



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**TAMING THE PUMA: THE CHINESE QUEST
FOR INFLUENCE IN ARGENTINA**

by

Victor M. Gutierrez Jr.

December 2023

Thesis Advisor:

Christopher N. Darnton

Second Reader:

Michael A. Glosny

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2023	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE TAMING THE PUMA: THE CHINESE QUEST FOR INFLUENCE IN ARGENTINA			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Victor M. Gutierrez Jr.				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>China—the primary strategic competitor of the United States—is pursuing increased presence and influence in the Western Hemisphere. Argentina is a major target for Chinese investment, military cooperation, and diplomatic engagement, and efforts undertaken here are likely to be reproduced in smaller states. This thesis explores Chinese lines of effort in Argentina and how these efforts have affected its level of influence. Analysis of primary and secondary sources reveals that trade and investment between the two powers has increased, military professional engagements are on the rise, and diplomatic ties have deepened since the relationship was established in the 1970s. However, Chinese influence has not significantly increased. Deepening of ties is explained by Argentine agency, as Argentina has utilized the presence of a new power to bolster its economy, strengthen its military, and assert its sovereignty on the global stage. These findings may be used to inform future engagements with Argentina, and observation should continue as the partnership between Argentina and China continues to evolve.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS China, strategic competition, Latin America, influence, Argentina, SOUTHCOM, great power competition			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 93	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

**TAMING THE PUMA: THE CHINESE QUEST
FOR INFLUENCE IN ARGENTINA**

Victor M. Gutierrez Jr.
Captain, United States Air Force
BS, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, 2019

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(WESTERN HEMISPHERE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2023**

Approved by: Christopher N. Darnton
Advisor

Michael A. Glosny
Second Reader

Afshon P. Ostovar
Associate Chair for Research
Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

China—the primary strategic competitor of the United States—is pursuing increased presence and influence in the Western Hemisphere. Argentina is a major target for Chinese investment, military cooperation, and diplomatic engagement, and efforts undertaken here are likely to be reproduced in smaller states. This thesis explores Chinese lines of effort in Argentina and how these efforts have affected its level of influence. Analysis of primary and secondary sources reveals that trade and investment between the two powers has increased, military professional engagements are on the rise, and diplomatic ties have deepened since the relationship was established in the 1970s. However, Chinese influence has not significantly increased. Deepening of ties is explained by Argentine agency, as Argentina has utilized the presence of a new power to bolster its economy, strengthen its military, and assert its sovereignty on the global stage. These findings may be used to inform future engagements with Argentina, and observation should continue as the partnership between Argentina and China continues to evolve.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION.....	2
B.	LITERATURE REVIEW	4
C.	POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS.....	9
D.	RESEARCH DESIGN	10
E.	THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE.....	11
II.	ECONOMIC EFFORTS	13
A.	COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT.....	14
1.	Argentine Attitude toward Investment.....	14
2.	Chinese Motives for Investment	16
B.	BRI	18
C.	TRADE.....	22
D.	CONCLUSIONS	24
III.	MILITARY.....	27
A.	TRAINING AND OUTREACH	28
B.	PROCUREMENT.....	30
C.	BASING	34
1.	Space Facilities	35
2.	Naval Facilities	38
D.	CONCLUSIONS	39
IV.	DIPLOMACY	41
A.	ONE-CHINA POLICY.....	42
B.	CHINA-CELAC.....	45
C.	NATIONAL POLICY SHIFTS	46
1.	Economics	47
2.	Socio-Cultural Factors.....	48
D.	BACKLASH	50
E.	CONCLUSIONS	52
V.	CONCLUSION	55
A.	ECONOMICS	56
B.	MILITARY.....	57

C.	DIPLOMACY	57
D.	ROADBLOCKS TO CHINESE INFLUENCE.....	58
E.	IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.	60
F.	FURTHER RESEARCH.....	62
LIST OF REFERENCES.....		65
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		79

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CDB	Chinese Development Bank
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CLTC	China Satellite launch and Tracking Control General
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic
FAA	Fuerza Aérea Argentina
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IEA	International Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JEMSE	Jujuy Energía y Minería Sociedad del Estado
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PLA	People’s Liberation Army
PLASSF	People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force
PRC	People’s Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SSA	Space Situational Awareness
ZTE	Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisors for the knowledge and insights they passed on as I wrote this thesis. Your feedback and the resources you provided greatly supported my research.

I also want to thank my classmates and professors for the recommendations and instruction you have provided. The small conversations and simple class discussions were more helpful than you know.

I also want to thank my friends and loved ones for the support you have provided throughout this process.

Lastly, I would like to thank God for giving me the patience, endurance, and wisdom needed to make it through the many academic challenges at NPS. To Him be the glory.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

China stands as the United States' primary competitor for global influence. Chinese influence has increased steadily in Latin America since the early 2000s. Though China initially only accounted for a small percentage of regional economies, trade with China eventually increased to make up as much as 30% of the economy of some countries in 2020.¹ Additionally, China has increased its involvement in the region through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global project offering loans and infrastructure investment to developing member countries. The introduction of the BRI to stands as a challenge to the influence of the United States (U.S.) in the region, and many accuse China of using debt trap diplomacy to increase both influence and access to the countries involved.²

A significant target for Chinese BRI and trade initiatives is Argentina. Argentina joined the BRI in 2022, but involvement with China extends further than infrastructure investment. Argentina allowed for the construction of a Chinese space facility within its borders.³ Additionally, China has urged Argentina to construct a naval facility in Ushuaia at the southernmost end of the continent.⁴ Further complicating Argentina's position with respect to China is its large foreign debts which it is frequently unable to pay. This thesis answers the question: how have China's policies and efforts affected its level of influence on Argentina?

¹ Diana Roy, *China's Growing Influence in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri>.

² Mansi Mishra and Vivek Kumar Mishra, "China's Belt And Road Initiatives: Examining Debt Trap Diplomacy for Regional Supremacy in the Context of Sri Lanka," *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 25, no. 1 (2021): 122–35; Brahma Chellaney, "China's Creditor Imperialism," Project Syndicate, December 20, 2017, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-sri-lanka-hambantota-port-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-12>; Faris Al-Fadhat and Hari Prasetyo, "How China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy Works in African Countries: Evidence from Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and Djibouti," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, November 2022, 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221137673>.

³ Jordan Wilson, *China's Military Agreements with Argentina: A Potential New Phase in China- Latin America Defense Relations* (Washington, D.C.: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015), 4.

⁴ Guillermo Saavedra, "China Pressures Argentina to Build Naval Base," *Diálogo Américas*, January 3, 2023, <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-pressures-argentina-to-build-naval-base/>.

The answer to this question is that although China has seemingly gained influence in some areas, this is a result of Argentina's agency and desire for advancement using a relationship with China. In all sectors, Argentina accepts aid or introduces policy changes that will allow it to reap benefits such as investment into the energy sector, advanced training and military engagement, and diplomatic recognition. However, Argentina also refuses to purchase equipment and redirects interest when its needs are not met or if it is not interested in an offer. Further, the country jealously guards its sovereignty and has attempted to make corrections in areas where sovereignty was violated.

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The Argentine case study is significant for understanding Chinese efforts and influence in Latin America. China is one of Argentina's largest trade partners and is attempting to increase its military ties as well. Argentina's membership in the BRI and associated loan banks combined with a tendency to default on foreign debt leave the country vulnerable to economic influence campaigns. Observable shifts in Chinese influence in Argentina following these efforts may be indicative of a wider trend in the region and can be used to inform military and political decision makers charged with countering China and maintaining U.S. influence in the hemisphere.

Currently, U.S.-Argentina relations are positive, and the countries collaborate often on various issues.⁵ The U.S. provides various forms of aid to Argentina, recognizes it as a regional ally, and works to address issues of terror and transnational crime. However, relations are not perfect. Economic ties between the U.S. and Argentina shrunk in the 2000s as trade with China grew.⁶ Further, U.S. exclusion of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela from the 2022 Summit of the Americas drew criticism from Argentine president Alberto

⁵ Karla I Rios, *Argentina: An Overview*, CRS Report No. IF10932 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2023), 2.

⁶ José Luis Machinea and Lucio Castro, "8. Argentina, the US, and China: A New Triangle in the Making?," in *China, The United States, and the Future of Latin America*, ed. David B.H. Denoon (New York University Press, 2020), 185, <https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479899289.003.0008>.

Fernandez.⁷ These actions reinforce an imperialistic view of the U.S., and fuel left wing opposition to its influence in the region. This creates an opening for Chinese intervention.

Examination of China's efforts in Argentina and the influence gained as a result are important for understanding their intent in the region. According to the World Bank, Argentina is the third largest economy in South America.⁸ However, Argentina is also in debt and is at frequent risk of default as recently as March 2023.⁹ This is particularly important with Argentina's membership in the BRI and the associated bank which provides infrastructure loans. Argentina provides a perfect target for debt-trap diplomacy hypothesized by many analysts and previously discussed by the U.S. government.¹⁰ Large foreign debt to China could influence the construction of more Chinese facilities, sway domestic policies, or pull Argentina to support China on the international stage. These effects may extend to smaller Latin American countries as well, making the Argentine case study of particular importance.

The Argentine case study is additionally important because of the potential of deepened Chinese-Argentine military ties. In March 2023, a "Global Times" article indicated that Argentina was considering the purchase of the JF-17, a fighter aircraft developed by China and Pakistan, after cancelling a previous arrangement in 2022.¹¹ This fighter would be purchased in place of the U.S. F-16 or the Swedish JAS-39 Gripen. Further, China has also pursued a naval installation in Tierra del Fuego which would give it access to the Antarctic and sway over the Drake Passage connecting the Atlantic and

⁷ Trevor Hunnicutt, Matt Spetalnick, and Humeysa Pamuk, "Biden Rebuked over Guest List at Americas Summit He Is Hosting," *Reuters*, June 10, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-faces-rebukes-over-guest-list-americas-summit-he-is-hosting-2022-06-10/>.

⁸ "World Bank Open Data," World Bank, accessed April 19, 2023, <https://data.worldbank.org>.

⁹ "Argentina Default on Foreign Currency Debt 'imminent,' Says Fitch," *Buenos Aires Times*, March 25, 2023, <https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/argentina-default-on-foreign-currency-debt-imminent-says-fitch.phtml>.

¹⁰ H.R., *DOLLAR DIPLOMACY OR DEBT TRAP? EXAMINING CHINA'S ROLE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE*, House of Representatives, 116 Cong. 36 (2019), accessed April 19, 2023, <http://www.congress.gov/>.

¹¹ Liu Xuanzun, "Argentina Is Considering Procurement of JF-17 Fighter Jets: Embassy," *Global Times*, March 15, 2023, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1287349.shtml>.

Pacific oceans.¹² China has established firm economic ties with multiple Latin American countries, but military ties and access provide China with force projection capability in the Western Hemisphere that stands in direct opposition to the U.S. position. Though Chinese-Argentine military ties have not been firmly established, this case is important for determining the level of military influence China may gain through its efforts.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Chinese involvement in Latin America has been thoroughly researched in recent years, but it is unclear if its influence has increased in the region. Increased involvement in the Western Hemisphere has drawn the attention of various academics and government agencies with the intent of analyzing current lines of effort in the region. Major research focuses on Chinese investment through the BRI, as well as increasing trade involvement with various Latin American states. Researchers have also placed focus on Chinese security assistance efforts in the region and how targeted states have reacted to these efforts. Attracting further attention are the political developments in the region as countries move to align with China in various ways. A review of literature covering economics and investments, military involvement and aid, and political influence shows that China is increasing its involvement throughout Latin America. However, the influence generated through this involvement is unclear.

The Chinese have undertaken significant efforts in the Latin American economic sector. The most notable Chinese effort in Latin America is the BRI. This initiative has attracted the attention of academia and the U.S. government alike. Cai Fang and Peter Nolan describe the BRI as a tool for development of the Chinese economy while promoting the development of partner countries.¹³ According to Fang and Nolan, the development potential of the BRI drew in Latin American countries. Yuanbo Li and Xufeng Zhu state that Latin America and the Caribbean countries were not initially included in

¹² Heiner Kubny, “China’s Port Plan in Ushuaia and Satellite Station in Antarctica,” *Polarjournal*, February 6, 2023, <https://polarjournal.ch/en/2023/02/06/china-plans-a-gateway-to-antarctica-in-argentina/>.

¹³ Cai Fang, Peter Nolan, and Wang Linggui, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of the Belt and Road*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2022), 12, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003286202>.

implementation plans.¹⁴ However, various representatives from Latin American countries—including Argentine president Mauricio Macri—attended a meeting to express their interest in the BRI; following the meeting, Latin America was considered an indispensable partner by the Chinese.¹⁵

Literature generally describes a positive Latin American and Argentine view toward the BRI and Chinese investment and predicts increased Chinese involvement in the future. Margaret Myers states that countries such as Peru, Bolivia, and Chile praised the BRI and called for other Latin American states to join.¹⁶ Argentina expressed a desire to be an active participant in the BRI in 2018 and joined the initiative in 2022.¹⁷ According to Evan Ellis, Chinese involvement will increase, and he predicts Chinese firms to be the largest foreign investors in the region by 2050.¹⁸ This causes concern for U.S. policy makers, as they believe Chinese projects could be used for military applications as well as civilian.¹⁹ Additionally, the Chinese tendency to extend loan terms instead of forgive debt, as well as the seizure of a port in the Sri Lankan case, lead U.S. policy makers to believe that China will leverage a country's inability to pay to seize control or create a dependency. In contrast to this view, Ajit Singh states that Chinese lending policy, at least in Latin America, leads to more autonomy for the countries accepting loans and has gained popularity with left-leaning governments.²⁰ This positive view encourages further Chinese BRI investment in the future.

¹⁴ Yuanbo Li and Xufeng Zhu, "The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and China's Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Sustainability* 11, no. 8 (2019): 3, <https://doi.org/10.3390/su11082297>.

¹⁵ Li and Zhu, 3.

¹⁶ Margaret Myers, "China's Belt and Road Initiative: What Role for Latin America?," *Journal of Latin American Geography* 17, no. 2 (2018): 240, <https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2018.0037>.

¹⁷ Rios, *Argentina: An Overview*, 2.

¹⁸ R. Evan Ellis, *The Future of Latin America and the Caribbean in the Context of the Rise of China* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2018), 7.

¹⁹ Karen M. Sutter, Andres B. Schwarzenberg, and Michael D. Sutherland, *China's "One Belt, One Road" Initiative: Economic Issues*, CRS Report No. IF11735 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2022), 2.

²⁰ Ajit Singh, "The Myth of 'debt-Trap Diplomacy' and Realities of Chinese Development Finance," *Third World Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (February 2021): 250, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1807318>.

Another area of Chinese attention in Latin America is the security sector. China has increased its military involvement globally, and Latin America is no exception. Evan Ellis identifies China's geostrategic objectives as the creation of a multipolar system, reunification of traditionally Chinese territories, and avoidance of a unified opposition to Chinese interests.²¹ These goals, particularly the first and third, reflect a desire to reduce U.S. influence and dominance globally, and agree with observations made by U.S. government sources.²² In the security sector, China is pursuing these goals through the provision of arms and vehicles, as well as through military-to-military exchanges with partner countries.²³ This is particularly the case in countries with anti-U.S. sentiments such as Venezuela, as supplying these countries and gaining influence allows China to maintain access to the region.²⁴

Though there is an increase in Chinese security cooperation with Latin America, literature states it is conducted with varying results. In Argentina, previously arranged purchases were cancelled due to poor performance of Chinese vehicles.²⁵ Ellis highlights this as a regional trend, with Chinese equipment underperforming in Ecuadorean, Venezuelan, and Peruvian military arms and vehicle purchases.²⁶ However, he also states that Latin American countries may still approach China for support if the U.S. were to suspend it for any reason.²⁷ Recipients of U.S. security assistance must pass Leahy vetting to ensure countries or units receiving aid are not responsible for gross violations of human rights. While China is not currently the preferred partner for many Latin American states, there is still risk of increased influence through security cooperation.

²¹ R. Evan Ellis, "China's Strategy in Latin America & the Caribbean," in *China Steps Out: Beijing's Major Power Engagement with the Developing World*, ed. Joshua Eisenman and Eric Heginbotham (New York: Routledge, 2018), 197.

²² Katherine Koleski and Alec Blivas, *China's Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, D.C.: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018), 1.

²³ Wilson, *China's Military Agreements with Argentina*, 4–6.

²⁴ R. Evan Ellis, "14. China's Security Challenge to the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean," in *China, The United States, and the Future of Latin America*, ed. David B.H. Denoon (New York: New York University Press, 2020), 346, <https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479899289.003.0014>.

²⁵ Wilson, *China's Military Agreements with Argentina*, 5.

²⁶ Ellis, "China Steps Out," 205.

²⁷ Ellis, 211.

A final area of focus for China is political influence. China seeks partners that will align with it on the international stage and will support it in its ambitions. In line with the second strategic objective identified by Ellis, China aims for other countries to recognize the One-China policy as truth. Currently, 8 of the 14 countries that recognize Taiwan as an independent state are in Latin America and the Caribbean.²⁸ Ryan Berg and Wazim Mowla state that recognition of Taiwan presents major benefits to countries in Latin America, but the temptation to change partners is ever-present.²⁹ This is increasingly true with the large number of left-leaning governments in Latin America. Further, China seeks to spread its influence through Confucius Institutes throughout Latin America.³⁰ These institutes are used to promote Chinese culture and values in host nations to create closer ties with the populace.³¹ This political influence assists China in pursuing their third geopolitical goal, as fewer states will stand against China's efforts and claims.

A survey of literature shows some Chinese success at political influence within Latin America. China has successfully achieved observer status in multiple regional institutions, and participates in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) where it can work without the interference of the U.S.³² Further, multiple Latin American Countries have abandoned Taiwan, with the most recent being Honduras.³³ Additionally, multiple Latin American countries have become comprehensive strategic partners, including Argentina.³⁴ Authoritarian regimes have additionally found an ally in

²⁸ R. Evan Ellis, *A Strategy to Respond to Extra-Hemispheric Actors in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Sheridan, WY: IndraStra Global, 2023), 16.

²⁹ Ryan Berg and Wazim Mowla, "Taiwan's Future in Latin America and the Caribbean," *The Diplomat*, September 1, 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/taiwans-future-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>.

³⁰ Lucía Wei He, "How China Is Closing the Soft Power Gap in Latin America," *Americas Quarterly*, April 12, 2019, <https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/how-china-is-closing-the-soft-power-gap-in-latin-america/>.

³¹ Danielly Silva Ramos Becard and Paulo Menechelli Filho, "Chinese Cultural Diplomacy: Instruments in China's Strategy for International Insertion in the 21st Century," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 62, no. 1 (2019): 7, <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201900105>.

³² Koleski and Blivas, *China's Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean*, 15.

