

**RISING POWER ALLIANCES AND THE THREAT OF  
A PARALLEL GLOBAL ORDER:**

**UNDERSTANDING BRICS MOBILIZATION**

**Final Report**

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*Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Naval Research.*

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## 1. PROJECT OVERVIEW AND MAJOR GOALS

Core Contribution of the Project: The Rising Power Alliances project has developed research under the Minerva Research Initiative topic – *Power and Deterrence, Global Order: The Changing Definitions and Compositions of Global Alliances/Coalitions*. In addition, the project also contributes to two other subtopics: “Drivers affecting how a state or states influence, interact, cooperate, and compete with others to achieve nation-state level objectives” (under Global Order) and “Political, military, and social environments in rising regional powers and their implications for regional stability” (under Area Studies).

Project Description: Projections about the future of the global order have traditionally relied on two assumptions: that rising powers are gradually “rising from within” the existing global governance infrastructure and that U.S.-led institutions are robust. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries are engaging in revisionist coalitions and creating new institutions or, as some argue, a parallel system, challenging U.S. global leadership. This new geopolitical dynamic is already affecting U.S. security interests, and it raises concerns that the United States could potentially be forced to contend with new and broadly legitimate global norms that it had no part in making. While much of the existing debate is in extremes, either envisioning a possible new Cold War or ignoring rising power alliances as an analytical unit, our ability to analyze rising power alliances and their implications has been limited. We lack theoretical frameworks that take into account rising powers’ own approaches to such alliances as well as empirical approaches able to capture their multiple, complex interactions.

To address this gap in extant scholarship, this project asks: What is the nature and the reach of rising power alliances strategically seeking to reform the U.S.-led global order? When and how do rising powers ally with one another and how robust are their alliances, especially the BRICS? How can the United States best respond to the new geopolitical dynamics to safeguard its interest and sustain its global leadership?

Our research contributions are broadly organized into three main themes (major goals):

1. Defining Global Alliances/Coalitions: Are conceptual definitions and analytical tools for studying alliances/coalitions applicable to the contemporary geopolitical landscape?
2. Examining BRICS Mobilization: New institutions and policy convergence in areas of strategic interest for the United States: Are BRICS creating a parallel global order?
3. U.S. Response to Rising Power Alliances/Coalitions: Moving beyond bilateral strategies: Is U.S. global leadership sustainable?

Reporting Period: This report covers the period from August 1, 2018 to March 31, 2023. Please note that we still have many publications – peer-reviewed journal articles as well as policy contributions – under review. As soon as they are published, we will post them on our Center’s Rising Power Alliances project website <https://sites.tufts.edu/cierp/rising-power-alliances-project/> and will inform the Minerva Research Initiative office.

## 2. ACCOMPLISHMENTS UNDER GOALS

### a. DEFINING GLOBAL ALLIANCES/COALITIONS

*Theoretical question: Are conceptual definitions and analytical tools for studying alliances/coalitions applicable to the contemporary geopolitical landscape?*

#### Research Gap:

Contemporary literature on alliances and coalitions has improved our understanding of the nature of international cooperation and the conditions under which states choose one arrangement over another. Yet, the analytical apparatus that predominantly frames discussions of alliances/coalitions and informs current debates about responding to the rise of new powers has largely been designed for explaining traditional-type alliances – formal agreements pledging states to cooperate using their military resources against a specific state or states along the lines of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. However, as the United States faces new centers of power and a new geopolitical context, current debates need to be extended to capture non-Western approaches to alliances/coalitions as well as new, unorthodox alignments such as the BRICS group.

#### The Project’s Accomplishments:

We have examined non-Western – specifically the BRICS countries’ – approaches to the changing nature of strategic relationships since the end of the Cold War and contributed new empirical data to advance this field of study.

*Defined Alliances from the BRICS Countries’ Perspectives:* Given the absence of formal alliances in most of the BRICS countries, we have used both alliance and alliance-related concepts and gathered data in local languages to systematically analyze how these countries’ international relations communities view close strategic relationships from both typological and operational perspectives. Our team’s five peer-reviewed articles analyze definitional issues in each of the BRICS countries and also make additional contributions listed below.

