

ONCE AN ADVISOR: HOW SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE IS ESSENTIAL
FOR THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE IN
STRATEGIC COMPETITION

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General Studies

by

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2022

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ONCE AN ADVISOR: HOW SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION, by Michael R. Nilsen, 112 pages.

With the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine, the U.S.-led international world order awakens to a potential New Cold War between democracy and autocracy. Like the previous one, this Cold War will see numerous proxy conflicts through all instruments of national power, or DIME. State and non-state adversaries have learned from the American Way of War, allowing them to flow to an advantageous position in the gray zone below the threshold of Western War and avoid potential military collisions. Consequentially, partnership, posture, and position through security cooperation will become increasingly important as the U.S. should empower the Free World to prevent and shape conflicts to be fortuitous to the American Way of War and policy. Our competition may be a partner's conflict, but we should choose the right partners. Through case study analysis, this paper will explore who are the right partners and how their national power increase is essential for the American Way of War and deterrence in strategic competition.

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ACRONYMS

ASLE	Advise, Support, Liaise, and Enable
ABCT	Armored Brigade Combat Team
AWG	Asymmetric Warfare Group
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BEB	Brigade Engineer Battalion
BSB	Brigade Support Battalion
CCMD	Combatant Command
CONU.S.	Continental United States
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DAWN	Democratically Aligned Web of Nations
DCS	Direct Consumer Sales
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EDRE	Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise
FA	Foreign Assistance
FARC	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i>
FIB	Force in Being
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FSF	Foreign Security Force
FMF	Foreign Military Financing

HBCT	Heavy Brigade Combat Team
HN	Host Nation
INSSG	Interim National Security Strategy Guidance
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
JMRC	Joint Multinational Readiness Center
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
MMAS	Master of Military Art and Science
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces
RoK	Republic of Korea
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SA	Security Assistance
SC	Security Force Cooperation
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade
SFAC	Security Force Assistance Command
TAAC	Train, Advise, and Assist Command
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
USFK	United States Forces Korea

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Authoritarianism is on the global march, and we must join with likeminded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over ...America is back. Diplomacy is back. Alliances are back. We are looking irrevocably toward the future and all that we can achieve for the American people—together. Let's get to work.

—President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 2021

America's military has no preordained right to victory on the battlefield.

—Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge*

Background

The current liberal, U.S. led, rules-based world order is under siege as Russia invades Ukraine, and democratic nations awaken to a possible New Cold War.¹ Operating with a different paradigm for war, many state and non-state actors challenge the rules-based international system. COVID-19 and extremist organizations have stressed that system, causing many democracies and partners to focus internally. With these democracies focused on internal politics, states such as China and Russia exploit and undermine the international order to advance their position of power.² Despite COVID-

¹ U.S. President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2021), 6, 9-10; Amer Madhani and Josh Boak, “7 Key Takeaways from Biden's 2022 State of the Union Speech,” *PBS*, March 1, 2022, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/7-key-takeaways-from-bidens-2022-state-of-the-union-speech>.

² Ronald O'Rourke, *Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense – Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R43838 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, last updated March 10, 2022,

19, non-state actors such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria also act as vector-less systems that destabilize nations around the world. Even though the U.S. Army will shift focus back to echelons above brigade multi-domain operations for Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), this is not enough for effective deterrence against autocratic adversaries. Flowing below conventional and nuclear deterrence, these adversaries find asymmetric gray zone ways to counter U.S.'s hard power capability and credibility.³ To complicate matters, the U.S. faces mounting debt and shrinking defense budget for the next generation.

Problem Statement

Historically, the American Way of War used a strategy of attrition known as containment against the Soviet Union with emphasis on gray zone activities to increase their relative position during strategic competition.⁴ With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the devastating conventional victory of Desert Storm, and a post 9/11 world, the

<https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf>; Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House Arts, 1999), 141-146; David Kilcullen, *In Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022), 10-20; Brian Steed, "Narrative in Culture, Center of Gravity, and the Golden Azimuth," in *Great Power Competition: The Changing Landscape of Global Politics*, ed. Mahir J. Ibrahimov (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, November 2020), <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combats-studies-institute/csi-books/great-power-competition-the-changing-landscape-of-global-geopolitics.pdf>; Robert M. Gates. "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 3 (2010): 2-6, <https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/25680910>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. As discussed in the CRS report, the Biden administration replaced great power competition with strategic competition.

U.S. and its allies have focused on other priorities, almost forgetting about the utility of the gray zone during the competition continuum. As demonstrated in figure 1, this becomes especially true for Phases 0 and 1. While the West has forgotten, adversaries like China and Russia learned from the American Way of War. Like chess or Weiqi (Go), their posturing will dramatically shape current and future potential conflicts in their favor, possibly negating Western conventional or nuclear deterrence. If the U.S. and its Allies do not also compete, our adversaries will dominate us before the first conventional military engagement. Given national bureaucratic limitations and a budget-constrained environment, how does the U.S. Army deter state and non-state actors in the gray zone as part of an interagency effort to achieve a position of advantage?




Figure 1. Competition Continuum with SFA Emphasis by Phase

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), V-13, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is threefold. First, U.S. Army must clarify its role in Phases 0-1 as building partnership, posture, and position to prevent and shape conflict through integrated deterrence and campaigning. This requires the Army and larger Joint Force to shift its paradigm for Security Force Assistance (SFA), stability operations, and how a Theater Army can set an AOR besides through sustainment. Instead of viewing SFA as simply a way to support counter-insurgency operations in conflict, the Army must understand how to best employ SFA in the gray zone during Phases 0-1 for the competition continuum as shown in figure 2. This requires a comprehensive approach using SFA/SC to achieve national ends. With the U.S. and allies enabling a free and open world trade, the Army with partners and interagency can employ SFA proactively through campaigning to prevent and shape conflicts for the American Way of War and policy. To support this paradigm shift, this paper will also demonstrate how many of our peers, such as China, already operate in the gray zone to obtain a position of advantage. Like the *Byzantine Grand Strategy*, the result of choosing the right partners globally should be a *Force in Being*, or an already prepared, politically aligned coalition ready to counter threats throughout the competition continuum to support the U.S.-led international order.⁵

Second, this paper will demonstrate how SFA is an effective economy of force method for deterrence, American Way of War, and U.S. policy. Given the domestic

⁵ MAJ James Dawdy and I came up with the term Force in Being to describe the web of partners that would work together to deter adversaries. Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahon's concept, a fleet in being, in his book, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783*, inspired the concept; David Kilcullen, 10-20, 67, 237-240.

political and economic environment, the Army must rely on more economy of forces means to achieve the same ways and ends. Ideally, the U.S. could field more Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), but this is neither cost effective nor a way to counter adversaries from exploiting the gray zone. By employing a whole-of-government approach and a smaller conventional footprint, the U.S. can go small and longer for a more holistic deterrence effect.



Figure 2. Competition Continuum with Gray Zone Overlay

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), V-4, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf.

Finally, this paper will demonstrate the limitations of SFA while outlining tailorable options for senior leaders. Like all elements of national power, SFA has limitations and is not a ubiquitous solution to every problem. These limitations will also demonstrate how important choosing the right partner is for U.S. national interests and setting an Area of Responsibility (AOR) for a U.S. Theater Army. This study is valuable

to the military enterprise because it outlines a tailorable, cost-effective grand strategy for the U.S. and its allies to prevent or shape current and future conflicts.

Research Questions

1. Primary: How can the U.S. Army use Security Force Assistance (SFA) to deter state and non-state actors in the gray zone of DIME operations given the nature of current activities to oppose U.S. interests, bureaucratic limitations, and budget constraints?
2. Secondary: Given a budget constraint environment, how is SFA essential for partnership and posturing for DIME operations in strategic competition?
3. Secondary: How can the U.S. best synchronize SFA activities with other stability efforts during Phase 0 given bureaucratic limitations?
4. Secondary: How can the U.S. Army more efficiently set a theater while presenting a smaller material footprint and target?

Scope/Proposed Methodology

This study judges the suitability, acceptability, feasibility, sustainability of synchronizing SFA means through Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), National Guard Partnership Programs (NGPPs), and Special Operation Forces (SOF). Given a budget-constrained environment and the multiple authorities for SFA, the DOD must take both whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches for employing SFA effectively for the right partner with other Allies and U.S. government agencies. Additionally, given a limited budget for the next decade, the sustainability criteria for setting a theater with a minimal footprint becomes critical. Finally, the study will assess

the patterns between all findings to define the necessity and limitations of partnership for advancing the U.S.'s position within an AOR.

This study applies a research strategy focused on qualitative case study analysis of SFA historical examples from Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), National Guard State Partnership Programs (NSGPP), to Special Operation Forces (SOF) and its impacts on partner capacity and posturing within a region to allow the U.S. an advantageous position compared to adversaries. It uses a case study qualitative analysis to examine the cost-benefit analysis for using SFA as a method for deterrence instead of historical means of U.S. Army hard power such as ABCTs and to understand how SFA affects a HN's capability for national power through a DIME model.

For conventional U.S. Army hard power forces, this paper focuses on ABCTs due to their more significant conventional deterrence effect compared to similar formations such as Airborne IBCTs. Additionally, with the loss of tanks in the Marine Corps, ABCTs are the most distinct formations that the U.S. Army can bring to the joint fight. Finally, ABCTs are the costliest land maneuver formation to maintain and will bring the most economic and logistical strain on the U.S. Army. There may be investigator bias due to never serving in an ABCT formation and familiarity with SFA; however, this study mitigates the bias by integrating diverse a great breadth of sources with opposing views for SFA, deterrence, and ABCTs. This paper does not examine possible solutions involving Stryker and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs and IBCTs) because they lack persistent hard power deterrence for state and non-state adversaries.

I assess that I am qualified to write this paper as a professional who seeks to bridge the gap between SFA operations and its lack of academic depth. As an Infantry

Officer who served in multiple positions above my rank and experience, I have extensive SFA and combined arms maneuver knowledge and experience in both competition and conflict. Also, I am one of four CGSOC Master Tacticians and one of fifty students competing for the Master Strategist competitions. During my last deployment as a Task Force Commander, CJ35, and the Joint Visitor Bureau Chief, I helped synchronize lethal and nonlethal targeting. Additionally, I helped established a counter-terrorism platform with multiple entities to help the Resolute Support Commander provide options to the highest level of U.S. government. Personally, I acknowledge my lack of ABCT and force management experience. I mitigate this through three methods. First, I have an extensive breadth for my literature review that incorporates opposing views. Second, I incorporate scholarly and credible sources from RAND Corporation, Army Office of Research and Statistical Analysis, JSTOR, and CARL. Third, I periodically had my staff group 6A, MMAS peers, and committee challenge this paper.

Assumptions

This paper makes four major assumptions to continue with its qualitative research methodology to answer the primary research question: How can the U.S. Army use Security Force Assistance (SFA) to deter state and non-state actors in the gray zone of DIME operations given the nature of current activities to oppose U.S. interests, bureaucratic limitations, and budget constraints? These assumptions are the following: SFA is a preventative comprehensive U.S. and Allied government activity, failing states are a threat to the U.S. led, rules-based international order, the U.S. will face a fiscally

constrained environment for the next decade, and U.S. SFA units face bureaucratic obstacles especially for conventional forces authorities.⁶

Regarding the first, due to the numerous factors involving SFA, it is difficult to establish a cause-and-effect relationship regarding SFA as a preventive tool, but RAND proved a positive relationship. There is a great breadth of research to validate this assumption, allowing the paper to proceed forward. Second, weak states allow states and non-state actors to exploit them, destabilizing a region.⁷ Third, the U.S.'s debt continues to climb and Congress routinely struggles to pass a budget. This paper assumes this situation will continue for the foreseeable future, forcing the military to adjust its means and ways for achieving strategic ends. This is an essential assumption since RAND studies demonstrate that ABCTs are the best means of military power besides nuclear weapons for deterring conventional conflict.⁸ Finally, SFA activities will continue to involve numerous units from the national guard state sponsor partnership program (SPP), security force assistance brigades (SFAB), foreign area officers (FAO), and special operation forces (SOF). These forces have different authorities that will result in bureaucratic obstacles for synchronizing SFA.

⁶ Jacob B. Sauders, "Better Together: SOF and Conventional Forces integration in Security Force Assistance," (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2017), 11-13.

⁷ Courtney J. Dean, "Why Security Force Assistance Fails," (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2016).

⁸ Michael J. Lostumbo, Michael J. McNerney, Eric Peltz, Derek Eaton, David R. Frelinger, Victoria A. Greenfield, John Halliday, Patrick Mills, Bruce R. Nardulli, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Stephen M. Worman, *The Strategic Benefits, Risks, and Costs of U.S. Military Presence Overseas* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR201.html.

Significance of the Study

The intent of this study is to provide tailorable cost-benefit options to Combatant Commanders (CCMD CDRs) for setting a theater to prevent and shape conflict to be favorable to the American Way of War and policy. This paper should also shift the U.S. Army's paradigm from only conventional and nuclear deterrence to include gray zone deterrence by increasing host nation capacity and credibility, improving U.S.-led international order's posture and position. Additionally, the study will advocate for stability operations, especially SFA and SC, to be more proactive in both application and doctrine for the Army, Joint, and multinational Force. This study will also continue the extensive dialogue for further research synchronizing SFA efforts through both a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach given the bureaucratic limitations and budget constraint environment.

Summary

Through the Security Cooperation Plan, CCMD CDRs already employ SFA throughout their AORs, but it is at an inflection point. Until 2019, U.S. Army doctrine oscillated its position for SC and SFA as a stability task and the larger Joint doctrine views SFA as a reactionary measure for failing states rather than being proactive. SFA can prevent conflict by empowering a *force in being*, or a democratically aligned web of nations (DAWN).⁹ Additionally, most doctrine views SFA and SC through the lens of COIN. Given SFA's limitations, CCMD CDRs must synchronize U.S. SFA efforts with

⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2, 2016), IV-13 – 14, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp4_01_5.pdf.

the right partner to gain a position of advantage.¹⁰ This is especially important as each advisor is a U.S representative that touches all levels of conflict simultaneously.

Additionally, the persistent nature of SFA combined with cost-saving methods provides a viable means for Theater Armies within CCMDs to shape the AOR during Phase 0 and 1 in the gray zone. This will counter many peers' ability to asymmetrically influence the AOR before engaging in conflict. This will also be a cost-saving measure as the U.S. Army continues to deploy ABCTs as part of the RAF. By building partner capacity and reducing the need for multiple ABCTs, the U.S. Army will deter peers in the gray zone while protecting the conventional forces for LSCO. Given the future budget constraint environment that the military must operate in, low cost but high-value options become essential. Strategic competition is an infinite game and low cost, high-value options provide the best means to compete in this infinite game. Ultimately, the goal should be to use SFA to position the U.S and its Allies in a contested or position of advantage rather than a position of a marked disadvantage as a theater transition from competition to crisis and conflict.

