Developing a Culture and Gender Inclusive Model of Military Professionalism
(Développement d’une culture et d’un modèle de professionnalisme militaire promouvant l’égalité des sexes)

Final Report of Task Group HFM-287.

Published August 2020
Developing a Culture and Gender Inclusive Model of Military Professionalism

(Développement d’une culture et d’un modèle de professionnalisme militaire promouvant l’égalité des sexes)

Final Report of Task Group HFM-287.
The NATO Science and Technology Organization

Science & Technology (S&T) in the NATO context is defined as the selective and rigorous generation and application of state-of-the-art, validated knowledge for defence and security purposes. S&T activities embrace scientific research, technology development, transition, application and field-testing, experimentation and a range of related scientific activities that include systems engineering, operational research and analysis, synthesis, integration and validation of knowledge derived through the scientific method.

In NATO, S&T is addressed using different business models, namely a collaborative business model where NATO provides a forum where NATO Nations and partner Nations elect to use their national resources to define, conduct and promote cooperative research and information exchange, and secondly an in-house delivery business model where S&T activities are conducted in a NATO dedicated executive body, having its own personnel, capabilities and infrastructure.

The mission of the NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO) is to help position the Nations’ and NATO’s S&T investments as a strategic enabler of the knowledge and technology advantage for the defence and security posture of NATO Nations and partner Nations, by conducting and promoting S&T activities that augment and leverage the capabilities and programmes of the Alliance, of the NATO Nations and the partner Nations, in support of NATO’s objectives, and contributing to NATO’s ability to enable and influence security and defence related capability development and threat mitigation in NATO Nations and partner Nations, in accordance with NATO policies.

The total spectrum of this collaborative effort is addressed by six Technical Panels who manage a wide range of scientific research activities, a Group specialising in modelling and simulation, plus a Committee dedicated to supporting the information management needs of the organization.

- AVT Applied Vehicle Technology Panel
- HFM Human Factors and Medicine Panel
- IST Information Systems Technology Panel
- NMSG NATO Modelling and Simulation Group
- SAS System Analysis and Studies Panel
- SCI Systems Concepts and Integration Panel
- SET Sensors and Electronics Technology Panel

These Panels and Group are the power-house of the collaborative model and are made up of national representatives as well as recognised world-class scientists, engineers and information specialists. In addition to providing critical technical oversight, they also provide a communication link to military users and other NATO bodies.

The scientific and technological work is carried out by Technical Teams, created under one or more of these eight bodies, for specific research activities which have a defined duration. These research activities can take a variety of forms, including Task Groups, Workshops, Symposia, Specialists’ Meetings, Lecture Series and Technical Courses.

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<td>AI</td>
<td>Artificial Intelligence</td>
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<td>ALDP</td>
<td>Army Leadership Development and Development Programme</td>
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<td>BAF</td>
<td>Bulgarian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Canadian Army</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Captain</td>
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<td>CEAM</td>
<td>Centre d’Expertise Aérienne Militaire</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CKSE</td>
<td>Core Knowledge, Skills and Experience</td>
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<td>CMW</td>
<td>Combat, Masculine-Warrior</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Commissioned Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Continuing Professional Development</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defense Conseil International</td>
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<td>DGM</td>
<td>Designated Group Member</td>
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<td>DHRD</td>
<td>Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity</td>
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<td>DHRIM</td>
<td>Director Human Resources Information Management</td>
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<td>DITB</td>
<td>Defence Industrial and Technological Base</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>Employment Equity</td>
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<td>EMRA</td>
<td>Electronic Medical Record Analyzer</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>F2T2EA</td>
<td>Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBA+</td>
<td>Gender-Based Analysis Plus</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFM</td>
<td>Human Factors and Medicine</td>
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<td>HMI</td>
<td>Human machine interface</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>JIMP</td>
<td>Joint International Multi-Agency Public-Private</td>
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<td>JNCO</td>
<td>Junior Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>JOTAC</td>
<td>Junior Officer Tactical Awareness Course</td>
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<td>JSSDC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic-Level Security and Defence Colleges</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO-led Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KSE-B</td>
<td>Knowledge, Skills and Experience – Behaviours</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTQ</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>Medium Altitude Long Endurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>Ministry of Armies</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>OAE</td>
<td>Operations Active Endeavour</td>
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<tr>
<td>OODA</td>
<td>Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PESTEL</td>
<td>Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal</td>
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<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>RCAF</td>
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<td>RE</td>
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<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<td>Research Task Group</td>
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<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
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<td>South Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>South-East European Brigade</td>
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<td>Stabilization Force in Iraq</td>
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<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
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<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>United States of America</td>
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Foreword

Some of the material in this report has been published in total as a book chapter:

**Chapter 1**


**Chapter 2**


**Chapter 3**


**Chapter 4**


**Chapter 5**


**Chapter 6**


**Chapter 8** (only Section 8.2)

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Developing a Culture and Gender Inclusive Model of Military Professionalism  
(STO-TR-HFM-287)

Executive Summary

Issue and Purpose: Interpretations of military professionalism significantly impact how ethos, doctrine, and culture are developed to meet environmental needs. Given the wide range of environments that military professionals navigate – domestically, internationally, and operationally – it is imperative for military and civilian leaders to understand the conceptual and practical implications of how military professionalism is cultivated and, subsequently, guides the conduct of military members.

Scholars have proposed several frameworks for understanding military professionalism (e.g., Abbot, 1988; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Sarkesian, 1981). While they offer a useful starting point, these theoretical models are grounded in a set of socio-historical conditions that offer limited insight into how military professionalism can and should be adapted to meet twenty-first century needs. For example, how can a historically-masculine warrior culture (Pinch, 2004) be adapted to incorporate more fluid and dynamic understandings of gender and identity? As the societies that militaries recruit from and serve become increasingly diverse and transnational, how will military leaders foster cross-cultural collaboration, both within their units and in conjunction with international partners? How should military professionalism be adapted to help members more effectively navigate the complexities of engaging armed adversaries in a multi-dimensional battlefield (i.e., field, cyber, space, and so forth)?

Scope and Procedure: Overall, research has shown that military professionalism is associated with, influenced by, and impacts numerous aspects of member conduct. Yet existing frameworks offer limited insight into how military professionalism may be monitored, measured, and adapted to inevitable changes in domestic, international, and operational environments. The goal of this panel was to elucidate the conceptual and practical challenges that one faces when developing a model or models of military professionalism that will be more robust to evolving needs.

The panel conducted 11 meetings to discuss conceptualizations of military professionalism, professionalization, and the military profession. Overall, the panel accomplished the following:

1) Reviewed existing models, frameworks, and measures related to military professionalism;
2) Examined aspects of military professionalism, including aspects of culture and diversity, from different North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations;
3) Examined the relationship between military professionalism and professional military education; and
4) Provided lessons learned and a way forward for examining military professionalism that takes into account evolving military requirements.

Results and Recommendations: Drawing upon case studies and insights from several NATO nations collaborating over the past three years, results revealed that the concept of military professionalism includes a wide variety of frameworks, with most anchored in the officer corps. However, case studies from Canada, Bulgaria, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom revealed that military professionalism has been used to understand diversity impacts within the military, such as the integration of women and other employment
equity groups (e.g., Indigenous in Canada). While the countries are culturally different, it does demonstrate the usefulness of a pluralistic approach to understanding what it means for military professionalism; thus, indicating there is no such thing as a “one size fits all.”

Results from the panel also revealed the understudied topic of military professionalism and professional military education, such that there is a relationship between the two, with the latter concerned with teaching and applying the concept in practice. Overall, based on Libel (2016, 2019) and articulated in Chapter 7 of this technical report, there are six dimensions when considering these two aspects: aim, governance, composition and selection of faculty, composition and selection of the student body, curriculum, and infrastructure.

Additionally, the panel was also able to publish a book with Springer titled “Rethinking Military Professionalism,” which includes the case studies presented here, as well as insights from a wide variety of academics and military experts in the field. Therefore, this technical report, as well as the Springer edited volume will serve as a resource for examining military professionalism concerning the changing nature and culture of the military.

**Military/NATO Significance:** The research presented in this report will begin to identify the gaps in current practices and provide alternative mechanisms to conceptualize professionalism that is reflective of changing requirements, culture, and demographics of the contemporary military forces. As result, the work of this panel offers military leaders, policymakers, and civilian stakeholders a set of case studies and insights that may help them rethink military professionalism to meet contemporary needs.
Développement d’une culture et d’un modèle de professionnalisme militaire promouvant l’égalité des sexes
(STO-TR-HFM-287)

Synthèse

Problème et objectif : l’interprétation du professionnalisme militaire influence de manière importante l’élaboration de l’éthos, de la doctrine et de la culture dans le but de répondre aux besoins de l’environnement. Étant donné le large éventail d’environnements dans lesquels les militaires professionnels évoluent – sur le territoire national, à l’étranger et en opération – il est impératif que les dirigeants militaires et civils comprennent les implications conceptuelles et pratiques de la façon dont le professionnalisme militaire est cultivé et guide par conséquent la conduite des militaires.

Les érudits proposent plusieurs cadres de compréhension du professionnalisme militaire (par ex., Abbot, 1988 ; Huntington, 1957 ; Janowitz, 1960 ; Sarkesian, 1981). Bien qu’ils constituent un point de départ utile, ces modèles théoriques s’enracinent dans un contexte socio-historique qui apporte des connaissances limitées sur la manière dont le professionnalisme militaire peut et doit être adapté aux besoins du vingt et unième siècle. Par exemple, comment faire évoluer une culture du combattant historiquement masculine (Pinch, 2004) pour y incorporer une conception plus fluide et plus dynamique des sexes et de l’identité ? Alors que les sociétés dont sont issus et que servent les militaires sont de plus en plus diverses et transnationales, comment les dirigeants militaires encourageront-ils la collaboration interculturelle, à la fois au sein de leurs unités et avec des partenaires internationaux ? Comment adapter le professionnalisme militaire pour aider les militaires à gérer efficacement la complexité de l’engagement d’adversaires armés sur un champ de bataille multidimensionnel (sur le terrain, dans la cyberdimension, dans l’espace, etc.) ?

Champ et procédure : dans l’ensemble, les recherches montrent que le professionnalisme militaire influence, est influencé par et associé à de nombreux aspects de la conduite des militaires. Cependant, les cadres existants apportent des connaissances limitées sur la manière de suivre, mesurer et adapter le professionnalisme militaire aux changements inévitables des environnements nationaux, internationaux et opérationnels. Le but de cette commission était d’éclairer les défis conceptuels et pratiques liés à l’élaboration d’un ou plusieurs modèles de professionnalisme militaire plus résistants à l’évolution des besoins.

La commission s’est réunie à onze reprises pour discuter de la conceptualisation du professionnalisme militaire, de la professionnalisation et de la profession militaire. La commission a réalisé les tâches suivantes :

1) Passage en revue des modèles, cadres et mesures existants, liés au professionnalisme militaire ;
2) Examen des aspects du professionnalisme militaire, notamment la culture et la diversité, dans plusieurs pays de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) ;
3) Examen de la relation entre le professionnalisme militaire et l’éducation militaire professionnelle ; et
4) Rédaction des enseignements retenus et d’une marche à suivre pour examiner le professionnalisme militaire, qui tient compte de l’évolution des besoins militaires.
Résultats et recommandations : tirés d'études de cas et d'informations de plusieurs pays de l'OTAN collaborant ces trois dernières années, les résultats ont révélé que le concept de professionnalisme militaire incluait une grande variété de cadres, la plupart ancrés dans le corps des officiers. Toutefois, les études de cas provenant du Canada, de Bulgarie, de France, de Suède et du Royaume-Uni ont révélé que le professionnalisme militaire était utilisé pour comprendre les effets de la diversité au sein des militaires, tels que les effets de l'intégration des femmes et d'autres groupes faisant l'objet d'une discrimination positive (par ex., les peuples autochtones au Canada). Même si les pays ont une culture différente, ces études démontrent l'utilité d'une démarche pluraliste pour comprendre les implications de la diversité dans le domaine du professionnalisme militaire et indiquent qu’il n’existe pas de « solution universelle ».


Par ailleurs, la commission a publié un ouvrage chez Springer, intitulé Rethinking Military Professionalism (repenser le professionnalisme militaire), qui inclut les études de cas présentées ici, ainsi que le point de vue d’une grande variété d’universitaires et de spécialistes militaires en la matière. En conséquence, le présent rapport technique, tout comme l’ouvrage publié chez Springer, sera une ressource à utiliser pour examiner le professionnalisme militaire en ce qui concerne l’évolution de la nature et de la culture militaires.

Importance pour les militaires/l'OTAN : les recherches présentées dans ce rapport commencent par identifier les lacunes des pratiques actuelles et proposent des mécanismes alternatifs pour conceptualiser le professionnalisme, mécanismes reflétant l’évolution des besoins, de la culture et de la démographie des forces militaires contemporaines. De ce fait, le travail de cette commission offre aux dirigeants militaires, aux décideurs et aux acteurs civils un ensemble de cas d’étude et d’informations qui peuvent les aider à repenser le professionnalisme militaire pour répondre aux besoins contemporains.
Chapter 1 – DEVELOPING A MODEL OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM: CONSIDERING CULTURE AND GENDER

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CANADA

1.1 BACKGROUND

The military profession contains unique expectations [34], [43], such as duty, loyalty, integrity, courage [34], and honour [27], and encompasses the society, military institution, and the individual soldier [43]. Various cultural aspects of the military, such as discipline, ceremonial displays and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps [6], [7], [17], are part of the military’s professional ethos while others derive from the military’s relationship with civil society [17]. Like members of any organization, moreover, military members will internalize the rules of conduct, impetuses, and norms from the ethos and doctrine formally espoused by the organization [17]. As a result, prescriptive frameworks of professionalism will play an important role in shaping the profession and the conduct of military members.

Although theories of military professionalism have a long history [1], [25], [27], [43], none of the existing models account for gender and diversity, such as the underlying socio-cultural aspects of the dominant male-oriented warrior framework [38], cross-cultural applications, civil-military and international relations, and how leadership and socialization [5], [44] shape military identity. The following chapter reviews the concepts of military professionalism and unprofessionalism, and military culture examined during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Research Task Group (RTG), which was stood up to rethink military professionalism in light of gender and diversity.

1.1.1 Military Professionalism and Unprofessionalism

A lot of research has been conducted into the concepts and constructs of medical professionalism [2], [8], [12], [24], [28], [55], but there has also been some influential work examining the military as a profession [25], [27]. As Table 1-1 shows, Butler and Budgell [8] examined the four seminal theories of military professionalism by Huntington [25], Janowitz [27], Sarkesian [43], and Abbott [1], analysing them into three components: foundational elements of military professionalism, level of analysis, and professional membership. Butler and Budgell [8] found several elements central to military professionalism:

1) Expertise, or the knowledge and skills required for that profession [46]. For example, military members receive specialized training [8].

2) Legitimacy, or the trust of the public in that profession having authority and autonomy over a specific area [19]. Therefore, the military as a profession requires the trust of the public for being a valid profession [8].

3) Jurisdiction, or the boundary work specific to the profession [6]. In the case of the military, members often require solutions to situations not seen in other professions [8], [46].

4) Identity, which is a self-concept made up of attributes, beliefs, values, motives, and experiences [8], [26], [45].

5) Culture, which is a set of shared values and beliefs within an organization [18], [19], [30], [39], [48].
Table 1-1: Theories of Military Professionalism. Adapted from Ref. [8], p. 21.

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<td>Foundational Elements of Military Professionalism</td>
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<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Military/Technical</td>
<td>Expertise</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Group Identity</td>
<td>Ethical</td>
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<td>Corporateness</td>
<td>Education/Training</td>
<td>Political</td>
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<td>Level of Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional Membership</td>
<td>Restricted to the officer corps – male, commissioned officers, often from “gentlemen” or elite backgrounds</td>
<td>Focuses on officer corps, but more inclusive model than Huntington</td>
<td>Focuses on officer corps</td>
<td>All members of the military</td>
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As one would expect, unprofessionalism or poor professionalism mirrors the highly differentiated character of professionalism [8]. Unprofessionalism, including misconduct, has a myriad of causes: external limitations (e.g., under-staffing) [8], [33], ineffective training, unfamiliarity with proper responses to threats, command failures, group influencers, lack of discipline [8], [41] and may range in severity (e.g., from rule breaking to crimes) [8], [54]. Unprofessionalism can be understood simply as the absence of one or more elements of professionalism. The causes of unprofessional behaviour, however, are many, and the willingness to understand its causes and consequences – even when this analysis points to the culture of the profession – is important to maintaining the integrity of the profession.

The recent external review of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the CAF provides a case in point of such a challenge to the professional military culture [15]. The External Review Authority pointed to “an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) members, and conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault” [15]. As a result, the integration of gender and diversity has become a salient concern for the military profession, even though gender and diversity were not concerns in traditional theories of military professionalism.

1.1.2 The Study of Military Professionalism

Butler and Budgell [8] and Ewles et al. [18] observe that the touchstones of military professionalism are military ethics [3], [35] discipline [4], socialization [52], leadership [9], and the military culture more broadly. Each of these can be seen as key elements in the study of military professionalism because they have a certain stability across all theories.

The military ethos can be understood as the distinctly military component of military professionalism [3], [8]. In the CAF’s conception of military professionalism, for example, identity, expertise, and responsibility constitute the military ethos [8], [35]. The CAF identity is understood as the uniquely Canadian military history and organization, while expertise refers to the proficiency in armed conflict – whether warfighting or
humanitarian missions – and responsibility is the obligation to defend the people of Canada and their interests [35]. The Canadian military ethos is also understood to include beliefs and expectations about military service, Canadian military values, and Canadian values – all of which shape a specifically Canadian military profession [35].

Discipline, socialization, and leadership also play essential roles in developing and maintaining military professionalism. Discipline is the means of maintaining the high standard of the military as a profession [4], [8]. Discipline includes the adherence to dress, deportment, and drill, which help control behaviours through cues as to what is acceptable, a sense of a shared identity, and group structures and relations [4], [8], [35]. Socialization, especially the early and intense socialization practiced by militaries [22], moulds the members of the profession. Research has shown that group socialization, such as in Basic Military Qualification in the CAF [36], influences intergroup perceptions, such that attitudes and beliefs can change during the training [22]. Leadership and leaders play a central role in exemplifying the core ethics, helping shape identity, supporting cohesion, and relaying customs and traditions of the military profession [8], [35].

Numerous researchers over the years have examined organizational culture [3], [6], [8], [10], [23], [25], [27], [31], [37], [43], [46], [47], [49], [52], [56]. Military culture, as defined by Burke [6], comprises discipline, professional ethos, ceremonies and etiquette, and esprit de corps and cohesion. Other researchers [1], [21], [32], [43] see culture as the means for transmitting the understanding of the profession. Thus, military culture becomes an integral part in the study of military professionalism. The conduct of members, the “set of normative understandings” ([6], p. 45) defined by the corporate identity, code of conduct and social worth [6], as well as customs, traditions, rituals, ceremonies, and displays of etiquette are all imbedded in the understanding of military culture [6].

Professions are socially constructed concepts [18], [42] and defined by the social biases of the dominant culture, whether masculine or feminine [13]. The theories presented in Table 1-1 demonstrate the inter-relationship between the concept of professionalism and the concomitant culture. Traditionally, military culture is situated in the Combat, Masculine-Warrior (CMW) image [16], [48], which emphasizes combat related activities, such as battle groups containing the fighting force and a male-dominated institution [16]. Due to this image, those who do not fit will have to modify behaviours, values, and attitudes to be part of the profession [11], [14], [52].

Despite the continuity in key concepts, theories of military professionalism have shifted with changes in the culture, which is evidenced in the differences between the theories of Huntington and Janowitz, who write in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the theories of Sarkesian and Abbot who both wrote in the 1980s. The earlier studies of military professionalism had relied on understanding the concept from the perspective of the individual, for example, with less emphasis on the impact of the external environment. More recent theories of military professionalism, in contrast, have been more strongly influenced by institutional requirements and community expectations [43], cementing the importance of military culture in the understanding of military professionalism. Research on military professionalism now faces new culture changes in adapting to gender and diversity.

1.1.3 Diversity and Gender

Although it has been shown that increases in diversity have benefits for organizations [38], diversity has been an ongoing challenge for the military, including the CAF [39], [57]. Diversity in an organization has been defined as ensuring the workforce reflects the society from which it was drawn [39], [57], with a high reliance on the balance of numbers [29]. One way to address gender and diversity issues is to challenge how gender is seen in order to account for the experiences of diverse men and women. Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) is an analytical approach, which goes beyond aspects of gender (e.g., identity, age, culture, etc.) to examine the differential impacts that programs, policies, research, and services have on diverse men and women [50]. GBA+ is one tool that can be used in rethinking the model of military professionalism.
1.1.4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Given that there is no recent inclusive model of military professionalism addressing gender and diversity, a NATO exploratory team was established with members from Bulgaria, Canada, and the United Kingdom, which led to a Research Task Group (RTG) being stood up in the fall of 2016. The NATO RTG, which now also included members from France, Sweden and the United States, was tasked with examining:

1) Theoretical, conceptual, and methodological research approaches for understanding military professionalism;

2) The relationship between military professionalism throughout the military career (from recruitment to transition to civilian life) and at different levels:
   a) Individual;
   b) Group/Team;
   c) Organizational; and
   d) Societal.

3) The cross-cultural context (e.g., historical and current military political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legal – PESTEL) of military professionalism;

4) The influence of military socialization and the impact on member conduct;

5) Ensuring diversity and inclusion in the study and measurement of military professionalism (e.g., GBA+); and

6) Appropriate methodologies for monitoring, measuring, and assessing military professionalism.

1.2 CHAPTER SUMMARIES

Research has shown that military professionalism is associated with, influenced by, and impacts numerous aspects of member conduct. Yet, existing frameworks offer limited insight into how military professionalism may be monitored, measured, and adapted to inevitable changes in domestic, international, and operational environments. This technical report presents case studies critically examining aspects of military professionalism from different countries, including Canada, Bulgaria, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom:

- Dr. Yantsislav Yanakiev (Chapter 2) presents the results from a survey of the Bulgarian Armed Forces members’ perspectives on the military profession, including their views on ethnic, cultural, and gender diversity.

- Dr. Krystal Hachey (Chapter 3) presents results from a qualitative study of diverse CAF members’ perspectives on military professionalism.

- Using interviews with French Air Force members, Dr. Laurence Frank (Chapter 4) examines the organization’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments.

- Lieutenant Frida Linehagen (Chapter 5) draws on interviews with personnel from Sweden’s Armed Forces to provide a deeper understanding of the experience female military personnel bring to the organization, their abilities to identify and use power resources in order to be accepted by the military organization.

- Ms. Rita Hawkshaw and Maj. Clodia O’Neil (Chapter 6) present an initial conceptualization of tenets of the Profession of Arms in the British Army and the supporting Continuing Professional Development (CPD) approach.
• Dr. Tamir Libel, Dr. Krystal Hachey, and Dr. David Last (Chapter 7) present a brief overview of the relationship between military professionalism and professional military education, with suggestions for future research.

• Dr. Krystal Hachey, Dr. Gregory Ruark, and Dr. Tamir Libel (Chapter 8) summarize and analyse the major themes in this report and propose directions for future research.

1.3 CONCLUSION

Since they were first proposed, theories of military professionalism [25], [27] have been shaped by the cultures in which the militaries were embedded [13]. Until very recent times, little emphasis has been placed on how gender and diversity fit into these theories. In response, a NATO RTG was established to develop a culture and gender inclusive model of military professionalism, taking into account key aspects which influence professionalism (e.g., military ethos, socialization), as well as additional aspects such as the relationship of military professionalism throughout the career and at different levels (e.g., individual, organizational). Given the different cultures of the military [17], this technical report will provide an overview of military professionalism from different NATO nations. [1]

1.4 REFERENCES


Chapter 2 – THE CHANGING MILITARY PROFESSION IN BULGARIA

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2.1 BACKGROUND: THE BULGARIAN MILITARY TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO DEMOCRACY

Bulgaria was a member of the Warsaw Pact until March 31, 1991, and one of the closest allies of the Soviet Union. Under the conditions of socialist society, the core role of the military profession was the defence of the socialist social system on the national and international level. In essence, this role was first and foremost political: the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria was a socialist state by virtue of the Article 1 of the Constitution the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria from 1971.

The dominant ideology was uniform and corresponded to an axiological self-identification. There was a hierarchical structure of participation of the military in exercising power. In addition, there was an established system of restrictions and privileges for the military (basically officers’ corps), justified by its assigned role as guarantor of the established socio-political system. Finally, there was a clear policy on shaping and maintaining the public image of the armed forces as “sentinel of peace and socialism.”

Since the end of the Cold War, in the conditions of a radically changed social environment and pluralistic society, the core role of the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) became the defence of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity (see the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 9 in National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria 2011) [18]. Correspondingly, the core of military professionalism changed significantly toward acceptance of new democratic values and norms by service members, even though the norms were quite different from those of the authoritarian socialist society.

The 1990 Political Parties Act effectively banned political activity in the BAF. The act bans command personnel and ranks from membership in parties and political organizations. It bans also political and religious propaganda in the units. The majority of the officer corps approved these changes ([1], pp. 41-46). The process of changeover from socialism to democracy was not easy, and it did not happen overnight. First, the process of differentiation between the political and professional ranks in the top echelons of the military administration and building democratic civil-military relations had started in the beginning of the 1990s, but the process was too slow and accompanied with many tensions [23]. Second, the definition of the national ideal concept – the axiological backbone of the officer’s professional identity – was even more ambivalent and vague. To quote Charles Moskos, the military profession is “legitimated in terms of values and norms: that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good” ([16], pp. 377-382).

