

ROUTING AND ACTION

MEMORANDUM

ROUTING

TO:(1) Humans in Complex Systems Branch (HCxS) (Troyer, Lisa)

Report is available for review

(2) Proposal Files Report No.: -MRI

Proposal Number: 70569-HC-MRI.9

DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL

CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER: W911NF-17-1-0028

INSTITUTION: George Mason University

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Eric McGlinchey

TYPE REPORT: Final Report

DATE RECEIVED: 8/30/23 6:24PM

PERIOD COVERED: 1/3/17 12:00AM through 1/2/21 12:00AM

TITLE: Final Report: Russian, Chinese, Militant, and Ideologically Extremist Messaging Effects on United States Favorability Perceptions in Central Asia

ACTION TAKEN BY DIVISION

(x) Report has been reviewed for technical sufficiency and IS ☒ IS NOT ☐ satisfactory.

(x) Based on my technical review, I have identified no OPSEC or Technology Protection concerns that need to be addressed regarding this report.

(x) Performance of the research effort was accomplished in a satisfactory manner and all other technical requirements have been fulfilled.

(x) Based upon my knowledge of the research project, I agree with the patent information disclosed.

Approved by SSL\LISA.L.TROYER on 8/31/23 8:41AM

ARO FORM 36-E

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB NO. 0704-0188		
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 30-08-2023		2. REPORT TYPE Final Report		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 3-Jan-2017 - 2-Jan-2021	
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views, opinions and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other documentation.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	15. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Eric McGlinchey
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER 703-993-2960

RPPR Final Report

as of 31-Aug-2023

Agency Code: 21XD

Proposal Number: 70569HCMRI
INVESTIGATOR(S):

Agreement Number: W911NF-17-1-0028

Name: Eric McGlinchey
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DUNS Number: 077817450

EIN: 540836354

Report Date: 30-Jun-2023

Date Received: 30-Aug-2023

Final Report for Period Beginning 03-Jan-2017 and Ending 02-Jan-2021

Title: Russian, Chinese, Militant, and Ideologically Extremist Messaging Effects on United States Favorability Perceptions in Central Asia

Begin Performance Period: 03-Jan-2017

End Performance Period: 02-Jan-2021

Report Term: 0-Other

Submitted By: Eric McGlinchey

Email: emcglinc@gmu.edu

Phone: (703) 993-2960

Distribution Statement: 1-Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

STEM Degrees: 0

STEM Participants:

Major Goals: The objective our research has been to investigate variations in perceptions of the United States abroad, particularly in regions where the US government extends considerable resources in military cooperation and development assistance. We explore why perceptions of the US in some Muslim-majority countries are increasingly negative, despite the US government's considerable investment in bilateral and multilateral cooperation efforts. We explore the causal effects as well as the causal mechanisms behind Russian, Chinese, and ideologically extremist anti-American propaganda efforts. We mix survey analysis, focus groups, ethnographies, and field experiments. We leverage existing surveys we began with the State Department's Office of Opinion Research's large holdings of Central Asia surveys but have since moved to Gallup's World Polls -- to develop a baseline of changing US favorability perceptions in Central Asia. The Gallup surveys allowed us to explore, albeit imperfectly, potential effects, patterns of association between variations in US favorability and suspected causal variables related to the media efforts of militant and ideologically extremist groups as well as to the soft power efforts of Russia and China. We are now conducting field research both focus groups and surveys -- to develop a clearer sense of the causal mechanisms driving US favorability perceptions in Central Asia.

Thus, broadly, our project's three major objectives are:

- (1) Establish a baseline of US favorability perceptions in Central Asia;
- (2) identify relationships between US favorability perceptions and demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral variables; and
- (3) isolate the causal mechanisms driving variations in US favorability perceptions.

We proposed to accomplish these objectives through a mixed-methods data collection approach using a mixture of (1) interviews with Eurasian activists, scholars, and political elites, (2) focus groups (3) and nation-wide surveys.

We proposed to convey our findings to US government analysts and policy makers as well as to a broader audience through publications, policy papers, and academic studies.

Accomplishments: Accomplishments

We are grateful to the Department of Defense Minerva Initiative for adjusting the grant duration so as to accommodate COVID field research delays. Ultimately, we were able to collect all data we proposed to collect in Central Asia as well as conduct 3 additional nation-wide surveys in the Caucasus. We summarize our data

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collection below:

**** Nationally-Representative Surveys in Seven Eurasian Countries****

We conducted four nationally-representative surveys in Central Asia in the Fall of 2022

1. Kazakhstan
2. Kyrgyzstan
3. Tajikistan
4. Uzbekistan

We conducted three nationally-representative surveys in the Caucasus in the summer of 2023

1. Armenia
2. Azerbaijan
3. Georgia

**** Five Rounds of Focus Groups ****

We completed focus groups in 3 Central Asian countries in the spring and summer of 2023

1. Kazakhstan
2. Kyrgyzstan
3. Uzbekistan

We completed focus groups in 2 Central Asian countries in spring 2019

1. Kazakhstan
2. Kyrgyzstan

**** Interviews ****

We conducted interviews with academics and activists in Kyrgyzstan at the project's launch in the summer and winter of 2017.

Given the COVID interruption, the majority of our data collection occurred at the end of the project. We are now working on a book monograph as well as several articles based on the data we have collected.

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Training Opportunities:

US as well as Central Asia-based graduate students worked with PIs McGlinchey and Laruelle throughout the grant. At George Mason University, Shahnoza Nozimova helped with survey instrument design and survey instrument translation. Dr. Nozimova completed her dissertation in 2022 and, in January 2023, began a 3-year postdoc at Oxford University. Dr. Nozimova and PI-McGlinchey are working on a co-authored article on great power influence in Tajikistan.

Dylan Royce, a PhD student at George Washington University, helped with data analysis of past, publicly available survey data and co-authored several papers with co-PI Laruelle.

PIs McGlinchey and Laruelle worked closely with several Central Asian scholars. Of particular note is our partnership with Central Asia Barometer (CAB), the academic-research team that implemented our focus groups and surveys in 2022 and 2023. The CAB partnership began with PI McGlinchey's mentorship of Kasiet Ysmanova while she was a visiting scholar at GWU's Central Asia Program, a program for which co-PI Laruelle serves as Director. Ysmanova, a scholar from Kyrgyzstan, has been Laruelle and McGlinchey's leading partner with CAB for the conduct of focus groups. Ysmanova is now in the process of applying for PhD programs.

Our CAB lead for the surveys has been Gulzhan Begeyeva. Begeyeva is a scholar from Kazakhstan. Begeyeva worked closely with us in the design of the 7 surveys and, with PI-McGlinchey, in the in-person piloting of the surveys. Begeyeva is currently a PhD student in Anthropology and Sociology at the Geneva Graduate Institute.

Two additional Central Asia-based scholars worked with McGlinchey and Laruelle in conducting the 2019 focus groups. Asel Doolotkeldieva, a scholar from Kyrgyzstan, worked with McGlinchey to conduct the 2019 focus groups in Kyrgyzstan. Serik Beisembayev, Director of the Astana Center for Sociological Research partnered with Laruelle to conduct the 2019 Kazakhstan focus groups.

Results Dissemination:

Our central focus this final year has been completing data collection (as described under major goals). We will be devoting the months ahead to analyzing the large amount of data we have collected and publishing findings.

PI McGlinchey delivered the following talks during the final year of the grant:

- September 9, 2022. "Russia's Erosion in Central Asia." PONARS Eurasia Policy Conference (Washington, DC).
- May 3, 2023. "Russian, Chinese, Militant, and Ideologically Extremist Messaging Effects on United States Favorability Perceptions in Central Asia." Annual Minerva Meeting (Arlington, VA).
- June 27, 2023. "Great Powers' Influence on Current Central Asian Politics." Department of State Foreign Service Institute (Arlington, VA).

PI McGlinchey, in his February 9, 2023 State Department briefing for Manuel Micaller, US Ambassador to Tajikistan, also presented survey results from the Minerva project's fall 2022 Central Asia surveys.

PI McGlinchey published one policy paper during the final year of the grant:

- "Russia's Erosion in Central Asia," PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 808, November 2022.