³³ Joe Cash, Gustavo Palencia, and Ben Blanchard, "China Opens Ties with Honduras, Taiwan Decries Monetary Demands," *Reuters*, March 26, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/honduras-government-says-ending-diplomatic-ties-with-taiwan-2023-03-26/>.

³⁴ Roy, *China's Growing Influence in Latin America*.

China, who stands against U.S. intervention and champions itself as the representative of the Global South. This combination of factors can lead to a gradual shifting of influence from the U.S. to China in the region and has gained the attention of U.S. policymakers.³⁵

Though China has deepened its ties and influence in the region, some literature suggests it is a result of Latin American desire to advance in the global system and shake U.S. hegemony. Russell Crandall describes Latin American states increasingly turning away from the U.S. and seeking regional solutions to economic and security issues.³⁶ He further states that this departure from the U.S. led to a more permissive environment and increased attention from countries such as Russia and China. Countries such as Peru capitalized on the appearance of China to diversify investments and increase trade.³⁷ Peter Smith and Ana Covarrubias also assert that governments in Latin America—Argentina included—welcomed China as a counterweight to the U.S.³⁸ Chinese presence in the region undoubtedly provides many benefits to Latin American countries.

China has been used as a balancing force against the U.S. and investment from China is readily accepted, but Latin American countries continue to prefer U.S. involvement. The Latin American public held more favorable views of U.S. policy than Chinese policy, and Chinese popularity has declined since 2012.³⁹ Additionally, Confucius Institutes which were meant to increase favorable views of China worldwide have had no visible effect, as views of China have deteriorated.⁴⁰ This was evidenced most recently by a 2020 poll showing only Venezuela showed greater preference for China than the U.S.⁴¹

³⁵ Mark P. Sullivan and Thomas Lum, *China's Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean*, CRS Report No. IF10982 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022), 2.

³⁶ Russell Crandall, "The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (2011): 84.

³⁷ Benjamin Creutzfeldt, "4. Latin American Views of Chinese and U.S. Policy," in *China, The United States, and the Future of Latin America*, ed. David B.H. Denoon (New York: New York University Press, 2020), 98, <https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479899289.003.0004>.

³⁸ Peter Smith and Ana Covarrubias, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, The United States, and the World*, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), 305.

³⁹ Creutzfeldt, "4. Latin American Views of Chinese and U.S. Policy," 98.

⁴⁰ Becard and Filho, "Chinese Cultural Diplomacy," 7.

⁴¹ International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Latin America," *Strategic Survey* 122, no. 1 (December 31, 2022): 359–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/04597230.2022.2145096>.

Further, the quality of Chinese aid is questioned by Latin American countries on the military front, leading to preference for U.S. weaponry and vehicles when they are available.⁴² These factors show Latin America's agency within the ongoing strategic competition, and its ability to use powers to provide benefits the other will not provide.⁴³

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

The first hypothesis regarding Chinese efforts suggests that Chinese influence is generally increasing in the region and the Argentine case is representative of this increase. This hypothesis suggests that China is gaining ground in military, economic, and political spheres within Argentina, and Argentina will continue to seek aid and perhaps become dependent on China. Though Latin American countries have varying levels of success with Chinese furnished military equipment, political and economic efforts in the region have attracted partners for investment and lending, and many countries have aligned with the One-China Policy. Argentina, specifically, has received recognition as a major Chinese partner, and continues to pursue investment and aid from China. Literature on the topic generally agrees with this hypothesis and suggests that the Chinese presence and threat in the region will grow, even though the level of influence generated by Chinese efforts is unclear.

A second hypothesis suggests that even though Chinese influence appears to be growing in the region, Argentina and other countries are simply taking advantage of the services offered by a new partner. This hypothesis suggests that any apparent increase in Chinese influence within Argentina is simply a recognition of Argentine desire for improvement and, therefore, alignment with Chinese policies to receive investment. Alignment with Chinese positions creates opportunity for infrastructure investment through the BRI and military aid. However, Argentina and other Latin American states still express interest in purchasing U.S. goods and equipment when possible.⁴⁴ This hypothesis

⁴² José Higuera, "Argentina Eyes \$664 Million for Fighter Jets," *Defense News*, September 21, 2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/09/21/argentina-eyes-664-million-for-fighter-jets/>.

⁴³ International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Latin America," 392.

⁴⁴ Higuera, "Argentina Eyes \$664 Million for Fighter Jets."

explains why Argentina would allow for the construction of Chinese space facilities in some regions, while it refuses to purchase vehicles that do not meet its requirements or perform as desired. Further support of this hypothesis comes from public opinion polling indicating a favorable view of the U.S., while views toward China have deteriorated. This hypothesis is also partially reinforced by the Latin American focus on regional sovereignty and general skepticism toward larger, extra-regional powers. Argentina is willing to work with China, or the U.S., in ways that will provide it the most benefit. In other words, China has only gained as much influence as Argentina and Latin America have allowed it gain, and Argentina will pivot as needed to achieve its own ends.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis evaluates Chinese lines of effort in the Argentine economic, military, and political spheres and determines the influence gained by China as a result of these efforts. These spheres represent a condensed version of the instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments (DIME). The construct is widely used in analysis of state influence and provides a summary of the many instruments available to influencing states.⁴⁵ This construct was chosen due to its coverage of major power tools utilized by China in other regions, and the visibility of actions taken in these spheres. Analysis of China's influence on Argentina in these spheres will be accomplished using a framework developed by Emily Meierding and Rachel Sigman. This framework expands on the work of David Baldwin, Robert Dahl, and others; influence is assessed according to the activities and mechanisms used to generate it, and its efficacy is determined by the behaviors changed to align with the influencing country.⁴⁶ The mechanisms used include reward and punishment, expertise, attractiveness, and recognition.⁴⁷ Changes in behavior can include signing basing agreements, purchasing

⁴⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Competition Continuum*, Joint Doctrine Note 1–19 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2019), 2–3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf?ver=2019-06-10-113311-233.

⁴⁶ Emily Meierding and Rachel Sigman, “Understanding the Mechanisms of International Influence in an Era of Great Power Competition,” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (April 2021): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab011>.

⁴⁷ Meierding and Sigman, 6.

weapons from one country instead of another, enacting legislation in favor of the influencer, and other ways. Behavioral changes are especially of note if they bring little relative benefit to Argentina in comparison to China.

Primary and secondary sources are utilized to determine Chinese lines of effort and their effects in Argentina. Primary sources such as Argentine, Chinese, and U.S. media sources provide varying perspectives on Chinese efforts and are widely available. These sources can also provide insight into the opinions of policy makers, defense officials, and other government actors. Government documents may provide official stances on Chinese actions and may detail strategies to counter Chinese influence within Argentina and the Latin American region. Secondary sources can provide the latest academic analysis of Chinese efforts and serve to complement primary sources and inform further research.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis covers Chinese efforts in the economic, military, and political spheres in Argentina and analyze their effect on influence in the country. Chapter I provides an overview of the thesis and relevant background information. Chapter II covers Chinese economic efforts including BRI projects, trade, and loans provided by China. Chapter III covers the defense sector to include Chinese basing in Argentina, military assistance, and arms sales. Chapter IV discusses political and diplomatic efforts in Argentina, and any policy alignments or divergence from Chinese interests. Chapter V presents conclusions and final analysis to answer the question of Chinese influence in Argentina: China has gained the most influence in the economic sphere, the least in the military sphere, and the diplomatic sphere has been relatively neutral. Overall, Chinese efforts have resulted in greater engagement with Argentina and deeper diplomatic and economic ties. However, this is a result of Argentina leveraging a new international partner to advance its own interests, and it is unlikely to allow China to gain any influence where Argentine sovereignty might be endangered.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. ECONOMIC EFFORTS

China has increased its economic efforts globally, and Latin America is no exception. Specifically in Argentina, Chinese companies have increased their investments into natural resources, especially into the extraction of lithium. Further, Argentina was permitted to join the BRI in 2022, and is considering various infrastructure projects. China is also one of Argentina's largest trade partners, surpassing the U.S. in both imports and exports.

At first glance, Argentina presents an excellent opportunity for Chinese investments in the Western Hemisphere. Argentina ranked as the 23rd largest economy in the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023, and the 3rd largest economy in South America in 2022.⁴⁸ The southern power additionally has abundant natural resources and agricultural goods and is open to foreign investments. This combination of factors makes Argentina an ideal partner for China as it looks to expand economically into the Western Hemisphere.

Although many factors make Argentina a favorable partner, various obstacles stand in the way of Chinese influence. The first of these obstacles is the Argentine economy, which is experiencing severe inflation of 114%.⁴⁹ This causes severe devaluation of the Argentine currency and severely affects its ability to make substantial purchases; however, this would make Chinese purchases of Argentine goods more desirable. Second is the Argentine foreign debt, which reached \$398.2 billion in March 2023 and 80.3% of the country's GDP.⁵⁰ Argentina has previously defaulted on its foreign debts, exacerbating inflation, and creating greater difficulty in securing loans from external banks. These economic setbacks may deter some partners or hinder Argentine investments, but it has not hindered China's desires to invest in Argentina.

⁴⁸ "Argentina (ARG) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners," The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed August 5, 2023, <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/arg>; "World Bank Open Data," World Bank, accessed August 15, 2023, <https://data.worldbank.org>.

⁴⁹ "It's Still the Economy, Stupid," *The Economist*, June 24, 2023.

⁵⁰ "Argentina Government Debt: % of GDP, 2004 – 2023 | CEIC Data," CEIC, accessed August 15, 2023, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/argentina/government-debt--of-nominal-gdp>.

This chapter assesses Chinese influence in the Argentine economic sector. The chapter assesses Chinese investments in Argentina related to lithium mining and the implementation of alternative energy technologies; this analysis shows that while China greatly benefits from these investments and advances its interests, Argentina can meet its goals and strengthen its economy and regional standing. It then analyzes Argentine membership in the BRI, its current effects, and future aims. Then, trade between the two countries is examined and shows China as Argentine partner of choice; however, it also shows little Argentine interest in this area in comparison with diplomatic recognition and other investments. Analysis in all these areas shows that the appearance of increased Chinese influence is the result of Argentina looking to boost its advancement through partnership with the larger power.

A. COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT

Chinese private investments have steadily increased in Argentina. Between 2007 and 2021, over half of the loans provided by Chinese commercial banks to Latin American countries went to Argentina.⁵¹ These investments are particularly focused on renewable energy efforts. Several Chinese banks and companies have started investments such as nuclear power facilities, hydroelectric power plants, and windmills.⁵² Additionally, several Chinese companies have invested heavily into lithium mining in Argentina for the purpose of manufacturing batteries. Further, Chinese investment led to the construction of one the largest Latin American solar plants in Jujuy.⁵³ These investments have increased in recent years and may increase further with Argentina's entrance into the BRI.

1. Argentine Attitude toward Investment

Argentina has welcomed energy investment and uses it to achieve its environmental goals. In 2020, Argentina placed a ceiling of 349 million tons of carbon emissions in

⁵¹ "How Not to Deal with China," *The Economist*, March 11, 2023.

⁵² Tara Hariharan et al., "What Will Argentina Gain From More Chinese Investment?," *The Dialogue*, February 24, 2022, <https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/what-will-argentina-gain-from-more-chinese-investment/>.

⁵³ Roy, *China's Growing Influence in Latin America*.

2030.⁵⁴ Plans to reduce emissions span all sectors from commerce to agriculture, but one of the largest areas is the energy sector. According to a national plan to combat climate change released in 2022, Argentina intends to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through sustainable energy projects such as solar and wind farms, as well as biomass energy production.⁵⁵ According to a 2018 interview with Argentine undersecretary for renewable energy Sebastian Kind, the transition to renewable energy is partially economically driven; Kind states that every 1,000 megawatts in renewable energy results in \$300 million in annual savings in liquid fuels.⁵⁶ These projects, along with a nuclear power plant, are currently financed by Chinese banks, and Chinese companies are participating in the implementation and design of some projects. For example, the Power Construction Corporation of China and Shanghai Electric Power Generation Group will operate a solar complex in Jujuy Province, though it will be built by Jujuy Energía y Minería Sociedad del Estado (JEMSE).⁵⁷ Further, the project was financed in part by Exim Bank of China which provided \$331.5 million.

Chinese companies have also invested in nuclear energy projects in Argentina, resulting in some controversy. Two nuclear plants were approved for construction under the Kirchner administration in 2014 and 2015.⁵⁸ Initially, Argentina intended to operate a Canadian reactor in one plant, while the other would utilize a Chinese reactor. In 2016, construction of the plant utilizing the Canadian reactor was cancelled due to economic

⁵⁴ Javier Lewkowicz, “Argentina’s New Plan for Reducing Carbon Emissions - Analysed in Depth,” *Dialogo Chino*, January 26, 2023, <https://dialogochino.net/en/climate-energy/362482-argentinas-new-plan-for-reducing-carbon-emissions-analysed-in-depth/>.

⁵⁵ Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible de la República Argentina, *Plan Nacional de Adaptación y Mitigación Al Cambio Climático* (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible de la República Argentina, 2022), https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/manual_-_adaptacion_y_mitigacion_al_cambio_climatico_1285pag_1.pdf.

⁵⁶ “Argentina Taps Its Renewable Energy Potential,” World Bank, accessed October 15, 2023, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/02/15/argentina-taps-its-renewable-energy-potential>.

⁵⁷ Juliana González Jáuregui, *How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021), <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/22/how-argentina-pushed-chinese-investors-to-help-revitalize-its-energy-grid-pub-86062>.

⁵⁸ Jáuregui.

crisis.⁵⁹ Plans for the Chinese reactor were also paused but were reapproved by 2021 with intent to begin construction in 2022. Controversies in the project came from the use of a Chinese reactor fueled with enriched uranium instead of a natural uranium reactor. The Chinese reactor would, therefore, introduce new technology instead of allowing Argentine technological sectors to develop it. According to Argentine sources, the reactor is particularly controversial not because it is new, but because a reactor of this kind is not functional in any other country—including China.⁶⁰ Therefore, in addition to the fears of nuclear accidents such as those in Pripyat or Fukushima, Argentina would be one of the testing grounds for a reactor concept that has never been fully implemented. Furthering the controversy is U.S. opposition to the use of Chinese nuclear technology.⁶¹ U.S. energy officials from the Biden Administration visited Argentina in 2021 and discussed their concerns with government officials. These concerns and others were voiced following China's push into Latin American economic and technological sectors during the global Covid-19 pandemic. Lastly, controversy surrounding the project emanates from public skepticism toward nuclear power; several organizations voiced environmental concerns surrounding the use of nuclear energy, and this led to the cancellation of one of the construction projects.

2. Chinese Motives for Investment

Investments—particularly in the energy sector—largely aim to benefit Argentina, but China has various motives for providing support. Chinese investments into the region have come not only in the form of monetary and technical support into Argentine power projects, but also in the form of acquisitions of Argentine mining firms and purchases of land for extractive purposes. More specifically, China is interested in Argentine lithium.

⁵⁹ Fermin Koop and Lili Pike, “China apunta a la Argentina en su despliegue nuclear mundial,” *Dialogo Chino*, May 23, 2019, <https://dialogochino.net/es/clima-y-energia-es/27282-china-apunta-a-la-argentina-en-su-despliegue-nuclear-mundial/>.

⁶⁰ Por Laureano Pérez Izquierdo, “Preocupación por un experimento nuclear chino en pleno corazón de América Latina,” *infobae*, February 19, 2020, <https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2020/02/19/preocupacion-por-un-experimento-nuclear-chino-en-pleno-corazon-de-america-latina/>.

⁶¹ LPO, “Biden’s envoys to Argentina expresses concern about China’s nuclear power plant and Huawei,” *LPO*, April 14, 2021, <https://www.lapoliticaonline.com/nota/133407-bidens-envoys-to-argentina-expresses-concern-about-chinas-nuclear-power-plant-and-huawei/>.

Lithium has various uses such as the production of pharmaceuticals and for polymerization; more recently, lithium has been used to produce batteries for electric vehicles, phones, and other electronic devices.⁶² China is a leader in electronics manufacturing, and investment into Argentine mining industry ensures the flow of lithium to fuel Chinese manufacturing and technological progress.

A primary method for Chinese investment in the Argentine lithium industry is direct investment into mining projects. One such example is Gangfeng Lithium, a Chinese company, which owns 51 percent of the Cauchari-Olaroz mining project in northwestern Argentina.⁶³ Gangfeng Lithium holds joint ownership of the Cauchari-Olaroz project with the Canadian company Lithium Americas. As of June 2023, the plant was active and producing lithium. Further, the plant planned to acquire purification and processing equipment necessary to refine lithium to battery-grade in the second half of 2023.⁶⁴ The facility seeks to operate at approximately 40,000 tons of lithium per year, with the intent to add another 20,000 tons of production by the completion of its second stage of expansion. Direct investment into lithium mining gives China greater control of a critical resource at a time it is in high demand, and directly contributes to another area of investment in the region.

Along with its investments into lithium extraction, China has also invested in the production of electric vehicles. Dongfeng Motor Corporation and BYD have invested \$310 million and \$100 million respectively for the development of personal electric vehicles and electric busses.⁶⁵ These investments allow China to bypass trade barriers established by MERCOSUR related to automotive manufacturing and will potentially allow Argentina and other Latin American countries to transition to electric vehicles more rapidly.

⁶² “Lithium,” in *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc, 2023), <https://www.britannica.com/science/lithium-chemical-element>.

⁶³ Jáuregui, *How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid*.

⁶⁴ “Cauchari-Olaroz Project Is Already Producing Lithium Carbonate,” *CE Noticias Financieras, English Ed.*, June 12, 2023, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2825432891/citation/ADCBEE263FE547B1PQ/1>.

⁶⁵ Marta Bekerman, Federico Dulcich, and Pedro Gaité, “Argentina’s Economic Relations with China and Their Impact on a Long-Term Production Strategy,” *CEPAL Review* 2022, no. 138 (December 2022): 36, <https://doi.org/10.18356/16840348-2022-138-2>.

Developments in this sector allow China to maintain its position as an electric vehicle manufacturer, while presenting the potential of advancement for Latin American countries with Argentina at the head. Chinese investment in this area will therefore provide financial incentive as well as leadership and regional incentives to Argentina and other Latin American states.

Pursuit of lithium and investment into renewable resources in Argentina allows China to achieve its goal as a leader in renewable energy. China is currently the lead consumer of energy and producer of carbon emissions.⁶⁶ In response to this, China has outlined a strategy to reduce its emissions by 2030 with the assistance of the International Energy Agency (IEA). Further, the IEA identifies China as a leader in clean energy and major reductions in carbon emissions will solidify this. This goal is particularly important for China's involvement with Argentine energy initiatives, as successful implementation of Chinese technologies and operation of Chinese facilities will prove China's reliability in this area.

