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Brexit will force the end of the UK's Trident nuclear deterrence because it will lead to a shrinking defense budget and increase popular support for Scottish independence. The loss of this nuclear capability will degrade the national security of the UK and its ability to support NATO and European Security.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: BREXIT and the End of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrence

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Thesis: Brexit will force the end of the UK’s Trident nuclear deterrence because it will lead to a shrinking defense budget and increase popular support for Scottish independence. The loss of this nuclear capability will degrade the national security of the UK and its ability to support NATO and European Security.

Discussion: As a result of the economic and political impact of BREXIT, Britain finds itself in a sea of unknowns. The economic uncertainty and eroding British pound is straining defense spending as the MoD attempts to balance its priorities. The likelihood of further decreases in defense spending, along with increased cost associated with relocating the Trident program degrade the UK’s ability to execute its Global Britain strategy and execute other defense requirements.¹ Additionally, the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU is fueling popular support in Scotland independence from the UK. The loss of the Trident program could be one of the most overlooked repercussions of Brexit on British national security. This study will examine BREXIT’s impact on the renewal of the UK’s nuclear deterrence and the effect it will have on British, European, and NATO defense.

Conclusion: The UK’s vote on BREXIT created a situation that has more negative repercussions than were ever imagined. With a steady decline in GDP over the past three years, it will continue in the near term.² As such, the defense budget will continue to dwindle with the economy. Additionally, BREXIT’s impact on the Scottish independence movement will continue to put pressure on London. The combination of these economic and political trends will force the UK to fundamentally alter British national security and terminate the Trident program.

¹ Piotr Szymański. “The consequences of Brexit for the UK’s security policy and NATO’s eastern flank.” OSW Commentary NUMBER 299, (March 04, 2019). <http://aei.pitt.edu/97058/>

² “UK (UK) GDP - Gross Domestic Product 2019.” [countryeconomy.com](https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/uk) (November 25, 2019), <https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/uk>.

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ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. British Military Strength Chart.....	3
Figure 2. Trident Submarine Operations	5
Figure 3. Trident Facilities located in Scotland.....	5
Figure 4. CSDP Current Missions and Operations	11
Figure 5. SNP Anti-Trident Propaganda.....	22
Figure 6. RNAD Coulport Explosives Handling Jetty.....	34
Figure 7. Valiant Jetty, Finger Jetty and Shiplift Building at Naval Base Clyde in Faslane	34
Figure 8. Valiant Jetty, Faslane. Attack submarines HMS Ambush and Triumph.....	35

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Defense Spending as Percentage GDP	9
Table 2. G7 GDP Comparison.....	16
Table 3. UK Contributions to CSDP Military Operations.....	30
Table 4. UK Contributions to CSDP Civilian Operations	31

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
DISCLAIMER	i
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	ii
LIST OF TABLES	ii
INTRODUCTION	1
FRAMING THE CURRENT STATE OF BRITISH DEFENSE	3
Trident and British National Defense	4
BREXIT and NATO	6
UK and European Security after BREXIT	9
The Need and Costs for Modernizing Trident	12
THE DILEMMA LEADING TO THE SUSPENSION OF TRIDENT	15
BREXIT’s Impact on the UK Economy and Defense Budget	15
Impact of BREXIT on Scottish Independence	19
The Role of Trident post-BREXIT	24
The Consequences of Suspending Trident	26
CONCLUSION	28
APPENDIX A: UK CONTRIBUTIONS TO CSDP OPERATIONS	30
APPENDIX B: BRITAIN’S NUCLEAR HISTORY	32
APPENDIX C: PHOTOS OF TRIDENT FACILITIES	33
ENDNOTES	35
BIBLIOGRAPHY	41

In 2015, Prime Minister James Cameron decided to hold a referendum to determine if the UK should depart the European Union (EU). The result of the vote was 51.9% of British citizens voted to leave the EU and 48.1% remain (separated by less than 4%).³ The 3.8% vote margin surprised many British politicians, including PM Cameron.⁴ Looking back at history, the European Economic Community (EEC) came to fruition in 1957 and evolved into the current day EU. It was not until 1973, when the UK finally joined the EEC/EU.⁵ Yet since 1973, British politicians have debated if they should remain a member of the EU or return to their autonomous roots.⁶ Now that the referendum pushed the UK to officially part ways with the EU, British politicians are debating how they will approach what is commonly known as BREXIT (British Exit from the EU). Many experts and politicians believe that there is a strong likelihood that BREXIT will have a negative impact on the citizens of both the UK and the EU, whether it is economical or burdensome for travel and work.⁷ The areas in which the most significant implications are anticipated are on defense cooperation and military spending.⁸ Although defense and security cooperation within the EU is less integrated than other areas, the impact is inevitable. Despite the overlapping affiliations most European countries have with the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or other multilateral treaties and organizations, there are many opportunities to overlook potential defense and security gaps because of BREXIT.⁹

So far, a majority of the focus on BREXIT has been on the economic implications. The UK and the EU already anticipate and have recently seen the economic impacts related specifically to trade and investments; however, a great impact will also hit the defense and security realm. As a 2017 Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) brief states, “If the BREXIT process affects the economy, the UK’s ability to achieve its level of ambition (LoA)

and maintain its capabilities – as set out in the 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review – will suffer.”¹⁰ Even if the UK continues to support its defense and security with 2% of GDP, as the economy shrinks a smaller GDP will result in less funding for defense.

