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TITLE:

**HARDENING WARFIGHTING'S CRITICAL VULNERABILITY: THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT A
STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES METHODOLOGY IN THE MARINE CORPS**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Hardening Warfighting's Critical Vulnerability: The Need to Implement a Strategic Human Resources Methodology in the Marine Corps

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Thesis: For the U.S. military to regain its strategic advantage, the Marine Corps must revolutionize its legacy manpower management practices by transforming to a warfighter focused Strategic Human Resources (SHR) methodology that maximizes the ability of every Marine and adapts to the evolving character of warfare.

Discussion: Pivoting from the Middle East region and counterinsurgency operations, the U.S. military focus is now the Indo-Pacific region and strategic competition. The 2017 National Security Strategy identified decades of U.S. "strategic complacency" resulting in its fall from the preeminent warfighting position. The 2018 National Defense Strategy called for a business transformation to cultivate a lethal, agile workforce able to integrate new capabilities and adapt to warfighting approaches by fully harnessing the talent and creativity of its people. The 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance echoed the sentiments of the previous Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) that the service is not "organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the future operating environment." In the March 2020 report on Force Design 2030, the CMC concluded "that modest and incremental improvements to our force structure and legacy capabilities would be insufficient to overcome evolving capabilities."

For the past century, the goal of the industrial era manpower management model was to achieve a required quantity of output and maintain adherence to the process, regardless of output quality or effectiveness. This administrative approach resulted in a system that lacks unity of effort, is irrelevant to warfighting, and provides minimal operational assessment metrics. Calls for transformation go unheeded as the Marine Corps continues incremental modernization regardless of the systemic decoupling from service strategy. The most significant barriers to manpower management reform efforts are: (1) how the Marine Corps selects and promotes its senior leaders; (2) what these senior leaders pay attention to, measure and control; and (3) the deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching techniques utilized by the service. To address these barriers, the following lines of effort are recommendations for the Marine Corps to transition to the future state of SHR: (1) make people the priority; (2) professionalize the HR community; (3) diversify the senior leader development model; (4) make transformational leadership the standard; and (5) embrace social sciences.

Conclusion: This thesis finds that the evolutionary approach to manpower management modernization efforts will not achieve Force Design 2030 objectives and beyond. The inability to achieve force design manpower management objectives is because the quantity of personnel was the primary goal of the system for the past century. Additionally, a revolutionary approach for transformation is necessary to overcome the deeply entrenched cultural barriers which consistently repelled previous manpower management reform efforts. Isolated short-term initiatives such as talent management will fail to achieve long-term success unless a foundation of professional HR practices are employed at the tactical and operational levels of the Marine Corps. The long-standing issues facing the Marine Corps require a systemic solution guided by a strategic people vision that unifies the HR community of stakeholders, is relevant to warfighting, and provides operationally relevant assessment metrics aligned to larger Marine Corps strategy.

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INTRODUCTION

Pivoting from the Middle East region and counterinsurgency operations, the global security focus of the United States (U.S.) is now the Indo-Pacific region and strategic competition against near peer adversaries. As described in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), decades of “strategic complacency” by the United States resulted in its fall from the preeminent position across the warfighting domains (land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace). Additionally, U.S. adversaries will consistently fight below the threshold of conventional warfare by exploiting U.S. adherence to the rule of law, which further widens this warfighting disparity.¹ In order to regain its strategic advantage, the U.S. military must rebuild its capabilities and operate more effectively in contested multi-domain environments. No longer the international rules setter, the United States is facing what renowned psychologist Thomas Kuhn defined as a “paradigm shift,” because it no longer possesses the unilateral military advantage in which its current force structure is based upon.² The U.S military must address this fact because its current military capabilities assume dominance across the warfighting domains. Since the warfighting dominance of the U.S. military no longer exists, the Department of Defense (DoD) must transform the way it prepares for and conducts future warfare.

In the *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America*, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) acknowledged the increased complexities of the global security landscape at a magnitude not seen in recent history. The changing character of warfare is due to increased lethality and a more disruptive battlefield, combined with increasing speed and reach of kinetic and non-kinetic targeting capabilities. Most notably, new technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomy, and biotechnology present both significant challenges and opportunities for the DoD. As a result of these changes to the character of warfare, the SecDef identified the need for a business transformation within the DoD by

cultivating a lethal, agile workforce able to integrate new capabilities and adapt to warfighting approaches. To achieve the transformative objectives outlined by the SecDef, each service must take sweeping action to fully harness the talent and creativity of its people.³

In July of 2019, the 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) echoed the sentiments of the previous Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) that the service is not "organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment."⁴ In this guidance, the CMC identified force design as the number one priority for the Marine Corps and outlined significant changes necessary to meet NDS objectives and to keep pace with the changing character of warfare. In the March 2020 report on Force Design 2030 phases I and II efforts, the CMC concluded "that modest and incremental improvements to our force structure and legacy capabilities would be insufficient to overcome evolving capabilities."⁵ These evolving capabilities require Marines to display unmatched mental agility, physical stamina, emotional resilience, and spiritual fitness to thrive in the 21st century operating environment. For the U.S. military to regain its strategic advantage, the Marine Corps must revolutionize its legacy manpower management practices by transforming to a warfighter focused Strategic Human Resources (SHR) methodology that maximizes the ability of every Marine and adapts to the evolving character of warfare.

This thesis utilizes an operational approach⁶ to review the current state of manpower management, introduce the desired future state, address a counterargument for maintaining the status quo, identify the problem set preventing revolution to the future state, and recommend lines of effort to counter barriers identified in the problem set. Due to the wide range of terminology used throughout the profession, this analysis will use the term "manpower management" to describe the current state, understanding this term has a specific definition and

role as part of the Human Resource Development Process (HRDP).⁷ For this analysis, manpower management is defined as “Processes, technology, and methods used to manage, support, develop and leverage human capital to support a company’s business strategies.”⁸ Marine Corps human capital consists of active and reserve component uniformed military members, DoD civilians, and contractors. This analysis will focus solely on active component uniformed military members and it will not address the manpower information system changes needed to support SHR.

Much of the research published during the past 20 years illustrated specific deficiencies within the current system, but none have advocated for a complete overhaul. This is because the quantity of personnel was the primary goal of the system for the past century. A revolutionary approach for transformation is necessary to overcome the deeply entrenched cultural barriers that consistently repelled previous manpower management reform efforts. Isolated short-term initiatives such as talent management will fail to achieve long-term success unless a foundation of professional HR practices are employed at the tactical and operational levels of the Marine Corps. The long-standing issues facing the Marine Corps require a systemic solution guided by a strategic people vision that unifies the HR community of stakeholders, is relevant to warfighting, and provides operationally relevant assessment metrics aligned to larger Marine Corps strategy.

MANPOWER MANAGEMENT: CURRENT STATE

The state of manpower management within the Marine Corps is inadequate to meet the current challenges facing the United States. In the 38th CPG, the CMC stated the need for significant change to force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership to align with the objectives of the NDS. The CMC specifically identified manpower and talent management practices as antiquated, unaccommodating, and discouraging to Marines seeking self-improvement.⁹ The CMC is not alone in his assessment of

the current state of manpower management in the Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps is not the only service facing these challenges.