According to data from surveys carried out in 1994 – 1995 in the military organization, at the individual level, the majority of military members felt that their profession had low social prestige, and this was an important indicator of the crisis in professional identity ([2], pp. 53-60). Similarly, opinion polls carried out in Bulgaria after 1990 showed that the public assessed the performance of defence in quite desperate terms. On the one hand, the Bulgarian public was steadily appreciative of the military as an institution. For the period 1990 – 1995, public trust in the BAF as an institution varied from 65% to 75%, and mistrust from 10% to 12%. During the first five years of transition to democracy, the BAF had undoubtedly been one of the highest rated institutions in the state. On the other hand, the same public was not so positive about the military profession. Few young people were interested in joining the armed forces. Conscription was not
popular at all. At the same time, close to two-thirds of the commissioned officers were not satisfied with the social status of the military profession ([2], pp. 53-60).

There were several social reasons for this situation: lack of public recognition of the military profession as a “value for the others,” lack of stability and predictability, underpayment, no housing arrangements, lack of adequate jobs for spouses, etc. As a result, the key characteristics of the military profession, such as public recognition, predictability, stability, job security, were undermined. Last but not least, funding for defence has been a major problem for the BAF since the end of the Cold War.

Nonetheless, the social and political context in Bulgaria has gradually changed, even if there is room for improvement. Several factors contributed to gradual improvement of the situation of the Bulgarian military over the last two decades and there have been significant changes in the understanding of military professionalism.

First, Bulgaria became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 and of the European Union (EU) in 2007. The country has been an active member of the Alliance, and it deployed troops on various NATO and EU missions and operations. Moreover, Bulgaria looks for an expanded NATO presence in the Black Sea region and, in support of this goal, has held a growing number of joint NATO military exercises in recent years. A NATO Force Integration Unit was also established at the MoD in Sofia in September 2016, which contributes to better coordination of national and Alliance efforts to guarantee security and stability in the region [19].

The second factor is related to active Bulgarian participation in regional and bi-lateral security cooperation in South Eastern Europe (SEE). A practical expression of the cooperation in the framework of this process is the establishment of South-East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) in 1998 [21]. In addition, the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 28 April 2006 between the United States and Bulgaria allows the US government to deploy and train up to 2,500 soldiers at three joint Bulgarian and US military installations (AFB Graf Ignatievo, AFB Bezmer and Army training range Novo Selo) under Bulgarian command [14].

The third important factor for the positive change of the situation of the BAF and the military profession is related to the political will to increase defence spending over the last several years. During the NATO Wells Summit in 2014, Bulgaria has agreed to spend at least 2% of its GDP on defence. In accordance with this decision, a national plan for increasing defence spending to 2% of gross domestic product until 2024 was approved by the Parliament [4]. This important commitment of the Bulgarian government for increasing defence spending made possible new projects for modernizing the BAF. These projects include procuring new multipurpose fighter jets for the Air Forces, building new patrol ships and renovating existing frigates for the Navy, and procuring new armoured vehicles for the Army [3].

Today, the BAF has a clearly defined role and missions. The main role of the armed forces is to guarantee the sovereignty, security, and independence of the country and defend its territorial integrity. There are three main missions for the Bulgarian Armed Forces: defence, support of international peace and security, and contribution to national security in peacetime [20].

To summarize, important political, economic, legal, and organizational developments have transformed the defence institution in Bulgaria, its civil-military relations, and have contributed to a new type of military professionalism.

2.2 POSTMODERN MISSIONS AND POSTMODERN SOLDIERS

The post-Cold War era has seen a significant increase in the number of military operations requiring multinational coalitions, such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, anti-terrorism, stability and support, search and rescue, humanitarian, etc. None of these missions were traditional military operations, being quite
different from Samuel Huntington’s classical definition of the military profession as “direction, operation and control of a human organization whose primarily function is the application of violence” [7].

Under these circumstances, gradual change in the nature of military professionalism and the traditional military culture has taken place. Military sociologists defined the period as postmodern and, correspondingly, the defence forces as postmodern organizations. The broader range of recent operations requires additional knowledge and skills from the military and “alternative professional types” have emerged. Besides the traditional warrior’s role, military professionals today are expected to be “soldier-statesmen,” “soldier-scholars,” “soldier-diplomats”, etc. In addition, there is a trend of more extensive use of multinational military forces and internationalization of military forces themselves [17].

Today, one can identify many of these postmodern trends in the defence organization in Bulgaria. The first trend in Bulgarian military professionalism is the new missions undertaken by the BAF after 1990, beginning in 1992 with the international deployment of the Bulgarian military with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Two infantry battalions, 850 personnel each, took part in UNTAC. The mission started in June 1992 and ended in September 1993. This was the first mission in which 10 Bulgarian soldiers died in service (MoD of the Republic of Bulgaria. Peacekeeping operation in Cambodia 2019) [10].

Following the UNTAC mission, Bulgaria took an active part in several NATO and EU peacekeeping activities, as well as ad hoc coalitions to enhance the international security environment. Most active and lengthy were the missions in the Balkans NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian military contributed one engineering and one transportation platoon to SFOR as a part of the Dutch contingent and the logistic group HELBA/BELUGA under Greek command during 1997 – 2001. In addition, a force protection company of 149 personnel and equipment was attached to SFOR HQ in the operation from 2002 to 2004. Finally, several Bulgarian militaries served as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) officers.

An official ceremony of handing over peacekeeping duties from the NATO-led SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU’s military operation EUFOR (Operation ALTHEA) was held on December 2004 at Camp Butmir in Sarajevo. The BAF participated in Operation ALTHEA with a 120-strong contingent, comprising a light infantry company protecting the headquarters of the operation, a national support element, a liaison and observation team, and staff officers at operation headquarters [13].

Bulgarian military personnel were also deployed in both missions in Kosovo, the NATO-led KFOR and the UN peacekeeping operation (UNMIK). Since February 2000, a 40-strong Bulgarian engineering platoon (attached first to the Dutch and later the German contingent) took part in the construction, maintenance, and repair of engineering facilities, as well as in the reconstruction of buildings needed by the local population. Since January 15, 2000, Bulgarian military observers have also been deployed in UNMIK. As part of the planned reduction in the strength of KFOR, our engineering platoon terminated its participation in the operation at the end of 2009. Currently, the Bulgarian contribution to KFOR is 10 military personnel at mission headquarters [12].

Bulgarian participation in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan started in the beginning of 2002 with a small 32 personnel sanitary contingent deployed in the area of responsibility of the British contingent outside Kabul. Changes in the security environment in the region have necessitated changes in the tasks performed by the contingent. Since 2003, the National Assembly authorized the participation of a mechanized platoon in ISAF and instructors to train the Afghan National Army. In 2007, our country gradually increased its contribution, sending another two companies, one under the Italian Battle Group in Kabul, the second in the defence of Kandahar Air Field, along with experts in specific tasks (i.e., Air Traffic Control of Kabul Airport, intelligence groups, and a Military Police platoon).
During the handover of security responsibilities in the capital from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces in 2009, our mechanized company and the safeguard platoon were pulled out of the operation zone. However, in 2009, a Bulgarian company took over the protection of Kabul Airport’s inner perimeter. Early in 2009, Bulgaria sent an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team to Kandahar in support of the Afghan National Army, and in 2011 another three such teams (two in Kabul and one in Kandahar), along with a Senior Advisors Team. Bulgaria has also committed medical teams to the operation in Kabul, sending the first team of surgeons to work under the Spanish Field Hospital in 2004, and later enlarging the participation of Bulgarian medical surgery teams in Herat and Kandahar.

In September 2012, the four Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams in support of the Afghan National Army were transformed into Advisor Teams. Following the operational transformation processes, the Ministry of Defence conducted a military assessment, with analysis and recommendations for our participation in the operation in 2011. As a result, by the end of the same year the government had adopted the Strategy for Transformation of the Participation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, setting up the framework of the forthcoming transformation of the Bulgarian contingent.

Currently, Bulgaria participates in NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which is focused on the preparing, assisting, and provisioning teams of advisors for the Afghan state institutions and national security forces in the Afghan government, along with partners and other international organizations engaged in the regional mission [11].

Since 2005, the Bulgarian Navy has supported Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), part of NATO’s naval force in the Mediterranean, which is an effort by the international community to combat terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. The Bulgarian Navy provided a frigate with a crew of roughly 110 service members to participate in the operation for a month each year, as well as a task force of the special maritime vessel inspection team. The Bulgarian frigate last participated in the October 2009 OAE mission [9].

In addition to the above-mentioned missions and operations, Bulgaria contributed to the first phase of the Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR), from 2003 until the end of 2005, as a part of the multinational coalition forces in the Polish division. During this period, five infantry battalions were rotated, each deployed for 6 months. As a whole, 2,309 Bulgarian military personnel participated in this phase of the SFIR operation, primarily in CIMIC projects and patrolling. Officially, the battalion commander was the Military Governor of Karbala. After 2005, and until 2008, the Bulgarian contingent was redeployed to guarding the Ashraf Detention and Protection Centre and to the protection of detainees undergoing a reintegration program at the Cropper Base in Baghdad [6].

Bulgaria has also contributed to the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), which was launched in 2004 to provide practical assistance in the training and equipping of the Iraqi Security Forces. NTM-I focused on training and educating mid-to-senior-level officers and the creation of robust and reliable military leadership at the strategic and the operational levels. In essence, NTM-I was not a combat mission; it was a separate operation, auxiliary to other international efforts aimed at the relief and reconstruction in Iraq. Since the beginning of 2009, Bulgaria has renewed its contribution to NTM-I, deploying two military personnel to mission headquarters [8].

All told, the military has been much more involved in operations that differ from the warfighting that they had been trained for. Bulgarian participation in peace support operations (PSOs), the umbrella term for operations like the traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace-building, peace-making, humanitarian operations, conflict prevention, etc., has initiated a process of transition from the traditional role of the warrior toward the new role of the proactive peacekeeper [22]. In other words, this long participation in peace support operations has precipitated a gradual change in the traditional military culture.
One of the most important indicators of the change is the relations between the military and the local population in the area of the deployment. The peace support force is deployed in the host country, both in the case of traditional peacekeeping and in peace enforcement, in order to help people and to protect their lives and their rights. This is a quite different role from the one of the warrior in the previous times.

The second important characteristic of the military culture change is the military’s involvement in managing civilian tasks. This is particularly true for the role of proactive peacekeepers. The PSOs, as a result of their complex character, involve many actors in the field, both military and civilian. Both sides frequently have different perceptions of the success of the PSOs. The way of working of the civilian organizations is quite different from the typical military understanding of organization, discipline, and responsibility. In such situations, the military has had to cooperate and work together with civilian organizations.

The third characteristic of the military role change, which distinguishes it from the traditional role of the warrior, is related to the extensive use of multinational military forces for executing PSOs. This change elevated the importance of cultural adaptability and cross-cultural competence among peacekeepers who had to be able to work with their counterparts from other military contingents and local populations.

The Bulgarian military was challenged to work with colleagues who have different organizational culture (decentralized versus. the centralized one typical for the Bulgarians), different leadership skills (direct versus indirect, which is common for the Bulgarians), different education and training, and, among other differences, the language barrier. In addition, the Bulgarian military faced organizational barriers to effective integration in multinational coalitions, such as different concepts of tactics and mission planning, different disciplinary codes, different command and control systems, equipment and armament, payment differences, and so forth.

All these factors undoubtedly influenced the change in military professionalism in the BAF. The role of proactive peacekeepers is connected with the performance of new tasks concerning active cooperation and coordination with civilian organizations, the local population, and the mass media. At the same time, the new generation PSOs have faced many of the demands belonging to traditional military professionalism. As we have seen in the recent PSOs, like ISAF and SFIR, strong combatant skills are still required to succeed in the operation. In this respect, the traditional military skills and values have not lost their value.

It is therefore important to determine the kinds of knowledge and skills the military needs to succeed in the new missions. A survey of Bulgarian service members – specifically, the contingent in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan – regarding challenges that they encountered in multinational operations identified a number of gaps in knowledge and training [24]. More than half the respondents (53.4%) reported needing additional English language training, particularly in the specialized English used in the documents they worked with on the mission (e.g., NATO abbreviations).

A second gap in the preparation of the Bulgarian military, according to about one-third of respondents, was knowledge of international law (35.3%), national psychology in the region of the mission (35.0%), religious communities in the region of the mission (33.3%), and international relations (32.7%). These knowledge gaps characterize the new dimensions of the military job and point to the need for new professional types, which differ from the traditional understanding of the military.

The third gap was in pre-deployment training, which almost one-third of respondents cited, and also relates to specific tasks during multinational operations: multicultural communication techniques (31.3%), history of the mission area (31.0%), and logistics on a mission (29.6%).

The fourth gap in training mentioned by about one-fourth of respondents was knowledge in the spheres of CIMIC (25.2%), economy in the region of the mission (25.2%), and public relations (23.7%).
This knowledge is important for the success of contemporary military operations, which require good awareness of the social political and economic situation in the region of the mission, as well as the organization of CIMIC projects for winning the hearts and minds of the local population.

In fifth place, about one-fifth of respondents noted that they needed additional training in public administration and administrative procedures when working in multinational operations, including better information about the administrative system in the region where the operation was carried out (21.1%), as well as the manuals and regulations of a NATO-led multinational operations (20.9%).

The lowest-ranked items on respondents’ list were additional knowledge in topography (14%), tactics (9.8%), conflict-resolution skills (13.2%), leadership skills for working in a mission (11.3%), team-working skills (9.5%), and decision-making skills (8.7%).

The comparison of these data with the data gathered from earlier surveys shows a steady trend of interest in additional knowledge and skills in multicultural communication techniques and the need for a better knowledge of the history of the conflict. This is easy to understand when one bears in mind that the Bulgarian contingent in the NATO ISAF acted in a relatively strange and remote region and among a population different from the Bulgarian culture. The share of the respondents who wanted more knowledge about logistics on missions was also relatively high.

To summarize, the data analysis shows that Bulgarian military personnel were satisfied with the level of their training as military specialists. When compared with their colleagues from other countries, 79% of the Bulgarian military personnel declared they did not face any deficiencies in their professional military education and training. At the same time, they lacked the training needed to fulfil the untraditional part of their military jobs – of the “soldier diplomat” and the “soldier statesman,” which became more and more important on operations. They also thought it was very important to broaden their English language proficiency in the new subject matter areas, such as rules of engagement, logistics, staff procedures, etc.

2.3 TRANSITION TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The Bulgarian Parliament decided to end conscription after 31 December 2007. This significantly changed the concept of military service and military professionalism, influencing the recruitment, motivation, and retention of Bulgarian military personnel. The decision to abolish conscription in Bulgaria was made as a result of two main factors. The first was the significant downsizing of the BAF after the end of the Cold War. From 1960 to 1990, the strength of the BAF was around 120,000. Until 1990, the period of conscription was two years for the Army and Air force, and three years for the Navy. A 1990 amendment to the Universal Conscript Act reduced the draught to 18 months. As a result, the strength of the BAF was downsized to 104,000. After that, the government adopted what was known as “Plan 2004,” which provided for decreasing the number of soldiers to 45,000 by the end of 2004 and ending conscription by 2007. During this time, the conscription period was reduced to 9 months. All the same, the motivation of young people to serve in the military was extremely low. In addition, this short term of service was not enough to train a soldier [5]. The second important factor behind abolishing conscription was the need for military training and skills needed for the BAF’s new missions. Sending mixed military formations (professional, conscript, and reserve) in the UNTAC mission in Cambodia had been unsuccessful.

Today, more than 10 years after abolishing conscription, the Bulgarian military is undergoing a mixture of “institutional” and “occupational” trends, to use Charles Moskos’s terms. According to Moskos, traditional military culture is based on specific norms and values, which constitute a specific military ethic (i.e., “defence of the common good,” national sovereignty, and territorial integrity). This is one side of the coin of Moskos’s understanding of the military as an institution. The other side is the understanding of the military profession as an occupation or as a job “like any other job.” In this case, the main source of legitimacy is the market: Self-interest is a high priority, rather than the interest of society ([16], pp. 377-382).
Representative surveys for the BAF carried out by the Defence Advanced Research Institute at G. S. Rakovski National Defence College from 2013 to 2017 are indicative of the gradual transition from the institutional to the occupational model of military professionalism in Bulgaria, even though the two models still co-exist.

Table 2-1 presents some indicators of this trend, based on data from the last survey of BAF members in 2017. The first indicator is related to the leading motives of service members who have chosen a career in the BAF. For those surveyed, the top three motivators for becoming a military professional were the desire to serve the motherland (M = 4.40), job security (M = 4.36), the amount of pay (M = 4.31), and the opportunity for professional development (M = 4.24). Interest in a specific specialty (M = 4.11), early retirement opportunity (M = 4.06), and interest in military equipment, weapons, and technology (M = 4.05) were also highly rated.

Motivators with comparatively less importance were the public prestige of the military profession (M = 3.90), the possibility for longer annual leave (M = 3.89), and the challenges of the military profession (M = 3.74). Finally, the motives with the lowest importance were the opportunity to use military housing (M = 2.95), participation in missions abroad (M = 3.41), and a desire for leadership and command of other people (M = 3.51).

Table 2-1: Arithmetic Mean Scores of the Answers of the Respondents on the Degree of Importance of Motives for Career Development in the BAF. (Scale: minimum = 1, maximum = 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Development Motives</th>
<th>Average Arithmetic Mean Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desire to serve my home country</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe and secure workplace</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of pay</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional career opportunity</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like the particular specialty I work in</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early retirement opportunity</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in military equipment, weapons and technology</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public prestige of the military profession</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility for longer annual leave</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The challenges of the military profession</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The desire to be a leader, to command and to lead others</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to participate in missions abroad</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to use military housing</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results on two indicators need additional clarification. The first is the comparatively low importance of a typical institutional factor like public prestige of the military profession. The result can be explained by the fact that military personnel perceive the image of the profession as comparatively low. The analysis of the data from the last survey in 2017 shows that nearly half of the respondents (49.0%) perceived the image of the institution as “not very good” and 31.0% considered it as “not good at all.” Merely 17.0% of respondents gave a moderately good rating to the public image of the military institution, and only 2%
rated it unconditionally as “very good.” The comparative analysis of the data for the period 2013 – 2017 confirms the negative tendency in the self-assessment of the public image of the BAF.

The poorly perceived public image of the military is a worrying tendency because it influences the core value of the military profession as a “profession for the others” aimed at “defence of the common good.” When military members perceive their job as not prestigious and not valued by society, this creates problems with attraction, recruitment, motivation, and retention of the human capital.

The second indicator needing additional comment is the comparatively low importance of a typical “occupational” factor like the opportunity to use military housing. This result can be explained by the fact that in the period after 1990 the military housing opportunities have been significantly reduced and, as a result, this is not a real motivator for military service.

To summarize, the leading motives for career development in the BAF were identical to those identified in the previous surveys from 2013 – 2015, and they relate mainly to the desire to serve the motherland (institutional motive) and the social aspects of the service and job security (occupational motive). An emerging trend is the higher importance accorded to stability and the predictability of a professional position in a defence organization over more traditional factors, such as participation in operations abroad and the command of others.

In the context of these occupational trends in the military professionalism in Bulgaria, two more indicators deserve attention. The first is the self-assessment of the social status of military personnel. The 2017 survey data clearly expressed negative self-assessments by service members of their social status. The overwhelming majority of respondents gave their social status a low assessment: 48.3% reported “not very good” and 36.2% “not good at all.” Moderately positive self-esteem was expressed by less than one-fifth of the surveyed members (17.3%). The percentage of those respondents who rated their social status as “very good” was only 2.2%. A comparison of 2017 data with the data from previous years (2013 – 2015) shows that there are no significant changes over the years regarding the self-assessment of the prestige of the military profession.

The second indicator is the perceived job stability and predictability provided by the military profession. Respondents were asked to assess the degree to which BAF service guarantees them a safe and secure future. The answers to this question can be interpreted as an overwhelming perception of insecurity among the respondents about the future of their military service. Nearly half the respondents (46.2%) declared “I rather do not feel secure,” and 14.3% said “I do not feel secure at all.” Less than one-tenth (5.9%) perceived complete job security, and close to a third (33.6%) felt rather secure about their future. A comparison with previous surveys from in 2013 – 2015 shows a sustained negative trend of uncertainty among service members about their future in the BAF. Accordingly, there is also a reduction in the relative share of those who perceive service in the institution as predictable and stable.

To summarize, the low level of perceived social status among BAF personnel in combination with perceived job instability and lack of predictability provided by the military profession deserves particular attention because it can lead to severe difficulties with attraction, recruitment, and retention of members in the years to come. Actually, the services have already experienced such problems.

### 2.4 FULL INTEGRATION OF WOMEN INTO THE SERVICES

The third postmodern trend in the BAF is the full integration of women into the services. As a result of abolishing formal barriers to service in the defence institution, all positions in the BAF are now open to women, and there has been a gradual increase in women’s representation.
Table 2-2 shows that for the period 2014 – 2018 the percentage of women among active duty military increased from 14.8% to 16.0%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared with the previous five-year period, 2009 – 2013, where women’s share in Bulgarian contingents was about 7%, the participation of women in international military missions and operations has been increasing (Table 2-3). Women in medical positions and CIMIC teams, where they are in permanent contact with a wide range of civilian organizations and local community representatives, have been particularly valuable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results from the surveys carried out in Bulgarian defence during the period 2013 – 2017 confirmed that there is no indication of organizational discrimination against female service members. People of both sexes reported that there are equal opportunities for professional realization in the defence institution. Thus, measures taken by the Ministry of Defence leadership to remove legislative and organizational barriers to guarantee gender equality are working. The problem is gradually overcoming prejudices and stereotypes in people’s minds, which is a process that will require focused policy, systematic work, and education.

2.5 PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY INSTITUTION AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Public support for the defence institution and the military profession is important for defence policy development and implementation. This section looks at the perceptions and attitudes of citizens regarding the BAF and the military profession.

According to data from a recent nation-wide public opinion poll carried out by the Bulgarian Defence Institute Professor Tsvetan Lazarov, in cooperation with Gallup International Balkan EAD in July – August 2019, the BAF was the second most highly approved national institution, after the president. The majority of Bulgarians (60.8%) approve of the BAF’s performance as an institution. The lack of approval was close to a fifth (21.3%), and 17.9% of respondents had no opinion. In addition, more than half of Bulgarians had “very positive” (15.9%) or “rather positive” (42.0%) personal attitudes toward the BAF. Those who had “rather negative” and “negative” attitudes amounted to 11.5% and 4.7%. One-fifth of the respondents (20.0%) declared that they had no opinion on the question.

When Bulgarians were asked whether they trusted the BAF as the guarantor of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, most of them declared that they “trust fully” (19.0%) or “rather trust” (38.0%) that the institution will be able to fulfil its constitutional responsibilities. About a third stated that they “rather do not trust” (22.3%) and “do not trust at all” (11.5%), while 9.2% had no opinion.
Moreover, the vast majority of the citizens reported that improving the public prestige of the BAF was a “very important” (50.2%) or “important” (33.7%) goal for the government, while 3.5% thought it “rather unimportant” and 1.2% “unimportant.” Less than a tenth (8.1%) were indifferent, and 3.3% had no opinion. Similarly, the great majority of Bulgarians thought that building and maintaining a strong BAF was a “very important” (59.1%) or “important” (28.4%) goal, with only 1.6% thinking it “rather unimportant” and 0.9% “unimportant.” Less than a tenth (7.4%) were indifferent, and 2.7% had no opinion on the question.

Data clearly show a positive and supportive attitude of Bulgarians toward the BAF. If we compare these results with the data from the beginning of the democratic changes in Bulgaria, we see that the positive attitude toward the defence institution has been stable, and there have been no significant changes over the time. Hence, the BAF can rely on comparatively high public support.

Regarding the public image of the military profession, a majority of Bulgarians perceived it as “very good” (15.1%) or “good” (43.6%), while less than a fifth considered the prestige of the profession as “not very good” (11.5%) or “not good at all” (4.7%). Another fifth (20.0%) had no opinion on the question. Comparing these data with military members’ self-assessment of their profession presented in the previous section, we see that BAF members are much more critical and unsatisfied than Bulgarian citizens. This discrepancy is likely the result of different expectations, different bases for comparison, and different levels of information. In any case, the low level of perceived prestige of the military profession among service members deserves attention by policy makers.

When compared with 17 of the most popular professions in the country, Commissioned Officer (CO), Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), and volunteer soldier/sailor were rated 9th, 14th, and 15th. Obviously, the public makes a distinction between the hierarchical positions inside the military profession, placing COs in the middle of the rating scale and NCOs and volunteer soldiers/sailors at the bottom. According to the data, commercial airline pilots, medical doctors, diplomats, university professors, engineers, pharmacists, attorneys in law, and judges were much more prestigious than being a CO. Less prestigious than COs were the professions of public prosecutor, journalist, police officer, clergyman, and customs officer. Without analysing the reasons behind the ratings, it should be mentioned that the CO profession has occupied the middle of the rating in previous surveys.