In addition to all issues related to BREXIT, prior to the referendum PM Cameron also pushed through Parliament a vote in 2016 that approved the renewal of the Trident nuclear program.¹¹ Britain now finds itself in a sea of unknowns as BREXIT officially arrived. As British politicians continue to kick the can down the road, the UK has withstood multiple changes in leadership and granted multiple extensions of determining the method of their exit. The economic uncertainty and eroding British pound are expected to influence defense spending.¹² Decreases in defense spending, along with increased cost associated with the Trident program, will strain the overall defense budget. Additionally, the UK’s decision to leave the EU is fueling increased support for Scotland to leave the UK. The loss of the Trident program could be one of the most overlooked repercussions if BREXIT leads to Scottish independence. Overall, the suspension of the Trident program and decrease in the overall defense budget will affect the UK’s ability to support NATO and European Security with the same capacity and capability it has in recent memory. This study examines why BREXIT will prevent the UK from executing the 2016 policy for an updated Trident nuclear deterrence due to a limited defense budget and the risk of Scottish secession. This security impact of BREXIT will not only diminish UK defense, it will also degrade the UK’s ability to support NATO and European Security, leaving them vulnerable to Russian aggression.

Framing the Current State of British Defense

When examining the British military, it is consistently ranked within the top ten across various global military strength rankings. In a recent article published by Grinberg News, the UK is ranked as the sixth most powerful military in 2020 based on their analysis of personnel, active platforms and systems, logistics, budget, and global reach.¹³ The British force total is an estimated 146, 980 active personnel.¹⁴ Records for trained and active members of the Royal Navy/Marines, Royal Air Force (RAF), and the Army in mid-2019 stood closer to 134,000 as all branches of service failed to meet their recruitment goals.¹⁵ In fact, as displayed in Figure 1, the British military as a whole experienced a decrease in military strength from 2016 – 2019.¹⁶ Meanwhile, in defense spending the UK is ranked fifth¹⁷ with a budget of approximately £55 billion.¹⁸




Figure 1: British Military Strength Chart¹⁹

The Royal Navy (including Marines), RAF, and Army enable British defense the ability to execute full spectrum operations. The UK maintains over 400 tanks, close to 900 aircraft, over 80 naval vessels, two aircraft carriers, and a robust logistics capability.²⁰ The recent

additions of the aircraft carriers and the new Lightning II F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft further enhances British strike capability.²¹ Additionally, the British Special Operations community provides some of the world's most elite units. They include the British Special Boat Service (SBS) which is the Special Forces unit of the Royal Navy.²² The SBS is considered “among the most elite and capable soldiers in the entire British military.”²³ The SBS has been ranked only second in the world to the US Navy Seals, and both provide similar special operations capabilities.²⁴ Then there is its sister service, the Special Air Service (SAS) that was heavily used to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, which is part of the British Army.²⁵ The SAS has been ranked third when against the world's best Special Forces units.²⁶ Overall, the British military is fully capable of operation across multiple domains with a variety of capabilities and nuclear weapons pushes their capability within a realm not many countries are able to operate.

Trident and British National Defense

The UK's nuclear program, Trident, currently consist of four Vanguard submarines that can carry up 16 Trident missiles.²⁷ Figure 2 provides an overview of Britain's current Trident submarine operations. The current upgrade, the Dreadnaught submarine, will carry only 12 Trident missiles.²⁸ The reduction in nuclear missiles is a recent trend by the UK, as they attempt to reduce costs and honor the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and working toward disarmament.²⁹ In 2015, the UK cut down from 160 operational warheads to 120 while also reducing the number of nuclear warheads on patrol.³⁰ With Lockheed winning the modernization contract for the Trident, the bar is set high for the follow-on act for the program.³¹ A recent report states, “Since its design completion in 1989, Trident II has made 167 successful test launches — a record unmatched by any other large ballistic missile or space launch vehicle.”³²




Figure 2: Trident Submarine Operations³³

The Trident program operates out of two main locations in Scotland; Naval Base Clyde in Faslane where the submarines are based and Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD) Coulport where the Trident missiles are stored.³⁴ Figure 3 below depicts both facilities, which are only eight miles apart.³⁵ This eases the loading and unloading process of the Trident missiles, due to the close proximity. See Appendix B for further graphics on the facilities of both RNAD Coulport and Naval Base Clyde in Faslane.



Figure 3: Trident facilities located in Scotland³⁶

Prior to BREXIT, British politicians voted on replacing the aging Vanguard submarines that carry Britain's nuclear arsenal. Former PM Teresa May stated, "In the last two years there has been a disturbing increase in both Russian rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons and the frequency of snap nuclear exercises."³⁷ In order to maintain what John Mearsheimer would call "balanced bipolarity" with Russia, the need to maintain and modernize a nuclear deterrence is a necessity for Britain.³⁸ This is especially true because the UK is one of three nations with an independent nuclear deterrence within NATO. Some have argued that the Trident program is not independent since the missiles are leased from the United States nuclear pool.³⁹ Additionally, the United States provides the technical design for all the components of the targeting and launching mechanisms within the weapon system.⁴⁰ This also applies to the support aspects as well; however, as with any piece of technology that is imported or purchased it remains a capability that is wielded by the British military. Furthermore, the United States nuclear partnership with the UK benefits both nations' defense and security posture.

As currently established, the Trident program is a significant element of the Royal Navy and the British Military. It enhances the UK's ability to execute a full-spectrum military capability. The UK's contributions to NATO and European security are of great value, and to understand them well one must assess the dimensions of the UK military that both directly and indirectly affect NATO.

