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THESIS

FACTORS THAT AFFECT U.S. MILITARY ACCESS IN INDONESIA

by

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FACTORS THAT AFFECT U.S. MILITARY ACCESS IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT

U.S. strategy to counter China in the Indo-Pacific requires military access to key defense partners in the region. Access in the region varies widely, and creates challenges for U.S. naval forces to conduct expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO). This thesis identifies the major factors causing variations in U.S. access to defense partners in the Indo-Pacific, and describes what levels of access the U.S. experiences in Indonesia. This thesis dissects military access into different types: maneuver and logistical. It examines each access type through comparative case studies with Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore. It then tests three factors that drive access in a U.S. defense partner by exploring shared security interests with the U.S., domestic politics, and institutionalized interactions. The cases show that all three factors generally help build and maintain U.S. access. However, great power entanglement fears skew Indonesia's threat perceptions, anti-American minority groups heavily influence domestic politics, and Indonesia has relatively weak bilateral defense institutions with the U.S. The effects of these factors cause Indonesia to only provide a medium level of maneuver access through limited-duration exercises, and a low level of logistical access through contracting agreements. INDOPACOM should focus on enhancing bilateral exercises to include the use of newly developed U.S. Marine Corps units specifically designed for conducting EABO in the region.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	PROBLEM	1
B.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS	1
C.	SIGNIFICANCE	2
D.	LITERATURE REVIEW	3
1.	Access Defined.....	3
2.	Variations in Access Throughout the Indo-Pacific Region	7
3.	Why Does Access Vary?	12
4.	Potential Explanations and Hypotheses.....	17
5.	Research Design	18
6.	Thesis Overview	20
II.	CASE STUDIES.....	21
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	21
B.	JAPAN	22
1.	Access in Japan	23
2.	Factors Affecting Access.....	25
C.	THE PHILIPPINES.....	29
1.	Access in the Philippines	30
2.	Factors Affecting Access.....	34
D.	SINGAPORE.....	40
1.	Access	40
2.	Factors Affecting Access.....	42
E.	CONCLUSION	47
1.	H1: Shared Security Interests.....	47
2.	H2: Public Support/Opposition	48
3.	H3: Institutionalized Interactions	48
III.	INDONESIA.....	51
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	51
B.	ACCESS IN INDONESIA.....	51
1.	Maneuver Access.....	52
2.	Logistical Access.....	56
C.	FACTORS AFFECTING ACCESS	58
1.	Shared Security Interests	58
2.	Public Support or Opposition	60

3.	Institutionalization	65
D.	CONCLUSION: WHAT FACTORS DRIVE U.S. ACCESS TO INDONESIA	67
1.	H1: Shared Security Interests.....	67
2.	H2: Public Support/Opposition	67
3.	H3: Institutionalized Interaction	68
IV.	CONCLUSION	69
A.	FACTORS DRIVING U.S. ACCESS IN INDONESIA.....	69
1.	Shared Security Interests	69
2.	Public Support.....	69
3.	Institutionalized Interaction	70
B.	U.S. ACCESS NEEDS VS. INDONESIAN ACCESS REALITIES.....	71
1.	Maneuver Access Requirements.....	71
2.	Logistical Access Requirements.....	72
C.	U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS	73
1.	What the U.S. Should Pursue	74
2.	What the U.S. Should Avoid	76
	LIST OF REFERENCES	79
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	91

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Indonesian Opinion of the United States	62
Figure 2.	Net U.S. Favorability.	62

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Measuring Levels of Access	22
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	anti-access/ area denial
AAR	after action report
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ANB	advanced naval base
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BNPB	Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management
BPC	building partner capacity
CARAT	Cooperation Afloat, Training and Readiness
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMLOGWESTPAC	Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific
CSI	Container Security Initiative
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreement
DCS	direct commercial sales
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EAB	expeditionary advanced bases
EABO	Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
EDCA	Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
EEZ	exclusive economic zone
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FMF	foreign military financing
FMS	foreign military sales
FRF	Futenma Relocation Facility
GS	Garuda Shield
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HA/DR	humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief
HN	host nation
HNS	host nation services
IMET	international military education & training
IRP	Increased Rotational Presence

ISIS-P	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Philippines
ISPS	International Port Security Program
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training
JSOTF-P	Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines
KORMAR	Indonesian Marine Corps
KOSTRAD	Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command
LCS	littoral combat ship
LKY	Lee Kuan Yew
MBA	Mutual Basing Agreement
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MDB	mutual defense board
MDT	Mutual Defense Treaty
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MLR	Marine Littoral Regiment
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAMRU-2	Naval Medical Research Unit 2
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIE	operations in the information environment
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
PAP	Peoples’ Action Party
PKI	Communist Party of Indonesia
PLAN	Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy
PN	partner nation
SA	security assistance
SACO	Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SBY	President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
SCS	South China Sea
SEB	Security Engagement Board
SFA	Strategic Framework Agreement
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SDF	Self Defense Force
TMD	theatre missile defense
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia
TNI-AD	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat

TNI-AL	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut
UDP	Unit Deployment Program
UN	United Nations
USINDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Command
VBSS	visit board search and seizure
VFA	Visiting Forces Agreement
WHO	World Health Organization

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM

The U.S. has traditional allies in the Indo-Pacific including Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines that provide the U.S. clear, well-defined access with high levels of assurance. However, as Richard Bitzinger states, “most of the United States’ Asian allies are situated in the wrong places to be of much use in the event of a South China Sea (SCS) crisis.”¹ Because current U.S. forward bases are located with allies well within the threat ring of Chinese anti-access weapon systems,² assured access to these allies is less operationally beneficial in a kinetic conflict between the U.S. and China.³ That said, the U.S. does have defense partners in the Indo-Pacific where access is limited and where an improvement in access would be highly beneficial. Indonesia is one of the most important defense partners in this category due to the key terrain it occupies at the southern edge of the first island chain in the SCS and its long-standing, albeit tempestuous, partnership with the U.S.

B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

What factors cause variation in the different types of U.S. access in the Indo-Pacific, and what kind of access does the U.S. experience in Indonesia? This thesis first identifies the major types of access the U.S. requires from a partner nation in the Indo-Pacific. Next, it compares different U.S. defense partners in the region to identify the factors that cause access to vary. Ultimately, this thesis explains the factors and conditions under which the U.S. has enjoyed access to Indonesia over time, and discusses what the U.S. can do to potentially improve access through security cooperation (SC) or security

¹ Richard A. Bitzinger, “Countering Anti-Access/ Area Denial Challenges Strategies and Capabilities,” in *Chinese A2/AD Capabilities and the U.S. Third Offset Strategy* (Singapore: RSIS, 2017), 6, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ER180424_Countering-Anti-Access.pdf.

² CSIS Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of China,” CSIS, April 12, 2021, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/>.

³ Justin J. Hoffman, “The End of the American Way of War & The Path for the United States to Reclaim Influence in the Indo-Pacific” (master’s thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 2021), 13–14, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/64279>.

assistance (SA) activities to support Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) in the SCS.

C. SIGNIFICANCE

Great power competition between the U.S. and China has increased the importance of U.S. access to the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. requires this access in support of its national security strategy to maintain an open, rules-based global commons, to allow U.S. power projection, and to protect allied and partner nations in the region.⁴ Access also provides the U.S. freedom to maneuver and sustain its military forces throughout the region in order to deter, or react to, conflict with China. To achieve this access, the U.S. must establish and maintain diplomatic and military relationships with key partners and allies in the region that provide strategic access within the first island chain. Indonesia fits this requirement due to its strategic location and its potential for relationship building and access development.

Indonesia is strategically significant in the deterrence of or reaction to Sino–U.S. conflict in the SCS due to its influence over major global maritime access routes such as the Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait, and Lombok strait. Additionally, its key terrain, strong influence in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and long relationship with the U.S. make Indonesia a key U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific.⁵ Despite this relationship, the U.S. has typically only enjoyed limited access in Indonesia.⁶ Greater access to Indonesia would benefit U.S. strategy by increasing the availability of stand-in expeditionary advanced bases (EAB) and the potential for sustainment capabilities from Indonesian facilities or U.S. advanced naval bases (ANB) just outside China’s anti-access/

⁴ The White House, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2021), 20, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security-strategic-guidance/>.

⁵ Jonah Blank, *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia*, RR 4412z3 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021), 8, <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR4412.3>.

⁶ Hoffman, “The End of the American Way of War & The Path for the United States to Reclaim Influence in the Indo-Pacific,” 27–28; Blank, *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific*, 45.

area denial (A2/AD) envelope.⁷ These factors also make Indonesia a potential high-value partner for China. As Indonesia shapes its foreign and military policy under the shadow of Sino–U.S. competition, it must carefully navigate between the two great powers, ensuring that it maintains strategic autonomy and maintains ASEAN neutrality.⁸ This complex geopolitical situation necessitates a nuanced approach to building upon the U.S.–Indonesian relationship and requires a close look at how U.S. actions affect its access to Indonesia. This thesis examines these issues to provide an assessment of the types and level of access to Indonesia the U.S. currently enjoys as it relates to the concept of EABO for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Answering the question of what factors cause a variation in U.S. access to Indonesia requires drawing upon literature about U.S. defense and area studies to establish what access is and how the U.S. gains access to the region. This section first uses U.S. SC and operational concepts to define access and break it down into its component types. Second, this review canvases the literature on four U.S. Indo-Pacific defense partners to establish the variations in levels and types of U.S. access. The third part of this section provides the three major reasons found in the literature for variation in U.S. access to the four PNs.

1. Access Defined

Access is a term with different uses in economic, diplomatic, and military contexts. Even the military conception of access is broad and requires a more operational definition in order to compare and contrast levels of access across time and across different partners. Access, as defined by Joint Publication 3-20, “facilitates U.S. defense posture, provides for

⁷ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2021), 1–5,6, https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/mcwl/TMEABO/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/sites/mcwl/TMEABO/SiteAssets/TM%20EABO%20-%20First%20Edition%20Rev%2020210415.pdf&action=default.

⁸ Emirza Adi Syailendra, “A Nonbalancing Act: Explaining Indonesia’s Failure to Balance Against the Chinese Threat,” *Asian Security* 13, no. 3 (September 2, 2017): 249, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1365489>.

freedom of movement and supports freedom of action during military operations by enabling U.S. forces to access partner nation (PN) territory, resources, or leadership.”⁹ The U.S. pursues access to partner nations predominantly through the use of SC and SA activities administered via the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in concert with the foreign policy of the U.S. State Department (DOS).¹⁰ These activities are meant to build relationships, access, capabilities, and capacities of partner nations to enable U.S. strategic objectives such as deterring adversaries, improving the stability of the PN, or responding to crises in the region.¹¹ The building and maintenance of SC relationships with defense partners is complex, and the requirements, focus, and resource requirements may vary over time.

How is access achieved? The consensus of U.S. SC planning guidance is that access is the byproduct of building relationships, partner capabilities, and capacities, which all take considerable time to develop.¹² According to a RAND study on building partner capacity, the correlation between partner access and building partner capacity (BPC) ran in both directions:¹³ Their findings suggest that when a partner nation (PN) demonstrates an increased capacity due to BPC activities, they show subsequent increases in relationships and access, which in turn increases the effectiveness of future BPC activities.¹⁴ The same study identified that, despite being a critical foreign policy goal, “even when relationship building or access is not a primary objective of a BPC initiative, there is a strong correlation between effectiveness in building capacity and good or

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation*, JP 3-20 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), II-3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf.

¹⁰ Christopher Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 2, 17, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1253z1.html>.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation*, v-vi.

¹² Defense Security Cooperation University, *Security Cooperation Management*, 41st ed. (Arlington, Virginia: Defense Security Cooperation University, 2021), 1-1, 4-1, <https://www.dscu.mil/pages/resources/greenbook.aspx>.

¹³ Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, 4.

¹⁴ Paul et al., 4.

improving relationships.”¹⁵ It is clear that relationships built through SC and SA activities correlate to access. According to the SC literature, if the U.S. can build capacity and relationships with a PN, access (conceived broadly) should follow.

There are three major types of access that this thesis separates from the literature: maneuver, logistical, and information access.

a. Maneuver Access

Maneuver access provides freedom of passage through a PN’s sea, land, and/or airspace.¹⁶ For EABO, maneuver access allows the rapid inter- and intra-island movement of forces to leverage key terrain during operations and to persist within the enemy threat envelope.¹⁷ At the highest level, maneuver access includes explicit agreements such as a signed visiting forces agreement (VFA) that allows U.S. military members freedom to travel to and from a PN on official business. Other means of access can be through rotational forces deployments, annual bilateral training exercises, or smaller-scale SC or SA activities. The lower end of the spectrum of maneuver access would be less frequent visitation that is heavily encumbered by narrow agreements and stipulations that limit troop movement in duration and/or location.

b. Logistical Access

Logistical access provides ownership or use of secure ports, military basing, utilities, classes of supply, maintenance, medical capabilities, and other services.¹⁸ The key distinction between logistics and maneuver access is the infrastructural and/or contractual component that the PN provides or allows to be developed in its territory. For

¹⁵ Paul et al., 4.

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation*, II-3.

¹⁷ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations*, 7-8.

¹⁸ *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation*, II-3.

EABO, the host nation (HN) plays a pivotal role in allowing U.S. forces to decrease their logistical footprint through use of host nation services (HNS).¹⁹

At the highest level, logistical access includes active U.S. military installations aboard the PN, an explicit status of forces agreement (SOFA), mutual logistics support agreements, and the maintenance or manufacture of U.S. defense equipment in a PN. Logistical access may also come in the form of an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) that allows the U.S. to procure logistic support, supplies, and services from certain partners for U.S. forces.²⁰ Other substantial forms of logistical access include memorandums of understanding (MOU) or memorandums of agreement (MOA) for established U.S. rotational force deployments that create infrastructure or stage equipment in a PN. To a lesser degree, annual large-scale bilateral training exercise contracts for supplies, maintenance, and utilities demonstrates a useful level of logistical access in a PN, especially if it results in the creation or improvement of facilities and services that enable U.S. operations. The execution of foreign military sales (FMS) and any maintenance component that requires a PN to purchase or provide the means required to maintain U.S. military equipment also falls in this category.

c. Information Access

Information access involves information systems and agreements that enable the sharing of actionable intelligence between the U.S. and partner nation.²¹ For EABO, this means operations in the information environment (OIE). OIE leverages host nation (HN) communications, cyberspace, and other networks to shape and support strategic objectives such as military deception, operational security, influence operations, and electronic

¹⁹ *Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations*, 7–4.

²⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Instruction 2120.01D: Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements*, Instruction 2120.01D (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015), A-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/2120_01.pdf?ver=CHcrQXsNoR43vDeR5Y80sg%3d%3d.

²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation*, II–3.

warfare.²² This type of access is not the focus of this thesis, despite the importance of the effects of OIE on EABO, because it is a factor that is more suited to near-peer allies. Due to the lack of robustness of Indonesian information security,²³ it is less likely that the U.S. would leverage Indonesian information capabilities as much as it would those of Japan or Australia.

2. Variations in Access Throughout the Indo-Pacific Region

As illustrated through different agreements and interactions, maneuver and logistical access varies throughout the Indo-Pacific between different allies and partners. This section briefly examines the literature on the level of U.S. access in Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia to identify possible reasons for major variations in quantity and quality of access.

a. Japan

Japan demonstrates the highest level of U.S. access in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. Forces Japan owns and operates over 85 facilities across the Japanese island chain.²⁴ Since the Japanese–U.S. mutual defense assistance agreement entered into force in 1954, U.S. troops have lived, trained, and operated out of Japan.²⁵ Since 1960, the U.S. and Japan have had a SOFA that grants U.S. access to land and facilities and outlines the legal status of U.S. personnel in Japan.²⁶ Today, over 55,000 U.S. troops are stationed at permanent U.S. bases throughout Japan along with thousands of defense civilians and family members, making it the largest concentration of U.S. military power in the Indo-Pacific region.²⁷ Japan

²² Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations*, 5–12.

²³ Blank, *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific*, 47.

²⁴ US Forces Japan, “About USFJ,” U.S. Forces Japan, April 27, 2022, <https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/>.

²⁵ Department of State, *Treaties in Force A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2020* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2020), 233, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf>.

²⁶ Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Japan,” Department of State, January 20, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-japan/>.

²⁷ Department of State. “U.S. Security Cooperation with Japan,”

provides the U.S. the access to maintain a global military hub capable of projecting substantial power throughout the Pacific.²⁸

b. The Philippines

The Philippines has offered the U.S. on average a high, yet varying, level of access over the course of its long alliance beginning with the signing of the mutual defense treaty (MDT) in 1951. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the U.S. operated two large bases in the Philippines: Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base.²⁹ After the end of the Cold War, costly base repairs and mounting anti-U.S. domestic sentiments led the Philippine Senate to reject an extension of U.S. access to Clark and Subic.³⁰ In 2014, aggressive Chinese actions in Mischief Reef and the Spratly Islands drove the Philippines to open back up to the U.S. by establishing a VFA, allowing U.S. rotational forces to more easily be deployed to the Philippines for exercises such as the Balikatan bilateral military exercise.³¹ After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, and the resulting Global War on Terror (GWOT), the U.S. was granted even greater access to the Philippines when former Philippine President Arroyo allowed the U.S. to use the Subic Bay and Clark bases for global anti-terror operations.³²

Currently, the U.S. enjoys high levels of both maneuver and logistical access to the Philippine archipelago. Under Article V of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2014, the U.S. was granted access to mutually agreed locations on a rotational basis and may build and improve permanent infrastructure.³³ Although the

²⁸ Michael E O'Hanlon, "Evolving the U.S. Base Structure in the Indo-Pacific," Brookings, November 2020, 2, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/FP_20201210_indo_pacific_ohanlon.pdf.

