

RETURN TO TWILIGHT: A MODEL OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Wargame Design
Strategic Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

RETURN TO TWILIGHT: A MODEL OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY, by Shawn Blaydes, 216 pages.

The United States is returning to a strategy of great power competition against rising and revisionist states. As the executive produces strategic guidance and initiatives movement across the whole of government, departments and agencies must determine how best to apply their means in an integrated fashion to achieve the directed ends. The joint force is still developing concepts and terms to address great power rivalry while competing through integrated campaigning. The existing doctrine and capabilities are suitable for employment in competition against adversaries, but there are no models that adequately depict actions below the threshold of armed conflict.

This thesis identifies relevant aspects of great power rivalry and models them as a competitive wargame. Critical elements of U.S. and Chinese strategies are discussed at length to identify current methods of implementation and fundamental aspects of competition. Modeling techniques are detailed so they can be replicated and proofed by other wargame designers. Although this model has achieved a modicum of success in the current international security environment, it will need to be revisited and updated to remain relevant as actors modify the means and ways of competition.

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ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
DATE	Decisive Action Training Environment
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
GPC	Great Power Competition
ISE	International Security Environment
OE	Operational Environment
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRO	People's Republic of Olvana
SC	Security Cooperation
TA	Target Audience
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle.

— John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961

Background

The 2017 National Security Strategy highlighted the reemergence of China and Russia as great powers and a return to multipolarity in the international security environment (ISE). This document issued a compelling mandate to pursue a strategy of great power competition (GPC) to secure American interests and slow the rise of adversaries.¹ As the U.S. and its rivals simultaneously pursue their interests in the international system, there exists a potential for conflicting interests, friction, and escalation to armed conflict. Military professionals must work to understand the sources of this friction and how to mitigate it while achieving specified ends. This thesis will produce a wargame to model great power rivalry as an educational tool to understand how states compete with one another.

Both the U.S. and the People's Republic of China (PRC) aim to lead an international system built in their image. The U.S. is committed to the preservation of the current international system, while China seeks to instigate changes to the structure and

¹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017), 2-4.

composition of international organizations that would be favorable to their interests.²

While the U.S. faces the prospect of displacement as the world's predominant superpower, the PRC sees an opportunity to rise from the "Century of Humiliation" and resume its role as the "Middle Kingdom."³ These narratives may or may not be true, but they are of concern to the states involved. Both states will pursue strategies they believe will increase their ability to exert power and control positions of advantage in the international order. This dynamic must be understood if a state wishes to develop effective strategies which prevent its adversary's accumulation of power and elevate one's own position of advantage.

The U.S. is investing in cooperative trade and security relationships to safeguard its position as a leader in the world system.⁴ The PRC is pursuing bilateral economic relationships and developing land and maritime trade routes to promote its rise to become the world's leader in trade.⁵ These strategies are implemented through asymmetric ways, relying on those means most abundantly available to the states, and creates friction across several domains when their execution impedes the accomplishment of adversary ends.

² Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 105.

³ *China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy: Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 20, 2011, <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/3.10.11HearingTranscript.pdf>.

⁴ U.S. President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2021), 6-8.

⁵ John Matthews, "China's Long Term Trade and Currency Goals: The Belt & Road Initiative," *Asia-Pacific Journal* 17, no. 5 (January 2019): article 5233, <https://apjjf.org/-John-A--Mathews/5233/article.pdf>.

These dynamics have been widely discussed in academic and policy forums but remain difficult to adequately understand without copious study and experience. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded, the U.S. military has increased its presence abroad to enable multilateral cooperation and strengthen partnerships through integrated campaigning.⁶ This places Servicemembers in direct contact with foreign populations and makes them defacto ambassadors of American values, ideals, and objectives.⁷ These Servicemembers must understand their role and potential impact within a strategy to increase influence abroad. Wargaming presents an effective and low-cost method to create awareness and understanding of their role as a means within a larger strategy.⁸

In this wargame, players will assume the role of an American or Chinese strategist. They will apply national resources to create leverage and develop a position of advantage in East Africa to achieve national objectives. Stated simply, they will develop a strategy to apply means and ways to achieve ends. Participants will also manage the risk posed by the limited availability of means as well as the risk presented by their opponent's actions when they interfere with their strategy. This thesis will explore the

⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 6, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf.

⁷ Charles Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Magazine*, January 1999, 5-6.

⁸ Larry Singell, "A Note on the Use of Simulation Games in Interdisciplinary Graduate Education," *Journal of Economic Education* 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1971): 61-63, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1182087>; Sebastian Bae and Paul Kearney, "Use Wargaming to Sharpen the Tactical Edge," *The RAND Blog* (blog), *RAND Corporation*, March 8, 2021, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/03/use-wargaming-to-sharpen-the-tactical-edge.html>.

nature of strategy in competition, the risk associated with competition in an evolving ISE, and the methods used to develop a model that reflects these phenomena.

This paper is organized into six chapters. Chapter One introduces the problem set, limitations on research, and the goals of this thesis. Chapter Two is a literature review of texts concerning great power rivalry, simulations and wargaming as an educational tool, and relevant wargame models. Chapter Three explores a nested approach to Grounded Theory and the Wargame Development Model as methods for research and modeling. Chapter Four identifies the concepts, processes, and strategies states employ to compete in the international system. Chapter Five details the modeling of relevant concepts identified in Chapter Four. Chapter Six reviews significant topics from the thesis, discloses relevant conclusions, and makes recommendations for future research. Appendices include all elements required to replicate the wargame, research data, and a glossary of selected terms concerning great power rivalry from U.S. joint military doctrine.

Problem Statement

Great power rivalry is a complex matter that requires the skillful application of means in an integrated fashion to achieve effects. The asymmetry between rival strategies presents potentialities for friction, misunderstanding, and escalation. There are limited educational resources to help Servicemembers understand the complexities of competition below the threshold of armed conflict. The Servicemembers implementing these strategies may significantly enhance their effectiveness if they understand the complexity of the ISE and comprehensive approach to integrated campaigning.

Purpose of the Study

This study models the interactions between great powers as a political-military wargame to explore the application of strategy, current U.S. joint doctrine, the concept of influence, and the friction that results from the pursuit of national objectives in competition. This allows participants to experiment with the development and application of strategy and facilitates increased understanding of the risks created by friction between great power rivals. Relevant aspects of national strategy and recently reported means are modeled to create the rules and mechanisms that govern the wargame. The result is a functional educational model to increase understanding of the dynamics inherent in great power rivalry.

Research Questions

Primary Research Question: How can great power rivalry be modeled through competitive wargaming as an educational tool for professional development? The answer to this question will be supported by three secondary questions.

Secondary Research Question 1: How do states compete with one another? This question supports the primary research question through the identification of the strategies that states employ to achieve their ends. These mechanisms will be essential to the creation of a model. This exploration will include broad actions across the elements of national power. Asymmetric actor preferences will be noted and included in the model to highlight the causes of friction between participants. Friction must be a key component of this model to educate participants about the risks that competition may pose.

Secondary Research Question 2: What aspects of great power rivalry are most important to model in a competitive wargame? This question will define the specific

types of operations, activities, and investments that will be included in the wargame. This will also determine the national objectives of actors and identify which aspects of asymmetry will be included in the model. The selected aspects will guide the development of rules governing player interactions and limitations.

Secondary Research Question 3: How can the key aspects of great power rivalry be effectively modeled through competitive wargaming? This question will answer how specific competition dynamics, resources, and actions will be modeled in the wargame. Comparing and modeling asymmetric competition strategies presents a complex problem that must be solved to produce a wargame that participants can understand. The methods of modeling will reflect a priority to enable participant decision-making and deliberate creation and implementation of a strategy.

Assumptions

There are four key assumptions within this work. The first assumption is that competition can be understood through the lens of elements of national power as defined by the U.S. government (USG). This is influential as it allows for the organization and interpretation of activities and effects in common terms. When applicable, terminology from joint doctrine or national security documents will be used to describe dynamics. The second assumption is that both the U.S. and PRC are, and will remain, rational actors that will make decisions that maximize their national interests. The third assumption is that actors will remain strategically predictable and take actions that are in line with historical trends or their declared national strategies. The fourth assumption is that competition activities will receive enough media coverage to be accessible through online and print media sources.

Definition of Terms

Competition – Activities in the international system whereby “states and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their own interests, [as] they continually compete for diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage.”⁹

Friction – The accumulation and interaction of forces that interfere with the accomplishment of one’s goal. “Countless minor incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal.”¹⁰ The effect of environmental factors and the complex interactions that occur when two disparate forces meet.

Influence – “The act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a Target Audience (TA).”¹¹ This implies the application of resources (time, material, money, or other assets) to elicit a desired reaction from a person, organization, or population. The joint force also describes influence as “the power to change or affect someone or something.”¹²

⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19, *Competition Continuum* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), 1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf?ver=2019-06-10-113311-233.

¹⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 155.

¹¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), I-3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf.

¹² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 42, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts_jcoie.pdf.

National Power – The cumulative ability of a state to apply diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, legal, and development capabilities or resources to accomplish an objective.¹³ Often expressed as DIME, or MIDFIELD, but also inherent to the concept of the “3D” approach (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense).

Wargame – “A warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of actual military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, affected by the decisions made by players representing the opposing sides.”¹⁴

Scope

This research covers the conduct of historic competition activities across the competition continuum from the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in East Africa in 2013 to today. The operational environment will be modeled using the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Africa scenario. Open-source research and media articles will be used to supplement the DATE. Published national strategies of the U.S. and PRC will be used to inform game priorities and actions.

Limitations and Delimitations

The primary limitation of this study is the short period available to conduct research, develop the model, and evaluate its effectiveness. All research, modeling,

¹³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-18, *Strategy* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), I-2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf.

¹⁴ Peter Perla, *The Art of Wargaming*, ed. John Curry (Annapolis, MD: The U.S. Naval Institute, 2011), 164.

testing, and publishing will occur within seven months. A large amount of data concerning national strategy and recent events will be rapidly compiled, synthesized, and incorporated into a model to allow adequate time for testing and analysis.

The information incorporated into this model will be restricted to publicly available, open-source information. This may result in the exclusion of relevant information but should not preclude the creation of an accurate and viable model. Publicly available information should reflect the intended national strategy as actors attempt to remain strategically predictable.¹⁵

The use of the DATE Africa scenario is an intentional delimitation to assist in the rapid modeling of a viable operational environment. Although the scenario is fictional, it provides detailed political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, historical, and geographic data to rapidly build a realistic environment for the model. To assist in developing the DATE model, information from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia will be used to identify recent events for modeling. Chinese strategy will be modeled as Olvanan strategy within the DATE Africa scenario.

The use of the DIME construct to describe national power is an intentional delimitation to increase the readability and organization of this piece. Servicemembers are familiar with this concept, and it provides a useful lens to categorize events. Data will be sorted as diplomatic, information, military, or economic in nature and will be modeled accordingly in the wargame. Additional aspects of financial, intelligence, legal, and

¹⁵ James Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 19, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1420042/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-on-the-national-defense-strategy>.

development elements of power will be addressed to a lesser degree. This delimitation facilitates discussion of the model in doctrinally familiar terms while assisting servicemembers in understanding how the U.S. and PRC are applying elements of national power to achieve advantage below the threshold of armed conflict.

The final delimitation is the exclusion of state actors other than China. U.S. and Chinese competition techniques will be modeled in the ISE, but there is not enough time for adequate research to model additional state actors. Ally, partner state, host nation, and third-party actions will be limited to significant events depicted through card events.

Significance of the Study

This study produces an interactive model to explore the asymmetric competition approaches employed by the PRC and U.S. to create effects in the international system. Specifically, this model seeks to add to the international relations and military bodies of knowledge through the creation of a wargame that depicts great power rivalry. The result will be an interactive educational tool that allows participants to develop a strategy and conduct supporting competition activities using historical data. This work expands the number of political-military wargames available to academics and military leaders while also creating a new variation of political-military wargame. Traditionally, military wargames have explored the dynamics of armed conflict to prepare junior officers for higher levels of command.¹⁶ This model is significant as it attempts to model military power specifically below the threshold of armed conflict.

¹⁶ Perla, *The Art of Wargaming*, 15-17.

Summary

This study provides a model of competition to teach military personnel how great powers vie for influence over states, populations, and resources to advance their national interests. This fills a gap in the available literature and models of competitive wargames and serves as a resource to teach military personnel how they contribute to national strategy. Throughout this thesis, these elements will be combined to answer the question: How can great power rivalry be modeled through competitive wargaming as an educational tool for professional development? A thorough review of the literature concerning influence mechanisms, competition objectives, and wargaming techniques will provide a foundation for understanding the problem.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The ability to learn faster than your competitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage.

— Arie de Geus

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: How can great power rivalry be modeled through competitive wargaming as an educational tool for professional development? The creation of a wargame requires a thorough review of the topic, an understanding of wargame design techniques, and reviewing relevant models. This provides a foundation to understand which types of data must be gathered and identifies what methods may be useful in depicting the data. Significant elements of literature and relevant wargame models are covered in this chapter. Additional references are included in the bibliography.

This chapter is organized into two sections exploring relevant aspects of great power rivalry and wargaming. The great power rivalry section addresses the characteristics of great powers and the implications of rivalry between them. The wargaming section addresses theory, wargame development, and political-military modeling techniques. Together they provide a base from which to begin an exploration of competition between the U.S. and PRC.

Great Power Rivalry and Competition

The term “great power competition” rose to prominence with the release of the 2017 National Security Strategy. Although it is frequently used, it remains poorly

understood.¹⁷ To identify meaningful distinctions about what qualifies a great power and how they act, it is useful to look back to previous periods of bipolarity and multipolarity in the international order.

Derek McKay and H. M. Scott provide a detailed overview of the multipolar system of power in Europe in their book *The Rise of the Great Powers: 1648 to 1815*. Notable aspects of competition noted in this text include the necessity to recognize rising powers, the importance of clarity about state intentions, and the tendency of states to assign diplomatic acumen to allies instead of adversaries.¹⁸ Many of the conflicts were attempts to secure or expand national borders but were ultimately constrained by the size of a state's military force and access to resources.¹⁹ Consequently, peace treaties often promoted the reshaping of boundaries to create weak "buffer" states to protect great powers from one another.²⁰ Most significantly, this details the complex alliance system between great powers and the consequences of conflict across the continent.²¹ This ends with the Congress of Vienna, the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, and a perceived balance of power between states. This arrangement allowed states to implement measures

¹⁷ Michael Mazarr, *Understanding Competition: Great Power Rivalry in a Changing International Order*, PE-A1404-1 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2022), 2, <https://doi.org/10.7249/PEA1404-1>.

¹⁸ Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers: 1648-1815* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 203-206.

¹⁹ Ibid., 175, 198, 227, 331.

²⁰ Ibid., 53, 340.

²¹ Ibid., 212-213.

to protect their interests but also provided a temporary outlet for political dialogue and collaboration.²²

John Mearsheimer frames great power rivalry as an obligatory application of resources in a contest for power to ensure survival. His theory of offensive realism proposes that great powers are required to constantly compete to assure their position in the international system.²³ He describes power in terms of military potential and declares that a great power is any state with “sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world,” and second-strike nuclear capability.²⁴ Uncertainty over rival actions and fear are the primary motivations to pursue aggressive policies.²⁵

Paul Kennedy supports Mearsheimer, McKay, and Scott’s realist depictions of multipolar rivalry. In his voluminous book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, he reinforces the link between a state’s access to resources, its ability to maintain a large military force, and its ability to achieve objectives in the international system.²⁶ Kennedy also makes the important distinction that a state’s power can only be measured relative to

²² McKay and Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, 344.

²³ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), 2-3.

²⁴ Ibid., 5.

²⁵ Ibid., 297-298.

²⁶ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1989), 429.

other states in the international system.²⁷ He supports this assertion through a comparison of conventional and nuclear military capabilities as coercive influence mechanisms.²⁸ Finally, he transitions to agenda-setting and persuasive influence mechanisms by highlighting the value of holding positions of importance in international organizations as an important aspect of power.²⁹ Kennedy posits that great powers decline when they are “overstretched,” and their obligations exceed their available means.³⁰

The Twilight Struggle provides a recent analysis of the Cold War as a bipolar great power rivalry. Hal Brands bridges the gap between realist and liberal perspectives on international relations, highlighting the importance of military strength to enable negotiation, partnership, dialogue, and multilateral cooperation. Brands provides a valuable perspective on attempts to maintain parity, the employment of offset strategies, and the use of “cost imposition and asymmetry” to develop advantages against a stronger adversary.³¹ The author defines great powers by their ability and willingness “to participate in an ongoing, open-ended contest for influence.”³² This builds on the realist

²⁷ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 18-19.

²⁸ Ibid., 423, 443-444, 452.

²⁹ Ibid., 487-488.

³⁰ Ibid., 580-582.

³¹ Hal Brands, *The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022), 241.

³² Ibid., 7.

tradition and begins to embrace classic liberalist and constructivist approaches to international relations.




Figure 1. Spectrum of Political, Irregular, and Conventional Warfare

Source: Adapted from Joseph Celeski, "Toward a Military Theory of Special Operations," in *SOF-Power Workshop: A Way Forward for Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art* (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2011), 23, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA591992.pdf>.

Joseph Celeski builds on the work of George Keenan to depict a range of competitive operations spanning from political warfare to conventional warfare (see Figure 1). This is useful in understanding how great powers constantly compete in the international environment and how military activities support national objectives below the threshold of armed conflict. Keenan's concept of political warfare "is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace," encompassing overt and covert activities such as political dialogue, information campaigns, economic agreements, and

encouragement of subversive elements in hostile states.³³ Celeski uses irregular warfare activities to bridge political warfare and conventional warfare, presenting options of the limited use of coercive military power to achieve objectives short of large combat operations.³⁴ Both ideas are complimentary to the Chinese conceptualization of competition as conflict, with or without armed combat.

The Chinese concepts of strategy and competition differ from the American perception. David Lai's monograph "Learning from the Stones" links Sun Tzu's conceptualizations of war and the strategic concept of "Shi" to the game *Go*.³⁵ Shi encompasses a set of ideas that resources can be configured in a manner that increases the overall strength of a state, allowing it to compete against stronger adversaries.³⁶ This is described as "'the alignment of forces,' the 'propensity of things,' or the 'potential born of disposition,' that only a skilled strategist can exploit to ensure victory over a superior force."³⁷ It is possible to make comparisons between positional warfare, mass at the

³³ George Kennan, "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare," [Redacted], April 30, 1948, Document 269, The Cold War International History Project, The Wilson Center, 1, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320>.

³⁴ Joseph Celeski, "Toward a Military Theory of Special Operations," in *SOF-Power Workshop: A Way Forward for Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art*, (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2011), 23-25, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA591992.pdf>.

³⁵ David Lai, "Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi" (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College, 2004), 4, <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1770&context=monographs>.

³⁶ Ibid., vi.

³⁷ Ibid.

decisive point, threats to centers of gravity, and the indirect approach, but it would fall short of the necessary conceptualization. The Western Way of War is inherently aggressive, while Shi promotes the adoption of a disposition most suited to the situation. It may be passive or aggressive, but is most concerned with the development of an advantage over the adversary through the arrayal of resources.³⁸ It encompasses all elements of national power which may be used to elicit a reaction, develop a position of advantage, threaten resource flows, or create any other dilemma for the adversary.³⁹ The game *Go* is used to explain these concepts, allowing participants to create a series of dilemmas for one another through the arrayal of forces to develop positions of advantage over the adversary.⁴⁰

This broader perspective on war is seen throughout the People's Liberation Army publication, *Unrestricted Warfare*. Through a detailed analysis of U.S. doctrine and international activities, the authors identify twenty distinct types of warfare currently being utilized or developed, ranging from control over the environment to nuclear warfare.⁴¹ Five U.S. influence mechanisms and three U.S. elements of national power are explicitly identified as types of warfare, although they would not meet the Western

³⁸ Lai, "Learning from the Stones," 2-5.

³⁹ Ibid, 3.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 6-8.

⁴¹ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, ed. and trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 18-55, <https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf>.

definition.⁴² This view is valuable in understanding how adversaries view influence and U.S. competition activities. The implication is that U.S. influence activities are interpreted as aggressive actions undertaken to develop positions of strength, which may threaten Chinese interests.




Figure 2. Hard and Soft Power Relationships

Source: Adapted from Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations, “Power and Strategy,” (Lecture, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 13, 2021).

Joseph Nye describes the effects of globalization on the exertion of national power through the concept of *soft power*. He proposes this power shapes the preferences of populations through exposure to culture, national values, and foreign policy⁴³ (Figure 2). This stands in contrast with *hard power*, which relies on actions and resources ranging from the promise of materiel to the use of military force. Soft power is likened to a force

⁴² Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 18-55.

⁴³ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 20, 25.

of attraction, where the affected entity moves toward the source without prompting. He differentiates this from the concept of influence while acknowledging that they can be related.⁴⁴ Hard and soft power should be used based on the outcomes they are likely to achieve. Both have inherent limitations, and they are best used in conjunction with one another.⁴⁵

Considering the concepts of rivalry, competition, hard power, and soft power, how do states achieve effects without initiating armed conflict? Influence remains the term of choice when discussing the creation of effects below the threshold of armed conflict. This term will be discussed further to understand the potentialities and methods of employment.

Influence

Influence is a “fuzzy” concept. The Merriam-Webster dictionary maintains seven primary entries on the topic, all of which indicate the use of indirect or intangible forces to create an effect.⁴⁶ It is important to note that indirect forces may be applied through credible threats. This distinction accepts the application of influence through hard and soft power mechanisms.

Joint doctrinal concepts provide a ready source for understanding influence as a phenomenon by providing standardized verbiage, but the concept remains difficult to

⁴⁴ Nye, *Soft Power*, 21.

⁴⁵ Nye, *Soft Power*, 29; Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 207-234.

⁴⁶ Merriam-Webster Incorporated, “Influence,” Merriam-Webster, last updated August 27, 2022, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/influence>.

master. Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, provides insights into the U.S. conception of influence as an action and as an effect. As an activity, influence is an “act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a [target audience] TA.”⁴⁷ If you apply resources to achieve an outcome within a TA, you are influencing a population. As an effect, influence activities result in “effects in ways that modify rules, norms, or beliefs.”⁴⁸ If you have achieved the desired effect within the TA, you have influenced the population.

Problematically, the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* and Army Field Manual 1-02.1, *Operational Terms* use the term “influence” 81 times, in vastly different ways, to describe actions and effects at all levels of warfare. Although the term has been defined in Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, it has not been standardized across the force. Standardization in usage both as an action and an effect would help clarify its meaning. For this thesis, the definition from Joint Publication 3-13 will be used and will be simplified as “the application of national resources, or means, in ways that produce an effect within a TA.”⁴⁹

In “Countering Unrestricted Warfare: Preparing to Compete Against China’s Actual Strategy,” Victor Norris suggests that Chinese officials value influence as “the next best thing to power,” viewing it as a “commodity” critical to achieving their national

⁴⁷ CJCS, JP 3-13, I-3.

⁴⁸ Ibid., I-5.

⁴⁹ Ibid., I-3. The author chose this definition to synthesize the concept of influence and strategy from joint doctrine. This highlights the linkages between these concepts.

objectives.⁵⁰ He also asserts that Chinese influence activities are employed to their fullest advantage below the threshold of armed conflict. Avoiding armed conflict circumvents U.S. strengths while leveraging asymmetric advantages in technology and freedom of action within the loosest interpretation of international laws and norms. Chinese influence activities are nested within all aspects of their national strategy, and like the U.S., seek to create influence by “producing effects in ways that modify rules, norms, or beliefs” among target populations.⁵¹

Adam Reitz provides a useful framework to understand influence mechanisms as encouraging or discouraging, and persuasive or coercive.⁵² He builds on Schelling’s model of coercive influence, reconciling the concepts of hard and soft power.⁵³ Persuasive actions include inducement and assurance (see Figure 3), which account for activities such as economic and development assistance traditionally overseen by the DOS and the USAID. Joint Publication 3-0, *Operations*, references each of the mechanisms within the model, notably directing the joint force to conduct information operations to influence TA’s through inducement and persuasion.⁵⁴ This lens may also be

⁵⁰ Victor Norris, “Countering Unrestricted Warfare: Preparing to Compete Against China’s Actual Strategy,” (Thesis, Air War College, 2020), 13, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1107333.pdf>.

⁵¹ CJCS, JP 3-13, I-5.

⁵² Adam Reitz, “Influence Mechanisms: A Framework for Integrated Operations,” *Small Wars Journal*, September 14, 2021, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/influence-mechanisms-framework-integrated-operations>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), III-19 – III-24,

used to reconcile differences in the U.S. and Chinese perceptions of influence, allowing all activities in the international system to be viewed as an attempt to influence populations. Finally, this assists in determining the purpose of competition activities, viewing them as mechanisms to achieve effects above or below the threshold of armed conflict to achieve national ends.




Figure 3. Influence Mechanisms

Source: Adapted from Adam Reitz, "Influence Mechanisms: A Framework for Integrated Operations," *Small Wars Journal*, September 14, 2021, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/influence-mechanisms-framework-integrated-operations>.

Wargaming

Formal texts on wargame development remain limited, but several texts have enabled formalization and progress in the field. Fortunately, game designers often include notes concerning the development of their models, which may be used to recreate, adapt,

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0.pdf; CJCS, JP 3-13, II-5 – II-13.

and develop new models for implementation. Several influential texts and models will be reviewed to inform the modeling approaches taken in this thesis.

Peter Perla's *The Art of Wargaming* synthesizes much of the body of knowledge concerning wargame history, design, and implementation. Perla begins with a concise history of wargaming and relates its utility as a training tool for military officers among western militaries.⁵⁵ He continues to outline many of the major features of modern models and provides a theory of wargaming design to inform game development.⁵⁶ The difference between game design and development is clear, transitioning from creation to refinement. Finally, the author highlights the emergence of political-military gaming as a method, an important development that helps to understand the linkages between military and other elements of national power as well as the impact of national resources on a state's ability to mobilize for war.⁵⁷

The Complete Wargames Handbook serves as a foundational text for the Wargame Development model.⁵⁸ James Dunnigan covers a wide variety of topics, including how to play a wargame, the emergence of computer-based games, and wargames developed for military use; His step-by-step instruction on wargame design is excellently written. Perla captures the theory, utility, and process of wargame design

⁵⁵ Perla, *The Art of Wargaming*, 41-43.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 206-216, 222.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 108.

⁵⁸ James Dunnigan, *The Complete Wargames Handbook: How to Play and Design Them*, 2nd ed. (New York: William Morrow, 1992), 114-115.

exceptionally well, but Dunnigan provides common-sense instruction focused on helping designers succeed in their endeavors.

Philip Sabin's *Simulating War* covers the topic of game design as it relates to education. He builds on Perla's work, exploring techniques to enable experiential learning within the time and space constraints of a modern classroom. He extensively debates the merits of simplicity versus accuracy in game depiction and underscores the importance of keeping the model relatable to the intended audience.⁵⁹ Educational games must convey the most important dynamics of a conflict while remaining simple enough to grasp in the time allocated for the lesson.⁶⁰ During model research and design, he emphasizes the importance of defining the operational environment and quantifying the dynamics of the conflict so they may be simplified and depicted.⁶¹ Testing is conducted to ensure that the model is accurate and adequately conveys its lesson. Sabin discusses the balance of reality, skill, and chance as integral aspects of a game that should be moderated to ensure models remain accurate and avoid unrealistic variations.⁶²

On Wargaming reiterates many of the most important points covered by Perla, Dunnigan, and Sabin, but also addresses the professional taxonomy of wargaming, the utility of simulations education for leader development, and the use of gaming for personal education. This work offers an excellent comparison between wargaming, John

⁵⁹ Philip Sabin, *Simulating War: Studying Conflict through Simulation Games* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 19.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 31-34.

⁶¹ Ibid., 47-48.

⁶² Ibid., 117-119.

Boyd's OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) Loop, and the impact simulations have on a leader's abilities to rapidly make effective decisions.⁶³ The utility of gaming in capabilities development is also compelling, with wargaming being used to simulate historical experience to artificially shorten the Caffrey Loop to force or offset revolutions in military affairs.⁶⁴ While the force management aspects of gaming are fascinating, the text's greatest contribution to this thesis is the hypothesis that "wargaming can be useful in developing the potential of individuals."⁶⁵ Caffrey, like the other wargaming theorists mentioned, defends the utility of gaming as a teaching tool and relates experiences at the National Training Center to improvements in Army doctrine, capabilities, and experience. If wargaming is a useful tool for education, who then has already attempted to model and explore great power rivalry?

While there are many models of the Cold War, most are hex-and-counter style combat simulations. *Twilight Struggle* provides a unique look at the rivalry between the U.S. and USSR by modeling the application of influence in individual countries as a method to achieve regional control.⁶⁶ The primary means of play is through the application of influence, which is roughly equated to the amount of effort and resources a

⁶³ Matthew Caffrey, *On Wargaming: How Wargames Have Shaped History and How They May Shape the Future*, Naval War College Newport Papers 43 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 284-286, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=newport-papers>.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 287-289.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 282-283.

⁶⁶ Ananda Gupta and Jason Matthews, *Twilight Struggle*, deluxe ed. (GMT Games, 2016).

state would allocate to an initiative. Participants must choose where and how much influence to apply to secure their regional interests and disrupt adversary attempts at control. Players must have a valid line of communication within regions before engaging in a specific country. Both factions must complete a certain number of military operations to disrupt their opponent, but if either player becomes too reliant on the military element of national power, they may inadvertently start a nuclear conflict. As players move through the game, they will encounter and replicate historic events which give certain advantages to a specified faction. This game provides an excellent, card-based, competitive game that familiarizes players with relevant Cold War history, captures the application of influence as part of a national strategy, and allows for competition below the threshold of armed conflict.