2.6 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION IN BULGARIA

This final section of the chapter presents a view about the transformation of the military professional in Bulgaria and some of the key challenges to military expertise. First of all, the postmodern trends show every sign of continuing to develop in the Bulgarian military, especially the change to occupational motives for military service. For this reason, it is important for the government to create and implement a corresponding long-term vision, strategy, and policy options for attraction, selection, recruitment, motivation, retention, and development in the defence organization.

The low level of perceived public prestige for the military profession by BAF members, their perceived lack of stability and predictability in military service, and their perceived lack of public support must be ended. Achieving this goal will require a whole-of-society approach that includes policy makers, military leadership, educational institutions and academia, non-governmental institutions, media, and citizens themselves. Otherwise, the defence institution will be unable to attract and retain qualified young people.

Second, the rapidly changing strategic security environment and the rising unpredictability of the world conflicts will require augmentation and intense specialization of the competencies of military professionals. The military will continue to be involved in implementing civilian tasks, in addition to warfighting. The process of integrating military and civilian expertise while guaranteeing security will continue to advance
and, as a consequence, the competencies required to work in interagency and diverse environments will become more and more essential for the military professional. In order to be effective in tomorrow’s military operations, leaders and the teams will have to be able to adapt rapidly not only to the military requirements of future operations, but they must also be able to collaborate with many civilian actors. Obviously, the military has to pursue a mixture of role models that combine traditional warrior’s skills with the skills of soldier diplomat, statesmen, mediator, etc. In addition, military leaders will have to develop a strong coalition and joint culture because future operations will be joint, multinational, and interagency. Likewise, the future armed forces will have to develop leaders who can lead the transformation process and build a new organizational culture.

Third, the BAF, like other postmodern armed forces, will continue to follow the process of changing the military organization as a whole – i.e. from a hierarchical to a network-building principle. The focus will be on de-learning and decentralization of the organizational processes, which will require a change in leadership practices and the organizational culture as a whole.

Fourth, the military profession will be strongly influenced by the development of new defence technologies, particularly digitalization and Artificial Intelligence (AI). One of the key questions is whether in the mid-term AI will replace human decision making in defence organizations. The answer is likely no, but AI will definitely be valuable in enhancing the human capacity to process huge amount of data and to increase immensely human effectiveness in decision making. To win future wars, defence organizations will have to leverage specialized skills in digital automation and AI. In addition, it is important that commanders have experts with a data science background, as well as people with on-the-ground expertise – i.e., people who understand use-cases and objectives.

Finally, and equally important, the process of building and sustaining democratic civil-military relations in Bulgaria and the improvement of civilian control over defence will continue in the context of Bulgaria’s membership in the EU and NATO. The key element of future civil-military relations will be the awareness of policy makers in the military and security domains and the broadening of the expertise and skills of the military in global, regional, and national policy. All this will require cultivating military-sensitive politicians and a politically sensitive military.

2.7 REFERENCES


Chapter 3 – PERSPECTIVES ON MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM FROM CANADIAN ARMED FORCES MEMBERS

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

Professionalism in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has been defined for almost two decades by Duty with Honour [6], [8], a guidance document prepared by the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute under the aegis of the Chief of the Defence Staff. As the introduction suggests, Duty with Honour was strongly influenced by the concepts of military professionalism advanced by Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) [27], [28]:

The profession of arms is distinguished by the concept of service before self, the lawful, ordered application of military force, and the acceptance of the concept of unlimited liability. Its members possess a systematic and specialized body of military knowledge and skills acquired through education, training and experience, and they apply this expertise competently and objectively in the accomplishment of their missions. Members of the Canadian profession of arms share a set of core values and beliefs found in the military ethos that guides them in the performance of their duty and allows a special relationship of trust to be maintained with Canadian society ([8], p. 10).

The traditional touchstones in Huntington’s and Janowitz’s definitions of professionalism – specialized knowledge, responsibility, competence, and the nature of civil-military relations – are woven with traditional military concepts like unlimited liability, the fighting spirit, discipline, and teamwork, along with Canadian and Canadian military values, such as duty, loyalty, integrity, courage, and the warrior’s honour [6]. Social and organizational imperatives are laid out as well, including different levels of responsibility (e.g., organizational, professional) and kinds of expertise (i.e., core, supporting, specialized, and common knowledge). Duty with Honour defines leadership, policies for professional development, history, heritage and traditions, and the key roles these concepts play in sustaining the profession of arms [6]. Figure 3-1 is meant to symbolize the relation between the concepts that represent Canadian military professionalism.

Duty with Honour also speaks to the importance of adapting to the evolving nature of professionalism as the environment and culture changes. The profession of arms must stay relevant (i.e., meet Canadians needs), be open (i.e., knowledge and relevant skills), be consistent (i.e., attributes of responsibility, expertise, and identity are consistent), and provide reciprocity (i.e., expectations and obligations between the Canadian society and
the profession and vice versa). In keeping with the model in Figure 3-1, changes in one area will affect other areas. Changes in technology, for example, will lead to changes in expertise and perhaps changes in one’s responsibility and identity (e.g., different occupation) [6]. In this respect, Duty with Honour recognizes that military professionalism is shaped by the surrounding culture and its values [16], [17], [18], [23], [44].

Over the years, military professionalism has been shaped by conceptual and cultural influences. On the conceptual side, theories of military professionalism have been evolving since Huntington and Janowitz as a result of changes in society and changes in the function of the military [18], [19]. Researchers have sought to understand the influence from social, organizational, and individual levels, including a move from a more traditional view of the military [27], [28], [44] to one shaped by the external environment [1]. On the cultural side, the Government of Canada recently released a new defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, which calls for institutionalized culture change that is more inclusive of gender and diversity [38].

Considerable research has examined the military as a profession [10], [49], [53] and militaries’ efforts to increase diversity [45], but few researchers have examined the diverse perspectives of members themselves concerning the concept of the military professionalism and how diversity fits into it. The goal of this project, therefore, was to examine the perspectives of military professionalism from diverse members across the CAF using a qualitative approach informed by gender-based analysis plus (GBA+). GBA+ challenges assumptions regarding shared experiences among diverse men and women to better understand diverse perspectives and experiences regarding the concept of military professionalism in the Canadian military context [50], [51], [52].

3.2 METHODS AND PARTICIPANTS

The research was developed using a constructivist paradigm, which emphasizes the inclusion of many social realities experienced by participants [12], [29] and the GBA+ process [50], [51], [52] to capture experiences from a wide variety of participants. This paradigm considers how racial, cultural, ethnic, and gender identities are included in the military institution, which has a robust socialization processes to create a shared identity.1

After Department of National Defence (DND) ethics approval,2 members of the Canadian military were invited to participate through a parallel subgroup [41] and snowball sampling technique [30] to ensure diverse participation [24]. Participants were selected from across specific demographic groups including age, gender, military rank, geographic location, and diverse identities, including Indigenous and visible minority, and members with a disability.3 Participants employed in occupations with a low representation of men (e.g., men employed as dentists) or women (e.g., women in the combat arms) [36] were sought out.4 Potential participants were invited via email to in-person interviews or focus groups at bases across Canada or to a telephone interview at their own convenience. All data were collected from October 2016 and January 2017. Interviews and focus groups ranged between 30 and 90 minutes [24], including administration of a consent form, semi-structured discussion using interview and focus group protocols, and debriefing regarding

1 For more information on the methodology of the study consult Hachey, Bryson and Davis [23]. For more information on the larger study results consult Hachey [24].

2 Department of National Defence Social Science Review Board Ethics Approval 1565/16F.

3 In complying with national legislation, the Employment Equity Act of the Government of Canada, the Canadian Armed Forces is required to ensure representation in the military of Designated group members (DGM), defined by four designated groups: women, Indigenous people, persons with disabilities and members of visible minorities [21], [22]. As a result, member sampling can include those who have self-identified in one of these categories. Purposive sampling was not possible for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) members as this information is not held in databases from which samples are drawn.

4 A representative sample of potential participants was created using SAS software. CAF member data was obtained from Director Human Resources Information Management (DHRIM), while employment equity (EE) DGM information (e.g., Indigenous people) was obtained from Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity (DHRD) [24].
follow-up contact should they have further questions. While all the data were integrated for data analysis, some focus groups were mixed gender and some only contained men or women.

As Table 3-1 shows, the final sample of voluntary participants consisted of 125 CAF members, with the highest representation being older than 35 (76.5%); Regular Force members (53.7%); those wearing a Navy uniform (56.1%); men (58.0%); English speakers (72.5%); and officers holding the rank of major and above (36.2%). Moreover, the majority of participants came from National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa (n = 37; 29.6%), two naval operational bases in Victoria (n = 20; 16.0%) and Halifax (n = 13; 10.4%), the Primary Reserve headquarters in Québec City (n = 11; 8.8%) and a Regular Force base in Vancouver (n = 14; 11.2%). As shown in Table 3-1, roughly a third of the sample identified as designated group members (DGMs), with roughly the same number from each group. While efforts were made to include diverse perspectives (e.g., visible minority), there are limitations to understanding the intersectionality (e.g., visible minority women) of these perspectives.

Table 3-1: Demographic Characteristics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Characteristic</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth (18 – 24)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Adults (25 – 35)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Age (36 – 49)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older Adulthood</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service Component</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Force</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Reserve Force</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Uniform</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea*</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Official Language</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French-speaking</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English-speaking</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rank</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Non Commissioned Member (NCM) (private / ordinary seaman to master corporal / master seaman)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The proportion of Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) participants was higher because they were targeted for another project involving the RCN.

Table 3-2: Additional Employment Equity Group Membership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Equity Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Person</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person with a Disability</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a Visible Minority</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since this research project focused on investigating military professionalism among diverse CAF members, the following questions sought to tap into their perceptions of professionalism, which would have been shaped, in part, by Duty with Honour [8]:

1) As a CAF member, how would you describe professionalism?
   a) What are the characteristics that make an individual professional?
   b) What makes a military professional?
   c) What makes you a professional?

2) To what extent is it important for the military to be considered a profession?
   a) In your experience, to what extent is professionalism an important part of the CAF / Royal Canadian Navy / Canadian Army / Royal Canadian Air Force / Regular or Reserve Force / your unit?

Given the impact of social media on professionalism, and in particular the potential impacts on the relationship between personal and professional identity [33], the following questions were included:

1) With the increase in the use of social media, to what extent is social media changing how work and personal life are divided?
   a) To what extent is social media impacting your professional relationships? On professionalism?

Once the interviews and focus groups were completed, data were first coded using the questions in the protocol, followed by a deeper investigation of the themes and patterns in the data [31]. NVivo [40] was used to organize the data and present large themes, Microsoft OneNote to summarize and articulate the themes, and Excel to present a summary matrix of all the themes discovered.
3.3 RESULTS

This section presents the major themes in professionalism and unprofessionalism (a theme that emerged in the analysis) identified by participants.5

3.3.1 Professionalism

When asked about aspects of professionalism in general and whether the Canadian military was considered a profession, some participants felt that it was not a profession, others that it was difficult to define, and still others that it was more of a job than a career, calling to mind Moskos’s (1977) [32] institutional and occupational model of military professionalism [9]. Some participants felt that professionalism depended on occupation, service type, and environment. One participant thought that professionalism was more important for the Army than for the Air Force or Navy “because you are more in the public eye” (interview, Regular Force, English-speaking, RCAF, junior NCM, female). Conversely, those who felt that the military was a profession generally spoke of its importance across the Canadian military.

Trust was an important aspect of military professionalism for participants in several senses: One must be trusted to get the job done, one must be able to trust that one’s peers will have one’s back, and the Canadian public must trust one’s efforts and approach. One participant remarked,

I think because there’s a lot of trust that’s put into us, not just in the role that we play in…but that we have to be able to work within our own organization and trust and believe in each other and believe that you have a good leader….But there’s a lot of trust needed from outside, in society, as well. (Focus group, English-speaking, senior officer, female).

Several participants related professionalism to the purpose of the military and the reason people join: that members know the risks, show a willingness to serve, that the military is a way of being, and above all else the military is unique among professions. As one participant defined military professionalism, “It’s just a way of being” (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, RCAF, officer, female, member of a visible minority).

Many participants noticed a change in what it meant to be a professional since the strong public reaction to military misconduct in Somalia in 1992 [11], [48], which resulted in the murder of a civilian during a peacekeeping mission and became part of the cultural narrative, resulting in professional leadership doctrine being developed [7]. There has also been heightened attention to sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the CAF, with the release of the Deschamps [13] report on sexual misconduct in the CAF and the Baines [2] report on misconduct in the Navy. Finally, the culture has also been affected by a younger generation reshaping the values, beliefs, and norms of the military (see also Ref. [26]).

The major specific themes that arose concerning professionalism can be grouped under:

1) Code of conduct and DND standards;
2) Cohesion and loyalty;
3) Competencies and individual characteristics (positive);
4) Dress and deportment;
5) Societal standards and public image; and
6) Training, education, and professional development.6

5 Quotations will include (if applicable) 1) Interview or focus group; 2) Regular Force or Primary Reserve; 3) First official language (English, French); 4) RCN, Canadian Army (CA), or Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF); 5) Officer or NCM, 6) male or female; 7) DGM status.
6 Results are presented in alphabetical order.
3.3.1 Code of Conduct and DND Standards

DND and the CAF have a Code of Values and Ethics that sets a standard for members [35]. Participants identified the code and its ethos as being key aspects of professionalism. One participant stated,

_To be a professional, in general, basically means that you have a culture and understanding of what is right and wrong and how to go about doing things to be successful (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, CA, senior officer, male)._ 

Professionalism meant adhering to standards set out by the military and society. As one participant noted, “It also means acting in an ethical manner in terms of not taking advantage of people, either in the chain of command, those who are above, or those below you” (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, RCN, senior officer, male).

3.3.2 Cohesion and Loyalty

Several participants noted that being professional also included teamwork and feeling a connection with those around you: “To me, professionalism means building a team, being loyal to your superiors above within the limits of the law, and showing loyalty downwards to your subordinates” (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, RCN, male). Another participant remarked that “we all learn about each other, then we have this symbiotic work relationship that we all understand and do” (focus group, English-speaking, senior officer, female).

3.3.3 Competencies and Individual Characteristics (Positive)

Several participants listed competencies and individual characteristics important to being a professional, such as honesty, integrity, loyalty, selflessness, sacrifice, reliability, and especially discipline and respect. Many participants felt that discipline was a main tenant of military professionalism: “I’d say a high degree of discipline and self-control makes one a professional” (focus group, English-speaking, Primary Reserve, CA, male). On being respectful, one participant remarked, “I would suggest that a professional treats every human being the same regardless of their culture, or where or how they identify” (interview, French-speaking, Regular Force, RCN, junior officer, male), while another stated, “Respect and fairness… I think professionalism has a lot to do with treating people fairly and equitably” (focus group, Regular Force, RCN, senior officer, female). Another participant stated that “Professionalism comes from a lot of personal characteristics…to be dedicated, to be honest, integrity, loyalty, those sorts of things, and to respect your surroundings, everyone in it” (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, CA, junior officer, female, Indigenous member).

3.3.4 Dress and Deportment

Participants often reported that one’s dress and how one portrays oneself were key features of professionalism, which is articulated in CAF dress instructions [39]: “Professionalism is looking sharp each and every day, being kind, and being respectful” (interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, CA, senior NCM, male). Another participant remarked, “What I believe is professionalism in the Armed Forces is an individual, a soldier who exemplifies the discipline and the deportment that is required of a soldier at any rank” (interview, English-speaking, Primary Reserve, CA, senior NCM, member of a visible minority). This sentiment was widely shared by the participants.

3.3.5 Societal Standards and Public Image

While linked to dress and deportment, as well as to the code of ethics, several participants suggested that general social standards and public image play a role in professionalism. One participant said, “We are
a profession because we have standards that have been published and everybody has agreed to” (interview, English-speaking, Primary Reserve, RCAF, senior NCM, male), while another stated,

The military has to be professional because not only are we projecting a sense of professionalism out to the civilian population who are looking at us each and every day...it’s something the country can use to be proud of their military as an institution. (Interview, English-speaking, Regular Force, CA, senior NCM, male).

Liability to the public was another standard: “We’re accountable to the public, there’s that expectation of accountability” (focus group, English-speaking, senior officer, female). Finally, some participants felt that professionalism extended to one’s personal life. One’s actions reflect either positively or negatively on one’s professionalism:

I think it should be expected outside of work as well. You are always in the public eye. When you make your oath to serve the Queen and the country, it’s not to make an oath to serve them eight hours a day; it’s for the whole time. (Interview, Regular Force, English-speaking, RCAF, junior NCM, female).

3.3.1.6 Training, Education, and Professional Development

Finally, competence in one’s occupation and a continued interest to learn through training, education, and professional development was considered a main theme of professionalism. One participant stated, “I think professionalism is based in the education” (interview, Regular Force, other official language, CA, junior NCM, female member of a visible minority), while another remarked, “we are a group of people that have to be highly skilled” (interview, Regular Force, English-speaking, CA, senior officer, male). Given the expertise required for a number of occupations in the CAF, several participants felt that maintaining and pursuing education, training, and professional development opportunities was an important aspect of being a military professional.

3.3.2 Unprofessionalism

When asked to identify aspects of unprofessionalism in the military, some participants felt there were none to report, while others felt that there were but that they were not unique to the military. Several participants also felt that the culture had changed over the years. As one reported,

I feel there is a change that is happening and I think it is the right change, what is acceptable, what is not acceptable, and it seems like people are slowly buying into it. And it’s really difficult to create change especially in a masculine environment. (Interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, RCN, junior officer, male).

For those who identified aspects of unprofessionalism, the following themes emerged:

1) Alcohol in the military;
2) Aspects of military culture;
3) Individual characteristics (negative); and
4) Subcultures in the military. 7

3.3.2.1 Alcohol and the Military

Changes have been made to alcohol policies in the military over the years (e.g., RCN Internal Review of Personal Conduct) [2], and several participants noted the impact it has had on unprofessionalism. One participant stated, “One of our big things was drinking, and we would see in foreign ports people would do stupid things” (interview,

7 Results are presented in alphabetical order.
Regular Force, English-speaking, RCN, senior officer, male). Another remarked that when a tradition involves drinking, “unprofessional behaviour can follow” (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, junior officer, male, person with a disability). Although drinking was still part of mess life, several participants felt that the use of alcohol in the military had changed substantially. As one participant remarked, “Now it’s controlled” (interview, Primary Reserve, French-speaking, RCN, senior NCM, male).

3.3.2.2 Aspects of Military Culture

Several participants identified customs and traditions that can support poor or unprofessional behaviour, including the language imbedded in everyday life, as well as jokes and haz ing, but they acknowledged that the culture was undergoing changes: “Sometimes the language is not as sensitive at times to certain items. But I would say we are definitely working to try to resolve that” (interview, Regular Force, RCN, senior officer, female, member of a visible minority). Another participant felt,

I will tell you that I feel there is a change that is happening and I think it is the right change, what is acceptable, what is not acceptable, and seems like people are slowly buying into it. (Interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, RCN, junior officer, male).

One participant stated, “Gender-related jokes and stuff still happen” (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, RCN, senior NCM, male, member of a visible minority), while another suggested that “some people, regardless of the job or culture they are in, are unprofessional” (interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, RCN, junior officer, male). Another characteristic raised by participants concerned being self-serving. As one participant remarked, “Most people are there for themselves. Either they will try to get all the credit so that they can look good, so they can go and get promoted” (interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, male).

3.3.2.3 Individual Characteristics (Negative)

Several participants felt that certain individual characteristics in people who join and how individuals portray themselves can affect professionalism. One participant noted, “This is an organization that you really want certain personality attributes….But the very attributes that benefit a person tend to push against some of the politically correct ideals that we see (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, junior officer, Indigenous member). Those who noted the inclusion of these aspects in military culture also felt that it was changing and that they had been desensitized to the full impact. As one participant stated,

There’s a lot of inside kind of jokes and within different communities….There’s a different sense of humour, but maybe I’m desensitized to it to a certain degree, and I know how to stop if the conversation goes too far. (Interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, RCAF, junior NCM, female).

3.3.2.4 Subcultures in the Military

A number of participants perceived that unprofessionalism was more prevalent in certain military subcultures. One participant suggested that there was “a culture of who’s good enough, who can measure up” in specific subcultures (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, RCN, junior officer, Indigenous member).
Another stated that in other subcultures it can be a “ground for military problem children” (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, junior NCM, male, member of a visible minority). One participant felt that there has been “a lack of professionalism” in some as well (interview, Regular Force, English-speaking, RCN, junior NCM, male, Indigenous member). While not exhaustive in the examination of subcultures in the CAF, these remarks do suggest that unprofessionalism in some subcultures in the CAF should be further investigated.

3.3.3 Leadership

Leaders were seen as essential to the professionalism or unprofessionalism of their subordinates. Participants thought that those who became role models had to provide support both to their subordinates and to their chain of command. One participant summarized the relation between leaders and professionalism as follows: “Leading from the top and setting those standards and achieving them yourself….A professional can’t hold anybody else to a standard if they’re not willing to do it themselves” (focus group, English-speaking, RCN, female). Another stated that “there has to be an active interest on the part of leaders to develop and mentor those who are coming after them” (interview, Regular Force, English-speaking, RCN, senior officer, male).

Those who identified unprofessional aspects of leadership referred to certain types of leadership and organizational approaches. Echoing the approach to unprofessional behaviour in Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations (2005) [7], one participant said that when unprofessional behaviour occurs, 

leaders have to engage themselves at all levels. And the corporal has to grab the private and the sergeant has to grab the corporal. You can start off with a little bit of gentle coaching to bring things back in line – or you can stomp your foot and say, “That’s it.” (Interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, junior officer, male, person with a disability).

Some participants felt that lack of consistent organizational communications and a consistent response to unprofessional behaviour has affected professionalism in the military. One participant stated regarding lack of communication, “It was a couple of months ago they suddenly announced that four people were getting court-marchalled back East….Nobody saw anything until this all popped up” (interview, Primary Reserve, English-speaking, CA, senior NCM, male). Another participant, regarding appropriate approaches to unprofessionalism, remarked, “But you don’t get fired, even if you don’t show up for work, even if you do something bad, the punishment is so ridiculous – you get promoted anyway” (interview, Regular Force, French-speaking, RCN, senior officer, male).

3.4 DISCUSSION

This qualitative study examined the perspectives of diverse CAF members on military professionalism to see how their perspectives of Canadian military professionalism related to the concept of professionalism in Duty with Honour [8], the CAF’s long-standing guide to military professionalism. This section discusses the main themes that emerged and how they compare with the concept of military professionalism in Duty with Honour and in recent literature.

Figure 3-2 illustrates themes related to professionalism and unprofessionalism as experienced by members of the CAF. Participants identified several aspects of unprofessionalism (left side of figure) and professionalism (right side of figure) that are all affected by leadership. The relationship between leadership and professionalism mirrors the one in Duty with Honour in which leadership is essential to sustaining the profession [6], [8]. For the participants, ultimately, professionalism is presented, understood, and practiced through leadership [6], [8], which is also responsible for creating a culture inclusive of gender and diversity [20], [23], [47].
Given the importance of leadership in regulating the military as a profession, problems arise when that leadership is toxic (e.g., micro-manager) [4], [15], [43], [54] or ineffective (laissez-faire) [3], [15], [54], or perceived as narcissistic [14], [15], [54]. This can be an issue when there are ethical lapses [10] that require leadership intervention. Solutions to admonish toxic leadership include leadership performance, which takes into account subordinate feedback [25], advisory panels [3], and increased focus on the qualities of effective leadership [15], [54].

The CAF leadership model, which focuses on the qualities of values-based leadership [7] is defined as “directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission, professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success” (p. 1). Ultimately, vertical cohesion is an important aspect to group performance and mission success; how effective a leader is, affects how members work with one another [46]. As depicted in Figure 3-2, cohesion and maintaining and pursuing training, educational, and professional development opportunities were identified as key aspects of professionalism. While cohesion here was described as working with others, research has shown that task cohesion, rather than group cohesion, is important to performance [34], [46]. In other words, the competence of the group members working towards a common goal matters more than whether they fit together socially (i.e., group cohesion), which has implications for diversity. Leaders who focus on tasks and practice respecting and caring for others lead to more successful teams [46].

As in Duty with Honour, participants considered adhering to a code of conduct, DND standards, dress and deportment guidelines, societal standards, and maintaining a professional public image were key to professionalism. These aspects depend on policies being clear and concise, as well as how members are socialized into them [23], [42]. This points to the importance of inclusive policies and leadership adhering and maintaining a consistent practice of these policies. As articulated by the latest Canada’s Defence Policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, people are important part of the military and, thus, the new policy aims to have “well-supported diverse, resilient people and families” ([38], p. 19). To allow time for these changes to be integrated into the culture of the CAF, it would be beneficial to revisit in a couple of years to see whether these changes have taken effect.

Instances of unprofessionalism were attributed to the use of alcohol (at certain events or during customs and traditions), specific aspects of military culture (e.g., jokes), specific individual characteristics (negative: individualistic versus collectivist), and military subcultures where the environment is highly competitive.
Basically, these aspects demonstrate where there are gaps in the professionalism of the military, some of which are currently being addressed by Operation HONOUR, the CAF strategy to eliminate inappropriate sexual behaviours [37], as well as Canada’s Defence Policy [38]. Again, this policy was just recently released after the current research was conducted, so it would be beneficial to revisit unprofessionalism once more time has passed to see whether cultural changes have taken place.