Honors and Awards: Nothing to Report

Protocol Activity Status:

Technology Transfer: Nothing to Report

PARTICIPANTS:

Participant Type: PD/PI

Participant: Eric Max McGlinchey

Person Months Worked: 12.00

Funding Support:

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as of 31-Aug-2023

Project Contribution:
National Academy Member: N

Participant Type: Co PD/PI
Participant: Marlene Laruelle
Person Months Worked: 12.00
Project Contribution:
National Academy Member: N

Funding Support:

Participant Type: Postdoctoral (scholar, fellow or other postdoctoral position)
Participant: Shahnoza Nozimova
Person Months Worked: 1.00
Project Contribution:
National Academy Member: N

Funding Support:

ARTICLES:

Publication Type: Journal Article Peer Reviewed: Y **Publication Status:** 0-Other
Journal: Under Review
Publication Identifier Type: Other Publication Identifier:
Volume: Issue: First Page #:
Date Submitted: 8/29/18 12:00AM Date Published:
Publication Location:
Article Title: "The Erosion of US Soft Power in Central Asia"
Authors: Eric McGlinchey, Wendy Chen
Keywords: Soft power, Kyrgyzstan, United States, Central Asia
Abstract: The US is suffering an image crisis in Kyrgyzstan. Public opinion polls between 2001 and 2014 reveal a nearly 50 percent drop in Kyrgyz favorability perceptions of the US. We explore the drivers behind this collapse. Using surveys, field interviews, and an analysis of the Kyrgyz press, we find that public skepticism of US foreign policy objectives as well as trust of the Russian state media's framing of Washington's foreign policy objectives has adversely influenced US soft power in Kyrgyzstan.
Distribution Statement: 3-Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors
Acknowledged Federal Support: Y

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Publication Type: Journal Article Peer Reviewed: Y **Publication Status:** 1-Published
Journal: Central Asian Survey
Publication Identifier Type: DOI **Publication Identifier:** <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2019.15961>
Volume: **Issue:** **First Page #:**
Date Submitted: 5/26/19 12:00AM **Date Published:** 4/10/19 4:00AM
Publication Location:
Article Title: Kazakhstani Public Opinion of the United States: Testing Variables of (Un)favorability
Authors: Marlene Laruelle, Dylan Royce
Keywords: Kazakhstan, United States, Soft Power, Public Opinion, Russia
Abstract: In this article, we look at Kazakhstanis' attitude toward the United States. After noting the decline in favorability toward the US since 2014, we explore some of the demographics that help identify which part of the population displays the most and least favorable perceptions of the US. We probe five main causal explanations: age and proficiency in English as determinants of favorability; Russian ethnicity, language, and news sources as determinants of unfavorability. We find that these explanations are largely unsupported by the data, with some nuances in the case of the second explanation. We conclude by discussing the need for in-depth research to advance our understanding of the observed ambivalences, and explore the policy implications of our findings.
Distribution Statement: 3-Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors
Acknowledged Federal Support: Y

Publication Type: Journal Article Peer Reviewed: N **Publication Status:** 1-Published
Journal: EUCAM Commentary
Publication Identifier Type: Other **Publication Identifier:**
Volume: 28 **Issue:** **First Page #:**
Date Submitted: 8/29/18 12:00AM **Date Published:** 10/1/17 4:00AM
Publication Location:
Article Title: Renewing EU and US Soft Power in Central Asia
Authors: Marlene Laruelle, Eric McGlinchey
Keywords: European Union, United States, Central Asia, Public Opinion, Soft Power
Abstract: Western influence in Central Asia is at an all-time low since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Europe – the European Union (EU) and individual member states alike – and the United States (US) supported Central Asian governments' efforts to join international organisations and to advance political, economic, and social reforms. Today, Western engagement and visibility in the region has diminished. Afghanistan is no longer the central focus of US foreign policy and hence US interest in Central Asia has waned. The EU, while active in development programming and funding, has partly lost its attractiveness as a model of regional integration and, as such, features less prominently in Central Asian states' perceptions. Meanwhile, other countries, most notably Russia and China, but also newly-arrived actors such as the Gulf States, have strengthened their influence in Central Asia.
Distribution Statement: 3-Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors
Acknowledged Federal Support: Y

RPPR Final Report
as of 31-Aug-2023

Publication Type: Journal Article Peer Reviewed: N **Publication Status:** 1-Published
Journal: Foreign Policy Centre
Publication Identifier Type: Other **Publication Identifier:**
Volume: **Issue:** **First Page #:**
Date Submitted: 8/29/18 12:00AM **Date Published:** 7/18/18 4:00AM
Publication Location:
Article Title: The Changing Landscape of Uncivil Society in Kyrgyzstan
Authors: Eric McGlinchey
Keywords: Kyrgyzstan, Civil Society, Public Opinion
Abstract: Kyrgyzstan is correctly regarded as among the most democratic leaning of the post-Soviet states. It is the only country in Central Asia that consistently earns a “partly free” rating in Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World rankings whereas all the other Central Asian countries are rated as “not free.” Kyrgyz citizens, moreover, are themselves inclined toward democratic governance. Seventy-one percent of Kyrgyz surveyed in Gallup’s 2016 World Poll agreed with the statement: ‘democracy is important for the development of the country’. How is it, then, that a polity that with both a democratically-oriented population as well as the region’s most competitive political institutions is concomitantly a polity home to elements of illiberal civil society?
Distribution Statement: 3-Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors
Acknowledged Federal Support: Y

Publication Type: Journal Article Peer Reviewed: Y **Publication Status:** 1-Published
Journal: Central Asian Survey
Publication Identifier Type: DOI **Publication Identifier:** 10.1080/02634937.2019.1596879
Volume: 38 **Issue:** 2 **First Page #:** 197
Date Submitted: 8/30/19 12:00AM **Date Published:** 4/1/19 4:00AM
Publication Location:
Article Title: Kazakhstani public opinion of the United States and Russia: testing variables of (un)favourability
Authors: Marlene Laruelle, Dylan Royce
Keywords: Kazakhstan, United States, Russia, soft power, foreign policy
Abstract: Though Central Asia is often studied through the prism of its relationships with external powers, research on local public perceptions of these different actors has largely been overlooked. The literature on Kazakhstanis’ perceptions of their neighbours, for instance, is scarce, and mostly focused on analysis of official discourse on Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy, with little exploration of how this is received, appropriated or refuted by the population. On the basis of Gallup data spanning the last decade, and several other surveys, we test most of the main hypotheses usually advanced to explain attitudes to the US and Russia - age, ethnicity and access to information - and draw five main conclusions: (1) Kazakhstanis are not defined by an exclusive pro-US/pro-Russian dichotomy; (2) they nevertheless largely choose Russia over the US if forced to pick; (3) age does not have a significant effect on foreign policy attitudes; (4) ethnicity does affect some of the attitudes under consi
Distribution Statement: 3-Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors
Acknowledged Federal Support: Y

RPPR Final Report
as of 31-Aug-2023

Publication Type: Journal Article Peer Reviewed: Y **Publication Status:** 1-Published

Journal: Eurasian Geography and Economics

Publication Identifier Type: DOI

Publication Identifier: 10.1080/15387216.2019.1645033

Volume: 60

Issue: 2

First Page #: 211

Date Submitted: 8/30/19 12:00AM

Date Published: 7/1/19 8:00AM

Publication Location:

Article Title: Untangling the puzzle of "Russia's influence" in Kazakhstan

Authors: Marlene Laruelle, Dylan Royce, Serik Beysembayev

Keywords: Russia, Kazakhstan, influence, soft power, vectors

Abstract: The theme of "Russian influence" has been invading the think tank world. Yet the concept of influence must be deployed with care. Analysts have frequently assumed that, when states do things thought favourable to Russia, it must be because Moscow has either forced them to act in that manner, or has actively manipulated their domestic politics so that they do so. Left largely unconsidered are the various other reasons that one state might act in a manner desirable to another. In this article we look at the different vectors that might yield Russia-favorable behavior by Kazakhstan: exogenous ones that Russia actively and passively generates and endogenous ones that are passively or even actively generated within Kazakhstan itself. We discuss Russia's economic and strategic links with Kazakhstan, the issue of the Russian minority, the status of the Russian language, Russian media presence, Russia's governmental and non-governmental networks, and the "payoff" of the latter three vectors:

Distribution Statement: 3-Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors

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Publication Type: Journal Article

Peer Reviewed: Y

Publication Status: 1-Published

Journal: Journal of Eurasian Studies

Publication Identifier Type: DOI

Publication Identifier: 10.1177/18793665211030937

Volume:

Issue:

First Page #: 187936652

Date Submitted: 8/30/21 12:00AM

Date Published: 7/1/21 4:00AM

Publication Location:

Article Title: The United States in Kazakhstani public opinion: Double-edged cultural influence and the collateral damage of foreign policy

Authors: Marlene Laruelle, Dylan Royce

Keywords: Kazakhstan, public opinion, Russia, United States

Abstract: This article employs surveys by Gallup, the Central Asia Barometer, and the Barometer of Eurasian Integration, as well as focus groups that were commissioned as part of this research, to argue (1) that Kazakhstani perceptions of the United States compare unfavorably to perceptions of China and especially of Russia; (2) that Russian influence is a minor or nonexistent cause of the United States' poor image; (3) that US cultural influence has an ambiguous effect on the country's image in Kazakhstan, due to a "clash of values" between conservative Kazakhstani society and relatively liberal US cultural exports; (4) that the United States' foreign policy, especially its violation of other states' sovereignty, has an unambiguously negative effect on its image among Kazakhstanis; and (5) that the resulting relatively negative image of the United States translates into reluctance to build or maintain ties with it.