Volko Ruhnke builds on the *Twilight Struggle* to explore power dynamics, faction alignment, and resource management in *Labyrinth: The Global War on Terror, 2001-?*⁶⁷ This model depicts the Global War on Terror across three continents, allowing the participants to leverage factions for support and positioning against their adversary. This model decreases the scale of its predecessor, focusing on a specific portion of the world to depict a set of interrelated military operations between loosely organized alliances of state and non-state organizations. This model also dissects the “Required Military Operations” track into three components. “U.S. GWOT Relations,” “U.S. Prestige,” and “Jihadist Finding” tracks allow for increased asymmetry between factions and increased focus on aspects of the competition relevant to the prosecution of faction strategies.

⁶⁷ Volko Ruhnke, *Labyrinth: The War on Terror, 2001-?*, 3rd ed. (GMT Games, 2016).

Created by one of the designers of *Twilight Struggle*, the game *1984: Dawn of Freedom* replicates the original model at the regional level to depict the breakup of the Soviet Union.⁶⁸ This model represents specific types of nodes that players can gain or lose control of to mobilize populations in an attempt to convert communist states to democracy. Asymmetry is depicted between government forces and protest factions through the types of actions they can take as governed by operations cards. The depiction of organization types that may be leveraged to build faction momentum is a unique take on the *Twilight Struggle* model and deserves further exploration through the lens of human network analysis.

Gandhi: The Decolonization of British India, 1917-1947, was built using the GMT counterinsurgency (COIN) system developed by Volko Ruhnke.⁶⁹ *Gandhi* employs a unique system to model military action in British India, focusing on stability operations and implementation of the rule of law to quell competing insurgencies. Muslim factions attempt to establish control over their own territories against the British Empire, while Gandhi is capable of mobilizing protests to destabilize the British government. This model performs well in depicting the complexity of insurgency and the asymmetry between conventional and irregular forces. The inherent complexity of the COIN system is intimidating to new participants, while experienced wargamers have a deep respect for the system.

⁶⁸ Jason Matthews and Ted Torgerson, *1989: Dawn of Freedom*, 2nd printing (GMT Games, 2020).

⁶⁹ Bruce Mansfield, *Gandhi: The Decolonization of British India, 1917–1947* (GMT Games, 2019).

The Army Training and Doctrine Command Research and Analysis Center created *Synthetic Staff Ride: Mindanao* to teach servicemembers about the complex relationships involved in combatting insurgency on the Philippine Island of Mindanao.⁷⁰ It is an educational model built around a series of complex actions requiring cooperation between elements of national power and the unified action partners resident in the area. Players must allocate limited resources and cooperatively prioritize initiatives to achieve objectives. Each set of actions and decisions is associated with one or more factions who may support or oppose the action, which consequently enables or prevents the execution of the action. Significantly, each interested faction can influence the success or failure of an initiative.⁷¹ The complex nature of this model allows participants to gain an appreciation for the complexities and essential nature of unified action to achieve objectives.

Root is a competitive board game allowing up to six factions to compete simultaneously.⁷² Each of the factions has exclusive objectives, moves on the board in unique ways, and employs asymmetric actions to interact with rival participants. Each faction receives a player mat to assist in managing the game and directing their actions. This game demonstrates how different factions can employ completely different methods of play to achieve similar effects. Ultimately, each faction must compete to accrue

⁷⁰ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Synthetic Staff Ride: Mindanao* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, 2015).

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Cole Wehrle, *Root*, 6th printing (Leder Games, 2018).

victory points faster than their counterparts. The different play style of each faction has value for replication and modification to model the asymmetric natures of terror organizations, insurgencies, and dissimilar military forces.

Summary

This chapter reviewed the relevant literature and models necessary to determine how great power rivalry be modeled through competitive wargaming as an educational tool. This included a review of literature and models valuable for understanding great power rivalry, the application of influence, and competitive wargaming. These concepts will form the foundation for research to be conducted, and it is expected that the research will build on the existing body of knowledge in these areas. Each of the wargame models addressed employs a different method for modeling friction and conflict. Exposure to a wide variety of game systems allows for the synthesis of modeling techniques to enable fusion and the creation of new models. During research and wargame design, the models and concepts discussed in this chapter will inform the models and dynamics included in the game. The next chapter will discuss the research methodology used to compile data to build upon the ideas presented in the literature review.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

As the tools of warfare continue to evolve at an ever-quicken pace, professional game designers... must develop dynamic new approaches to modeling the effects of those tools on human decision making.

— Peter Perla, *The Art of Wargaming*

Introduction

This chapter explains the methodologies used to research and determine the suitability of great power rivalry for modeling as an educational wargame for professional development. Two methodologies were used in concert to understand how states compete with one another, identify which aspects of competition are most important for inclusion in a wargame, and determine how to model these dynamics. James Dunnigan's *Wargame Development Model* was used in conjunction with *Grounded Theory* to collect, code, and categorize data to design a wargame. Both methodologies were integrated to facilitate exploration of the topic from concept development through production, as shown in Figure 4.

Wargame Development and Grounded Theory as a Nested Methodology

Wargame Development was selected in conjunction with Grounded Theory methodology to allow for a thorough exploration of the research question, rigorous research, and participative learning. This process allowed for continuous collection and processing of data while incorporating the results into a constantly evolving wargame model. The persistent refinement of concepts allowed for the synthesis of international relations theory, military doctrine, and recent history to allow for rapid comprehension by

participants. The research and data collation informed the modeling of competition dynamics and development of rule sets which assisted participants through a guided exploration of the topic. The resultant post-game conversations have consistently resulted in additional analysis of competition as a phenomenon while exposing concerns, potentialities, and novel approaches that were not previously considered.




Figure 4. Nested Wargame and Grounded Theory Methodologies

Source: Adapted from Kathy Charmaz, *Classic Grounded Theory: Applications with Qualitative and Quantitative Data*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2014), 32; James Dunnigan, *The Complete Wargames Handbook: How to Play and Design Them*, 2nd ed. (New York: William Morrow, 1992), 114-115.

Both Wargame Development and Grounded Theory methodology begin with the determination of the research question, which informed the initial wargame concept.⁷³ The second step of Dunnigan's model required research, which was conducted using the Grounded Theory methodology.⁷⁴ Charmaz proposes an iterative seven-step model for research, which was abbreviated to six steps, as there was no human subjects' research conducted during the compilation of this thesis.⁷⁵

Data Collection

Grounded Theory allows for the continuous collation of data and specifically avoids strict adherence to rigid methods.⁷⁶ This free-flowing data collection methodology allowed the researcher to explore new facets of the problem, develop a broader understanding of the issue, and produce new perspectives on the topic. The data types and collection methods listed here were supplemented with research notes and collated data which may be found in the appendices.

Although research methods were flexible, they began with a review of news articles and public statements concerning recent U.S. and Chinese activities and investments across East Africa from 2014 to 2021. This enabled development of an initial picture of the methods and preferences for how states are competing with one another in

⁷³ Kathy Charmaz, *Classic Grounded Theory: Applications with Qualitative and Quantitative Data*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2014), 32; Dunnigan, *The Complete Wargames Handbook*, 114.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Charmaz, *Classic Grounded Theory*, 32.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 47.

the region. These actions were modeled as activities, and investment trends were used to develop the initial game resource allocations. Following Dr. Barney Glasser's dictum that "All is data," round table discussions, lectures, videos, and other sources were considered and captured as citations or research notes where applicable.⁷⁷

Identifying the most important aspects of competition for modeling entailed analysis of declared methods announced through strategic communications and the collection of information about state investment and partnership. This allowed for the distinction between how states say they will act versus how they implement overt action. To determine how states declare they will compete, an analysis of national strategy and statements was conducted to identify the declared methods of competition, stated goals, and the commitment to partnerships or investments. To determine how states are competing, an analysis of news articles and press releases highlighted trends in investment preferences as well as the associated reaction of partner state populations.

To determine how relevant aspects of great power rivalry would be modeled, relevant dynamics from existing wargames were analyzed and tested to determine their suitability for modification. When suitable models were not available, novel approaches were developed, depicted, tested by volunteer participants, and modified until the desired dynamic was achieved. These approaches are covered extensively in Chapter 5.

Data Analysis

Data was coded and categorized to identify trends, gaps, and conflicts. Initial coding was completed by the paragraph of text to ensure the largest possible number of

⁷⁷ Charmaz, *Classic Grounded Theory*, 53.

codes were considered prior to focused coding and categorization.⁷⁸ Subsequent focused coding grouped texts by the most common codes to identify trends and identify themes for incorporation into the model.⁷⁹ While initial coding was spontaneous, the source of texts was considered in coding to ensure their purpose was understood. Initial coding included references to aspects of national power, influence activities, and declared national strategies.

Theory building assumed the form of wargame modeling, incorporating dynamics that trended throughout coding and categorization. Wargaming prototyping, rules writing, play-testing, and editing served to incorporate additional data, modify the model, and refine the understanding of rivalry dynamics. Each iteration of play-testing and refinement offered an additional opportunity to discover new aspects of the data, evaluate unexpected outcomes, and identify gaps in understanding. As an iterative process, each of the data collection and analysis iterations resulted in additional data collection, refinement of data categorization, and yielded a stronger model.

Summary

Competition remains an inherently complex and ill-defined phenomenon. Grounded Theory methodology provided a qualitative inductive approach to data collection and analysis. This allowed for adjustments to the research plan and the incorporation of unexpected sources to build a stronger model. The result is a model that synthesizes large volumes of data to assist in understanding great power rivalry to

⁷⁸ Charmaz, *Classic Grounded Theory*, 209.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 210.

educate servicemembers on how states apply elements of national power to achieve their objectives. The Wargame Design Process enhanced the Grounded Theory methodology, providing valuable interaction with data to discover unexpected trends, outcomes, and potentials. The concepts, models, and dynamics modeled are discussed in depth in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

We're eyeball to eyeball...and I think the other fellow just blinked.

— Secretary of State Dean Rusk

Introduction

Modeling great power rivalry begins with an exploration of the systems that inform and shape state actions. This provides a foundation to explore the mechanisms states employ to compete and the sources of friction that arise between them. Analysis of relevant models, theories, and strategies will provide essential aspects to model in this wargame to answer the primary research question: How can great power rivalry be modeled through competitive wargaming as an educational tool for professional development?

Secondary research question one is: How do states compete with one another? This question is answered in this chapter through the identification of state-specific approaches to great power rivalry and the associated risks. This aspect of competition provides the context for the game and will inform the actions of actors in the model.

Secondary research question two is: What aspects of great power rivalry are most important to model in a competitive wargame? This question will be answered through research into the OE and relevant factors affecting both states' ability to execute their strategies. Known factors include destabilizing and stabilizing non-state actors such as insurgent groups and international organizations. Interaction with these organization are often unavoidable at the tactical level, and coordination at the operational or strategic

levels can often prove useful. The ability of these actors to impact a state's objectives is essential to understanding risk and opportunity in the operational environment.

Answering research questions one and two in this chapter will fulfill a portion of the primary research question. This will allow for the modeling of these factors in chapter five to answer the final secondary research question and develop the wargame. This chapter begins with an overview of great power rivalry to qualify which states are engaged in this dynamic.

Great Power Rivalry

Great power rivalry is a competition between states capable of exerting significant and sustained influence in the international system. Who qualifies as a great power? Key aspects of great power rivalry include a state's requirement to:

- 1) Maintain the ability to act unilaterally in the international system.⁸⁰
- 2) After the advent of nuclear weapons, possess a second-strike nuclear capability and the credibility to use it.⁸¹
- 3) Hold positions of significance in international organizations.⁸²
- 4) Wield substantial economic production capacity.⁸³

⁸⁰ McKay and Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, 91-93.

⁸¹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 5; Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 429.

⁸² Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 392.

⁸³ Ibid., 449, 470.

- 5) Maintain the capability to sustain a conventional war against the strongest state in the world.⁸⁴
- 6) Have sufficient resources to undertake sustained actions outside of one's own borders.⁸⁵
- 7) "Participate in an ongoing, open-ended contest for influence."⁸⁶

The U.S. and PRC meet all requirements and are currently engaged in a rivalry for power across all inhabited continents.⁸⁷ That power is "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want."⁸⁸ Other countries are also vying for power to lesser degrees of success. Russia has been called a great power, but recent events in Ukraine call into question its ability to act unilaterally or compete militarily with other countries of significance.⁸⁹ There has also been speculation about the European Union emerging as a great power; however, their collective military endeavors are often overshadowed by

⁸⁴ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 4-5.

⁸⁵ McKay and Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, 175, 198.

⁸⁶ Brands, *The Twilight Struggle*, 7.

⁸⁷ Matthew Kroenig, *The Return of Great Power Rivalry Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 2.

⁸⁸ Joseph Nye, "The Information Revolution and Power," 113, no. 759 (January 2014): 20, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45388160>.

⁸⁹ Daniel Drezner, "Is Russia Still a Great Power?" *The Washington Post*, March 15, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/15/is-russia-still-great-power>.

the prioritization of economic cooperation.⁹⁰ The U.S. and PRC have attained great power status, but regional and emerging powers may still rise to the same stature.

Great powers are inclined to compete with one another to assure their domestic security, maintain their position in the international order, and increase available power in relation to adversarial states. While the formation of strong alliances can increase a state's security, it cannot innately prevent decline. The decline of a state is linked to its loss of ability to project power, which may be caused by:

- 1) Destruction or significant weakening of a state's military.⁹¹
- 2) A lack of resources to support the military.⁹²
- 3) International obligations which exceed available means; "overreach."⁹³

Discourse concerning great power rivalry has evolved from a competition to muster military might. Engagement in the international community, adherence to a declared system of values, and partnership are now more important than ever. It is important to understand the concept of great power rivalry and current rhetoric concerning "competition" in the international system. The terms may vary, but they are

⁹⁰ Teresa Eder and Jason Moyer, "The European Union's U-Turn: Emergence of a Great Power?" The Wilson Center, March 2, 2022, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/european-unions-u-turn-emergence-great-power>.

⁹¹ McKay and Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, 76, 94, 215, 222, 319.

⁹² Ibid., 54, 173, 234.

⁹³ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 580-582; Brands, *The Twilight Struggle*, 243.

inexorably linked. Notable great power rivalries include the Peloponnesian War, the Great Game, and the Cold War.⁹⁴

Competition is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “rivalry: such as the effort of two or more parties acting independently to secure the business of a third party by offering the most favorable terms.”⁹⁵ Rivalry is then defined as “active demand by two or more organisms or kinds of organisms for some environmental resource in short supply.”⁹⁶ The first definition implies attempts to build relationships with clientele, while the latter implies an attempt to secure access to resources. “Competition” has become the catch-all phrase to describe the ongoing great power rivalry between the U.S. and PRC. Both states are attempting to secure “spheres of influence” using partnerships and assistance initiatives in key locations across the globe. They are rivals, vying for access to limited resources, in competition with one another, and acting independently to secure client state alignment by offering the most favorable terms. Reduced to the language of strategy, this could be rephrased as: states are applying means, or national resources, through ways, or coordinated approaches, to sway weaker states to support their ends.

⁹⁴ David Fromkin, “The Great Game in Asia,” *Foreign Affairs* 58, no. 4 (1980): 940-947, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20040512>. The Great Game was an Anglo-Russian diplomatic and military competition for control over Central Asia from 1830 to 1907.

⁹⁵ Merriam-Webster Incorporated, “Competition,” Merriam-Webster, last updated August 21, 2022, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/competition>.

⁹⁶ Merriam-Webster Incorporated, “Rivalry,” Merriam-Webster, last updated August 25, 2022, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rivalry>.

The U.S. has titled its current approach to international relations “great power competition.” The ends of this strategy are the protection of the American citizens at home and abroad, the expansion of economic interests, and the protection of liberal democratic ideals.⁹⁷ This strategy seeks to achieve security, prosperity, and the promotion of democratic ideals through engagement in the international community.⁹⁸ These goals represent national ends that are achieved through the promotion of engagement, interdependence, and observance of the rules-based international order. These values are reflected in the charters of international institutions, supported by the U.S., established after World War Two. These systems are supported by an expansive network of bilateral and regional alliances, which achieve realist security objectives while enabling liberalist approaches to international dialogue.⁹⁹ The U.S. maintains a position of prominence in each of these organizations, allowing the state to set agendas and achieve its ends collaboratively.¹⁰⁰ The PRC has labeled U.S. initiatives international law warfare and economic aid warfare, highlighting their competitive nature.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ U.S. President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 9.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 8-21.

⁹⁹ CJCS, JP 3-0, I-10.

¹⁰⁰ Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” *The American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (December 1962): 951-952, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1952796>.

¹⁰¹ Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 55.

The U.S. Approach to Strategy

The U.S. develops and implements strategies to compete for influence, leverage,¹⁰² and advantage¹⁰³ in the international system.¹⁰⁴ These strategies direct the integrated employment of instruments of national power in a synchronized way to achieve a national objective or end.¹⁰⁵ A strategic end always achieves a U.S. national objective, but it may also contribute to the advancement of a partner nation's objective.¹⁰⁶ This construct of ends, ways, and means allows for the assessment and management of risk in terms of resources. If there are not enough means to address threats or hazards, the resulting shortfall is a risk. This allows for the directed reallocation of resources or coordination between departments and agencies to address risk through collaboration. The joint force recognizes the value of collaboration and promotes unified action to

¹⁰² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), GL-10, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf. A relative advantage in...circumstances against the...adversary across any variable within or impacting the operational environment sufficient to exploit that advantage.

¹⁰³ CJCS, JP 3-0, III-37 – III-38. Positional advantage, the operational reach to affect a...center of gravity, the momentum to exploit success and achieve operational or strategic objectives, the ability to form and employ multinational forces, and assured mobility for friendly forces.

¹⁰⁴ Anthony Aguilar, Steven Ferenzi, and Bryan Groves, "Great Power Competition - Part 1," *Knowledge Wins*, video of discussion, August 21, 2020, 2:43, https://youtu.be/qfjAuUkcg_s.

¹⁰⁵ CJCS, JP 3-0, I-12.

¹⁰⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), GL-10, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf. A partner nation is a state that the U.S. works with, in a specific situation or operation.

achieve U.S. objectives.¹⁰⁷ Military operations from the tactical to strategic levels are nested to achieve these objectives.

At the individual country level, the U.S. Ambassador is responsible for the development of an integrated country strategy, synchronization of all executive branch departments and agencies, and establishing strategic themes and messages to achieve national objectives.¹⁰⁸ Specified goals include facilitating U.S. operational access and influence, building partner capacity to counter shared threats, promoting stable and secure sovereign partners, and fostering support for America's political, economic, and security interests.¹⁰⁹ These integrated country strategies translate national strategies into feasible plans which are supported by departments and agencies across the whole of government.

The combatant commander develops a theater strategy and issues a campaign plan to employ military resources and achieve directed effects within an area of responsibility.¹¹⁰ The actions of a combatant commander are informed by and will impact multiple country strategies. Synchronization with other elements of national power is

¹⁰⁷ CJCS, JP 3-0, I-8. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities to achieve unity of effort.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Department of State (DoS), "Department of State Strategic Planning," 18 FAM 301.2 (DoS, Washington, DC, July 2020), 1-2, <https://fam.state.gov/fam/18fam/18fam030102.html>.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), 216, <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf>.

essential to achieve the desired conditions in the security environment.¹¹¹ Security cooperation presents an ideal example of an activity that accomplishes the combatant commander's objectives while supporting an ambassador's objectives.¹¹²

Operations are further refined at the sub-unified or component command level to direct actions in specific countries or joint operational areas consisting of the entirety or specified portions of a country or countries. These often take the form of military engagement, information operations, or other actions undertaken to create favorable conditions within the operational environment to support integrated country strategies and prevent conflict.¹¹³ Because the ambassador remains responsible for the integrated application of national power inside of a country, coordination with other USG organizations is essential.

The scale of combatant command geographic areas of responsibility justifies the establishment of several theater-level strategies to address specific regions or problems (East Africa, North Africa, Islamic State, etc.). This may result in the establishment of

¹¹¹ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, vii. The security environment is the set of global conditions, circumstances, and influences that affects the employment of U.S. means and includes the sum of all operational environments. Also referred to as the international security environment.

¹¹² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), v, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf. Interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote U.S. security interests, develop partner capabilities, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to partner nations.

¹¹³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), xii-xiii, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_16.pdf.

task-specific organizations or the designation of an operational commander to oversee units that are temporarily assigned to accomplish an end. The assignment of liaison elements to embassies assists in keeping all parties informed and identifying opportunities for collaboration among departments and agencies.



Figure 5. Nested Approach to National Strategy

Source: Adapted from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), IV-22, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf.

The U.S. directs the applications of national power to achieve objectives in the international system through the issuance of broad strategies at the national level (see Figure 5). These strategies are further refined through integrated country strategies and theater strategies to address regional and country-specific requirements. Operations accomplish the nested objectives of these strategies and specifically account for

interagency coordination to ensure unity of effort.¹¹⁴ When executed properly, each operation, activity, or investment undertaken by the USG is nested to support a national strategic objective. This does not imply that individual actions are achieving strategic impact, but rather that all actions should be undertaken to support the attainment of strategic ends as specified in subordinate strategies.

States compete through the application of strategy to achieve national objectives. To effectively model great power rivalry, participants must be able to develop and implement strategies. Elements of national, theater, and integrated country strategies must be represented in a model to depict how specific actions support these strategies. The next two sections will address how the U.S. and PRC are applying strategies to compete.

The U.S. Approach to Great Power Rivalry

The U.S. has instituted GPC as its approach to great power rivalry. This is reflected in both the 2017 *National Security Strategy* and the 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. The *National Security Strategy* represents the overarching U.S. strategy because all other strategies are subordinate to it. The most current iteration of this document prioritizes engagement with partner states and institutions across all elements of national power to achieve national security objectives.¹¹⁵ This partnership entails the application of resources abroad to influence populations and develop leverage

¹¹⁴ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-10. “The coordination that occurs between elements of...USG departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.”

¹¹⁵ U.S. President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 9-15.

in the international system.¹¹⁶ This is a long-term endeavor sustained by the continued application of resources to assure partners and induce neutral countries to cooperate with U.S. initiatives.




Figure 6. Competition Continuum

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, *Strategy* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), III-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf.

As opposed to the strategy of containment employed during the Cold War, the U.S. has assumed a strategy of “managed competition.” This allows for simultaneous cooperation and competition with countries instead of relying solely on the suppression and isolation of rivals.¹¹⁷ The “competition continuum” (see Figure 6) portrays the conceptual spectrum of relationships that two or more actors may share

¹¹⁶ Aguilar, Ferenzi, and Groves, “Great Power Competition - Part 1,” 2:43.

¹¹⁷ Joseph Nye, “America’s New Great Power Strategy,” Project Syndicate, August 3, 2021, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-china-new-great-power-strategy-by-joseph-s-nye-2021-08>.

simultaneously.¹¹⁸ This is an evolution from the binary construct of war or peace. The continuum recognizes that states will adopt an approach towards rivals that best serves the national interests, even if they are in competition or conflict elsewhere.¹¹⁹ It also accounts for the long-term nature of rivalry by acknowledging, “In enduring competitions, the joint force does not win or lose but is in the process of winning or losing.”¹²⁰

In competition, the U.S. applies resources to partner states and organizations to “maintain or establish favorable conditions within the international order.”¹²¹ The objectives of these actions are to incentivize cooperation, discourage subversive behavior, and garner support for U.S. initiatives.¹²² Influence is a central theme in competition. Joint doctrine defines it as “the act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a TA.”¹²³ The “act or power” describes the application, or potential for application, of diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other elements of power (means and ways). Although no longer in vogue, this often represents the synchronized employment of resources from the three Ds of diplomacy, defense, and development.¹²⁴ These actions

¹¹⁸ CJCS, JP 5-0 (2020), I-4 – I-5, I-10.

¹¹⁹ CJCS, JDN 1-18, III-1 – III-2.

¹²⁰ CJCS, JDN 1-19, III-1.

¹²¹ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 15.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 15-16.

¹²³ CJCS, JP 3-13, I-3.

¹²⁴ Ryan McCannell, “At the Nexus of Diplomacy, Development, and Defense: AFRICOM at 10 Years,” *War Room*, September 29, 2017,

aim to provide a positive impact on foreign populations and garner support for the U.S., which support strategic ends.

The DOD Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation is an example of how combatant commanders work with DOS to conduct humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief to mitigate destabilizing environmental and societal influences while building influence.¹²⁵ OHDACA projects are developed through interagency coordination to accomplish long-term objectives within a country or region. This often includes the construction of education facilities, shelters for natural disasters, or public works that mitigate environmental factors causing strife. These initiatives demonstrate the resolve of the American people to support and advance the interests of partner states while making a visibly positive contribution to local populations.

Activities must create an impact on a TA to say the action “influenced” a population. TAs may range from individuals to international organizations or non-state actors and often constitute specific organizations within a government. In the example above, the TA for an OHDACA project is the partner nation government and the local population. Additional examples include military engagement, which focuses on interactions with foreign militaries, and the DOS International Visitor Leadership Program, which establishes dialogues with formal and informal foreign leaders from a

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/special-series/anniversaries/forming-africom-part-3/>.

¹²⁵ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “C12 - Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid,” accessed March 25, 2022, <https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-12>.

wide variety of organizations.¹²⁶ Each of these programs attempts to influence a TA through the provision of resources, exposure to American ideals, and the formation of relationships between individuals.

The outcome, or end, of influence activities is the attainment of conditions favorable to the accomplishment of U.S. national objectives. This often contributes indirectly to these goals through the attainment of theater or country-specific objectives that create or maintain conditions favorable to the attainment of national objectives. An example of influence contributing to strategic ends can be drawn from the DOS's aim to facilitate U.S. operational access and influence while fostering support for America's security interests.¹²⁷ Maintenance of infrastructure and access agreements are essential to the projection of American resources. Road and rail networks, roll-on roll-off capable seaports, and airports capable of hosting C-17 and C-5 aircraft all enable strategic mobility and access provided by the U.S. Transportation Command.¹²⁸ Each of the example development projects aids in assuring American power projection while also influencing TAs.

Influence activities allow the U.S. to attain leverage, which is the ability to exploit a relative advantage in circumstances against a rival across any variable within the

¹²⁶ U.S. Department of State (DoS), "IVLP," Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, accessed March 30, 2022, <https://eca.state.gov/ivlp>.

¹²⁷ DoS, "Department of State Strategic Planning," 1-2.

¹²⁸ John Fasching, "Strategic Mobility: The Essential Enabler of Military Operations in Great-Power Competition," The Heritage Foundation, November 17, 2020, <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2021-essays/strategic-mobility-the-essential-enabler-military>.

operational environment.¹²⁹ “The act of leverage involves using resources and/or relationships in a creative way to bring about certain effects in the world.”¹³⁰ Examples include the ability to obtain a country’s support in an international organization or the ability to build a military coalition to address mutual security concerns. The accumulation of influence across the operational variables may be seen as a source of leverage. Great powers build this leverage to develop a position of strength in the international community, increase their potential power through the development of multinational coalitions, and assure their ability to employ elements of national power abroad.¹³¹

Advantage encompasses the concept of positional superiority over an adversary.¹³² In large-scale combat operations, this is phrased in terms of the ability to threaten an enemy’s center of gravity, the ability to operate from decisive terrain, or the ability to array and employ forces in a manner that enables the accomplishment of the military end state.¹³³ In competition, this notion encompasses the ability to secure access to global commons, the security of strategic lines of communication, freedom of access to partner nations, and the ability to protect national interests at home and abroad.

¹²⁹ CJCS, JP 5-0 (2020), GL-10.

¹³⁰ David M. Anderson, *The Age of Leverage*, Issues in Governance Studies 37 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, November 2010), 3, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_leverage_anderson.pdf.

¹³¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2012), 6, http://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/ccjo_2012.pdf.

¹³² CJCS, JP 3-0, III-37.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, III-37 – III-38.

The potential for advantage exists across all the operational variables and in all domains. Great powers must determine how to apply finite means to develop a position of advantage in relation to adversaries that may reasonably pose a threat to national interests. States achieve advantage when they can employ latent leverage alongside available elements of national power to achieve their ends. Influence creates leverage, leverage begets advantage, and advantage enables the protection of national interests.

Several prominent ways of conducting U.S. influence activities include information operations, security cooperation (SC) activities, development initiatives, and cultural outreach. These activities advance the interests of the nation by demonstrating resolve to assist partner nations, increasing interactions with foreign populations, and creating positive perceptions of U.S. activities. These ways also demonstrate a resolve to help states increase the capacity to address their issues unilaterally or collaboratively.¹³⁴ Each of these ways leverages informational power to influence populations and promulgate American soft power in the international system.¹³⁵

Information operations are actions designed to allocate means as ways to achieve influence. They are defined as “the integrated employment...of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries...while protecting our own.”¹³⁶ Updated concepts on

¹³⁴ U.S. Africa Command, “Our Mission,” accessed January 14, 2022, <https://www.africom.mil>.

¹³⁵ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, viii. Informational power is the ability to leverage information to shape perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behavior and the course of events.