3.4.1 Important Considerations and Limitations

It is important to keep in mind several considerations and limitations when interpreting the results reported here [25]. In particular, external influences, such as the situational or environmental aspects that could have shaped participants responses – e.g., the release of the Deschamps report [13] on sexual misconduct in the CAF and the Baines report [2] on misconduct in the Navy. A second consideration is the research method, which was shaped by GBA+ to ensure diverse participation. Linked to the participation of diverse members, a third consideration is the sampling procedure, which sought input from specific groups (i.e., DGM). There are limitations regarding the representativeness of the experiences of diverse men and women (i.e., only binary information collected) and the generalizability of the findings to the entire CAF population.

While efforts were made through sampling to target diverse CAF members, only binary information was collected for gender; therefore, other gender identities could not be included in the sampling strategy, which is also important for understanding diverse views. Nor could this research consider intersectionality (e.g., visible minority men) and its effects on experience, professional identity, and perspectives on the military profession. Future research, therefore, should explore how models of professionalism impact different gender identities and the intersectionality of those identities. In addition, the goal of a qualitative study is not to generalize across a population but to provide insight into the experiences of a group of CAF members, which can be used to formulate future research considerations [25].

Further, military professionalism has been examined many times before [5], and the definition had been evolving for over 50 years. Although not generalizable to the entire CAF population, the results nonetheless demonstrate CAF members’ perspectives and experiences reflect the traditional concept of military professionalism. Notably, leadership is seen as one of the most important aspects for facilitating a diverse culture in the military [20], [23], and it can affect both professional and unprofessional behaviour.

3.5 CONCLUSION

This research focused on the diverse perspectives of CAF members on their understanding of professionalism and unprofessionalism. Using a qualitative approach integrated with the GBA+ process, interviews and focus groups were conducted across Canada. The pivotal role that leadership plays in conveying, understanding, and practicing professional behaviour is key. This research highlights the many factors concerning professional behaviour with important considerations and future research in the field of military professionalism. Further research will be important to better understand how diversity contributes to, and to what extent different others are absorbed within, traditional models of military professionalism.

3.6 REFERENCES


Chapter 4 – NEW TIMES FOR MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM: 
RETHINKING CORE COMPETENCIES 
AND DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES

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4.1 CONTEXT EVOLUTIONS FOR FRENCH DEFENCE

In France, the election of a new president generally comes with an update of the Defence White Paper outlining the overarching defence orientations, at the heart of which is the preservation of France’s independence and sovereignty. The most recent White Paper (2016) published under the presidency of François Hollande highlighted the increasing complexity of the defence sector. The state set strategic priorities for the coming years, encompassing homeland security and the continuity of the nation’s essential functions, and at the external level the maintenance of security in Europe and in the North Atlantic space, the control of amplifying risks and threats arising from economic globalization, crisis analysis and management, the fight against terrorism and criminal trafficking, and strengthening of cybersecurity. High technologies have become an important part of military equipment evolution and a prerequisite to improving operational performance. The state engaged significant investments in its Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB) to equip defence forces with new generations of arms, anticipation and tracking devices, and enhanced destruction capabilities. The Ministry of Armies (MoA) now has a dedicated body, the Agency for Defence Innovation, which coordinates all research and development projects initiated with industrial partners and with academic and research institutions. The atypical ties the MoA has with industrial consortiums also fostered the need to control DITB firms’ internationalization strategies, mergers, and the opening of investment to foreign countries, which have led to complex contractual arrangements and the necessity to balance secret defence aspects and the strategic positions of French defence with the business competitiveness of the DITB [22].

In 2016, the MoA employed 205,120 military personnel and 60,300 civilians, according to the Social Yearbook of 2016. Past cuts in military budgets have restructured the whole of the defence sector and led to the scaling down of operations and the reduction of staff. New operational challenges, the appearance of new threats, and increased participation in international military alliances forced the MoA to expand human resources and financial means. The new defence orientations also require new skills and expertise, mostly technological knowledge for intelligence units, which led to a recruitment campaign seeking 15,000 officers under fixed-term contracts. Major efforts have been deployed to attract female candidates with minimal success. The share of female staff in the MoA has stagnated at around 20% (civil/military). The MoA takes pride in being one of the most feminized armies in the world. Equality is one of the founding principles of armies since 1972, and women and men soldiers have exactly the same rights and duties [22].

As with any public institution, defence also faces the need to modernize its functioning and to become a more adaptive organization able to cope with the changes occurring in the business environment. The capacity to handle change has become a major asset and a critical capability in both public and private sectors. Change can be needed at different levels and varies from incremental modifications to discontinuous flows. At best, change improves the overall functioning after a reconfiguration of the organization and at worse it raises anxiety and skepticism when the actors do not perceive themselves to be gaining from the restructuring process. Baker [3] observes that the pace of technological innovation is increasing and that most organizations are under greater pressure to deal with constant and pervasive technology, which in turn requires enhanced skills and active strategic management processes. Technology has the power to
revolutionize the way an organization operates and to set new working patterns that lead to increased productivity and more efficient resource consumption (human and material). Sometimes change occurs like a big bang that acts like a shock to the system and to historical practices, such as demonstrated by drones flying over a remote war zone with air control performed in a container located in the United States.

Sophistication and precision of weapons is expected to reduce the number of collateral civilian casualties and to enhance tactical performance. The recent kill shot record beaten by Canadian Special Forces in 2017 on an ISIS target in Iraq from a distance of more than 3500m shows that electronics have improved. Optical equipment, such as rangefinders and ballistic calculators, have eliminated manual mathematical calculations to determine elevation and windage.

Military applications developed with Artificial Intelligence (AI) will undeniably mark the end of an epoch. AI is a priority defence issue for all military powers of the twenty-first century. The US. and China are currently at the forefront of the new digitalized arms race [26]. The French MoA believes that AI will be crucial for tomorrow’s military operations. A new dedicated agency has a budget of 100 million euros to handle all AI projects and ventures until 2025, and more than 200 experts will be recruited. Human-machine interface (HMI) technology has been used in different industries, like electronics, entertainment, military, and medicine, and helps in integrating humans into complex technological systems. The interface consists of hardware and software that allow user inputs to be translated as signals for machines that, in turn, provide the required result to the user.

The use of electronic control systems, HMI, and AI has initiated profound changes in military practice. It has redefined operational tactics, widened the scope of activities, and also effected the way forces are trained, managed, and assigned to missions. The subject of technology assisted wars and remote control systems has led to the discussion of whether physical military presence in the field will still be required as technology evolves. If soldiers are no longer deployed in the field and if most of the work is performed from home in a safe working environment, what will become of military values? How is military professionalism going to evolve in the context of increasing technological assistance? In the armed forces, terms such as discipline, obedience, commitment, unity, and comradery have long been considered the essence of military professionalism. With technological progress and new actors setting foot in the military sector, new ethical and moral questions arise. Countries like the US, Canada, and the UK regularly resort to private military service providers, but France remains reluctant to use the services of contractors. When discussing the matter in an economics of defence class in the French Air Force Academy, a majority of cadets felt that private military contractors might be less committed and more motivated by high wages. They questioned the military values of private agents they perceived as mercenaries.

The new types of war require new skills, means, and dynamic capabilities. Contemporary military operations are conducted in the era of the knowledge economy and professionalism is now defined by essential skills. Skills allows members of the military to complete missions assigned to them and complete them well. Professionalism is the key to any job, but probably more so when it comes to the military. An infantry soldier needs to be able to shoot, an engineer to build, and a pilot to fly. Lacking knowledge and skills can mean death for someone who has only seconds to react to fire or stop the bleeding of a wounded comrade. Professionalism entails that the evolution of skills and competencies follow technical evolutions and that continuous learning becomes the priority of human resources management. In sociology, many authors have raised the difficulty public institutions have in freeing themselves from ‘path dependency’ because the past often determines organizational evolution. How will military culture and traditions cope with the new digitalized defence system? Will this affect the core essence of military values and hence military professionalism?

Moving to a new level of capacity requires capacity building, which results from a series of decisions and actions made at different organizational levels. Miller [21] brought up the importance of configuration as a distinctive asset explaining the firm’s performance. Value stems from the synchronizing of all organizational
elements, such as technology, policies, and systems and routines, which determine “the degree to which an organization’s elements are orchestrated and connected by a single theme” (p. 509). Miller argues that successful configurations derive from competitive tactics, organizational skills and resources, decision support systems, and coordinative mechanisms. With the current pace of innovation and technological revolutions, the military institution will have to become ductile, a process that Rindova and Khota [34] named continuous morphing as the capacity to reshuffle resources and skills as needs arise to preserve a competitive advantage and stay ahead of the competition.

In this chapter, I examine the future of military professionalism in light of these evolutions. The subject usually studied under the rubric of the revolution of military affairs in management science. I first address the meaning of military professionalism that prevails and how things have been done and envisioned in the armed forces. I then provide a quick overview of new technological applications that will complement or become alternative military practices. In the following section, I discuss the need to reach a dynamic state where the French Army is organizationally aligned with innovation and meets its new capabilities requirements. Finally, I review the set of properties making organizations more adaptive and agile, and I propose a conceptual model for military professionalism that accounts for these multidimensional challenges and enables military institutions to reconfigure their resource base when necessary, without compromising the core values and the cohesion of the entire system.

4.2 THE WAY WE DO THINGS AROUND HERE

A military career is not like any other occupation. It is a patriotic commitment, a mission, and a moral engagement with something bigger than a job. Military professionalism embodies sacred values and representations, and the traditional military terminology still encompasses the words loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and courage. Facing fear, danger, and adversity (physical or moral) shape the personal courage that has long been associated with armies. It is a matter of enduring physical duress and at times risking personal safety. Military professionalism was discussed in the special issue of Joint Forces Quarterly in 2011 [14], which reiterated the notion that dedication remains at the heart of military engagement:

“It’s an Army of flesh and blood, an Army of young men and women like yourselves who signed up willingly to face danger and to risk their lives for something greater than those lives. Your job is to lead them and lead them well. That is what they expect of you. Actually, it isn’t a job at all; it’s a duty. For those of you who have no prior service, you are going to be awestruck at the manner in which these young Soldiers do their duty every single day.” (p. 6)

Meaning is essential and significant both personally and culturally. How belief and culture are understood, interpreted, translated, internalized, applied, and put into practice can be complicated. Leaders set the tone of the culture of their organizations. The meaning of the community, no matter how defined, becomes essential for interconnectedness, for bonding, and for understanding. It all has to do with the relationship between the organization and the individual. Military institutions also reflect national and cultural values and cultural peculiarities. Licht et al. [17] studied the cultural rules governing social institutions. On the matter of hierarchy/egalitarianism, for instance, they examined the ideal way to elicit cooperative, productive activity in society and observed that hierarchy refers to a cultural emphasis on obeying role obligations within a legitimately unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources. The study of cultural features in a given society also provides interesting insights on the particular values shaping a nation’s social pact, such as the use of violence, gender parity, innovation, and democracy. Cultural peculiarities might become even more prominent when armies live, interact, and work together in coalitions, and coordinating multinational forces requires strong cross-cultural management skills.

Making public institutions more adaptive also implies overcoming the hurdles of bureaucracy and a great deal of skepticism from civil servants. Organizational sociologists have observed trajectories in public
institutions causing path dependency effects [19], [32]. In the public sector, history matters; it matters even more in the military. Emblematic leaders and war heroes, collective pride, values and culture shape the military memory. Change can be seen as a betrayal of former heroes’ actions or a decoupling of decisions and orientations taken by highly ranked officers or officials. Path dependency shapes organizational patterns, which in turn predesign sequences of actions entrenched in the day-to-day functioning. Saying that individuals are naturally inclined to make the right decisions on the basis of available options is a simplistic view of things. In the armed forces, the symbolic nature of things cannot be ignored, and pragmatism can be offset by traditions, thereby reducing the number of available options to resolve a given situation. Political institutions might be less fluid than other sectors and less flexible because structural arrangements reflect historical decisions and political ambitions and aspirations.

Di Maggio and Powell [8] have coined the term institutional isomorphism (also called the Iron Cage) to describe the tendency of leaders to imitate other organizations: “Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them.” Isomorphism is particularly common in public institutions as it guarantees legitimacy, proven decision-making, and the reproduction of successful past actions. In France, for instance, high-level bureaucrats have graduated from the same prestigious schools and have obtained a standardized education and similar training. There is a sense of a professional community sharing the same beliefs and vision in various sectors and interacting on a regular basis about what they deem to be “best practices.” In public institutions, two sources of pressure co-exist: the pressure of efficiency and the pressure to maintain ceremonial organizational cultures. These aspects are deeply ingrained in the functioning of the public system and usually survive political change because high-level civil servants remain in place in France after presidential elections.

In the turmoil of current times, institutions face the double pressure to cope with unforeseen events and to modernize, which implies that technological progress is likely to reengineer organizational and human routines. The next section provides a brief overview of what awaits the military sector with regard to technological revolution.

4.3 THE WAY WE DO THINGS FROM NOW ON: WAR-EMBEDDED TECHNOLOGIES

Is military professionalism called into question in the contemporary political and social environment? According to Carnes Lord in Joined Forces Quarterly [14], the US Army is suffering an erosion of the traditional values that underpin its professional ethos on account of the continuing disintegration of traditional moral and cultural values in the larger society:

The weakening of organized religion in much of the country, the breakdown of the family, the impact of Hollywood and popular music and related developments pose a formidable challenge to the good order and discipline of a military that, thanks to the internet and contemporary social media is even more inextricably embedded in civilian society and culture than ever before (p. 71).

Inevitably, internal tensions arise with progress. The digital divide is not to be taken lightly because in military institutions rank sustains historical working patterns, resists the adoption of new technologies, and maintains obsolete procedures. The pace of innovation of the last three decades created three generations of militaries with variable digital dexterity and enthusiasm for electronic and automated devices. In France, a quick look at the career officers age-pyramid indicates that four “technological generations” interact, the mean age of officers being 41.6 years in 2016 (age interval ranges from 22 to 61 years), with a significant proportion between 42 and 52 years [22].

Maintaining military critical capabilities requires advanced technology. Will traditions and beliefs be sustained if human relationships and communications become increasingly handled by technological
applications? Major technological changes have reshaped strategic priorities in defense. Cybersecurity, whose function is to protect systems, networks, and programs from digital attacks, has become a cornerstone of military activity. Cyberattacks usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying sensitive information, extorting money from users or interrupting normal business processes now target civilian public infrastructures (e.g., hospitals, power plants, water and sanitation systems). Strengthened surveillance, control, and security have become a critical component of the MoA’s mission, which is also in charge of protecting strategic sites, ensuring nuclear deterrence, and maintaining homeland security in times of repeated terrorist attacks.

AI is becoming a critical part of modern warfare. Compared with conventional systems, military systems equipped with AI are capable of handling larger volumes of data more efficiently. In addition, AI self-control, regulation, and actuation of combat systems (due to its inherent computing and decision-making capabilities) is expected to increase performance and empower armed forces with new capabilities: automation of actions, increased pace of operations, better prepared forces and strengthened strategic influence, and psychological domination [26]. AI applications already in use allow facial recognition, image reading, and making sense of a large volume of data. Inventoried AI military applications that will be put in use in the years to come include the following [35]:

- Warfare platforms: efficient warfare systems, less reliant on human input and increased synergy, and enhanced performance of warfare systems while requiring less maintenance.
- Cybersecurity: protect networks, computers, programs, and data from any kind of intrusion. Cyberattacks can lead to loss of classified military information and damage to military systems.
- Logistics and transportation: prepare effective and safe transportation of goods, ammunition, armaments, and troops. AI may help lower transportation costs and reduce human operational efforts.
- Target recognition: enhance the accuracy of target recognition in complex combat environments. Defence forces may gain an in-depth understanding of potential operation areas by analyzing reports, documents, news feeds, and other forms of unstructured information.
- Battlefield healthcare: robotic surgical systems and robotic ground platforms can provide remote surgical support and evacuation activities in war zones. Systems equipped with AI can mine soldiers’ medical records and assist in complex diagnosis. IBM’s Watson research team partnered with the US Veterans Administration to develop a clinical reasoning prototype known as the Electronic Medical Record Analyzer (EMRA). The technology is designed to use machine learning techniques to process patients’ electronic medical records and automatically identify and rank their most critical health problems.
- Combat simulation and training: construct computerized models that acquaint soldiers with the various combat systems deployed during military operations.
- Threat monitoring and situational awareness: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations used to acquire and process information to support a range of military activities.
- AI and data information processing: quickly and efficiently process large volumes of data to obtain valuable information. AI can assist in culling and aggregating information from different datasets, as well as acquiring and summing supersets of information from various sources. These devices include probability-based forecasts of enemy behavior, aggregation of weather and environmental conditions, anticipation and flagging of potential supply line bottlenecks.
- Augmented soldiers: technologies that augment human capabilities with material such as exoskeletons and wearables based on soft robotics that tune into the human body, which are being created to directly interact with the central nervous system of the soldier.
Innovation makes available less expensive and human-costly flying equipment, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly called drones, which are remotely piloted aerial vehicles that have significant roles in defence as well as commercial sectors. UAVs are increasingly used for border surveillance, and they allow monitoring, surveying, and mapping tasks formerly performed by fighter planes and a human presence on the ground. Drones also have improved range, persistence, and surveillance capabilities, along with the ability to use force without physical risk to the attacker.

The potential of drones became obvious in the Air Force. In 1995, four Hunter models, conceived by Israel Aerospace Industries were acquired and used until 2004. To welcome these devices, an inter-army team was put in place in the Air Force experimentation center (CEAM) in Mont-de-Marsan before the creation in 2001 of the experimentation squadron drone 1/33 Adour, renamed in 2010 “Escadron de drones 1/33 Belfort,” based in Cognac since 2009. The tactical Hunter drone, deployed in Kosovo in October 2001, completed 25 missions and was also used by civil authorities to conduct surveillance of the G8 Summit in Evian in 2003 and 60th anniversary of D-Day in 2004 in Normandy. The European Harfang drone completed its first operational mission in Afghanistan from the Bagram base in 2009. MALE drones (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) have unique features. They allow a permanent and discreet presence in target zones and improve understanding of conditions on the ground, movements of enemy, and real-time data transmission. Their 24/7 availability provides a major time efficiency. By increasing potential interactions between observation-decision-action, drones have significantly contributed to the reliability and the shortening of decision-making process, called the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) or Boyd cycle, also referred to as F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess).

Integrating new devices, such as drones, automated applications, and very soon AI-enabled systems, goes far beyond the simple acquisition of technology. As Baker [3] argues, technology has the power to reshape institutional functioning, and a change of such magnitude will necessarily marshal a vast quantity of additional means and resources as well as new skills leading to new capabilities. It goes without saying that AI will instigate profound changes in the configuration of armies and in the way operations have been conceived until now. For instance, the use of combat simulation and training will require major investments in computers, simulation software, training of trainers, and a reconfiguration of education programs in military academic institutions. The introduction of AI also entails that life-long learning will become an essential component of a military career. Military education will be impacted too, and many courses, such as human resources management, aeronautical engineering, ethics and legal knowledge, and economics of innovation – to mention just a few examples – will need updating.

The adoption, testing, and integration of a new generation of devices induces a time-lag until they are sufficiently reliable to shift practices. During this time, it is business as usual. The capacity to remain efficient in this dual mode of functioning means that military institutions need to become ambidextrous, a notion that I explain in the next section. It also supposes a complete shift of mindset about the organization of the war and the preparation of forces. The dual functioning entails major adaptations in terms of training, learning, changing processes, review of strategies and operational tactics. Needless to say that military institutions will have to become more adaptive, find ways to develop skills rapidly, and remove the bottlenecks of bureaucracy.

4.4 MAKING INSTITUTIONS AGILE AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Change management and capacity building are intertwined notions. Making institutions more agile and reactive means that these systems are prepared for reconfiguration, optimization, and modernization, both at the human and structural levels. Armies deal with two types of pressures: maintain peace and security in
the state and abroad and adapt to external changes, such as the social and cultural environment, which compelled Defence to accept more intimate relations with the rest of society through more open and transparent communication from political power. With information and communication technology, social media, and the free press citizens have the right to be accurately informed.

The need to preserve traditional values while inculcating new modes of functioning (with technologically assisted and automated material, for example) forces military institutions to practice a dichotomous management that academic research calls organizational ambidexterity. Some authors have characterized satisfying competing or antagonistic objectives as organizational schizophrenia [11]. The concept of organizational ambidexterity stems from the field of organizational learning and innovation in which March [20] first examined how firms have, on the one hand, exploited accumulated knowledge and perfected processes to organize their activities, and have, on the other hand, experimented in new directions, taken risks, and created new knowledge. In the managerial literature, ambidexterity refers to the capacity to produce and combine innovations sourced in both exploitation and experimentation so as to develop the scope of business and optimize strategies. Further research has identified four types of ambidexterity: structural ambidexterity, a deliberate split of exploration and exploitation activities within the firm, temporal ambidexterity, alternating periods focused on one or the other, reticular ambidexterity, the capacity to liaise with other organizations in the innovation process, and contextual ambidexterity, an intrinsic way of functioning in which some firms are genetically ambidextrous [7]. O’Reilly and Tushman [29] also observed ambidexterity among individuals who simultaneously performed routinized tasks and innovation actions. Lievre and Aubry [18] described how project managers handled emergency situations in polar expeditions and observed that their propensity to react efficiently to sudden events depends on their capacity to articulate in situ exploitation and exploration skills, as well as to adapt and to resort to rational thinking.

How firms rapidly and fluidly adapt to change has led to extensive research in organization sciences. From the 1970s onward, many authors have investigated the field of capacity and how organizations cope with organizational change and modernization. The capacity to make an appropriate change has paved the way to the study of dynamic capabilities, which provides insight for strategic renewal, agile organizations, change management, reconfiguration of routines, and flexible processes. The seminal work of Teece et al. [36] laid the foundations of dynamic capabilities, which means the ability of an organization to purposefully adapt an organization’s resource base. Dynamic capabilities underpin the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments.

Dynamic capabilities theory provides senior managers of successful companies with actionable tools to adapt to radical discontinuous change, while maintaining minimum capability standards to ensure competitive survival. Accordingly, managers reorganize their own routines to make the most of their existing resources while simultaneously planning for future process changes as the resources depreciate. Dynamic capabilities divide into three categories: anticipate and influence opportunities and threats, seize and take up opportunities and reconfigure the resource base, and protect and optimize tangible and intangible assets.

At the individual level, capacities and capabilities arise from a blend of knowledge acquired in the socializing process, as Nonaka and Takeuchi [27] have shown. The authors observed that while people interact in an organization, they exchange and gain tacit and explicit knowledge. New knowledge, new know-how, and competencies form in learning stages and follow an incremental process in which new mental schemes set in [4], [13]. If people have a propensity to learn, so do organizations. In the past two decades, managerial research has shown that when individuals work together and cooperate they develop collective skills and capabilities [6], [9]. Rindova and Kotha [34] who have studied the lifecycle of Yahoo and Excite, noted that firms became more agile and adaptive from the moment they opted for continuous morphing, which describes the comprehensive ongoing transformation through which the focal firms sought to regenerate their transient competitive advantage in hypercompetitive environments.
If everyone agrees on the importance of capacity and capability to achieve the desired objectives, less attention has been paid to the practice of capacity building. Capacity building is a term used by international donors and development experts to designate actions aimed at creating an enabling environment. The problem with the capacity building concept is that it has become too closely associated with initiatives such as micro-credit programs, health policies, trainings, organizational modernization, livelihood policies, economic development, entrepreneurship innovation, technological progress, etc. This expansion of the concept has made it ambiguous, inviting many critics among academics and practitioners. Yet most agree on the fact that there are actions that enable individuals, organizations, and countries to “access more capacity.”

For Hildebrand and Grindle [12] capacity building refers to efficacy, the “ability to perform proper tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably.” For the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [28], capacity building is the “ability to handle or manage affairs successfully.” Systemic approaches have been adopted to understand how capacities and capabilities arise from the combinations of skills [1], and how knowledge can be marshalled to solve problems. Until now, capacity building has found no legitimacy and no academic credibility from a theoretical standpoint, although capacity is the stepping stone of individual, organizational, and institutional development.

Cohen and Levinthal [5] argue that the ability to exploit external knowledge is another critical component of innovative capabilities. The ability to evaluate and utilize knowledge from outside stems from the use of prior related knowledge. At the most elemental level, this prior knowledge includes basic skills or even a shared language but may also include knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological developments in a given field. Thus, prior related knowledge confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to achieve a goal. These abilities collectively constitute what is called a firm’s absorptive capacity, with the assumption being that the organization needs prior related knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge.