Distribution Statement: 2-Distribution Limited to U.S. Government agencies only; report contains proprietary info

Acknowledged Federal Support: Y

RPPR Final Report as of 31-Aug-2023

Publication Type: Journal Article

Peer Reviewed: N

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Journal: Foreign Policy Centre

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Publication Identifier:

Volume: Issue:

First Page #: 61

Date Submitted: 8/30/21 12:00AM

Date Published: 3/2/21 1:01AM

Publication Location: London

Article Title: Retreating Rights: Examining the pressures on human rights in Kyrgyzstan

Authors: Eric McGlinchey

Keywords: Kyrgyzstan, human rights, populism

Abstract: Three decades after the Soviet collapse, Kyrgyzstan finds itself in a catch-22. Kyrgyz state capacity is weak and, as a result, political chaos is frequent. There is an upside, however, to chaos. Whereas other Central Asian governments, most notably Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have proven able to systematically target the political opposition, religious groups, and ethnic minorities, Kyrgyz state repression of human rights has been piecemeal and fleeting. The downside of Kyrgyz chaos, particularly from the perspective of vulnerable populations, is that guarantees of basic human rights are non-existent.

Distribution Statement: 2-Distribution Limited to U.S. Government agencies only; report contains proprietary info
Acknowledged Federal Support: Y

Partners

,

I certify that the information in the report is complete and accurate:

Signature: Eric McGlinchey

Signature Date: 8/30/23 6:24PM

Abstract:

For this, our final year of the grant, we conducted nationally representative surveys in seven countries--Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. We also conducted focus groups in three countries -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The goal of this large data collection effort was to probe soft power influence of Russia, China, and the United States in Eurasia. We use several dependent variables to probe soft power influence: perceptions of the war in Ukraine; affinity toward international treaty organizations; receptivity to conspiracy theories; and respondent alignment with traditional / nationalist values or with postmaterialist values. We also use an embedded survey experiments (between-subjects design in the Central Asia surveys, within-subjects design for the Caucasus surveys) to probe if media source – Russian state media, US state media, or Chinese state media – alters respondent perceptions regarding prominent events in international relations.

Objectives:

Our surveys, embedded survey experiments, and focus groups address objectives 2 and 3 of our Minerva -funded research:

- Objective 2: Identify Causal Effects Linking US Favorability Perceptions with Attitudinal and Behavioral Variables
- Objective Three: Isolate Causal Mechanisms Driving Variations

Our surveys are among the most comprehensive, if not the most comprehensive survey-based exploration of US favorability perceptions in Eurasia. Our embedded experiment offers a rigorous approach to isolating the potential causal mechanism media source exerts. Our focus groups provide detailed narratives with which to explicate causal mechanisms identified in our surveys and experiments.

Findings:

PI McGlinchey shared initial survey results during his May 2023 presentation at the Annual Minerva Meeting. The slides from this presentation are included in this upload. Central findings which emerge from this research include the following:

1. Central Asians consume and trust Russian state media far more than they do either US state media, Chinese state media, or Western media.
2. Central Asians are far more likely to agree with the statement that the US provoked "the conflict in Ukraine" than they are to agree with the statement that Russia provoked the conflict in Ukraine.
3. The majority of Central Asian respondents agree with the Russian state media-promulgated narrative that the "US is supporting ISIS so as to increase Washington's influence in the Middle East and Eurasia."

While our analysis of survey and focus group data is only just beginning, the above preliminary findings are cause for considerable concern. Moscow, despite its aggression in Ukraine, is held in high regard in Central Asia. Washington, in contrast, is viewed with suspicion. It is our hypothesis that this suspicion is not entirely attributable to deep-seated antipathy toward the United States. Rather, we suspect that this striking variation in how Central Asians perceive Moscow and Washington is a result of Russia's considerably greater presence in the Central Asian information space. Our analysis of the Caucasus surveys--the data for which we have just received--will allow us to probe this hypothesis.

Enclosed Documents:

1. Slides from McGlinchey's Minerva Annual Meeting Presentation
2. McGlinchey's policy paper, "Russia's Erosion in Central Asia," PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 808, November 2022.
3. Armenia survey instrument. The Azerbaijan and Georgia survey instruments, including the within-subject experiment embedded in these instruments, follow the same format as the Armenia survey.

Great Power Influence in Central Asia

2023 Minerva Meeting
May 3, 2023

Eric McGlinchey Marlene Laruelle
emcglinc@gmu.edu laruelle@gwu.edu



THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON, DC

Descriptive Questions

How prominent is foreign state media in Central Asian news consumption?

Do Central Asians trust foreign state media?

Do Central Asian world views parallel positions advanced in different foreign state media outlets?

Causal Question

Does consumption of foreign state media shape Central Asian world views?

Field research

Surveys in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan


- completed in November 2022

Focus groups in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan


- currently in the field

Surveys in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia


- pilots complete
- surveys in the field



Media frequency as news source



Trust in news source






Англосаксы пытаются остановить самую опасную эпидемию

18:45 05.12.2020 (обновлено: 14:27 14.12.2021)




LGBT rights and country culture



США коррумпировали Украину и управляют ею в своих интересах — эксперт

14:45 20.04.2023 (обновлено: 15:00 20.04.2023)



Подписаться на

Новости

Telegram


Политолог Александр Дудчак прокомментировал власти США о выделении средств на борьбу на Украине.

99+ материалов


Спецоперация России по защите Донбасса

Россия признала независимость ДНР и ЛНР. 24 февраля 2022 года Владимир Путин объявил о начале специальной военной операции российских войск в Донбассе. Подробности о спецоперации РФ читайте в материалах Sputnik.

Framing Russia's military presence in Ukraine



Who provoked the conflict in Ukraine



Убийство туристов в Таджикистане — операция западных спецслужб? Мнение эксперта

19:10 05.08.2018 (обновлено: 14:27 14.12.2021)



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Новости


Telegram

Американские военные активно сотрудничают с ИГ* — сбежавший глава боевиков

10:39 19.05.2020 (обновлено: 14:27 14.12.2021)



US supports ISIS



Findings

1. Russian state media, 9 months into Russia's war in Ukraine, is frequently accessed and remains highly credible across Central Asia.
2. US and Chinese state media platforms have small audiences and are distrusted.
3. Central Asian public opinion coincides with narratives the Russian state media champions.
4. In some cases, for example public expressions of the US-ISIS conspiracy, Russian state media may be causal of Central Asian public opinion.

Probing causality – next steps

Survey experiments

- Between-subjects design (Central Asia)
- Within-subjects design (Caucasus)

Focus groups

- Supporters and opponents of Russia's military action
- Russian migrants in Central Asia

Networked news

- Spread of Russian-sourced news accross Central Asian outlets
- Spread of US-sourced news accross Central Asian outlets
- Telegram responses to Russian and US-sourced news in Central Asia

Publications

McGlinchey, “The Central Asian Antigay Movement in Global and Local Perspective,” *NYU Jordan Center* (December 2021).

Laruelle and Royce, “The United States in Kazakhstani public opinion: Double-edged cultural influence and the collateral damage of foreign policy,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* (July 2021).

McGlinchey, “The populist and nationalist threat to human rights in Kyrgyzstan,” *Foreign Policy Centre* (March 2021).

McGlinchey and Laruelle, “Explaining Great Power Status in Central Asia: Unfamiliarity and Discontent,” *Minerva Owl in the Olive Tree* (October 2019).

Laruelle and Royce, “Kazakhstani Public Opinion of the United States and Russia: Testing Variables of (Un)Favourability,” *Central Asian Survey* (2019).

Laruelle, Royce, and Beyssembayev. “Untangling the Puzzle of ‘Russia’s Influence’ in Kazakhstan,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* (2019).

Russia's Erosion in Central Asia

PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 808

November 2022

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Crossroads Central Asia

Central Asian leaders have notably not voiced support for Russia's war in Ukraine. The chilly response to Moscow might at first appear surprising given Central Asia's extensive ties with Russia. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, like Belarus, are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance whose signatories pledge to protect one another against external attacks. But while Belarus' Alyaksandr Lukashenka has been an enthusiastic proponent of Russia's war, Central Asian leaders have not—not even Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who had enlisted Russian CSTO troops to help quell protests in January 2022. Central Asian countries' refusal to endorse Moscow's war is also at odds with the region's economic dependence on Russia. For Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, labor remittances from Russia constitute between one-tenth and one-third of annual GDP.