B. BRI

A core element of China's engagement with the developing world is the BRI. The BRI is an infrastructure project that was initially intended to link China with the rest of Asia and Europe. However, it evolved into a global project with infrastructure investment and aid extending into Latin America and Africa.⁶⁷ This project is expected to shift the economies of member states to make them more profitable and turn them into producers rather than commodity exporters. Additionally, some believe China could influence action of countries involved in the BRI by leveraging clauses demanding repayment to force action from the target country.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ International Energy Agency, *An Energy Sector Roadmap to Carbon Neutrality in China* (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2021), 13, <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/9448bd6e-670e-4cfd-953c-32e822a80f77/AnenergysectorroadmaptocarbonneutralityinChina.pdf>.

⁶⁷ James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, *China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2023), <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>.

⁶⁸ McBride, Berman, and Chatzky.

Argentina joined the BRI in 2022 and seeks to utilize it for advancement. As previously discussed, much of the Chinese investment in Argentina is related to energy. The BRI allows for investment into the energy sector, but also allows for investment in other areas. For example, China and Argentina have signed agreements to modernize the Belgrano Cargas and San Martin Cargas railways. In the energy sector, the BRI also has the potential of modernizing power transmission infrastructure for Argentina. Further, multiple companies have agreements with Argentina to renovate high-voltage power lines. Additionally, the BRI has been used to provide improvements to communications infrastructure.⁶⁹ These projects assist in the modernization of Argentina and the advancement of Argentine goals, but the U.S. has expressed issue with these investments.

An area of concern for the U.S. is the implementation of Chinese surveillance and telecommunications technologies in Jujuy.⁷⁰ A Reuters report states that Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (ZTE), a Chinese telecommunication company, signed a \$30 million contract with the province of Jujuy in 2019 for surveillance equipment, telecom equipment, and emergency services. U.S. officials commented on the deal, warning of the possibility of Chinese spying and use of the information to gain a political advantage or punish dissent. ZTE called the concerns baseless and stated the implementation of these technologies helped China reduce crime within its cities. Increased vulnerability to Chinese spying following the BRI is no secret, as Belarus, Cambodia, and other countries have been increasingly targeted following these projects.⁷¹ Further, Argentine telecom companies have previously been targeted by the Chinese state-linked hacker group Nickel.⁷² Implementation of more Chinese technologies creates more openings for exploitation by similar groups, or potentially by state-owned groups.

⁶⁹ Jáuregui, *How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid*.

⁷⁰ Cassandra Garrison, “‘Safe like China’: In Argentina, ZTE Finds Eager Buyer for Surveillance Tech,” *Reuters*, July 5, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-china-zte-insight-idUSKCN1U00ZG>.

⁷¹ Stefania Palma, “China Accused of Using Belt and Road Initiative for Spying,” *Financial Times*, August 15, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/d5ccb654-a02c-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4>.

⁷² Mateo Haydar and Colin Agostisi, *How China Spies on Nations Throughout Western Hemisphere* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2022), <https://www.heritage.org/cybersecurity/commentary/how-china-spies-nations-throughout-western-hemisphere>.

The BRI in Argentina brings benefits to both China and Argentina. Improvements in infrastructure will assist Argentina with commerce and will also provide avenues for Chinese goods to flow to port. Furthermore, successful implementation of BRI objectives encourages Argentina to advertise the initiative. In early June 2023, Argentina and China signed a plan to promote the BRI.⁷³ Argentina is the largest Latin American country to join the BRI and may serve as an example for smaller countries to follow. Promotion of the project encourages other large South American countries to sign the memorandum of understanding and join the project as well. If the promotional campaign is effective, China will gain more partners in the Western Hemisphere. The larger the number of countries joining the initiative—especially from different regions—the more credibility is given to the project. This further cements China’s position in the region.

Initiatives undertaken by Argentina and China through the BRI have focused primarily on economic aid and investment. Though Argentina joined the BRI in 2022, it joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2020.⁷⁴ This Chinese led bank was established for the purpose of advancing the BRI through loans and services directed toward infrastructure improvements.⁷⁵ The bank has members from over 20 countries, with China being the largest contributor. Initially, loans provided by the AIIB were intended for Asian countries who were lagging developmentally. Loans from the bank could be used to update airports and seaports, roads, railways, and other critical infrastructure to allow for greater interconnectivity between Asian nations. However, membership opened to other regions as the BRI expanded. Argentina was the third Latin American country to join the AIIB and did so while working to refinance debt through the International Monetary Fund

⁷³ “China and Argentina Sign Cooperation Plan to Jointly Promote Construction of Belt and Road,” *Global Times*, June 2, 2023, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202306/1291863.shtml>.

⁷⁴ “Argentina Joins Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” *Silk Road Briefing*, November 2, 2020, <https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/11/02/argentina-joins-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/>.

⁷⁵ Hong Yu, “Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 26, no. 105 (2017): 358.

(IMF).⁷⁶ This debt further influenced Argentina’s desire to join the BRI, as AIIB loans and investment through the BRI come with minimal conditions.⁷⁷

One such loan Argentina seeks from the AIIB is for a wind farm in Tierra del Fuego. According to the AIIB, Tierra del Fuego relies exclusively on natural gas for energy generation.⁷⁸ Due to the difficulty in obtaining natural gas and the isolation of the provincial power grid from the rest of the country, it is in Argentina’s best interest to modernize their infrastructure. In response, the AIIB intends to provide a loan of \$65 million to Argentina to construct a wind farm capable of providing 33.6 MW of power.⁷⁹ This project will modernize the provincial power grid, while advancing both Chinese and Argentine clean energy goals. The appraisal decision for the project is expected to be made by the end of August 2023. If approved, the loan will not be paid out until June 2029.

The few conditions Chinese banks do impose—such as the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) which Argentina has previously borrowed from—restrict the borrower and can be leveraged to influence action. One such example is the loan for the Belgrano Cargas Railway. The conditions of this loan allowed the CDB to withhold funds if Argentina attempted to abandon construction of hydroelectric dams on the Santa Cruz River.⁸⁰ When Argentina attempted to cancel the dam project following an election, the CDB leveraged this clause and caused Argentina to reverse course. Although further investment through the BRI increases the potential for similar moves by China, the program functions as a lifeline for Argentina. This consideration has led to full membership in the BRI, and greater pursuit of investment regardless of the risk.

⁷⁶ Silk Road Briefing, “Argentina Joins Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.”

⁷⁷ “Argentina Joins China’s Belt And Road Initiative,” *Silk Road Briefing*, February 8, 2022, <https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/02/08/argentina-joins-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/>.

⁷⁸ “Argentina: Tierra Del Fuego Energy Transition Support Program - Projects - AIIB,” Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, accessed August 20, 2023, <https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/details/2023/proposed/Argentina-Tierra-del-Fuego-Energy-Transition-Support-Program.html>.

⁷⁹ Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

⁸⁰ Anna Gelpern et al., *How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments* (Williamsburg, VA: AidData, 2021), 39, <https://www.aiddata.org/publications/how-china-lends>.

C. TRADE

A third core element of China's engagement with Argentina is trade. Trade between China and Argentina has steadily increased since the early 2000s, while trade with the U.S. has diminished.⁸¹ Ties with China have steadily strengthened, resulting in China becoming Argentina's second largest trade partner behind Brazil.⁸² Initial investments by China sparked the relationship, and the availability of loans and the opportunity to diversify the economy have further nurtured it. Additionally, Argentine economic hardship has led to a currency swap with China and the use of the yuan for Chinese imports.

Argentina's trade relationship with China began in 2004 and has continued to grow. Hu Jintao's visit to Argentina and the discussion of investment led to an agreement promising Argentina would recognize China as a market economy, and China would boost imports from Argentina.⁸³ In 2014, Argentina also signed a treaty with China promising more balanced trade, diversification of Argentine exports, and increased infrastructure cooperation. Trade with China increased from \$2.68 billion in exports in 2004, to \$5.93 billion in 2021.⁸⁴ The top exports to China are primarily produce, with soybeans making up 30% of exports and frozen meats being 28.3%. However, trade relations suffered a setback in 2021 after Argentina banned the export of beef due to a rise in domestic prices.⁸⁵ This ban was reversed, and beef became China's primary import from Argentina in 2023 even though there were some controls placed on certain cuts of meat.⁸⁶ Further, other agricultural exports were affected by taxes imposed by the Fernández government on products such as soya, one of the largest exports.⁸⁷ Trade also suffers more generally, as the administration focuses more heavily on diplomacy with China rather than trade. This

⁸¹ Machinea and Castro, "8. Argentina, the US, and China," 185.

⁸² The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Argentina (ARG) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners."

⁸³ Machinea and Castro, "8. Argentina, the US, and China," 193.

⁸⁴ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Argentina (ARG) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners."

⁸⁵ *The Economist*, "How Not to Deal with China."

⁸⁶ "China (CHN) and Argentina (ARG) Trade," The Observatory of Economic Complexity, September 2023, <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/arg>.

⁸⁷ *The Economist*, "How Not to Deal with China."

leads Chinese businessmen to seek audience with local governments and businesses instead of engagement with national bodies.

Though Argentine exports of goods have been hindered, China continues to be Argentina's number one choice for imports.⁸⁸ The top item imported by Argentina was telephones valued at \$82 million, followed by inorganic compounds valued at \$49.2 million.⁸⁹ More generally, China exports finished mechanical goods and components, while importing agricultural products and meats from Argentina. These trends align with infrastructure investment and Argentine goals of advancement, as telecommunications equipment will be used to update cellular networks and implement 5G upgrades.

China has also benefited from Argentine economic hardship through Argentina's use of the yuan for trade. According to Reuters, Argentina's dollar reserves dwindled following drought and reduced agricultural exports.⁹⁰ In response, Argentina paid for imports using the Chinese yuan. This was possible due to a currency swap of \$5 billion conducted with China in November 2022.⁹¹ Argentina's use of the yuan legitimizes China's attempts to make it into a global trade currency. This currency exchange was preceded by negotiations between China and Saudi Arabia to shift oil purchases to yuan instead of U.S. dollars in 2022.⁹² Though Argentina suffers from diminishing reserves and economic hardships that may stunt trade, China is able to benefit in a different manner.

Overall, trade between Argentina and China is profitable for both countries and continues to grow. Argentina draws the greatest benefits from trade, as it continues to

⁸⁸ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Argentina (ARG) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners."

⁸⁹ "China (CHN) and Argentina (ARG) Trade."

⁹⁰ "Argentina to Pay for Chinese Imports in Yuan Rather than Dollars," *Reuters*, April 27, 2023, Currencies, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/argentina-govt-pay-chinese-imports-yuan-rather-than-dollars-2023-04-26/>.

⁹¹ Eliana Raszewski, "Argentina Strikes \$5 Bln China Currency Swap Extension," *Reuters*, November 15, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/argentina-agrees-5-bln-china-currency-swap-extension-president-says-2022-11-15/>.

⁹² Rashid Husain Syed, "One Day, Oil Might Not Be Bought with Dollars Anymore but with Yuan: China and Saudi Arabia Are Attempting to Cross the Rubicon, Chipping Away at Dollar Dominance in the Oil Trade," *The Globe and Mail (Online)*, January 17, 2023, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2766123852/citation/ED22D328389645A0PQ/1>.

receive necessary machinery and communications technology while exports continue to be controlled and taxed. China benefits from the relationship as it receives foodstuffs, but trade is hampered by the weak Argentine economy and little Argentine interest in deepening the trade relationship. However, China also gains legitimacy through Argentine use of its currency to purchase goods.

D. CONCLUSIONS

Chinese economic efforts in Argentina involving infrastructure investment, loans and aid through the BRI, and trade relationships show varying levels of effect on influence in Argentina. In the realm of infrastructure investment, Argentina appears to be exercising agency through seeking out Chinese investments where loans through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are not possible. Further, Argentina's recent joining onto the BRI allows it to receive more investment, but also allows China to increase its presence in the country. Additionally, China has become a major trade partner for both imports and exports to Argentina, but the Argentine government continues to act with its own interests first. Argentina accepts offers for investment and aid from China and it willingly trades, but it is held back by its own economic weakness. This allows for Chinese intervention in some areas, such as threatening the funding for a railway project. Overall, Argentina is working primarily in its own interests by pursuing affordable alternatives for its modernization.

China has gained partial influence in the infrastructure and investment sectors due to its low prices, willingness to expand, and alignment with Argentine goals. However, Argentine agency cannot be ignored. Most infrastructure investment is directed toward the energy sector and the transition to clean energy. China seeks to show its leadership in the transition to clean energy, while Argentina desires to be a regional leader for the transition. National and local government officials appealed to China to encourage energy investment.⁹³ Argentina joined the BRI in 2022 with hopes to further this investment. A major roadblock to Chinese investments and purchase of Chinese technology is Argentine debt. According to Dialogo Chino, the cancellation of a nuclear power plant was due to

⁹³ Jáuregui, *How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid*.

economic troubles; more specifically, construction of the plant was cancelled to reduce the amount Argentina would have to borrow for its construction.⁹⁴

Argentina's entry into the BRI requires further observation to determine influential effects of the program. Chinese investment in Argentina thus far has been through ventures independent of the BRI. However, active investments are similar to those executed under the BRI, particularly those related to railroad modernization.⁹⁵ These projects fall under the BRI's "five links," and are accompanied by policy coordination, trade facilitation, financial integration, and cultural and social exchange in BRI member states. With Argentina's full membership into the initiative, there is a possibility for increased Chinese influence through the full implementation of these links.

China has gained influence in the arena of trade with Argentina, but it faces the roadblocks of Argentine agency and economic weakness. Argentina imports goods primarily from China, especially automobile parts and telecommunications equipment.⁹⁶ However, Argentina has previously enacted legislation that hindered China's ability to purchase agricultural goods to rectify its own market.⁹⁷ Further, Argentina continues to pursue diplomatic recognition instead of preferential status as a trade partner. Recognition from China as a diplomatic partner reinforces Argentine claims to the Malvinas, reinforces sovereignty, and allows for bilateral—rather than unilateral—declarations for trade and in other areas.⁹⁸ In response, Chinese investors have sought an audience with local government officials to gain access to infrastructure opportunities and natural resources. Chinese influence may even begin to wane, as Argentina faces an election in October 2023. If non-Peronist candidates are elected, they may favor trade with China while minimizing the promotion of Chinese ventures in the region.

⁹⁴ Koop and Pike, "China apunta a la Argentina en su despliegue nuclear mundial."

⁹⁵ Myers, "China's Belt and Road Initiative," 241.

⁹⁶ "China (CHN) and Argentina (ARG) Trade."

⁹⁷ *The Economist*, "How Not to Deal with China."

⁹⁸ "45th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between Argentina and China | Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto," Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Worship Argentina, accessed September 25, 2023, <https://cancilleria.gob.ar/en/news/newsletter/45th-anniversary-diplomatic-relations-between-argentina-and-china>.

Overall, Chinese influence falls between the first and second hypotheses. The clearest example of increased influence is the energy sector. China currently invests heavily in Argentina's energy sector, including in mines that China is able to exploit for lithium for its own industry. China was also able to leverage its position as a lender in this sector to further its influence by threatening to withhold the loan for the Belgrano Cargas Railway if Argentina canceled the Santa Cruz River dam project; the threat succeeded, and construction resumed. Further, China is also Argentina's second largest recipient of exports and sends the most goods to Argentina. However, poor economic conditions in Argentina force the country to take care of itself in many situations, even to the point of frustrating trade and relations with China. These factors make Argentine agency more evident, as Chinese investment into energy projects aligns with Argentine goals and is given priority to ensure success. Further roadblocks to Chinese influence may arise following the October 2023 presidential elections, as right-wing candidate Javier Milei and his allies stand firmly against China.

III. MILITARY

Chinese military expansion is one of the greatest concerns of the U.S. and many of its allies. The rising power has established military partnerships globally—both with U.S. allies and historical adversaries. Specifically in the Western Hemisphere, China maintains positive relations with both Venezuela and Cuba.⁹⁹ Chinese strategic documents emphasize the importance of collaboration and partnerships to further the interests of the state, and Chinese actions follow this strategy.¹⁰⁰ These partnerships often include arms sales, increased training and exchange opportunities, and potential basing agreements that accompany investment through the BRI. These avenues for influence are of concern in Argentina.

Much to the concern of the U.S., China has increased its military engagement with Argentina. The U.S. considers Argentina an important partner and has provided it with major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally status.¹⁰¹ However, China continues to press for influence; China has attempted to complete various arms deals with Argentina, maintains a military exchange and training program, and has discussed basing in the country. These attempts have been met with criticism by the U.S., as well as warnings that close relationships with China may endanger the partner being targeted.¹⁰² These criticisms also come from within Argentina, as many government and local officials do not fully trust Chinese efforts in the country.

This chapter discusses Chinese military efforts within Argentina. It then analyzes Chinese training and outreach programs in Argentina and their efficacy in generating

⁹⁹ “China and Venezuela Strengthen Their Relationship,” *Diálogo Américas*, July 7, 2023, <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-and-venezuela-strengthen-their-relationship/>.

¹⁰⁰ The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, *China’s National Defense in the New Era* (Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2019), http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/China-Defense-White-Paper_2019_English.doc.

¹⁰¹ “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,” *United States Department of State* (blog), accessed May 21, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/>.

¹⁰² “US Congresswoman Warns Buenos Aires Not to Build Chinese Fighter Jets,” *MercoPress*, March 5, 2023, <https://en.mercoPress.com/2023/03/05/us-congresswoman-warns-buenos-aires-not-to-build-chinese-fighter-jets>.

influence. Further, it discusses procurement programs and Argentine willingness—or unwillingness—to purchase Chinese equipment; more specifically, the chapter focuses on the purchase of the JF-17 and analyze previous Chinese attempts at selling weaponry. Lastly, it examines Chinese basing attempts in the region, specifically the establishment of the Espacio Lejano Station in Neuquén, and Chinese desires to build a naval facility at Ushuaia. The chapter concludes that China has gained very little influence in the military sphere, and Argentina looks to benefit from Chinese desires while continuing to nurture a relationship with the U.S.

A. TRAINING AND OUTREACH

One area of Chinese expansion into the global defense sector is training. China has increased the amount of officer exchanges and other forms of training it provides to partner countries.¹⁰³ China identified a desire for increased cooperation in its 2015 Defense White Paper and continued to highlight it in its 2019 paper.¹⁰⁴ These documents discuss Chinese intent to deepen ties with partner nations through training in both traditional and non-traditional military operations, and place emphasis on the maritime domain. Further, the 2019 document states that China conducts exchanges with over 150 countries and provides expanded training and equipment cooperation.¹⁰⁵

While the largest strides are being made with Venezuela and Cuba, Argentina and other Latin American nations are of great interest to China and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As part of its regional strategy, China has formed the China-Latin America Superior Defense Forum.¹⁰⁶ This forum allows military officials from China and member

¹⁰³ Ellis, “China Steps Out,” 205.

