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Michael D. Robinson (Major)

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If the Marine Corps wants to support service-wide naval integration initiatives through AC/RC integration, maximize resources, minimize risk, eliminate waste, and become a single, integrated total force with greater efficiency when mobilizing, SMCR units need to maximize limited training time by abandoning the monthly training model, synchronize training and operations with active component commands, and Training Allowances (T/A) need to be divested from Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) and consolidated at installations.

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United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

RESERVE FORCE DESIGN 2030

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Major Michael D. Robinson

AY 2020-21

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Bradford A. Wineman Ph.D.
Approved: _____
Date: 27 APR 21

Oral Defense Committee Member: Nathan Packard Ph.D.
Approved: _____
Date: 29 Apr 2021

United States Marine Corps
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Executive Summary

Title: Reserve Force Design 2030

Author: Major Michael D. Robinson, United States Marine Corps Reserve

Thesis: If the Marine Corps wants to support service-wide naval integration initiatives through AC/RC integration, maximize resources, minimize risk, eliminate waste, and become a single, integrated total force with greater efficiency when mobilizing, SMCR units need to maximize limited training time by abandoning the monthly training model, synchronize training and operations with active component commands, and Training Allowances (T/A) need to be divested from Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) and consolidated at installations.

Discussion: Force Design guidance for the Reserve Component was limited; therefore, few changes for the reserve component (RC) have been directed as of the date of this paper. Both the *Commandant's Planning Guidance* and *Force Design 2030* calls for examination of a single, fully integrated total force, but does not expound on this future integrated force any further. Therefore, without additional reserve-specific guidance, it is assumed that results of a reserve component review should render greater AC-RC integration, support service-wide naval integration initiatives, maximize resources, eliminate waste, and support efficiency when mobilizing. There have been numerous recommendations to create a single, more integrated total force. Several academic papers, published both before and after the release of the aforementioned guidance, advocate that active component (AC) operational control of Select Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units would yield increased readiness, reduced risk, and improved efficiency. Simply transferring operational control of the reserve to Commanding General, I and II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), may resemble a single, more integrated total force, but does not improve readiness, mitigate risk, maximize resources, nor reduce waste. If the Commandant's Guidance is to create a single, integrated total force capable of supporting naval expeditionary concepts and initiatives, a transfer alone does not mitigate the various challenges that reserve units endure. By adopting a quarterly training schedule, in which personnel are transported to equipment and training areas, RC units establish habitual relationships with AC units, supply and maintenance responsibilities at Headquarters Training Centers (HTC) would be reduced, and the service would have increased attentiveness to the administrative, medical, and logistical responsibilities associated with mobilizing, transporting, and integrating reserves with the active component.

Conclusion: The *Commandant's Planning Guidance* explicitly stated his expectation that "just as our active component will change, so will our reserve component." Though a revolutionary, radical departure from the existing reserve model, the changes recommended in this paper would significantly reduce cost and risk, and render an integrated total force capable of supporting naval expeditionary concepts like Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment or Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

To most of our active comrades, the reserve is mysterious, puzzling, or secretive. I have served within each category of the Ready Reserve over the last 21 years, and developed a personal affinity for reducing reserve challenges and helping active component members to understand and appreciate the sacrifices, yet tremendous satisfaction of remaining reserve. I hope this paper will contribute to those efforts.

I would like to thank Doctor Bradford A. Wineman for his patience, guidance, and feedback throughout the development of this paper. I also need to thank all the Marines, active and reserve, who have inspired me to be an advocate for the reserve, an ambassador for change, and whose shared enthusiasm for reserve integration helped form my ideas. Most importantly, I want to thank my wife who has always encouraged and supported me. Semper Fidelis!

Introduction:

Former Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), General Robert B. Neller, identified significant threats, shortcomings, and that the Marine Corps is not prepared to execute emerging operational naval concepts. Current Commandant, General David H. Berger, has increased momentum toward a historic reformation so the Marine Corps is prepared to serve "as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness," able to conduct concepts like Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).[1] One example of the tasks that General Berger specified, in support of service development toward LOCE and EABO, was to assess capabilities and organizations for possible divestures or reductions so that resources may be invested elsewhere.[2] It should be assumed that this guidance is generally applicable to the total force. Force Design guidance for the active component (AC) was aggressive, yet specific, and so implementation is well underway. Conversely, Force Design guidance for the Reserve Component was limited; therefore, few changes for the reserve component (RC) have been directed as of the date of this paper. The *Commandant's Planning Guidance* explicitly stated his expectation that "just as our active component will change, so will our reserve component," and that reserve units and individuals must be "ready to mobilize."[3] Both the *Commandant's Planning Guidance* and *Force Design 2030* call for examination of a single, fully integrated total force. Each of these documents do not expound on this future integrated force any further.[4] Therefore, without additional reserve-specific guidance, it is assumed that results of a reserve component review should render greater AC-RC integration, support service-wide naval integration initiatives, maximize resources, eliminate waste, and support efficiency when mobilizing.

There have been numerous recommendations to create a single, more integrated total force. Several academic papers, published both before and after the release of the aforementioned guidance, advocate that AC operational control of Select Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units would yield increased readiness, reduced risk, and improved efficiency. While transferring control of the reserve could improve efficiencies when mobilizing reservists, these proposals still render semi-independent, active and reserve components, which does not adequately meet the assumed *Force Design 2030* guidance. The proposals overlook particular reserve challenges pertaining to time, geographic dispersion, and logistics, which would persist and are not mitigated unless increasingly drastic changes to training and operations are considered. Simply transferring operational control of the reserve to Commanding General, I and II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), may resemble a single, more integrated total force, but does not improve readiness, mitigate risk, maximize resources, nor reduce waste. A change to operational authority alone only transfers responsibilities and risk to a different commander. If the Marine Corps wants maximize resources, minimize risk, eliminate waste, and become a single, integrated total force prepared to support service-wide naval integration initiatives with greater efficiency when mobilizing, SMCR units need to maximize limited training time by abandoning the monthly training model, synchronize training and operations with active component commands, and Training Allowances (T/A) need to be divested from Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) and consolidated at installations. Reserve Headquarters Training Centers (HTC) would relinquish supply and maintenance responsibilities for increased attentiveness to the administrative, medical, and logistical responsibilities associated with mobilizing, transporting, and integrating reserve personnel with active component commands by

adopting a quarterly training schedule that transports personnel to the equipment and training areas.