¹³⁶ CJCS, JP 3-13, ix.

information operations have expanded this purview to include joint force use of informational power to “change or maintain the observations, perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behaviors of relevant actors.”¹³⁷ This is a significant shift, recognizing the need to address competition below the threshold of armed conflict and the importance of influencing friendly and neutral populations as well as the adversary. Of the fourteen information-related capabilities noted in joint doctrine, only five are employed for the projection of U.S. messages (see Table 1).¹³⁸

The relationship between operations and influence is significant, as it can be modeled. If means, or resources, are allocated to achieve influence, the number of means allocated in a particular region may be roughly correlated to the amount of influence an actor hopes to achieve. This is greater than foreign direct investment or official assistance, and all deliberate interactions may be accounted for if the goal includes influencing a TA. Although the amount of effort applied may not reflect the amount of influence gained, it provides a starting point for modeling. The actions themselves may also be modeled to familiarize participants with the means and ways used to achieve influence. This allows for the identification of influence activities that may be modeled.

¹³⁷ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, viii.

¹³⁸ CJCS, JP 3-13, II-5 – II-13.

Table 1. U.S. Information Related Capabilities used for Influence

Capability	Description
Strategic Communication	Efforts to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests by engaging key audiences using coordinated programs, plans, themes, and messages synchronized across all instruments of national power.
Public Affairs	Public information, command information, and public engagement activities are directed toward both the internal and external publics with an interest in the DOD.
Civil-Military Operations	Civil-Military Operations establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government entities, non-governmental organizations, and the civilian populace to achieve U.S. objectives.
Military Information Support Operations	Military Information Support Operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.
Key Leader Engagements	Deliberate engagements between U.S. military leaders and the leaders of foreign audiences that have defined objectives, such as a change in policy or supporting U.S. objectives.

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), II-5 – II-13, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf.

The joint force employs information-related capabilities to create effects in target populations and develop operationally desirable conditions.¹³⁹ Strategic communications and public affairs operations habitually occur at the strategic and operational levels to highlight the positive works of the U.S. military. Military information support operations and civil-military operations bridge the gap from strategic to tactical, bringing messages directly to individuals and organizations. Although the execution of these tasks occurs at the tactical level, they can create operational effects in support of U.S. interests. These actions are greater than the concept of the *Strategic Corporal* proposed by Marine

¹³⁹ CJCS, JP 3-13, I-3.

General Charles Krulak.¹⁴⁰ These present opportunities to directly influence key leadership and populations to build support for U.S. initiatives. Successes in these endeavors have led to the expansion of military information support activities and civil-military operations through direct integration with U.S. Embassies to support “U.S. Ambassador and USG strategic goals...in specific countries.”¹⁴¹

“Security cooperation provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives.”¹⁴² This activity increases partner nation stability, ensures access to key infrastructure for power projection, and allows for collaboration to achieve mutually beneficial security objectives. Key subprograms include foreign military sales, peace operations, and international military exchange training. Security cooperation is also closely coordinated with security force assistance programming, foreign internal defense operations, counterterrorism operations, civil-military operations, and military information support activities.¹⁴³ U.S. Africa Command employs these programs to increase stability and set the conditions for successful diplomatic engagement.¹⁴⁴ These

¹⁴⁰ Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal,” 5.

¹⁴¹ Joint Special Operations University and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, 4th ed. (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, June 2015), 3-15, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA625223.pdf>.

¹⁴² CJCS, JP 3-20, v.

¹⁴³ Ibid., II-3 – II-13.

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Africa Command, “Security Cooperation,” accessed January 20, 2022, <https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/security-cooperation>.

activities strengthen and expand the global network of U.S. alliances and partnerships to achieve security objectives through collaboration.

USAID is the lead for development and humanitarian efforts of the USG. The agency funds development projects that increase the standard of living, expand economic activity, and increase access to education.¹⁴⁵ They also coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations overseas. USAID plays a large role in U.S. support for stabilization initiatives to demobilize insurgents and provide services to refugees.¹⁴⁶ Interagency initiatives have also reduced wildlife trafficking used to fund insurgency in East Africa specifically.¹⁴⁷ At-risk populations benefit from the funding, programming, and attention that USAID brings, increasing the stability of the region and providing a reminder that the U.S. population is committed to the advancement of partner state populations.¹⁴⁸

DOS leads U.S. executive branch diplomatic and information initiatives. They conduct unilateral and interagency coordination to ensure U.S. strategic messages are

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “What We Do,” last updated March 22, 2022, <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do>.

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Horn of Africa Joint Planning Cell: Annual Report* (Washington, DC: USAID, June 2013), 12, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Horn_of_Africa_JPC_Annual_Report_2013_1.pdf.

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “East Africa: Countering Wildlife Crime,” (USAID, Washington, DC, 2022), 1, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Combating_Wildlife_Crime_fact_sheet_2022.pdf.

¹⁴⁸ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Resilience,” February 26, 2022, <https://www.usaid.gov/east-africa-regional/resilience>.

nested into all USG activities. These programs translate national strategic messages and priorities into local messages and actions. The American Spaces program provides library-like spaces with access to digital information to allow foreign populations to experience some aspects of American culture. This connectivity and exposure to American ideals and priorities create support for U.S. initiatives.¹⁴⁹

The Bureau of Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights oversees State Department counterterror, conflict stabilization, and refugee protection initiatives.¹⁵⁰ These programs are long-term and focus on solving the root causes of instability. Initiatives to improve security are closely coordinated with the DOD to ensure SC and other programs and nested with mutually supporting objectives.

Cumulatively, the U.S. approach to competition employs a strategy to apply means through ways to accomplish ends while balancing risk to achieve conditions beneficial to national security. This includes the application of diplomatic, development, and defense resources to create a positive influence in the international system which provides leverage and enables continued operations from a position of advantage. Each of these is relative to rivals who are also operating in the international system, often in the same locations as U.S. entities.

¹⁴⁹ U.S. Department of State (DoS), “American Spaces,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, accessed January 26, 2022, <https://eca.state.gov/programs-and-initiatives/initiatives/office-american-spaces>.

¹⁵⁰ U.S. Department of State (DoS), “Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights,” accessed January 25, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/>.

Declared programs of the U.S. can be modeled to represent activities undertaken to achieve influence. Both the allocation of funds and the allocation of personnel represent investments in these endeavors. These attempts at influence build to enable leverage in the international system. Although leverage is difficult to quantify, it may be assumed that if a state has achieved more influence in a location than a rival, they have achieved leverage and, therefore, advantage in a location. The overwhelming presence of leverage and advantage does not mean that a state is winning, but it is a dynamic that can be modeled to determine if a wargame participant is working to achieve the declared national ends by applying resources in a logical fashion. Stated otherwise, the application of means, in coordinated ways, to achieve an objective may be modeled by applying resources in significant locations to achieve influence and develop a position of advantage to achieve ends. Significant factors for modeling include the ways covered through discussion of information operations, security cooperation, development, and public diplomacy.

The Chinese Approach to Great Power Rivalry

The PRC likewise applies strategy to compete in the international order. Guiding principles include the avoidance of direct military confrontation, increasing international dependence on Chinese trade, the reduction of domestic reliance on global technology component flows, and expanding influence abroad.¹⁵¹ Like the U.S., the PRC applies ends, ways, and means to seek influence, leverage, and advantage. However, the ways

¹⁵¹ Ryan Hass, “How China is Responding to Escalating Strategic Competition with the U.S.,” Brookings Institution, March 1, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-china-is-responding-to-escalating-strategic-competition-with-the-us>.

and means of employment between the two actors are different, reflecting the differences in national values and resources of the state.

The PRC's strategy has evolved, reflecting its increased capacity and strength to act in the international system. There have been three shifts in national strategy to reflect the increased capacity of the state. As the Cold War ended, the PRC maintained a cautious but interactive relationship with the United States. Policies trended towards subversion, seeking to "hide its capabilities and bide its time" while seeking "asymmetric capabilities to thwart American military power, trade agreements to constrain American economic coercion, and membership in regional institutions to stall American rule-setting and coalition building."¹⁵² The second strategy yielded the start of initiatives like BRI as the state began leveraging its national power to influence weaker states.¹⁵³ The third shift is ongoing and trends toward expansion into increasing roles of leadership in international organizations and the development of independent regional blocs.¹⁵⁴

The most visible international Chinese projects are associated with the BRI. Recent rhetoric on Chinese expansion has highlighted the possibility of economic coercion of partner nations.¹⁵⁵ Others have argued that these agreements are mutually

¹⁵² Rush Doshi, "Great Changes Unseen in a Century: The Elusive Phrase Driving China's Grand Strategy," *China Leadership Monitor* 68 (Summer 2021): 2, https://www.prcleader.org/_files/ugd/af1ede_c6526da05ad84ddcba3a8ce4b1c6d8f1.pdf.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Michael Mazarr and Ali Wyne, "The Real U.S.–China Competition: Competing Theories of Influence," *The Interpreter*, January 29, 2020, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/real-us-china-competition-competing-theories-influence>.

beneficial, bilateral, and normal transactional foreign policy agreements.¹⁵⁶ Some projects financed through the BRI have been backed using natural resource grants from the partner state, while others are guaranteed using the infrastructure built through the program.¹⁵⁷ Regardless of the terms of the agreement, the increased local and regional economic activity spurred by these projects offers a significant incentive for partner states while providing a mechanism for the exertion of PRC influence to create leverage.¹⁵⁸ Domestically, the economic and diplomatic benefits of the BRI are supporting technological independence, boosting national industrial advancement, and enabling investment in an increasingly capable military.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ Mazarr and Wyne, “The Real U.S.–China Competition,”; Brautigam, *The Dragon’s Gift*, 25-30, 41-42.

¹⁵⁷ Dylan Yachyshen, “Great Power Competition and the Scramble for Africa,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 30, 2020, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/04/great-power-competition-and-the-scramble-for-africa>.

¹⁵⁸ Maryla Maliszewska and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, “The Belt and Road Initiative Economic, Poverty and Environmental Impacts,” (Policy Research Working Paper No. 8814, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019), 10, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31543>.

¹⁵⁹ Edward Luttwak, *The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 95.




Figure 7. Belt and Road Initiative Global Infrastructure Map

Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies, “Mapping the Belt and Road Initiative: This is Where We Stand,” Merics, June 7, 2018, <https://merics.org/en/tracker/mapping-belt-and-road-initiative-where-we-stand>.

The PRC’s rise has been informed by a detailed study of other prominent countries in the international order. The 1991 text, *Unrestricted Warfare*, provided a detailed accounting of the U.S. military doctrine employed in Operation Desert Storm and an expansive accounting of U.S. influence activities. Of the 20 forms of warfare identified in the text, 11 have no military analog in the U.S. and would be accounted for through the diplomatic, economic, development, or legal forms of national power¹⁶⁰ (Table 2). Significantly, the activities titled as “new terror war,” “drug war,” “smuggling warfare,” and “ecological war” are considered criminal activity in America. The text also

¹⁶⁰ Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 18-55.

identifies five U.S. information-related capabilities as types of warfare (Table 2).¹⁶¹ This provides a valuable perspective in understanding how rivals view U.S. activities as well as the potentially detrimental effects of influence activities on rival interests. This is unsurprising since influence has been described as a “commodity” critical to achieving Chinese national objectives.¹⁶²

The PRC is applying the “Three Warfares” of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare to compete. This indirect approach allows the state to achieve its ends while avoiding direct military confrontation when contravening international norms.¹⁶³ The use of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare sometimes bear similarities to U.S. influence activities, however there are also radical departures. The construction of artificial military islands in the South China Sea to manipulate international laws concerning territorial waters and exclusive economic zones provides one such example.¹⁶⁴ This strategy is inherently subversive, embracing a position of disadvantage in the international order while trying to develop advantages

¹⁶¹ Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 18-55.

¹⁶² Norris, “Countering Unrestricted Warfare,” 13.

¹⁶³ Luttwak, *The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy*, 105; Laurent Murawiec, “China’s Grand Strategy is to Make War While Avoiding a Battle,” *Armed Forces Journal*, September 15, 2005, <http://armedforcesjournal.com/chinas-grand-strategy-is-to-make-war-while-avoiding-a-battle/>.

¹⁶⁴ Oriana Mastro, “How China is Bending the Rules in the South China Sea,” *The Interpreter*, February 17, 2021, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea>.

through prolonged campaigns to shape international opinion.¹⁶⁵ This reinforces the assertion that the PRC is “making the weapons [to] fit the fight” instead of “fighting the fight that fits one’s weapons.”¹⁶⁶

Activities in recent news articles, press releases, and BRI projects provide an opportunity to model PRC influence activities. The actions detailed in *Unrestricted Warfare* provide a means of categorization of activities. Due to the limited information available in English, there is a critical assumption that the BRI is China’s primary means of legitimate action in the international system, and those surrounding activities are designed to enable the construction of sea and land lines of communication with Europe. For modeling, it is assumed that the completion of BRI projects are means and ways to achieve the construction of these lines of communication as a national end.

¹⁶⁵ Ian Shapiro, “On the Second Edition of Lukes’ Third Face,” *Political Studies Review* 4, no. 2 (May 2006): 147–148, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9299.2006.000105.x>.

¹⁶⁶ Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 19.

Table 2. Forms of Warfare Identified in *Unrestricted Warfare*

Warfare Type	Description	Comparable Concept
Information Warfare	“War in which information technology is used to obtain or suppress information.”	Information Operations
Computerized Warfare	“The various forms of warfare which are enhanced and accompanied by information technology.”	Cyber Operations
Precision Warfare	Use of precision-guided munitions to enhance the effectiveness and synchronization of one’s military.	2 nd Offset Strategy
Mil. Operations Other than War	Military operations below the threshold of armed conflict to police and influence nations.	Peace Operations; Security Cooperation
Trade War	Use of domestic trade law; erecting and dismantling tariff barriers; trade sanctions; embargoes on exports of critical technologies; Section 301 law; most-favored-nation treatment.	Economic Policy; Free Trade; Sanctions
Financial War	The manipulation of financial markets through assets or currency manipulation creates negative effects in the market.	Market Manipulation
New Terror War	“This type of terrorist operation uses the latest technology...and sets itself against humanity as a whole.”	Terrorism
Traditional Terror War	“Use of limited resources to fight an unlimited war. National forces must...conduct themselves according to...rules and therefore are only able to use their unlimited resources to fight a limited war.”	Unconventional Warfare; Support to Insurgency
Ecological War	“Non-military warfare [where] modern technology is employed to influence the...state of rivers, oceans, crust of the earth,...polar ice sheets, air circulating in the atmosphere, and the ozone layer.”	No equivalent
Psychological Warfare	“Spreading rumors to intimidate the enemy and break down his will.”	Psychological Operations
Smuggling War	“Throwing markets into confusion and attacking economic order.”	No equivalent
Media Warfare	“Manipulating what people see and hear...to lead public opinion.”	Military Information
Drug Warfare	“Obtaining...illicit profits by spreading disaster in other countries.”	Narcoterrorism
Network Warfare	“Venturing out in secret and concealing one’s identity in a type of warfare that is virtually impossible to guard against.”	Unconventional Warfare
Technological Warfare	“Creating monopolies by setting standards independently.”	No equivalent
Fabrication Warfare	“Presenting a counterfeit appearance of real strength before the eyes of the enemy.”	Military Deception
Resources Warfare	“Grabbing riches by plundering stores of resources.”	Economic Cooperation
Economic Aid Warfare	“Bestowing favor in the open and contriving to control matters in secret.”	Development
Cultural Warfare	“Leading cultural trends...to assimilate those with different views.”	Diplomacy
International Law Warfare	“Seizing the earliest opportunity to set up regulations.”	Diplomacy

Source: Adapted from Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, ed. and trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 18-55, <https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf>.

Nonstate Actors and the Security Environment

Understanding the security environment is a prerequisite to sustainable investment or partnership with a state. Corruption, lawlessness, insurgency, and other destabilizing factors can interfere with investments or prevent an actor from achieving their objectives.¹⁶⁷ International organizations, non-profits, and multinational corporations can also significantly impact the operational environment.¹⁶⁸ While the focus of this paper is rivalry between great powers, nonstate actors play a crucial role in the implementation of a national strategy. Although potentially significant, this discussion will not include the effects of multinational corporations or influential persons on the security environment.

Corruption has the potential to exist on both sides of an investment, and often does. Corrupt countries are more likely to partner with malign foreign governments because their leaders are interested in advancing personal agendas rather than advancing the interests of the population.¹⁶⁹ Chinese construction companies are willing to use bribery and make risky business decisions because they are backed by the direction of an

¹⁶⁷ Matthew Hill and Borges Nhamire, “Mozambique Seeks Resumption of Total Gas Project Amid Insurgency,” *Financial Post*, January 14, 2021, <https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/mozambique-seeks-resumption-of-total-gas-project-amid-insurgency>.

¹⁶⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), II-19 – II-20, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_08.pdf.

¹⁶⁹ Patrick Quirk, “One of the Best Ways the U.S. Can Counter Russia and China has Nothing to do with the Military,” *Business Insider*, January 22, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/fighting-corruption-is-key-in-era-of-great-power-competition-2020-1>.

autocratic government concerned with developing strategic lines of communication to wealthy markets rather than the enforcement of vague laws concerning corruption abroad.¹⁷⁰ While unacceptable by international standards, enticing the elite of a foreign country does provide the benefit of ensuring their support to achieve national objectives.¹⁷¹ The U.S. has also employed less than desirable techniques for influence, supporting autocratic regimes in Zaire, the Philippines, and South Vietnam to guarantee supplies of important resources and ensure access for military forces during the Cold War.¹⁷² Aid was used to support friends, and it was cut off when countries did not support U.S. initiatives.¹⁷³ Today, the U.S. and OECD countries have put stringent laws in place to punish corruption at home and abroad. Although corruption can net short-term gains, long-term returns on investment are often minimal or nonexistent.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ Yizheng Zou and Lee Jones, "China's Response to Threats to Its Overseas Economic Interests: Softening Non-Interference and Cultivating Hegemony," *Journal of Contemporary China* 29, no. 121 (May 2019): 101-103, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1621532>; Jonathan Hillman, "Corruption Flows Along China's Belt and Road," Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 18, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-flows-along-chinas-belt-and-road>.

¹⁷¹ Quirk, "One of the Best Ways the U.S. Can Counter Russia and China has Nothing to do With the Military."

¹⁷² Conor Savoy and Janina Staguhn, "Global Development in an Era of Great Power Competition," Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, March 2022), 3, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep40146>.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

¹⁷⁴ Working Group on Corruption and Security, *Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security* (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2014), 10-12, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13073>.




Figure 8. Map of Africa's Militant Islamist Groups

Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Map of Africa's Militant Islamist Groups," April 26, 2017, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/map-africa-militant-islamic-groups-april-2017>.

Insurgency and terrorism pose threats to regional stability, ignoring borders and usurping the ability of a legitimate government to exercise sovereign control over a territory.¹⁷⁵ Insurgencies actively work to replace governments, while terrorist

¹⁷⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2021), ix, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf. Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to challenge the political control of a region.

organizations work to achieve concessions or displace systems.¹⁷⁶ Both are sources of instability and pose risks to foreign investments. Because insurgency and terrorism are regional issues, states may provide security assistance to increase regional security, create leverage with the partner state, and set the conditions for additional trade and development investments.

Displaced civilians, which include refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants, move due to conflict, natural disasters, and economic hardship.¹⁷⁷ The accumulation of these displaced populations into camps allows for the provision of essential services, but also creates the opportunity for radical organizations to recruit vulnerable persons.¹⁷⁸ The risk for conflict with local communities over resources near camps is also high, diminishing the limited carrying capacity for livestock essential to nearby communities.¹⁷⁹ Increased rates of corruption amongst host nation government

CJCS, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 215. Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence to instill fear and coerce a target audience.

¹⁷⁶ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* (Washington, DC: CIA, 2012), 9-11, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713599>; James Gelvin, "Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to Terrorology," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 4 (October 2008): 571, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802257291>.

¹⁷⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), I-8, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf.

¹⁷⁸ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Somalia: Information about Al-Shabaab, Including Areas of Control, Recruitment Procedures and Affiliated Groups," November 29, 2011, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f0eb6385.html>.

¹⁷⁹ Asfaw Kumssa, J. H. Williams, John Jones, and Eric Des Marais, "Conflict and Migration: The Case of Somali Refugees in Northeastern Kenya," *Global Social Welfare* 1 (March 2014): 147-149, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40609-014-0006-9>.

officials and the exploitation of relief supplies to feed illicit market activity also have the potential to disrupt local economic flows and create conflict.¹⁸⁰ Long-term disruption associated with the presence of refugees, internally displaced persons, or migrants may lead to resentment from the host nation and calls for relocation or disbandment.¹⁸¹



Figure 9. UNHCR Presence – East and Horn of Africa

Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Presence - East and Horn of Africa,” February 14, 2017, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/80182>.

¹⁸⁰ Asfaw Kumssa and John Jones, “Human Security Issues of Somali Refugees and the Host Community in Northeastern Kenya,” *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* 12, no. 1 (March 2014): 32-36, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2013.810797>.

¹⁸¹ Tom Odula, “Kenya to Close Dadaab, World’s Biggest Refugee Camp,” *AP News*, May 11, 2016, <https://apnews.com/article/b5d902e689544b7ea6e2944e8110ac29>.

Corruption, violence, and displaced civilians can have destabilizing effects in areas that are unprepared to address them. Government cooperation with international organizations, nonprofit organizations, and friendly states can assist in addressing the underlying causes of instability and reduce the suffering of affected populations.¹⁸² If effective, these organizations can provide a stabilizing effect on regions.

International organizations operate under formal agreement by three or more member countries to promote the national interests of the members at the regional or global level.¹⁸³ At the regional level, international organizations work to stop conflict, increase trade, provide humanitarian assistance, and encourage cooperation to address a myriad of other issues. Countries can increase support for international organizations to achieve common objectives or reduce support when they do not share a common vision.¹⁸⁴ Countries seeking to achieve national interests may coordinate with an international organization to achieve unity of effort when they are working to achieve similar end states.¹⁸⁵ When effectively coordinated, international organizations can bring increased resources to bear on problems.

Nongovernmental organizations are self-governed, not-for-profit organizations committed to the alleviation of human suffering and the advancement of societies.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² CJCS, JP 3-29, I-7 – I-11.

¹⁸³ CJCS, JP 3-08, II-18.

¹⁸⁴ Sarah Bermeo, *Targeted Development: Industrialized Country Strategy in a Globalizing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 4-5.

¹⁸⁵ CJCS, JP 3-08, I-4.

¹⁸⁶ CJCS, JP 3-08, IV-10 – IV-12, II-18 – II-19.

While these organizations sometimes have an aversion to working alongside the military, they often have significant experience in the region of concern and expertise in the focus area of their organization.¹⁸⁷ Multiple outlets exist to coordinate efforts with nongovernmental organizations, including relationships developed by diplomatic staff and partnership opportunities with state development organizations. Although specific operating philosophies may differ, support for nongovernmental organizations can reduce root causes of instability and positively contribute to regional security.¹⁸⁸

Each of the organizations discussed can be modeled as having a positive or negative impact on the security environment of a region. Effective coordination offers the opportunity for countries to advance their national interests by addressing destabilizing factions through the promotion of stability initiatives. While these factions do not counterbalance one another, they can provide solutions to the root causes of instability, reduce the imperatives for lawlessness, and allow for adequate governance. States apply resources to support selected organizations when their interests align.

Friction in the Pursuit of National Interests

As states pursue national interests in the anarchic system of states, they risk creating conflict with rivals.

Eventually they find themselves in competition/conflict with other parties in the international arena. This occurs when interests are incompatible, and they contest with one another as each seeks to protect or advance its own interests. This competition can take many forms ranging from diplomatic, economic, or informational interactions that are within the norms of peaceful international interactions. It can also take the form of large-scale international armed conflict.

¹⁸⁷ CJCS, JP 3-08, xi.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., II-19.

In between are a variety of aggressive and hostile actions that states, and non-state actors can mix and match in an effort to create leverage and gain advantage.¹⁸⁹

The incompatibility of interests is the source of friction between states. Peter Paret provides some clarity to the concept, describing the Clausewitzian concept of friction as “uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, the unforeseen and their effect(s).”¹⁹⁰ This identifies inefficiency and ineffectiveness in one’s own actions, actions of external actors, uncertainty, and “the unforeseen” as sources of friction. John Boyd takes a much broader approach to the concept, stating simply, “friction impedes activity.”¹⁹¹ This broader definition lends to the inclusion of the natural environment, the anarchic nature of the system of states, the pursuit of asymmetric strategies, and the deliberate or intentional interference of rivals. This may range from the loss of a ship due to inclement weather to the deliberate and coordinated expulsion of a state from an international organization. While both definitions were developed to describe the difficulty of armed conflict, they appropriately describe the force resulting from the pursuit of incompatible national interests below the threshold of armed conflict.

The U.S. and PRC have both expressed an intent to use influence as a tool to achieve important state interests of expanding foreign and domestic trade.¹⁹² This is not a

¹⁸⁹ CJCS, JDN 1-18, I-3.

¹⁹⁰ Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 202.

¹⁹¹ John Boyd, *A Discourse on Winning and Losing*, ed. Grant Hammond (Maxwell AFB, AL: Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine and Development and Education, Air University Press, 2018), 57, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0151_Boyd_Discourse_Winning_Losing.pdf.

¹⁹² U.S. President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 9; State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Peaceful Development,”

zero-sum prospect, but the potential for great power initiatives to conflict with one another is high. Profitable markets and natural resources are finite, often dictated by geography.¹⁹³ When they are collocated with high-volume ports along global sea lanes, they become enticing marks for state influence activities.¹⁹⁴ Access to these locations also enables refueling and maintenance of naval vessels, which are becoming increasingly important in regions such as the Red Sea due to piracy and regional conflicts.¹⁹⁵ The importance of global trade has led to the establishment of American and Chinese military installations in the Horn of Africa, which creates a potential for conflict.

The nature of the anarchic system of states leads to suspicion over rival activities.¹⁹⁶ This cannot be eliminated, but the insecurity created by unilateral action to accomplish national objectives can be lessened through dialogue within international organizations, bilateral communications, and the signaling of motives.¹⁹⁷ Marine General James Mattis demonstrated an expert understanding of this dynamic when he announced

(White Paper, Beijing, September 2011), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm.

¹⁹³ Aidan Buys, “China, Japan, India and the East Africa Blue Economy,” (Policy Insights 61. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2018), 10-11, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25986>.

¹⁹⁴ Yoel Guzansky and Gil Hurvitz, “A Port Rush: Competition for Control of Trade Routes,” (INSS Insight 1200, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, August 5, 2019), 3-4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19523>.

¹⁹⁵ Grant Harris, *Why Africa Matters to U.S. National Security* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, May 2017), 20, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26663>.

¹⁹⁶ Charles Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (October 1997): 175-183, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054031>.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 178.

that the U.S. would remain “strategically predictable but operationally unpredictable.”¹⁹⁸

The reference to operational unpredictability signals that the U.S. is committed to the attainment of national goals and will take measures appropriate to attain them within the bounds of international law.

The pursuit of asymmetric strategies could lead to misunderstanding over interference with state activities. The U.S. employed political warfare to great effect in the Cold War, while the PRC has announced the strategy of Three Warfares to compete in the current era of great power rivalry. Political warfare employed all elements of national power to provide multiple dilemmas for the adversary below the threshold of armed conflict while aggressively promoting American interests.¹⁹⁹ The PRC’s Three Warfares strategy seeks to leverage domestic technological advantages while avoiding American strengths to reshape the international order in a manner that benefits Chinese interests.²⁰⁰ As both states pursue their ends, they must balance not only the amount of pressure they place on one another, but also the ways that they employ it.

¹⁹⁸ Secretary of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), 5, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

¹⁹⁹ Charles Cleveland, Ryan Crocker, Daniel Egel, Andrew Liepman, and David Maxwell, *An American Way of Political Warfare: A Proposal*, PE-304 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 4-7, <https://doi.org/10.7249/PE304>.

²⁰⁰ Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Doowan Lee, and Andrew Dowse, “COVID Information Warfare and the Future of Great Power Competition,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 13–14, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48599306>; Emilio Iasiello, “China’s Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout from Cyber Espionage Activities,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 9, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 50-65, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26466776>.




Figure 10. Influence Mechanisms

Source: Adapted from Adam Reitz, "Influence Mechanisms: A Framework for Integrated Operations," *Small Wars Journal*, September 14, 2021, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/influence-mechanisms-framework-integrated-operations>.

The use of persuasive mechanisms (Figure 10) such as assurance and inducement is generally seen as acceptable in the international system. States may use coercive mechanisms (Figure 10) such as deterrence and compellence when their national security interests are threatened, but generally, these measures are reserved for defensive or retaliatory purposes. In competition below the threshold of armed conflict, the subversive activities of a state remain secret, and little information exists to facilitate an honest discussion of the ways and means available. There is ample friction in the current rivalry between the U.S. and PRC. If rhetoric escalates, it could cause a decline in interstate communication and increase the likelihood that competition escalates to conflict.

Both the U.S. and PRC face claims that they are declining powers. Some speculate that the PRC is outpacing U.S. growth and displacing U.S. influence, resulting

in a comparative decline in the ability to employ elements of national power.²⁰¹ Others claim that the PRC has reached the peak of the dynastic cycle and will subsequently face division from within the country, preventing it from applying power outside of its borders in any meaningful manner.²⁰² This speculation may or may not be true, but it highlights the need for states to avoid decline or the loss of relative power against a rival. Framed as Great State Autism, this provides a dangerous dynamic where states remain almost intentionally unaware of adversary capabilities or intentions, focusing narrowly on applying historically successful methods to achieve ends.²⁰³

As states compete to secure resources and ensure their continued economic growth, there is ample opportunity for conflict. The finite number of resources and strategic lines of communication push states to compete in at least some of the same locations. Asymmetric methods of competition are difficult to manage and fully understand. Destabilizing factions pose a risk to state investment, while international organizations present a separate opportunity to compete for influence and leverage in the international system. States must balance their application of resources while accounting for each of these factors. Each of the organizations and dynamics discussed here also provides opportunities for modeling: insurgency, displaced civilians, international organizations, important nodes in sea and land lines of communication, and asymmetric ways of competition. Each of these presents the potential for friction.