²⁹ Renato Cruz De Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century," *Asian Survey* 43, no. 6 (2003): 971–72, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2003.43.6.971>.

³⁰ Sebastian Strangio, "Former U.S. Bases in the Philippines Prompt Mixed Feelings," *The Diplomat*, September 17, 2020, ProQuest.

³¹ Strangio; Department of State, *Treaties in Force*, 363–64.

³² De Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations," 980.

³³ Voltaire T. Gazmin and Philip S. Goldberg, "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation," *Asian Politics & Policy* 9, no. 4 (October 23, 2017): sec. Preamble, Article V, <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12361>.

EDCA verbiage requires U.S. forces to be rotational, the U.S. logistical infrastructure, to include five new U.S. basing projects in support of rotational deployments, is permanent.³⁴ Nevertheless, the property remains under full control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).³⁵ Despite the signing of the EDCA, the election of President Duterte in 2016 and his turn away from the U.S. partnership and move towards China “led to the non-implementation of the EDCA and the current crisis in Philippine-U.S. security relations.”³⁶ Thus, the Philippines allows less freedom to the U.S. now than it did when Clark and Subic Bay were operating and offers less access than Japan does today. However, U.S. access to the Philippines is still relatively high compared to other partners in the Indo-Pacific.

c. Singapore

Although not a treaty ally, Singapore has provided transactional access of critical ports and infrastructure to U.S. forces since the early 1990s. Codified in a MOU, Singapore allows the U.S. access to facilities such as the Changi Naval Base for rotational U.S. Naval forces as well as the basing of U.S. fighter and surveillance aircraft.³⁷ Singapore also allowed the opening of a critical U.S. headquarters, Logistics Group Western Pacific (COMLOGWESTPAC).³⁸ In 2005, the partnership deepened with the signing of a strategic framework agreement (SFA) that increased defense dialogues and allowed the

³⁴ Andrew Tilghman, “The U.S. Military Is Moving into These 5 Bases in the Philippines,” *Military Times*, August 8, 2017, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/03/21/the-u-s-military-is-moving-into-these-5-bases-in-the-philippines/>.

³⁵ Gazmin and Goldberg, “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation,” 720.

³⁶ Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Death of EDCA and Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” *ISEAS* 2020, no. 42 (May 11, 2020): 3, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_42.pdf.

³⁷ Lam Peng Er, “Singapore-China Relations in Geopolitics, Economics, Domestic Politics and Public Opinion: An Awkward ‘Special Relationship’?,” *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies*, July 19, 2021, 4–5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1951480>.

³⁸ David Capie, “The Power of Partnerships: U.S. Defence Ties with Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam,” *International Politics* 57, no. 2 (February 19, 2020): 251, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-019-00205-8>; Lynn Kuok, “The U.S.-Singapore Partnership: A Critical Element of U.S. Engagement and Stability in the Asia-Pacific,” *Brookings*, July 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-u-s-singapore-partnership-a-critical-element-of-u-s-engagement-and-stability-in-the-asia-pacific/>.

U.S. to deploy four littoral combat ships (LCS) on a rotational basis to Singapore.³⁹ The steady increase of U.S.-Singaporean involvement in exercises such as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and Singapore's involvement in U.S. operations such as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) show a deepening defense relationship.⁴⁰ Overall, Singapore provides the U.S. with substantial maneuver and logistical access to its facilities and spaces albeit on a rotational basis rather than in an ownership capacity. Singaporean access is dwarfed by that of Japan, but Singapore demonstrates a steady increase SC and SA activities with the U.S. and provides a significant logistical offset to the loss of the U.S. bases in the Philippines.⁴¹

d. Indonesia

Indonesia seems to fall well below these other Indo-Pacific defense partners in terms of U.S. access. Despite long-standing U.S.-Indonesian relations, over the last three decades, the relationship has been challenged throughout three major periods beginning with the end of the Cold War, to the start of the GWOT, and through the rise of China in the SCS.⁴² While there have been challenges, there have also been opportunities that have allowed the U.S. to develop or exercise maneuver and logistical access in Indonesian territory.

One of the main indicators of restricted access in Indonesia is its staunch no-basing policy for any foreign military on Indonesian soil.⁴³ This anti-basing sentiment is reflected not only in Indonesia's continued rejections of U.S. requests for airfield access,⁴⁴ but also

³⁹ Kuok, "The U.S.-Singapore Partnership," 5–6.

⁴⁰ Department of State, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Singapore," Department of State, April 20, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-singapore/>.

⁴¹ Capie, "The Power of Partnerships," 251.

⁴² Evan Laksmana, "Pragmatic Equidistance: How Indonesia Manages Its Great Power Relations," in *China, The United States, and the Future of Southeast Asia: U.S.-China Relations*, ed. David B.H. Denoon, vol. 2 (New York: NYU Press, 2017), 123–24.

⁴³ Hoffman, "The End of the American Way of War & The Path for the United States to Reclaim Influence in the Indo-Pacific," 11.

⁴⁴ Tom Allard, "Exclusive: Indonesia Rejected U.S. Request to Host Spy Planes - Officials," *Reuters*, October 20, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/indonesia-usa-idUSKBN2750M7>.

in its opposition to U.S. rotational forces in the region such as in Darwin, Australia.⁴⁵ Indonesia's aversion to foreign forces freely operating in and around its territory is restrictive, but there have been opportunities for U.S. forces to maneuver in Indonesian space. Military exercises such as Garuda Shield (GS), which started as an annual bilateral exercise between Indonesia and the U.S. in 2007,⁴⁶ allow U.S. forces to conduct military-to-military activities that at least provide limited maneuver access during the exercise. CARAT is an exercise opportunity for the U.S. to access Indonesian sea, land, and airspace while conducting complex surface warfare scenarios with Indonesian forces.⁴⁷ Although U.S. forces do not regularly transit or occupy Indonesian space like with other regional defense partners, bilateral and multilateral exercises provide limited-duration maneuver access.

There have been other exceptions when Indonesia has allowed U.S. forces into its territory for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). After the devastation of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the U.S. launched Operation Unified Assistance and tasked the Lincoln Strike Group to provide sea-basing for the coordination of the multilateral HA/DR response for Indonesia.⁴⁸ U.S. aircraft provided critical supplies and evacuation of injured and displaced Indonesians in Aceh Province, and pilots generally had free rein of Indonesian airspace.⁴⁹ In 2009, the Pandang earthquake provided the U.S. another opportunity to access the Indonesian archipelago but with greater Indonesian oversight. Indonesia's response to the earthquake was faster than in 2004 due to the restructuring of

⁴⁵ Syailendra, "A Nonbalancing Act," 242; Shafiah F. Muhibat, "Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration: Still Under the Radar?," *Asian Politics & Policy* 8, no. 1 (2016): 151, <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12235>.

⁴⁶ Frega Wenas Inkiriwang, "'Garuda Shield' vs 'Sharp Knife': Operationalising Indonesia's Defence Diplomacy," *The Pacific Review* 34, no. 6 (May 27, 2020): 11–12, <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2020.1772352>.

⁴⁷ Prashanth Parameswaran, "US, Indonesia Launch Naval Exercise," *The Diplomat* (Tokyo: Tribune Content Agency LLC, September 12, 2017), <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/us-indonesia-launch-naval-exercise/>.

⁴⁸ Bruce A. Elleman, "Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia," *Center for Naval Warfare Studies Naval War College Newport Papers*, no. 28 (February 1, 2007): 55–56, <https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA463367>.

⁴⁹ Elleman, 59–61.

its emergency management framework in 2008, and the creation of the Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management (BNPB).⁵⁰ The BNPB closely coordinated the multinational HA/DR efforts limited to a one-month emergency phase.⁵¹ These two crises provided the U.S. with military access to provide assistance, but they were both limited episodes.

The general consensus is that when compared with the examples of Japan, Singapore, and the Philippines, access to Indonesia is greatly restricted; however, based on the SC and SA activities and HA/DR responses between the two countries, the U.S. does have some access to Indonesia under certain circumstances.

3. Why Does Access Vary?

What causes variation in U.S. access over time, and why are there variations between partners? Indo-Pacific defense literature on the previous country cases provides three major factors that influence access: shared security interests, institutionalized interactions, and domestic political support.

a. Shared Security Interests

Self-interest is a powerful motivator, and when interests are shared between partners it can promote partnership and lead to increased access. A 2020 RAND study of the U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific broke down shared security interests in the Indo-Pacific into multiple variables including threat perception, support on security issues, and how confident the PN was that the U.S. would defend it in a conflict with China.⁵² That study, as well as a 2019 RAND study on Asian security cooperation, found that the regional

⁵⁰ Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., *Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 49, JSTOR.

⁵¹ Moroney et al., 49; BNPB, Bappenas, and The Provincial and District/City Governments, *West Sumatra and Jambi Natural Disasters: Damage, Loss and Preliminary Needs Assessment* (Jakarta, Indonesia: BNPB, 2009), 8, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/177951468285048532/pdf/514090WP0Box34110DALA0West0Sumatera.pdf>.

⁵² Bonny Lin et al., *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Study Overview and Conclusions*, RR 4412 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), fig. 5.1, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4412.html.

threat of China pushed Asian nations to strengthen their partnerships with nations under similar threat.⁵³ Each of the countries outlined so far have some perception of China as a threat,⁵⁴ which is a major security interest shared by the U.S.⁵⁵

Japan and U.S. shared security interests include maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. Chinese pressure in the East China Sea, and its unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that overlaps Japan's Senkaku Islands, has threatened Japan and pushed them to counterbalance the growing threat.⁵⁶ This spurred an increase in Japan's defense cooperation with both U.S. and other ASEAN partners in order to maintain a rules-based order in the region.⁵⁷ In the 2010s, Japan rapidly deepened defense cooperation under its National Defense Program Guidelines by expanding SC with Australia and ASEAN countries.⁵⁸ Japan also focused on defense industrialization, created ACSAs, and arranged for visiting forces from its Indo-Pacific partners.⁵⁹ Whether it was with the U.S. or with partners in the region, Japan deepened defense cooperation with those that shared common defense interests.

As a claimant to the SCS, the Philippines has major security and economic interests where their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) overlaps China's unilateral Nine-Dash Line claim. The events surrounding the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012 demonstrated to the Philippines the maritime security mismatch between the technologically superior Chinese

⁵³ Scott W. Harold et al., *The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific*, RR 3125 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019), 7, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3125.html; Lin et al., *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific*, 29–30.

⁵⁴ Lin et al., *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific*, fig. 6.1.

⁵⁵ The White House, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 6.

⁵⁶ Scott W. Harold et al., *The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation*, 24; Military Balance, "Chapter Six: Asia," *Military Balance* 121, no. 1 (January 1, 2021): 221, <https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868795>.

⁵⁷ Lin et al., *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific*, 46–47.

⁵⁸ Scott W. Harold et al., *The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation*, 25.

⁵⁹ Scott W. Harold et al., 19.

maritime forces and the Philippine maritime and air forces.⁶⁰ The incident was the genesis of the EDCA, which balanced the Chinese maritime threat with the allowance for improved U.S. access through rotational forces and the prepositioning of key resources for HA/DR and other contingencies.⁶¹ Through EDCA, the U.S. has relatively assured maneuver and logistical access to the Philippines to deter China in the SCS.

While Singapore does not compete with China over maritime claims, it still has a history of shared security interests with the U.S.⁶² Shortly after the U.S. war in Vietnam, former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, believed that China would seek to expand its sphere of influence throughout Southeast Asia. Wanting to maintain the counterbalance of U.S. Pacific power, Lee granted the U.S. Navy access to Singapore's ports in 1991.⁶³ However, Singapore's partnership with the U.S. is not only aimed at balancing against China.⁶⁴ Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the Bali bombings in 2002, Singapore also shared a common Islamic Extremist threat with the U.S., which drove further defense cooperation with the signing of the SFA. Inked in 2005, the SFA allowed for greater counter-terrorism cooperation with the U.S.⁶⁵ The SFA built on the previous MOU, and further enhanced U.S. security cooperation and access to Singapore.⁶⁶

b. Domestic Political Support or Opposition

Domestic support for, or opposition to, the U.S. is an important factor for gaining and maintaining access, and the assessment of PN political will for U.S. involvement is a

⁶⁰ Renato Cruz De Castro, "Facing Up to China's Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea Dispute: The Case of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Stand-off and Its Aftermath," *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (August 1, 2016): 158–59, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797016645452>.

⁶¹ De Castro, "Facing Up to China's Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea Dispute," 174–75.

⁶² Capie, "The Power of Partnerships," 246.

⁶³ See Seng Tan, "America the Indispensable Power: Singapore's Perspective of America as a Security Partner," *Asian Politics & Policy* 8, no. 1 (2016): 119–35, <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12236>.

⁶⁴ Kuok, "The U.S.-Singapore Partnership," 3.

⁶⁵ Kuok, 2.

⁶⁶ Tan, "America the Indispensable Power," 127.

key part of SC assessments.⁶⁷ Cooley found that overseas basing is inescapably driven by domestic politics independent of the actions or policies of U.S. forces.⁶⁸ It is apparent that domestic politics and public opinion can be mobilized to make or break U.S. access as experienced in Okinawa and the Philippines, or can at least provide neutral ground such as in Singapore.

Generally, Japanese support for the U.S. has enabled maneuver and logistical access throughout the country.⁶⁹ However, U.S. basing in Okinawa has caused damage to property, the environment, and led to the rape and killing of Okinawan citizens.⁷⁰ These high-profile incidents created friction between the allies, which was partially alleviated by moving some of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to Guam and relocating the Futenma Air Station.⁷¹ Anti-base movements are antithetical to logistical access, but in Japan they have yet to completely undermine the deeply entrenched alliance shared by Japan and the U.S.

Philippine domestic politics stifled U.S. relations in the mid-1990s and led to a loss of U.S. access. The return of American forces after the closures of Clark and Subic Bay generated Philippine domestic criticism, and delayed the signing of an ACSA.⁷² An ACSA would have maintained a small measure of U.S. logistical access to the Philippines after the base closures. Domestic sentiments in the 1990s also prevented President Ramos from pursuing a SOFA with the U.S.⁷³ However, after 9/11 generated strong domestic anti-terrorism sentiment, President Arroyo said that the Filipinos were willing to support its

⁶⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation*, III-12.

⁶⁸ Alexander Cooley, "U.S. Bases and Domestic Politics in Central Asia," in *Rebalancing the Force: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Carnes Lord and Andrew Erickson (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 181, ProQuest.

⁶⁹ Nick Bisley, "Securing the 'Anchor of Regional Stability'? The Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance and East Asian Security," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 30, no. 1 (April 2008): 84, <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs30-1d>.

⁷⁰ Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 19, ProQuest.

⁷¹ Bisley, "Securing the 'Anchor of Regional Stability'?", 78.

⁷² De Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations," 976-77.

⁷³ De Castro, 977.

U.S. ally.⁷⁴ More recently, President Duterte’s plan to suspend the long-standing U.S. VFA was blunted in part by domestic politics and Filipino popular opinion.⁷⁵

Singaporean domestic political attitudes towards the U.S. have been relatively neutral and uncontroversial allowing the government to continue providing logistical and maneuver access that maintains U.S. strategic engagement.⁷⁶ Because the U.S. does not technically own or operate the base and infrastructure, it does not compare directly with Japan and the Philippines; however, it still shows that a lack of political opposition can have a positive influence on access. Domestic sentiments may change in the future if the U.S. acts unilaterally against China and forces Singapore to choose sides. This would be detrimental to U.S. access in Singapore.⁷⁷ These examples suggest that domestic political factors can have a stabilizing, destabilizing, or neutral effects on U.S. access that may or may not be aligned with the PN’s security interests.

c. Institutionalized Interaction

One study showed that the deeper and broader the SC relationship between the U.S. and a PN, the more institutionalized access becomes. According to Paul et al., the more robust the PN-U.S. relationship is, the greater the potential for capacity building through higher-level activities.⁷⁸ High-level BPC activities take time to develop and require extensive ground work to establish processes and streamline routine interactions between the partners.⁷⁹ Based on how the U.S. joint force conducts SC activities, the processes are institutionalized by the capture of lessons learned during functional security cooperation

⁷⁴ De Castro, 980.

⁷⁵ Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of Crisis in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: From an Alliance to a Security Partnership?,” *The Pacific Review*, November 26, 2020, 22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020.1845227>.

⁷⁶ Carnes Lord and Andrew Erickson, “Introduction,” in *Rebalancing the Force: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 7, ProQuest.

⁷⁷ Chris Rahman, “Singapore: Forward Operating Site,” in *Rebalancing the Force: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Carnes Lord and Andrew Erickson (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 125, ProQuest.

⁷⁸ Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, 21–22.

⁷⁹ Paul et al., 4, 89.

evaluations and are incorporated into future SC iterations.⁸⁰ Although there is not extensive literature highlighting this, evidence from different PNs suggests that institutionalized interactions provide pathways to access.

