

FORMULATING CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
A PROCESS TO CREATE A DELIBERATE AND PERSISTENT
STRATEGIC SECURITY POLICY IN CANADA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
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fulfillment of the requirements for the
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

MAXWELL W. RIOPELLE, MAJOR, CANADIAN ARMY
MA, American Military University, Charles Town, West Virginia, 2020
BA, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, 2009

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2022

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Name of Candidate: Maxwell W. Riopelle

Thesis Title: Formulating Canadian National Security Strategy: A Process to Create
Deliberate and Persistent Strategic Security Policy in Canada

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
John H. Modinger, Ph.D.

_____, Member
William M. Raymond, Jr., Ph.D.

_____, Member
Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, M.A.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2022 by:

_____, Assistant Dean of Academics for
Dale F. Spurlin, Ph.D. Degree Programs and Research

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ABSTRACT

FORMULATING CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: A PROCESS TO CREATE A DELIBERATE AND PERSISTENT STRATEGIC SECURITY POLICY IN CANADA, by Maxwell W. Riopelle, 160 pages.

This research paper analyzed the National Security Strategy (NSS) formulation processes used by the United States and Australia to make recommendations for what process the Government of Canada should adopt. Canada does not have a process to persistently formulate an NSS and only produced such a strategy once, in 2004. As a result, Canadian departments and agencies do not have a common understanding of Canadian national interests, strategic threats, nor a unified plan to reconcile the former with the latter. Each case study analyzed the genesis of the country's NSS process, characterized and defined the type of process with a unique model, and determined the effectiveness of the process to align government departments across all instruments of national power. The paper assessed each case for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability as a recommended process for Canada. A Systematic-Delegated process, like Australia, is recommended but with the inclusion of additional departments beyond defense.

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ACRONYMS

CDA	Conference of Defence Associations Institute (Canada)
CGSC	Command and General Staff College (US)
CSE	Communications Security Establishment (Canada)
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Canada)
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
INSSG	Interim National Security Strategy Guidance (US)
NSC	National Security Council (US)
NSS	National Security Strategy
PCO	Privy Council's Office (Canada)
PRC	People's Republic of China
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Canada)
US	United States (of America)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Meng Wanzhou, the Chief Financial Officer of the star Chinese telecommunications company, Huawei, was arrested at the Vancouver International Airport, the Canadian Pacific port of entry, in December 2018. The United States had issued a warrant for her arrest in connection with Huawei's alleged violations of US sanctions imposed against Iran. Canada is a signatory to an extradition treaty with the United States and in accordance with Canadian law, Ms. Meng began a series of legal proceedings in the Supreme Court of British Columbia to determine if Canada would extradite her to the United States. In response, China detained Canadians Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig for suspicious reasons only 10 days after the arrest of Meng. The Canadian courts placed Meng on house arrest while due process was carried out, which her legal team prolonged for 1,019 days. In that time, the "Two Michaels," as the media had dubbed the Canadian captives, were kept in windowless prison cells, given limited access to Canadian consular services, and subjected to trials of their own based on supposed espionage charges. The Chinese proceedings against the "Two Michaels" were not-so-subtly timed in tandem with the Canadian proceedings of Meng. When the Canadian court was close to making a verdict on Meng's case, the Chinese courts sentenced Michael Spavor to 11 years in prison.¹ This apparent hostage-taking placed the

¹ Richie Assaly, "A Timeline of the Meng Wanzhou Trial and Mounting Tensions between Canada and China," *The Toronto Star*, September 24, 2021,

issue of China as an emerging threat to Canada in full view of the public and challenged the popular paradigm held by the elected Government of Canada that China was a benign partner. This conflict was not the first indication that China may become a threat to Canadian national interests.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS),² Canadian Department of National Defence (DND),³ and numerous security-oriented authors in the academic community had been sounding the alarm on China since at least 2013 when Xi Jinping became Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and President of China. These security experts discussed issues ranging from intellectual property theft, to violence and coercion exercised against the Chinese diaspora in Canada, to Chinese espionage operations underway in Canada. These threats represented the first consistent existential threat Canada has faced in generations. However, Canada's response to these threats has lacked a common understanding and unity of effort. One reason for the limited Canadian reaction has been a historically consistent lack of strategic vision from the government.

<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2021/09/24/a-timeline-of-the-meng-wanzhou-trial-and-mounting-tensions-between-canada-and-china.html>.

² Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *The Security Dimensions of an Influential China*, World Watch: Expert Notes No. 2013-09-02 (Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2013), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/csis-scrs/documents/publications/CHINA_POST_CONFERENCE_E_SOURCE.pdf.

³ Paul Wells, "Chief of Defence Staff Jonathan Vance on What China Is Doing to Canada," *Macleans*, December 3, 2018, <https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/chief-of-defence-staff-jonathan-vance-on-what-china-is-doing-to-canada/>.

Since Canada's confederation in 1867, Canada has once produced a national security strategy (NSS).⁴ Individual departments occasionally produce their own strategy documents on an ad hoc basis with isolated or indirect guidance from the Prime Minister; however, no process compels them to do so. As a result, Canada has no systematic approach to routinely produce or update an NSS with whole-of-government input or otherwise. The absence of an inter-departmental strategy leaves Canada with no guiding document to define common national interests, threats, strategic objectives, or a unified Canadian vision to address its national security. Therefore, Canadian government departments have been reactionary to conflicts and disjointed in their responses with no shared understanding of the threats nor a Canadian security strategy.

Problem Statement

Canada lacks a defined process to develop coherent and holistic NSS, resulting in government departments and agencies who have neither unity of effort nor mutual support and who operate without a common understanding of national interests or objectives. The result is that Canada cannot reorient itself to emerging threats, like China, in a timely or effective manner. Ideally, Canada should have a formal process that integrates all departments capable of influencing national security matters with a view to define strategic objectives, national interests, and a long-term plan to achieve those objectives.

⁴ LCol S. Murphy, "Moving Beyond Reflection and Discussion: The Case for Canada to Craft a National Security Strategy," (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2019), 57, 1, 13.

The Canadian government would have to construct this process in a way that mitigates domestic political rivalry and requires successive government to update the NSS routinely. Canada's common law parliamentary system is partly to blame because it does not prescribe direction as to how, or how often, governments should develop NSS. Without such a mandate, governments have no consistent way to define the terms of the environment, Canada's strategic objectives, or national interests. Further, without a structured framework to bring departments together in defining these terms, formulating and communicating a plan becomes an ad hoc affair at best or non-existent at worst.

The result is stove-piped efforts between departments who lack a unity of effort and efficiency. In fact, because of the lack of defined terms, some departments may often be working counter-productively to others. Exacerbating this issue is the idea that Canada may not have a strategically minded culture, given it has lacked any direct existential threats for most of its history.⁵ Therefore, creating a sense of urgency among Canadian officials and the general population, as an initial step to affecting the change needed to solve this problem,⁶ has been difficult. The lack of domestic political drivers forcing governments to consider a more structured approach compounds this problem. Creating an NSS could limit the short-term political ambitions of a given elected government or it could force a government to act on an issue that may be politically difficult to do.

⁵ Major-General Eric Tremblay and Bill Bentley, "Canada's Strategic Culture: Grand Strategy and the Utility of Force," *Canadian Military Journal* 15, no. 3 (2015): 5–17, 10.

⁶ Billy Miller and Ken Turner, "Leading Organizational Change: A Leader's Role," (Assigned reading, L105, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 2021), 10, 3-4.

However, that is not to say that the problem has gone completely undetected. CSIS⁷, DND, and several security policy academia⁸ have begun drawing attention to the problem—specifically with respect to the increasing threat posed by the Chinese government to Canada and its Western allies. Among these security experts, there is consensus on the idea that a lack of NSS will increasingly become a growing problem for Canada as it faces emerging threats like the People’s Republic of China and others.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to explore what process Canada should employ to develop and routinely update an NSS. This study did not attempt to address the factors that have caused or have influenced Canada to not have an NSS development process but did make recommendations to mitigate them. Nevertheless, it was beyond the scope of this study to address Canadian strategic culture or why parliamentary common law prescribes little in the way of its many processes. This study did not attempt to answer what a contemporary NSS should be, but rather what the process to develop a Canadian NSS should be. This study focused on fitting the theories of strategy development into a process that could work within the Canadian parliamentary system. This study made recommendations for implementation of an NSS development process that could be

⁷ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry: Highlights from an Academic Outreach Workshop*, World Watch: Expert Notes No. 2018-05-02 (Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2018).

⁸ Stephanie Carvin, “Beyond AUKUS: Canada May Not Need Nuclear Subs - But It Is in Dire Need of a Strategy,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, October 18, 2021, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/beyond-aukus-canada-may-not-need-nuclear-subs-but-it-is-in-dire-need-of-a-strategy/>.

utilized by an audacious Canadian government who might wish to make national security a priority.

Research Questions

The primary research question of this study is, “What process should Canada use to develop National Security Strategies that are capable of aligning government departments in applying instruments of national power against threats to national interests?” Answering this question addressed a critical gap in Canadian strategic policy development and allowed the country to not only react to strategic issues more coherently, but to plan for and implement strategic security goals. This model could also assist other policy fields facing similar issues, such as foreign policy. Supporting this primary question are three additional secondary questions.

The first of these secondary questions is, “what process did the Government of Canada use in 2004 to develop its sole NSS?” The purpose here was to isolate the original motivation to initiate an NSS and examine the process used to develop that NSS. Insight was gained by examining why the government produced the NSS and what systems or structures are already in place within the Canadian parliamentary framework that can be used to implement a permanent and regular process.

The next secondary question is, “what processes do allies use to produce their own NSS?” This question led to a case study comparison that identified different NSS process types and drew contrasts with Canadian methods. Researching this question was a necessity, given the lack of formal processes in Canada, because it identified potential solutions that have already been exercised and created a working template for developing a Canadian approach.

The third secondary research question is, “how have each of the sample countries identified and responded to emerging threats with their instruments of national power, as a result of their respective NSS?” As will be explained below in the delimitations section, this study focused its research by selecting a single common threat against which to compare. Answering this question enabled an assessment in efficacy of the various NSS development processes of each country. Ultimately, Canada needs to select a process that will aid its ability to respond to threats and plan for its security. Exploring the latter two questions generated the data necessary to make inductive recommendations about what process Canada should use.

Assumptions

This problem framework touches on several facets of Canadian government and society, as well as those in the sample countries to be studied. This study made four key and plausible assumptions to effectively tackle this problem whilst remaining focused on the primary research question.

The first assumption was that within Canada, there are no unreported shadow structures or documents that develop NSS in secret. An open-source research study cannot account for variables of this nature. The research did not indicate that something of this nature appears to exist; therefore, this study focused on the utility and requirement of having a publicly understood NSS and a process to derive that strategy.

The second assumption was that senior public servants in Canada are highly trusted agents within the Canadian political system by any political party that forms government. This can be measured by the fact that over time there is very little, if any, replacement of senior public servants after an election that changes government. It is the

duty of the senior public servants to carry out whatever policies and programs the elected government directs. This assumption was important for NSS processes that delegated much analysis to government department bureaucrats. It also factored into recommendations such as placing more control over the NSS development process into the hands of senior bureaucrats, such as Deputy Ministers, who are theoretically divorced from domestic politics.

The third assumption was that the Canadian intelligence and security community produces analysis that carries weight among Canadian government stakeholders. The most credible and deepest understanding of threats to Canada will be found in sources originating from this community. While some individual officials, departments, or companies may find this threat analysis disruptive to their individual objectives, the intelligence and security community within Canada has the most transparent motivations and best expertise on this subject, given their mandate is to protect Canada.

The fourth and final assumption was that the current and future Canadian governments do not wish to radically reshape Canada's position nor alignment within the world if Canadian history is to be predictive. Canada is a Western democratic country aligned with the other great countries of the West, such as the United States. While in recent decades, Canada has been diversifying and deepening relations outside of its traditional allies, there is no indication that Canadian leadership seeks to alter Western alignment for another, like the People's Republic of China. Previous Canadian governments have sought engagement with China in hopes of democratizing its government, similar to efforts by US President Nixon in 1972 and carried through successive governments until the last decade. However, the West designed these

objectives to bring China into alignment with the international order and not the other way around. Given engagement with China has been unsuccessful in this regard, this study assumed that no Canadian government wishes to follow the People's Republic of China and abandon its democratic values. By applying these assumptions, this study focused on understanding what process Canada should use to develop comprehensive strategies that will be effective at securing Canada against strategic threats.

Definition of Terms

9/11: refers to the Al-Qaeda terror attack carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001.

Strategy: explains how states will achieve their national objectives by utilizing their instruments of national power.⁹

Instruments of National Power: “are the manifestations of the elements of power” wielded by a state; namely national resources and capabilities.¹⁰ They are more specifically categorized as the diplomatic, informational or social-psychological, military, and economic levers of power (DIME).¹¹

National Security Strategy: is the specific strategy employed by a state to “pursue its national security interests” and serves to coordinate all national government sub-

⁹ Harry R. Yarger, “9: Strategy Formulation,” in *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 140.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2006).

strategies¹² in the application of instruments of power to achieve the national security objectives.¹³ Using the instruments of national power definition above (DIME) for a Western country like Canada, it can be understood that national security includes diplomatic relationships and democratic values, protecting the information domain, military or traditional security, and economic security.

China, PRC, and Chinese Communist Party: are terms each referring to the government of the People's Republic of China. They are not generalized terms and do not conflate the state with the people of China.

Canadian intelligence and security community: is all Canadian government security organizations including the Department of National Defence (DND), the Communication Security Establishment (CSE), department of Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canada Border Services Agency, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). The larger government community also includes the department of Global Affairs Canada (GAC), the department of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada, the Department of Finance Canada, and the department of Public Services and Procurement Canada. The academic community includes the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute, as well as several Canadian university departments specializing in Canadian security issues. This community forms the expertise who advise the Government of Canada on matters relating to security.

¹² Murphy, "Moving Beyond Reflection and Discussion," 1.

¹³ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 1.

Scope

To achieve the purpose of this study, the scope of the paper included relevant theories, models, and a study of two case countries. The literature review explored Canadian national interests, strategic culture, and theory which facilitated a case study comparison resulting in recommendations for a Canadian NSS process. A government could take these recommendations and formulate a specific strategy to address the threats facing Canada at that specific time. To understand how different NSS formulation processes could be adopted in Canada, this study explored the fundamental theories that underpin strategy formulation, assessed how each case study country built their own security strategies, and compared how effective each was at aligning inter-departmental action against a selected strategic threat. Rather than conclude with a specific draft NSS, the scope of the study was to identify the gap in Canada's ability to produce any NSS and recommend a detailed process for the Government of Canada to formulate frequent NSS that address all threats in the strategic environment.

Limitations and Delimitations

Limitations imposed by constraints on this study included time, access, and universality of results. The author conducted this study at the US Command and General Staff College (CGSC) as a Master of Military Arts and Sciences requirement for the Command and General Staff Officer Course, which commenced in September 2021 and completed in May 2022. This time constraint limited the depth and breadth that this study can capture, which emphasized the importance of adhering to the scope articulated in the previous section.

There were two constraints relating to access in terms of classification and documentation. The author conducted the research in an unclassified environment, which limited access to any classified procedures within Canada and case study countries. The other access limitation was with respect to undocumented norms and procedures within the Canadian parliamentary system. Unlike the US system, many procedures, laws, and norms within the Canadian system are unwritten and considered either common law or understood by convention. Given this practice, this study was at times unable to find primary resources when researching prescribed practices within the government. The construct of the study mitigated this constraint by searching for authoritative secondary and tertiary resources that may describe or capture some of these practices.

One final constraint was in the nature of the qualitative research format itself. The results of this study may be challenging to generalize and apply to other countries because the research methodology herein used the qualitative case study method. The case comparison of NSS processes in other countries were assessed for their relevance to Canada. Therefore, the recommendations in Chapter 5 are intended to apply to the Canadian problem set outlined in this paper and lack the statistical strength needed to be able to apply these results to other countries.

Delimitations this study imposed on itself include the nature of sample countries and the scope of the threat Canada is attempting to secure itself against. Whilst researching how other countries develop NSS, it was important to limit the sample of countries to those most similar to Canada, so that these processes could reasonably be transferred and applied within the Canadian system. Chapter 3, Methodology will expand on the sample case selection, but essentially the sample countries needed to be

functioning democracies with similar departments for managing the security of their country. Further, the sample countries selected also faced the same biggest existential threat. The threat within the study was delimited to what is arguably the largest existential security threat facing Canada and the sample countries: the People's Republic of China. There are many security threats facing these countries: terrorism, food security, nuclear proliferation, rogue states, and transnational crime; however, Chapter 2, the Literature Review, demonstrated that China is the most important security threat facing these countries. By selecting one threat, rather than all of them, this study was able to maintain its scope and underscored the importance of having an NSS development process to counter credible threat vectors. The comparisons between cases and Canada were clearer and more direct by utilizing the same common threat as the lens through which to assess the efficacy of an NSS development process. Nevertheless, conclusions drawn from this study, regarding an NSS development process, apply to combating all threat vectors.

Significance of the Study

Canada has an important role to play in the international rules-based order from which it benefits. Canada is a relatively wealthy middle power as demonstrated by its G7 membership. Canada is a founding member of NATO, the largest military alliance in the history of the world, as well as several other key military partnerships, such as the FVEY ("Five-Eye") intelligence-sharing partnership between the English-speaking countries of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Canada is the second largest country in the world by landmass and claims the 4th largest value of natural resources in the world, comprised of oil, uranium, timber, natural gas, and

phosphate.¹⁴ Given Canada's privileged geo-political position in the world and its abundance of highly sought-after natural resources, Canada has an inherently high-stakes role to play in guarding its national security.

Yet, most evidence leads observers to conclude that Canada does not take its security all that seriously. Canada has once produced an NSS during its 154-year history, under Prime Minister Paul Martin in 2004, which was an anomaly borne out of the uncertainty and fear of 9/11, which had disproved the thesis that Canada is far away and safe from the threats of the world.¹⁵ While the 2004 NSS was a temporary step in the right direction, Canada has not since produced nor updated an NSS because it has no process or mandate to do so. The result is that with respect to national security, Canada is reactionary, vulnerable, and unpredictable, as well as unhelpful to its allies. In September of this year, the new US ambassador to Canada stated that the Biden administration has been, "waiting for Canada to release its framework for its overall China policy."¹⁶ Without a process to ensure governments produce and routinely update an NSS, Canada cannot achieve whole-of-government unity of effort towards commonly understood security objectives, which would result in succinct and mutually supporting policies from all departments.

¹⁴ M. Garside, "Leading Countries Worldwide Based on Natural Resource Value as of 2021," Statista, accessed November 14, 2021, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/748223/leading-countries-based-on-natural-resource-value/>.

¹⁵ Murphy, "Moving Beyond Reflection and Discussion," 13-14.

¹⁶ Robert Fife, "Ottawa Draws up Indo-Pacific Strategy with Focus on China Aggression," *The Globe and Mail*, November 5, 2021, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-former-ambassador-to-japan-recruited-to-craft-first-indo-pacific/>.

Instead, Canada should aspire to be a proactive, protected, and predictable country not only for the sake of its own vital security, but to be an asset, rather than a liability, to its allies and partners. This study will examine how other countries have addressed the need for the development of effective NSS and demonstrate how Canadian leaders and officials could apply these findings to the Canadian context. Academics in the field of Canadian security are currently debating on what Canada's next NSS should be. Creating a new NSS is an important undertaking that could help guide Canada through the present-day uncertainty and emerging security threats. However, what is missing in the discussion is the development of a process that will ensure an NSS is routinely assessed and implemented in perpetuity, not by ad hoc epiphany; thus, planning for the protection of Canadian interests well into the future.

Summary

This study highlighted how other countries have been able to produce an NSS that effectively enabled those countries to maintain their security against emerging strategic threats and how these solutions could be applied to the Canadian problem set. Without a process of its own, Canada has been unable to provide frequent and current strategic guidance regarding national security; thus, its departments and agencies are not synchronized under a common goal. Within Canada, there is no official common understanding of strategic threats, national interests, or national security objectives. This lack of shared understanding leaves the Canadian government departments to guess and interpret such meaning without consistency, prioritization, or a common picture of the security environment. The result is that Canada has been unable to proactively plan for its own security and has frustrated allies who are unsure of Canada's position on several

critical issues. Importantly, this could lead to miscalculations by adversaries who do not understand Canada's position.

This study showcased how other countries have produced their own NSS and how effective they have been at orienting their governments towards solving security issues, specifically in respect to the PRC threat. The aim was to answer the primary research question, "What process should Canada use to develop National Security Strategies that are capable of aligning government departments in applying instruments of national power against threats to national interests?" By dissecting the most successful processes used by our allies to produce NSS and applying those findings to the Canadian system of government, this research addressed this critical gap in Canadian security studies and provides options for the Government of Canada to meet its security responsibilities.

Canada has the resources and geo-political capital to be a significant and positive force on the international security environment. The Government of Canada's most important responsibility is to guarantee the security of its citizens, yet because of Canada's privileged position, next to a security provider like the United States, and its geography protecting it with large oceans on all three other sides, it has been difficult to foster a culture that pays any attention to its own protection. However, changes in technology and the nefarious nature by which state and non-state actors can vector threats against a well-protected country, like Canada, are quickly changing those assumptions. Canada can no longer guarantee its security through apathy and luck. Many departments within the Government of Canada, though not all, recognize this problem and try to produce sensible policies to meet the new threat environment. However, they lack national leadership and coordination from the top. Canada can address this problem by

creating and mandating an NSS process that consistently takes input from the Canadian intelligence and security community and applies the Government's strategic vision for Canada. Such a process would create a Canadian security strategy and, by synchronizing their efforts, become a force multiplier for Canada's government departments who could enable and support each other to achieve specific and commonly understood security objectives.