BREXIT and NATO

A key source of NATO's ability to deter war is its ability to wield a nuclear deterrent with its three independent nuclear powers: the United States, France, and the UK. Between the three nations, they hold a capability only a select number of nations possess. The British government has consistently made it clear that its commitment to NATO is a top priority and

will not be altered by BREXIT. For example, prior to his election as Prime Minister, while serving as the British Foreign Secretary in 2016, Boris Johnson emphasized British support to NATO stating, “Article five in the NATO treaty of 1948, the doctrine of mutual defense, is incredibly important...It’s something that the British government believes in absolutely, fervently, and that we stand behind full square.”⁴¹ More recently, Defense Minister Wallace reemphasized British commitment, stating “NATO remains the cornerstone of our security,” as it is a “proven and unparalleled defensive alliance - our best means of countering Russian malign activity and hostility.”⁴²

The British military not only provides a nuclear deterrence to NATO, they also provide capabilities across the full military spectrum for offensive and defensive dimensions as well as to the non-military dimensions that is very active across the globe.⁴³ At the last NATO summit in London, Prime Minister Johnson emphasized that the UK will continue to lead “the European contribution to the NATO readiness initiative and we are contributing one armed brigade, two squadrons of fast jets, six major warships - including the two aircraft carriers.”⁴⁴ The UK also participates in ongoing NATO missions, such as NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), which maintains a presence in the Baltic region in East Europe.⁴⁵ The British military leads the NATO battle group in Estonia and provides the largest share of the EFP force, followed by the US military.⁴⁶ The UK provides a multiple capability sets, to include “battle tanks, mechanized infantry and air defense assets,” as this “UK-led battlegroup is essential to discourage the persistent threat from the east.”⁴⁷

The British military also fills significant roles within the defense and security community of the EU and NATO. For example, a prime position within the defense community that would be at risk with the loss of Trident and a decrease in military defense spending is the

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR) position. Since its establishment in 1951, the British military primarily filled the role of DSACEUR.⁴⁸ With BREXIT in effect, can Britain afford a nuclear deterrent if the economy is negatively affected? Any degrade to these two areas could create a shift in priority for positions that the UK historically maintained.⁴⁹ As recently as 2017, the French argued their military capability makes them better suited to fill the DSACEUR position.⁵⁰ NATO members have discussed the transfer since it is preferred DSACEUR is held by a NATO member.⁵¹ The Deputy Director of the Royal United Security Institute (RUSI), Malcolm Chalmers, stated “the role is essential to offer NATO military assets to EU missions under the Berlin Plus agreement.”⁵² If the UK loses Trident, this makes the case for France even stronger seeing France would then be the only NATO nuclear state on the European peninsula. Most experts do not expect any substantial shift in the UK’s influence in European security, however this is dependent on their ability to establish a post-BREXIT relationship and ensure no significant changes to the current set of capabilities they provide.⁵³ It also depends on how EU and UK defense relations unfold over the upcoming months.

Prior to BREXIT, the British incorporated reductions in defense personnel and equipment investment.⁵⁴ The early part of the 2010s witnessed Britain’s defense budget decrease by over £8 billion and it has not fully recovered to its previous levels.⁵⁵ Although the British Defense Minister, Gavin Williamson, may boast about the their defense budget reaching 2.1% of GDP (£38.4 billion) in fiscal year 2019-20 (see Table 1), a large portion of that figure includes spending on military pensions and intelligence.⁵⁶ To date, outside of the UK and the US, the only European states meeting the 2% GDP pledge are Greece, Estonia, Poland and Romania.⁵⁷ Britain has also increased its role on NATO’s Eastern European flank and several other locations as a part of the “Global Britain” concept.⁵⁸ The sustainability of these efforts are

in question since the British military is stretching its personnel and capabilities thin with these efforts.⁵⁹ Members of the British Foreign Affairs committee has openly criticized the Global Britain concept, calling it “an aspiration” and “a bit of a slogan...that people are using with different intent.”⁶⁰

Table 1: Defense Spending as Percentage GDP⁶¹

Fiscal Year	Total spending (cash, £ million)	As % GDP	
2015/16	38,940	2.05	Actual
2016/17	41,590	2.11	Actual
2017/18	43,257	2.11	Actual
2018/19	45,309	2.14	Provisional
2019/20	46,564	2.13	Provisional
2020/21	48,493	2.15	Projected

UK and European Security after BREXIT

The impact of BREXIT on British defense spreads beyond its own borders. Although Britain is leaving the EU, it is not leaving Europe, NATO, or the UN. The UK intends on maintaining its role in maintaining stability across the globe and remaining assertive against authoritarian aggression.⁶² During a speech at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C, the UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace stated, “The security of Europe is vital to the United Kingdom’s security and that will not change because we have left the political union of the European Union.”⁶³

The implications of BREXIT will nonetheless have a ripple effects on European and NATO defense and security efforts. These effects have already begun, with the EU blocking the UK out of the Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System (military-grade) data deal.⁶⁴ Centre for European Reform analyst Luigi Scazzieri, states, “EU member states have little appetite to

grant the UK the status of privileged EU partner,” especially since the UK regularly blocked European defense initiatives as members of the EU.⁶⁵ Even when it concerns military operations, EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier specified British involvement in EU mission are on a “case by case basis.”⁶⁶

When the UK was a member of the EU, it ensured that its security policies were nested in the broader EU security architecture. For example, a European Affairs Journal articles states, “The UK's 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) and the EU's 2016 Global Strategy identify a set of shared challenges and priorities, which serve to guarantee continued cooperation between London and Brussels in the foreign and security policy realm.”⁶⁷ In addition, the UK participated in the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)⁶⁸