Japan and the Philippines both have long-standing alliances with the U.S. that provide a legal framework for the movement, staging, and conduct of U.S. forces on PN territory. Since the early to mid-1950s, these defense treaties have laid the bedrock for establishing U.S. access to ports, bases, transit, and logistical support. Nearly five pages of the 2020 DOS Treaties in Force list the many agreements between the U.S. and Japan.⁸¹ In comparison, the Philippines has less than two pages of defense agreements in force.⁸² This comparison is not meant to draw a causal link, but merely illustrates the vast number of defense related agreements that the U.S. shares with a high-access ally such as Japan compared to a lower-access Philippines. Singapore has 19 treaties in force, which is three less than the Philippines, but the non-treaty ally still provides the U.S. substantial access as previously discussed.⁸³ Indonesia's list of agreements under defense is only 11 items.⁸⁴

4. Potential Explanations and Hypotheses

Based on the literature, this thesis investigates three hypotheses that explain what major factors cause a subsequent gain or loss of maneuver and/or logistical access for the U.S. in Indonesia.

a. H1: Shared Security Interests

The first hypothesis is that the stronger the shared security interests are between a PN and the U.S., the greater the access a PN will grant to the U.S. Conversely, when countries do not share similar security interests, or when shared security interests are weak, the U.S. enjoys less access. Indonesia and the U.S. share concerns about the rise of

⁸⁰ Chinese Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation*, V-2, E-1.

⁸¹ Department of State, *Treaties in Force*, 234-37.

⁸² Department of State, 363-64.

⁸³ Department of State, 403-5.

⁸⁴ Department of State, 206-7.

aggression and its aversion to the rules-based order of the free and open Indo-Pacific. The maritime threat China poses to this order, as well as regional threats from non-state actors and natural disasters, increases Indonesia's SC and SA activities with the U.S. to balance against the threats. An increase in SC and SA activities should lead to improved relationships, partner capacity building, and access to Indonesia.

b. H2: Public Support/Opposition

The second hypothesis is that if Indonesian public support for U.S. SC is high or increasing, the U.S. is more likely to maintain or gain access. When there is substantial public opposition or support is decreasing, the U.S. is less likely to maintain or gain access. Domestic politics influence policy decisions by growing or shrinking policy makers' political capital. If the Indonesian public is against the U.S., it is more difficult for Indonesian officials to provide the U.S. access without domestic political backlash. When U.S. support is popular, increased cooperation and access can boost a PN official's clout.

c. H3: Institutionalized Interactions

The third hypothesis is that the formalization of interactions through signed agreements is an indicator of current access and increases the assurance of future access. When access agreements are not codified, access is less assured in the future. Signed agreements can create binding relationships such as with treaty allies or defense partnerships. Agreements can also institutionalize relationships by streamlining interactions. The longer a treaty or Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) is in effect, the deeper the relationships and the more ingrained access will be. This hypothesis also speaks to the staying power of agreements in that the deeper the institutionalization of access the U.S. has with a PN, the less likely changes in threat perception or public support for the U.S. will decrease access.

5. Research Design

To find out what factors cause variation in the different types of U.S. access in the Indo-Pacific, this thesis conducts three country case studies of partner nations in the region to establish the factors that influence U.S. maneuver and logistical access. The case studies

examine the effects of shared security threats, domestic political factors, and institutionalized interactions all have on U.S. access as outlined in the hypotheses. These examinations include a study of scholarly articles, political analysis, U.S. state and defense department analyses, diplomatic dialogues, and key leader engagements to determine the influence of the hypothesized independent variables. Maneuver and logistical access are assessed qualitatively in each country based on interactions between the U.S. and the PNs to determine a hierarchy of access between the case countries.

a. Design

The country cases selected all have strategic significance to the U.S. and are location in the first island chain in the SCS. Japan and the Philippines are both long-standing U.S. allies that should display a high degree of U.S. access, but the Philippines has shown various changes in access over time. While it is not a U.S. ally, Singapore provides the U.S. with considerable access. These country cases provide benchmarks for the factors that affect each type of access so they can be applied to Indonesia.

Next, the thesis traces the past 20 years of U.S. access in Indonesia compared to its access to other defense partners in the region. This thesis then examines Indonesia by investigating the influence of the different factors on U.S. maneuver and logistical access to Indonesia. In order to assess this access, due to the lower level of access the U.S. enjoys in Indonesia, this analysis focuses on SC and SA activities to determine how access has changed over the last 20 years. News reports, key leader engagements, bilateral exercise after action reports (AAR), and other defense sources were consulted to assess changes in access.

Finally, this thesis estimates the likelihood that Indonesia would provide the U.S. the requisite access to conduct EABO against China by comparing the assessed level of access with the requirements from U.S. Marine and U.S. Navy operational planning concepts.

b. Scope and Limitations

This thesis is concerned only with the effects of diplomatic and military instruments of national power. Though there are likely economic factors that influence U.S. access to Indonesia, this project is focused on the effects that can be most readily influenced by the defense department and United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).

Given more time, Malaysia would have been the next choice for inclusion in the comparative case study; however, the additional case was not thought to illuminate anything that is not already covered by the chosen countries in this study.

6. Thesis Overview

This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter introduces the problem and major questions this project addresses. Chapter I also defines access and provides a review of the relevant literature that addresses the factors that affect access. Finally, this chapter lays out the hypotheses and roadmap for the rest of the thesis. Chapter II consists of country case studies that examine the independent variables of shared security interests, political support or opposition, and institutionalized interactions. This chapter then assesses the levels of maneuver and logistical access the U.S. enjoys in each country and identifies the causal links between the factors and levels of access. Chapter III focuses on Indonesia and examines the factors that affect U.S. maneuver and logistical access. This chapter pulls from the recent history of Indonesia-U.S. relations and dives deeper into SC and SA activities that establish a trend line for access over time. Chapter IV concludes the thesis with a comparison of how the hypothesized factors affect Indonesia compared with the other case countries to help determine a better way forward for U.S. SC planners.

II. CASE STUDIES

A. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. has many different defense partnerships in East Asia, and each partner allows different levels and types of access based on a variety of factors. This chapter examines three partners to determine the important factors that drive U.S. maneuver and logistical access: Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore. These factors help frame the context of Indonesian access, and help assess what factors the U.S. should focus on to improve it.

This chapter covers three hypothesized factors that cause variation in U.S. access to defense partners in the Indo-Pacific. The first factor is a shared security interest between the U.S. and the PN. This factor is necessary for the growth and maintenance of overall U.S. access. Without shared security interests, a security partnership falls apart and leads to decreasing U.S. access. The second factor involves domestic politics and the public support or opposition for U.S. partnership and presence. This factor involves the positive or negative sentiment for the U.S. in different host nation actors from the general public to the political and military elites. Negative sentiment for the U.S. has negative effects on U.S. logistical access primarily through anti-basing politics while positive U.S. sentiment enables host nation policy makers to provide the U.S. logistical access. The third factor is the institutionalization of interactions between the host nation and U.S. military through military education programs, annual exercises, and defense institutions created by signed agreements. All three of these factors were found to have explanatory value for changes in U.S. maneuver or logistical access, or lack thereof, throughout the three case studies.

The following case studies use three U.S. defense partners in East Asia to evaluate how each factor affected the trend in U.S. maneuver and logistical access. This thesis uses a qualitative measure for both types of access covered and identifies critical changes over time from the Cold War era to the present. The measure of maneuver and logistical access throughout this chapter is qualitative and places a country in one of three categories for both maneuver and logistical access: low, medium, and high (see Table 1). Low maneuver

access only includes small unit training or exchanges, and the allowance of U.S. personnel to transit to and about the host country for official purposes. Medium maneuver access includes bilateral exercises or short-duration operations such as HA/DR. High maneuver access describes a host nation that allows rotational, forward-deployed U.S. troops in a host nation.

For logistical access, low describes the minimal support facilities and service contracts that U.S. forces would need to negotiate on a case-by-case basis to accomplish an exercise or mission. A medium level of logistical access includes long-term, durable contracts for base, port and/or facility use. High logistical access is a permanent presence of U.S. forces on U.S.-owned basing.

Table 1. Measuring Levels of Access

Maneuver Access					Logistical Access				
	Rotational/ Operational Deployments	Exercises/ Limited Duration Operations	Small Unit Training/ SME Exchange	Transit / Overflight Rights		Base Ownership	Long- term Base Use	Useable Facilities/ FMS	Host Nation Support/ Services
Overall Level of Access					Overall Level of Access				
High	X	X	X	X	High	X	X	X	X
Medium		X	X	X	Medium		X	X	X
Low			X	X	Low			X	X
Examples	<i>JSOTF-P, UDP</i>	<i>Balikatan, HA/DR, Joint MARSEC patrols</i>	<i>Platoon exchanges, Mobile Training Team</i>	<i>No visa required, well established travel process</i>		<i>Camp Schwab, Okinawa</i>	<i>Changi Naval Base</i>	<i>Air/Sea ports available, Shared platforms</i>	<i>Established contracts and vendors, Food, Water, Medical</i>

B. JAPAN

From post-WWII U.S. occupation to the present, the U.S. has a history of nearly unfettered maneuver and logistical access to Japan. Thus, Japan represents the high-water mark for maneuver and logistical access that the U.S. could hope to achieve with a defense partner in the Indo-Pacific. Japanese–U.S. relations have fluctuated over the life of the alliance, but access has remained high despite political stressors and diplomatic adversity. How the U.S. maintained high levels of access despite these challenges provides insight

into what factors are most conducive to building and maintaining maneuver and logistical access with a defense partner.

1. Access in Japan

The U.S. currently enjoys a high level of both maneuver and logistical access to Japan. This access is demonstrated not only by published policies and high-level agreements between Tokyo and Washington but through the long history of U.S. forces deployments, exercises, and long-held U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa.

Japan makes it easy for the U.S. to deploy and maneuver troops in Japan and Okinawa. Maneuver access to Japan is outlined in the 1960 SOFA, which allows for the movement of U.S. troops, dependent family members, and equipment to and throughout Japan.⁸⁵ This agreement streamlines the travel requirements for U.S. forces and their families by simplifying the visa process. With a set of military orders and military identification, U.S. personnel are virtually free to move to and throughout Japan. Also, Article V of the SOFA allows for vessels and aircraft under U.S. control the freedom to transit Japanese space and access any port in Japan without tax or toll. The only caveat to U.S. freedom of maneuver is the courtesy of notification to Japanese authorities prior to arrival under “normal circumstances.”⁸⁶

The SOFA is most notably exercised regularly by the U.S. Marine rotational forces deployed with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the Unit Deployment Program (UDP). The combat-ready Marines of the 31st MEU serve as the “largest rapid-deployable Marine unit”⁸⁷ and have been continuously deployed in the Asia-Pacific since the Vietnam War. The MEU and UDP regularly conduct training and exercises with minimal coordination with Japanese officials regarding the movement of personnel and

⁸⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Art. IX, accessed January 7, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/2.html>.

⁸⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Art. V.

⁸⁷ Emma Chanlett and Ian E Rinehart, *The U S Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy*, CRS Report No. R42645 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), Summary, ProQuest.

equipment throughout Japan. Overall, the U.S. enjoys a high level of maneuver access given the SOFA and the long history of deployments and training in Japanese territory.

Logistical access to Japan is the highest the U.S. experiences in the region based on both written agreement and the reality of forces that live on and operate from the many U.S. bases on the mainland of Japan and in Okinawa. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan allows the U.S. to construct and occupy facilities, create lines of communication, and employ weapon systems on U.S. installations in Japan.⁸⁸ U.S. basing in Japan and Okinawa supports over 50,000 military personnel and serves as the “most significant forward-operating platform for the U.S. military in the region.”⁸⁹ Unlike in other ports the U.S. enjoys access to in the Pacific, Japan hosts the only U.S. carrier homeport abroad and the largest forward airbase.⁹⁰

In addition to allowing the U.S. to own bases, Japan goes above and beyond by paying for U.S. troops to stay and train in Japan through host nation support (HNS). The Japanese government pays roughly \$4 billion annually in HNS for U.S. military training and to maintain U.S. presence.⁹¹ In the current agreement, Japan covers approximately “61 percent of annual utility costs and roughly 75 percent of training relocation costs” for U.S. basing and forward-deployed troops.⁹²

Aside from U.S.-owned infrastructure in Japan, the Self Defense Force (SDF) also provides indirect logistical access by producing and fielding U.S. weapon systems procured through FMS. In June, 2020, Japan produced its first F-35 in its Mitsubishi Heavy Industry

⁸⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan,” Art. III.

⁸⁹ Chanlett and Rinehart, *The U S Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy*, summary.

⁹⁰ Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U. S. -Japan Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 281, ProQuest.

⁹¹ Calder, 11.

⁹² Eric Johnston, “As Negotiations Stall, How Much Does Japan Actually Pay to Host U.S. Forces?,” *The Japan Times*, December 16, 2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/12/16/national/how-much-does-japan-pay-to-host-u-s-forces/>.

facility in Nagoya.⁹³ Although Japan will have to rely completely on imported parts for its domestically produced F-35s, its possession of the parts and facilities to assemble and repair F-35s are a logistical asset. This asset is effectively staged and could provide U.S. forces a supply and/or maintenance capability during a conflict or contingency that causes U.S. aircraft casualties. The Japanese F-35 program, like many other high-end FMS programs, includes more than just the purchase of aircraft. The program includes U.S. management, training, logistical support, and technical support to Japan over a 25-year period.⁹⁴ This program is a foot in the door for future logistical access that creates supply chains and repositories for critical parts that can be shared among the coalition during a conflict.

In summary, the robustness of U.S. facilities and military capability in Japan demonstrates a high level of agreed-upon, and realized, logistical access to Japan. The combination of maneuver and logistical access gives the U.S. a significant strategic foothold in Asia that represents near-maximal level of access that an independent country could offer.

2. Factors Affecting Access

The Japanese case illustrates how shared security interests and strong public support help increase U.S. access through the growth of institutions such as the defense treaty and other written agreements. This case also shows how the institutions have weathered different challenges to domestic politics while maintaining high access levels.

a. Shared Security Interests

The Japan–U.S. security relationship evolved from a focus on the Cold War threat to different regional and international threats. This evolution reflects a change of focus away from balancing the bipolar world order to the threat perceptions shared by the two

⁹³ Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Rolls Out First Domestically-Built F-35 Stealth Fighter,” *The Diplomat* (Tokyo, United States: Tribune Content Agency LLC, June 6, 2017), ProQuest.

⁹⁴ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Japan – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft,” July 9, 2020, <https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-f-35-joint-strike-fighter-aircraft-0>.

allies.⁹⁵ Common security issues such as the nuclear threat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) bind the U.S. and Japan into a tighter security relationship that helps maintain the high logistical and maneuver access the U.S. enjoys.

A nuclear-capable DPRK creates a security challenge that the SDF is incapable of handling alone and thus deepens the security cooperation between Japan and the U.S. The DPRK's launch of the Taepodong-1 ballistic missile in 1998 sparked Japan into cooperating in missile defense research with the U.S. and ultimately committing to the purchase of a Theatre Missile Defense Systems (TMD) from the U.S. This system tied Japan's TMD into the American National Missile Defense program, allowing both countries to identify and defend against the DPRK threat.⁹⁶ The extension of this critical U.S. defense asset in Japanese territory increases U.S. maneuver access because it allows the U.S. to deploy a forward strategic capability.

The shared threat perception of the DPRK also increased maneuver and logistical access to Japanese basing for the United Nations (UN). Specifically, "seven bases under UN command in Japan can be used without prior permission for defending Korea."⁹⁷ Japan's requirement for alliance based on the shared threat of the DPRK lead Japan to offer greater access to its allies for basing and the movement of troops through its territory.

b. Public Support or Opposition

The overall high level of Japanese domestic support for the U.S. positively correlates to the high levels of logistical and maneuver access the U.S. enjoys. Japanese public opinion over the basing of U.S. forces throughout Japan and Okinawa varies but Japan is generally supportive of the U.S. presence for regional security. As of 2011, annual surveys show that 70 percent of Japanese people held positive views towards the U.S. over

⁹⁵ Bisley, "Securing the 'Anchor of Regional Stability'?", 89.

⁹⁶ Bisley, "Securing the 'Anchor of Regional Stability'?", 81.

⁹⁷ Ted Osius, *U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Why It Matters and How to Strengthen It* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 2001), 11, ProQuest.

the previous 30 years.⁹⁸ However, Japanese anti-basing politics ultimately resulting in the agreement to shift nearly half of the Marines out of Japan has threatened U.S. logistical access.⁹⁹ Japanese people opposed to U.S. basing put pressure on their government, which constrains Washington's ability to maintain the massive collection of U.S. basing in Japan and has led to increased limitations on U.S. access in the past. Japanese anti U.S.-protests in the 1960s and the ongoing Futenma relocation plan demonstrate the pressures domestic politics can create that limit access.

In the 1960s, Japanese citizens feared that their apparent loss of control over Japan's internal security, paired with the heating up of the Cold War in the Indo-Pacific, would cause Japan to abandon pacifism and be pulled into a kinetic war by the U.S.¹⁰⁰ These fears led to intense protests, which reshaped the foundation of the U.S.-Japan defense partnership and regional security. Specifically, the pressures of the 1960s protests led to a change in U.S.-Japanese relations from the rigidity of the Eisenhower administration to the "consultative framework" of the Kennedy administration.¹⁰¹ This new framework required the U.S. to notify Japan of major troop movements and critical military activities such as nuclear tests. While the soft requirement of notification is not a direct barrier for U.S. access, it is still an additional requirement levied against U.S. maneuver access. The protests also led Japanese parliament to place boundaries in the U.S. security treaty to prevent involving Japan in the U.S. war in Vietnam and prevented Japanese prime ministers from referring to the U.S. treaty as an "alliance" until the 1980s.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Alisa Gaunder, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics* (London: Routledge, 2011), 337, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203829875>.

⁹⁹ Kyodo News Service, "Transfer from Okinawa to Guam 'Progressing Well': U.S. Marine Head," Kyodo News Service, August 21, 2019, ProQuest.

¹⁰⁰ Gaunder, *The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics*, 332.

¹⁰¹ Nick Kapur, "Mending the 'Broken Dialogue': U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy in the Aftermath of the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 3 (June 1, 2017): 499, 508, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhw053>.

