domain; the Soviets ignored the protest and continued to build up their fortifications on the island. In 1944 another incident took place when the Japanese occupied a small islet adjacent to Heishiatzu, but by that time Japan was reluctant to escalate the violation and they later withdrew from the islet.[8]

The well-known Changkufeng incident near the Korean-Manchurian-Soviet tripoint in mid-July, 1938 involved a disputed sector of the border that separates Manchuria and the Soviet Maritime Province. The questionable border section involved two interpretations: the

Japanese asserted that the boundary ran along the ridgeline of the mountains, but the Soviets claimed the Tumen River as the boundary; this difference precipitated the head-on military clash between the two powers, and although the fierce and bitter battle ended with Japanese troops in possession of the ridgeline (Japanese version) power-politics between Moscow and Tokyo forced the Japanese to withdraw west of the Tumen.[9] (See Map 5) It is interesting to note that this section of the border had been redemarcated in 1886 and twenty-six additional stone markers were erected for the purpose of aligning the boundary more accurately. In 1909, 1911, and around 1915, this segment had been resurveyed independently by the Chinese and the Russians, but the results were never officially formalized; ironically, the boundary drawn on the aforementioned maps was in all cases east of the very mountain ridge that the Soviets claimed to belong to the USSR in the Changkufeng clash. Nevertheless, by 1937, many of the markers were either destroyed or removed over the years and it became very difficult to accurately identify where the line extended.[10]

Sino-Soviet Relations

As World War II drew to a close, Stalin advised the Chinese Communists to cooperate with the Nationalists rather than engage in civil war. United States initiatives to persuade the Chinese to form a coalition government failed to bring the two factions together. By mid-1949, remnants of the Nationalist Government were forced to relocate to nearby Formosa, leaving the Communists in control of the mainland, and on 1 October 1949, Mao Tse-tung claimed full control.


LOCALE OF THE
CHANGKUFENG (LAKE HASAN)
INCIDENT, 1938
0 1 2 3 4
MILES
0 1 2 3 4
KILOMETERS
42°36'
130°35'
42°36'
SHULIIUFENG
462
U.S.S.R.
MANCHURIA
MANCHURIA
KOREA
YANGKUANPING
194
U. S. S. R.
SHACHAOFENG
L. HASAN
141
58
MANCHURIA
CHANGKUFENG
FANGCHUANTING
TUMEN RIVER
PODGORNAYA
MARKER "T"
AREA SHOWN
USSR
MANCHURIA
KOREA
KOREA
International Boundary
U.S.S.R.
KOREA
42°24'
130°35'
42°24'

MAP NO. 5

The USSR recognized the new regime the day after it had formally established itself as China's new "dynasty."

The new regime was, however, not without problems: when the Chinese Communists finally occupied Manchuria in 1947, the Soviet Union had already stripped the "Rhur" of the Far East of virtually all its industrial machinery and equipment. In spite of this and other incidents which, in the eyes of many Chinese, left Soviet intentions and sincerity suspect, political and economic exigences necessitated that China "lean" to one side. By minimizing past grievances she might have had with the Soviet Union, Mao and Stalin worked out in early 1950 an agreement of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, which ushered in what appeared to be a formidable alliance between two Communist giants, attracted to each other through a common frontier and bonded together by a monolithic ideology.

This alliance provided a measure of immediate security for both sides. For the Soviets, it meant a "secure" eastern border which allowed her to concentrate on the western front. For the Chinese, it meant technical and economic assistance necessary to get the nation on its feet. If Mao had any thoughts of surfacing the matter of "unequal treaties" and territorial claims, he did not publicize them at this time.

The 1950's were an era of hope and frustration for the Chinese. The PRC entered the Korean war after UN troops crossed the 38th parallel and threatened China's borders; the unresolved Taiwan question brought the PRC and Nationalists into direct conflict over the offshore islands in 1955 and again in 1958 (US military assistance to the Nationalists

was not matched with USSR aid to the PRC); moreover, disastrous domestic policies such as the Great Leap Forward, and differences with the USSR on foreign policy and ideology caused the Soviets first to abrogate their 1957 pledge to provide China with nuclear technology assistance and second, to completely withdraw all aid and technical advisors. Naturally, Chinese resentment was bitter because the withdrawal of needed assistance came at a time when economic setbacks and natural calamities made China vulnerable to domestic unrest. These Soviet actions caused the PRC leadership to rethink their strategy. In 1949 China stood up. Now, a decade later she would have to stand on her own feet. This period is generally thought to mark the period when the two countries began to drift apart.

The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute

As early as 1954, Mao Tse-tung reportedly raised the issue of outer Mongolia with Khrushchev on the latter's visit to Peking but Khrushchev refused to discuss the matter. Chou En-lai was similarly rebuffed when he tried to present a wider range of territorial issues to Premier Khrushchev in Moscow three years later. Moreover, during the Hundred Flowers campaign of 1957, some elements in China criticized Soviet imperialism as being no different from that of the Czarist era. Although the latter criticism was quickly deemphasized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it would reassert itself when the smoldering rift burst into the open.[11]

The Cuban Missile crisis appeared to have been the political fodder that fueled the touchy border issue. After Khrushchev's famous Cuban Missile fiasco in 1962, the PRC accused the Soviets of adventurism and capitulationism. This was followed by the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) charge that the Chinese were guilty of maintaining a double-standard position; i.e., preaching wars of liberation in one breadth and in another, condoning the colonial status of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.[12] The PRC's reply was curt and obviously directed more at the Soviets than the CPUSA:

> . . . You are not unaware that such questions as those of Hong Kong and Macao relate to the category of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. It may be asked: In raising questions of this kind, do you intend to raise all the questions of unequal treaties and have a general settlement? Has it ever entered your heads what the consequences will be? Can you seriously believe that this will do you any good?[13]

The response further emphasized, "By virtue of these unequal treaties, they annexed Chinese territory in the north, south, east, and west. . . ." The Karakhan declarations of 1919 and 1921 (see Annex C, Page 131)notwithstanding, the PRC served notice to the USSR that there were outstanding issues on border and territorial matters that would be settled when "conditions are ripe."[14] Moreover, Sino-Indian friction appeared to add fuel to the PRC-USSR rift. In 1959, the Soviets took a neutral stand in the Chinese-Indian frontier conflict and when the same border erupted again in 1962, the Soviets again claimed neutrality; however, much to China's chagrin, the USSR

provided military aid and equipment to India. By this time, the fissures that appeared in the Communist sphere deepened: the Soviet's de-Stalinization program, the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, rapproachment with Yugoslavia, military intervention in Hungary and Poland, "capitulation" in Cuba, and shifts toward peaceful coexistence represented some of the differences that intensified the dispute.

Attempts to repair the split seemed to be partially successful, at least temporarily, after Khrushchev's dismissal. However, Sino-Soviet polemics resumed over a wide range of issues: Vietnam, the Sino-Indian crisis of 1965, the PRC's Cultural Revolution, Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and use of Brezhnev's doctrine of "limited sovereignty." The "Brezhnev Doctrine" was used by the Soviets to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia, based on the rationale that intervention was justified to "correct the internal matters of a Communist state which endangered the Socialist community as a whole."[15] The PRC strongly denounced the doctrine, presumably because the USSR could use it to justify Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of China.

The Sino-Soviet boundary question that surfaced during the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis became an irritating as well as disconcerting issue to both sides; to reduce tensions, both sides agreed to establish a border commission to negotiate a settlement. The Soviet Government's viewpoint on the subject was expressed in 1963:

> "Since 1960," the statement said, "Chinese servicemen and civilians have been systematically violating the Soviet border. In the single year 1960 over 5,000

> violations of the Soviet border from the Chinese side were recorded. Attempts are also being made to 'develop' some parts of Soviet territory without permission." The statement went on to quote a document, allegedly issued by the Chinese administration in Manchuria, instructing fishermen to ignore orders by Soviet border guards to keep off disputed islands in the Amur and the Ussuri.[16]

The Soviet position outlined in the statement continued to point out some of the difficulties that would have to be overcome in resolving the border problem:

> The Soviet Government has invited the Chinese Government a number of times to hold consultations on the question of ascertaining separate sections of the border line, to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding. The Chinese side, however, evades such consultations while continuing to violate the border. This cannot but make us wary, especially in view of the fact that Chinese propaganda is making definite hints at the 'unjust demarcation' of some sections of the Soviet-Chinese border allegedly made in the past. However, the artificial creation of any territorial problems in our times, especially between Socialist countries, would be tantamount to embarking on a very dangerous path. . . .[17]

Negotiations began in Peking in early 1964 but were subsequently suspended with virtually no progress having been made. In 1966, the Chinese accused the Soviets of provoking over 5,000 incidents in the five and one-half years since mid-1960, of building up military strength on the Chinese frontier, and of engaging in military maneuvers designed to intimidate the Chinese.[18] During the Cultural Revolution (1966-68), tensions along the entire Sino-Soviet border increased significantly. In 1966, Moscow accused the Chinese of inciting mass demonstrations along the Soviet frontier to support the PRC's territorial claims; the sector along the Manchurian--Far Eastern border became especially sensitive as evidenced by Soviet charges that Chinese troops had opened fire on Soviet ships in the Amur River.

By early 1967, Radio Peking alleged that a plot to attack China through Manchuria had been smashed. The allegation claimed that Soviet revisionists and US and Japanese imperialists were responsible for the scheme. This was followed by an announcement of a border clash, allegedly between Chinese and Soviet troops on the eastern boundary in the area of Vladivostok. According to diplomatic sources in Moscow, 1968 was a year of frequent, but minor border incidents. Although there was minimal publicity surrounding the violations, the PRC protest of September 1968 alleged 29 Soviet violations of Chinese air space in the Manchurian area during August.[19]

The Chenpao/Damansky Border Incident

The intensity of armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet frontier forces escalated in 1969 and caused considerable casualties on both sides. The sites of many of the incidents brought back memories of the Soviet-Japanese clashes that occurred over three decades earlier.

One of the islands on the Ussuri River became the scene of a bitter battle on 2 March 1969. Damansky Island, the Russian name or Chenpao, the Chinese name, is located approximately 180 miles south of Khabarovsk. Damansky is one of about 700 islands that was not formally allocated by treaty. Insignificant in size (less than one mile long and one-half mile wide), uninhabited, and of little tactical or strategic value, it remains a mystery as to why it became the scene of international confrontation. (See Map 6).

SKETCH MAP SHOWING SINO-SOVIET BOUNDARY LINE IN AREA AROUND CHINESE TERRITORY CHENPAO ISLAND



MAP NO. 6

The Chinese claimed that under international law the thalweg principle applied to navigable rivers would clearly put the island under PRC jurisdiction. The Soviets claimed that maps of the 1861 protocol showed the boundary to be on the west bank of the Ussuri. The Chinese pointed out the absurdity of the claim since the maps were of a 1:1,000,000 scale, it would be impossible to differentiate one terrain feature from the other.[20] The delimitation concept of the 1860 Peking treaty specified that the boundary would lie on the respective banks of the Ussuri River: the west bank to China and the east bank to Russia, leaving the river itself neutral.

As could be expected, accounts of the 2 March 1969 incident by each side were diametrically opposed, each accusing the other of instigating the clash. The Chinese report of the incident is extremely sketchy. A Peking Review article claimed that the incident occurred at about 0900 hours, 2 March, when large numbers of fully armed Soviet mechanized troops flagrantly intruded into the Chenpao Island area, Chinese territory, created provocations, and refused to withdraw. At 0917, the Chinese reported, "the intruding Soviet soldiers outrageously opened up with cannon and gun fire on Chinese frontier guards."[21] The Soviet account reflects a different perspective of what happened during the 2 March border clash. The Soviets claimed that the incident occurred around 1100 hrs when a group of Chinese approached the Soviet's Damansky Island. As the Soviet frontier patrol guards approached the "demonstrators" to turn them back, the first row of demonstrators scattered exposing the

second line of Chinese who, "quickly pulled submachine guns from under their coats and opened fire on the Soviet patrol." By 1117 hours, Chinese troops prepositioned on the island the night before, ambushed the remainder of the Soviet guard unit. Reinforcements from other border units responded to the battle which lasted about two hours. Although both sides claimed victory, neither left forces permanently on the island.[22]

The Damansky Island incident caused world-wide attention to be focused on the growing PRC-USSR confrontation. In retrospect, the armed clash set both countries on a collision course that threatened to completely sever Sino-Soviet relations and start an open war. Although previous border incidents had occurred,[23] the violence of the 2 March fight and the hostile reaction generated in both countries signaled a new phase in Sino-Soviet relations.