Although the concept of a common defense policy has been around since 1948, it is the 2009 Lisbon Treaty that developed the CSDP that exist today.⁶⁹ Missions sets encompassed under CSDP are humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-keeping, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, and post-conflict stabilization operations.⁷⁰ The UK, along with France and Germany, are the largest members of the CSDP.⁷¹ Currently, the CSDP has six ongoing military missions, with 11 civilian missions outlined in Figure 4.⁷² EU NAVFOR Atalanta, one of the largest CSDP operations, operates within the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and part of the Indian Ocean.⁷³ EU NAVFOR’s mission is to protect shipping vessels, including those of the World Food Program (WFP) other vulnerable ships, deter and prevent piracy, monitor fishing activities, and support other EU missions to increase security in the region.⁷⁴ The UK military has support the EU NAVFOR Atalanta mission since December 2008, while contributing over 1,000 personnel and a €1.2 million annual budget.⁷⁵ Other CSDP operations with large British formations include

supporting EUNAVFOR MED Sophia (1,137 personnel, €1.2 million), EUFOR Althea (803 personnel, €2.22 million), and EUMAM RCA (700 personnel, €4.4 million) just to name a few.⁷⁶



Figure 4: CSDP Current Mission and Operations.⁷⁷

As a result of leaving the EU, the UK will also leave the CSDP. Despite this, it would behoove France to include Britain in consultation for European nuclear deterrence policies as the Russian threat continues to loom. The importance of UK support to EU operations spans across multiple methods between spending, personnel, and equipment. A RUSI document identified, “Numerous government departments and law enforcement agencies, such as the MoD, National Crime Agency (NCA), Foreign Office and Department for International Development work on EU-related missions and operations, but also provide bilateral support to host countries.”⁷⁸ Table 3 and Table 4 (located in Appendix A) provides a snapshot of UK contributions to CSDP Operations since 2004.⁷⁹

Without a seat in the council, the UK will have minimal influence in CSDP decisions.⁸⁰ However, the loss in influence and a role outside of the CSDP could potentially save the UK upwards to £3.319 million based on one estimate from 2014–15.⁸¹ Additionally, it frees up UK government and law enforcement resources to pursue other priorities that may support their Global Britain strategy. It is unclear at this time on a UK role in CSDP, as one would anticipate the EU and UK announce a defined relationship. The RUSI document also addressed the consequences of BREXIT on European defense, highlighting the UK could continue to participate in a selective basis as “associated partner,” similar to Norway.⁸² British General, Sir Mike Jackson, stated “the impact from departing the EU “is more of a policing and judicial matter rather than a military matter. The [UK’s] military dimension is provided by NATO.” Under the 2003 Berlin Plus Agreement, the EU is authorized NATO assets and capabilities during operations where the EU is the lead.⁸³ Many experts believe the CSDP will lose credibility without the UK, seeing a reduction of its status on the global stage and the effectiveness of its military capabilities decline.⁸⁴ Both parties will assess cooperation on a case-by-case basis, although final approval and oversight will fall on the EU.⁸⁵

The Need and Costs for Modernizing Trident

One of the UK’s top security requirements for many years has been the need to modernize its Trident nuclear force. The current Trident fleet began supporting operations in 1992 and experts believe it will take up to 17 years before replacements can begin operations.⁸⁶ PM Margaret Thatcher first agreed to acquire Trident from the United States in 1980 and the first Vanguard patrol did not happen until 1994.⁸⁷ The typical lifespan of a nuclear submarine is 30 years, so a renewal should not come as a surprise to anyone as Trident’s predecessor, Polaris, operated from 1962 to 1992.⁸⁸ Appendix B provides a complete timeline of Britain’s nuclear

history. Unfortunately, this does not make the process to execute the recently approved renewal any less difficult. British politicians are dissecting the nuclear submarine modernization program, in addition to other expensive weapon platforms such as the F-35 jets that go along with the two new aircraft carriers that are also under construction.⁸⁹ To add, there are the “Trident II (D5) submarine-launched fleet ballistic missiles (SLBMs), equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and thermonuclear warheads.”⁹⁰ These components play a significant role in modernizing the Trident program and building a full-spectrum capability. The issue most politicians have with this renewal is the substantial cost. In 2013, the UK conducted a Trident Alternatives Review and determined, “no alternative system is as effective or capable as the current Trident system, or as cost effective.”⁹¹

The initial costs of Trident modernization accounts for the largest portion of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) budget. Although the exact figures have varied throughout numerous sources, the expected cost is north of £41 billion for the four new submarines with Trident warheads, while other projections estimate a cost north of £50 billion.⁹² As a result, modernizing Trident would account for a quarter of the MoD’s 10-year equipment plan.⁹³ It is not clear if these figures also include support and sustainability requirements that are critical with equipment and systems of this magnitude. One report states that the contract for equipment support efforts for modernization accounts for 65% of the Royal Navy’s budget, worth an astounding £29.1 billion.⁹⁴ As a 2017-RAND study warned, “Any reduction in the defense budget could therefore be expected to result in the abandoning or at least delayed receipt of certain capabilities, with serious long-term effects.”⁹⁵ Even before the BREXIT referendum, the Trident modernization program had already encountered multiple delays and indicators it would exceed the anticipated budget.⁹⁶ An unfortunate side effect of the increasing cost could lead to

either the temporary or permanent withdrawal of ships from service and would significantly affect the Royal Navy, British defense, European defense, and NATO.⁹⁷