I. Background

The reserve component consists of three main categories, depicted in Figure 1, Categories of the Marine Corps Reserve; the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.[5] The analysis, discussion, and recommendations in this paper will be exclusively focused on the Ready Reserve, and will not pertain to the Standby Reserve nor the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve is further divided into two subcategories; the Selected Reserve (SelRes) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR is a collection of servicemembers whom have completed their military service obligation (MSO) and remain in the IRR by default, have completed their MSO and have volunteered to remain in the Ready Reserve, or have not completed their MSO but were authorized by Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) to transfer to the IRR.[6] At any given time, the IRR can fluctuate between 60,000-70,000 reservists.[7]

Marine Corps Reserve								
Ready Reserve				Standby Reserve		Retired Reserve		
Selected Reserve (SelRes)			Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)	Active Standby List	Inactive Standby List	Active Duty Retirees	Fleet Marine Corps Reserve	Non-Regular Retirees
Selected Marine Corps Reserve	Individual Mobilization Augmentees	Active Reserve						

Figure 1. Categories of the Marine Corps Reserve[8]

The SelRes contains four sub-categories; the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR), Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), the Active Reserve (AR), and personnel in the entry level training pipeline held in the Initial Active Duty Training (IADT) sub-category. Each of these sub-categories supports a specific need for the total force. The lesser-known categories are the IMA, AR, and IADT. IMA elements, or IMA detachments, consist of reserve personnel structure assigned to AC to facilitate rapid expansion, and can be accessed prior to a mobilization

of the IRR.[9] These reservists train with their assigned AC organization, and may be looked upon for staff augmentation, both of which are coordinated on an individual basis. The Active Reserve (AR) members are a cadre of reservists in a career program on active duty orders whom facilitate the integration of the RC within the Total Force.[10] More than 2,200 AR Marines assist in RC administration, organization, training, retention, recruiting, and instruction, and are assigned to positions throughout MARFORRES, headquarters staffs, and support organizations to mitigate potential friction during integration.[11]

The SMCR is the largest part of the SelRes, and is most commonly associated with the titles, "reserve" or "reservist." The SMCR is comprised of subordinate units under four Major Subordinate Commands (MSC); the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Logistics Group, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and Force Headquarters Group.[12] The mission of MARFORRES is "to augment, reinforce, and sustain the AC with trained units and qualified individuals."[13] MARFORRES is distributed amongst 160 geographically dispersed sites within 47 states, including Alaska, Hawaii, Washington DC, and Puerto Rico.[14]

SMCR units assemble for training at Headquarters Training Centers during scheduled drill periods for Inactive Duty Training (IDT), which are typically accomplished during one weekend per month. An IDT shall be no less than a four-hour period, and an individual may complete no more than two IDT's in one calendar day. Each two-day drill weekend will equate to four IDT's, so SMCR Marines are authorized 48 IDT's, or 24 training days annually.[15] Additionally, SMCR Marines must conduct a two-week Active Duty (AD) period, commonly referred to as Annual Training (AT).[16] Altogether, the active and inactive duty training for an SMCR member each year will total 38 workdays. Effective use of time is a significant priority for SMCR units due to limited training days. Time constraints are of the many challenges

underscoring the necessity for adequate support and maximum efficiency; hence, the focus group for this paper will be the SMCR and the support thereof.

SMCR unit support does not rest solely upon the Active Reserve. The full-time support system within MARFORRES consists of about 6,000 members; two-thirds are AD and one-third are AR positions.[17] Full-time support members serve as either Site Support Staff or integrated billets. Site Support personnel or Inspector-Instructors (I-I) are responsible for all day-to-day unit functions, supervision, inspections, instruction, and training assistance for their designated SMCR unit(s).[18] The Tables of Organization (T/O) for a site contain the FTS personnel structure necessary to manage the garrison functions as well as the SMCR personnel structure assigned to the respective operational unit. Occasionally, FTS Marines will be identified as "integrated" on the T/O. Integrated can be defined as the AC or AR member is deployable along with the SMCR unit. Integrated staff positions are commonly critical staff, including operations, training, or maintenance chief positions. Those staff members assigned to the Site Support T/O, and not labeled as "integrated," will typically remain in garrison during unit mobilizations.[19] Particular I-I leadership positions, such as the Battalion I-I (O-5) and Battalion I-I Sergeant Major (E-9), are assigned to personnel of the same paygrade as the SMCR command team. These senior members, and the integrated personnel, provide continuity and mentorship, and assist in the Command and Control of subordinate units.[20] According to a RAND Corporation study in 2007 examining reserve integration, the FTS system of MARFORRES produces "the backbone" to managing SMCR units, enables successful training coordination, and is the primary reason for fewer challenges compared to the other services.[21] The FTS or I-I staffs do not only provide training support and manage site responsibilities. These individuals are paramount to the MARFORRES mission of integrating RC personnel into AC commands.

There are countless examples throughout Marine Corps history exhibiting the active and reserve components functioning as a single, integrated force. The most identifiable occasions were during large-scale reserve mobilizations for the Korean War (1950-1953), for Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield (1990-1991), and the mobilizations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom that occurred from 2001-2003. At the conclusion of World War II in August 1945, the end strength of the Marine Corps was about 485,000.[22] By June 1946, Marine Corps end strength had been reduced to about 155,000 personnel.[23] Once conflict erupted on the Korean peninsula in June 1950, the Marine Corps leadership quickly determined that reserve augmentation would be required. The first mass mobilization of more than 33,000 reservists brought the 1st Marine Division to full strength, and by the end of the Korean War, more than 130,000 reserve Marines had been activated to reinforce the active component.[24] After the Inchon landing, Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding General of Marine Forces Pacific, stated that, had it not been for reserve augmentation bringing the 1st Marine Division to full strength, he never would have been able to carry out an operation that represented the "lasting glory and prestige of the U.S. Marine Corps…"[25]

Following the Korean War, the next significant AC-RC integration event was the mass mobilizations in late 1990 and early 1991 for Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield (ODS). The President authorized reserve mobilizations between August 1990 and February 1991, which he deemed "essential to completing [the] mission." SMCR Marines augmented both I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), and 15% of the all Marines in the Persian Gulf theater were reservists.[26] The Marine Corps mobilized 63% of the SMCR for the operation, proportionately more than any other service.[27] During Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, over 24,000 reserve Marines reinforced the AC, creating a single, fully integrated force.[28]

A final historical example of the active and reserve components acting as a single, integrated force occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unit mobilizations averaged just five days, arriving to gaining force commands on time with 99% of SMCR Marines reporting for duty, and 98% of Marines medically fit to deploy.[29] Over 21,000 reservists were mobilized between January and August 2003. Once again, the Marine Corps called upon a higher percentage of its reserve component for reinforcement more than any other service.[30] When interviewed on the reliance of force integration to accomplish the operation, Lieutenant General Conway, then Commanding General (CG) of I MEF said, "We could not have done what we did without the reserves."[31]

There are various categories of the reserve component, but the central focus of this paper is the Ready Reserve and the organization, readiness, and efficiency of SMCR units. A historical review of mass mobilizations, such as the Korean War, Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, and Operation Iraqi Freedom reveal that MARFORRES has consistently and effectively augmented and reinforced active component units when called upon to do so.