¹⁰ Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

We can define winning in competition in many ways: deterring conflict, upholding our interests, remaining the security partner of choice, keeping allies and partners free from coercion and subversion, and discouraging adversaries from malign actions because they know that these acts will not succeed. What we must remember is a win today is an opening for new competition activities tomorrow.

—General James C. McConville, “Preface,” in Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army in Military Competition*, Chief of Staff Paper #2, 2021

Introduction

This research has four main objectives. First, provide cost-effective and tailorable options to senior leaders on how SFA supports the American Way of War and deterrence, especially during strategic competition. This requires a paradigm shift as conventional and nuclear capability and credibility will not deter adversaries from competing in the gray zone. The U.S. must remain the partner of choice to shape and prevent future conflicts.¹¹ Second, it provides a better understanding of how to synchronize SFA efforts despite the multiple units and authorities in a budget constraint environment. Currently, SFA has a ubiquitous nature in terms of its usage and the units that employ it.¹² This

¹¹ U.S. President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 6-10; John Pelham, *Combat Multiplier: Examining the Security Force Assistance Brigade’s Role in Future Army Strategic Deterrence*, Land Warfare Paper 141 (Arlington, VA: The Association of the United States Army, October 4, 2021), <https://www.ausa.org/publications/combat-multiplier-examining-security-force-assistance-brigades-role-future-army>; Kilcullen, *Dragons and the Snakes*, 1-30, 200-230; James Dubik, “Deterrence: Looking Below the Conventional Threshold,” *Army* 72, no. 2 (February 2022): 5-7, <https://lsc-pagepro.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?m=22217&i=733966&p=6&ver=html5>.

¹² Dean, “Why Security Force Assistance Fails.”

paper seeks to address how a theater army can better synchronize SFA given the varying authorities and prevent advising fratricide. Third, this paper will add to the breadth and depth of academic and doctrine writing for SFA and SC. During a review of the current literature, it is evident that there is no depth and limited breadth to any academic or doctrinal writing for SFA. There are only five previous United States Command and General Staff Officer College MMAS or SAMS monographs addressing SFA. By adding another SFA MMAS, this paper will address an important topic that multiple senior government leaders emphasize for strategic competition.¹³ Finally, this paper seeks to help the U.S. Army better understand itself, the enemy, and its operational environment. Without it, the U.S will lack a coherent strategy as Asymmetrical conventional hard power alone will no longer deter our adversaries.¹⁴

Problem

Adversaries have adapted to the American Way of War. Competing in the gray zone below conventional war to posture themselves in a position of advantage, adversaries seek to undermine the U.S.-led rules-based international system's center of gravity: its alliances and partnerships.¹⁵ This is a major issue since the rules-based

¹³ Department of Joint and Multinational Operations (DJIMO), "C206RB: Statement of Admiral Phillip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. INDO-PACIFIC Command posture (09 March 2021)," (Course reading, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2021).

¹⁴ Kilcullen, *Dragons and the Snakes*, 1-30; Sun Tzu, "Attack by Stratagem, Verse 18," in *Art of War* (New York: Vintage, 2021), 11-14; Steed, "Narrative in Culture, Center of Gravity, and the Golden Azimuth."

¹⁵ Jahara Matisek and William Reno, "Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context Matters," *Joint Force Quarterly* 92 (1st Quarter

international order has lifted more people out of absolute poverty and improved the quality of life for people around the world.¹⁶




Figure 3. China's Global Influence

Source: Marco Hartanto, "Citizen Soldier Bridging Global Partnership," (Unpublished draft paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2022), 2.

2019): 65-73; Joseph Dunford Jr., "Allies and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of Gravity," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 87 (4th Quarter 2017): 4-5, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1325218/from-the-chairman-allies-and-partners-are-our-strategic-center-of-gravity>; Phil Reynolds, "Security Cooperation in the Gray Zone: How to Beat China without a War," War Room - U.S. Army War College, October 6, 2021, <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/partner-capacity>; Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*; A. Dugin, *Foundations of Geopolitics* (Russia: Arktogetja, 1997).

¹⁶ The World Bank Group, "Decline of Global Extreme Poverty Continues but Has Slowed: World Bank," The World Bank, September 19, 2018, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/19/decline-of-global-extreme-poverty-continues-but-has-slowed-world-bank>.

China, Russia, and other adversaries seek to disrupt this system for their own gain, increasing their position of advantage on the world stage through multiple asymmetric means.¹⁷ Unlike a Clausewitzian Collision, adversaries employ a strategy of flow to degrade their opponents before the United States and its Allies escalate to conventional war to deter enemy forces.¹⁸ Ironically, many of these adversaries believe the U.S. already operates in this manner and they adapted to match the American Way of War, employing numerous advantages across the DIME spectrum to wear down opponents.¹⁹ Despite an institutional aversion to synchronize multiple aspects of DIME, the U.S. must take a whole-of-government approach in the gray zone and compete through multiple means to deter adversaries.²⁰

¹⁷ Kilcullen, *Dragons and the Snakes*, 1-30, 67, 100-187, 200-230; Secretary of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>; Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*. Based on the literature review and Dr. Brian Steed's classes during History 100 and 400 for CGSOC, strategies of flow and collision are eastern and western traditions of war respectively tracing the philosophical roots to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Chess and Go are the best ways to understand the difference. Representing collision, chess is a very decisive game of will in which each a pawn has the potential to become queen. At the end of chess, it is very clear even to an untrained eye who has won. In juxtaposition, Go represents flow and is more a competition of intellect. Though rarer in chess, it is also not uncommon for Go players to capitulate once they realize that they opponent has intellectually defeated them.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Gates. "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,"; Reynolds, "Security Cooperation in the Gray Zone."

To complicate the problem, strategic competition is an infinite game and does not have a finite set of rules.²¹ The United States cannot simply win in a finite context, but must find sustainable ways and means to constantly compete, increase its relative position, and achieve its ends.²² Sustainable infinite competition becomes especially important as the U.S. will be economically constrained for the foreseeable future.²³ Being an infinite game with multiple finite games, strategic competition is like the U.S. playing multiple games of Go, Chess, and Checkers simultaneously while attempting to synchronizing the results of all games to achieve national ends. In practice, this competition becomes even more difficult since finite games influence each other due to globalization. To accommodate the nature of an infinite game and how U.S. adversaries view war in a holistic manner not limited to just military means of national power, this paper will use DIME as an assessment tool. It will also judge the different variables as either increasing, decreasing, or remaining the same.

The American Way of War, Deterrence, and Strategy: More than Just a Battle

As most of the Western World diplomatically boycotted the 2022 Olympic Games, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin held a press conference asserting their new “no limits” partnership.²⁴ With Russia massing over 180,000 forces on Ukraine’s

²¹ Simon Sinek, “The Finite and Infinite Games of Leadership,” Talks at Google, June 19, 2017, 56:05, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_osKgFwKoDQ.

²² Kilcullen, *Dragons and the Snakes*, 200-230. This is especially important when considering Kilcullen’s Byzantine approach, allowing them to last over 1000 years

²³ Reynolds, “Security Cooperation in the Gray Zone.”

²⁴ Tony Munroe, Andrew Osborn, and HumeYra Pamuk, “China, Russia Partner up against West at Olympics Summit,” *Reuters*, February 4, 2022,

boarder and tensions rising around Taiwan, China and Russia used the 2022 Olympics as a platform to continue their narrative war against the current U.S.-led international order. Their narrative is simple but appealing. Considering the past two years, the current international order is a failure and autocracy is the better alternative.²⁵ As the Olympics concluded with declining Russian and Chinese prestige and popularity among the international community, Russia invaded Ukraine under the auspices of peace keeping and supporting sovereign Russia forces in Southeastern Ukraine. On 24 February 2022, the 31st anniversary of the Desert Storm ground campaign, the U.S. and its allies awaken to a new Cold War that will determine the future of the 21st Century.²⁶

In the 21st Century, war is the extension of politics by other means, especially all the aspects of national power or DIME. Even though Sun Tzu and Clausewitz disagree on war being either a competition of intelligence or will, they both recognized the relationship between politics and war. Their works on war reflect their time. At the

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-china-tell-nato-stop-expansion-moscow-backs-beijing-taiwan-2022-02-04/>. This portion of the MMAS is based on a revised version of the author's CGSOC history H400 paper arguing why the American Way of War is a mass DIME attrition strategy. Much of the inspiration came from a Hegelian Dialect with Dr. Brian Steed during H100, H400, Writing Improvement, and War Club. This paper owes Dr. Steed and CGSOC Staff Group 6A a great deal thanks.

²⁵ Munroe, Osborn, and Pamuk, "China, Russia Partner up against West at Olympics Summit."

²⁶ Editorial Board, "Beijing 2022 Will Be Remembered as the 'Scandal Olympics'," *The Washington Post*, February 21, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/19/beijing-2022-scandal-olympics/>; "The Russia-Ukraine War: Latest News," *The Wall Street Journal*, accessed February 24, 2022, <https://apple.news/AdLLIQbtRQ7mtm4mvehHJzw>; Elbridge Colby and David Ochmanek, "How the U.S. Could Lose a Great-Power War," *Foreign Policy*, October 29, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/29/united-states-china-russia-great-power-war/>.

intersection of the strategy and campaigns, Clausewitz focused more on when a nation during the Napoleonic Period employed the military instrument of power as the other instruments failed to achieve political ends. Conversely, Sun Tzu focused deliberately on grand strategy and how to win wars before the application of the military instrument due to its high cost, especially in a pre-industrial society. Regardless, both understood that all objectives are political in nature.²⁷ Given today's interconnected operational environment due to globalization and social media, this link forces nations to extend their policies through all aspects of DIME, especially soft power. Therefore, even the West views war through a conventional lens, many nations including the U.S. act as war is the entire competition continuum and constantly use military means to accomplish political ends.²⁸

There is great debate on the definition of the American Way of War, deterrence, and strategy. Even though there are full academic discourses dedicated to these topics, this paper will focus on America's strategy as the ways that the U.S. government uses means to achieve nation ends. A way of war consists of three elements, its doctrine, vision, and execution. The doctrine and vision are how a nation views itself in current and future conflict, while the execution is how that nation employs its ways and means

²⁷ Ong Cher Howe, "A Study of Sun Tzu's *Art of War* and Clausewitz's *On War*," *Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 41, no. 2 (June 16, 2015): 68-80, [https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/content/dam/imindef_media_library/graphics/pointer/PDF/2015/Vol.41%20No.2/7\)%20V41N2_A%20Study%20Of%20Sun%20Tzu-s%20Art%20Of%20War%20And%20Clausewitz-s%20On%20War.compressed.pdf](https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/content/dam/imindef_media_library/graphics/pointer/PDF/2015/Vol.41%20No.2/7)%20V41N2_A%20Study%20Of%20Sun%20Tzu-s%20Art%20Of%20War%20And%20Clausewitz-s%20On%20War.compressed.pdf).

²⁸ Rosa Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017); Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 141-146; Dugin, *Foundations of Geopolitics*; Steed, "Narrative in Culture, Center of Gravity, and the Golden Azimuth."

for national ends.²⁹ For the American Way of War, this paper focuses on current literature embodied by Dr. Echevarria. He argues that the American Way of War is more of a way of battle obsessed with a strategy of annihilation in the hope that enough victories on the battlefield will translate to successful campaigns and conflicts. When annihilation does not work, the U.S. doubles down, eventually becoming a strategy of attrition.³⁰

The American Way of War focuses on reducing an opponent's means, be it soft or hard power. As described by Dr. Echevarria's book, *Military Strategy: A Short Introduction*, and figure 4, nations predominately use strategies that either target an actor's Will To Fight, known as dislocation or exhaustion, or strategies that focus on reducing the means of an opponent, known as annihilation or attrition. The difference between strategies is the length of time and the target of effects. As discussed before, the American Way of War focuses on decisive action consisting of offense, defense, and stability operations. Following the conclusions of both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, the U.S. military focuses on the offense because it is the more decisive form of war.³¹

²⁹ Brian Steed, "Military Strategies," (PowerPoint Presentations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 14, 2021; Antulio J. Echevarria, II, *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017).

³⁰ Antulio J. Echevarria, *Toward an American Way of War* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, March 2004, V-VI, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11199>.

³¹ Steed, "Military Strategies,,"; Echevarria, *Military Strategy*; Howe, "A Study of Sun Tzu's Art of War and Clausewitz's On War."

Strategies




Figure 4. Dr. Brian Steed’s Summation of Antulio J. Echevarria, II
Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction

Source: Brian Steed, “Military Strategies,” (PowerPoint Presentations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 14, 2021), slide 1; Antulio J. Echevarria, II, *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1-80.

Though annihilation and then attrition is arguably the vision and doctrine of the American Way of War for the military instrument of national power, it appears that the American Way of War is two-fold.³² First, it is the way of battle centered around lethal

³² Rose Lopez Keravuori. “Lost in Translation: The American Way of War,” *Small Wars Journal* (November 17, 2011), <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lost-in-translation-the-american-way-of-war>; Buddhika Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek. “The Strategic Crisis in the American Way of War: A Global Discount Security Shop?” #Writing Contest 2018, The Strategy Bridge, October 23, 2018, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/10/23/the-strategic-crisis-in-the-american-way-of-war-a-global-discount-security-shop>; Executive Secretary, National Security Council (NSC), *A Report to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security* (Washington, DC: National Security Council, April 14, 1950), <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191>. Discussions on the

targeting and firepower for annihilation that eventually becomes a strategy of attrition once initial victories do not translate into successful conflicts. Second, it is a dual strategy of attrition and empowerment at the strategic level in which the U.S. may not have clear ends but employs effects across DIME to degrade an opponent's soft and hard power while rapidly building the DIME for allies.³³ Consequentially, the American Way of War removes an opponent's capability while rapidly building the DIME capability of the Free World. The two best examples of this are the grand strategy of containment during the Cold War that eventually led to the defeat of the Soviet Union and the economic emphasis placed on outproducing all other actors during World War II.³⁴

Though Sun Tzu and Clausewitz disagreed on certain aspects of war, they both recognized the indisputable relationship between war and politics. Despite the western view that this extension exists only through military power, the reality is that the U.S. and others employ all instruments of national power, or DIME, to achieve their ends. Consequentially, war has become the entire competition continuum, especially with an interconnect world through social media and globalization. This explains why elements of the executive branch such as the National Security Council have grown exponentially in respond to the growing intersection of domestic, foreign, and national security policy.³⁵

American Way of War during Dr. Steed's CGSOC War Club, H100, and H400 classes also greatly informed the conception of this paper's view on the American Way of War.