Based on the above stated facts, opposition to the renewal of Trident has largely risen due to cost concerns. With the MoD's 10-year equipment plan already outdated, the Trident modernization program delayed and over budget, and opposition continuing to grow, the scales are beginning to tip. As the reality of BREXIT begins to sink in, the Scottish National Party (SNP) grows more eager to separate Scotland from Trident and London. The 2017 RAND study describes the SNP as "vehemently hostile" toward funding of "Britain's nuclear deterrent."⁹⁸ At a minimum, SNPs desire the removal of Trident nuclear missiles from Scotland.⁹⁹ The issues the MoD would then run into is finding a new home for Trident and the cost that would be associated with such a significant move. Additionally, Liberal Democrats are pushing to reduce Trident patrols and the number of submarines in operation.¹⁰⁰

The 2016 Trident renewal vote received a majority support but the margin may not survive the growing opposition to Trident since then. British members of parliament (MPs) voted 472 to 117 in favor of a Trident nuclear weapons system renewal.¹⁰¹ Although the margin is significant, it is important to note the 58 to one vote by Scottish MPs against Trident's renewal.¹⁰² The PM at the time, Theresa May, stated, "it would be a gross irresponsibility for the UK to abandon its nuclear weapons."¹⁰³ Several MPs believe "all nuclear weapons are immoral" and a "political weapon," while others believe the UK must be prepared for whatever threats materializes in the future.¹⁰⁴ In the end, Britain must determine if post-BREXIT Britain can afford to continue with the Trident renewal program, how far Scotland is pushed by leaving the EU, and if forcing them to participate in Trident will influence their decision.

The Dilemma leading to the Suspension of Trident

After reviewing the current state of British Defense, the Trident program renewal and British role in NATO and European security, the potential impact of BREXIT make executing the 2016 policy for an updated Trident nuclear deterrence difficult. As a result, the negative repercussions of BREXIT will lead to the end of Britain as a nuclear-armed power. First, BREXIT will degrade the British economy and decrease government revenues. This will result in budget cuts and this will include decreasing the already strained UK defense budget. Second, BREXIT will lead to Scottish independence and the loss of the multi-billion dollar Trident base in Faslane, Scotland. Third, the combination of shrinking UK defense spending and the additional costs to relocate Trident will lead to the suspension of the UK's Trident program. Lastly, it is important to consider the consequences of suspending the Trident program will have on UK, NATO and European security as a whole.

BREXIT's Impact on the UK Economy and Defense Budget

The impact BREXIT will have on the British economy and defense budget will play a vital role in the eventual suspension of the Trident program. Finances plays a significant role for European, NATO, and British defense, both currently and post-BREXIT. A recent Financial Express report stated, "In 2017, the UK exports to the EU were £274 billion (about 44% of total UK exports) and imports from the EU were £341 billion (or, 53% of all imports)"¹⁰⁵ Trade agreements with the EU are the largest hurdle the UK will have to overcome as it brings the most challenges. As a member of the EU, the UK was privy to 40 free trade deals signed by the EU.¹⁰⁶ This meant the UK did not pay additional tariffs on goods under the World Trade Organization (WTO) terms.¹⁰⁷ Since the BREXIT vote, the UK has attempted to replicate those trade deals in order to maintain tariff free access to these 70 countries.¹⁰⁸ One issue British

politicians are learning is that without the EU, it is significantly more difficult to negotiate with non-EU countries. Many analysts questioned if the UK would be able to negotiate trade agreements similar to the current EU deals.¹⁰⁹ Despite those questions, the UK was able to agree to 20 “continuity” agreements.¹¹⁰ This however, does not affect trades conducted with EU countries. As the UK breaks off from the EU, they will also exit organizations such as the European Customs Union, which will "substantially raise transaction costs on roughly half of Britain's trade.”¹¹¹

Additionally, this will affect the British GDP as it is beginning to lag behind its fellow G7 members in demonstrating growth based on annual GDP (See Table 2 – G7 GDP Comparison).¹¹² In 2016, the British GDP suffered a steep decrease in annual GDP and that trend continued in 2017.¹¹³ Despite the slight increase in annual GDP in 2018, 2019 provided another decrease.¹¹⁴

Table 2: G7 GDP Comparison (US \$)¹¹⁵

(Green shows increase in GDP from previous year)

COUNTRY	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
United States	18,224,800	18,715,000	19,519,400	20,580,200	21,427,100
Japan	4,389,476	4,926,668	4,859,788	4,971,767	Not Available
Germany	3,362,242	3,468,188	3,664,511	3,951,340	3,846,591M
France	2,439,436	2,472,282	2,591,775	2,780,152	Not Available
United Kingdom	2,897,060	2,669,107	2,640,067	2,828,833	2,824,850M
Italy	1,833,196	1,869,196	1,950,703	2,075,856	Not Available
Canada	1,556,506	1,530,024	1,649M934	1,712,479	Not Available

Although trade deals do not make up the total GDP, they account for a large portion and have a significant impact. As the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) estimates,

“By the end of the 2020s, Johnson's agreement, if accepted, would axe the size of the country's economy up to 4%...uncertainty over EU-UK trade have already slowed down economic growth and resulted in a 2.5% smaller economy in comparison to what was expected if Britain had voted against leaving the bloc in 2016.”¹¹⁶

Coincidentally, one significant reason for BREXIT was the payments to the EU.¹¹⁷ Since the referendum passed, Bloomberg Economics reports state the UK has lost approximately £130 billion in economic growth and projected to lose another £70 billion through 2020.¹¹⁸ The £200 billion lost is more than the total contributions to the EU over the last 47 years.¹¹⁹