²⁰¹ Rush Doshi, *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 261-263.

²⁰² Luttwak, *The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy*, 93-94.

²⁰³ Ibid., 13-15.

Summary

Sufficient support exists to answer secondary research question 1: How do states compete with one another? States compete through the employment of strategies to achieve national objectives in the international system. States apply resources (means) in a coordinated fashion (ways) to achieve the desired objective (ends). States generally attempt to employ methods that they are proficient in against adversary weaknesses to gain a benefit. Ultimately, the application of means and ways achieves influence within a target population and allows the state to apply leverage to develop a position of advantage in the international system.

The U.S. has employed political warfare to coordinate the employment of all elements of national power below the threshold of armed conflict to achieve its ends. It is also committed to the preservation of the current international system as it provides unique benefits and advantages for the employment of national power. The U.S. works through a complex set of bilateral and multilateral agreements to leverage partner state capabilities to achieve common interests.

The PRC employs the Three Warfares to subvert the current international system and modify it to achieve advantages that support the attainment of Chinese objectives. This strategy relies on technological advantage and the manipulation of international law to achieve state objectives. The PRC also uses the BRI to create influence in partner states and develop redundant land and maritime lines of communication with Europe to increase trade and bolster domestic economic activity. China is ultimately committed to continuing its rise to become the predominant power in the international order.

The application of asymmetric strategies poses the risk of friction between the U.S. and PRC. Competition for influence in the same locations increases the chance that initiatives interfere with a rival's interests. Rhetoric and domestic issues may amplify these effects and create a risk of conflict between these states. While the international system is not zero-sum, limitations on the availability of resources and geographic considerations inherently shape the areas in which conflict is most likely to occur.

Through exploration of the dynamics essential to the first secondary research question, it is also possible to answer secondary research question 2: What aspects of great power rivalry are most important to model in a competitive wargame? There are four dynamics that must be modeled to create an educational wargame about great power rivalry. They are 1) the development and application of a strategy, 2) the application of means and ways to achieve influence, 3) the risk associated with friction and escalation, and 4) the role of nonstate actors in the ISE. The development of these dynamics will be explained in detail in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5

WARGAME DESIGN

Wargaming is an experiment in human interaction. Without human players there may be a model, but there is no game.

— Peter Perla, *The Art of Wargaming*

Introduction

This chapter details the modeling techniques employed in the creation of the wargame that accompanies this thesis. The data inputs, modeling outputs, and rules governing the activity of dynamics are discussed to answer secondary research question 3: How can the key aspects of great power rivalry be effectively modeled through competitive wargaming? The answers to secondary research questions 1 and 2 are used to determine which dynamics will be modeled.

While the overall design of this wargame is covered, this chapter examines four areas in depth: 1) the creation of a system that prioritizes the development and application of a strategy, 2) the application of means and ways to achieve influence, 3) the risk associated with friction and escalation, and 4) a limited discussion of the role of nonstate actors in great power rivalry. This chapter is organized around these four topics.

To abide by the rules governing the use of the U.S. Army DATE, the PRC is modeled as the Peoples Republic of Olvana (PRO) when discussing the game model. Data concerning China's investment in East Africa will be used to inform the modeling of Olvanan actions, and the PRC will not be directly referenced in this chapter. Notes and parenthetical references concerning this relationship are included for the readers' convenience.

Modeling Strategy in Great Power Rivalry

Understanding that strategy is the application of resources (means) in a coordinated fashion (ways) to achieve national objectives (ends), this model will provide an environment where players may explore the creation, implementation, and modification of strategies. The inclusion of strategy in this game is facilitated through the turn order and timeframes of moves, the nature of the terrain, the elements of national power available for employment, and the scope of action. With the appropriate environment provided, it is the player's responsibility to apply their provided resources in a coordinated fashion to achieve their national objectives. This may be accomplished with or without a facilitator and should emerge through prolonged play as players learn how to develop and implement strategies in game play.

The development and application of strategy is enabled through players' decisions on the allocation of resources inside the game's models, which enables the players to develop multi-year strategies to apply, influence, create, leverage, and positions of advantage. The prolonged timeframe gives players the opportunity to develop, implement, and modify strategies to adapt to the changing environment. The game is divided into six turns, with each turn representing a two-year period. Turns are further subdivided into eight action rounds. Action rounds do not specifically represent a set number of months but represent the employment of influence activities over a period of months or years. Disambiguating the action rounds from a specified number of months allows for the conceptualization of simultaneous execution of actions, which may take variable lengths of time.

National priorities may change to reflect updated national interests; however, for the purpose of this model, national priorities are depicted as static and noted on the player mats to guide player actions and enable the employment of means and ways to achieve the objectives. This drives player action and assists them in developing a strategy. The accomplishment of the depicted goals provides a benefit in terms of victory points, encouraging players to focus on the attainment of their ends.

U.S. priorities are centered around stability, access to partner states, strategic mobility, and the protection of U.S. trade interests.²⁰⁴ Players are encouraged to invest in national capitals to promote diplomatic relationships and show engagement through the national government, air and seaport infrastructure to preserve access for trade and force projection, security partnerships to increase stability, and international organizations to promote multilateral cooperation and stability in the international order. The U.S. player will accrue one additional victory point per turn for each partner organization that they control and two additional victory points per turn if they control both an airport and seaport in the same country. Each turn, the U.S. player may select a state security partner and a stability partner to address underlying causes of instability and challenge insurgency in a state. The U.S. will be able to place partner tokens to mitigate insurgency and refugees in a location of their choosing. This supports humanitarian assistance, stabilization, and SC initiatives to promote good governance and increase the economic capacity of a state. The U.S. will receive a victory point if there are no refugee or insurgent tokens in their partner state. This does not model the elimination of these

²⁰⁴ U.S. President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 9.

factions, but rather the application of sufficient resources to address the problems facing states hosting large refugee populations and insurgency. If needed, the U.S. can invest in additional security and humanitarian partnerships to achieve the conditions required to attain their ends. When properly coordinated, the U.S. player can develop a strategy to promote stability in a state through cooperation and securing access to key transportation nodes to promote economic activity.

Olvanan (Chinese) interests are centered on the establishment of infrastructure corridors to promote international trade and establish a critical East African node for the BRI. The primary location for this activity is the LAPEX pipeline located in the fictional country of Nyumba; however, previous investment in the DAGOMA corridor in the fictional country of Kujenga can also be leveraged for advantage.²⁰⁵ Operationally, the goal of these investments is both access to emerging markets and the extraction of resources to continue Olvana's economic growth. Strategically, establishing a deep-water port and an overseas military base in East Africa supports maritime trade routes between Olvana and Europe prior to entrance into the volatile Red Sea and Suez Canal.²⁰⁶ The Olvanan player may pay to reduce the effects of instability in a specified location through

²⁰⁵ Rosalyn Rettman, "The TANZAM Rail Link: China's 'Loss-Leader' in Africa," *World Affairs* 136, no. 3 (Winter 1973-1974): 232-233, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20671520>.

²⁰⁶ U.S. Department of Transportation, "Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean-Violence Due to Regional Conflict and Piracy," MSCI Advisory: 2020-017, Maritime Administration, December 14, 2020, <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2020-017-red-sea-gulf-aden-arabian-sea-and-indian-ocean-violence-due-regional-conflict-and>.

the application of resources to garner the cooperation of local officials and appease discontented elements.²⁰⁷

While the PRO (PRC) does establish some military presence during this game, most of the focus is directed toward the establishment of nodes and lines of communication to facilitate resource extraction and enable the inflow of Olvanan goods to the host nation. This reflects the “central task” of economic development, supported by the BRI and the “Made in China 2025” initiative.²⁰⁸ Access to deep water ports suitable for expansion forms the base for Olvanan expansion in the region. Rail and pipeline infrastructure terminate at these ports, enabling seaborne transportation of raw materials to the PRO and returning Olvanan-made goods to the partner nation. The Olvanan player receives benefits by controlling infrastructure and groups of similar resource locations. This allows for the development of a strategy to create stable conditions, establish infrastructure corridors, and deliberately apply resources to achieve desired ends. The PRO will gain additional benefits as “Belt and Road Cards” are played and states establish formal trade agreements with Olvana.

²⁰⁷ Paul Nantulya, *Chinese Security Contractors in Africa* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 08, 2020), <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/08/chinese-security-contractors-in-africa-pub-82916>; Wes Martin, “Corruption Is China’s Friend in Its Quest to Dominate Africa,” *The National Interest*, September 13, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/corruption-chinas-friend-its-quest-dominate-africa-31242>.

²⁰⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), 11, <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-dod-china-military-power-report-final.pdf>.

The modeling of terrain focuses on significant population centers, resource-dense locations, and areas of instability. These locations are connected by physical lines of communication including roadways, railways, and pipelines, based on the DATE Africa scenario. Minor modifications have been made to facilitate gameplay and allow for the modeling of insurgency. The two primary modifications are the addition of a road between Mbala and Kigoma to enable the movement of factions and the addition of Kakuma as a population center to model a refugee camp in Amari. Neither addition is native to the DATE Africa scenario. The LAPEX infrastructure has been modified to disallow player use of the line of communication until it is constructed. Although some road infrastructure exists in these locations, this is intended to force player investment in infrastructure to allow for action in Nyumba. Geographic modeling of the terrain is focused only on large hydrologic features which affect the transportation of people and goods. This model covers 795,850 square miles of land and maritime terrain across four countries at a critical confluence of trade routes.

Natural and manmade resources are modeled as a part of the nearest population center. Control of the population center enables control of the resource. Control is thus important to the Olvanan player's interest in resource extraction, and it is important to the U.S. player's interest in maintaining access to strategic mobility nodes. The associated resource descriptions are intentionally broad, allowing the players to focus on attaining strategic objectives as opposed to the specific subcategory of resources to be controlled. Mineral resources are modeled simply as mines, and petroleum resources are modeled simply as oil extraction. Only airports capable of landing C-17 type aircraft or larger are included. Each city's influence value is modeled as:

[Connections to Adjacent Cities] + [Resources Present in the City] = Influence Value

Each coastal city has a port associated with it, but the Port of Mombasa has been increased in value by two to reflect the presence of the only Roll-on Roll-off port capability in the region. Cities with refugee camps or insurgent strongholds are increased in value by one point to reflect the additional resources required to stabilize these locations.

These modifications resulted from rigorous play-tests held over the course of four months to assess the ability of the model to accomplish its objective of teaching great power rivalry tenets. The overall ability of players to develop and implement a strategy worked well, which reinforces the utility of the game system developed for *Twilight Struggle* and subsequently modified for implementation in *1989* and *Labyrinth*.

Comments from play-testers highlighted opportunities to increase asymmetry between factions, which led to the creation of player mats to capture player-specific capabilities and victory point accrual. The purpose of player-specific advantages is to focus participant actions on the accomplishment of national ends in a manner consistent with U.S. and PRO ways, and to reward the implementation of a coherent strategy. Two trends emerged from implementing and evaluating faction advantages. The first is increased friction over the control of ports, which allows the Olvanan faction to establish infrastructure corridors and the U.S. faction to receive benefits from strategic mobility. Specifically, the ports of Lamu, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam become key terrain that players vied for control of. The second is that players who do not employ a coherent strategy that leverages their faction's strengths will quickly lag behind their adversary.

Players tend to identify this by the end of round one or two and reestablish balance, albeit from a position of disadvantage on the victory point track.

A weakness of strategy modeling and competition in *Return to Twilight* is the role of partner states and international organizations in influencing great powers. This aspect was intentionally underdeveloped due to the limited time and the focus of this thesis. The role of these entities is captured loosely in the event cards and in partnership constructs. This model employs both realist and liberal theory, identifying the importance of cooperation with states and international organizations while also relegating them to the role of positive and negative spaces that great powers struggle to control.

This model provides the tools and environment for players to develop strategy, but the player must make a deliberate effort to develop a comprehensive approach to achieve their objectives. When playing without assistance, players will identify this need over time through gameplay. With the assistance of a facilitator, players will understand this priority much earlier and will achieve better results. This model is designed to assist players in focusing on the competitive aspect of great power rivalry, applying national resources (means) in a coordinated fashion (ways) to achieve national objectives (ends).

Modeling Influence as the Application of Means and Ways

Influence is the primary means of action in this model. It determines both the number of actions a player may take as well as the potential impact of those actions. Influence is approximated as the total of national resources applied to create an effect in a TA.²⁰⁹ The implementation of this on the game board is the amount of effort (means) a

²⁰⁹ CJCS, JP 3-13, I-3.

player applies to a specific location or organization to achieve an effect. In this model, influence is achieved through the expenditure of influence points, the play of events, and partnership with international organizations.

Influence points are available on each card in the upper left-hand corner. These points may be used to accrue friendly influence or decrease rival influence in a population center, an infrastructure location, or an international organization. There are two actions a player may take to apply these points. Players may use these points to increase their influence through the placement of influence tokens. If enough influence is placed, a player controls the asset. Both players may place influence tokens to change the balance of influence and control from one faction to another. This represents the total application of national power below the threshold of armed conflict through cooperative means. Examples include public diplomacy, SC, engagement, and partnered infrastructure development. Players may also use points for subversive actions, which may decrease their rival's influence. Subversion represents hard and soft power actions taken below the threshold of armed conflict through the intelligence, financial, informational, law enforcement, and economic elements of national power. Examples include hiring a labor force away from a rival infrastructure project, providing intelligence information to support the arrest of a corrupt local official, or the use of political pressure to prevent a rival from implementing an agreement framework. The exact application of means and ways are not specified in this construct to allow for player determination in how and where they choose to apply influence.

Influence is also modeled through events depicted on each card. The player may choose to play a friendly event in lieu of spending influence points. Most card point

values are balanced against the event, but events also contain specific advantages to engage the player. Each event is modeled on an actual event that occurred in East Africa during the period depicted. Early competition events occur from 2014 to 2017, mid-competition events occur between 2018 and 2021, and future competition events are speculative events based on the current and previous constructs used by both factions to create influence. Events are divided into soft and hard power events. This is noted on the upper right-hand portion of each card as demonstrated in Figure 11. If a player must play a rival card, they may spend the influence point value of the card, but the adversary event will also occur. This forces the player to evaluate trade-offs and conduct cost-benefit analysis as a part of developing their strategy.



Figure 11. Modeling Influence through Card Play

Source: Created by author.

Partnerships are depicted both on the board and on the player mats. The U.S. can leverage security partnerships and humanitarian assistance missions in cooperation with states and international organizations in line with the National Security Strategic Guidance.²¹⁰ The PRO's relationships are based on infrastructure development initiatives associated with the BRI, meant to increase Olvana's investment in developing nations.²¹¹ Players may expand their partnerships beyond the player mat and influence one of the five organizations depicted on the game board. Humanitarian missions are available for implementation from the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner on Refugees and the International Organization for Migration. There are also three security missions that may be employed, one from the UN and two from the African Union. Players place influence in these organizations to represent support for missions in international organizations, funding, materiel support, or the provision of peacekeepers.²¹² The organization tokens may only be placed or moved while one faction is in control. The organization token will remain in place if it is uncontrolled, and it will be removed from the board if it is

²¹⁰ U.S. President, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 6.

²¹¹ Doshi, "Great Changes Unseen in a Century," 6-7.

²¹² United Nations, "How We are Funded," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed January 5, 2022, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>; International Crisis Group, *The Price of Peace: Securing UN Financing for AU Peace Operations*, Africa Report No. 286 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020), 4-5, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31334>.

uncontrolled for an entire turn. This models the average UN peacekeeping mission ending after approximately three years.²¹³

The implementation of soft power does not directly correlate to Joseph Nye's definition, but rather depicts the use of persuasive actions to achieve effects (Figure 8). Influence may be generated through both hard and soft power, across the range of military operations, and through all elements of national power. While cards are categorized as hard or soft power and assigned an influence value, they are designed to give an approximation of their impact on a TA. The true value of influence activities lies in the ability to nest actions and create sustainable gains as part of a larger strategy. Many of the actions depicted, such as card #34, "SATMO," are difficult to categorize as an element of national power. While SC activities are clearly military in nature, they are often part of diplomatic initiatives and could be categorized as a sub-element of diplomatic action. This has been referred to as a big 'D' (diplomacy), little 'm' (military) approach.²¹⁴ Few actions are solely the purview of one element of national power. When effectively applied, elements of national power are applied in concert with one another to create greater effects as depicted in Figure 12. Because of these complex relationships, elements of national power have not been associated with individual cards.

²¹³ Vision of Humanity, "UN Peacekeeping: 8 Facts about UN Peacekeeping Today," accessed February 21, 2022, <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/eight-facts-about-united-nations-peacekeeping-in-todays-world/>.

²¹⁴ Cesar Rodriguez, Timothy Walton, and Hyong Chu, "Putting the FIL into DIME: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 97 (2nd Quarter 2020): 126, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1099537.pdf>.

Players will determine how best to apply means in ways that are conducive to achieving their objectives.



Figure 12. Elements of National Power as Interrelated Activities

Source: Created by author.

The amount of influence available to each player and the number of faction-aligned events is carefully controlled through each phase of the game. The card values and events have been modeled to grant the PRO the advantage in turns one and two, the U.S. advantage in turns three and four, and no faction advantage in turns five and six. The first move in turns one and two are awarded to Olvana, while the U.S. takes the first move in turns three and four. This reflects the PRO's lead in investment beginning in 2008 and the lack of increased American investment until approximately 2015 as shown in Figure 13. Although the PRO has outspent the U.S. during the entirety of the period covered by the model, the U.S. is awarded initiative in turns three and four to reflect their

increase in investment, continued military contributions to stability, and to ensure the model remains balanced.




Figure 13. U.S. and PRC Influence in Selected East African Countries

Source: Tableau Public, “FBIC Interactive Data Viz,” PardeeCenterIFs, May 25, 2021, https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/pardeecenterifs/viz/FBICDataVizFinal_16195805654860/FBICInteractiveDataViz.

Olvanan cash investment in East Africa rose steadily from 2014 until it peaked in 2018 (modeled from PRC data shown in Table 3). While the Coronavirus SARS-COV-19 likely played a role in decreased investment, the PRO is also shifting to “innovative finance” models, which entails the provision of services and materiel instead of loans to partner nations.²¹⁵ Notably, the PRO is investing significantly more in Kenya, Tanzania, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti than the U.S., which is reflected through the inclusion of

²¹⁵ Jevans Nyabiage, “China in Africa: No More Hard Cash as Debt-Hit Nations Battle COVID-19 Disruptions,” *South China Morning Post*, December 12, 2021, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3159288/china-africa-no-more-hard-cash-debt-hit-nations-battle-covid>.

more card events producing influence in Kujenga and Nyumba. This is also reflected in the starting position, with significant influence in the ports of Lamu and Dar es Salaam. Overall Olvanan investment in East Africa still exceeds U.S. levels, however other forms of influence such as development assistance, volunteerism, public diplomacy, and SC are not captured in foreign direct investment or humanitarian assistance models.²¹⁶ Olvana is also conducting these activities, but their overall effort and focus on the region have declined comparatively.

Table 3. PRC Foreign Direct Investment (USD Millions)							
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Burundi	13.2	12.4	12.4	10.3	12.5	8.2	10.5
Djibouti	40.1	60.5	125.4	232.9	178.5	125.3	98.8
Eritrea	106.7	119.4	378.5	216.6	223.9	223.3	199.9
Ethiopia	914.6	1130.1	2000.7	1975.6	2568.2	2558.9	2992.8
Kenya	853.7	1099	1102.7	1543.5	1755.9	1624.2	2154.3
Rwanda	110.7	123.6	89.4	99.3	146.8	167.5	170.8
Somalia	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
South Sudan	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Sudan	1747	1809.4	1104.3	1201.6	1325.1	1203.1	-----
Tanzania	885.2	1138.9	1192	1280.3	1302.8	1335.5	1541
Uganda	464.1	722.2	1006.5	575.9	798.2	670	712
Total	5135	6215.5	7011.9	7136	8311.9	7916	7880.1

Source: Data adapted from Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?search_query=China%20Outward%20Investment:%20accum:.

U.S. investment in East Africa was declining until 2015 and has remained behind the PRO’s overall direct investment in the region. Investments in the region increased

²¹⁶ Savoy and Staguhn, *Global Development in an Era of Great Power Competition*, 7-9.

between 2015 and 2017 and remained steady through 2020 (Table 4). The U.S. contributes significantly more than the PRO only in Burundi. Uganda and Rwanda receive roughly equal investment from both great powers, and this is modeled through the absence of starting influence in Ziwa and the relative absence of cards enabling advantages in the country. Kenya has received a significantly higher proportion of its funding from the PRO, but relations with the U.S. remain good. The U.S. maintains a robust military and scientific research presence in the country, which enables cooperative efforts with the partner state.

Table 4. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (USD Millions)							
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Burundi	40.3	42	388.6	64	50	62.7	62.3
Djibouti	8.2	5.7	6.8	11.6	9.6	24.9	20.1
Eritrea	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.1	0.1
Ethiopia	664.8	746.4	874.9	1026.7	821.3	866	794.2
Kenya	807.4	711.7	805.7	855.4	829.2	685.4	679.4
Rwanda	157.5	198	176.8	176.8	168.7	184.9	189
Somalia	203.2	203.5	214.5	332	382.1	470	690.4
South Sudan	796.1	595.1	543.5	886.0	678.7	558.4	724.8
Sudan	255.7	271.9	227.6	111.2	227.1	275.8	229.8
Tanzania	509	452.6	500	597	658.7	464.6	605.6
Uganda	470.1	409.9	538.7	640	611.4	516.5	642.3
Total	3912	3636.9	4277.3	4700.8	4437.5	4109.3	4637.9

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#?x=2&y=6&f=3:51,4:1,1:24,5:3,7:1&q=3:51+4:1+1:24+5:3+7:1+2:28,49,57,59,87,144,156,275,164,169,181+6:2020>.

The distribution of influence is precisely balanced to ensure both players have access to the same number of resources over the course of the game. In round one, defined as turns one and two and called “Early Competition,” the U.S. player will have

ten cards in the deck worth a total of 29 points. In the same period, the Olvanan player will have 13 cards worth 32 points available. This equates to a 31% chance of drawing a U.S. card and a 41% chance of drawing an Olvanan card. There are also nine neutral cards that favor neither faction, representing 28% percent of the “Early Competition” deck. The PRO will make the first move, reflecting their advantage in the allocation of influence. Both players may use a card’s influence point value, but they must play adversary events as well. When a card is used for the event or influence value, it will be removed from the deck unless noted otherwise on the card. This means that Olvana maintains a three-point advantage over the U.S. player. There are two scoring cards that will be played in this period, with Kujenga favoring Olvana from the beginning and Amari favoring the U.S. at the start of the game. Along with the starting position advantages, this indicates that Olvana should maintain a leading position at the end of “Early Competition.”

Table 5. Early Competition Card Distribution and Probability			
	Card Value	Instances	Probability
U.S.	1	1	0.03125
	2	2	0.0625
	3	4	0.125
	4	3	0.09375
Olvana	1	3	0.09375
	2	4	0.125
	3	3	0.09375
	4	3	0.09375
Neutral	1	2	0.0625
	2	3	0.09375
	3	1	0.03125
	4	1	0.03125
Scoring	0	2	0.0625
	Total Cards:	32	Sum of Probabilities 1
	Total Points:	76	

Source: Created by author.

The second phase is called “Mid Competition,” and covers turns three and four. During this phase, increased U.S. investment in East Africa is reflected by an increase in available influence points and events captured on the newly introduced “Mid War” deck. Because only selected “Early Competition” cards are retained for continued use, the deck remains balanced, inverting the allocation of influence and card frequency modeled in “Early Competition” to favor the U.S. instead of the PRO. Olvana has ten cards in the deck worth a total of 29 points, while the U.S. has 13 cards worth 32 total points. This equates to a 31% chance of drawing an Olvanan card and a 41% chance of drawing a U.S. card. There are also nine neutral cards that favor neither faction, representing 28% of the “Mid Competition” deck. The U.S. will take the first move in this phase, representing the initiative gained through reinvigorated investment in the region. Just as in “Early Competition,” expended cards will be removed from the deck unless otherwise

stated on the card. At the end of the second phase, influence should be balanced, with both players having placed roughly the same number of influence points on the board. The Nyumba scoring card is introduced in this phase, and whoever holds most of the influence in the country may gain an advantage in Victory Points. The PRO's ties with Nyumba initially place it in a position of advantage.

Table 6. Mid Competition Card Distribution and Probability			
	Card Value	Instances	Probability
U.S.	1	3	0.09375
	2	4	0.125
	3	3	0.09375
	4	3	0.09375
Olvana	1	1	0.03125
	2	2	0.0625
	3	4	0.125
	4	3	0.09375
Neutral	1	1	0.03125
	2	2	0.0625
	3	2	0.0625
	4	1	0.03125
Scoring	0	3	0.09375
	Total Cards:	32	Sum of Probabilities 1
	Total Points:	76	

Source: Created by author.

The third phase is known as “Future Competition,” and covers turns five and six. The remaining cards from the “Early” and “Mid Competition” phases are combined with the “Future Competition” deck, resulting in an equitable distribution of influence and events between both factions. There are 11 neutral cards in this phase, and player hand sizes will increase to 10 cards, enabling the development of more robust strategies built on positional advantages and experience gained in phases 1 and 2. The player with the

most victory points will start play at the beginning of the turn, representing their advantage and initiative in the region. The Ziwa scoring card is introduced in this phase but is only one of four scoring cards available during this phase. The equitable balance of influence will allow players to solidify advantages and build on strengths developed in previous phases to reach the end of the game.

Table 7. Late Competition Card Distribution and Probability			
	Card Value	Instances	Probability
U.S.	1	2	0.06060606
	2	3	0.09090909
	3	3	0.09090909
	4	3	0.09090909
Olvana	1	2	0.06060606
	2	3	0.09090909
	3	3	0.09090909
	4	3	0.09090909
Neutral	1	1	0.03030303
	2	2	0.06060606
	3	2	0.06060606
	4	2	0.06060606
Scoring	0	4	0.12121212
	Total Cards:	33	Sum of Probabilities 1
	Total Points:	77	

Source: Created by author.

Due to the randomization of cards before distribution, either player may receive any of the cards available in any period. This means that each time the game is played, each faction will receive different resources with which to craft a strategy. Calculating combinations without repetition where n is the number of cards available to draw from and r is the number of cards drawn:

$$\frac{n!}{r!(n-r)!} = \frac{32!}{8!(32-8)!} = \frac{32!}{8! \times 24!} = \frac{263,130,836,933,693,530,167,218,012,160,000,000}{25,016,479,557,884,214,194,995,200,000} = 10,518,300$$

Thus, with a hand size of eight cards out of 32 available cards in phases one and two, there are over 10.5 million unique card combinations per turn. A player may receive card hand values as low as ten or as high as 32 influence points in any turn. According to a Gaussian distribution, the average hand should yield approximately 23 points per turn. This is intentional; the variation allows for re-playability and exploration of scenarios where great powers apply varying levels of resources to a region. This also allows for alternate versions of history where a state may not join the BRI or establish preferential trade agreements with a partner state. This model is not designed to replicate history but rather to allow for exploration of competition below the threshold of armed conflict and education about how states are applying influence abroad. Although each card is specifically tied to a recent historical event, cards are removed from and returned to the deck in order to drive intended changes in the balance of power between two rivals.

Table 8. Card Distribution by Faction								
	U.S. Cards	U.S. Points	Olvana Cards	Olvana Points	Neutral Cards	Neutral Points	Scoring Cards	Total
Round 1	10	29	13	32	7	15	2	32
Round 2	13	32	10	29	6	15	3	32
Round 3	11	29	11	29	7	19	4	33
Total	34	90	34	90	20	49	4	97

Source: Created by author.

Two significant issues affecting influence were noted during play-testing and will be discussed in more detail. First, the card point distribution was imbalanced. Second, the participants pursued unproductive competition over locations instead of pursuing

strategies to advance their national interests. Both issues were corrected through multiple revisions and rigorous play-testing.

The root cause for the first issue was that the original card point values ranged from one to five points, distributed uniformly (Table 9). While this ensured predictable probabilities, it resulted in extreme variations of hand values over the course of a game. The variation in point totals possible in turn one ranged from 10 to 42. While some hands remained balanced between both players, there were often instances of extreme differentiations which detracted from gameplay and distracted players from the game objectives. This allowed one player to simply “outspend” their opponent, preventing meaningful competition between the factions.

Table 9. Uniform Distribution of Cards, Point Values 1-5						
Point Value	1	2	3	4	5	Possible Low Hand Value: 10
No. of Cards	6	6	6	6	6	Possible High Hand Value: 42
Subtotals	6	12	18	24	30	Potential Point Spread: 32

Source: Created by author.

The second card point value distribution attempt followed a Gaussian distribution, assuming that most events would achieve a moderate level of success, with lower and higher value events occurring at one or two standard deviations (Table 10). This model successfully limited the point spread but limited players’ ability to conduct subversion or create high points of increased application of means in a strategy. Players were less enthusiastic about the model overall and did not engage as fully as when there were more high point value cards available.

Table 10. Gaussian Distribution of Cards, Point Values 1-5									
1	Point Value	0	1	2	3	4	5	0	Possible Low Hand Value: 18
2	Deviations	3 σ	2 σ	1 σ	0	1 σ	2 σ	3 σ	
3	Percentage	0.15%	2.35%	13.5%	68%	13.5%	2.35%	0.15%	Possible High Hand Value: 30
4	# Cards of 30	0.045	0.705	4.05	20.4	4.05	0.705	0.045	
5	# Cards of 30, Rounded	0	1	4	20	4	1	0	Potential Point Spread: 12
6	Subtotals (Line 1 x 5)	0	1	8	60	16	5	0	

Source: Created by author.