¹⁰⁴ The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, *China’s National Defense in the New Era*; State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, *China’s Military Strategy* (Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015), https://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/China-Defense-White-Paper_2015_English-Chinese_Annotated.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, *China’s National Defense in the New Era*, 32.

¹⁰⁶ R. Evan Ellis and Leland Lazarus, “China’s New Year Ambitions for Latin America and the Caribbean,” *The Diplomat* (Tokyo, United States: Tribune Content Agency LLC, January 11, 2022), <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2644849763/abstract/89CD6082AEFE4550PQ/1>.

Latin American states to gather and address issues of defense cooperation, diplomacy, and governance.¹⁰⁷ A Chinese source also stated the intent to give participants a better understanding of Chinese defense development and to enhance trust with partners. Though training is identified as a major focus of PLA and Chinese strategy for global engagement, details on the training provided are scant outside of general descriptions. Chinese documents identify maritime security, counterterrorism, space operations, and cyber operations as areas of interest. Argentina's University of National Defense offered a class on Sino-Argentine relations in 2020 covering several areas of interest as well.¹⁰⁸ This course included classes on cultural and soft power of China, historic relations between the two countries, and defense and scientific cooperation. Additionally, one of the stated goals of the program is to deepen relations between the two countries and encourage personnel exchanges. Of particular interest is that China demonstrated its approval of the course content, as attaché Liu Chang attended the opening ceremony.

In addition to training, China uses military outreach to build relationships with Latin American countries. In a 2016 policy paper, Chinese officials listed military exchanges of personnel and naval vessels to increase friendly relations with partner nations.¹⁰⁹ This goal has been further reinforced by the 2019 white paper that stresses the importance of the Chinese attaché programs.¹¹⁰ The PLA boasts 130 military attaché offices throughout the world, including in Argentina. According to Liu Chang, the Chinese attaché to Argentina, the relationship with Argentina involves visits, professional exchanges, and military courses.¹¹¹ Further, the Chinese navy has conducted an Argentine

¹⁰⁷ Huang Panyue Editor, "Fourth China-Latin America High-Level Defense Forum Launched," *China Military*, October 30, 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/9326872.html.

¹⁰⁸ Universidad de la Defensa Nacional, "Con una convocatoria extraordinaria, comenzó el curso 'Argentina Estudia China 2020,'" UNDEF, 2020, <https://www.undef.edu.ar/con-una-convocatoria-extraordinaria-comenzo-el-curso-%c2%a8argentina-estudia-china-2020%c2%a8/>.

¹⁰⁹ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Grenada, *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean* (Grenada: Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Grenad, 2016).

¹¹⁰ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's National Defense in the New Era*, 31.

¹¹¹ "China's Embassy in Argentina Marks 90th Anniversary of PLA - China - Chinadaily.Com.Cn," *China Daily*, July 29, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-07/29/content_30290461.htm.

port visit as part of their engagement with the region. In 2013, the PLA Navy made its first port call in Buenos Aires.¹¹² This visit was led by the destroyer Lanzhou and included a visit between Admiral Li Xiaoyan and defense minister Agustin Rossi. However, no other major port visits have been conducted since 2013.

Chinese efforts at training and engagement with Argentine defense officials are varied and generally met with positive Argentine reactions. Both lines of effort have yielded steady increases in engagement, and China continues to identify military engagements and training with partner countries as key to its success on the global stage. Port calls appear to be the exception to positive engagement, as there have been no other major port visits since the visit to Buenos Aires in 2013. Though ties between the countries continue, specific details of training are generally difficult to determine, and Argentine attitudes toward the efficacy of Chinese training are unclear. However, based on the Argentine military's history of anti-communist sentiment, it is unlikely these engagements have generated much influence.¹¹³

B. PROCUREMENT

One of China's primary forms of influence in the military domain is military sales. As China has increased its global outreach it has begun to provide more equipment and organize more sales of military goods throughout the world. Specifically in Latin America, China has increased its output of weapons and vehicles. Traditional allies such as Venezuela and Cuba continue to be China's primary customers, but others have begun to purchase equipment or consider contracts, including Argentina. Chinese sales to Argentina are varied and extend into air, land, and sea domains. Multiple agreements have been formed between the two countries, but they have fallen through due to quality concerns

¹¹² "Chinese Navy Vessels Call in Buenos Aires for the First Time Part of a South American Tour," *MercoPress*, October 31, 2013, <https://en.mercopress.com/2013/10/31/chinese-navy-vessels-call-in-buenos-aires-for-the-first-time-part-of-a-south-american-tour>.

¹¹³ Jesus Gomez, "Military Rule in Argentina, 1976-1983: Suppressing the Peronists" (Austin, University of Texas at Austin, 2001), 12, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA390747.pdf>.

and economic troubles.¹¹⁴ Though seemingly a clear avenue of influence for China, sales and procurement efforts are relatively ineffective.

One of the areas of greatest concern for Chinese sales to Argentina is aircraft. The Argentine air force, or Fuerza Aérea Argentina (FAA), is responsible for conducting air sovereignty operations, airlift operations for combat and humanitarian purposes, and assists in counternarcotics operations.¹¹⁵ However, the FAA is currently hindered by an aging fleet. Its primary fighter aircraft, the Mirage 5 produced by Dassault Industries, was decommissioned in 2015. In response, the FAA has considered multiple aircraft but has focused primarily on the U.S.'s F-16 and the Chinese JF-17. The F-16 is Argentina's primary interest for modernization of its fighter fleet. The F-16 is a U.S. made fighter aircraft manufactured by Lockheed Martin. This multi-role aircraft was first flown in 1976 and has received numerous upgrades since its introduction.¹¹⁶ The F-16 Block 70/72 remains in service with the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and with other U.S. allies; this aircraft and its variants are used by Turkey, Denmark, Chile, and others.¹¹⁷ Its versatility, reliability, and relatively low price make the F-16 an attractive aircraft for use in force modernization. Further, rivalry between Chile and Argentina serves as additional motivation to pursue the F-16. Chile operates approximately 40 of these aircraft and has worked with the U.S. to upgrade their variants.¹¹⁸ Thus, obtaining the aircraft comes with prestige and the perception of military advancement. These qualities led to Argentine interest in the aircraft.

¹¹⁴ Ellis, "China Steps Out," 205.

¹¹⁵ "Janes : Argentina," Janes, 2023, https://customer.janes.com/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_884/army.

¹¹⁶ "F-16 Fighting Falcon," Lockheed Martin, accessed August 29, 2023, <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-16.html>; "F-16 Fighting Falcon," Air Force, accessed August 29, 2023, <https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104505/f-16-fighting-falcon/> <https%3A%2F%2Fwww.af.mil%2FAbout-Us%2FFact-Sheets%2FDisplay%2FArticle%2F104505%2Ff-16-fighting-falcon%2F>.

¹¹⁷ "F-16 Fighting Falcon"; "Janes : Chile," Janes, 2022, https://customer-janes-com.libproxy.nps.edu/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_912/air-force.

¹¹⁸ "Janes : Chile"; Aaron Mehta, "Chile Approved for \$634M Worth of F-16 Upgrades," *Defense News*, July 24, 2020, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2020/07/23/chile-okd-for-f-16-upgrades/>.

The competitor to the F-16 is the Chinese JF-17. This aircraft is a joint venture between Pakistan and China.¹¹⁹ The fighter aircraft was first flown in 2003 and is currently used by Pakistan and Myanmar. The JF-17 underwent two major upgrade programs and is currently at Block III; this upgrade package includes updated radar systems, thrust vectoring, and weapons compatibility improvements.¹²⁰ This aircraft is the most advanced offering China has made to a South American country, and the primary competitor to the U.S. made aircraft.¹²¹

The FAA has various motivations for securing a new aircraft. Replacement of the Mirage 5 allows Argentina to assert sovereignty over its airspace. Currently, the FAA does not have aircraft usable for air sovereignty patrols. Further, investments into aircraft modernization and procurement have thus far been focused on light attack aircraft used in narcotics interdiction missions.¹²² New fighter aircraft would allow Argentina to counter larger conventional threats in its airspace and assert control over its territory. Similarly, a new fighter provides Argentina increased capability for controlling narco trafficking. In recent years, narco trafficking flights through Argentine airspace have become more prevalent. In 2021, 400 kilograms of cocaine were discovered in the Entré Ríos province.¹²³ Authorities discovered the drugs in a hangar that drug traffickers used as a logistics base for shipments destined for Uruguay. Introduction of new fighter aircraft would allow the FAA to intercept these flights and reduce trafficking through air corridors. Additionally, fighter jets can be used for air interdiction missions. Though not as easily executed as with light attack aircraft, fighters can be used to identify traffickers and provide direction to forces on the ground or at sea.

¹¹⁹ “Janes,” Janes, 2020, <https://customer.janes.com/display/JAWAB676-JAWA>.

¹²⁰ Janes.

¹²¹ Dili Loro Horta, “Why China Wants to Power Argentina’s Air Force Modernisation,” *East Asia Forum*, July 10, 2021, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/07/10/why-china-wants-to-power-argentinas-air-force-modernisation/>.

¹²² Janes, “Janes : Argentina.”

¹²³ Alicia Florez, “Entre Ríos: Argentina’s Rising Drug Trafficking Transit Hub,” *InSight Crime* (blog), October 25, 2021, <https://insightcrime.org/news/entre-rios-new-transit-hub-drug-planes-argentina/>.

China also has various motivations for providing its JF-17. The first of these is legitimacy. Various countries in Latin America have purchased Chinese military equipment, but none have purchased the JF-17 since its introduction.¹²⁴ An Argentine purchase of the JF-17 would improve Chinese credibility in the region and assure other countries of the quality of Chinese goods. This is particularly important, as Chinese military goods have previously been rejected due to quality issues.¹²⁵ Argentine acceptance of the JF-17—especially following criticism of and rejection of previous equipment—would signal to the rest of the region that China can provide high quality military goods. Another benefit for China is presence in the region. Argentine acceptance of the JF-17 would lead to contracts for maintenance and training on the new fighter aircraft. Further, Argentina’s interest in the FC-1, a variant of the JF-17, included the possibility of having the aircraft and some components assembled in Argentina.¹²⁶ This presence would provide further leverage in selling the JF-17 variants in Latin America, as costs would be significantly reduced for transportation, and it would bolster the economy with more jobs.

Though Argentina has expressed interest in the JF-17, several roadblocks exist that prevent quick procurement. Argentina continues to face economic hardship, as well as domestic political difficulties. In 2015, China and Argentina signed an arms deal that included the purchase of ships, armored vehicles, and aircraft—to include the JF-17.¹²⁷ The deal was signed under the Kirchner administration but was cancelled following the election of right-wing president Macri. In 2023, Argentina faces the potential election of Javier Milei, a right-wing political outsider with an anti-Chinese leaning. Milei has described China as an assassin and has criticized its governmental structure and level of

¹²⁴ Loro Horta, “Why China Wants to Power Argentina’s Air Force Modernisation.”

¹²⁵ Julieta Pelcastre, “China Sells Low Quality Weapons,” *Diálogo Américas*, August 1, 2023, <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-sells-low-quality-weapons/>.

¹²⁶ Usman Ansari and José Higuera, “Having Visited Pakistan and China, Is Argentina Ready to Buy the JF-17 Jet?,” *Defense News*, July 5, 2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/06/24/having-visited-pakistan-and-china-is-argentina-ready-to-buy-the-jf-17-jet/>.

¹²⁷ Loro Horta, “Why China Wants to Power Argentina’s Air Force Modernisation.”

control over its citizens.¹²⁸ However, he stated that he would honor any agreements established before his potential rise to the presidency.

An additional roadblock to procurement of the JF-17 is Argentine desire for the F-16 and U.S. attempts to deny China a foothold in the region. Argentina has expressed interest in the F-16 and is a frequent customer of the U.S.¹²⁹ Further, Argentine defense officials have criticized the quality of Chinese defense goods, while praising quality control and testing methods used by NATO.¹³⁰ Additionally, Argentina maintains status as a major non-NATO ally of the U.S., making it eligible for excess defense articles at discounted prices.¹³¹ This allows the U.S. to transfer equipment with relative ease, while satisfying the Argentine military's desire for NATO goods. As of August 2023, the U.S. intends to approve the sale of Danish surplus F-16s to Argentina.¹³² Though Denmark has not finalized a decision on the sale, Argentina is likely to forgo the purchase of the JF-17 in favor of the U.S.-made aircraft. However, the JF-17 remains a competitor. This is likely due to the United Kingdom's prohibition on selling defense articles to Argentina following the Falkland's War, including aircraft with British ejection seats.¹³³ While the possibility exists for the FAA to pursue the Chinese aircraft, international and Argentine domestic issues seem to favor the F-16.

C. BASING

An equally important—though less obvious—issue is Chinese basing within Argentina. China is working to expand its global military presence and has already made

¹²⁸ Shi Jiangtao, "Sudden Rise of 'Argentina's Trump' Puts Economic Ties with China at Risk," *South China Morning Post*, August 18, 2023, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3231570/sudden-rise-argentinas-trump-javier-milei-puts-economic-ties-china-risk>.

¹²⁹ Higuera, "Argentina Eyes \$664 Million for Fighter Jets."

¹³⁰ Pelcastre, "China Sells Low Quality Weapons."

¹³¹ "Major Non-NATO Ally Status."

¹³² Ryan Finnerty, "USA to Approve Sale of Danish F-16s to Argentina," *Flight Global*, August 14, 2023, <https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/usa-to-approve-sale-of-danish-f-16s-to-argentina/154540.article>.

¹³³ Usman Ansari, "Could Britain Stop Argentina from Buying the JF-17 Warplane?," *Defense News*, September 28, 2021, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2021/09/28/could-britain-stop-argentina-from-buying-the-jf-17-warplane/>.

progress in other regions. In 2021, China halted construction of a port facility in the United Arab Emirates; U.S. intelligence agencies discovered military construction taking place on the facility, and the Emirati government claimed no knowledge of the construction.¹³⁴ In December 2021, desires for expansion continued into Equatorial Guinea, where China sought to establish its first military port on the Atlantic.¹³⁵ These facilities and others like them start as commercial ports and are then fitted to resupply PLA Navy assets. Opportunities for this kind of expansion are arising in Argentina and other Latin American countries with the introduction of the BRI and infrastructure projects with associated port facilities. Specifically in Argentina, Chinese basing attempts have manifested through the construction of a space facility and interest in an Antarctic facility in Ushuaia.

1. Space Facilities

Space operations facilities are among the first of Chinese attempts at expansion into Argentina. A 2022 Chinese white paper explained that space operations and advancement directly service the Chinese national strategy.¹³⁶ To further its goals, China focuses on international cooperation, domestic innovation, and the implementation of infrastructure to manage its technologies and operations in orbit. Some of these technologies and operations involve remote-sensing, communications, and navigation. Further, it cooperates with various countries—including Argentina—to conduct its operations and facilitate space access for its partners. One aspect of this cooperation is provision of space situational awareness (SSA), which requires ground stations throughout the globe to monitor orbits. One of the stations used for this mission is the Espacio Lejano Station in Neuquén.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ “Secret Chinese Port Project in Persian Gulf Rattles U.S. Relations With U.A.E.,” *Dow Jones Institutional News*, November 19, 2021, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2599351890/citation/B7042EDB1B8C402DPQ/1>.

¹³⁵ Leland Lazarus and Ryan Berg, “Washington Must Respond to China’s Growing Military Presence in Latin America,” *Foreign Policy*, March 14, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/14/china-latin-america-military-pla-infrastructure-ports-colombia/>.

¹³⁶ The State Council, “Full Text: China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” The State Council The People’s Republic of China, 2022, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202201/28/content_WS61f35b3dc6d09c94e48a467a.html.

¹³⁷ Matthew Funaiolo et al., “Eyes on the Skies: China’s Growing Space Footprint in South America,” accessed September 1, 2023, <https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space>.

The Espacio Lejano Station is one of the clearest examples of Chinese basing in the Western Hemisphere. This facility is situated on 500 acres in Neuquén province bordering Chile. Argentina and China signed the contract permitting the construction and operation of the facility in April 2014.¹³⁸ The contract identifies that Neuquén was selected by China as the optimal location for the facility. It also grants China several privileges for the operation of the facility, including tax exemption and control of the land for 50 years after the contract took effect. Of additional note are clauses stating the Government of Argentina will not interfere with the activities carried out on the facility, and Argentina will not be liable for any activities conducted by the Chinese government in Argentine territory.¹³⁹ These details align closely with Chinese port projects in other countries and regions and give the appearance of basing.

Further contributing to the appearance of basing is the organization responsible for the project: the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC). This entity is a precursor to the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) Space Systems Department and is manned by PLA personnel.¹⁴⁰ This source of manning alone creates concerns of Chinese military basing. Of additional concern is the 35-meter antenna used by the CLTC at Neuquén. This antenna operates on frequency bands typically used for government systems—S and Ka—which can transmit classified information such as missile guidance information or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data.¹⁴¹ Further, military operations from the facility are not strictly prohibited. The contract signed by the Chinese and Argentine governments makes no mention the prohibition of military use; Macri noticed this after taking office in 2015 and commissioned his foreign minister to rework

¹³⁸ Argentine Republic and People's Republic of China, "Cooperation Agreement Between The Government of the Argentine Republic and The Government of the People's Republic of China on the Construction, Establishment and Operation of a Deep Space Station of China in the Province of Neuquén, Argentina, Within the Framework of the Chinese Moon Exploration Program" (2014), 5, <https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/240000-244999/243830/ley27123.pdf>.

¹³⁹ Argentine Republic and People's Republic of China, 3–4.

¹⁴⁰ Funairole et al., "Eyes on the Skies"; Mark Stokes et al., *China's Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities* (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2020), 38, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/China_Space_and_Counterspace_Activities.pdf.

¹⁴¹ Funairole et al., "Eyes on the Skies."

the deal.¹⁴² Chinese officials agreed to limit the facility to civilian use following a meeting in 2016, but there continues to be no oversight. This combination of manning, resourcing, and oversight creates concerns of military operational use.

The project is supported by some local and national Argentine officials, but others are skeptical of Chinese presence. The space facility is approximately 40 minutes from the closest town of Las Lajas.¹⁴³ Residents of the town are suspicious of the base as it is isolated from the city, and residents of the facility seldom go to the town other than to visit a local Chinese market. Juan Belikow, a professor at the University of Buenos Aires, echoes a concern shared by the U.S.: secrecy.¹⁴⁴ China continues to operate the facility without oversight, and Argentine agencies with access to the facility are given 2 hours and 40 minutes of operational time—the minimum promised in the 2014 contract. Oversight concerns were echoed by Juan Uriburu, a lawyer who has previously worked on Sino-Argentine projects, who said that the content of the contract does not matter unless there is a way to ensure compliance in reference to the 2016 revisions.¹⁴⁵ These factors and the minimal investment received in Las Lajas and by the Argentine government beg the question of support for similar projects in the future.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴² Argentine Republic and People's Republic of China, Cooperation Agreement Between The Government of the Argentine Republic and The Government of the People's Republic of China on the Construction, Establishment and Operation of a Deep Space Station of China in the Province of Neuquén, Argentina, Within the Framework of the Chinese Moon Exploration Program; Cassandra Garrison, "China's Military-Run Space Station in Argentina Is a 'Black Box,'" *Reuters*, January 31, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight-idUSKCN1PP0I2>.