Coupled with trade deals, investments and finances play a significant role. This is especially true in Europe as the London Stock Exchange is the largest market for businesses and investors in Europe.¹²⁰ It is also known as “the gateway to Europe” for countries in the Middle East, the United States, and numerous other investors.¹²¹ The importance of the London Stock Exchange to the EU is captured in its market capitalization, which exceeded \$4.6 trillion in 2018.¹²² The only market with a similar or higher market capitalization within Europe is Euronext stock exchange, which is based out of multiple cities in Europe including London.¹²³ Other European market capitalization are less than half of the London Stock Exchange.¹²⁴ In spite of this, several firms have already relocated from the UK to mainland Europe and those that have not made the move are considering this due to concerns of BREXIT. Since the BREXIT vote in 2016, London has experienced their largest international bank move jobs out of the UK, at least 45 other financial institutions reportedly making a move to Frankfurt, and many others departing for cities such as Paris, Dublin, Amsterdam, Milan and Madrid.¹²⁵ With uncertainty surrounding Britain and the loss of duty-free access to European countries, investors are steering away from the UK. In the early months of 2019, a major Japanese car manufacturer canceled its plans to move a car-making plant there.¹²⁶ The lack of investments have a butterfly effect, leaving many British citizens without work and putting the burden on the government to cover unemployment cost. Although, no significant data shows unemployment rates have increased, one would anticipate unemployment rates increase as a result of BREXIT.

As the economy goes, so does the MoD's Budget. As mentioned previously, the UK's 10-year military equipment plan is under pressure due to the costs of modernizing Trident as well as economic pressures from decreasing government revenues.¹²⁷ With tight purse strings, the MoD will be forced to prioritize which capabilities they will retain and which may be lost in order to stay on budget.¹²⁸ This is due to the recent economic down turn that was not anticipated or planned for by the MoD. In the 2015 British spending review, the UK's defense anticipated a budget of \$63 billion by 2020.¹²⁹ In the fall of 2019, a spending review provided the MoD an additional £2.2 billion to fill a funding gap in defense.¹³⁰ The gap is allegedly due to operational commitments, however it is documented that the MoD has previously dipped into the reserve fund to assist with Trident expenses.¹³¹ Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace Douglas Barrie stated the funds are already committed, "£300 million for the 2019–20 fiscal year and £1.9bn for 2020–21. However, it is only a short-term settlement, and there is the likelihood of a Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) sometime in 2020."¹³²

Even with the additional funds, the MoD fell short of its desired amount, requiring an emergency meeting to discuss their current budget, and required adjustments.¹³³ One of the areas MoD leadership must look first are the defense budgetary requirements. An area that will take a priority are those related to Britain's alliances and partnerships. In the wake of BREXIT, these alliances strengthen their security and are of vital importance.¹³⁴ The UK maintains one of the largest defense budgets in the world, while also maintaining the fifth largest military in Europe.¹³⁵ As expressed in multiple forums, the UK intends on maintaining an important role in NATO and utilizing US bilateral cooperation as top priorities.¹³⁶ With that said, full-spectrum capabilities remain a defense requirement and this includes pushing forward with Trident. The issue that the MoD continues to run into is the impact of BREXIT.

A European security expert believes the weakening economy will aggravate the military's current problems. He argues that these problems, "include the stagnation of the defense budget (in 2011-18 expenditure fell from 2.4% to 2.1% of GDP), a decline in the overall size of the armed forces and personnel shortages, wear and tear on the equipment, and delays in implementing rearmament programs. In addition, the depreciation of the pound negatively affects the costs of importing military equipment."¹³⁷ What does this mean to the MoD's priorities to maintain a strong presence in NATO and bilateral operations? Difficulties with funding personnel and equipment will eventually translate to fewer global activities, both soft and hard. The British military is already conducting operations without usual combat platforms, with the least number of operational fighter planes (only 136) in decades and just 19 destroyers and frigates in operation.¹³⁸ This is just the beginning as the economy shrinks post-BREXIT; the defense budget will also continue to decrease. Meanwhile, large financial commitments such as the Trident program, the F-35 fighter jets, and new aircraft carriers are consuming the budget.¹³⁹ Dr. Phillips O'Brien, who works at the Scottish Center for War Studies at the University of Glasgow, thinks that, "Britain would decide to scrap its nuclear program rather than make painful cuts elsewhere."¹⁴⁰

Impact of BREXIT on Scottish Independence

An immediate consequence to BREXIT came shortly after the UK voted to leave the EU. The impact of BREXIT created a second opportunity for Scottish Independence. In 2012, the PM David Cameron and the First Minister of Scotland Alex Salmond agreed to authorize the 2014 Scottish referendum.¹⁴¹ Although PM Cameron was confident that it would not happen, this had the potential to end the Act of Union of 1707 and allow Scotland to gain independence.¹⁴² Despite PM Cameron's confidence, a very strong campaign by the SNP

seeking independence (the Yes Scotland Campaign) gained momentum throughout Scotland. The pro-independence campaign thrived from its Yes Declaration, which stated, "I believe it is fundamentally better for us all, if decisions about Scotland's future are taken by the people who care most about Scotland, that is, by the people of Scotland. Being independent means Scotland's future will be in Scotland's hands."¹⁴³ One of the largest inspirations for a Scotland Exit (SCOTXIT) is the SNP desire for a nuclear-free Scotland, which is home of the Trident program at the Faslane Naval Base, near Glasgow.¹⁴⁴ The two-year campaign gained so much steam into the 2014 vote that Scotland marginally missed its independence with 55% voting against independence and 45 % voting for it.¹⁴⁵ The SNP declared the "once-in-a-lifetime" referendum ended the way it started, with Scotland a member of the UK and the home of Trident.¹⁴⁶ As foreshadowed earlier, the immediate consequence to BREXIT came when First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon called for a second referendum. Mrs. Sturgeon's request creates an additional crisis and is part of the evidence that Scotland's independence is a matter of when, not if.¹⁴⁷ SNPs described the UK leaving the EU as a "material change" of "sufficient magnitude," which warrants a second opportunity at independence.¹⁴⁸