As tensions increased, both sides probably reinforced their frontier units around Damansky and stepped up the frequency of their patrols. On the morning of 15 May, another incident erupted on the island with larger forces involved. The seven to nine-hour battle resulted in greater losses for both sides--some sources claim 60 Russian and 800 Chinese casualties. The lower Soviet casualty figure is attributed to their advantage in tactics and armament.[24]

After the confrontations of 2 and 15 March, the Soviets initiated communications with the Chinese and recommended that boundary negotiations, which had broken down in 1964, be resumed immediately. In their note to the PRC, the Soviets not only reaffirmed their claim

to Damansky Island, but also reminded the Chinese of the PRC's acceptance of the existing frontiers by the 1951 navigation agreement, and of Chou En-lai's view of the border dispute as a minor issue:

> After deploring the breaking off of boundary negotiations, and recalling that the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, had said in 1960 that the unestablished sections of the Soviet-Chinese frontier were "insignificant discrepancies in the maps, easy to solve peacefully," the Soviet Note urged the Chinese Government to "refrain from any actions on the frontier that may cause complications and to solve any differences that may arise in a calm atmosphere and through negotiations."[25]

The Soviet statement closed with a note of caution to the Chinese regarding further encroachments:

> The Soviet Government has stated, and considers it necessary to repeat, that it resolutely rejects any encroachments by anyone on Soviet territory, and that any attempts to talk to the Soviet Union and the Soviet people in the language of weapons will be firmly repulsed.[26]

The Chinese, calling the Soviets the new Tsars of today, made their position on the clashes known:

> We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. Should the Soviet revisionist renegade clique cling to its reckless course and continue to provoke armed conflicts on the border, the Chinese people, following the teaching of our great leader Chairman Mao, will certainly wipe out the invading enemy resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely.[27]

Despite diplomatic efforts to convene a joint conference to work out the Sino-Soviet border issue, armed conflict continued to erupt along the Manchurian border, of which the Pacha/Goldinsky Island

incident is another example of hostile action involving disputed islands. Moreover, armed clashes also occurred along the western or Sinkiang sector. (See Map 7)

In late August 1969, an editorial in Pravda publicly raised the spectre of a Sino-Soviet nuclear war, and subsequent unconfirmed hints of a Soviet preemptive strike against the PRC's budding nuclear facilities added to the tensions.[28] Chinese reaction reflected the belief that the threat was genuine; the PRC's nuclear development and test sites in Sinkiang were vulnerable and their retaliatory capability was no match against superior Soviet nuclear and conventional forces posed along the Far Eastern frontier.

The Chinese, unable to risk further provocation and unwilling to display any signs of weakness, such as "capitulation" as the Soviets did in 1962, took a defensive posture toward the USSR and sought to defuse the border crisis by agreeing to resume border negotiations. A formal statement announcing that the PRC and USSR had reached an agreement to reopen border talks was released in October, 1969.[29]

There have been numerous reasons given to explain both Chinese and Soviet actions and intentions during the border crisis. Many of the events appear to have evolved around the use of "border confrontation" as an instrument of domestic and international policy. Although the Soviet-Japanese clashes of the 1930's also involved provocations by both sides (and even claims of Japanes aggression), there are similarities between the border incidents of the two eras, namely that of an unclear boundary line and disagreement over ownership of river islands.

SKETCH MAP SHOWING SINO-SOVIET BOUNDARY LINE IN AREA AROUND CHINESE TERRITORY PACHA ISLAND



MAP NO. 7

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Vol. XI, Part 1, "Small Wars and Border Problems," pp. 40-42. (hereafter referred to as "JSM")

2. Ibid., p. 43.

3. Ibid., p. 22.

4. Ibid., p. 37.

5. Ibid., p. 53.

6. Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-1945, p. 82.

7. Ibid., p. 83.

8. JSM, Vol. XI, Part 1, p. 76.

9. Ibid., p. 68.

10. US Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Vol. XI, Part 3, Book A, p. 112.

11. Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis, pp. 15-19.

12. Ibid., p. 19.

13. Ibid., p. 31.

14. Ibid., p. 30.

15. Keesing's Research Report, The Sino-Soviet Dispute, p. 106.

16. Ibid., p. 111.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 113.

19. Ibid., pp. 114-115.

20. J. A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People's China and International Law: A Documentary Study, Vol. I, p. 464.

21. Peking Review, Vol. 10, 7 March 1969, p.

22. Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March '69 Clashes." The American Political Science Review, Volume LXVI, No. 4, p. 1187.

23. Ibid., p. 1175.

24. Ibid., pp. 1189-1190.

25. Keesing's Research Report, p. 119.

26. Ibid.

27. Peking Review, Vol. 10, 7 March 1969, p. 10.

28. Tai-sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, p. 106.

29. Ibid., pp. 111-113.

CHAPTER V

PRC AND THE SOVIET FAR EAST

In assessing the PRC's perception of her security needs, one should determine to what extent the question of territorial claims or border demarcation, are related to the broader and more complex issue of the Sino-Soviet conflict. An examination of the territorial or border issue must not only consider the value the PRC would attach to reclaiming by force all or a part of the region, whether it be for economic, strategic, or political reasons, but it must also consider the PRC's propensity to use international law when dealing with other nations in solving such issues.

This chapter will examine the possibility of the PRC using international law to settle the territorial/border dispute and will also review the economic development of the disputed territory in the Soviet Far East to assist in determining whether the PRC is likely to pursue an aggressive policy for reclaiming lost territory.

International Law Considerations

The fact that the PRC has acknowledged explicitly the utility of international law provides us with some, although not a substantial, basis for understanding her actions. Moreover, the PRC's fairly recent admission to the United Nations may accelerate development in this field. If nothing else, it will make her position more readily known as specific issues are raised:

> Owing to its technical rules and institutions, bourgeois international law has its utility as a means for facilitating international intercourse. It may and should be given necessary introduction.[1]

Prior to emergence of the Sino-Soviet border dispute the PRC had defined her territorial domain pretty much within the scope of accepted principles of international law:

> . . . 1. The land within the country's boundaries;
> 2. National waters (internal waters, rivers, and lakes) and part of a river which forms a boundary with another state--the exact boundary line being equidistant from both banks, or, if it is a navigable river, the middle of the main channel used for navigation;
> 3. Territorial waters; and
> 4. Airspace superjacent to China's territorial domain.[2]

The fact that the above description was developed for a 1957 PRC textbook may account for the paucity of more specific definitions of such things as the PRC's perception of how a state acquires territory or by what principle it would delimit and demarcate its frontiers. Since 1957, China has entered into a number of treaties which redemarcated her boundaries with Burma, India, Nepal, and North Korea. An examination of some of these agreements reflects a firm, but reasonable Chinese position in border negotiations, and shows that she has incorporated some of the techniques for boundary making, similar to those discussed in Chapter II, particularly the technique of using the thalweg principle when demarcating navigable river boundaries.

Some Chinese jurists argue that, "modern international law cannot be understood if divorced from its 'Class nature.'" The general thrust of their objection argues that capitalist states have, among other things, justified territorial encroachment based on norms that

sanctify conquest, prescription, and other forms of acquisition.[3] This message, although not clearly explained, appears to hint that the Chinese have yet to synthesize Mao's ideology with the principles of international law. If this simplified notion is true, then we can expect the PRC to resort to international law when it is advantageous and in her best interest.

PRC's Territorial Claims

The Sino-Soviet border dispute should be viewed from two perspectives: first, from the larger context of territorial claims and second, from the narrower viewpoint of the border itself. One way of sorting out Chinese perceptions related to this subject is to start with the formal agreements which created China's frontiers, and specifically, those that dealt with the Manchurian--Far Eastern sector.

The following discussion is based on a sampling of PRC writers and commentators who have concerned themselves with the subject of treaties. Some have claimed that by following Marxist-Leninist principles, "a treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed in good faith."[4] However, other Chinese have singled out treaties that were concluded under conditions that they consider to be "aggressive or enslaving in nature." Such treaties, they claim, created an "exploitative" or "unequal" relationship and are not protected by international law, making them subject to repudiation.[5] The term "unequal" is difficult to define, particularly in the context perceived by the Chinese and which are clearly translatable into ideas understood in Western practice. By international law, treaties are not classified as being equal, or unequal; in fact there is no legal definition for

"unequal treaty." It appears that even to the Chinese, the term has several generalized connotations. To the Nationalists, unequal referred to infringements upon Chinese sovereignty such as, for example, provisions pertaining to the right to station troops in China and the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Communist objection, however, is based more on treaty provisions which were coercive, exploitative, aggressive, and enslaving:

> . . . Under international law, coercion of a representative or coercion of a state by the threat or use of force in order to procure the signature or ratification of a treaty is considered to be a factor vitiating the validity of the treaty in question. The CPR /PRC/ position agrees with this principle but goes beyond it. The concept of exploitation in interstate relations sealed by treaties has much broader application than coercion in the conclusion of treaties.[6]

The Communist Chinese emphasis is on the importance of the Marxist-Leninist idea that "the genuine sovereign equality between all parties concerned should become the foundation of international treaties." This concept appears to have been the basis from which the Chinese adopted the "doctrine" of classifying State-to-State agreements as "equal" or "unequal."[7] Moreover, the interpretation that treaties can be classified into equal and unequal treaties and that the latter category is "illegal and void, hence states have the right to abrogate same," conforms, according to Hungdachiu to the general position of most Soviet scholars, for example, Koshevnikov:

> Equal treaties are treaties concluded on the basis of equality between the parties; unequal treaties are those which do not fulfill this elementary requirement (and they) . . . are not legally binding.[8]

But, Communist Chinese scholars also make a point that "verbal reciprocity" is not the only consideration for determining whether or not a treaty is equal, but that other important political and economic facts must be considered in toto; Hungdachiu quotes the PRC's Wang Yao-t'ien:

> Whether or not a treaty is equal does not depend upon the form and words of various treaty provisions, but depends upon the state character, economic strength, and the substance of correlation of the contracting states.[9]

The ultimate result appears in the PRC's flexible interpretation as noted by Hungdachiu, "It should be noted that in the Communist Chinese view a treaty once equal or just can become unequal or enslaving as circumstances change."[10]

A comparison of the ROC (Republic of China/Nationalists) and PRC attitudes and actions related to "unequal" treaties can be summarized.

ROC: The Nationalists began denouncing unequal treaties (those that enforced extraterritorialty and tariff controls) as early as the 1920's, and by 1943 they were successful in having all such treaties terminated. However, the Nationalists were silent about treaties which ceded territory to foreign powers until 1949, when they denounced several agreements between China and the Russians/Soviets, including the treaty of Peking (1860) and the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945.

PRC: The Communists reserved the right to abrogate treaties previously concluded by the Nationalist Government. By the early 1960's, they openly denounced a series of "unequal" treaties (as

aggressive, exploitive, and coercive) which included Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860).[11] Both the ROC and PRC, according to Hsiung, have regarded renegotiation as the best solution to resolve treaty issues, but the PRC simultaneously has taken the position that until future negotiations are completed, the status quo should be maintained.[12]

Border Dispute

It is apparent from the above discussion that the Sino-Soviet territorial issue is beclouded in juridical questions which are complicated by historical factors of enmity, doctrinal orthodoxy, and power-politics.

The border redemarcation issue, however, is less complicated and it appears that a settlement could be reached through serious negotiations. Along the Manchurian--Far Eastern boundary, the current dispute focuses on the following points: (a) the Manchouli area (Kyakhta treaty of 1728, versus the Tsitsihar Treaty of 1911); (b) the "64 village area" (Aigun Treaty, 1858); (c) allocation of some 700 river islands (Treaties of Aigun and Peking, 1860); and (d) the sector between Lake Khanka and the Tumen River.

In the Manchouli area, the PRC claims that Russian encroachment involves approximately 350 square miles of land. This area is relatively undeveloped, but lies astride the former railraod line (Chinese Eastern Railway) that connected Chita-Harbin-Vladivostok. Militarily, the sector is an excellent armor/mechanized infantry axis of advance into Manchuria.

The "64 village" area is unquestionably Chinese territory, but the PRC position has not been, to date, particularly firm or belligerent concerning the return of the area. Reoccupancy of the area would put China in control of territory that could threaten the Soviet city of Blagoveshchensk and give the Chinese, in effect, a military "beach-head" on the north bank of the Amur. Chinese control of this foothold would directly imperil the Trans-Siberian Railway which runs parallel to the Amur.