¹⁰² Gaunder, *The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics*, 332.

In 1995, a high-visibility incident involving a U.S. servicemember raping an Okinawan girl caused a local uproar that led to the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO).¹⁰³ The SACO was a key component during the review of U.S. force posture in Japan and began the long process of closure and transition of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Nago in northern Okinawa as well as the broader redistribution of U.S. Marines to Guam. Beginning in 2006, U.S.-Japanese efforts to realign U.S. bases in Japan laid the groundwork to relocate MCAS Futenma. The relocation planned for the movement of 8,000 Marines to a new base in Guam contingent on Japanese construction of replacement facilities and financial support.¹⁰⁴ Swings in Japanese and Okinawan political leadership between 2006 and 2013 prevented significant progress on realignment efforts and delayed construction on the Futenma Relocation Facility (FRF) to late 2013.¹⁰⁵ MCAS Futenma remains open until the FRF can be completed, which prevents a gap in U.S. logistical access to suitable airfield facilities.

The U.S. and Japan are still negotiating the relocation, but negotiations move at the speed of U.S. strategic interests and without sacrificing the access the U.S. needs. As evidenced by the deliberations with the SACO since the 1990s, Japanese public opposition clearly affects the decisions of U.S. defense officials and policy makers to decrease troop levels and U.S. land holdings when able. However, the overall positive opinion of the Japanese regarding the U.S. presence sustains access for the U.S.

c. Institutionalization

The U.S.-Japan defense relationship is a highly developed institution that is codified in a myriad of agreements and has been regularly exercised by generations of American servicemembers. The strength of the institution has protected U.S. access through changes in Japanese leadership and anti-U.S. domestic politics. U.S. access was institutionalized starting with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, which established

¹⁰³ Gaunder, 334.

¹⁰⁴ Chanlett and Rinehart, *The U S Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy*, Summary.

¹⁰⁵ Chanlett and Rinehart, 16.

the U.S.-Japan defense partnership and set the precedence for U.S. access. In 1960, the treaty was revised to reflect the geopolitical and strategic defense changes of the day. The new treaty created “a U.S. commitment to defend Japan in exchange for U.S. access to bases in Japan for the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East.”¹⁰⁶ In the late 1960s, talks began between the U.S. and Japan about the return of the U.S. bases in Okinawa back to the Okinawans, but the talks have yet to uproot the staying power of the treaty. The U.S. remained able to continue its strategic forward presence in the region with minor adjustments. U.S. force restructuring in Japan may have reduced the number of U.S. troops in Okinawa but the maneuver and logistical access remained virtually the same while decreasing U.S.-Japanese political friction over base politics.¹⁰⁷ Overall, U.S. access to Japan is maintained at a high level and is protected from sharp declines due to the treaty alliance and the institutional framework that provides relief of political stress.

Overall, Japan has allowed the U.S. a high level of both maneuver and logistical access. The alliance was born out of Cold War threat perceptions and Japan has maintained high levels U.S. access because of shared threats it is unable to handle on its own. Japan struggles with anti-U.S. domestic politics which threaten U.S. access to its bases in Okinawa, but the long-standing alliance institutions prevent Japan from decreasing U.S. logistical access.

C. THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippines currently offers the U.S. a high level of maneuver and a medium level of logistical access. Like Japan, the Philippines is a long-time treaty ally of the U.S.; however, the Philippines has provided the U.S. a far less consistent level of access throughout the history of the alliance. After WWII, the U.S. experienced high levels of logistical and maneuver access in the Philippines because it owned and operated two major bases: Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. In the early 1990s, U.S. access dropped significantly after the closure of both bases. The U.S. regained a limited amount of

¹⁰⁶ Gaunder, *The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics*, 331.

¹⁰⁷ Bisley, “Securing the ‘Anchor of Regional Stability’?,” 78–79.

logistical access during the GWOT and more recently after the increase in Chinese aggression in the SCS. The swings in access provide evidence for how public opposition to U.S. bases, changes in shared security threats, and defense partnership institutions affected the level of access enjoyed by the U.S. over time. The effects of these factors also help explain the current challenges to U.S. access during the Duterte administration.

1. Access in the Philippines

The Philippines currently offers the U.S. a high level of maneuver and medium level of logistical access. As a long-standing treaty ally, the U.S.–Philippine defense relationship is backed by agreements that codify U.S. access such as the VFA and the more recent incarnation of the defense treaty: the EDCA. However, when compared to Japan, the agreements and actual exercise of access are more restrictive in the Philippines. Besides the requirement for the U.S. to pay for the use of Philippine space and facilities, there are a number of other limitations on maneuver and logistical access.

Maneuver access in the Philippines is limited to non-permanent U.S. forces that are restricted to short-duration security cooperation activities. Per the EDCA, U.S. forces are restricted to mutually agreed-upon locations in Philippine territory on a rotational basis to conduct exercises, joint training, and other agreed-upon activities.¹⁰⁸ While there are limits on U.S. actions, there are still numerous opportunities for U.S. forces to deploy to, and move about, Philippine territory.

One way the U.S. exercises its access to the Philippines is through bilateral military exercises. During the 2021 Mutual Defense Board (MDB) and Security Engagement Board (SEB), the U.S. and the Philippines agreed to increase their planned security cooperation to 300 activities in 2022.¹⁰⁹ Among the hundreds of security cooperation activities, the

¹⁰⁸ Gazmin and Goldberg, “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation,” Article 1, Sect. b.3.

¹⁰⁹ US Embassy in the Philippines, “Philippines, U.S. Host Annual Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board,” U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, October 15, 2021, <https://ph.usembassy.gov/philippines-u-s-host-annual-mutual-defense-board-and-security-engagement-board/>.

major perennial event that brings U.S. forces to the Philippines is the bilateral training exercise Balikatan. In past iterations, Balikatan brought upwards of 3,000 U.S. troops to the Philippines to train.¹¹⁰ The exercise persisted even through the pandemic with the completion of the 36th Balikatan in 2021, albeit with a reduced U.S. footprint of only 225 personnel.¹¹¹ Although it is limited in scope and duration, Balikatan annually provides a battalion-sized U.S. taskforce maneuver access to Philippine territory.

Another example of U.S. maneuver access was the conduct of joint operations during the GWOT. During Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines in 2017, U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) aided Philippine forces in battling Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Philippines (ISIS-P) in Marawi as part of the greater GWOT.¹¹² The taskforce included over 500 U.S. troops and a “fleet of drones”¹¹³ on Philippine soil. The flow of operational forces and equipment demonstrated that the U.S. still had a fair amount of maneuver access to conduct real world joint operations despite the limitations of force size and scope. Overall, the U.S. has enjoyed a high level of maneuver access to the Philippines that is only limited, by agreement and in practice, to agreed-upon exercises and operations.

Logistical access in the Philippines is also limited, but includes the agreement for construction of facilities and the acquisition of utilities. The EDCA allows for the usage of AFP bases and facilities agreed upon by the Philippine government. Currently, the U.S. has facilities on four AFP bases but the facilities are owned by the AFP.¹¹⁴ The EDCA

¹¹⁰ Todd South, “Pentagon to Spend Nearly \$5M on Marine Corps Mission in the Philippines,” *Marine Corps Times*, August 9, 2018, <https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/08/09/pentagon-triples-military-spending-in-philippines/>.

¹¹¹ US Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. and Philippine Forces Conclude 36th Balikatan Exercise,” U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, April 23, 2021, <https://ph.usembassy.gov/us-and-philippine-forces-conclude-36th-balikatan-exercise/>.

¹¹² Linda Robinson, Patrick Johnston, and Gillian Oak, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014*, RR 1236 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 112, <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1236>.

¹¹³ South, “Pentagon to Spend Nearly \$5M on Marine Corps Mission in the Philippines.”

¹¹⁴ Satur C. Ocampo, “Expanding U.S. Military Presence in Phl Bases,” *The Philippine Star*, November 20, 2021, <https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2021/11/20/2142620/expanding-us-military-presence-phl-bases>.

also allows the U.S. to preposition supplies and equipment with notice to the AFP.¹¹⁵ In practice, the U.S. uses its operational control over portions of Philippine facilities to store HA/DR and surveillance equipment.¹¹⁶ Overall, the U.S. enjoys a medium level of logistical access to the Philippines limited to specific locations as approved by the AFP.

a. High Points of U.S. Access

The U.S. enjoyed the highest levels of access to the Philippines during the Cold War and the GWOT. Following the Japanese occupation in WWII, the U.S. operated two major bases in the Philippines under the Mutual Basing Agreement (MBA) of 1947. The MBA allowed the U.S. to construct, improve, and control agreed-upon space in the Philippines in exchange for military assistance and mutual defense.¹¹⁷ Prior to their closures, Clark Air Base was the home of the 13th Air Force and, during the Vietnam War, Naval Station Subic Bay was home of U.S. 7th Fleet. These major U.S. bases in the Pacific provided logistical and maneuver access to the U.S. during major military conflicts including Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. After their closures, the next high-point of U.S. access was following the 9/11 attacks. The GWOT provided an opportunity of revitalization of U.S.–Philippine defense ties as well as a partial restoration of U.S. access. After 9/11, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal granted the U.S. access to its former bases to conduct military operations during the GWOT.¹¹⁸ Throughout the next two decades, the Philippines allowed the U.S. increased access through agreements such as the EDCA as well as the Increased Rotational Presence (IRP) which allowed U.S. troops to be stationed in the Philippines for longer durations.¹¹⁹ U.S. troop numbers in the Philippines

¹¹⁵ Gazmin and Goldberg, “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation,” Article IV, Sect. 1.

¹¹⁶ Seth Robson, “‘We Plan to Move Fairly Quickly’: U.S., Philippines to Restart Work on Shared Military Facilities,” *Stars and Stripes*, September 23, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2021-09-23/us-philippines-mutual-defense-treaty-duterte-2989695.html.

¹¹⁷ Department of State, “Agreement Concerning Military Bases, Manila, 14 March 1947” (Department of State, March 14, 1947), 164, 181.

¹¹⁸ De Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” 980.

¹¹⁹ De Castro, “Abstract of Crisis in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” 9.

rose from a couple dozen to nearly 5,000, and there was an increase in U.S. naval ship visits for training and other operations.¹²⁰ While the U.S. did not own permanent bases, thus lowering logistical access to medium, it still enjoyed a high level of maneuver access through near-continuous rotations, training, and operations throughout the Philippines.

b. Low Points of U.S. Access

The lowest point for U.S. access to the Philippines occurred in the post-Cold War period in the early 1990s beginning with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Clark and Subic Bay. The Philippine Senate voted against an extension of the MBA on a razor-thin margin, which led to the U.S. withdrawal from Clark Air Base and Subic Bay in 1992.¹²¹ Then President Fidel Ramos refused the signing of an ACSA and avoided creating a SOFA with Washington. While there was a VFA pending, the Philippines and the U.S. suspended large-scale exercises in 1996 and only 20 U.S. troops were allowed to participate in smaller exercises.¹²² With no bases and nearly no troops deploying or exercising, the 90s were a low point in U.S. maneuver and logistical access.

Today, maneuver U.S. access to the Philippines remains high due to the continued growth of bilateral exercises such as Balikatan that allow large amounts of U.S. forces to train in the Philippines. Outside of the two-week-long Balikatan exercise, the U.S. also has access through agreements such as the IRP, VFA, and EDCA that facilitate deployments of U.S. rotational forces to the Philippines.¹²³ These agreements also allow the U.S. to use AFP bases to pre-stage supplies and equipment long-term, which indicates a medium level of logistical access.

¹²⁰ Herbert Docena, "US Troops Retake the Dragon's Lair," Mother Jones, August 22, 2008, <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/08/us-troops-retake-dragons-lair/>.

¹²¹ De Castro, "Abstract of Crisis in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations," 1–2.

¹²² De Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations," 977.

¹²³ De Castro, "Abstract of Crisis in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations," 9–10.

2. Factors Affecting Access

The changes in U.S. access to the Philippines demonstrate how shared security interests and public support can boost U.S. access while the loss of a common threat and decreasing public support can diminish access. This case also illustrates the importance of institutionalization and military person-to-person relationships because of how U.S.-influenced AFP servicemembers provided protection against abrupt decreases in defense relations and access.

a. Shared Security Interests

The perception of common threats including transnational terrorism and Chinese aggression in the SCS created the need for increased defense and security cooperation within the post-Cold War U.S.–Philippine alliance. Prior to the end of the Cold War, U.S. access to the Philippines included the Clark Air Base and U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay. The fall of the Soviet Union removed the shared security threat between Manila and Washington which ultimately lead the U.S. to withdraw from the region and allowed for anti-basing domestic politics to develop in the Philippines.¹²⁴

In the early 2000s, the shared security interest in the GWOT led to increased security cooperation and increased presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines, which reversed the downward trend of U.S. access throughout the 1990s. After 9/11, President Arroyo of the Philippines allowed the U.S. to access its former bases in Clark and Subic Bay to combat the shared threat of terror organizations.¹²⁵ President Arroyo was quick to announce “principled, and unequivocal support to the United States, granting overflight rights and offering logistical backup and medical personnel to American forces.”¹²⁶ The shared threat of terrorism also paved the way for the deployment of JSOTF-P which allowed the U.S. to deploy to Mindanao in support of the AFP’s anti-terror campaign.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ De Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” 974.

¹²⁵ De Castro, 980.

¹²⁶ De Castro, 980.

¹²⁷ De Castro, “Abstract of Crisis in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” 6.

More recently, Chinese aggression against the Philippines in the SCS has led to an improvement in U.S.–Philippine relations reflected by increased SC activities and political pressure on President Duterte to walk back his anti-U.S. rhetoric and threats to U.S. access. In 2016, Duterte decided to distance the Philippines from the U.S. and form a closer relationship with China to take advantage of Chinese economic development assistance.¹²⁸ Duterte was also against U.S. pressure on the Philippines for human rights violations connected to his war on drugs.¹²⁹ Duterte sought to shut down U.S. counter-terror operations, pull out U.S. troops, and put an end to the U.S.–Philippine Balikatan exercise.¹³⁰ In 2020, Duterte even set out to abrogate the U.S. VFA which would have crippled the alliance. However, persistent Chinese aggression in the SCS made Manila recalculate its U.S. policy. In 2020, A Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship targeted a Philippine Navy vessel and two Chinese marine research stations opened on Fiery Cross and Subi Reefs, both of which are claimed by the Philippines. In order to balance the increased Chinese threat in the SCS, Manila needed to maintain its U.S. security relations. Consequently, Duterte suspended the abrogation three times between 2020 and 2021 before fully restoring the VFA.¹³¹ Ultimately, Manila and the AFP agreed that the U.S. military presence in the Philippines was necessary for defense against China, and Duterte backed down.

The threat of terrorism and Chinese pressure in disputed Philippine territory has led the Philippines to develop closer defense relations with the U.S. Because of U.S. counter-terror capabilities and shared interests, the U.S. gained maneuver and logistical access to the Philippines via operations conducted under JSOTF-P. While the U.S. has not gained access due to the increased threat of China in the SCS, it is clear that the shared perception of the

¹²⁸ De Castro, “The Death of EDCA and Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” 3.

¹²⁹ Andrea Chloe Wong, “Duterte’s Back-down on U.S. Forces in Philippines,” *The Interpreter*, August 24, 2021, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/duterte-s-back-down-us-forces-philippines>.

¹³⁰ Gregory Winger, “Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US–Philippine Alliance,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 17, no. 3 (June 24, 2021): 8, <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orab013>.

¹³¹ De Castro, “Abstract of Crisis in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” 23.

growing threat prevented significant losses in U.S. access by maintaining the VFA and Balikatan.

b. Public Support or Opposition

Positive public opinion of the U.S. in the Philippines is a key factor that puts pressure on Manila to maintain close defense ties and provide access to the U.S. Pro-U.S. sentiment of Filipino elites and the AFP also bolsters U.S. access by constraining Philippine government leadership from enacting anti-U.S. policies. Conversely, when Philippine public opinion of the U.S. sours, U.S. access is challenged and typically decreases. Philippine domestic support for the U.S. hit a low point in the early 1990s leading up to the base closures, and, more recently, the mistrust of the U.S. commitment to the MDT coincided with Duterte's attempts to weaken the alliance.

The base closures in the early 1990s reflected the growing public opinion that the Philippines no longer required the support of its former colonial power. After recalculating the cost-benefit of U.S. presence, the Philippine senate narrowly voted not to extend the U.S. basing agreement over general sovereignty concerns of permanent foreign military presence and due to U.S. troop behavior.¹³² Philippine anti-basing sentiment in the senate stemmed primarily from the lack of necessity for the U.S. to continue countering the Soviet threat, as well as the insufficient compensation for usage of the bases.¹³³ After the base closures, the U.S. attempted to improve its access through the signing of an ACSA and SOFA with Manila. Public criticism of the U.S. presence pressured the Philippine government, which caused Manila to reject the ACSA, SOFA, and even suspended large-scale bilateral exercises with the U.S.¹³⁴ It was not until Chinese expansion into the SCS in the late 1990s that both Washington and Manila sought to revive the defense alliance starting with the signing of a VFA in 1998.

¹³² Strangio, "Former U.S. Bases in the Philippines Prompt Mixed Feelings."

¹³³ De Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations," 975.

¹³⁴ De Castro, 976–77.