Prior to the first Scottish referendum, a lot of the support for the Yes Scotland Campaign came from those wishing to remove the nuclear Trident program from Scotland. One of the conditions an independent Scotland is likely to impose on London is to force the withdrawal of the Royal Navy's nuclear submarines and Trident missiles from their base at Faslane and Coulport.¹⁴⁹ This would assist the SNP in achieving a nuclear free Scotland and may sway their pursuit of a second referendum. During the renewal vote for Trident, "Every single Member of Parliament from Scotland voted against the replacement of Trident," says Kate Hudson, general director of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Mrs. Hudson ignored that one

conservative Scottish MP did vote in favor of the Trident renewal, nevertheless the commanding vote by Scottish MPs did make a bold statement to London.¹⁵⁰ Mrs. Hudson also expressed concern that, "The current Trident system and Vanguard submarines are based in Scotland. And under the Union agreement with Scotland, the Scottish parliament doesn't have control over foreign policy, so at the moment those nuclear weapons remain there."¹⁵¹ This directly supports the Yes Campaign declaration that the Scottish parliament should have authority on decisions that directly influence Scotland. Mrs. Hudson understands the strength of the SNPs, as that party holds all the Scottish seats in Parliament, except for one conservative Scottish MP. Even then, all SNP members of Parliament stood for an independent Scotland and this included the MP who is from Faslane where Trident is located.¹⁵²

However, a major counter argument is value of the numerous jobs Trident and the Royal Navy provide for Scotland. Currently, there are approximately 3,000 service personnel and 4,000 civilian workers supported by the Trident program in Faslane and Coulport.¹⁵³ In 2017, the Defense Secretary announced that the Royal Navy's eight new warships would be built on Clyde base over the next 20 years, saying, "We're investing in Scotland on the basis that Scotland will be staying in the UK."¹⁵⁴ Faslane is also expected to house all Royal Naval submarines if Scotland remains, increasing the position total to 8,200 by 2022.¹⁵⁵ The expectation is that the commitment will benefit both sides.

As BREXIT inches closer, eventually a final vote will come to fruition. Mrs. Sturgeon's request to have a second referendum prior to 2019 was denied by PM Theresa May.¹⁵⁶ SNPs will utilize a pro-EU / anti-nuclear campaign fueled by Theresa May's denial to assist in strengthening the cause.¹⁵⁷ The addition of the renewed nuclear defense program, dictated by London, could tip the balance in favor of Scottish independence. Scotland is in the driver seat at

this moment and it is a matter of time until London makes a decision between a second referendum and Trident. In the event Scotland did achieve independence, the SNP will ensure Trident is removed from Scotland and their written constitution would ban nuclear weapons from being based in Scotland, as they would most likely join the NPT.¹⁵⁸ The SNP will continue to campaign against nuclear weapons and has dedicated an entire webpage titled “Trident – What you need to Know.”¹⁵⁹ The webpage highlights how Trident does not address modern threats such as “terrorism, cyber-attacks, and climate change.”¹⁶⁰ Figure 5 shows propaganda displayed on the site that demonstrates what Scotland could pay for if not for the Trident renewal.¹⁶¹



Figure 5: SNP Anti-Trident Propaganda.¹⁶²

The British Parliament knows Scottish independence will be costly just as it is learning independence from the EU is also costly. Even though Scotland is pro-EU, there is no guarantee that independence will give them entry to the EU. Since Scotland is currently a part of the UK, Scotland will also leave the EU once BREXIT is complete. Though the EU is staying silent on a potential Scottish referendum, many experts believe Scotland would be required to get in line and apply for membership, which could take years.¹⁶³ This process would also apply to the

United Nations, NATO, and other international organizations that Scotland is part of because it is inside the United Kingdom. The timeline for approval is just one of the obstacles. Multiple countries may oppose Scotland's entry to those organizations. For instance, Spain who has dealt with its own share of separatist movements will most likely block Scotland's aspirations to join the EU.¹⁶⁴ A report from the first Scottish referendum stated, "Spanish government officials have hinted strongly that Spain would exercise its veto right in the European Union to block Scotland's entry as a warning to the Catalans," who have had expressed a desire for independence from Spain.¹⁶⁵ But, due to changes in leadership, the Spanish position may change. For example, former Spanish Foreign Minister, Joseph Borrell, stated, "Why not? If they leave Britain in accordance with their internal regulation... If Westminster agrees, why should we be against it?"¹⁶⁶ This would be a significant win for the SNPs and those in favor of Scottish independence.

Even though there are hurdles for Scotland to overcome after independence, it is unlikely to stop the SNP or its citizens from voting because the Yes Scotland Campaign garnered 45% of its population to vote for independence Britain will then be left with three difficult choices: (1) allow Scotland to conduct a second referendum, (2) relocate Trident, or (3) terminate Trident. In the event option one transpires and Scotland gains independence, then option two will also happen. This means the UK can only choose from options two and three. The UK government previously conducted assessments to examine the feasibility of relocating Trident. The two locations found to be most promising for rebasing the Trident program are Milford Haven and Plymouth."¹⁶⁷ In the 1960s, the MoD looked in Milford Haven as a potential home for Polaris but was not chosen since it was also the home of an oil refinery at the time.¹⁶⁸ The potential of having submarines, naval ships, and oil tankers in the same port could have

been disastrous. Milford Haven no longer has an oil refinery since they have transitioned to natural gas, now making the location a viable option.¹⁶⁹