³³ Executive Secretary NSC, *A Report to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*; Jayamaha and Matissek, "The Strategic Crisis in the American Way of War"; Steed, "Military Strategies."

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ "The Growth of the National Security Council," *The Washington Post*, August 5, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-growth-of-the->

In the past, the U.S. used a strategy of attrition to shape current and future crisis and conflicts by competing with adversaries through multiple instruments of national power. While this American Way of War was suitable in the past, its efficacy has deteriorated in the new Cold War because our adversaries have adapted to it.³⁶ For instance, China employs its economic instrument through the One Belt Road and other ways to coerce weaker nations to expand Chinese influence around the world. Russia uses a very similar strategy with the Nord Stream pipelines for Germany and other NATO countries.³⁷

As part of the American Way of War, the U.S. seeks to prevent conflicts through deterrence, but the current view of conventional and nuclear deterrence has diminishing efficacy. Deterrence involves capability and credibility that includes a mix of plausible threats and demonstrating the will to use force to overcome an opponent.³⁸ By constantly and clearly communicating this through the instruments of national power, the U.S.

[national-security-council/2015/08/04/788f8a2c-3b06-11e5-b3ac-8a79bc44e5e2_graphic.html](https://www.national-security-council/2015/08/04/788f8a2c-3b06-11e5-b3ac-8a79bc44e5e2_graphic.html).

³⁶ Dmitri Trenin, “Welcome to Cold War II,” *Foreign Policy*, March 5, 2014, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/04/welcome-to-cold-war-ii/>.

³⁷ Donald M. Bishop, “Dime, Not Dime: Time to Align the Instruments of U.S. Informational Power,” *The Strategy Bridge*, June 20, 2018, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/6/20/dime-not-dime-time-to-align-the-instruments-of-us-informational-power>; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), III-41, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf?ver=us_fQ_pGS_u65ateysmAng%3d%3d; Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*; Liang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 141-146; Dugin, *Foundations of Geopolitics*; Steed, “Narrative in Culture, Center of Gravity, and the Golden Azimuth.”

³⁸ Robert P. Haffa, “The Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies for Great Power Competition,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (2018): 96-97, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26533617>.

government seeks to deter adversaries from taking malicious action.³⁹ Currently, the U.S. views deterrence as either in conventional or nuclear ways even though it executed gray zone deterrence in the past.⁴⁰ To maintain suitability in current and future conflicts, the U.S. may have to return to lessons learned from the past century.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and victory of Desert Storm, our adversaries have adapted to the overwhelming U.S. nuclear and conventional advantage by refocusing efforts to the gray zone. Employing a strategy of flow, they achieve a position of advantage during strategic competition without the U.S. effectively deterring them. Finally, our adversaries' gray zone activities can employ a strategy of exhaustion and/or coercion that targets the will of HNs and our allies, degrading their credibility to fight in future conflict.⁴¹ This becomes especially important for U.S. strategy as a nation's will to fight is most malleable before a crisis or conflict and our adversaries' strategy of flow directly targets the U.S. friendly center of gravity, its global partnerships and coalitions.⁴² Thus, the U.S. cannot rely on just nuclear or conventional deterrence but must also compete with our adversaries' flow throughout DIME in the gray zone while also empowering HNs and allies during competition.

³⁹ Haffa, "The Future of Conventional Deterrence," 96-97.

⁴⁰ Dubik, "Deterrence."

⁴¹ Ibid.; Kilcullen. *Dragons and Snakes*, 10-20; Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 141-146.

⁴² Michael McNerney, Ben Connable, S. Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Marek Posard, Jasen Castillo, Dan Madden, Ilana Blum, Aaron B. Frank, Benjamin J. Fernandes, In Hyo Seol, Christopher Paul, and Andrew Parasiliti, *National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don't* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), VIII-XV, <https://doi.org/10.7249/rr2477>.

Security Force Assistance and Deterrence

Definitions

To assist with a historic literature review regarding SFA and deterrence, this paper will first provide a basic understanding of SFA and how it fits into Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance. Though there are several definitions at various levels of government for SFA, Security Force Cooperation (SC), Foreign Assistance (FA), and other activities that involve SFA, below is a guideline to key definitions and frameworks that will guide this paper. It relies heavily on the latest Joint Publication 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, to provide context since SFA and interrelated activities usually have conflicting, ambiguous, and overlapping definitions.




Figure 5. Security Cooperation Framework

Source: Taylor P. White, "Security Cooperation How It All Fits," *Joint Force Quarterly* (1st Quarter 2014): 107.




Figure 6. Relationship of Security Force Assistance with Security Cooperation, Security Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2009), 1-7.

Part of SC and FA, *Security Force Assistance* is a DOD activity that supports the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.⁴³ This includes a broad range of activities, especially with HNs that require extensive assistance due to fragility. Based on the culture and history of a HN, it also includes supporting institutions that directly support the military or security institutions.⁴⁴ Unlike the U.S., other nations do not have the same separation between their national

⁴³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017), GL-6, https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_20.pdf.

⁴⁴ Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” *The RUSI Journal* 164, no. 3 (2019): 10–21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1643258>. 21.

power institutions. For instance, Jordan has a government that mirrors Western Democracies, but King Abdullah exercises much more control due to unique cultural and historical reasons. Consequentially, SFA activities usually have a great range of activities instead of just building direct capacity for a nation’s military or police forces.⁴⁵ Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate how SFA interconnects with other SC activities while simultaneously being a subset of FA and SC.

In juxtaposition, *Security Cooperation* includes all the DOD activities with establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This is key because the Joint and Army doctrine recognizes that SFA and its related activities promote the U.S. and its Allies’ center of gravity (COG), its partnerships and Alliances.⁴⁶ It also promotes the stability of those partners, helping them to be less fragile in respect to both state and non-state actors. This gets to the heart of the new National Defense Strategy’s way known as campaigning.⁴⁷ While Security Cooperation is a DOD-related activity, *Security Assistance* is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 that aid in furtherance of national policies and

⁴⁵ Taylor P. White, “Security Cooperation How It All Fits,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (1st Quarter 2013): 107.

⁴⁶ Dunford, “Allies and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of Gravity.”

⁴⁷ “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), March 30, 2022, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF>.

objectives.⁴⁸ This includes a whole-of-government approach that incorporates other U.S. Government agencies such as the DOS.⁴⁹ Since SFA units usually fall under other authorities during competition, they can execute SC, SFA, and SA simultaneously.

Similarly, *Foreign Internal Defense* is any U.S. government support from civilian and military agencies to help a host nation contend with internal threats.⁵⁰ Based on what SFA activities DOD entities will do with host partners, it could count as FID, SC, and SA simultaneously.⁵¹ As the most encompassing definition, Foreign Assistance usually takes three forms: development, humanitarian, and security assistance. All these activities eventually work towards *Foreign Assistance*, or the range of support to foreign nations.

SFA, Deterrence, and Shaping

SFA as a means for deterrence and shaping is not new to the U.S. Government. General George Washington's first Inspector General, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, instilled professionalism into the Continental Army during the American Revolution. As a Prussian military advisor, he created the *1779 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* that eventually became the backbone of

⁴⁸ CJCS, JP 3-20, GL-5.

⁴⁹ White, "Security Cooperation How It All Fits," 106-107.

⁵⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 17, 2018, validated on February 2, 2021), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_22.pdf.

⁵¹ White, "Security Cooperation How It All Fits," 108.

the U.S. Army's doctrine.⁵² His manual manifests itself today as the Army's keystone field manuals, FM 3-0, *Operations* and ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. Following the historic example of Von Steuben, the U.S. Army has undertaken its own SFA endeavors several times throughout history to achieve unified action for national ends.⁵³

Currently, SFA is at an inflection point, especially for the U.S. Army. After 20 years of executing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, SC doctrine focuses on a portion of the competition continuum instead of the entire spectrum. Current SC doctrine either addresses COIN operations after a successful LSCO or a reactionary stability operation. There are numerous misconceptions such as the mere presence of advisors will lead to successful stability effects. Reality is much more difficult as SFA is just like any other weapons system. Despite the doctrine, there has been a shift to a more proactive approach across the competition continuum.⁵⁴ The most recent SFA manifestation is the creation of the SFABs to shape and prevent conflict while providing increased capability across the conflict continuum. SFABs supplement the already preexisting SFA entities that support U.S. SC. All this occurs simultaneously as U.S. Army clarifies its roles during competition while modernizing after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

⁵² Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2009), V.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Scott Naumann, "U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Overview Brief," (PowerPoint Presentation, U.S. Army Mission Command Center of Excellence, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 25, 2022).



Figure 7. Security Force Assistance Command Purpose

Source: U.S. Security Forces Assistance Command, “Security Forces Assistance Command Recruiting Brief,” (PowerPoint Presentation, Fort Bragg, NC, 2021), slide 2.

The U.S. Government relies on SFA to provide a cost-effective option to achieve two means towards deterrence. First, SFA with the support of other SC activities builds HN capacity for defense, decreasing its fragility, while also protecting the U.S.’s COG of gravity, its partnerships.⁵⁵ This is essential because weak nations eventually cause instability for a region, weakening the rules-based international system.⁵⁶ Additionally, strong and politically aligned partners with the U.S. create a web of deterrence against

⁵⁵ Dunford, “Allies and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of Gravity,”; Carl von Clausewitz, J. J. Graham, and F. N. Maude, *On War* (Las Vegas: Superior Publishing House, 2021), 595-597; Naumann, “U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Overview Brief.”

⁵⁶ Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,”; Naumann, “U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Overview Brief.”

potential dragons and snakes.⁵⁷ NATO is the best example of this concept in action as it deters Russian and non-state adversary aggression.

By building host nation capacity, U.S. forces build upon its COG, its alliances and partnerships.⁵⁸ Currently, China and other adversaries operate in the gray zone to gain an advantage and undermine the rules-based international order. By strategic maneuver or strengthening relationships with politically aligned partners, the U.S. provides regional powers an alternative to the authoritarian strategies of flow and coercion used by our adversaries. For instance, the U.S. can provide an alternative to adversaries' economic coercion through economic support like foreign military and direct commercial sales.⁵⁹

Partnership also helps the U.S. build the team before competition turns into a crisis. These partnerships become even more important as crisis turn to conflict as the potential U.S. led Coalition becomes the very embodiment of the international order as it did during Desert Storm. Before the ground campaign began, GEN Schwarzkopf recognized that the Coalition's partnership was its COG as it became the physical embodiment of reestablishing the rules-based international order. As a result, he spent months building the coalition, especially between Arabic allies and Israel. This is also

⁵⁷ Kilcullen, *Dragons and the Snakes*, 10-20, 67, 237-240; O'Rourke, *Renewed Great Power Competition*.

⁵⁸ Clausewitz, Graham, and Maude, *On War*, 595-597. Everyone quotes this section, but they fail to include his additional examples. One of his examples is how the partnership/relationship in an alliance is the COG.

⁵⁹ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Fiscal Year 2021 Security Cooperation Figures," December 22, 2021, <https://www.dsca.mil/news-media/news-archive/fiscal-year-2021-security-cooperation-figures>.

why Iraq targeted Israel during the war, hoping an Israeli response would fracture the new and fragile coalition between Arab nations, the West, and Israel.




Figure 8. The Competition Continuum

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 July 2010), VI-2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf.

SFA units such as SFABs also provide the U.S. Government access to key geographic areas within CCMDs, allowing it to posture itself to a position of advantage.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ CJCS, JP 3-22, I-3, GL 5-6; U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, "Statement of General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. on the Posture of U.S. Central Command," (Washington, DC, March 10, 2020), <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/2967180/posture-statement-of-general-kenneth-f-mckenzie-jr-commander-centcom-before-the>; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, "Statement of General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force, Commander, United States European Command," (Washington, DC, September 2020), [https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SASC%2029%20MAR%202022%20EUCOM%20Statement%20\(Gen%20Wolters\).pdf](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SASC%2029%20MAR%202022%20EUCOM%20Statement%20(Gen%20Wolters).pdf); United States Indo-Pacific Command Staff, "U.S. INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility," U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, accessed September 30, 2021,

Based on the relationship with HN, SFA can shape U.S. access to geographic regions.⁶¹ When dealing with competition, this access become critical for a CCMD's Theater Posture Plan as the Joint Force works to posture itself for current and future conflicts.⁶² Partnership becomes the driving force on whether a theater is either mature or not when a crisis arises. In recent years, this access has become increasingly important due to the cost of constantly deploying U.S. forces for RAF missions, but also for future U.S. force survivability as enemies have adapted to the current U.S. and larger Western Way of War.⁶³ It is also essential because just as host nations compete for U.S. support, other nations desire access to those nations simultaneously.⁶⁴ This is why adversaries target actors around economic choke points such as Djibouti or Indonesia.

<https://www.pacom.mil/About-U.S.INDOPACOM/U.S.PACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/>.

⁶¹ Kilcullen. *Dragons and the Snakes*, 1-30, 67, 100-187, 200-230.

⁶² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, *Joint Logistics* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, October 16, 2013), IV-4, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp4_0.pdf.

⁶³ O'Rourke, *Renewed Great Power Competition*.

⁶⁴ Ibid., Reynolds, "Security Cooperation in the Gray Zone."




Figure 9. SFAB Operations across the Competition Continuum


Source: U.S. Security Forces Assistance Command, “Security Forces Assistance Command Recruiting Brief,” (PowerPoint Presentation, Fort Bragg, NC, 2021), slide 4.

Regarding the first means, it is in the best interest of the U.S. led, rules-based international system to help the right partners be as stable as possible because weak nations are easy targets for exploitation from state and non-state adversaries, creating instability within a CCMD AOR.⁶⁵ For instance, one Chinese stratagem literally states to “loot a burning house” because weak actors due to instability can easily be exploited for your ends.⁶⁶ Through the figures and table below, the RAND Corporation demonstrated that the U.S. Government’s SC preventative hypothesis has a great deal of merit based on choosing the right partner. By looking at over 100 countries and focusing on 12 case

⁶⁵ Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,”; Michael J. McNerney, Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, *Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), 15-16/

⁶⁶ Peter Taylor, *The Thirty-Six Stratagems: A Modern-Day Interpretation of a Strategy Classic* (Oxford: Infinite Ideas, 2013).

studies over 13 years, RAND cooperation quantitatively examined the relationship between SC and State Fragility Index (SFI). As part of their findings, RAND concluded that SFA with the support of other SC activities helped to decrease all 12 country’s SFI from 1995-2008.⁶⁷ SFA is also an essential part of SC, allowing the U.S. advisors to ensure that all other SC activities achieve unity of effort for national ends while increasing a HN’s security apparatus. For the second means, the U.S. Joint Forces realize that it must constantly compete for access. The current CSA published his White Paper #2, outlining how SFA through the SFABs will be the U.S. Army’s answers to compete in the gray zone with adversaries. It is important to realize that if the U.S. does not compete for this access, deterring adversarial actions, those same adversaries will step into the vacuum left by U.S. influence for their own gain.⁶⁸



SOURCE: RAND portrayal based on examination of policy documents.
 RAND RR350-2.1


Figure 10. The Preventive Hypothesis Causal Chain: Problem Identification

Source: Michael J. McNerney, Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, *Assessing Security Cooperation as*

⁶⁷ McNerney et al., *Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool*, 15-16, 66-68, 82.