The allocation of some 700 river islands/islets in the Argun, Amur, and Ussuri Rivers could be negotiated on the basis of the thalweg principle which the Chinese have frequently cited in their arguments. It should be recalled that various treaties specified that the boundary would run along the respective river banks; thus, the river and numerous islands would be treated as neutral territory. Use of the median line or thalweg principle is not an "automatic provision"; it takes specific and mutual action by the treaty signatories to be incorporated into the agreement, hence Chinese claims and Soviet counter-claims to various islands serve to inflame an already hostile issue. Probably the most important of the many islands in Heishiatzu located in the Amur-Ussuri confluence. The Chinese could--and do--build a strong case for their ownership using the provisions of the Aigun and Peking treaties in conjunction with the thalweg principle as justification. However, Soviet occupancy of the island since 1932 gives them stronger justification for countering Chinese claims based on occupancy, development, and

possession of the island for the past 44 years. PRC possession and occupancy of the island would be strategically unacceptable to the Soviets, since Khabarovsk, one of the principal cities in the Far East region, lies adjacent to this island. Additionally, the southern spur of the trans-Siberian railroad is located within 10-20 kilometers of the island. (See Map 8). Almost all of the remaining islands are uninhabited, and except for some of the larger ones situated near population centers, afford minimal military advantages.

The imprecisely demarcated sector from Lake Khanka to the Tumen River has been a frequent source of conflict as reflected in the Japanese incidents of the late 1930's and the Chinese incidents of the late 1960's.

PRC's Northeast Industrial Area: Manchuria

The Manchurian region is of immense strategic, political, and economic importance to China. The Amur River's hydro-electric power and associated flood control potential remain undeveloped because of the continuing border dispute which involves both the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. Restoration of the territory to pre-19th century status would give the PRC full control of these rivers, including access to the vast natural resources of the region and the Maritime province with its strategic harbors which would afford Manchuria direct access to the Pacific. Naturally, this reversal of conditions would severely affect the Soviets' ability to develop the Far East into an economically viable region and would virtually eliminate their status as a Pacific power.


USSR
TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD
KHABAROVSK
AMUR RIVER
HEISHIATZU ISLAND
PRC
MANCHURIA
USSURI RIVER
USSR
N

MAP NO. 8

The region in the vicinity of Harbin, southward to the Yellow Sea, comprises China's "Ruhr." The region has steel mills, extensive oil fields and refineries, chemical fertilizer plants, and agricultural machinery factories supported by an excellent railroad network. Also located in this area are thermal and hydroelectric power plants and various extractive mining sites for minerals and metals such as coal, copper, iron ore, manganese, and magnesite. Agriculturally, the area is heavily cultivated with soybeans and kaoliang crops.

Ethnolinguistically, the eastern region of Manchuria is predominantly Han Chinese with some Korean settlements near the Sino-Korean border; in the western sector, a large belt of Mongolian peoples (Inner Mongolia) lies adjacent to the Mongolia People's Republic; and scattered throughout the northwest are groups of Tungusic peoples. It is estimated that the population of Manchuria in 1975 was 64 million, with the greatest density being in the industrial region from Harbin southward to Mukden. The population along the border of the Argun-Amur Rivers ranges from 3 to 26 persons per mile; the density along most of the Ussuri River border is much higher, ranging from about 20 to 260 persons per square mile.

Chinese accomplishments on the border's fringe areas have been primarily devoted to a military buildup of fortifications for the frontier guards.

Economic Development of the Soviet Far East

Ever since the Sino-Soviet rift burst into the open in the early 1960's, the Soviets began to step up implementation of their

economic development plans for the Far East. This accelerated pace appears to be laying the groundwork for a decisive, strategically motivated Soviet development of the region which lies adjacent to the Chinese frontier.[13]

Of the nineteen Soviet economic regions, the Far Eastern sector is the largest. In general terms, this region encompasses the territory east of Lake Baikal and consists of about one-fourth of the area of the Soviet Union. Located farthest from European USSR, it is bounded on the north by the Arctic, the east by the Pacific Ocean, and the south by Manchuria. The seven provinces of the Far East include the Yakut ASSR, Amur Oblast, Primorskiy Kray, Sakalin Oblast, Khabarovsk Kray, Magadan Oblast, and Kamchatka Oblast.[14]

The general territory which belonged to China as a result of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (and which is often referred to by the PRC as territory ceded to Russia in the mid-nineteenth century via the unequal treaties of Aigun and Peking) includes the present day Amur Oblast, the southern half of Khabarovsk Kray, and the Primorskiy Kray. (See Map #9). Economic development of the Soviet Far East will be reviewed in terms of agricultural self-sufficiency, industrial and energy development, and population growth. In addition, a brief examination will be made of the Soviet military buildup of the region, particularly of the area bordering the Chinese Manchurian frontier.

Agriculture

Agriculture in the Soviet Far East is poorly developed due to physical restraints (rugged conditions, short growing season, permafrost,

SOVIET FAR EAST ECONOMIC REGION



MAP NO. 9

0 200 400 600
MILES

and poor soil condition), high production costs, and low yields. Consequently, agricultural production is inadequate to satisfy local demand. Severe climatic conditions do not encourage the development of agriculture; even in the more favorable areas of the south, the growing season is limited to approximately 120 days. Consequently, wheat and barley must be spring sown; even hybrid strains of the hardy winter-sown rye and oats produce low yields. Maize ripens into grain only in the upper Ussuri valley, a region where soybeans and rice are also grown.[15] Although the Amur-Ussuri region is not hampered by permafrost, the major hazard is excessive moisture resulting from the East Asian monsoons that give an annual rainfall of 24-28 inches, 70 percent of which falls during the summer months. In turn, the heavy rainfall leads to widespread floods in the Amur, Zeya, and Bureya basins and concomitant water-logging of fields. As a result, meadows are transformed into bogs, livestock (particularly sheep) suffer and the abundant moisture and humidity stunts the ripening of grain, encourages pests, and causes plants to rot. Harvesting is also hindered by the rain, making use of machinery extremely difficult.[16]

The cultivated area in the Soviet Far East is about 1/300 of the total area and is concentrated primarily in the Amur Oblast and Primorskiy Kray[17] and, to a lesser extent, in the southern half of Khabarovsk Kray. Unfortunately, most of the available statistical data refer to the Far East Economic Region as a whole rather than by individual province. Even so, it is interesting to note that the

provinces of Amur, Primorskiy, and southern Khabarovsk not only provide the bulk of the Far East's current agricultural output, but the general area also coincides with the territory claimed by China.

Because of the climatic conditions, late summer crops fare the best, such as maize, millet, rice, and soybeans. Soybeans, a crop highly valued for its varied industrial uses in addition to its use as human food and animal fodder, is one crop produced in abundance. More than a third of the arable land in the Far East is allocated to growing soybeans.[18] Rice, formerly grown by Koreans in the 1930's, is primarily cultivated in alluvial soils around Lake Khanka and in the valleys of Daubikhe and Ulakhe on the eastern part of Primorskiy. Increased rice production resulted when imports from China fell. For example, in the five-year period 1965-1970, acreage for rice increased by 60 percent and total tonnage increased by about 30 percent. One Soviet estimate indicates that a potential of five times the 1965 acreage of land suitable for rice is available in the Primorskiy and Pri-Amur regions. In 1971, new rice plantations were initiated in the Maykhe valley near Vladivostok and at Slavyanka.[19] Rice and soybeans are two of China's prized agricultural products and any arable land suitable for these crops would be tremendous assets to a country with a burgeoning population.

Livestock production in the Far East is also at a disadvantage owing to inadequate fodder supplies and badly organized stockfarming. Even milk and meat yields are poor. The two million cattle and pigs

make up over 90 percent of all livestock in the Far East Region[20] and amount to about 1.5 percent of the Soviet total.

North of the Amur Oblast, the terrain becomes mountainous and climatic conditions become increasingly unfavorable for agriculture and livestock raising.

Agricultural productivity in the Far East has failed to keep pace with demand and the present trend shows little promise of improvement.

Adverse climate, low yields, high costs, and poor profitability have restricted agricultural output in the Far East and have caused the region to import large quantities of foodstuffs each year. For example, about 50 percent of the milk requirements, 45 percent of the vegetables need, 20 percent of the potatoes consumed, 30 percent of its eggs, and over 50 percent of its total meat (less fish) needs are imported.[21] Traditionally, cheap food imports used to come across the border from Manchuria, but this source has been cut off by the Sino-Soviet dispute. In view of the costly transportation outlays involved in trans-shipment of foodstuffs from surplus agricultural regions in the USSR, Moscow may look toward nations in the Pacific for importing agricultural products to supplement the shortfall in the Far East, in exchange for timber and other mineral and energy resources.

In summary, it is doubtful that the Amur-Primorskiy-Khaborovsk provinces will become self-sufficient in the near future without massive injection of capital, labor, and improved agricultural and

managerial techniques. However, the potential is there. By reclaiming their "lost" territory, China would be adding essential arable land to her northeast; by controlling the flooding of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and by relinking the various transport communications network on both sides of the river, the PRC's economic position could be considerably improved.

Energy and Minerals

Transforming the Soviet Far East into an economic asset depends heavily on the exploitation of its hydro-electric power, and its mineral wealth.

Obviously joint Sino-Soviet plans for using the Amur River as a source of hydro-electric power and flood control have been overtaken by the deterioration of relations between the two countries. However, development of Hydro-electric facilities on tributaries of the Amur (the Zeya and the Bureya) and thermal power-generating schemes at Suchan basin and other locations are underway.[22]

The Sikhote-Alin Mountains which separate the Amur-Ussuri flood plains from the narrow coastal plains along the Sea of Japan are excellent sources of tin, tungsten, lead, and zinc.

The western coastal range of Sakhalin island provides coal and its northern plains contain rich deposits of crude oil and natural gas, the latter being piped into Komsomol'sk-Amure where steel and iron are produced.

The Far East/Economic Region as an entity contains a vast storehouse of natural resources, most of which is still undeveloped, and the three provinces which make up China's "lost" territory have considerable economic potential in the form of energy and mineral exploitation.

The Amur Oblast contains most of the hydroelectric potential in the Soviet Far East. It is also a possible source for development of ferrous metals and industries requiring electric-energy-intensive and fuel-intensive support. In addition, it will also become the main center of production of mineral fertilizers (nitrogen base) for the entire Far East. In this province there are sizeable brown coal, gold, manganese, and tin mines.

Khabarovsk Kray is the current center of the ferrous-metals industry. It has the potential for becoming the major producer of tin in the Soviet Far East since it has ore deposits of its own and is located midway between other ore deposits in the northern, eastern, and western sections of the Far East and Eastern Siberia. The Komsomol'sk steel and iron center is also located in this province and will be linked with the new BAM railway, giving it multiple transport routes eastward.

The Primorskiy Kray serves not only as the Soviet Far East's fishing center and a major provider of agricultural products, but it also has oil refineries, a number of operational thermal electric power plants, coal, tin, and gold mines. Vladivostock has some machine building and metal working industries. Industrial production here is based on coal and fish-products industries and is growing faster than in other regions of the Far East. Also the kray is the largest provider of building construction materials in the Far East. Cement is exported to Siberia, as well as fish products, plywood, and hardwood lumber for funiture construction. The main ports of the Far East are located in

this region, including Vladivostok, which is the largest city in the Soviet Far East in terms of population and gross industrial output.

In summary, data on mineral and energy output for the specific provinces under discussion are lacking, primarily because available statistics identify the Soviet Far East as an economic unit rather than by specific sub-provinces. In addition, estimates of reserves are constantly being revised as new discoveries are made. The "three provinces" are known to contain diverse mineral and ore deposits (gold, tin, molybdenum, iron, antimony, and coal). Hydroelectric and thermal sources of energy are potentially very great, and the two most obviously deficient resources are oil and natural gas. The mineral wealth in this area remains to be fully exploited.

As the transport communications network in the Soviet Far East is improved, Soviet development of the vast energy and mineral resources of the region can be accelerated, making the USSR the only major world power that is self-sufficient in critical minerals, energy resources, and other metals.

Timber

Difficult terrain, inadequate transport facilities, long distances from major markets, and poor productivity have created serious problems for low-cost timber exploitation in the Soviet Far East. For example, the cost of extracting timber in the Far East ranges from 25-50 percent above the average for the Soviet Union.[23]

Exploitation in the Ussuri and Amur basins, however, have been stepped up. The Amur basin has about 76.7 million acres of virgin

forests and represents the second major source of lumber products for the Soviet Far East. As a region, the Far East has about 17 percent of the total Soviet timber reserves. The Bureya basin and lower Amur between Khabarovsk and Nikolaevsk contain excellent commercial timber. A pulp and paper mill was scheduled to be built at Nizhnii Amur on Lake Kizi and similar combines could be built along the lower course of the Amur, in the Bureya River basin, and along the Komsoml'sk-na-Amure-Sovgavan Railroad.[24] In addition, wood-derived chemical plants are emerging, such as the turpentine-resin plant at Svobodnyy (north of Blagoveschensk), ethyl alcohol at Khor (near Khabarovsk), and a large plant at Amursk (near Komsomol'sk) to produce cellulose, tire cord, man-made fibers, and synthetic rubber. Currently, a significant amount of timber is exported from the Far East to Japan and is likely to continue. Exportation to other Pacific nations is expected as port-handling facilities at Nakhodka and elsewhere are expanded and upgraded to handle international trade.