¹⁴³ Garrison, "China's Military-Run Space Station in Argentina Is a 'Black Box.'"

¹⁴⁴ "Chinese Space Station on Argentine Soil Continues to Arouse Suspicion," *Diálogo Américas*, May 22, 2023, <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinese-space-station-on-argentine-soil-continues-to-arouse-suspicion/>.

¹⁴⁵ Synergia Foundation, *China's Mysterious Space Station in Argentina* (Bengaluru: Synergia Foundation, 2019), <https://www.synergiafoundation.org/insights/analyses-assessments/china-s-mysterious-space-station-argentina>.

¹⁴⁶ Alexandra Jaffe, "China Built a \$50 Million Space Base in Argentina to Reach the Dark Side of the Moon, but It's Casting a Shadow on Its Neighbors," *Vice*, November 30, 2018, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/a3mje4/china-built-a-dollar50-billion-space-base-in-argentina-to-reach-the-dark-side-of-the-moon-but-its-casting-a-shadow-on-its-neighbors>.

2. Naval Facilities

In addition to space facilities, China seeks to expand into Argentina through naval basing. China expressed interest in constructing a port in Ushuaia in 2019.¹⁴⁷ According to Chinese officials, the station would be used for resupply of Argentine Antarctic stations. However, the location of the facility raises concerns of increased Chinese control of southern waters and increased traffic of Chinese fishing fleets. Further, increased Chinese control could lead to the positioning of Chinese naval vessels in Argentina depending on terms negotiated between the two countries.¹⁴⁸ Establishment of the facility—especially with provisions allowing PLA Navy assets to use the facility—would greatly benefit China and provide increased force projection capabilities in the Western Hemisphere.

Though construction of the port has not begun, opponents to its construction have appeared internationally. The U.S. is perhaps the biggest international opponent to expansion. Current criticisms are mostly targeted toward the Neuquén space facility, but similar arguments extend to the Chinese naval facility.¹⁴⁹ These concerns are voiced by Alberto Rojas from Chile’s Finis Terrae University. Rojas states that a Chinese base in Tierra del Fuego would provide a permanent enclave in the Western Hemisphere and force projection capability in the region.¹⁵⁰ Further, domestic opponents to China may create a roadblock to the facility following the October 2023 election. If presidential hopeful Javier Milei is elected, he intends to sever ties with China and increase them with the U.S.¹⁵¹ There is no guarantee that Milei’s declared intent—assuming it is more than inflammatory campaign rhetoric—will be carried out. Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil made similar promises to Milei, but quickly reversed course in many areas after recognizing the aid China could

¹⁴⁷ Evan Ellis, “New Directions in the Deepening Chinese-Argentine Engagement,” *Diálogo Américas*, July 30, 2021, <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/new-directions-in-the-deepening-chinese-argentine-engagement/>.

¹⁴⁸ Saavedra, “China Pressures Argentina to Build Naval Base.”

¹⁴⁹ Saavedra.

¹⁵⁰ Kubny, “China’s Port Plan in Ushuaia and Satellite Station in Antarctica.”

¹⁵¹ “Javier Milei Promises to Break Argentina’s Relations with China and Strengthen Them with the US.,” *Euro ES Euro*, August 18, 2023, <https://euro.eseuro.com/world/858363.html>.

provide.¹⁵² Though it is a developing issue, the construction of a Chinese naval facility in Argentina remains a possibility and continues to face strong opposition.

D. CONCLUSIONS

Chinese military efforts have had varying levels of success. Argentina has formed agreements with China to increase joint training and frequently conducts engagements with Chinese military officials. Further, Chinese technologies are in demand to replace obsolete equipment and upgrade Argentine capabilities. Lastly, Argentina has allowed organizations related to the PLA to establish working facilities in Argentine territory with little oversight. China's progress on these fronts cannot be ignored.

However, China continues to face obstacles in increasing influence in this area. Though China and Argentina have engaged more frequently, Argentina remains relatively cautious in purchasing Chinese equipment. Argentina continues to show a preference for NATO equipment and has rejected Chinese technologies in the past due to their low quality. Currently, China's offer of the JF-17 has yet to be accepted by the FAA. Additionally, the U.S. has approved the sale of surplus Danish F-16s—the aircraft Argentina expressed the most interest in. The weak Argentine economy undoubtedly plays a part in the delayed decision, but Argentina's preference for U.S. equipment is clear. Further, future Chinese deals are threatened by the potential presidency of Javier Milei, who desires a closer relationship with the U.S.

Similarly, Chinese attempts at basing have mixed success. Though China has successfully established a space facility in Neuquén, concerns of their activity arose soon after. Macri worked to quickly amend the deal to prohibit military action, and the stipulations preventing oversight continue to draw criticism from national and international experts alike. Further, local Argentines continue to be suspicious of China. The secretive nature of the Espacio Lejano Station coupled with the lack of local investment following its completion leave citizens with little motive to welcome a larger presence. The potential construction of a naval base in Ushuaia additionally draws criticism, though the governor

¹⁵² *Testing the Limits of China and Brazil's Partnership* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2020), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/testing-the-limits-of-china-and-brazils-partnership/>.

of the region has allowed mineral exploration and other trade with China. Further, experience with the Neuquén ground station may continue to raise questions of sovereignty and create skepticism within the Argentine defense sector. Chinese basing is also at risk if Milei is elected, though he promises not to disrupt preestablished deals.

Chinese military efforts in Argentina have resulted in minimal gains in influence, aligning more closely with the second hypothesis. Training and engagement have increased, but with no clear effect on the Argentine military. Further, Chinese technologies continue to be eyed with suspicion, while NATO technologies are coveted; the clearest example of this is the focus placed on the F-16 although China has heavily advertised its JF-17. Though some basing has already occurred, many state officials remain critical of additional Chinese basing attempts or apparent infringements on Argentine sovereignty. Further, Argentina attempted to correct a portion of the Neuquén agreement with the introduction of a clause to prevent military activity. Argentina has exercised its agency and accepted perceived advantages it could gain by working with China in some areas but rejected others where it believed there was less to gain. This reality may only worsen for China if right wing politicians take control following the October 2023 elections, a possibility following primary votes.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ Nicolás Misculin, Eliana Raszewski, and Candelaria Grimberg, “Argentine Far-Right Outsider Javier Milei Posts Shock Win in Primary Election,” *Reuters*, August 14, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-set-primary-vote-with-ruling-peronists-fighting-survival-2023-08-13/>.

IV. DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy—often combined with investment—is one of China’s principal avenues for influence in a country. The diplomatic sector is heavily tied to all other areas of influence; successes on the diplomatic front can lead to increased military presence, support in international forums, and economic partnership. Xi Jinping himself has also expressed a desire to “lead the reform of the global governance system” in favor of a system that favors China.¹⁵⁴ As part of its efforts to increase its presence in the Western Hemisphere, China has greatly increased its diplomatic efforts in the region. This has resulted in some success, such as the Central American Parliament stripping Taiwan of its observer status in favor China.¹⁵⁵ Many other countries have also switched their diplomatic recognition to China to secure more financial aid. Diplomatic ties with China carry great potential for these smaller countries.

Chinese political activity in Argentina is noteworthy. Since diplomatic ties were established in 1972, China and Argentina have signed almost 200 treaties, memoranda, and other diplomatic communications that bolster their ties.¹⁵⁶ The countries have signed agreements on trade, culture sharing, mining, energy, and many other areas. Argentina has supported Chinese presence in the region, mainly for economic purposes, and has expressed disapproval of U.S. criticism of Chinese presence. Further, continued diplomacy with China has resulted in increased investment and presence—both physical and ideological. China’s ideological—or informational—presence has come through media companies that promote Chinese culture and values, while sympathizing with some Chinese values themselves. This presence has resulted in backlash within the populace and has prompted political rhetoric opposing it.

¹⁵⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, *China’s Approach to Global Governance* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations), accessed October 4, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/>.

¹⁵⁵ Ismael Lopez, “Central America Parliament Expels Taiwan, Makes China Permanent Observer,” *Reuters*, August 22, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/central-america-parliament-expels-taiwan-makes-china-permanent-observer-2023-08-22/>.

¹⁵⁶ Cancillería Argentina, “Biblioteca Digital de Tratados - Usted Se Encuentra En El Buscador de Tratados,” Biblioteca Digital de Tratados, accessed October 4, 2023, <https://tratados.cancilleria.gob.ar/busqueda.php?consulta=si&modo=c>.

This chapter analyzes Chinese diplomatic efforts in Argentina and associated informational efforts. It first discusses the One-China Policy and Argentina's adoption and promotion of it. It then covers Argentina's support for China in the region, specifically in the China-CELAC forum. Further, it covers Chinese effects on Argentine domestic policy, including the signing of multiple agreements and introduction of policy to allow for increased Chinese presence. Lastly, it discusses the backlash Argentine government officials and China have faced related to environmental effects, ideological differences, and humanitarian issues. The chapter concludes that though China seems to have gained influence on the surface with increased informational presence and political backing, Argentina is primarily focused on the economic benefits it can receive from China and is acting in a way that it can reap those benefits. Therefore, analysis of diplomatic of the diplomatic arena will focus heavily on economic policies and attempts influence them.

A. ONE-CHINA POLICY

One of the keys to Chinese diplomatic influence is a country's recognition of the One-China Policy. This policy states that the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the only government of China, and it inherently denies the existence of the Taiwanese—or Republic of China (ROC)—government.¹⁵⁷ The PRC has claimed to be the only legitimate government of China since 1949 and states that the ROC ceased to exist in the same year.¹⁵⁸ Opposition to Taiwanese independence is a continuous effort; this was demonstrated when the PRC wrote opposition to Taiwanese independence into its constitution in 2022.¹⁵⁹ The PRC has since based its diplomatic relations with other countries on their recognition of Taiwan or the One-China Policy; if a country will not recognize the PRC as the one true government of China, it will not receive diplomatic

¹⁵⁷ Michael J. Green and Bonnie S. Glaser, *What Is the U.S. "One China" Policy, and Why Does It Matter?* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter>.

¹⁵⁸ [Redacted], *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei*, CRS Report No. RL30341 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 1.

¹⁵⁹ "China Enshrines Opposition to Taiwan Independence in Constitution," *Le Monde*, October 22, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/asia-and-pacific/article/2022/10/22/taiwan-says-china-must-discard-old-mindset_6001368_153.html.

recognition. The PRC also goes to great lengths to ensure nations do not support Taiwan and openly warned European countries against official ties before the Taiwanese foreign minister's visit in June 2023.¹⁶⁰

Adoption of this policy is widespread in Latin America and throughout the globe. China's refusal to diplomatically acknowledge countries who maintain relations with Taiwan has motivated many to change their political allegiance.¹⁶¹ These efforts have resulted in only seven Latin American countries still recognizing Taiwan, with Honduras being the most recent to abandon relations with the country. The change in allegiance followed Taiwanese refusal to provide financial aid, and other Latin American countries are encouraged to make the switch as well. Others, such as Argentina, changed their recognition much earlier.

Argentine recognition of the PRC is firmly established. Diplomatic relations between Argentina and China began in 1972 and have continued to strengthen since then.¹⁶² The countries celebrated their 45th anniversary of ties in 2017 and voiced plans to strengthen the relationship. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Argentina was recognized as a comprehensive strategic partner—China's highest classification for partner countries which signifies full cooperation and development—and voiced desires to further strengthen the partnership through various meetings and engagements with Beijing.¹⁶³ One such meeting occurred between November 29 and December 2, 2018.¹⁶⁴ During this meeting—which followed the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires—Xi Jinping and Mauricio Macri confirmed support for one another on issues of sovereignty; Macri affirmed

¹⁶⁰ "China Warns Europe against Official Ties with Taiwan Ahead of Minister's Visit," *Reuters*, June 9, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china-warns-europe-taiwan-contacts-ahead-ministers-trip-2023-06-09/>.

¹⁶¹ Roy, *China's Growing Influence in Latin America*.

¹⁶² "45th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between Argentina and China | Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto."

¹⁶³ Jonathan Fulton, "China's Mena Presence," in *China's Changing Role in the Middle East* (Atlantic Council, 2019), 3, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20938.4>.

¹⁶⁴ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, "Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Argentine Republic," Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Worship Argentina, 2018, <https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/en/announcements/news/joint-statement-between-peoples-republic-china-and-argentine-republic>.

Argentine support of the One-China Policy, while Xi Jinping ensured Chinese support on the issue of the Malvinas and offered to mediate the issue. The meeting also resulted in the Second Five-Year Joint Action Plan signed by Macri and Xi which altered a currency exchange and established various other memorandums of understanding covering issues such as trade, human rights, and education.¹⁶⁵ These relations continue into 2023, as Argentina has not changed their position.

Though Argentina continues to support the One-China Policy, it has not completely abandoned relations with Taiwan. Although Argentina does not recognize Taiwan as an independent country, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Argentina fosters a trade and cultural relationship between the countries.¹⁶⁶ According to diplomat Miguel Li-jey Tsao Argentina and Taiwan have various options for cooperation outside of an official diplomatic relationship. He states that trade between the two countries increased during the COVID-19 pandemic, and his office has encouraged cultural exchange through showings of Taiwanese movies and educational programs. Taiwan's Vice Foreign Minister Alexander Yui states that the greatest factor in preventing official diplomatic ties between Taiwan and other nations is Chinese interference, and stated there would be a Taiwanese embassy in Buenos Aires if not for this interference.¹⁶⁷ Yui stated China's goal in each country it develops ties with is to remove all Taiwanese presence. He used the example of El Salvador, where China made multiple promises to establish companies and boost the economy. However, these promises were forgotten as soon as the Chinese embassy was established.

¹⁶⁵ "The Second Five-Year Joint Action Plan and the Deepening of Relations between Argentina and China," Fundeps, April 9, 2019, <https://fundeps.org/en/joint-action-plan-china/>.

¹⁶⁶ Erica Wu, "Taiwanese Find Their Feet in Argentina | Buenos Aires Times," *Buenos Aires Times*, August 13, 2022, <https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/opinion-and-analysis/taiwanese-find-their-feet-in-argentina.phtml>.

¹⁶⁷ Laureano Pérez Izquierdo, "Alexander Yui, vicecanciller de Taiwán: 'Estamos aprendiendo de Ucrania para defendernos,'" *infobae*, March 22, 2023, <https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/03/22/alexander-yui-vicecanciller-de-taiwan-estamos-aprendiendo-de-ucrania-para-defendernos/>.

B. CHINA-CELAC

China has also gained ground through regional organizations. In 2014, China founded the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) forum. Beijing founded this organization in an effort to increase its engagement with Latin American states in a forum independent of the U.S.¹⁶⁸ The organization consists of China and the 33 Latin American and Caribbean states and allows for various forms of information sharing. According to an informational booklet published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China-CELAC additionally hosts various subforums under the larger umbrella of China-CELAC; these subforums include economics, technical innovation, think tank interchange, and legal forums.¹⁶⁹

The China-CELAC forum opens possibilities of influence for China in the region and particularly in Argentina. The introduction of a power that defies the historical U.S. regional hegemony is attractive, particularly to left-leaning administrations. The ability to work with another developing country instead of the U.S. strengthens the idea of Argentine sovereignty, which was reinforced by President Alberto Fernández. In a January 2023 CELAC summit, Fernández criticized the U.S. for its accusations and demonization of China.¹⁷⁰ Fernández stressed Argentina's sovereignty and its rights to develop ties with any nation it desires. He further stated that China presented opportunities for development that he would be ungrateful for ignoring.

This forum opens a door for another of China's principal methods for influence throughout the developing world: economic aid. The establishment of the China-CELAC forum provides a medium for Beijing to promote its aid policies to the region without U.S. interference. These policies have generated more support for Chinese presence in the region as was voiced by Fernández. The promise of aid has also led to the abandonment of

¹⁶⁸ Margaret Myers, "China's Regional Engagement Goals in Latin America," *The Dialogue*, May 7, 2020, <https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/chinas-regional-engagement-goals-in-latin-america/>.

¹⁶⁹ Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, *Basic Information about China-CELAC Forum* (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2016), 25, http://www.chinacelacforum.org/eng/ltjj_1/201612/P020210828094665781093.pdf.

¹⁷⁰ "Hopefully, CELAC Will 'Help Us Deepen Links with China', Argentine President," *MercoPress*, January 23, 2023, <https://en.mercopress.com/2023/01/23/hopefully-celac-will-help-us-deepen-links-with-china-argentine-president>.

Taiwan as a diplomatic partner for many Latin American countries in favor of China in the case of Central America; further, China was added as an observer to the Central American parliament in Taiwan's place.¹⁷¹

Membership in these organizations does not represent a complete abandonment of ties to the U.S. or its allies, but instead represent Argentine agency. Argentina has remained in China-CELAC and promoted Chinese presence because it presents an opportunity for Argentina and other Latin American countries to develop. Argentina's promotion of China in the forum, as well as its maintenance of relations with both the U.S. and Taiwan show a desire to maintain agency while maximizing the aid available to it.

C. NATIONAL POLICY SHIFTS

In addition to its involvement and search for support in regional organizations, China also seeks to influence Argentine national policy to its benefit. China has expanded its involvement in the Western Hemisphere on economic, military, and diplomatic fronts. Similarly, Argentina expressed a desire to increase cooperation with the Global South as part of its own engagement strategy.¹⁷² To accomplish this, Argentina has worked closely with its partners—particularly China—to determine what policies are most beneficial to mutual growth. China, in return, has expressed its interest in investment and advancement of its partner, and increased its efforts an engagement to promote these ideas. The result of this engagement is the creation of various commissions between China and Argentina covering a multitude of issues including politics, defense, and nuclear energy. In turn, these commissions have resulted in several bilateral agreements and memoranda that provide varying levels of benefit to either party. According to Maria Ana Leal, these agreements can be organized into the categories of economics, socio-cultural engagement, and geopolitics.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Lopez, "Central America Parliament Expels Taiwan, Makes China Permanent Observer."

¹⁷² Maria Leal, *Hechizo Chino: Construcción de Poder En Argentina y América Latina*, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Almaluz, 2022), 143.

¹⁷³ Leal, 150.

1. Economics

The economic sector has generated the greatest number of agreements between the two countries and policy change for Argentina. As discussed in the economic chapter of this thesis, China has pursued investments into mining, energy, and infrastructure. The pursuit of these ventures has led to various agreements in each area. By changing and introducing policies, as well as generating new agreements, officials at various levels of the Argentine government seek to encourage Chinese investment in their provinces and cities. China itself seems most interested in affecting economic policy related to mining and energy.