To increase variation in the card deck without sacrificing the consistency provided by employment of the Gaussian distribution, actions were modeled as within a standard deviation or exceeding a standard deviation. One-point and five-point cards representing the most successful and least successful actions were modeled outside of one standard deviation. Cards equaling two, three, and four-point values were first modeled inside one standard deviation. The decision was later made to decrease the occurrence of two and three points cards to six instances and increase the occurrence of three-point cards to eight instances to maintain the bell-shaped curve of the distribution. The resulting distribution was both balanced and represented consistency in outcomes (Table 11). A shortfall of this model was the return of imbalance in high and low hand values, increasing from a maximum spread of 12 in a strict Gaussian distribution to 26 in the modified distribution. During play-tests, the random draw of significant numbers of five-point cards highlighted this imbalance.

Table 11. Adjusted Gaussian Distribution of Cards, Point Values 1-5									
1	Point Value	0	1	2	3	4	5	0	Possible Low Hand Value: 11
2	Adjusted Deviations	3σ	$1\sigma-2\sigma$	0	0	0	$1\sigma-2\sigma$	3σ	
3	Percentage	0.15%	15.85%	22.667	22.667	22.667	15.85%	0.15%	Possible High Hand Value: 37
4	# Cards of 30	0.045	4.755	6.8	6.8	6.8	4.755	0.045	
5	# Cards of 30, Rounded	0	5	7	7	7	5	0	Potential Point Spread: 26
6	# Cards of 30, Adjusted	0	5	6	8	6	5	0	
7	Subtotals (Line 1 x 5)	0	5	12	24	24	25	0	

Source: Created by author.

The elimination of five-point cards returned balance to gameplay and reduced the potential point spread to 20 points. Having achieved a high of 32 points and a low of 12 points in potential variation between player hands, 20 represented a midpoint and was deemed acceptable for implementation. The adjusted distribution was also used to inform the modeling of faction cards in each phase which created several inconsistencies in the model requiring slight modification within the faction distributions. Since the faction with more cards represented in a phase would also benefit from a higher probability of having their card played, any abnormalities were modeled as skewed positive distributions to limit the extent of their advantage. The faction with fewer cards was modeled as a skewed negative distribution to add weight to the value of their card's values and events, allowing them to maintain competitiveness. Although there is only a three-point difference between factions with and without advantage, the higher occurrence of forced events ensures that the PRO maintains an advantage in the first phase and the U.S. maintains an advantage in the second phase. The skewed distribution

of points provides balance and ensures that both factions can execute a viable strategy even while they lack advantage.

Table 12. Adjusted Gaussian Card Distribution, Point Values 1-4								
1	Point Value	0	1	2	3	4	0	Possible Low Hand Value: 11
2	Adjusted Deviations	3σ	1σ-2σ	0	0	1σ-2σ	3σ	
3	Percentage	0.15%	15.85%	22.667	22.667	15.85%	0.15%	Possible High Hand Value: 29
4	# Cards of 30	0.045	4.755	6.8	6.8	4.755	0.045	
5	# Cards of 30, Rounded	0	5	7	7	5	0	Potential Point Spread: 20
7	Subtotals (Line 1 x 5)	0	5	12	24	20	0	

Source: Created by author.

While influence may be modeled solely based on publicly available figures, play-testing was a crucial step in developing a balanced model. Designed as a teaching tool, the rote application of resources does not allow players to develop and execute meaningful strategies if there is no balance. The PRO maintains a competitive edge in investment funding, and if it was not modeled as such, it would be a disservice to understanding influence activities. Assistance initiatives and strong relationships built through military engagement, SC, public diplomacy, education initiatives, and volunteerism provide benefits that cannot be quantitatively captured at this time. Play-testing allows designers to capture these sentiments, understand how players interact with the game, and make appropriate adjustments to the model.

Modeling Friction and Escalation

The primary focus of this model is to develop a strategy to exert influence and develop a position of advantage. All strategies must address risk, whether it is a preexisting element of the ISE, a byproduct of actions taken, or residual risk resulting from the constrained application of way and means. This wargame employs the Competition Continuum to model risk and provide accompanying limitations on player action.




Figure 14. The Competition Continuum

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-94, *Armies, Corps, and Division Operations* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2021), 1-8, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33025-FM_3-94-000-WEB-1.pdf.

The Competition Continuum represents a range of possible actions that a state can take, in relation to a rival, through the application of national power to achieve its objectives.²¹⁷ This construct compliments the conflict continuum and provides value when evaluating one's posture and character of relations with a rival.²¹⁸ An actor may simultaneously cooperate with a rival in one area while competing against them in

²¹⁷ CJCS, JDN 1-19, 2.

²¹⁸ Army Futures Command (AFC), AFC Pamphlet 71-20-2, *Army Futures Command Concept for Brigade Combat Team Cross-Domain Maneuver 2028* (Austin, TX: Army Futures Command, 2020), 8-10, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1128560.pdf>.

another. Armed conflict is often a measure of last resort and requires extensive resourcing. The goal of this model is to conduct actions across the elements of national power as an integrated whole, below the threshold of armed conflict, to achieve national objectives across a multi-state region. This represents actions across Phase Zero and Phase One of the joint operations model.²¹⁹

The Competition Posture Track is a numerical scale that tallies the trends of a player's actions. While each individual action results in a single move on the tracker, the position of the marker captures the overall "tone" of a player's strategy and their disposition towards their adversary. As players' actions move the tracker, their disposition will be categorized as cooperation, competition, or conflict. Because this model strives to enable the implementation of a competitive strategy below the threshold of armed conflict, and because the decision to join or initiate an armed conflict will likely originate from the highest echelons of national government, any player whose token moves into block seven, "CONFLICT," will immediately lose the game.

²¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, V-13. Phase Zero refers to ongoing and emergent shaping activities. Phase One includes ongoing and emergent deterrence measures. Both phases consider the actions of all elements of national power.




Figure 15. Competition Posture Tracker

Source: Created by author.

The movement of tokens along the tracker is dictated by the type of action a player takes. When a soft power action occurs, the player's token will move one space towards block zero, "COOPERATION." If a hard power action is taken, that player's token will move one space towards block 7, "CONFLICT." Players move their tokens at the end of each card play, which forces the player to continually assess their posture and enables them to make necessary changes to their strategy to maintain an appropriate posture.

There are benefits to maintaining a posture that incorporates elements of both hard power and soft power. If a player favors soft power and allows their token to move into block zero (COOPERATION), the influence point value of their cards will be reduced by half. This forces players to reckon with the importance of deterrence and maintaining threat credibility to employ this form of influence.²²⁰ Understanding the downfalls of reaching either side of the tracker, players must also manage their relationship with their rival. If a player is three or more steps closer to Cooperation than

²²⁰ Vesna Danilovic, "The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (June 2001): 344–347, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3176149>.

their opponent, the influence value of their cards will be reduced by one point. This forces player interaction, allowing for the aggressive pursuit of positional advantage as well as the opportunity to negotiate and cooperate.

The Competition Posture model began as an operations tracker and measured the number of subversive actions a player took. If the player took too many subversive actions, they would push the region into conflict and lose the game. While the intention of remaining below the threshold of armed conflict remained the same, the system drove players to avoid any subversive measures. The implementation of a relational system and the modeling of hard and soft power constructs through card play has increased the prominence of the tracker and now directly influences player strategy formulation. During play-testing of the current model, players tended to compete aggressively at the beginning and the end of matches, opening the possibility for cooperation during the middle turns as players learn to focus on the pursuit of asymmetric national strategies. Regardless of player dynamics, this has proven an excellent driver for discussion about escalation during play-testing.

Modeling Non-State Actors in the Security Environment

The integration of refugees, insurgents, and international organizations allows for a wider perspective on the operational environment. Although this model does not represent partner state interests to the fullest capability, the inclusion of destabilizing and stabilizing factions allows players to assess the security environment, develop strategies for mitigation, and relate these actions to the attainment of national ends.

There are many great systems for modeling insurgency and non-state actors that are too complex for the level of warfare and the learning objectives of this wargame.

Return to Twilight's factions generate, move, and interact in a very simple manner, which allows participants to take actions to manipulate the security environment and achieve their national ends. A unique benefit of this system is that there is no explicit requirement that players address destabilizing or stabilizing factions. Players are free to interact with these organizations in a manner that suits their needs, but they will inevitably find such needs during the course of play.

There are two insurgent organizations and two refugee populations present in this model. These entities strain the resources of state governments, create friction with resident populations, and may pose a threat to public and private investments. The generation of these actors occurs at the beginning of every turn from known locations, and if there is more than one insurgent or refugee token in a location, the additional token will move to an adjacent location. Only one token per entity will generate per turn, and each entity is limited to five tokens. Several mechanisms, including dice rolls and spinner boards, were tested and discarded while developing the generation rules and movement dynamics. During game-testing, it was decided that the players with the fewest starting equities in an area should choose the generation location and movement direction of the tokens. Subsequent play-tests yielded a variety of strategies for moving the tokens and yielded unexpected and strategically interesting surprises. While players were expected to move destabilizing faction tokens to positions that interfere with their opponent's equities, there have also been instances of cooperation to move these tokens to positions of irrelevance and allow for rival expansion. This encourages negotiation and cooperation to address the situation through means other than the stabilizing factions. Subsequent discussions yielded the insight that states could cooperate to collectively execute

mitigation strategies. While unexpected, it fits very well within the construct of the model. The role of these actors is to encourage assessment of the security environment in developing a strategy, and that may happen in a variety of ways.

The insurgent organizations represented in this model are Hizbul al Harakat (HaH) and the Army of Justice and Purity (AJP). Both organizations were modeled by the Army Doctrine and Training Command as part of the DATE Africa scenario.²²¹ HaH is an Islamic insurgency competing for the governance of Nyumba from strongholds in the western portion of the country. This has been modeled for the purpose of force generation in the cities of Lodwar and Moyale.²²² The AJP is a Christian cult-based insurgency in southern Kujenga attempting to establish an autonomous state.²²³ AJP operating locations have been depicted in Mbala and Mpika. Each of these organizations has the potential to spread as they fight against the host nation's government to gain control of the territory. Players can mitigate these threats by influencing international organizations and providing support to the peacekeeping missions.

Refugees continue to pose a challenge for states and international organizations in East Africa. The relief, security, and resettlement efforts required to protect vulnerable

²²¹ "DATE Africa Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions," OE Data Integration Network, accessed September 30, 2021, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Africa/DATE_Africa_Non-State_Threat_Actors_and_Conditions.

²²² "Hizbul al-Harakat," OE Data Integration Network, accessed October 5, 2021, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Africa/DATE_Africa_Non-State_Threat_Actors_and_Conditions/Hizbul_al-Harakat.

²²³ "Army of Justice and Purity," OE Data Integration Network, accessed October 5, 2021, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Africa/DATE_Africa_Non-State_Threat_Actors_and_Conditions/Army_of_Justice_and_Purity.

populations are labor and resource-intensive. For modeling, refugees have been templated to generate from camps established in Kakuma and Kigoma. The DATE - Africa scenario offers broad latitude for modeling refugees, stating only that Nyumba is a producer of refugees and that Amari and Kujenga frequently have issues with refugees crossing into their territory.²²⁴ The camp in Kakuma represents the DATE Mtangazajiland region, which is based on the real Kakuma Refugee Camp built to house child soldiers from wars in Sudan.²²⁵ The Kigoma refugee camp is not addressed in the DATE scenario and is based on the Nyarugusu Camp, which houses Burundian refugees.²²⁶ If refugees are not protected and do not have access to basic necessities, they may migrate in search of basic survival and security needs. Any location that refugees have migrated to cannot be influenced until the refugee crisis has been mitigated through partnerships with international organizations.

The tools to address sources of instability are provided through partnerships with international organizations. There are two humanitarian missions and three peacekeeping missions available on the board. These are modeled as one UN peacekeeping mission, two AU peacekeeping missions, one UN High Commissioner for Refugees humanitarian

²²⁴ “Africa,” OE Data Integration Network, accessed October 8, 2021, <https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Africa>.

²²⁵ “Amari,” OE Data Integration Network, accessed October 8, 2021, <https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Africa/Amari>; Utz Pape and Theresa Beltramo, *Africa Can End Poverty* (blog), *World Bank*, April 12, 2021, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/after-three-decades-how-are-refugees-kenyas-kakuma-refugee-camp-faring>.

²²⁶ United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, “Burundi Situation,” Operational Data Portal, last updated July 31, 2022, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/burundi/location/2034>.

mission, and one International Organization for Migration humanitarian mission. Players must spend between three and five influence points to determine where these missions will be placed on the board if they are attempting to stabilize an area. Like infrastructure and population center control, players may compete for influence in these organizations. This provides options for competition and cooperation to determine when, where, and how these organizations' resources may be allocated. The U.S. maintains an asymmetric advantage in cooperation with international organizations; however, recent Olvanan initiatives to support the AU have also been included as card events. Unlike destabilizing factions, international organizations have no movement restrictions except that they must be placed in a population center. They may be moved once per turn by the faction that controls them and can be moved by the opposing player only if they seize control of the organization during an action round. The only limitation on peacekeepers is their span of control, which is restricted to the population center where they are placed.

Play-tests significantly influenced the current number of international organizations. During the first play-test, there were two UN and two African Union Peacekeeping missions. Control of the organization resulted in the placement of two tokens, which meant that insurgencies were quickly eliminated and not truly addressed in strategy formulation. The model was revised to reduce peacekeeping missions to one each for the UN and AU. This resulted in the unchecked spread of insurgents in both play-tests conducted. A third peacekeeping mission was added, but with a slightly increased cost to encourage early partnerships to mitigate security concerns. The inclusion of the third peacekeeping mission, in conjunction with the implementation of asymmetric U.S. security partnerships, has resulted in a balanced model that encourages

early intervention but allows players to recover in later turns if they fail to address the security environment.

Summary

This chapter has detailed modeling techniques to answer Secondary Research Question 3: How can the key aspects of great power rivalry be effectively modeled through competitive wargaming? Each of the four critical areas identified in Chapter Four have been discussed, with significant challenges and corrections explained: 1) The development and application of a strategy, 2) The application of influence, 3) The risk associated with escalation, and an associated system to manage escalation, and 4) The role of nonstate actors in the ISE.

This model enables the development, implementation, and adjustment of a strategy developed by the player. Through the provision of means and ends, players are left to organize the application of their limited resources in a logical fashion (ways) to accomplish their objectives. Players apply influence in a competitive environment through the application of resources to gain leverage and advantage amongst population centers. Players are encouraged to operate along the entirety of the competition continuum while managing their activities to control escalation. Finally, players interact with an unpredictable and evolving security environment, which they can act to shape in line with their national objectives. Each of these is important to understanding how great powers compete in the international system as well as the tools available to them. If properly employed, each of these facets should result in a discussion between the participants and a facilitator. Discovery of these aspects has also been observed during play-testing, independent of facilitator involvement.

Thus, as a teaching tool, this model has achieved its objectives in all play-tests. Participants have expressed a positive attitude towards the model and often ask to be included in future testing iterations. The specificity of card actions has been praised as informative, while the overall mechanisms for player interaction with the operational environment and their opponent are broad enough for flexible strategy formulation and execution. Special Operations participants tend to discuss the model in terms of Political and Irregular Warfare, while Conventional Force participants have frequently mentioned the role of Security Cooperation and preparation for Large Scale Combat Operations. Both are valid points of discussion and lend to the overall concept of Integrated Campaigning, which remains a vital concept for military contributions to a national strategy of GPC.

While the concepts discussed in this chapter help improve the body of research on wargame design, they are by no means comprehensive or complete. The goal of this chapter has been to build on previous concepts and contribute to the overall understanding of how to create effective models. The next chapter will answer the primary research question, review the limitations of this research, and provide recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the tools of warfare continue to evolve at an ever-quicken pace, professional game designers... must develop dynamic new approaches to modeling the effects of those tools on human decision making.

— Peter Perla, *The Art of Wargaming*

Introduction

This thesis has laid the foundation for explaining how great powers compete within the international system at the strategic level, has identified methods for modeling these phenomena, and provides the answer to the primary research question: How can great power rivalry be modeled through competitive wargaming as an educational tool for professional development? Through analysis of U.S. and Chinese models of competition, the risks of competition, and defining how influence can be modeled in a competitive wargame, this thesis has produced a wargaming model adequate for teaching these principles.

Observations

Two sets of observations were made. The first set of observations identified methods for competition in great power rivalry. These observations were modeled and then observed in play-testing. The second set of observations was made through play-testing. These observations were used to refine the model to achieve its objective as an educational tool.

The first set of observations came through the compilation, coding, and categorization of current events in East Africa. These events informed the creation of

game card events and provided insight into the preferred methods for exerting influence in the region. These observations informed the creation of the model and led to the inclusion of asymmetric methods for influencing populations within the game.

The second set of observations was gathered through the course of seven play-tests beginning in November 2021 and ending in March 2022. Observations in testing led to several revisions of influence point distribution and increased asymmetry within the model. Although many changes have been incorporated into this model, it is not complete. There are many additional facets of great power rivalry that could not be captured in the short period of time allocated to this research. This provides ample opportunity for expansion, revision, and refinement of this model. Recommendations for future research will be addressed in the following section.

These observations have provided an answer to the Primary Research Question: How can great power rivalry be modeled through competitive wargaming as an educational tool for professional development? It is possible to model great power rivalry by developing a representation of the security environment as links and nodes, identifying specified national ends, and providing participants with means below the threshold of armed conflict to vie for control of key terrain. This allows players to develop viable strategies and compete against one another to achieve their specified ends. This model is scalable and can be implemented at the global or regional level across multiple domains.

Recommendations

The focus of this model rested squarely on the land domain and included only two great powers. While the model accomplishes its goal of educating Soldiers about the

dynamics of great power rivalry, there is ample room for improvement, expansion, and refinements. The following are the most significant identified opportunities for improvement.

First, this wargame models the movement of influence in the land domain. The information environment crosses all domains, presenting an opportunity to expand this game to include maritime routes, air routes, Space, and the cyber domain. There are few models that represent the physical and virtual terrain of cyberspace, and no known models that tie physical terrain to these models. Developing a complementary link-node type map of the cyber terrain in East Africa would significantly enhance Soldier's abilities to understand and link cyber effects to land operations.

Second, there are several opportunities to create rules variations within this model. One proposed model would eliminate card play and blindly draw influence tokens to enable player action. Players would need to discuss the means, ways, and ends that they intend to employ before placing their tokens. Recording the ends, ways, and means would allow an observer to quantify the strategies used, build a pattern of events, and identify which concepts players are most and least familiar with. This would allow for the development of training and education events designed to expand the participants' understanding of influence activities and introduce them to new capabilities.

Third, this model could be expanded to include a Russian faction. Building an asymmetric player mat and associated rules for Russia would expand the body of knowledge captured in this thesis and allow players to better understand how different actors prefer to compete in the international system. This variation could also include the

modeling of two additional partner states so that all three factions could be employed simultaneously.

Fourth, this model could be refined to focus on one country at the tactical or operational level of war. This could include the placement of specific activities such as Special Operations Cross-Functional Teams, American Corners initiatives, or USAID development projects. This would allow players to manage multiple activities and investments in an evolving operational environment. A possible mechanism for employment could include a fixed annual budget, with operating costs for different activities.

Fifth, this model has not been blind play-tested yet. Each of the play-tests included a facilitator or Soldiers familiar with the model from previous exposure. Rigorous blind play-testing of this model would yield further innovation, result in increased refinement of play mechanisms, and would produce additional dynamics that have not yet been discovered.

There are many other opportunities for additional research into the mechanisms of great power rivalry. Additional research will add to the academic body of knowledge and increase the utility of political-military wargames. Additional innovation and refinement will be required to yield an elegant political-military model on par with hex and counter models such as the *Operational Wargame System*.²²⁷

²²⁷ Tim Barrick, *Operational Wargame System* (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2019).

Conclusion

This thesis answered the question: How can great power rivalry be modeled through competitive wargaming as an educational tool for professional development? Three supporting research questions supported the answer. These questions identified how states compete with one another, the aspects of great power rivalry essential for modeling in a wargame, and methods for modeling aspects of competition. Grounded Theory and the wargame design model enabled the collation and modeling of data to create this wargame.

Wargame design and development focused on four key areas. These were the development of strategy, the application of influence, escalation, and the role of nonstate actors in competition below the threshold of armed conflict. Each of these facets yielded a specific game mechanism that facilitates education and conversation about the means and ways great powers manage these aspects. The strategy model, conflict continuum model, and influence mechanisms model informed the organization of actions and distribution of resources of this wargame.

The wargame *Return to Twilight* is successful in its goal of providing an educational tool. It provides an accessible, distributable, and replicable model to allow Soldiers an opportunity to learn about great power rivalry before being exposed to it in the operational environment. Participants benefit from the ability to develop strategies, develop an understanding of resources available to exert influence to create effects in a target population, and the risk associated with competition against a great power rival. The revival of wargaming in the U.S. Army represents an opportunity to enhance Soldiers' capabilities in a limited resource training environment to enable effective

execution of influence activities abroad when called upon. The hope remains that additional models will be created and the return of wargaming to the Army will expand our purview on the ISE and lead to innovative solutions to wicked problems before the need arises.

GLOSSARY

The following glossary establishes standard definitions for terms used in joint doctrine which appear throughout this thesis. The standardization of terminology reduces confusion when a word may have multiple definitions in a common dictionary. A shared understanding of terminology allows for accuracy in communications and becomes critically important when that assignment of tasks implies the attainment of one or more conditions that may be essential to the successful conduct of operations. The common refrain to capture this sentiment at the Command and General Staff College is, “words mean things.”

Advance. A policy aim within the Cooperation portion of the Conflict Continuum. “Expand cooperative activities in the most appropriate manner (e.g., building partner capacity, increasing interoperability, and expanding Joint Force access) to achieve U.S. aims while also enabling or advancing partner interests.” “In some instances, USG actions may seek to shape a partner’s perception of interests, increasing alignment with U.S. policy objectives.”²²⁸

Advantage. “This includes positional advantage, the operational reach to affect a...center of gravity, the momentum to exploit success and achieve operational or strategic objectives, the ability to form and employ multinational forces, and assured mobility for friendly forces.”²²⁹

Adversary. “A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.”²³⁰

Armed Conflict. A state along the Competition Continuum. “The use of violence is the primary means by which an actor seeks to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict

²²⁸ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 9.

²²⁹ CJCS, JP 3-0, III-37.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, GL-6.

varies in intensity and ranges from limited warfare to major wars between great powers.”²³¹

Assurance. A pledge, guarantee, or action to make certain a state or organization’s security.²³² “The forward presence or stationing of military capabilities in a friendly country that provides political leverage giving substance to diplomacy and credibility to agreements.”²³³

Broaden. An action was taken in terms of a state’s relations with other actors. A state attempts to expand already established relationships with an actor to achieve a desired condition or behavior without the use of coercion; strengthening good relations.²³⁴

Client State. “A country that is economically, politically, or militarily dependent on another country.”²³⁵

Coercion. “To persuade an adversary to stop an ongoing action or start a new course of action by changing their cost/benefit analysis.”²³⁶

Compellence. “The use of credible threats or actual actions that seek to change the status quo. Compellence threatens imposition or continuation of a condition undesirable to the adversary until they accede to demands. Compel involves the use of unlimited or decisive force to remove the ability to resist.”²³⁷ Compellence uses the threat or application of military power to force an adversary to take a course of action they would not otherwise pursue.²³⁸

Country. *See* “State.”

²³¹ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 8.

²³² Merriam-Webster Incorporated. “Assurance.” Merriam-Webster. last updated August 18, 2022. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assurance>.

²³³ CJCS, JDN 1-18, III-3.

²³⁴ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 20.

²³⁵ Merriam-Webster Incorporated, “Client state,” Merriam-Webster, accessed December 29, 2021, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/client%20state>.

²³⁶ CJCS, JDN 1-18, III-3.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ CJCS, JP 3-0, VI-7; CJCS, JP 1, I-3.

Competition. 1) Activities in the international system whereby “states and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their own interests, [as] they continually compete for diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage.”²³⁹ 2) “Rivalry: such as the effort of two or more parties acting independently to secure the business of a third party by offering the most favorable terms.”²⁴⁰

Competition below Armed Conflict. A state along the Competition Continuum. Actions taken to pursue national objectives “when two or more strategic actors view one another as competitors (as opposed to adversaries) that have incompatible interests. Competitors may cooperate with one another or engage in behavior detrimental to other strategic actor’s interests (e.g., removing ‘most favored nation’ status or increasing tariffs)” “but neither seeks to escalate to armed conflict.”²⁴¹

Competition Continuum. A spectrum of possible inter-state relations within the operating environment which includes cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The competition continuum expands the peace-war binary model of international relations to describe concurrently existing state dispositions. This model allows for states to simultaneously compete with one another in one realm while cooperating in another.²⁴²

Competition Mechanisms. “Ways to maintain or establish favorable conditions within the international order.”²⁴³

Conflict Continuum. A continuum of potential states of military interaction between states that spans from peace to war.²⁴⁴

Constructivism. An international relations theory that “emphasize[s] the importance of ideas and culture in shaping both the reality and the discourse of international politics...They believe that leaders and other people are motivated not only by

²³⁹ CJCS, JDN 1-19, 1.

²⁴⁰ Merriam-Webster Inc., “Competition.”

²⁴¹ CJCS, JDN 1-18, III-2; CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 20.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, vi, 8.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁴⁴ CJCS, JP 3-0, VI-1.

material interests, but also by their sense of identity, morality, and what a society or culture considers appropriate. And such norms change over time.”²⁴⁵

Contest. A policy aim within the Competition below Armed Conflict portion of the Conflict Continuum. The use of “prudent means to achieve the best possible strategic outcome within given resources or policy constraints, recognizing that this lesser aim entails risk that the competitor will achieve further gains.”²⁴⁶

Control. “Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed.”²⁴⁷

Control (Relationships). An action was taken in terms of a state’s relations with other actors. A state exerts “direct influence over an actor as a part of an occupation, who would normally not be aligned with” with the state’s desired conditions.²⁴⁸

Cooperation. A state along the Competition Continuum. “Includes mutually beneficial relationships between strategic actors with similar or compatible interests. Although interests will only rarely be in complete alignment, relations that are fundamentally cooperative are strategically important for the U.S. because they underpin the international order, enhance collective security, help to ensure access, enable burden-sharing, and deter conflict.”²⁴⁹

Cooperation (Relationships). An action was taken in terms of a state’s relations with other actors. A state “works alongside partners with similar interests.” These actors do not need to overtly support the state’s activities or positions but must share specific interests which align with the states.²⁵⁰

Counter. A policy aim within the Competition below Armed Conflict portion of the Conflict Continuum. “Regulate...competition to ensure the U.S. maintains its relative strategic position and the competitor achieves no further gains; only seek

²⁴⁵ Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005), 7.

²⁴⁶ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 9.

²⁴⁷ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-8.

²⁴⁸ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 20.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

to improve the U.S. position to that [which is] achievable given existing resources and authorities, and in a manner that does not jeopardize interests elsewhere.”²⁵¹

Country. *See* “State.”

Create. A Competition Mechanism. “To produce a condition where it does not already exist, and its existence could positively impact achievement of national interests or may be essential.”²⁵²

Defeat. A policy aim within the Armed Conflict portion of the Conflict Continuum. “Create conditions to impose desired policy objectives upon the adversary.”²⁵³

Degrade. A policy aim within the Armed Conflict portion of the Conflict Continuum. “Reduce the adversary’s ability and will to the greatest extent possible within resource and policy constraints.”²⁵⁴

Deny. A policy aim within the Armed Conflict portion of the Conflict Continuum. “Frustrate the policy objectives of the adversary.”²⁵⁵

Deterrence. The prevention of action through the presentation of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and belief that the cost of the action outweighs the perceived benefits.”²⁵⁶ “the defensive use of credible threats generally to preserve the status quo. Threatens negative reaction in response to adversary aggression.”²⁵⁷

Displaced Civilian. A broad term primarily used by the DOD that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person.²⁵⁸

²⁵¹ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 9.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁵⁶ CJCS, JP 3-0, VI-4, V-9, GL-8.

²⁵⁷ CJCS, JDN 1-18, III-3.

²⁵⁸ CJCS, JP 3-29, I-8.

Effect. “1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.”²⁵⁹

Engage selectively. A policy aim within the Cooperation portion of the Conflict Continuum. “Cooperation is transactional with the sole aim of achieving U.S. aims when the maintenance of a larger relationship with the partner is not desirable or worthwhile.”²⁶⁰

Engagement. The maintenance of routine contact or interaction with persons, organizations, or entities to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.²⁶¹

Establish (Relationships). An action was taken in terms of a state’s relations with other actors. A state initiates a relationship with an actor to address an emergent situation that is of common concern.²⁶²

Force Projection. “The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the U.S. or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations.”²⁶³

Foreign Assistance. “Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment and support for foreign internal defense to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters that may be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.”²⁶⁴

Friction. The accumulation and interaction of forces that interfere with the accomplishment of one’s goal. Friction was described by Clausewitz as phenomenon that occurs when “Countless minor incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that

²⁵⁹ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-9.

²⁶⁰ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 9.

²⁶¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), III-6, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_57.pdf; CJCS, JP 3-0, xix, GL-12.

²⁶² CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 20.