The potential lumber productivity of the Amur-Primorskiy-Khabarovsk provinces, particularly for export purposes, adds to the economic attractiveness of the area.

Fishing Industry

Regionally, the west coast of Kamchatka, the estuary of the Amur, and the Okhostk coastline and the southern parts of Sakhalin are expecially productive for the fishing industry.[25] Historically, questions of fishing rights in the area often have strained relations between the Soviets and Japanese; for example, Japanese access to the

rich fishing grounds off the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin and to the valuable Salmon fishing concessions in the Kamchatkan rivers have been a source of constant negotiations. In recent times, however, the Primorskiy fisheries have expanded the most, primarily because of the concentration of the Soviet ocean-going fleet in the warmer ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka. Dal'ryba, the Far Eastern Fishing Department headquartered in Vladivostok, controls the entire Far Eastern fishing fleet which includes fish catching, processing, storage, whaling, and fishing expedition. Vladivostok and Nakhodka are the best Soviet ports, equipped with handling and unloading facilities as well as ship repair yards. Moreover, these ports are linked to the Trans-Siberian Railroad for quick transport of fish to points west. The oceangoing orientation of this fleet enables it to range far into the Pacific, Indian,and Antarctic Oceans.[26] The fisheries in Kamchatka and Sakhalin are at a disadvantage, being deficient in port and repair facilities. Fish unloaded at these locations for processing have to be reshipped to other ports where they are transferred on to mainland rail terminals for marketing. Most of the fish caught in the Magaden and Khabarovsk sectors are coastal or riverine rather than deep sea.

Projections for 1975 placed the Far East fishing output at around 3.3 million tons, or about one-third of the planned total for the Soviet Union. This industry requires a relatively high volume of capital investment, but in the long run the fish resources of the Far East and north Pacific may be turned into profitable export industries.

The protein and fertilizer products derived from the industry are sorely needed in Asia. Although the Primorskiy Kray serves as the nerve center of the Soviet's Far Eastern fishing industry, the north Pacific waters contain the richest fishing grounds.

Transportation

The Trans-Siberian Railway, completed in 1916, is the single most important transportation facility between the Far East Economic Region with the rest of the Soviet Union. The single track railway originally included a one and one-half mile bridge across the Amur River to the city of Khabarovsk; from this location it was extended southward to Vladivostok on the Pacific coast. Twenty years later, as tension between the Soviets and Japanese Manchukuo began to heighten, the railway was double tracked as far eastward as Khabarovsk. The primary iron and steel producing site of Komsomol'sk was linked to this rail system in 1940, and it was later extended to the coastal city of Sovetskaya Gavan on the Pacific.

More recently, construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railroad has been underway and will link the points of Ust'-Kut on the Lena (North of Lake Baikal) with Komsomol'sk-na-Amure. This vital land link will become the second major access route to the Transbaikal area and the Far East. The completed BAM not only will provide economic benefits to the region in terms of rapid, high capacity transportation, but also will serve as an essential military asset in case of emergencies. Although the BAM was purposely routed away from the Chinese border, the section which transits the Far East Region lies within the Amur and southern Khabarovsk Provincial borders. The 3,200 Kilometer-long BAM will traverse some of the most rugged territory in

Eastern Siberia and the Far East, and when completed, it is expected to be the main artery into which railroads and highways will merge in the future. Present plans forecast the BAM to become operational in the mid-1980's.[27]

Population

It was not until after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 that Russian settlement in the Far East began in earnest. The rapid rise of the population through migration was to increase the relative proportion of Russian inhabitants in the Far East. Deportations in the 1930's greatly lowered the Korean, Japanese, and Chinese population of the Soviet Far East. Since the 1960's renewed Government financial assistance and other incentives have spurred population growth, but the turnover rate of migrants, especially the skilled and professional workers, remains higher than desired. According to the 1970 census, the Soviet Far East's rate of population growth was 19.6 percent for the previous decade.[29] The pattern of population distribution continues to be along the Trans-Siberian railway and other transportation routes such as inland waterways, roads, and coastal shipping routes. Although some diffusion has taken place, about 70 percent of the towns with a population of more than 15,000 are situated within 30 miles of the Trans-Siberian railway. A brief overview of the population trend of the Far Eastern area of concern is reflected from a census report outlined in Pravda:[30]

Province	Population (Millions) 1959	1970	Percent Increase	Percent Urban 1959	1970
Primorskiy	1.38	1.72	24.7	67	73
Khabarovsk	1.14	1.35	17.8	74	78
Jewish A. O.	0.16	0.17	6.1	72	69
Amur	0.72	0.79	10.5	60	62

The population of the major cities of the Soviet Far East based on 1970 figures are: Vladivostok 442,000; Khabarovsk 437,000; Komsomol'sk 218,000; and Blagoveshchensk 128,000.[31]

One source estimates that by the year 2000, the proportion of urban dwellers in Pacific Siberia (Eastern Siberia and the Far East) is expected to increase from the present 65 percent to 75 percent, and of the projected 20 million people (1970 figure is 13.2 million), only 10 percent will be living in the Far North, and most of the remainder will be overwhelmingly urbanized and located in the southern areas near the Chinese frontier.[32]

Demographically, the population of the Soviet Far East is characteristic of a pioneering region. Compared with the USSR norm, its population is relatively young and has a greater proportion of working age males, and until the 1960's it had a significantly higher birth rate. It also has a smaller percentage of the population aged 60 years or older primarily due to a lower life expectancy, the severe climatic conditions, and a high rate of retirement back to European Russia.

Great Russians make up 90 percent of the total population in the Soviet Far East, with the remainder of the inhabitants consisting

of scattered minority groupings of indigenous peoples. Russian inhabitants are concentrated heavily along the Sino-Soviet frontier, most of Shakhalin and the coastal regions of Primorskiy Kray and Kamchatka Oblast. Another concentration is centered along the southern half of the Lena River and around Magadan. Turkic peoples are concentrated primarily along the northern half of the Lena and Aldan Rivers with additional pockets throughout the Yakut ASSR. Other major ethnic groups scattered throughout Kamchatka Oblast and the northeastern most region of Yakut ASSR include the Paleo-Siberian Peoples of Chukchi, Koryaks, Nivkhi, and Eskimoes. A small Jewish population is located in Birobidzhan, capital of the Hebrew ASSR which is located due west of Khabarovsk.

Although Slavic Russian domination of the Soviet Far East threatens the national identity of the minority inhabitants, dissention among these ethnic peoples does not appear to be as much of a problem as in the western sector of the Sino-Soviet frontier (Sinkiang) or along the "Inner" and "Outer" Mongolian frontier where ethnic problems are serious and potentially explosive.[33]

Military.

The Soviet Union has a significant amount of its military forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet frontier. It is estimated that 43-45 assorted divisions (Armor, Mechanized, and Infantry) are currently stationed there, of which seven are tank divisions.[34] This build-up was likely the result of increased tensions, particularly

during the 1969 border clashes with the PRC. About one-third of the Soviet divisions in the Far East consist of units which are assigned a Category 1 degree of combat readiness (that is, the personnel strength is maintained between 75 to 100 percent with complete equipment). The remaining divisions are probably equally divided between Category 2 and 3 combat readiness which means the units are maintained at lower than 75 percent personnel strengths and have less equipment, except for combat vehicles, which are normally complete.[35] Of the deployed divisions, it is probable that at least half the number are positioned opposite the Manchurian frontier, the PRC's Rhur of the Orient. Air Force and air defense units provide additional combat power to the deployed army units; estimates place about 25 percent of the Soviet's long range Air Force in the Far East. The Soviets' Pacific fleet consists of 105 submarines (about 40 nuclear) and 60 major surface combat ships. The main ports of the Far East are located in the Maritime Province (Primorskiy Kray), and include Vladivostok, the prime Pacific base for the Soviet Navy.

The lack of public documents outlining more specific statistics on Soviet military deployment in the Far East, particularly of her strategic and tactical nuclear forces, indicates the sensitivity of this subject. One can speculate, given the well-known Soviet paranoid regarding the "Yellow Horde," that the Sino-Soviet conflict has caused the USSR to give increased attention to the security of her back door which protects the vast, virtually untapped resources of the area.

CONCLUSION

The Chinese Communist's victory in 1949 established what can be thought of as a new Chinese "dynasty." Basing their legitimacy on the rationale of state "continuity" and "succession," the Communists gained territorial sovereignty over the former Nationalist Chinese State and renamed it the People's Republic of China (PRC). The new government's sudden control of a land about the size of the United States (3.7 million square miles) and situated on similar latitudes was not without tremendous problems. In view of the tremendous potential for a population explosion, a significant problem is the fact that a high proportion of land in China, by nature, is unsuited for intensive agriculture and settlement. Moreover, it is surrounded by a dozen neighboring states and a vast ocean. Of her frontiers, the common boundary contiguous with the USSR is the longest in the world and potentially the most volatile.

The PRC-USSR treaty of 1950 replaced the 1945 ROC-USSR treaty and was primarily concerned with friendship, commerce, and mutual assistance. The need for a secure frontier between the two nations underpinned their relations. The concept, or even the idea, of territorial claims or border demarcation problems is not known to have existed in those early years.

The historical evolution of the Manchurian-Far Eastern border, the object of this study, has its beginning in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. This treaty is of particular significance because it constituted the first international agreement between China and a

western nation, Russia. This treaty turned out to be extremely vague in its territorial delimitations, and the conflict in meanings between the texts of the two countries appears to have been used advantageously by Russian expansionists in subsequent agreements with the Chinese.

It is important to recall that China had been ruled by non-Han Chinese invaders, the Mongols and the Manchus (Annex A, Page 102) While these invaders elected to rule China from Peking, the territorial empires that these dynasties encompassed were at the time, beyond that which was ever controlled by the Han-Chinese dynasties. Hence, succession by the Nationalists, followed by the Communists raises the difficult question of which territorial domain actually had been inherited: the domain of a Han-Chinese Dynasty or the territorial empire of a previous non-Han-Chinese Dynasty? PRC's sovereignty encompasses, according to the Chinese Communists, all territory lost due to the unequal treaties era (Post-1840's). Territory which "might" have been lost due to the Treaty of Nerchinsk is a juridical problem which may never be seriously contested, although, based on circumstantial evidence, a strong case could be made that the Chinese forfeited a considerable amount of territory as a result of the treaty. Why? There are no answers, but many possible reasons--lack of resolve, preoccupation with other matters, ignorance of Russian intentions, or lack of a clear territorial policy for its frontierlands. From the Soviet viewpoint, the Siberian-Far East region was, for all practical purposes, unpopulated except for sporadic clusters of small tribes which pursued a livelihood

based on a type of nomadic animal-husbandry. By the mid-seventeenth century, when Russian Cossack adventurism and persistent explorations of the area began to alarm the Ch'ing Court, neither the Manchus nor the Han Chinese had actually settled, or even lived in the area, therefore they could not claim clear title to the region. The Chinese, however, asserted that the tribes living in the contested region were vassals of the Chinese Court and hence the land of the tribes was within Manchu territory.

Each nation, fully committed to building up their respective contiguous frontiers, jealously guard their prerogatives and neither is likely to give in on any major issue without considerable concessions from the other side. The Chinese Communists have indicated a willingness to use existing treaties as a starting point for border negotiations if the Soviets would acknowledge they were unequal. To date no substantive progress has been made. As recently as April 1976, the USSR has offered to resume border talks which have been suspended since May 1975.[36]

Thus, Chinese territorial claims to the Amur region, the Maritime Province, and possibly other land is met with equally vigorous Soviet rejection of these claims. This dispute continues to be on extremely bitter and potentially explosive element of the larger Sino-Soviet conflict.

Finally, the emergence of the current territorial and border dispute occurred after the Sino-Soviet conflict had gained considerable momentum and when relations between the two countries was at their lowest point since the Communist Chinese seized power in 1949. Once

the territorial/border issue burst into the limelight, it quickly began to take on a life separate from, but interacting with other elements of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Although the PRC leadership peacefully has resolved territorial/border issues with most of her other neighbors, the Sino-Soviet sector appears to have developed a schizophrenic personality of its own. Consequently, it appears that the PRC has deliberately avoided the establishment of a national policy which could be uniformly applied to China's territorial/border problems. The fact that the dispute with the USSR is being handled with extreme caution emphasizes the sensitivity of the issue.