Central Asian countries are not prisoners to their economic, military, and even historical ties to Russia. Multiple drivers—geography, embeddedness in global financial networks, fierce commitment to sovereignty, and generational change—disincline Central Asian states to support Russia's war in Ukraine. More broadly, the invasion of Ukraine marks a critical juncture in Central Asia-Russia relations. While forms of dependencies will persist, Central Asia's view of Russia will not be the same again. Just as Moscow's aggression in Ukraine, paradoxically, has strengthened NATO, so too has Russia's war solidified Central Asian states' individual and collective resolve to lessen dependence on the northern neighbor.

The Central Asian Response to Russia's War in Ukraine

We should make clear that while Central Asian countries have not expressed support for Russia's war in Ukraine, they have also avoided directly clashing with Moscow on the

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international stage. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan [submitted](#) abstention votes in response to the March 2, 2022, UN resolution calling on Russia to withdraw troops from Ukraine. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan altogether ignored the March 2 UN resolution. And four of the five Central Asian countries (Turkmenistan again was a no-show) voted against the April 7, 2022 resolution [calling](#) on Russia to be suspended from the UN Human Rights Council.

Central Asian states' demurring on UN resolutions, however, should not be equated with support for Russia's war in Ukraine. Indeed, they have made their distaste for the war clear both to audiences at home and to President Vladimir Putin himself. The Kyrgyz government [banned](#) public displays of "Z," the letter painted on Russian military vehicles in Ukraine, a symbol of support for Russia's war in Ukraine. Then Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov [emphasized](#) that Uzbekistan "recognizes Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity" and "We do not recognize the Luhansk and Donetsk republics." Tokayev, sharing the stage with Putin at the June 2022 Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, rejected the latter's view that the former Soviet Union constitutes a "historical Russia" and, moreover, [accentuated](#) that Kazakhstan would not recognize the "quasi-state entities" of Luhansk and Donetsk.

Not one of the five Central Asian states, in short, has come out in support of Russia's war in Ukraine. Yes, there has been variation in the degree to which Central Asian states have articulated their displeasure with Moscow. The Tajik and Turkmen leaders have avoided public pronouncements on the issue, while the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek governments have openly conveyed their distaste for the war. In total, however, the region's collective refusal to support Moscow's aggression in Ukraine belies Russian expectations that see Central Asian states as subservient to their northern neighbor.

Many in Russia, not surprisingly, view Central Asia's response as intransigence. Russian film director Tigran Keosayan—also the husband of Russia Today media agency chief Margarita Simonyan—[fumed](#) in an April 2022 YouTube tirade: "Kazakhs, what kind of ingratitude do you call this... look carefully at Ukraine... if you think that you can get away with trying to be so cunning, and imagine that nothing will happen to you, you are mistaken." However, it seems it is Keosayan who is mistaken. Central Asians have good reasons not to declare their support for Russia. And, as it turns out, Russia has good reasons not to challenge Central Asia's refusal to be seen as publicly backing Russia's war.

Geography

Keosayan's outburst, his threat that Central Asia might face the same future as Ukraine, rests on the faulty logic that the Kremlin would perceive Central Asian geopolitical autonomy to be as threatening to it as Ukrainian geopolitical autonomy. As distasteful as it is to enter the distorted neo-imperialist worldview of the Putin regime, when one does, it quickly becomes apparent that Central Asian states are far less threatening to Russia

than are states like Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus, all countries that share a border with NATO member states. Central Asia's neighbors – Iran, Afghanistan, China, and Russia – are theocracies and autocracies that pose little current threat to Russian geopolitical interests. Whereas closer political and economic ties between NATO and the EU with Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus do, in the Kremlin's view, pose a threat, Central Asia's dealings with neighboring theocracies and autocracies are of minimal concern to the Russian government.

Central Asia's geography, moreover, offers a distinct advantage for Moscow that recently came to light when the U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network [identified](#) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, along with 14 other countries, as "common transshipment points through which restricted or controlled exports have been known to pass before reaching destinations in Russia or Belarus." Central Asian countries have [pledged](#) they will abide by the international sanctions regime, but, as the U.S. Treasury's recent report makes clear, monitoring and reporting cases of export control evasion rests as much with financial institutions ("banks... credit card operators and foreign exchange dealers") as it does with state governments. Central Asian states have privatized and decentralized financial institutions, consistent with the urgings of Western governments and international financial organizations like the World Bank. While this reform of the banking sector has been a boon to business and investment, it makes Central Asian state enforcement of the international sanctions regime against Russia and Belarus difficult.

Russia is capitalizing on this difficulty. In June 2022, the U.S. State Department [issued](#) a press release identifying an Uzbek company circumventing sanctions and providing "microcircuits" to the Russian military. Central Asia's borders are porous. The region is part of the "northern route" over which opiates from Afghanistan [transit](#) to reach markets in Europe. U.S. sanctions have put a curious spin on Central Asia's trade routes. A Kyrgyz colleague shared a story that a relative based in Europe recently arrived in Bishkek with suitcases filled with semiconductors. His relative works for an ice cream equipment company whose Russian clients could no longer find critical machine parts due to Western sanctions. Long a transit point for narcotics traveling to Europe, Central Asia is now an entry point for Western technology destined for Russia.

Russia needs Central Asian countries to remain on good terms with the West. It is in the Kremlin's interest for Central Asian countries *not* to be perceived as supporters of its war in Ukraine. At a time of tightening international sanctions, Central Asia offers Russia one of the few viable access points to technology critical for sustaining the Russian military. The increasingly important role Central Asia plays in Russia's wartime economy, combined with the reality that Central Asia poses little geopolitical threat to Moscow, enables Central Asian leaders to stake out positions that champion Central Asian and Ukrainian state sovereignty.

State Sovereignty

The Kremlin's case for invading Ukraine had multiple themes, from security to Nazis. But Central Asians saw plainly a military attack on a smaller and weaker state by a massive neighbor. As a group of small former Soviet republics, it is Ukraine's troubles, not Russia's grievances, that Central Asians feel and share.

Central Asian republics were reluctant to embrace their independence in 1991, leaving them with a sense of insecurity. Thus, their foreign policy priorities routinely start with aspects such as "further strengthening of the independence and sovereignty of the state" (in Uzbekistan's [case](#)) or "strengthening the independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country" (the Kazakh [version](#)). Such wording may not be surprising for small and new states. However, they sound relevant given that any good textbook on Central Asia's history discusses the "creation of nations" in the region in the early Soviet years. Hence the nervousness in Central Asia on Putin's Ukraine rhetoric.

Central Asian states are neither potential NATO members nor maturing liberal democracies. Yet, the Russian leadership more than once reminded Central Asia that it was not much different from Ukraine when it came to Moscow's longing for its imperial past. What stands out from Putin's 2014 [remark](#) is his mentioning that Kazakhs did not have statehood before President Nursultan Nazarbayev built it for them. What seemed like praise at the time now looks like a warning, with the February 2022 upheaval as a test. In this context, key foreign policy slogans of Central Asian states, such as the multivectorism of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the self-reliance of Uzbekistan, or the neutrality of Turkmenistan are moves to find leeway from their former patron. Central Asians are not interested in revising the 1991 status quo. This was made clear in 2008 when Central Asian states refused to endorse Russia's attack on Georgia, nor its biting off parts of Ukraine in 2014.

Generational Change

Central Asian states are still young polities but changes that occurred domestically and in the external environment over the past thirty years are another reason why Central Asia is unwilling to side with Russia. Although most reluctant to embrace independence in 1991, Central Asian elites and societies are much different from those of the 1990s or 2000s. While Russia's influence on Central Asia remains huge politically and economically, cultural connections and the shared longing for the Soviet days are not the same now. The changes in the region's relations with other extra-regional players also create greater space for Central Asia's Russia maneuvering. Three related factors can be highlighted.

First, with the death of Uzbek President Islam Karimov in 2016 and the resignation of Nazarbaev in 2018 (or truly in 2022), no Central Asian state today has a leader with a high-level political career during the Soviet time. If the first Kyrgyz president, Askar Akayev,

hardly spoke Kyrgyz, the current leader hardly speaks Russian. Former Uzbek president Karimov, for all his “no strings attached” philosophy, more than once [praised](#) Putin as a person one can “go on a scouting trip with,” but this is not a vocabulary one expects from his successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Of course, politicians’ actions do not always reflect their age or past political experiences. That said, former communist bosses of Central Asia would understand Russia’s anti-American or anti-NATO arguments much better than the current generation of leaders.

Second, the broader international environment changed in the past decades to create fewer incentives for Central Asian leaders to seek Russia’s support and protection. Most critically, the West’s democracy promotion has long passed its peak. The region’s autocracies survived the pressure. Its only victim was Kyrgyz president Akayev, ironically the architect of the “island of democracy” in Central Asia. Speaking from Moscow, Akayev recently [said](#) that his biggest mistake and the reason for his ouster was allowing Freedom House to open an independent printing house in Bishkek. The current generation of Central Asian leaders is no more liberal than their predecessors, but they understand Western policies and are better understood by the West.