American economist and Hoover Institute Fellow, Tim Kane, wrote two books that reignited a longstanding debate over DoD manpower policy effectiveness. In his 2012 book, *Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It's Time for a Revolution*, he argued that many of the industrial era practices in use today are traced back to the second industrial revolution of 1899. At that time, U.S. Secretary of War Elihu Root orchestrated significant changes to the Army using “assembly-line” manufacturing concepts to improve the efficiency of the Army. By treating labor as a mass-produced and interchangeable resource, Secretary Root established a long-standing precedent for DoD’s current manpower policy. Kane proposed the U.S. military should transition to a merit-based officer promotion system because the current outmoded seniority-based promotion model results in the unnecessary loss of talented junior officers. This promotion model was based on the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) passed in 1980 because it placed numerical limits on the number of field grade officers (based on end strength) in effort to standardize promotion timelines and create predictable career paths across the services. While the passage of DOPMA was under the guise of egalitarianism within the DoD, it inadvertently created a system that recognized seniority as the most important consideration for promotion to the next rank. Kane also proposed a market-based economy system for use in the officer assignment process to give commanders more authority in the hiring process. To address this “next in-line” officer promotions and assignments model, he proposed the use of the Total Volunteer Force (TVF).¹⁰

In his follow-up book published in 2017, *Total Volunteer Force: Lessons from the US Military on Leadership Culture and Talent Management*, Kane stated that ending the draft in

1973 with the implementation of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) was a revolutionary success. While he contended that the AVF was a success, he also argued that military personnel volunteer only once during their service, and the highly centralized manpower system within the DoD controls the remainder of their career with little concern for personal preferences. Kane described the TVF concept as a series of evolutionary personnel reforms that restore authority over personnel decisions to service chiefs and local commanders.¹¹ Advocating for the replacement of the AVF with the TVF concept, Kane provided twenty distinct recommendations for the DoD to implement which he broadly categorized into: (1) assignments; (2) performance evaluations; and (3) compensation. Although half of the recommendations require changes to legislation, he contended that all the independent recommendations would increase military readiness if implemented by the military services. He surmised that these recommendations would result in elongated service tenure filled with higher levels of morale and productivity and would reduce the demand on recruiting.¹²

In his 2020 research on enlisted retention in the Marine Corps, Eric Reid identified that the existing manpower management process is “profoundly wasteful of human capital”¹³ and “incapable of providing the more skilled and experienced force required to meet 38th CPG and Force Design 2030 goals.”¹⁴ Throughout his research, he found similar results as Kane regarding the continuous application of an outdated policy that is no longer relevant to meet operational needs. In the case of enlisted retention, Reid found that the Enlisted Personnel Management Plan system established in 1985 by the DoD, combined with the service level Enlisted Grade Structure Review and Enlisted Career Force Control concepts developed during that time, continue to guide service manpower practices despite evidence contrary to the effectiveness of these practices. Several previous CMC efforts attempted to address the fallacies behind the

effectiveness of a “young and lean”¹⁵ enlisted force, but all have failed to change enlisted human capital management practices.

Lastly, the DoD underwent many changes to mirror the unfolding social environment within the United States during the past century, but the Marine Corps outwardly resisted force integration across diversity and inclusion lines of effort (race, sexual preference, and gender).¹⁶ The consistent resistance by the Marine Corps is important to point out because this is a common theme throughout its history regarding changes to manpower management practices. Due to the large scope of manpower management activities, this thesis will focus on its warfighting relevance, the unity of effort of its stakeholders, and its assessment capacity.

Manpower management is a critical element to warfighting but remains administrative in practice. *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1 Warfighting* identified manpower management as an essential element in the preparation for war.¹⁷ As the foundational document guiding all service efforts, Marine Corps leadership strenuously promotes the concepts presented in MCDP 1. This is not the case for manpower management because its constrictive practices inhibit Marines in developing the adaptive unpredictability necessary to employ the concepts outlined in its capstone warfighting philosophy.¹⁸

The Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA) is the three-star office of primary responsibility within Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) charged with the oversight of service-wide manpower management and orchestrates these activities through the HRDP.¹⁹ Published in January 2020, Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-30G

Marine Corps Manpower and Personnel Administration described this role:

The mission of the Human Resource Development Process is to provide commanders with qualified Marines, in the right place, at the right time, with the right skills, using a disciplined process. The DC M&RA also provides occupational field (OCCFLD) managers

for many military occupational specialties (MOSs) including administrators in the 01 OCCFLD and senior leaders for several civilian Marine communities of interest.²⁰

Working with commanders, senior leaders, and individual Marines, the 01 OCCFLD is responsible for executing the four functions of administration across all elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

In the 2013 article titled “The Seventh Warfighting Function,” Joel Hoffman made the cogent observation regarding the anomaly of the 01 OCCFLD in comparison to all other principal staff organizations, due to its lack of warfighting function representation and doctrinal publication association. Hoffman additionally highlighted the 01 OCCFLD’s long-standing lack of warfighting relevance during exercises and operations as confirmed by the MAGTF Staff Training Program.²¹ This lack of warfighting representation remains the primary reason that manpower management activities remain administrative in practice and unimportant to leaders at the tactical and operational levels of the Marine Corps.

As a component within the DoD, the Marine Corps is a “people-centric” warfighting organization in which its current and future success are the result of yesterday’s human capital structure, processes, and strategies.²² In light of these facts, manpower management is essential to warfighting, but its current state is insufficient to overcome the challenges facing the U.S. military. While the 01 OCCFLD is a primary stakeholder, manpower management is a cross-functional responsibility within the Marine Corps that requires a unified effort throughout the service.

A unity of effort is difficult to achieve because manpower management stakeholders have competing interests and there is no unifying strategy to harness these disparate actions to holistically develop the ability of each Marine. At the strategic level of the Marine Corps, DC M&RA is responsible for service-level manpower management activities, but the Commanding

Generals, Marine Corps Recruiting Command (CG MCRC) and Training and Education Command (CG TECOM), and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I) are other key HQMC organizations involved in HRDP execution. Appendix A provides two graphics to illustrate the complexity of HRDP activities.²³ These organizations coordinate with DC M&RA through the HRDP, but they also have other specific missions, disparate responsibilities, and multiple reporting chains. The current HQMC organizational structure is needlessly complicated and possesses no unifying principle, which makes unity of effort nearly impossible.²⁴

At the operational level of the Marine Corps, HQMC actions do not represent the interests of Fleet Marine Force commanders. A recent CNA Research Memorandum acknowledged the HRDP is the execution element of manpower management, focused on delivering services through transactional tasks. The study acknowledged that “integrating senior leaders into a cohesive team that collectively and equally represents interests across the organization plays a large role in organizational success and results in better decision making.”²⁵ For example, Jarod Perry’s research in *When Good Incentives Go Bad: A Case Study of Marine Corps HR Performance* found that Marine Corps commanders delegate the personnel administration functional responsibility to Installation Personnel Administration Centers (IPAC), but the motivation that drive IPACs are not associated with the operational readiness needed by commanders. Inspection results are what motivates IPAC performance, and this principal-agent problem is one of the weaknesses within the current state of manpower management.²⁶ Organizations below the operational level of the Marine Corps possess similar responsibilities, but there is typically less experience, corporate knowledge, and awareness of how the elements of manpower management relate.

The unity of effort among manpower management stakeholders decreases further at the tactical level. The O5 levels of command (battalion and squadron), are typically the beginning of life for manpower officers who serve as the organization's S-1 responsible for conducting the four functions of administration and advising the commander regarding the functional areas of responsibility. Since the breadth of S-1 responsibility is significant (see Appendix B), the young officer at the helm spends most resources tackling the myriad of administrative tasks, while the "command team"²⁷ and other special staff or higher headquarters personnel divide up the most important business of developing people. This habitual practice results in minimal unity of effort, reinforces the administrative nature of the 01 OCCFLD throughout the Marine Corps, and limits the development of each Marine.