- [Brazilian Alliance Perspectives: Towards a BRICS Development-Security Alliance](#), *Third World Quarterly* 43 (5), 1115–1136, 2022
- [Transformation of Alliances: Mapping Russia's Close Relationships in the Era of Multivectorism](#), *Contemporary Security Policy* 43(2): 274–307, 2022.

- [India's Multi-alignment Management and Russia-India-China \(RIC\) Triangle](#), *International Affairs* 97(3): 801–822, 2021.
- [Alliances in Chinese International Relations: Are They Ending or Rejuvenating?](#) *Asian Security* 17(2): 158–177, 2021.
- [Rethinking Alliances: The Case of South Africa as a Rising Power](#), *African Security* 13(4): 325–352, 2020.

*Analyzed the Nature of Strategic Partnerships and Multialignment Policies:* Strategic partnerships – long-term, informal entities – have dominated discourse on close strategic relationships in the BRICS countries, and there has been an increased focus on strategic autonomy and theorizing multialignment (discussed in our article on India’s multialignment) and multivectorism (especially in our Russia-focused article). While prior literature examined strategic partnerships as predominantly economic entities and as a result of multialignment/multivectorism policies, we demonstrated how they could evolve into development-security alliances. For example, while BRICS has been predominantly focused on economic cooperation, the group enabled Brazil to advance its specific security agenda. This demonstrates that middle powers in BRICS (rather than China and Russia) are contributing to and championing the deepening of security cooperation and a potential alliance formation.

*Conceptualized “Multialignment Management” and Explained the Revival of the Russia-India-China (RIC) Triangle.* Extant scholarship has examined multialignment as a geopolitically important policy approach, but it did not situate it in the context of institutional density. Our article on Indian multialignment not only explains how India uses BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the RIC triangle to pursue its counterterrorism diplomacy, but it also analyzes the drivers of India’s shift toward enhancing RIC despite its militarized crisis with China. More generally, this work paves the way for a broader treatment of “alignment complexity,” where states shift from operating through alliances/strategic partnerships as single institutions to “alignment complexes” comprising various interacting alignments. We have addressed this in a separate study under review.

*BRICS Coalition Building Database Has Been Built.* Existing databases were consulted to assess the availability of data on rising power alliances/coalitions and to help develop definitional and coding specifications as well as the format for the new database. Given that the formation and performance of BRICS has defied the traditional drivers of alliance behavior (external threat, ideological proximity, etc.), we have examined the BRICS countries’ coalition building in areas strategically important for the United States. The cases include collaboration on finance, health, space, nuclear non-proliferation, climate, energy, agriculture, counter-terrorism, trade, and cybersecurity and are in the process of being uploaded on the project’s website. Each case study provides a narrative that examines the BRICS countries’ coalition building on the specific issue, including the countries’ interests, cooperation activities and milestones, interlinkages with other institutions and issues, negotiation barriers, and coalitional performance.

**b. BRICS MOBILIZATION**

*Theoretical question: Are the BRICS countries creating a parallel global order?*

**Research Gap:**

Contemporary scholarship acknowledges the importance of addressing the BRICS as an analytical category but it has not produced a clear account of the nature of BRICS mobilization and its consequences for U.S. national security. Yet collective mobilization is the crux of power politics as the BRICS countries represent major regional powers that seek to create issues, set agendas, establish and implement rules or programs, and evaluate and/or adjudicate global outcomes. Dissatisfied states in U.S.-led institutions can use parallel institutions to pressure for reforms or they can use the new institution to discover new interests and agendas. Although it is unlikely that the BRICS countries will be able to directly coerce the United States to follow their interests and agendas, they can significantly limit U.S. policy space and alter the rules of the game such that the United States may be better off playing by the new rules despite its strong preference for the original status quo. More generally, contemporary international relations scholarship has established that the turn of states toward informal institutions such as G+ groups and BRICS has become a broader system-relevant phenomenon, so analyzing BRICS contributes to the evolution of the literature on informal governance and its role in mediating tensions among major actors in the international system.