⁶⁸ Reynolds, “Security Cooperation in the Gray Zone.”

a Preventive Tool (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), 18.



SOURCE: RAND analysis.

NOTES: Values displayed represent the average marginal effect of SC on SFI based on Models 2-4. Data on countries' SFI, regime type and state reach are for 2009.

RAND RR350-4.8

Figure 11. Predicted Marginal Effect of \$1,000 SC per 10,000 on Partner States' State Fragility Index (SFI) in 2009

Source: Michael J. McNerney, Angela O'Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, *Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), 67.

NOTE: Darker colors indicate a greater correlation between SFA activities and reducing the SFI.

Table 1. Security Cooperation Recipients

Country	SC Funding (\$M)	Change in SFI 1995–2008	Primary Source of SC Funding	Major Command	Key Observation
Colombia	7,591	14→12	Counternarcotics and law enforcement	SOUTHCOM	Most observers argue SC had major effect
Jordan	3,043	9→6	FMF	CENTCOM	Improved military effectiveness; advanced U.S. policies
Philippines	708	15→12	FMF Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency	PACOM	Large variation in U.S. SC policies
Georgia	337	14→9	Balanced	EUCOM	Retrain WMD scientists; stabilize restive areas; strengthen security capabilities
Yemen	131	18→16	Balanced	CENTCOM	SC effect depends on state characteristics
Honduras	110	13→8	Counternarcotics and law enforcement	SOUTHCOM	Military education a priority
Guatemala	102	20→11	Counternarcotics and law enforcement	SOUTHCOM	Professionalize military sector; improve disaster response
Azerbaijan	77	19→13	FMF	EUCOM	Improve NATO interoperability
Bangladesh	74	20→12	FMF Other train and equip	PACOM	Help professionalize military
Armenia	59	8→7	FMF	EUCOM	Improve NATO interoperability
Mali	24	20→14	Other train and equip	AFRICOM	Helped maintain security
Niger	24	20→18	Counterterrorism	AFRICOM	SC effect inconclusive

Source: Michael J. McNerney, Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, *Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), 67.

Security Force Assistance, Partnership, and Posture

Security Force Assistance is an essential SC activity for maintaining partnership. Partnership allows for access to the key LOCs and other logistical nodes, but it is also more than that.⁶⁹ It fosters a relationship that allows for the U.S. to gain valuable intelligence gathering and force management systems through partnership. For instance, the 7th Army Training Command executes SFA by sending Joint Multinational Readiness Training Center Observer Coach Trainers to run combat training centers (CTCs) in Georgia and Ukraine to deter Russian aggression.⁷⁰ These CTCs also validate

⁶⁹ CJCS, JP 5-0, IV-16, V-12, H-2.

⁷⁰ Stuart Gallagher, “Mission Ukraine: U.S. Army Leads Multinational Training Group to Counter Russian Threat,” Association of United States Army, May 19, 2020,

the needs and gap requirements for the DOD as it models the future force through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).⁷¹ SFA advisors not only help partners such as Georgia and Ukraine, but help CCMDs and the Joint Staff to have a better understanding of the operational environment and where current U.S. military shortfalls exist.⁷²

Partnership also effects all aspects of national power. As supported by figures 4 and 10, SFA units such as SFAB also generate multi-domain effects across the other aspects of DIME when executing military assistance. For example, a 12-man SFAB team advising a Minister of Defense Joint Operations Center will not only increase the military capability of the HN but will also enable the Embassy's integrated country strategy (ICS) objectives, improve public perception about the U.S. government, and enable U.S. centric supply chains connected with larger policies such as the Build Back Better World (B3W). Many of these DIME elements become interconnected due to the small nature of SFA teams. As they advise HN forces, these small teams must synchronize all aspects of national power as they become U.S. representatives. Ultimately, this can lead to HNs

<https://www.ousa.org/articles/mission-ukraine-us-army-leads-multinational-training-group-counter-russian-threat>.

⁷¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual* (JCIDS Manual) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 12, 2015), https://www.dau.mil/cop/rqmt/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/cop/rqmt/DAU%20Sponsored%20Documents/Manual%20%20CJCS,%20JCIDS%20Manual,%2012%20Feb%202015,%20Errata,%2018%20Dec%202015;CJCS,JP5-0,IV-16,V-12,H-2.

⁷² Pelham, *Combat Multiplier*; CJCS, JP 3-20, V-3.

joining the Free World and picking the U.S. as the partners of choice across DIME, further isolating revisionist powers that seek to undermine the international system.




Figure 12. SFAB Role in Military Competition

Source: U.S. Security Forces Assistance Command, "School of Advanced Military Studies Recruiting Brief," (PowerPoint Presentation, Fort Bragg, NC, 2021), slide 5.

Like any weapon system, SFA has its limitations. Though RAND demonstrated that SC can have positive impacts on a state, most case studies involved partners that have politically aligned interests to the U.S. Not every relationship blossoms. If you choose the wrong partner, it can be disastrous. This was apparent in partners such as Somalia and Sudan where decades of SFA failed to make the HN legitimate.⁷³ Like with any human interpersonal relationship, there are numerous qualitative reasons why assistance would fail in the partnered nation, especially if they are the wrong partner. One

⁷³ Dean, "Why Security Force Assistance Fails,"; Knowles and Matissek, "Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States," 11-12.

of the biggest is attempting to make the HN a mirror image of the U.S. military.⁷⁴ This SFA approach may work for some HNs but will be disastrous for others.⁷⁵

The ideal solution is to select the right partner at the right location, but this can be as unforeseen conflicts can dictate your partners. Due to the potential divergence between U.S. and partner interests, SFA units must constantly assess if these interests align at the strategic and operational level while also balancing U.S. priorities.⁷⁶ This is increasingly important with the FY 2017 NDAA consolidating and codifying existing Title 10 SC authorities into 10 U.S.C. §§301-386, forcing SFA units and country teams to monitor and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of SC activities.⁷⁷

Unity of Effort

The U.S. faces great friction with achieving unity of effort towards national ends. Legally, this becomes extremely difficult due to the different authorities and funding over Titles 10, 22, and 50.⁷⁸ Each authority resides with agencies, but all are necessary to execute national instruments of power holistically. For example, Title 10 is exclusive to DOD while Title 22 is DOS, but there are some Title 22 authorities that the DOD

⁷⁴ Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves.”

⁷⁵ Ibid.; Renanah Joyce, Max Margulies, and Tucker Chase, “The Future of US Security Force Assistance,” Modern War Institute, November 29, 2021, <https://mwi.usma.edu/the-future-of-us-security-force-assistance/>.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Christina L. Arabia, “Defense Primer: DOD ‘Title 10’ Security Cooperation,” (Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, updated May 17, 2021), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11677.pdf>.

⁷⁸ Pelham, *Combat Multiplier*.

executes. Additionally, each authority comes from different Congressional appropriation and authorization with vastly different limitations for the execution of SC.⁷⁹ This becomes more complication once SFA units must account for U.S. and multinational interests. Due to this friction, some experts recommend creating a SC CCMD to promote unity of command.⁸⁰ Due to different stack holders, SFA requires a comprehensive approach to achieve ends aligned among the coalition, U.S. government, and HN. Instead of viewing SFA and stability operations as a reactionary measure, a proactive one would allow the U.S. to select better partners for future conflicts. In terms of U.S. Army SFA, one of the biggest areas of concern for unity of effort is synchronizing conventional and SOF SFA operations. As demonstrated below, SOF and conventional force synchronization are best in gray zone to achieve strategic ends. Despite having different command structures, the U.S. government must achieve unity of effort or will have SC fratricide.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Arabia, “Defense Primer.”

⁸⁰ Joyce, Margulies, and Chase, “The Future of US Security Force Assistance,”; Pelham, *Combat Multiplier*; Sauders, “Better Together,” 69-71.

⁸¹ Ibid.




Figure 13. Environmental Complexity, SFA, and I3 Zone

Source: Jacob B. Sauders. “Better Together: SOF and Conventional Forces integration in Security Force Assistance,” (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2017), 70.

Setting a Theater with a Smaller Footprint

In conjunction with conventional deterrence, SFA units are a cost-effective means to achieve nation ends. For the conventional U.S. Army, an ABCT can cost up to the \$100 million a year to train and maintain. That is a \$1 billion fixed cost to maintain and train the current 10 ABCT fleet.⁸² This cost rises exponentially as RAF mission cost anywhere from \$200 million to \$2 billion. With multiple ABCTs deployed forward, this brings the U.S. Army’s price tag up to \$7.5 billion globally.⁸³ The U.S. Navy is even more expensive as a carrier strike group (CSG) usually costs approximately \$2-3 billion for the same period with it costing \$20-33 billion globally.⁸⁴ In comparison, an SFAB

⁸² Pelham, *Combat Multiplier*; Lostumbo et al., *The Strategic Benefits, Risks, and Costs of U.S. Military Presence Overseas*.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Henry J. Hendrix, “At What Cost a Carrier?,” (Disruptive Defense Papers, Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, March 2013), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA575866.pdf>.

costs approximately \$27 million for training and deployment bringing the entire SFAC price tag to around \$132 million a year to influence over 100 nations.⁸⁵




Figure 14. Succeeding in Competition to Deter Crisis and Win in Conflict

Source: U.S. Security Forces Assistance Command, "Security Forces Assistance Command Recruiting Brief," (PowerPoint Presentation, Fort Bragg, NC, 2021), slide 12.

⁸⁵ Thomas I. Thornhill, "The Value of the SFAB," *Infantry* (Spring 2021): 21-22, https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2021/Spring/pdf/8_Thornhill_SFAB.pdf; Pelham, *Combat Multiplier*.



Figure 15. National Guard State Partnership Program

Source: Marco Hartanto, “Citizen Soldier Bridging Global Partnership,” (Unpublished draft paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2022), 4.

Given the smaller footprint, SFA units can set a theater for a minimal cost. SFA units are tactical level formations that can have operational and strategic level effects within a CCMD. Usually with 333 funding for training foreign forces, one 12-man team or a 50-person company can execute SFA operations for an entire country, simultaneously achieving CCMD campaign objectives and DOS ICS.⁸⁶ With 333 funding being less than 0.5% of the DOD budget, the U.S. must place more emphasis using the SFA units to set a theater with a smaller footprint.⁸⁷ Based on the positive relationship between FSI and SC, SC activities are a cost-effective way to shape and set a theater.⁸⁸ The figure below demonstrates that DOD SC amounts to \$7.5 billion dollars with 65%

⁸⁶ Knowles and Matissek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” 21.

⁸⁷ Sauders, “Better Together,” 69-71; Pelham, *Combat Multiplier*.

⁸⁸ Pelham, *Combat Multiplier*.

allocated to Afghanistan and Iraq SFA operations. With the drawdown CENTCOM, future SC budgets will rarely rise above \$4 billion, making it 0.41 percent of the entire \$715 billion DOD discretionary budget.⁸⁹ For the operational cost of two CSGs, the U.S. can set multiple theaters for the U.S. achieve a position of advantage. One of the best examples is Mongolia in 2021. An SFAB company was able to compete with other adversaries such as Russia and China for the opportunity to be the Mongolian government's partner of choice.⁹⁰

Summary

This paper ascertains four trends. First, world actors operate as if the entire competition continuum is war despite contrary legal definitions. This involves posturing and position across DIME. Second, deterrence involves multiple ways from nuclear and conventional to gray zone deterrence. Based on historic trends, the need to compete in the gray zone and develop coalitions before crisis is essential. Third, SFA is difficult due to the lack of unity of command as it involves numerous government entities. SFA is also impossible to distinguish from other SC activities because of the interconnection. SFA and other SC activities also directly support HN militaries, but those efforts have effects

⁸⁹ Arabia, "Defense Primer.," Pat Towell, *The Department of Defense DOD Budget: An Orientation*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R46965 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, November 12, 2021, 1-2, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46965>).

⁹⁰ Dan McDaniel, "5th Sfab's Col. David Rowland Had the Privilege to Participate in the Mongolian Armed Forces 100th Anniversary Celebration in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia This Week. Mongolia Is One of Many Partners We Are Training alongside This Spring as We Strengthen Enduring Regional Partnerships, <https://t.co/9puhtzbdoh>," Twitter, May 10, 2021, <https://twitter.com/5thSFAB/status/1391987484817457153>.

beyond the military instrument of national power. This includes using other SC activities such as FMS to build military capacity and empower other parts of the HN government. Finally, SC is an economy of force operation that allows the U.S. to build HN capacity, reducing fragility in key states that are good partners.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This paper seeks to answer the research questions presented in Chapter 1 and build upon the limited SFA academic depth. Through a qualitative case study methodology, this paper will obtain a deeper understanding of the purpose and nature behind the research questions, potentially providing options for senior leaders, joint doctrine writers, and academics. This chapter will provide the methods for relevant data collection and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the case study methodology. Finally, this study will establish an additional SFA framework for future academic papers and doctrine to provide options for senior leaders as the operational environment evolves.

Methodology

This study seeks to answer how the United States can deter state and non-state adversaries through SFA given the bureaucratic limitations and a fiscally constrained nation. It implements a case study qualitative analysis of historical examples involving conventional and SOF security force assistance advisors specifically focused on the U.S. Army. By its infinite game nature, strategic competition and deterrence are subjective and difficult to quantitatively measure. The study also does not focus on testing a theory or hypothesis, but instead gravitates towards exploring ideas and themes related to SFA to potentially produce a theory that will inform senior leadership. A qualitative approach using case studies is necessary to understand these subjective and lived experiences with

regards to deterrence in the gray zone, detailing how SFA can shape and deter current and future conflicts. This will help shift the Army's paradigm during Phases 0-1.