Another challenge to the unity of effort is the lack of coordination by DC M&RA with the Manpower, Personnel, and Administration (MPA) community. Appendix C contains a generic framework of manpower management billets, organizations, and practices to define this community and chapter three of MCTP 3-30G provides a more detailed explanation. Matthew Halton, Christie Everett, and Shanelle Porter researched this endemic problem facing the institution, identified similar problem sets and provided potential solutions to close the manpower management stakeholder gap. The common theme of their combined research identified the lack of a professional bridge between DC M&RA's HRDP activities and the 01 OCCFLD in achieving unified strategic people objectives.²⁸ While the 01 OCCFLD is a subset within the MPA community, it is the logical nucleus for MPA community synchronization. The decoupled administrative tasks of current state manpower management do not produce operational performance or effectiveness assessment metrics.

Current state manpower management activities contribute minimally to operational effectiveness. Marine Corps unit readiness is dependent on the aggregate of investment in personnel, training, and equipment to ensure preparedness to perform required missions at any time. A unit's "personnel-level (P-level) is based on the unit's ability to provide deployable, military occupational specialty (MOS) qualified personnel and DoD civilians to accomplish its missions." The P-level calculation is based on the lower percentage of personnel strength or Critical MOS calculations.²⁹ This P-level readiness percentage gives no indication of the effectiveness of manpower management activities in relation to the ability of each Marine to function in the 21st century operating environment.

While the number of personnel that are deployable is important, this standard quantity measurement is insufficient to qualify whether the service is recruiting the right people, focusing its people on the right things, ensuring its people are doing things the right way, or if it is giving people the right development (4Rs).³⁰ The only other measurement activity at the tactical level for current state manpower management activities is through the Marine Corps Administrative Analysis Team (MCAAT) and Inspector General of the Marine Corps (IGMC) programs. As stated in a recently published article entitled "Practical Administration at the Battalion Level," Harrison Willeford succinctly summarized his perception of these programs in an organization:

In a Battalion S-1, the MCAAT and Functional Area Checklists can be considered the de facto T&R Standards. In practice, these checklists provide an S-1 shop's general administrative tasks. Administrators can train for the Commanding General's Inspection Program or MCAAT inspection in much the same way ground combat personnel would train for a live fire range.³¹

This is the standard perception for managing a S-1 at the tactical level in the current state manpower management environment, but the results of a MCAAT or IGMC inspection do not show any correlation of these administrative tasks to warfighting effectiveness.

Perry confirmed this premise by explaining that MCAAT measures of performance are simply the output of administration with little regard for its effect on the readiness of the force. Perry also identified that the Marine Corps possesses no doctrine governing the application of administration to the readiness of the force, nor does it have any measures of effectiveness.³² Current state manpower management is irrelevant to warfighting because it is administrative in practice, it lacks unity of effort through all levels within the Marine Corps, and it provides minimal performance or effectiveness assessments. The Marine Corps must close these gaps through a revolution from current state manpower management to SHR.

STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES: FUTURE STATE

In his book, *Common Sense Talent Management: Using SHR to Improve Company Performance*, renowned HR expert Steven Hunt provided in-depth guidance for corporations to understand, develop, and execute SHR to improve company performance. While the Marine Corps is not a civilian for-profit business organization, the development and effective employment of people is universal, regardless of the organization's assigned mission. Hunt described this relationship:

When used appropriately, HR processes improve both business performance and employee satisfaction. This benefits everyone: employees, managers, leaders, HR professionals, customers, and shareholders. Strategic HR processes can and should play a central role in building better workplaces and, through this creating a better world overall. But it is up to us to use these processes in a way that matters.³³

As described, SHR is the strategic dimension of the HR methodology used within an organization and is synonymous to talent management when used in a broad sense.³⁴ While the DoD acknowledges the need to change the way it manages talent, Marine Corps talent management efforts will be unsuccessful unless a foundation of HR practices are employed throughout the service.

Employment of SHR based on standard HR practices is the optimal solution for the Marine Corps to employ but requires a revolution from current state administrative manpower management activities. In her article, *Harnessing Military Talent to Compete in the 21st Century*, Emma Moore argued that the U.S. military requires an overhaul to its HR management processes, by addressing structural factors through sustained actions, rather than short-term test programs.³⁵ This enduring transformation is necessary to influence human behavior. The 4Rs previously introduced and defined in Appendix D, are based on the psychology of employee behavior that reflect basic methods for forecasting and adjusting people's behavior, which apply to any organization that employs people.³⁶ Through this revolution, the future state of Marine Corps SHR will be more relevant to warfighting, it will improve the unity of effort of its many stakeholders, and it will provide an assessment mechanism to align with service strategy.

The intent of SHR is to get an organization's workforce to execute the necessary activities to achieve its corporate objectives, otherwise known as business execution.³⁷ The business of the Marine Corps is warfighting, which requires Marines across the service to support its role as America's Naval Expeditionary Force in Readiness. All tactical and operational level activities within the Marine Corps should support this objective, but this is not the case for manpower management. In contrast to the civilian industry, the Marine Corps remains decades behind the evolution of HR to support business execution. To illustrate this concept, figure 1 describes the four generations of civilian HR to evolve throughout the previous 30 years. The Marine Corps remains stagnant in personnel administration yet is attempting to leap into the talent management generation. Each generation builds upon the previous, so wholesale leaps over a generation will not produce lasting success.




Figure 1: Generations of HR in Civilian Industry

Source: adapted from Steven Hunt, *Common Sense Talent Management: Using Strategic Human Resources to Improve Company Performance*, 30-31.

Analyzing the descriptions of each generation in Appendix E, the failure of the Marine Corps to keep pace is apparent. The Marine Corps does possess elements of each generation (e.g., computers, data, performance evaluations, a larger Marine Corps strategy), but it does not have a vision that connects these disparate elements. Fortunately, the Marine Corps can transition its current state administrative functions to build the necessary foundation of HR. Harnessing an HR community of professionals is essential to go beyond ensuring the readiness of Marines, as it will enable their improved effectiveness (i.e., talent management). While talent management is important, it is not the end state. SHR efforts will focus on 21st century warfighting execution.

Through SHR, the Marine Corps will benefit by: (1) creating alignment of goal management practices to warfighting efforts; (2) increasing productivity of every Marine through performance management processes; (3) improving efficiency through staffing management; (4) ensuring sustainability through workforce planning and succession management; (5) creating scalability through flexible and predictive analysis practices; and (6) complying with governance requirements through HR expertise.³⁸

To achieve synchronization between these business execution drivers, the integration of HR information systems (HRIS) is a critical requirement. HRIS is beyond the scope of this analysis, but in *Dynamic Talent Management Model: Establishing the Framework for the Exploitation of Artificial Intelligence in Strategic Human Resourcing*, Mabel Annunziata identified the significant HRIS challenges facing the Marine Corps and provided some practical solutions to enable improved data readiness.³⁹ Appendix F contains a summary of the HRIS problem facing the Marine Corps and a 360-degree profile proof of concept. Harnessing all business execution drivers in support of warfighting is one of the benefits of SHR but unifying the many stakeholders will provide significant value to the service.