Since the revival of the U.S.–Philippine alliance in the late 1990s, opinions of the U.S. have varied between the Philippine public, the military and elites, and senior government leadership. The most recent major point of contention in the alliance has been the U.S. commitment to defend the Philippines in case of Chinese attack.¹³⁵ The Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 highlighted the growing concern in the Philippines regarding U.S. defense commitment to Philippine defense. Then president Arroyo sought to clarify Washington’s commitment to defend the Philippines to which president Obama pledged to uphold the commitments in the MDT.¹³⁶ Manila’s renewed trust led to the creation of the EDCA and increased U.S. access via deployments of P-3s and surveillance drones, as well as U.S. support to the military buildup of the AFP.¹³⁷

Public trust of the U.S. remained high throughout the Aquino and Duterte administrations, which mitigated the effects of Duterte’s seemingly unilateral attempts to distance from the U.S. and reduce access. According to Social Weather Stations, Philippine public trust in the U.S. remained between 55 to 75 percent and generally grew throughout Duterte’s term.¹³⁸ The military and key Philippine leadership also maintained trust in the U.S. demonstrated by how the alliance was insulated from Duterte’s anti-U.S. policy rhetoric. Philippine Defense Secretary Lorenzana and former President Ramos opposed Duterte’s attack on the U.S. alliance and pressured Duterte out of cancelling U.S. bilateral exercises.¹³⁹ Regarding Duterte’s push for the U.S. to pull out of its JSOTF-P operations in Mindanao, the AFP never received official directives to withdraw U.S. forces and were reluctant to act on the political rhetoric.¹⁴⁰ It is clear that the mostly pro-U.S. public,

¹³⁵ Christopher Paul, *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 60.

¹³⁶ De Castro, “Abstract of Crisis in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” 9.

¹³⁷ De Castro, “Facing Up to China’s Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea Dispute,” 175.

¹³⁸ Social Weather Stations, “Second Quarter 2019 Social Weather Survey: Trust in China Falls to Net -24 (Poor),” Social Weather Stations, July 19, 2019, <https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20190719100415>.

¹³⁹ Winger, “Alliance Embeddedness,” 10.

¹⁴⁰ Winger, 9.

Philippine elites, and AFP prevented Duterte's unilateral actions from causing a debilitating loss of U.S. access.

Anti-basing public opinion in the Philippines had direct and negative effects on U.S. logistical access. These sentiments continue to shape the U.S.–Philippine alliance by preventing U.S. permanent basing. However, the overall opinion of the Philippine public, elites, and military is pro-U.S., and has led to a revival of the alliance and protection of U.S. access for operations, rotational forces, and exercises.

c. Institutionalization

The U.S.–Philippine alliance is a long-standing institution that has provided significant staying power to U.S. access. The evolution of formal institutions under the alliance, and other signed agreements from the MBA to the EDCA, provide a measure of U.S. access and insight into the factors that affect access. Military-to-military relationships have also become institutionalized through decades of shared operations, exercises, and other training that reinforced the defense partnership and aided in creating the pro-U.S. attitude of the AFP. Although the Philippines is generally pro-U.S., swings in nationalism, high-profile incidents involving U.S. servicemembers, and Duterte's personal vendettas against the U.S. can create volatility in the relationship. However, according to Gregory Winger's principle of "alliance embeddedness," the formal and informal institutions in U.S.–Philippine relations buttress against challenges to the alliance.¹⁴¹

The U.S.–Philippine treaty and other agreements such as the EDCA generally act as a benchmark for U.S. maneuver and logistical access by describing what U.S. forces can and cannot do in the Philippines. It is clear that the signing of the agreements typically falls at the end of the causal chain, because the agreements codify what access is allowed after both countries evaluate their own geopolitical factors and strategic needs. For instance, Article 1 of the MBA allowed for the U.S. to retain the basing it had rather than establish

¹⁴¹ Winger, "Alliance Embeddedness," 4.

new basing.¹⁴² However, the major signed agreements enabled the development of formal and informal institutions to develop and maintain the access the U.S. already has.

Two important formal institutions that developed between the U.S. and Philippines were the MDB and SEB. These annual bilateral security boards allow U.S. military leadership to discuss, alter, and exercise U.S. maneuver and logistics access to the Philippines. These boards are the mechanism through which USINDOPACOM increases its annual security cooperation and interactions with the AFP. These regular high-level defense leadership interactions help maintain a positive relationship over time by ensuring both the U.S. and the Philippines adapt to changing political and security needs, and allow for “continued, robust relations” through the conduct of increasingly complex exercises such as Balikatan.¹⁴³

Generations of U.S.–Philippine military interactions have created personal and professional relationships that developed into an institution that has shaped Philippine defense policy in favor of U.S. access. Besides the meetings and exercises, the International Military Education & Training (IMET) program has inculcated thousands of Philippine service members with U.S. defense policy. The IMET program has affected enough Philippine officers that “at least half of the seventeen AFP Chiefs of Staff between 2008 and 2020 have cited receiving some professional military education or training from the United States.”¹⁴⁴ The effects of the U.S. indoctrination were evident during Duterte’s recent attempts to revoke U.S. access. The formal institutions of the U.S.–Philippine alliance do not prevent unilateral action from the Philippines to end the treaty or effectively deny the U.S. access. However, the informal institutionalization of U.S.–Philippine military interactions has “embedded” pro-U.S. policy thinking on key Philippine leadership at the national level. These leaders put pressure on Duterte to maintain the U.S. alliance and prevent him from enacting policies that negatively affect the alliance and U.S. access.

¹⁴² Department of State, “Agreement Concerning Military Bases, Manila, 14 March 1947,” 162.

¹⁴³ US Embassy in the Philippines, “Philippines, U.S. Host Annual Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board.”

¹⁴⁴ Winger, “Alliance Embeddedness,” 4.

In conclusion, the Philippines case illustrates a wide variance of U.S. access between the Cold War period through the GWOT and into the current Duterte administration. The loss of a common enemy after the Cold War led to a loss of shared security interests. This lowered the Philippine people's appetite for hosting U.S. bases and the issues that come with foreign military presence. After the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the increased aggressive behavior of China in the SCS, U.S.–Philippine security interests realigned and the Philippines granted the U.S. access to address these issues. Despite President Duterte's campaign to distance the Philippines from the U.S., popular opinion and the power of formal and informal institutions have reinforced the alliance and prevented losses in U.S. access.

D. SINGAPORE

Unlike Japan and the Philippines, Singapore is not a U.S. treaty ally; however, the U.S. has enjoyed a high level of maneuver and a medium level of logistical access to the small city-state since the closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines. In an effort to prevent a power vacuum in East Asia, Singapore sought to maintain the stabilizing presence of the U.S. in the region. Since the 1990s, Singapore provided the U.S. access to air and sea ports that allowed for the forward-deployment of rotational units without the political baggage that comes with U.S. basing like Okinawa. Singapore illustrates how shared security interests can develop indirectly without the same threat perceptions and shows how institutional developments short of a treaty alliance can still generate maneuver and logistical access for the U.S.

1. Access

The U.S. enjoys a high level of maneuver access and a medium level of logistical access in Singapore. Even though the U.S. does not technically operate or own any military bases in Singapore, it still enjoys nearly free access to Singaporean air and naval bases that were purpose-built with the U.S. military in mind. The U.S. maintains rotational operating forces in Singapore as well as a major logistics headquarters (COMLOGWESTPAC). Compared to Japan, Singapore provides less space and facilities, but space is much more limited in Singapore. When compared to the Philippines, U.S. access is fairly similar in

that the bases belong to the host nation and the U.S. is simply invited to use them as codified in the MOU and its addendum. However, rather than the U.S. cooperating with the AFP to improve structures and facilities on Philippine bases, Singapore has tailored their own bases to fit U.S. needs. Despite a lack of base ownership, the U.S. enjoys a medium level of logistical access to Singapore because of the continuous presence of COMLOGWESTPAC and the allowance of long-term U.S. rotational forces in Singapore.

The U.S. currently enjoys a high level of maneuver access in Singapore through the deployment of rotational forces, frequent port visits, and exercises. The U.S. Navy engages in regular rotational deployments of littoral combat ships and P-8's,¹⁴⁵ and the U.S. Air Force has conducted regular rotations of fighter squadrons for decades.¹⁴⁶ Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployments in the Western Pacific regularly call at Changi Naval Base and are provided with a hearty assortment of community relations and welfare activities for the thousands of sailors and Marines to experience. There are sailors and airmen stationed in Singapore that help facilitate unit deployments and port calls and allow for easy maneuver access.

The U.S. currently enjoys a medium level of logistical access in Singapore with the use of Changi Naval Base and Paya Lebar Air Base. Like the Philippines, the U.S. presence is not technically permanent and the ownership of the bases remains with Singapore. However, Singapore allows the U.S. slightly more access than the Philippines because of the persistent stationing of COMLOGWESTPAC and the way Singapore purpose-built its naval port for specific U.S. power projection capabilities.¹⁴⁷

U.S. access to Singapore has generally maintained an upward trend since the end of the Vietnam War. The event that highlighted the low point of U.S. access was in the early 1970s. A failed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation in Singapore and the

¹⁴⁵ Peng Er, "Singapore-China Relations in Geopolitics, Economics, Domestic Politics and Public Opinion," 4.

¹⁴⁶ Val Gempis, "Flexibility Helps 497th CTS Airmen Succeed in Singapore," Air Force Print News, June 8, 2004, <https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/136752/flexibility-helps-497th-cts-airmen-succeed-in-singapore/>.

¹⁴⁷ Tan, "America the Indispensable Power," 127.

lack of U.S. progress in Vietnam led Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew (LKY) to reject U.S. basing.¹⁴⁸ LKY's stance on permanent basing has in some ways persisted through Singapore's policies, but the ability for the U.S. to transit through and use Singaporean bases has greatly increased after the end of the Cold War. Through the 1990s, Singapore signed an MOU with the U.S. that helped maintain U.S. access to the region by allowing COMLOGWESTPAC to migrate from Subic Bay and build up the port at Changi to accept U.S. carriers.¹⁴⁹ Through the early 2000s, Washington and Singapore signed an SFA to address global terrorism and expand security cooperation.¹⁵⁰ Finally, the past two decades of the U.S.-Singaporean defense relationship was enhanced by the signing of an EDCA which allowed for the basing of U.S. littoral combat ships and surveillance aircraft in Singapore's ports.¹⁵¹

2. Factors Affecting Access

Singapore illustrates how the shared threat of regional instability positively influences defense partnerships and leads to the establishment of institutions that grow and support increased U.S. access. Singapore also provides a potentially useful model of U.S. defense partnerships in non-allied countries due to the comparatively small U.S. footprint and its correlation to low public opposition.

a. Shared Security Interests

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Singapore shared an interest in maintaining regional stability in East Asia. The era of global terrorism and WMD proliferation challenged regional security and placed an even greater importance on security cooperation. Great power competition and the rise of Chinese aggression has also

¹⁴⁸ Tan, 122.

¹⁴⁹ Capie, "The Power of Partnerships," 251.

¹⁵⁰ Department of State, "Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security," Department of State, July 12, 2005, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/95360.pdf>.

¹⁵¹ Capie, "The Power of Partnerships," 251.

challenged regional stability and affected Singapore's power calculations in favor of U.S. access.

After the Cold War, the decline of U.S. presence in East Asia worried Singaporean leaders. LKY feared the U.S. withdrawal from the region, and the resulting power vacuum it would create, because he believed that no other country in the world could pacify the seas and maintain international order like the U.S. had since WWII.¹⁵² This ultimately led Singapore to invite the U.S. to use Changi Naval Base as a replacement to offset the closure of Subic Bay. Shared interest in regional security increased U.S. access to Singapore, but after 9/11 the U.S. presence created a different security dilemma: the threat of global terrorism.

As a U.S. defense partner in support of the GWOT and an international entrepot, Singapore was a prime target for terror organizations and their Asian affiliates. Allegedly, an attack on a commercial hub and U.S. troops stationed in Singapore was being planned as the next major target following 9/11.¹⁵³ This increased U.S.-Singaporean defense relations by causing Singapore to join the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the International Port Security Program (IPSP).¹⁵⁴ These programs allow U.S. Customs and Coast Guard to inspect Singaporean port facilities to ensure U.S.-bound shipments are safe, and that high-risk vessels are protected. Thus, U.S. logistical access was slightly increased by virtue of the increased U.S. influence and personnel in Singapore's ports.

The GWOT also led Singapore to sign the SFA in 2005, which made Singapore a "Major Security Cooperation Partner".¹⁵⁵ The SFA enhanced U.S.-Singapore counter-terror and counter-proliferation cooperation and increased U.S. maneuver access by

¹⁵² Ang Cheng Guan, *Lee Kuan Yew's Strategic Thought* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2012), 74, ProQuest.

¹⁵³ Tan, "America the Indispensable Power," 126.

¹⁵⁴ Andrew T H Tan, "Singapore's Approach to Homeland Security," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2005, 355–56, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27913290>.

¹⁵⁵ Peng Er, "Singapore-China Relations in Geopolitics, Economics, Domestic Politics and Public Opinion," 5.

increasing joint military training and exercises.¹⁵⁶ The shared threat of transnational terror and weapons proliferation effectively enhanced U.S. access through the enhancement of the defense partnership and the increase in SC with Singapore.¹⁵⁷ The Singapore case illustrates that the threat of terrorism drew it closer to the U.S. and increased its dependency on U.S. presence.

Similar to Japan and the Philippines, the rise of Chinese aggression in the SCS has colored Singapore's perceptions of regional stability and has increased U.S. partnership and access. What makes Singapore unique, however, is that it is not a claimant state of the SCS, and does not have any dispute with China over sovereignty claims. What Singapore is most worried about is China's challenge to regional states' sovereignty and the disruption the freedom of navigation because of the potential negative effects on Singapore's successful trade economy.¹⁵⁸ Singapore's concerns over China have evidently led to increased U.S. access through the signing of the DCA, the basing of littoral combat ships, and the basing of P-8 surveillance aircraft, which are capabilities aimed at balancing China's presence in the SCS.¹⁵⁹

b. Public Support or Opposition

Public opinion of the U.S. military presence in Singapore is unique because it contributes less to access compared to Japan and the Philippines. Because of the authoritarian structure of Singapore, and the lack of large U.S. bases, the Singaporean government is less concerned with public opinion and the typical issues resulting from foreign basing. The pro-U.S. sentiments of LKY and his son, current prime minister Lee Hsien Loong, have had positive effects on U.S.-Singapore defense relations, security cooperation, and increased U.S. access.

¹⁵⁶ Tan, "Singapore's Approach to Homeland Security," 357.

¹⁵⁷ Evan S. Medeiros et al., "Singapore," in *Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 159, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg736af.15>.

¹⁵⁸ Kuok, "The U.S.-Singapore Partnership," 3.

¹⁵⁹ Capie, "The Power of Partnerships," 251.

Singaporeans are generally pro-U.S. and are supportive of U.S. military presence. According to a RAND study of 2018 opinion polls, Singaporean public opinion was significantly more in favor of the U.S. than with China.¹⁶⁰ Even though a vast majority of Singaporeans are ethnic Chinese, Singaporeans seemed to side with the U.S. because it is less threatening than China.¹⁶¹ Singaporeans also enjoy the benefit of U.S. presence without the “domestic policy costs” of basing politics.¹⁶² Ultimately, Singapore does not experience anti-U.S. or anti-basing domestic political pressures that constrain its policy makers from allowing U.S. access.

Even if there were anti-U.S. sentiments in the Singaporean public, it is unclear if it would have significant effects on Singapore’s policy decisions regarding U.S. access. Typically, Singaporean domestic political issues do not stoke political party rivalries or strong civic movements because of the long history of political domination by the People’s Action Party (PAP).¹⁶³ The PAP is exceptional in that it is a single-party government that has effectively mitigated the growth of inter-party factions.¹⁶⁴ The PAP has been effectively insulated from swings in public opinion unlike the more democratic Japan and the Philippines. Thus, U.S. access to Singapore is not significantly affected by public opinion.

c. Institutionalization

The U.S.-Singapore defense partnership has benefitted from the growth and development of key institutions penned in bilateral agreements, and by the fostering of relationships through programs like IMET. Each successive agreement from the MOU to the DCA has captured an increase of U.S. logistical access to Singaporean basing and infrastructure. The decades of U.S.–Philippine military relationships and diplomatic ties

¹⁶⁰ Lin et al., *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific*, fig. 6.1.

¹⁶¹ Medeiros et al., “Singapore,” 162.

¹⁶² Medeiros et al., 183.

¹⁶³ Medeiros et al., 163.

¹⁶⁴ Netina Tan, “Minimal Factionalism in Singapore’s People’s Action Party,” *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 39, no. 1 (April 1, 2020): 126, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420932684>.

has generated pro-U.S. sentiment. Thus, Singapore's desires to maintain U.S. presence not only for its own defense institutions, but for regional institutions as well.

The 1990 MOU initially established U.S. access to Singaporean bases and facilities and marked the beginning of a steady increase in U.S. access. The MOU has expanded with the strategic needs of the U.S. and Singapore, and has been the foundation of the development of other agreements like the SFA and DCA. In 1998, an addendum to the MOU was signed to include the newly built Changi Naval Base.¹⁶⁵ The SFA and DCA continued to build on the MOU by continuing to support U.S. presence and by increasing security and defense cooperation. These agreements led to the creation of institutions such as the Defense Cooperation Committee that focuses U.S.-Singaporean defense cooperation through technology collaboration.¹⁶⁶ Finally, the SFA established Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner of the U.S. which has been described as establishing Singapore as a "U.S. ally in all but formal terms."¹⁶⁷ The persistent deepening of agreements between the U.S. and Singapore precedes the steady increase of U.S. defense cooperation and access.