In the area of mining, Argentina and China have signed several agreements promising information sharing on mineral deposits both on and offshore. An agreement signed in 2022 on scientific cooperation states that the countries would study metal enrichment and develop various methodologies for “the detection of covered mineral deposits.”¹⁷⁴ The agreement applies similar terms to marine geology, where the countries agreed to map the Argentine continental shelf and determine what mineral resources it holds. This agreement is of particular interest when considering Chinese desire for investment into Argentine mining; it allows Chinese industry to identify deposits of lithium or other valuable metals early on and offer investment or encourage Argentine industry to mine the deposit.

Energy—specifically renewable energy—is an area of interest for Argentine policymakers. Argentina increased its efforts to transition to clean energy sources since 2015.¹⁷⁵ To accomplish this transition, Argentina has enacted policies that encourage foreign investment into alternative energy industries including solar, wind, and nuclear. According to Juliana Jáuregui, approximately 90% of energy will be generated by these new sources. Further, Argentina used the 2021 UN Climate Change conference to propose

¹⁷⁴ China Geological Survey and Argentine Mining Geological Service, “Memorandum of Understanding between China Geological Survey of the People’s Republic of China and The Argentine Mining Geological Service of the Ministry of Productive Development of the People’s Republic of Argentina” (2022), 23, https://tratados.cancilleria.gob.ar/tratado_archivo.php?tratados_id=kqWmlZY=&tipo=kg=&id=kp6ql5o=&caso=pdf.

¹⁷⁵ Jáuregui, *How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid*.

a debt swap mechanism for a country's work on climate change, showing its confidence in the effectiveness of Argentine policies and plans. However, Argentina cannot make the planned transition alone.

To assist in its transition to renewables, Argentina has made an appeal to China. Welcoming Chinese investment is not solely an economic maneuver, but a political one as well. Argentina has increased its efforts to receive diplomatic recognition from China. These efforts have seen some success, as China recognizes Argentina as a comprehensive strategic partner, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed the importance of their relationship and Chinese desire to increase cooperation.¹⁷⁶ The appeal to China has also occurred on a local level. In April 2023, Governor Raúl Jalil of Catamarca Province met with Governor Zhao Long.¹⁷⁷ The meeting consisted of the officials praising the work of their counterpart, while stressing Catamarca's potential for investment in the mineral sector. Involvement in the conversion to renewables presents benefits to China as well, as it is legitimized on the international stage as a leader in renewable investment.

2. Socio-Cultural Factors

Another major area of diplomatic influence for China is the socio-cultural sector. To facilitate an environment that further its interests, China has increased its engagement with through media and culture to gain favor. It has done this through social media accounts, cultural exchange, and direct engagement with media groups to promote its interests.¹⁷⁸ Additionally, these information sources are used promote the idea of Chinese success in the region and the sovereignty and solidarity of both countries. According to a Freedom House report, these communications are partially possible because of ideological alignment between the current Argentine administration and the PRC government.¹⁷⁹ In

¹⁷⁶ Wang Yi, "China Willing to Work with Argentina to Bolster Cooperation Prospects," *Xinhua*, October 31, 2021, http://www.news.cn/english/2021-10/31/c_1310281620.htm.

¹⁷⁷ "Governor Zhao Long Meets with Governor Raúl Jalil of Catamarca Province_Latest_Foreign Affairs Office of the Fujian Provincial People's Government," *Fujian*, April 11, 2023, https://wb.fujian.gov.cn/English/latest/202304/t20230413_6148540.htm.

¹⁷⁸ "Argentina: Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022 Country Report," Freedom House, accessed October 2, 2023, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/beijings-global-media-influence/2022>.

¹⁷⁹ Freedom House, "Argentina: Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022 Country Report."

this area, China utilizes its partial ideological alignment with the government to gain access to—and attempt to gain influence with—the Argentine people.

Socio-cultural engagement has also generated policy change for Argentina. Further, this policy change has been unique to this sector. According to Leal, the Chinese and Argentine governments signed a memorandum of understanding in February 2015 that outlines informational exchange between the two countries.¹⁸⁰ Leal states that this memorandum is unique when compared with those signed in other sectors because it ensures the confidentiality of information shared between the countries. The document itself states the two countries will not provide the documents used for the implementation of the memorandum to a third party and adds that termination of the agreement does not affect the obligation to keep the items confidential.¹⁸¹ In addition to this stipulation, the document authorizes exchanges, training, seminars, and research communications for sharing information for 5 years following the agreement, and authorizes an automatic five year extension if the signers did not express the desire to withdraw. This agreement allows for twofold engagement with Argentine policy makers and public, as both Argentine and Chinese media are authorized to promote the relationship and ideology of the PRC.

Political and cultural influence extends beyond official channels as well. According to Leal, Argentina has allowed to China to host various programs including cultural exchanges, television, and radio programs meant to promote a positive outlook on Chinese cultural and society.¹⁸² These programs include Chinese language classes, culture weeks, and bookshelves that promote Chinese thinking and culture. Included in this strategy are Confucius Institutes. These organizations are used globally to promote Chinese culture and encourage educational cooperation between China and the partner country. Argentina has three of these institutes which provide language training, scholarships, and opportunities

¹⁸⁰ Leal, *Hechizo Chino*, 202–3.

¹⁸¹ Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services of the Argentine Republic and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People's Republic of China, "Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Information and Communications Between the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services of the Republic of Argentina and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People's Republic of China" (2015), 11.

¹⁸² Leal, *Hechizo Chino*, 214.

for students to study in China.¹⁸³ The institutes are often criticized by the U.S. as a vehicle for educational influence and curtailment of academic freedoms. However, Professor Norberto Consani of the National University of La Plata—director of the Confucius Institute in the same university—the institute has not influenced the university’s criticism of Chinese human rights abuses. However, Chinese teachers are cautious on the subject and avoid economics or political topics. Effective implementation of these strategies could cause the Argentine populace to favor policies that align with China or promote views like China’s. In Argentina, this could result in increased left-wing sentiment and pursuit of deeper ties.

D. BACKLASH

Though China has increased its political and media outreach in Argentina, it is often met with skepticism or resistance. Argentine policymakers and the public seem to welcome increased trade with China but are skeptical of its presence in country. According to Freedom House polls, the Argentine public has a general trust for China and a desire for increased trade and political ties.¹⁸⁴ However, a portion of the population has a distrust of Xi Jinping and the Chinese government. According to a Pew Research poll conducted in 2018, 47 percent of Argentines had no confidence in Xi Jinping to do the right thing in world affairs.¹⁸⁵ Pew’s research also showed that over 50% of Argentines believed China does not respect personal freedoms. This view on China contradicts Argentina’s views on personal freedoms, as media outlets and individuals are free to question the government or express viewpoints conflicting with it.¹⁸⁶ These views of China at the individual level have the potential to create obstacles to Chinese incursion through votes, and it also leads to more extreme displays of disapproval. In November 2020, The Economic Times reported

¹⁸³ Jaime Moreno, “China’s Educational Influence Expected to Grow in Latin America,” *VOA*, April 23, 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-educational-influence-expected-to-grow-in-latin-america-/6524956.html>.

¹⁸⁴ Freedom House, “Argentina: Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022 Country Report.”

¹⁸⁵ Kat Devlin, *5 Charts on Global Views of China* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2018), <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2018/10/19/5-charts-on-global-views-of-china/>.

¹⁸⁶ “Argentina: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report,” Freedom House, accessed October 4, 2023, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2022>.

an increase in anti-Chinese sentiment in Argentina.¹⁸⁷ Citizens have expressed this sentiment through rallies in Buenos Aires and attacking Chinese entrepreneurs. The article further states that citizens pushed back against Chinese investment into production of pork following an epidemic of swine flu that decimated Chinese pork industry. While the Argentine government welcomed the investment, Argentine citizens pushed back against the project because of environmental concerns and danger to humans. Even though Chinese investment has been encouraged by the government and provided some infrastructure, the Argentine people remain unconvinced.

Like the Argentine populace, the media has expressed disapproval of Chinese incursion into Argentine politics and other matters.¹⁸⁸ Media outlets have criticized China over issues such as illegal fishing, corruption, human rights violations, and environmental damage. These criticisms have extended directly to China's form of government. Juan Pablo Cardenal published an article attacking Chinese government; he criticized the lack of democracy in China and Chinese belief that its form of government has surpassed democracy.¹⁸⁹ Further, he identified Chinese unwillingness to accept criticism of its form of government or its many infringements on its citizens. Cardenal wrote this article for the organization Centro para la Apertura y el Desarrollo de América Latina (CADAL), a group focused on Latin American development which has increased its criticisms of China.¹⁹⁰ This organization and many others have questioned Chinese involvement in the region, and journalists like Cardenal play a part in influencing the public and presenting opposition to the spread of Chinese ideology.

Opposition to China additionally comes from political classes. This opposition is especially apparent with the 2023 Argentine presidential election. In August 2023, Javier

¹⁸⁷ Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, "Anti-China Protests Rise in Argentina, the Recipient of Maximum Chinese FDI in Latin America [International-News]," *The Economic Times*, November 19, 2020, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2461615584/citation/4AF19EC05E914EC9PQ/1>.

¹⁸⁸ "Argentina: Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022 Country Report."

¹⁸⁹ Juan Cardenal, "Democracia al estilo chino," CADAL.ORG, 2021, <https://www.cadal.org/>.

¹⁹⁰ "Argentina: Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022 Country Report."

Milei won the primary election with his party La Libertad Avanza.¹⁹¹ Milei—a right wing candidate—has voiced his opposition to China and was recognized by the South China Morning Post as a threat to economic ties.¹⁹² He has stated he would be against state economic ties to China but would not prohibit private ventures between companies.¹⁹³ Election of Milei may harm both economic and political ties to China. His rhetoric against China—if carried out while in office—could result in refusal of aid or increased investment in favor of ties to the U.S. This may be reciprocated, as China may decide to withdraw other forms of aid depending on Milei’s treatment of it. Milei’s potential election and presidential term will require observation, as rhetoric may be overshadowed by requirements of office and the wellbeing of the country.

E. CONCLUSIONS

China has achieved many diplomatic successes in Argentina. The countries have maintained diplomatic ties since 1972; the relationship has also strengthened and is recognized as a comprehensive strategic partnership by Beijing. Further, Argentina has accommodated China in various fields through policy changes. Their interests have aligned to increase the spread of renewable energy sources. Engagement to enact policies in favor this kind of investment have occurred on both national and provincial levels and have achieved success in enacting new legislation. Additionally, Chinese engagements at the national level have generated several agreements that have increased information flow to the Argentine public in favor of China, its culture, and its political views. On all fronts, China has seemingly gained ground in Argentine political life.

These apparent gains have not directly translated into increased influence. Argentina, like the U.S., outwardly agrees with the One-China policy and recognizes the PRC government for diplomatic purposes. However, Argentina continues to have a strong

¹⁹¹ “PASO 2023: el mapa de resultados de las elecciones a presidente en la Argentina,” *LA NACION*, August 30, 2023, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/paso-2023-el-mapa-de-resultados-de-las-elecciones-a-presidente-en-todo-el-pais-nid13082023/>.

¹⁹² Jiangtao, “Sudden Rise of ‘Argentina’s Trump’ Puts Economic Ties with China at Risk.”

¹⁹³ María Eugenia Duffard, “La victoria de la ultraderecha en Argentina se cierne sobre sus relaciones con China y Brasil,” *Voz de América*, August 21, 2023, <https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/la-victoria-de-la-ultraderecha-en-argentina-se-cierne-sobre-las-relaciones-con-china-y-brasil/7231729.html>.

relationship with Taiwan. Trade continues and even strengthened during the COVID-19 pandemic, and cultural ties continue to thrive. Further, changes in national policy have resulted in increased Chinese presence and investment in the country, but the populace does not fully support it. Citizens continue to push against issues stemming from Chinese presence including increased environmental damage and corruption. Media outlets have also criticized Beijing for its domestic human rights abuses and stance against democracy—which receives great attention due to Argentina’s past experiences with authoritarian rule. China may also see increased opposition on the national political front as Javier Milei leads in national polling. Shifts in policy at the national level have not translated into dominance of the political scene.

Chinese diplomatic efforts in Argentina have resulted in some gains in influence, but results continue to lean towards the second hypothesis. Diplomatic efforts have led the Argentine national government to generally align with China where economic policies are concerned at both the international and regional level. This is clear with Argentina’s advocacy on behalf of China in the China-CELAC forum, and the establishment of ties as comprehensive strategic partners. Further, multiple agreements have been put in place to allow China to continue investment and to disseminate cultural information throughout the country. However, national policy makers have not expanded political involvement beyond these spheres. Additionally, the populace welcomes investment, but it stands against Chinese political views and the damage its presence causes to the country and its sovereignty as demonstrated through public opinion polling and criticism by CADAL. While investment may continue and China may be allowed a greater commercial or media presence within the state, its influence on Argentine political views is unlikely to grow.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, *Basic Information about China-CELAC Forum*, 25.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. CONCLUSION

China continues to be the U.S.'s primary competitor for influence. Within the Western Hemisphere—and within Argentina—China has increased its influence efforts. Perhaps the greatest area of interest for China is the economic front, where it has achieved various successes in the form of trade agreements, investment opportunities, and memberships in the BRI. Similarly, China has made some progress in the military arena where it has increased engagement with the Argentine military, and it gained a facility for operation of its satellites. Related to the previous two areas is diplomacy, where China has signed several agreements with Argentina to allow increased cultural and economic presence, and Argentina has continued to support China in international and regional forums.

The Argentine case is critical to U.S. understanding of Chinese goals in Latin America. As the third largest economy in the region with a sizeable military and diverse political landscape, Argentina presents an excellent opportunity for Chinese influence. Economic struggles provide an environment conducive to Chinese investment and economic leverage, especially with Argentina's new membership in the BRI; relative economic strength also gives Argentina the ability to resist Chinese efforts where they are not wanted. Military modernization projects give China an opportunity to market its equipment—particularly fighter aircraft—and show the strength of its defense industry, while alliance with the U.S. presents an effective alternative to aid and training Argentina may desire. Further, political division presents China with an opportunity to capitalize on ideological alignment with left-leaning administrations, while the rising right-wing stands against any Chinese incursions. The combination of factors in Argentina allows it to serve as a representation of Latin America as a whole. Chinese efforts to influence the economic, military, and political spheres in Argentina will provide insight into regional responses to Chinese endeavors.

Though China seems to be gaining ground in some instances it has not happened without Argentine agency playing in. In the economic area, Argentina has accepted trade and investment to benefit itself. In the military domain, Argentina has accepted increased

engagement and has allowed for construction of Chinese facilities manned by military personnel; however, it has rejected Chinese-made equipment in favor of U.S. equipment and continues to pursue the U.S. F-16. In the diplomatic domain, Argentina has changed and enacted policy to allow for China to increase its engagement, but its aims are largely to allow for more investment and economic progress. Further, the Argentine public has pushed back against the increased Chinese political presence.

Overall, the effects of Chinese influence efforts in Argentina align more closely with the second hypothesis. Although China seems to have gained ground in many aspects in Argentina, the Argentine government is largely capitalizing on the presence of a new trade partner with a desire to invest. Analysis of the individual arenas analyzed in this thesis demonstrates this conclusion.

A. ECONOMICS

China has achieved the greatest gains in the realm of economic influence. China surpassed the U.S. and became Argentina's second largest trading partner.¹⁹⁵ Additionally, China has greatly increased its investments in Argentina, and the Argentine government has welcomed China with open arms. Investment has brought not only increased revenue, but also opportunities for renewable energy, infrastructure improvement, and the position as a regional leader in these sectors. Further, Chinese aid provided through the BRI and loans provide opportunities for growth that avoid the normal IMF channels.

Though Chinese influence has increased in this area, it largely aligns with the second hypothesis. China has secured large businesses in desirable sectors, secured a member for the BRI, and invested in infrastructure that supports its goal as a renewable energy leader.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, Argentina agreed to a currency exchange and started to make purchases in Chinese yuan.¹⁹⁷ Although these shifts benefit China, they were done out of Argentine necessity and desire for advancement. Advancement of the Argentine energy grid allows the country to achieve its environmental goals and modernize its

¹⁹⁵ "Argentina (ARG) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners."

¹⁹⁶ International Energy Agency, *An Energy Sector Roadmap to Carbon Neutrality in China*, 13.

¹⁹⁷ Reuters, "Argentina to Pay for Chinese Imports in Yuan Rather than Dollars."

infrastructure. Investment from Chinese companies also allows for modernization of industry and profits from the extraction of metals such as lithium. Use of the Chinese yuan was also out of necessity, as the country's dollar reserves are quite low.¹⁹⁸ China continues to invest in the country, and the Argentine government—and the people—largely welcome this investment.¹⁹⁹ However, Chinese economic involvement is utilized for Argentina's benefit.

B. MILITARY

Of the areas analyzed, China has gained the least influence in the military domain. Argentina and China have formed various agreements that allow for military exchanges and training. The countries have additionally signed agreements in the past authorizing the sale of military equipment.²⁰⁰ Previous cooperation also resulted in the establishment of the Espacio Lejano Station in Neuquén. However, these gains are counteracted by Argentine mistrust of Chinese equipment, a historically anti-communist stance, as well as reluctance to allow Chinese basing due to issues of sovereignty.²⁰¹ Further, Argentina maintains an alliance with the U.S. and prefers NATO equipment.²⁰² This preference may also result in the Argentine purchase of Danish F-16s instead of the JF-17. While China has made some progress with Argentina in this area, Argentine agency is more at play.

C. DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy has also seen some increases in Chinese influence, but also follows the second hypothesis. Argentina and China have formed numerous agreements that allow China a presence in the economy, culture, and media. The Argentine government has also defended China in international forums and supports the One-China policy. However, Argentina advances these policies for its own benefit. Changes in policy have resulted in

¹⁹⁸ Reuters.

¹⁹⁹ "Argentina: Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022 Country Report."

²⁰⁰ Loro Horta, "Why China Wants to Power Argentina's Air Force Modernisation."

²⁰¹ Martin Dinatale, "Polémica por una estación espacial de China en el Sur," *LA NACION*, September 3, 2014, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/polemica-por-una-estacion-espacial-de-china-en-el-sur-nid1723908/>.

²⁰² Pelcastre, "China Sells Low Quality Weapons."

increased trade and opportunities for increased investment. Further, China publicly supports Argentine sovereignty and legitimizes its claim to the Malvinas.²⁰³ Additional complications for Chinese influence arise from the Argentine public's disapproval of the Chinese human rights record.²⁰⁴ Issues may be further exacerbated by the 2023 presidential election, especially following the election of Javier Milei who is right-wing and against China.