**The Project's Accomplishments:**

*Conceptualized the BRICS Convergence Index and Created a Unique Dataset of BRICS Cooperation 2009–2021 to Measure BRICS' Mobilization and Explain the Counter-Hegemonic Challenge.* Contemporary scholarship acknowledges that informal institutions are important platforms for renegotiating global governance, but it remains divided on how these institutions operate and challenge the United States. While realists suggest that some informal institutions such as BRICS serve as platforms for U.S. rivals to exert counter-hegemonic influence, rational institutionalists focus on analyzing their institutional forms and their mixed performance in specific niches of global governance. Yet neither approach offers insights into the internal dynamics that make these institutions robust, hindering our understanding of their challenge to U.S. hegemony. To address this gap, we conceptualize and measure policy convergence of the BRICS states across various issue areas. Our BRICS Convergence Index examines both institutional output and informal institution building through transnational communication and members' cooperation at the subgroup level. It uses a novel dataset of BRICS cooperation on forty-seven policy issues between 2009 and 2021. Using data on U.S. policy preferences on the same issues, we identify the key sites of BRICS-U.S. contestation. We find an overall increase in BRICS policy convergence and limited divergence from U.S. preferences across a wide range of policy issues. However, since BRICS has engaged with more security issues after 2015 and substantively deepened its cooperation, its capacity for counterhegemonic mobilization has increased. This paper is under review and will be uploaded with the new dataset on the project's website when published.

*Examined Whether BRICS Can De-Dollarize the Global Financial System.* We published [Can BRICS De-dollarize the Global Financial System?](#) in the Cambridge University Press *Elements* series and wrote a related piece for *Foreign Affairs* called "[The Anti-Dollar Axis: Russia and China's Plans to Evade U.S. Economic Power.](#)" Both publications coincided with U.S. decision-making to impose sanctions on Russia, produced a lot of interest, and were widely distributed. Existing scholarship has not systematically examined BRICS as a rising power de-dollarization coalition, despite the group developing multiple de-dollarization initiatives to reduce currency risk and bypass U.S. sanctions. To fill this gap, we developed a 'Pathways to De-dollarization' framework and applied it to analyze the institutional and market mechanisms that BRICS countries have created at the BRICS, sub-BRICS, and BRICS Plus levels. This framework identified the leaders and followers of the BRICS de-dollarization coalition, assessed its robustness, and discerned how BRICS mobilizes other stakeholders. This research is the first analysis of coalitional de-dollarization efforts by revisionist powers. We have found that BRICS' coalitional de-dollarization initiatives have established critical infrastructure for a prospective alternative nondollar global financial system. Imposing sanctions reinforces existing de-dollarization trends and undermines U.S. power in the long term.

In terms of other BRICS' policy convergence areas, we have been developing research on BRICS as a coalition in outer space and on the group's energy statecraft and analyzing the implications of coalitional behavior in these issue areas for the United States. Regarding BRICS coalition building in space, we found that although a Russia-China axis is present in BRICS cooperation, the two states have been unable to mobilize other BRICS states around their specific space agenda. With respect to BRICS mobilization in the energy field, we have adjusted our research to examine U.S. and BASIC (BRICS minus Russia) energy policies considering the geopolitical situation, U.S. vulnerabilities and strategic positioning in the context of the Ukraine conflict. More recently, we have also been asked to contribute an article for a special issue on soft balancing in the *International Affairs* journal and analyze BRICS as a soft balancing coalition. The products will be posted on the project's website once published.

*Analyzed the BRICS Group's Institutional Dynamics: Leadership and Robustness.* The BRICS group's success has been a puzzle for international relations literature, especially when the group survived and continued to deepen collaboration despite the militarized dispute between China and India. The co-investigator co-edited a special issue in *Global Policy* and invited top BRICS experts from each of the BRICS countries to offer their views on BRICS's survival – the introduction and the conclusion of the special issue are below:

- [BRICS Amidst India-China Rivalry.](#) Introduction to the [Special Section: India-China Conflict and BRICS: Business as Usual?](#) *Global Policy* 12(4): 509–513, 2021.
- [Scenarios for BRICS Evolution in Light of the India-China Conflict.](#) *Global Policy* 12(4): 539–544, 2021.

In addition, we have examined the link between leadership and performance of informal institutions and sought to identify how the BRICS states have used the three types of leadership – mutual interest leadership, entrepreneurial, and structural leadership to affect institutional performance. The paper will be posted on the project's website once published.