Due to the limited time available and the nature of the research questions, this methodology does not necessitate direct engagement with living persons. Its information collection is to open-source means, but this study will mitigate its limitations through a breadth of credible sources, including visual representations such as figures to help the reader better understand the comparison, especially regarding the DIME evaluation criteria. Reducing the complex nature of SFA operations is essential for communicating the conclusions to a larger audience.

Improving Qualitative Rigor

The paper improves rigor through trustworthiness and validity, major academic cornerstone for qualitative studies. Despite its difficulty, this paper will improve trustworthiness by examining provided information through the lens of internal and external validity and transferability. Internal validity focuses on the precision and accuracy of data while external validity discusses the reliability and generalization. Transferability is the generalization potential for a study's future research.⁹¹ As discussed in the following section, this paper's DIME assessment will accomplish rigor through

⁹¹ Susan Morrow, "Quality and Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research in Counseling Psychology," *Journal of Counseling Psychology* 52, no. 2 (2005): 250–60; Sharon Kolb, "Grounded Theory and Constant Comparative Method: Valid Research Strategies for Educators," *Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational Research and Policy Studies (JETERAPS)* 3, no. 1 (2012): 83–86; Dr. Cupp and MAJ John Gomber helped me develop this section of Chapter 3 the most since it was about increasing my paper's rigor.

credible sources, especially for the diplomatic and informational power. It will also be transferable by maximizing the case study methodology.

For this paper’s research questions, a qualitative approach is essential due to the subjective nature of deterrence because it involves the motivations of nations and leaders. Since this paper has limited time, it will maximize the case study methodology through four case studies over different time periods and CCMDs to provide a Western and Eastern perspective. The case studies will involve 1960-2021 Korea, 1980s-2021 Columbia, 1990- 2021 Somali, and 2007-2021 Lebanon.




Figure 16. Visual Representation of the Methodology

Source: Created by author.

For the evaluation criteria, this paper uses a combination of quantitative/qualitative measurements for DIME. The biggest split is between hard and soft power, or between military and economic with diplomatic and information power. Even though measuring DIME is difficult, its definitions are clear. Diplomacy focuses on engagement between actors while the information instrument involves government

agencies, non-state actors, and groups that create, exploit, and distribute knowledge. The military instrument focuses on employing force to impose a nation's will on another while the economic instrument is the heart of a nation.⁹² For the diplomatic and information instruments of national power, this paper uses the Soft Power indexes that involve over 30 variables assessing soft power capability. The biggest weakness of this technique is the lack of quantitative trends beyond 2010. Additionally, soft power was not a term in academia until the 1980s, making it difficult to assess before that time. Finally, this paper will assess diplomatic and information together because of limited time. Measuring hard power is easier to apply rigor as the economic instrument measured by GDP is the most objective. For the military, this paper will observe quantitative and qualitative measures like military spending, size, and ranking.

Summary

Chapter 5 will synthesize pertinent conclusions from Chapters 1 through 4, to provide a conclusive inference for the research questions. It will also propound how gray zone activities, deterrence, and SFA are not new for the U.S. military and will answer how SFA supports deterrence and the American Way of War. Finally, this paper's conclusion will demonstrate how SFA must have unity of effort through multiple activities to shape environments and deter adversaries. SFA does not solve every problem, but when employed correctly, can be a very effective and efficient way to achieve national ends.

⁹² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Doctrine Note (JDC) 1-18, *Strategy* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 25, 2018), II-5 – II-7, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Results and Overview

This Chapter seeks to analyze the research questions presented in Chapter 1 through a qualitative case study methodology using the instruments of national power as variables while a country received U.S. SFA/SC. Organized into seven parts, this chapter analyzes four cases across different time periods and CCMDs. These cases are South Korea (1950-2020), Colombia (1980-2020), Lebanon (2007-2020), and Somalia (1990-2020). Since there is no recognized quantitative measurement for DIME, these case studies will use various qualitative and quantitative data points to analyze trends to ascertain pertinent trends and themes. Below are the results, listed on a descending DIME scale. Based on this paper's analysis, South Korea had an exponential DIME increase, Colombia and Lebanon had moderate to strong increases, and Somalia had a strong decrease.




Figure 17. Case Study Analysis Results

Source: Created by author.

The analysis' four major trends are choosing the right partner, deterrence, unity of command, and setting the theater with a smaller footprint. Regardless of case study, the analysis reinforces literature review themes that choosing the right partner is critical and can be the most important factor for SFA. Choosing the right partner like South Korea can lead to exponential DIME increase. A right partner is a HN whose Clausewitzian Trinity of People, Policy, and Probability, align with U.S. interests. This increase simultaneously helps the HN's stability while also increasing their ability to deter adversaries. Additionally, relationships have two ends as the U.S. must demonstrate persistent commitment as well, sending informational and diplomatic signals to fence

sitters and adversaries. Conversely, SFA is not a magic pill and picking the wrong partner can be disastrous.⁹³

There is a holistic link between unity of effort and SFA monitoring vs operations. During and after the Korean War, South Korean SFA advisors through the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) and later the United States Forces Korea (USFK) centralized under UNC transformed a broken and corrupt South Korean military into one of the best militaries in the world.⁹⁴ It is essential to note that the command structure between U.S. and HN also became unified with South Koreans taking lead on operations instead of the UNC. In a large part, this is due to the consistent and strong unity of command that operationalizes SFA activities over a prolonged period instead of monitoring it.⁹⁵ In the South Korea case study, there is a strong unity of purpose as North Korea provides an existential threat to the country and region. Other operational environments lack this existential threat as other HNs contend with adversaries that slowly destabilize a region over time, raising fewer red flags.

There are two additional trends. First, SFA units provided a lower cost option to set a theater with HNs rather than expensively employ larger U.S. conventional forces.

⁹³ “2022 World Military Strength Ranking,” Global Firepower, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php>.

⁹⁴ Ibid.; U.S. Department of State (DOS), “U.S. Security Cooperation with Korea,” (Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, January 20, 2021), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-korea>; Jeffrey Burroughs, “The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States,” (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010).

⁹⁵ “Post-1953,” United Nations Command, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.unc.mil/History/Post-1953-Evolution-of-UNC/>.

Second, SFA requires a comprehensive approach. RAF missions are very expensive and demonstrated only conventional deterrence. In comparison, SFA operations provide a low-cost option or alternative for both conventional and gray zone deterrence. Lebanon provides the best example while using a comprehensive approach. With only 50-100 SOF military advisors executing SFA with UN advisors, the U.S. effectively employed a comprehensive approach that transformed Lebanon within 10 years. It went from a political puppet of Iran and Syria to a contested state that could handle a humanitarian crisis from Syria while defeating Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Many attribute this transformation to the LAF becoming a professional military force that acted as a counterweight to Hezbollah.⁹⁶ Setting a theater with SFA will probably become even more important with the increase of proxy wars between democracy and autocracy. For instance, during Ukrainian-Russian 2022 War, the Ukrainian military fought the Russians with its only military support being SC from the U.S. and NATO.

INDOPACOM: South Korea (1950-2020)

Regarding SFA, South Korea is an improbable outlier, but outliers can change the world. Transformed from a corrupt and ineffective military to one of the best militaries in the world, South Korea experienced an exponential increase in DIME over 70 years. This could be for various reasons such as having the best OE for unity of effort, actively facing existential threats. Another possible reason for such an exponential increase is the

⁹⁶ Aram Nerguizian, *The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah and the Race to Defeat Isis.* " *The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah and the Race to Defeat ISIS*, Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 1, 2021), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/lebanese-armed-forces-hezbollah-and-race-defeat-isis>.

consistent and massive U.S. commitment to South Korea compared to the other case studies.⁹⁷ With over 70 years of U.S. commitment, South Korea has exponentially benefited from U.S. support, leading multiple partners to support the country.⁹⁸

For South Korea's diplomatic and information instruments, it experienced strong growth from 1950 to 2021. At the beginning of the Korea War, South Korea was a corrupt government with little diplomatic and information capability. Bifurcated at the 38th parallel between the Communist North and the Democratic South, Korea had experienced several decades under the rule of the Japanese. With the division between north and south, South Korea's identity was relatively new, and the country had numerous internal problems when North Korea invaded in the summer of 1950. Though the U.S. backed South Korea, it had few allies in the region, very little diplomatic standing in the world community, and was a fragile and undeveloped democracy.⁹⁹

Within 70 years, South Korea transformed into one of the top soft powers in the world. Today, there are numerous soft power rankings that consistently include South

⁹⁷ DOS, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Korea,"; "Country Military Strength: South Korea, 2022," Global Firepower, accessed February 22, 2022, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=south-korea; Brand Finance, "Global Soft Power Index 2021," Brandirectory, accessed February 22, 2022, https://brandirectory-live-public.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/reports_free/brand-finance-global-soft-power-index-2021.pdf.

⁹⁸ DOS, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Korea,"; "South Korea Military Size 1985-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/military-army-size>; Robert K. Sawyer and Walter G. Hermes, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005).

⁹⁹ Ibid.; "Host Nation – Republic of Korea: International Contributions," United Nations Command, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.unc.mil/Organization/Contributors/>.

Korea in the top 20 countries. This includes the Portland Soft Power 30, the Lowey Diplomacy, and the Brand Finance World Soft Power Indexes. Additionally, South Korea continues to increase soft power. For instance, South Korea decreased its ranking from 22 to 19 within the last four years for the Soft Power 30. Much of South Korea's current increase in soft power resulted from national policies to support the U.S.'s partnerships around the world to deter adversaries. Over time, many South Korea's leaders attribute their exponential increase due to the massive U.S. whole-of-government commitment. This increase resulted in many consistently calling the South Korea the "Miracle on the Han River" due to its rapid economic growth after the Korean War.¹⁰⁰

Despite its small size and being on a peninsula, South Korea has expanded its diplomatic network, provides its own SFA in support U.N. mandates for fragile countries, and possesses a desired a culture. Before the Korean War, South Korea has little to no diplomatic relations besides with the U.S. Today, South Korea has diplomatic relations with over 180 countries.¹⁰¹ The country transformed from a corrupt, undeveloped country to one that regularly sends its military on diplomatic missions to assist with U.N. stability operations around this world. Poignantly, South Korean military forces regularly support U.N. SFA/SC missions with Italy and other European Advisory units to train the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), one of the other case studies for this paper. As for its

¹⁰⁰ Brand Finance, "Global Soft Power Index 2021," Portland, "South Korea," The Soft Power 30, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://softpower30.com/country/south-korea>; Lowy Institute, "Global Diplomacy Index," accessed February 25, 2022, <https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/#>; DOS, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Korea."

¹⁰¹ Lowy Institute, "Global Diplomacy Index."

culture and information, the world constantly desires it. With several very successful pop culture events like the award-winning *Parasite*, *Train to Busan*, *Old Boy*, and *Gangnam Style Dance*, South Korea is a cultural powerhouse that has great diplomatic and informational influence beyond its small, limited peninsula shores.¹⁰²

Militarily, South Korea transformed from a weak, underdeveloped 100,000 soldier strong military to one of the top militaries during the war. During the Korea War, the UNC established the KMAG with the mission of executing SFA to professionalize the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces. The KMAG was extremely successful as they trained over half a million South Koreans and increased the size of the ROK Army from 100,000 to over 200,000 while engaging with adversaries. Due to the KMAG's efforts, ROK forces bore the preponderance of fighting against communist forces by the end of the war, holding gains from 38th Parallel. Despite never being more than 2,000 advisors, the KMAG owed its success to making the ROK forces the best version of themselves and independent, not a mirror image of the U.S.¹⁰³

SFA for South Korea continued for the next 70 years with a unified command between the U.S. and ROK. With the ceasefire between North and South Korea, the KMAG and other UNC elements dissolved into the United States Forces Korea (USFK), a unified command between U.S. and ROK forces. To sustain unity of command and

¹⁰² “‘Gangnam’ Mania,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 20, 2012, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444620104578008230854641420>; Portland, “South Korea,”; Brand Finance, “Global Soft Power Index 2021.”

¹⁰³ DOS, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Korea,”; Burroughs, “The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States,”; Sawyer and Hermes, *Military Advisors in Korea*.

effort, the UNC and deputy commanders are U.S. and ROK leaders that have similar roles in both the UNC and USFK. For instance, the UNC and USFK commander is the same person. Since 1957, the USFK has supported the UNC through SFA with ROK Forces.¹⁰⁴ This included not only deterring North Korean and Chinese conventional aggression to the North, but also communist insurgencies within the country.¹⁰⁵ It appears that SFA and SC efforts had tremendous effect as the South Korea military size and spending grew to the over half a million people and \$40 billion dollars.¹⁰⁶ Through seventy years of training, advising, and assisting, ROK forces have become one of the most powerful militaries in the world and has taken lead on most USFK and UNC security efforts on the peninsula.

South Korea has become an economic powerhouse. Despite being an underdeveloped country in 1950, South Korea became the “Miracle on the Han River” as it became a developed country with a strong economy within a decade period after the Korean War.¹⁰⁷ This trend continued through the next 60 years with South Korea. There

¹⁰⁴ DOS, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Korea,”; Burroughs, “The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States,”; Sawyer and Hermes, *Military Advisors in Korea*; “Mission of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command,” United States Forces Korea, accessed February 25, 2022, <https://www.usfk.mil/About/Combined-Forces-Command/>; “Host Nation – Republic of Korea: International Contributions,” United Nations Command.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.; Burroughs, “The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States.”

¹⁰⁶ “South Korea Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2022,” Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/military-spending-defense-budget>.

¹⁰⁷ South Korea GDP 1960-2022,” Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/gdp-gross-domestic-product>; Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and Korean Culture and Information Service

are some decades in which South Korea had double-digit GDP growth for almost the entire decade.¹⁰⁸ Despite its small size and relatively obscure beginning, South Korea has transformed into an economic monster with great economic influence in the INDOPACOM AOR.¹⁰⁹

South Korea is an outlier case study, but such outliers can transform the HN and the world. It is a case study example that demonstrates how SFA with other SC activities can dramatically transform a HN, resulting in the betterment of the nation and larger region. Even though a repeat of South Korea is improbably, it is not impossible. It will probably require several conditions like the HN's Clausewitzian's trinity being politically aligned with U.S. interests and facing both internal and external existential threats. Despite this paper originally assessed another Korean case study to be impossible, the current 2022 Ukraine-Russian War provides another succinct example. In a similar way to South Korea, Ukraine's Clausewitzian trinity aligns with U.S. and NATO political interests.¹¹⁰

(KOCIS), "The Korean Economy – the Miracle on the Hangang River," Korea.net, accessed February 25, 2022, <https://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Economy/The-Miracle-on-The-Hangang>.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.; "South Korea Economic Growth 1960-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/economic-growth-rate>.