The literature review in the next chapter focuses on the identified problem statement, understanding how Canada currently derives security policies, reviewing theories that frame strategic security planning and describe how policies in government come to fruition, and current assessments of China as a security threat to Canada. This review lays the required foundational framework to effectively proceed with a case study comparing NSS development processes. Canada will benefit from a security strategy that is forwarding looking and proactive vice only reacting to crises.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This literature review divided the proposed secondary research questions into sections that highlight what is currently known on the proposed topic and the problem statement. The secondary questions are first, what process did Canada use in 2004 to develop its only NSS, second, what processes are used by similar countries, and third, how have these countries fared in reorienting their government departments and resources to counter the emerging PRC threat?

The first secondary research question was separated into the following components. One, what has been written regarding how Canada produces national strategy? Two, what were the circumstances that led Canada to produce an NSS in 2004? Three, what has been the consensus on a need for a Canadian NSS. Critical to understanding how to approach the data collection was a review of what has been written on the underlying concepts of strategy and the PRC threat. The categorization of these concepts generated two more sections of the literature review. The first was to understand what theories of strategy and policy development could offer regarding how strategies should be developed. The second was to review what is debated or known of the PRC threat by the intelligence and security community. Therefore, this literature review left the second and third secondary research questions as the primary focus of the data collection in Chapter 4.

This literature review began with known authorities on the subject area like CSIS, CDA Institute, and reviewing scholastic theses on the topic at CGSC. This initial review

brought the threat that China poses to the West and Canada to the fore. Simultaneously, a search into how the United States creates NSS revealed a detailed and specific process whose NSS ostensibly gave direction to whole-of-government. A subsequent search on the Canadian process yielded one result, a monograph written for the CGSC School of Advanced Military Studies by a Canadian student, LCol Shane Murphy. In his paper, Murphy pointed out the need for an updated Canadian NSS because Canada had only produced such a strategy once in its entire history.¹⁷ Beginning with his identified problem, that Canada needed an NSS, further sources were researched that discussed this issue. Much was found regarding the point made by LCol Murphy that Canada lacks an NSS and needs one to face today's threats. However, sources appeared to be focused on what the next NSS should be, rather than assessing why Canada does not produce an NSS consistently in the first place and how to derive a process which solves that problem. This study picks up where LCol Murphy and others have left off in terms of finding a solution to Canada's strategy problem, with respect to proactively and effectively implementing an NSS formulation process.

Obstacles to Producing an NSS in Canada

Canada lacks a process for developing an NSS and has only once produced such a strategy in 2004. There appear to be common themes and obstacles that account for Canada's lack of a process to produce security strategy guidance. They are a lack of perceived existential threats, a reliance on the United Kingdom and then the United States as a security provider, and a philosophical national debate ever vacillating between

¹⁷ Murphy, "Moving Beyond Reflection and Discussion."

defining Canadian national interests through the lenses of realism or liberal internationalism.

A cursory review of Canada's history will find a country that has not perceived a nearby existential threat since the War of 1812 that pitted Canadians against their former colonial kin to the south.¹⁸ The most cataclysmic security events to unfold in the world, such as the Great Wars or the Cold War, as historically important as they were, still happened an ocean away for most Canadians. LCol Murphy drew on several sources, including Colin S. Gray, a British-American author on geopolitics and Director of Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, and Canadian author Philippe Lagassé, an associate professor at Carleton University whose research has focused on Canadian defense policy, to demonstrate the well-documented notion that Canada has perceived few credible existential threats to its national security throughout much of its history.¹⁹ It is suggested that without a perceived threat, Canada, its government, and its population lack the impetus to allocate much time or resources to its national security. In fact, despite the spike in concern of terrorism following 9/11, it is difficult to find any sources that largely dispute the notion that Canada has not perceived existential threats even though many argue those threats exist.

¹⁸ LCol E. Laforest, "Sleeping with the Elephant: A Canadian Strategic Culture" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2016), 17, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1022063.pdf>.

¹⁹ Ibid., 10, 29.

The theme that Canada has a strategic culture of apathy or that it lacks strategic culture at all were common assertions put forward by many sources.²⁰ Some pointed out the lack of an existential threat while others highlighted additional reasons for this situation. Some point to Canada's early dependence on the United Kingdom until the Statute of Westminster was passed in 1931,²¹ which granted Canada full autonomy on matters of foreign policy, followed by a pivot to seeking security guarantees from the United States after the Second World War.²² Canada's geography, providing massive buffers from potential threats as well as substantial natural resources, was also considered a reason by some to explain Canada's strategic culture.²³ Many sources described Canada's strategic culture as one of apathy or laziness for these reasons, but others described Canada's strategic culture as one purely focused on the US.²⁴ A great deal of consideration is given to understanding how the American government may react to positions Canada takes given its economic interdependence and geographic proximity.²⁵ Dr. Susan C. Schneider, a cross cultural economic management expert, also collaborated the arguments put forth by these security experts and historians. She validated the impact

²⁰ Tremblay and Bentley, "Canada's Strategic Culture."

²¹ Ibid.

²² Jack L. Granatstein, *Whose War Is It? How Canada Can Survive in the Post-9/11 World* (Toronto, Ontario: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2007), 57-58.

²³ Tremblay and Bentley, "Canada's Strategic Culture."

²⁴ Alan Stephenson, "Canadian National Security Culture: Explaining Post 9/11 Canadian National Security Policy Outcomes," (Ph.D. diss., Carleton University, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.22215/etd/2016-11459>, 352.

²⁵ Laforest, "Sleeping with the Elephant," 16.

of national culture on a nation's strategy through a quantitative study which empirically concluded that there is a causal link.²⁶ A majority of the history and security sources researched cited historian Jack Granatstein in their works, making him a notable source worth additional attention. Reviewing Granatstein uncovered another facet to understanding the obstacles faced by Canadian governments who may wish to derive NSS: a philosophical debate within Canadian society and politics as to what constitutes Canada's national interests.

NSS and other national strategies are supposed to describe the ends, ways, and means that protect or enhance national interests.²⁷ However, beginning in the 1960s, many Canadian leaders wanted to define Canadian national interests in less tangible and more soft power related terms that gave primacy to the ideals of liberal internationalism as imagined by US President Woodrow Wilson.²⁸ Canadian politicians balked at the idea of national interests being secured through the cold-blooded calculations of realpolitik.²⁹ Canadians, they argued, wanted to focus on humanitarian issues, not security. Canadian political scientists, like Allan Gotlieb, have since argued that the Canadian political

²⁶ Susan C. Schneider, and Arnoud De Meyer, "Interpreting and Responding to Strategic Issues: The Impact of National Culture," *Strategic Management Journal* (1986-1998) 12, no. 4 (May 1991): 312-313.

²⁷ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 11.

²⁸ Tony Smith, *Why Wilson Matters: The Origin Of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).

²⁹ Granatstein, *Whose War Is It?*, 50.

conscience is caught between a need for realism and a desire to do good with respect to Canada's national interests and its role in the world.

By 1967, Canada's national interest was defined by a perceived moral obligation to help solve the problems of the world.³⁰ However, Gotlieb continued to argue that the national unity issues within Canada during the late 20th century refocused, for some, the definition of Canadian national interests squarely back under the lens of realism.³¹ In fact, while successive Canadian governments from 1967 until 1993 wanted to pivot to humanitarian issues as a core Canadian interest, they were all forced into reality-based policies focused on protecting Canadian unity, economic prosperity, and the critical relationship with the United States. In 1993, a new Canadian government under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien would sharply return Canada's definition of national interests centered, again, under idealism.³²

Granatstein, similarly to Gotlieb, criticized the government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien of pursuing national policies founded on idealism at the expense of national interests founded in realism. He described how Chrétien refused to support the 2003 US invasion of Iraq not because it conflicted with some real national interests, as the French and Russians had done, but because the United Nations had not sanctioned the intervention, essentially surrendering Canadian independence to multinationalism.³³

³⁰ Allan Gotlieb, "Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy," (Benefactors Lecture, C.D. Howe Institute, Toronto, Canada, November 3, 2004), 13.

³¹ Ibid., 15.

³² Ibid., 15-16, 25-26.

³³ Granatstein, *Whose War Is It?*, 71.

While it is accurate that this is how Chrétien packaged his official statement for public and allied consumption, he most likely shunned Canadian participation simply because Canadians overwhelmingly did not support the war.³⁴ Nevertheless, his choice to use the absence of a UN mandate vice simply stating it did not meet Canadian interests, still makes Granatstein's larger point. Granatstein described the conflict Canadian leaders have wrestled with in defining national interests as a misunderstanding between national interests and values.

Like Gotlieb, Granatstein argued that Canadian governments have oscillated between developing foreign, defense, and development policies based either on national interests rooted in realism or interests rooted in the values and morality of liberal internationalism. He defined Canada's national interests as the need to protect Canadian territory and unity, promote Canada's economic prosperity, and, as a small country with global interests, it must promote democracy and freedom.³⁵ Given Canada's strategic culture has perhaps been spoiled by a lack of existential threats, it follows that a major obstacle to producing NSS is a nation divided in defining its own national interests.

How and Why Canada Produced an NSS in 2004

Prior to Prime Minister Paul Martin taking office in late 2003, there were calls to address Canada's lack of strategic culture and a security strategy that was missing in

³⁴ Ipsos-Reid, "Majority (71%) Of Canadians Think Canada Did 'Right Thing' By Not Supporting U.S. In War Against Saddam Hussein," last updated January 3, 2004, <https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/majority-71-canadians-think-canada-did-right-thing-not-supporting-us-war-against-saddam-hussein>.

³⁵ Ibid., 56-57.

action, but sorely needed, in the post-9/11 world.³⁶ The United States had just invaded Iraq and Canada was left unsure as to what its security policies should be, yet the world was rapidly changing around sleepy Canada. Paul Martin had also been the Minister of Finance during 9/11 and had witnessed first-hand how the Canadian government reacted to security crises in the absence of any strategy. In late 2003, he won his first election as the Prime Minister of Canada and his government's Throne Speech,³⁷ delivered early the next year, directly stated that Canada must develop its first NSS to effectively deal with threats like natural disasters and non-state terrorism.³⁸ Some also suggested that the Paul Martin government wanted to utilize an NSS to demonstrate a refined understanding³⁹ of Canada's amorphous national interests and poorly understood strategic culture.⁴⁰ In other words, his government used the need for an NSS to not only guide government policies going forward, but to shore up domestic political support.

³⁶ Scot Robertson, "Finding a Way: National Security and Defence Policy for a New Liberal Leadership," *Policy Options*, accessed November 16, 2021, <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/paul-martin/finding-a-way-national-security-and-defence-policy-for-a-new-liberal-leadership/>.

³⁷ Government of Canada, "About the Speech from the Throne," Privy Council Office October 14, 2021, <https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/campaigns/speech-throne/info-speech-from-throne.html>.

³⁸ Université Laval, "Textual Data for Policy Analysis: POLTEXT – Canadian Throne Speeches – 37th Legislature – 3rd Session, 02 February 2004," Département de Science Politique, 2020, <https://www.poltext.org/en/part-1-electronic-political-texts/canadian-throne-speeches>.

³⁹ Murphy, "Moving Beyond Reflection and Discussion," 14.

⁴⁰ Stephenson, "Canadian National Security Culture," 205-206.

This NSS document was authored by the Privy Council Office (PCO) which is a non-partisan secretariat meant to advise and assist the elected government cabinet in “implementing its vision, goals, and decisions in a timely manner.”⁴¹ Deputy Prime Minister Anne McLellan was also tasked as the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and in that capacity she tabled the NSS in parliament with a view to create federal-provincial forums that would meet on a regular basis to address emergency management issues, security issues, and routine systematic review.⁴² The fact that this document was published by the PCO suggests that this may have been a whole-of-government effort.

This 2004 NSS identified three national security interests: protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies, and contributing to international security.⁴³ The pivot back to realism and the national interests espoused by Granatstein and Gotlieb is evident and the second security interest is a clear reaction to 9/11 based on the national interest of maintaining good relations with the United States. The 2004 NSS identified six key objectives: enhance intelligence gathering and synthesis, improve emergency planning and management, the inclusion of

⁴¹ Government of Canada, “Privy Council Office,” Privy Council Office, last updated September 16, 2020, <https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council.html>.

⁴² “Government Of Canada Releases Comprehensive National Security Policy,” News Release, Government of Canada, April 27, 2004, <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2004/04/government-canada-releases-comprehensive-national-security-policy.html>.

⁴³ Government of Canada, *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy* (Ottawa, Ontario: Privy Council Office, 2004), vii, <https://www.deslibris.ca/ID/200507>.

public health into national security planning, protecting maritime transport security, enhancing border security, and contributing to international security.⁴⁴ The NSS then described the ways and means to achieve each objective throughout the main body of the document.

Given the obstacles to Canadian NSS development, this document serves as a relatively useful foundation from which to build upon for future governments with respect to identifying national interests and articulating the ends, ways, and means to achieve objectives. However, while Granatstein praised the succeeding government led by Stephen Harper for naturally understanding and embracing realist national interests,⁴⁵ Murphy pointed out that this government eschewed their promise to update an NSS in 2007 and that governments since have resorted back to the historical Canadian trend of leaning on individual department policies in lieu of a succinct NSS.⁴⁶

Canada Needs an NSS Today

The almost rhythmic cycles of Canadian governments swinging back and forth from policies based on more pragmatic realist interests to ones buoyed by idealistic values, while experts call for a succinct Canadian strategy that can define these terms and provide for much needed guidance, is back again. This time Canada finds itself at another moment in history where geopolitical changes are tectonic in scale and rapid. The rise of an increasingly aggressive Russia after its war with Ukraine in 2022, the rise and fall of

⁴⁴ Government of Canada, *Securing an Open Society*.

⁴⁵ Granatstein, *Whose War Is It?*, 57.

⁴⁶ Murphy, “Moving Beyond Reflection and Discussion,” 14.

the Islamic State, the rapid growth and assertion of a belligerent China led by Xi Jinping since 2013, and the recent catastrophic withdrawal of US forces out of Afghanistan represent a tidal wave of change in the world for which Canada has appeared unprepared.

Responding to some of these rapid changes, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia announced the creation of a new security pact called AUKUS in September of 2021 that will be focused on military capability.⁴⁷ Within this pact was an agreement by Australia to scrap its contract to buy French-made diesel submarines for US nuclear submarines instead. Canada's absence from the military pact left pundits and experts in Canada spinning in concern that Canada had been left behind by its most important ally, the United States, given the announcement appeared to surprise most officials in Canada.⁴⁸

Stephanie Carvin, an associate professor of international relations at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, was one of many recent experts to lament Canada's lack of national strategy. She leveraged the AUKUS announcement to reorient Canadians' concern from one of being left out of AUKUS to one in search for strategy. She rightly articulated that Canada would not be considered for a security pact in the Pacific because it would make for a poor partner.⁴⁹ She argued that

⁴⁷ BBC, "Aukus: UK, US and Australia Launch Pact to Counter China," *BBC News*, September 16, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58564837>.

⁴⁸ Matthew Bondy, "Excluded from AUKUS? Canada Should Seek to Invite Itself Aboard," Centre for International Governance Innovation, September 30, 2021, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/excluded-from-aukus-canada-should-invite-itself-aboard/>.

⁴⁹ Carvin, "Beyond AUKUS."

Canada lacks the military capabilities Washington is looking for in a Pacific partner, lacks the commitment to invest resources, as echoed by Gotlieb,⁵⁰ and, most importantly, that Canada lacked a published strategy for the Pacific at the time AUKUS was announced. Carvin poignantly concluded:

Ottawa needs to contribute ideas and embark on a sustained effort to engage our allies, and to base this engagement on a defined set of national priorities that reflect Canadian interests . . . while the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom may have imperfect foreign and defence policies, they clearly understand the importance of setting goals and developing strategies, something that requires hard choices in an era of uncertainties. Canadians need to start asking hard questions as to why we are not doing the same.⁵¹

Her statements are reminiscent of the repeated calls for strategy development found in 2003⁵² just prior to Prime Minister Martin's release of the 2004 NSS and as far back to 1967 when Gotlieb first made similar critiques.⁵³

In lieu of having a strategy, most Canadian policies and cooperation with allies continue to be formulated today in an ad hoc manner,⁵⁴ which Murphy argued would result in Canadian government departments creating individual strategies misaligned with each other.⁵⁵ Some sources have concluded that this has come to fruition and that Canada operates a decentralized and uncoordinated security apparatus with no strategic

⁵⁰ Gotlieb, "Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy," 5.

⁵¹ Carvin, "Beyond AUKUS."

⁵² Roberstson, "Finding a Way."

⁵³ Granatstein, *Whose War Is It?*, 51. Granatstein refers to Gotlieb's initial critiques in 1967, which Gotlieb makes again in his 2004 lecture series paper.

⁵⁴ Carvin, "Beyond AUKUS."

⁵⁵ Murphy, "Moving Beyond Reflection and Discussion," 5.

direction.⁵⁶ The department of Public Safety Canada claims to lead Canada's national security effort; however, its web page suggests a diluted focus on a wide variety of priorities including emergency preparedness, counter-terrorism, cyber security, ensuring diversity and inclusion in Canadian security policy, counter proliferation, and community engagement, whilst offering no holistic policy that ties these aspects together into a cohesive departmental strategy.⁵⁷ Canadian defense operates from a centralized defense policy; however, those policies are crafted within DND and without any national strategy to guide them. In 2017, Canada released its current defense policy, "Strong, Secure, Engaged," which was focused on demonstrating rigorous costing and support for the Canadian Armed Forces whilst being strategically vague and offering little to weave the DND into a larger national security picture.⁵⁸ It includes specific details for certain military capabilities that are or will be procured, but without any guiding strategic purpose, it all reads as very arbitrary.

A lack of coordination and no unified understanding has most notably been observed when comparing the Trudeau government's policy of engagement with China,⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Wesley Wark, "A Case for Better Governance of Canadian National Security," Centre for International Governance Innovation, March 29, 2021, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/case-better-governance-canadian-national-security/>.

⁵⁷ Government of Canada, "National Security," Public Safety Canada, last updated May 12, 2021, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scr/index-en.aspx>.

⁵⁸ Canada Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa, Ontario: Department of National Defence, 2017), <https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.835971/publication.html>.

⁵⁹ Lynette H. Ong, "Navigating Canada-China Relations in a Turbulent Era," Public Policy Forum, October 7, 2020, <https://ppforum.ca/publications/navigating-canada-china-relations/>.

until the capture of the “Two Michaels” in 2018, with the intelligence and security reports from CSIS and the Canadian intelligence and security community sounding the alarm on China.⁶⁰ The delay and secrecy in Ottawa’s decision on whether or not to ban Huawei from Canadian 5G telecommunications infrastructure⁶¹ and the United States asking Canada to produce a China-policy⁶² demonstrate that neither Canadian allies nor most Canadian government officials know what the Government of Canada’s position is on China. While many sources have exclaimed the need for a new NSS, others have argued to simply update the old one,⁶³ but most seem to violently agree that the status quo is insufficient. However, no one has tackled how Canada might develop or reinvent an NSS without needing the expert community to remind the government every generation. In Budget 2022, the Government of Canada announced it will review the defense policy with a view to update Canadian Armed Forces roles, responsibilities, and funding;⁶⁴ however, without an NSS to provide purpose and whole-of-government coordination, the new policy too will likely arrive as an isolated costing document that provides for Canada’s national security no better than the last policy.

⁶⁰ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry*.

⁶¹ Bondy, “Excluded from AUKUS?”

⁶² Fife, “Ottawa Draws up Indo-Pacific Strategy with Focus on China Aggression.”

⁶³ John Gilmour, “Does Canada Need a New National Security Policy?,” (Policy Perspective, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, July 2021), https://www.cgai.ca/does_canada_need_a_new_national_security_policy.

⁶⁴ Department of Finance Canada, “Chapter 5: Canada’s Leadership in the World,” in *Budget 2022* (Ottawa, Ontario: Government of Canada, modified April 7, 2022), <https://budget.gc.ca/2022/report-rapport/chap5-en.html>.

Strategy and Policy Development Models

This study sits at the juncture of strategy and policy formulation; thus, it was prudent to review key theories as they relate. The preeminent and most direct theory of strategy is the ends, ways, and means, goal-oriented method, first alluded to by famous Prussian military theorist, Carl Von Clausewitz,⁶⁵ and further developed by US Army War College professor Harry Yarger.⁶⁶ Other interpretations of this theory include the reversed method, Means, Ways, and Ends, proposed by Air Command and Staff College professor Vanya Bellinger.⁶⁷ With respect to policy formulation, this study applied the Streams Model to understand how political agendas and public policies are set. Professor John Kingdon, a political scientist and published expert on the US government from the University of Michigan, adapted this model from another originally developed at Cornell University's Graduate School of Management by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen, to describe how organizations solve problems. These theories provided the lens through which this study reviewed successive cases to determine how those countries solved strategy formulation problems like those experienced in Canada.

The discussion on ends, ways, and means begins with Clausewitz when he mused on the Theory of War in Book II of *On War*. In Chapter Two of this book, he discussed a definition of strategy limited to the context of war and not necessarily grand statecraft.

⁶⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 143.

⁶⁶ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*.

⁶⁷ Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, "When Resources Drive Strategy: Understanding Clausewitz/Corbett's War Limited by Contingent," *Military Strategy Magazine* 7, no. 1 (Spring 2020).