**c. U.S. RESPONSE TO RISING POWER ALLIANCES/COALITIONS**

*Theoretical puzzle: Is U.S. global leadership sustainable?*

**Research Gap:**

Contemporary geopolitical dynamics are already affecting U.S. security interests. The BRICS group stood by Russia during the Ukraine crisis rather than supporting the U.S. agenda. The Russia-India-China (RIC) relationship has been reinforced through the three countries' engagement with multiple overlapping entities (BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Eurasian Economic Union) and deeper defense, energy, and environmental cooperation. Rising powers have demonstrated that they can mobilize to develop alternative institutions, potentially paving the way for a parallel, non-U.S.-led global order. How can the United States best safeguard its interests, maintain its influence in global institutions, and respond to BRICS mobilization?

**The Project's Accomplishments:**

Scholarly debates about developing U.S. policies to address the rise of new powers have predominantly focused on managing the rise of China or confronting the China-Russia alliance. Our project contributes to these debates by analyzing the challenges the United States faces in global institutions considering the existence and the deepening of revisionist coalitions. It also rethinks wedge strategies and examines the opportunities for dialogue among the United States and other regional powers. Our contributions are listed below:

*Examined Bloc Behavior in the UN when the United States Disagrees with a Joint China-Russia Position: Importance of Assessing U.S. Coalition Building Strategies in the UN.* Existing scholarship addresses the dyadic affinity among major powers and the growing importance of rising power groups in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) voting, but it does not examine how the policy positions of other states align with those of the United States versus those of China and Russia. To investigate, we examine UNGA voting patterns over a 30-year period from 1991 to 2020. By utilizing simple t-Tests and estimating both OLS and LOGIT models (N=219,625), we find that the Sino-Russian positions enjoy much broader global support than those of the United States. Additionally, states that belong to the G-77, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS are more likely to align with China and Russia than states that do not belong to these groups. Conversely, members of NATO are more likely to side with the United States than their non-NATO counterparts. The effect of states' membership in soft-balancing institutions on their propensity to align with China and Russia has steadily increased over time. Meanwhile, the effect of states' membership in NATO on their likelihood to align with the United States lacks a clear temporal trajectory. The article is under review and an op-ed discussing the sustainability of U.S. leadership in the UN is being developed (to be uploaded).

*Analyzed the Use of Wedge Strategies in Response to Revisionist Coalitions.* Contemporary scholarship has established that China and Russia increasingly seek to mobilize other states to challenge U.S. agendas and interests. As such alignments deepen, U.S. wedge strategies are becoming an essential tool for preventing unfavorable policy outcomes and shaping

contemporary power dynamics. Yet, extant scholarship has largely overlooked U.S. policy development in this field. To understand the United States' contemporary use of wedge strategies, we analyze its wedging behavior in the Indo-Pacific and in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our analysis demonstrates the challenges of designing wedge strategies and the need to rethink the factors that make them effective. We argue for expanding the range of available wedge strategies, map their strategic and operational aspects, and discuss implications for future research (article under review).

*Explored Opportunities for a Reset of Major Power Relations.* The war in Ukraine has strengthened the connections among NATO countries as well as tested – and in some ways even reinforced – the linkages among the BRICS countries. Without the BRICS group and its members, Russia's ability to sustain the war would have been both politically and economically jeopardized. The threats of both nuclear war and climate change require a reset of major power relations. We examined how such a reset can happen to avoid deepening bloc politics. Drawing on the studies of environmental peacemaking and its role in conflict management, the article [Climate Peacebuilding: A Reset for Major Power Relations?](#) envisions how to create diplomatic opportunities for conflict transformation to connect separate climate, development, and security initiatives around mutually supportive objectives. U.S. engagement with the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) group plays an important role in this context. Not only did the United States cooperate with the group pave the way for the 2015 Paris Agreement when collective action seemed impossible, but the group's members can help preserve major powers' bargaining space and prevent the deepening of bloc behavior in global governance.