SHR will synchronize force development, recruiting, training, education, operations, and readiness activities.⁴⁰ As depicted in Appendix C, there are numerous billets, organizations, and practices contributing to HR within the Marine Corps, some of which are functionally misaligned or redundant.⁴¹ Through the development of the HR Warfighting Function and associated doctrine that identifies responsibilities of these stakeholders, it will clearly define levels of HR, establish lines of effort, and realign those outlying functions. Figure 2 summarizes the desired future state of Marine Corps SHR.

Fundamental HR practices build people readiness, SHR Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) improve people effectiveness, and the HRDP orchestrates HQMC service-wide warfighter management efforts. This synchronization is no easy task because like the civilian industry, most Marine Corps leaders view HR as an administrative practice that is not impactful to operations.⁴² This long-standing false assumption requires a strategic vision for HR to unify its stakeholders and inform leaders about this significant departure from the status quo operating environment.




Figure 2: Summary of the Desired Future State of HR

The United States Army continues its transformation and credits the progress made due to its senior leader involvement by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army (who was a former Army G-1 well-versed in talent management).⁴³ Analyzing the Army’s Talent Management Task Force efforts, it is apparent that “people are the number one priority”⁴⁴ for the Army’s Chief of Staff and this message is being widely promulgated throughout the force. While not a one for one match because the Army has a robust and mature community of professionals, the Marine Corps should learn from its HR leadership and expertise development model. With a unity of effort achieved, SHR will also provide the necessary assessment mechanism to consistently optimize warfighting efforts.

The Marine Corps regularly employs the assessments process to ascertain the progress of operations in achieving the desired end state through measures of performance and effectiveness. Civilian industry professionals use KPIs similarly. KPIs are a set of measures concentrating on specific organizational performance areas most critical for the current and future success.⁴⁵ Through SHR and its associated strategic people vision, KPIs are instrumental in assessing the

effectiveness of the 4Rs at critical HRDP intersections and associated battle rhythm events (see Appendix G). Assessing the effectiveness of these KPIs in real time is necessary to drive design and planning efforts of an organization.⁴⁶

The Marine Corps typically does not have an issue attaining its recruiting mission, achieving mandated end strength constraints, nor meeting promotion requirements. The main HR challenge identified by the authors of *Personnel Reform Lives, but Don't Call it 'Force of the Future,'* is not in the quantity of service members, but the quality of their skills and talent to keep pace with the current and future operating environments.⁴⁷ The guidance established by the CMC through the Force Development Strategic Plan, CPG, or Force Design, is the desired end state for the strategic people vision. The HR community of professionals utilize business execution drivers to change employee behavior in support of the desired end state. Returning to the 4Rs of SHR, figure 3 illustrates one example of how “doing things the right way” using performance management KPIs can increase business execution.

KPIs support the unit's mission and align with larger Marine Corps strategy. As validated through a dedicated assessment mechanism, these KPIs are necessary for the organization to allocate its workforce resources (left side of figure) to employees exhibiting the desired behavior, which will reinforce this behavior. Conversely, the personnel who are not displaying the desired behavior, will either change their behavior or leave the organization. The desired output of the business execution drivers change based on the unfolding operational environment. The changing character of war informs the strategic people vision. HR stakeholders at all levels within the Marine Corps will synchronize these changes through the 4Rs of SHR.




Figure 3: The Performance Management Cycle

Source: adapted from Steven Hunt, *Common Sense Talent Management: Using Strategic Human Resources to Improve Company Performance*, 184.

This simple example encapsulates how a fundamental HR practice (performance evaluations) at the tactical or operational level of the Marine Corps supports the accomplishment of strategic objectives. Specific, measurable, and relevant KPIs are essential for this linkage but necessitates the change from current state manpower management to the future state of SHR. SHR will enable warfighting relevance, improve the unity of effort of its many stakeholders and provide a dedicated assessment mechanism to align with service strategy in real-time. A revolution will require a departure from the long-standing status quo methodology.

MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

There exists a debate about the necessity of a revolutionary approach to changing the current manpower management system, when maintaining the status quo evolutionary approach is sufficient. The Marine Corps is undergoing significant change to divest itself of existing legacy capabilities and excess capacity to support Force Design 2030 objectives. Even though the CMC stated the need for a reformation of its industrial-aged manpower management practices, there are valid arguments for the Marine Corps to maintain its evolutionary approach

to manpower modernization. This section will review three possible arguments for maintaining the status quo: (1) an incremental approach will minimize disruption to the Force Design 2030 plan of action and milestones; (2) current enlisted manpower management practices are sufficient because the Marine Corps desires high turnover to support its role as an economy force in comparison to the other DoD services; and (3) transactional leadership is appropriate to use in this economy of force model because it treats enlisted Marines as low skilled interchangeable resources that focus on task accomplishment.

Attempting a transformation from current state manpower management to the future state of SHR during Force Design 2030 will overburden the system. For example, the HRDP stakeholders will oversee the reduction of active component end strength by 12,000 Marines in the next seven years and a supporting establishment reduction of civilian personnel structure of approximately 15 percent as part of Force Design 2030. By implementing concurrent changes to the system responsible for conducting these actions could have detrimental effects to the long-term success of the initiative. Manpower management system stability is essential for achieving strategic objectives.

Seventy-two percent of the enlisted force within the Marine Corps (120,960/168,000) possesses less than four years of service and it annually retains only 25% of first term Marines (7,500/30,000), so there is no need to optimize their talent and creativity because they are essentially an interchangeable resource.⁴⁸ The recruit and replace model used by the Marine Corps remains successful in achieving its assigned mission as a force in readiness. One of the hallmarks of the Marine Corps is its promotion of a “young and lean”⁴⁹ enlisted force that boasts its ability to provide better value than the other services.

John Jackson argued this point in his 1994 article titled, “Better, Faster, Cheaper: The Effectiveness of the Marine Corps.” Jackson claimed that from 1945 through the 1980s, the Navy-Marine Corps team was the expeditionary warfare force of choice over 200 times because of its ability to rapidly transition a forward deployed MAGTF to any global crisis. Once in a crisis area, the Marine Corps was able to support a wider range of military conflict should the crisis escalate, with a smaller and more lethal footprint than the United States Army or Air Force. Jackson further articulated that the Marine Corps is a force of economy because it operates with approximately six percent of DoD’s budget and boasts a much less expensive E-1 to E-3 population (49%), when compared to the Army (26%) and Air Force (22%).⁵⁰

A transactional leadership style is more beneficial to the Marine Corps because it retains a small portion of enlisted Marines annually. This highly competitive enlisted retention environment necessitates individual task performance as the primary motivation for Marines to set themselves apart from one another in relation to their achievement.⁵¹ When combined with the accession training pipeline mantra for instant obedience to orders, this survival of the fittest mindset permeates being the best as the goal of first-term enlistments, which fits the overall message of the service. The Marine Corps is not the cure for every ill facing the United States, but when assigned to a mission, the Marines will get it done better, faster, and cheaper than the other services.⁵²

The most glaring problem in advocating to maintain the status quo is the current CMC’s outspoken message that the Marine Corps remains inadequately manned, trained, or equipped for the future operating environment, despite years of failed attempts by previous Commandants. Returning to the arguments of Art Corbett and Reid, the Marine Corps must overcome its longstanding evolutionary approach to legacy capabilities modernization. This is because of the

wide disparity between current state capabilities built for Middle East counter-insurgency operations and the future state of Indo-Pacific strategic competition with near-peer adversaries. Additionally, the U.S. military no longer possesses the unilateral military advantage in which its current force structure is based upon. With full operational capability by the year 2030, combined with the reduction of 12,000 active component Marines in the next seven years, and the lack of progress made under existing evolutionary approaches to manpower management modernization, the urgency of the Force Design 2030 plan of action necessitates a revolution from current state manpower management to a future state of SHR. This transition is not a simple process because deeply rooted cultural barriers continue to repel manpower management change initiatives.