II. Mobilization

The Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible for providing organized, trained, and equipped reserve forces to the Combatant Commanders. The policy that outlines the process for augmenting and reinforcing the AC with properly manned, trained, and equipped reserve Marines is outlined in the *Marine Corps Total Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan*.[32] When mobilizing reserve members, MARFORRES and its subordinate units are the losing command. The losing command is responsible for providing each reservist with orders to the gaining force command (GFC), completing medical and dental screening, and ensuring each reservist joins the GFC with a complete inventory of individual combat clothing

and equipment (ICCE), gas mask, and Table of Organization (T/O) prescribed weapon.[33] Aviation squadrons from 4th Marine Aircraft Wing are authorized to self-deploy directly from their HTC to the supported Combatant Commander's area of responsibility (AOR), but an SMCR ground unit typically aggregates at their HTC, deploys from their HTC to an Intermediate Location (ILOC), and is supported at that ILOC by their gaining force command (GFC).[34] According to the policy, it is assumed that a planning factor of no less than 30 days, from unit activation to deployment available-to-load (ALD) date, should be used for SMCR unit availability in support of contingency operations.[35] During crisis action planning, however, SMCR unit availability is determined based on the unit's equipment shortfalls and sourcing, the time required for the unit to accomplishing pre-deployment training, and the time needed for movement and loading at the port of embarkation.[36] Prior to the reserve unit's activation, Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, notifies the Deputy Commandant for Installation and Logistics of any equipment shortfalls. Once approved, DC I&L directs Marine Corps Logistics Command to distribute force-held materiel from centralized storage/readiness facilities.[37] The gaining force command is responsible for all pre-deployment logistical and training support, as well as addressing any remaining equipment deficiencies.[38] SMCR ground units may deploy from an aerial port of embarkation and fall in on equipment in theater, but the gaining force command is still responsible for ensuring that the unit is properly equipped for pre-deployment training.[39]

According to an assessment of the mass reserve mobilization for OIF, mobilizing reserve personnel was an expedient and efficient process, and the reactions to the personnel influx were positive; but there were considerable issues in equipping reserve units. Units traveled from HTC to an ILOC, but lacked the necessary equipment for pre-deployment training, or integrated into I

MEF units upon arrival into Kuwait without required equipment quantities.[40] Likewise, reports from Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield (ODS) claimed similar difficulties in equipping reserve units.[41] In both cases, commanders declared that reconciling supply and maintenance issues wasted valuable preparation and training time prior to major combat operations.[42] The trend between the mass mobilization of reservists in 1991 and 2003 suggests that there remains a problem with equipping reserve units during mass mobilizations. Command chronologies from MARFORRES following FY17 and FY18 indicate a persistent demand by the active component for reserve personnel augmentation for exercises, regular operations, and in support of Combatant Command requirements. Very few instances of reserve augmentation included a requirement for personnel accompanied by organizational equipment.[43] Although the results reflect overwhelming success with personnel reinforcements, there appears to be room for improving the ability to equip these forces upon mobilization.

III. Previous Recommendations

There have been several papers published over the last decade recommending changes to the structure and management of the reserve. Four different studies, each by Marine Corps Command and Staff College students, present a case for boldly reorganizing existing reserve structure and transferring authority, administration, and training and readiness responsibilities to active component commands.[44] Each of these papers predate the *Force Design 2030* guidance, yet the authors present cases that would suggest that the Marine Corps is not a "single, integrated total force." These theses argue that by transferring reserve companies and battalions under active component infantry battalions or regiments, or by reassigning reserve aviation structure to active component squadrons, the service could reduce facilities, equipment, and operation and maintenance costs, thereby reducing redundant organizations, including the Major Subordinate

Commands within MARFORRES or MARFORRES altogether. The authors assert that the benefits of pre-established or permanent Operational Control (OPCON) or Tactical Control (TACON) relationships could expedite planning and coordination during the Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan (MAID-P) process for reserve units.[45] All four authors propose that I and II MEF. Integration in III MEF is cost prohibitive due to its location in Okinawa, Japan. Organizational reductions, like divesting battalion, regimental, or MSC headquarters units could potentially free resources for essential new capabilities, but each author acknowledges that further analysis is necessary.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps' guidance stated the Marine Corps will not have "distinct and semi-independent active and reserve," but the consistent problem with the four recommendations for permanent AC acquisition of reserve units is that they do not fully articulate the challenges affecting the current reserve organizational construct. There are numerous complexities to maintaining reserve operational readiness involving administrative and logistical challenges that were not addressed within the analyses. There are additional complexities when transferring authorities and responsibilities of a reserve unit to a GFC, also not addressed. For example, the typical augmentation or integration phases of the MAID process involve the reserve unit traveling from home training center to the GFC in most cases.[46] During a mobilization situation, MARFORRES sustains the garrison support functions via site support staff. If MARFORRES were to be divested and the SMCR were transferred under AC commands, yet each HTC remain at their respective locations, all support responsibilities would then fall upon I and II MEF. The previous proposals to simply transfer operational control of the SMCR, without additional changes to the current SMCR model, did not identify the support responsibilities that transfer to the MEFs even after the SMCR is mobilized.

Each author recommended integrating a reserve infantry company or battalion into existing active component commands. Successful cases of reserve integration in the other services, identified by a RAND Corporation study, involved units possessing a mission with characteristically high maintenance requirements such as an aviation squadron, motor transport battalion, or mechanized battalion; one in which reserve members could supplement perpetual maintenance operations on weekends.[47] Accordingly, the infantry would not be the suitable command(s) to implement full integration. The aforementioned studies also recognized the geographic challenges corresponding to distributed reserve units, which is not remedied through full integration unless locations are consolidated. Divesting and geographically consolidating reserve units might be operationally or fiscally preferred, but may not be ideal for reserve recruiting and retention. Reserve Force Design recommendations should not be narrowly focused on particular units, like the infantry, nor should be recommending fully divesting existing reserve sites without thoroughly assessing the current SMCR model, and considering available options that could meet CMC guidance.

Permanent AC operational control of reserve units would certainly produce a single, integrated Total Force, but the reorganization would not yield higher readiness, mitigate risk, or reduce waste if this transfer was the only result of reserve Force Design. Despite the recommendations that the Marine Corps should proceed on this course, the aforementioned papers provide insufficient insight into existing reserve unit challenges that demand attention. A more thorough review of the obstacles that cause the RC to be distinct, and independent from the AC, would expose shortfalls within the current SMCR model that can be avoided. In doing so, the service would acknowledge that active commands acquiring reserve units, as a result of

reserve Force Design, could result in greater risk to resources and readiness unless additional changes are incorporated.

III. Challenges within the Monthly SMCR Model

The active and reserve components are similar in many ways. Similarities begin with individual qualification and carry through unit requirements. Military occupational specialty (MOS) training and readiness (T&R) standards are the same for AC and RC Marines. Reserve units are assigned the same Mission Essential Task List (METL) as their active counterparts; however, training or readiness sustainment for reserve units is a greater challenge for reasons outlined in later sections of this paper. These aspects unique to the reserve persist if reserve unit operational control is transferred to active commands. The enduring hurdles to reserve training and readiness, which warrant consideration prior to rearranging the current system, are logistical, administrative, or are obstacles to unit command and control.

The largest collection of perpetual challenges for reserve unit training, readiness, and support, which were not recognized in the proposals to transfer reserve operational control to the active component, pertains to the physical needs, or logistics. As mentioned, reserve sites are geographically dispersed throughout the country, in accordance with civilian population centers. To manage so many large, scattered programs, MARFORRES must supplement service-level policy with extensive, amplified guidance, and must implement methods unique from active units, to provide the ample logistical support necessary to conduct disaggregated training and operations.