### 3. RESULTS DISSEMINATION

#### Peer-reviewed Publications:

Han, Z. & Papa, M. 2022. Brazilian Alliance Perspectives: Toward a BRICS Development-Security Alliance? *Third World Quarterly* 43(5): 1115–1136.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2055539>

Liu, Z. & Papa, M. 2022. Can BRICS De-Dollarize the Global Financial System? *Elements in the Economics of Emerging Markets Series* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029544>

Locoman, E. & Papa, M. 2022. Transformation of Alliances: Mapping Russia's Close Relationships in the Era of Multivectorism. *Contemporary Security Policy* 43(2): 274–307.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1994692>

Verma, R. & Papa, M. 2021. BRICS amidst India-China Rivalry (Introduction to the Special Section), *Global Policy* 12(4): 509–513. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12977>

Papa, M. & Verma, R. 2021. Scenarios for BRICS Evolution in Light of the India-China Conflict, *Global Policy* 12(4): 539–544. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13010>



O'Donnell, F. & Papa, M. 2021. India's Multi-alignment Management and Russia-India-China (RIC) Triangle. *International Affairs* 97(3): 801–822. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab036>

Han, Z. & Papa, M. Alliances in Chinese International Relations: Are They Ending or Rejuvenating? 2021. *Asian Security* 17(2): 158–177. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1825380>

Williams, C. & Papa, M. 2020. Rethinking Alliances: The Case of South Africa as a Rising Power. *African Security* 13(4): 325–352. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2020.1871796>

Our research was cited in various works including in Congressional Research Service reports, for example, our article on Indian multi-alignment was cited in Kronstadt, K. 2022. India-Russia Relations and Implications for U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service, note 48. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47221>

### **Conference Presentations:**

#### International Studies Association (ISA) 2023 Annual Convention in Montreal

- Environmental Peacemaking: Rebuilding Major Power Relations, Papa M., paper presented on the High Stakes and New Strategies: Global Power Shifts in an Age of Disruption panel, 03/18/2023
- Soft Balancing in the Regions: Is Peaceful Change Possible, Roundtable, speakers Papa. M, on the conceptual aspects of soft balancing coalitions, and Han Z. on BRICS' evolution and empirical data, 03/17/2023

#### Global Diplomatic Forum Series on the New World Order

- De-dollarization of the Global Financial System, Zoom webinar – Papa, M & Liu, Z., 01/12/2023

#### Credit Suisse Research Institute Fall Meeting,

- *The Future of the Monetary System*, Remarks on the prospects of Bretton Woods III, Zurich – Papa, M. & Liu, Z., 11/10/2022

#### Political Economy Seminar, co-hosted by the National University of Singapore, Hong Kong Baptist University, National Taiwan University, and China Europe International Business School

- Liu, Z. & Papa, M. “Can BRICS De-Dollarize the Global Financial System?” book-based discussion, 09/14/2022

#### International Studies Association 2022 Annual Convention

- Papa, M. 2022. “Partnership Complex, not Alliance: How are Rising Powers Challenging U.S. Role in Global Governance?” Presentation of the working paper at the panel: Re-Assessing the Emerging Powers-Global Governance Nexus, 03/28/2022
- Papa, M. & O'Donnell F. 2022. “Counter-hegemonic Security Coalitions: Evaluating the BRICS Challenge to U.S. Security Policy Interests” Presentation of the working paper at the panel: Middle Powers in their Security Environment, 04/02/2022

International Conference on “BRICS Cooperation, Global Governance and Mutual Learning among Civilizations,” hosted by Huaqiao University College of International Relations

- Papa, M. 2021 “From Alliances to Partnership Complexes? The Case of BRICS,” Working Paper presentation, 11/17/2021

International Studies Association (ISA) 2021 West Annual Conference

- Liu, Z. & Papa, M. 2021. “Collective De-dollarization Statecraft: The Case of BRICS,” 09/24/2021

2021 Bratislava Conference on Earth System Governance

- Papa, M. 2021. “Climate Security as a Coalition Magnet? Prospects for Action in the United States and in the BRICS Countries,” Working paper presentation, 09/08/2021

Harvard Asia Center

- “Border Conflicts in the Himalayas: Bhutan, Nepal, India, and China,” O’Donnell, F., “Asia Beyond the Headlines,” 2021 Seminar Series, 04/28/2021

International Studies Association (ISA) 2020 Northeast Annual Conference

- “BRICS Mobilization through Coalition Building: Leadership Dynamics within the BRICS Group,” Han, Z. & Papa, M., 11/07/2020.