BARRIERS TO REVOLUTION: PROBLEM SET

The problem set is a list of reasons that prevent the transition of the current state to the desired future state.⁵³ Illustrated in Appendix H, the question used to frame the problem set is, “Can the evolutionary approach to manpower management modernization develop Marines with the cognitive and physical attributes necessary to innovate, adapt, and succeed in the rapidly changing 21st century operational environment?” To answer this question, it is important to understand that organizational change is necessary for continuous improvement and to keep pace with the changing character of war. The years of strategic complacency among the military services require bold adjustments to the status quo business practices. In *Mastering Organizational Change Management*, Barbara Davis explained that the personal nature of change creates conflict in which both internal and external variables can create a double wall that becomes a solid barrier to implementing change.⁵⁴ Figure 4 illustrates the double wall dilemma organizational change initiatives face.




Figure 4: Barriers to Change

Source: Barbara Davis, *Mastering Organizational Change Management*, (Plantation, Florida: J. Ross Publishing, 2017), 19.

Based on the author's experience and observations, combined with the existing research on the topic, the most significant barriers to change within the Marine Corps is its organizational culture (internal) and its lack of a strategic people vision (external). A strategic people vision outlines why people are important for the organization's future success, it identifies what the organization needs from its people (individual and collective), it explains the plan of action for how it is going to achieve the strategy, and it identifies when (and how often) the strategy will be reevaluated.

Organizational culture eats strategy for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Rick Torben recognized that designing and aligning strategy, capabilities, and culture is necessary for organizational transformation.⁵⁵ Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerrass summarized the importance of military culture:

The sum collection of beliefs, values, attitudes, and learned behavior of a group of people. A military's culture provides the underlying foundations for decisions in strategy, planning, organization, training, and operations.⁵⁶

Analyzing the vast and complex organizational culture of the Marine Corps is beyond the scope of this analysis. This problem set analysis will use Edgar Schein's embedding mechanisms illustrated in figure 5 and focus on three aspects of Marine Corps culture: (1) how the Marine

Corps selects and promotes its senior leaders; (2) what these senior leaders pay attention to, measure and control; and (3) the deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching techniques utilized by the service (primary embed mechanisms). The existing manpower systems and processes (secondary reinforcement and stabilizing mechanism) cement a double wall that repels change to existing business practices.




Figure 5: Embedding Mechanisms

Source: Edgar Schein and Peter Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2016), 183.

The DoD and CMC are advocating for business transformation, but the way the service selects and promotes its senior leaders is a primary embedding mechanism (internal barrier) for its culture. A 2020 RAND research study made service-common observations about the tendency for senior officers to select officers on promotion boards whose career experiences are comparable to their own (ducks pick ducks) and that the existing personnel systems discourage risk-taking in career management choices and in professional performance.⁵⁷ The narrow make-up of risk averse Marine Corps general officers perpetuates the lack of diversity of thought, creativity, and change agency among the key decision maker cadre.

Leo Spaeder succinctly made this same point in 2019, by identifying that the hegemony of infantry officers and naval aviators in promotion and command assignments within the Marine Corps limits the pool of talent necessary to achieve CPG objectives.⁵⁸ When combined with a

manpower management methodology focused solely on the process instead of the effectiveness of the output, then the internal barrier to change remains solidified.⁵⁹

Brian Kerg made this correlation in “The Accidental Marine Corps Commander” by linking the difference in the commanders we ask for to the commanders we get as a result of the existing manpower system that requires obedience to the narrowly defined commander’s career path.⁶⁰ This homogeneous senior leader cadre will focus on unit training and equipment readiness (the things they know best based on career experiences), while giving little attention to people readiness and effectiveness (the things they are not well-versed in). Unless the service diversifies the senior leader cadre by selecting and promoting from across the other occupational fields (promoting HR officers in this case), then status quo manpower practices will continue indefinitely.

Another key embedding mechanism that repels change to the existing system is what these senior leaders pay attention to, measure and control – or in the case of people, do not pay attention to. In his article, “Manpower: The Billion Dollar Afterthought,” Stephen McNeil asserted the need to shift existing culture so that Marine leaders will recognize the true value and cost of every Marine within the organization. McNeil further argued that manpower is a secondary concern behind material readiness and tactical proficiency, with no sense of urgency to improve manpower posture. At the time of the article’s publication, the manpower cost for the Marine Corps in Fiscal Year 2016 consumed 61 percent of the entire budget, yet senior leaders gave little emphasis to it.⁶¹

CNA confirmed the lack of concern in *Developing a Strategic Talent Management Framework for the Marine Corps*, as it noted the Marine Corps is lacking in three areas: (1) there is no strategically focused consideration of talent “for what?”; (2) the Marine Corps has not

codified its strategic people objectives; and (3) there is no process for revisiting objectives or cultural tenets.⁶² The years of neglect are becoming more pronounced as the United States is taking drastic action to overcome the strategic competition gap with its near peer adversaries. Marine Corps senior leaders can no longer focus solely on training and equipment to win the day. The Marine Corps must prioritize people to maximize warfighting efforts in the 21st century operating environment.

Lastly, the revolving door of uniformed non-HR senior leaders serving in critical HRDP billets prevent service-level consistency and manpower subject matter expertise supporting initiatives spanning multiple senior leader cycles such as Force Design 2030. Matthew Halton's 2017 article, "The Amateur MOS," illustrated that manpower officer billets (0102 MOS) accounted for less than ten percent of the total chargeable officer billets within DC M&RA. In comparison with intel, aviation, and logistics HQMC agencies, the functionally aligned MOSs related to those OCCFLDs were 89%, 87.1%, and 67.9% respectively.⁶³ Since 1976, every general officer who served as DC M&RA originally commissioned from outside the HR OCCFLD.⁶⁴

Another key embedding mechanism that repels change is the standard leadership development model which focuses on transactional approaches and finite mindset activities. Effective warfighting requires obedience to orders, standard operating procedures, and the application of professional military education, training, and doctrine. While these variables are necessary to warfighting, the DoD's over reliance on these transactional tasks throughout the leader development model inhibits the adaptability of warfighters to operate in the 21st century operating environment.⁶⁵

In his Master of Military Studies thesis, *Transforming a Culture through Leadership*, Michael Martinet contrasted transactional leadership with transformational leadership practices and concisely illustrated the Marine Corps' preference in developing transactional leaders. Martinet surmised that the transactional leaders place the priority on mission or task accomplishment over the development of subordinates, while transformational leaders put the interests of their subordinates before their own and share risks, failures, and mission accomplishments with their followers.⁶⁶ This is essentially the difference between finite and infinite mindsets.

While winning battles used to be the mission for America's Naval Expeditionary Force in Readiness, preventing non-violent competition from escalating into conflict and enabling the success of the joint force should escalation occur is now the strategic aim point.⁶⁷ Infinite game mindsets focus on continuing to play the game and improving the long-term success of the organization in achieving its strategic vision. This infinite game mindset will enable the Marine Corps to build stronger teams and develop more innovative solutions through improved trust with its senior leaders.⁶⁸ In contrast, short-term task accomplishment efforts aim to "win," create silos of mistrust, and breed conflict between subcommunities that compete for relevance within the organization. These barriers will continue to thwart evolutionary manpower modernization efforts and will not develop the Marines with the cognitive and physical attributes necessary to innovate, adapt, and succeed in the rapidly changing 21st century operational environment.