D. ROADBLOCKS TO CHINESE INFLUENCE

China has gone through numerous efforts to increase its influence in Argentina. Its investments in the country are numerous, it has tried repeatedly to cement military deals, and cooperation in policy seems to be successful. However, China has not seemed to gain significant ground outside of economics, where Argentina has taken advantage of the presence of a new partner with immense interest in trading and investing. What has prevented increases in other areas?

One of the major roadblocks to Chinese influence is ideological difference. The people and government of Argentina express support for democracy, human rights, and environmental stewardship among other principles.²⁰⁵ In contrast, China is widely known for its discrimination against minority groups, its effect on the climate, and repressive government.²⁰⁶ It has become a victim of its own success, as immense growth and expansion into international affairs has brought more attention to these areas. Argentina has previously declined to debate the human rights issues at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council but cited its refusal to delegitimize and politicize the human rights

²⁰³ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, "Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Argentine Republic."

²⁰⁴ "Argentina: Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022 Country Report."

²⁰⁵ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, "Human Rights and the Values of Our Society | Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto," Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Worship Argentina, accessed October 12, 2023, <https://cancilleria.gob.ar/en/foreign-policy/human-rights-and-values-our-society>.

²⁰⁶ Lindsay Maizland, *China's Fight Against Climate Change and Environmental Degradation* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021), <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-climate-change-policies-environmental-degradation>.

council as its reason for abstaining.²⁰⁷ Further, polls of Argentine citizens show disapproval of the Chinese human rights abuses, hindering any influence over the Argentine public.²⁰⁸ When considering Argentina's history with authoritarian government and human rights abuses, it is unlikely the military would ideologically align with China either. For these reasons Argentina allows China to gain ground only when beneficial to its growth—mainly in the economic sector—but hesitates to allow for other forms of engagement.

The second major roadblock to Chinese influence is Argentine sovereignty. Argentina—like other Latin American countries—has a history of colonization and imposition by foreign powers. The region experienced this before its liberation from the Iberian powers, and later experienced it from the U.S.²⁰⁹ Because of these encounters, Argentina and other countries in the region are cautious of accepting too much intervention from a foreign power. This is true for China as well. Argentina has already encountered sovereignty issues with the establishment of the Espacio Lejano Station; China gained access to 500 acres of Argentine land, as well as a treaty that promised no Argentine oversight of the facility.²¹⁰ The Argentine government mitigated some issues by asking the Chinese not to conduct military operations, but it still has no way to ensure compliance. This also makes a Chinese naval port in Ushuaia unlikely, as Argentina grows wary of other potential infringements. These issues additionally translate into the economic sector. Argentina has allowed China to purchase various companies and invest in Argentine infrastructure. Though the economic relationship is thriving, Argentina may relent if there is potential for losing control of its own territory. Further, issues with loans and

²⁰⁷ “Argentina Abstains from UN Vote on Xinjiang Abuses Debate | Buenos Aires Times,” *Buenos Aires Times*, July 10, 2022, <https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-abstains-from-un-vote-on-xinjiang-abuses-debate.phtml>.

²⁰⁸ “Argentina: Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022 Country Report.”

²⁰⁹ Smith and Covarrubias, *Talons of the Eagle*.

²¹⁰ Argentine Republic and People’s Republic of China, Cooperation Agreement Between The Government of the Argentine Republic and The Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Construction, Establishment and Operation of a Deep Space Station of China in the Province of Neuquén, Argentina, Within the Framework of the Chinese Moon Exploration Program.

requirements from the IMF have existed for decades.²¹¹ Argentina is unlikely to accept loans from China if they require drastic changes to the economic system that the Argentine government does not perceive as beneficial. Argentina jealously guards its sovereignty, creating a high hurdle for China in its quest for influence.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.

Argentina exercising its agency to take advantage of Chinese presence without succumbing to it presents a few advantages to the U.S. The first of these is reduced fear of Chinese presence in the Western Hemisphere. Particularly in the military sphere, Chinese influence presents a smaller concern than in the economic domain. Argentina prefers to use U.S.-made equipment and is also unlikely to allow larger-scale Chinese basing due to sovereignty concerns. Additionally, Argentina is unlikely to shift its ideological stance to match China; the strength of democracy in Argentina, history of authoritarianism, and criticisms of Chinese actions both in Argentina and abroad create a mismatch in ideology and roadblock to change. While China has increased its ties to Argentina, presidential elections may also pose a threat to Chinese influence. Javier Milei maintains an anti-China stance, but also declared his intent to increase ties to the U.S. This includes potential dollarization of the Argentine economy, a move which has received criticism from many economists.²¹²

Although Chinese influence in Argentina is not a major threat, the U.S. should stay vigilant. Chinese strategy since the end of the Cold War has been to slowly erode U.S. global influence.²¹³ Similarly, it may be working slowly to increase its influence in Argentina. Consistent engagement over several decades may open doors to further influence, especially if the Argentine economy does not stabilize or the U.S. is forced to

²¹¹ Jorgelina Do Rosario, “Analysis: IMF Has a Tough Call on Argentina: Force Major Reforms or Pull the Plug,” *Reuters*, September 15, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/imfs-argentina-predicament-seek-reforms-tango-or-kill-music-2023-09-15/>.

²¹² Leandro Gabin, “Milei’s Path to Dollarization: Riddled with Doubts,” *Americas Quarterly*, September 11, 2023, <https://americasquarterly.org/article/mileis-path-to-dollarization-riddled-with-doubts/>.

²¹³ *The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2021), <https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/>.

turn its attention away from engagement in Latin America. Further, China can still leverage its current presence in Argentina to varying degrees. The Espacio Lejano ground station alone is to exist for 50 years, and the lack of oversight provides opportunities for China to carry out space operations uninterrupted. Public perception also presents issues for the U.S. in comparison to China, as only 41% of respondents to a Pew Research poll had a favorable view of U.S. as of 2019.²¹⁴ The U.S. may need to further cement its relationship and engagement with Argentina to mitigate the Chinese threat.

The Chinese experience in Argentina provides many lessons the U.S. can apply to future engagement with the country and Latin America as a whole. An area that requires special attention is the issue of sovereignty. The U.S. has historically intervened in Latin America, and often to its detriment.²¹⁵ This has led to Latin American countries being cautious of intervention from larger powers in their affairs or territory, and the Chinese case shows the sentiment is still accurate today. As a counter to Chinese interests, the U.S. can provide economic and military assistance to Latin American countries without strict control over its application to show respect for their sovereignty and trust in their judgement. Respect for sovereignty and agency may also involve minimizing public criticism of relations with China, as many states will affirm their right to maintain relations with any country they please.²¹⁶ Regional engagements can also become more inclusive of states that were considered pariahs—Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—to promote dialogue on issues of development and human rights. The U.S. maintains the advantage over China on military aid, human rights, and views on democracy, and should continue to promote these ideals. Democracy in the region has strengthened dramatically in the region since the 20th century, but it has experienced some setbacks in the previous decade.²¹⁷ U.S.

²¹⁴ Pew Research Center, “Global Indicators Database,” *Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project* (blog), March 2022, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/>.

²¹⁵ Smith and Covarrubias, *Talons of the Eagle*.

²¹⁶ *MercoPress*, “Hopefully, CELAC Will ‘Help Us Deepen Links with China’, Argentine President.”

²¹⁷ *The Rapidly Deteriorating Quality of Democracy in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2020), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-rapidly-deteriorating-quality-of-democracy-in-latin-america/>.

promotion of these ideals may garner respect from Latin American leaders and assist in curbing these effects.

Lessons from Argentina can also be applied globally as the U.S. competes with China for influence. The issues faced by Argentina and other Latin American countries also apply to others in the Global South; many of these countries need economic and military aid, and China provides excellent opportunities for advancement. The U.S. can apply many of the same lessons, especially respect for democracy and sovereignty, throughout the rest of the world to show its trust in these countries as allies and partners. However, global relations present more complications than Latin America, as many states embracing China have been criticized by the U.S. for previous human rights abuses and are unwilling to accept imposition of American ideals. In these instances, the U.S. must choose its battles carefully as neglecting these countries may result in animosity, but trying to force relations can also breed hostility. Also important is vocal U.S. focus on China. Latin America and the world observed and experienced great power competition during the first Cold War and want no part of another.²¹⁸ The U.S. would benefit from directing its attention, at least outwardly, to assisting its partners rather than purely countering China. This may restore confidence in the U.S. and encourage relations with those that fear conflict.

F. FURTHER RESEARCH

Chinese influence in Argentina requires further observation. The relationship between the countries has steadily evolved since the establishment of diplomatic relations in the 1970s, and a changing global landscape will influence how the Chinese will engage with their partners. The Argentine left-wing has demonstrated a willingness to work with China, especially in the economic domain. Partnership in this area appears to be a result of desperation and previous troubles with the IMF.²¹⁹ If the economy continues to deteriorate,

²¹⁸ Voice of America, “VOA60 Africa - Macky Sall: Africa “does Not Want to Be the Breeding Ground of a New Cold War”,” video, 1:00, Voice of Americas, September 21, 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/voa60-africa---macky-sall-africa-does-not-want-to-be-the-breeding-ground-of-a-new-cold-war-/6757204.html>.

²¹⁹ Rosario, “Analysis.”

Argentina may develop an overreliance on China and erosion to its sovereignty as a result. As of November 2023, Javier Milei was elected president of Argentina.²²⁰ Following his election, his attitude toward China may dramatically affect the relationship, or he may realize the benefit to maintaining ties. A Milei-led administration also will not necessarily result in a better relationship with the U.S., as a populist stance may result in erosions in Argentine democracy and U.S. unwillingness to support his administration. Further, worsening inflation and inability to pay back loans may result in greater reliance on Chinese economic aid and investment, while the diplomatic sector may shift to increasingly favor China because of increased Chinese presence and continued left-wing influence. Although the Argentine military favors the U.S., further observation is recommended in the military domain to determine any shifts in attitude or changes to Chinese strategies. Argentine history of anti-communism and authoritarianism may act as an ideological guard against China to some extent. However, long-term shifts in attitude as the military relationship with China continues are still possible.

Although a shift in the relationship to favor China is possible, this should not be taken as a sign of complete capitulation. The sectors covered in this thesis generally point to Argentine agency being the predominant factor driving the relationship and potential shifts in influence, and that is unlikely to change. Argentina acknowledges the benefits associated with a relationship with China but is also cautious to avoid endangering its sovereignty. Although the relationship has grown and Chinese presence has increased, these have been leveraged to benefit Argentina where possible. Where China has demonstrated a desire to grow, Argentina has looked to reap the benefits.

²²⁰ Nicolás Misculin et al., “Argentine Libertarian Milei Pledges New Political Era after Election Win,” *Reuters*, November 20, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-readies-vote-likely-presidential-election-thriller-2023-11-19/>.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Air Force. “F-16 Fighting Falcon.” Accessed August 29, 2023. <https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104505/f-16-fighting-falcon/>
[https%3A%2F%2Fwww.af.mil%2FAbout-Us%2FFact-Sheets%2FDisplay%2FArticle%2F104505%2Ff-16-fighting-falcon%2F](https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104505/f-16-fighting-falcon/).
- Al-Fadhat, Faris, and Hari Prasetyo. “How China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy Works in African Countries: Evidence from Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and Djibouti.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, (November 2022): 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221137673>.
- Ansari, Usman. “Could Britain Stop Argentina from Buying the JF-17 Warplane?” *Defense News*, September 28, 2021. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2021/09/28/could-britain-stop-argentina-from-buying-the-jf-17-warplane/>.
- Ansari, Usman. “Could Britain Stop Argentina from Buying the JF-17 Warplane?” *Defense News*, September 28, 2021. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2021/09/28/could-britain-stop-argentina-from-buying-the-jf-17-warplane/>.
- Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. “Argentina: Tierra Del Fuego Energy Transition Support Program.” Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed August 20, 2023. <https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/details/2023/proposed/Argentina-Tierra-del-Fuego-Energy-Transition-Support-Program.html>.
- Becard, Danielly Silva Ramos, and Paulo Menechelli Filho. “Chinese Cultural Diplomacy: Instruments in China’s Strategy for International Insertion in the 21st Century.” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 62, no. 1 (2019): 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201900105>.
- Bekerman, Marta, Federico Dulcich, and Pedro Gaité. “Argentina’s Economic Relations with China and Their Impact on a Long-Term Production Strategy.” *CEPAL Review* 2022, no. 138 (December 2022): 25–44. <https://doi.org/10.18356/16840348-2022-138-2>.
- Berg, Ryan, and Wazim Mowla. “Taiwan’s Future in Latin America and the Caribbean.” *The Diplomat*, September 1, 2022. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/taiwans-future-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>.
- Buenos Aires Times*. “Argentina Abstains from UN Vote on Xinjiang Abuses Debate | Buenos Aires Times.” July 10, 2022. <https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-abstains-from-un-vote-on-xinjiang-abuses-debate.phtml>.

- . “Argentina Default on Foreign Currency Debt ‘imminent,’ Says Fitch.” March 25, 2023. <https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/argentina-default-on-foreign-currency-debt-imminent-says-fitch.phtml>.
- Cancillería Argentina. “Biblioteca Digital de Tratados – Usted Se Encuentra En El Buscador de Tratados.” Biblioteca Digital de Tratados. Accessed October 4, 2023. <https://tratados.cancilleria.gob.ar/busqueda.php?consulta=si&modo=c>.
- Cardenal, Juan. “Democracia al estilo chino.” CADAL.org, 2021. <https://www.cadal.org/>.
- Cash, Joe, Gustavo Palencia, and Ben Blanchard. “China Opens Ties with Honduras, Taiwan Decries Monetary Demands.” *Reuters*, March 26, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/honduras-government-says-ending-diplomatic-ties-with-taiwan-2023-03-26/>.
- CEIC. “Argentina Government Debt: % of GDP, 2004 – 2023 | CEIC Data.” Accessed August 15, 2023. <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/argentina/government-debt--of-nominal-gdp>.
- Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. “Anti-China Protests Rise in Argentina, the Recipient of Maximum Chinese FDI in Latin America [International-News].” *The Economic Times*, November 19, 2020. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2461615584/citation/4AF19EC05E914EC9PQ/1>.
- Chellaney, Brahma. “China’s Creditor Imperialism.” Project Syndicate, December 20, 2017. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-sri-lanka-hambantota-port-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-12>.
- China Daily*. “China’s Embassy in Argentina Marks 90th Anniversary of PLA.” July 29, 2017. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-07/29/content_30290461.htm.
- Chorn, Adrien. *The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/>.
- Council on Foreign Relations. *China’s Approach to Global Governance*. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed October 4, 2023. <https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/>.
- Crandall, Russell. “The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America.” *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (2011): 83–86, 87–90, 91–95.
- Creutzfeldt, Benjamin. “4. Latin American Views of Chinese and U.S. Policy.” In *China, The United States, and the Future of Latin America*, edited by David B. H. Denoon, 83–106. New York: New York University Press, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479899289.003.0004>.

- Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs. *Basic Information about China-CELAC Forum*. Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2016. http://www.chinacelacforum.org/eng/ltjj_1/201612/P020210828094665781093.pdf.
- Devlin, Kat. *5 Charts on Global Views of China*. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2018. <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2018/10/19/5-charts-on-global-views-of-china/>.
- Diálogo Américas*. “China and Venezuela Strengthen Their Relationship.” July 7, 2023. <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-and-venezuela-strengthen-their-relationship/>.
- . “Chinese Space Station on Argentine Soil Continues to Arouse Suspicion.” May 22, 2023. <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinese-space-station-on-argentine-soil-continues-to-arouse-suspicion/>.
- Dinatale, Martin. “Polémica por una estación espacial de China en el Sur.” *LA NACION*, September 3, 2014. <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/polemica-por-una-estacion-espacial-de-china-en-el-sur-nid1723908/>.
- Dow Jones Institutional News*. “Secret Chinese Port Project in Persian Gulf Rattles U.S. Relations With U.A.E.” November 19, 2021. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2599351890/citation/B7042EDB1B8C402DPQ/1>.
- Duffard, María Eugenia. “La victoria de la ultraderecha en Argentina se cierne sobre sus relaciones con China y Brasil.” *Voz de América*, August 21, 2023. <https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/la-victoria-de-la-ultraderecha-en-argentina-se-cierne-sobre-las-relaciones-con-china-y-brasil/7231729.html>.
- Dye, J.L. “Lithium.” In *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc, 2023. <https://www.britannica.com/science/lithium-chemical-element>.
- The Economist*. “How Not to Deal with China.” March 11, 2023.
- . “It’s Still the Economy, Stupid.” June 24, 2023.
- Ellis, Evan. “New Directions in the Deepening Chinese-Argentine Engagement.” *Diálogo Américas*, July 30, 2021. <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/new-directions-in-the-deepening-chinese-argentine-engagement/>.
- Ellis, R. Evan. “14. China’s Security Challenge to the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean.” In *China, The United States, and the Future of Latin America*, edited by David B.H. Denoon, 341–70. New York: New York University Press, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479899289.003.0014>.

- . *A Strategy to Respond to Extra-Hemispheric Actors in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Sheridan, WY: IndraStra Global, 2023.
- . “China’s Strategy in Latin America & the Caribbean.” In *China Steps Out: Beijing’s Major Power Engagement with the Developing World*, edited by Joshua Eisenman and Eric Heginbotham, 193–214. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- . *The Future of Latin America and the Caribbean in the Context of the Rise of China*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2018.
- Ellis, R. Evan, and Leland Lazarus. “China’s New Year Ambitions for Latin America and the Caribbean.” *The Diplomat*, Tokyo, United States: Tribune Content Agency LLC, January 11, 2022. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2644849763/abstract/89CD6082AEFE4550PQ/1>.
- Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Grenada. *China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*. Grenada: Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Grenad, 2016.
- Euro ES Euro*. “Javier Milei Promises to Break Argentina’s Relations with China and Strengthen Them with the US.” August 18, 2023. <https://euro.eseuro.com/world/858363.html>.
- Fang, Cai, Peter Nolan, and Wang Linggui, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of the Belt and Road*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003286202>.
- Finnerty, Ryan. “USA to Approve Sale of Danish F-16s to Argentina.” *Flight Global*, August 14, 2023. <https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/usa-to-approve-sale-of-danish-f-16s-to-argentina/154540.article>.
- Florez, Alicia. “Entre Ríos: Argentina’s Rising Drug Trafficking Transit Hub.” *InSight Crime* (blog), October 25, 2021. <https://insightcrime.org/news/entre-rios-new-transit-hub-drug-planes-argentina/>.
- Freedom House. “Argentina: Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022 Country Report.” Accessed October 2, 2023. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/beijings-global-media-influence/2022>.
- Freedom House. “Argentina: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report.” Accessed October 4, 2023. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2022>.
- Fujian*. “Governor Zhao Long Meets with Governor Raúl Jalil of Catamarca Province_Latest_Foreign Affairs Office of the Fujian Provincial People’s Government.” April 11, 2023. https://wb.fujian.gov.cn/English/latest/202304/t20230413_6148540.htm.