International Studies Association (ISA) 2020 West Annual Conference

- “Managing Indian Multialignment: Alignment Theory and the Russia-India-China (RIC) Triangle.” O’Donnell, F. & Papa, M., 9/26/2020.
- “Understanding Rising Power Mobilization: Developing a BRICS Convergence Index,” Han, Z., Papa, M. & O’Donnell, F., 9/26/2020.

American Political Science Association (APSA) 2020 Annual Meeting

- “Toward a BRICS Alliance? A View from Brazil,” Han, Z. & Papa, M., 09/10/2020.
- “Chinese Views of Alliances in International Relations” (poster presentation), Han, Z. & Papa, M., 09/12/2020.

**Fletcher-organized Conferences and Related Outreach:**

Conference: “Rising Power Coalitions: Reimagining Global Governance,” 12/01/2022 – 12/02/2022 at The Fletcher School, Medford MA

- Conference agenda <https://sites.tufts.edu/cierp/rising-power-coalitions-reimagining-global-governance/>
- “Fletcher Hosts Rising Power Alliances Conference,” *Tufts Daily* article by Ishaan Rajabali, 12/07/2022, features an interview with Fletcher MA student and project researcher Ashutosh Patil <https://tuftsdaily.com/news/2022/12/07/fletcher-hosts-rising-power-alliances-conference>
- Fletcher Russia Program “Fletcher’s Rising Power Alliances Project Hosts Conference on the BRICS Coalition” by Vishal Manve, 02/09/2023 features an interview with Mihaela

Papa, <https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherrussia/fletchers-rising-power-alliances-project-hosts-conference-on-the-brics-coalition/>

#### Conference/Panel Hosted at The Fletcher School: 10/01/2021

Papa, M. hosted an event to introduce “India-China Conflict and BRICS: Business as Usual?” Special Section of the Global Policy journal. Panelists included all six contributors:

- Prof. Raj Verma from Huaqiao University, China
- Prof. Malte Brosig from University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa
- Prof. Victoria Panova from Far Eastern Federal University, Russia
- Dr. Haibin Niu from Shanghai Institute for International Studies, China
- Prof. Karin Costa Vazquez, Fudan University, China
- Prof. Sreeram Chaulia, Jindal School of International Affairs, India

#### Other Fletcher School Research Seminars and Webinars

- Papa, M, Liu, Z. & O’Donnell, F. “Rising Power Coalitions and Global Crises in 2021” webinar, 09/10/2021.
- Liu, Z. “The Political Economy of Sovereign ‘Leveraged’ Funds and Financial Statecraft: The Case of China.” The Fletcher School, 11/12/2020.
- Papa, M., O’Donnell, F., Liu, Z. & May, L. “Rising Power Coalitions in Global Governance: Introducing the BRICS Convergence Index.” The Fletcher School, 10/19/2020.
- Papa, M. Overview of the Rising Power Alliances project, CIERP Open House, The Fletcher School, 09/22/2020
- Han, Z. & Papa, M. Research seminar, Rising Power Alliances/Coalitions and U.S. Global Leadership, 09/09/2019

#### **Minerva and DoD-related Presentations:**

##### 2022 Minerva Program Review

- Traditional and Non-Traditional Allies and Partners – Discussion with Policymakers on Integrated Deterrence, Webinar with Papa, M. as a Panelist, 10/13/2022

##### Minerva Virtual Policy Discussion Series

- Papa, M. participation and input during the Session V: “Hegemonic Shifts in Global Power,” 10/26/2021

### Homeland Defense and Security Information Analysis Center (HDIAC) Webinar

- Papa, M. “The Changing Nature of Alliances: Perspectives from Rising Powers,” 04/08/2021.

### 2020 Minerva Program Review and the Next National Defense Strategy, Session II: Global Influence

- Papa, M. “Rising Power Alliances and the Threat of a Parallel Global Order: Understanding BRICS Mobilization,” 10/01/2020.