Thus, he defined strategic ends as, “those objects which will directly lead to peace.”⁶⁸ He described the means as the cumulative tactical victories that achieve the desired ends.⁶⁹ Clausewitz never directly superimposed the discussion of tactical strategy with statecraft; however, he did allude to its relationship when he described his famous trinity-theory in Book I, Chapter One. The trinity was meant to describe the unchanging nature of war as three components balanced between the people of a state, their military, and their government.⁷⁰ The conduct of war requires all three, in that the people provide the will and the resources for war, the government sets the political objectives of a conflict, and the military provides the means to achieve those objectives. Importantly, Clausewitz laid the foundation for our contemporary understanding of the military as an instrument of national power when he described war as an extension of policy by other means. “We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. . . The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”⁷¹ Clausewitz consistently communicated the importance of having defined ends to achieve political objectives and applying the necessary means to achieve those ends. *On War* never fully elaborated on the ends and means at a strategic-

⁶⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 143.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 89.

⁷¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

statecraft level; however, this goal-oriented concept has since been leveraged to build a modern strategic equivalent: ends, ways, and means.

Retired Colonel, and then Professor, Arthur F Lykke Jr. published an article at the US Army War College in 1989 titled “Defining Military Strategy.” In it he developed the ends, ways, and means theory of military strategy, which took Clausewitz’s ends and means and further broke ‘means’ down into means and ways, referring to resources and the application of those resources, respectively.⁷² Ends, ways, and means has since come to dominate US academies and strategic policy formulation. Harry Yarger, a professor of National Security Policy, at the US Army War College later broadened Lykke’s work into a theory of strategy to be applied at the statecraft-level whilst often citing Clausewitz and well known military historians such as Macgregor Knox.⁷³ His research and publications have directly supported the US joint publications on strategy⁷⁴ and his book on strategy is a mandatory reading at the US Command and General Staff College for the Strategic Context of Operational Art course.

This study drew on Yarger’s work to define strategy and instruments of national power. His most prominent assertion was the concept of applying strategy through the ends, ways, and means theory. Here, the ends are the development of strategic objectives, which take into consideration the desired strategic effect, national interests, and the

⁷² Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, “Defining Military Strategy,” *Military Review* 69, no. 5 (May 1989): 3–8.

⁷³ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 77-80.

⁷⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2017), x-xii.

strategic environment.⁷⁵ The ways are the strategic concepts, usually employing verbs, that explain how objectives are to be met by utilizing the instruments of national power.⁷⁶ The means are the resources available to support the strategic concepts and can be tangible, such as forces, people, or money, and they can be intangible, such as national will or international goodwill.⁷⁷ Ends, ways, and means is a theory of strategy development that any state can apply. In this study, the ends, ways, and means theory provided a blueprint for NSS formulation and was a benchmark for any given process.

The Streams Model offered a useful model for understanding the complex and seemingly chaotic systems of a federal government. Michael Cohen et al developed an original model designed to offer a pragmatic explanation of how complex and large organization, like the government, make decisions and form processes, which diverged from monoculture and rational decision-making. Their model posited that organized anarchies are characterized by problematic and inconsistent preferences, unclear technology or processes not fully understood by all its members, and fluid participation where time and effort devoted to different domains varies from one time to another.⁷⁸ The first and third characterizations of this model work remarkably well for describing the environment in Canadian national security policy development with respect to its ad hoc

⁷⁵ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 48-49.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 55.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 60.

⁷⁸ Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1972): 1–25, 1.

reactive nature. This model suggests that potential problems, potential solutions, and participants within such organizations move from one choice opportunity to the next based on several intermeshing variables⁷⁹ that are best summarized as chance. Kingdon took this model and improved upon it to better specialize in understanding how governments solve problems.

Kingdon's version, referred to as the Streams Model, observed that within a government, there are three major process streams that describe the political environment within which problems are solved with policies and that these must converge for a policy to come forth and solve a given problem. These streams are problems, policies, and politics.⁸⁰ First, Kingdon described problems as those which "capture the attention of people in and around government."⁸¹ Second, he explained that policy proposals are initiated and injected by communities of specialists such as government planning and budget offices, political staffers, academics, and interest groups. Third, the political stream refers to the political environment made up of national mood, public opinion, election results, changes in the ideological distributions within an elected government, and pressure campaigns brought to bear by interest groups and lobbyists. Kingdon explained that these three streams are made up of actors who act as impetus or constraints on change. Therefore, these three streams come together at critical times, creating a window of opportunity, where a recognized problem is matched with an available policy

⁷⁹ Ibid., 16.

⁸⁰ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: The University of Michigan. Little Brown and Company, 1984), 92.

⁸¹ Ibid.

solution because the political climate at the time these options come together makes change possible with impetus being greater than constraint.⁸²

Criticism of these models mostly focus on its messiness and difficulty in testing the model empirically;⁸³ however, it is important to recall that Kingdon's model is founded in Cohen et al's empirical study. Moreover, this study considered the constructivist approach used by Kingdon to be a more useful representation to gain understanding of how complex organizations function vice theories who generalize the actors involved as rational monoliths. Furthermore, the fluid nature of this model made it flexible and easy to apply to the case studies in this paper. Therefore, this study adopted Kingdon's Streams Model to understand the windows of opportunity that existed when case study countries created their respective NSS process.

Defining the PRC Threat

The deteriorating relations between China and the West, specifically the United States, has been the center of much academic and political debate during recent years. Some have described the conflict as a new cold war,⁸⁴ even suggesting that war may be

⁸² Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 92-93.

⁸³ Pragati Rawat and John Charles Morris, "Kingdon's 'Streams' Model at Thirty: Still Relevant in the 21st Century?," *Politics & Policy* 44, no. 4 (2016): 608–38, <https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12168>.

⁸⁴ Hal Brands and John Lewis Gaddis, "The New Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-10-19/new-cold-war>.

inevitable and describing how it will begin,⁸⁵ such as Hal Brands, who is an often cited and active publisher on matters of China. Others contend that the comparison to a cold war is overstated and that while the United States and China are competing, they lack several ingredients necessary for a cold war, such as a lack of an ideological struggle, economies that cannot be divided because of globalization, and that neither country are leading opposing alliance systems fighting bloody proxy wars.⁸⁶ However as China has become more assertive and less benign in recent years, stronger and more frequent arguments are emerging that suggest the ingredients for a cold war not only exist, but have more dangerous potential than the old cold war ever had. Political scientist John Mearsheimer described the current situation as an intense security competition with a foe [China] who will become far more formidable than the Soviet Union ever was, locking the United States in a new cold war that is likely to turn hot.⁸⁷

Using the Canadian national interests proposed by Granatstein, one can assess how China directly threatens Canada. The national interests he defined were to protect Canadian sovereign territory, maintain Canadian unity, enhance Canadian prosperity, and

⁸⁵ Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “How War With China Begins,” *Defense One*, November 1, 2021, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/11/how-war-china-begins/186522/>.

⁸⁶ Thomas J. Christensen, “There Will Not Be a New Cold War,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 24, 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-24/there-will-not-be-new-cold-war>.

⁸⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, “The Inevitable Rivalry,” *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-cold-war>.

defend freedom and democracy at home and abroad.⁸⁸ Today, the PRC threat is well documented and the below review summarizes how it threatens each of Canada's national interests. The examples include predatory Chinese business practices harming Canadian joint ventures, PRC activities that degrade democratic institutions, PRC interference in elections and other institutions of Western society, PRC intelligence collection laws that threaten democracies and businesses alike who interact with Chinese enterprises, and direct threats to Canadian territory and its environment.

Western companies engaging in joint ventures with Chinese companies have often found themselves sacrificing a great deal of intellectual property (IP) while the Chinese companies do not share their own research and development in return and the Chinese companies continually press for greater shares of the joint venture until the Western companies are squeezed out, all while profiting off of the Western firm's technology.⁸⁹ Much of the PRC's efforts to collect IP through its private companies has also resulted in Western technology directly modernizing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China.⁹⁰ The seemingly lucrative, but ultimately draining, joint venture deals are harmful to Canadian enterprises which directly threatens Canadian economic prosperity. This threat also indirectly attacks Canadian prosperity by allowing Canadian IP to be

⁸⁸ Granatstein, *Whose War Is It?*, 56-57.

⁸⁹ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry*, 109.

⁹⁰ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry*, 108.

syphoned and reproduced in China at a lower cost, thereby weakening Canada's competitive advantage.

The PRC has been degrading democracies abroad, including attempts at foreign interference in Canada, and repressing freedoms within their own country. With the technological boost from stealing foreign IP and an increasingly opaque authoritarian government,⁹¹ China has successfully developed a model of domestic repression as reported in its western region of Xinjiang province where its Uyghur population faces increasing isolation and unbending control.⁹² Experts within the Canadian intelligence and security community, among others, are concerned that China may export this model of authoritarian control to other dictatorships around the world, threatening freedom and democracy within the international system. Further, misinformation watchdog groups and Canadian media reported on PRC interference with the Canadian 2021 general election,⁹³ which included influencing the Chinese diaspora in Canada via threats, intimidation, and misinformation campaigns.⁹⁴ These threats have used direct approaches; however, the more insidious threats to free societies are employed using indirect approaches.

⁹¹ Ibid., 47-48.

⁹² Adam Schiff, "The U.S. Intelligence Community Is Not Prepared for the China Threat," *Foreign Affairs*, September 30, 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-30/us-intelligence-community-not-prepared-china-threat>.

⁹³ Terry Glavin, "China's Interference in Canada's Election Doesn't Seem to Faze the Liberals," *Ottawa Citizen*, September 15, 2021, <https://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/election-2021/glavin-chinas-interference-in-canadas-election-doesnt-seem-to-faze-the-liberals>.

⁹⁴ Marcus Kolga and Ai-Men Lau, "DisinfoWatch Report," *DisinfoWatch*, December 1, 2021, <https://disinfowatch.org/influence-operation-targeting-canadian-2021-federal-election/>.

The PRC has been building their capacity to indirectly subvert their adversaries by leveraging technology in the information domain. Google and cybersecurity company FireEye conducted reviews showing that fake accounts based out of China were actively stoking fears and division in the United States, encouraging people to partake in protests on issues such as COVID-19 and anti-Asian racism.⁹⁵ Other reviews demonstrated the PRC's ability to utilize Chinese companies to control information outside of China to influence the foreign sphere. They discovered that Chinese phone-maker Xiaomi automatically censored more than 1300 terms by periodically downloading updated lists used to control filters on the browser applications. These terms included Chinese and English words like "freedom," "human rights," and "democracy," as well as a list of names including Chinese political activists and perceived rivals to state news outlets.⁹⁶

Canada's intelligence and security community share the concern of China's ability and willingness to conduct foreign interference.⁹⁷ They described China's foreign interference against democratic systems through four main facets. Increasing the use of the Chinese diaspora abroad as agents of PRC policy, coopting foreigners to support and promote PRC policy goals, implementing a global strategic communications plan, and the creation of a China-centered economic and strategic bloc.⁹⁸ In fact, more broadly China is

⁹⁵ Sarah Cook, "China's Content Manipulation Reaches New Frontiers," *The Diplomat*, November 16, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/chinas-content-manipulation-reaches-new-frontiers/>.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry*, 75-82.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 77.

actively challenging and threatening the liberal international order, as demonstrated when China created its own version of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, known as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, out of a presumed distrust of the Western system.⁹⁹ Other examples include the creation of China's own cross-border interbank payment system (CIPS) and supporting bank meant to contribute to the de-dollarization of the international system and is directly rooted in its strategic rivalry with the United States.¹⁰⁰ China's commitment to foreign interference and degradation of freedom and democracy directly threatens Canada's national interest of maintaining a free and democratic world.

Another avenue that the PRC actively threatens Canada and its allies is through its robust intelligence laws. The recently implemented Chinese intelligence laws, which compel individuals and enterprises to comply fully with PRC intelligence agencies, give a legal framework to legitimize observations long made about how these agencies have operated.¹⁰¹ What is most concerning is how the PRC will use the global reach of international Chinese companies to widen the PRC intelligence operations net and, given the explicit role PRC intelligence has in supporting the economic growth of the country, how far these intelligence operations will go to give a competitive advantage to PRC

⁹⁹ Enda Curran, "The AIIB: China's World Bank," *Bloomberg*, August 6, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/chinas-world-bank>.

¹⁰⁰ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry*, 115-118.

¹⁰¹ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry*, 89.

companies over international enterprises.¹⁰² The US Federal Bureau of Investigation describes the Chinese economic espionage and counterintelligence espionage as grave threats to the economic well-being and democratic values of the United States.¹⁰³ In fact, several Western intelligence and security communities view Chinese intelligence capabilities as a threat to their economies and democratic institutions.¹⁰⁴ This intelligence capability, combined with China's willingness to manage and control Chinese diaspora within Canada and other countries to achieve policy aims, directly threatens Canadian sovereign integrity, Canada's economic prosperity, and potentially democratic institutions within Canada.

The PRC also threatens Canadian territory directly. One area where China has signaled ambitions that could arguably threaten Canada is in the Arctic. The conventional wisdom, as articulated by Rob Huebert, has been that China's Arctic ambitions represent a threat to the territorial integrity of Canada's Arctic and control over critical economic resources.¹⁰⁵ This view has been challenged by some who have argued that China's interests in the Arctic are not malicious and even represent areas of cooperation for

¹⁰² Ibid., 91.

¹⁰³ "The China Threat," Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed November 16, 2021, <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat>.

¹⁰⁴ Helen Warrell, "MI5 Warns of Spy Threat from Professional Networking Sites," *Financial Times*, April 19, 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/9348605f-1b4d-49e8-9505-838dab88fd5a>.

¹⁰⁵ Rob Heubert, "Did the Cold War Ever End?: The New Arctic Security Triangle," (Center for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, Alberta, October 29, 2020), https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/NAADSN-Cold-War_Huebert.pdf.

Canada and China.¹⁰⁶ However, these arguments are wed to the principles of liberal internationalism, which, since President Nixon's first meeting with Mao Zedong in 1972, have argued that engagement with China will normalize the PRC into becoming a responsible international member and democratize its authoritarian government. The rise of President Xi Jinping to the head of the CCP in 2013 represents a China that is no longer "biding its time,"¹⁰⁷ and strengthens the argument that engagement has failed, leaving China as an authoritarian, though semi-capitalist, state. In fact, Mearsheimer argued that it was the US policy of engagement that created the PRC geopolitical rival that the West faces today.¹⁰⁸

Finally, one other consideration regarding how the PRC threatens Canadian territory is in its empirically growing responsibility for climate change. Climate change should be a security issue for Canada and its territory. Climate change has the potential to negatively impact Canadian food security, increase natural disasters such as forest fires and flooding,¹⁰⁹ and harm Canada's economic prosperity as well. Since the turn of the

¹⁰⁶ Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom, and Frédéric Lasserre, *China's Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada*, vol. 5, *Beyond Boundaries: Canadian Defence and Strategic Studies* (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press, 2018), 154.

¹⁰⁷ Tobin Harshaw, "Emperor Xi's China Is Done Biding Its Time," Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March 3, 2018, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/emperor-xis-china-done-biding-its-time>.

¹⁰⁸ Mearsheimer, "The Inevitable Rivalry."

¹⁰⁹ Elizabeth Bush, Nathan Gillett, Barrie Bonsal, Stewart Cohen, Chris Derksen, Greg Flato, Blair Greenan, Marjorie Shepherd, and Xuebin Zhang, *Canada's Changing Climate Report - Executive Summary* (Ottawa, Ontario: Department of the Environment and Climate Change, 2019), 9, 13.

century most Western states have managed to curb, if not decrease, their CO₂ emissions with a view to reduce the effects of climate change; however, China has continued to rapidly increase its share of the world's total CO₂ emissions¹¹⁰ as China is locked in on its strategy to usurp the US as an economic hegemon. Today, while China still only produces a quarter of the CO₂ emissions of an American on a per citizen basis, its commitment to domestic coal energy production in the near future should concern Canada and the West.¹¹¹ Climate change is a potential area for cooperation with China because it is an existential threat to every country, regardless of political borders; however, until China can commit to phasing out coal energy, it poses a direct threat to Canada and the West.

The clearest example of the direct threat that China poses to Canada was the “Two Michaels” anecdote articulated in Chapter 1, Introduction. The 2018 hostage taking showed a blatant disregard for international norms and human rights, openly mocked Canadian democratic values and adherence to the rule of law, and directly threatened Canadian citizens. This study noted that there are far fewer Canadian sources appealing for more engagement with China post-2018. Polls conducted by the Angus-Reid Institute on Canadian perceptions of China show that a strong majority of Canadians held

¹¹⁰ Justin Gillis and Nadja Popovich, “The U.S. Is the Biggest Carbon Polluter in History. It Just Walked Away From the Paris Climate Deal,” *The New York Times*, June 1, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/01/climate/us-biggest-carbon-polluter-in-history-will-it-walk-away-from-the-paris-climate-deal.html>, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/01/climate/us-biggest-carbon-polluter-in-history-will-it-walk-away-from-the-paris-climate-deal.html>.

¹¹¹ Felix Horne, “China’s Coal Announcement Potential Climate Game-Changer,” Human Rights Watch, September 22, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/22/chinas-coal-announcement-potential-climate-game-changer>.

favorable views of China pre-2018, while that number dropped to only 14% post-2018, which holds true today.¹¹² This review has concluded that the Canadian public and the Canadian intelligence and security community overwhelmingly view the People's Republic of China as a threat or with suspicion; however, the Government of Canada's position is somewhat unclear, depending on the department or branch of government.

Summary

The literature review uncovered a great deal of consensus regarding the urgent need of the Government of Canada to produce an NSS. Without a capstone security strategy, Canadian government departments and agencies work inefficiently by misaligning their efforts towards individual, but often, counter-productive initiatives that are not coordinated to achieve national security. They lack vision, unity of effort, and a shared understanding of the security environment and Canada's national interests. Many suggested that this lack of strategic foresight stems from an immature strategic culture within Canada that has been encouraged by constantly having a big brother ally throughout Canadian history. However, 9/11 served as an initial wake-up call where it became clear to officials that Canada needed to provide strategic guidance of its own to navigate the changing world. Canada produced its first and only NSS in 2004, which was a valuable step in the right direction; however, every successive Canadian government since has slipped back into the complacency of the past and now Canada finds itself

¹¹² Angus Reid Institute, *Canadian Opinions of China Reach New Low* (Vancouver, British Columbia: Angus Reid Institute, May 13, 2020), <https://angusreid.org/covid19-china/>.

without a coherent security strategy in a geopolitical environment that appears more brittle and dynamic with each passing year.

Yarger drew on Clausewitz to formulate his theories on strategy development, which he summarized as identifying national interests and deriving the ends, ways, and means to defend or realize those national interests.¹¹³ This theory provided a structured set of criteria to understand what strategy is at the statecraft-level, identify case country NSS documents, and to evaluate the completeness of each NSS. Kingdon offered the Streams Model to understand the impetus and constraints, or political friction, when trying to match problems with policies in a given political environment.¹¹⁴ This unique analysis offered a series of examples as to how other countries' political entrepreneurs managed to overcome these challenges in crafting a process to produce an NSS.

The analysis measured the efficacy of an NSS by its ability to align whole-of-government policy against a threat. This study selected what is considered by many to be the biggest existential security threat to Canada: The People's Republic of China. Given the gravity of security shock waves that China has sent throughout the international system, far more has been written on the PRC security threat than this literature review has the scope to completely digest; however, a few common themes were drawn out as they apply to Canada's national security. Most authors recognized the rapidly changing geopolitical security situation between the West and China, and many described it as a new cold war or worse. Specific threats to Canada include corporate espionage, IP theft,

¹¹³ Angus Reid Institute, *Canadian Opinions of China Reach New Low*.

¹¹⁴ Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 89-93.

direct threats to democratic institutions around the world, including Canada, risk of PRC intelligence collection in Canada that compromise Canadian communications, business, government, and private citizens, as well as territorial threats to the Canadian arctic, China's energy dependence on coal and its impact on climate change, and most critically, the threat that China poses to private Canadian citizens abroad, as seen with the "Two Michaels." Canada's lack of NSS has paralyzed Canadian arms of government in reacting to and countering these threats. Understanding how other countries have used their NSS to align their governments against these threats provided a useful comparison of security efficacy.

The proposed research method herein built upon this review. It established a sample of similar democracies that also face an existential PRC threat. Using the theories established in this chapter, this study dissected their NSS and assessed how they produced their strategies. The methodology also operationalized the efficacy by which each country did or did not align their government bodies against this security threat. The data analysis thereafter provided useful recommendations as to how Canada can create an effective process to consistently develop NSS that will protect Canada from security threats, like the People's Republic of China.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The aim of this study was to understand how other countries have developed their NSS that shield or enhance their national interests from the common threat that the PRC presents to each. This chapter discusses the method used to collect and analyze data with a view to answering the primary research question, “What process should Canada use to develop National Security Strategies that are capable of aligning government departments in applying instruments of national power against threats to national interests?” The study further focused the research of this question by delimiting the threat to the PRC. The data collection in Chapter 4 addresses the remaining secondary questions which are, “what processes do allies use to produce their own NSS” and “how have each of the sample countries identified and responded to the emerging PRC threat, as a result of their respective NSS?” To answer these questions, this study produced a list of sample countries and a carefully studied their NSS as well as how they produced their NSS. This study then compared these methods to how well their respective governments realigned themselves to face those common threat. Finally, this Chapter also discusses ethical considerations that this study consciously made in keeping with best research practices.

Method

This research used a qualitative case study approach to gain insight into each of the proposed research questions.¹¹⁵ The author chose a qualitative method because this method is better suited to answering questions of “why” and “how” of social phenomenon, such as how governments and the individuals within them function, to understand what happened and what each result means to each case.¹¹⁶ This method better captured both the tangible and abstract concepts in play. A qualitative method also avoided having to operationalize qualitative variables that are the focus of this study, purely into empirical data for a quantitative method. Doing so presents its own challenges such as simplifying complex variables into simple categories that may not accurately represent each situation. With more time, this study, or future studies, could expand on this research with a mixed-methods or quantitative approach that focuses on empirical data sets to support, or argue against, the findings of this thesis.