²⁶³ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-9.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, GL-9.

one always falls far short of the intended goal.”²⁶⁵ He specifically attributes friction to incomplete intelligence, the inherent complexity of mobilizing forces, the effect of environmental factors, and *the complex interactions that occur when two disparate forces meet*.

Grand Strategy. “Grand strategy exists at a level above those strategies intended to secure particular ends, and above the use of military power alone to achieve strategic objectives. Grand strategy aims to secure and advance a nation’s long-term, enduring, core interests over time. A nation’s grand strategy also shows great persistence over time, orienting on those interests deemed most important; interests for which virtually any nation will spend, legislate, threaten, or fight to defend or advance.”²⁶⁶

Great Power. A state with the following characteristics that is actively pursuing national interests in the international system:

- 1) Maintains the ability to act unilaterally in the international system.²⁶⁷
- 2) Possesses a second-strike nuclear capability and the credibility to use it.²⁶⁸
- 3) Holds positions of significance in international organizations.²⁶⁹
- 4) Wields substantial economic production capacity.²⁷⁰
- 5) Can sustain a conventional war against the strongest state in the world.²⁷¹
- 6) Has sufficient resources to undertake actions outside of one’s own borders.²⁷²
- 7) Is willing “to participate in an ongoing, open-ended contest for influence.”²⁷³

Hard Power. The implied or actual application of state resources or actions to elicit a reaction from an actor. This includes the use of coercive power and persuasive power but is differentiated from Soft Power by its tangible nature. (Author)

²⁶⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 155.

²⁶⁶ CJCS, JDN 1-18, I-4.

²⁶⁷ McKay and Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, 91-93.

²⁶⁸ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 5; Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 429.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 392.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 449, 470.

²⁷¹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 4-5.

²⁷² McKay and Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, 175, 198.

²⁷³ Brands, *The Twilight Struggle*, 7.

Human Factors. “The physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions.”²⁷⁴

Improve. A policy aim within the Competition below Armed Conflict portion of the Conflict Continuum. “Employ all measures short of those that might reasonably lead to conflict in order to achieve U.S. objectives, prevent the competitor from achieving its aims, and improve the overall strategic position.”²⁷⁵

Inducement. “Offering something positive, for example, promises of aid, security guarantees, or tariff concessions. Inducement differs from enabling as it seeks to change another state or actor’s behavior.”²⁷⁶

Influence. “The act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a Target Audience.”²⁷⁷ The joint force also describes influence as “the power to change or affect someone or something.”²⁷⁸ This is almost identical to Joseph Nye’s description of power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want.”²⁷⁹

Influence Activities. Actions taken across the elements of national power, below the threshold of armed conflict, to influence a target audience and achieve a specified change in the security environment.

Influence Mechanisms. The four influence mechanisms of compellence, deterrence, inducement, and assurance describe persuasive and coercive ways through which states may attempt to influence other actors in the international system.²⁸⁰

Inform. A Competition Mechanism. “To develop a shared perspective with partners and identify areas where cooperation would be of mutual benefit, and or convey the

²⁷⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Joint Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), GL-8, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0.pdf.

²⁷⁵ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 9.

²⁷⁶ CJCS, JDN 1-18, III-3.

²⁷⁷ CJCS, JP 3-13, I-3.

²⁷⁸ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, 42.

²⁷⁹ Nye, “The Information Revolution and Power,” 2-3.

²⁸⁰ Reitz, “Influence Mechanisms.”

limits of acceptability for a competitor's current/future behavior.”²⁸¹ “Inform activities involve the release of accurate information to domestic and international audiences to put joint operations in context; facilitate informed perceptions about military operations; and counter adversarial misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda. Inform activities help to assure the trust and confidence of the U.S. population, allies, and partners and to deter and dissuade adversaries and enemies.”²⁸²

Information. “A particular arrangement or sequence of things conveys specific information. Information is stimuli that have meaning in some context for its receiver.”²⁸³

Information Environment. “The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.”²⁸⁴ This includes “numerous social, cultural, cognitive, technical, and physical attributes that act upon and impact knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world views, and, ultimately, actions of an individual, group, system, community, or organization. The Information Environment also includes technical systems and their use of data. The Information Environment directly affects and transcends all Operational Environments.”²⁸⁵

Information Operations. “The integrated employment...of information-related capabilities...to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries...while protecting our own.”²⁸⁶

Information-Related Capability. “A tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions.”²⁸⁷

Informational Power. “The ability to leverage information to shape perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behavior and the course of events. The Joint Force applies informational power to change or maintain the observations,

²⁸¹ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 15.

²⁸² CJCS, JP 3-0, III-19.

²⁸³ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, 42.

²⁸⁴ CJCS, JP 3-13, I-1.

²⁸⁵ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, 42.

²⁸⁶ CJCS, JP 3-13, I-1.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, I-3 – I-4.

perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behaviors of relevant actors.”²⁸⁸

Inspire (Relationships). An action was taken in terms of a state’s relations with other actors. A state attempts to motivate an actor to pursue a policy or action aligned with state interests using incentives or signals.²⁸⁹

Instruments of National Power. “U.S. instruments of national power are the national level means our national leaders can apply in various ways to achieve strategic objectives (ends).”²⁹⁰

Insurgency. “The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”²⁹¹

Interagency Coordination. “The coordination that occurs between elements of...USG departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.”²⁹²

Internally Displaced Persons. “Any persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or place of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”²⁹³

International Security Environment. *See* “Security Environment.”

Interorganizational Cooperation. “The interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; participating USG departments and agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; the private sector;” and other mission partners.²⁹⁴

²⁸⁸ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, viii.

²⁸⁹ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 20.

²⁹⁰ CJCS, JP 3-0, x.

²⁹¹ CJCS, JP 3-24, I-1.

²⁹² CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-10.

²⁹³ CJCS, JP 3-29, IV-30.

²⁹⁴ CJCS, JP 3-08, I-2, GL-8.

Irregular Warfare. “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”²⁹⁵

Joint Force. “A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander.”²⁹⁶

Key Terrain. “Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either force.”²⁹⁷ This is further clarified for activities conducted during competition: “Because perceptions and attitudes inform behavior, the Joint Force must treat them (informational, physical, and human aspects of the security environment) as ‘key terrain.’”²⁹⁸

Leverage. “A relative advantage in...circumstances against the...adversary across any variable within or impacting the operational environment sufficient to exploit that advantage.”²⁹⁹

Leverage (Relationships). An action was taken in terms of a state’s relations with other actors. A state applies influence to change an actor’s policy or actions that are counter to the state’s interests.³⁰⁰

Liberalism. An international relations theory that views the international system as “a global society that functions alongside the states and sets part of the context for states.”³⁰¹ This theory highlights the importance of trade, international organizations, and non-state actors in shaping within the international system.

Link. “1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points.”³⁰²

²⁹⁵ CJCS, JP 1, I-6.

²⁹⁶ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-11.

²⁹⁷ CJCS, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 125.

²⁹⁸ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, ix.

²⁹⁹ CJCS, JP 5-0, (2020), GL-10.

³⁰⁰ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 20.

³⁰¹ Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 5.

³⁰² CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-12.

- Maintain. A policy aim within the Cooperation portion of the Conflict Continuum.
“Cooperate in order to maintain relationship and secure bilateral advantage but without significant increase in resources or commitment unless strictly in accord with overriding U.S. interests.”³⁰³
- Migrant. “A person who belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries or has fled their native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution.”³⁰⁴
- Military Engagement. “Routine contact and interaction between...elements of the Armed Forces of the U.S. and those of another nation’s armed forces or...civilian authorities...to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.”³⁰⁵
- Military Power. “An instrument of national power used to achieve political ends. Military operations traditionally focus on compelling adversaries through the threat or application of physical power in the form of destructive or disruptive force (combat power) to achieve victory.”³⁰⁶ The military instrument of national power is employed “in coordination with diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments to advance and defend U.S. values and interests, achieve objectives consistent with national strategy.”³⁰⁷
- Nation. “A homogeneous group of people with a common heritage, language, religion, or political ambition.”³⁰⁸
- Nation-State. “When nations and states come together, there is a...nation-state, wherein most citizens share a common heritage and a united government.”³⁰⁹ A state which governs a population which is primarily comprised of the same nationality.

³⁰³ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 9.

³⁰⁴ CJCS, JP 3-29, IV-30.

³⁰⁵ CJCS, JP 3-0, xix, GL-12.

³⁰⁶ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, 1.

³⁰⁷ CJCS, 3-0, I-1.

³⁰⁸ Adam Dastrup, “Defining Nation-States,” in *People, Places, and Cultures*, ed. Raymon Huston (Tulsa, OK: Tulsa Community College, 2020), <https://open.library.okstate.edu/culturalgeography>.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

National Power. The cumulative ability of a state to apply diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, rule of law, and development capabilities or resources to accomplish an objective.³¹⁰ Often expressed as DIME, or MIDFIELD, but also inherent to the concept of the “3D” approach (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense).

National Security. “A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the U.S. with the purpose of gaining: a. A military... advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relation position; or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.”³¹¹

Neutrality. “In international law, the attitude of impartiality during periods of war adopted by third states toward a belligerent and subsequently recognized by the belligerent, which creates rights and duties between the impartial states and the belligerent.”³¹²

Node. “An element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical thing.”³¹³

Operational Access. “The ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission.”³¹⁴

Operational Environment. “A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”³¹⁵

Operational Level of Warfare. “The level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.”³¹⁶

³¹⁰ CJCS, JDN 1-18, I-2.

³¹¹ CJCS, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 150.

³¹² CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-13.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, GL-13.

³¹⁵ CJCS, JP 3-0, xv.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, GL-14.

Partner Nation. 1. “A nation that the U.S. works with in a specific situation or operation.”³¹⁷ 2. “In security cooperation, a nation with which the DOD conducts security cooperation activities.”³¹⁸

Partner State. *See* “Partner Nation.”

Permissive Environment. “Operational environment in which host nation military and law enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.”³¹⁹

Persuade. A Competition Mechanism. “To shape partners’ objectives and competitor behaviors while remaining flexible in the pursuit of secondary objectives.”³²⁰

Political Warfare. “The employment of all means as a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures..., and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.”³²¹

Position. A Competition Mechanism. “To increase access, influence, and strategic understanding in the environment. It may include the use of intelligence activities, the exchange of information with partners, the frequent rotational deployment of forces during exercises, and the effective positioning of forward based capabilities.”³²²

Power. “Power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want.”³²³

Public Diplomacy. The use of media and messages to “support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the

³¹⁷ CJCS, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, GL-10.

³¹⁸ CJCS, JP 3-20, GL-5.

³¹⁹ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-14.

³²⁰ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 16.

³²¹ Kennan, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” 1.

³²² CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 15.

³²³ Nye, “The Information Revolution and Power,” 2-3.

U.S. and citizens of the rest of the world.”³²⁴ This includes the promotion of American history, values, traditions, and foreign policy objectives through the implementation of cultural, information, and exchange programs.³²⁵

Preserve. A Competition Mechanism. “To prevent deterioration of a stable situation. Although there is no assumption of immediate malign intent by other actors, if ignored this condition could lead to the rise of an adversary, challenge, or crisis.”³²⁶

Range of Military Operations. “The range encompasses three primary categories: military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; and large-scale combat operations.”³²⁷

Realism. An international relations theory whereby “the central problem of international politics is war and the use of force, and the central actors are states.”³²⁸

Refugee. “Any persons who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, gender, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.”³²⁹

Reinforce (Relationships). An action was taken in terms of a state’s relations with other actors. A state supports an actor’s ongoing policies or actions that are aligned with the state’s interests.³³⁰

³²⁴ U.S. Department of State (DoS), “About Us – Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,” Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, accessed March 3, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/about-us-under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs>.

³²⁵ U.S. Department of State (DoS), “Public Diplomacy Career Track,” accessed March 3, 2022, <https://careers.state.gov/work/foreign-service/officer/career-tracks/public-diplomacy>.

³²⁶ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 15.

³²⁷ CJCS, JP 3-0, xvii, V-4.

³²⁸ Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 4-5.

³²⁹ CJCS, JP 3-29, IV-30.

³³⁰ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 20.

Risk Management. “The process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits.”³³¹

Rivalry. “Active demand by two or more organisms or kinds of organisms for some environmental resource in short supply.”³³²

Security Cooperation. “All DOD interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations.”³³³

Security Environment. “The security environment is the set of global conditions, circumstances, and influences that will affect the employment of the U.S. military and includes the sum of all operational environments.”³³⁴

Soft Power. “Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” through exposure to culture, national values, and foreign policy, which may influence populations to desire the same outcomes of the state.³³⁵

Stability Activities. “Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”³³⁶

State. “A territory with defined boundaries organized into a political unit and ruled by an established government that has control over its internal and foreign affairs.”³³⁷

³³¹ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-15.

³³² Merriam-Webster Inc., “Rivalry.”

³³³ CJCS, JP 3-20, GL-5.

³³⁴ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment*, vii.

³³⁵ Nye, *Soft Power*, 20-21.

³³⁶ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-15.

³³⁷ Dastrup, “Defining Nation-States.”

Stateless Person. “Citizens who have been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish their right to the nationality claimed.”³³⁸

Strategic Communication. The synchronized communication of national strategy to key audiences “to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives.”³³⁹

Strategic Security Environment. “The strategic security environment is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict. This environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing and disappearing.”³⁴⁰

Strategic Level of War. “The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives.”³⁴¹

Strategy. “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”³⁴² “Strategy develops an idea or set of ideas of the ways to employ the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve national, multinational, and theater objectives.”³⁴³

Strengthen. A Competition Mechanism. “To develop alliances and partnerships and reward actors for siding with friendly forces. This may include military engagement and security cooperation or favorable access to trade and foreign assistance.”³⁴⁴

³³⁸ CJCS, JP 3-29, IV-31.

³³⁹ CJCS, JP 3-13, II-5 – II-7.

³⁴⁰ CJCS, JP 1, xi.

³⁴¹ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-15.

³⁴² CJCS, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 203.

³⁴³ CJCS, JP 3-0, I-12.

³⁴⁴ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 15.

Subversion. “Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority.”³⁴⁵

System. “A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole.”³⁴⁶

Target Audience. “An individual or group selected for influence.”³⁴⁷

Targeting. “The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.”³⁴⁸

Theater Strategy. A level of warfare encompassing “an overarching construct outlining a combatant commander’s vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives.”³⁴⁹

Uncertain Environment. [An] “operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.”³⁵⁰

Unified Action. “The synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities to achieve unity of effort.”³⁵¹

Wargame. “A warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of actual military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, affected by the decisions made by players representing the opposing sides.”³⁵²

³⁴⁵ CJCS, JP 3-24, GL-5.

³⁴⁶ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-16.

³⁴⁷ CJCS, JP 3-13, I-4.

³⁴⁸ CJCS, JP 3-0, III-30.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., GL-17.

³⁵⁰ CJCS, JP 3-0, GL-17.

³⁵¹ Ibid., I-8.

³⁵² Perla, *The Art of Wargaming*, 164.

Weaken. A Competition Mechanism. “To recognize, understand, and impose a change in a competitor’s behavior using physical and informational aspects of power.”³⁵³

³⁵³ CJCS, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 15.

APPENDIX A

MATERIALS LIST

All items required to recreate the model proposed in this thesis are included in Annex A or available online. A complete copy of *Return to Twilight* includes the following:

- 1 - Rules Booklet (Appendix B)
- 1 - 22" x 31" Map Board
- 2 - Player Mats
- 112 – U.S. Tokens
- 107 – Olvanan Tokens
- 24 – Neutral Actor and Game Tokens
- 60 Event Cards
- 4 - Scoring Cards
- 1 - 6-sided die (available digitally at <https://www.calculator.net/dice-roller.html>)

APPENDIX B

RULES AND DESIGNER NOTES

Return to Twilight: A Model of Great Power Rivalry

The complete rule for gameplay with designer's notes.

All figures and tables in this appendix are the work of the author. Images are uncopyrighted works of the USG.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. *A Quick Description of Play.* This wargame models the ongoing great power rivalry between the United States (U.S.) and the People's Republic of Olvana (PRO) in East Africa between 2014 and 2025. Players assume the roles of either a U.S. or PRO strategist in a contest to influence populations, develop leverage over their adversary, and establish positions of advantage to accomplish their national objectives. The U.S. is dedicated to maintaining peace and stability to maintain strong trade ties with regional partners, while the PRO is working to establish economic corridors as part of the ongoing belt and road initiative. States compete in six-month increments through the application of resources to achieve their ends. The number one imperative for both sides is to avoid an all-out hot war. Hard and soft power are givens in the daily life of a strategist, but nobody wins if the region devolves into conflict.

The purpose of the game is to expose Soldiers to the complexity of developing and implementing interagency strategies, the resources available to compete below the threshold of armed conflict, and the perpetual risk of conflict. Good luck in your attempts for influence, leverage, and advantage.

1.2. *How to Win.* There are four ways to win (or lose).

1.2.1. *Victory Point Accrual.* A player will win if they accrue 25 Victory Points. Victory Points are awarded during 1) Scoring Rounds, 2) at the end of each Turn, and 3) as dictated by Operations Cards. If both players score during the same event (i.e., a scoring round or the end of a Turn), all scoring must be complete before determining if victory conditions have been met. More information on scoring is found in rule 9 (Scoring).

1.2.2. *Illegally Held Cards.* If a player holds a Scoring Card at the end of any Turn, they will immediately lose. The opposing player may check the adversary's hand at the end of any Turn, providing that they also expose any held cards that they may have. If both players hold a Scoring Card at the end of a Turn, the victor will be determined as per rule 1.2.4 (End of Game Victory).




1.2.3. *Conflict.* If either player's token moves into Block 7 (Conflict) of the Regional Stability Track, that player immediately loses. More information on the Regional Stability Track is found in rule 6.0 (Regional Stability Track).

1.2.4. *End of Game Victory.* If neither side has achieved victory by the end of Round 6, every State will be scored as if the corresponding Scoring Card had been played. All States must be scored cumulatively before applying points to the Victory Point Track. If neither player reaches 25 total VPs, the player with the most Victory Points will be declared the victor. If the end of game Victory Point balance is 0, neither player will be declared the victor. There are no draws. Players may repeat Turn 6 as many times as necessary until someone reaches a victory condition or a player loses the will to

compete. Repeat End of Game Victory scoring at the end of each subsequent Turn played.

1.3. *The Game Map.* The board is built around a strategic level map depicting four fictional East African States: Amari, Kujenga, Nyumba, and Ziwa. The primary items displayed on the map are Cities, Lines of Communication, international borders, and significant bodies of water. Each city also depicts the natural and manmade resources that are associated with the location. If a city hosts a refugee camp or suffers recurrent insurgency, the destabilizing factions are depicted. The map demonstrates how States are connected through road, rail, pipelines, airports, and seaports. These connectors are vital to the economic success of the state, and destabilizing factions can quickly threaten their viability if not controlled.


Stability
Number

	Kismayo	3
		
		



1.4. Cities. Cities are depicted in the same color as the State they are associated with.

1.4.1. Stability Numbers. Each City has a Stability Number in the upper-right corner, which represents the level of effort and amount of resources a State must apply to create influence amongst key segments of the population. The influence value of Refugee Camps and Insurgent Strongholds is higher than the City would otherwise receive, denoting the higher level of effort and additional resources required to stabilize these locations.



1.4.2. Adjacency. Cities are considered adjacent to any other City that is directly connected by a Line of Communication.

1.4.3. Placing Influence. There are two blocks at the bottom of each City where players will place Influence Tokens. The U.S. player will always place their tokens in the leftmost block, next to the resource block. The PRO player will place their tokens in the bottom rightmost block. Players may only place tokens in a City

that already contains that player's Influence Token, a City directly adjacent to a City that contains that player's Influence Token. Players may always place Influence in a Capital City or Seaport regardless of adjacency.

1.4.4. Controlling Cities. To control a City, a player must place Influence equal to or greater than the Influence Value of the City. It costs 1 Influence Point to place 1 Influence Token in a friendly Controlled or Uncontrolled City. If the City is Controlled by the opposing player, it costs 2 Influence Points to place 1 Influence Token in a City. If a City's control status changes during an Action Round, additional Influence Tokens are placed at the lower cost. Cities are Contested if neither player has Control and both players have placed Influence tokens in the same location. To Control a Contested City, a player must place Influence equal to the Influence Value of the City plus the total of opposing player Influence.

1.4.5. Resources. Each City has Resources that are Controlled when the City is Controlled. A player must Control a City to leverage the associated Resources.

1.4.6. Game Setup Markers. Each faction's starting positions are marked on the map by a blue star (U.S.), green diamond (PRO), or non-player faction symbol and are marked with the starting influence token value.

1.5. Infrastructure. Infrastructure represents road, rail, and pipelines in varying combinations. Airports, seaports, military installations, and Capitals may also be Controlled; however, they are Controlled whenever the associated City is Controlled.

1.5.1. Adjacency. Infrastructure is considered adjacent if there is a direct Line of Communication to a Controlled City. Players may only place Influence Tokens in Infrastructure locations adjacent to a City that contains that player's Influence Tokens. For Infrastructure scoring, Controlled Infrastructure must draw a continuous Line of Communication to a Controlled friendly seaport.

1.5.2. Placing Influence. It costs 1 Influence Point to place one Influence Token on Infrastructure. If the opposing player has Influence Tokens on an Infrastructure location, you may subtract 1 Influence Point from the opposing player's Influence for each Influence Point you invest. Once there is no remaining opposing player Influence at an Infrastructure location, you may place an Influence Token at the location. There is no increase in Influence Point investment value if it is controlled by the opposing player. Players may not remove Influence Points from Infrastructure once placed.


1.5.3. Controlling Infrastructure. Infrastructure is Controlled once there are more Influence Tokens than the Investment Value of the location. Infrastructure becomes Uncontrolled if the opposing player invests enough Influence Points to reduce the number of Influence Tokens at the location below the Investment Value. Only Controlled Infrastructure with a continuous line of communication to a Controlled friendly seaport will count for Infrastructure scoring.

1.6. Lines of Communication. Lines of Communication are roads, railways, and pipelines that currently exist or are planned for future construction.



1.6.1. Existing Lines of Communication. Lines of Communication with solid black lines may be immediately used for determining adjacency.

1.6.2. Planned Lines of Communication. Lines of Communication depicted by a dashed line represent planned routes that have not been completed yet. All planned Lines of Communication have an

Infrastructure block which must be controlled by any player before the Line of Communication may be used to determine adjacency. Both players may use completed Lines of Communication. Insurgent Factions and Refugees may use Lines of Communication depicted by a dashed line regardless of whether the infrastructure is controlled or not.



1.6.3. Infrastructure Corridors. To leverage Infrastructure Corridors for Resource extraction or to determine corridor control, a player must control the associated seaport. Only Infrastructure with direct and uninterrupted Lines of Communication to the seaport will be counted. A player must control three pieces of infrastructure, along the same corridor, with valid Lines of Communication to Control the Corridor. Only Resources that can be moved along a Controlled Corridor will be counted.




1.7. Resource Icons. Each City has natural and/or manmade Resources which can assist the player in achieving national objectives and accruing Victory Points. There are six types of infrastructure which benefit either the U.S. or Olvanan player. They are Airports, Capital Cities, Military Bases, Mines, Oil Extraction, and Seaports.


1.8. Controlling Spaces. For Control of Cities, see rule 1.4.4. (Controlling Cities). For Control of Infrastructure, see rule 1.5.3. (Controlling Infrastructure).

1.9. Markers.


1.9.1. U.S. Markers. All U.S. Markers contain the color blue as a primary component color or text color. U.S. Influence Tokens contain a blue star on the front and back. U.S. aligned factions have blue text and contain blue elements in the design.



1.9.2. Olvana Markers. All Olvanan Markers contain the color red and green with red text color. Olvanan Influence Tokens contain a green diamond on the front and back.



1.9.3. Other Faction Markers. Other markers have a graphic depiction of their organization on the front and a MIL-STD-2525D depiction of the organization type and disposition.



1.9.4. Game Management Markers. Tokens are used on the board to track Competition Posture, Victory Point accrual, progress in the Advantage Track, Turn progress, and Action Round progress.

2. GAME SETUP

2.1. Deal Cards. Shuffle the Early Competition cards and deal ten cards to each player. Players are allowed to examine their cards prior to placing their initial Influence markers and partnered forces each Turn.

2.2. U.S. Setup. The U.S. player sets up first, placing a total of ten Influence markers in the following locations: three in Kisumu, two in Mombasa, two in Nairobi, and three anywhere else in Amari or International Organizations. The U.S. player also selects a Security Partner, a Humanitarian Assistance Partner, places Influence, and places tokens as per rule 8.1. (U.S. Player Mat).

2.3. Olvana Setup. The Olvana player sets up second. Olvana places a total of 12 Influence markers in the following locations: three in Dar es Salaam, two in Lamu, one in Mbeya, one in the LAPEX Corridor infrastructure between Lamu and Garissa, one in the Dar es Salaam Corridor infrastructure between Dar es Salaam and Mbeya and three anywhere in Kujenga Nyumba, or International Organizations. The Olvana player also selects an Infrastructure Partner and places Influence as per rule 8.2. (Olvana Player Mat).

2.4. Game Progress Markers. Place U.S. and Olvana markers on the “Start” block of the Advantage Track. Place the U.S. and Olvana tokens in block 4 of the Competition Posture Track. Place three corresponding tokens in the Peacekeeping Missions box and two corresponding tokens in the Humanitarians block. Place the Action Round Marker in the “1” space of the Action Round track with the red side facing up. Place the Turn Marker on block one of the Turn Track. Finally, place the VP Marker on the Victory Track on the “Start” space.

2.5. Player Mats. Setup Player Mats as per rule 8. (Player Mats).

3. GAME SEQUENCE


3.1. Turns. *Return to Twilight* has six turns. Each Turn represents two years and will involve approximately eight player actions. At the beginning of the game, each player receives eight cards from the Early Competition deck. At the beginning of Turn Three, the Mid Competition deck is shuffled in with Early Competition cards that are marked with “Return to Deck,” and players’ hand size increases to nine. At the beginning of Turn Five, the Future Competition deck is shuffled in with Early and Mid-Competition cards that are marked with “Return to Deck,” And players’ hand size increases to ten.

3.2. Phasing Player. The Phasing Player is the player who will play an event during the current Action Round.

3.3. Card Decks. If all cards in the play deck are issued, reshuffle all discards marked with “Return to Deck” to form a new draw deck. Cards played that are not marked with

“Return to Deck” are removed from the game when they are played. Deal every card in the draw deck before reshuffling, except in turns 3 and 5 when new cards are introduced.

3.4. Deck Management. When moving from the Early Competition deck to Mid Competition, or from Mid Competition to Future Competition, do not add the discards to



the deck—instead, add the Mid Competition or Future Competition cards (as appropriate) to the existing deck and reshuffle. Discarded cards from previous phases (Early or Mid) are not shuffled into the deck if they are not marked with “Return to Deck.”

3.5. Turns. A Turn in *Return to Twilight* has the following structure:

- Generate Insurgents and Refugees
- Select and Place Partners/Influence (Player Mats)
- Deal Cards
- Action Rounds (8 Action Rounds per Turn)
- Turn Scoring (Player Mats)
- Advance Turn Marker
- Final Scoring (after Turn 6 only))

3.5.a. Generate Insurgents and Refugees. At the beginning of each Turn, Insurgents and Refugees will generate if they are able. Insurgents and Refugees will only be generated and moved in the Generate Insurgents and Refugees portion of a Turn.

3.5.a.1. Generate Insurgents.

3.5.a.1.2. Army of Justice and Purity Insurgents generate one unit per Turn in either Mbala or Mpika. The U.S. player will place and move Army of Justice and Purity Insurgent tokens

3.5.a.1.3. Insurgent Token Placement. Insurgent tokens are placed as per rule 4.1.1. (Insurgent Token Placement).

3.5.a.2. Generate Refugees. Refugees will generate one token in both Kakuma and Kigoma at the beginning of each Turn. The Olvana player will place and move Refugees generated in Kakuma. The U.S. player will place and move Refugee tokens generated in Kigoma.

3.5.b. Select and Place Partners/Influence (Player Mats). Each player is afforded faction-specific advantages outlined on their player mat.

3.5.b.1. The U.S. will select a State Security Partner and a Humanitarian Assistance Partner. The U.S. will then place three Influence tokens anywhere in the State Security Partner State.

3.5.b.2. Olvana will select an Infrastructure Partner and place two Influence tokens in the corresponding State.

3.5.c. Deal Cards. Each player begins with eight total cards on turns 1-2. On turns 3-4, players should receive enough cards to bring their total hand size to nine. On turns 5-6, players should receive enough cards to bring their total hand size to ten.

3.5.d. Action Rounds (8 Action Rounds per Turn). There are eight Action Rounds per Turn. Players alternate playing cards, one per Action Round, for a total of eight cards. The Olvana player plays first in Turns 1-2. The U.S. player plays first in Turns 3-4. In Turns 5-6, the player with more Victory Points will play first. The player whose turn it is to play a card during an Action Round is called the 'Phasing Player.'

3.5.e. Turn Scoring (Player Mats). After the last Action Round of each Turn, players will assess Victory Point Conditions as noted on the bottom of their Player Mats. Once both players have scored, the Victory Track will be assessed to see if either player has met victory conditions.

3.5.f. Advance Turn Marker. Move the Turn Marker at the end of each Turn. If it is the end of Turn 2, shuffle the Mid Competition cards into the draw deck. If it is the end of Turn 4, shuffle the Future Competition cards into the draw deck.



3.5.g. Final Scoring (after Turn 6 only). At the end of Turn 6, perform Final Scoring as described in the Scoring rules.