Each individual Headquarters Training Center (HTC) experiences its own unique challenges due to unit type, location, facilities relationships, access to training areas, and more. One example of a limitation is weather may have a drastic impact on training and operations

during particular months of the year. Units in Minnesota must February must contend with temperatures averaging from 11-26 degrees from December to February each year. Similar units located in San Diego, California do not face the same challenges.[48] Weather can delay or increase required maintenance, hinder or halt travel, and increase safety risks during training. Though weather affects can be mitigated by planning, reserve unit training schedules contain time and less flexibility for unforeseen or uncontrollable environmental circumstances. Another challenge unique to each reserve unit, based on the unit's location, concerns the HTC's proximity to appropriate training areas. During scheduled weekend training periods or during the unit's AT, a reserve unit may expend valuable time in transit to and from the training location. For example, reserve units located aboard Camp Lejeune, North Carolina may travel just 20 minutes to conduct marksmanship training; whereas units in Tampa, Florida must travel 3 hours to Camp Blanding, thus consuming 6 hours of a training weekend. Reserve unit transit time to and from training locations is considered a known overhead cost to achieve training objectives, must be accounted for, and little can be altered to mitigate travel time spent for reserve unit training.

Reserve HTCs are geographically isolated and have limited staff at each installation, so MARFORRES must produce Force Orders with additional procedures for most logistical functions; including supply chain management, calibrations, ammunition procurement, and commercial billeting or catering programs. For example, a supply practice unique to the RC is that MARFORRES units possess a Training Allowance (T/A), as opposed to a full Table of Equipment (T/E). A T/A is the minimal assets from the T/E required to conduct unit training based on the unit's Mission Essential Tasks (MET) with regards to storage limitations, limited maintenance personnel, and time constraints.[49] Most supply accounts, such as a battalion

account, are often spread amongst multiple site locations, further frustrating routine supply accountability, supply administration, maintenance operations, and the reconciliation thereof. Moreover, there are dozens of sites that support multiple SMCR companies, many of which belong to a different MSC; therefore, many HTC's must manage multiple supply warehouses for individual combat clothing and equipment, or (ICCE) gear, and multiple armories to differentiate between supply accounts. Likewise, maintenance programs for MARFORRES units are also complex. A unit's equipment might reside in a different location from the unit's maintenance capability, including the necessary tools and technicians; therefore, Reserve units must still expend significant resources to manage their T/A.

A final example of a logistical challenge distinct to SMCR operations, in which MARFORRES must maintain a unique program, pertains to commercial billeting and feeding. While some HTC's are located aboard DOD installations that have government lodging and available messing facilities, most sites are not in close proximity to these amenities. Reserve Marines that reside more than 50 miles from their assigned SMCR unit can be provided commercial lodging at a nearby hotel during scheduled IDT periods if the unit lacks the organic facilities for safe, adequate lodging.[50] Likewise, units that lack a food service capability may obtain meals through commercial catering, often cheaper and more efficient than procuring military meals kits or field rations.[51] Bills for both commercial billeting and catered meals are reconciled through a regimental or battalion credit card account, and supervised by MARFORRES. During FY16, the hotel and catering bills for 23d Marine Regiment alone totaled more than $1.4 million. [52]

Within the current model, MARFORRES manages unique programs to reduce the supply and maintenance burden on a reserve unit. Special supply, maintenance, transportation, and

financial processes and programs are just some of the logistical obstacles that MARFORRES must confront to support disaggregated reserve training and operations. Transferring SMCR units to active commands, like I or II MEF, would not reduce logistical obstacles to reserve unit training and operations unless additional changes were made as well. Nevertheless, familiarity with the programs and processes that are crucial to reserve unit training and operations might influence the success of reserve Force Design.

The second collection of perpetual challenges to reserve unit training, readiness, and support, pertain to the administrative obstacles unique to the reserve. The active and reserve components are administratively similar in some ways, yet the two are very different in many other ways. For example, promotion rates for active and reserve officers are equally competitive. According to promotion board statistics, the promotion rates for AC and SMCR Lieutenant Colonels during the FY13-FY21 selection boards averaged 67% and 68%.[53] Command selection amongst AC officers is also equally competitive as RC command competition. Statics from the AC Command Screening Boards, available through Manpower Management, Officer Assignments (MMOA), reflect that the selection rate for AC Lieutenant Colonels applying for command in FY19 and FY20 was 27%.[54] According to the Reserve Boards Program Manager, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the command selection rate for SMCR officers is 25%, and almost matching the AC selection rate.[55] Despite some similarities, there are distinct administrative differences for the RC that cannot be mitigated by integration. The aforementioned proposals to transfer reserve operational control to the active component acknowledged the administrative burden that would befall the MEF's. To address reserve-specific administrative issues that differ from the active force, each of the aforementioned proposals included recommendations to transfer reserve support personnel to active commands

too.[56] Though the added support would be helpful, the authors did not articulate the administrative complexities that make the reserve distinct regardless of structural changes like the full AC acquisition of the SMCR. Some examples of these challenges, that should be considered prior to organizational changes, are the differences in compensation, in retirement systems for the two components, and the differences to contractual obligations that cause RC talent management to differ from the AC.

Administration for AC members, such as compensation, orders, and retirement, is relatively simple compared to administration for the reserve. For instance, orders for AC members are limited to Permanent Change of Station (PCS), Permanent Change of Assignment (PCA), Temporary Alternate Duty (TAD), or for separation.[57] Like the various categories and subcategories of the RC, there are various reserve utilization categories and duty types. A reservist may be in an Active or Inactive Duty status, depending on the purpose or utilization, of the reserve member. Inactive Duty (ID) are voluntary episodes of duty other than Active Duty (AD), including IDT or FHD as previously mentioned, Additional Training Periods (ATP), Additional Flight Training Periods (AFTP), or Readiness Management Periods (RMP).[58] Conversely, a reservist may be voluntarily or involuntarily in an Active Duty status for occasions like Annual Training (AT) or Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS) depending on the purpose of the orders.[59] The reserve utilization categories for those in receipt of voluntary or involuntary orders are for training (individual or unit), support (organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, etc.), mobilization (in a time of war or emergency), or other purposes including an involuntary recall to service, a retiree recall, or for medical or legal processing.[60] Should commanders within I and II MEF become responsible for reserve forces, transitional periods should be expected until administrative differences between regular and reserve Marines

like pay, utilization categories, and orders to effectively and efficiently exercise command authority over reservists are understood.

Like an AC service member, a reservist will earn pay commensurate with their paygrade and years of service whether the reserve duty is completed in an active or inactive status. A reservist will also be compensated for their participation by earning credit towards a reserve retirement. The significant difference in retirement systems is another item that makes the RC distinct from the AC. Reservists can earn retirement points through any of the previously mentioned utilization categories, whether in an active or inactive status, or from time served prior to separating from the AC.[61] The reserve retirement point system will determine the individual's retirement eligibility, is a tool to calculate projected retirement pay, and, by quantifying participation, informs boards for retention, promotion, and reserve command opportunities.[62] The point system is a historical record, titled the member's Career Retirement Credit Report (CRCR), that organizes participation by Anniversary Year and archives the information in the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). This administrative record is important to SMCR members; therefore, if SMCR commands will be transferred to active component leadership, they should have an understanding of how reserve retirement accrual differs from active component retirements.