The PRC's announced willingness to let the border issue remain in its current status until differences with the USSR could be resolved peacefully through negotiations, and their alternative of taking up the greater territorial issue "when the time is ripe," is apparently designed to buy time for the Chinese, who are faced with a host of problems ranging from selecting a successor for the aged Mao, controlling domestic turbulence, attaining economic self-sufficiency, and dealing with a militarily stronger Soviet Union.

The Soviet government's increased interest in the Far East Economic Region, and specifically the territory which China ceded to Russia in the mid-nineteenth century, has given the area greater political and strategic appeal as well. The Baikal-Amur Mainline railway which has been under construction since 1974 will give the Soviets needed transport communications facilities to accelerate economic development of various industries in the region, making

the area less dependent on the vulnerable Trans-Siberian railway which runs parallel and close to the Sino-Soviet border.

With increased emphasis of the Soviet government to establish Russian settlements in the Far East, particularly along its historically vulnerable borders with China, and the continuing military build-up along the frontier, the Far East region will have to supplement its local economy with greater imports of foodstuffs and consumer products. Even if relations with the PRC improve, it is likely that a strong Soviet military presence will remain permanently positioned along the southern border. The border dispute prevents either party from unilaterally or jointly developing the hydro-electric/flood control potential of the mighty Amur river: its exploitation could accelerate and improve agricultural and industrial development of the area on both sides of the river. Russification of the population, and economic development of the area in depth will make any PRC's initiatives for reclaiming the territory, by any means, extremely difficult and risky.

Extension of Soviet economic, military, and political power to the Far East region with its Pacific coastline gives the USSR major power status in the Pacific, a position she is unlikely to yield. As the Amur Oblast, Khabarovsk and Primorskiy Krays develop into a viable economic entity, one could speculate that the PRC would become more insistent on reclaiming the territory, by force if need be, but such a bold step at this time, though possible given the right combination of political and ideological irrationality, is highly unlikely.

Beset with growing pains, succession problems, and confronted with superior military forces opposite her Manchurian border, it is unlikely that the PRC will, in the near future, press her claims to former Chinese territory ceded to the USSR. If China's new leadership perceived a need for rapprochement with USSR, the Chinese conceivably could settle the border dispute, at least to the degree that the problem would be relegated to a lower priority in order for her to achieve her more immediate objective of reduced tensions. The manner of settlement, however, would probably leave the door ajar for future Chinese haggling. Such a strategy is based on her theoretical dogma pertaining to unequal treaties on which she has taken a firm stand. In spite of this fact, however, the PRC has deliberately avoided taking the crucial step of actually declaring the unequal treaties null and void. Moreover, her border policy does not appear to be uniformly applied to all situations--the Sino-Soviet border being the obvious exception. It appears that the historical border dispute will remain a special issue while the PRC sifts through the principles of international law in an attempt to synthesize a form of law suitable for dealing with this dilemma on an ideologically acceptable basis. When the PRC attains true world power status, she may view the situation from a different and more aggressive perspective.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. James C. Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations, p. 15.

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3. Ibid., p. 19.

4. Ibid., p. 241.

5. Ibid., p. 244.

6. Ibid., p. 252.

7. Jerome A. Cohen, ed., China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies, p. 258.

8. Ibid., p. 259.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 265.

11. Hsiung, p. 253.

12. Ibid., pp. 244-245.

13. Carl Modig, Soviet Economic Development of Siberia: Strategic Implications, p. 3.

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15. Violet Conolly, Beyond the Urals, p. 141.

16. Ibid., p. 142.

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27. N. Baybakow, "Great Plans, Great Deeds." Moscow Znamya in Russian No. 9, p. 45.

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32. Ibid., p. 177.

33. Brian Crozier, Conflict Studies, "Ethnic Pressures in the Soviet Union," p. 19.

34. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1975-1976, p. 9; and Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in An Era of Detente," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 208.

35. Ibid., p. 9.

36. "Soviet, in New Overture, Calls on China to Resume Border Talks." New York Times, 29 April 1976, p. 10.

ANNEX A

SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS TO 1686

Any historical review of Russia and China should also include a brief look at Mongolia--the "third force" which has had profound and lasting historical effects on the power struggle that developed between the two countries.

The first significant historical appearance of these pastoral nomads in China occurred late in the third century B.C., when the Chinese (Han) Emperor Shih Huang Ti, repulsed an invasion that had taken the so-called "barbarians" south across the great Yellow River. The Chinese Emperor aggressively pushed the Mongols back across the Gobi desert and subsequently built the Great Wall along his northern frontier as an obstacle to further barbaric encroachments.[1]

Throughout the following twelve centuries, the Mongols continued to exhibit an aggressive war-like nature, but it was not until the thirteenth century that their organization for world expansion began in earnest. Through skillful leadership, good organization, excellent discipline, and superb use of military strategy, Genghis Khan and his progeny forged one of the largest empires in the world. The Mongol soldiers were expert horsemen, courageous fighters, and rugged individualists; they fought hard, lived off the land they conquered, and established a system of tribute wherever they roamed.

By the year 1241, the Golden Horde, as they were often called, had conquered Siberia, European "Russia," Poland, and parts of

Hungary and Italy.[2] Kublai, another of Genghis Khan's grandsons, turned his attention southeastward toward China and by 1279 claimed complete control over the Empire when he established the Yuan Dynasty. It was about this time (late thirteenth century) that the Mongol Empire, composed of several administrative divisions, reached its zenith; portions of this empire constituted a force which was to endure for another two centuries.

The mongol influence began to decline, however, when their sheer momentum stretched the Empire so thin that it could no longer be sustained. The gradual collapse of the Yuan Dynasty was irreversible, resulting from a combination of factors; namely, rival power-politics by members of the ruling court, and severe dissension and unrest among the people.[3] As the dynasty reached its ebb, a peasant Buddhist, Chu Yuen-Chang, defeated the Mongols and proclaimed himself Emperor of the new Ming Dynasty (1368 AD), ushering in an era for the Han Chinese which was to endure for almost three splendid centuries.[4] The emergence of the princes of Muscovy and the dissolution of Mongol cohesiveness told a similar story in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

In 1480, Ivan III, the Great, refused further payment of tribute to the Tartars and won independence, a full century after the end of Mongol domination in China. By 1502, the Golden Horde, that two and one-half centuries earlier had decimated the Russians, was itself destroyed.[5]

Squeezed between China and Russia, the Mongols returned to their nomadic patterns in the vicinity from whence they came, never to regain the cohesiveness nor the power they once had. The imprint of their invasions into Russia and China, however, had a lasting effect on both countries.

Russian Expansion

By the late sixteenth century (under the reign of Ivan the Terrible) the small state from which Russia was to grow had reached a turning point. Moscow became the center of power over Russian principalities and the westward surge of traffic along lower Siberia was reversed.[6] The decline of Mongol power was counterbalanced by the rise of power in another area--Western Europe. With her eastern front pacified, Russia then turned her efforts to expansion in the West. Consequently, in the centuries ahead, Southern Siberia became the principal route for Russian traders and adventurers who relentlessly pressed eastward, often with little help from Moscow.

The Chinese Empire

Although Mongol dominance in China lasted less than one century, the occupation had profound psychological consequences on the Ming Chinese, which led to a substantial increase of their ethnocentrism on the one hand and simple xenophobia on the other.[7]

However, Ming China endured for over two and one-half centuries, and proved to be one of the most prosperous eras in Chinese history. Sparked by the tales of the Venetian traveler, Marco Polo, who traveled throughout China in the late 13th century, and the more

tangible evidence of China's wealth that reached Europe and other parts of the world (silks, ceramics, tea, gold, and silver, to name a few. China became the target of commercial penetration.

The Himalayan mountains to the south and the vast oceans to the East had for centuries provided China with natural barriers to foreign intrusion. The northern frontier, except for a small holding in the northeast, continued, however, to be a source of persistent friction throughout the Ming period, and in the mid-fifteenth century a resurgence of Mongol power pushed the Ming authority back inside the Great Wall. The third force, although not of a scale comparable to that of Kublai Khan, remained the dominant political factor in the Inner Asian region that kept Russia and China at arms length. By the early sixteenth century, European pressure along China's southern frontiers began to be felt. The Portuguese led the procession, followed by the British, and then the Dutch. Foreign encroachment on China's sovereignty and way of life was often the cause of friction and armed confrontation which left an indelible mark on the Chinese and undoubtedly effected subsequent relations with the Occident. Furthermore, as O. Edmund Clubb stated in his book China and Russia, The "Great Game," "Japanese pirates added Asian insult to Western injury when they invaded China and sacked Nanking in 1555."[8]

These encounters reinforced Chinese belief in the concept that China was the one supreme culture, the center of civilization

predestined under a mandate from heaven. Thus, she had no need of anything from aliens. Political decay under the inept emperor, Wan-Li, weakened the Ming Dynasty. The Japanese and Occidentals continued to exert relentless pressure on China's sea front. Internal rebellion and external pressures diluted the Ming's hold on China, and in the mid-seventeenth century the old historical pattern was repeated, this time with invasion from the northeast borderlands. The Tungusi Jurchens, another group of nomads from the area of modern Manchuria, had two objectives--first, to divide the Mongols and weaken their power, and second, to conquer China. By 1644 both military objectives had been achieved. The term Jurchen was changed to "Manchu," a term from which modern Manchuria derives its name. This new era became known as the Ch'ing Dynasty and lasted from 1644 to 1911.[9] The Manchus, unlike the Mongols, had been Sinicized in their ways long before their overthrow of the Ming Dynasty, a fundamental factor that enabled them to effect a smooth transition of power and subsequent rule.[10]

Under the Romanov dynasty, Russian expansion in the east continued unabated. Everywhere they went, they constructed "ostrogs" (fortified strongpoints) along the way. By leap frog fashion the Russians expanded their influence, demanding tribute from those they conquered. In 1628 the Russians first extracted tribute from the Buryat Mongols, and in 1632 the ostrog of modern Yakutsk on the Lena River was established. In 1636 the Russians discovered the Amur River and three years later in 1639 their transcontinental trek took the Cossacks to the Sea of Okhotsk--they had reached the Pacific.[11]

The desire to establish trade relations with China was uppermost in Moscow's eyes. The Russian Cossacks had been extending their conquests in the northeast at the same time the Manchus were subduing the Chinese.

The new Ch'ing Dynasty, unsophisticated as they were, ascended to power with "Confidence born of victory."[12] They faced not only the Mongols and the Russians to their north, but they had to contend with the seafaring barbarians along the China coast.

Russian pressure along the frontier intensified, and many of the Cossack contacts with various tribes on the Amur resulted in outright plunder and cruelty. This incensed the Ch'ing court since these tribes were, in effect, vassals of China. The Chinese claimed suzerainty over much of the frontier region being encroached upon by the Russians. The expedition led by Khaborav (1649) and followed by Stepanov (1654) were especially outrageous.[13] These and other Russian expeditions set the tone for the future relationship between the natives of Amur and the Russians--a relationship which alienated the local inhabitants and caused them to favor Manchu policy in the region.[14]

Russian attempts to establish political relations with the Ch'ing court met with frustration and delay due to Russian refusal to prostrate (Kowtow) themselves to the Emperor, a ceremonial tribute of respect more than subjugation. Yet, Moscow persisted, sending one envoy after another until 1676 when the Ch'ing Emperor, Kung Hsi received the Russian representative, Nikolay Spathar-Milescu.[15]

The First-Sino-Russian Border Dispute

As was noted earlier, E. Pavlovich Khabarov, a Russian Cossack, set out on an expedition to conquer the Amur in 1650, using the fortified ostrog Albazin as his base of operations. His raids on native villages became legendary, and in 1652 the Manchus sent a force to counter the Russian threat. The Manchu expedition appeared to have understood neither the nature of their enemy nor the fact that Russian intent in the Amur was not simply a border raid (analogous to previous Tartar tribe incursions) but the forerunner of a concerted push for colonization. In 1652 the Manchus engaged the Russian force at Achansk and just as the tide of battle shifted against the Russians, the Manchus withdrew giving the barbarians a victory by default, thus ending the first Sino-Russian border clash. In June, 1658 another conflict took place near the confluence of the Sungari and Amur rivers, this time against Kabarov's successor, Stepanov. The Manchus, having better logistical support, scored a clear victory over the Russians, and brought a degree of peace back to the area. In spite of the Manchu's initial success, their policy of leniency and failure to prosecute their victories, encouraged the Russian government eventually to reestablish its authority in the Amur.[16]

The death of Tsar Feodor in 1682 brought both young Peter the Great and his half brother, Ivan to the throne, but actual power was vested in another member of the Miloslavskii family--Tsarevna Sohpia.[17] During this period, the regent was faced with vital questions concerning Russia's national boundaries and the advancement of Russian interests

in both her western and eastern frontiers. On her west, she faced the problems of Poland, Austria and the Crimea. On her east, open warfare over the Amur River Valley threatened her Far Eastern position. She was faced with the possibility of a two-front war and needed desperately to decide which direction Russia's foreign policy should take.[18]

In 1683, the continued border incidents aroused the new Ch'ing emperor to the point of writing to the Tsar, advising that the Chinese were peaceloving people:

> We rule the universe on the principle that there shall be no discrimination between Chinese and foreigners, that all people are our own children. We love and sympathize with them and hope that all people may live in their own homes and enjoy their lives.[19]

Having said this, the Emperor went on to elaborate on the many grievances against the Russians:

> The Lo-Ch'as of Russia have, without reason, invaded our Solon frontier, disturbed and injured our hunters, boldly engaged in robbery, and repeatedly harbored our fugitives. . . . Their crime increases daily. . . .[20]

Emperor Kan-hsi closed by asking the Tsar to respect the Manchu position and to feel free to report any grievances against the Chinese. The situation on the frontier, however, failed to improve, and Albazin (Chinese name is Yak'osa) became Kan-hsi's first target.