Military knowledge and practice now apply to a wider array of people and organizations. New technological knowledge, the need to gain more human resources flexibility and the rising privatization trends have led to a greater mixing in the composition of armed forces. In the operating environment, diverse categories of actors interact and handle warfare, with, as one might expect, a different conception of military professionalism. Historically, the military usually distinguishes between enlisted and officer careers. In 1996, French president Jacques Chirac announced the end of mandatory military service and his decision to professionalize armies. Professionalization draws from the hypothesis that industrialization of Western countries, the weakening legitimacy of the use of force, the nuclear threat, and the rise of technologies made the annual costly training of thousands of new young soldiers irrelevant. In a context in which new technologies arose and missions gained in complexity, more specialized manpower was needed. Handing over expensive material and sensitive functions to inexperienced hands could not be allowed. Technological skills became the backbone of the institution, and the MoA now recruits contract officers on 5- and 15-year contracts to rapidly inject technical expertise into the various domains, with new staff capable of using and mastering the most advanced knowledge and technologies. Armies now have a critical need for specialists in various fields, such as ICT, logistics and maintenance, human resources management, and communications. An accelerated training of six months is provided to acquaint these candidates with the military culture and functioning. The war in Iraq has witnessed the entry of a new category of military personnel, with varying degrees of acceptability around the world, private militaries or military contractors. The so-called business of war includes independent corporations offering military services to national governments, international organizations, and also to non-state actors. They are providing combat and protection forces and other support or technical services. In some countries, private militaries are controversial, but more subtle forms of privatization exist. In France, private companies such as DCI, Cassidian, and Helidax provide military training for cadets and Special Forces, helicopters, aircraft maintenance, and other support services to the military.

Whether these new actors have conferred greater agility and capacity on the French military forces has led to animated debates, but the matter remains to be studied academically. The most skeptical viewpoints argue...
that these “mercenaries” do not share military values and the institutional culture. At worst, it is believed that they could join opposing forces for higher wages if the opportunity arose.

Is military professionalism gender sensitive? Many studies have tried with mitigated success to investigate (with good intentions) whether women bring specific skills to militaries. The matter usually leads to stereotyped ideas or clichés, such as “women are more caring, social or less violent.” No study differentiates gender-based skills or competencies within forces. As General de Lattre de Tassigny once said: “I don’t want to know if there are women in the division, for me there are only soldiers” [30], [31]. Of course, reality is more complicated.

4.5 SISTERS IN ARMS

For modern armies, gender mixing is an asset and an opportunity to display modern values. There are many reasons explaining the discrepancies of gender representations at the center of which glass ceiling effects and invisible filters prevent female candidates from climbing the rank ladder. Role and status may lead to different analyses. With a rate of 20%, the French MoA is among the top four of most feminized MoDs worldwide. Women make up 55,000 of 266,800 staff and have access to all functions – 32,000 women serve in the army. Women only count for 7% of general officers and for 8% of all deployed staff in external operations. The 2019 – 2025 Military Law Project ensures that women get access to officer positions at the Chief of Staff level and to the French War College. A recent survey indicates that 60% of MoA female staff feel it is difficult to be a woman in the army. The recruitment of female candidates has been stable since 2008, and several explanations have been put forward. Christophe Pajon [30], [31], who conducted several studies related to the role of women in the Air Force, notes that the strong masculine cohesion and promiscuity representations could deter women. Women might also be more caught between female identity and military identity in international conflicts. The symbol of morals (courage), physical features, and virility also belong to masculine representations, and the percentage of women decreases in the higher ranks. In addition, the French military recruits in prestigious engineering schools and scientific and technical academic institutions that have low feminization rates.

The nature of war is changing, and Rambo-style illustrations of soldiers have given way to an image of technological dexterity and expertise. Less direct combat, more anticipation, more analysis and efficiency in four dimensions dominate military practices today. Pajon [30], [31] proposed that the increasing technologization of military operations will have an impact on the attractiveness of a military career for women because it reduces the use of physical force. Other aspects might be worth investigating. From my experience as a lecturer at the French Air Force Academy, female military personnel open up more easily about their dissatisfaction or their difficulty respecting and being managed by a superior they consider not competent enough. Generational gaps also seem to widen and the perceived obsolescence of military structures and the burden of bureaucracy often deter young hires who share some disappointment and a relative skepticism about the military institution and its overall performance.

4.6 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ERA OF THE MILLENNIALS

The Millennials, also known as Generation Y, are the demographic cohort following Generation X and preceding Generation Z. Millennials are sometimes referred to by media and social networks as “echo boomers” due to a major surge in birth rates in the 1980s and 1990s, and because Millennials are often the children of baby boomers. For the last few years, the driving force behind organizational transitions has been the millennial generation. The “digital natives” have infused the working world with their own style of communication and relationship to personal information. Organization 1.0 was structured according to rigid processes. This process-dominated system of management is now challenged by an expectation of greater flexibility and mobility. Organization 2.0 has to be responsive, which presents a major problem for human resources because a hierarchical structure is replaced by internal networking through social communities.
Performance and results are attained with a more collaborative, solutions-based work structure, which often blurs hierarchy or makes routines obsolete. Managerial figures are no longer involved in day-to-day projects because the system does not endow them with classic authority and capacity. Nimon [25] believed that the employee of the future does not need to have experience as much as a potential for learning skills. In a system of agile process management, employees want to be constantly informed as to how successfully or efficiently they are executing the tasks assigned to them. And to achieve this, a new culture of evaluation has to be created. Born in the digital society, Millennials are also more concerned with ethics, social impacts, and environmental considerations of business [2].

In the era of the Millennials, will the military be judged negatively by concerns for global peace, justice, and ecological behavior? A national poll in 2018 in France indicates that the perception of the military remains positive:

- 84% of the French people have a good image of their military.
- The young generation shares this opinion in the same proportion (84%).
- Militaries are perceived as efficient (79%), reactive (79%), reassuring (77%), and they have a special place in the French spirit.
- Courage (47%) and commitment (45%) are the two values that best reflect French soldiers.
- 84% of those under 30 years old consider that being a military member is rewarding.
- 81% believe that defence budgets should be maintained or increased.
- 48% think that soldiers are insufficiently equipped with materiel and weapons to fulfil their assignments.

At the organizational level, moving forward is easier when citizens support the institution and have a positive opinion about its missions. This being said, the enthusiastic portrait of the French armed forces should be placed in context because these surveys took place after major terrorist attacks perpetrated in Nice and Paris in 2016 and 2017.

4.7 THE OUTLOOK OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Resteigne and Soeters [33] argue that working in military coalitions has become the rule rather than the exception. Since the Cold War, several reasons have led to increased cooperation between national militaries. First, professionalization of forces and the end of conscription decreased the number of available soldiers. Second, the end of the Soviet threat and the global financial crisis impacted national budgets (and hence military spending). The quest for efficiency and the elimination of resource duplication also motivated forces to share resources. Given the more diffuse nature of threats, extended overseas postings are required, and operations are extended over longer periods.

Working in military coalitions entails multicultural interactions, reflecting varying military cultures, professional organizations, languages, religions, and visions. The modular environment can lead to culture shocks when some values or beliefs collide, become incompatible, or difficult to accept by others. The concept of military culture has been vastly debated in sociology through its symbols, physical attributes, language, traditions and history and if common culture elements have been observed, significant peculiarities remain among international forces involved in joint operations.

The rationale for coalitions (EU, NATO) is the “pooling and sharing” policy, which describes various forms of defence cooperation. Pooling means that national capabilities are provided to other countries. A special multinational structure is set up to pool these contributions and coordinate their deployment. The European

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1 Ministère des armées IFOP-DICoD, mai 2018 [23].
Air Transport Command is one such example. Pooling can occur in the development, procurement, or subsequent operation of sharing, which means that one or more countries provide their partners with capability or equipment (such as airlift) or undertake a task for another country [24]. If this occurs on a permanent basis, the partners can cut this capability and, theoretically, save on costs. In the EU Council’s conclusions on military capability development of December 2010, the EU proposes pooling and sharing as a solution to save money and increase the efficiency of their military resources. NATO is pursuing similar aims with its Smart Defence initiative, made official at the Alliance’s summit in Chicago in May 2012. As Mölling [24] observes, role specialization takes place if a state gives up certain capabilities and concentrates only on a few others. Many European states refuse to do so as they are afraid of mutual dependence. Nevertheless, role specialization is already taking place, but it is involuntary, uncoordinated, and has major consequences for the capability of all partners.

Considering that coalition partners have different means and capacities, some will struggle more than others to afford expensive equipment. In addition, state modernization actions undertaken in many countries worldwide have led to costly change management programs, limiting their capacity and willingness to purchase new military material not considered a national priority.

4.8 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN MOTION: MAKING SENSE OF THE CURRENT DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT

Military professionalism is a dynamic concept that is meant to evolve to remain aligned with societal changes and the global environment. On the one hand, military professionalism seeks to preserve the core values and the traditions that keep the spirit of individuals willing to serve their country and work for the security of others. On the other hand, professionalism requires a vision and new ideas to strengthen the capacity of the institution to accomplish its mission through a system endowed with enhanced and distinctive capabilities (Figure 4-1).

In order to meet the upcoming challenges, military institutions need to make agility their main objective if they want to become more adaptive. To become agile the military institution will have to bring profound changes to its current configuration and “walk the talk” of modernization. Ingraining dynamic capabilities will ensure that adaptiveness, interconnectedness, resilience, and regenerative capacity become entrenched institutional assets and not artefacts. Professionalism also entails marshalling the right amount of resources to achieve goals and to reduce the opportunity cost of military spending. A recent study conducted with the French Air Force shows that increasing budgets does not go hand in hand with increased performance. Despite the additional funding granted to aeronautical maintenance, the number of available and ready-to-use aircraft has not improved. Problems such as organizational inertia and burdensome work processes have to be addressed to allow agility to set in [10].
Table 4-1 synthesizes the set of capacities military organizations will need to become agile. We applied generic properties identified in former studies to the military environment.

**Table 4-1: Typology of Dynamic Capabilities. Adapted from Ref. [10].**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Capacity</th>
<th>Properties</th>
<th>Military Specifics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Sensing and seizing new business opportunities and market repositioning</td>
<td>Implement ambidexterity in institutional functioning. Develop stronger anticipation skills and seek higher impacts with less resource consumption. Reduce actions' opportunity costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>Quality of leaders’ skills and competencies</td>
<td>Adopt management practices valuing competencies and skills rather than only ranks. Train managers to effectively lead different military generations and inculcate a life-long learning culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Process reengineering and redefinition of operational flows</td>
<td>Boost operational readiness with rehearsing and simulations. Nurture ambidexterity to exploit/explore knowledge, solutions, and ideas in home bases and on international operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>Creativity, new ideas and resources to innovate</td>
<td>Lighten top-down processes and allow new ideas and solutions to come from everywhere and everyone in the organization, including from external contributors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Quality of relations with Stakeholders (SHs)</td>
<td>SH support eases change, so adopt fluid and transparent communication with all SHs (civil/military).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reticular</td>
<td>Strategic networks and alliances, communities of practice, clusters</td>
<td>Avoid unnecessary duplication of resources and means. Use knowledge transfer and information sharing with all stakeholders (internal and external).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Corporate design, organization of business units</td>
<td>Reduce bureaucratic rigidity and remove burdensome procedures. Avoid duplication of units and ease decision-making at all levels. Set up loosely-coupled units promoting creative thinking (ideas lab model).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>Projection into another organizational set up</td>
<td>No one size fits all system. Design and reconfigure units to enable then to cope with future actions and specialities according to their strengths and distinctive capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mimetism</td>
<td>Anticipation and alignment with strategic repositioning needs in the sector</td>
<td>Perform feedback with Alliance partners and industrial/academic project managers to identify best practices and opportunities. Resorb the path dependency that limits future options.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>Recovery and survival in times of crisis or emergency</td>
<td>Value the reporting of mistakes and failure so as to learn from experience, adjust and improve actions. Create a knowledge-management system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercultural</td>
<td>Acceptation of ideas/concepts from other cultural paradigms</td>
<td>Develop cross-cultural management skills to facilitate coalition work and negotiations with host governments. Set up international innovation teams.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the future of military professionalism and the evolution of armed forces’ core competencies in the light of technological advances, new sources of threats, performance requirements, and generational stratification of the workforce. There have been numerous advancements on the battlefield in the form of arms, decision-making tools, transportation, and air power. Technological inventions have direct impacts not only on the battlefield, but also on all the people operating on a remote computer thousands of miles away from a conflict zone.

AI-assisted warfare is slowly but surely transforming the nature of war, leaving heroism open for redefinition. Demonstrating overwhelming force while using superior technology and intelligence stems from the illusion of technological domination, according to Lefeez [16]. She adds that the increase in armament combined with stagnating military budgets might compel military decision-makers to abandon core capabilities to acquire these expensive materials. Ultimately, it might even be counter-productive and lead to a loss of capacities. Other social priorities have to be addressed, such as preserving domestic safety and security and armed forces missions must fit into a larger social project (e.g., stabilization, reconstruction). The positive opinions reflected by polls can quickly be ruined by exaggerated military spending, due to the high opportunity cost that they entail.

The political turmoil and the pace of innovation entails that military organizations must ingrain dynamic capabilities in their structures and processes. In the short term, operational units may be more concerned about agility than bureaucracies. Upstream, sharp anticipation skills allow militaries to sense and seize opportunities and to be better prepared for the unexpected. Ultimately, these capabilities enable militaries to detect weak signals and boost reactivity. Downstream, these dynamic capabilities enable people and organizations to build distinctive assets and unique resources, to valorise new learning and knowledge and to make the system responsive to the changes in the operating environment – all this, of course, without harming the core values that ensure the cohesion of the system.

With respect to gender equality, armed forces are recruiting more women, who nevertheless continue to face a glass ceiling. The peculiar input or skills supplied by women is totally subjective, academically speaking. To some, empowering women in conflict may be one of the most sensible and effective ways to build peace. For others, feminization might increase with the technologization of war as lethality reduces.

What the hiring and retaining of highly educated and skilled Millennials will require in terms of new managerial skills and practices is another aspect of organizational evolution. According to three senior US officers,

\[
\text{it is time to understand them. Considering the average age of enlisted members was 27 and the average age of officers was 34 1/2 as of 2015, Millennials are moving into junior leadership positions where they are shaping the Army’s values, ethics and organizational functions.}
\]

The challenge awaiting armies is to preserve the core values of military engagement and answer the ever-increasing demand for performance. The growing social pressure concerning the preservation of natural resources, human rights, and the accountability about the destruction of populated living areas will need to be addressed in future strategies. However, the main challenge resides in the management of the transition period. Understanding the mechanisms of organizational ambidexterity will help filling the gap. In practice, the existing material and resources will be used to their end of life, while new high tech material is gradually added to the artillery.

To conclude, the main challenge is institutional. Changing work routines can be painstaking if the system values the past over the present. In military institutions, history matters and probably more than in any other government department. Agility requires getting rid of bureaucratic bottlenecks and also of mental cages locking the system in the past. The following citation could not better illustrate this state of mind:
At its center, war defines the military profession and, therefore, war is what officers must study. History offers the reality of war far more effectively—and realistically—than exercises, simulations, or the efforts of war gamers using computers to imagine an unknowable future [15].

4.10 REFERENCES


Chapter 5 – POWER RESOURCES AMONG FEMALE OFFICERS

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5.1 INTRODUCTION

The Swedish Armed Forces are a politically controlled, bureaucratic, and hierarchical institution [2], [7] with a male-dominated culture [28]. Further, Castilla and Benard [12] argue that the organization is meritocratic and emphasizes rank, degree, competence, and strong social cohesion. For example, studies among rangers in the Swedish Armed Forces show that a specific type of masculinity fits the culture. The culture states what the men are and are not allowed to feel, and it creates, among other things, focus and a strong sense of community [4]. The organization makes clear demands on its members, both women and men, who are (literally) prepared to sacrifice their lives [13], [50].

According to the European Institute for Gender Equality, Sweden is one of the world’s most gender-equal countries, with the first feminist government in the world [16], [47]. The Armed Forces are one of Sweden’s largest government organizations and, at the same time, one of the most male-dominated among them [31]. Soldiers and sailors have long been men only, as well as their commanders. Since 1980, women are allowed to enter the military, but in specific positions only. The restrictions were removed in 1989, and there have been no formal limitations on the roles and units women can apply for since then [46]. Today, after 39 years with women in military positions, women make up about 8% of the active-duty force [47]. This study examines the historically male-dominated military profession where the organization conforms to masculine norms [4], [5], [43], which in turn influences how military women identify with and behave in the organization.

Military organizations have been challenged by the processes of normalization in relation to other state institutions, professionalization, and social acceleration [17], [21], [35], [42]. The integration of women and the demands for gender equality seem to challenge the military profession [21]. Hofstede [20] argues that Swedish organizations are considered feminine and women-friendly when they value care and welfare. This contrasts with the Swedish Armed Forces, which is a masculine organization with a hierarchy and meritocracy. This means that the political decisions made by the Swedish feminist government collide with the masculine norms in the Swedish Armed Forces.

Iskra [22], who studied women in the US military elite and their strategies for achieving success shows that women use opportunities that arise to further their careers. They do not doubt their ability to be women and feel attached and loyal to their workplaces, which offer a system with mentors for professional guidance and personal support. The support systems are crucial to help women in their careers, which Alvinius et al. [4] show in their study.

In order to conform to the male norm within the military, women develop strategies at the individual level [32], such as distancing themselves from traditional femininity and instead approaching the prevailing masculine norm by imitating fighting soldiers [43]. Likewise, Linehagen [31] writes that women develop strategies, and the author considers it a complicated balancing act between being a woman and an accepted colleague in the military culture. Similar results can be found in other Western countries [18], [33], [45].

Kovitz [26] suggests that when women demand integration on equal terms they are perceived as “enemies” in their own organization because women in such roles constitute a threat to men’s existence and to the masculine structure. Although there are women within male-dominated organizations, the male perspective
is reinforced and communicated as the generally accepted norm. The military culture creates a context in which the male-dominated norm constitutes informal rules [15], [28], [37].

Several studies on gender stereotypes show that men are expected to be authoritative, competent, and dominant, while women are expected to be kind, supportive, and helpful [11], [14], [38]. Stereotypes also demonstrate perceptions about status, and in male-dominated contexts men are awarded higher status than women [40], [41]. Research also shows that organizations that have long been male-dominated resist female leadership and are unwelcoming to women because the roles of wife and mother make it more difficult for the women to succeed in the military profession [44]. Several other studies from various countries and organizations [22], [23], [32] show that when setbacks at work become too noticeable, the informal support of a partner or other family member is important.

The focus of this study is informal and formal support, which will be referred to by the more general term resources so as to include power and power resources. Resources describe the relationship between the individual and the organization, in particular between female military personnel and the armed forces. Based on the literature and the Swedish context, this study examines power resources because power is a natural part of a hierarchical and bureaucratic organization [36], such as the Swedish Armed Forces. The purpose is to arrive at a deeper understanding of the power resources used by female military personnel within the armed forces.

5.1.1 Power Resources

The empirical evidence in this study shows that capabilities and assets are important for female personnel in a male-dominated organization. Korpi [25] suggested that assets and capabilities are power resources one uses in organizations. There is a lack of knowledge about power resources among female members of militaries, which is why the present study can fill a gap in our knowledge. This section looks at the concept of power resources.

One of the most-cited researchers on power is Max Weber who defines power as the probability of getting one’s will done despite opposition [49]. Ahrne and Roman’s [1] concept of normative power, which is aimed at consciousness, is the most applicable in the military context. Korpi [25] states that the concept of power is not only about exercising power, but also about possessing resources for power without having to use them. Having these resources keeps opposing actors under control because they know they will lose a conflict if it arises. Korpi defines power resources as actors’ capacities to use their means to reward or punish other actors. Ahrne and Roman [1] state that power relationships are not just about conflicts and hard resistance, but also about collaboration that arises from access to differing power resources. They also claim that one normative power resource is the ability to change perceptions and awareness [1].

An actor with many power resources finds it easier to get their will done in a relationship, according to Korpi (1985), who presents a model for power resources that explains how the use of power resources express itself as reward or punishment, depending on how they are used. Korpi [25] suggests that power is relational and can therefore be exchanged, where exchange means that two actors trade mutual rewards, which occurs when there are great differences in power resources between actors. The stronger actor does not have the need to punish, and the weaker actor understands that a peaceful outcome pays the greatest dividend, which is at the same time the weaker actor’s reward to the stronger actor. Conflict is the opposite of exchange. It occurs when both actors use power resources to punish each other, which may occur when the actors’ power resources are close to each other. The exploitation interaction occurs when one actor uses a pressure resource, a power resource with negative impact on the actor, whereupon the other actor does as they are told without confrontation and, in this way, gives some type of reward [25].

Lindgren [30] studies gender in organizations using Korpi’s [25] power resource model. Lindgren considers that power conditions that arise between colleagues of different genders are not as easy to determine as
formal power relations between superiors and subordinates. Lindgren [30] considers that there is imbalance in power resources between women and men in male-dominated organizations and, therefore, draws on the exchange interaction in this study.

5.2 METHOD

This study was qualitative and inductive in design, with the purpose of the study to gain a deeper understanding in which power resources are useful for female personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces. Thematic analysis was used to examine the data [8]. Thematic analysis is a structured process in which the first step consists of open coding aimed at identifying meaningful units in each transcribed interview.

5.2.1 Selection of Participants

This study focused on female military personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces. An open request for participation was published on a joint social media platform. There were about 1,000 members in the group, all women within the Swedish Armed Forces. The women who fulfilled the study’s inclusion criteria and who would consider participating replied by email and were contacted to book a time for an interview. A total of 16 participants of various ages were interviewed. Rank varied from the lowest (soldier/sailor) to the highest (general/admiral). The participants had between 3 and 33 years of service in the armed forces, and all services were represented (army, navy and air force). Because there were few women within each rank and from each service, however, no identifying information is given for quotations in the study to protect participants’ anonymity.

Although not generalizable to all the female personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces, the 16 interviews provided an in-depth analysis of the power resources used by the participants in the organization. Bryant and Charmaz [9] warn about collecting too much data, and mean that the analysis of fewer interviews gives better data quality.

5.2.2 Data Collection

A semi-structured interview guide was created for data collection, consisting of two themes: experiences concerning the military profession and experiences around gender, status, and support. The interviews were conducted in a location where the respondent felt most comfortable. The respondents were able to talk about their experiences of and thoughts about their work in the Swedish Armed Forces and were not interrupted if they strayed into issues other than those included in the interview guide. Following Bryman [10], further questions were asked, based on themes emerging from the respondents’ description of their experiences as the interview proceeded. Follow-up questions such as “What do you mean? Did I understand you correctly? Please describe it in more detail” were used to obtain deeper insight into the participants’ experiences. The interviews lasted 35 – 59 minutes and were recorded, with the participant’s permission. The material was transcribed in conjunction with the interview and was thereafter printed out.

5.2.3 Data Analysis

Data analysis followed Braun and Clarke’s [8] method of thematic analysis. The first stage was to become familiar with the material. Parts of the material had to be read several times in order to note initial analytical observations. The second stage involved coding, whereby the material that was relevant to the issue of power resources was labelled. In total, around 50 labels were generated at this stage. Stage three of data analysis sought themes, and the 50 labels were placed into eleven subcategories, which were reduced to four themes. In the fourth stage, the various subcategories and themes were scrutinized to see whether they held against each other. During this review, six subcategories were sorted under other categories or merged. The fifth stage of the thematic analysis involved identifying the essence of each theme and naming them. The four
themes that emerged were structural power resources, cultural and social power resources, emotional power resources, and minority perspective as a power resource. The sixth and the final stage of the thematic analysis involved linking together data and the analytical descriptions into a story and giving it a context in relation to existing literature. This stage forms the discussion section.

5.3 RESULTS

Analysis of the data revealed four themes describing the power resources female military personnel highlighted in the interviews. The women in the study revealed that power resources were used in relation to men and the organization and served the position of the women in the organization. The power resources were multifaceted and ranged from the organizational to the individual level. All themes are described in detail and reinforced with quotations.

5.3.1 Structural Power Resources

The structural power resources category concerns how the women in the study found methods for success in the structure of the military organization and consists of the subordinate categories competence, work processes, and career planning.

5.3.1.1 Competence

The participants reported growing tired of their jobs periodically and sought to develop. Some had taken leave, and several had attended the Swedish Armed Forces’ program for life and career development. The women thought that competence development through trying out a new job or attending a course had helped them get new positions or other work tasks within the armed forces. In several cases, the women in the study had university-level education that they had obtained either before they became members or simultaneously with their military work, or by taking study leave, and then returning to the armed forces. One participant remarked:

*I am an upper-secondary school teacher too, so that fits in really well, the educational training is largely identical I would say, apart from teacher training being longer... My subjects are Swedish, history and English, and I studied for six years.*

The women had studied in order to change occupations but had the opportunity to use their new knowledge in other positions within the armed forces. Others had wanted to remain with their employer, but felt they were not able to further their careers and had therefore chosen to study at a civilian university in the hope that this would take them further within the organization, which it had also done. One participant remarked:

*I tried to become an engineering trainee in the armed forces and wanted to study in my home town, but that university didn’t count in this concept. So I took study leave and did other things for a bit, and then I got a place at the university to study engineering. Despite knowing it was a risk, I started studying in any case. During my study years, the rules changed...and I was finally counted as an engineering trainee in the armed forces.*

5.3.1.2 Work Processes

Performing well was important to most women in the study. Some were driven to perform to ensure their own unit or group was the best. Others placed great demands on themselves because they liked to challenge themselves. However, most performed because they believed they had to perform better than men do to deserve their place in the armed forces. As one participant said:

*You had to cover up all failings, and you had to be on top. Perform in order to be good enough. This is something personal I carry within myself...but what I can feel is that before I put more of the burden on myself, but instead it is actually about me being different....It isn’t really about me, instead it is about us being women among men, somehow.*
Others thought that it is important to be inconspicuous, not to be too much not too little – but at the same time be better than the men, but without showing it. Several of the women considered that they had fought hard to get to where they were. At the same time, several women in the study said that they lacked professional feedback and often had to find alternative ways to get it. In one workplace where several women work, they linked up to pep talk each other and give feedback. The feedback often came from the outside, by someone completely different giving feedback on what they had seen and appreciated.