LINES OF EFFORT: RECOMMENDATIONS

The below lines of effort (LOEs) provide recommendations for the Marine Corps to transition from the current state of manpower management to the desired future state of SHR. These five LOEs are essential in guiding and assessing the progress of the transition: (1) make people the priority; (2) professionalize the HR community; (3) diversify the senior leader

development model; (4) make transformational leadership the standard; and (5) embrace social sciences.

1. Make People the Priority: This is the single most important measure the Marine Corps must take to develop the Marines needed to effectively operate in the 21st century. The actions of the Marine Corps must match the rhetoric that “everything starts and ends with the individual Marine.”⁶⁹ The below recommended actions will support this LOE.

- a. Establish “people” as one of the warfighting functions. The Marine Corps values and prioritizes warfighting functions during planning, training, education, and operations. The elevation of people as one of the warfighting functions will increase the importance of developing people in the Marine Corps.
- b. Establish a strategic people vision and implement SHR. A strategic people vision outlines why people are important for the organization’s future success, it identifies what the organization needs from its people (individual and collective), it explains the plan of action for how it is going to achieve the strategy, and it identifies when (and how often) the strategy will be reevaluated.
- c. Implement a strategic communication plan that reinforces people as the priority and promotes SHR methodology benefits. This is important in shifting the mind-set of senior leaders and individual Marines away from the legacy administrative nature of manpower management activities.
- d. Develop training and equipment around the individual Marine. Human capital is the constant variable required for current or future strategic approaches to modernization in response to the changing character of war. Human capital must be the dominant consideration for how the United States secures its resources.⁷⁰
- e. Stop the recruit and replace enlisted manpower management model. As the overwhelming preponderance of the force (~90%), the Marine Corps must harness the creativity and talent of enlisted Marines to operate in the 21st century operating environment. In general, enlisted Marines achieve peak physical and cognitive performance after their first enlistment, thus retaining a larger portion of first term Marines is more beneficial for the Marine Corps.⁷¹

2. Professionalize the HR Community: The effective development of people necessitates a HR community of professionals to align the strategic people vision with the business execution

drivers in support of larger Marine Corps strategy. The below recommended actions will support this LOE.

- a. Transform the 01 OCCFLD into HR subject matter experts (SMEs). The need for HR expertise is essential at all echelons of command to enable unity of effort in supporting service strategy. There are a wide range of HR stakeholder impacts that require SME synchronization on behalf of the commander. Appendix I contains a proposal for “The Future 01.”
- b. Leverage these SMEs as the nucleus for leading all HR community efforts. At the tactical and operational levels of the Marine Corps, fundamental HR practices enable individual and unit readiness. This readiness is essential in supporting the 4Rs of SHR with business execution drivers (alignment, productivity, efficiency, sustainability, scalability, and governance).
- c. Create a professional bridge between DC M&RA and the HR community. Senior leader sponsorship gives credibility to a community and enables service-level attention to resolve resource shortfalls. There are numerous opportunities for the HR community to influence service-wide strategy but require general officer support to assist with implementation.
- d. Change academic prerequisites for 0102 PMOS to enable it as a necessary MOS for the 8840 MOS (Manpower Management Officer). There are (24) 8840 MOS active component billets that require an advanced degree from Naval Postgraduate School and are located at critical junctures within the HRDP. This MOS Manual change will enable the development of 01 OCCFLD HR SMEs.
- e. Change specific 8006/8014 MOS billets across the HRDP to 01 OCCFLD requirements. Without exposure to the HRDP throughout a career, it is difficult to develop HR SMEs. Through a more detailed analysis, the strategic realignment of these generic any officer/enlisted Marine billets (serving in an HR related capacity) to 01 OCCFLD requirements will build a pool of HR SMEs throughout the force.

3. Diversify the Senior Leader Development Model: The current senior leader development model requires strict adherence to achieve specific leadership positions and penalizes any deviation by not selecting those Marines for promotion or assignment because of non-traditional career paths. The current system also discourages risk taking and diversity of thought. The below recommended actions will support this LOE.

- a. Allow Marines the option to follow technical, leadership, or hybrid career paths without penalty. There is a false dichotomy that Marines can only be one.⁷² The more diverse the educational background and experience Marines possess, the more inclusive and open-minded they are as senior leaders. The 21st century operating environment requires maximum creativity from its warfighters.
- b. Train and educate Marines throughout their careers about the priority of people in warfighting. People are more important than training and equipment.
- c. Periodically adjust assignments, awards, and performance evaluation policies to keep pace with the unfolding social environment. The changing character of war requires innovation and adaptation by the military to keep pace. Based on the new behaviors required to meet future warfighting requirements, the service must adjust how it influences the behavior of its Marines. This also applies to transformational leadership (LOE 4) and soft skill competence (LOE 5).
- d. Reinforce and reward constructive risk-taking behavior. The zero-defect mentality in making mistakes is detrimental to building senior leaders who are comfortable with taking calculated risks. Senior leaders want Marines to take necessary risks, but never provide opportunities for them to build this skill throughout their development.
- e. Promote Marines from all occupations to the general officer ranks. No one OCCFLD has the market cornered on leadership. While some OCCFLDs have more leadership opportunities (statistically), this does not equate to better senior leaders.

4. Make Transformational Leadership the Standard: The transactional leadership approach to warfighting is no longer effective in developing Marines for the 21st century operating environment. Based on the increased need for creativity, resilience, and intellectualism, combined with the constantly changing social dynamics of civilian personnel entering the service, requires a more individualized approach to leadership. The below recommended actions will support this LOE.

- a. Adjust the leadership traits and principles to reflect this change. These traits and principles become second nature and are influential in the development of Marines.
- b. Embed transformational leadership concepts during all training and education career milestones. Transformational leadership learning objectives will provide

sufficient repetitions for senior leaders to be comfortable employing within their organizations.

- c. Include subordinate evaluations on reporting seniors and reviewing officers to identify blind spots of senior leaders. Allow constructive criticism language in performance evaluations and recommendations for future assignments.
- d. Evaluate senior leaders through unbiased third-party institutions when screening for command and senior enlisted leader billets. These key leader billets are influential on the lives of many Marines, which require scrutiny of the potential candidates before assignment.

5. Embrace Social Sciences: While there are a large number of collateral duty assignments (e.g. SAPR VAs, COSC officers, SPPOs, EORs, FFIs) with a small amount of dedicated experts (e.g. FROs, MFLCs, SARCs, EOAs, Chaplains) serving in the Marine Corps in a semi-related social science capacity, there is a need for increased social science awareness. Interpersonal communication and conflict resolution, listening, emotional intelligence, organizational change, creativity, motivation theory, and psychology are a few areas that the Marine Corps struggles to employ effectively. Competence in these soft skills are just as important (if not more important) as hard skills. The below recommended actions will support this LOE.

- a. Conduct an independent review of the existing state of soft skill development within the Marine Corps.
- b. Based on the findings, adjust the collateral duty assignments and dedicated expertise to re-allocate existing needs. Add new positions or remove unnecessary positions to achieve the optimal balance for meeting the needs of Marines and their families.
- c. Train and educate Marines throughout their careers to build soft skill competence. Like the zero-defect mentality of making mistakes, soft skill development does not get many repetitions because these skills are a vulnerability kept mostly hidden by Marine Corps leaders. This lack of emotional connection within the service inhibits trusting relationships and can cause lasting barriers for individual Marines.