In May, 1685, the Russian ostrog Albazin, located near the Amur River, became the scene of a major conflict between Russia and China. The battle lasted ten days, ending in a Chinese victory.

The second attack commenced a year after the first, on July 7, 1686, and lasted for five months. In October of that year the advance Russian representatives arrived in Peking and convinced the Ch'ing Court to withdraw their troops from Albazin pending the arrival of the appointed Russian envoy. In December 1686, Chinese forces withdrew to a position two miles from Albazin leaving the Russian force decimated, but still in command.[21]

During this period Sophia continued to face mounting problems on both fronts. Poland and Austria were at war with the Turks, desiring to push them out of Europe, if possible. The Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Vasilii Golitsyn, knew Poland wanted Russian assistance in this war, and he also knew that Russia needed to insure the loyalty of the Cossacks who were also at war with the Turks. Golitsyn reopened negotiations with Poland and personally exerted his best efforts in bringing about a settlement, naturally in a manner that would be in Russia's best interest. Through skillful negotiations, Golitsyn brought about a "Treaty of Eternal Peace" between Russia and Poland in April 1686, in which Russia acquired the cities of Kiev, Smolensk, Roslavl, and other designated places, increased trade, and other concessions. Russian gains were at Poland's expense.[22] Although the treaty with Poland was a high mark of Russian diplomacy, her alliance with Poland committed her to war with the Crimean Tatars, thus her attention continued to be focused on the western front.

At the same time, word of the Russo-Chinese conflicts in the Far East required Moscow to act. Golitsyn selected Feodor A. Golovin, an extremely talented man, to represent Russia in arranging for a settlement, oriented to bring an end to all matters of dispute.

ANNEX A

FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550-76, pp. 35-36.

2. WGF Jackson, Seven Roads to Moscow, pp. 10-11.

3. US Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550-76, p. 55.

4. US Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550-60, p. 50.

5. US Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550-76, p. 54.

6. Jackson, p. 14.

7. Edmund O. Clubb, China & Russia The "Great Game", p. 6.

8. Ibid., p. 7.

9. Ibid., p. 19.

10. John K. Fairbanks, The United States and China, 3d ed., p. 82.

11. Clubb, pp. 12-13.

12. Ibid., p. 22.

13. Frank Alfred Golder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850: An Account of the Earliest and Later Expeditions, pp. 50-51.

14. Mark Mancall, Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728, p. 22.

15. Clubb, pp. 26-27.

16. Mancall, pp. 30-31.

17. Bickford C. O'Brien, Russia Under Two Tsars 1682-1689, p. 39.

18. Ibid., p. 105.

19. Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820), Vol. I and II, p. 64.

20. Ibid.

21. O'Brien, p. 113.

22. Ibid., p. 99.

ANNEX B, NOTE 1

SINO-RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1686-1689

The historical background leading to China's first treaty with a Western State (The Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689) is often given scant attention in current literature; however, an understanding of events that occurred between the two countries helps one to appreciate the apparent pattern that runs through subsequent Sino-Russian relations.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk.

Attention to the frontier was taxing China's resources, and Emperor K'ang-hsi recognized the need for a "neutralized" border. Russia, preoccupied with her western front, was eager to trade with China. Both sought a diplomatic solution.

Ambassador Feodor A. Golovin, 35 years old at the time, departed Moscow for China in January 1686 to resolve the border problem and work out a trade agreement. A solution had to be worked out short of War. His instructions were:

> All bloodshed must be avoided; in the event of a rejection of his proposals by the Chinese, he was to make arrangements for another embassy to go to Peking. The Amur River was to be obtained in its entirety, if possible, as the boundary between the two countries. Failing this, compromise boundary lines were to be proposed along certain tributaries of the Amur--the Bystraia or the Zeia River. And if the Chinese still would not yield, as a last concession Albazin was to be designated as the border. Golovin was also instructed to arrange for a commercial agreement with China on as favorable terms as possible.[1]

I. A. Vlasov, the voevoda (military supervisor) of Nerchinsk, was the Russian mission's second envoy; Golovin was fortunate having a man of Vlasov's caliber, who had first-hand information of and experience about the Amur. Among several other delegates was Andrei Belobotsky, a Pole educated in Latin, who served as Latin translator. About 500 soldiers accompanied the delegation from Moscow and in Siberia additional Cossacks and other forces along the Amur were at Golovin's disposal if necessary.[2]

Upon being advised that the Russian officials, headed by Theodore A. Golovin, had arrived in Selenginsk and were waiting to meet with the Chinese to discuss the border problem, Emperor K'ang-hsi directed that a mission be formed to meet with the Russians. The date was April 1688. About a half-dozen officials (Chinese, Manchu, and Jesuit priests) made up the Mission with So-e-Tu, Chamberlain of the Imperial Guards and a relative of the Emperor, being a key member. In addition, about 800 troops drawn from the Eight Banners were selected to accompany the delegates. Since Selenginsk lay at the southern tip of Lake Baikal (located approximately 950 air miles northwest of Peking), the Chinese contingent would have to pass through Khalkha (Mongol) territory. So as not to alarm the sensitive Khalkhas, the Emperor dispatched a messenger to inform them of the Chinese deligation's peaceful purposes.[3]

At the end of May (1688), the Emperor instructed the mission with specific peace terms, pointing out that the struggle between China and Russia was caused by Russian invasion of Chinese frontier territory, occupation of territory belonging to Chinese subjects, and the harboring of fugitives. Two major Russian strong points were claimed by the Chinese: Nerchinsk (Nipuch'ao) and Albazin (Yakosa). Moreover, the Emperor stressed the strategic importance of the Hei-lung-Chiang territory (modern Manchuria). By descending the Hei-lung-Chiang River (Amur), the Russians could reach the Sungari River, the Nonni, and lands belonging to vassal tribes, and by following the Amur to its estuary, they could reach the sea. He was emphatic in his guidance:

> if we do not recover this entire region, our people on the frontier will never have peace . . . . We shall join with them to define the limits of the boundaries, and we shall grant them trade; if they do not agree, we shall not talk peace with them.[4]

Basically, the Amur River system was the key to the entire river network in Northern Manchuria, providing direct access into the heart of Manchuria to the south and the Pacific Ocean to the northeast. Moreover, China considered that the tribes inhabiting the banks along these rivers to be vassals under Manchu suzerainty. If the Manchus could not maintain peace for the tribes, they (the tribes) could be expected to turn toward the Russians.[5]

Not long after the Chinese mission had departed Peking, news that war had broken out between the eastern (Eleuth) and

the western (Khalkha) Mongols reached the Emperor. Prior to this upheaval, the Eleuth Prince had been pro-Manchu, but now control of the Mongol country passed to the anti-Manchu leader of the Eleuth tribe, Gladan. Gladan engaged the Khalkhas and after a series of heated battles, routed the Khalka forces who sought refuge in inner Mongolia. The Emperor ordered the state mission to return home to avoid becoming involved in the Mongol war, and also advised the Russian Ambassador in Selenginsk of the delay.[6] The conference was rescheduled, but did not take place until the summer of 1689. Part of the delay was due to the Mongol war and the temporary seige of Selenginsk, and part was due to the failure to agree upon a meeting place. The Chinese wanted negotiations to be held at Nerchinsk, the Russians at Albazin; eventually Nerchinsk was selected. The Nerchinsk ostrog was located on the north bank of the Shilka River approximately 230 air miles from the confluence of the Argun/ Amur Rivers.[7]

The Chinese employed two Westerners to act as interpreters, a French Jesuit Priest, Jean-Francois Gerbillon, and a Portuguese Jesuit, Thomas Pereira.[8] Gerbillon arrived in Peking in March 1688, only two months prior to being commissioned a Colonel for the Selenginsk mission! Originally the Emperor did not appoint Han Chinese (non-Manchu) to the mission, but two were eventually added to the group. However, since the Han Chinese officials appointed were scholars ignorant of horsemanship they became a burden on the trip, consequently only Manchu ministers were

sent to the Nerchinsk conference in 1689. Although the Manchu representatives were excellent horsemen, they were, unfortunately, not scholars or men of letters and thus they left no account of this mission![9]

Several sources claim that the Chinese intent at the conference was to limit Russian holdings:

> "The Manchus desired to limit Russian holdings to the territory west of Lake Baikal and the Lena River," concludes O. Edmund Clubb.[10]

Lo-Shu Fu in her research states:

> . . . At that time China demanded both Nerchinsk and Albazin, in addition to the whole Amur River. Actually China desired to push the Russians back to Yakusk, making the Lena River the natural boundary between the two countries.[11]

Lake Baikal and the Lena River represent two natural terrain features that could easily have been used to delimit the frontier.

Missions from the two countries met on the frontier in mid-August 1689; Feodor Golovin for the Russians and So-e-Tu for the Chinese. The actual meeting place was set up mid-way between the camps of the two groups. The Russians regarded the presence of the Jesuit interpreters with suspicion since the Jesuit order had suffered numerous rebuffs from Moscow in recent years and relations between Rome (Catholic) and Moscow (Orthodox) were, at best, strained.

The preliminaries, the ceremonial and the plenum sessions involved extreme measures by both sides to preserve a sense of diplomatic equality; Chinese military strength was, however, greater.

The initial sessions focused primarily on proposals and counter-proposals dealing with delimitation of the frontier and failed to produce immediate results.

The task of actually negotiating the treaty was done by the Jessuits Gerbillon and Pereira for the Chinese, and the Pole, Belobotsky, for the Russian side. Unfortunately, the Mongol translators for each side were so poor that Latin had to be used.[12] One can only speculate on what would have happened had Mongolian, the "common" language of both the Russians and Chinese, been used successfully rather than Latin, and the necessity to rely on Western interpreters had not been so acute.

Both missions entered negotiations technically ignorant and ill equipped to undertake so important a task as delimiting the frontier. Both countries faced internal problems as well as the uncertainity of a third-force (the Mongols) who were not above playing one power against the other. Delimitation was subject to numerous proposals and counterproposals before negotiations finally gave tacit agreement to a zone that was spelled out in a concise but ambiguous treaty. The exact intent and meaning given to the delimitation by both sides remain subject to differing interpretations:

Lo-Shi Fu cites from a memorial prepared for the Emperor:

> After we (the Chinese delegates) met them we told their ambassadors: 'The Lena (Li-ya-na) River was originally our territory; can we establish the natural boundary there? Ambassador Feodor (Golovin) would not agree to this . . . .'[13]

O'Brien provides the following sequel of events: first, the Russians suggested withdrawal of both sides to a zone which existed prior to 1682 (previous to the seige of Albazin). Chinese refusal caused the negotiations to bog down; the Russians asked for the minimum terms acceptable to the Chinese, and So-e-Tu presented a map and traced his terms--a line following the Gorbitsa River in a northeast arc through the great chain of the Outer Khingan Mountains, with the region west of the river to Russia, east to China, and the area north of the mountains to Russia, south to China. Furthermore, the lands west and north of the Argun River whould remain with Russia, the remainder to China.[14]

Golovin's counterproposal put the boundary from the source of the Gorbitsa to the mouth of the Amur with Russia claiming all land to the north of the boundary and China all land to the south.[15] The Chinese recognized that Russian control of the mouth of the Amur would give them access into the heartland of Manchuria, thus they withdrew from the session and called for a show of force. The Russians backed by a much smaller military capability realized additional compromises would be necessary.