### **Interviews and Op-eds:**

- Papa, M. “Climate Peacebuilding: A Reset for Major Power Relations?” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 47(1): 69–75, Winter 2023, available at <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/579fc2ad725e253a86230610/t/640259bcd98f0a2cdaffa4a9/1677875644812/Mihaela+Papa.pdf>
- Locoman, E. & Papa, M. “How Russia Quietly Built its Allies Since the Cold War,” Publisher: @360.info wire agency, 05/30/2022, available at <https://360info.org/how-russia-quietly-built-its-allies-since-the-cold-war/>
- Papa, M., Interview on BRICS with *Chinese Social Sciences Today*, a newspaper sponsored by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and published by Social Sciences in China Press, interview conducted on 05/13/2022.
- Papa, M., Interview on US-India-Russia relations for Morning Consult, 04/06/2022 available at <https://morningconsult.com/2022/04/05/us-india-relations-russian-invasion-ukraine/>
- Verma, R. & Papa, M. “Does the India-China Rivalry Matter for BRICS?” in China-India Brief, 03/20/2022 Available at <https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/details/china-india-brief-200#guest2>
- Papa, M., Interview on Ukraine, “Expert Reveals Why Putin Started the War and What Will be China’s Role” in Vecernji List (Evening Paper, main Croatian newspaper), 03/18/2022 <https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/strucnjakinja-za-vecernji-otkriva-zasto-je-putin-krenuo-u-rat-i-kakvu-ulogu-ce-odigrati-kina-1571714>
- Liu, Z. & Papa, M., “The Anti-Dollar Axis,” *Foreign Affairs*, 03/07/2022 available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-03-07/anti-dollar-axis>

### **Upcoming Conference Presentations (papers accepted):**

- Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), Chicago, 04/13-16/2023, “Bloc Politics at the UN? How Other States Behave when the United States and China-Russia Disagree,” paper to be presented by Nurullayev, D. (non-presenting co-author Papa, M.)

- International Political Science Association World Congress, Buenos Aires, 07/15–07/19/2023, “Bloc Politics at the UN? How Other States Behave when the United States and China-Russia Disagree,” paper to be presented by Nurullayev, D. (non-presenting co-author Papa, M.)

#### 4. HONORS AND AWARDS

- International Studies Association-West 2021 Best Faculty Paper award awarded to Zongyuan Liu and Mihaela Papa for *Collective De-dollarization Statecraft: The Case of BRICS*.

#### 5. TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES

The Rising Power Alliances project has offered extensive training opportunities while employing many researchers at different stages of their careers. The participants have included both U.S. citizens and foreign students as well as students speaking Russian, Portuguese, and Mandarin to enable us to examine local data. Several examples of training opportunities include:

*Postdoctoral scholars’ professional development:* Postdoctoral scholars have had an opportunity to learn from senior scholars and each other during our Center’s research meetings as well as project team meetings. They have had regular weekly meetings with the co-Investigator, who has worked with them on all aspects of the project’s research and provided regular feedback. Postdoctoral scholars have also had mentoring opportunities as they engaged with research assistants and delegated project tasks.

Our former postdoctoral scholars now work at the Council of Foreign Relations, the Stimson Center, and in other policy positions where they continue to examine the issues they worked on during the project in a more applied, policy context. Two of our postdoctoral scholars have started tenure-track positions at Sacred Heart University and the University of Arizona, where they are still conducting research and publishing on the same topics.

*Graduate researchers received training in all aspects of research:* Graduate researchers have been trained in database development, coding, and the relevance of various data sources. They have also completed IRB-relevant coursework, and we trained them to effectively conduct interviews, use and store data, and engage in academic writing. Some graduate researchers have served as proofreaders and transitioned texts into publication-required formats. Finally, for the final conference “Rising Power Coalitions: Reimagining Global Governance” December 1–2, 2022 at The Fletcher School, our graduate researchers chaired the panels and facilitated discussions.

We also hired a Tufts undergraduate researcher, who helped us prepare papers for publication, analyzed energy data, and reviewed Chinese sources. He will do his MA next year.

*Best practices for research presentations:* Postdoctoral scholars and graduate researchers were encouraged to present their research. We funded their conference fees, and investigators gave them feedback after presentations. For some of our graduate researchers, the opportunity to present at Fletcher was their first research presentation.