Theories and Framework for Assessing Data

This study formed a theoretical framework for collecting and assessing data by operationalizing the primary and secondary research questions (see Figure 1). The methodology here was to break down each into its base components to simplify data collection. This study then applied the strategic and policy development theories from the

¹¹⁵ R. E. Stake, *The Art of the Case Study* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1995).

¹¹⁶ A. Teherani, T. Martimianakis, T. Stenfors-Hayes, A. Wadhwa, and L. Varpio, “Choosing a Qualitative Research Approach,” *Journal of Graduate Medical Education* 7, no. 4 (2015): 669, <https://doi.org/10.4300/JGME-D-15-00414>.

literature review to the data, as well as a unique model for characterizing NSS process types created by the author. This method enabled consistent comparisons between the case studies. This framework led to the adoption of a case study roadmap that covered the historical circumstance behind the NSS formulation process, the actors involved in the NSS formulation process creation, the NSS formulation types itself, and the efficacy of that NSS to enable a whole-of-government approach to counter a PRC threat.




Figure 1. Study Framework

Source: Created by author.

The primary research question, what NSS formulation process should Canada use to align the efforts of its government departments against strategic threats, served as the anchor point for the framework of this study. The author selected a specific threat, the People’s Republic of China, to delimit the study and provide a common frame of

assessment. The author broke this question down into three components: first, what historical NSS formulation process has Canada used in the past, second, what is the PRC threat, and third, how have Canada's closest allies approached NSS formulation and how effective were they at aligning government towards the PRC threat? The former two components were addressed in the literature review and answer the first secondary research question (SRQ) regarding Canada's historical experience with NSS formulation. Therefore, the latter remained as the point of departure for this research. The allied country case sample selection is further delimited in the data collection section of this chapter.

The case study framework broke down this last question into the second and third SRQ: what NSS processes do the other sample countries use (SQR2) and how well have those countries aligned whole-of-government to apply diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power against the PRC threat (SQR3)? The framework herein then broke down SQR2 into the base components of "process genesis" and "process type." The study assessed the process genesis component of SRQ2 through the theoretical lens of the Streams Model, as imagined by John Kingdon.¹¹⁷ Kingdon's Streams Model provided this study a lens through which to identify the key actors and circumstances involved in creating or obstructing the implementation of an NSS formulation process for each case study country. These actors, or streams, included the strategic or security problems of which the respective governments were aware, the policy solutions proposed to solve those problems, and the

¹¹⁷ Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 92-93.

political climate at the time, all of which combined to create a unique window where the case study country settled on a policy solution to their strategic security problem. By applying Kingdon's model, this study was able to derive practical insight as to how other countries solved NSS formulation problems, like those faced by Canada.

Regarding the NSS process itself, the framework applied the ends, ways, and means theory¹¹⁸ as a lens to identify if a particular case country had an NSS or equivalent concept and to what degree their respective NSS embodies the core model concepts. This study then analyzed this data using its own model to categorize the observed characteristics of each NSS formulation process, which this paper refers to as the Process Formulation Type model and is explained in the Data Analysis section of this chapter. Finally, with SQR2 answered, the last step of the sample each case study was to answer SQR3: how effective were each case country's NSS at aligning whole-of-government against the PRC threat? This was done by reviewing the ends, ways, and means articulated in each country's NSS and observing how that country applied the instruments of national power (DIME) against the PRC threat. This theoretical framework created an organized data collection plan that became the case study roadmap.

Using the above framework as a path towards achieving the aim of this study, the author organized the cases into a four-step approach to systematically answer the research questions. The first step was to set the historical context in which each country developed their NSS formulation process. Second, this study applied Kingdon's Streams Model to better understand how these actors overcame frictions and obstacles to pair potential

¹¹⁸ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*.

solutions to the strategic problems of the time and brought about their nation's NSS process. The third step was a detailed review of each nation's NSS formulation process to include what aspects of ends, ways, and means theory they applied, who drafted it, whether government drove it from the top down or built it collaboratively in a whole-of-government approach up, and whether it was a structured or ad hoc process. The last step this study made in each case assessment was to review to what degree each nation's government departments and agencies were aligned in their application of DIME with respect to the assessed PRC threat and the stated NSS objectives.

This paper used an abbreviated US joint planning doctrine model to theoretically frame the assessment of each case study as a recommendation to the Canadian government. In US joint planning doctrine, planners validate course of action development for tactical and operational plans using the model feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete. Military staff use these vetting criteria to ensure the courses of actions, or options, which will be shown to the approving Commander are each valid so that the Commander could reasonably select any option to achieve the mission. This paper has used feasibility, acceptability, and suitability to assess the validity of each case study process as the basis of a recommendation for Canada. Distinguishability, ensuring that options are different, and completeness, ensuring objectives, military end states, forces required, and time estimates are all considered, were not applicable to this study in a useful way. However, the study used the concepts of feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Feasibility determines if the option can accomplish the mission within time, resource, and other limitations. For this study, feasibility was considered whether a process could be implemented within the Canadian parliamentary

system of government. Acceptability determines if the proposed option is balanced to mitigate risks or if it introduces unreasonable risks. This paper used acceptability to determine if the assessed NSS process appropriately balanced the strategic guidance in terms of ends, ways, and means, with the threats in the strategic environment. Lastly, suitability determines if the proposed option can achieve the mission.¹¹⁹ This paper used suitability to determine if the assessed NSS process effectively solved the strategic guidance problem and aligned government action against a threat across all instruments of national power (DIME).

The feasible, acceptable, suitable assessments were each made at the end of steps two, three, and four, respectively (See Figure 1). In step two, the process genesis which explained how the case country created and implemented their NSS process, was concluded with a feasibility assessment to determine if a similar implementation could unfold in the Canadian system of government. In step three, the NSS process type characterization lent itself to an acceptability assessment to determine if all the markers of ends, ways, and means were present and if that guidance was sufficient to meet the strategic threats. Finally, in step four, the effectiveness assessment of the NSS process to align government departments across all instruments of national power was an appropriate place to conclude with the suitability assessment. These four steps addressed the secondary research questions of this study by describing how each nation managed to

¹¹⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1, 2020), chap. 3, 41-42, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf.

create their given process, defining each nation's NSS process, and how their government bodies are aligned in their application of DIME, or not, against the PRC threat.

Data Collection

This case study had to explore a sample of other countries with a few key control variables. Each country needed to have similar types of government, in the broadest sense, to ensure Canada could reasonably apply similar processes. Therefore, these countries were limited to stable governments with historically consistent democratic norms. Additionally, each sample country needed to have assessed the People's Republic of China as a threat, so that this study could validate the effectiveness of each NSS in that regard. To that end, this study utilized an alliance as a framework to selecting sample countries.

The FVEY, "five-eye," alliance refers to the strategic intelligence sharing alliance of the five English-speaking countries of Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. This five-nation group met the criteria needed to cogently assess the research questions as each has strong democratic norms underpinned by longstanding democratic traditions and each face strategic security threats from China. The case study sample size was further scoped down to the United States and Australia. The United States was selected because it was known to the author that this country had a robust NSS process that could be used for comparison and because the US has been very vocal and forward about its posturing against the PRC threat. Australia was also selected as a case study country because it is the most comparable FVEY country to Canada in several factors. Australia, like Canada, is a former British colony, is a parliamentary democracy, has a comparable population, similarly sized military, and nearly equally

sized economy. It also considers the United States to be its most important strategic partner, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 4, Analysis. These commonalities represented key control variables in the study of these cases.

Within each case it was necessary to collect data regarding their NSS. This data collection included the NSS document or statement itself and the process used to derive the NSS. The US process was very prescriptive making it easy to collect data. The complete Australian process was less prescriptive and more nebulous. In this case, this study ascertained certain key facts about the process; who authored their NSS, was the process driven from the top or bottom up within the government, who were the key stakeholders involved in its development, and what mandated or motivated the government to create an NSS? Lastly, to assess the efficacy of their NSS to counter the PRC threat, this study collected security related government department policies, government documents, statements made by government officials, and news articles relating to certain government departmental actions.

Data Analysis

The qualitative approach used in this study applied case study analysis to compare how the United States and Australia produced their NSS and how effective those NSS were at aligning their respective governments to guard against the PRC threat. Using the case study roadmap outlined above, this section articulates how the data collected was analyzed to answer each research question. This case format meant describing the historical context surrounding the creation of the NSS formulation process, understanding the actors involved in creating the process, analyzing the process, and observing for unified whole-of-government action against the PRC threat.

The case study format began each case with a contextual preamble that established the political and security environment relevant to the creation of that case country's NSS formulation process. Depending on the case, the political or security environment motivated the impetus to create an NSS formulation process; therefore, each case study begins by emphasizing the most important circumstances that directly influenced the creation of an NSS formulation process. This context also served as the departure point for later analysis that used Kingdon's Streams model and discussed in detail the actors involved in the creation of a case country's NSS formulation process, each of which existed in a particular historical context.

The second step in this case study format was to understand the genesis of each country's NSS formulation process. Understanding why a process was created gave insight into the conditions and motivations present and how those created windows of opportunity to politically solve strategic problems. This insight allowed for comparisons to be made to Canada's strategic and political environment later in this study. Using Kingdon's Streams model, the study identified the streams present during the window of opportunity where a case country created an NSS formulation process. The analysis of these three streams, which were problems, politics, and policies, consisted of identifying the constraints and impetus within each stream and determining where, and how, the impetus overcame the constraints.¹²⁰ This analysis created an opportunity for this study to describe and correlate the thematic conditions present when countries successfully established an NSS formulation process and how actors created impetus that overcame

¹²⁰ CJCS, JP 5-0, 93.

common constraints within the respective decision-window streams. This section was concluded with a feasibility assessment to determine if and how the same process could be implemented in Canada.

Third, the study assessed the NSS for each case using Yarger's strategy definition to identify the document or other medium that each country used to define their nation's national interests and the ends, ways, and means for securing those interests. The NSS of each country communicated ends, ways, and means with varying degrees of prescription and were based either in pragmatic terms or in aspirational ones. The author found no accepted standard that defined types of NSS formulation processes; therefore, the author created a novel approach to categorize observed processes.

This study posits that two key observations distinguish types of NSS formulation processes: the degree of structure and the degree of centralization in the process. The degree of structure describes the formality and preplanned nature of the process with least structured processes described as a process of an ad hoc nature. The degree of centralization describes the degree to which the executive branch of government retains control of the NSS creation and drives the process from the top-down or if the government delegates creation down to its departments. Therefore, decentralized creation refers to those processes where the government aggregated an NSS by giving subordinate government departments greater spans of agency. This format enabled the study to apply quadrant analysis using the degree of structure and the degree of centralization as the two axis of the quad chart (see Figure 2). This analysis resulted in the categorization of observed NSS formulation processes and allowed the study to create meaningful labels to define different processes.

This study labelled the four process types as Extemporaneous-Directed, Extemporaneous-Delegated, Systematic-Directed, and Systematic-Delegated. The processes with the greatest structure tended to be very systematic and the purpose for the case study countries to create an NSS process was to create systematic strategic planning.¹²¹ Whereas, processes that are ad hoc, like Canada, are reactionary and infrequent; thus, these were labelled as extemporaneous. The more a process was centralized, the more it was directed and drafted from the inner circle of the executive branch of government; thus, these processes were labelled as directed. The more a process was decentralized, the more it tended to have components of the process delegated to other government departments; thus, it was labelled as delegated. The study used these definitions to characterize NSS process types, which aided in conceptually understanding each NSS process and giving meaning to comparisons and recommendations in this paper. The Canadian 2004 NSS discussed in Chapter 2, Literature Review, used an Extemporaneous-Directed process as defined here. This third step in the case study was concluded with an acceptability assessment to determine if the process communicated and balanced strategic guidance in terms of ends, ways, and means, with the risks and threats in the strategic environment.

¹²¹ Ross Babbage, “Strategic Decision Making: Optimising Australia’s National Security Planning and Coordination for 2015,” (Kokoda Paper No. 8, Kokoda Foundation, Giralang, A.C.T., 2008), iii, https://kokodafoundation.wildapricot.org/Resources/Files/KP%208%20Strategic%20Decision%20Making_FinalJoinedUp.pdf.




Figure 2. Process Formulation Type

Source: Created by author.

The purpose of the fourth and final step of the case study format was to assess the effectiveness of each NSS process at aligning whole-of-government to counter the PRC threat. This analysis first reviewed the most recent NSS of the case country to determine how it defined its strategic threats emanating from the PRC regime, how it defined national interests, and then what ends, ways, and means it articulated to protect or achieve those interests in the face of the stated strategic threats. This paper specifically, parsed out the elements of the NSS that addressed the PRC threat. Then, this paper researched observable actions by various government departments and agencies using the instruments of national power (DIME) as a lens. If government departments were aligned

through effective strategic guidance, then instruments of national power, each a result of the aggregate actions of all government departments, would be aligned and support common end state objectives against the named strategic threats. This last case study step was concluded with a suitability assessment that determined if that case country NSS process achieved alignment of government departments and instruments of national power against the PRC threat. After understanding the creation and characteristics of each case NSS formulation process, this paper supported pragmatic recommendations for how the Government of Canada could develop an NSS formulation process that would best align its departments to defend against strategic threats, like those posed by the People's Republic of China.

Ethical Considerations

Given the potentially confrontational nature by which this study places Canada and the PRC, the most significant ethical consideration this study consciously adhered to was to strongly differentiate between the government of China and the people of China. The People's Republic of China has a proclivity to deliberately conflate its government and the CCP with the Chinese people themselves, in China and abroad, to deflect legitimate criticism against the China by labeling it as being racist. This study examined the threat that the Chinese government, not the Chinese people, pose to Canada and makes no such conflation. The people of China are separate and apart from the PRC threat in the view of this paper.

Summary

This study used a qualitative approach to address the primary research question, “What process should Canada use to develop National Security Strategies that are capable of aligning government departments in applying instruments of national power against threats to national interests?” The author derived a theoretical framework that broke down the primary research question into secondary research questions. After removing those questions already answered in the literature review, the author used the remaining questions to create a four-step format for the case study. Therefore, the aim of the research was to determine what NSS formulation processes did the United States and Australia use and to assess which method was best at solving the problem in the primary research question. The research herein analyzed what conditions and actor actions led to the creation of an NSS formulation process, defined types of NSS formulation processes, and assessed the shared understanding and alignment derived by each type of formulation process. At the end of the genesis, process type, and effectiveness steps the paper respectively vetted each process using the model of feasible, acceptable, suitable, which the study used to assess each process and informed recommendations in the final chapter. In doing so, this paper created a normative assessment of how to establish an NSS formulation process in Canada.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter is organized by case study and the purpose of each is to conduct analysis of the NSS processes to offer tangible and specific recommendations for the Government of Canada. Each case is broken down into four steps, indicated by sub-headers, which categorizes the information collected and analyzed within the framework laid out in Figure 3 below. These steps are, first, to establish the historical context that led to needing an NSS process, second, to understand the genesis of the process itself, third, to characterize and analyze the type of NSS process, and fourth, to assess how effective each process was at aligning government departments against the selected strategic threat, the PRC threat. The analysis conducted at the conclusion of the second, third, and fourth steps were respectively framed using the joint military planning model of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability outlined in Chapter 3, Methodology. This total analysis enabled the recommendations found in Chapter 5.




Figure 3. Study Framework

Source: Created by author.

Case Study of the United States

American Context

This study found that the United States has the most prescriptive and entrenched NSS development process of the cases studied. The US NSS process has roots dating back to 1947, with the current system effectively operating since 1986. The US NSS process has allowed it to generate frequent and updated strategies that effectively align whole-of-government security policies. The US NSS documents effectively acted as an umbrella providing the grand strategic vision of the international environment, defined US interests, and framed US ends, ways, and means within that context.

In 1947, Senator John Gurney (R-SD) sponsored the National Security Act of 1947, which was the first major reformation aimed at centralizing the US armed services

including the creation of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This act also created the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the US President, “with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”¹²² According to this law, the NSC is composed of the Secretary of Defense, each of the armed services secretaries, the National Security Resources Board, and anyone else designated by the President.¹²³ Some of its stated duties include ensuring more effective coordination of policies and functions between government departments and to assess the objectives, commitments, and risks to the United States for advice to the President.¹²⁴ While the National Security Act of 1947 originally did not explicitly mention an NSS, the implications were present that the NSC would perform this task in the form of advice to the President. In 1986, US Congress passed a new law that formalized the explicit requirement for an NSS document.¹²⁵

¹²² National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st sess., (July 26, 1947), Sec. 101, <https://global.oup.com/us/companion.websites/9780195385168/resources/chapter10/nsa/nsa.pdf>.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Kathleen J. McInnis and John W. Rollins, *The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R44828 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, June 3, 2021), 6, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44828>.

¹²⁵ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, 99th Cong. (1986), 1074-1075, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/dod_reforms/Goldwater-NicholsDoDReordAct1986.pdf.

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reformation Act made law the requirement of the President of the United States to issue an annual report of the country's National Security Strategy to Congress. Specifically, Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act amended the National Security Act of 1947 with the addition of a section explicitly requiring the formation of frequent NSS. The law requires this NSS to include the national interests, goals, and objectives of the United States, the short- and long-term uses of the instruments of national power (DIME), and the adequacy of capabilities of the United States to carry out the NSS.¹²⁶ In other words, the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates US executive branches to articulate an NSS in terms of ends, ways, and means.

Process Genesis

The US approach to creating an NSS formulation process required great effort among political entrepreneurs. Kingdon's Streams Model provided a lens through which to organize and understand how those political actors managed to overcome frictions in the political environment. These streams were the problem, politics, and policy streams, as discussed in Chapter 2.¹²⁷ The result was a process that has not only survived seven US administrations over 36 years but has consistently produced NSS giving strategic guidance to US departments ever since. By understanding how this process managed to

¹²⁶ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 1074-1075.

¹²⁷ Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 92-93.

come into being, this paper aims to provide useful recommendations for any Canadian government that may consider this approach.

Two key reports in the 1980s identified the problem stream that the US Armed Services had systemic issues in conducting joint operations. The 1985 President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, also known as the Packard Commission, and Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and Senator Samuel Nunn's (D-GA) Task Force on Defense Reorganization staff study for the 1985-86 Senate Armed Services Committee each documented the organizational problems with the Armed Services. These reports determined several problems. Inter-service rivalry resulted in poor military advice being given to the US President. Neither the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the Secretary of Defense had the required authorities to sufficiently coordinate the Armed Services or other defense organizations, which caused numerous operations to either fail, like Operation Eagle Claw in Iran 1980, or have unnecessary issues that risked mission failure, like the US intervention in Grenada 1983.¹²⁸ Finally, without any overarching strategic guidance, the United States suffered from poor strategic planning, plagued by decentralized departments trying to meet budgetary constraints.¹²⁹ The United States did not sufficiently articulate national interests, common strategic goals, and did not

¹²⁸ James R. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac : The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, vol. 79, Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 298-319.

¹²⁹ Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1999), 5, 45-47, psi-praege.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/Topics/Display/2052386?cid=137&sid=2052386.

coordinate the US defense and security establishment as well as expected by US officials. However, the problems identified in these reports had not been yet publicly released.

The political stream describes the political atmosphere, which consists of public opinion, interest group pressure campaigns, and partisan distributions in Congress;¹³⁰ the atmosphere was mostly apathetic to the problem that Goldwater and Nunn were chasing. The issue was not in the headlines and therefore, Congress felt no pressure to address it. Goldwater and Nunn sparked public interest and increased that pressure by releasing their task force staff study and the Senate. The study had been signed for internal use, but the material was not classified, so they began to release some material at a trickle to generate interest. The material demonstrated systemic problems in US defense planning and operations that were shocking due to the lack of awareness. The plan worked and the issue began to dominate the news cycles. Goldwater and Nunn seized each opportunity to deliver prepared speeches that capitalized on each new release and built political initiative in Congress and in public opinion.¹³¹ The two senators effectively created political impetus where none had existed before, which set the conditions for their window of opportunity where their policy solution would have its moment to address the problem.

The policy stream, or solution, to this problem had points of friction found mostly in the armed services military leadership and with some hesitant senators. The solution

¹³⁰ Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 93.

¹³¹ Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 320-332.

called for a more centralized and coordinated defense services.¹³² Some general officers offered quite a bit of resistance to any such reform, preferring the inherent freedom they enjoyed with independent Armed Services.¹³³ These generals were influential with the Senate Armed Services Committee, who Goldwater and Nunn had to convince, to gain the support needed for reform. Goldwater and Nunn made it a personal mission to rectify these policy friction points and decided to organize a three-day retreat with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to assuage their reservations. They assembled serving and retired military officers, as well as academic subject matter experts, such as famous political scientist Samuel Huntington, to provide expert advice regarding the coordination problems between defense organizations. They also provided space for those opposed to express their concerns but were well prepared for experts to make rebuttals.¹³⁴ The staff work the retreat produced increased the corporate understanding of the problem not only between Goldwater and Nunn, but also among many of the Senators in attendance, and it was an effective information campaign to gain support among Senators on both sides who would later be needed to pass any reforms. Goldwater and Nunn had diminished the policy friction and gained policy impetus, per Kingdon's model, to clear the path for their solution to match the problem.¹³⁵

¹³² Ibid., 333-345.

¹³³ Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 341-342.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 331-336.

¹³⁵ Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 92.