For thirty years, Russia has tried to bolster its political weight in the region, but its attack on Ukraine will accelerate a decreasing trend. Historically, public opinion hardly mattered—and was hardly ever measured—in most parts of Central Asia. However, the Internet and social networks now allow a diversity of voices to be heard, bringing forth more nationalists, Islamic figures, conservatives, and progressives, which further weaken Moscow’s influence.

Global Finance

Just as the free flow of ideas over the Internet has empowered distinctly Central Asian voices freed from the Soviet colonial overhang, so too has the free flow of capital given rise to a Central Asian economic class that is networked globally rather than only to the post-Soviet space. Central Asians want to maintain open access to global financial markets. Central Asian economies are [heavily dollarized](#). As a hedge against uncertainty, economic actors—individuals, banks, buyers, and sellers—use dollars to establish commodity prices, denominate loans, and secure savings. Central Asian imports and exports are similarly denominated in dollars. If Central Asia faces currency sanctions similar to those imposed on Russia and Belarus, costs to individuals and businesses would be severe as dollars and euros fall into short supply. Central Asian states’ ability to facilitate foreign trade would be hobbled. And Central Asian governments’ ability to secure and service foreign loans would disappear.

The destabilizing impact of sanctions is already being felt in Central Asia, even though Central Asian countries are not the intended targets of these sanctions. Dollars in Kyrgyzstan are in short supply as Russians, traditionally the ones injecting hard currency

into the local economy, are [snapping up](#) dollars on the Kyrgyz exchange because they are increasingly difficult to buy at home. In Uzbekistan, the major sale of the state-owned UzAgroExportBank was called off when the Russian buyer, Sovcombank, [declared](#) the purchase had become “impossible due to sanctions placed on the bank.” All in all, the value of remittance flows from Russia to Central Asia is [predicted](#) to drop 25 percent as the Russian economy slows. Suffering through the collateral damage of international sanctions on Russia, Central Asian governments are now motivated to avoid the even more damaging effects of direct sanctions.

Lastly, Central Asian elites, like their Russian counterparts, hold considerable assets overseas, which can make them influential in local geopolitics. For example, persuasive Russian-Uzbek businessman Alisher Usmanov [holds](#) billions of dollars in Swiss bank accounts.

Implications

Central Asia’s responses to Russia’s invasion have three broad implications. First, Russia’s role in Central Asia has been declining, and the war only accelerates this process. However, a complication is that Central Asia is the only post-Soviet region where attitudes toward Russia, and general political relations with Moscow, have been broadly positive. But the war crossed a red line by calling into question the legitimacy and sovereignty of their own nations and states.

Second, Russia will attempt to counteract its eroding image by using other levers of influence. Moscow has multiple buttons to press, and Central Asia has multiple weaknesses that can allow these to work. The region has many pressure points and dividing lines, from “Turkic and non-Turkic” and “EEU or non-EEU” to “CSTO or non-CSTO” and “upstream to downstream.” As a prime example of local deviations, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan [refused](#) to sign a mostly symbolic agreement between the two of them on “Friendship, Neighborliness, and Cooperation” at the Central Asian Summit this past July.

Finally, Central Asia’s international partners need not stand idle as Russia attempts to reshape the region for its benefit. They can encourage the region’s wider international connectivity to reduce its dependence on their northern neighbor, particularly concerning labor migration, transport corridors, and pipelines. Supporting regional cooperation is also critical. Russia has, in the past, been keen to disrupt regional platforms that excluded Moscow. In this light, platforms, such as the consultative [meetings](#) of Central Asian leaders, must be encouraged as a key element to strengthen the region’s international agency.

Central Asia Barometer

MANAGEMENT SECTION (A)

A1. Respondent ID: |__|__|__|__|

A2. Region (Coded according to country)

Armenia		
Region	Region	Region
Region	Region	Region
Region	Region	Region

A3. Name of district: _____ (Written)

A4. Settlement Type

1. Urban
2. Rural

A5. Name of town/village: _____ (Written)

A6. Language of interview: (Coded according to country)

- 1 Armenian¹
- 4 Other (specify) → Terminate interview

SCREENER

A7. Hello. My name is [name] and I am working with [company name]. We are conducting surveys on various topics. The survey we are conducting today focuses on the political and economic situation in Armenia and foreign affairs, as well as your preferences in the media.

You have been chosen at random. We guarantee your confidentiality and anonymity. I will not keep a record of your personal information, except your phone number for a possible check on my work by my supervisor.

The interview will take no more than 40 minutes of your time. In case you have questions, you can ask me or contact our survey company [company name] on the phone number: +996 (312) 97-92-93.

Do you agree to be interviewed for this survey?

1. Yes
2. No

¹ AM and GE

INTERVIEWER NOTES WHETHER RESPONDENT AGREES TO INTERVIEW

If the respondent does NOT agree to the interview, ask question A8, fill out answers on questions A9 and A10 based on your visual estimation, thank the respondent and end the interview.

A8. Could you please tell me why you would not agree to the interview? (DO NOT READ):

1. Do not have the time
2. Do not want to participate in survey about political issues
3. Other (RECORD): _____

A9. Sex of nonrespondent (DO NOT READ)

1. Male
2. Female

A10. Age of nonrespondent (DO NOT READ)

1. 18-29
2. 30-39
3. 40-49
4. 50-59
5. 60-69
6. 70-79
7. 80 or older

If the respondent agrees to complete the questionnaire, continue. Note the following information:

A13. When the interview begins, is it only the respondent who is present? (except the interviewer/s)?

1. Yes
2. No

If NO, politely ask if you could be allowed to interview the respondent in private. Explain that the interview is private and confidential. However, if the respondent wants others to be present, respect that.

(SCREENER COMPLETE; PROCEED TO SUBSTANTIVE INTERVIEW)

DEMOGRAPHIC SECTION (D)

D1. Sex (DO NOT READ)

1. Male
2. Female

D2.1 What is your primary language at home (DO NOT READ OUT. RECORD ON ANSWER IN COLUMN D2.1) (Multiple answers)

Georgian

Azerbaijani
Russian
English
Armenian
Other /SPECIFY/ _____
I don't know
Unsure/ refuse to answer

D2.2 Are you able to conduct conversations freely in any other languages? (DO NOT READ OUT) (Multiple answers)

Georgian
Azerbaijani
Russian
English
Armenian
Other /SPECIFY/ _____
I don't know
Unsure/ refuse to answer
No other language except my primary language

D2.3. Which languages can you read well? /DO NOT READ OUT/ (Multiple answers)

Georgian
Azerbaijani
Russian
English
Armenian
Other /SPECIFY/ _____
I don't know
Unsure/ refuse to answer

D2.4. Which languages can you write well? /DO NOT READ OUT/ (Multiple answers)

Georgian
Azerbaijani
Russian
English
Armenian
Other /SPECIFY/ _____
I don't know
Unsure/ refuse to answer

D3. Your marital status? (READ, ONE answer)

1. Single

2. Married
3. Legal cohabiting
4. Divorced
5. Widower, widow
98. (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D4. How old are you? / Your age please.

1. _____

98. Don't know
99. Refused to answer

D5. What is your education? (ONE answer)

1. Uneducated
2. Primary or incomplete primary (4 years or less)
3. Incomplete Secondary (9 years)
4. Complete Secondary (11 years)
5. Incomplete technical (some years at vocational school/college)
6. Complete technical (graduated from vocational school/college)
7. Incomplete higher education (some years at university)
8. Complete Higher (graduated with BA, MA or similar)
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D6. What is your main occupation? (READ, ONE answer)

1. Work in agriculture or forestry
2. Work in the field of industrial production
3. Work in construction, transport, communication
4. Work in government
5. Working in the field of culture, science, education, health, finance, insurance, media
6. Work in services, trade, catering, utilities
7. Military personnel, law enforcement officers
8. Retired
9. Housewife
10. Temporarily does not work, unemployed
11. Student
12. Other _____
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D7. What could you say about your mood during the last month? (READ, ONE answer)

1. Wonderful mood
2. Average, steady state
3. Experiencing stress or irritation
4. Feel fearful or anguish
5. Other _____ (SPECIFY)
98. (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D8. What consumer status can you attribute your household to?

1. We do not have enough money to buy basic food
2. We can buy food but do not have enough money for clothes
3. We can buy clothes but do not have enough money for more expensive things (TV, fridge)
4. We can buy some expensive things (TV, fridge) but do not have enough money to buy a car or real estate
5. We can afford any expenses
98. (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D9. How often has your household received income from remittances in the last 6 months?

1. Never
2. Once
3. A few times
4. Every month or so
5. Multiple times per month
98. (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D10. Have you ever worked abroad?

1. Yes
2. No
98. (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D11. (If D10=1) If so, in which country/countries?

1. Russia
2. European Union
3. China
4. The United States
5. Turkey
6. Gulf Country (Dubai, Qatar)
7. Other
98. (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D12. (If D10=1) In total, how long have you worked abroad?