Along with the deepening of defense agreements, there has also been a deepening of Singaporean military relationships with the U.S. through bilateral exercises and IMET programs. Outside of the annual bilateral exercises, thousands of Singaporean servicemembers have participated in U.S.-based training, professional military education, and graduate education at defense technical schools. At multiple state-side U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard bases, Singaporean pilots train with U.S. pilots on multiple shared platforms such as the F-16, AH64-D, and F-15. Singapore has even operated its own detachment of fighter aircraft in the U.S. for nearly 30 years.¹⁶⁸ Much like the other case

¹⁶⁵ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "Factsheet - The Strategic Framework Agreement," Singapore Ministry of Defense, July 12, 2005, https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdffdoc/MINDEF_20050712001/MINDEF_20050712003.pdf.

¹⁶⁶ Singapore Ministry of Defense, "Factsheet - The Strategic Framework Agreement."

¹⁶⁷ Tan, "Singapore's Approach to Homeland Security," 357.

¹⁶⁸ Department of State, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Singapore."

countries, the long history of U.S. defense cooperation has institutionalized interactions between the countries and has fostered continued growth of the partnership.

In conclusion, U.S. access to Singapore is substantial and demonstrates the potential power of non-alliance defense partnerships. What allows the U.S. to enjoy a high level of maneuver and a medium level of logistical access to Singapore is the shared security interest of a stable Indo-Pacific and a strategic U.S. military presence to maintain that stability. Domestic politics are accommodative to U.S. access, but, with Singapore's political dynamic and the dominance of the PAP, domestic support is not as significant a factor as it is in Japan and the Philippines. Since the 1990s, the U.S. and Singapore have been steadily building defense institutions via written agreements and Singaporean immersion in American defense culture via IMET and U.S. training. Singapore provides a model for low political cost and high impact access in the region.

E. CONCLUSION

The previous cases demonstrate a general trend in U.S. access to East Asian defense partners. The first hypothesis mainly captures the “why” behind the need for U.S. cooperation, presence, and access in a host nation. The second hypothesis describes the political system in which an alliance or partnership operates and can either strengthen or weaken U.S. access. The third hypothesis covers the utility of institutions to both measure and bolster defense partnerships by codifying the access the U.S. enjoys.

1. H1: Shared Security Interests

Shared security interests have a direct, positive effect on U.S. access. These interests are typically born from a common threat perception of an outside actor or of a general destabilization of the region. The shared threat of the DPRK and China draws Japan closer to the U.S., which strengthens the alliance and maintains a high level of U.S. access. These threats justify the political and economic costs of hosting a large American force in Japan and Okinawa. Without a strong shared interest, the benefits of an alliance or partnership decline, which detracts from U.S. access. After the Cold War, the costs of maintaining Subic Bay and Clark Air Base were higher than Philippine threat perceptions

that were no longer concerned with a Soviet threat. This led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the Philippines. Later, the threat of international terror organizations and the rise of Chinese aggression in the SCS led the Philippines to reassess the costs of U.S. presence and caused an increase in U.S. cooperation and access. Similarly, the withdrawal of the U.S. from Asia after the Cold War caused LKY to fear destabilization of East Asia, and Singapore provided the U.S. access to offset the Philippine base closures. It is clear that shared security interests are a critical requirement for establishing and maintaining U.S. access.

2. H2: Public Support/Opposition

Public opinion of U.S. presence can have significant effects on U.S. access by constraining policy decisions especially in governments exposed to public opposition. Public opinion is not typically homogenous throughout the country, and is heavily affected by local basing politics. Anti-U.S. basing politics put pressure on host nations and can threaten or limit U.S. access like in Japan and the Philippines. Political and military elites also play an important role in affecting decisions regarding the U.S. defense partnership. Elite support of the U.S. alliance is prevalent in the Philippines and has prevented unilateral threats to U.S. access from President Duterte. If public and elite opinion are aligned, or if policy makers are insulated from public opinion like in Singapore, then political support is not a significant factor.

3. H3: Institutionalized Interactions

Institutions provide both a measurement of and a stabilizing effect on U.S. access to a partner nation. Written agreements codify components of maneuver and logistical access. Agreements also create formal institutional frameworks for defense cooperation. Intangible institutions developed through relationship building help stabilize U.S. access by influencing military and political leaders with U.S. defense policy knowledge. All three cases have some form of written agreement that outlines their defense partnership with the U.S. Each case also has a formal defense dialogue that allows for changes to be made to the partnership to adjust for changes in domestic and foreign policy. Other institutionalized interactions such as IMET, bilateral exercises, and other programs help expose foreign

military leaders to U.S. schools. All three cases have decades of history participating in U.S. SC and SA activities and it is apparent that this positively affects pro-U.S. sentiment and accommodative policy making for U.S. access.

The next chapter applies these three hypotheses to Indonesia to both measure U.S. maneuver and logistical access and to identify how effective these factors are at explaining changes in access.

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III. INDONESIA

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter assesses the level of U.S. maneuver and logistical access in Indonesia and explains what factors drive that access. Based on news coverage, journal articles, and unit AARs over the past two decades, the U.S. has experienced an overall medium level of maneuver and a low level of logistical access in Indonesia. Bilateral exercises and other military engagements grant the U.S. medium levels of maneuver access, but this access is limited to the duration of the exercises only. Unlike the countries discussed in Chapter II, Indonesia does not allow foreign basing, rotational deployments, or sustained logistical access through any agreements due to its nonalignment foreign policy and domestic political opposition to closer defense cooperation with the U.S.

B. ACCESS IN INDONESIA

Compared to Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore, Indonesia allows the U.S. much lower levels of maneuver and logistical access. The U.S. and Indonesia have engaged in large bilateral exercises and joint HA/DR operations on Indonesian territory, but the maneuver access the U.S. enjoyed has been limited to the duration of those engagements. The lowest point for U.S. access coincided with the low point in U.S.-Indonesian relations after Indonesian forces killed unarmed civilians during the Santa Cruz massacre in Dili, East Timor, in 1991.¹⁶⁹ The trend in access since rapprochement in the mid-2000s has been positive but asymptotically approaches the hardline limits of Indonesia's strategic foreign policy of nonalignment to maintain neutrality. Indonesia does not have an agreement with the U.S. to allow regular maneuver or logistical access through rotational forces or other base use agreements. The access the U.S. does enjoy in Indonesia is contingent on pre-planned exercises or coordinated responses to natural disasters.

¹⁶⁹ Angel Rabasa and John B. Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia Challenges, Politics, and Power* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 113, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2002/MR1599.pdf.

1. Maneuver Access

Indonesia currently offers a medium level of maneuver access to the U.S. The most pertinent measure of maneuver access is the establishment of and changes in bilateral and multilateral exercises and operations that allow the U.S. to maneuver forces in Indonesian space. Although Indonesia does not allow rotational foreign units, there have been opportunities for U.S. forces to transit to and about Indonesian territory in the air, on land, and at sea. The U.S. and Indonesia regularly engage in bilateral and multilateral training in the Indonesian archipelago, and these engagements have generally grown in size and scope over the past two decades. The two countries have also conducted joint maritime security patrols in the North Natuna Sea.¹⁷⁰ The highest level of maneuver access the U.S. has experienced was during two limited-duration HA/DR operations in response to natural disasters in the early 2000s. The low points in maneuver access occurred during the “lost decade” of the 1990s, when U.S.–Indonesian security cooperation was nearly terminated.

A major limit to U.S. maneuver access is Indonesia’s policy against hosting rotational force deployments from foreign militaries. Indonesia has a strong aversion to rotational forces reflected in its rejection of U.S. requests to host surveillance aircraft on Indonesian airfields and its opposition to U.S. rotational forces in Darwin.¹⁷¹ Indonesia’s policy is in line with its goal of maintaining a balance between the U.S. and China as they compete for regional influence. This policy has created an upper limit to U.S. access that, under normal conditions, prevents the U.S. or any other country from enjoying a high level of maneuver access in Indonesia.

There are multiple cases in the past two decades where Indonesia has allowed U.S. ships, aircraft, and ground forces to maneuver in Indonesian territory, if only for a short duration. The U.S. and Indonesia have engaged in regular bilateral military exercises since the 1990s, which has allowed the U.S. limited-duration maneuver access to the archipelago.

¹⁷⁰ Kanupriya Kapoor and Randy Fabi, “Indonesia Eyes Regular Navy Exercises with U.S. in South China Sea,” Reuters, April 13, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-us-southchinasea-idUSKBN0N400320150413>.

¹⁷¹ Syailendra, “A Nonbalancing Act,” 242; Muhibat, “Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration,” 151.

The two major exercises include GS and CARAT. Over the past few decades, these exercises have shown an increase in size and scope, which generally reflect an increase in SC. This increased cooperation creates higher-quality maneuver access for future exercises that approaches the upper limits of access that Indonesia will allow.

GS is an annual bilateral exercise between the U.S. Army and Indonesia's army, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD), that began in 2007. The exercise serves as the largest bilateral military exchange between the two countries and began with a focus on peacekeeping and civil-military operations.¹⁷² The exercise grew in 2013 from a smaller force scenario to a larger exercise focused on airborne operations, which included "a total of 500 paratroopers from both countries" and the use of U.S. transport aircraft.¹⁷³ Since then, the exercise has grown in scope and complexity. GS 19 included over 700 U.S. Army soldiers conducting combined live-fire of both countries' AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, a Javelin missile range, and a combined-arms platoon attack range with TNI-AD supported by U.S. artillery and close air support.¹⁷⁴ GS 21 grew even further to include nearly 2,300 and 2,200 U.S. and Indonesian troops respectively across the islands of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan.¹⁷⁵ GS 22 is expected to be of a similar size and complexity as in 2021 but will likely take place on an island group in the Natuna Sea, which will be a first for U.S. troops training with Indonesians in the area for a joint, large-scale exercise.¹⁷⁶ The increases in size and complexity of GS, as well as the variety of locations across the archipelago, have created a greater opportunity for more U.S. troops to conduct increasingly complex maneuvers on Indonesian soil.

¹⁷² Inkiriwang, "'Garuda Shield' vs 'Sharp Knife,'" 881–82.

¹⁷³ Inkiriwang, 882.

¹⁷⁴ US Fed News Service, "United States: 70-Year Partnership Achieves New Heights at Exercise Garuda Shield 19," U.S. *Fed News Service*, August 30, 2019, ProQuest.

¹⁷⁵ Koya Jibiki, "US and Indonesia to Hold Largest Island Defense Drills," *Nikkei Asia*, July 30, 2021, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/US-and-Indonesia-to-hold-largest-island-defense-drills>.

¹⁷⁶ John McBeth, "Garuda Shield: Indonesia Tilting to U.S. against China," *Asia Times*, April 20, 2022, <https://asiatimes.com/2022/04/garuda-shield-indonesia-tilting-to-us-against-china/>.

GS has become an increasingly significant exercise in the region by virtue of its location, size, and the capabilities trained by both Indonesia and the U.S. Army. The exercise continues to strengthen the bond between U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and the TNI's Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD) with the execution of critical capability sets such as parachute operations and beach landings.¹⁷⁷ The increases in size and complexity of GS have created opportunity for a larger U.S. Army force to exercise higher levels of maneuver access but only during the two weeks of the annual exercise.

CARAT is an annual, multinational naval exercise that presents a key access opportunity for the U.S. to maneuver through Indonesian space. While CARAT is smaller than GS in troop size, it represents high-level maritime cooperation in the strategically significant Indonesian archipelago that, with one exception, has grown in complexity since its inauguration in 1995. From 2000 to 2004, U.S. restrictions on security cooperation with Indonesia prevented the latter from participating in the exercise.¹⁷⁸ But when Indonesia rejoined CARAT in 2005, 1,500 personnel each from the U.S. and Indonesia conducted naval exercises and community relations engagements, improved roads, and provided medical services to Indonesians in Surabaya.¹⁷⁹ The following year, over 2,000 troops and four ships from each partner participated in increasingly complex operations including amphibious and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations.¹⁸⁰ A decade later, in 2016, new levels of interoperability were exercised including the use of a combined staff afloat, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) dive and salvage operations, and cross-deck helicopter landings.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ McBeth "Garuda Shield: Indonesia Tilting to U.S. against China."

¹⁷⁸ Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, "US, Indonesia Resume Maritime Exercises at Key Time," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 33, no. 3 (March 2005): 3, ProQuest.

¹⁷⁹ Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, "US, Indonesia Resume Maritime Exercises at Key Time."

¹⁸⁰ Brian Brannon, *U.S., Indonesian Navies Partner for CARAT* (Washington, United States: Federal Information & News Dispatch, LLC, 2006), <https://www.proquest.com/docview/190401998/citation/315C599C97544ACAPQ/1>.

¹⁸¹ Commander Destroyer Squadron Seven, *Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Indonesia 2016 After Action Report*, 2016.

The next several iterations of CARAT saw fluctuations in troop numbers and ship participation but continued an increasingly complex set of drills both at sea and ashore. In 2019, CARAT included surface warfare division tactics, integration of maritime patrol aircraft, and combined live-fire exercises between U.S. Marines and Indonesian Marines (KORMAR).¹⁸² CARAT has become even more complex with the addition of capabilities that increase U.S. forces' familiarity with Indonesia from the air, on the surface, and sub-surface. While U.S. troops are exercising in Indonesian territory for typically only about a week during CARAT, it is a week where critical U.S. maritime capabilities from ships, to P-8 surveillance aircraft, to a U.S. Marine Battalion Landing Team are all maneuvering in and about the Indonesian archipelago. The histories of GS and CARAT show growth in the capabilities that the U.S. is able to bring, but the ability for the U.S. to maneuver is still bound by the dates of the exercises.

The highest level of U.S. maneuver access to Indonesia was experienced during two short-duration HA/DR operations on Indonesian soil: the responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami's impact on Aceh and the 2009 earthquake in Padang, West Sumatra. In response to the tsunami, the United States launched Operation Unified Assistance, in which the Lincoln Strike Group sailed to the coast of Aceh to coordinate the multilateral HA/DR response for Indonesia.¹⁸³ During the operation, only about 2,500 U.S. troops were operating ashore because of the task force commander's decision to use the USS Lincoln as a sea-base to minimize U.S. intrusion.¹⁸⁴ U.S. aircraft generally had free rein to use Indonesian airspace to deliver supplies, and some pilots even made unilateral decisions (against Jakarta's instructions) to pick up and deliver injured Indonesians to the crowded hospital in the provincial capital city.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² Commander Destroyer Squadron Seven, *Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Indonesia 2019 After Action Report*, 2019.

¹⁸³ Elleman, "Waves of Hope," 55–56.

¹⁸⁴ Elleman, 92.

¹⁸⁵ Elleman, 59–61.

In 2009, the U.S. conducted HA/DR operations in response to the Padang earthquake, but was granted less access than it had during the 2004 tsunami response. Indonesia's newly developed internal HA/DR capabilities allowed it to coordinate relief efforts rather than relying so heavily on the U.S. to lead the operations.¹⁸⁶ The U.S. response did not include establishing a joint task force to take charge of operations, but rather worked through Indonesia's disaster relief agency BNPB, which had been established in 2008 and retained full control of the operation.¹⁸⁷ U.S. access was limited to a "one-month emergency phase" and U.S. aircraft were closely coordinated by Indonesia.¹⁸⁸ Both the 2004 and 2009 natural disasters provided opportunities for U.S. maneuver access through HA/DR, but they show a declining trend in the ability for the U.S. to enjoy access as Indonesia's HA/DR capabilities and capacity increase.

Overall, Indonesia has allowed the U.S. a medium level of maneuver access through regular bilateral exercises, joint patrols at sea, and limited-duration HA/DR operations. Indonesia appears to have a hard limit barring the U.S. or any other foreign military from attaining a high level of maneuver access due to its restrictions on rotational forces and limits on U.S. forces operating on Indonesian soil.

2. Logistical Access

The logistical access that the U.S. enjoys in Indonesia has remained low throughout the history of the defense partnership. The logistical access that the U.S. does experience comes from a combination of transactional use of ports and facilities, the infrastructure built to sustain shared platforms that Indonesia has obtained from the U.S., and decades of HNS contracting for bilateral exercises.

¹⁸⁶ Moroney et al., *Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 49; BNPB, Bappenas, and The Provincial and District/City Governments, *Damage, Loss and Preliminary Needs Assessment*, 8.

¹⁸⁷ Moroney et al., *Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 49.

¹⁸⁸ Moroney et al., 49–50.

U.S. Navy port visits to Indonesia allow the U.S. logistical access, but compared to the previous case countries, port access in Indonesia is not authorized by an access agreement like Singapore's MOU or Japan's basing agreements. Between the regularly scheduled bilateral training exercises and scheduled U.S. Navy port visits in Indonesia,¹⁸⁹ U.S. ships have docked in ports across the archipelago, from Bengkulu, to Jakarta, to Ambon.¹⁹⁰ However, there is a major point of contention with the docking of U.S. Naval vessels in Indonesian ports. Indonesia requests a detailed crew list from naval vessels that dock at its ports, which the U.S. Navy refuses to supply at any international ports.¹⁹¹ This administrative sticking point has caused friction in past port visits when U.S. sailors tried to debark but the TNI requested biographical information.¹⁹² The issue required engagement with the U.S. Embassy Naval Attaché to intervene with a compromise, which indicates a limitation for port visitation and thus a low level of access.¹⁹³

The U.S. does have an ACSA with Indonesia that was signed in 2009, which allows for U.S. forces to procure logistics, services, and other support through Indonesia.¹⁹⁴ The ACSA allows for the U.S. to create bilateral contract agreements for Indonesian logistics or services that the U.S. will pay back later.¹⁹⁵ The ACSA exercises the use of Indonesian contract vendors, and the conduct of exercises over time generates trusted vendor

¹⁸⁹ Capie, "The Power of Partnerships," 252.