*Individual study:* All team members have advanced their data gathering, writing, and analytical skills throughout the project. In addition, the following skills have been developed: research planning and scoping skills; detailed conceptualization and implementation of tasks; preparing papers for publication and journal matching; database development; and index development.

## 6. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Nothing to report.

## 7. PARTICIPANTS

Name	Role	Person months
Ajay, Ishaan	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Burakovsky, Maria	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Chawla, Naina	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Cicchinelli, Nicholas	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Duprey, Alexandra	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Gallagher, Kelly Sims <sup>1</sup>	PD/PI	1
Han, Zhen	Postdoctoral (scholar, fellow or other postdoctoral position)	17
Hoag, Scott	Graduate Student (research assistant)	2
Holt, Jeremy	Graduate Student (research assistant)	2
Hume, Eleanor	Graduate Student (research assistant)	3
Jain, Prayank	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Jamison, Joseph	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Kennelly, Emily	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Liu, Zihao	Graduate Student (research assistant)	10
Liu, Zongyuan Zoe	Postdoctoral (scholar, fellow or other postdoctoral position)	16
May, Lisa	Graduate Student (research assistant)	11
Mendonca Pereira Ferreira, Maisa	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Nurullayev, Dmitriy	Postdoctoral (scholar, fellow or other postdoctoral position)	4

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<sup>1</sup> National Academies Member

O'Donnell, Francis	Postdoctoral (scholar, fellow or other postdoctoral position)	21
Papa, Mihaela	Co-Investigator	17
Parfenov, Mark	Other Professional	2
Patil, Ashutosh	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Poliakova, Oleksandra	Graduate Student (research assistant)	4
Prasad, Neeraj	Graduate Student (research assistant)	3
Pumford, Christopher Donald Collin	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Rim, Hyun	Graduate Student (research assistant)	4
Sanders Montandon, Arthur	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1
Shim, Christopher	Graduate Student (research assistant)	4
Spracklin, Rosemary	Graduate Student (research assistant)	3
van der Wansem, Anne Marie	Other Professional	5
Williams, Christopher <sup>2,3</sup>	Postdoctoral (scholar, fellow or other postdoctoral position)	3
Wu, Zhengxi	Undergraduate Student	2
Yin, Chengzhi	Other Professional	1
Zelezna, John	Graduate Student (research assistant)	1

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<sup>2</sup> International collaborator: South Africa

<sup>3</sup> International travel and duration of stay: South Africa to Boston for one week for project conference, December 2022.

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

<b>1. REPORT DATE</b> 31-03-2023	<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Final Performance Report	<b>3. DATES COVERED</b>	
		<b>START DATE</b> 01-08-2018	<b>END DATE</b> 31-03-2023
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Rising Power Alliances and the Threat of a Parallel Global Order: Understanding BRICS Mobilization			
<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b> N00014-18-1-2744	<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Papa, Mihaela and Gallagher, Kelly S.			
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<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>			
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Projections about the future of the global order have traditionally relied on two assumptions: that rising powers are gradually “rising from within” the existing global governance infrastructure and that U.S.-led institutions are robust. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries are engaging in revisionist coalitions and creating new institutions or, as some argue, a parallel system, challenging U.S. global leadership. This new geopolitical dynamic is already affecting U.S. security interests, and it raises concerns that the United States could potentially be forced to contend with new and broadly legitimate global norms that it had no part in making. Yet existing theoretical approaches do not consider rising powers’ own views of alliances and empirical data fails to capture these countries’ multiple, complex interactions. This project addresses these research gaps by asking: What is the nature and the reach of rising power alliances strategically seeking to reform the U.S.-led global order? When and how do rising powers ally with one another and how robust are their alliances, especially the BRICS? How can the United States best seize the new geopolitical dynamics to safeguard its interest and sustain its global leadership?			
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> rising powers; BRICS; alliance; coalition; global governance; emerging economies; de-dollarization; alliance, alignment policy; multivectorism; strategic partnership; statecraft; international relations theory; conflict; security; Brazil; Russia; India; China; South Africa			
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			



<b>a. REPORT</b> U	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> U	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> U	<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>  SAR	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>  17
<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b> Mihaela Papa			<b>19b. PHONE NUMBER (Include area code)</b> 617-627-2778	

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