1. Less than one year
2. Between one and two years
3. Between two and five years
4. More than five years
98. (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D13. What is your nationality? (DO NOT READ)

1. Georgian
2. Azerbaijani
3. Armenian
4. Russian
5. Ossetian
6. Kurd/Yezidi
7. Lezgin (AZ)
8. Mixed (RECORD)

9. Other (RECORD)
10. (DO NOT READ) Don't know
11. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

D14. Do you consider yourself a believer? If YES, what religion and church (DO NOT READ)

1. Armenian Apostolic Church
3. Orthodox Church
4. Catholic
5. Protestant
6. Jew
7. Muslim
8. Buddhist
9. Other Christians (Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses)
10. Atheist
11. Agnostic
12. None
13. Other (Specify)_____
98. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)
99. Don't know (DO NOT READ)

D14-1. (If D14=5) Which branch of Islam do you belong to?

1. Sunni Islam
2. Shia Islam
3. Other_____
98. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)
99. Don't know (DO NOT READ)

D15. (If D14=5) On average, how often do you attend the mosque for prayer and Jum'ah Prayer? (IF MUSLIM)

1. More than once a week
2. Once a week for Jum'ah prayer
3. Once or twice a month
4. A few times a year, especially for the Eid
5. Seldom
6. Never
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

D16. People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, do you pray several times a day, once a day, a few times a week, once a week, a few times a month, seldom, or never?

1. Several times a day
2. Once a day
3. A few times a week
4. Once a week
5. A few times a month
6. Seldom
7. Never
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

D17. How important is religion in your life – very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?

1. Very important
2. Somewhat important
3. Not too important
4. Not at all important
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

D18. Does a wife have the right to divorce her husband?

1. Yes
2. No
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

EXPERIMENTAL SECTION (E)

E1. Control: Recently a vaccine has been developed against all strains of coronavirus which is absolutely safe for children under 5 years old. Our government should vaccinate all preschool children with this vaccine.

To what extent do you agree with the above statement?

1. Very much agree
2. Rather agree
3. Rather disagree
4. Strongly disagree
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

E1-1. (Include image)

The Russian state-funded Sputnik news agency has recently reported that a vaccine has been developed against all strains of coronavirus which is absolutely safe for children under 5 years old. Government of Armenia should vaccinate all preschool children with this vaccine.



To what extent do you agree with the above statement?

1. Very much agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

E1-2. (Include image)

The US state-funded VOA news agency has recently reported that a vaccine has been developed against all strains of coronavirus which is absolutely safe for children under 5 years old. Government of Armenia should vaccinate all preschool children with this vaccine.



To what extent do you agree with the above statement?

1. Very much agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

E1-3. (Include image)

The Chinese state-funded Xinhua news agency has recently reported that a vaccine has been developed against all strains of coronavirus which is absolutely safe for children under 5 years old. Government of Armenia should vaccinate all preschool children with this vaccine.



To what extent do you agree with the above statement?

1. Very much agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

MEDIA SECTION (M)

M1. How often would you say that you follow national and international news?

1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Often
4. Always (Read: Several times per day)
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

M2.01 How often do you get your news from the following state media sources... (Show screen and mark those selected by the respondent)

	Always (Several times per day)	Often (several times per week)	Someti mes	Don't know (DO NOT READ)	Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)
Public TV of Armenia					
Public Radio of Armenia					

Armenpress					
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M2.02 How often do you get your news from the following non-state media sources... (Show screen and mark those selected by the respondent)

	Always (Several times per day)	Often (several times per week)	Someti mes	Don't know (DO NOT READ)	Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)
Armenia TV					
ArmNews TV					
Shant					
Yerkir Media					
Kentron TV					
News.am					
Tert.am					
Hetq.am					

M2 How often do you get your news from the following state media sources... (Show screen for each option)

	Always (Several times per day)	Often (several times per week)	Someti mes	Never	Don't know (DO NOT READ)	Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)
a. Russian State Media Sources such as Pervyi Kanal, Rossiya RTR, Sputnik, TASS, RIA Novosti, Argumenty i fakty	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Chinese State Media Sources such as CCTV or Xinhua	1	2	3	4	98	99
c. United States State Media sources such as RFE/RL, VOA, Current Time	1	2	3	4	98	99
d. Western news sources such as CNN, Euronews	1	2	3	4	98	99
e. Messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram	1	2	3	4	98	99

f. Social media platforms such as V Kontakte and Odnoklassniki	1	2	3	4	98	99
g. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter	1	2	3	4	98	99
h. Relatives, friends, neighbours, coworkers	1	2	3	4	98	99
i. Mosque (if D14=1)	1	2	3	4	98	99
j. Other (SPECIFY)	1	2	3	4	98	99

M3. (DO NOT ask if M1=1) Do you trust news from the following sources... (show screen)

	Complet ely trust	Rather trust	Rather do not trust	Comple tely do not trust	Don't know (DO NOT READ)	Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)
a. State Media Sources of Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Russian State Media Sources	1	2	3	4	98	99
c. Chinese State Media Sources	1	2	3	4	98	99
d. United States State Media sources	1	2	3	4	98	99
e. Local Non-State Titular Language News Sources	1	2	3	4	98	99
f. Local Non-State Russian Language News Sources	1	2	3	4	98	99
g. Western news sources	1	2	3	4	98	99
h. Messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram	1	2	3	4	98	99

i. Social media platforms such as V Kontakte and Odnoklassniki	1	2	3	4	98	99
j. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter	1	2	3	4	98	99
k. Relatives, friends, neighbours, coworkers	1	2	3	4	98	99
l. Mosque (if D14=1)	1	2	3	4	98	99
m. Other (ask if M2.j ≠ 4, 98, 99) _____ (SPECIFY)	1	2	3	4	98	99

M4. (Do not ask if M1=1) What are the top three news sources you turn to most frequently? Which of these is most trustworthy? (Open ended, 1-3 options)

Source Title (3 answers)	Most Trustworthy (One Answer)
XX	
XX	
XX	

M5. (Do not ask if M1=1, if M2 (e,f,g) = never) Reflecting on the social media platforms you use to consume news, what are the top three platforms you turn to most frequently? Which of these is most trustworthy?

Platform Title (3 answers)	Most Trustworthy (One Answer)
XX	
XX	
XX	

M6. From where are the movies and TV series you like best (READ, ONE answer)

1. Local movies and TV series (from Armenia)
2. Old Soviet movies
3. From the US (Hollywood)
4. From Europe (France, Italy, other European countries)
5. From Russia
6. From China
7. From Turkey and the Emirates
8. From South Korea and Japan
9. From India (Bollywood)
10. From other countries _____

98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
 99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

M7. From where are the music you like best (READ, ONE answer)

1. Local music (from Armenia)
 2. Old Soviet songs
 3. From the US
 4. From Europe (France, Italy, other European countries)
 5. From Russia
 6. From China
 7. From Turkey and the Emirates
 8. From South Korea and Japan
 9. From India
 10. From other countries_____
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
 99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

POLITICAL SECTION (P)

P1. Please tell me about your opinion, in general, of each of the following foreign countries.

	ROTATE	Very favorable	Rather favorable	Rather unfavorable	Very unfavorable	Don't know	Refused
a.	Russia	1	2	3	4	98	99
b.	China	1	2	3	4	98	99
c.	United States	1	2	3	4	98	99
d.	Ukraine	1	2	3	4	98	99
e.	Georgia [AM, AZ]	1	2	3	4	98	99
h.	Azerbaijan [AM, GE]	1	2	3	4	98	99
i.	Turkey	1	2	3	4	98	99

P2. Please tell me about your opinion, in general, of each of the following leaders.

	ROTATE	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	Don't know	Refused
a.	Vladimir Putin	1	2	3	4	98	99
b.	Xi Jinping	1	2	3	4	98	99
c.	Joe Biden	1	2	3	4	98	99
d.	Volodymyr Zelenskyy	1	2	3	4	98	99
e.	Ilham Aliyev	1	2	3	4	98	99

f.	PM Irakli Gharibashvili	1	2	3	4	98	99
g.	PM Nikol Pashinyan	1	2	3	4	98	99

P3. What degree of cooperation would you like to see in the following areas of cooperation between Russia and Armenia?

	ROTATE	Greater	Lesser	None	Don't know	Refused to answer
a.	Political cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
b.	Military cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
c.	Economic cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
d.	Cultural cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
e.	Science and technology cooperation	1	2	3	98	99

P4. What degree of cooperation would you like to see in the following areas of cooperation between the US and Armenia?

	ROTATE	Greater	Lesser	None	Don't know	Refused to answer
a.	Political cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
b.	Military cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
c.	Economic cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
d.	Cultural cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
e.	Science and technology cooperation	1	2	3	98	99

P5. What degree of cooperation would you like to see in the following areas of cooperation between China and Armenia?