¹⁹⁰ BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, "Indonesia: U.S. Navy Hospital Ship Arrives in Ambon Bay to Provide Medical Service," *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, July 28, 2010, ProQuest; U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, "U.S. Littoral Combat Ship, USS Coronado Makes Port Visit to Jakarta, Indonesia," U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, September 15, 2017, <https://id.usembassy.gov/u-s-littoral-combat-ship-uss-coronado-makes-port-visit-jakarta-indonesia/>; U.S. Fed News Service, "US Navy Ship Mercy, Pacific Partnership Mission Arrives in Indonesia," U.S. Fed News Service, March 31, 2018, ProQuest.

¹⁹¹ Blank, *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific*, 58.

¹⁹² Commander Destroyer Squadron 31, "Pacific Partnership 18, Indonesia, Sovereign Immunity, Planning" (Joint Lessons Learned Information System ID: 196024, July 10, 2018), <https://www.jllis.mil/apps/?do=lessons:lesson.view&doit=view&disp=lms&lmsid=196024>.

¹⁹³ Commander Destroyer Squadron 31.

¹⁹⁴ Foreign Affairs Committee, "Report to Congress Concerning Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Activities for Fiscal Year 2018," Foreign Affairs Committee, January 2019, Tab 1, <https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Jan-2019-DOD-Acquisition-and-Cross-Servicing-Report.pdf>.

¹⁹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation*, A-7.

relationships. Besides the benefit of the ACSA, the U.S. does not enjoy logistical access in Indonesia through other access agreements for staging forces or equipment. While Indonesia has some air and seaport infrastructure to host U.S. forces, AARs indicate that the infrastructure is limited in both capability and in the processes required to streamline debarkation and deployment of U.S. forces.¹⁹⁶

C. FACTORS AFFECTING ACCESS

The factors that affect U.S. access to Indonesia follow similar patterns as other countries in the region up except where access hits the hard limits set by Indonesia's non-alignment policy and domestic politics. The U.S. and Indonesia share security interests in promoting regional stability through HA/DR, defending against transnational terror, and preventing Chinese encroachment in the SCS. The Indonesian public has been generally supportive of the U.S., and Indonesia has a long history of participation in U.S. SC and SA programs which should promote U.S. access. However, Indonesia's domestic and foreign political dynamics limit the level of U.S. maneuver and logistical access allowing Indonesia to "navigate" between the Sino-U.S. rivalry. Indonesian policy makers tend to avoid overdependence on any great power and appease politically powerful anti-U.S. Indonesian civic groups.¹⁹⁷

1. Shared Security Interests

The U.S. and Indonesia share security interests that create a need for cooperation and access. Indonesia's security threats, both internally and in the SCS, create pressure on the government to modernize its military capabilities and cooperate in multilateral defense endeavors to prevent infringement in its sovereign waters. Since the early 2000s,

¹⁹⁶ 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, "KORMAR Exchange After Action Report" (Kaneohe Bay, HI, September 28, 2018), 1–2; Colin Duffield, Felix Kin Peng Hui, and Sally Wilson, "Infrastructure Investment in Indonesia: A Focus on Ports," *Southeast Asian Economies* 37, no. 3 (December 10, 2020): 181, <https://doi.org/10.1355/AE37-3g>.

¹⁹⁷ Emirza Adi Syailendra, "Indonesia's Jalan Tengah in the New Age of Great Power Rivalries," *New Mandala*, November 24, 2021, <https://www.newmandala.org/indonesias-jalan-tengah-in-the-new-age-of-great-power-rivalries/>; Michele Ford and Thomas B. Pepinsky, *Beyond Oligarchy: Wealth, Power, and Contemporary Indonesian Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 158–59, ProQuest.

transnational terrorist groups have encouraged closer U.S.–Indonesian defense ties and led to increased cooperation and U.S. maneuver access. PRC threats to Indonesia’s maritime security have had similar positive effects on SC and positively affected U.S. maneuver and logistical access in Indonesia.

The GWOT provided an opportunity for the U.S. and Indonesia to mend their defense ties and ultimately increased U.S. maneuver access. In the late 1990s, U.S.–Indonesian defense relations were restricted by the political fallout of Indonesia’s human rights abuses during the East Timor crisis. After the U.S. began operations in the GWOT, the TNI seized the opportunity of the shared security threat posed by international terror organizations to alleviate Indonesia’s isolation and to create new cooperative opportunities for military engagement.¹⁹⁸ In response, the U.S. lifted restrictions on Indonesia for IMET, supplying arms, and financing to support anti-terrorism operations.¹⁹⁹ The attacks on 9/11 spurred then Indonesian President Megawati to allow overflight rights for U.S. aircraft operating in the GWOT.²⁰⁰ The shared threat of terrorism in both countries thus drove an increase in cooperation and increased U.S. maneuver access.

Conflict in the SCS also drove an increase in security cooperation, which laid the groundwork for greater U.S. access to Indonesia. In 2009, China declared its Nine-Dash Line in the SCS, which overlaps Indonesia’s EEZ in what Indonesia calls the North Natuna Sea.²⁰¹ Indonesia rejected China’s claims with a note to the UN in 2010,²⁰² but since the declaration, China has conducted illegal fishing incursions into Indonesia’s EEZ where China claims it has historical fishing rights.

¹⁹⁸ Marcus Mietzner, “Part Three: The Post-Authoritarian Transition, 1998–2004,” in *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, 2009), 230–31, ProQuest.

¹⁹⁹ Muhibat, “Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration,” 143.

²⁰⁰ Rabasa and Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia Challenges, Politics, and Power*, 117.

²⁰¹ Aaron Connelly, “Indonesia’s New North Natuna Sea: What’s in a Name?,” *The Interpreter*, July 19, 2017, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-s-new-north-natuna-sea-what-s-name>.

²⁰² Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, “Naval Development in Indonesia,” in *Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia*, ed. Geoffrey Till and Atriandi Ristian Supriyanto (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58406-5_5.

Indonesia's ability to control its North Natuna Sea and maintain stability in the southern part of the SCS is a shared interest of both Indonesia and the U.S., which has had a positive effect on U.S. maneuver access to the Natunas.²⁰³ Both Washington and Jakarta seek an increased U.S. presence in the region to satisfy the U.S. rebalance of forces in Asia and Jokowi's maritime initiatives.²⁰⁴ Through the mid-2010s, as China continued to develop its ability to project maritime capabilities throughout the SCS, the perception of a shared threat led to the start of a U.S.–Indonesian maritime security patrol exercise.²⁰⁵ The exercise took place in 2015 in Batam, which is 300 miles southwest of the disputed area, and included surface vessels and surveillance aircraft.²⁰⁶ Even though Indonesian officials claimed that the exercises were not targeting a specific threat, it is clear that Indonesia wants to increase its military capabilities in the region to be able to react to Chinese pressure.²⁰⁷ In response to illegal Chinese fishing in 2016, Indonesia Defense Minister Ryacudu deployed a battalion-sized task force including three frigates, five F-16s, and a TNI battalion to Ranai, a nearby dilapidated base on the main island in the Natuna Sea. He told reporters that “Natuna is a door; if the door is not guarded, then thieves will come in” and was clearly referring to the Chinese, just not by name.²⁰⁸ Joint patrols with the employment of U.S. surveillance aircraft in this strategically significant area of the SCS created positive gains in maneuver access for the U.S. through SC activity.

2. Public Support or Opposition

Indonesian public opinion is a powerful constraint on its foreign and defense policy makers, which pushes Indonesia towards non-alignment policies and creates direct, negative effects on U.S. access. Simply because Indonesian defense policy makers or

²⁰³ Lin et al., *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific*, 48.

²⁰⁴ Muhibat, “Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration,” 151.

²⁰⁵ Kapoor and Fabi, “Indonesia Eyes Regular Navy Exercises with U.S. in South China Sea.”

²⁰⁶ Kapoor and Fabi.

²⁰⁷ Muhibat, “Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration,” 148.

²⁰⁸ Aaron Connelly, “Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going It Alone,” Lowy Institute, December 5, 2016, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-south-china-sea-going-it-alone>.

political elites share interests with the U.S. does not enable them to overcome the constraints of domestic politics on their decision making. Indonesia's policies have generally limited U.S. access in order to maintain strategic autonomy and prevent overreliance. There have also been more concrete instances where public opinion dictated policy action that directly limited U.S. access. In the early 2000s, anti-American domestic political pressures limited President Megawati's policy alignment with U.S. GWOT operations and forced her to diplomatically "reject" U.S. unilateral actions.²⁰⁹ Despite the evidence that a majority of Indonesians were supportive of the U.S., an influential minority created enough political pressure in the fledgling democracy to prevent U.S.-aligned policies from being politically viable.

Indonesian public opinion of the U.S. has varied since the early 2000s, but Indonesians have generally favorable attitudes towards the U.S.²¹⁰ Figure 1 indicates that there has been a generally low number of Indonesians who strongly view the U.S. either favorably or unfavorably. Figure 2 combines the findings to determine the number of net favorability by subtracting the "somewhat unfavorable" and "very unfavorable" responses from the "somewhat favorable" and "very favorable" responses in Figure 1. This net favorability shows that Indonesians on the whole have been supportive of the U.S. since 2009. However, the large anti-American minority identified by the results of public opinion surveys is amplified by Indonesian Islamist groups that are opposed to the U.S. and that provide additional pressure on policy makers through their membership networks and social media.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ Kai He, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy after Soeharto: International Pressure, Democratization, and Policy Change," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8, no. 1 (May 16, 2007): 66, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcm021>.

²¹⁰ Pew Research Center, "Opinion of the United States," Global Indicators Database, March 8, 2022, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/1>.

²¹¹ Ford and Pepinsky, *Beyond Oligarchy*, 173.




Figure 1. Indonesian Opinion of the United States²¹²




Figure 2. Net U.S. Favorability.²¹³

²¹² Adapted from Pew Research Center, "Opinion of the United States."

²¹³ Adapted from Pew Research Center.

The role of political Islam has become a most divisive cleavage in Indonesian politics.²¹⁴ After the fall of the New Order, Islamic movements ceased being repressed by the government and have developed a greater role in Indonesian politics.²¹⁵ In addition to the large moderate Islamic groups that were active during Suharto's regime, the fall of the New Order brought forward hard-liner, ultra-conservative Islamist groups. These groups fed on and propagated anti-American rhetoric based on ideological perceptions of the U.S.-Israeli partnership and the GWOT as a war on Islam.²¹⁶ Conservative Islam in Indonesian politics has become a major factor for Indonesian political elites. Even political elites not politically or ideologically aligned with certain Islamist groups cooperate with them to access Islamic networks for mobilization, financing, and even "coercive resources" to entice voting.²¹⁷ It is clear that political pressure and the fear of losing a large Islamic constituency plays a role in shaping Indonesian policy makers' decisions, including those related to U.S. access.

Islamist political pressure created difficulty for President Megawati to support increased U.S. access early on during the GWOT. While she stood by the U.S. and "strongly condemned" the attacks on 9/11, she also criticized the U.S. for its subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.²¹⁸ It was not until the Bali attacks in 2002 when terrorism was perceived in Indonesia as something other than "an American issue"²¹⁹ and Megawati could find political viability in deepening cooperation with the U.S. besides simply allowing overflight of Indonesian territory. Megawati's balancing of external pressure from the U.S. and internal domestic pressure against the U.S. highlights the struggle for

²¹⁴ Edward Aspinall et al., "Mapping the Indonesian Political Spectrum," New Mandala, April 25, 2018, <https://www.newmandala.org/mapping-indonesian-political-spectrum/>.

²¹⁵ Alexander R. Arifianto, "The State of Political Islam in Indonesia: The Historical Antecedent and Future Prospects," *Asia Policy* 27, no. 4 (October 2020): 130, <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2020.0059>.

²¹⁶ Ann Marie Murphy, "Democratization and Indonesian Foreign Policy: Implications for the United States," *Asia Policy* 13, no. 1 (2012): 98, <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2012.0011>.

²¹⁷ Ford and Pepinsky, *Beyond Oligarchy*, 173.

²¹⁸ He, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy after Soeharto," 66.

²¹⁹ Ann Marie Murphy, "US Rapprochement with Indonesia: From Problem State to Partner," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32, no. 3 (2010): 372, <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs32-3c>.

Indonesian top leadership to back pro-American policy even when it addresses shared threats.

An example of political pressure that resulted in a direct decline in U.S. access was the ousting of Naval Medical Research Unit 2 (NAMRU-2) from Jakarta in 2009. Established in the 1970s, NAMRU-2 was a Jakarta-based joint medical research operation in which the U.S. Navy focused on tracking and curing infectious diseases. One of the major focuses of the facility was identifying avian flus, which have proven particularly detrimental to Indonesia when they developed into pandemics.²²⁰ In 2006, a vaccine-sharing dilemma between Indonesia and an Australian pharmaceutical company caused Indonesians to feel taken advantage of, which generated Indonesian disdain for the World Health Organization (WHO). When Western pharmaceutical companies tried to sell a drug produced from the shared virus back to Indonesia at a significant markup, it highlighted for Indonesians the “inequalities of the global health regime.”²²¹ In 2008, Indonesian Health Minister Supari harnessed the appearance of inequality in the WHO to inflate anti-Western and nationalist sentiment. She politicized the issue and published a book with unfounded conspiracy theory accusations about sinister plots by the U.S. and WHO to use vaccines as weapons against the developing world.²²² Despite the collective good that NAMRU-2 had done for Indonesian and global health research and development, the negotiations to renew the agreements allowing American medical servicemembers to stay were cancelled by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in the leadup to the 2009 Indonesian presidential elections.²²³ SBY, constrained by anti-American sentiment, followed the trend of Indonesian officials affected by anti-Western political rhetoric. Even though NAMRU-2 provided millions of dollars to fund much-needed medical research that directly benefited Indonesia, anti-Americanism prevented NAMRU-2 from being politically viable, and the U.S. lost access to the Jakarta facility.

²²⁰ Murphy, “Democratization and Indonesian Foreign Policy,” 108.

²²¹ Murphy, 107.

²²² Murphy, 108.

²²³ Murphy, 109–10.

Indonesian policy makers have faced a challenging balancing act between pragmatic policymaking and appeasing influential civic groups. Public opinion helps explain the dichotomy between Indonesia's anti-American policy actions and the recognition of senior leaders for the need of a U.S. regional presence.²²⁴ Domestic pressure from large minority groups has created anti-American sentiments that many Indonesian politicians cannot ignore without paying a considerable political cost.

3. Institutionalization

The U.S. and Indonesia developed some bilateral institutions that have maintained the defense partnership, but the partnership is limited to lower levels of access. While lacking a treaty alliance, they have developed strategic and comprehensive partnerships that enable cooperation across the range of government. Institutionalized military interactions such as long-standing bilateral exercises, IMET, and other SC programs grant the U.S. limited access, but this access pales in comparison to the other case studies that have long histories of institutionalized interaction with the U.S. through treaties and other access agreements.

Unlike U.S. relations with Japan and the Philippines, U.S.-Indonesian relations following WWII did not establish a treaty alliance, basing agreement, or any other access framework. When Singapore was opening its ports to the U.S. after the closure of Philippine bases in the post-Cold War era, U.S.-Indonesian relations were under severe political strain. Indonesia's violent repression of Timorese protestors in the early 1990s created a humanitarian crisis that caused the U.S. to cease arms sales and IMET funding to Indonesia.²²⁵ Despite limited cooperation through Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and other small-scale activities, the U.S.-Indonesian relationship entered a "lost decade" of SC.²²⁶ U.S.-Indonesian defense ties did not begin to rebound until after the fall

²²⁴ Muhibat, "Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration," 151.

²²⁵ Murphy, "US Rapprochement with Indonesia," 365.

²²⁶ Rabasa and Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia Challenges, Politics, and Power*, 113, 118.

of the New Order and Indonesia's democratization in the early 2000s when the countries returned to conducting bilateral exercises.

Indonesia and the U.S. have engaged in SC dating back to the early 1950s, but the major strategic frameworks that institutionalized military interactions were not established until between 2010 and 2015. The Obama and SBY administrations in 2010 created a comprehensive partnership that established joint working groups on bilateral military engagements.²²⁷ In 2015, President Jokowi visited Washington and increased cooperation with a strategic partnership that focused on “co-development and co-production of defense equipment,” and signed an MOU for maritime cooperation.²²⁸ These frameworks allow high-level meetings where both countries can track progress and increase bilateral engagements.

U.S.–Indonesian bilateral military engagements are the primary mechanism for U.S. maneuver access and are also a key component in building military-to-military relationships. CARAT and GS are only a part of many different defense engagements between the two defense partners that help to normalize U.S. presence and build interoperability between forces. Defense engagements have grown drastically from the few in the early 2000s, to over 170 activities annually in 2015, and over 200 in 2019.²²⁹ Far from an alliance that establishes basing rights and host nation support, the U.S.–Indonesian partnership still provides some access during the limited, yet numerous, joint defense activities it undertakes.

²²⁷ Muhibat, “Indonesia-U.S. Security Collaboration,” 144.

²²⁸ Prashanth Parameswaran, “The New U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership After Jokowi’s Visit: Problems and Prospects,” Brookings, December 8, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-new-u-s-indonesia-strategic-partnership-after-jokowis-visit-problems-and-prospects/>.