Keeping things in order and creating structure at work was something that many women in the study saw as their strength. Several women thought being helpful and responsible was strongly associated with the military profession:

Yes, well I know that I am one of those persons who get things done, you know. Orderly and detailed in what I do.

Some women in the study even said that they had worked out methods of getting men to agree to their ideas and proposals. They suggested that one way was to talk individually with the men about your proposal to establish it with each one of them before raising it with the team. Another way was to choose men closer to oneself and tell them first. It was important to know that the men are on one’s side.

5.3.1.3 Career Planning

Often, the women in the study did not follow the template for a military career; instead, they sought and found other routes through their profession. The reasons were several. One was that they had not found the position they sought congenial; another reason was that they chose to work in a position closer to office hours after having a child. Several women have also changed jobs for safety reasons during pregnancy. Many times, the women had found interesting work that engaged them and that they had not included in their career plan to begin with:

Then there was the requirement for international postings, and the whole focus changed in the Armed Forces. And I am a bit of two minds there, and haven’t wanted to take that track, have felt doubtful about what we are doing. Therefore I have niched myself a bit, within education and people, because I think that is interesting.

Several of the women stated that they primarily wanted interesting jobs where they felt comfortable and they could contribute something. They were aware that the jobs they had were not always the most attractive from a career standpoint, but at the same time they were happy to have been able to have had an impact on their position and their tasks. Because several of the women had found their own niche within the profession and had not followed the standard template, they had also mostly been able to drive their own development and career themselves. Many more women did not have any particular career plans. One woman said that she had never had the ambition to have a career or to rise through the ranks, although she held one of the highest ranks in the Swedish Armed Forces.

At the same time, several of the women in the study thought that women on the whole needed more pushing than men to advance in their careers. One participant thought the reason was that women tend to rate themselves lower than men and that they believe they are not sufficiently good at their jobs. Others thought that women hesitate a bit longer and therefore need a push in the right direction. Several of the women in the study described that they themselves had been lifted up by others in the organization, that there had been people who believed in them and that this support had been necessary for them to dare to take the step. For others, it was the other way round. Several women described having been openly opposed for no objective reason when they had applied for jobs. In the end, they had used the last resort and approached the most senior manager who had decided the case in their favor:
There was a lot of bother before I got the position I had trained for. Despite me having everything that was required, they still chose not to employ anyone, and said that there was no vacant position. In the end, I keyed myself up and told the top boss, who blew his top. After that, I got the job.

Several women in the study took a long view and were keen to know and be able to impact their careers in the long term. Some had changed direction entirely, because the career ladder was very narrow and slow; others hoped that the organization would open more doors to validate previous academic education to allow quicker career progress. Some of the women said they had chosen not to study certain courses or join certain units because there has been no woman predecessor, so the women had judged it an impossible or extremely complicated route to follow. Some women had also been tactical in terms of pregnancies and parental leave during their careers and had clear plans about how to have a career in a system where the majority were men.

5.3.2 Cultural and Social Power Resources

The category concerns how women in the study found methods for success in the military organization culture and consists of the subcategories resistance and adaptation.

5.3.2.1 Resistance

It emerged from the study that it is important to carry out just the right amount of gender equality work. The women thought that too much led to people becoming worried that the smallest misspeaking might be reported, which is not considered good. Nobody in the study mentioned anything about too little gender equality work. To make men think about issues related to gender equality, the women in the study had sometimes used humor:

But it was because they were talking about it, and then I just wanted, but we do joke quite a lot, and then it turned out that I somehow said it in that way. It wasn’t really anything...and he understood that it was nothing. But perhaps there was a bit of seriousness in it too from my side, to get an answer. “How shall we do it? Shall I sit by myself in a sauna then, or? Shall I sit by myself and discuss it myself? While you are sitting together?

The women in the study said that, despite lack of gender equality and derogatory comments about women making themselves heard whenever, they choose well-timed moments to make a stand. They also said that these reprimands did not appear to help. It seems like no-one cares, and nothing changes.

Several women in the study felt that it was difficult to take the initiative in the expected way in a male organization. One woman said that men could step up and carry out a fairly new task with self-confidence while she was expected to not undertake a similar task unless it was a requirement. The women in the study chose to take the initiative only when they felt secure:

It is after all, the case that the Armed Forces are made by men, for men. Both in how things work and how things are done. That is after all the male way of doing things! It might perhaps be the best way, I don’t know, but women do perhaps have other ways of leading or thinking. It would be a good thing to include that further up the system too.

5.3.2.2 Adaptation

It emerged from the study that it might be important for women not to contribute to the idea that they are different. The participants said that they had often been asked to give a female viewpoint on something, but they thought that they could not always do this because they did not know what a female viewpoint was. Most of the women in the study could not see any differences between women and men in the exercise of the military profession. When gender differences were highlighted, they were quickly put down to personality. Many were careful not to generalize about male and female characteristics.
Similarly, differences between the armed forces and other actors in society were not discussed. When subjects such as gender inequality in terms of salary, derogatory jargon, or male-dominated culture were raised, the women in the study were careful to state that these issues were not unique to the armed forces. On the question of whether women are treated differently from men in the armed forces, one woman answered:

Yes, you probably are. Just as you probably are in the rest of society, nothing specific to the armed forces.

It was also important for several of the women in the study to adopt attributes of the majority, such as using coarse language when suitable.

The participants also learned how to pigeonhole some individuals in the organization because it helped them navigate the system by keeping an eye on where the adversary was. It might be that a top-level manager, for example, only has a few honest individuals to ask for advice.

5.3.3 Emotional Power Resources

Emotional power resources concerns how women in the study drew on personal attributes to achieve success in the military organization. The category consists of the following subcategories: meaningfulness, positive emotional coping, distancing, and being oneself.

5.3.3.1 Meaningfulness

Making a difference in society is a feature most of the women in the study thought vital to their success. Doing something important for Sweden weighed heavily on the women, and a few also emphasized that they needed to feel needed. Several were proud of being part of the security process in Sweden.

5.3.3.2 Positive Emotional Coping

It was important to feel comfortable and have fun at work. The women described their workdays as varied and eventful. They also thought that they contributed happiness to their work teams, but at the same time that they also bore an expectation to be happy. Many of the women in the study described themselves as social beings, with a strong interest in people and curiosity, which helped them to carry out their work:

Then some come to me and want a confidential chat. They want a sounding board for ideas about how they can take things further or talk about having encountered this and that. These things happen now and then, and then I take the time.

Several of the women in the study said that they preferred the company of men. Some had almost exclusively male friends and others had always really liked working with men.

Fighting to be considered an equal in a community of men was also significant for the women in the study. Gaining legitimacy among the men might express itself as always hurrying so as not to be forgotten or battling with a task so that it is really well done. Many fought to perform their work tasks well, and one woman thought that this was one of the reasons many women in the armed forces left early – i.e., because they were simply too ambitious.

5.3.3.3 Distancing

For several women in the study, it was important to be honest and straightforward, but at the same time even more important not to seem too sensitive. A few women confessed that they were sad not to have
been allowed to become one of the gang of men at work but were anxious not to show this. Others said that they had not at all bothered about being included somewhere. The “blokey” atmosphere that was common in several places was something that most women shrugged their shoulders about, at least outwardly. It was more important for the younger women in the study to be included and less important for the older ones:

This thing about being one of the blokes. I don’t feel very engaged in it, to be honest. I’m in my bubble somehow, and I do what I’m supposed to.

5.3.3.4 Being Oneself

Not adopting a formal work persona was a characteristic that several participants thought helped them at work. Yet several thought that they were expected to be formal as military members, so it was necessary to have a good sense of what was suitable for the situation. The women in the study reported that that they sometimes heard from men in the organization that they should be less informal, and some were doubtful about how they were supposed to act. Most, however, saw their informal side as a strength, in being fair, showing fellowship feelings and listening equally to all, irrespective of their military rank. For all women in the study, it was important to be the same person at work as at home:

I have actually always been the same at work as I am at home! I don’t think you should assume a role just because you put on the uniform; instead, it is much easier to just be as I am.

Despite this, it was important for several women in the study to avoid bringing the military home with them. Several shared a home with another military person and recognized that it was good for them to talk about other things than work during leisure time. Some of the women in the study made it clear that although they liked their jobs very much, their lives were not consumed by work—they did not sit at home in the evening studying work matters. They also said they enjoyed being women during leisure hours, putting on makeup, painting their nails, and chatting with other women.

Living in a gender-equal relationship was important for many of the women in the study. Several said that they shared parental leave and days off to care for sick children. Making two military careers work, where both travelled periodically, was not easy, but it worked if you lived in a gender-equal relationship. The women in the study who were not living with a partner thought that they would have to search a long time before finding a partner who would buy into their demand for gender equality:

My husband had to assume chief responsibility at home when I was attending a long and demanding course some time ago. He is not a military officer anymore, and that is good, because then we would both have had to be away, but it is great that he has been a military officer, because that way he knows what it entails.

5.3.4 Minority as a Power Resource

Minority as a power resource concerns how women in the study balanced their roles as divergent to achieve success in the military organization. This category consists of the following subcategories: seeking out like-minded people, and avoidance.

5.3.4.1 Seeking Out Like-Minded People

Most of the participants in the study did not work closely with other women. Sometimes they knew other female military personnel at the periphery, in other positions, or with other military grades, which meant that the women had differing work duties. Several described it as a bit of a relief to sometimes work closely with other women, and sometimes it was enough that the other woman was nearby. The study shows that women choose to talk
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about other things with women than they usually do with men, and that they think that community feeling is different when there are more women in the workplace. As a minority, the women were used to receiving more attention, and the older women in the study had often been ground breakers in their field:

*During my second maternity leave, I decided I wanted to go back to the Navy again and wanted to go to sea. At that time, there was no other woman who had done that – gone to sea after having children – and then lots of people thought it was mega-odd.*

Several of the women chose to contribute actively with their difference and were proud to be women in the armed forces. Some of them even chose to use their femininity provocatively; for example, by using strong perfume. After many years in the armed forces, several women in the study had become increasingly positive toward other women in the organization; they supported and singled out each other as positive examples.

### 5.3.4.2 Avoidance

At the same time, it was important not to overdo being a woman. It was important to wear the uniform correctly and not to wear jewellery that stands out too much, to wear one’s hair up, and so on. According to one woman in the study, the best situation for them was when the men forgot that they woman. On the whole, it has taken longer for older women to permit themselves to be women than for the younger women in the study:

*So I can actually admire those young girls today, who stand up for being a woman. Because I didn’t! It was more like, I would have climbed up and fetched the moon, if anyone asked me to do so. Like, I will transform myself!* 

Some of the women in the study said that they were not against gender equality initiatives but that they had never had any problem and that they were not intending to work toward a gender-equal organization. Nor did the participants think it a given that women would be partial toward other women simply because they were women, and some admitted that they had periodically resisted other women. At the same time, it was important to not see too much of any man either. Rumours spread quickly and it was not advantageous for the women either, they say.

### 5.4 DISCUSSION

This study sought a deeper understanding of the power resources used by female military personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces. The interviews with women in the Swedish forces revealed several power resources among female military personnel. The women used power resources to participate and advance in the Swedish Armed Forces. Analysis of the data revealed four themes describing the power resources female military personnel highlighted in the interviews. The themes are Structural power resources, Social and Cultural power resources, Emotional power resources and Minority as a power resource. These power resources are individual, informal and to some extent hidden. It is the women themselves who generate the strategies, to adapt to organizational requirements and structures and to facilitate them to remain in the organization. But at the same time this makes it difficult for future recruitment. This is discussed in detail in the following.

Choosing a career path that differs from the organization’s planned path was a theme throughout for the women in the study. Congeniality, family logistics, and interest were offered as some of the reasons for a different career path, and the women underlined that they have had to work hard themselves to find this career path, rarely without encountering resistance. The fact that the organization is so strongly male-coded could be an underlying reason for their lack of interest and comfort. Kanter [24] argued that the women’s behavior can be traced back to their positions in the organization and considers that the organizational structure limits women’s opportunities. Women have little expectation of promotion, low ambitions, and tend to undervalue their competence, which explains why the women in the study lack career plans, have
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more education than their positions require, and why they choose different career paths than those the organization planned. Using power strategies in this context is a way of adapting to the masculine norms within male-dominated military organization. On the other hand, there appear to be extra demands, hidden conditions and invisible power resources that the women individually develop that also constitute an obstacle for the Swedish Armed Forces to achieve its long-term goal, which is to recruit more women. Recent studies have shown that this development is slow [31].

Although the participants’ education, for example, appears to be strong power resource, it is still used as an exchange relationship, according to Korpi’s [25] model. As the military organizational structure limits women’s opportunities, the women understand that they gain most from a peaceful settlement here too, and reward the organization. That is to say, the women hold back and fall into place instead of fighting for themselves by putting their structural power resources into play. The fact that most of the women found their own career paths can be seen as a power resource that helps them forward in the organization, but in the longer term also punishes them. According to Korpi [25], we can understand that the women, by choosing a different and informal career path, have found a place in the organization’s advancement system and their power resources have been strengthened to a level equal to that of the organization, whereupon they challenge the formal organizational structure. In this way, a conflict relationship arises, when both parties are punished: The organization, as its structure is undermined and deviated from, and the women, as they quickly encounter resistance and withdrawn opportunities.

As Lindgren (1985) wrote, the men in the organization probably have the upper hand in terms of power resources in the male-dominated armed forces, and the cultural and social power resources found among the women in the study are largely used as an exchange relationship, according to Korpi [25]. The women in the study understand that they are in an inferior position as a minority and that they gain most from not opposing the masculinity norm. For this reason, they adapt to the prevailing norm by not contributing with their difference, for example, or by refraining from criticism of the culture. At the same time, the actions of the women function as a reward for the male-dominated organization, which is reproduced over time. The resistance that the women put up against the male-dominated organization is extremely careful; for example, by joking to make men think in a gender-equal way, and only using carefully chosen moments to make a stand. This carefulness protects the women from punishing and being punished, and it does not have any negative impact on the male-coded organization either; instead, it can still be interpreted as an exchange relationship. The reward to the women is to be welcomed into the organization, and the reward to the organization is that it retains and is reinforced in its masculinity norm. The cultural and social power resources can be likened to what Ahrne and Roman [1] call “normative power resources,” as both the resistance and the adaptation largely aim to change others’ perceptions and awareness of women and their assumed intentions. That is, by managing to change the view of themselves, from probably being a demanding minority asking for gender-equal conditions and an organization that is adapted to them too, to apparently adapting to the demands and masculinity norm of the organization.

The emotional resources can be likened to Hochschild’s theory of emotional labor. Hochschild [19] argued that emotions and their meaning are socially construed in relation to their specific context (the relationship between employee, employer, customers, clients, and colleagues), and that we learn the rules for when, where, and how some feelings should be expressed by sensing the atmosphere. The theory, according to Hochschild [19], concerns work is carried out according to an employer’s specific emotional rules for what is permitted or not, but like several other researchers [6], [34], [39], I would like to widen the concept to a power resource from a gender perspective, where women form a minority and need to survive in a male-dominated organization. For this reason, methods such as distancing, feeling meaningfulness, being oneself and using positive emotional coping are important resources in negotiating power with male colleagues and with the employer. Women control their own and others’ emotions through distancing or through positive coping, to name some examples. The emotional power resources can also be likened to coping strategies, according to Lazarus’s model [29]. But women’s power resources should be seen in light of work life research and in an organization context, which means that Hochschild’s theory of emotional labor fits well.
The women describe themselves as happy and structured, which reinforces the gender-stereotyped image of women, and give them a lower status in relation to what Ridgeway [40] and Ridgeway and Corell [41] write about men are accorded higher status in male-dominated contexts. Being typically feminine does not constitute a threat to the male-dominated organization because such a person does not challenge the gender order [48] and, therefore, does not give rise to any punishment [25]. Wahl [48] also argues that a woman’s typically feminine behavior offers limited opportunities for advancement because a woman exhibiting typically feminine behavior is considered to lack the authority required of managers. In the long term, women experience the feeling of punishment, according to Korpi’s model.

When women use the minority perspective as a power resource, they eventually join together and seek support in each other or find themselves and are proud of being women. The strength in this provides a power resource that can be used as a pressure resource, according to Korpi [25], and the result is that the male-dominated organization offers a reward for not being confrontational because this would have a negative impact on it. However, the exploitation occurs, in Korpi’s words, when women receive attention for being a minority or choose to be provocative in their femininity. At the same time, the minority perspective’s power resource is antagonistic when women, instead of choosing the strength of their femininity, choose the strength in the male-dominated organization. From women’s viewpoint, the avoidance’s dissociation from other women and from gender equality work develops into a reward to the male-dominated organization, and the exchange relationship is established, which is in line with Korpi’s theoretical perspective [25].

The study also showed that what, on the one hand, is a power resource, on the other hand often functions as resistance against something different. According to Korpi [25], several of the women’s power resources can reward or punish the male-dominated organization [30]. The results of this study suggest the organization usually receives rewards. When the women in the study reward and reproduce the male-coded organization, which is what the organization demands [13], I suggest they are punishing themselves, their femininity, and the right to a gender-equal workplace.

The study highlights how women’s power resources in an organization with male traditions and dominance largely neither reach their full potential nor are utilized in the organization. With an increased number of women, their power resources would have grown stronger, and the Swedish Armed Forces would have benefited and probably increased its effective ability. Like Wahl [48], I consider that the increased number of women also must increase the number of women in management positions, because an increased number of female managers means an increased number of women with power. Wahl differentiates between the group of women as an unused power resource, and as an unused complementary resource, where the group of women as a power resource is permitted to exercise power, not be used by the power. I consider that more women with power in the armed forces would both have increased the power resources of individual women, and the group of women as a power resource would, in turn, have increased the task effectiveness of the military organization.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, military organizations have been challenged by the processes of normalization with other state institutions, professionalization, and social change [17], [21], [35], [42]. The integration of women and demands for gender equality seem to confront the military profession [3]. The military organization has survived many years in its form and although Sweden is one of the most gender-equal countries in the world, the challenge with feminization is obvious.

Achieving gender equality in the Swedish Armed Forces requires discussing the prevailing masculinity norm and the benefits of a more gender-equal organization. The Swedish Armed Forces would have to reverse the perceived challenge feminization presents to the military profession into a strength and allow more women in leadership positions.

Finally, this is not a study of the military profession, but the study contributes to a scientific debate about the challenges women face in military organization. This needs to be explored from a military professional perspective, including by both women and men, which is further highlighted in the next section.
5.5 CONCLUSION

The analysis of the interviews shows that the female military personnel use power resources to adapt to the male-dominated organization’s demands and to even out perceived asymmetric power relationships in their daily professional work. To participate and advance in the organization, the women use power resources that can be explained using four themes: structural power resources, cultural and social power resources, emotional power resources and minority perspective as a power resource.

The results of the study can be used as the basis for discussion in education and in conversations about the conditions of women in the organization, but also as documentation for illuminating the gender perspective in personnel provision and in recruitment to the armed forces.

Further quantitative studies are required on the power resources of both women and men in military organizations. It would also be interesting to make a qualitative study of the power resources of military men, and then compare it to this study. The result would create a broad basis for discussions about gender equality, power, and effectiveness in the armed forces.

5.6 REFERENCES


Chapter 6 – MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE BRITISH MILITARY

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6.1 INTRODUCTION

The rapidly changing security environment requires the British Army to re-evaluate what it means to be a military professional. This necessitates a common understanding of military professionalism that emphasizes Continuing Professional Development (CPD), ensuring that members of the British Army remain competent professionals who are able to continually adapt to contemporary and future challenges. In the first step to achieving this aim, the British Army sought to conceptualize tenets of the profession of arms and the supporting CPD approach. The focus on professional development was taken because this was recognized to be a key lever to professionalization in the British Army. To inform the concept, a review of the current CPD approach was undertaken to identify opportunities that could, ultimately, further professionalize the British Army. This chapter predominately outlines the findings from the review and presents the initial conceptualization of the professional tenets and the supporting CPD approach. To gain a broader understanding, a brief review of professionalism in the British Army was undertaken using Butler and Budgell’s [5] four critical professional components. These components were derived from the theories of Huntington [10], Janowitz [11], Sarkesian [20], and Abbott [1], [2]. This brief review will help contextualize the key reasons professional development is an important enabler of professionalism in the British Army. Further opportunities for professionalism are highlighted.

6.2 A BRIEF REVIEW OF PROFESSIONALISM IN THE BRITISH ARMY

A number of influential theories of military professionalism have been espoused, evolving over time to reflect social and cultural influences and the changing function of the military [1], [2], [10], [11], [20]. The early theories were shaped by the hegemony of men [10], [11], [20] and the management of violence [10]. However, there are a number of enduring commonalities within these theories from which Butler and Budgell [5] identified four critical components of professionalism:

- Expertise;
- Legitimacy;
- Jurisdiction; and
- Identity and culture.

These components are not mutually exclusive and will be briefly reviewed in the context of the British Army. While professional development strongly contributes to expertise, for example, it is also a key enabler of the other components. Thus, there is a focus on professional development in the review of all the components. An in-depth review of the British Army’s current CPD approach will be presented under expertise.

6.2.1 Expertise

A fundamental distinguishing characteristic of a profession from other occupations is the possession of an expert body of abstract knowledge and skills [23]. This expertise is accumulated through lengthy training and experience (e.g., Ref. [19]). Contemporary areas of military expertise include “direction, operation, and
control of a human organisation, including the application of violence, peacekeeping, and stabilization and reconstruction operations” ([5], p. 21). CPD enables members of the military profession to maintain their expertise and acquire new knowledge and skills required to meet these contemporary and changing demands [23]. Further, maintenance and evolution of military expertise through CPD allows the profession to uphold standards of practice, which instils public trust, providing assurance the military can fulfil its social responsibility [5].

Recognizing that CPD is a key enabler for the twenty-first century British profession of arms, a review1 of the British Army’s CPD approach was undertaken. Related aspects of career development were also reviewed. The findings would inform the development of tenets of the profession of arms and supporting CPD framework. Initially, critical themes were identified that had to be included across all ranks’ education and development if the Army was to remain competitive in future conflicts. These included enhancing thinking skills (intellectual flexibility) and, specifically, creative, critical, and adaptive thinking to support the development of new doctrine, capabilities, and ways of fighting in new types of operations and environments. The primary method of analysis used in the review was a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis, looking holistically through the career learning and development system for both officers and soldiers. Additionally, an internal benchmarking analysis was conducted to compare the differences in development between corps, officers, and soldiers. The main findings from the review are outlined below, along with opportunities to develop the CPD approach to enhance relevant expertise and further professionalize the British Army.

6.2.2 Course Format

Allowing for some notable exceptions, the majority of courses required for promotion and development at all ranks are residential, class-based courses, some of which are nearly a year long. Attendance is either based on promotion or selection within the promoted cohort. Once a course has been completed, there are no “top-up courses.” Nor can an individual who has not been selected attend relevant modules or access online materials. Nor, in general, can an attendee opt out of a section that has no relevance. Courses are all or nothing; they are not modular, so must be taken in a single attempt or not at all, with the issue compounded by the fact that selection and attendance must be at a specific time in rank and career. There is no ability or incentive to attend courses early or to self-teach elements to get ahead. There are areas of similarity between officer, senior non-commissioned officer, and junior non-commissioned officer training, specifically in some areas of the Army Leadership Development and Development Programme (ALDP). But there is no synergy between the courses that would allow integration between officers and non-commissioned officers. The current course format does not allow flexibility for the organisation, or personal agency for the individual. The British Army training and education system, the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT), is widely regarded as an excellent mechanism for articulating course requirement and framing course content, and it would support more distributed and workplace training. However, the bureaucratic process that has been built up around DSAT has, in many areas, led to a system and course content that is very slow to change and adapt to new requirements.

To change this format of exhaustive content at long residential courses to facilitate shorter modular courses will require the British Army to take greater risk in course content. The risk is that the Army will no longer be able to train for every eventuality. The Army will have to allow areas currently taught in the classroom to be delivered through self-study, on-demand learning at the point of need, or in the workplace. Soldiers and officers will not leave a course as finished product but will need to seek additional information and resources on their own. Further study will be required, and units will need a higher tolerance of mistakes. This carries risks and requires a change in attitude to courses in both the Army and Defence. It may be the case that a nuanced

1 Review undertaken by the British Army Programme CASTLE. CASTLE’s objective is to modernise the British Army Career pathways enabling greater organisational agility, institutional and individual choice. The programme will maximise the opportunities for, and the talent of, the Army’s people so that they are motivated, ready and skilled to prevail in day to day competition and war.
approach can be taken, depending on course content. The Army Advanced Development Programme\(^2\) scheme, which adheres to a 70:20:10 approach, is an example of a different approach\(^3\) to course format.