Across the total force, talent management and stabilizing manpower inventories is equally important. The guiding principles of talent management for the AC are the same RC, but the methods for maintaining the manpower inventory and staffing requirements for the reserve are very different.[63] With a few exceptions, every person enters military service with an 8-year Military Service Obligation (MSO) prescribed by United States Code Title 10.[64] An initial MSO for an active-duty enlistee is typically four years active and four years in the Ready Reserve,

either SelRes or IRR. An initial MSO for a reserve enlistee is typically six years in the SMCR and two years in the Ready Reserve. The significant difference between AC and RC obligations is not merely in the component or the obligation length. An AC Marine's obligation expires upon reaching the End of Active Service (EAS) date. An SMCR Marine's obligation expires upon reaching their Mandatory Drill Participation Stop Date (MDPSD). The profound difference between AC and RC members is that SMCR members have the option to remain affiliated with the SMCR unit without an obligation. To voluntarily serve beyond the member's EAS, an active-duty Marine would be required to renew or extend their obligation; whereas, a reservist whom is no longer obligated may renew or extend their obligation for a new MDPSD, may choose to transition from the SMCR unit to the IRR, or may continue to remain affiliated with the unit without an SMCR obligation.[65] The voluntary option to remain affiliated with the SMCR unit beyond the MDPSD causes uncertainty for commanders, inventory managers, and manpower planners alike. Furthermore, there are no SMCR monitors that will direct manpower assignments and carryout the actions to necessary to achieve staffing plans.[66] Reserve commands use the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) to mitigate inventory uncertainty, promote force sustainment, and provide commanders with the necessary personnel resources to stabilize SMCR units.[67] Each incentive, such as an affiliation or retention bonus, is deliberately targeted to increase obligors and decrease the percentage of non-obligors in SMCR units, or encourages a reservist to participate in professional military education or career progression training in exchange for extending their MDPSD.[68] According to statistics from a Reserve Manpower Planner, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the SRIP has assisted the SMCR to achieve a historically high stabilization rate of 75% obligors and only 25% non-obligors in the SMCR.[69]

A reserve unit's most valuable resource is time. As previously discussed, individual reservists are allotted 48 IDT's and a 14-day active-duty period per year for a sum of 38 training days. Assuming that the work day could range from 8-12 working hours per day, reservists are allocated between 304 - 456 work hours per year. These figures sound ample for meeting requisite training, but this calculus does not account for the host of activities other than training that are ubiquitous with a functioning military unit; including accountability or award formations, planning meetings, safety briefs, equipment inventories, uniform inspections, preventative maintenance, embarkation, medical and dental screening, administrative audits, meals, and traveling between HTC and training locations. Determining the best use of the unit's scare time, and how to avoid wasted time, is principal priority for reserve leadership.

Many administrative matters are the same across the total force, but there are several areas that, if RC units were to be permanently integrated with AC commands, would likely remain the same causing an administrative disparity from the AC. The aforementioned proposals to absorb SMCR units into I and II MEF did not identify these administrative differences, which could present challenges unbeknownst to an active-duty commander. Some examples of these challenges, that should be considered prior to organizational changes, are the differences in compensation, in retirement systems, and the differences to contractual obligations that cause RC talent management to differ from the AC.

There is no single activity that is more important for a military unit than command and control, and so without effective command and control, any operation or engagement would be impossible.[70] The most significant barrier that affects command and control is uncertainty, which needs to be reduced to make sound decisions.[71] The second most significant barrier that affects command and control is time. Commanders need time to increase their knowledge so that they

can make informed decisions.[72] Command and control is a significant challenge for the reserve. Compared to most active-duty commanders, reserve commanders deal with greater uncertainty and possess far less time in relation to their span of control. Reserve units also rely on a different command and control support structure from active-duty commands. The proposals to transfer SMCR units to AC commands did not identify the obstacles to reserve and control, nor would this reconfiguration alone reduce these challenges.

Active-duty battalions or regiments are usually consolidated aboard a single installation. As previously mentioned, MARFORRES is geographically distributed throughout the country leaving regiments, battalions, and sometimes even companies divided across several states and time zones. For example, 23d Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division, comprised of a headquarters company, four infantry battalions, and a truck company, is distributed amongst 24 locations in 13 different states.[73] The 4th Medical Battalion, 4th Marine Logistics Group, contains just three companies, yet is divided amongst 9 locations in 9 different states.[74] The disaggregation of a reserve unit separates the commander from each subordinate unit, expanding the commander's span of control. The SMCR unit commander reduces uncertainty of each individual unit, which each have unique challenges as previously mentioned, by visiting subordinate battalion, company, or detachments during a scheduled training weekend. In so doing, the commander achieves a personal presence with the unit, gathers firsthand observations, provides tailored communication, and solicits feedback from subordinates.[75] The commander can only be present with one unit at a time, however. Although the commander may travel to each location to observe, evaluate, and guide the subordinate unit, SMCR members are not full-time like active duty, and are constrained with limited training time; therefore, the reserve unit

disaggregation contributes to the commander's uncertainty. The constant uncertainty and limited time makes command and control significantly more difficult for the reserve commander.

In spite of the uncertainty caused by the geographic distribution of MARFORRES and the time constraints to reserve training, reserve commanders have discovered how to deal with these issues. Reserve units practice detailed command and control by developing tightly coupled plans due to inflexible reserve training schedules and to facilitate successful logistical support. Commanders provide their superiors with detailed briefs, schedules, projections, and reports before and at the conclusion of training weekends. Reserve commanders must also practice mission command with their subordinates due to the separation and time constraints. Mission command is suitable for geographically separated reserve units that must function independently with little supervision, must maximize initiative from small site support staffs of lower ranking individuals, and must foster cooperation amongst the reserve unit when it assembles for training.[76] According to a 2018 DOD report on demographics, SMCR units contain older, and often more educated personnel as compared to an active unit, thus mission command is often compatible and effective.[77] Within the current SMCR monthly training model, time constraints and disaggregation make an SMCR commander's ability to effectively and efficiently command and control the unit an extremely challenging task.

One of the basic elements of the command and control system is the support structure. Another challenge for the command and control of a reserve unit is the unique relationship between the Battalion Commander and the Inspector-Instructor. As discussed earlier, the reserve staff and I-I staff constitute a cohesive team, cooperating, and committed to a single mission—to sustain unit readiness to mobilize, and to augment and reinforce the active component. The site support staffs, arranged into an organizational hierarchy of companies, battalions, regiments, and

MSC's, create a support structure for the command and control system, including the people, equipment, facilities, procedures, and policies to assist commanders with command and control at various levels.[78] In addition, the commander and I-I sometimes share command authorities for awards, correspondence, or legal responsibilities to improve staff efficiency, as trust is the cornerstone of cooperation.[79] The organizational hierarchy of reserve battalions or squadrons, regiments or groups, and Major Subordinate Commands facilitate career progression so that leaders can develop their ability to effectively command and control reserve units. Simply transferring reserve unit operational control to the MEFs could temporarily increase existing challenges to reserve unit command and control by potentially affecting leadership development, career progression, and retention; therefore, changes to the current SMCR training model and reserve support system should be considered before any changes to the MARFORRES organizational structure are implemented.