In 1986, President Reagan signed the Goldwater-Nichols Act into law. This addressed the organizational problems plaguing coordination of the Armed Services by centralizing their command and control under the Secretary of Defense and empowering the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to better coordinate the Armed Services. It also amended the National Security Act of 1947 to include a section mandating the US President to provide Congress an annual NSS, which forced the government to provide the strategic guidance necessary for all departments to plan in a concerted effort and towards common goals and interests.¹³⁶

The genesis of the US NSS process is easily understood using Kingdon's streams model. The problem stream specific to the NSS was that US government departments lacked strategic guidance; therefore, they planned outwardly from budget constraints and in isolation from one another. The political stream and environment were initially apathetic to the problem; however, Senator Nunn and Senator Goldwater became two political entrepreneurs who elevated the impetus of the public to demand a solution to the problem by commandeering the attention of the media through carefully planned leaks of the task force staff study, critical of the US military instrument of power. The policy stream was primarily concerned with fixing inter-service rivalry and improving US joint operational capabilities. However, to enable the latter the proposed policy solution addressed the strategic guidance problem by adding a section into the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which mandated future administrations to produce an annual NSS report. This solution was very feasible to implement in the US system of government.

¹³⁶ Lederman, *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 84.

The purpose of the NSS Process Genesis section of the paper was to understand how each case country derived its process and if that same implementation would be feasible in the Canadian government to support a recommendation for a Canadian process. This paper assessed that while the US process benefits from consistency and frequency of application because it is mandated in law, that same method of implementation may not be feasible in the Canadian parliamentary system. In the Canadian parliamentary system of government, it is the elected government's prerogative to set and change laws, which is generally done much easier than in the US system where the President, House, and Senate may not be all controlled by the same political party. The only written law that is unquestionably binding for Canadian political actors is the Constitution Act¹³⁷ and to introduce a new amendment to this act makes the entire document negotiable for provincial and other stakeholders; thus, this option is politically unfeasible.

Given this, a hypothetical Canadian law introduced by a government that would mandate each elected government to produce an NSS may be followed, or the next elected government may decide to change it for any reason; thus, it would not carry with it the same guarantee of longevity as in the US system. What historically gives Canadian law its longevity is bipartisan impetus in the political stream. The best example of this would be Canadian universal healthcare, when in 1966 Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson (Liberal) introduced the Medical Care Act at the federal level and extended universal

¹³⁷ University of Alberta, "Democratic Governance: Convention," Centre for Constitutional Studies, July 4, 2019, <https://www.constitutionalstudies.ca/2019/07/convention/>.

healthcare to Canada's provinces following the popularity of Saskatchewan's implementation of a similar plan 1961 under Minister of Provincial Parliament Tommy Douglas (CCF).¹³⁸ While the federal conservatives contested the act in parliament, as opposition parties do, the issue was not revisited after its implementation due to overwhelming popularity across the country.¹³⁹ The senior public servants of Canadian government departments, beginning at the Deputy Minister level and below would have been responsible for implementing the act and it is this very senior bureaucracy that apolitically maintains the intent of this act today. Therefore, to implement an NSS process in Canada by law or by convention¹⁴⁰ requires bipartisan support in the political stream. Senators Goldwater and Nunn demonstrated a way political impetus can be manufactured, whereas Tommy Douglas and Lester Pearson took advantage of an impetus that already existed in the political stream. Any feasible Canadian solution to the strategic guidance problem in Canada will have to take the political stream into account or even take advantage of opportunities that present themselves in public opinion if a Canadian NSS process is to survive changes in elected government.

¹³⁸ "Canadian History Hall: Tommy Douglas and Medicare," Canadian Museum of History, last updated March 10, 2022, <https://www.historymuseum.ca/history-hall/tommy-douglas-medicare/>.

¹³⁹ . "Making Medicare: The History of Health Care in Canada, 1914-2007. - The Medical Care Act, 1966," Canadian Museum of History, last updated April 21, 2010 <https://www.historymuseum.ca/cmc/exhibitions/hist/medicare/medic-5h23e.html>.

¹⁴⁰ University of Alberta, "Democratic Governance: Convention."

NSS Formulation Process

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the United States has consistently produced an NSS since 1987, which includes 17 NSS between Presidents Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump¹⁴¹ and the most recent Interim NSS Guidance delivered by the Biden Administration in March 2021.¹⁴² Since the George W. Bush presidency of 2000, the frequency of NSS publication has contracted from annually to one NSS per four-year presidential term; however, Congress has never communicated a problem with receiving an NSS only every four years. In fact, some experts, like international security specialist Catherine Dale from the US Congressional Research Service, have argued that it makes little sense to produce an NSS annually as national strategies are unlikely to change dramatically within a year.¹⁴³ This paper assesses that the United States uses a Systematic-Directed process (see Figure 2) that is led by the National Security Council (NSC), approved by the President of the United States, and sets the strategic guidelines for its government departments.

The US NSS has five purposes according to Alan Stolberg, a PhD in Political Science and former associate professor at the US Army War College. First is to provide

¹⁴¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “National Security Strategy,” Historical Office, accessed January 17, 2022, <https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Security-Strategy/>.

¹⁴² US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2021), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>.

¹⁴³ Catherine Dale, *National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL34505 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, July 28, 2008), 13.

guidance for all government departments and agencies on defense and foreign policies. Second, it provides the executive branch's strategic vision on security to the Legislative Branch to justify money that will be spent towards these purposes. Third, it communicates this strategic vision for both domestic and foreign audience consumption. Fourth, it addresses niche security concerns that certain political constituents have raised. Fifth, it is a strategic communications tool to sell the administration's policies. To that end, the US NSS addresses specific strategic ends and provides very general guidance on ways and means to a much lesser extent. The specific means and ways are communicated via classified National Security Policy Directives.¹⁴⁴

The US NSC staff take months to conduct strategic analysis and produces the NSS in close coordination with the executive branch via the National Security Advisor. This strategy formulation can include input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress, and academia. Some have even been *red-teamed* to validate assumptions and planning considerations by standing a second independent group of officials, experts, and academia who would critique draft NSS line by line, such as the 2006 US NSS. Often the final drafts are batted back and forth between the National Security Advisor and the US President to ensure it captures the President's intent and *voice*.¹⁴⁵ The NSS is then transmitted to the US President for final concurrence and signature before being reported

¹⁴⁴ Alan G. Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents," (Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, US Army War College, 2012), 71-72.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 73-85.

to Congress in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, the US executive branch centralizes the NSS process by employing the NSC to shape and direct it; however, it benefits from collaboration with government department and non-government stakeholders. The result is an overarching strategic framework for agencies and departments that integrates foreign and security policy; thus, encouraging more holistic and complimentary policy.¹⁴⁷

The US ability to consistently produce a meaningful NSS can be attributed to both the mandate created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the allocation of the necessary bureaucratic horsepower to conduct a holistic analysis, as seen with the NSC. The National Security Act of 1947 created the NCS as a body to advise the US President on security matters. Today the Council includes representation from the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power. The US President chairs the council and the body is formed by the US Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of National Intelligence, and any other officials desired by the US President. The deliberate organization of the NSC has ensured it can address strategic issues using every instrument of national power (DIME). While the influence of the NSC has varied from one administration to the next, the trend in recent years has been for the NSC to take on a more prominent role in leading and implementing security policy in the United States. Until 1938, the US President was the lone national security

¹⁴⁶ Lederman, *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 84.

¹⁴⁷ Lederman, *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 84.

coordinator; however, the increasing complexity of the operating environment that emerged in the Second World War necessitated an advisory council to produce the analytical rigor and advice needed to support the President's decision-making process. This council has been improved and enhanced following the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and amendments since.¹⁴⁸

The Systematic-Directed process (refer back to Figure 2) used by the United States is structured and centralized. By creating the NSC, the National Security Act of 1947 formed the government body that would eventually be responsible for crafting the NSS. This advisory body crafts proposed NSS based on the intent and guidance of the executive branch, specifically the US President, and its control is not delegated to other government bodies. The NSC membership deliberately includes government representation from not only the defense department and security agencies, but also representatives of the economy, trade, and foreign policy. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 has mandated US administrations to produce an NSS and every President since then has authorized an NSS based on the extensive staff work and advice from the NSC. The results have been frequent NSS that define the strategic environment, national interests, and desired end states. Finally, the resultant NSS have provided the guidelines for how US administrations want their departments to achieve those end states through the spectrum of DIME.

This paper assessed the acceptability of the US NSS process in communicating and balancing government guidance via ends, ways, and means with the strategic risks to

¹⁴⁸ McInnis and Rollins, *The National Security Council*, 1-6.

the United States. The US NSS process is an acceptable method in achieving this balance. The product document is written and therefore easily communicated and retrievable by bureaucrats across departments. By centralizing the production of the NSS in the NSC, whose membership is the most senior from numerous government organizations, the government easily coordinates and includes threats, interests, and ends, ways, and means with input from departments and agencies representing all instruments of national power. This is perhaps the most advantageous part of the US NSS process.

The NSC is a robust organization and is appropriately staffed to carry out rigorous analysis with input from across the government, while remaining under the direct supervision of the executive branch and the President. This has ensured that US NSS are comprehensive and deliver guidance to government departments who exercise influence in any instrument of national power. The prescriptive nature of the US NSS process from its mandate in law to how it is produced makes it very easy to integrate into a wider array of US government department sub-strategies. The US Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* is one example of this as it articulates how the NSS will directly initiate the production of a National Defense Strategy by the Secretary of Defense and how the defense strategy directly guides the National Military Strategy led by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the US NSS process is acceptable in balancing guidance with strategic risks through a clearly communicated and prescriptive model.

¹⁴⁹ CJCS, JP 1, chap. 2, 3-4.

NSS Effectiveness

President Joseph Biden issued the *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (INSSG) in March of 2021 in lieu of an NSS because his new administration wished to immediately unify his government departments and agencies around a cohesive vision while his NSC staff continue their analysis to draft a complete NSS. President Biden states in his personal forward to the document that, “. . . I am issuing this interim guidance to convey my vision for how America will engage with the world. I direct departments and agencies to align their actions with this guidance, even as we begin work on a National Security Strategy.”¹⁵⁰ The INSSG described American national interests and defined specific threats that challenge those interests. This included a clear identification of the People’s Republic of China as the most significant pacing threat to American interests. The INSSG then laid out three strategic end states and numerous ways in which it envisioned the United States achieving those ends, which included guidance that touched on all instruments of national power (DIME). The INSSG was comprehensive in that it touched on all perceived threats against American interests including states, non-state actors, pandemics, climate change, and even the economic and political instability domestically and abroad. The ends and ways¹⁵¹ articulated in the INSSG were designed to provide guidance in meeting all these challenges; however, this paper reviewed only those ways that intersected with the PRC threat vector.

¹⁵⁰ US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 4.

¹⁵¹ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 77-80.

The INSSG elaborated on how China has emerged as a strategic threat. First, it states that democratic nations are increasingly challenged by antagonistic authoritarian powers, alluding to both China and Russia. The document asserted that these, “anti-democratic forces use misinformation and weaponized corruption to exploit perceived weaknesses and sow division within and among free nations, erode existing international rules, and promote alternative models of authoritarian governance.”¹⁵² These methods were then elaborated on as they pertained specifically to the PRC threat. The INSSG lamented China’s rapid transformation into an assertive power who is attempting to mount a sustained challenge against the open international system and claimed that China is the only competitor with the capability of combining its own instruments of national power to such a detrimental effect.¹⁵³ The INSSG placed China directly at odds with American national interests to ensure a corporate understanding of the risks to those national interests.

The INSSG then defined three American national interests and three strategic end states that all government departments and agencies should collectively strive to achieve in securing and promoting those national interests. The national interests defined in the INSSG were first, the protection and security of the American people, second, expanding economic prosperity and opportunity, and third, the realization and defense of democratic values domestically and abroad. The INSSG then scoped itself down to the realm of national security when it stated the three national security requirements, which this paper

¹⁵² US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 7.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 8.

assessed as the strategic end states; the objectives that all arms of government must strive to collectively achieve to protect or enhance all three defined American national interests. The first end state in the INSSG was to defend and nurture the American people, economy, national defense, and American democracy. The second, to promote a favorable distribution of international power by deterring and preventing adversaries from threatening the United States or allies, impeding access to international waters, or dominating key regions. The third and final end state was to lead and sustain the open international system through democratic alliances, partnerships, institutions, and rules.¹⁵⁴ The end state objectives found in the INSSG were very broad, but it was clear that each supported all three national interests, and these ends were supported by very detailed guidance on ways in which the US government should achieve them.

The INSSG placed diplomatic ways front and center to its strategy and highlighted US intentions to strengthen existing alliances, deepen specific strategic partnerships, and apply other niche diplomatic levers to achieve the end states and hedge against the PRC threat. With respect to the Indo-Pacific region, the guidance specified that the United States would reaffirm, invest in, and modernize alliances with Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.¹⁵⁵ In September 2021, the Republic of Korea and US Departments of Defense released joint press statements reaffirming their joint commitment to the defense of the Korean peninsula and addressed ways forward on

¹⁵⁴ US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 9.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

numerous diplomatic, military, and economic issues.¹⁵⁶ In November 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia released joint statements announcing a new military pact between the countries that would share sensitive technologies and coordinate their security efforts in the Indo-Pacific.¹⁵⁷ The INSSG also discussed building deeper partnerships in the Indo-Pacific with Japan, India, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states.¹⁵⁸

The U.S. Departments of State and Defense, as well as the President himself, have accelerated the importance of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, from a maritime cooperation dialogue between Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, to a diplomatic partnership aimed at containing Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific.¹⁵⁹ In October 2021, the US press secretary released a statement announcing budgeted multi-department initiatives to enhance the US-ASEAN partnership in the areas of health, climate change, economy, and education.¹⁶⁰ Finally, the INSSG committed to other

¹⁵⁶ “Joint Press Statement for the 20th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue,” US Department of Defense, September 28, 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2790817/joint-press-statement-for-the-20th-korea-us-integrated-defense-dialogue/>.

¹⁵⁷ BBC, “Aukus.”

¹⁵⁸ US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 10.

¹⁵⁹ Ted Kemp, “Quad Summit and China: Game Theory Predictions for the Future of the Quad,” *CNBC News*, September 24, 2021, <https://www.cnbc.com/quad-summit-and-china-game-theory-predictions-for-the-future-of-the-quad/>.

¹⁶⁰ The White House, “Fact Sheet: New Initiatives to Expand the U.S.-ASEAN Strategic Partnership,” The White House Briefing Room, October 26, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/26/fact-sheet-new-initiatives-to-expand-the-u-s-asean-strategic-partnership/>.

diplomatic measures that would protect the UN against malign PRC influence and continue to maintain pressure on China regarding humanitarian issues in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong-Kong.¹⁶¹ To that end, the US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, took on this initiative by early summer of 2021, built a coalition of UN members to counter-balance China, recruited young Americans into positions of UN leadership, and has frequently raised the issue of the Uyghur genocide at the UN Security Council.¹⁶² Each of these are examples of INSSG direction translated into inter-departmental action across the diplomatic levers of national power.

The first end state in the INSSG, defend and nurture the American people and American democracy, is directly affected by the information space and the need to combat misinformation. The ways outlined in the INSSG to counter misinformation are focused on ameliorating domestic issues to rebuild faith in American society, such as racial injustice and voter disenfranchisement, rather than directly combating sources of misinformation. However, it does outline ways to protect the information space infrastructure from those same sources. The document specified that the US government would ensure US 5G networks were secure and that cyber security would be enhanced by increasing cooperation with the private sector, expand cyber capabilities, and pursue international cooperation on cyber security.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 13, 21.

¹⁶² Mark Magnier, “US to Counter China’s ‘Malign’ Influence on United Nations, Says Senior Official,” *South China Morning Post*, June 17, 2021, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3137583/us-counter-chinas-malign-influence-united-nations-says-senior>.

¹⁶³ US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 17-19.

While the US government had already banned Huawei from building US 5G networks, the Democrats introduced the Secure Equipment Act in October 2021, which would essentially deny companies like Huawei and ZTE from receiving Federal Communications Commission approval to build or supply components of any network infrastructure. The US House of Representatives voted in favor of the act 420-4, the US Senate voted in favor unanimously on 28 October, and on 11 November 2021, President Biden signed the act into law.¹⁶⁴ On cyber security, by August 2021 the US Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency partnered with the biggest cloud technology and information technology companies in the country to establish the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative meant to create a common operating picture between private sector companies and the US government.¹⁶⁵ The INSSG aided in unifying early government planning, across the governing party and US departments and agencies, to enable quick action in defending the information space.

The INSSG focused the military instrument of national power with guidance on ways that directly countered the PRC threat. It directed a military review to better understand how the United States should be postured in that regard and stated that it would end the war in Afghanistan to free up the military resources necessary to do so.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ David Shepardson, “Biden Signs Legislation to Tighten U.S. Restrictions on Huawei, ZTE,” *Reuters*, November 11, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/technology/biden-signs-legislation-tighten-us-restrictions-huawei-zte-2021-11-11/>.

¹⁶⁵ Justin Doubleday, “CISA Looks to Tie Together Public-Private Partnerships through New Cyber Planning Office,” *Federal News Network*, August 5, 2021, <https://federalnewsnetwork.com/cybersecurity/2021/08/cisa-looks-to-tie-together-public-private-partnerships-through-new-cyber-planning-office/>.

¹⁶⁶ US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 14-15.

The US Department of Defense and Department of State completely withdrew US forces from Afghanistan five months later in a rapid manner that ushered in the total collapse of the Afghan government and drew deserved criticism;¹⁶⁷ however, it did free up military resources that had been tied to Afghanistan for 20 years.

In November 2021, the US Department of Defense submitted a Global Posture Review to President Biden, which echoed the language of the INSSG and recommended a prioritization of the Indo-Pacific by increasing regional access for military partnership activities, increasing rotational and permanent military forces in Australia and the Republic of Korea, and increasing military infrastructure hosted by other nations in the Pacific.¹⁶⁸ Four months later, during the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Admiral Aquilino reaffirmed the strategy to maintain and increase distributed forces not only in Guam, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, but also in the Pacific Islands. He emphasized the importance of the joint negotiation between the US Department of Defense, Department of State, and Department of the Interior with the Pacific Islands on

¹⁶⁷ Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer, and Amy Mackinnon, “State Department Launches Review of Afghan Withdrawal,” *Foreign Policy*, December 10, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/10/state-department-review-afghan-withdrawal/>.

¹⁶⁸ Jim Garamone, “Biden Approves Global Posture Review Recommendations,” US Department of Defense, November 29, 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2856053/biden-approves-global-posture-review-recommendations/>.

renewing the Compacts of Free Association,¹⁶⁹ giving the US military access to basing while denying the same for other countries without US permission.¹⁷⁰

Lastly, with respect to the application of the military instrument of national power, the INSSG directed that US forces will continue to execute operations that support freedom of navigation and overflight, such as through the South China Sea.¹⁷¹ This directly supports the second end state of promoting a favorable distribution of power by preventing adversaries from denying access to global commons and the US Navy increased these operations in the South China Sea by nearly double in 2021 as compared to 2020.¹⁷² These observations of the military instrument of US national power again demonstrated how US departments and agencies quickly executed actions in close alignment with strategic goals set out by the executive branch in the INSSG.

The INSSG guidance related to the economic lever of national power focused on defending the US economy from coercive PRC economic practices and reinforcing international institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO). The document

¹⁶⁹ *Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea*, US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, March 10, 2022, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/22-11_03-10-2022.pdf, 31.

¹⁷⁰ US Department of the Interior, “Compacts of Free Association,” Office of Insular Affairs, accessed April 10, 2022, <https://www.doi.gov/oia/compacts-of-free-association>.

¹⁷¹ US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 20.

¹⁷² Minnie Chan, “South China Sea: US Navy Moves Suggest New Approach in Likely Taiwan Flashpoint,” *South China Morning Post*, January 11, 2022, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3163854/south-china-sea-us-navy-moves-suggest-new-approach-likely>.

emphasized the need to protect and diversify US critical supply chains [away from China] by enhancing domestic capabilities and develop critical supply chains among allies to protect US economic and security interests.¹⁷³ To further support this guidance, President Biden concurrently signed “Executive Order 14017 - America’s Supply Chains,” which directed a review by US government departments on supply chain vulnerabilities. In February 2022, seven US departments published their reports identifying supply-chain liabilities and their respective sub-strategies to address those issues.¹⁷⁴ As an example, the US Department of Energy published a report identifying vulnerabilities to a US clean energy transition with recommendations focused on expanding domestic capabilities like solar.¹⁷⁵ Similarly, the US Department of Defense published a report regarding supply-chain vulnerabilities in the defense industry and along with recommendations to boost domestic capability it also advocated for building a supply chain network amongst allied nations. The COVID-19 induced supply-chain disruption has further spurred US private industry to conclude that a diversification away from China is merited, given that US-based companies reporting China as a top-three

¹⁷³ US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 16, 20.

¹⁷⁴ Taite R. McDonald, Kevin L. Turner, Hannah M. Coulter, Reese Goldsmith, and Kelsey M. Hayes, “White House Outlines Strategy to Revitalize and Fortify U.S. Manufacturing, Supply Chains,” Holland & Knight, March 8, 2022, <https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2022/03/white-house-outlines-strategy>.

¹⁷⁵ Office of Policy, US Department of Energy, *America’s Strategy to Secure the Supply Chain for a Robust Clean Energy Transition* (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, February 24, 2022), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/America%20Strategy%20to%20Secure%20the%20Supply%20Chain%20for%20a%20Robust%20Clean%20Energy%20Transition%20FINAL.docx_0.pdf.

sourcing country dropped from 96% in 2019 to 77% in 2021,¹⁷⁶ which will further assist US government efforts to protect its supply chains. The INSSG delivered clear guidance on how the government wished to address supply chain issues and government departments followed suit.