¹⁰⁹ KOCIS, "The Korean Economy."

¹¹⁰ Zack Beauchamp, "Why the First Few Days of War in Ukraine Went Badly for Russia," *Vox*, February 28, 2022, <https://www.vox.com/22954833/russia-ukraine-invasion-strategy-putin-kyiv>; U.S. Department of State (DOS), "U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine," (Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, May 24, 2022), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/#:~:text=Since>

Ukraine’s shocking frustration of Russia’s initial objectives during the conflict highlights how SC will probably become increasingly important in the future. The 2014 Ukrainian military would not have had the same showing as the U.S. and its allies transformed the Ukrainian security forces with \$2.7 billion over 8 years of equipping, training, advising, and assisting.¹¹¹ Even more importantly, Ukraine’s performance during this conflict caused Russia’s invasion to backfire, deteriorating Putin’s and Xi’s narrative to undermine the current rules-based international order. Representing democracy, Ukraine has galvanized the world against revisionist actors.¹¹²

SOUTHCOM: Colombia (1980-2020)

Though not as strong as South Korea, Colombia had positive trends across DIME. It is also a case study that involved a country that faced its greatest challenges from internal non-state adversaries. Despite numerous non-state entities such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Pablo Escobar causing instability within the region, Colombia transformed into a relatively stable, regional power. Through SC, the U.S. helped with this transformation as the DOS took lead. It employed various U.S. agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Drug Enforcement Agency

%202014%2C%20%E2%80%8Bthe%20U.S.,and%20improve%20interoperability%20with%20NATO.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Chris Fitzgerald, “Why The Russian Invasion of Ukraine Has Galvanized the International Community,” *Geopolitical Monitor*, March 1, 2022, <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/why-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-has-galvanized-the-international-community/>; Beauchamp, “Why the First Few Days of War in Ukraine Went Badly for Russia.”

(DEA), and the DOD to achieve U.S.'s and Colombia's shared political ends. Under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador, the DOS exercised an effective unity of effort to achieve U.S. objectives.

U.S. SFA efforts within Colombia faced many challenges such as the most powerful criminal in human history, Pablo Escobar, the drug trade that continued to degrade Colombia's legitimacy even after Escobar's death, and the FARC insurgency that attempted to overthrow the legitimate Colombian government.¹¹³ Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Colombia was a place where a drug king in jail was more powerful than the Colombian President.¹¹⁴ Due to consistent U.S. commitment to the country over 40 years, Colombia has become a regional power.

Colombia's diplomatic and informational national power has seen a relatively modest increase, but it faced many challenges to get there. Due to its instability in the last quarter of the 20th Century, Colombia has been more focused on domestic politics than increasing its international diplomatic power. Aligning itself with the U.S. during the Cold War, Colombia has received decades of commitment from the U.S. and support

¹¹³ June S. Beittel, *Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R43813 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, last updated December 16, 2021), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R43813.pdf>; U.S. Department of State (DOS), "U.S. Relations with Colombia," (Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, July 19, 2021), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-colombia/#:~:text=Law%20Enforcement%20and%20Security%20Cooperation,the%20citizens%20of%20both%20countries>; Amy Tikkanen, "Pablo Escobar: Colombian Criminal," *Britannica*, last updated January 1, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pablo-Escobar>.

¹¹⁴ Steven Gutkin, "DEA Agent Attacks Colombia as 'Narco-Democracy'," *The Washington Post*, October 1, 1994, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/10/01/dea-agent-attacks-colombia-as-narco-democracy/410189e6-0878-48b9-925a-127ce47148f1/>.

from international organizations such as the UN and OAS. Despite this support, Colombia essentially became a narco-democracy in the 1980s and 90s. During this time, Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state run by drug cartels such as the Medellin and Cali Cartels.¹¹⁵ Becoming the major suppliers of cocaine throughout the world, these cartels increased instability within the region and even within the U.S., resulting in the number of deaths due to cocaine increasing sixfold over 30 years.¹¹⁶

Escobar and the Drug Cartels were not the only non-state adversary that Colombia had to overcome to increase its diplomatic and informational power. During the 20th Century, the FARC executed an insurgency within Colombia, dramatically decreasing the Colombian government's instruments of national power and ability to govern its borders. With mostly civilians caught in the crossfire, over 220,000 people died in the decade-long conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government. Additionally, over 10,000 death or injuries occurred due to FARC IEDs and more than 17 percent of the Colombian population has officially registered as a victim because of Colombian Government and FARC engagements. With all this instability within the country and region from non-state adversaries, Colombia was very weak diplomatically and informationally, tarnishing its international standing.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Beittel, *Colombia*; DOS, "U.S. Relations with Colombia."

¹¹⁶ Margaret Warner, Li Hui Chen, Diane Makuc, Robert Anderson, and Arialdi Minino, "Drug Poisoning Deaths in the United States, 1980-2008," (NCHS Data Brief No. 81, National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Washington, DC, December 2011), <https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db81.htm>.

¹¹⁷ Beittel, *Colombia*.

With 40 years of U.S. SFA and SC commitment with various government agencies achieving unity of effort under the U.S. Ambassador, Colombia increased its diplomatic and informational power. As Colombia used to be a *nacrodemocracy* run by the drug cartel while also fighting a civil war with the FARC, the country now enjoys relative peace and stability.¹¹⁸ This internal stability allows it to increase its diplomatic and informational capabilities, becoming a regional power.¹¹⁹ For instance, Colombia's soft power consistently has increased allowing it to be in the top 60 countries for soft power within the world. Regionally, it has become one of the top four soft power states while also becoming one of the top Brand Finance Tier 2 Soft Power countries.¹²⁰ While doing all this, it has decreased the drug trade, almost cutting it in half and increased the appeal of Colombia's culture.¹²¹ Another powerful example is Disney setting its new movie, *Encanto*, in Colombia as a sign more people embrace Colombian culture internationally and recognize Colombia's soft power progress.¹²² This becomes even

¹¹⁸ Burroughs, "The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States," 60-70.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 58-60.

¹²⁰ Brand Finance, "Global Soft Power Index 2021."

¹²¹ John Brennan, Scott Jackson, and Mike Sullivan, "1st SFC(A) and SFAC: The Indigenous Approach," February 11, 2021, Apple Podcasts, 39:00, <https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/1st-sfc-a-and-sfac/id1534621849?i=1000508753675>; Niall McCarthy, "The Globe's Top Cocaine Producers," Statista, September 7, 2016, <https://www.statista.com/chart/5749/the-globes-top-cocaine-producers/>.

¹²² José María Luna, "Disney's Encanto Isn't Just about Representation - It's an Act of Defiance," *Polygon*, December 27, 2021, <https://www.polygon.com/22851932/encanto-disney-latine-colombia-in-movies>.

more evident as the movie's song *We Don't Talk about Bruno* has become the number one most popular Disney song ever, influencing a global generation of children.¹²³

Colombia saw a strong increase in military power. Within 40 years, the military went from a relatively ineffective and corrupt organization to a very professional force.¹²⁴ This is reflective of how the Colombia military has grown from 66,000 to over 450,000 within a 20 period while exponentially increasing its military spending from \$1 to over \$10 billion.¹²⁵ With both monetary, training, and advising support through SFA, numerous U.S. agencies applied a whole-of-government approach that enabled the Colombian security forces to defeat the FARC insurgency, allowing the Colombian government to relatively reintegrate them back into society.¹²⁶ Additionally, the Colombia security forces became more effective against the drug trade, cutting the

¹²³ Marisa Dellatto, “‘We Don’t Talk about Bruno’ Hits No. 1-Only the 2nd Song from Disney Animated Film to Hit The Top Spot,” *Forbes*, February 1, 2022, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisadellatto/2022/01/31/we-dont-talk-about-bruno-hits-no-1-only-the-2nd-disney-song-to-hit-the-top-spot/?sh=aa3aaa268bfc>.

¹²⁴ Brennan, Jackson, and Sullivan, “The 1st SFC(A) and SFAC.”

¹²⁵ Burroughs, “The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States,” 60-70.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 58-60.

amount of cocaine production in half for almost a decade.¹²⁷ These actions not only brought stability and security to Colombia but to the larger Latin American region.¹²⁸

Colombia also saw a dramatic increase in its economic capability. Potentially due to the increased stability within the region, Colombia saw its GDP increase from \$33.4 billion to over \$270 billion dollars due to consistent almost double-digit growth. Its GDP per capita also increased exponentially from approximately \$1,000 to over \$8,000 within the same time period, resulting in Colombia developing a middle class within the country.¹²⁹

CENTCOM: Lebanon (2007-2020)

Before the Lebanese Civil War, the world viewed the capital of Lebanon, Beirut, as the Paris of the Middle East and a regional soft power giant.¹³⁰ After the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah and Syria essentially controlled Lebanon's internal and external policy, increasing its instability and dramatically decreasing its soft power within the

¹²⁷ Burroughs, "The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States," 60-70; McCarthy, "The Globe's Top Cocaine Producers."

¹²⁸ DOS, "U.S. Relations with Colombia,"; Burroughs, "The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States," 60-70.

¹²⁹ "Colombia GDP 1960-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COL/colombia/gdp-gross-domestic-product>; "Colombia GDP Growth Rate 1961-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COL/colombia/gdp-growth-rate>.

¹³⁰ Tom Joyner, "The Most Dire Collapse the World Has Seen - Worse than the Great Depression - Is Happening in This Country," *ABC News*, August 4, 2021, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-08-04/lebanons-collapse-continues-one-year-after-beirut-blast/100343112>.

Middle East and the Mediterranean. Since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War with Israel and Hezbollah, the U.S. and Lebanon have taken a more cooperative partnership. This shift in partnership demonstrated that key elements of Lebanon like the LAF and a good portion of its population aligned with U.S. interests instead of other state and non-state adversaries within the region.

Additionally, U.S. SFA combined with multi-national support dramatically transformed the LAF into a professional force representative of all the population, capable of enabling the government to employ all aspects of national power. This transformation was essential for the last decade as the LAF competed not only with Hezbollah but also with of ISIS's rise to power. In juxtaposition to Iraq's response to ISIS, SFA allowed the LAF to become a counterweight to both state and non-state adversaries in the region. Today, Lebanon is on the verge of economic collapse due to the 2020 Beirut port explosion, wiping away the last decade of national power progression.¹³¹ Despite these challenges, it appears that a small SFA presence backed by \$2 billion of SC over 16 years provided Lebanon with more agency in the face of numerous state and non-state adversaries and continues to keep Lebanon from becoming a failing state.¹³²

¹³¹ Carla E. Humud, *Lebanon*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R44759 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, April 21, 2021), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44759>; Bilal Y. Saab, "The United States Has Not Lost Lebanon," *Foreign Policy*, May 8, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/08/dont-scrap-washingtons-lebanon-policy-its-working/>; Brennan, Jackson, and Sullivan, "1st SFC(A) and SFAC,"; Joyner, "The Most Dire Collapse the World Has Seen."

¹³² Humud, *Lebanon*; Saab, "The United States Has Not Lost Lebanon,"; Brennan, Jackson, and Sullivan, "The 1st SFC(A) and SFAC."

Since the 2006 Lebanon War, Lebanon experienced a moderate increase in diplomatic and informational power. At the end of the 2006 War, Lebanon was at a low comparable to its Civil War. It was essentially a political battleground between greater regional powers such as Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia attempting to indirectly control the country through numerous non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Shia political groups.¹³³ Lebanon also had a terrible relationship with its other neighbors, especially Israel as Hezbollah caused the 2006 war through continued missile strikes into Israeli territory. Additionally, no soft power index even considered Lebanon on list and its SFI listed Lebanon as the 24th most fragile state in the world, making it a failing state in the alert category.¹³⁴

Since the U.S. applied the SFA and SC, Lebanon has experienced a moderate increase in its diplomatic and informational power because of an increase in stability and capability to increase its own agencies in the face of numerous state and non-state actors.¹³⁵ In juxtaposition to 2006, Lebanon has seen its SFI oscillate from 28 to 46 down to 40, ensuring that it is no longer a failing state and in the USAID SFI warning instead of alert category.¹³⁶ Additionally, it appears this relative stability increase allowed

¹³³ Saab, “The United States Has Not Lost Lebanon.”

¹³⁴ Brand Finance, “Global Soft Power Index 2021,”; The Fund for Peace, “Country Dashboard,” Fragile States Index, accessed March 6, 2022, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>.

¹³⁵ U.S. Department of State (DOS), “U.S. Security Cooperation with Lebanon,” (Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, May 21, 2021), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-lebanon/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20has%20invested,August%202020%20Beirut%20port%20explosion.>

¹³⁶ The Fund for Peace, “Country Dashboard.”

Lebanon to have more agency despite Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Hezbollah attempting to run the country.¹³⁷ Indicative of this shift is the breakdown in relationships between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon as the diverse Lebanese political groups desired to seek their own destiny. Finally, the Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index did not include Lebanon on the top 100 list until 2021, indicating that despite its numerous challenges from ISIS and Hezbollah to over a million Syria refugees, Lebanon continued to increase its soft power in the region.¹³⁸

Even though SFA has no relationship, the Lebanese diaspora has and continues to increase Lebanon's diplomatic and informational power around the world. Whereas Columbia as an example of the cocaine drug trade being a non-state actor that destabilizes the world, the Lebanese diaspora is the opposite. Known as one of the more successful and influential diasporas in the world, Lebanon has anywhere from 4-14 million people in Africa, North and South Americas, and Europe. Despite most of them not knowing Arabic, the Lebanese diaspora influences many Western Nations including the United States with Lebanese culture and values, increasing those nations' prosperity. Famous American examples include Ralph Nader, Mark Esper, John Abizaid, Salma Hayek, Nassim Taleb. The diaspora goes on to include numerous heads of state, cultural icons, and prominent academics from nations across four continents. Even though the

¹³⁷ Humud, *Lebanon*; Saab, "The United States Has Not Lost Lebanon."

¹³⁸ Brand Finance, "Global Soft Power Index 2021."

country of Lebanon may still be in turmoil, its culture and values continue to indirectly influence the world for the better.¹³⁹

Despite numerous challenges, a small SFA element set the theater and helped transform the LAF into a professional force capable of contending with multiple state and non-state adversaries and disasters. After the 2006 Lebanon War, the military was corrupt and incapable of maintaining security for the country. Using old equipment, training, tactics, the LAF did not represent the diverse Lebanese population. Its incompetence during the 2006 Lebanese War demonstrated to the region Hezbollah's supremacy, inspiring Lebanese political groups to support it.¹⁴⁰ Recognizing these problems, the Lebanese government asked for U.S. SC in addition to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIF-Lebanon). With both SOF and conventional advising from various nations, SFA units transformed the LAF into a professional force. Additionally, the Lebanese Government followed the advice of the DOS and ensure LAF represented the entire Lebanese population, increasing its legitimacy within the country.