4. NON-PLAYER FACTIONS


4.1. Insurgents. The Army of Justice and Purity (AJP) and Hizbul-al-Harakat (HaH or al-Harakat) represent insurgent factions vying for control against legitimate governments in East Africa. These groups pose a problem to regional security and decrease the likelihood of international investment in the affected areas.

4.1.1. Insurgent Token Placement.

Insurgent tokens may only be placed in Cities. Only one Insurgent token may occupy a City. If there is more than 1 Insurgent token in a City, the second token will be moved to an adjacent City. If the adjacent City already has an Insurgent token, move the token along a valid line of communication to an available adjacent City. If there is no adjacent City available, the Insurgent token will be removed from the board. Players may not place Influence tokens in any City occupied by Insurgents.



4.1.2. Mitigating Insurgent Forces. Peacekeeping Missions can be implemented to mitigate Insurgency. Peacekeeping Missions may be placed in any City on the board and do not have any requirements for Lines of Communication. Peacekeepers will defeat any Insurgents in the same City. Insurgents cannot move to or through a City with Peacekeepers.



4.1.3. Army of Justice and Purity. “AJP is a rebel group and heterodox Christian cult which operates in southern Kujenga and its surrounding States. Originally known as the Truth Revival Movement and the Kujengan True Faith and Allegiance Army, its stated goals include the establishment of multi-party democracy distinct from Kujenga. Their leadership council has publicly expressed their goal of ruling according to their strict, non-traditional interpretations of selected portions of the Christian Bible, mixed with a heavy dose of anti-colonial rhetoric. It is structured and functions as a military unit.”³⁵⁴

4.1.4. Hizbul-al-Harakat. “A jihadist fundamentalist group based in central East Africa. Its leadership had previously pledged itself to the militant Islamist organization Al-Qaeda, but quarrels and interpersonal conflicts led to al-Harakat distancing itself from the group. Since then, the group has withdrawn from the major Cities, controlling a few rural areas in the rough mountains of western Nyumba. The group describes its purpose as waging jihad against “enemies of Islam.”³⁵⁵

4.2. Refugees. Refugees continue to pose a problem in East Africa. The Camps at Kakuma and Kigoma are the result of long-term conflicts and pose a complex problem for local governments and Humanitarians, taxing the resources of local communities and decreasing stability in the region.

4.2.1. Refugee Token Placement. Refugee tokens are placed according to the same rules as Insurgent Token Placement (rule 4.1.1.). Players may not place Influence

³⁵⁴ Department of the Army, “DATE Africa Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions.”

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

tokens in any City occupied by Refugees. Refugees and Insurgents may occupy the same location.

4.2.2. Mitigating Refugees. Humanitarian Missions can be implemented to mitigate Refugees. Humanitarian Missions may be placed in any City on the board and do not have any requirements for lines of communication. Humanitarians will remove any Refugee tokens in the same City. Refugees cannot move to or through a City with Humanitarians.

4.2.3. Kakuma Refugee Camp. Refugees in Kakuma pose a problem that creates effects across Amari's borders with Kujenga and Nyumba. "Corruption and poor governance along the border contribute to increased numbers of refugees flowing into the better economically positioned Amari. Refugees create a burden on Amari's finances, provide potential cover for terrorists, and are perceived by Amarians as threats to their jobs. Protests occur regularly along the border and in the larger population centers where refugees congregate."³⁵⁶

4.2.4. Kigoma Refugee Camp. "Ten years ago, Kujenga passed the Refugee Act, making it officially illegal for a refugee to live outside a Refugee Designated Area without obtaining a permit."³⁵⁷ Regardless, "large numbers of refugees continue to transit the State every year. This recently prompted Kujenga to launch an emergency appeal to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) for 2 million Swiss francs to assist 40,000 people."³⁵⁸

4.3. Unified Action Partners.

4.3.1. Peacekeepers. Players may fund Peacekeeping Missions to mitigate the instability caused by Insurgent factions.

4.3.1.1. Activating Peacekeepers. Players may place Influence in the African Union and UN Peacekeeper blocks on the game board according to the same rules for establishing Control of a City. If players establish Control of a Peacekeeping Mission, they may place the associated Peacekeeping token on the board in any City. If a player loses control of the Organization, the token will remain in the same location until either player establishes control of the Organization and elects to move it.

³⁵⁶ Department of the Army, "DATE Political: Amari."

³⁵⁷ Department of the Army, "DATE Social: Kujenga," ODIN, accessed February 2, 2022, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Africa/Kujenga/Social:_Kujenga.


³⁵⁸ Ibid.

4.3.1.2. Employing Peacekeeping Forces. Players who Control a Peacekeeping Mission may place the associated token in any City. There are no requirements for Lines of Communication. Placement of a Peacekeeping token in a City will immediately result in the removal of any Insurgent token in the same City. Insurgents may not move through or occupy any City that contains Peacekeepers.



4.3.2. Humanitarians.

4.3.2.1. Activating Humanitarians. Players may place Influence in the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and International Organization for Migration blocks on the game board according to the same rules for establishing Control of a City. If players establish Control of a Humanitarian Mission, they may place the associated Humanitarian token on the board in any City. If players lose control of the organization, the token will remain in the same location until a player establishes control of the Organization and elects to move it.



4.3.2.2. Employing Humanitarians. Players who Control a Humanitarian Mission may place the associated token in any City. There are no requirements for Lines of Communication. Placement of a Humanitarian token in a City will immediately result in the removal of any Refugee token in the same City. Refugees may not move through or occupy any City that contains Humanitarians.

5. OPERATIONS

5.1. Card Play. Cards may be played in one of three ways: as Events, to exert Influence, or to support Subversion. Players must conduct one of these three actions when they are the phasing player. Players may not pass their Turn by declining to play a card or by discarding a card.

5.2. Events. Events are listed on each non-scoring card. If events are elected for play, they will be executed precisely as noted on the card. If the card instructions conflict with the rules in this booklet, the card instructions supersede the rules.

5.2.1. Friendly Card Events. Players may elect to play the event depicted on a friendly or neutral card. U.S. Cards are marked with a blue star in the upper left-hand corner. Neutral cards are marked with a white clover in the upper left-hand corner. When players perform an event, they will execute the event as listed on the card. After executing the event, players will adjust their Competition posture on the Competition Posture track. If the card is marked with an “H” inside a dark grey circle in the upper right-hand

Influence Point Value and Faction Indicator

Power Type



Event

corner, move the Competition Posture token one space to the right (towards “Conflict”) on the track. If the card is marked with an “S” inside a light grey circle in the upper right-hand corner, move the Competition Posture token one space to the left (towards “Cooperation”) on the track. If a friendly or neutral event is played, the player may not spend the Influence Point value of the card. If players choose to forego the event on a neutral or friendly card, they must choose another valid action to perform during their Turn.

5.2.2. Adversary Card Events. If a player plays a card to place Influence or conduct Subversion, and the card contains an adversarial Event, the Event still occurs. The Phasing Player may choose whether the event occurs before or after the Phasing Player’s action.

Note: Any time a player uses a card for operations, and it triggers their adversary’s event, their opponent plays the event during the Action Round as if they had played the card themselves.

5.2.3. When an action or event requires a set amount of Influence Points, using a card of an equal or higher value will satisfy the requirement.

5.2.4. When an event forces a player to discard a card, the Event on the discarded card is not implemented. This rule also applies to Scoring cards.

5.2.5. Except as noted in rule 10.1.5, card text that contradicts the written rules supersedes the written rules.

5.3. Placing Influence Points. The Phasing Player may choose to place Influence Points instead of playing a friendly or neutral event. Influence markers are placed one at a time. Influence markers must be placed in a location that already contains friendly influence or adjacent to a location that contains friendly influence at the beginning of the Action Round.

5.3.1. It costs one Influence Point to place an Influence marker in a City or Organization that is friendly-Controlled or uncontrolled. It costs two Influence Points to place an Influence marker in an adversary-Controlled City or Organization. If a location becomes Uncontrolled during the placement of Influence Points, all subsequent Influence Points may be placed at the lower cost.


5.3.2. Influence markers may be placed in multiple Cities and multiple Organizations up to the number of Influence Points on the card played.

5.3.3 Influence markers may always be placed in National Capitals, Seaports, or International Organizations.

5.4. *Subversion.* Subversion represents a States application of Diplomatic, Information, Military, Financial, and Intelligence activities below the threshold of armed conflict. There are no requirements to have Influence or Lines of Communication to conduct Subversion in a City or Organization; however, your opponent must have Influence markers in the target for Subversion to be attempted.

5.4.1. To resolve a Subversion attempt, multiply the Stability Number of the target City by two. Then roll a die and add the Influence Points on the card to it. If the modified die roll is higher than the doubled Stability Number, the Subversion is successful; otherwise, it fails. If the Subversion is successful, remove opposing Influence markers equal to the difference from the target City. If there are insufficient adversary Influence markers to remove, add friendly Influence markers to make up the difference.

Example: The U.S. player plays a card with an Influence Point Value of 3 to conduct a Subversion attempt in Mtwara. The U.S. player has no Influence in Mtwara. The Olvana player has 2 Influence Points. The U.S. player rolls a six-sided die which lands on 4. The U.S. player adds his Operations Number (3) to the die roll (4) for a total of 7. The player subtracts twice the value of Mtwara Stability Number ($2 \times 2 = 4$) from this result to get a final total of 3. This is the number of Olvanan Influence markers that are removed from Mtwara. Because Olvana only has two Influence Points in Mtwara, the U.S. player would add 1 U.S. Influence marker to the location.



5.4.2. Move the Phasing Player's marker on the Competition Posture Track one space towards "Conflict." Subversion is always a Hard Power action.

5.4.3. Cards that State a player may make a "free Subversion attempt" do not cost additional Influence Points and do not affect the Competition Posture Track.

6. REGIONAL STABILITY TRACK

6.1. *Balancing Competition Strategies.* Players should balance their competition strategy to include both Hard and Soft Power actions below the threshold of armed conflict. Remaining within acceptable bounds of competition is an important part of any regional competition strategy.

6.2. Soft Power. There are two types of Soft Power Actions.

6.2.1. Soft Power Actions. If a Player places Influence Tokens instead of playing an Event or Conducting Subversion, they will move their Competition Posture Token one space left towards 0 “Cooperation.” If a player plays a card Event with an “S” in a light gray circle on the top right-hand corner of the card, this is a Soft Power action, and the player will move their Competition Posture Token one space left towards 0 “Cooperation.”

6.2.2. Cooperation. If a Player’s Competition Posture token is placed on block 0 “Cooperation,” the Influence Value of all cards is halved. Events will still be played as written on the card.

6.3. Hard Power. There are two Hard Power Actions.

6.3.1. If a Player elects to conduct Subversion instead of playing an Event or placing Influence, they will move their Competition Posture Token one space right towards 7 “Conflict.” If a player plays a card Event with an “H” in a dark gray circle on the top right-hand corner of the card, this is a Hard Power action, and the player will move their Competition Posture Token one space right towards 7 “Conflict.”

6.3.2. Conflict. If a player’s token is placed in block 7 (Conflict) of the Competition Posture Track, that player triggers a conventional conflict and immediately loses the game.

6.4. Competition Imbalance. If a player is three or more spaces away from their adversary on the Competition Posture Track, the player who is closest to the zero “Cooperation” block will reduce the Influence Value of their cards by one. Once both tokens are within three spaces of each other, there will be no remaining effect on Influence Values.



Example. The U.S. Competition Posture Token is on space two, “COOPERATION.” The Olvanan Token is on space five, “COMPETITION.” Because the Olvanan player is three spaces ahead of the U.S. player, the U.S. player loses one Influence Point (to a minimum of one Influence Point per card) when using Points to place Influence or conduct Subversion. If the U.S. player conducts a Hard Power action or if the Olvanan player conducts a Soft Power action, the players will no longer be separated by three or more spaces, and the penalty will end.

7. ADVANTAGE TRACK

7.1. The Advantage Track. The Advantage Track contains a marker for both the U.S. and Olvana. Each faction may spend Influence Points for an opportunity to move along the Track and gain rewards.



7.2. Activating the Advantage Track. To advance in the Advantage Track, play a card with an Influence Value equal to or greater than the number indicated for the next step of the track. Roll the die. If the number rolled is equal to the range indicated for the next step, the player advances their token and collects the reward indicated. Players may make only one attempt per Turn, regardless of success or failure.

Note: Players may use a friendly, adversary, or neutral card to activate the Advantage Track. Events noted on a card used to activate the Advantage Track do not occur. The card is discarded unless marked with “Return to Deck.”

7.3. Rewards. Moving along the Advantage Track results in awards of Victory Points and/or special advantages. All six of the boxes on the Advantage Track are marked with two numbers divided by a slash. The first player to reach a position will receive the number of Victory Points noted left of the slash. The second player to reach the block will receive the number right of the slash. Move the Victory Point tracker immediately to reflect the earned Points.

- Upon reaching space 2 (Military Engagement), the player may discard their Held Card at the end of the Turn.
- Upon reaching space 4 (Diplomatic Agreements), the player receives +1 to all future Advantage Track Rolls (until canceled as per rule 7.2)

Design Note: The Advantage Track is the ‘safety valve.’ If you do not want to play a card, you may use it in the Advantage Track to avoid the Event (provided it has enough Influence Points to meet the requirement for the block).

8. PLAYER MATS

8.1. U.S. Player Mat. The U.S. Player Mat contains instructions and trackers for U.S.-specific advantages. The U.S. implements its national strategy through collaboration with partner states and organizations.

8.1.1. U.S. State Security Partner. The U.S. may choose 1 State Security Partner to conduct Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force Assistance, or Counter-Insurgency Operations. The State Security Partner token will defeat Insurgent tokens and prevent

insurgents from moving through or occupying the City where the partner is employed. The U.S. selects one partner before the first move of each Turn. The U.S. player may place the associated Security Force token anywhere within the State that that token is associated. Once placed, the token may not be moved again until the beginning of the next Turn. The U.S. may also place three Influence Tokens in the partner State prior to the start of each Turn. Selecting a Security Partner State does not preclude the U.S. from investing in Peacekeeping Missions.

8.1.2. U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Partner. The U.S. may choose one Humanitarian Assistance Partner to conduct Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response Operations. The Humanitarian Assistance Partner token will remove Refugee tokens and prevent Refugees from moving through or stopping in the City where the partner is placed. The U.S. selects one partner before the first move of each Turn. The U.S. player may place the associated Humanitarian Assistance token in any City on the board. Once placed, the token may not be moved again until the beginning of the next Turn. Partnership with a Humanitarian Organization will increase the cost of Olavanan Influence in that organization on the game board to two Influence Points for one Influence Token in an Uncontrolled organization and three Influence Points to place one Influence in a Controlled organization. Selecting a Humanitarian Assistance partner does not preclude the U.S. from investing in Humanitarian Missions.

8.1.3. U.S. Strategy and Turn Scoring. The U.S. accomplishes its goals by maintaining influence in international organizations, supporting State stability, and retaining access to force projection infrastructure. The U.S. will gain additional Victory Points at the end of each Turn if they control international organizations, defeat insurgents in partnered states, and control air and seaports.

8.2. Olvana Player Mat.

8.2.1. Olvana Infrastructure Partner. Olvana may choose one State Infrastructure Partner to support the construction of economic infrastructure. Olvana may place two Influence Points in the partnered State before the beginning of the Turn and will gain two Victory Points at the end of the Turn if they Control the selected corridor (nine total points of Infrastructure with a Controlled Line of Communication to a Controlled seaport).

8.2.2. Olvanan Belt and Road Partners. When the Belt and Road cards are played as events, the associated States will permanently join the Belt and Road on the Olvana Player Mat. Olvana may add one to the Influence Point value of a card when it is spent entirely on Infrastructure in a single State that has joined the Belt and Road.

8.2.3. Olvanan Reaction to Destabilizing Factions. In addition to investment in International Organizations, Olvana may mitigate insurgents and refugees through bribery and inducement. Olvana may pay two Influence Points to remove Insurgents tokens or two Influence Points to remove Refugee tokens from the board. Insurgents

and Refugees will continue to generate as per Turn rules and Card rules unless addressed by a Peacekeeping Mission.

8.2.4. Olvana Strategy and Turn Scoring. Olvana accomplishes its goals by controlling seaports to support trade and by establishing infrastructure corridors to enable resource extraction. Olvana will gain additional Victory Points at the end of each Turn if they control infrastructure, seaports, and resources.

9. SCORING

9.1. *Scoring Overview.* The object of the game is to score more Victory Points (VPs) than your opponent. Victory Points are scored through geographic Influence and positioning within the four States. Each State has its own ‘scoring card’. Scoring cards reward Victory Points if a great power has sufficient influence in the country at the time the card is played. VPs are also earned during certain Events. Finally, each player may score points based on their leverage and position in the region based on national priorities as stated on their Player Mats at the end of each Turn (rule 8. Player Mats).

9.2. *Victory Track.* The Victory Track marker starts at “0”, which represents equilibrium between the Great Powers, and moves toward U.S. or Olvanan dominance each time a faction scores a Victory Point. Regardless of the token location, a U.S. Victory Point results in the token moving one space towards U.S. Dominance, and an Olvanan Victory Point moves the token one space towards Olvanan Dominance.


9.3. *Scoring Cards.* Each of the four States depicted on the board has a scoring card. When the scoring card is played, both players will count the number of Cities they control to determine their standing in the State.

9.3.1. Presence: A player has Presence in a State if it Controls at least one City in that State.

9.3.2. Influence: A player achieves Influence within a State if it Controls more Cities than their opponent in that State.

9.3.3. Control: A player has Control of a State if it Controls greater than half of the Cities in the State. The number required is noted on the scoring cards.

9.3.4. Additional Conditions. Players may score an additional Victory Point for control of ports and political centers as listed on the scoring cards.



9.3.5. Once both players have determined their Victory Points, the difference between the scores is applied to the Victory Track.

9.3. End of Turn Scoring. At the end of a Turn, both players will score based on their assigned Player Mat. The U.S. will gain:

- 1 VP for each Peacekeeping Mission and each Humanitarian Mission it controls.
- 1 VP if the selected Security Partner State is free of Refugees and Insurgents.
- 2 VP for each State where the U.S. Controls at least 1 airport and 1 seaport.

The Olvanan player will gain:

- 1 VP for every third piece of infrastructure controlled (regardless of Lines of Communication).
- 1 VP for every third resource controlled (must be of the same type).
- 2 VP if Olvana controls its selected Infrastructure Partner Corridor.

9.4. Final Turn Scoring (After Turn 6 Only). Conduct end of Turn Scoring before conducting Final Turn Scoring. If neither side has achieved victory by the end of Round 6, every State will be scored as if the corresponding Scoring Card had been played. All States must be scored cumulatively before applying points to the Victory Point track. Players may not reach 25 total VPs, however, the player with the most Victory Points will be declared the victor. If the end of game Victory Point balance is zero, neither player will be declared the victor. There are no draws. Players may repeat Turn 6 as many times as necessary until someone reaches a victory condition or a player loses the will to compete. Repeat End of Game Victory scoring at the end of each subsequent Turn played.

10. GAME CREDITS

The following people were essential to the development and refinement of this game. Without their counsel, this game would not have been possible. There is a piece of each of them in this game and they all have my sincerest gratitude.

Research Consultation and Design Input

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MAJ Jeff Benton, USA	CPT Mike Teeter, USA
MAJ Leann Whitson, USA	CPT Brian Hammel, USA

APPENDIX C

WARGAME COMPONENTS

This appendix includes the game components required to recreate a model of *Return to Twilight*. All items except the map are designed to print on 8.5 inches wide and 11 inches tall, letter-sized paper stock. The map is designed to print at a scale of 22 inches wide and 34 inches tall.



The United States of America

U.S. TURN INSTRUCTIONS & ADVANTAGES

- At the beginning of EACH TURN choose 1 Security Cooperation Partner State from the pool on this player mat (this choice must remain the same until the beginning of the next turn). This will remain your partner unless you choose a different partner at the beginning of the next turn.
 - Place the Partner State token in the "State Security Partner" area of the "PARTNERS" block.
 - Collect the corresponding "Partner State Military Force" token and place it in ANY location on the game board (you may not move it again until the beginning of the next turn).
 - Place three Influence anywhere in the corresponding country on the game board.
- At the beginning of EACH TURN choose 1 Stability Partner from the pool on this player mat (this choice must remain the same until the beginning of the next turn). This will remain your partner unless you choose a different partner at the beginning of the next turn.
 - Place the Partner token in the "Stability Partner" block.
 - Collect the corresponding "Stability Partner" token and place it in ANY location on the game board (you may not move it again until the beginning of the next turn).
 - Olvanan Influence in this organization will cost twice the normal amount when spending a card for the Influence Point value.
- At the end of EACH TURN, RECEIVE A VICTORY POINT for:

VP	Condition
1	Each Stability Partner Organization that you Control.
1	If there are no Destabilizing Factions in your Security Partner State (stability bonus).
2	If you Control an Airport and Sea Port in the same Country.

PARTNERS



HUMANITARIAN PARTNER















STATE SECURITY PARTNERS

SUBVERSION (RULE 5.4.1)

- Multiply the Stability Number of the target City by 2.
- Roll a die and add the Influence Points of the played card to it.
- Remove opposing Influence markers equal to the roll+Influence Points – the doubled Stability Value of the City.
- Add friendly influence if there are not enough adversary Influence Tokens.
- Move the Phasing Player's marker on the Competition Posture Track one space towards "Conflict."

United States Game Tokens (Front)


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1	1	2	2	3	3	4	5	6	7
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1	1	2	2	3	3	4	5	6	8
1	1	2	2	3	3	4	5	6	8
1	1	2	2	3	3	4	5	6	8
<div> <div>SECURITY PARTNER AMARI</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>SECURITY PARTNER NYUMBA</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>SECURITY PARTNER ZIWA</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>AMARI DEFENSE FORCE</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>NYUMBAN ARMED FORCES</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>ZIWA PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCE</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>HUMANITARIAN PARTNER UNHCR</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>HUMANITARIAN PARTNER IOM</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>ADVANTAGE TRACK</div>  </div>									
<div> <div>COMPETITION POSTURE</div>  </div>									

United States Game Tokens (Reverse)


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7	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1
7	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1
7	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1
7	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1
8	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1
8	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1
8	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1
8	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1
8	6	5	4	3	3	2	2	1	1
IO U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES	IO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION	HUMANITARIAN PARTNER	HUMANITARIAN PARTNER	ZIWA	NYUMBA	AMARI	SECURITY PARTNER	SECURITY PARTNER	SECURITY PARTNER
								COMPETITION POSTURE	ADVANTAGE TRACK

Olvana Game Tokens (Front)


Olvana Game Tokens (Reverse)



Other Game Tokens (Front)



Other Game Tokens (Reverse)



Card Sheet 1 (Front)

<p>001 EARLY COMPETITION S</p> <p>3</p>  <p>REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS</p> <p><i>Remove all Olvahan Influence from a single Organization. Place 3 U.S. Influence in any single Organization.</i></p> <p>The U.S. remains committed to economic growth, security, and transparent governance in Africa.</p> <p><small>George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to the Corporate Council on Africa's U.S.-Africa Business Summit," transcript of speech delivered at the Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., June 26, 2003, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/06/020306262.html.</small></p>	<p>002 EARLY COMPETITION H</p> <p>3</p>  <p>STABILIZING FAILED STATES</p> <p><i>The U.S. adds sufficient Influence to Kismayo for Control. Olvahan cannot make Subversion Attempts in Kismayo for the remainder of this Turn.</i></p> <p>The U.S. commits personnel, resources, and funding to support counter-terror operations in East Africa.</p> <p><small>Luis Martinez, "U.S. Military Advisers Deployed to Somalia," ABC News, January 11, 2014, https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/01/u-s-military-advisers-deployed-to-somalia-first-time-since-backlash-down/.</small></p>	<p>003 EARLY COMPETITION S</p> <p>2</p>  <p>COUNTER-POACHING*</p> <p><i>U.S. gains 2 Influence in any City in Amani or Kujenga.</i></p> <p>U.S. Agencies support counter-poaching in East Africa through military, diplomatic, and development activities to counter terrorist finance activities.</p> <p><i>Return to deck</i></p> <p><small>"2015 East Africa Report," Danielle Sykes and Kim Wylie, U.S. Agency for International Development, January 24, 2014, https://www.usaid.gov/pressroom/development/2015/East-Africa_2015AnnualReport_-_508_compatible.pdf.</small></p>	<p>004 EARLY COMPETITION S</p> <p>4</p>  <p>TRADE & INVESTMENT FRAMEWORKS</p> <p><i>U.S. Gains 2 Influence in Amani or Zhiva.</i></p> <p>U.S. signs Trade and Investment Framework Agreements with the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).</p> <p><small>"Trade & Investment Framework Agreements," Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed November 15, 2021, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/invest-investment-framework-agreements.</small></p>	<p>005 EARLY COMPETITION S</p> <p>3</p>  <p>FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE*</p> <p><i>Add 1 U.S. Influence to a single City already containing U.S. Influence, at the end of each Action Round for the remainder of this turn.</i></p> <p>U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of State continue to fund relief efforts to alleviate refugee suffering and reduce violence.</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p><small>"Somalia - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1," U.S. Agency for International Development, January 24, 2014, https://www.usaid.gov/pressroom/development/1606somalia_cse_fs01_10-1-24-2014.pdf.</small></p>	<p>006 EARLY COMPETITION H</p> <p>2</p>  <p>FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE*</p> <p><i>U.S. places 2 Influence and removes 1 Olvahan Influence in any City in Kujenga, Nyumba, or Amani.</i></p> <p>The U.S. increases support to the Nyumban military, eliminating 2 senior Hizbul al-Harakat leaders in Nyumba.</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p><small>"US Army Attacks Terrorists in Somalia," Jerusalem Post, September 2, 2014, https://www.jpost.com/international/us-army-attacks-terrorists-in-somalia-374104.</small></p>	<p>007 EARLY COMPETITION S</p> <p>3</p>  <p>ESTABLISHED NETWORKS</p> <p><i>Olvahan reveals their hand of cards for this turn. If Olvahan has no remaining cards, the U.S. gains 1 VP. The U.S. player may spend the Influence Value of this card.</i></p> <p>The U.S. identifies major Chinese investments and activities in the region through long-term, ongoing relationships with government officials and non-profit organizations.</p> <p><small>Javier C. Hernandez, "China Sentences Man to Death for Espionage, Saying He Sold Secrets," New York Times, April 19, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/world/asia/china-spy-death-sentence.html.</small></p>	<p>008 EARLY COMPETITION S</p> <p>4</p>  <p>FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS</p> <p><i>Remove a total of 4 Olvahan Influence by removing no more than 2 Influence each from Amani, Kujenga, or Nyumba.</i></p> <p>The U.S. renews and expands the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to increase trade and reduce tariffs.</p> <p><small>"African Growth and Opportunity Act," Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed November 15, 2021, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/af-trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa.</small></p>
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Card Sheet 2 (Front)

<p>009 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>HAGUE TRIBUNALS</p> <p><i>The U.S. may play this card along with an Olvanean card to cancel an Olvanean Event. The canceled card is placed into the discard pile. If this card is played by Olvanea, the U.S. gains 1 VP.</i></p> <p>The U.N. indirectly rules Olvanea's maritime claims illegal, undermining Olvanea's ability to shape international law.</p> <p>Euan Graham, "The Hague Tribunal's South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence?", Lowy Institute for International Policy, Aug 18, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/council/foreign-policy/p144841/the-hague-tribunal-south-china-sea-ruling-empty-provocation-or-slow-burning-influence.html.</p>	<p>010 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>A NEW TYPE OF FOREIGN POLICY</p> <p><i>Olvanea must randomly discard a card. If the card has a U.S. associated Event, the Event occurs immediately. If the card has an Olvanea associated Event or an Event applicable to both players, then the card must be discarded without playing the event.</i></p> <p>Unprecedented U.S. policy moves prove unpredictable for Olvanean analysts.</p> <p>Jennifer Williams, "Trump may have just thrown decades of U.S.-China relations into disarray", Vox, December 5, 2016, https://www.vox.com/world/2016/12/5/3824092/trump-phone-call-president-sawen-china.</p>	<p>011 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>BUGS*</p> <p><i>Add 1 Olvanean Influence to 1 African Union Peacekeeping Mission, and the UN Peacekeeping Mission.</i></p> <p>"Confidential data on the IT network of the Olvanean-built African Union headquarters...was being siphoned off to Shanghai."</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p>"African Union Bugged by China: Cyber Espionage as Evidence of Strategic Shifts", Council on Foreign Relations, March 7, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/asia/african-union-bugged-by-china-cyber-espionage-as-evidence-of-strategic-shifts/p44841.</p>	<p>012 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>DATA DETECTIVE</p> <p><i>The U.S. reveals all scoring cards in their hand of cards. The Olvanea player may add 2 Influence to the State named on one of the revealed scoring cards.</i></p> <p>Stolen U.S. data reveals espionage networks in East Africa.</p> <p>Zach Dorfman, "China Used Stolen Data to Expose CIA Operatives in Africa and Europe", Foreign Policy, December 21, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/21/china-stolen-us-data-exposed-cia-operatives-spy-networks/.</p>	<p>013 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>STANDARD GAUGE RAILWAYS</p> <p><i>Remove half of U.S. Influence in one location along the LAPEX or Monibasa Economic Corridor, except Nairobi and Monibasa.</i></p> <p>Amari, Nyumba, and Ziwa sign a trilateral agreement to begin the construction of a standard gauge railway.</p> <p>Ian Taylor, "Kenya's New Lunatic Express: The Standard Gauge Railway", African Studies Quarterly 19, no. 3-4 (October 2020): 30, https://africafirst.com/kenya-standard-gauge-railway/.</p>	<p>014 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>INFORMATION OPERATIONS*</p> <p><i>Olvanea rolls a die and subtracts the number of their position on the Regional Stability Track. Add this number of Influence to the board.</i></p> <p>Olvanea conducts information operations to justify its investments as legitimate and valuable to local populations.</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p>Olivia Solon and Ken Dillman, "China's Influence Operations Offer a Glimpse into the Future of Information Warfare", NBC News, October 21, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/china-s-influence-operations-offer-glimpse-future-information-warfare-n1244066.</p>	<p>015 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>ARMS SALES</p> <p><i>Place 2 Olvanean Influence in either Kujenga or Ziwa. Olvanea receives 1 Victory Point.</i></p> <p>Olvanean arms sales in Africa increase by 55%.</p> <p>Nan Tian, "China's Arms Trade: A Rival for Global Influence?", The Interpreter, September 17, 2018, https://www.bowinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-arms-trade-rival-global-influence.</p>	<p>016 EARLY COMPETITION H</p>  <p>CYBER MONITORING*</p> <p><i>Add 2 Olvanean Influence to Nyumba. For the remainder of the turn, the Olvanea player receives +1 to the Influence value of any card that uses all its Influence Points in Nyumba.</i></p> <p>Olvanea infiltrates the information systems of U.S. airlines, technology companies and contractors involved in the movement of U.S. troops.</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p>Ros Krasny, "Olvanea hacked U.S. military contractors, Senate panel finds", Reuters, September 17, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-cyberespionage/chinese-hackers-breached-us-military-contractors-senate-probe-idU.S.KBN0HC11A20140917.</p>
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Card Sheet 3 (Front)