The INSSG also gave indications on the US government's position regarding the on-going US-China trade war and economic policy towards China. To that end the guidance in the document stated that the United States would seek to mitigate Chinese coercive economic practices by enforcing US trade law and by seeking reforms to enhance the WTO.¹⁷⁷ In accordance with this guidance and in alignment with recommendations made by the US Department of Energy, the US Department of Commerce extended tariffs on Chinese solar products¹⁷⁸ and initiated an anti-dumping investigation regarding solar products.¹⁷⁹ Katherine Tai, the US Trade Representative issued two speeches in October 2021 where she elaborated on the guidance in the INSSG regarding US trade policy towards China moving forward and proposals for

¹⁷⁶ Ira Kalish, "Economic Brief: Supply Chains Diversify Amid Disruptions," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 5, 2021, <https://deloitte.wsj.com/cfo/2021/05/05/economic-brief-amid-disruptions-supply-chains-diversify/>.

¹⁷⁷ US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 15, 20.

¹⁷⁸ Chad Bown and Melina Kolb, "Trump's Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide," *Trade and Investment Policy Watch (blog)*, *Peterson Institute For International Economics*, March 28, 2022, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide>.

¹⁷⁹ Lulia Gheorghiu, "Commerce Department Kicks off 1-Year Solar Tariff Investigation on Panels Imported from Southeast Asia," *Utility Dive*, March 29, 2022, <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/commerce-department-kicks-off-1-year-solar-tariff-investigation-on-panels-i/621153/>.

improvements to the WTO. On 4 October 2021 in Washington, DC, she stated that to defend US economic interests from China's "non-market" practices through its state owned enterprises and because of China's poor performance in meeting conditions set out in the 2019 Phase One trade deal, the United States would work with its allies to strengthen rules for fair trade, maintain targeted tariffs [on China], and strengthen the WTO.¹⁸⁰ On 14 October 2021 in Geneva, Katherine Tai spoke to the Graduate Institute's Geneva Trade Platform where she made specific recommendations to reform the WTO in regards to enhancing the monitoring and trade negotiation methods, as well as addressing abuse of the dispute settlement function, each of which would address PRC misuse at the expense of smaller countries.¹⁸¹ The INSSG evidently has been effective at communicating US executive government economic intent resulting in aligned department and agency action.

The INSSG addressed ends and ways against named threats, but it also notably delimited areas of cooperation with China such as climate change, global health security, arms control, and nonproliferation, where US assessment has concluded that US and Chinese interests may overlap.¹⁸² While results have varied, US departments have

¹⁸⁰ Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Executive Office of the President, "Remarks As Prepared for Delivery of Ambassador Katherine Tai Outlining the Biden-Harris Administration's 'New Approach to the U.S.-China Trade Relationship'," (Washington, DC, October 4, 2021), <http://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speeches-and-remarks/2021/october/remarks-prepared-delivery-ambassador-katherine-tai-outlining-biden-harris-administrations-new>.

¹⁸¹ USTR, "Remarks As Prepared for Delivery of Ambassador Katherine Tai Outlining the Biden-Harris Administration's 'New Approach to the U.S.-China Trade Relationship'."

¹⁸² US President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 21.

demonstrated aspirations to continue or achieve cooperation with China in these aspects. For example, on 10 November 2021 the US Department of State published the US-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s, which emphasized shared mutual interests and commitments to the Paris Agreement.¹⁸³ The next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference at the UN is scheduled for August 2022, where the US will aim to continue arms control dialogue with China.¹⁸⁴ Effective cooperation will likely be stymied by the state of adversarial relations between the US and China; however, continued dialogue towards cooperation is as important to achieving the ends set out in the INSSG as is directly combating the threats.

The US INSSG, albeit an interim NSS, has been very effective at clearly communicating the US government strategic vision for the country and delivering specific national security guidance and a common purpose to the bodies of US government. Therefore, this paper assesses the suitability of the US NSS process to be very effective for coordinating all instruments of national power (DIME). The US government departments are very aligned against the PRC threat because they have clear strategic guidance in the form of a written NSS approved by the US President that carries the authority of that office. The NSC constructed this guidance with intense staff rigor, using a Systematic-Directed NSS process (See Figure 2), and pulled the appropriate input

¹⁸³ Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, “U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s,” (Media Note, Department of State, November 10, 2021), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-china-joint-glasgow-declaration-on-enhancing-climate-action-in-the-2020s/>.

¹⁸⁴ Heather Williams, “Crisis Stability as a Priority in U.S.-China Relations,” *RealClear Defense*, December 15, 2021, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/12/15/crisis_stability_as_a_priority_in_us-china_relations_807886.html.

from the defense and security intelligence community, including non-government officials, like academia. As a result, the NSS produced by this process is comprehensive, complete, and is effectively understood by the US government departments. In military parlance, the NSS provides the intent and desired end state of the elected government, which enabled the government departments to take initiative towards issues whilst nesting themselves with the greater strategic goals.

Case Study of Australia

Australian Context

When turning to the case of Australia, this study's methodology discovered a layered NSS process that, since 2010, is very structured and has aspects that are both directed and delegated (See Figure 2). The Labor government's introduction of *The Strategic Framework 2010*, an Australian Department of Defence policy document,¹⁸⁵ was Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's answer to the need for a structured approach to NSS development.¹⁸⁶ Prior to 2007, Australia did not have a holistic NSS equivalent. Instead, it produced four Defense White Papers about once every decade, beginning in 1976, primarily focused on defense review.¹⁸⁷ Nevertheless, these papers always had a slightly

¹⁸⁵ Australian Government, *The Strategic Framework 2010* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of Defence, 2010), <https://defence.gov.au/publications/TheStrategyFramework2010.pdf>.

¹⁸⁶ Michael Evans, "Towards an Australian National Security Strategy," *Institute for Regional Security* 3, no. 4 (2007): 113–30.

¹⁸⁷ Australian Government, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of Defence, 1994), <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2016-defence-white-paper>.

broader scope than just defense and included strategic guidance from the government executive. Since the introduction of an NSS formulation process, the Government of Australia has produced four NSS in the form of statements by the Prime Minister and their respective Defence White Papers.¹⁸⁸ The Australian method, while not prescribed in law like the US process, is a structured method that uses a directed approach by the Prime Minister to set the initial strategic guidance and then delegates significant portions of the total NSS process to the Department of Defence. Successive Australian governments have demonstrated bipartisan support for this process since 2010.

Unlike Canada, two major geopolitical changes shaped the Australian strategic culture into one that strives for self-reliance: the end of the Vietnam War and the Global War on Terror. The end of the Vietnam War was the first of these two major events. Australia, like much of the West at the time, was concerned with the spread of communism and particularly the stability of Malaysia and Indonesia, which was a major factor contributing to its decision to join the United States in Vietnam.¹⁸⁹ When the United States withdrew completely from Vietnam in 1975 and the United Kingdom shifted its strategic focus out of the Indo-Pacific, the concern of regional stability still remained and was very local for Australia. The allied withdrawal from the Indo-Pacific was the impetus for the first Australian Defence White Paper whose stated strategic objectives were to establish “self-reliance as the primary focus of Australian defense

¹⁸⁸ Each of these NSS and their derivative Defence White Paper are individually referenced in the subsequent sections.

¹⁸⁹ Peter Edwards, “Australia and the Vietnam War: 50 Years On,” *The Strategist*, February 29, 2020, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-the-vietnam-war-50-years-on/>.

policy.”¹⁹⁰ This Defence White Paper also sought to establish defense capability planning in line with strategic objectives for the nascent Australian Defence Force,¹⁹¹ after the separate Australian armed services had been amalgamated under one organization.¹⁹² While this first Defence White Paper was well-intentioned, by 1981, it had failed to achieve the defense capabilities the government desired because it lacked clearly defined national interests and did not appropriately plan for means and ways to achieve the stated ends.¹⁹³

The subsequent Australian Defence White Papers in 1987, 1994, and 2000 improved and expanded on the strategic direction offered and included “defense national interests,” which were largely consistent over the two decades. These defense national interests were regionally focused and included: the defense of Australian territory and its interests in the Indo-Pacific, maintenance of alliances, promotion of strategic community among Indo-Pacific nations, and ensuring Antarctica remains demilitarized.¹⁹⁴ With

¹⁹⁰ Parliament of Australia, *Australian Defence (1976 Defence White Paper)*, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, August 20, 2015), https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/DefendAust/1976.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Graeme Dobell, “Reviewing the Department of Defence (Part 1),” *The Strategist*, November 18, 2019, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/reviewing-the-department-of-defence-part-1/>.

¹⁹³ Parliament of Australia, *Australian Defence (1976 Defence White Paper)*.

¹⁹⁴ Australian Government, *1987 Defence White Paper* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of Defence, 1987), 22, <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2016-defence-white-paper>.

respect to ends, ways, and means,¹⁹⁵ the strategic ends described in these documents were broad enough in scope to be considered the grandest strategic vision for the country; however, the ways and means were scoped to just the military instrument of national power (DIME).¹⁹⁶ Each of these subsequent white papers increasingly mentioned how the application of the military instrument would affect other instruments, such as the economy, and how conditions in the economic or diplomatic sphere could impact the military strategy.¹⁹⁷ Therefore, while the early Australian Defence White Papers were somewhat broad in their strategic scope as far articulating how national security in the military sense impacted other domains such as the economy, they still fell short of a holistic NSS that could articulate and coordinate the ends, ways, and means across all the instruments of national power.

The second geopolitical shock to affect Australian strategic culture was the Global War on Terror. After the 9/11 attacks in New York, Australia joined the US war effort in the Middle East to counter terrorism, the biggest existential threat to Western interests and Pax Americana, since the defunct Soviet Union. Like many Western nations at the time, Australian defense spending saw substantial increases meant to support this

¹⁹⁵ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 48-49.

¹⁹⁶ Australian Government, *2000 Defence White Paper* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of Defence, 2000), 77, 117, <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2016-defence-white-paper>.

¹⁹⁷ Australian Government, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 86-87.

new role in maintaining global security.¹⁹⁸ However, despite the dramatic change in the international security environment and the new active combat role for Australia to play in that environment, no white papers were produced to realign defense ends, ways, and means for nine years. There were three defense updates produced in 2003, 2005, and 2007 that did not dramatically realign defense planning, but they did recognize the growing complexity of the new international security environment, which included the military rise of China, and, in contrast to the *2000 Defence White Paper*, recognized a need for capabilities that went beyond the traditional military instrument of national power.¹⁹⁹

These new strategic pressures were quite literally trampling the Australian strategic culture of self-reliance, as the defense updates of the 2000s even eliminated the use of the phrase “self-reliance” that had been so prominent in the previous white papers.²⁰⁰ The increased complexity and magnitude of strategic threats to Australian national interests could no longer be exclusively serviced by the Australian Defence Force. Nevertheless, the Australian government had attempted such a feat, which set the conditions for a fresh look at how ways and means are matched against strategic ends.

¹⁹⁸ Macrotrends LLC, “Australia Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2022,” Macrotrends, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/AUS/australia/military-spending-defense-budget>.

¹⁹⁹ Parliament of Australia, *Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003, 2005 and 2007* (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, August 20, 2015), https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/DefendAust/NationalSecurity.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

Process Genesis

During the 2000s, increased defense spending muted by increased defense capability costs and a rapidly changing strategic environment that demanded nuanced whole-of-government approaches²⁰¹ created an impetus for a review in national security planning that had not been experienced since the first Defence White Paper in 1976. Like the end of the Vietnam era, there was a perception that defense spending was unchecked, inefficient, and was not achieving the strategic objectives of the nation. At least this is how the Honourable Kevin Rudd of the Australian Labor Party presented the situation when he led his party to an election victory in 2007. Prime Minister Rudd made national security planning an election issue by promising to bridge the gap between strategic guidance and force structure planning in a bid to both demonstrate his serious commitment to national security whilst also preparing to hem defense spending.²⁰² It is upon this context that the Rudd government implemented a process that changed how Australian national security was planned, from an ad hoc military-centric process, to something much closer to an NSS as defined in this paper.

Kingdon's Streams Model, when applied to the Australian case, revealed a confluence of actors and environment that together created a window of opportunity for the creation of an Australian NSS formulation process.²⁰³ The Labor Party identified the problem stream in its 44th National Conference as an ineffectual national security

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents," 19-20.

²⁰³ Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 92-93.

apparatus that was not meeting the strategic threats of the time. Like the 2007 Defence Update that the previous Liberal government had produced, the Labor Party platform correctly identified that international terrorism, like many modern strategic threats, was very complex and required an integrated whole-of-government solution.²⁰⁴ The platform also acknowledges a series of other inter-related problems constraining effective Australian national security. With respect to the Department of Defence, the platform derided procurement for being costly and too slow to effectively support national security,²⁰⁵ and there was a perceived disconnect between strategic guidance and force structure planning.²⁰⁶ Finally, the Labor Party recognized that security functions between government departments were poorly coordinated resulting in inefficient overlap, waste, and confusion.²⁰⁷ The impetus to solve this problem was further buoyed by popular support in the politics stream.

The politics stream generated little political friction in the political environment to constrain a solution in 2007.²⁰⁸ During the 2000s, the Global War on Terror routinely

²⁰⁴ Australian Labor Party, *Australian Labor Party National Platform and Constitution 2007* (Sydney, Australia: Parliament of Australia, 2007), chap. 14, para. 23, <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22library%2Fparty%2F1024541%22;src1=sm1>.

²⁰⁵ Australian Labor Party, *Australian Labor Party National Platform and Constitution 2007*, chap. 14, para. 195.

²⁰⁶ Stolberg, “How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents,” 20.

²⁰⁷ Australian Labor Party, *Australian Labor Party National Platform and Constitution 2007*, chap. 14, para. 226.

²⁰⁸ Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 92-93.

entered public discussion as Australia actively participated in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Election issues polling, which asked respondents what issues were very important to them, demonstrated that both defense and national security issues consistently polled as very important issues among 60% of the population between 2004 and 2006, just prior to the 2007 General Election. The same poll further indicated that 51% of respondents felt the Liberal Party would better handle issues of national security compared to only 21% for the Labor Party.²⁰⁹ Therefore, this political environment represented an opportunity for the campaigning Labor Party to pitch its commitment to national security.

Despite the usual partisan criticism of policies between political parties during an election, the Liberal and Labor parties articulated a great deal of consensus on issues of national security outside election campaigns during the 2000s. For example, the Liberal Defence Update in 2003, 2005, and 2007,²¹⁰ the 2007 Labor platform,²¹¹ and a timeline of Liberal and Labor defense policies throughout the 2000s²¹² demonstrated significant support for enhancing coordination of security functions between government

²⁰⁹ Newspoll Market Research, “Newspoll Survey - Issues Rated Very Important in a Federal Election,” (Newspoll and *The Australian*, June 14, 2007), https://web.archive.org/web/20070614034149/http://www.newspoll.com.au/image_uploads/0604%20issues.pdf.

²¹⁰ Parliament of Australia, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003, 2005, and 2007*.

²¹¹ Australian Labor Party, *Australian Labor Party National Platform and Constitution 2007*.

²¹² Nigel Brew, “A Quick Guide to the History of Proposals for an Australian Department of Homeland Security,” Parliament of Australia, July 14, 2017, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick_Guides/HomelandSecurity.

departments. Further, the Labor Party, though wanting to curtail what it perceived to be undisciplined defense spending,²¹³ committed to maintaining status quo defense budgets.²¹⁴ Given this, the political stream in 2007 was a very permissive environment to proposing new solutions to address national security concerns.

Following election victory, the Labor Government under Prime Minister Rudd sought to follow through with its national security rethink. This policy stream²¹⁵ entailed better matching strategic guidance with department execution by restructuring the Australian security apparatus to plan for long-term strategic objectives more rigorously, an acknowledged problem.²¹⁶ The new government's intent was to bridge the gap while institutionalizing national security review on a regular basis that would occur no more than every five years.²¹⁷ To achieve this goal, Prime Minister Rudd delivered Australia's first National Security Statement on 4 December 2008, the inauguration of an NSS process in Australia. This statement communicated national interests, strategic ends, named specific strategic threats, such as Pakistan's role in the Global War on Terror, and articulated the ways and means to achieve the ends in a set of national security priorities. In his statement, Rudd emphasized that, "Australia cannot afford a short term, reactive

²¹³ Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents," 20.

²¹⁴ "2007 – Labor," Australian Strategic Policy Institute, last updated July 26, 2018, <http://www.aspi.org.au/aspi-election-policy-library/2007/2007-labor>.

²¹⁵ Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 92-93.

²¹⁶ Babbage, "Strategic Decision Making," iii.

²¹⁷ Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents," 20-21.

approach to national security. Ours must be an integrated approach based on a clear-sighted view of our long term *[sic]* national security interests.”²¹⁸ Moreover, this new process did not do away with the strategically broad Defence White Papers but integrated them and added other processes into what this paper has assessed as the total NSS structure of Australia.

The intersection of the Australian problem stream, the political stream, and the proposed policy stream created a window of opportunity for the Rudd government. The new NSS process included the National Security Statement, a strategic risk assessment, a force structure review, and an audit of the defense establishment, all of which then fed the production of a more robust and comprehensive Defence White Paper.²¹⁹ Under the new NSS process, the *2009 Defence White Paper* maintained the broad strategic scope of previous white papers, but now included over a year of analysis conducted by multiple departments, academia, and extra-governmental experts and amplified the guidance set out in the 2008 National Security Statement. The influence of the 2008 National Security Statement could be gleaned from a host of new sections created in the *2009 Defence White Paper*, such as explaining the need for long-term strategic planning, balancing

²¹⁸ Parliament of Australia, “House Hansard - National Security - Mr Rudd,” Prime Minister of Australia, December 4, 2008, 12549. <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22chamber/hansardr/2008-12-04/0045%22>.

²¹⁹ Stolberg, “How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents,” 21.

strategic risk with available means, and developing appropriate defense capabilities.²²⁰ This new process matched ways with national strategic ends.²²¹ The Rudd government captured the new NSS process in a document titled, *The Strategic Framework 2010*.²²² While this process is not mandated by law, both major political parties and every administration since have cycled through an NSS process.

In accordance with the assessment criteria laid out in the methodology section, this paper found the Australian NSS formulation process to be very feasible if transposed to the Canadian system. Australia has a nearly identical parliamentary government structure to Canada. Both Canada and Australia have similar House²²³ and Senate Committees²²⁴ on defense and national security, as well as national security specific Cabinet committees²²⁵ capable of advising the government and crafting an NSS, as is the

²²⁰ Australian Government, *2009 Defence White Paper* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of Defence, 2009), 15, 26, 58, 70, 125, <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2016-defence-white-paper>.

²²¹ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 77-80.

²²² Australian Government, *The Strategic Framework 2010*.

²²³ Parliament of Canada, “List of Committees of the House of Commons,” House of Commons of Canada, 2022, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/Home>.

²²⁴ Parliament of Canada, “Committees,” Senate of Canada, 2022, <https://sencanada.ca/en/committees/>; Parliament of Australia, “Committees,” 2022, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees.

²²⁵ Government of Canada, “Cabinet Committee Mandate and Membership,” Prime Minister of Canada, last updated December 3, 2021, <https://pm.gc.ca/en/cabinet-committee-mandate-and-membership>; Commonwealth of Australia, “Directory – National Security Committee.” Australian Government, 2022, <https://www.directory.gov.au/commonwealth-parliament/cabinet/cabinet-committees/national-security-committee>.

case for Australia. However, the stated purposes of the Cabinet security committees in each country differ slightly.

According to the Office of the Prime Minister, the Canadian Cabinet Committee on Safety, Security, and Emergencies, “considers threats and risks to the safety and security of Canada and Canadians, manages ongoing emergencies, and ensures strategic, integrated, and forward-looking leadership for emergency managements.”²²⁶ In contrast, the Australian Cabinet National Security Committee states,

The National Security Committee considers major foreign policy and national security issues of strategic importance to Australia, border protection policy, national responses to developing foreign policy and security situations (either domestic or international) and classified matters relating to aspects of operation and activities of the Australian Intelligence Community.²²⁷

The former is dedicated to reactive crisis response and blurs national security with emergency management. The latter is squarely focused on national security as defined in this paper and long-term strategic planning to support Australian national interests. Nevertheless, changes to Canada’s Cabinet committees would only be a matter of will for the government of the day. Therefore, this paper assessed that it would be very feasible for Canada to adopt the Australian NSS formulation process as it could direct and create the new process, using similar government organizations, like the Australian government did from 2007-2010.

²²⁶ Government of Canada, “Cabinet Committee Mandate and Membership”; Commonwealth of Australia, “Directory – National Security Committee.”

²²⁷ Commonwealth of Australia, “Directory – National Security Committee.”

NSS Formulation Process

The Australian NSS formulation process is Systematic-Delegated (See Figure 2), with the security statement component being centralized under the Prime Minister. The systematic aspect of the Australian process has, like the US process, ensured frequent NSS cycles, which have made improvements to align whole-of-government department ways and means in achieving strategic end states.²²⁸ It has even evolved those ways and means as the strategic environment has changed. Unlike the US process, the Australian NSS process does not produce a single NSS document; rather, the Australian NSS has five components: the national security statement, the strategic risk assessment, the force structure review, the defense establishment audit, and culminates in the Defence White Paper. The National Security Statement given by the Prime Minister contains all the elements of ends, ways, and means;²²⁹ however, the statement is designed to initiate the remaining series of reviews and documents who provide analytical rigor to the total NSS process. The Defence White Paper then restates the strategic vision of the government's National Security Statement but founded in more substantial analysis.

The NSS cycles in 2008-2009 and 2013 met the challenge of the problem stream, which was a need to derive long-term strategic planning for the government that incorporated ways and means beyond just the Australian Defence Force. The National Security Statements made by the governments during these two NSS cycles were comprehensive in that they articulated Australia's national interests, defined the threats to

²²⁸ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 77-80.

²²⁹ Ibid.

those interests, and discussed ways and means that broadly touched on most instruments of national power. For example, the 2009 National Security Statement defined the interests of Australia as:

maintaining Australia's territorial and border integrity.

promoting Australia's political sovereignty.

preserving Australia's cohesive and resilient society and the long-term strengths of our economy.

protecting Australians and Australian interests both at home and abroad.

promoting an international environment, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, that is stable, peaceful and prosperous, together with a global rules based order which enhances Australia's national interests.²³⁰

These interests were comprehensive and served as guidance to all instruments of national power,²³¹ not only the military.