### 6.2.2.1 Army versus Cap-Badge Learning

The training for rank is standardized and well-defined for soldiers in the ALDP. On top of this requirement, specifically for soldiers, the cap badges lay on additional educational requirements. There is a large variation in time and style. For example, a Royal Engineer (RE) artisan bricklayer will have undertaken 478 days of role training for promotion, in addition to that required by the ALDP, by the time they reach warrant officer. A Royal Logistics Corps logistic specialist, on reaching the same rank, will have conducted 82 days of role training, while an infantry warrant officer will have conducted 224 days. Different corps have different approaches to workplace learning. Some, such as the Adjutant General’s Corps and the Corps of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, depend on workplace learning to develop skills taught on course because they are used every day in unit. Conversely, for some, such as the RE bricklayer, most skills are assumed to be taught on course, with minimal additional training in unit. Most skills are taught at the private to corporal ranks, and then not used once attaining the senior non-commissioned officer ranks. There are no top-up courses offered to maintain competency for those who may take longer to be promoted. While the Army has a standard training profile for rank training, the profile between cap badges varies significantly. The cost implications of this variance are currently being investigated.

### 6.2.2.2 Officer versus Soldier Learning: Focus

Interventions seem to favor trade training for soldiers, and rank training for officers. This is understandable. Soldiers deliver their military effect through their trade, while officers are more likely to serve in a headquarters and in staff roles, so a more generic training for rank seems appropriate. The logic fails in the transition from soldier to officer. A late-entry officer attending the Intermediate Command and Staff Course, aimed at preparing majors for sub-unit command, will have spent on average 350 days in trade training (corps and trade dependent) but only an average of 20 days in formal educational training. Conversely, their direct-entry officer counterpart will most likely have an undergraduate degree. To achieve an equitable level of military education, the training gap must be closed.

### 6.2.2.3 Officer versus Soldier Learning: Syllabus

The ALDP syllabus for soldiers is progressive and clear, showing development from one rank to the next in consistent areas of command, leadership, and management. Conversely, there is no such clear progression for officers. There is some consistency and development of behavioural and functional areas between sequential officer ranks, but there is no behavioural or functional area that is covered and developed consistently throughout an officer’s career from junior officer (lieutenant-captain) through field ranks (major-lieutenant colonel) to senior officer (colonel and above).

### 6.2.2.4 Officer versus Soldier Learning: Risk\(^4\)

Officer education held very little risk. In most courses less than 10% of the syllabus was assumed to be undertaken in workplace training, and even less was held as a training gap. As an example, only one element of the Junior Officer Tactical Awareness Course\(^5\) training syllabus is held as a training gap (i.e., execute the operation) and three elements were taken as workplace training (e.g., apply command

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\(^2\) AADP prepares lieutenant colonels for the rank of colonel.

\(^3\) The 70:20:10 model for learning and development assumes 70% of an individual’s time is spent on challenging assignments (learning on the job and on the job experience), 20% on developmental relationships (learning from others through mentoring and coaching) and 10% on formal coursework and training (structured learning).

\(^4\) Learning risk: assumption that training will be undertaken in the workplace/unit.

\(^5\) This course prepares officers for the rank of captain.
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functions at sub-unit level). The only officer course to take large areas at risk was the Commanding Officers’ Designate Course. All this stands in stark contrast with soldier ALDP training. Here, up to half of the elements within the syllabus are taken at risk, to be trained in units. The attitude to risk in officer and soldier training appears to be very different. It is possible that officers are assumed to require a greater assurance in their training because they have to take responsibility for activities. The hallmark of officer education seem to be that the Army is trying to teach for every eventuality, as opposed to teaching a state of mind or an approach to dealing with problems supported by an understanding of where additional knowledge can be found.

In adopting more workplace learning, the Army must accept that soldiers will return to their units after a course and still require training. This affects the assessment of trained strength and will require different tools to articulate the people capability that each unit and sub-unit must have. The effect could be mitigated, however, through extended pre-deployment training. But there are risks involved with adopting a “just-in-time approach” to training. Soldiers will need to continue their development and training in unit to gain and retain their competencies. This may require additional training-focused personnel and resource in units, such as a reinvigorated training wing that can assess requirements and assure training outcomes. The ability to deliver this training and continuation training may be difficult due to the tempo of exercises, deployments, operations, and trawls, unless the activity forms part of the education.

6.2.3 Link between Education, Promotion, and Posting

The findings from focus groups with officers and soldiers, interviews with career managers, and a review of the personnel and learning and development practices, indicate that education had little impact on progression, posting, or selection for further development that shaped and developed individuals’ expertise for the longer term. This was consistent when considering prior educational qualifications, meaning those who had undertaken a military sponsored (and financed) educational qualification (e.g., postgraduate degree) or an external industrial placement. It is possible that this is due to a lack of information on education qualifications available from the personnel administrative system to assist boards in making their decisions. As a result, the Army does not receive a return on investment, and individuals may experience low job satisfaction because they are unable to apply their expert skills [19]. Military personnel may be disincentivized to pursue further education and self-improvement because these are perceived not to be valued by the Army establishment.

There is an opportunity to formalise placements and education into the career structure. This could be used to incentivise further education and broaden experience within the organisation. However, to justify the placement or course, there will need to be an organisational benefit that outweighs having an individual away from the workplace. Additionally, the Army may wish to consider the inherent value of learning prior to pre-employment training to develop creativity, adaptability, and a broad base of knowledge and skills to draw upon. This must include a clear policy on how the Army will track and use an individual’s previously attained qualifications, such as degrees or apprenticeships, and their previous work-based knowledge, skills, and experience. The Army might consider whether they recognize and reward these or only those attained while in service. An Army competency framework may help develop a method of slotting in previous qualifications. CPD in the form of the knowledge, skills, and experience – behaviours (KSE-B) framework could be fully integrated into career structures and career management, forming part of the criteria for progression, posting, and development.

Currently, some courses carry a personal obligation in the form of return of service. There is no organisational equivalent; the Army is not obliged to use an individual in the skillset in which they have been trained for. If the Army wishes to develop specific people capabilities, especially if there is an individual investment, then the Army may have to make its obligations explicit. This may take the form of guaranteeing the next one or two postings, geographic stability, or the promise of additional courses leading to
accreditation. The Army may have to further develop its long-term succession planning to ensure the best return on education for both the individual and the organisation. This may come at the cost of organisational agility and individual choice.

To summarize, the findings from the review of the British Army CPD approach, the current learning and development system will not be able to adapt to future and rapidly changing requirements; it is inflexible and heavily bureaucratic and is not structured to deliver (or assist with) through-life personal CPD and the through-life requirements of the Army. Learning and development at every rank will become more important to generating the required expertise for the conflicts of the future. The learning and development pathways are markedly different between corps, trades, and markedly between officers and soldiers. The Army has a very low-risk appetite when setting course content, especially in officer education. The educational progression through soldier ranks is well-defined, as are the pan-Army requirements for every soldier rank (corps requirements vary). This is not the case for officers, where the educational requirement through career is more fractured and less well articulated. The lack of connection between education and development, and a career (outside of specified courses) may contribute to the variation in interest and focus within the learning culture throughout the organisation and between individuals. If the Army wishes to adopt a framework for a profession of arms, part of which is the requirement for CPD, then there must be a culture that supports, prioritizes, and encourages learning and education. It is suggested that the fastest way to bring this ethos into the core is to link CPD to the career structure, career management, and the reward strategy.

A consideration of the factors, potential opportunities, and investment in resources will help the British Army’s CPD maintain a high level of expertise; maintaining military expertise is crucial to remaining a legitimate professional body that the public trusts [4].

6.2.4 Legitimacy

Butler and Budgell [5] describe professional legitimacy in this statement:

*When society grants a profession the authority and autonomy to monopolize an area of expert knowledge such as law, medicine, and national defence, the profession is seen to be operating as a legitimate agent of society and the public trusts that the profession will act in the best interests of society* (p. 22).

In the UK, the British Army ultimately acts to “protect our people and our values, and ensure that our country prospers” ([17], p. 9). The British military professional further reciprocates with selfless commitment to British sovereignty and the nation, unlimited liability, and political neutrality [26]. Integral to professional legitimacy, the profession is bestowed with the autonomy to implement mechanisms to ensure the profession instils public trust, to maintain legitimacy, and to uphold their social responsibility. Establishing and adhering to standards of conduct and maintaining expertise and internal professional regulation are important to retaining legitimacy [1], [7], [16].

The standards of conduct are embodied in the British Army’s values and standards (2008). The values are courage, discipline, respect for others, integrity, loyalty, and selfless commitment. The three standards outline the way that the values should be enacted: lawful, appropriate, and with total professionalism. Breaches in the Army values and standards that adversely impact the efficiency or operational effectiveness of the service are appraised through established disciplinary mechanisms. The importance of the standard of conduct to legitimacy is reflected in the following excerpt:

*The British Army has a unique and trusted standing in the Nation and more widely. Founded on principles that underpin our society, the Army’s Values and Standards contribute directly to preserving this position and delivering operational effectiveness* ([27], p. 30).
To further ensure a shared understanding of the required standard of behaviour, the British Army’s appraisals (introduced in 2015) employ performance attributes based on a framework of Core Knowledge, Skills and Experience (CKSE). These have been developed from an analysis of military behaviours and characteristics to provide a broad, modern, and objective basis for assessment. The CKSE framework’s ten attributes are adaptability and initiative, awareness and understanding, breadth of perspective, communication and influence, delivering results, physical and mental resilience, problem solving and decision making, teamwork and collaboration, values and standards, and leadership. To help standardize behaviours, the types of observable behaviours of both positive and negative performance are provided to service personnel, along with the definitions and factors that support each attribute.

CPD tries to inculcate the standards of conduct along with expert skills and knowledge to conduct military functions (e.g., Refs. [5], [7], [15]). The review of the British Army’s current CPD approach discussed above found that training for officers and soldiers initially had a stronger focus on compliance (discipline) and deference than on the other British Army values and standards. These findings reflect a cross-cultural study where British officers-in-training rated discipline as more important than other Western European countries and the Latin countries [24]. Balancing discipline with the other values and standards in training may help entrench these behaviours in the British military professional, subsequently strengthening professional legitimacy.

6.2.5 Jurisdiction

Professional jurisdiction, “the boundaries of a domain within which expert knowledge is applied” ([5], p. 23), is likely to be maintained through establishing legitimacy [1] and success in that domain [1], [14]. A clear strategic vision will support the claim of professional jurisdiction [5]. Britain’s most recent five-year strategic vision for Defence was set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review [17]:

“Our vision is for a secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence. Everything we do in the UK and around the world is driven by our determination to protect our people and our values, and ensure that our country prospers (p. 9).

The strategic vision has been integrated into the British Army’s organisational and operational strategies, enabling members of the military profession to understand their professional jurisdiction. The vision should also emphasize the importance of broadening the expert knowledge and skill base [5]; this perspective is captured in the Strategic Defence and Security Review [17]:

“Our Armed Forces rely on the skills, commitment and professionalism of our people. We place heavy demands on them. Recruiting, training and retaining the right mix of capable and motivated Service personnel is essential to deliver success on operations (p. 32).

6.2.6 Identity and Culture

Professional identity has been defined as “one’s professional self-concept based on the central, distinctive, and enduring attributes, beliefs, motives, and experiences that exemplify a profession” ([6], p. 9). Leonard et al. [13] proposed that key components of identity also include competencies (skills, abilities, talent and knowledge), values and beliefs, and desired behaviours. Socialization (conveying knowledge primarily to newcomers) and continuous training in the competencies and values would, alongside work experience, create, and then strengthen, military professional identity [8], [18]. The beneficial outcome of strengthening a work group identity has been found to be positively related to high job satisfaction and job involvement [28]. In the British Army, while the majority of the key competencies are taught, there is an opportunity to enhance professional identity by embedding all the British Army’s values and standards in training, which currently only focuses on discipline and compliance.
Walsh and Gordon [29] further postulated that military identity is influenced by the broader military culture. The extensive research on organisational culture can help with understanding the military professional culture. Woods and West [30] define organisational culture as “shared meanings, values and attitudes and beliefs that are created and communicated within an organisation” (p. 525). In addition, Schein [21] distinguished three different levels of an organisation’s culture. Examples from the British military profession are provided for two of Schein’s cultural levels: espoused values, which are the Army’s explicit values and standards, and artefacts, which are the levels of hierarchy, ritual, military uniform and regimental insignia. The third cultural level is basic hidden assumptions: unconscious values and behaviours that can be made explicit through discussion with organisational members. The British Army displays a number of characteristics that distinguish military culture from other professional cultures. These include communal life, hierarchical structure, deference to the chain of command (with associated rules and regulations), a strict disciplinary system to maintain standards of behaviour, and national social responsibilities [3].

Leaders have a strong effect on culture and are also reciprocally influenced by important cultural values [30]. Leaders can strengthen identification with their professional members by emulating values [22]. In 2015, the British Army developed a Leadership Code, drawing on values-based, transformational, and transactional leadership theories, for all leaders (officers and soldiers), which sought to embed the military profession values. The Leadership Code [26] translated the British Army’s values and standards into desired leadership behaviours: lead by example, encourage thinking, apply reward and discipline, demand high performance, encourage confidence in the team, recognize individual strengths and weaknesses, and strive for team goals, which was made into the acronym LEADERS. To assist senior military leaders to lead by example, 360-degree feedback assessments are undertaken to enhance self-awareness and personal and professional development of behaviours. There is the opportunity to explicitly embed the Army Leadership Code in the progressive levels of leadership training to further influence the values and behaviours of British military professionals.

Butler and Budgell [5] further outlined three constructs, which underpin military professionalism. These constructs have been discussed in the review of military professional components: military ethics (discussed in legitimacy, values, and standards), leadership, and discipline.

In this brief review, examples have been provided where the British Army supports the four critical professional components. Drawing together these components, Butler and Budgell ([5], p. 31) outlined the role of professionalism in the Army:

- The Army as a profession is focused on the development and application of the esoteric knowledge and related practical professional skills of land warfare. (Expertise)
- The Army has a social responsibility to its people to fight and win the nation’s wars and to preserve and protect their way of life. (Legitimacy and Jurisdiction)
- The Army profession maintains a professional ethic of selfless service that is committed to the prevention of abuse of its own authority and power. (Legitimacy)

The above interlocking components are reinforced by the final component, identity and culture, and are underpinned by military ethics, leadership, and discipline. There are opportunities to enhance and sustain the British Army profession in the face of the changing character of conflict and competition in the twenty-first century. With CPD being an important enabler of the professional components, a key opportunity is to strengthen and adapt the CPD approach to further professionalize the British Army.

**6.2.7 Initial Conceptualization of the Professional Tenets and the CPD Approach**

The CASTLE program has sought to develop tenets of the profession of arms and a supporting CPD approach, based on the review of the current professional development approach (discussed above). From the review, a
key finding was the inflexibility and high level of bureaucracy in the British Army’s learning and development system. This may impede the expansion of the professional knowledge and skills required within a rapidly changing environment and may have a detrimental effect on the British Army’s status as a profession [31].

6.2.7.1 Tenets of the Profession of Arms

The six professional tenets were conceptualized prior to the development of this chapter and drew on the prominent theories of Huntington [10], Hackett [9], and Janowitz [11]. To provide consistency with the review undertaken in this chapter, Butler and Budgell’s [5] professional components are placed in parentheses and italicized.

1) **Service.** An ethos of service to the Queen, country, public, Army, regiment and comrades above individual self-interest. (Legitimacy, jurisdiction, identity and culture)

2) **Values.** An individual’s behaviour and conduct are based upon and held to account against, the values of the British Army: courage, discipline, respect for others, integrity, loyalty and selfless commitment. (Legitimacy, identity and culture)

3) **Martial Knowledge.** A deep understanding of war’s enduring nature and changing character and how it impacts all aspects of military activity and thinking. (Expertise)

4) **Mission Command.** The combination of leadership, decision making, control and management that manifests in the uniquely military state of Mission Command. (Expertise)

5) **Martial Skill.** The ability to plan, direct, deliver, and contribute to military force to achieve politically directed ends at every level, tactical to strategic, against a capable adversary. (Expertise)

6) **Staff Skill.** The ability to plan, direct, deliver, and contribute to the staff capability required to develop and sustain the Army while it prepares for war. (Expertise)

It is proposed that these six tenets apply to all ranks in the Army. The depth of knowledge and skills develop with study and experience. The ethos of service and values are universal to all, regardless of rank or position. The development and maintenance of the six professional tenets will require professional development. This focus is consistent with Jans and Schmidtchen’s [12] view that a professional development approach should help to convert professional values into professional behaviours. The development and maintenance of professional competence in all six areas will require a combination of study and practice throughout a military career.

6.2.8 The CPD Approach to Support the Attainment of the Professional Tenants

6.2.8.1 The KSE-B Framework

To support the development of a professional force within the proposed tenets, Army learning and development must be structured accordingly. This structure could be provided through the adoption of a KSE-B framework based around the professional tenets, forming the ways of delivering a formally professionalized force. Based on the themes identified in an analysis of future educational requirements, a high-level KSE-B framework was suggested as follows:

1) **Knowledge.** The knowledge base for both officers and soldiers required three forms of knowledge:
   a) To be a military professional requires that all ranks have an understanding appropriate to their role and rank of the following:
      - Current and evolving conflicts.
      - Current UK doctrine and military capability.
      - Likely adversary doctrine, capability, and likely theatres of operation.
b) To deliver operational capability in line with their operational role so they can deliver military effect in the Battlespace in times of competition.

c) To deliver staff capability so they can effectively manage the Army in peacetime and when at home.

2) Skills and ability. A military professional needs to be able to perform the following:

a) Plan at an appropriate level.

b) Manage, lead, and command personnel and equipment appropriate to their level.

c) Think, so they are creative, critical, and adaptive.

d) Engage with other officers, soldiers, services, government departments, the public and the media.

3) Behaviours and traits. All military individuals at all ranks must be able to act as follows:

a) Ethically, able to think through ethical problems using the framework provided by the British Army values.

b) Collaboratively, with other Army personnel, other services, and civilians.

b) Professionally, able to develop their military thinking.

6.2.8.2 Learning and Development Principles

The following principles should underpin the design of the content and method of future Army learning and development, providing the means to attain the professional objectives. These aim to increase flexibility and decrease the bureaucracy of the learning and development system.

1) Professional. Mastery of the profession of arms enabled by learning and development and ingrained through CPD is considered an integral part of a military career. There is a clear progression and development of professional military knowledge and skills through all ranks.

2) Individual and Organizational Agility. The Army adopts a KSE-B framework, based around the profession of arms, to facilitate more choice for the individual and opportunity for the organisation to develop specific people capability.

3) Integrated. The KSE-B framework is fully integrated with career structures and career management throughout the chain of command; used as evidence for progression, posting, and selection for further development.

4) Workplace Orientated. Where operational risk allows, focus learning and development in the workplace in the form of exercises, projects, programs, and external placements, as well as everyday activities, adopting the 70:20:10 principle.

5) Meritocratic. Access to courses and course content is primarily due to ability and potential.

6) Rewarded. Those who demonstrate commitment to the mastery of the profession of arms through professional development, higher education, and its application in the workplace (military or on attachment) are rewarded.

An overview of the initial conceptualization of the profession of arms and the supporting professional development approach is provided in Figure 6-1.
6.3 CONCLUSION

A re-appraisal of what it means to be a British Army professional was required owing to the changing character of conflict and competition. To gain a current and broad perspective of military professionalism in the British Army, a brief review was undertaken using Butler and Budgell’s [5] four critical professional components: expertise, legitimacy, jurisdiction, and identity and culture. The review provided examples where the British Army emulates the four critical components. CPD was considered to be a key lever to enhancing professionalization in the British Army because it enables the following:

• Members of the military profession to maintain their expertise and acquire new knowledge and skills required to meet the contemporary and changing contextual demands, which instils public trust by assuring the military can fulfil its social responsibility. (Expertise)

• The British Army to remain professional – not only as a mechanism to maintain expert skills and knowledge to effectively conduct the military but also to inculcate the standards of conduct. (Legitimacy)

• Professional jurisdiction, by supporting legitimacy and success in the military domain through continuous education to renew and broaden the expert knowledge and skills needed to adapt to the changing context and threats. (Jurisdiction)

• The strengthening of the military professional identity and culture by continuous training in the competencies and values. (Identity and Culture)

Recognizing the importance of professional development, the first step to achieving a common understanding of military professionalism, we conceptualized the tenets of the profession of arms and the supporting CPD approach. Drawing on influential military professionalism theories, the proposed professional tenets were service, values, martial knowledge, mission command, martial skill, and staff skill. The six tenets apply across all ranks. The development of the CPD approach was based on an in-depth review of the current CPD approach. To support the attainment of the professional tenets, a KSE-B framework was postulated around these tenets. A key finding from the review was the inflexibility and high
level of bureaucracy in the current learning and development system. This may impede the expansion of professional knowledge and skills required within a rapidly changing environment and may have a detrimental effect on the Army’s professional status. Thus, to increase flexibility and decrease the bureaucracy in the training system, the following learning and development principles were recommended:

- Professional;
- Individual and organisational agility;
- Integrated;
- Workplace orientated;
- Meritocratic; and
- Rewarded.

An opportunity identified to enhance the professionalism of the British Army was the extensive embedding of the British Army’s values – the initial conceptualization of the professional tenets and the CPD approach addresses this. Another opportunity is to explicitly embed the Army Leadership code in the progressive levels of leadership training to further influence the values and behaviours of British military professionals. Ultimately, it is anticipated that the final iteration of the professional tenets and supporting CPD approach will help reinforce and sustain the British Army profession to meet the military challenges of the twenty-first century.

### 6.4 REFERENCES


Chapter 7 – MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION: AN UNDERSTUDIED RELATIONSHIP

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7.1 INTRODUCTION

The following chapter provides a brief overview of what has been learned as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Research Task Group and how it might apply to Professional Military Education (PME). It will review:

1) The definitions and characteristics of military professionalism;
2) A description of military education organizations;
3) Current pressures and drivers of change to the military profession; and
4) The relationship between military professionalism and PME.

Because of the variety of terms in use by different countries, we will use the terms entry level, mid-career, and senior officer education organizations to refer to the three points at which officers are routinely educated.

7.2 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

The concept of ‘military professionalism’ is contested [30], [48], but is comparable across states, languages, and cultures [42]. Frameworks describing military professionalism developed in the United States (US) during the Cold War generally related military leadership to the government and society [32], [35], [53]. Included in these frameworks are key concepts associated with military professionalism, such as expertise, responsibility, and corporateness [32]; cohesion, education, and training [35]; the individual, institution and society, including the political environment [62]; occupational and institutional aspects [53]; and aspects related to bureaucracy and professionalization [16].

Examining professions using a comparative perspective, Abbott [1] considers all military members part of the profession, in contrast to the focus on the officer corps in military sociology [41]. He does note, however, that, organization-based professions like the military and the clergy do not fit the normal model of professional autonomy. Etzioni [27], examining teachers, nurses, and social workers, referred to them as semi-professions, a description that might be appropriate for the military context. The description has been applied to the police [17] and can be inferred for the US military [39]. The growing use of military contractors also highlights the dividing line between the military as a profession (or semi-profession), and the functions carried out under contracts [63], [64]. The military differs from nurses, teachers, social workers, and most military contractors in its inversion of specialization. Most professions and semi-professions build on a common body of knowledge towards increasing specialization with seniority and career progression. Military professionals, in contrast, begin as specialists (infantry, artillery, pilots, etc.) and develop increasingly general knowledge through higher education and training to permit them to integrate
these specialties. Other security professionals – police, gendarmes, interior ministry troops, security intelligence, and border troops – have a similar inverted structure, perhaps because social capital and trust are important criteria for promotion to key security leadership positions [41].

Taxonomic descriptions of professions based on traits and functions exaggerate the role of knowledge and expertise, and accept professional ideologies at face-value [60], [61]. Professional ideologies focus on the role of the military in war-fighting [6]. In contrast, neo-Weberian approaches define professions in terms of “exclusionary social closure in the marketplace sanctioned by the state” ([61], p. 4). Professions are described as monopoly practices, which are sometimes socially beneficial, and sometimes predatory from the perspective of the state and its citizens [49], [59], [70]. States and societies that have suffered military-political predation – Argentina, Brazil [56], Chile [29], Cambodia [21], Germany [50] – and states experiencing military failure – France [7], [69], Poland (author discussions), Russia [3], [4], [13] – typically re-examine their security professionals.

Plurality in the literature reflects not only the diversity in approaches to study military professionalism, but also the pluralism and discord of contemporary civil-military relations. What do governments and societies expect of their military investment? The paradox of the military profession is that many soldiers see the epitome of professionalism as competence to fight wars, but most countries’ governments and societies want their military investment to avoid or prevent wars, and to be useful in peace; in 1590, Maurice of Nassau expected his mercenaries to repair dykes when not fighting the Spanish [28]. Most countries employ military forces as part of a spectrum of security services – police, paramilitary, and military – serving a variety of national needs short of war. When they work well together, security professions form an ecosystem like health professions, with mutual learning, cross-employment, and common understanding of the needs of the state. This is more common in smaller countries; it is obscured by the employment of military forces by major powers for expeditionary operations, with a focus on the upper end of the doctrinal “spectrum of conflict” illustrated in Figure 7-1 [71].
A cultural divide, both between individual professionals and between national forces, separates those who seek to understand military roles across the spectrum, and those who focus at the upper end of the spectrum of conflict, treating the lower end as a distraction. This cultural divide is a theme in military education, just as prevention and treatment are competing themes in medical education.