Negotiations continued with Latin interpreters on both sides getting intimately involved. The Ud River became a stumbling block in connection with the Khingan Mountain chain since these mountains did not extend directly to the sea, but broke up into lesser mountain belts, one of which turned northeast

toward the Russian settlement of Okhotsk (this the Chinese called the Nosse range). The Russian interpretation was of another mountain chain, one which served as a barrier, veering south and then east, generally paralleling the course of the Amur River. The Ud River folwed between these two mountain chains forming a vast valley that was known to the Russians for its high quality sables. The Russians refused to recognize the Chinese interpretation of the Nosse range and the negotiations appeared to approach another stalemate. It was Gerbillon's efforts that convinced the Chinese that the mountain range they were referring to was located over a thousand leagues from Peking. Both parties agreed to leave the territory in question undemarcated until both missions could consult with their respective governments.

Compromises continued until terms of the treaty were drawn up into six articles, written in Russian, Manchu, and Latin texts, with the latter announced as being the authoritative one.

> In the Russian text . . . only the territory south of the Ud River was designated as neutral. The Ud itself and the land north of it were demarked as Russian . . . the Chinese immediately raised objections, and insisted that the Russians revise the Latin draft to agree with the original Chinese intent. For some unexplained reason when the Russian and Manchu copies accompanying the final Latin text appeared, these alterations had not been made.[16]

One can only speculate as to the reason for the Chinese envoy's negligence in not checking to insure that the Russian version was changed and to clarify the ambiguous terms of the Manchu version. This oversight may have been due to the fact

that none of the Chinese envoys was a scholar or man of letters. Conversely, the reason may have been intentional, or it may even have been due to ignorance on the part of the Chinese, since this treaty was their first with a Western State. Russia, on the other hand, had far greater experience in treaty making, and was satisfied to let the ambiguity remain until a future time.

V. S. Frank is more explicit in his analysis concerning the diplomatic ploy, subtle as it may seem, bu the Russian delegation. His analysis compares the Russian and Manchu versions with the Latin text and attempts to shed light on the meaning of the first article of the treaty which defines the new northern frontier of China. A literal translation of the Russian version follows:

> 1. The river called Gorbitsa (Kerbichi), discharging itself from the left side into the river Shilka (Saghalien Vla) near the river Chernaya (Chorna), will form the frontier between the two states. Similarly, the dominions of the two states will be divided along the chain of mountains stretching from the source of that river right to the sea in such a way that all rivers, small or great, flowing into the river Amur from the southern slope of these mountains will remain in the dominion of his Czarish Majesty's Russian state. Rivers between the river Ud' (in the dominion of the Russian state) and the frontier mountains (in the dominion of the Chinese state near the Amur), discharging themselves into the sea, as well as all land between the above mentioned river Ud' and the frontier mountains, will remain undivided at present . . . .[17]

Comparison to the Latin text the Russian version reveals the following deviations:

(1) It omits the closer definition of the rivers flowing from the other side of the mountains (which are to remain Russian)--qui ad Borealem plagam vergunt,
(2) It defines the river Ud' as being "in the dominion of the Russian state," and
(3) It defines the mountain chain serving as frontier between the two Empires as lying "in the dominion of the Chinese state, near the Amur."
The two texts thus present entirely different solutions of the territorial issue. The genesis of the Latin text is described in a highly reliable source, the diary of the Jesuit father Gerbillon, who took part in the Nerchinsk talds as an interpreter and go-between . . . .[18]

Frank continues to cite Gerbillon's detailed account of the negotiations at Nerchinsk, finding that:

> . . . the Chinese claimed originally the whole territory south of the mountain chain called "Nosse," stretching itself north-eastward from the sources of the Gorbitsa jusqu' a la mer orientale et boreale and ending in a long peninsula, and (2) that they finally agreed to accept a compromise solution by which the land and rivers between the "Nosse" chain and another range running parallel with the Amur would for the time being remain undivided.
>
> What are these two ranges? The river Gorbitsa (or Kerbichi, to use its Manchu name) joins the Shika (Saghalien Ula) some one hundred miles upstream from the confluence of the latter with the Argun. The Gorbitsa has its source in the great Stanovoy Range. This chain starts in Transbaikalia under the name of Yablonnoy Range, where it separates the rivers flowing into Lake Baikal and the tributaries of the Lena from the head-rivers and tributaries of the Amur. Then it crosses the 55th degree of latitude and stretches nearly to the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk (leaving the river Ud' to the south). There it takes a sharp turn northeastward and continues under various names to the northeastern extremity of Siberia where it ends in the Chukotka Peninsula. Seventeenth-century Russian maps assumed, however, that another clearly marked range branched off the Stanovoy proper near the headwaters of the Gorbitsa and ran to the Sea of Okhotsk, reaching it south of the Ud' estuary.

> Are we entitled to identify the "Nosse" chain with the Stanovoy proper travesing the whole of Eastern Siberia? The word Nosse is, no doubt, a corrupt form of the Russian Nos, meaning (1) nose, (2) peninsula, tongue of land, cape . . . There are several peninsulas both in European Russia and in Siberia bearing that name with or without a qualifying adjective. Gerbillon calls a long mountain chain ending in a peninsula, "Nosse," obviously transferring the name of a conspicuous part to the whole. He says further that this chain stretches itself to the Eastern and the Northern seas, that is, to the Pacific and the Arctic oceans, meaning presumably that it reaches the northeastern extremity of Siberia . . . .[19]

The problem of historical research is highlighted by Lo-shi Fu:

> Identification of georgraphical terms is difficult because many place names commonly known in early Ch'ing period are no longer famous or even exant. Such problems demand a wide study of the maps, gazetteers, and journals of contemparary travellers.[20]

Using the Latin text, one can conclude that the Chinese were entitled to much more territory than many historians give them credit for:

> . . . the entire territory lying beyond the Stanovoy watershed, that is, the whole Pacific Coast including Kamchatka, was to become a no man's land. The Russian delegates, however, were quick to see that the very laconism of the Latin text rendered it rather ambiguous. In a very astute and farsighted manner, they "touched it up" in translating it into Russian. Without explicitly contradicting the Latin text, they made a few seemingly trivial changes which gave a totally different meaning to the treaty:
>
> (1) The qualifying oblique sentence qui ad Borealem vergunt, referring to rivers "flowing from the other side of the mountains" which were to remain in Russian possession, was dangerous from the Muscovite point of view: the Russians intended to "smuggle" into the treaty another chain, viz., one running parallel to the Amur. In this case, a large number of rivers flowing into the Pacific north of this chain would remain Russian. The Latin clause implied that only rivers flowing into the Artic were to remain Russian; it was therefore dropped from the Russian text.

(2) and (3) The closer definition of the river Ud' as being under Russian dominion and on the frontier chain as being under Chinese dominion narrows the provisionally undivided territory to a comparatively small area and surreptitiously substitutes one mountain chain for another.

The Russian delegation thus managed to substitute a totally different mountain chain for one demanded by the Chinese, eliminating the potential threat of a Chinese claim for a large slice of eastern Siberia, including the whole Pacific Coast. It also managed to dodge a definite demarkation in the Far East.[21]

ANNEX B, NOTE 2

Developments between 1727-1842

From the period of the Treaty of Kyakhta onward, China's wealth became widely known and foreign attempts to penetrate her trade barriers were intensified. European industrialization provided further impetus for new markets. Meanwhile, Russia continued to explore and dominate the north Pacific until 1778 when Englishman James Cook passed thru the Bering Straits. In 1784 the first U. S. ship docked at Canton.

The French Revolution and Napoleonic wars diverted Russia's attention to her western front once again. Moreover, the emergence of England and France as military powers with strong navies threatened Russia's expansionist policies. As the European front quieted, China became the prize, and increased pressure was exerted on the Middle Kingdom. The modern weapons of warfare employed by the "barbarians" were no match for the Chinese forces and by the mid-19th century a series of armed clashes, starting with the Opium Wars of 1839-42, breeched the Celestial trade wall and won for Britian a firm foothold. France and the US followed, and the trade wall slowly crumbled in a rapid sequence of treaties. The unequal treaty system cast the Chinese into an inferior legal status, opened five ports to most favored nation trade, and provided the foreign signator'es extraterritorial jurisdiction over their own citizens.[22]

China's predicament became progressively worse. Her contentment to mark time gave the western nations the needed technological advantage that was to bring China to her knees. She could only look forward to meeting her obligations on equal footing after she had mastered western technology and international law.

ANNEX B, NOTE 3

The Treaty of Aigun.

Russian insistence on realignment of the border and her relentless efforts to obtain most-favored nation treatment in trade matters (in the face of mounting competition from England, France and the US) added to China's growing problems. Moreover, internal dissent and rebellion drained China's treasury and limited her capability to mount an effective military response against the aggressive seafaring powers. Despotism played its role too. I-Shan, a member of the imperial clan who had been administratively admonished for his part in the Nanking Treaty, was transferred to ILi and later was named commander of forces on the Amur.[23]

Since the Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kyakhta, nothing had been done about demarcation of the "mountain chain" and settlement of the Ud River question. Dispite the treaty, the northeastern frontier had become subject to frequent disturbances; not only to trap game, but demanding tribute from the tribes in the area as well. The Manchus, taxed with more pressing problems, failed to exert necessary control over the sparsely populated area. These irregularities resulted in large part from ignorance of the country and loose interpretation of an extremely vague treaty. The Russians had thoroughly probed the Amur River to its estuary by the mid 1850's without serious Manchu confrontation.

To protect her Far Eastern interests from the persistent seafaring powers, Russia felt she urgently needed a foothold in a warm water port in the Pacific.[24]

Admiral Putyatin had tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a new border treaty and was in Peking attempting to get an audience with the Emperor in the spring of 1858. Meanwhile I-Shan met with Muraviev to discuss the border. The Russian opened by boldly suggesting that the Amur and Ussuri Rivers be used to delimit the new boundary. Upon I-Shan's refusal, Muraviev appeared upset and left. That evening his "navy" fired a steady bombardment which continued throughout the night. The next day, I-Shan, obviously affected by the night's activity, sought another conference with Muraviev. The two met again and negotiated the Aigun Treaty of Friendship and Boundary on 28 May 1858.[25]

In less than one week of negotiations, Muraviev had astutely evaded the dilatory tactics of the Manchus and enhanced the Russian Empire with the entire north bank of the Amur, bringing her one step closer to a suitable, unencumbered frontier on the Pacific. The Ch'ing Court, furious shen it learned of I-Shan's agreement, recalled him and stripped him of all powers.[26] Yet, troubled with pressures on her seafront, China could ill afford to fight Russia at this time--a peaceful settlement was required, and in less than six weeks both countries ratified the Aigun Treaty.[27]

ANNEX B

FOOTNOTES

1. Bickford C. O'Brien, Russia Under Two Tsars 1682-1689, pp. 113-114.

2. Mark Mancall, Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728, pp. 142-143.

3. Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820), Vol. I and II, p. 94.

4. Ibid., p. 95.

5. Mancall, pp. 151-152.

6. Fu, p. 95.

7. O'Brien, p. 114.

8. Fu, pp. 475-476.

9. Ibid., pp. 473-474.

10. Edmund O. Clubb, China & Russia The "Great Game", p. 33.

11. Fu, p. 474.

12. Mancall, p. 156.

13. Fu, p. 102.

14. O'Brien, p. 116.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 117.

17. V. S. Frank, The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 21, p. 266. Permission to quote extensively from this article was obtained from the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., pp. 267-268.

20. Fu, p. XV.

21. Frank, pp. 269-270.

22. Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese, Their History and Culture, p. 343.

23. Clubb, p. 77.

24. David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia, pp. 18-19.

25. Clubb, p. 85.

26. Ibid., p. 87.

27. William F. Mayers, Treaties Between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers, p. 96.

ANNEX C

SINO-RUSSIAN-JAPANESE DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1858-1937

In the latter half of the 19th century, contest for Manchuria and Korea began to develop into a three-way power struggle: One leg of the triad was anchored by a weakened and passive China, the second by a powerful and cocksure Russia, and the third by a growing and determined Japan. From the power-politics that developed came armed confrontation in which each became involved with one or the other in a vacillating display of political intrique.

The Manchurian-Far Eastern boundary became a conduit for the transmission of foreign policy by the three contending nations (China, Japan, and the USSR) up to WWII. Highlights of these events pull together the political intrique and grand strategy that fashioned subsequent actions:

1858: Foreign intervention coupled with domestic rebellion pressured the Manchu Empire to cede to Russia 185,000 square miles in the Treaty of Aigun.

1860: Mounting external pressures forced China to sign numerous "unequal treaties" including the Peking treaty which awarded to Russia the Maritime Province (133,000 square miles).