Whether active or reserve, there are numerous obstacles to achieving effective command and control for units. Uncertainty is the most critical obstacle that must be reduced. Uncertainty is mitigated by time, but time is a critically limited resource for a reservist and a reserve unit. Reserve unit geographic dispersion, and the limited time reservists have to train, exacerbates uncertainty. A reserve commander experiences significant challenges when exercising command and control within the current reserve configuration. If SMCR units were transferred to the MEF's, these challenges would likely remain unless additional changes are made.

IV. Recommendation

To fully accomplish the CMC's intent, SMCR units need to; 1) revert to a quarterly training model instead of monthly drill weekends; 2) synchronize RC training evolutions with AC exercises and operations to increase AC/RC integration; and 3) divest the SMCR unit

Training Allowances, consolidate equipment for training at Enhanced Equipment Allowance Pools (EEAP), and maintain this equipment at the locations where the AC/RC integrated training will occur. These changes would be a revolutionary, radical departure from contemporary practices, but could significantly reduce annual expenditures and structure, reduce risk, and improve total force integration.

The current, monthly SMCR training model is an inefficient use of a reserve unit's limited time, and should be replaced with a more economical timetable. A new training model for the 38 days allotted annual to each reservist could be organized into a quarterly system of one garrison drill weekend, and three one-to-two-week periods; (8 IDTs + 20 IDTs + 20 IDTs + 14-day AT = 38 training days). As previously outlined, numerous SMCR units must travel from the HTC to an alternate location to conduct training, losing valuable time in transit as opposed to training. Decreasing the frequency of SMCR training iterations would reduce the IDTs spent at the HTC preparing for and traveling to/from training areas. According to the FY18 4th Force Reconnaissance Company command chronology, the unit has since transitioned away from the monthly training plan. During a phone interview, the Inspector-Instructor explained that the training and readiness standards for reconnaissance Marines are inherently risky and complex, can be completed in fewer training locations, and require significant training support. By minimizing frequency and consolidating training evolutions annually, the company has maximized its limited resources to achieve more training repetitions, increased observation for the commander's evaluation, and the longer evolutions together have created more opportunity to exploit white-space to address administrative matters.[80] The training and readiness standards and mission essential tasks make the reconnaissance company a unique specimen for analysis, but 4th Force Reconnaissance Company confronts many of the same difficulties to training and

readiness as any SMCR command. A concern within this recommendation could pertain to the distance between the HTC, or aggregation point, and an installation, or integration point. Units that reside farthest from any Marine Corps installation, such as HTCs in Texas, Minnesota, or in the Midwest, might expend two IDTs traveling from aggregation point to integration point, and two IDTs returning to the HTC. Travel days are already accounted for during AT planning with two travel days; one at the beginning and one at the end of the AT. A notional travel comparison of the monthly and quarterly training models, depicted in Figure 2, illustrates that more days are lost annually during the monthly training model that a quarterly training model rounding up for units that would travel farther. The notional depiction of a monthly SMCR training plan reflects that 10 of 48 IDTs or 7 of 38 training days are lost to travel while a quarterly SMCR training plan expends 8 of 48 IDTs and 6 of 38 training days in travel.

Monthly SMCR Training Plan					Quarterly SMCR Training Plan				
Month	IDT Total	Training Days	Plan	Travel IDT/Day	Month	IDT Total	Training Days	Plan	Travel IDT/Day
OCT	4	2	Garrison		OCT				
NOV	3	1.5	Garrison		NOV	8	4	Garrison Drill	0
DEC	4	2	Garrison		DEC				
JAN	5	2.5	Field	2 , 1	JAN				
FEB	5	2.5	Field	2 , 1	FEB	20	10	Training Week	4 , 2
MAR	5	2.5	Field	2 , 1	MAR				
APR	7	3.5	Field	2 , 1	APR				
MAY	4	2	Garrison		MAY	20	10	Training Week	4 , 2
JUN	N/A (AT)	14	AT	0 , 2	JUN				
JUL	--	0	No Drill		JUL		14	AT	0 , 2
AUG	4	2	Garrison		AUG				
SEP	7	3.5	Field	2 , 1	SEP				
Total	**48**	**38**		**10 , 7**	**Total**	**48**	**38**		**8 , 6**

Figure 2. Notional Travel Comparison of Monthly Model vs Quarterly Model.

The quarterly training model would significantly reduce drill periods at the HTC, allowing several million dollars per year in hotel and catering bills to be invested elsewhere. Reserve training evolutions, consolidated into three, one or two week-long iterations per year

aboard major Marine Corps installations, would also simplify other MARFORRES support processes for procurement for ammunition from supply sources throughout the country and for approving and certifying off-site training request (OTR). Although the weekend training model is compatible with the typical civilian work week (Monday – Friday), longer, less frequent drill periods could maximize the limited time allotted to reserve units, thereby reducing waste and raising readiness.

Shifting SMCR training plans from a monthly, weekend model to a training plan with fewer, longer training periods aboard major Marine Corps installations would also facilitate AC/RC integration. Indeed, RC units can be integrated with the AC during weekend evolutions; however, weekend training could be disruptive to the AC unit's battle rhythm or pre-established training, exercise, and employment plan (TEEP). AC commands could be pared with a reserve element, and would need to incorporate the SMCR into their TEEP to fully exploit total force integration. Integrated training periods of one-two weeks would likely generate the habitual AC/RC command relationships mentioned in the Commandant's guidance, would yield higher productivity, and would be easier to coordinate for both parties. Improved, integrated planning and operations could assist AC unit material readiness by incorporating RC personnel into preventative or corrective maintenance schedules while fulfilling appropriate training requirements for the reserve members. Additionally, integrating the RC with the AC within the new quarterly training model would resemble the process outlined within the Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan (MAID-P), or a mini-mobilization. Thus, relinquishing the monthly, segregated training routine for the integrated quarterly training plan would improve the service's familiarity and proficiency to execute the mobilization process. Further analysis into these recommendations may determine that not all AC commands would

benefit from consistent reserve reinforcement, that the capabilities and capacities in reserve should be altered, or new company-size elements be established for optimal AC/RC force mix. The service must consider how the reserve can best compliment the active component. Continuing to train separately on separate equipment, far from regular units, does not achieve the CMC's intent.

If SMCR units aggregated at the HTC a few times per year, then traveled to train aboard larger Marine Corps installations with AC units, there would be no need for each SMCR unit to maintain a Training Allowance. Most of the equipment maintained by MARFORRES could be divested and consolidated into enhanced equipment allowance pools (EEAP), similar to the capability provided by Exercise Support Division, Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force Training Center (MAGTFTC), Twentynine Palms, California. Establishing additional EEAP sites would require a substantial initial investment for facilities, reallocating personnel, and transporting equipment, but would yield substantial long term cost savings. The service would need to redirect personnel and operations and maintenance (O&M) funding from MARFORRES, previously required for reserve supply and maintenance functions, to form each EEAP. Furthermore, MARFORRES could discontinue contracts for supplemental maintenance programs and would no longer need to transport equipment from HTC to training areas, liberating additional funds to be invested elsewhere. Reserve units would still need to be equipped when augmenting a gaining force command during a mobilization. Before redistributing equipment from MARFORRES to establish additional EEAP's, Marine Corps Logistics Command should assess impacts to processes intended to support reserve units with pre-positioned or war reserve material.