	ROTATE	Greater	Lesser	None	Don't know	Refused to answer
a.	Political cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
b.	Military cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
c.	Economic cooperation	1	2	3	98	99

d.	Cultural cooperation	1	2	3	98	99
e.	Science and technology cooperation	1	2	3	98	99

P6. What degree of cooperation would you like to see in the relations between Turkey and Armenia?

1. More cooperation
2. Less cooperation
3. The current level of cooperation (no change)
4. I wouldn't like any cooperation
98. Don't know
99. Refused to answer

P7. What degree of cooperation would you like to see in the relations between the Emirates and Armenia?

1. More cooperation
2. Less cooperation
3. The current level of cooperation (no change)
4. I wouldn't like any cooperation
98. Don't know
99. Refused to answer

P8. What degree of cooperation would you like to see in the relations between South Korea and Armenia?

1. More cooperation
2. Less cooperation
3. The current level of cooperation (no change)
4. I wouldn't like any cooperation
98. Don't know
99. Refused to answer

P9. Which of the following best describes the Russian military presence in Ukraine that began on February 24, 2022?

1. The Russian military presence in Ukraine is best described as a "special operation"
2. The Russian military presence in Ukraine is best described as a "war by Russia against Ukraine"
3. Other _____(SPECIFY)
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused (DO NOT READ)

P10. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (show screen)

	ROTATE	Complete ly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Complete ly disagree	Don't know	Refuse d
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a.	The Russian government provoked the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine.	1	2	3	4	98	99
b.	The Ukrainian government provoked the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine.	1	2	3	4	98	99
c.	NATO member countries provoked the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine.	1	2	3	4	98	99
d.	The United States government provoked the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine.	1	2	3	4	98	99

P11-1. How would you overall evaluate the US activities in Armenia?

1. Absolutely favorable
2. Rather favorable
3. Rather unfavorable
4. Absolutely unfavorable
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

P11-2. In your opinion, our economic development is accelerated/would have been accelerated by Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus?

1. Absolutely agree
2. Rather agree
3. Rather disagree
4. Absolutely disagree
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

P11-3. How would you evaluate the China's policy towards Muslims in China?

1. Absolutely favorable
2. Rather favorable
3. Rather unfavorable
4. Absolutely unfavorable
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

P11-4. Please tell me if you strongly support, rather support, rather oppose, or strongly oppose the following:

	Strongly support	Rather support	Rather oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know [DO NOT READ]	Don't know [DO NOT READ]
--	-------------------------	-----------------------	----------------------	------------------------	---------------------------------	---------------------------------

a. China developing energy and infrastructure projects in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Chinese technology being used in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99

P11-5. How much confidence do you have that China's investment in our country will help Armenia?

	Great deal	Some	Not very much	Not at all	Don't know [DO NOT READ]	Don't know [DO NOT READ]
a. Create jobs in Armenia for our citizens	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Improve energy and infrastructure in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99

P11-6. How concerned, if at all, are you that...?

	Very much concerned	Rather concerned	Rather not concerned	Not concerned at all	Don't know [DO NOT READ]	Don't know [DO NOT READ]
a. Chinese development projects could lead to an increase of	1	2	3	4	98	99

national debt with China						
b. Armenia's economic relationship with China could harm Armenia's economic relationship with Russia	1	2	3	4	98	99
c. Chinese buyers want to purchase land in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99

P11-7. How confident are you that Russia's investment in our country will help Armenia?

	Fully confident	Rather confident	Rather not confident	Not confident at all	Don't know [DO NOT READ]	Don't know [DO NOT READ]
a. Create jobs in Armenia for citizens of Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Improve energy and infrastructure in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99

P11-8. How concerned, if at all, are you that...?

	Very much concerned	Rather concerned	Rather not concerned	Not concerned at all	Don't know [DO NOT READ]	Don't know [DO NOT READ]
a. Russian development projects could lead to an increase of national debt with Russia	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Armenia's economic relationship with Russia could harm Armenia's economic relationship with China	1	2	3	4	98	99

P12. Should Armenia's economic development be modelled upon other countries' experience?

1. Yes, Armenia should model on other countries' experience
2. No, Armenia should follow his own path of economic development
98. Don't know
99. Refused to answer

P12-1. (If P12 = 1) On which country's experience should we model Armenia's economic development? (Multiple answers)

1. Russia
2. China
3. The US
4. Turkey
5. Iran
6. The Emirates
7. South Korea
8. Singapore
9. Other
98. Don't know
99. Refused to answer

P13. What of the following political systems below do you think is the best one? (show screen)

1. The Soviet system that existed until 1991
2. The current political system of Armenia
3. The current United States political system
4. The current Russian political system
5. The current Chinese political system
6. A political system based on sharia law
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

P14. People have different views about how their countries relate to the world. Would you tell me which of the following statements best describes how you see Armenia? (multiple answers)

- a. I see Armenia as part of the Western world
- b. I see Armenia as part of the CIS
- c. I see Armenia as part of the Muslim world
- d. I see Armenia as part of the Asian world

P15. People have different views about the kinds of civilizations with whom their countries should build ties in the future. Would you tell me which of the following statements best describes how you see Armenia? (multiple answers)

- a. Armenia should build more ties with the Western world
- b. Armenia should build more ties with the post- Soviet world
- c. Armenia should build more ties with the Muslim world
- d. Armenia should build more ties with the Asian world

P16. Please tell me if you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the following:

	Strongly support	Rather support	Rather oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know [DO NOT READ]	Don't know [DO NOT READ]
a. The US military bases in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Russian military bases in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
c. Chinese military bases in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99

P17. Do you know what NATO is?

1. Yes

2. No
 98. Don't know
 99. Refused to answer

P17-1 (If P17 = 1) As you know, NATO is a military and political alliance of countries of Europe, the United States and Canada. Do you strongly support, rather support, rather oppose, or strongly oppose the following:

	Strongly support	Rather support	Rather oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know [DO NOT READ]	Don't know [DO NOT READ]
a. Armenia should develop cooperation with NATO	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. NATO should not expand to the East, including such countries as Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine	1	2	3	4	98	99

P18. How much do you think the following situations are a big problem for Armenia (show screen)?

	Very much	Quite a lot	Somewhat of a problem	Not a problem	Don't know	Refuses to answer
a. Corruption	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Lack of democracy	1	2	3	4	98	99
c. Violent crime	1	2	3	4	98	99
d. Persecution of human rights organizations	1	2	3	4	98	99
e. Economic dependence on Russia	1	2	3	4	98	99
f. Russian interference in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
g. Western interference in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99

h. Inter-ethnic tensions in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
i. Poverty/unemployment in Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
j. Harsh climate	1	2	3	4	98	99
k. High cost of living	1	2	3	4	98	99
l. Dishonest politicians	1	2	3	4	98	99
m. Oligarchical power	1	2	3	4	98	99

P19. How much do you generally trust the following people/institutions in Armenia? (show screen)

	No trust at all	Trust a little	A lot of trust	Don't know	Refused to answer
a. People from your own ethnic group	1	2	3	98	99
b. People from other ethnic groups in Armenia	1	2	3	98	99
c. The President	1	2	3	98	99
d. The Parliament	1	2	3	98	99
e. The Judiciary	1	2	3	98	99
f. Local government	1	2	3	98	99
g. Police	1	2	3	98	99
h. Religious leaders	1	2	3	98	99
i. Non Governmental Organizations that support human rights	1	2	3	98	99

P20. What do you think of the following government systems as a way of running a country? (show screen)

	Very good	Rather good	Rather bad	Very bad	Don't know	Refused to answer
a. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Having the army rule	1	2	3	4	98	99

c. Having a democratic political system	1	2	3	4	98	99
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P21. How democratically governed is Armenia today (evaluate from 1 to 10)? (SHOW screen)

	Fully democratic									Fully undemocratic	Don't know	Refuse to answer
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

P22. In your opinion, which country is currently the main friend of Armenia? (ONE answer)

1. (RECORD): _____
2. No one
- 98.(DO NOT READ) DON'T KNOW
- 99.(DO NOT READ) REFUSE TO ANSWER

P23. In your opinion, which country is currently the main enemy of Armenia? (ONE answer)

1. (RECORD): _____
2. No one
- 98.(DO NOT READ) DON'T KNOW
- 99.(DO NOT READ) REFUSE TO ANSWER

P24. In the future, if times are hard in Armenia (food shortages, unemployment, hyper-inflation), which of the following countries will help us?