1861-1900: The Ch'ing Dynasty was thrown into a state of disunity and corruption by the death of Emperor Hsien-Feng and the emergence of Regent rule by the two Dowagers--the Eastern Empress and the Western Empress. Increased corruption and reluctance of the

scholar-officials to separate the Middle Kingdom concept from the reality of western technology impeded China's modernization of domestic affairs, foreign policy, and international relations.[1]

1891: China's plan for construction of a railroad to link Peking with the northeastern cities of Manchuria coincided with Russia's desire to interconnect the European region and the Maritime Province with a transcontinental railroad. The Tsar seized the opportunity to facilitate Russia's ambitious plan in the 1896 Sino-Russian "Secret Pact" which established the Chinese Eastern Railway Company (CER). In this pact, Russia gained numerous concessions at China's expense, ranging from the right to station armed guards in Manchuria (for protection of Russian interests), rights to the Railroad for 80 years, and the right to connect the Far Eastern line between Chita and Vladivostok by cutting across Chinese territory in northern Manchuria. The Railroad became an important factor in the economic development of the region as well as an irritable source of conflicting interests in the volatile power-politics of China-Russia-Japan.[2]

1895: Japan's decisive victory in 1895 added Asian insult to the humiliation reaped upon China by the Western powers. China's concessions included the loss of Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula (which was later renounced) to Japan and recognition of Korea's independence.

1900: China's retaliation against foreign encroachment during the Boxer Rebellion episode ended in Chinese defeat. Near the city

of Blagoveshchensk, on the north bank of the Amur, Russian reaction to the rebellion was as drastic as it was brutal, ending in the massacre of thousands of Chinese; those who escaped were forced to flee the "64 villages," an area which had been reserved by the Treaty of Aigun for Chinese domicile in perpetuity. China was saved from being carved up like a mellon, but Russia's interest in Mancuria mounted.

1904: By 1903, the trans-Manchurian railroad and its southern branch to Ports Arthur and Dalny (Dairen) had progressed at a rapid rate. Russia's desire to annex Manchuria was frustrated by the combined pressures of Japan and other Occidental powers.[3] Nearby, conflicting interests in Korea and Manchuria precipitated the 1904 Russo-Japanese War that ended in Japanese victory. The Treaty of Portsmouth conceded to Japan, among other things, the southern spur of the Manchurian railroad from Dairen and Port Arthur to as far north as Changchun, and the transfer of Russian leasehold in Liaotung. It also required the evacuation of Russian (as well as Japanese) troops from Manchuria, except for the leased zone and the railroad territory.[4] By this action, Japan gained a foothold in China and posed a threat to Russia.

1911-1912: Overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and establishment of the Republic of China.

1915: The outbreak of World War I occupied the European powers. Recognizing this as to her advantage, Japan issued the famous 21 demands on China which expressed Japan's aggressive policy in the

Far East. Articles 1, 2, and 6 are of particular interest:

> Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term respecting the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to a further period of ninety-nine years respectively.
>
> Article 2. The Japanese subjects shall be permitted in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to lease or own land required either for erecting buildings for various commercial and industrial uses or for farming.
>
> Article 6. The Chinese Government engage that whenever the Chinese Government need the service of political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan shall first be consulted.[5]

Thus, by strengthening her position in South Manchuria, Japan began to clarify her visions of a Manchurian state separate from China.

1917: Soviet revolution, overthrow of the Tsar, and establishment of Communist Russia (USSR). In 1918, while the Civil War gained momentum, troops from China, Japan, USA, England, France, and Czechoslovakia made a joint military intervention into Siberia, but were withdrawn by 1922.

1919-1920: As the civil war in Russia raged, the Soviet Foreign Office addressed several notes to the Chinese Central Government which outlined the Soviet policy toward China. The notes, signed by Lev Mikhailovitch Karakhan (who later became the Soviet Envoy to China), declared null and void all previous treaties, agreements, etc. between the Tsarist regime and China. These notes ignited Chinese nationalism and reportedly had a profound effect on the leanings of

a then obscure student "intellect," Mao Tse-tung. The essence of the 1919 declaration read:

> /We promise/ to give back to the Chinese people all the power and authority which were obtained by the Government of the Tsar by entering into understandings with Japan and the Allies. . . . The Soviet Government has renounced all the conquests made by the Tsarist Government which took away from China Manchuria and other territories. The population of these territories shall decide for themselves to which country they would like to belong. . . .[6]

A year later the second Karakhan declaration, which reinforced the first, was more specific with regard to Moscow's unilateral "abrogation" of treaties between China and Russia:

> The Government of the RSFSR declares null and void all treaties concluded with China by the former Governments of Russia, renounces all seizure of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China, and restores to China, without compensation and forever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie. . . .[7]

1921: Mongolia declared her independence and entered into a secret treaty with the USSR. In 1924, the Republic of China (ROC) formally recognized Mongolia's separation from China. Although the USSR recognized China's "sovereignty" over Mongolia, Soviet dominance over the country prevailed. With the Mongolian issue settled, attention refocused on Manchuria.

1924: The ROC-USSR Treaty of 31 May 1924 paved the way for reestablishment of normal relations between China and the Soviet Union. Articles III and IV of the treaty formalized the Karakhan notes of 1920 and 1921, and Article VII dealt with the redemarcation

of their boundaries. The English translation of the treaty does not reflect the term "unequal treaties:"

> Article III. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to annul at the Conference as provided in the preceding Article, all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, etc., concluded between the Government of China and the Tsarist Government and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, etc., on the basis of equality, reciprocity and justice, as well as the spirit of the Declarations of the Soviet Government of the years of 1919 and 1920.[8]

Again, it is important to see the term "redemarcation" and not "demarcation," the former being more restrictive.

> Article VII. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to redemarcate their national boundaries at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, and pending such redemarcation, to maintain the present boundaries.[9]

Basically, in Article II, the signatories agreed to hold a conference to work out details relative to questions developed from the twenty-five articles of the treaty. The conference was to be held within a month of the signing of the agreement, with the detailed arrangements relative to the questions to be completed not later than six months subsequent to the opening of the conference.

1929: Hints of the first Sino-Soviet "war" had been brewing over the volatile issue of the Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER) and by mid-July 1929, the situation grew tense. The ROC, determined to seize the CER, continued to harass the Russians operating the railroad, causing a rupture in the relations between the two countries. The big powers attempted to mediate a conciliation, but without success, and on 18 November 1929, a two-pronged attack by Russia and Mongolia forces

across the Manchouli and Dalainor sectors, followed by air strikes brought China to heel. Although the Chinese lacked sufficient military forces and the cohesive leadership necessary to repel the incursion, Soviet forces refrained from escalating the conflict. A peace protocol was arranged in Khabarovsk on 22 December 1929, bringing about the re-establishment of the status quo and a joint agreement to meet and work out all outstanding questions. Until Japan invaded Manchuria 19 months later, virtually no progress was made on these issues.[10]

1931: Japan, firmly intrenched and enjoying the fruits of an industrialized southern Manchuria, pressed home her visions of keeping Manchuria independent from China, when she invaded Manchuria in September 1931, to set into motion the Sino-Japanese war. Russia, by virtue of her presence in Manchuria and having her Far East frontier adjacent to the area, became indirectly involved in the conflict. Relations between Japan and Russia began to falter and in 1933, desirous of extricating herself from Manchuria, Moscow initiated negotiations for the sale of the CER to Japan. It was not until 12 March 1935, however, that Russia and Japan came to terms on the sale of the railroad, much to the chagrin of the Chinese who were part owners.[11]

The Japanese-Russian Border Conflicts 1935-1945

An examination of the major incidents between Russia and Japan will reveal the role played by the uncertainty of various segments of the boundary line between Manchuria and the Soviet Far East.

As will be recalled, the treaties that delimited the Manchurian--Far Eastern boundary were concluded between Tsarist Russia and Manchu Empire. Both empires were subsequently replaced and the succeeding states, the ROC and USSR, agreed to nullify all previous treaties and agreements and to redemarcate their common boundaries; they further agreed that until such commissions accomplished the details, things would remain status quo.

Ironically, the boundary question remained unsettled, and when Japan invaded Manchuria seven years later, she inherited China's border problem.

A. O. Cukwurah states that it is customary that once a boundary treaty has been ratified and executed, it operates as a legal instrument of conveyance. "A successor state then succeeds not to the treaty as such but to the boundaries of its territory, as it does to the other facts of its international life."[12]

By the summer of 1935, Japanese activities along the Manchurian border and Inner Mongolia increased tensions and prompted a series of incidents with Mongolian and Soviet troops. As a result, the Japanese proposed and the Russians accepted, a plan to set up a border commission to handle border incidents. As so frequently happened in the past, nothing came of the proposal and new incidents involving armed conflict began to increase. Besides blaming the Soviets for instigating the incidents, the Japanese claimed that the violations resulted from the fact that the boundary lacked "clear" definition. Japan was

particularly interested in a joint commission to define the border between Lake Khanka and the Tumen River. Russia retorted that Manchukuo had, in fact, inherited binding treaties that had clearly defined the boundary. In spite of accusations and proposals by both sides, progress on defining the boundaries was virtually nil. Similarly, efforts by Manchukuo and the Mongols to clarify the boundary issue along the Mongol frontier also brought negative results.[13] The Mongolian-Manchurian boundary was reportedly fixed by Manchu authorities during the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1734 to separate warring pastoral nomads. Despite this "boundary," disputes continued constantly thereafter with the more powerful tribe gaining control. No definitive demarcation line was ever laid out or observed,[14] hence, the Mongolia People's Republic and Japan/Manchukuo faced a familiar "unclear" boundary dilemma around their common frontier.

By 1936, both sides were apparently using border incidents as an instrument of military and foreign policy; the power-politics of the incidents became manifested in Japanese and Soviet press releases. Border tensions appeared to be an ideal political vehicle for influencing events between West Europe and the Far East.

In late 1935 Izvestia reported a secret military alliance between Germany and Japan, and the Soviet press charged that the Japanese border incidents occurred at the request of Germany in order to prevent ratification of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance agreement. Furthermore, the press predicted that more incidents would occur and they did. These border flare-ups renewed the call for an impartial

commission to investigate the incidents. Again, Japan reiterated her former position, that the disputes were due to an ill-defined border which required demarcation. Moscow wanted the commission extended to cover Mongolia as well as the Manchurian boundary, and was also emphatic in pointing out that "demarcation" was out of the question since it was purely a matter of "redemarcation" of the existing "frontier"; Izvestia had only to refer to the Peking treaty of 1924 (Articles III and VII).[15]

The Japanese softened their position and, in March 1936, reopened an earlier proposal to redemarcate the Lake Khanka-Tumen River boundary. The Japanese were willing to set up a permanent commission to investigate incidents in the aforementioned sector contingent upon its redemarcation. The Soviets wanted assurances that their acceptance of the proposal would depend upon broadening the scope of the plan to cover the entire frontier to include Mongolia which was already under study by the Manchukuo/Mongol authorities.[16]

As the decade passed its half-way mark, a series of important events had occurred that were to influence the closing years of the 1930's in the Far East. The Long March by the Chinese Communists during the period 1934-36 established Mao Tse-tung as the Party's leader and provided the organization with a base of operation in Yenen. The Sian incident involving Chiang Kai-Shek and the former Manchurian War Lord, Chang Hsueh-liang, brought the Chinese Nationalists and Communists together in a "united front" against the Japanese. Stalin's ruthless

purge that commenced in 1934 was in full swing, and in January 1937, it was learned that some of those on trial had been indicted for advocating the cession of the Far East to Japan.[17] The purges reportedly affected the morale of the Soviet Armed Forces including those on the Far Eastern front. Then, sparked by the Marco Polo Bridge incident, Japan unleased her "second" invasion of China in September 1937. Russia, troubled with increasingly difficult international events on her west, was forced to keep a cautious eye on her East; Japan, fully engaged in the south, had to temper her actions on her north. On 21 August 1937, China (ROC) and the Soviet Union (USSR) signed a treaty of non-aggression.

ANNEX C

FOOTNOTES

1. Chien-nung Li, The Political History of China, 1840-1928, pp. 103-109.

2. Paul H. Clyde, International Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689-1922, pp. 52-55.

3. Ibid., p. 117.

4. Ibid., p. 143.

5. Ibid., pp. 234-235.

6. David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia, p. 181.

7. Ibid., p. 182.

8. Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-1945, pp. 156-157.

9. Ibid., p. 157.

10. Dallin, pp. 265-268.

11. Moore, p. 27.

12. A. O. Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law, pp. 105-106.

13. Moore, pp. 55-59.

14. US Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Vol. XI, Part 1, p. 37.

15. Moore, pp. 62-63.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 80.

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