Based on these national interests the statement defined seven strategic ends that the Australian government would seek to achieve which included specific objectives regarding security self-reliance, building alliances, shaping regional diplomatic relations, supporting multi-lateral institutions, and increasing interagency and intergovernmental cooperation within Australia. The statement then elaborated on specific actions the government would take and resources that would be applied to achieve those objectives, including, but not limited to, the Australian Defence Force (ADF). It concluded by restating the purpose of periodic National Security Statements, which are to set out

²³⁰ Parliament of Australia, "House Hansard - National Security - Mr Rudd."

²³¹ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*.

whole-of-government national security priorities. In the example of 2008, these priorities were:

1. improving the coordination of national security policy . . . through establishing for the first time the office of National Security Adviser;
2. implementing the recommendations of the Smith report on homeland and border security. . . ;
3. enhancing our ADF capabilities;
4. strengthening the US alliance;
5. strengthening our cooperation with regional partners;
6. promoting an Asia-Pacific Community;
7. actively pursuing nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament . . . ;
8. enhancing economic development in the South-West Pacific . . . ;
9. enhancing Australia's e-security capability; and
10. incorporating the implications of climate change and energy security into the formal national security decision-making framework.²³²

This National Security Statement described ends, ways, and means with sufficient rigor to provide the necessary strategic guidance to all government departments. It also formed the basis from which the Strategic Risk Assessment, force structure review, defense audit, and the resulting *2009 Defence White Paper* were derived. Combined, these were the Australian NSS.

In 2013, the re-elected Labor government under Prime Minister Julia Gillard, altered the approach and published a 46-page NSS document in lieu of only making a statement. Like the 2008 National Security Statement, this NSS document detailed

²³² Parliament of Australia, "House Hansard - National Security - Mr Rudd."

national interests, listed strategic risks, named its strategic ends, and discusses the way forward from the current strategic outlook, including a list of national security priorities. In addition to the national interests, ostensibly more rooted in realism, the 2013 NSS added values-based national interests such as human rights at home and abroad, and rule of law as a framework for government departments to balance the need to protect Australia with the need to protect civil liberties.²³³ Also like the 2008 National Security Statement, this NSS delivered strategic guidance that was pertinent to the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of national power. For example, its strategic ends were to, “ensure a safe and resilient population, . . . to protect and strengthen our [Australian] sovereignty, . . . to secure our assets, infrastructure, and institutions, . . . [and] to promote a favorable international environment.”²³⁴ The document then listed specific ways that government departments would support each end. For example, it listed eight ways to achieve the strategic end of promoting a favorable international environment. These included:

- Supporting multilateral engagement as a member of organisations and forums including the UN, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Trade Organization and EAS.
- Working through the G20—including as host in 2014—to promote strong, sustainable and balanced global growth by ensuring international economic rules, norms and institutions work effectively.

²³³ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security 2013* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013), 7, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167267/Australia%20A%20Strategy%20for%20National%20Securit.pdf>.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

- Promoting the strength of arms control treaties and adoption of standards from the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
- Promoting international peace and security as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for 2013–14 and through deployments to UN peacekeeping and peace monitoring missions.
- Through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, helping to prevent the country from again becoming a haven for global terrorists, provide security, and contribute to a better future for the Afghan people.
- Deploying around 380 AFP members to multi-and bilateral international missions in the AsiaPacific [*sic*] region and international hubs to promote the rule of law and build law enforcement capacity overseas.
- Participating actively in the annual Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and related regional dialogues, including the annual PIF Regional Security Committee meeting.
- Providing over half of Australia’s bilateral and regional aid to fragile and conflict affected countries.²³⁵

This specific direction would have applied to most departments of the Australian government, providing them clear guidance that aligned their specific priorities and tasks. The document also budgeted specific resources to many of these priorities. Within this same year the Gillard government exercised the process set out in the *Strategic Framework 2010* and published the *2013 Defence White Paper*.²³⁶

However, identifying Australian government strict adherence to this process became murky between 2015 and 2019. Oral National Security Statements were made in 2015 and 2016; however, their scope was significantly limited to a specific threat;

²³⁵ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, 20.

²³⁶ Australian Government, *2013 Defence White Paper* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of Defence, 2013), <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2016-defence-white-paper>.

terrorism.²³⁷ The latter even titling their statement as the *National Security Statement on Counter-Terrorism*.²³⁸ These statements included elements of ends, ways, and means, but by limiting their scope to a singular threat, they failed to provide guidance across all departments for all threats. Simply put, they did not provide the framework for a strategic plan, but rather only a component of one. Nevertheless, a Defence White Paper was still published in 2016. However, while the Australian Defence White Papers have generally been broad in scope, reiterating the government's strategic outlook and describing how military, economic, and diplomatic domains intersect to affect national security, they primarily focused on the military ways and means. The final product was no different in the case of the *2016 Defence White Paper*,²³⁹ meaning that without a comprehensive National Security Statement or document, the government's comprehensive strategy and vision was less clear.

The current Liberal Government administration led by Prime Minister Scott Morrison since 2018, has been somewhat opaque in communicating its NSS formulation process. However, Prime Minister Morrison delivered a National Security Statement in March of 2022 that, while less dogmatically organized around ends, ways, and means

²³⁷ Tony Abbott, "National Security Statement," Office of the Prime Minister, February 23, 2015, <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22media/pressrel/3676115%22>.

²³⁸ Malcom Turnbull, "National Security Statement on Counter-Terrorism," Malcolm Turnbull, 29th Prime Minister of Australia 2015-2016, September 1, 2016, <https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/national-security-statement-on-counter-terrorism>.

²³⁹ Australian Government, *2016 Defence White Paper* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of Defence, 2016), <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2016-defence-white-paper>.

than the statements between 2008 and 2013, it did reopen the strategic aperture to generally cover most strategic threats, national interests, and how his government intended to address those issues.²⁴⁰ Prior to the 2022 National Security Statement, Senator Jim Molan, a retired Australian General who is claimed to be a personal “conciliary” by Prime Minister Morrison,²⁴¹ had criticized the government for lack of a more comprehensive Australian NSS. He further expanded on this stating that government officials have indicated to him that a complete NSS exists, but “cannot be released,” which would indicate the Australian government has potentially chosen to push its NSS to the classified level.²⁴² This departure would mean that the Australian NSS is only being communicated to Cabinet and bureaucrats with the appropriate security clearances. Therefore, this paper will continue its assessment of the Australian NSS formulation process based on the open-sourced published process first established by Prime Minister Rudd and then practiced by successive Australian governments. This paper makes a reasonable assumption that the Morrison government is still utilizing the same contextual process, albeit more secretively, given that Prime Minister Morrison

²⁴⁰ Prime Minister of Australia, “Virtual Address, Lowy Institute,” (Transcript of address, Sydney Australia, March 7, 2022), <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/virtual-address-lowy-institute>.

²⁴¹ Ryan Taylor, “Scott Morrison Speech Transcript Unveiling \$270bn Australian Defence Plan,” *Rev* (blog), June 30, 2020, <https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/scott-morrison-speech-transcript-unveiling-270bn-australian-defence-plan>.

²⁴² Jim Molan, “Australia Needs a Broad and Clear National Security Strategy,” *The Strategist*, July 30, 2021, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-needs-a-broad-and-clear-national-security-strategy/>.

delivered a strategically broad Defence Update in 2020²⁴³ and a public National Security Statement in 2022. The remaining portion of this section will review what is known about the Australian NSS formulation process, based on the published works from the Rudd Government and the *Strategic Framework 2010*.

The two most important components to the total NSS process in Australia are the National Security Statement and the Defence White Paper. Both are products of a systematic process that links each of them to the other, but each are produced with differing degrees of centralization. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet drafts the National Security Statement using a centralized process that seeks external expertise and input but is directed by the Prime Minister's department. In contrast, the Defence White Paper is delegated to the Department of Defence and hundreds of staff and external experts draft the document with a bottom-up approach, needing only occasional touchpoints with the Prime Minister and National Security Committee to ensure whole-of-government coordination.²⁴⁴ Combined, these two documents are the outwardly communicated products of the Australian NSS.

In the case of the 2008 National Security Statement, a senior official in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet drafted the statement. Senior leaders in the

²⁴³ Australian Government, *2020 Defence Strategic Update* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of Defence, 2020), <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2020-defence-strategic-update>.

²⁴⁴ Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents," 20-26.

Office of National Security,²⁴⁵ a division within the department,²⁴⁶ provided strategic security guidance to the drafter. The drafting of the statement sought external input as well, which included input from twelve think-tanks, like the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and reviewed the NSS of other countries for lessons learned. The Strategic Policy Coordination Group, a collection of senior public servants from security-related departments and organizations, coordinated the drafter's efforts through a whole-of-government approach that pulled input from twelve departments and agencies.²⁴⁷ Therefore, the executive branch, and more specifically the Prime Minister and his most senior officials, maintained close control and direction over the drafting process, and pulled the necessary expertise from a variety of sources.

The Deputy Secretary Strategy, Mr. Michael Pezullo, produced the *2009 Defence White Paper* that followed the National Security Statement.²⁴⁸ Like Canada, the Australian Department of Defence is led by a Minister. Under the minister, the Secretary of Defence is responsible for defense policy advice to the government, budgeting, and managing the public servant workforce. Underneath the Secretary of Defence are several Deputy Secretaries who are responsible for very specific defense functions, one of which

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 25.

²⁴⁶ Australian Government, "National Security," Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2022, <https://www.pmc.gov.au/national-security>.

²⁴⁷ Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents," 24-26.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 22.

was the Deputy Secretary Strategy, today known as the Deputy Secretary Strategy, Policy, and Industry.²⁴⁹

In 2009, the Prime Minister empowered Mr. Pezullo to produce the Defence White Paper and other Deputy Secretaries, such as Force Management and Technology, were made available to assist him. One pragmatic reason the Prime Minister delegated this task to the Department of Defence is that, unlike the United States, the Australian National Security Committee has limited staff compared to the Department of Defence, which was able to support Mr. Pezullo with over one hundred military officers and public servants, thirty of which the Department had tasked to the project full-time. The drafting team members had the freedom to propose the structure of the white paper, such as the strategic environment, national interests, and ways for the Australian Defence Force, based on their expertise. They also factored in the conclusions of the Strategic Risk Assessment, the Force Structure Review, as well as input from academia, industry, and other defense specialists. Throughout, the Prime Minister utilized the National Security Committee to maintain occasional supervision of the drafting process and the National Security Committee met regularly to refine the strategic outlook and inject that refinement into the drafting process. In total, this comprehensive process took 20 months to complete.²⁵⁰ The Prime Ministerial touchpoints via the National Security Committee were a good method to ensure whole-of-government coordination and imprint executive

²⁴⁹ Australian Government, “Senior Leaders,” Department of Defence, accessed March 30, 2022, <https://www.defence.gov.au/about/leaders>.

²⁵⁰ Stolberg, “How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents,” 22-26.

branch DNA on the white paper without centralizing its delegated bottom-up methodology.

The Australian NSS process has portions maintained at the classified level too. The Department of Defence published a classified version of the Defence White Paper that included a more detailed articulation of the ways and the means to resource them. This classified version was produced using detailed war game scenarios that sought to compare how well different ways or capabilities could be matched against specific threats. The Strategic Risk assessment was also classified. This risk assessment was novel in that it utilized a whole-of-government approach to evaluate numerous strategic risks. This assessment was categorized into risks, probabilities, seriousness, and consequences. These were then analyzed to produce priorities and make recommendations to reduce risk and consequences. As Stolberg wrote, it put more science into the articulation of risk, whereas the National Security Statement was more art.²⁵¹

The Australian Defence White Paper, given its linkage and role in a systematic NSS, is therefore very different from defense white papers published in Canada. Australian Defence White Papers are consistently focused on planning for and building military capabilities, means and ways, which support strategic ends, including significant chapters on strategic guidance that parrot the intent of the National Security Statement. While there is a strategic flavor to the white papers, their ways and means are focused on the military instrument of national power, which leaves only the national security statement and classified Strategic Risk Assessment to offer guidance to the other

²⁵¹ Stolberg, “How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents,” 29-31.

government departments. Overall, this Australian NSS process is a Systematic-Delegated process with some centralized sub-components.

This paper assessed NSS processes for their acceptability in how they communicate and balance ends, ways, and means with strategic risks.²⁵² The Australian process, particularly the National Security Statement, can be excellent at communicating these factors, as seen in 2008, 2013 [document], and to a lesser degree, in 2022. However, these statements are subject to the political impulses of the executive branch and have been applied with varying degrees of consistency, as seen with the statements made between 2015 to 2017, which did not meet the threshold of ends, ways, and means defined in this paper and were often squarely focused on a singular threat, like terrorism. The National Security Statements of 2008, 2013 [document], and 2022 sufficiently balanced ends, ways, and means with the threats they identified by naming strategic threats, defining national interests, and then laying out specific ends, ways, and means, to protect those interests that were intersected by the threats.

The back end of the NSS process was closed out with the Defence White Paper, which restated elements of the National Security Statement and laid out in rigorous detail how the military instrument of national power would support those ends, ways, and means. Therefore, the complete NSS process was excellent at balancing ends, ways, and means with strategic risks for the military instrument of national power. However, where this process could be improved would be to duplicate the Defence White Paper method for other instruments of national power and integrate these papers similarly into the

²⁵² Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 77-80.

Australian NSS process. A suggestion would be to include a foreign policy, trade policy, and health policy white paper into the NSS process like the method used by the United Kingdom discovered in Stolberg's research.²⁵³ This would provide an opportunity for other government departments to analyze how their department fits into the national security picture and how they can support the long-term strategic objectives of the nation. Using the strong and complete process examples of 2008/9 and 2013, this paper assessed the Australian NSS process to be somewhat acceptable, but it could be improved by expanding its methodology to other departments to create a more holistic and complete process.

NSS Effectiveness

The Australian NSS Systematic-Delegated process has resulted in consistent and persistent long-term strategic planning. The examples include the 2008 National Security Statement and 2009 *Defence White Paper* under Prime Minister Rudd, the 2013 NSS document and Defence White Paper under Prime Minister Gillard, and the 2015 and 2016 National Security Statements under Prime Ministers Abbott and Turnbull leading into the 2016 *Defence White Paper*. Under the present government elected in 2018, Prime Minister Morrison's officials claimed to have maintained the NSS process and pushed much more of it into the classified realm.²⁵⁴ Supporting this claim is the publication of the 2020 *Defence Strategic Update* and the March 2022 National Security Statement,

²⁵³ Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents," 55-61.

²⁵⁴ Molan, "Australia Needs a Broad and Clear National Security Strategy."

which is both a retrospective summary of the government's NSS since 2018 and a forward-looking statement on strategic guidance. Therefore, the Australian NSS process has been effective in producing systematic strategic guidance supported through rigorous analysis. This paper assessed how effective this process has been at aligning a whole-of-government response to strategic problems and has scoped this assessment to the PRC threat. This answered the final assessment criteria, suitability, of the Australian NSS process as a recommendation for the Government of Canada by assessing if the Australian process was able to align government instruments of national power against strategic threats.

Most notable in this case was how the Australian NSS process was effective at guiding a strategic pivot from balancing Australian relations between the United States and China in 2013 to guarding Australian national interests against the PRC threat today. The 2013 Australian NSS document produced under Prime Minister Gillard made clear that Australia perceived China as an important economic trading partner and viewed China's military and economic rise as an opportunity for China to positively contribute to the international and regional community.²⁵⁵ The 2013 NSS described an enhanced relationship with China as one of the ways it will enable regional security, even stating that, "the importance of a deepening of our relationship with China cannot be overstated."²⁵⁶ The *2016 Defence White Paper* introduced the first hints of a strategic transition in Canberra. This white paper maintained the view that the United States and

²⁵⁵ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, 29.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

China would equally impact the Indo-Pacific and continued to call for closer economic ties with China via a free trade agreement. However, some changes in the language compared to 2013 were noted. First, it identified the United States as Australia's most important strategic partner, a title previously shared, to a degree, with China in 2013, and called for a broadening and deepening of the US alliance. Second, it raised concern over the militarization and increased tensions in the East and South China Seas, a subtle critique of the PRC regime, without going so far as to name these PRC actions as a threat to Australian interests.²⁵⁷ This slow strategic transition became a sharp pivot after the 2018 election of Prime Minister Scott Morrison and the Liberal Party.

Prime Minister Morrison applied the NSS process in an unusual method in that he appears to have reversed the order. His government started the process by drafting and publishing an update to the *2016 Defence White Paper* titled the *2020 Defence Strategic Update*. While this title may give the initial impression that this document was a defense white paper-lite, it was similar in length to previous white papers, 68 pages, and it employed the broadest and most strategically comprehensive language of any of the Defence White Papers yet. The update stated, "this framework is intended to provide a tight focus for planning, and alignment with broader Government initiatives such as the Pacific Step-up and efforts to build a secure, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific of independent, sovereign and resilient states."²⁵⁸ The first two of six chapters read more like a National Security Statement defining threats, national interests, and specific ends,

²⁵⁷ Australian Government, *2016 Defence White Paper*.

²⁵⁸ Australian Government, *2020 Defence Strategic Update*, 21.

ways, and means, and occupied nearly half the total document. The update completed the strategic pivot regarding China in this half of the document.

The *2020 Defence Strategic Update* named strategic threats, defined national interests, and articulated ends, ways, and means to protect those interests from the threats. This document began by recognizing that the strategic environment had changed since the *2016 Defence White Paper*; thus, necessitating a revised strategic vision. In the biggest change from previous statements and documents, the update specifically named China's assertive pursuit of influence in the Indo-Pacific a concern, something that had been argued as the benign natural consequence of China's growth in previous documents.²⁵⁹ This document detailed the threats in the Indo-Pacific region as 'grey-zone' conflict, militarization of the South China Sea, [foreign] interference, disinformation, economic coercion, and cyber warfare.²⁶⁰ The update elaborated on the PRC threat as undermining rules-based norms and international institutions, a defined national interest; thus, requiring a strategic response.²⁶¹

To address these threats, the *2020 Strategic Update* articulated end state objectives in the framework of *shape, deter, respond*. Here, the strategic guidance was to shape the strategic environment through strengthening diplomatic instruments of power and delivering strong advocacy for stability, security, and sovereignty. The Australian government was to deter actions against Australia's national interests through new

²⁵⁹ Australian Government, *2020 Defence Strategic Update*, 11.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

military capabilities and diplomatic posturing. The third piece of this framework was to respond to strategic threats with credible military force.²⁶²

The ways for achieving these end states included all instruments of national power. Shaping was to be achieved through deepened diplomatic alliances. This included a focus on deeper cooperation with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), supporting the Pacific Step-Up Strategy²⁶³ by building regional military cooperation, and supporting international institution's ability to enhance the rules-based order and economic growth.²⁶⁴ Deterrence was to be achieved through strengthening defense ties with the United States, Japan, and New Zealand. It would also deter through increased defense planning with its closest allies, the Five-Eyes, and the acquisition of new capabilities such as long range strike missiles and an enhanced cyber capability.²⁶⁵ Finally, specific ways to achieve the government's ability to respond to threats with a credible military force was to secure supply chains and expand the submarine fleet.²⁶⁶ The National Security Statement by Prime Minister Morrison two years later in 2022 is both an update on the government's progress with the strategic pivot set out by the *2020 Defence Strategic Update* and it provides forward looking guidance beyond 2022.

²⁶² Ibid., 25-29.

²⁶³ Australian Government, "Pacific Step-Up," Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2022, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific>.

²⁶⁴ Australian Government, *2020 Defence Strategic Update*, 21-24.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 22-27.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 29, 42.

The 2022 National Security Statement is the most current product of the NSS process in Australia. Like the *2020 Defence Strategic Update*, the 2022 statement named the PRC threat, identified national interests that the PRC threatens, and articulated ends and ways to address that threat. The statement discussed all strategic threats, but the PRC was presented as the threat of greatest magnitude and importance to counter. Nevertheless, the statement discussed ends and ways that address numerous threats and provided security guidance with a whole-of-government approach. The statement addressed technology innovation, health preparedness as it related to pandemic responses and COVID-19, infrastructure, trade, and even mentioned clean-energy policy. It is important to highlight that despite the importance of the PRC threat, this statement did not singularly focus only on that threat; rather, it took a holistic approach that intended to align all efforts of government that support all national interests.²⁶⁷ To demonstrate the utility of an NSS, this paper has scoped itself to the PRC threat and assessed how a given NSS enabled whole-of-government action against a named threat.

The 2022 statement significantly elaborated on the PRC threat even when compared to the 2020 update. The statement claimed China is more assertive and uses its growing power in concerning ways. It indirectly forecasted China's potential to become an acute threat like Russia, referring to Russia's illegal and aggressive war against Ukraine, then transitioned to the Indo-Pacific and specified the PRC militarization of South China Sea, growing tensions with Taiwan, and PRC disruption of the Indo-Pacific Status quo as direct threats to Australian national interests. The statement also

²⁶⁷ Prime Minister of Australia, "Virtual Address, Lowy Institute."

characterized threats in the Indo-Pacific using a DIME framework; foreign interference [diplomacy], disinformation [information], espionage and the PRC military threat [military], and economic coercion [economy]. The unflinching candor in which the 2022 National Security Statement specified the threat to Australia is even more detailed than the US Interim NSS Guidance.