²²⁹ “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia,” The White House, October 26, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia>; *The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report* (Washington, DC: The Department of Defense, 2019), 37, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

D. CONCLUSION: WHAT FACTORS DRIVE U.S. ACCESS TO INDONESIA

1. H1: Shared Security Interests

The shared security interests between the U.S. and Indonesia of addressing transnational terrorism and Chinese aggression in the SCS have shown positive effects on U.S. maneuver access; however, Indonesia's perceptions of the threats limit how much access is achieved. When terror organizations pose a direct threat in Indonesian territory or the PRC continues to trespass in the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia is more likely to allow U.S. access in that area during joint patrols or even future GS exercises.²³⁰ When there is not a direct threat to Indonesian territory, Indonesia remains focused on the avoidance of becoming entangled in the competition of great powers.²³¹ Indonesia's non-alignment strategy greatly hinders the U.S. from achieving higher levels of logistical access through basing and limits higher maneuver access through rotational deployments.

Indonesia's interests in responding to natural disasters has provided the U.S. multiple opportunities through HA/DR operations to deploy forces on Indonesian soil. But as Indonesia's HA/DR capabilities increased, the role for U.S. forces declined and maneuver access has decreased.

2. H2: Public Support/Opposition

Indonesians generally have positive views of the U.S., but unlike the other case countries, overall public support does not mean increased U.S. access. Instead, a large anti-U.S. minority generates enough political pressure on Indonesian leaders to prevent policies that would increase U.S. access. The political power of Islamic civic organizations gives this large minority leverage over Indonesia's elected officials and prevents them from making policies that could be construed as pro-U.S. even if those policies are in Indonesia's interests. Indonesian officials must also be careful that their past interactions with the U.S.,

²³⁰ Rabasa and Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia Challenges, Politics, and Power*, 117; Kapoor and Fabi, "Indonesia Eyes Regular Navy Exercises with U.S. in South China Sea."

²³¹ Yohanes Sulaiman, "What Threat? Leadership, Strategic Culture, and Indonesian Foreign Policy in the South China Sea," *Asian Politics & Policy* 11, no. 4 (October 2019): 614, <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12496>.

such as SBY's extensive U.S. education, are not used by the anti-U.S. minority against them at the ballot box. Indonesian domestic politics pose a particularly challenging situation to the U.S., because even if it increases its appeal to the Indonesian public and has a positive influence on its leadership through IMET, dialogues, or other interactions, it does not overcome the influential anti-U.S. minority groups' ability to lobby against policies that would increase U.S. access.

3. H3: Institutionalized Interaction

The U.S.-Indonesian partnership lacks the history of institutionalized interaction and the strength in agreements that the U.S. has with its other defense partners discussed in the case studies. While the institutionalized interactions between the U.S. and Indonesia have helped to gradually increase U.S. maneuver access through bilateral exercises, this access is limited to the weeks that U.S. forces are conducting the exercise and does not extend to a sustained or general use of Indonesian territory. The comprehensive strategic partnership frameworks formed between 2010 and 2015 advanced defense cooperation in critical areas of shared security interests through annual bilateral defense dialogues that facilitate training exercises, education, and FMS.²³² IMET and other U.S. training and education continue to shape Indonesian defense officials, which potentially makes them targets of anti-U.S. political rhetoric rather than bolstering pro-U.S. defense policies.

²³² Department of Defense, *The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report*, 37–38.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. FACTORS DRIVING U.S. ACCESS IN INDONESIA

The three hypothesized factors explored in this thesis have had varying levels of effect on U.S. maneuver and logistical access in Indonesia compared to the other case countries. The contrast between Indonesia and the other cases explains why the U.S. only experiences a medium level of maneuver and low level of logistical access there.

1. Shared Security Interests

As seen in Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore, shared security interests should have direct, positive effects on both maneuver and logistical access for the U.S. This is because common threat perceptions lay and maintain a foundation for security cooperation, which justifies the sustainment of a treaty alliance or defense partnership. For Indonesia, transnational terror organizations, maritime security threats, and natural disaster response have brought U.S. and Indonesian threat perceptions into alignment and granted the U.S. some maneuver access; however, the access is only enjoyed during the limited-duration of operations and engagements. Furthermore, Indonesian perceptions of rising Chinese aggression in the SCS are trumped by Indonesia's fear of becoming entangled in great power competition and the fear of losing out on Chinese support for Indonesia's economic development.²³³ Thus, Indonesia's threat perceptions limit the positive effects that shared security interests have on U.S. maneuver and logistical access.

2. Public Support

Similar to the population in other case countries, the majority of Indonesians are generally supportive of the U.S. However, unlike those other countries, the pro-U.S. majority does not generate greater U.S. access because of the heavy influence of a substantial anti-American minority in Indonesian domestic politics. Indonesia's domestic politics also differ from Japan and the Philippines in that Indonesians do not have to wrestle

²³³ Sulaiman, "What Threat?," 614.

with anti-basing politics because Indonesia does not host any foreign military bases. Instead, Islamist organizations in Indonesia lobby against U.S. foreign policy actions regardless of whether or not they align with Indonesia's interests or provide a direct benefit to Indonesia like the medical research done by NAMRU-2. It is reasonable to assume that Islamist pressure would only increase on Indonesian policy makers if there were a permanent presence of U.S. forces through a basing agreement. Even if the U.S. were to pursue an approach similar to its establishment of rotational force deployments in Singapore to avoid anti-basing politics, it is not likely a viable political position for Indonesian leaders.

3. Institutionalized Interaction

Indonesia has the weakest institutionalization of its interactions with the U.S. compared to the other case countries because it is not a treaty ally like Japan or the Philippines, and it does not have any formal agreements that authorize U.S. access such as a SOFA, VFA, or an MOU for base access like in Singapore. The U.S. and Indonesia also experienced a "lost decade"²³⁴ in their defense relationship after the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor, which stunted the growth of bilateral defense institutions until after 9/11. Without bases, rotational deployments, or access agreements, bilateral exercises are the only source of regular U.S. access to Indonesia. Since the 2000s, exercises GS and CARAT have provided the U.S. limited-duration maneuver access to Indonesia, which has been increasing in size and scope. The comprehensive strategic partnership signed in 2015 provides a framework of dialogues to plan and coordinate regular SC and SA activities. While the U.S. and Indonesia have taken steps forward to improve bilateral defense institutions and improve bilateral exercises, U.S. maneuver and logistical access is still limited to the duration of the exercises.

²³⁴ Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, "The Rocky Course of US-Indonesian Military Relations," in *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia*, 1st ed., Challenges, Politics, and Power (RAND Corporation, 2002), 118, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mr1599srf.20>.

B. U.S. ACCESS NEEDS VS. INDONESIAN ACCESS REALITIES

The current levels of U.S. access to Indonesia are not supportive of EABO in response to competition or conflict in the SCS. EABO requires maneuver and logistical access to enable the employment and sustainment of U.S. naval expeditionary forces that are distributed, mobile, persistent, and sustainable.²³⁵ Indonesia's medium level of maneuver access hinders the U.S. from employing mobile and persistent stand-in forces in Indonesian territory outside of the limits of CARAT and GS exercise windows and locations. Indonesia's low levels of logistical access limits the ability of U.S. forces to sustain distributed operations. If the U.S. expects to operate using EABO in the southern reaches of the SCS, it will require certain maneuver and logistical access requirements to be met.

1. Maneuver Access Requirements

EABO requires a high level of maneuver access to allow for the deployment of rotational forces that persist in the HN littorals, the ability for that force to maneuver throughout the HN's territory, and for the force to conduct operations to deter or defeat an adversary from the HN's territory. Current EABO doctrine characterizes the forces required to conduct these operations as "stand-in forces" that are forward-deployed, persistent, and littoral. These forces operate under an adversary's threat envelope to provide a deterrent effect during times of competition and lethal force during armed conflict.²³⁶ Stand-in forces are meant to occupy and maneuver through key littoral terrain, present an adversary with a complex dilemma, and to prevent the adversary from being emboldened to escalate conflict in the region.²³⁷ An example of a country that offers the U.S. a level of maneuver access that would likely enable the conduct of EABO is the Philippines.

²³⁵ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations*, 1–3.

²³⁶ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1–4.

²³⁷ Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1–5.

The U.S. no longer operates large forces stationed at U.S.-owned bases in the Philippines, but the Philippines still provides the U.S. with a high level of maneuver access through the EDCA and the IRP. These agreements allow U.S. forces to conduct longer rotational deployments to the Philippines, which allow the U.S. to persist within the PRC's threat rings and compete with PLAN influence in the SCS. Without agreements authorizing rotational force deployments, the U.S. would only have limited-duration maneuver access during exercises like Balikatan. In contrast, Indonesia has no access agreements with the U.S. and only allows the U.S. to deploy naval forces in Indonesian territory during the execution of exercises like CARAT, which only occur a few weeks out of the year. If Indonesia and the U.S. engaged in more military exercises to increase the length of time U.S. naval forces were present in Indonesian territory, those exercises would increase the duration of maneuver access. However, without rotational force agreements, the level of deterrence and capability that exercise forces provide would remain limited to the exercise location and therefore would not provide the mobility required for EABO. This would limit the deterrent effect of the forces.

2. Logistical Access Requirements

The requirements to sustain mobile, forward, and distributed forces during EABO create added complexity in the planning of operational-level logistics, which is not simply solved by achieving a higher level of logistical access. While an ally like Japan provides a high level of logistical support, as well as a high level of HNS support, much of the land-based, logistical infrastructure (ports and facilities) that enables ground-based aircraft and the reloading of ship munitions in port is predictable and easily targetable.²³⁸ The fixed infrastructure in Japan and well-worn lines of communication leading from bases to ports create easy targets for Chinese planners. Instead of high logistical access through static infrastructure and a heavy U.S. force footprint, EABO logistical planning requires the

²³⁸ Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, *Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations Handbook*, 1.1 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 2018), 20.

establishment of expeditionary advanced bases (EAB) that create an operational advantage through flexible, redundant, and dispersed logistics nodes.²³⁹

EABs rely less on the efficiency of U.S. foreign basing and more on the resiliency of forward-staged logistics cites and the procurement of sustainment and support through contracts and HNS.²⁴⁰ To satisfy the logistical access requirements that enable EABO, the HN must allow the U.S. to stage supplies in austere locations and be able to support U.S. sustainment needs through contracted vendors or other HNS. The U.S. has this access in the Philippines, and is able to store critical equipment and supplies aboard AFP bases and other facilities predominantly for HA/DR or surveillance missions.²⁴¹

Indonesia does not currently offer the U.S. the ability to stage logistics in its territory, but it does have a history of providing HNS for exercises through the ACSA. The ACSA provides U.S. exercise forces flexibility in its logistical planning in case the exercise support agreements made during bilateral exercise planning require a change.²⁴² The more exercises the U.S. conducts in Indonesia that rely on HNS through contracting, the more fidelity the U.S. has in understanding the logistical support capabilities of the Indonesian local economies in case they are required during an EABO scenario.

C. U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the current trend in U.S. maneuver and logistical access in Indonesia, there are multiple approaches the DOD can take to achieve greater access and address the challenges of EABO. The DOD should maintain the trajectory of current SC activities with Indonesia but seek to increase the duration exercise forces are present there. The U.S. should avoid putting pressure on Indonesian policy makers to divert from their non-alignment policy by allowing U.S. rotational forces or by forcing Indonesia to choose between China and the U.S. for SC or SA activities.

²³⁹ Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 28. *Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations Handbook*, 1.1

²⁴⁰ Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 28.

²⁴¹ Robson, ““We Plan to Move Fairly Quickly.””

²⁴² 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, “KORMAR Exchange After Action Report,” 2.

1. What the U.S. Should Pursue

To increase U.S. access in Indonesia to better suit the needs of EABO in the SCS, the U.S. should pursue three courses of action. First, the U.S. should continue the trend of increasing the size and complexity of GS and CARAT exercises. Because these exercises allow large numbers of U.S. forces into Indonesian territory, they are the best source of regular maneuver access for the U.S. By increasing troop numbers and exercise complexity, U.S. Army and naval forces require greater logistical support through Indonesian HNS. This may provide opportunities in the future to create an agreement to stage exercise equipment and provisions in Indonesia outside the confines of the exercise windows. Also, the proposed changes in location for GS provide the U.S. an opportunity to aid Indonesia in developing the infrastructure around the exercise location, such as roads, ammunition storage, and range complexes, to support the exercise participants. Building up the support and infrastructure for the exercises would also allow for an increase in duration for the exercise, which would extend U.S. maneuver access. These major exercises, and the growth trajectory they show, have potential to improve and extend U.S. maneuver and logistical access to Indonesia as long as they are not perceived as a rotational deployment or foreign base by policy makers.

Second, the U.S. Marine Corps should increase its participation in existing U.S.-Indonesian exercises, and support the manning requirements to increase the size of its own exercises with Indonesia. The U.S. Marine Corps typically participates in CARAT, but also conducts its own annual platoon exchange with the KORMAR.²⁴³ The platoon exchange alternates locations between Indonesia and Hawaii year-to-year reducing the time U.S. Marines get to spend in Indonesia. The participation of Marines in SC activities in Indonesia pales in comparison to the U.S. Army during Garuda Shield despite the shift in the commandant's focus to the newly minted 3d Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR).

²⁴³ U.S. Embassy Consulates in Indonesia, "U.S. and Indonesian Marines Begin Bilateral Military Training Exchange," U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, August 13, 2019, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1933555/us-and-indonesian-marines-begin-bilateral-military-training-exchange/>.

The 3d MLR should be a main focal point in U.S.-Indonesian bilateral exercises and training. This unit is task organized to conduct EABO as a stand-in force, and is regionally aligned to the first and second island chains in the Indo-Pacific.²⁴⁴ Once operationally capable, INDOPACOM should prioritize the engagement of 3d MLR with the Indonesian TNI and KORMAR to establish relationships and build up institutionalized interaction through existing and new bilateral exercises. By using 3d MLR forces to augment CARAT and GS, INDOPACOM can test and evaluate its newest force in a critical part of the first island chain using pre-existing institutions. Once 3d MLR gains enough momentum, INDOPACOM should develop a separate Marine bilateral exercise with Indonesia. A 3d MLR exercise in Indonesia would not only benefit the U.S. Marine Corps as a whole by testing its new doctrine and equipment, but it would also extend the length of time the U.S. has critical capabilities capable of influencing the southern end of the SCS.

Finally, the U.S. should continue to pursue FMS cases in Indonesia because of the potential benefits shared aircraft platforms have on logistical access. In 2012, Indonesia requested eight AH-64D Apache helicopters, which included the tools, equipment, spare parts, and logistical support for the aircraft.²⁴⁵ In the past two years, Indonesia has also requested eight MV-22 Ospreys and up to 36 F-15 Strike Eagles with the logistical support, tools, and equipment required to operate and maintain the systems.²⁴⁶ The infrastructure required for Indonesia to fly these aircraft could potentially be used to support the staging, maintenance, or operation of U.S. aircraft during training and operations in the region.

²⁴⁴ Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines Stand Up First Marine Littoral Regiment,” USNI News, March 4, 2022, <https://news.usni.org/2022/03/04/marines-stand-up-first-marine-littoral-regiment>.

²⁴⁵ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Indonesia – AH-64D APACHE Block III LONGBOW Attack Helicopters,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, September 21, 2012, <https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/indonesia-ah-64d-apache-block-iii-longbow-attack-helicopters>.

²⁴⁶ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Indonesia – MV-22 Block C Osprey Aircraft,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, July 6, 2020, <https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/indonesia-mv-22-block-c-osprey-aircraft>; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Indonesia – F-15ID Aircraft,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, February 10, 2022, <https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/indonesia-f-15id-aircraft>.

2. What the U.S. Should Avoid

To ensure the U.S. does not backslide in its maneuver and logistical access to Indonesia, there are two things the U.S. should avoid. First, the U.S. must avoid pursuing basing or rotational forces in Indonesia. Because of Indonesia's hard stance against hosting foreign, forward-deployed forces,²⁴⁷ pushing Indonesian leaders to allow for seemingly permanent force presence could cause unnecessary friction in the bilateral relationship. This friction is exacerbated by anti-American political Islamist rhetoric, which creates an untenable position for Indonesian policy makers regardless of whether or not closer alignment to the U.S. would be in Indonesia's best interest.

Second, the U.S. should not force Indonesia to choose between the U.S. and China for SC or SA activities. Indonesia's fear of great power entanglement forces Jakarta to diversify its defense article suppliers regardless of the additional costs of not consolidating.²⁴⁸ While the U.S. should continue to push FMS and facilitate the direct commercial sales of U.S. aircraft and other major end items to Indonesia, the focus should be on the defense modernization goals of the recipient rather than competition. Ultimately, the effort and political capital the U.S. spends on Indonesia should not be used to fight against the core institutions of Indonesia's no foreign basing and non-alignment policies. Instead, the U.S. should focus on extending the duration of the access it already has in Indonesia.

In closing, Indonesia currently provides the U.S. with medium maneuver access and low logistical access, neither of which meet the requirements for EABO in the SCS. Barring conditions where China directly attacks Indonesia or challenges its sovereign territory, Indonesia's domestic politics and non-alignment policy will remain a hard limit to U.S. access that prevents the achievement of higher levels like the U.S. experiences in

²⁴⁷ House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, "House Leadership Ensures No Foreign Military Bases in Indonesia," House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, April 9, 2020, <https://www.dpr.go.id/en/berita/detail/id/29952/t/House+Leadership+Ensures+No+Foreign+Military+Bases+in+Indonesia+>.

²⁴⁸ Evan Laksmana, "Are Military Assistance Programs Important for US-Indonesia Ties?," East Asia Forum, April 18, 2018, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/04/18/are-military-assistance-programs-important-for-us-indonesia-ties/>.

Singapore, the Philippines, or Japan. However, during major exercises like CARAT and GS, the U.S. does experience a medium level of maneuver access albeit for a limited duration. Bilateral exercises provide the potential to increase the duration of maneuver access and flex the logistical support capabilities of HNS in Indonesia.

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