### 7.3 MILITARY EDUCATION ORGANIZATIONS

Like other professions and occupations, military officers and other ranks are trained, educated, and socialized in many different organizations. Training consists of preparation for known tasks under predictable circumstances. Education consists of developing bodies of knowledge, problem solving and critical thinking skills. Socialization consists of inculcating values, attitudes, and beliefs. The appropriate balance of these activities is perennially debated, and the outcomes of the debates are manifested in governance, faculty, students, curriculum, and investments in infrastructure [45]. Training establishments invest in rifle ranges, vehicles, and obstacle courses; education establishments invest in libraries and laboratories. Military organizations mix the three activities in varying measures, even when training and socialization are relegated to combat units. The common elements of this mixture create common elements of professional experience that transcend national boundaries [41], [42].

We take military education organizations to be establishments with a physical address and permanent teaching staff, delivering programs that approximate the Bologna criteria for post-secondary education. Applying the Bologna criteria represents a significant change. Since 1999, even autonomous and self-regulating professions like the clergy increasingly measure their professional education against objective external standards, influenced by society outside the profession, and comparable across professional, cultural, and linguistic lines (see Merzon [49] in general, and Lee [42], pp. 101-102, for the case of Muslim clergy in the Netherlands).

Military professionals may receive education in any post-secondary institution, but PME generally occurs in specialized military education organizations, which typically operate at three distinct levels: entry level, pre-commission establishments for young officers; mid-career staff colleges for command and staff officers; and senior courses to prepare military executives – Colonels, generals, and naval flag officers, often in the company of government and even private sector civilian executive students.1 There are global patterns in the separation or combination of these educational organizations, which tend to vary with size and historical evolution. Smaller countries tend to have a single joint staff college for mid-career courses, while larger countries have separate service staff colleges, with token representatives of other services. Entry level military academies are more commonly divided by service, and senior officer executive programs are almost always joint, multinational, and civil-military. These institutional patterns, illustrated in Figure 7-2, are important because they shape the education and socialization of military professionals. Separation encourages specialized competence within services – army, navy, air force. Joint education encourages not just interpersonal familiarity (often useful for future operations), but also an active study of the integration of the services and their common functions.

Using data from 2011 (Appendix 7A1) more than two thirds of all states have joint education at mid-career and senior officer levels (patterns B, C, and E), and many combine services even at the pre-commission level (patterns B and E), either in the same programs of study, or in the same institutions [39].

These data indicate only the first level of diversity in military education – the mixing of the service tribes. Post-Cold War peace support and stabilization operations were declared to be “whole of government,” “joined-up” or “Joint International Multi-Agency Public-Private (JIMP)” [9], [10], [73] or they adopted a “comprehensive approach” [2], [48]. Civil-military cooperation, inter-agency coordination, and new mission objectives brought more civilian instructors into mid-career education in the early 1990s. Civil servants had

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1 Jalili refers to these as Joint Strategic-Level Security and Defence Colleges, JSSDCs [34].
been attending senior officer education (war colleges and national defence universities) since the Second World War in many countries. Some point to “Milner’s Kindergarten” of 1902 as an even earlier example of civil-military cooperation and mutual education on operations at the command level [37]. But after the Cold War, both international exposure and civilian exposure seemed to accelerate, not only for senior officer education, but also for mid-career staff college courses and even entry level military academies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Illustration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>No institutions of higher learning – service training only</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Single institution provides educational content at every level, with specialized content at pre-commissioning and joint content at mid-career</td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Service institutions at pre-commissioning level are followed by a single joint institution</td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Single service institutions at pre-commission and mid-career, with (in some cases) a joint course or institution at the highest level</td>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Integrated all-service education from pre-commission to the highest level, provided by a single institution.</td>
<td><img src="image5" alt="Illustration" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7-2: Patterns of Military Education: Entry, Mid-Career, Senior Officer. The grey boxes represent separate campuses at entry level (lowest), mid-career, and senior officer level (highest). The coloured bars represent service courses of study, with purple indicating joint courses. (Last, [39], see Appendix 7A1.)

Inclusion of foreigners has been a practice dating back to the earliest forms of military education. Educating the sons of foreign kings and chieftains was a vehicle of influence for the ancients [31], which today we call defence education diplomacy [38]. Internationalization of military education today embodies a two-way flow.
of influence: we expect foreign students to understand and be sympathetic to us, and we expect our students, and the larger institution, to learn from foreign students.² For most NATO countries, this is imperative, because they rarely act alone; United Nations and Alliance actions are collective.

Faced with increasing diversity and the challenge to operate across national and organizational lines, military professionalism has become an organizing principle for managing military human resources. Upper echelons of the services – army, navy, air force, and specialists such as health care, military police, logistics, and so on – have different understandings about the requirements of military professionalism. These understandings are reflected even when they are not articulated in discussions about ranking and promoting leaders at every level. As gender, ethnicity, religion, and other alternatives begin to erode a formerly homogeneous military identity, military education organizations become the testing ground for new ideas and experiments with concepts, doctrine, and the self-conception of the military.³

7.4 CURRENT PRESSURES AND DRIVERS OF CHANGE

Sources of pressure on Western military organizations and civil-military relations are internal, domestic, and international. Some are long-standing, and some are novel and only beginning to be understood. All these levels are interrelated, and connected to the problem of socializing, training, and educating leaders in military education organizations.

The move from conscription to all-volunteer forces in many countries has been well documented. It was accompanied by pressure for the institution to conform to changing social norms [15], [24], [26], [35], [68]. Cultural diversity became more important, both to permit forces to recruit from a wider cross-section of society, and to enhance understanding of more complex operating environments. The inclusion of women and ethnic and sexual minority groups has been widely studied [20], [25], [66]. Overall, these externally driven changes have helped to make most Western military forces more socially and intellectually diverse. This has placed new demands on education and socialization in military education organizations. Entry level military academies in most Western countries had to abandon the character of “boys’ schools” by the 1980s, and mid-career and senior officer education organizations are still struggling with the ascendancy of masculinity which is sometimes toxic [11].

Employment of all-volunteer forces in NATO is related to technological and operational changes accompanying the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Although the label RMA was sometimes criticized as a fad or sales gimmick for American weapons [22], new technologies of artificial intelligence and nanotechnology combined with new applications of information and communications technology (cyber offense and defence, influence operations) are now moving faster than most military forces can adapt to. Specialized education organizations for technical staff officers have difficulty maintaining capacity in legacy technologies, and have inadequate resources for new technologies associated with cyber, nanotechnology, and artificial intelligence. New personnel policies and new career paths are being explored to bring essential knowledge and skills into the military profession.

Changes in Western society leave not only the military, but professions at large fighting for their status and jurisdiction [14], and we know that professions evolve and adapt, or disappear over time [1]. This has implications to the type of expertise and ethics that military education organizations need to provide at entry, mid-career, and senior officer levels. Overall, the more civilian defence employees are included in military education, and the more the focus of education shifts away from military-operational to broader security issues,

² Sokolsky’s [67] Fraternity of the Blue Uniform describes the role of major powers building relationships with future allies. The two-way flow of mutual learning is more common in the experience of most countries [34].
³ Okros and Scott [54], for example, used interviews at the Canadian Forces College to explore the potential impact of gender identity on operational effectiveness.
the more the military profession has the opportunity to evolve into a cluster of related security professions, analogous to the ecosystem of health professionals described by Pikkarainen et al. [57].

7.5 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

For professional armed forces to maintain their jurisdiction over the military domain, they have to adapt their expertise, ethics and skills-set in ways that meet their changing tasks. Failure to do so could lead to mistakes, loss of legitimacy, decreased funding, and preference of societal customers for competitor professions or other actors. We have seen this competition at work in the rise of special operations forces, with different cultures and skill-sets, as competitors to conventional forces [12]. Visible failures of military force to improve Western security after decades of conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and North Africa are weighed against fears of new major power confrontations that call for conventional war-fighting skills and equipment.4

Table 7-1 illustrates that military professionalism can no longer be isolated from other services in the increasingly interdependent security sectors of most countries facing complex threats and challenges to military competence, in both expeditionary operations and support to domestic security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7-1: Examples of Security Sector Education Organizations.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police: National, Regional, Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry level (pre-commission academies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 5 years of service experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-career (staff colleges) typically 10 – 15 years of service experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officer (National Defence College, or JSSDCs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive officers, typically 15 – 25 years of service experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 There is no shortage of analysis pointing to the failure of Western engagements in recent wars: on Afghanistan, Rashid [58], Jakobsen [33]; on Libya, Campbell [19], Siebert [65]; on Iraq’s connection to the rise of Da’esh, Bennis (2016); Costs of the wars will constrain future security decisions [8]. The “pivot to Asia” calls for new resources and reallocation to conventional naval and air forces, citing rise of China’s capabilities [23], [52].
The majority of the world’s countries, with populations between 2 million and 50 million, do not have separate institutions for each cell, even if they have separate army, navy, and air force service academies. Senior officer education organizations (National Defence Colleges, War Colleges, or JSSDCs, as Jalili calls them [34]) are best placed to combine education and strategic leadership for a security sector ecosystem of higher professional education.

An agile and proactive military education system is the key to successful adaptation of professional armed forces’ expertise, ethos and ethics [45], [46]. PME contributes not only to military professionalism, but to the larger goals of pursuing human security, national security, and international security. Just as medical doctors claim pre-eminence within the health sector, military professionals claim pre-eminence within the security sector, because of the severity of the challenges they face. Libel [44] provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of evolving PME organizations. It consists of six dimensions:

- **Aim.** The drivers of change have led military education organizations to significantly adapt their official aims [47]. Identified by the shift from the ‘management of violence’ to the ‘management of operations’ [44]. In other words, the profession-of-arms no longer focuses on preparation for war-fighting, but rather for generic tasks and skill-sets of raising and commanding military forces in operations across the spectrum of conflict [36], [44]. Nor can they reasonably claim a monopoly of competence across this spectrum, as the rise of JIMP, whole of government, and comprehensive approaches suggests.

- **Governance.** Contemporary PME organizations in the West and elsewhere tend to either have or pursue academic accreditation of their programmes. This together with growing requirements for joint and inter-agency education significantly changed both the internal and external governance structures and stakeholders. The core expertise, skill-sets and ethos of the profession-of-arms are consistently extended well beyond the military domain [43]. As the profession loses its monopoly over the education and commission of its members, this will have far reaching implications on its identity and jurisdictions [18].

- **Composition and Selection of Faculty.** Van Creveld [72] observed in the late 1980s that American PME organizations recruited civilian doctorates alongside military faculty members. America was late to the game. Entry level military academies in Europe, the Commonwealth – Africa, Asia, and Latin America – had begun to recruit civilian academics in the 1960s if not before. Scientific socialism also emphasized technical doctoral staff in the Soviet sphere, giving military universities in several post-Soviet states a fast track to accreditation (Poland, Serbia, Romania, Hungary, and Czech Republic for example). Evolution of national models has led to considerable variance in the specific arrangements adopted by different countries and organizations to combine academic and military faculty members. To generalize, however, it is normal to find military, retired military, and civilian academic faculty in all levels of military education organizations. Less universal, but still widespread in senior officer education, is the combination of senior students with academic faculty and senior mentors [51].

- **Composition and Selection of Student Body.** While in the past, joint and inter-agency students were seen almost exclusively in the senior military colleges (e.g., war colleges), the ever-increasing joint and inter-agency/whole of government nature of contemporary military operations have brought them more mid-career military education organizations (e.g., command and staff colleges), and even to military academies [43], [55]. The academization of mid-career and senior officer education and their transformation into defence universities has led to more intermingling of military and civilian students at every level.
The consequence is that military students are unlikely to go through their professional education without being challenged by colleagues and students exposed to very different values, with consequences for socialization.

**Curriculum.** From the 1950s to the end of the Cold War, mid-career and senior officer education under American influence became increasingly common, often quite limited, and centred on core programmes and electives [72]. However, post-Cold War changes drove accreditation of military curricula, broadening the content, and replacing doctrine with research-based content. The uncertainty of military operations, the manifest failings of doctrine, the rise of new domains such as cyber, and growing diversity in the classroom have also affected the content, context, and pedagogy of military curricula [34], [40]. As early as 2000, military educators speculated about education for a broader security profession [5].

**Infrastructure.** Looking at Western defence universities, there has been a general trend towards accreditation, increasing emphasis on research and some fusion of responsibilities for doctrinal and conceptual development [44]. In some cases, re-development has included both physical (e.g., libraries, purchase of books) and digital (e.g., subscription for databases, online journals, etc.) infrastructure. More broadly, however, there are large gaps between the relatively small budget and infrastructure of defence universities and funds and facilities available to even modest civilian universities. These gaps cast doubt on some defence university claims to lead security sector education.

### 7.6 CONCLUSION

In the post-Cold War era, military education organizations have adapted towards the defence university model. They have done so most successfully where entry, mid-career, and senior officer education are co-located, and resources are concentrated in nearby or co-located campuses to permit pooling of resources. Access to civilian universities and collegial collaboration with other security professionals will be important for developing the military profession, and these are best achieved in the context of post-secondary education and research. Perhaps surprisingly, the evolution of defence university complexes puts military education in the forefront of education for broader security expertise in most countries.

### 7.7 REFERENCES


Appendix 7A-1: PATTERNS OF MILITARY EDUCATION ORGANIZATIONS, 2011

Region codes and country lists are from Buzan and Waever, 2003. Regions are arranged by institutional density. Density is total number of university-like institutions for higher security education (police, paramilitary, and military) divided by number of states; median is 2.33; average is 2.57, dragged upward by SAS. Weighted average by number of states would be closer to EUR average.

ASS  Asian Super-complex – includes China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia (Buzan and Waever include SAS and EAS in ASS for some purposes, but here they are separate)

BZ  Buffer Zones (not a contiguous group of states)

CAF  Central Africa

EAS  East Asia (Australia, NZ and Micronesia) – the majority are microstates

EUR  Europe

HNP  Horn Proto-complex

MEA  Mid-East and North Africa

NAM  North America, includes Central American states and Caribbean

PSO  Post-Soviet states

SAS  South Asia – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh

SAM  South America

WAP  West African Proto-complex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>B = 5/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>B = 2/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNP</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>B = 2/5  B+E = 3/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>B = 5/14 B+E = 8/14</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>B = 3/12 (C = 9/13)</td>
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### MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION: AN UNDERSTUDIED RELATIONSHIP

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<td>22</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>B = 103/188 B+E = 114/188</td>
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About 60 percent of all states are B or E. Leaving out A, this rises to more than 70 percent, compared to 13 percent for D – separate service at entry and mid-career.
Chapter 8 – DEVELOPING A CULTURE AND GENDER INCLUSIVE MODEL OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM: LESSONS LEARNED AND WAY FORWARD

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8.1 INTRODUCTION

Over the past three years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Research Task Group (RTG) 287 panel accomplished the following:

1) Reviewed existing models, frameworks, and measures related to military professionalism;
2) Examined aspects of military professionalism, including aspects of culture and diversity, from different NATO nations;
3) Examined the relationship between military professionalism and professional military education; and
4) Provided lessons learned and a way forward for examining military professionalism that takes into account evolving military requirements.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline how each of the aims were addressed over the three years that the panel was operational.

8.2 MODELS, FRAMEWORKS, AND MEASURES OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

As also discussed in Chapter 1 (Hachey), several frameworks of military professionalism have long dominated the literature, especially those of Huntington [6], Janowitz [7], and Sarkesian [14]; with the former two heavily influencing the development of military doctrine in the United States [4] and Canada [12]. Other models have focused on comparative analysis and change in military professionalism, including ones by Moskos [10], Caforio [3], Abbott [1], and Nuciari [13]. The following section summarizes the historical evolution of key concepts in military professionalism, including the long-standing frameworks and models.

With a focus on the officer corps, Huntington [6] defined a profession as “a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics” (p. 7), with professionalism comprising expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Expertise refers to the specialized skills of military personnel, including the education and training required to develop such skills. Huntington [6] followed Harold Lasswell [8] in defining the special skillset of the military professional as the “management of violence,” meaning the main function of the military is to plan and direct combat operations and to organize, equip, and train the force that will carry them out. Responsibility refers to the officer corps’ social obligation, which gives rise to civil-military relations: in return for performing a service “essential to the functioning of society” (p. 9), the officer corps is

1 Section 8.2 was taken from section 14.2 written in Libel and Hachey [9].
DEVELOPING A CULTURE AND GENDER INCLUSIVE MODEL OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM: LESSONS LEARNED AND WAY FORWARD

granted a professional monopoly. Additionally, specific customs and traditions, laws, and codes help guide the officer’s behaviour [6]. Finally, based on Huntington’s definition, corporateness denotes the shared sense of unity between officers within a hierarchical organization that includes non-professionals, such as non-combat officers and reservists. This led later scholars to criticize the Huntingtonian concept for ignoring the multiple non-combat officer specializations as non-professional [5]. Moreover, given the time period, Huntington’s [6] framework only looked at male officers and their experience as individual professionals [2].

Janowitz [7] also focused on the officer corps and their transition to a profession, defining military professionalism as expertise through skill and performance, responsibility, group identity and cohesion, and education and training. He also described the future of the military profession as concerned with dilemmas that military leaders must contend with, including the influence of technological advances and the social environment. No longer is there a dichotomy of wartime and peacetime; rather, the military has also become a constabulary force focusing on enacting civilian control [7]. While more inclusive of the external influences on the military (e.g., societal pressures), Janowitz [7], like Huntington [6], focuses on a male officer corps [2].

Following Lasswell [8] in defining the purpose of the military profession as the “management of violence,” Sarkesian [14] situates the military profession within the broader political and societal environment, along with the institutional perspective (e.g., political military-civilian relations) and the individual perspective (i.e., as shaped by institutional socialization). Core principles of professionalism, as outlined by Sarkesian [14], include “honesty, integrity, loyalty, honour and gentlemanly conduct” (p. 11). Military professionalism encompasses civilian control, dignity and worth, justice, as well as special knowledge and skill, legitimacy, group identity, and professional ethos. When personal values, institutional requirements, and community perspectives are in disaccord, professionalism breaks down [14]. Like Huntington’s [6] and Janowitz’s [7] frameworks, Sarkesian’s [14] focuses on the officer corps, with a broader focus on the intersections among the individual, the institution, and societal aspects [2].

Moskos’s [10], [11] Institutional/Occupational (I/O) model is not focused on the officer corps but on all types of military personnel. In contrast with earlier frameworks, his model aims to explain the military’s transition from a professional corps to an institutional and occupational one. Institutional refers to elements such as service to country (legitimacy), adjacency of work and where members reside (residence), and a primary commitment to the organization (role commitment). Occupational refers to aspects such as a marketplace economy (legitimacy), a separation of work and where a member resides (residence), and a secondary commitment to the organization (role commitment). In reality, both elements are present within the military [11]. Many aspects of the institutional model are reflected in doctrinal field manuals, and includes values and norms, self-sacrifice, liability, military discipline [11]; however, given where the military is structured (i.e., within a government organization), aspects of the occupational model are also present (e.g., supply and demand) [11].

Building on the I/O model, Càforio [3] proposed the Bureaucratization/Professionalization (B/P) model, which shows how aspects of both are present in the officer corps to measure processes of change within the profession. Key to this model are the “aim of the officers’ activity, lines of action, prevailing normative ethical references prevailing sources of the direction of thinking, types of satisfaction sought, sociocultural references and reference group” (p. 64), all of which are similar to how the I/O model was broken down. As Nuciari [13] states “all scholars dealing with the military profession agree on one peculiarity: it is simultaneously a bureaucracy and a profession” (p. 15).

Taking a systems approach to understanding military professionalism that avoids a concrete definition, Abbot [1] described the military professional as an “exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases” (p. 8) and as including work, jurisdiction, and competition. Occupational groups control knowledge and skills, and abstraction distinguishes professionals from non-professionals. Work refers to the tasks inside the profession and the people that carry them out.
In addition, tasks have subjective qualities (e.g., diagnosis and treatment) and objective qualities (e.g., impacts from technology). The power and prestige of the academic knowledge of the profession is very important to maintaining its jurisdiction. Thus, “diagnosis, treatment, inference, and academic work provide the cultural machinery to jurisdiction” (p. 59).

8.3 CASE STUDIES: MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Through the 11 meetings of this RTG it was decided to outline aspects of military professionalism within the context of each participating nation. That is, identify the unique aspects of the culture, while also examining military professionalism. The following section provides the key aspects from each of the case studies explored:

1) **Bulgaria:** With the social and political transition of the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF), Yanakiev articulated the importance for the Bulgarian government to create and implement a long-term vision of the military in light of the increased number of non-traditional, multinational coalition operations. The ensuing strategy and policies focused on the recruitment, selection, retention, motivation, and development of the Bulgarian military. Importantly, the mixed-methods approach sought to improve perceived stability and predictability through organizational transformation. This was also to ensure the effectiveness of the BAF across operations, which would include specialized training to infuse personnel with competencies related to an ever changing battlespace (e.g., regional security mission), implementation of leadership practices establishing inclusive environments (e.g., organizational culture) to attract and retain diverse personnel, and continued building of civil-military relations. Overall, this study demonstrated the unique challenges of post-communist societies in adopting and adapting their military culture to western perceptions of military professionalism.

2) **Canada:** Through qualitative interviews, Hachey presented the perceptions regarding military professionalism from members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). In particular, leadership plays a pivotal role in conveying, understanding and practicing professional behaviour. However, future research should look at the potential of longitudinal quantitative tools to monitor the state and characteristics of the military as a profession, as well as how these traditional models have an impact on diversity in the military.

3) **France:** Examining the core competencies and dynamic capability of the French Armed Forces, Frank reviews the recent challenges to military professionalism in the wake of continued modernization. In particular, she presents a way forward on how the military can adapt to cope with the unpredictability of the future political and social environments using a dynamic model of military professional. Using the lens of *continuous morphing*, Frank identifies organizational capacities the military will need to quickly adapt to and integrate high-impact technology (e.g., artificial intelligence) within operations that also allows for recognition and utilization of unique attributes of current personnel in order to build and sustain an agile force while also moving forward the institution itself.

4) **Sweden:** Focusing on the experiences of women, Linehagen presents the results from a qualitative study examining the power resources that women use in the Armed Forces. Four themes emerged: structural power resources, cultural and social power resources, emotional power resources, and minority perspectives. Overall, her study emphasised the crucial role of individual development of practices by women soldiers that are aimed in integrating them within units while ‘changing them from within’ to fit better for future gender inclusion. In addition, the findings can be extended to change development and organizational practices to promote increased inclusiveness and fairness with the potential to improve recruitment and retention of diverse personnel.
5) **United Kingdom:** Using a theoretical approach, Hawkshaw and O’Neil examined the conceptualization and the subsequent practical implication of professionalism for the British Army. In particular, this chapter references Butler and Budgell’s (2015) critical components of military professionalism derived from influential theories to briefly review professionalism in the British Army. The main focus of the review is on professional development which is a key enabler to the professional components. Overall, this chapter provides a greater understanding of how these concepts could be applied to a future career management paradigm in the British Army.

Overall, several insights can be gleaned from the case studies:

- While the sociology of the military profession provides ideal types and various analytical approach to study the militaries, individual armed forces have self-conceptions that direct their actions;
- Mixed-methods approaches provide rich data to study state and characteristics of military professionalism;
- The incorporation of organizational behaviour and dynamic frameworks provides insights to institutional structures and processes impacting professionalism;
- In spite of an inclusive approach for military recruitment and development, Western armed forces still have a male-dominated military professional culture; and
- Current research suggests the need to adopt a dynamic model of professionalism with support from the military institution, government, and society to maintain a diverse armed force effective in today’s changing operational environment.

### 8.4 LESSONS LEARNED AND WAY FORWARD

Based on the three year NATO RTG, the following lessons learned were identified:

1) There is not a “one size fits all” model of military professionalism that would be relevant to all cultures/nations. Not only does the sociology of the military profession literature outline a variety of approaches to study the military profession, but armed forces themselves have also adopted different professional self-conceptions. The latter, in turn, have also changed over time.

2) In spite of several decades of increasingly inclusive military recruitment and retention policies, the professional military culture of NATO armed forces tends to still be male-dominant. In other words, the increasing numbers of soldiers from ethnic, religious and sexual minorities have not led to transformation of the male-dominant character of NATO armed forces culture of military professionalism.

3) The relationship between increasingly inclusive military personnel and military professionalism are under-studied. Even though there is plethora of literature examining diversity management (e.g., gender inclusion, multi-ethnic relations) and military professionalism, the two are largely separated. Thus, future research could focus on the changing demographics of the military and the nature of military professionalism.

4) Both qualitative and quantitative research methods shed light on crucial aspects of the state and characteristics of military professionalism.

In addition, suggestions for the way forward include the following:

1) As outlined in Chapter 7 (Libel, Hachey, and Last), the relationship between military professionalism and professional military education has been under-studied. Legitimacy of NATO armed forces is dependent on their status as a professional force. Their status as a professional force is also dependent on adapting the various dimensions of the concept to the changing circumstances
(i.e., drivers of change). Once the drivers of change are taken into account, it will be key to adapt the professional military education system to provide the ability to meet the changing requirements.

2) There is a crucial need for cross-NATO longitudinal analysis of the state and characteristics of military professionalism. This would provide NATO with comprehensive and timely insights into the state and characteristics of military professionalism (e.g., the development and conduct could be tasked to a specialized multinational teams).

8.5 REFERENCES


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North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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Theories of military professionalism have not been developed to account for aspects of gender and diversity, such as the underlying socio-cultural aspects of the dominant male-oriented warrior framework, cross-cultural applications, civil-military and international relations, and how leadership and socialization play a role in member conduct and shaping military identity. Based on this gap, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exploratory team and subsequent Research Task Group (RTG) was established to examine military professionalism.
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