- Fulton, Jonathan. "China's Mena Presence." In *China's Changing Role in the Middle East*. Atlantic Council, 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20938.4>.
- Funaiole, Matthew, Dana Kim, Brian Hart, and Joseph Bermudez Jr. "Eyes on the Skies: China's Growing Space Footprint in South America." Accessed September 1, 2023. <https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space>.
- Fundeps. "The Second Five-Year Joint Action Plan and the Deepening of Relations between Argentina and China," April 9, 2019. <https://fundeps.org/en/joint-action-plan-china/>.
- Gabin, Leandro. "Milei's Path to Dollarization: Riddled with Doubts." *Americas Quarterly*, September 11, 2023. <https://americasquarterly.org/article/mileis-path-to-dollarization-riddled-with-doubts/>.
- Garrison, Cassandra. "China's Military-Run Space Station in Argentina Is a 'Black Box.'" *Reuters*, January 31, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight-idUSKCN1PP0I2>.
- . "'Safe like China': In Argentina, ZTE Finds Eager Buyer for Surveillance Tech." *Reuters*, July 5, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-china-zte-insight-idUSKCN1U00ZG>.
- Gelpern, Anna, Sebastian Horn, Scott Morris, Brad Parks, and Christoph Trebesch. *How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments*. Williamsburg, VA: AidData, 2021. <https://www.aiddata.org/publications/how-china-lends>.
- Global Times*. "China and Argentina Sign Cooperation Plan to Jointly Promote Construction of Belt and Road." June 2, 2023. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202306/1291863.shtml>.
- Gomez, Jesus. "Military Rule in Argentina, 1976–1983: Suppressing the Peronists." University of Texas at Austin, 2001. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA390747.pdf>.
- Green, Michael J., and Bonnie S. Glaser. *What Is the U.S. "One China" Policy, and Why Does It Matter?* Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter>.
- Hariharan, Tara, M.K. Vereen, Rasheed Griffith, Jorge Heine, Claudio M. Loser, and Daniel Montamat. "What Will Argentina Gain from More Chinese Investment?" *The Dialogue*, February 24, 2022. <https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/what-will-argentina-gain-from-more-chinese-investment/>.

- Haydar, Mateo, and Colin Agostisi. *How China Spies on Nations Throughout Western Hemisphere*. Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2022.
<https://www.heritage.org/cybersecurity/commentary/how-china-spies-nations-throughout-western-hemisphere>.
- He, Lucía Wei. “How China Is Closing the Soft Power Gap in Latin America.” *Americas Quarterly*, April 12, 2019. <https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/how-china-is-closing-the-soft-power-gap-in-latin-america/>.
- Higuera, José. “Argentina Eyes \$664 Million for Fighter Jets.” *Defense News*, September 21, 2022. <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/09/21/argentina-eyes-664-million-for-fighter-jets/>.
- Hunnicut, Trevor, Matt Spetalnick, and Humeyra Pamuk. “Biden Rebuked over Guest List at Americas Summit He Is Hosting.” *Reuters*, June 10, 2022.
<https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-faces-rebukes-over-guest-list-americas-summit-he-is-hosting-2022-06-10/>.
- International Energy Agency. *An Energy Sector Roadmap to Carbon Neutrality in China*. Paris: International Energy Agency, 2021. <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/9448bd6e-670e-4cfd-953c-32e822a80f77/AnenergysectorroadmaptocarbonneutralityinChina.pdf>.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Latin America.” *Strategic Survey* 122, no. 1 (December 31, 2022): 359–92. <https://doi.org/10.1080/04597230.2022.2145096>.
- Izquierdo, Laureano Pérez. “Alexander Yui, vicecanciller de Taiwán: ‘Estamos aprendiendo de Ucrania para defendernos.’” *infobae*, March 22, 2023.
<https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/03/22/alexander-yui-vicecanciller-de-taiwan-estamos-aprendiendo-de-ucrania-para-defendernos/>.
- Izquierdo, Por Laureano Pérez. “Preocupación por un experimento nuclear chino en pleno corazón de América Latina.” *infobae*, February 19, 2020.
<https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2020/02/19/preocupacion-por-un-experimento-nuclear-chino-en-pleno-corazon-de-america-latina/>.
- Jaffe, Alexandra. “China Built a \$50 Million Space Base in Argentina to Reach the Dark Side of the Moon, but It’s Casting a Shadow on Its Neighbors.” *Vice*, November 30, 2018. <https://www.vice.com/en/article/a3mje4/china-built-a-dollar50-billion-space-base-in-argentina-to-reach-the-dark-side-of-the-moon-but-its-casting-a-shadow-on-its-neighbors>.
- Janes. “Janes.” 2020. <https://customer.janes.com/display/JAWAB676-JAWA>.
- . “Janes: Argentina.” 2023. https://customer.janes.com/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_884/army.

- . “Janes: Chile.” 2022. https://customer-janes-com.libproxy.nps.edu/CountryIntelligence/Countries/Country_912/air-force.
- Jáuregui, Juliana González. *How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/22/how-argentina-pushed-chinese-investors-to-help-revitalize-its-energy-grid-pub-86062>.
- Jiangtao, Shi. “Sudden Rise of ‘Argentina’s Trump’ Puts Economic Ties with China at Risk.” *South China Morning Post*, August 18, 2023. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3231570/sudden-rise-argentinas-trump-javier-milei-puts-economic-ties-china-risk>.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Competition Continuum*. Joint Doctrine Note 1–19. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2019. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf?ver=2019-06-10-113311-233.
- Koleski, Katherine, and Alec Blivas. *China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018.
- Koop, Fermin, and Lili Pike. “China apunta a la Argentina en su despliegue nuclear mundial.” *Dialogo Chino*, May 23, 2019. <https://dialogochino.net/es/clima-y-energia-es/27282-china-apunta-a-la-argentina-en-su-despliegue-nuclear-mundial/>.
- Kubny, Heiner. “China’s Port Plan in Ushuaia and Satellite Station in Antarctica.” *Polarjournal*, February 6, 2023. <https://polarjournal.ch/en/2023/02/06/china-plans-a-gateway-to-antarctica-in-argentina/>.
- LA NACION. “PASO 2023: el mapa de resultados de las elecciones a presidente en la Argentina.” August 30, 2023. <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/paso-2023-el-mapa-de-resultados-de-las-elecciones-a-presidente-en-todo-el-pais-nid13082023/>.
- Lazarus, Leland, and Ryan Berg. “Washington Must Respond to China’s Growing Military Presence in Latin America.” *Foreign Policy*, March 14, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/14/china-latin-america-military-pla-infrastructure-ports-colombia/>.
- Le Monde. “China Enshrines Opposition to Taiwan Independence in Constitution.” October 22, 2022. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/asia-and-pacific/article/2022/10/22/taiwan-says-china-must-discard-old-mindset_6001368_153.html.
- Leal, Maria. *Hechizo Chino: Construcción de Poder En Argentina y América Latina*. 2nd ed. Buenos Aires: Editorial Almaluz, 2022.

- Lewkowicz, Javier. “Argentina’s New Plan for Reducing Carbon Emissions – Analysed in Depth.” *Dialogo Chino*, January 26, 2023. <https://dialogochino.net/en/climate-energy/362482-argentinas-new-plan-for-reducing-carbon-emissions-analysed-in-depth/>.
- Li, Yuanbo, and Xufeng Zhu. “The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean.” *Sustainability* 11, no. 8 (2019): 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su11082297>.
- Lockheed Martin. “F-16 Fighting Falcon.” Accessed August 29, 2023. <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-16.html>.
- Lopez, Ismael. “Central America Parliament Expels Taiwan, Makes China Permanent Observer.” *Reuters*, August 22, 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/central-america-parliament-expels-taiwan-makes-china-permanent-observer-2023-08-22/>.
- Loro Horta, Dili. “Why China Wants to Power Argentina’s Air Force Modernisation.” *East Asia Forum*, July 10, 2021. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/07/10/why-china-wants-to-power-argentinas-air-force-modernisation/>.
- LPO. “Biden’s envoys to Argentina expresses concern about China’s nuclear power plant and Huawei.” April 14, 2021. <https://www.lapoliticaonline.com/nota/133407-bidens-envoys-to-argentina-expresses-concern-about-chinas-nuclear-power-plant-and-huawei/>.
- Machinea, José Luis, and Lucio Castro. “8. Argentina, the U.S., and China: A New Triangle in the Making?” In *China, The United States, and the Future of Latin America*, edited by David B.H. Denoon, 185–208. New York University Press, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479899289.003.0008>.
- Maizland, Lindsay. *China’s Fight Against Climate Change and Environmental Degradation*. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-climate-change-policies-environmental-degradation>.
- McBride, James, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky. *China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative*. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2023. <https://www.cfr.org/background/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>.
- Mehta, Aaron. “Chile Approved for \$634M Worth of F-16 Upgrades.” *Defense News*, July 24, 2020. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2020/07/23/chile-okd-for-f-16-upgrades/>.
- Meierding, Emily, and Rachel Sigman. “Understanding the Mechanisms of International Influence in an Era of Great Power Competition.” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (April 2021): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab011>.

- MercoPress*. “Chinese Navy Vessels Call in Buenos Aires for the First Time Part of a South American Tour.” October 31, 2013. <https://en.mercopress.com/2013/10/31/chinese-navy-vessels-call-in-buenos-aires-for-the-first-time-part-of-a-south-american-tour>.
- . “Hopefully, CELAC Will ‘Help Us Deepen Links with China’, Argentine President.” January 23, 2023. <https://en.mercopress.com/2023/01/23/hopefully-celac-will-help-us-deepen-links-with-china-argentine-president>.
- . “US Congresswoman Warns Buenos Aires Not to Build Chinese Fighter Jets.” March 5, 2023. <https://en.mercopress.com/2023/03/05/us-congresswoman-warns-buenos-aires-not-to-build-chinese-fighter-jets>.
- Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible de la República Argentina. *Plan Nacional de Adaptación y Mitigación Al Cambio Climático*. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible de la República Argentina, 2022. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/manual_-_adaptacion_y_mitigacion_al_cambio_climatico_1285pag_1.pdf.
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto. “Human Rights and the Values of Our Society | Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Worship Argentina. Accessed October 12, 2023. <https://cancilleria.gob.ar/en/foreign-policy/human-rights-and-values-our-society>.
- . “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Argentine Republic.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Worship Argentina, 2018. <https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/en/announcements/news/joint-statement-between-peoples-republic-china-and-argentine-republic>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Worship Argentina. “45th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between Argentina and China.” Accessed September 25, 2023. <https://cancilleria.gob.ar/en/news/newsletter/45th-anniversary-diplomatic-relations-between-argentina-and-china>.
- Misculin, Nicolás, Lucinda Elliott, Walter Bianchi, and Lucinda Elliott. “Argentine Libertarian Milei Pledges New Political Era after Election Win.” *Reuters*, November 20, 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-readies-vote-likely-presidential-election-thriller-2023-11-19/>.
- Misculin, Nicolás, Eliana Raszewski, and Candelaria Grimberg. “Argentine Far-Right Outsider Javier Milei Posts Shock Win in Primary Election.” *Reuters*, August 14, 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-set-primary-vote-with-ruling-peronists-fighting-survival-2023-08-13/>.

- Mishra, Mansi, and Vivek Kumar Mishra. “China’s Belt And Road Initiatives: Examining Debt Trap Diplomacy for Regional Supremacy in the Context of Sri Lanka.” *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 25, no. 1 (2021): 122–35.
- Moreno, Jaime. “China’s Educational Influence Expected to Grow in Latin America.” *VOA*, April 23, 2022. <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-educational-influence-expected-to-grow-in-latin-america-/6524956.html>.
- Myers, Margaret. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: What Role for Latin America?” *Journal of Latin American Geography* 17, no. 2 (2018): 239–43. <https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2018.0037>.
- . “China’s Regional Engagement Goals in Latin America.” *The Dialogue*, May 7, 2020. <https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/chinas-regional-engagement-goals-in-latin-america/>.
- Noticias Financieras. “Cauchari-Olaroz Project Is Already Producing Lithium Carbonate.” *CE Noticias Financieras, English Ed.*, June 12, 2023. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2825432891/citation/ADCBEE263FE547B1PQ/1>.
- The Observatory of Economic Complexity. “Argentina (ARG) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners.” Accessed August 5, 2023. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/arg>.
- The Observatory of Economic Complexity. “China (CHN) and Argentina (ARG) Trade,” September 2023. <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/arg>.
- Palma, Stefania. “China Accused of Using Belt and Road Initiative for Spying.” *Financial Times*, August 15, 2018,. <https://www.ft.com/content/d5ccb654-a02c-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4>.
- Panyue, Huang, Editor. “Fourth China-Latin America High-Level Defense Forum Launched.” *China Military*, October 30, 2018. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/9326872.html.
- Pelcastre, Julieta. “China Sells Low Quality Weapons.” *Diálogo Américas*, August 1, 2023. <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-sells-low-quality-weapons/>.
- Pew Research Center. “Global Indicators Database.” *Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project* (blog), March 2022. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/>.
- Raszewski, Eliana. “Argentina Strikes \$5 Bln China Currency Swap Extension.” *Reuters*, November 15, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/argentina-agrees-5-bln-china-currency-swap-extension-president-says-2022-11-15/>.

- [Redacted]. China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. CRS Report No. RL30341. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015.
- Reuters*. “Argentina to Pay for Chinese Imports in Yuan Rather than Dollars.” *Reuters*, April 27, 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/argentina-govt-pay-chinese-imports-yuan-rather-than-dollars-2023-04-26/>.
- . “China Warns Europe against Official Ties with Taiwan Ahead of Minister’s Visit.” *Reuters*, June 9, 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china-warns-europe-taiwan-contacts-ahead-ministers-trip-2023-06-09/>.
- Rios, Karla I. *Argentina: An Overview*. CRS Report No. IF10932. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2023.
- Rosario, Jorgelina Do. “Analysis: IMF Has a Tough Call on Argentina: Force Major Reforms or Pull the Plug.” *Reuters*, September 15, 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/imfs-argentina-predicament-seek-reforms-tango-or-kill-music-2023-09-15/>.
- Roy, Diana. *China’s Growing Influence in Latin America*. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri>.
- Saavedra, Guillermo. “China Pressures Argentina to Build Naval Base.” *Diálogo Américas*, January 3, 2023. <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-pressures-argentina-to-build-naval-base/>.
- Silk Road Briefing*. “Argentina Joins Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.” November 2, 2020. <https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/11/02/argentina-joins-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/>.
- . “Argentina Joins China’s Belt And Road Initiative.” *Silk Road Briefing*, February 8, 2022. <https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/02/08/argentina-joins-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/>.
- Singh, Ajit. “The Myth of ‘debt-Trap Diplomacy’ and Realities of Chinese Development Finance.” *Third World Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (February 2021): 239–53. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1807318>.
- Smith, Peter, and Ana Covarrubias. *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, The United States, and the World*. 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022.
- State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. *China’s Military Strategy*. Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015. https://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/China-Defense-White-Paper_2015_English-Chinese_Annotated.pdf.

- Stokes, Mark, Gabriel Alvarado, Emily Weinstein, and Ian Easton. *China's Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities*. Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2020. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/China_Space_and_Counterspace_Activities.pdf.
- Sullivan, Mark P., and Thomas Lum. *China's Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean*. CRS Report No. IF10982. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022.
- Sutter, Karen M., Andres B. Schwarzenberg, and Michael D. Sutherland. *China's "One Belt, One Road" Initiative: Economic Issues*. CRS Report No. IF11735. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2022.
- Syed, Rashid Husain. "One Day, Oil Might Not Be Bought with Dollars Anymore but with Yuan: China and Saudi Arabia Are Attempting to Cross the Rubicon, Chipping Away at Dollar Dominance in the Oil Trade." *The Globe and Mail (Online)*, January 17, 2023. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2766123852/citation/ED22D328389645A0PQ/1>.
- Synergia Foundation. *China's Mysterious Space Station in Argentina*. Bengaluru: Synergia Foundation, 2019. <https://www.synergiafoundation.org/insights/analyses-assessments/china-s-mysterious-space-station-argentina>.
- The State Council. "Full Text: China's Space Program: A 2021 Perspective." The State Council The People's Republic of China, 2022. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202201/28/content_WS61f35b3dc6d09c94e48a467a.html.
- The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. *China's National Defense in the New Era*. Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019. http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/China-Defense-White-Paper_2019_English.doc.
- Trinkunas, Harold. *Testing the Limits of China and Brazil's Partnership*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/testing-the-limits-of-china-and-brazils-partnership/>.
- United States Department of State. "Major Non-NATO Ally Status." Accessed May 21, 2023. <https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/>.
- Universidad de la Defensa Nacional. "Con una convocatoria extraordinaria, comenzó el curso 'Argentina Estudia China 2020.'" UNDEF, 2020. <https://www.undef.edu.ar/con-una-convocatoria-extraordinaria-comenzo-el-curso-%c2%a8argentina-estudia-china-2020%c2%a8/>.

- Voice of America*. “VOA60 Africa – Macky Sall: Africa “does Not Want to Be the Breeding Ground of a New Cold War”.” Video, 1:00, Voice of Americas, September 21, 2022. <https://www.voanews.com/a/voa60-africa---macky-sall-africa-does-not-want-to-be-the-breeding-ground-of-a-new-cold-war-/6757204.html>.
- Wilson, Jordan. *China’s Military Agreements with Argentina: A Potential New Phase in China- Latin America Defense Relations*. Washington, D.C.: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015.
- World Bank. “Argentina Taps Its Renewable Energy Potential.” World Bank. Accessed October 15, 2023. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/02/15/argentina-taps-its-renewable-energy-potential>.
- . “World Bank Open Data.”. Accessed April 19, 2023. <https://data.worldbank.org>.
- World Bank. “World Bank Open Data.” Accessed August 15, 2023. <https://data.worldbank.org>.
- Wu, Erica. “Taiwanese Find Their Feet in Argentina | Buenos Aires Times.” *Buenos Aires Times*, August 13, 2022. <https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/opinion-and-analysis/taiwanese-find-their-feet-in-argentina.phtml>.
- Xuanzun, Liu. “Argentina Is Considering Procurement of JF-17 Fighter Jets: Embassy.” *Global Times*, March 15, 2023. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1287349.shtml>.
- Yi, Wang. “China Willing to Work with Argentina to Bolster Cooperation Prospects.” *Xinhua*, October 31, 2021. http://www.news.cn/english/2021-10/31/c_1310281620.htm.
- Yu, Hong. “Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.” *Journal of Contemporary China* 26, no. 105 (2017): 353–68.
- Zovatto, Daniel. *The Rapidly Deteriorating Quality of Democracy in Latin America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-rapidly-deteriorating-quality-of-democracy-in-latin-america/>.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California



DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

WWW.NPS.EDU

WHERE SCIENCE MEETS THE ART OF WARFARE