The statement defines national interests throughout the body of the text, but three appear to be most important to be protected from the PRC threat. These included maintaining and strengthening the rules-based order, maintaining a free and open society, and strengthening economic prosperity. This paper assessed there to be three end state objectives that each supported numerous national interests and are similar to the end state objectives found in the 2020 update. These are, first, shaping the strategic environment, second, strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and third, building national resilience in both supply chains and the information space.²⁶⁸ The 2022 National Security Statement highlighted numerous specific ways that the government was leveraging instruments of national power to achieve these end states.

The statement itself is a good source to verify ways employed by the government that had a direct link to the NSS process because the statement was often retrospective. The following includes ways that support the specified end states that are both pulled from the statement itself and were researched independently. Shaping the strategic environment has largely been supported through the diplomatic instrument of national

²⁶⁸ Prime Minister of Australia, “Virtual Address, Lowy Institute.”

power. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with ASEAN,²⁶⁹ security discussions and deepening partnerships with the Quad,²⁷⁰ and the new AUKUS trilateral security alliance between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States each demonstrate concrete action taken by Australian government departments to achieve the end state objective of shaping the strategic environment by guarding it against PRC influence.²⁷¹

The Australian government is trying to achieve strategic deterrence through strategic alliances such as AUKUS, but also by building the capacity of its military instrument of national power. The statement declared that Australia would deter through military capabilities such as long-range strike missiles and nuclear-powered submarines.²⁷² In September 2021, Australia announced it would be acquiring US Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of 1000 miles. These missiles will give the Royal Australian Navy the ability to strike as far as the South China Sea with only limited maneuvering.²⁷³ It was in that same week that Australia announced the AUKUS alliance and through this partnership, Australia would be able to build nuclear power submarines

²⁶⁹ Will Nankervis, “ASEAN and Australia: Advancing Our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” *Fulcrum*, December 10, 2021, <https://fulcrum.sg/asean-and-australia-advancing-our-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/>.

²⁷⁰ Australian Government, “Quad,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2022. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad>.

²⁷¹ Prime Minister of Australia, “Virtual Address, Lowy Institute.”

²⁷² *Ibid.*

²⁷³ David Axe, “Australia’s Huge New Weapons Buy Will Give It Long-Range Strike Ability For First Time Since F-111 Bombers,” *Forbes*, September 21, 2021, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/09/21/australias-huge-new-weapons-buy-finally-replaces-the-countrys-long-gone-f-111-bombers/>.

with proprietary information shared by the United States.²⁷⁴ The United States had only shared this information once before, with the United Kingdom, and through the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement that came into effect in 2022, Australia will eventually be able to build nuclear powered submarines in Australia.²⁷⁵ Importantly, the strategic deterrence end state has been supported by carefully coordinated efforts between diplomatic and military instruments of national power.

The third end state set out in the statement to counter the PRC threat was to build national resilience in both supply chains and the information space. The statement laid out several specific ways it will support this end state and categorizes them into cyber security, critical infrastructure protection, and sovereign manufacturing capacity. In 2020 Australia released a Cyber Security Strategy that laid out a 10-year \$1.67 billion (AUS) plan to provide enhanced online security for businesses and essential services. The government also passed new laws that made reporting of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure integrated with government cyber services.²⁷⁶ In addition to a robust cyber security apparatus, Australia took other measures to protect its critical infrastructure by being one of the first countries to ban the Chinese telecom company Huawei from building Australian 5G infrastructure citing concerns over the PRC intelligence compliance law that applies to all Chinese companies.²⁷⁷ These are examples of how

²⁷⁴ BBC, “Aukus.”

²⁷⁵ Prime Minister of Australia, “Virtual Address, Lowy Institute.”

²⁷⁶ Prime Minister of Australia, “Virtual Address, Lowy Institute.”

²⁷⁷ Robert Clark, “How Australia Came to Ban Huawei,” *Light Reading*, 21 2021, <https://www.lightreading.com/asia/how-australia-came-to-ban-huawei/d/d-id/769688>.

Australia used a combination of diplomatic, information, and military instruments of national power to support the national resilience end state.

The supply chain resilience aspect was also supported by numerous instruments of national power. The Modern Manufacturing Strategy was meant to enhance supply chain resilience by boosting domestic capacities in the areas of space, medical products, food and beverage, clean energy, critical minerals, and defense. One example of defense is the \$1 Billion (AUS) Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordinance Enterprise meant to enhance Australian defense industry ability to make weapons in Australia.²⁷⁸ Another economic policy the Australian government most evidently crafted to safeguard its supply chains against the PRC threat is the China Plus strategy. This business phenomenon is not unique to Australia and involves the practice of businesses diversifying their supply chains away from China. In 2021, the Australian Treasurer described Australia as being on the “frontline” of the trade war between the United States and China and pledged official government support behind the China Plus strategy.²⁷⁹

Economic policies like these are meant to protect Australian interests in the face of economic coercion, but Australia has employed diplomatic efforts in this regard as well. In 2021, Australia gave a scathing statement against China during the Trade Policy Review of China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 2021. In it, the Australian representative highlighted how malign Chinese trade practices were

²⁷⁸ Prime Minister of Australia. “Virtual Address, Lowy Institute.”

²⁷⁹ Victor Ferguson, Darren Lim, and Scott Waldron, “Markets and Resilience in the Face of Economic Coercion,” *The Interpreter*, November 1, 2021, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/markets-and-resilience-face-economic-coercion>.

inconsistent with WTO commitments and pointed to examples of economic coercion China employed against Australia.²⁸⁰ The last and final diplomatic instrument that Australia has leveraged to increase its economic and manufacturing resilience was to coordinate defense manufacturing efforts with the Quad. The intent is to shift sensitive and critical supply chains within trusted allies and away from threats of disruption by potential adversaries.²⁸¹ The end state objective of nationally resilient infrastructure, information space, and supply chains has been supported through ways that were evident in every instrument of national power.

This paper based its suitability assessment of the Australian NSS process on its ability to align government department actions against a national threat through a corporately understood strategy. This paper tested that alignment by observing how multiple government departments applied the instruments of national power (DIME). The Australian NSS process is a very suitable process for providing useful strategic guidance to its government departments, which has resulted in the government's desired pivot against the PRC threat. All instruments of Australian national power (DIME) have been oriented to protect Australian national interests against the PRC threat. The strongest instrument has been the military instrument, which logically follows the methodology of the Australian NSS process that recruits additional analytical power by delegating a deep analysis of the military instrument to the Department of Defence via the strategically

²⁸⁰ Trade Policy Review Body, World Trade Organization, "Trade Policy Review: China - Minutes of the Meeting," (The World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, November 24, 2021), 14-16, <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/TPR/M415.pdf&Open=Tru>.

²⁸¹ Prime Minister of Australia, "Virtual Address, Lowy Institute."

broad Defence White Papers. Nevertheless, the consistent communication of identified threats, defined national interests, and the corresponding ends, ways, and means to address those threats in the national security statements has given sufficient strategic guidance to suitably align all instruments of national power.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of Findings

The findings in this paper demonstrated that the most important factor in producing an NSS that can align whole-of-government against strategic threats and enable long-term strategic planning is to utilize a frequent systematic process. The case studies of the United States and Australia demonstrated two very distinct systematic processes. The US process is Systematic-Directed and centralizes nearly the entire drafting process. The use of a directed process was made possible by a large executive branch staff and supporting security apparatus, like the National Security Council, and the fact that this process has been mandated in law since 1986. The Australian NSS process is Systematic-Delegated, and initiated, in all cases but one, by a National Security Statement given by the Prime Minister and then followed up by a series of reviews and documents mostly delegated to the Department of Defence and coordinated with whole-of-government through the National Security Committee and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, resulting in a final published strategy in a Defence White Paper. The assessment of these case NSS process types compared with Canada is in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Process Formulation Type - Findings for Canada (CA), The United States (US), and Australia (AU)

Source: Created by author.

This paper analyzed the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of each NSS process to inform recommendations for a Canadian NSS formulation process. The political entrepreneurs responsible for the US process engineered a political environment that was sympathetic to introducing new laws to address problems with inter-Armed Service rivalries and inter-departmental strategic planning. This new political impetus enabled the US Congress to mandate the US NSS process by law, which has ensured its longevity, consistency, and predictable frequency; however, mandating such a process in law to guarantee its application by government is not necessarily feasible in the Canadian

parliamentary system. It is the prerogative of elected Canadian governments to set laws as they see fit with much greater flexibility than in the US system of government. Further, to enshrine the process in the Constitution of Canadian is likely a non-starter as doing so would open the entire document to renegotiation. The Australian process would be more feasibly adopted in a Canadian system because it was supported through a largely unspoken bipartisan consensus on the importance of national security, and it has been practiced to such effect. The Australian Labor Government took advantage of a window of opportunity, created by public interest and the need to combat the image that Labor was weak on security, to introduce a novel NSS process. With over a decade of successive implementation by governments from both major political parties since, the Australian NSS process has become a convention that has delivered four NSS serving the interests of Australia.

This paper assessed that both the US Systematic-Directed and the Australian Systematic-Delegated processes produced NSS that were acceptable in their ability to balance guidance on ends, ways, and means with the strategic threats. They both communicated defined national interests and named strategic threats. They both also communicated guidance on end state objectives that would protect or achieve their national interests, as well as specific ways to achieve those end states. The Australian model could better integrate all instruments of national power (DIME) into the strategic drafting process by delegating white papers to not only the Department of Defence, but other key departments such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Health, and the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources. Nevertheless, the Australian process managed a degree of integration across all

instruments of national power by coordinating other departmental input into to the Defence White Paper through the National Security Committee and by communicating National Security Statements that usually delivered broad public guidance to all government departments.

The delegated process is a better candidate for parliamentary systems. A delegated process was necessary in Australia because of the number of dedicated staff needed to undertake the desired level of analysis for all the NSS components: the statement, the Strategic Risk Assessment, the defense reviews, and the Defence White Paper. The executive branch had been able to dedicate the National Security Committee and Prime Ministerial staff to the drafting of the statement; however, they lacked the horsepower to commit similar rigor to the other components without delegating those parts to the Department of Defence. Further, like the Canadian system, the Australian bureaucracy is apolitical from the Deputy Minister level and down, meaning the senior public servants within the departments and their staffs face little turnover and are very experienced. Therefore, a completely centralized process in Australia may not have been able to produce a strategy of similar analytical depth. The centralized process works best in the US system given the large number of staff in the NSC available to draft an NSS and the deeper penetration of political turnover in US departments may make a delegated process less effective in the US government.

This paper assessed the suitability of both the US and Australian NSS processes as effective in that they both aligned government departments and agencies around a common purpose. Specifically, they were both effective at aligning actions across all government departments and agencies against the PRC strategic threat. In the case of

Australia, the NSS process helped successive governments navigate a strategic pivot from engagement with China as a cooperative partner in 2013 to protecting Australia against the malign strategic threats emerging from China today. The suitability assessment reaffirmed the importance of having a systematic NSS process to consistently draft and maintain NSS.

Recommendation for the Canadian NSS Formulation Process

Canada must implement an NSS formulation process of its own to enable long-term strategic planning and set its own course in a strategic environment where existential threats to Canada are increasingly more acute, complex, and of greater magnitude than in the recent past. It is recommended that the Government of Canada pursue a Systematic-Delegated NSS process. The Australian case study provides a template for how that could be achieved. Nevertheless, based on lessons learned from both country cases, this paper proposes a modified process from the Australian model. The Government of Canada's best chance at producing an NSS that can suitably protect the interests of Canada in today's strategic environment will be by creating a systematic process. The most feasible implementation of an enduring process will be one that seeks the political buy-in of opposition parties and whose drafting leverages the apolitical bureaucratic experts. The most acceptable process will have significant portions delegated to all departments whose influence intersects with national security across any instrument of national power.

First, the Government of Canada must decide on a framework for an NSS. This paper recommends that Canada use Yarger's ends, ways, and means model as an NSS blueprint, as seen in the cases of the United States and Australia. An NSS of this caliber

would articulate the national interests, candidly define the strategic threats to Canada, and then set forth guidance on ends, ways, and means. This guidance would include a vision of the end state objectives needed to guard the national interests against the threats, the ways and methods that departments should achieve those ends, and even earmark or identify the resources to support the ways. The aim is to create whole-of-government guidance to align inter-departmental action across all instruments of national power (DIME).

The most challenging aspect of creating an NSS process in Canada will be an implementation whose process endures beyond a single NSS cycle. The Government of Canada could seek bipartisan collaboration between the two major political parties to create an apolitical process. Such buy-in from the official opposition may be helped by discussion in the Public Safety and National Security Committee similar to how US Senators Goldwater and Nunn generated political consensus for their proposed solution. Such collaboration would help insulate the process from dramatic changes or complete abandonment by the next government. In Australia, the utility of having an NSS process appears to have outweighed the perceived short-term political gains from cancelling a predecessor's initiative.

Additionally, the adoption of a delegated process could help further depoliticize the process by transferring much of its analysis to the public service. In this way, the bureaucracy maintains the process and their resultant work becomes a recommended strategy to the executive branch. It would be in the best interest of Canada for its political parties to agree on an NSS process and allow political criticisms to be left for the resultant NSS themselves. Finally, recalling the growing concern among the Canadian

public, academia, and allies regarding the PRC threat and Canada's lack of strategy, using Kingdon's Streams Model, this paper asserts that Canada's political environment regarding national security is gaining impetus for a solution to Canada's strategy problem. A window of opportunity for Canada is coming into focus and a daring political entrepreneur should seize the moment.

The Government of Canada will have to decide on a recurring impetus to initiate the NSS process, critical to creating a systematic process. As in both the US and Australian cases, it is recommended that a temporal condition be used to ensure the NSS is consistently updated. The US process originally mandated that an NSS be produced every year, which eventually became once per four-year administration; an NSS every year was impractical. The more flexible Australian process requires a complete NSS cycle no more than every five years and, since 2007, it has usually been exercised well inside that time limit. Given the episodic nature of Canadian elected government term lengths due to frequent minority governments, Canada should adopt a similar temporal condition to initiate an NSS process. Canadian majority governments have a four-year limit; therefore, imposing a four-year limit on NSS updates would ensure that majority governments would produce an NSS at least once during their term. Minority governments, too, would have to consider an NSS update if they are elected within a looming expiry of the current NSS. This suggested temporal limit is consistent with the frequency of NSS produced by the US and Australian processes, each of which were effective at aligning government departments towards strategic goals and managing considerable pivots in strategy.

Next, the Government of Canada will need to address the philosophical seeing on national interest exposed by Granatstein and Gotlieb and define broad Canadian national interests for the long-term. Canadian national interests should be enduring and, while it is important to recommunicate them with each NSS, they do not need to be redefined with each NSS. Therefore, the executive branch, in collaboration with history, national security, and foreign policy academia should set out to define Canadian national interests and settle the debate. In true Canadian fashion, this paper suggests a compromise on the debate, not unlike the national interests defined in the Australian 2013 NSS document. Canadian national interests should encompass both realist interests and elements of liberal internationalism, such as preserving the international order that has served Canada well as a middle power. Using the Australian 2013 NSS document and the proposed interests by Granatstein as a model, this paper proposes that a modern set of Canadian national interests are: first, protecting Canadian territory, sovereignty, and the climate, second, enhancing Canadian economic interests, third, strengthening democratic institutions at home and abroad, and fourth, promoting a free and open world order. These are four practical and apolitical core interests that if enhanced would undoubtably put future Canadian generations on better footing.

The next steps of this recommendation describe the proposed Canadian NSS process mechanisms from initiation to publishing. The Canadian NSS should describe Canada's national interests, define acute and enduring strategic threats, and articulate ends, ways, and means that protect those interests. The Government of Canada can initiate the process by announcing its intention to update the NSS and, consequentially, review supporting departmental policies or white papers. Given that Canada has just

announced its intention to update the defense policy in *Budget 2022*, it would not be a stretch to further announce that this move comes as part of a larger effort to review Canada's NSS. Before the departments can begin their internal reviews, they will require some national security guidance, like the National Security Statements used in the Australian process.

This paper notes the efficacy of written guidance as used in the 2013 Australian NSS and every US NSS; therefore, like the Australian National Security Statements, it is recommended that a rigorously drafted written document published by the Privy Council's Office initiate this process. It would entail the oversight of the Prime Minister's National Security Advisor and Cabinet and include whole-of-government input via a refocused National Security Committee. This committee would pull input from the intelligence and security community, such as CSIS, DND, CSE, and the RCMP, as well as academia, ideally. The purpose of this initial guidance is to steer the analysis for policy or white paper reviews by government departments; therefore, the government can choose to publicly announce this guidance or communicate it in classified format with more detail. The case studies showed both methods worked. This initial step could be called the Initial National Security Guidance and serve as a working draft for the final NSS. It will reiterate Canadian national interests, articulate strategic threats as observed by the intelligence and security community as well as government, and offer initial guidance on end state objectives that support national interests considering the threats.

Next, it is recommended that the Canadian process include a classified Strategic Risk Assessment (SRA), like in the Australian process. An SRA would expand upon the strategic risks in detail, prioritize them against the Canadian national interests, and

wargame potential methods to mitigate those risks. The SRA could be delegated to DND, which includes the CSE, and be given support by the department of Public Safety, which includes the domestically focused RCMP and CSIS. This specific delegation would ensure the SRA is drafted by security threat experts without classification limitations and that it considers strategic threats in the global and domestic environments. An initial national security guidance and SRA will provide the necessary information for government departments to begin their concurrent policy reviews or white papers with a shared corporate vision and common understanding of the strategic environment.

Using a Systematic-Delegated NSS process, the Government of Canada can take advantage of experience and consistency in the senior bureaucracy of various departments to enable rigorous strategic planning. While the Australian process was somewhat acceptable in delegating most of the NSS process to its Department of Defence, this paper considers that a more inclusive process including more departments, like that used in the United Kingdom, would produce better inter-departmental alignment. Given the strength of the delegated process is the ability to leverage the analytical horsepower and expertise that reside within the public service of a department, it follows that tapping more departments whose actions intersect with many instruments of national power (DIME) would bring more rigor and produce broader alignment across DIME.

The Australian process maintained intermittent supervision of the departmental drafting process and injected updates to the government guidance from the executive branch via the National Security Committee. As mentioned, the Australian National Security Committee pulled whole-of-government input from other departments to ensure the Defence White Paper made considerations beyond just the military. Instead, this

paper proposes that the Initial National Security Guidance and SRA trigger policy or white paper reviews of all departments relevant to national security: for example, DND, the department of Public Safety, Global Affairs Canada (diplomatic relations, trade, and development), the department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, and the Public Health Agency of Canada. With a common vision and guidance to initiate their reviews, each department would produce supporting analysis that assesses how their department can achieve the national interests and strategic end states set out by government. They can assess which strategic threats influence their departments in depth and offer further analysis to understand those threats. Finally, they can refine and augment ends which support the government vision, articulate expertly analyzed ways to achieve the ends, and suggest the means required to enable their departments. This comprehensive analysis on ends, ways, and means forms the basis for which the government can synthesize the efforts of each department into a coherent NSS.

Using the Initial National Security Guidance as a draft, the Canadian executive branch, through a National Security Committee, could integrate the SRA and departmental white papers into a holistic NSS. It would be the prerogative of the government to classify portions of the NSS or not, but this paper echoes Stolberg in asserting the importance of a publicly published NSS to widely communicate Canada's vision to its public service, its citizenry, its allies, and its adversaries. The US process kept details of the means resourcing its strategy classified and the Australian process kept the details of the SRA classified. However, both countries made the overall NSS public including national interests, named strategic threats, ends, and ways. In Canada, the Privy

Council's Office would lead the communication and disclosure efforts of the SRA and the NSS with the intent to maintain as much public transparency as possible.

The US process published a singular written NSS, whereas the Australian process included an orally delivered National Security Statement and concluded with a written Defence White Paper, which summarized the NSS. Here, given this paper recommends concurrent multiple department white papers or reviews to be synthesized by the executive branch, it is recommended that the Privy Council's Office publish a written Canadian National Security Strategy drafted through a National Security Committee. Maintaining the same person responsible for drafting throughout the process will ensure continuity and timely delivery. The Australian government utilized a senior public servant in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to lead the drafting process of the National Security Statement. Similarly, the Prime Minister could task the National Security Advisor to lead the process and draft the Initial National Security Guidance, communicate the results of the SRA to the departments, coordinate inter-departmental white paper drafting through a National Security Committee, and finally, synthesize the products of each step into the Canadian National Security Strategy for approval by the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

The recommended Canadian NSS process would centralize the initiation and final publication of an NSS, delegate significant analysis and proposed policies to multiple government departments relevant to national security, and coordinate the total process. The Systematic-Delegated process proposed here would move Canadian national security efforts from an ad hoc, reactionary, and disjointed affair to a whole-of-government and unified strategy with long-term vision. The most critical action the Government of

Canada can take to develop strong strategic habits will be to commit to any systematic NSS process. The status quo has left Canada strategically adrift, yet it has all the potential necessary to become an effective guarantor of security within the current global environment; it must only act.

Recommendation for Future Research

This study filled a knowledge gap with respect to how NSS are produced and how those NSS align government action towards national interests and against strategic threats. In doing so, it also generated several new questions that merit future study. It was beyond the scope of this study to include additional case studies; however, additional recommendations could be obtained by duplicating this research methodology for a detailed study on the United Kingdom, New Zealand, or other countries outside of the FVEY intelligence community. The research methodology could also be reapplied to test for effectiveness against strategic threats other than China. Another area for study would be to address the question, “what are Canada’s national interests?” Academics have used historical precedent to define Canadian national interests to date; therefore, a different methodology may add new perspectives to the Canadian national interest discussion. Further, given the problems with procurement perceived by the case countries and faced by Canada as well, it may be useful to determine if systematic NSS processes improved procurement problems, given one purpose of an NSS is to enable long-term planning. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, accepting the conclusions in this paper, it would be timely to leverage this research and determine Canada’s next NSS.

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