These qualitative changes coupled with increased SC and Lebanon doubling its military spending facilitated Lebanon's military transformation. Over 16 years, the LAF remained at 80,000 personnel, but its military spending more than doubled from \$1.15 to \$2.51 billion.¹⁴¹ The increased spending from the Lebanese government along with the

¹³⁹ Elissa Haddad, "The Lebanese Diaspora: An Exploration of Assimilation and Success in the United States," (Thesis, University of San Diego, 2018), abstract, 190-245.

¹⁴⁰ Humud, *Lebanon*, 19-23; Saab, "The United States Has Not Lost Lebanon."

¹⁴¹ "Lebanon GDP 1988-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/LBN/lebanon/gdp-gross-domestic-product>;

increase in U.S. SC set conditions for both SOF and conventional SFA units to transform the LAF into a professional force.¹⁴² This set conditions for the LAF to successfully deal with a humanitarian crisis consisting of over 1 million IDPs caused by the Syrian conflict, contain the rise of ISIS to Syria and defeat both its state and non-state offenses into the country, and act as a political counterbalance to Hezbollah within Lebanon.¹⁴³ Many Lebanese political leaders such as the President come from the LAF and act as a political counterweight to Hezbollah's and by extension Iran's influence within the country. Even with the Lebanese government struggling, many external and internal entities view the LAF as the glue keeping the Lebanese government together.¹⁴⁴

Economically, SFA appeared to have an exponential increase until the 2020 Beirut Explosion. Due to its small size, Lebanon does not have redundant economic institutions and systems with the Beirut Port containing the preponderance of economic capability. While the port was still operational from 2006 to 2020, Lebanon's economy essentially doubled creating a small period of prosperity.¹⁴⁵ As with South Korea and Colombia, it appears that Lebanon experienced a rise of the pyramid for Maslow's

"Lebanon GDP Growth Rate 1989-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/LBN/lebanon/gdp-growth-rate>.

¹⁴² "2022 Military Strength Ranking," Global Firepower.

¹⁴³ Nerguizian, *The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah and the Race to Defeat ISIS*, 19-23; Saab, "The United States Has Not Lost Lebanon."

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ "Lebanon Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/LBN/lebanon/military-spending-defense-budget>.

Hierarchy of Needs. With security forces become more professional and maintain a HN's internal security, then a HN becomes more stable satisfying the basics needs of the population allowing other aspects of DIME to flourish. This could explain why HNs that experience a decrease in the SFI will also see an increase in DIME simultaneously. Given how devastating the Beirut Port 2020 explosion was for Lebanon, it also appears that only the LAF and SC are only things that keep Lebanon from becoming a failed state again.¹⁴⁶

EUCOM/AFRICOM: Somalia (1990-2020)

Somalia is a case study of a bad partner in which almost all aspects of its Clausewitzian trinity do not align with U.S. interests. Even though it did not have very strong diplomatic and informational power before 1990, Somalia has loss almost all its soft power influence due to its ongoing civil war. Before Somalia became a battleground between various tribes, VEOs, and the Somalian government, it was an autocracy that ruled with absolute control. With the end of the Cold War, Somalia lost a great deal of SFA/SC from the Soviet Union, causing conditions for the central leadership to lose power with the various groups. This resulted in a humanitarian crisis of over 100,000 people persisting, forcing the U.S. to be involved. The U.S. shifted to a direct action (DA) approach with TF Ranger to support United Nations Missions in Somalia (UNSOM I and II). With the disastrous results of the Black Hawk Down, the U.S. has continued to oscillate between a SC and DA approach with the attempt to contain the country's

¹⁴⁶ Nerguizian, *The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah and the Race to Defeat ISIS*,”; Humud, *Lebanon*, 19-23; Saab, “The United States Has Not Lost Lebanon.”

instability from completely spilling over in the region, which is in an essential global economic choke point.¹⁴⁷

Somalia has even less diplomatic or informational power today than what little it had in 1990. Compared to the other case studies, at least one of the many soft power indexes will rank each of them. The opposite appears true with Somalia as it is absent from all searchable soft power indexes.¹⁴⁸ Additionally, Somalia consistently ranks at the bottom of the USAID SFI, being in the top five most unstable countries in the world for more than a decade.¹⁴⁹ As discussed with the Lebanon and Columbia case studies, there appears to demonstrate a strong relationship between stability and diplomatic and informational power. Since it has been in a state of civil war for almost two decades, Somalia lacks the institutional capacity to improve its soft power.¹⁵⁰

In a similar manner to soft power, Somalia experienced a strong decrease in military power. Before its Civil War, Somalia had an average military that could control its borders.¹⁵¹ Currently, it ranks well below average at 139 of 142 countries in the world

¹⁴⁷ Burroughs, “The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States,” 51-61; Knowles and Matissek. “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” 10-21.

¹⁴⁸ Branch Finance, “Global Soft Power Index, 2021.”

¹⁴⁹ J. J. Messner, “Fragile States Index 2014: Somalia Displaced as Most-Fragile State,” The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, June 24, 2014, <https://fundforpeace.org/2014/06/24/failed-states-index-2014-somalia-displaced-as-most-fragile-state/>.

¹⁵⁰ Burroughs, “The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States,” 51-61; Knowles and Matissek. “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” 11-12.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

according to the Global Firepower Index. It also continues to decrease based on Somalia's instability. Additionally, the Somali military cannot control its own borders. There are at least four other factions that claim sovereignty in Somalia besides the national government, various tribes, and VEOs within the region.¹⁵² These conditions reflect Somalia's military trends over twenty years. For instance, Somalia's 225,000 military dramatically decreased to approximately 20,000 and its military spending from 1990 to 2013 was completely dependent on foreign assistance.¹⁵³

Somalia's increase in economic power is an anomaly. Despite an ongoing civil war for almost two decades, Somalia's economy more than tripled from \$1 billion to almost \$5 billion.¹⁵⁴ There is little to nothing written about Somalia's economy growth despite numerous issues. Despite the hesitation to attribute Somalia's growth to a rising tide raises all boats argument, it is difficult to ascertain any other alternative to explain such an economic increase. This key location, the increase in globalization, and the capitalism effect on the world probably increased Somalia's GDP despite its instability.

¹⁵² Knowles and Matisek. "Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States," 11-12; "2022 Military Strength Ranking," Global Firepower.

¹⁵³ "Somalia Military Size 1985-2022." Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/SOM/somalia/military-army-size>; "Somalia Military Spending/Defense Budget 1961-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/SOM/somalia/military-spending-defense-budget>; U.S. Department of State (DOS), "U.S. Relations with Somalia," (Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of African Affairs, April 15, 2021), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-somalia/>.

¹⁵⁴ "Somalia GDP 1960-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/SOM/somalia/gdp-gross-domestic-product>; "Somalia GDP Growth Rate 1961-2022," Macrotrends, accessed February 22, 2022. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/SOM/somalia/gdp-growth-rate>.

Summary

Based on case studies, it appears there is a strong relationship between SFA, stability, and a HN's national power. The most critical aspect of this relationship appears to be whether the U.S. has chosen the right partner. This makes sense since SFA is about relationships and having the right partner is critical to maximize the effects of SFA for national power. DIME changes appear to be proportional to how good of a partner the HN is in each case study. Again, a good partner appears to be one in which its Clausewitzian trinity aligns with U.S. interests and the rules-based international order's democratic values. As seen with Lebanon, Colombia, and South Korea, this HN trinity can become more aligned with those interests and values. The lack of attraction in Somalia is probably one of the reasons why SFA had limited effect.

Partnership leads to posture and a position of advantage for both the U.S. and the HN. With the SFA supported by SC helping to increase a HN's stability and DIME, the HN can become more of a regional or international power that supports the rules-based international order. Colombia is the best example which was fraught with numerous non-state adversaries. With U.S. SFA, Colombia defeated most of them and helped increase democratic influence within the region. With this increase in influence, the U.S. and the rules-based international order increased its posture and position through partnership with minimal cost. Even if the U.S. cannot achieve a decisive position, it can at least negate an adversary's previous decisive position as with the LAF in Lebanon.

SFA empowers a HN's whole-of-government, not just security forces. In South Korea, Lebanon, and Colombia, the SFA units had unity of command under different U.S. agencies, but also empowered the larger governmental institutions that support those

security forces. Diplomatically, informationally, and economically, the U.S. can deter both state and non-state adversaries with supply chains connected to Build Back Better Program (B3W). Who the U.S. partners with sends a message to the world about the rules-based international order's democratic values. Additionally, many nations do not have the same bureaucratic division between political and military entities like the U.S., leading relationship building between SFA units and a HN military to have local political effects as well. For instance, numerous Lebanese, Colombia, and South Korean political leader received U.S. SFA during their military service. These politicians and their supporters appear to act as a political counterweight to deter numerous state and non-state actors in the gray zone that attempt to coerce HNs to their agenda.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of war is to make a better peace.

—Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, “Introduction,” in *Strategy*

It will not be easy, there will be costs... the darkness that drives autocracy is ultimately no match for the flame of liberty that lights the souls of free people everywhere.

—President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Remarks on the United Efforts of the Free World to Support the People of Ukraine, 2022

Introduction

The American Way of War is still suitable but lost some of its efficacy because our adversaries have adapted to it. In response to the tremendous U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence such as Desert Storm, state and non-state adversaries target host nation Will to Fight in the gray zone during competition to achieve advantageous positions that will shape future crises and conflicts. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the 31st Anniversary of Desert Storm ground campaign, the U.S. and rules-based international order awakens to a possible New Cold War between democracy and autocracy.¹⁵⁵ Given how autocratic state and non-state adversaries employ a strategy of flow to undermine the rules-based international order, the U.S. must empower its current and potential allies while operating in a budget constraint environment. By using security force assistance (SFA) and security cooperation (SC) as a strategy of flow to collision through Kilcullen’s proposed Go Byzantine Strategy, the U.S. can empower a democratically aligned web of

¹⁵⁵ This paper uses the term democracy to include all democratic constitutional republics and similar forms of government.

nations (DAWN) while deterring autocratic adversaries in terms of nuclear, conventional, and gray zone credibility and capability.¹⁵⁶ SFA and SC will be essential to the American Way of War and strategic competition as partnership can lead to improved posture and position, but first the U.S. must choose the right partner. This paper applied its research questions from Chapter 1 for its Literature Review, Analysis, and Conclusions. Using a case study methodology, it analyzed how SFA is essential to both deterrence but also how it applies to the American Way of War. Based on the Literature Review, this paper acknowledges two major points. First, the Western and Eastern ways of war are strategies of flow and collision respectively. Second, that there are national and international legal definitions of war that limit it to just conflict on the conflict continuum, but most actors act as if war is the entire continuum across DIME.

Conclusions

Security Force Assistance and Deterrence, Partnership, and Posture

There are four conclusions that align with the above research questions. The first and most critical conclusion is that choosing the right partner is essential for maximizing SFA effects. As described in Chapter 4, this paper observed a DIME increase for three of the four case studies with one being an exponential increase. Additionally, if it was not for the disastrous 2020 Beirut Port Explosion, all three of those case studies would have seen a strong or exponential increase in DIME. This demonstrates the first finding that

¹⁵⁶ Kilcullen, *Dragons and the Snakes*, 200-230. Kilcullen proposes in his book that the rules-based international order should adopt a Byzantine Grand Strategy. This paper proposed to call it a Go Byzantine Strategy because it follows Kilcullen's proposal and it is a play on the game Go.

choosing the right partner is critical for SFA and SC. As depicted by Figure 20, the right partner is an actor whose Clausewitzian trinity of society, government, and military are willing to embrace democratic values while also aligning with U.S. interests. Although an anomaly, South Korea is an example of an outlier that can affect the world. With its Clausewitzian trinity aligning with U.S. interest while receiving over 70 years of SC, South Korea transformed from an undeveloped country to an international powerhouse that influences the entire global. Though this paper originally assessed another outlier as improbable, Ukraine has become one as it represents democracy in the current conflict.

By picking the right partner, it appears the U.S. increases that partner's credibility and capability across the DIME spectrum. This also furthers the U.S.-led international order's position, allowing it to achieve a position of advantage through the DIME spectrum or denying adversaries one. As our adversaries employ a strategy of flow to degrade an actor's Will to Fight during competition, SFA can build capability and credibility essential for deterrence, American Way of War, and policy.

Second, Security force assistance and cooperation are not magic bullets. Though SFA and SC are low cost compared to RAF deployments, CSGs, and other means, it does not preclude it from disastrous results. Picking a poor partner such as Somalia after the civil war began can result in a continuous sunk cost for the U.S. government and its allies. Despite almost 20 years of oscillating strategy for Somalia, the U.S. continues to struggle with the conflict. Somalia saw a dramatic decrease in DIME probably because it is not a good partner. At best, the U.S. and its allies have adopted a strategy of containment to prevent the Somalian Civil War from destabilizing the region.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS				
Case	Diplomatic/ Information	Military	Economic	DIME Overall
South Korea- 1950-2020	+	+	+	+
Columbia 1980s-2020	+	+	+	+
Lebanon 2007- 2020	+	+	+=	+
Somalia 1990-2020	-	-	+	-


Legend

Purple- Exponential Increase
 Dark Green- Strong Increase
 Light Green- Moderate Increase
 Yellow- No Change
 Dark Red- Strong Decrease

DIME Micro Breakdown
Diplomatic and Information- Mix of qualitative and quantitative trends relying on the Soft Power 30/100 and Lowy Global Diplomacy Indexes and historical observations.
Military- Mix of qualitative and quantitative trends such as historical observations, global firepower ranking, and military spending and size.
Economic- Quantitative trends focusing on Nominal GDP and growth


Figure 18. Case Study Analysis Results

Source: Created by author.



United States Command and General Staff Office
College Masters in Military Art and Science

Go Byzantine: Empower the Right Partners and the Rules-Based International Order to Build the Team Before Conflict




Findings:

- Pick the right partner to support the American Way of War (AWoW) and Policy.
- SFA/SC is not a magic bullet.
- Unity of command is a major issue.
- SFA/SC increase DIME position through integrated deterrence and campaigning

Recommendations

- Adopt Kilcullen's Go Byzantine Strategy to prevent or shape conflicts for the AWoW.
- Need a DIME and "Will to Fight" assessment.
- Update U.S. and MN doctrine.