CONCLUSION

The longstanding manpower management methodology employed by the Marine Corps is insufficient to develop Marines to operate most effectively in the 21st century environment. Years of strategic complacency within the DoD resulted in the fall from its preeminent position as the global warfighting domain rules setter. To overcome this growing disparity, the DoD strategy shifted to strategic competition with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region. The 2017 NSS, the 2018 NDS, and the 38th CPG, all stated the need for significant changes to DoD business practices and identified the need to better harness the ability of its people. The mission of the Marine Corps is now the prevention of non-violent competition from escalating into conflict and enabling the success of the joint force should escalation occur. Through the Force Design 2030 initiative, the CMC is attempting to man, train, and equip the Marine Corps to meet the 21st century operating environment. The CMC identified that incremental change to legacy capabilities as insufficient, thus the Marine Corps must pursue transformational changes and he identified manpower management as needing overhaul.

Much of the research published during the past 20 years illustrated specific deficiencies within the current manpower management system, but none have advocated for a complete overhaul. This thesis finds that the evolutionary approach to manpower management modernization efforts will not achieve Force Design 2030 objectives and beyond. This is because the quantity of personnel was the primary goal of the system for the past century. Additionally, a revolutionary approach for transformation is necessary to overcome the deeply entrenched cultural barriers which consistently repelled previous manpower management reform efforts. Isolated short-term initiatives such as talent management will fail to achieve long-term success unless a foundation of professional HR practices are employed at the tactical and operational levels of the Marine Corps. The long-standing issues facing the Marine Corps require a systemic

solution guided by a strategic people vision that unifies the HR community of stakeholders, is relevant to warfighting, and provides operationally relevant assessment metrics aligned to larger Marine Corps strategy.

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²⁹ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 3000.1B Marine Corps Readiness Reporting*, (Washington DC, July 14, 2020), <https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCO%203000.13B.pdf?ver=2020-07-15-110758-503>.

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³¹ Harrison Willeford, "Practical Administration at the Battalion Level," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, Virginia, December 2020, 67.

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APPENDIX A




Figure 6: Summary of the Human Resource Development Process

Source: Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 5250.1 Human Resource Development Process (HRDP)*, 2-4,

<https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCO%205250.1.pdf?ver=jVieWbJtYE2v0IKt6pplYQ%3d%3d>.




Figure 7: HRDP Cycle

Source: Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 5250.1 Human Resource Development Process (HRDP)*, 2-6,

<https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCO%205250.1.pdf?ver=jVieWbJtYE2v0IKt6pplYQ%3d%3d>.

APPENDIX B

0102 Second Lieutenant The unit “expert” the day after graduation for:	
- Marine Corps Forms Management Program	- Exceptional Family Member Program
- Marine Corps Records Management Program	- Classified Material Control Center
- Unit Staffing	- Marine Corps Sponsorship Program
- Performance Evaluation System	- Public Affairs
- Government Travel Charge Card Program	- General Administration
- Privacy Act	- Voter Registration Program
- Promotions	- Marine Corps Publications Management
- Personnel Administration	- Military Awards
- Defense Travel System	- Marine Corps Total Force System
- Legal Administration	- Victim and Witness Assistance Program
- Postal Affairs	- Casualty Affairs
- Separation and Retirement	- Limited Duty Program
- Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program	

Figure 8: Estimate of a Manpower Officers Responsibility at a Battalion S-1 (2017)

Source: Matthew Halton, “The Amateur MOS: A Collection of Action Officer Ramblings on How to Recover an MOS Neglected by the Institution,” Marine Corp Gazette, (Quantico, Virginia, March 2017), 67.

Understanding an S-1’s Functions The Functional Area Checklists can be found online at the Inspector General’s webpage. Not all checklists on the website are applicable to every unit; the executive officer or S-1 officer should verify applicable functional area checklists with their Inspector General at least annually. Once applicable functional areas are determined, a well-organized battalion will deliberately assign responsibility for each functional area among its commodities. While specific assignments vary by unit, these functional areas are commonly assigned to the S-1:	1050: General Administration 1400: Promotions 1560: Lifelong Learning 1610: Performance Evaluation 1650: Military Awards 1742: Voter Assistance 1900.1: Separations & Retirement 3040: Casualty Affairs 4600: Government Travel Charge Cards 4650: Defense Travel System 5110: Postal Affairs 5211: Privacy Act 5210: Records Management 5600: Publications Management 5800.14: Victim & Witness Assistance 5800.16: Legal
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Figure 9: Estimate of a Manpower Officers Responsibility at a Battalion S-1 (2020)

Source: Harrison Willeford, “Practical Administration at the Battalion Level,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, Virginia, December 2020), 67.

APPENDIX C

DC CD&I	CG MCRC	CG TECOM
• Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) • Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD) • Total Force Structure Process (TFSP) ○ Total Force Structure Division ○ Authorized Strength Report ○ Occupational Field Managers & MOS Specialists	• Headquarters, MCRC • Recruiting Districts • Recruiting Stations • Recruiting Sub-Stations • Recruiting Regions	• Formal Schools & PME • Human Performance Division • Mission Essential Tasks, Training & Readiness Manuals • MOS Manual • Recruit & Service-Level Training
DC M&RA	OTHER	
• Human Resource Development Process (HRDP) • DC Action Group ○ Financial Management (MB) ○ Manpower Strategy (MX) ○ Secretariat • Civilian Workforce Management • Marine and Family Programs (MF) ○ Career planning ○ Casualty affairs ○ Combat & Operational Stress Control (COSC) ○ Command Individual Risk & Resiliency Assessment System (CIRRAS) ○ Community counseling ○ Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) ○ Family advocacy ○ Family readiness ○ Postal affairs ○ Sexual Assault Prevention & Response (SAPR) ○ Sponsorship ○ Substance abuse ○ Single Marine program ○ Suicide prevention program ○ Transition readiness ○ Voluntary education • Manpower Management (MM) ○ Promotions (MMPR) ○ Awards (MMA) ○ Integration (MMIB) ○ Separations & Retirements (MMSR) ○ Records & Performance (MMRP) • Manpower Policy (MP) ○ Manpower Plans & Policy (MPP) ○ Equal Opportunity & Diversity (MPE) • Manpower Information Systems (MI) • Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) • Reserve Affairs (RA) • Wounded Warrior Regiment (WWR)	• Administration & Resource Management • Defense Travel System • Director of Safety • Directorate of Analytics & Performance Optimization • G-10 Force Preservation Directorate • Government Travel Charge Card • Health Services • Religious Ministries • Request Mast • Service Voting Officer • Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) • Talent Management Task Force • Unit Readiness • Unit Training Management	

Table 1: Manpower Management HQMC Stakeholders – Current State**

Commanding Officer	Marine and Family Life Counselor (MFLC)*
Executive Officer	Force Fitness Instructor (FFI)*
Senior Enlisted Leader	Career Retention Specialist (CRS)*
Chaplain*	Substance Abuse Control Officer (SACO)*
Family Readiness Officer*	Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC)*
Single Marine Program (SMP) Representative	Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocate (SAPR VA)
Medical Officer*	Suicide Prevention Program Officer (SPPPO)
S-1 Officer	Limited Duty Coordinator*
S-1 Chief	Equal Opportunity Advisor/Representative (EOA/R)*
Chain of Command	Safety Representative
- OIC	Legal Officer*
- SNCOIC	Sponsorship Coordinator
- Mentor	Financial Management Representative
- Sponsor	Education Officer
	Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) Officer
	Operations, Training and Readiness Representatives
	NCOs, SNCOs, and Officers
	Installation Personnel Administration Center (IPAC)*

*Services may reside external to the organization; ** Stakeholders defined as billets, organizations, and practices.