The integrated AC/RC relationship contained in this proposal is similar to RC utilization found within the Navy Selected Reserve (SelRes). The Navy SelRes experiences similar geographic challenges due to the locations of fleet homeports and Naval Air Stations in proximity to major metropolitan areas where reservists often live.[81] Historically, AC-ship rotations and training schedules were difficult to synchronize with reserve availability, and so the Navy opted for individually augmenting tactical fleet-level commands with technical specialists. These actions are facilitated by geographically dispersed Navy Operational Support Centers (NOSC), managed by AC or reserve full-time support personnel. Senior enlisted sailors and officers are integrated at headquarters staffs.[82] In addition to augmenting the AC fleets and squadrons, the Navy maintains several permanent reserve units, OPCON to Navy SelRes, available for mobilization such as all Navy intra-theater fleet logistics support, Mobile Construction Battalions (Seabees), and Cargo Handling Battalions.[83] The Marine Corps vision for a new fleet architecture that is fully integrated with the Navy could include a new reserve paradigm that closely resembles Navy AC/RC integration.[84] Like the Navy, a thorough analysis of Marine Corps mission sets and challenges to achieving steady-state readiness may warrant particular reserve capabilities to remain intact for unit-level augmentation while other reserve capabilities are individually integrated into AC commands. As the Commandant stated in the CPG, "our MEFs need not be identical," the command relationships within the SMCR may not need to be identical.[85]

Transitioning away from the standard, monthly training schedule, integrating AC and RC units during one-week or two-week training periods, and establishing EEAPs to support episodic integrated training would require substantial adjustments across the service. Expansion projects at designated installations for lodging and messing facilities, ranges, maintenance and

staging areas, and administrative workspace would likely be necessary to accommodate regular surges of additional battalion or regimental-sized groups. Not only would this new model require equipment to be realigned and facilities expanded, these changes would also demand frequent communication, increased coordination, and additional liaison positions within MARFORRES, MEF, and installation staffs.

Implementing any significant change requires a deliberate, organized, and phased approach. Similar to the divestiture of tanks announced within *Force Design 2030,* implementing plans for divestitures or reallocating equipment should be based on maintenance and sustainment costs.[86] For example, implementing this proposal might begin with integrating 4th Marine Logistics Group Marines into 1st and 2nd Marine Logistics Group battalions in order to rapidly reduce the MARFORRES vehicle inventory. Initial phases should begin with plans for personnel redistributions, establishing EEAP Tables of Organization, equipment redistributions, and preparing service posture to support a transitional period of 12-24 months. The service should anticipate friction during the transition state, until reaching a steady state in 24-36 months from implementation.

There are political considerations included within these recommendations due to the potential economic impacts. Although this proposal does not recommend closing an HTC in any particular location, divesting Training Allowances might allow facilities to be consolidated. Additionally, if implemented, this proposal would impact reserves utilizing home-state training areas to train with AC counterparts at major installations, and would stimulate significant investments at existing installations. These events could draw scrutiny from state representatives and have cascading political affects; therefore, the service should prepare sufficient justification for these changes.

Abandoning the one-weekend-a-month model, relinquishing the T/A, and relying on multiple-AT plan could give time back to both the SMCR commander and the I-I. Between quarterly training periods, MARFORRES might be able to increase reserve responsiveness and readiness to mobilize by exploiting automated systems for time consuming matters necessary to deploy. Reservists would have increased administrative milestones to complete via correspondence, including MarineNet courses, individual administration audits, online physical health assessments, or video teleconference meetings. Each arrival to the HTC could be treated as a mini-mobilization. Completing administrative tasks between drill periods, and the I-I staff's familiarity with mobilization-like procedures, should increasingly expedite the process.

Transitioning to a new approach for SMCR training could certainly affect recruiting and retention. The author did not disseminate a survey to measure preference toward the recommended multi-AT model against the existing monthly training model. A survey was not sent to Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) targeting potential reserve applicants (non-prior service) nor AC members exiting active duty (prior service) because, having not yet served in an SMCR status, these individuals cannot accurately answer which training model would be preferred or more compatible with their civilian occupations. Recruiters and prior service recruiters (PRS) were not surveyed because assessing successful recruiting or affiliation to a quarterly SMCR training plan would need to be evaluated through statistical analysis over time. Existing SMCR members, nor site support staffs, were also not surveyed for preference toward the multi-AT model against the existing monthly training model, but this information could indicate viability for the recommendations in this paper. For SMCR members, a principal query should include whether training one weekend per month and two weeks in the summer or two-

three longer training periods (fall, spring, and summer per se) would be more or less compatible with family, work, and school obligations.

V. Conclusion

The *Commandant's Planning Guidance* explicitly stated, "just as our active component will change, so will our reserve component," but very few reserve component (RC) Force Design changes have been directed as of the date of this paper. The guidance declares the reserve must be "ready to mobilize," and called for an examination of a single, fully integrated total force that is operationally relevant, training toward service-wide priorities, and supporting initiatives like increase naval integration. It is also assumed, based on CMC guidance, that results of an RC Force Design should render increased AC-RC integration, maximize resources, eliminate waste, and support efficiency when mobilizing. Despite several recommendations to create a single, more integrated total force by transferring operation control of the reserve to the active component, these proposals do not fully meet *Force Design 2030* guidance. The service should consider profound changes to the current reserve system to adequately accomplish the CMC's intent. SMCR units need to abandon the monthly training model, synchronize training periods with AC units, and the equipment provided to establish Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) Training Allowances (T/A) need to be divested, consolidated into Enhanced Equipment Allowance Pools (EEAP), and maintained at larger installations. By adopting a quarterly training schedule that transports reserve personnel to the equipment and training areas, supply and maintenance responsibilities at Headquarters Training Centers (HTC) could be negated for increased attentiveness to the administrative, medical, and logistical responsibilities associated with mobilizing, transporting, and integrating reserves with the active component. These changes would be a revolutionary, radical departure from existing reserve practices, but could

significantly reduce cost and risk. In doing so, the Marine Corps reserve will be properly postured to augment and reinforce the active component with individuals and units ready and capable to contribute to the future fight.

End Notes

[1] *Marine Operating Concept. 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance,* pg 9.
[2] *Force Design 2030*, pg 2. "Operating under the assumption that we will not receive additional resources, we must divest certain existing capabilities and capacities to free resources for essentially new capabilities."
[3] *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance,* pg 8.
[4] Ibid, pg 8; *Force Design 2030*, pg 4.
[5] *Organizations of the Marine Corps* (MCRP 5-12D), pg 1-10.
[6] Ibid, pg 1-11.
[7] https://www.marforres.marines.mil/About/Mission-Statement/
[8] Figure 1. *Categories of the Marine Corps Reserve*; MCO 3000.19B, pg 1-7.
[9] *Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual* (MCO 1001R.1L), pg 1-2.
[10] *Management of the Active Reserve (AR) Support to the USMCR* (MCO 1001.52K, pg 2.
[11] *Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual* (MCO 1001R.1L), pg 1-2.
[12] *Organizations of the Marine Corps* (MCRP 5-12D), pg 1-11.
[13] *Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual* (MCO 1001R.1L), pg 1-1.
[14] https://www.marforres.marines.mil/About/Mission-Statement/
[15] *Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual* (MCO 1001R.1L), pg 3-3.
[16] Ibid, pg 1-1.
[17] *Evolution of the Military's Active-Reserve Current Force Mix*, pg 94.
[18] *Marine Forces Reserve Site Management & Command Relationships* (ForcO 5000.3), pg 2-1.
[19] Ibid, pg 2-1.
[20] *Factors to Consider in Blending Active & Reserve Manpower within Military Units*, pg 94.
[21] Ibid, pg 93.
[22] https://www.marforres.marines.mil/usmcr100/history
[23] https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/Research-Tools-Facts-and-Figures/Chronologies-of-the-Marine-Corps/World-War-II-1941-1945/
[24] https://www.marforres.marines.mil/usmcr100/history/
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] *Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Lessons Learned*, pg 9.
[28] https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/Research-Tools-Facts-and-Figures/Chronologies-of-the-Marine-Corps/Persian-Gulf-1990-1991/
[29] *Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Lessons Learned*, pg 10.
[30] Ibid, pg 28.