Authoritarianism is on the global march, and we must join with like-minded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over.

-INSSG: Go Byzantine through democratically aligned web of nations (DAWN)


"America's armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over two centuries they have, during the same period engaged in several hundred military undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations"

Lawrence A. Yates, The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1782005


Exponential DIME Increase Strong DIME Increase Modest DIME Increase Strong DIME Decrease




South Korea



Colombia



Lebanon



Somalia

"OUR COMPETITION MAY BE OUR PARTNER'S CONFLICT, BUT THEIR CURRENT CONFLICT COULD BE OUR FUTURE CRISIS"

SFA/SC OE Shaping




Figure 19. Go Byzantine: How Security Force Assistance is Essential for the American Way of War and Deterrence is Strategic Competition

Source: Created by author.




Figure 20. Right Partner Consisting of Clausewitzian Trinity of People, Government, and Military

Source: Created by author based on McNerney, Michael, Ben Connable, S. Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Marek Posard, Jasen Castillo, Dan Madden, Ilana Blum, Aaron B. Frank, Benjamin J. Fernandes, In Hyo Seol, Christopher Paul, and Andrew Parasiliti. *National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don't* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 110, <https://doi.org/10.7249/rr2477> and peer feedback from A221.





Figure 21. Go Byzantine Strategy to Shape the Character of Current and Future Conflicts

Source: Created by author.



Colored countries on the left represent where the U.S. executes current conventional SC operations. Darker countries on the right represent which countries get the most from \$1,000 of U.S. SC. The red circles represent key economic choke points that involve approximately 70% of world trade. **Potentially good partners are those in darker colors or in white, around the red circles already receiving SC. Provide more options to good partners.**

2

Figure 22. Potential Right Partners

Source: Created by author.

Unity of Effort

The third conclusion is that unity of command is the biggest issue for unity of effort regarding SFA and SC. As with choosing the right partner, the U.S. will constantly have to employ a comprehensive approach as multiple allies will also train host nations. For example, in the Lebanon case study, U.S. SOF and conventional advisors had to work with the UNIF-Lebanon mission involving Italian, South Korean, Colombian, and other militaries. Additionally, U.S. forces will advise under different authorities with different U.S. agencies taking lead based on the mission. All these entities executed SFA and SC simultaneously with Lebanon and with a constant requirement for coordination to prevent information and SFA fratricide. Though not impossible, the lack of unity of command made it exponentially more difficult Lebanon to increase HN capability and capacity.

When the U.S. accomplishes this coordination correctly or when a U.S. agency has unity of commands like the UNC/USFK with South Korea or the Embassy with Colombia, SFA can maximize its effectiveness. In the face of both state and non-state existential threats, South Korea is the clearest case study for unity of command and effort. The KMAG and later USFK exercised absolute unity of command for SFA efforts through the Korean War and later the armistice. Additionally, those commands were combined commands that focused on South Korea being independent while participating in the SFA process. This unity of command and effort with the HN in comparison to Somalia, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, highlights how SFA is just like any other operation and requires a great deal of synchronization to achieve political objectives. The difficulty with unity of effort highlights the need for CCMDs and DOS to work together to achieve both the CCMD campaign plans and DOS integrated country strategies simultaneously despite possible different priorities for the same objective to support the President's INSSG. In the 21st Century, SFA and SC requires a comprehensive approach to maximize unity of effort to achieve political ends.

Setting a Theater with a Smaller Footprint

For the fourth conclusion, there is strong quantitative evidence that SFA enables a theater army to set a theater by increasing HN capability and credibility to either prevent conflict or shape an operational environment that is fortuitous for the American Way of War. As with picking the right partner in the right location being the most critical aspect of SFA, the U.S. can improve its posture within a region to achieve or maintain a decisive position with a small footprint. Regardless of the DIME result, all case studies eventually were able to employ a smaller footprint because of SFA units. This was especially true

for Lebanon and Colombia. In those case studies, the U.S. only employed a small force over decades through numerous government agencies to improve the host nation. SFA units in these case studies allowed the U.S. increased access within the region that has and can continue to influence the respective CCMD's theater posture plans. Additionally, these small forces empowered their respective case studies to become more independent and act as a counterweight to adversarial influences within their respective regions. Recognized as a legitimate and professional organization by the international community, the Lebanese Armed Forces act as a counterweight to Hezbollah, ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other autocratic influences in the region. In a similar manner, Colombian security forces helped transform it from a narcodemocracy to defeating the FARC and reducing the cocaine trade. With the right partners, the U.S. can employ a small low-cost effective comprehensive approach to prevent conflicts or shape operational environments.

Although not a case study, this paper must acknowledge how Ukraine in the current context dramatically supports how a CCMD can set a theater with a smaller footprint. Despite only receiving \$2 billion of SC and receiving 8 years of SFA from approximately 2,000 advisors, Ukraine unexpectedly frustrated the Russian military efforts to quickly oust President Zelenskyy and capture Kyiv. Though time will tell, this Kyiv Miracle probably could not have occurred without those eight years of SFA. In juxtaposition to Iraq and Afghanistan in which the HN's Will to Fight dissipated relatively quickly despite decades of SFA and SC, Ukraine held its own against the second most powerful military in the world with little military help besides SC from the outside world. By increasing both credibility and capability in Ukraine, the U.S. has

shaped the current conflict to be fortuitous for its mass DIME attrition strategy as it wages a diplomatic, informational, and economic war on Russia.

It appears that picking the right partner can help shape an operational environment to be fortuitous for a strategy of annihilation or attrition like the American Way of War with a smaller footprint. Since a HN's credibility or Will to Fight is most malleable before conflict, SFA units appear to be the best means of military power to set a theater to prevent or shape conflict. If the U.S. builds a friendly actor's Will to Fight before conflict, then conflicts will become one of attrition or annihilation instead of exhaustion or dislocation. With a small force of a few hundred or less in Lebanon and Colombia and persistent commitment, SFA units shaped the operational environment in those regions. With Colombia, U.S. government agencies helped Colombia become a regional power while reducing the influence of numerous non-state adversaries. For Lebanon, it was even more pronounced. Under the Ambassador and CCMD CDR, advisors transformed the LAF, preventing the spread of Al-Qaeda and ISIS while dealing with a humanitarian crisis and countering the influence of Hezbollah.

When applying the same lens to Ukraine, SFA helped shaped an operational environment that may not have deterred Russia but became advantageous American Way of War and Policy. Though not legally or militarily at war with Russia, the U.S. has successfully waged a DIME war to isolate Russia at the geopolitical and strategic level in concert with Ukrainian galvanizing the democratic world against revisionist powers. When the U.N. security council voted to condemn Russia's aggression, over 140 joined Ukraine and the West while only five nations voted with Russia. The Russian economy is in shambles as the Russian currency is only a fraction of its value from months ago.

Finally, the U.S. has won the narrative war, carefully releasing the truth about Russia's intentions before its misinformation campaign could take effect. This alerted the democratic media to the nature of the conflict before Russia could control the narrative. Though the American Way of War has been successful so far at the strategic level for this conflict, its success rests on a Ukrainian foundation consisting of the Will to Fight and DIME capability. Without helping to build Ukraine's capability and credibility before conflict, the American Way of War would have been less effective, possibly failing to increase U.S. influence while allowing Russia to undermine the rules-based international order.

Recommendations

Based on the findings, this paper recommends that the U.S. should employ a Byzantine like strategy to support the American Way of War and policy while establishing a Combined Joint Train, Advise, and Assist Headquarters to proactively operationalize SC globally. The U.S. should employ a flow-to-collision grand strategy, or Kilcullen's Go Byzantine, to build a Democratically Aligned Web of Nations (DAWN) with the aims to prevent and shape conflicts to be fortuitous for the American Way of War and policy. As demonstrated by the figure, "Go Byzantine: How Security Force Assistance is Essential for the American Way of War and Deterrence is Strategic Competition," the U.S. already has the foundational means for this grand strategy. Already employs SFA units in the highlighted countries around the world, the U.S. should prioritize SFA/SC operations with the right partners around the areas in red circles. Those red circles represent key LOCs that represent up to 70 percent of the world's trade. Ergo, China's unrestricted warfare such as the Belt and Road initiative

attempts to either economically coerce countries around these LOCs or build new ones controlled by China. By empowering DAWN, especially through SFA/SC, the U.S. and its allies can provide another option to potential allies globally. For instance, the B3W should incentive potential actors, further countering revisionist strategies like the Belt and Road Initiative.

Go Byzantine does not require a dramatic change to the current U.S. Way of War or its ways and means. It requires SFA/SC to be proactive not reactionary. To prevent and shape future conflicts, the Go Byzantine Grand Strategy will require a comprehensive approach. In many regions of the globe, the pieces for DAWN already exist as with the partnerships such as the Quad or NATO. Empowering and building partnership will signal to U.S. policies to both potential and current allies while fulfilling the new 2022 National Defense Strategy ways: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages.¹⁵⁷ Building the team before crisis across the instruments of national power directly contributes to the NDS ways. This is not new as the famed NSC-68 advocated the U.S. empower the Free World to contain communism. Building regional powers during the Century Cold War allowed the U.S. to attrite the Soviet Union's hard and soft power until its collapse. Integrate defense, campaigning, and building enduring advantages require allies to maintain and empower the rules-based international order. There is no guarantee for victory on 21st Century battlefields but building the right team in the right location puts the odds in favor of democracy.

¹⁵⁷ "Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy," DOD.

Additionally, employing a Go Byzantine Strategy will prevent or shape the operational environment in which the character of war favors the American Way of War and policy. Since our adversaries have adapted to the American Way of War, the U.S. should either modify its way of war or completely change it. Changing its way of war is infeasible because the U.S. would require a societal change. In juxtaposition, the U.S. government and its allies can employ a comprehensive approach through to build DAWN by increasing a host nation's credibility (Will to Fight) and capability (DIME). By empowering potential DAWN HN's credibility and capability, it integrates deterrence across DIME for strategic competition and helps prevent or shape the character of future conflicts. As discovered by RAND, if the Will to Fight is equal among actors, then the conflict's character becomes one of attrition or annihilation. With Will to Fight being most malleable before conflict, it is imperative that the U.S. empower the right partners in the right locations.

Our competition may be our partner's conflict, but their current conflict may be our future crisis. As with integrated deterrence and campaigning, this Grand Strategy builds enduring advantages. Supporting the NDAA 2017 mandate for SC assessments, SFA units must execute a JCIDS like assessment on HN forces. This report should help inform the Joint Force Management process to help product DOTMLPF-P solutions for current and future force structures. As detailed in Chapter 2, this technique is not new. Under the auspice of SFA/SC, GEN Starry and TRADOC worked with Israel after the Yom Kippur War to learn valuable lessons about the conflict. Using their unprecedented access, they updated the U.S. joint doctrine and force management, resulting in the famed Airland Battle doctrine and the Army of Excellence that supported the devastating victory

of Desert Storm. For a poignant example, the U.S. is learning from the current Russia Ukraine conflict to build enduring advantages and a more lethal force in the future.

The U.S. must be proactive for SFA/SC. Go Byzantine can help set a theater with a smaller budget and force, providing tailorable options. A whole-of-government approach to operationalize SFA and SC within each region. This will become essential during strategic competition as the DOS or other agencies will take lead. Supported by SC, SFA units such as SFAB can influence up to 150 nations across DIME globally for less than \$5 billion dollars. This approach can also allow the U.S. to have permanent bases, but reducing RAF missions to a battalion task force, dramatically cutting cost.

Second, the U.S. government should consider creating another component command that focused on SC. Many may desire an advisor corps or SFA CCMD. This paper does not recommend such massive shifts in policy, but the U.S. must address SC's unity of command and effort issue. Though not case studies, this trend ostensibly plagued Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Consequentially, the U.S. should consider creating a combined joint train advise and assist command (CJTAAC) like the KMAG within CCMDs. Linking multiple agencies, the CJTAAC could operationalize SC operations with the respective CCMD TCPs, DOS JRSs, and other policy documents. Though it will have multiple bosses, it is a necessary step to make stability operations proactive. Perhaps the best model would be the United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC) or 7th Army Training Command in Europe. USSC synchronizes SC within Israel and Palestine while answering to both DOD and DOS authorities. Adopting a similar model with a SFAB or similar unit would provide a single point to establish unity of effort for SFA and SC.

Areas for Further Research

There are three areas for further research. First, RAND or another credible organization should execute further study into the quantitative relationship between SFA/SC, stability, and Will to Fight. Like the RAND studies, another paper should take a similar quantitative approach regarding the relationship between SFA/SC and a HN's credibility (Will to Fight) and capability (DIME). A good starting point is the RAND study as demonstrated in Figures 8-9. Ostensibly, the darker colored nations that SC influences SFI the most is a good blueprint for the right partners. Second, further research should look at both quantitative and qualitative metrics assessing an actor's Will to Fight, DIME, and what makes a good partner. This will include retroactively assessing an actor's soft power beyond just top 30 since indexes focus on the most powerful nations but lacked historical analysis. As discussed through Chapters 4 and 5, the U.S. needs to find the right partner, but that partner does not require global influence. Further research should rectify these academic hurdles and attempt to standardize metrics for the U.S. government and its allies. Third, there must be more research for the *Go Byzantine* comprehensive approach, especially for the CJTAAC concept. Though the USSC provides a historic framework for a SC headquarters, each CJTAAC must be different. For example, France and United Kingdom have done SFA for decades in Africa. Equally important, there must be more research on where interests conflict between the U.S. and its allies within each CCMD. This can potentially create SFA and SC fratricide across the DIME, creating opportunities for autocratic adversaries to exploit.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ This section is a direct result of A221 peer feedback, especially from MAJs Jerome Duval and Koon Gosh, our international students.

Summary

Our adversaries have adapted to the American Way of War, reducing its suitability in the 21st Century. Though SFA is not a magic bullet to everything, a proactive approach has the potential to increase credibility and capability for current and potential democratic allies. As with every relationship, the U.S. must pick the right partner because our partners send a clear message to potential allies and adversaries. It also appears to help a Theater Army achieve an information advantage within the HN and larger region as well. As the world awakens to a possible New Cold War with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this messaging will be essential for future competition. To counter this rise in authoritarianism and its coercive strategies, the U.S. can apply a strategy of flow to collision, or *Go Byzantine Strategy*, to augment the current U.S. DIME attritional strategy. In the past, the President signed a combined DOS and DOD SC strategy. Due SC's importance for deterrence and American Way of War, perhaps it is time for the that again. Through a comprehensive approach, the U.S. and its allies can employ SFA and SC to build Will to Fight and capability that will prevent and shape conflicts to become fortuitous for the American Way of War.

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