<p>017 2 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>MEDIA WARFARE</p> <p>The U.S. immediately discards a card with an influence value of 3 or more, or Olvana may remove 4 U.S. Influence (no more than two from any single location or organization).</p> <p>"[Obama's] way of expression has reflected the loss of confidence and helplessness. This shows that the Obama administration is in a state of confusion, which also shows that the US is losing its grip on world affairs."</p> <p>"China Media: Anger at Obama," BBC News, August 5, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-28655237.</p>	<p>018 3 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>ZIWA JOINS THE BELT AND ROAD*</p> <p>Add 3 Olvanan Influence in Ziwa, or enough Influence to equal U.S. Influence in Ziwa, whichever is greater (no more than two in any single location).</p> <p>Ziwa signs a Memorandum of Understanding with Olvana to increase cooperation on infrastructure development.</p> <p><i>Olvana places the "Ziwa Joins the Belt and Road" Token in the "Belt and Road Agreements" block.</i></p> <p>"China and Uganda," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, accessed November 16, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zh/eng/mb_663304/zqzg_663340/tcs_663828/gldp_663832/3109_664244/.</p>	<p>019 3 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>KUJENGA JOINS THE BELT AND ROAD*</p> <p>Add 3 Olvanan Influence to Kujenga, or enough Influence to equal U.S. Influence in Kujenga, whichever is greater (no more than 2 in any single location).</p> <p>Kujenga signs an agreement to begin construction of a Olvanan-funded port and special economic zone worth at least \$10 billion.</p> <p><i>Olvana places the "Kujenga Joins the Belt and Road" Token in the "Belt and Road Agreements" block.</i></p> <p>"Tanzania says construction of China-funded port to start in 2015," Funtuka Ngunjiri, Reuters, October 27, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-uk-tanzania-port-idAFKBNUI00YM20141027.</p>	<p>020 3 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>AMARI JOINS THE BELT AND ROAD*</p> <p>Add enough Olvanan Influence for control of Kampala. Reduce U.S. Influence by half in one location in Amari.</p> <p>Amari signs agreements to receive Olvanan grants, loans, investment, infrastructure development and the creation of Olvanan cultural centers.</p> <p><i>Olvana places the "Amari Joins the Belt and Road" Token in the "Belt and Road Agreements" block.</i></p> <p>Xinhua, "Belt and Road Initiative Transforming Kenya's Development Space," China Global Television Network, November 25, 2021, https://africa.cgm.com/2021/11/25/belt-and-road-initiative-transforming-kenya-development-space/.</p>	<p>021 4 EARLY COMPETITION H</p>  <p>OVERSEAS MILITARY BASING</p> <p>Olvana places 4 Influence in cities with Military Bases (no more than 2 in any single location). Move the Olvanan token 1 step towards conflict, on the Regional Security Track.</p> <p>The Peoples Liberation Army establishes a military base in East Africa to protect national investments and interests.</p> <p>Jeff Seidman, "China Eyes More Bases in Africa, US Military Official Says," Voice of America, April 22, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/africa/china-eyes-more-bases-africa-us-military-official-says/624629.html.</p>	<p>022 4 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>ECONOMIC STABILITY</p> <p>Move both player's tokens 1 space towards Cooperation on the Competition Posture Track. Olvana places 2 Influence. Olvana receives 2 VP.</p> <p>Increased investment activity increases income and local economic activity, increasing regional stability.</p> <p>"Why Africa is Becoming a Bigger Player in the Global Economy," Ernst & Young Global Ltd., September 11, 2020, https://www.ey.com/en_gl/why-africa-is-becoming-a-bigger-player-in-the-global-economy.</p>	<p>023 4 EARLY COMPETITION S</p>  <p>CIVILIAN CASUALTIES</p> <p>Remove all U.S. Influence from 1 city in Nyumbura or add 4 Olvanan Influence to Cities in Nyumbura (adding no more than 2 Influence per City).</p> <p>U.S. admits to killing up to 116 civilians across the Horn of Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia.</p> <p>Phil Stewart, Jonathan Landay, and Roberta Rampton, "U.S. Says It Killed Up to 116 Civilians in Strikes Outside War Zones," Reuters, July 1, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drones-casualties-idUSKCN02H6LX.</p>	<p>024 1 EARLY COMPETITION</p>  <p>ELECTION VIOLENCE</p> <p>The player removes a total of 2 of their opponent's Influence Points in a single State.</p> <p>Election tensions lead to ethnic violence, damaging investments and relationships, paving the way for adversarial intervention.</p> <p>John Campbell, "What Went Wrong With Kenya's Elections?" Council on Foreign Relations, November 3, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/what-went-wrong-kenya-elections.</p>
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Card Sheet 4 (Front)

025

EARLY COMPETITION

1

LOST BOYS*

Opponent must spend 2 Influence in Kakuma or lose 1 Victory Point.

Instability in refugee camps fuels Hizbul-al-Harakat recruiting.

Return to deck.

Penelope Chester, "Amid Ongoing Conflict, Somali Refugees Recruited to Fight Al-Shabaab," United Nations Dispatch, April 06, 2010, <https://www.unrtdpatch.com/amid-ongoing-conflict-somali-refugees-recruited-to-fight-al-shabaab>.

029

EARLY COMPETITION

4

THE SECOND FACE OF POWER

All cards played by the opponent, for the remainder of this turn, receive -1 to their Influence value (to a minimum value of 1 Influence Point).

The power to set the agenda grants the power to control the narrative.

David A. Baldwin, "The Faces of Power Revisited," n.d., <https://scholar.princeton.edu/daabaldwin/faces-of-power-revisited.pdf>.

026

EARLY COMPETITION

2

REFUGEES*

Your adversary MAY spend a card worth 2 Influence Points in a refugee location of your choosing. If they do not spend the Influence Points, generate refugees in this location as if it were the beginning of a turn. You may also spend the Influence Points on this card.

Refugees in the region continue to require resources.

Return to deck.

"Consequences of Underfunding in 2020," UNHCR, August 25, 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/underfunding-2020>.

030

EARLY COMPETITION

3

HIZBUL-AL-HARAKAT*

Roll a die. Subtract 1 from the die roll for each City that al-Harakat occupies. On a modified die roll of 4-6, the player receives 1 VP, eliminates 1 al-Harakat faction, and reduces the opponent's Influence by half in one location in Amari or Ngunba. If the attempt fails, al-Harakat generates as if it were the beginning of a turn and the player may use the Influence Points on this card.

Return to deck.

This card event must be played.

"Kenya Attack: 147 Dead in Garissa University Assault," BBC News, April 3, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32165080>.

027

EARLY COMPETITION

2

WE SAW THAT COMING

Play this card simultaneously with a card containing an opponent's Event. The opponent's Event is canceled but you may use the Influence value of the opponent's card to conduct Activities.

"Espionage and counterespionage have been essential tools of statecraft for centuries...recent cases suggest that the intelligence war is escalating."

Mike Giglio, "China's Spies Are On the Offensive," The Atlantic, August 26, 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/inside-us-china-espionage-war/56747/>.

031

EARLY COMPETITION

KUJENGA SCORING

Both Sides Score

Presence: 1	Gain 1VP
Influence: > Rival	Gain 2VP
Control: 5	Gain 4VP
+1 for control of each Port	

MAY NOT BE HELD

028

EARLY COMPETITION

2

ARMY OF JUSTICE AND PURITY*

Roll a die. Subtract 1 from the roll for each City that the AJP occupies. On a modified roll of 4-6, the player receives 1 VP, eliminates 1 AJP faction, and reduces the opponent's Influence by half in one location in Kujenga. If the attempt fails, AJP generates as if it were the beginning of a turn and the player may use the Influence Points on this card.

Return to deck.

This card event must be played.

"Lord's Resistance Army," United Nations Security Council, March 7, 2016, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/2127/materials/summarises/entry/04522600468s-resistance-army>.

032

EARLY COMPETITION

AMARI SCORING

Both Sides Score

Presence: 1	Gain 1VP
Influence: > Rival	Gain 2VP
Control: 4	Gain 4VP
+1 for control of the capital	

MAY NOT BE HELD

Card Sheet 5 (Front)

<p>033 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>INVESTING IN ORGANIZATIONS*</p> <p><i>The U.S. gains a VP for each Humanitarian or peacekeeping Mission it controls.</i></p> <p>The United States remains the largest donor to the United Nations, contributing roughly \$11 billion in 2019, which accounted for just under one-fifth of funding for the body's collective budget.</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p>Amanda Shendruk and Zachary Rosenthal, "Funding the United Nations," Council on Foreign Relations, August 4, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/finance/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-us-contributions-have-on-agencies-and-programs.</p>	<p>034 MID COMPETITION H</p>  <p>SATMO*</p> <p>Add 1 U.S. Influence to Amari, Kujenga, and Zhiva.</p> <p>The U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization is the executive agent for overseas security assistance training management and support. They deploy worldwide to meet the requirements of foreign nations requesting training assistance.</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p>Steven B. Clark, "Delivering Partner Capability," Army Aviation Magazine, n.d., http://www.armyaviationmagazine.com/index.php/archives/2019/03/20-delivering-partner-capability.</p>	<p>035 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>THE UGLY OLVANAN</p> <p>Remove all Olvanan Influence from one City in Amari. Place 1 U.S. Influence in the same city.</p> <p>Video surfaces of an Olvanan businessman stating that all Amaranans are 'like monkey people, I don't like talk with them, it smells bad, and poor, and foolish, and black.'</p> <p><i>"Arrest and Expulsion for Chinese Businessman," Pontifical Institute for Foreign Missions, September 7, 2018, https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Arrest-and-expulsion-for-Chinese-businessman-7. The Kenyans, including the president are all-monkeys - 44688.html.</i></p>	<p>036 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>RETURN ON INVESTMENT</p> <p><i>If the U.S. controls at least one Kujengan City or 2 Kujengan Infrastructure, the U.S. uses this Event to draw the top 2 cards from the draw pile. The U.S. may discard or keep any or all of the drawn cards.</i></p> <p>"Investments in infrastructure contributes to higher productivity and growth, facilitates trade and connectivity, and promotes economic inclusion."</p> <p>Naoyuki Yoshino, Nela Hendriyety, and Saloni Lakshia, "Quality Infrastructure Investment: Ways to Increase the Rate of Return for Infrastructure Investments," March 31, 2019, https://20japan.org/policy-brief-quality-infrastructure-investment-ways-to-increase-the-rate-of-return-for-infrastructure-investments.</p>	<p>037 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>FLOODED MARKETS</p> <p>Add 1 U.S. Influence to each of any 3 cities or Infrastructure in Amari.</p> <p>Amari's cement exports to the region dropped by 40 percent due to the flood of Olvanan cement entering the country. The World Bank warned that Amari's economic competitiveness was declining due to the influx of Olvanan excess</p> <p>Paul Nantulya, "Implications for Africa from China's One Belt One Road Strategy," March 22, 2019, https://africacenter.org/spoing/implications-for-africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy.</p>	<p>038 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>INVESTMENT MODELS</p> <p>The U.S. receives 1 VP, removes 2 Olvanan Influence, and adds 2 U.S. Influence.</p> <p>Polling reveals a preference for U.S. investment models, but also reveals positive perceptions of some Olvanan investments.</p> <p>Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Samy and Edson Selomey, "Africans Regard China's Influence as Significant and Positive, but Slipping," Afrobarometer, 2020, https://afrobarometer.org/publications/af407-africans-regard-chinas-influence-significant-and-positive-slipping.</p>	<p>039 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>LABOR IMPORTS</p> <p>The U.S. may add 1 Influence to 3 any Cities that do not contain Influence from either the U.S. or Olvana.</p> <p>Political and business leaders lash out against imported Olvanan labor, asking international partners to help increase resilience in national economies.</p> <p><i>"Implications for Africa from China's One Belt One Road Strategy," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 22, 2019, https://africacenter.org/policy/implications-for-africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy.</i></p>	<p>040 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>DEVELOPMENT FUNDING</p> <p>Remove 4 Olvanan Influence from any location in Kujenga, Nyumba, or Zhiva (no more than 2 Influence per location). Replace the Olvanan Influence with U.S. Influence.</p> <p>The U.S. allocates funding to displace Chinese investments in Africa. The USIDFC will more than double the amount of money available for US investment in low- and middle-income countries than was previously available."</p> <p>Kaelyni Forde, "US Ups Investment in Africa to Counter China's Influence," Al Jazeera, June 18, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/06/18/us-ups-investment-in-africa-to-counter-chinas-influence.</p>
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Card Sheet 6 (Front)

<p>041 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>PRESS RELEASE</p> <p>EXPOSING OLVANAN ACTIVITIES</p> <p>On Olvana's next action round, it must discard a card with an influence value of 2 or more and roll 3-6 on a die to cancel this Event. Repeat this Event for each Olvana action round until Olvana successfully rolls 3-6.</p> <p>The U.S. shares information about Olvanan espionage, subversion, and manipulation to increase awareness and undermine Olvanan actions.</p> <p>Christopher Wray, "The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United States," Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 7, 2020, https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states.</p>	<p>042 MID COMPETITION H</p>  <p>DFC</p> <p>FOREIGN TRADE INVESTMENTS*</p> <p>Place enough influence in one Organization or City to Control it.</p> <p>The US International Development Finance Corporation pushes to mobilize the U.S. business community to invest in Africa."</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p>David A. Weiner, "The US Government Makes Its Big Push for Investment in Africa," Atlantic Council, October 16, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/newatlantiss/the-us-government-makes-its-big-push-for-investment-in-africa.</p>	<p>043 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>SECURING INVESTMENTS</p> <p>Add 2 Olvanan Influence to Musoma or Nairobi. If influence is applied to Nairobi, remove 1 al-Harakat token from Aniani or Njumbwa. Olvana receives 1 Victory Point</p> <p>Amari and Ziwa commit military and police forces to protect Olvanan nationals and infrastructure projects.</p> <p>Paul Nantulya, "Implications for Africa from China's One Belt One Road Strategy," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 22, 2019, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy.</p>	<p>044 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>NYUMBA JOINS THE BELT AND ROAD*</p> <p>Move the U.S. token 1 space towards Conflict on the Competition Posture Track. Olvana receives 1 VP. Gain enough influence for control of one Infrastructure along your selected Infrastructure Corridor.</p> <p>Nyumba signs a Memorandum of Understanding with Olvana to build the LAPEx Corridor.</p> <p>"Somalia signs MOU with China to join the Belt and Road Initiative," China Global Television Network, September 2, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D0pJZ1Z701I.</p>	<p>045 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>Propaganda</p> <p>MISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS*</p> <p>Add a total of 2 Olvanan Influence and remove 2 U.S. Influence from any location.</p> <p>Olvana modifies its information operations tactics, adopting Donovanian misinformation techniques to create false narratives.</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p>Olivia Solon and Ken Darian, "China's Influence Operations Offer a Glimpse into the Future of Information Warfare," NBC News, October 21, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/news-china-s-influence-operations-offer-glimpse-future-information-warfare-n124406.</p>	<p>046 MID COMPETITION H</p>  <p>STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE</p> <p>On the U.S.'s next action round, it must discard a card with an influence value of 2 or more and roll 3-6 on a die to cancel this Event. Repeat this Event for each U.S. action round until the U.S. successfully rolls 3-6.</p> <p>"The SSF combines...space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities, that enable specific types of strategic information operations (IO) missions expected to be decisive in future wars."</p> <p>John Costello and Joe McReynolds, "China's Strategic Support Force: A Forerunner for a New Era," October 2, 2018, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1651760/chinas-strategic-support-force-a-forerunner-for-a-new-era.</p>	<p>047 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES*</p> <p>All Olvanan cards played by the Olvana participant receive +1 to their influence value for the remainder of this turn (to a maximum of 4 influence per card). This does not apply to events.</p> <p>The Leader of Olvana announces that Confucius Institutes are a way "to cultivate and prepare...to make sure the [Olvanan Communist Party] will be in power in the future...and increase our influence around the world."</p> <p>Benedict Rogers, "How China's Overseas Confucius Institutes Pose a Powerful Threat to Academic Freedom," Hong Kong Free Press, May 5, 2019, https://hongkongfp.com/2019/05/05/chinas-overseas-confucius-institutes-pose-powerful-threat-academic-freedom/.</p>	<p>048 MID COMPETITION S</p>  <p>GREAT PRESS COVERAGE*</p> <p>Olvana gains 1 Influence in each city adjacent to Olvanan controlled infrastructure.</p> <p>[Olvana] "is using a variety of strategies including ramping up international broadcasting, undertaking extensive advertising campaigns, and infiltrating foreign media outlets to spread its world view."</p> <p><i>Return to deck.</i></p> <p>Amy Gunia, "China's Media Inference Is Going Global," Report Says," Time, March 25, 2019, https://time.com/555736/china-inference-global-media/.</p>
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049

MID COMPETITION

H

4

INFORMATION WAR*

The U.S. reveals their hand of cards for this turn. Olvana may remove 4 U.S. Influence (no more than two from any location or organization) and place 1 Olvanan Influence.

Olvana continues to steal information through malicious attacks on U.S. information systems, exploitation of Olvanan citizens abroad, and coercive business practices in Olvana.

Return to deck.

*Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations: Observed TTPs," Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, July 19, 2021, <https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/insights/articles/aas21-00b>.

050

MID COMPETITION

3

COVID-19*

Add the number of your token's current location on the Competition Posture Track; add 2; and remove this number of Influence from any mix of Adversary locations.

The COVID-19 Pandemic reduces Foreign Direct Investment by 16%.

Return to deck.

*"COVID-19 Slashes Foreign Direct Investment in Africa by 16%," United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 21, 2021, <https://unctad.org/news/covid-19-slashes-foreign-direct-investment-africa-16>.

053

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

The U.S. places a total of 2 U.S. Influence and removes 2 Olvanan Influence from any single City with a Military Base or from a Peacekeeping Mission.

Security Force Assistance Brigades deploy to partner with and build the capacity of partnered nation militaries.

Devon L. Suits, "2nd SFAI Leaders Discuss Recent Africa Mission, Plans to Extend Advisory Footprint," U.S. Army, June 10, 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/24806/2nd_sfaai_leaders_discuss_recent_mission_plans_to_extend_advisory_footprint.

054

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

The U.S. places enough Influence to control a Peacekeeping Mission and may immediately move the partner force token from it's current location.

U.S. Africa Command conducts combined training with African partner states to increase interoperability and support regional security initiatives.

Share America, "U.S. Africa Command Helps Partners Address Security, COVID-19," U.S. Department of State, November 23, 2021, <https://share.ameica.gov/africom-helps-partners-address-security-covid-19>.

051

MID COMPETITION

4

5TH GENERATION MOBILE NETWORKS*

Pick an unmarked State on this card and place 5 Influence there. Mark the state you placed Influence in and return this card to the deck. If all states are played, remove this card from play.

5G Mobile Networks increase access to information, enabling greater information operations effects in the region.

- ☐ Amari
- ☐ Kujenga
- ☐ Nyumba
- ☐ Ziwa

Carlos Mureithi, "Kenya Becomes the Second African Country to Roll Out 5G," Quartz, April 1, 2021, <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/kenya-becomes-second-african-country-065036925.html>.

055

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY

The U.S. may designate a single State (Amari, Kujenga, Nyumba, or Ziwa) that, for the remainder of the turn, Olvana cannot add Influence to using Influence Points.

U.S. Diplomats release intelligence estimates, highlighting subversive Olvanan strategy in the region.

Leave this card face up near the selected country for the remainder of the turn.

"The Guardian view on megaphone diplomacy: countering Russian disinformation," The Guardian, February 14, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/14/the-guardian-view-on-megaphone-diplomacy-countering-russian-disinformation>.

052

MID COMPETITION

NYUMBA SCORING

Both Sides Score

Presence: 1	Gain 1VP
Influence: > Rival	Gain 2VP
Control: 4	Gain 4VP
+1 for control of each port	

MAY NOT BE HELD

056

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

SUBVERSION AND COUNTERSUBVERSION

Add 3 U.S. Influence and make a free Subversion Attempt using the Influence value of this card.

"Does the use of subversion actually help a state or group achieve its goals? Put another way, does subversion work? During the Cold War, Western officials generally assumed that it did. But for both the West and the Communist world, the record was decidedly mixed."

William Rosenau, "Subversion Old and New," War on the Rocks, April 24, 2014, <https://warontherocks.com/2014/04/subversion-old-and-new>.

Card Sheet 8 (Front)

057

4

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

WESTERN INTERESTS

The U.S. receives 1 VP. The U.S. may move either player's Competition Posture token up to two spaces in any direction. Neither player token may be placed in block 7.

The U.S. coordinates with Western Allies to synchronize efforts and exert influence in the region.

Therry Tardy, "NATO's Sub-strategic Role in the Middle East and North Africa," The German Marshall Fund of the United States, February 11, 2022, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-sub-strategic-role-middle-east-and-north-africa>.

058

1

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS

Olvana may take a step on the Advantage Track.

"Beijing has spent billions building dams, highways, railways, and ports in countries from Egypt to South Africa. But those sorts of projects are only part of the story... Beijing has invested heavily in cultivating political, educational, and institutional relationships with leaders and citizens in almost all African countries."

Lina Benabdallah, "China's Soft-Power Advantage in Africa: Beijing Isn't Just Building Roads—It's Making Friends," Foreign Affairs, December 23, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/africa-in-focus-2021-12-23/chinas-soft-power-advantage-africa>.

059

2

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

INCREASING OLVANAN PRESENCE

Remove all U.S. Influence from any single location along the Dar es Salaam Economic Corridor.

"Reports of...coercive, corrupt, or covert tools to interfere in other country's domestic political decisions also have become more common." Overseas investment is a strategy to increase influence and secure advantage.

Ryan Haas, How China is Responding to Escalating Strategic Competition with the U.S., Brookings Institution, March 1, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-china-is-responding-to-escalating-strategic-competition-with-the-us/>.

060

3

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

RESOURCE BACKED LOANS

Add 2 Olvanan Influence. The U.S. may not make Subversion attempts in Kufenga or Nyumba.

Lucrative low-cost financing arrangements guarantee extractive rights to Olvaba and impede U.S. investment.

Yun Sun, "China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah," Brookings Institution, February 7, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/>.

061

3

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

INDUSTRIAL-SCALE ESPIONAGE

The U.S. reveals their hand of cards, face-up, for the remainder of the turn.

Outsized Olvanan espionage efforts yield U.S. intellectual property, state secrets, and military plans.

Pete Williams, "FBI Director Wray Says Scale of Chinese Spying in the U.S. 'Blew Me Away,'" NBC News, February 1, 2022, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/espionage/fbi-director-wray-says-scale-chinese-spying-us-blew-away-rcna14368>.

062

4

FUTURE COMPETITION

S

REALIGNING RESOURCES

Olvana may relocate a total of 4 Influence from anywhere on the board.

Olvana reduces financial commitments and scales back activities in the region.

Yun Sun, "China's Retrenchment from Africa?," Brookings Institution, December 6, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/12/06/tccac-2021-chinas-retrenchment-from-africa/>.

063

4

FUTURE COMPETITION

COOPERATION

You and your opponent may place 2 Influence each. If you agree on placement for the Influents, if you cannot reach an agreement, move both players 1 step towards conflict on the Competition Posture Track.

This can serve both of our purposes. Can't it?

Joseph Sany and Thomas Sheehy, "Sleeping Giant Poyar Rivalry: U.S.-China Competition in Africa," U.S. Institute of Peace, April 28, 2021, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/sleeping-giant-poyar-rivalry-us-china-competition-africa>.


064

FUTURE COMPETITION


ZIWA SCORING	
Both Sides Score	
Presence: 1	Gain 1VP
Influence: > Rival	Gain 2VP
Control: 2	Gain 3VP
+1 for control of Capital	

MAY NOT BE HELD

Card Sheet Backs (Common to all Cards)



Map Board



APPENDIX D

CHARTS AND GRAPHS

This appendix includes data compiled by the author to support modeling.




Figure 16. Regional Official Development Assistance Trends: East Africa

Sources: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#?x=2&y=6&f=3:51,4:1,1:24,5:3,7:1&q=3:51+4:1+1:24+5:3+7:1+2:28,49,57,59,87,144,156,275,164,169,181+6:2020>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?search_query=China%20Outward%20Investment:%20accum:.

Table 13. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (USD Millions)							
Country	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Burundi	40.3	42	388.6	64	50	62.7	62.3
Djibouti	8.2	5.7	6.8	11.6	9.6	24.9	20.1
Eritrea	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.1	0.1
Ethiopia	664.8	746.4	874.9	1026.7	821.3	866	794.2
Kenya	807.4	711.7	805.7	855.4	829.2	685.4	679.4
Rwanda	157.5	198	176.8	176.8	168.7	184.9	189
Somalia	203.2	203.5	214.5	332	382.1	470	690.4
South Sudan	796.1	595.1	543.5	886.0	678.7	558.4	724.8
Sudan	255.7	271.9	227.6	111.2	227.1	275.8	229.8
Tanzania	509	452.6	500	597	658.7	464.6	605.6
Uganda	470.1	409.9	538.7	640	611.4	516.5	642.3
Total	3912	3636.9	4277.3	4700.8	4437.5	4109.3	4637.9

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#?x=2&y=6&f=3:51,4:1,1:24,5:3,7:1&q=3:51+4:1+1:24+5:3+7:1+2:28,49,57,59,87,144,156,275,164,169,181+6:2020>.

Table 14. PRC Foreign Direct Investment (USD Millions)							
Country	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Burundi	13.2	12.4	12.4	10.3	12.5	8.2	10.5
Djibouti	40.1	60.5	125.4	232.9	178.5	125.3	98.8
Eritrea	106.7	119.4	378.5	216.6	223.9	223.3	199.9
Ethiopia	914.6	1130.1	2000.7	1975.6	2568.2	2558.9	2992.8
Kenya	853.7	1099	1102.7	1543.5	1755.9	1624.2	2154.3
Rwanda	110.7	123.6	89.4	99.3	146.8	167.5	170.8
Somalia	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
South Sudan	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Sudan	1747	1809.4	1104.3	1201.6	1325.1	1203.1	-----
Tanzania	885.2	1138.9	1192	1280.3	1302.8	1335.5	1541
Uganda	464.1	722.2	1006.5	575.9	798.2	670	712
Total	5135	6215.5	7011.9	7136	8311.9	7916	7880.1

Source: Data adapted from Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?search_query=China%20Outward%20Investment:%20accum:.




Figure 17. Official Development Assistance: Burundi

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 18. Official Development Assistance: Djibouti

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 19. Official Development Assistance: Eritrea

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 20. Official Development Assistance: Ethiopia

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 21. Official Development Assistance: Kenya

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 22. Official Development Assistance: Rwanda

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 23. Official Development Assistance: Somalia

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 24. Official Development Assistance: South Sudan

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 25. Official Development Assistance: Sudan

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 26. Official Development Assistance: Tanzania

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.




Figure 27. Official Development Assistance: Uganda

Source: Data adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Data Results,” Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>; Census and Economic Information Center, “China Outward Investment,” CEIC Data, accessed January 30, 2022, <https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/search?>.

Table 15. Card Introduction and Deck Management by Round						
		US	Olvana	Nuetral	Scoring	Deck Size
Round 1	Fielded	10	13	7	2	32
	Removed	7	10	3	0	-20
	Remaining	3	3	4	2	12
Round 2	Fielded	10	7	2	1	20
	Running Total	13	10	6	3	32
	Removed	7	4	0	0	-11
	Remaining	6	6	6	3	21
Round 3	Fielded	5	5	1	1	12
	Running Total	11	11	7	4	33
	Removed	0	0	0	0	0
	Remaining	11	11	7	4	33

Source: Created by author.

Table 16. Faction Card Availability by Round					
	US Event Cards	Olvana Event Cards	Nuetral Event Cards	Scoring Cards	Deck Size
Round 1	10	13	7	2	32
Round 2	13	10	6	3	32
Round 3	11	11	7	4	33

Source: Created by author.

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