[31] Ibid, pg 10.
[32] *Marine Corps Total Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan*, (MCO 3000.19B), pg 3.
[33] Ibid, pg 64.
[34] Ibid, pg 46.
[35] Ibid, pg 14.
[36] Ibid, pg 14.
[37] Ibid, pg 140.
[38] Ibid, pg 46.
[39] Ibid, pg 47.
[40] *Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Lessons Learned*, pg 16.
[41] Ibid, pg 75.
[42] Ibid, pg 75.
[43] Marine Forces Reserve Command Chronology, 1 Oct 2017 – 30 Sep 2018, pg 43-44.
[44] Riggs, *Making the Marine Corps Reserve Truly Operational.* 2012. Bartucco, *A Fractured Force: Reforming the Marine Corps into a True Total Force.* 2020. Sanchez, *The U.S. Marine Corps Reserve: Reorganization for an Integrated Force.* 2015. Brooks, *The United States Marine Corps Reconnaissance Reserve: Adaption, and Integration for the Future.* 2012. Command & Staff College, MCU.
[45] *Marine Corps Total Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration, & Deactivation Plan* (MCO 3000.19B).
[46] Ibid, pg 55.
[47] *Factors to Consider in Blending Active & Reserve Manpower within Military Units*, pg 73, and 79.
[48] https://www.usclimatedata.com/ Annual temperature in San Diego, CA fluctuate a mere 11 degrees on average per year.
[49] *Table of Organization and Equipment Management Policy* (Force Order 5311.2A), pg 6.
[50] *Commercial Billeting of SMCR Personnel Performing Multiple Drills at Reserve Centers* (Force Order 11000.4B), pg 2.
[51] *Marine Forces Reserve Food Service & Subsistence Program* (Force Order 10110.1B), pg 18
[52] *Status of Funds Update*, Power Point Presentation, 23rd Marine Regiment, 19 April 2017.
[53] https://www.manpower.usmc.mil/webcenter/portal/oracle/webcenter/page/scopedMD/s19266c6e_c01c_4c53_84cb_fa423f0310db/Page9b649a0f_4e69_4805_8281_ab5d1de5d760.jspx
[54] *FY21 Road Show Brief.* Power Point Presentation, MMOA. July 31, 2020.
[55] Brennett Ford, email message to author, March 3, 2021. The FY21 board received 76 SMCR applications, and selected 19 for command equating to a selection rate of 25%.
[56] Riggs, pg 21. "The manpower to fill these billets would come from within the Active Reserve component ... that currently fills 4th Marine Division's staff...".
[57] *Marine Corps Administrative Procedures (MCO 5000.14D)*, pg 27.
[58] *Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual* (MCO 1001R.1L), pg 43.
[59] Ibid, pg 55.
[60] Ibid, pg 41.
[61] Ibid, pg 62.
[62] Ibid, pg 62.
[63] *MCO 5250.1,* pg 9. Guiding Principles of Talent Management: Every Marine is a Rifleman; The needs of the Marine Corps are paramount; Field Grade Officers are Marine Air Ground Task

Force (MAGTF) experts; SNCOs provide advice, technical expertise, and oversee the development, welfare and morale of the whole Marine; Identifying the best and fully qualified is the foundation of the Marine Corps promotion model; Every Marine has an equal opportunity to excel, regardless of race, gender, creed, or sexual orientation.

[64] *Fulfilling the Military Service Obligation (MSO*), DODI 1304.25, pg 1.

[65] *Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual* (MCO 1001R.1L), pg 25.

[66] *Human Resource Development Process (HRDP*) (MCO 5250.1), pg 14.

[67] *Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP)* (MCO 7220R.39), pg 2-3.

[68] *MARADMIN 621/18 Policy Clarification to the Service Obligation for Reserve Marine Attending Training; MARADMIN 589/20 FY21 Reserve Affiliation Composite Score Points Incentive; MARADMIN 486/20 FY21 SMCR Reserve Officer Retention Bonus; MARADMIN 364/19 FY20 SMCR Billet Identification Code (BIC) Incentive; MARADMIN 576/19 FY20 SMCR Lateral Move, Career Progression MOS and MOS Proficiency Training Programs.*

[69] Maj Jessica Arellano, email message to author, March 6, 2021. IDMS data search of reserve MDPSD expiration of 6 MAR 2021 or after with valid Reserve End of Current Contract (RECC) reflected 74.7%; remaining SMCR with valid RECC having exceeded MDPSD was 25.3%.

[70] *Command and Control (MCDP 6),* pg 46.

[71] Ibid, pg 63-65.

[72] Ibid, pg 66.

[73] *Marine Forces Reserve Unit Directory.* https://www.marforres.marines.mil/Portals/116/Docs/Units/MFR_Directory_BYMSC_PDF.pdf?ver=2017-08-29-164110-487

[74] Ibid.

[75] *Command and Control (MCDP 6),* pg 81, 126. "A key way [that] commanders can provide focus is by personal attention and presence...putting [themselves] in the right place at the vital time." pg 133.

[76] Ibid, pg 90, 117, 140.

[77] *2018 Demographics Report, Department of Defense.* 46% of Marine Corps Active Duty members are age 25 or younger, 54% of Marine Corps Active Duty members are 26 or older, pg 37. 32% of Marine Corps Reserve members are age 25 or younger, 68% of Marine Corps Reserve members are age 26 or older, pg 92. 13.6% of Active Duty members have obtained a bachelor's degree, pg 41. 16.6% of Reserve members have obtained a bachelor's degree, pg 96.

[78] *Command and Control (MCDP 6),* pg 57, 61.

[79] Ibid, pg 121.

[80] Maj Jonathon Harris, Inspector-Instructor, 4th Force Reconnaissance Company, Alameda, California, phone interview on 25 Mar 2021.

[81] *Integrating Active and Reserve Component Staff Organizations: Improving the Chances of Success*. Pg 123.

[82] Ibid, pg 112.

[83] *Evolution of the Military's Active-Reserve Current Force Mix.* Pg 8.

[84] *Commandant's Planning Guidance,* pg 4. "We must be fully integrated with the Navy to develop a vision and a new fleet architecture that can be successful against our peer adversaries while also maintaining affordability."

[85] Ibid, pg 3.

[86] *Force Design 2030*, pg 8.

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