1. We can only rely on ourselves
2. Countries of Europe _____(specify)
3. United States of America (USA)
4. Russia
5. China
6. Turkey
7. Other _____(specify)
- 98.(DO NOT READ) DON'T KNOW
- 99.(DO NOT READ) REFUSE TO ANSWER

P25. If Armenia is under attack, which of the following countries can we rely on to help defend ourselves? (multiple)

1. We can only rely on ourselves
2. NATO countries (USA, Canada, European countries)
3. Russia
4. China
5. Turkey
6. Other _____(specify)
- 98.(DO NOT READ) DON'T KNOW
- 99.(DO NOT READ) REFUSE TO ANSWER

RANDOM QUESTIONS SECTION (R)

R1. Which statement best captures your belief about Armenia? (READ, ONE answer)

1. Armenia is below other countries
2. Armenia is equal to most countries
3. Armenia stands above most countries
4. Armenia is the greatest
98. (DO NOT READ) Don't know
99. (DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

R2. Do you have children?

1. Yes
2. No
1. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
2. Refused (DO NOT READ)

R2-1. (If R2 = 1) If your children could study abroad at no financial cost, where would you choose for your child to study? (DO NOT READ)

1. Russia
2. China
3. USA
4. Turkey
5. The Emirates
6. South Korea
7. Singapore
8. Malaysia
9. Czechia
10. Poland
11. France
12. Great Britain
13. Germany
14. Other _____
15. I wouldn't want him/her study abroad
98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

R2-2. (If R2 = 2,3,4) If you could study abroad at no financial cost, where would you choose to study? (DO NOT READ, OPEN ENDED)

1. Russia
2. China
3. USA
4. Turkey
5. The Emirates
6. South Korea
7. Singapore
8. Malaysia
9. Czechia
10. Poland
11. France
12. Great Britain
13. Germany
14. Other _____
15. I wouldn't want to study abroad

98. Don't know (DO NOT READ)
 99. Refused to answer (DO NOT READ)

R3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongl y agree	Rather agree	Rather disagre e	Strongl y disagre e	Don't know	Refuse d to answer
a. Regardless of who is officially in charge of governments and other organizations, there is a single group of people who secretly control events and rule the world together	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Some governments are involved in the murder of innocent people, and keep it a secret	1	2	3	4	98	99
c. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some organization	1	2	3	4	98	99
d. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some countries/states	1	2	3	4	98	99
e. Russia, America, and other powerful countries secretly work together to control world events.	1	2	3	4	98	99

R4. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongl y agree	Rather agree	Rather disagre e	Strongl y disagre e	Don't know	Refuse d to answer
a. Mobile phones are used by governments and corporations to spy on people	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. Internet is used by foreign powers to undermine our statehood.	1	2	3	4	98	99
c. Foreign powers have plans to seize control of Armenia's natural resources	1	2	3	4	98	99
d. The United States sponsors ISIS to increase its influence across the Middle East and Eurasia	1	2	3	4	98	99

e. Russia's aim is to control all of its neighboring states	1	2	3	4	98	99
f. The Great Powers always use Armenia in their games	1	2	3	4	98	99

R5. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Refused to answer
a. I see myself as part of my local community	1	2	3	4	98	99
b. I see myself as part of the Armenia's nation	1	2	3	4	98	99
c. I see myself as part of the Western world	1	2	3	4	98	99
d. I see myself as part of the post- Soviet world	1	2	3	4	98	99
e. I see myself as part of the Muslim world	1	2	3	4	98	99
f. I see myself as part of the Asian world	1	2	3	4	98	99

R6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	ROTATE	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Refused
a.	LGBT rights are compatible with the culture of Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
b.	Feminism is compatible with the culture of Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
c.	Different interpretations of Islam from other countries should be allowed	1	2	3	4	98	99
d.	Islamist extremism is a threat to the culture of Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
e.	Chinese men seeking brides in Armenia is a threat to the culture of Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
f.	Western men seeking brides in Armenia is a threat to the culture of Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
g.	Russian men seeking brides in Armenia is a threat to the	1	2	3	4	98	99

	culture of Armenia						
i.	I am proud of belonging to my nationality	1	2	3	4	98	99
j.	Marriage should be only between a man and a woman	1	2	3	4	98	99
k.	Western culture poses a threat to our way of life	1	2	3	4	98	99
l.	Russian culture poses a threat to our way of life	1	2	3	4	98	99
m.	Chinese culture poses a threat to our way of life	1	2	3	4	98	99
n.	Breaking away from the USSR was a positive development for Armenia	1	2	3	4	98	99
o.	Some non-governmental organizations in Armenia spy on behalf of foreign governments	1	2	3	4	98	99

Questions R7a-R7f (randomize)

R7a. On this list are various groups of people. Would you like to have the following group of people as your neighbors? (show screen)

	Yes, I would	No, I wouldn't	I don't care	Don't know	Refused to answer
Immigrants from China	1	2		98	99
Students from China	1	2		98	99

R7b. On this list are various groups of people. Would you like to have the following group of people as your neighbors? (show screen)

	Yes, I would	No, I wouldn't	I don't care	Don't know	Refused to answer
Immigrants from India, Pakistan	1	2		98	99
Students from India, Pakistan	1	2		98	99

R7c. On this list are various groups of people. Would you like to have the following group of people as your neighbors? (show screen)

	Yes, I would	No, I wouldn't	I don't care	Don't know	Refused to answer

Immigrants from Turkey, Iran, Arab countries	1	2		98	99
Students from Turkey, Iran, Arab countries	1	2		98	99

R7d. On this list are various groups of people. Would you like to have the following group of people as your neighbors? (show screen)

	Yes, I would	No, I wouldn't	I don't care	Don't know	Refused to answer
Immigrants from Russia	1	2		98	99
Students from Russia	1	2		98	99

R7e. On this list are various groups of people. Would you like to have the following group of people as your neighbors? (show screen)

	Yes, I would	No, I wouldn't	I don't care	Don't know	Refused to answer
Immigrants from USA, Canada, European countries	1	2		98	99
Students from USA, Canada, European countries	1	2		98	99

R7f. On this list are various groups of people. Would you like to have the following group of people as your neighbors? (show screen)

	Yes, I would	No, I wouldn't	I don't care	Don't know	Refused to answer
Immigrants from Afghanistan	1	2		98	99
Students from Afghanistan	1	2		98	99

R7g. On this list are various groups of people. Would you like to have the following group of people as your neighbors? (show screen)

	Yes, I would	No, I wouldn't	I don't care	Don't know	Refused to answer
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Immigrants from Ukraine	1	2		98	99
Students from Ukraine	1	2		98	99

R7.1. On this list are various groups of people. Would you like to have the following group of people as your neighbors? (show screen)

	Yes, I would	No, I wouldn't	I don't care	Don't know	Refused to answer
Drug addicts	1	2		98	99
Homosexuals	1	2		98	99
People of different religion					
Heavy drinkers/alcoholics					

FINAL QUESTION (F)

F1. Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. If the top step is 10 and the bottom step is 0, on which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time ?

Number on ladder (RECORD): _____
 98.(DO NOT READ) Don't know
 99.(DO NOT READ) Refused to answer

F2. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up survey in approximately one year?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know (DO NOT READ)

POST-SURVEY CONTROL QUESTIONS FOR ENUMERATORS (Z)

Z1. Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

1. The respondent was comfortable (at ease) with the entire questionnaire
2. The respondent was comfortable with most of the questions
3. The respondent was comfortable with only some of the questions
4. The respondent was generally uncomfortable with the survey questions

Z2. Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

1. The respondent understood all of the questions
2. The respondent understood most of the questions
3. The respondent understood most of the questions, but with some help from me
4. The respondent had difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from me

Z3. Fill in number of people present at the interview including yourself and the respondent:
Number of persons (RECORD): _____

Z4. Which were the languages used in the interview? (Note all that apply)

1. National language
2. Russian
3. Other (RECORD): _____

Z5. Which of the following statements best describe the conditions of the interview?

1. Interview was conducted in private with only the respondent
2. Interview was conducted in the presence of one or more family members / friends who did not intervene in the interview but were very nearby or in the same room
3. Interview was conducted in the presence of one or more family members / friends who intervened in the interview in a noteworthy way

Z6. If any person was present during the interview, who might have been listening during the interview?

1. Spouse only
2. Children only
3. A few others
4. Small crowd
98. Not applicable
99. Don't know/could not tell

Z7. Did the respondent check with others for information to answer any question?

1. No, although there were people present
2. Yes
98. Not applicable
99. Don't know/could not tell

Z8. How was the respondent, in your plain opinion, responding to questions about Russia and President Putin?

1. Very frankly
2. Quite frankly
3. Not too frank
4. It seems that he/she was not saying what s/he thinks
99. Don't know/could not tell

Z9. During which questions was the survey respondent being the least honest (if any)?
(Remember that you marked such questions earlier)

1. Questions about local politics and persons
2. Questions about mood/income/personal circumstances
3. Questions about other groups

- 4. The person seemed to be always honest
- 99. Don't know/could not tell

Z12. Interviewer general comments about interview (IF NECESSARY)

Z13. Interviewer name