Table 2: Manpower Management Unit Stakeholders – Current State**

APPENDIX D

1. <u>Hire the <i>right</i> people.</u> Staff positions with employees whose personal attributes match the competencies and goals associated with their jobs. This is the primary focus of recruiting, workforce planning, and certain aspects of succession management and compensation.
2. <u>Focus employees on the <i>right things</i>.</u> Clearly identify and communicate the goals you want employees to achieve, and measure and reward employees against these goals. This is the focus of goal management, goal-based compensation, and variable pay.
3. <u>Make sure people are doing their job the <i>right way</i>.</u> Define the competencies employees must display to achieve their job goals or support the desired company culture and provide feedback and other resources that encourage them to demonstrate these competencies. This is the primary focus of performance management and merit-based compensation.
4. <u>Provide job experiences and resources that drive the <i>right development</i>.</u> Create a work environment that helps employees develop the attributes that influence competency performance and goal accomplishment. Put people in jobs, assign them goals, and provide them with training and learning resources that build their capabilities to more effectively perform their current role and progress into future job roles. This is the primary focus of career development and certain aspects of succession management.

Table 3: 4Rs of Strategic HR in Civilian Industry

Source: adapted from Steven Hunt, *Common Sense Talent Management: Using Strategic Human Resources to Improve Company Performance*, (San Francisco, California: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 18-19.




Figure 10: How Fundamental Strategic HR Processes Influence Components of Job Performance and Examples of HR Methods Associated with Each Process

Source: Steven Hunt, *Common Sense Talent Management: Using Strategic Human Resources to Improve Company Performance*, (San Francisco, California: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 18.

APPENDIX E

• <u>Pre-1990: Generation "personnel administration."</u> Prior to 1990, many HR organizations were almost entirely focused on personnel administration. This was due in part to the sheer amount of time required to manually administer HR processes before the wide-spread use of computers. Prior to 1990, many HR organizations were not even called "human resources." Instead, they had titles such as Office of Personnel Administration or Personnel Department. The main focus of HR in this generation was how to process employee paperwork efficiently.
• <u>1990 to 2000: Generation "human resources."</u> Two things happened in the 1990s that led to personnel management being redefined as "human resources." First, implementation of HR process automation technology significantly reduced the time needed to perform administrative HR tasks, which freed up HR organizations to focus more on topics related to strategic HR. This led to significant advances in the expertise found within HR related to predicting and changing employee behavior. Many of the talent management techniques that are now widely used were largely developed in the 1990s (e.g., competency models, structured interviews, goal setting). Second, the widespread adoption of personal computers made it possible for HR organizations to use more sophisticated techniques to support key talent decisions related to hiring, promotions, and pay (e.g., using computer-based tools to evaluate employee performance and assess job candidates). Throughout the 1990s, the focus of HR shifted beyond simple personnel management to include processes designed to improve the quality of workforce decisions (e.g., selecting high performing employees, proactively managing employee turnover, and using job goals to drive employee development).
• <u>2001 to 2010: Generation "talent management."</u> Widespread adoption of Internet systems in the 2000s allowed HR organization to share data across what had previously been independent HR processes for example, automatically importing data collected during the hiring process into systems used to support ongoing employee development. Greater access to data enabled HR to shift from focusing on specific employee decisions to creating more integrated methods to increase workforce productivity. No longer was HR limited to being a series of isolated silos focusing on staffing, training, compensation, and succession. Now HR could function as a set of integrated processes designed to ensure a steady supply of high performing talent in critical job roles.
• <u>2011-. Generation "business execution."</u> As companies adopt more efficient and easy-to-use computing applications, HR organizations are spending less time administering HR processes and more time figuring out how to use these processes to increase workforce productivity. HR is focusing less on simply keeping track of who employees are and more on ensuring that these employees are being used effectively to support the company's short- and long-term business strategies.

Table 4: Descriptions of the Four Generations of Civilian Industry HR

Source: adapted from Steven Hunt, *Common Sense Talent Management: Using Strategic Human Resources to Improve Company Performance*, (San Francisco, California: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 30-31.

APPENDIX F




Figure 11: DC M&RA HRIS

Source: Mabel Annunziata, *Dynamic Talent Management Model: Establishing the Framework for the Exploitation of Artificial Intelligence in Strategic Human Resourcing* (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, School of Advanced Warfighting, 2019), 22.




Figure 12: 360 Degree Proof of Concept - Individual View

Source: Mabel Annunziata, *Dynamic Talent Management Model: Establishing the Framework for the Exploitation of Artificial Intelligence in Strategic Human Resourcing* (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, School of Advanced Warfighting, 2019), 24.

APPENDIX G




Figure 13: Manpower Management Annual Battle Rhythm

Source: Manpower Management Integration Branch, *Manpower Staffing Leveling Brief Executive Overview, Occupational Field Sponsor and MOS Specialists Symposium*, PowerPoint presentation, (Quantico, Virginia, December 2019), 20.

APPENDIX H

Can the evolutionary approach to manpower management modernization develop the Marines with the cognitive and physical attributes necessary to innovate, adapt, and succeed in the rapidly changing 21st century operational environment?

Current State: Manpower Management (MM)

- Pivot to Indo-Pacific region & strategic competition
- Years of strategic complacency reduced U.S. military warfighting domain dominance
- Marine Corps is not manned, trained or equipped for 21st century op environment
- Ongoing Force Design 2030 efforts
- MM is administrative in nature, no unity of effort, lack of warfighting relevance, & no relevant assessment metrics
- No strategic people vision – talent for what?
- MM unimportant to warfighting & is the costliest resource in budget
- Changing social dynamics (race, gender, sexual preference, social media)
- Deeply rooted cultural barriers to change
- Rapidly changing technology & proliferation
- Homogenous & risk averse senior leaders
- Inflexible senior leader development model
- Transactional leadership focus
- Enlisted Marines are interchangeable – industrial economy
- Flat budget

Make People the Priority

Professionalize HR Community

Diversify Senior Leader Development Model

Make Transformational Leadership the Standard

Embrace Social Sciences

Desired State: Strategic Human Resources (SHR)

- Naval force in readiness, Littoral Operations in Contested Environments (LOCE), Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations (EABO)
- Persistent & decentralized operations in Weapons Engagement Zones (WEZ)
- Force Design complete by 2030
- Increased range & lethality of precision munitions
- Joint force integration & naval interoperability
- Increased emphasis on operations in information environment (OIE)
- 12,000 reduction in active component end strength
- SHR is operational in nature, provides unity of effort, warfighting relevant, & provides relevant assessment metrics
- Marines displaying cognitive & physical attributes to innovate, adapt, & succeed in 21st century ops
- Enlisted Marines are highly skilled – knowledge-based economy
- Diversity of thought, change agency, and disruptive thinking by senior leaders
- HR community of professionals
- Transformational leadership focus

Figure 14: Framework to Counter Problem Set

APPENDIX I





Figure 15: The Future 01

Source: Nicole Bohannon, *The Future 01*, (Personnel Administration School, Camp Johnson, North Carolina, January 27, 2021), PowerPoint Presentation.

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