At first glance, Plymouth seems like a simple solution since it is currently the primary nuclear repair facility, a refueling station for the Royal Navy, and current location for naval submarines but there are many obstacles to overcome.¹⁷⁰ One major issue is that the current facility in Plymouth does not meet the minimum three-mile radius from the populace that is required when housing Trident missiles.¹⁷¹ Additionally, a former defense advisor stated that it would take 20 years to move Trident from Scotland and £25 billion to build a facility capable to maintain the program.¹⁷² This may be an exaggeration as the current facilities took 13 years and close to £2 billion to build, however the British government spent additional funds in the 1990s to expand the facility to support the transition from Polaris to the larger Trident missiles.¹⁷³ Even if London decided to choose option two, the defense budget would not support the move in addition to the costs of modernizing Trident and also paying for the UK's overseas operations. The SNP is aware of the projected cost and timeline for removal, and one of its advisors stated that if Scotland gains independence, they should lease out the Faslane facility to London for a minimum of £1.1 billion per year.¹⁷⁴ Even that price may be too steep for the MoD and British MPs. For all these reasons, if Scotland gains its independence, the UK government is most likely to choose option three, terminating the Trident program.

The Role of Trident post-BREXIT

How does this all change the role of Trident since BREXIT? Despite the strong support in 2016 for the renewal of Trident, BREXIT creates a perfect storm for the opposition to establish a compelling case to suspend its renewal. With the projected shrinking British economy and defense budget, Trident becomes even more burdensome and a drain on other

parts of the British military. A London based report stated, “This price tag is double what MPs were told when they first voted on Trident replacement in 2007 as part of a double-sided motion which didn't just decide to replace Trident, but also committed to taking "further steps towards meeting the UK's disarmament responsibilities under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”¹⁷⁵ Technically, the MoD ensured the Trident renewal included a reduction in the number of Trident missiles carried, which could be considered taking steps toward disarmament. In the event of option two or three happening, the Scottish community and economy is expected to take a hard hit. It is estimated that at least 15,000 people will be impacted in some shape if Trident is moved or shut down.¹⁷⁶ Both Scotland and the UK will also feel the economic hardships of such a decision, though a complete shutdown would divert savings to offset some of the impact. Even without considering Trident, MP's have complained that British military operations have already endured a significant gap in between “Post-BREXIT ‘Global Britain’ and the capacity to generate military capability to support the level of global presence.”¹⁷⁷ Even with the additional £2.2 billion discussed earlier, £700 million (30%) will go to pensions, while the remaining will go toward Trident modernization efforts.¹⁷⁸ Such short-term fixes will only delay the inevitable and generate a much larger, long-term issue that will have lasting effects on the MoD and the UK. With the upcoming SDSR later this year, the MoD anticipates getting control of the situation, but it may be too late.¹⁷⁹

Between Trident and BREXIT, the UK felt the political strain in 2019. On the 50th anniversary of the Royal Navy nuclear-armed submarine patrols, British MPs called it a celebration.¹⁸⁰ Is the Trident renewal about deterrence or political status? This is the debate between the MPs, as the SNPs and Liberal Democrats are screaming for disarmament. Dr. O'Brien also believes “it's not primarily about defense but about political status - a desperate

attempt by the leadership class to cling on to the delusion of being in the big power league.”¹⁸¹ He also states, “The fact that the missiles are completely dependent on the United States makes it obvious the UK is a supplicant not a key player.”¹⁸² Both statements speak a certain degree of truth, but they can also be flipped. Having a nuclear deterrence strengthens defense and solidifies the UK as a great power, which also makes them a key player on the global stage. The leader of the Labor Party Jeremy Corbyn has stated he would give up the Trident deterrent if he became PM.¹⁸³ While BREXIT makes Scottish independence more likely, the extremely expensive relocation cost to move Trident to England would follow suit. All of the UK’s nuclear deterrence is located in Scotland and if Scotland leaves, they would likely join the UN NPT.¹⁸⁴ This would then allow Scotland to force the removal of the nuclear program. The options for London are extremely limited, but then again, the simplest solution is to suspend the Trident renewal.

The Consequences of Suspending Trident

As currently constituted with BREXIT and Trident, the MoD has suffered from decreased military funding and capabilities. The shrinking British military has resulted in the smallest British army since the Napoleonic wars.¹⁸⁵ It seems that one of the overlooked consequences of BREXIT will be the end Trident and a weakened UK that may lose its position on the global stage. If the UK does suspend Trident, it will also diminish NATO and Europe’s nuclear deterrence. George Robertson is a Scot and former NATO Secretary General. He believes that Scottish independence and the removal of Trident from Scotland would be “cataclysmic” and result in essentially “disarming the remainder of the United Kingdom.”¹⁸⁶ A report from the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS) highlighted that France would be left as the lone “EU member state that has nuclear weapons, a veto power in the UN Security

Council and military bases in third world countries through bilateral agreements, including the option to deploy troops there.”¹⁸⁷ Although this would slightly lower Britain’s position among great powers, the money saved from Trident may be reinvested into its conventional forces. That is if BREXIT does not cut too deep into the British economy, which is a significant unknown. A former Labor MP, John Woodcock, believes giving up nuclear weapons “would leave the UK and its NATO allies at the mercy of nuclear blackmail from Putin.”¹⁸⁸ This may be true, but NATO will still have two of its three nuclear capable members and could potentially look elsewhere to replace the British program.

In the end, BREXIT weakens the power of the UK, NATO, and European regional security. One major benefactor of this all would be Russia. This is one major reason as to why the UK would want to hold on to Trident at all cost. As a European Research Fellow explained, “Britain’s perception of Russia in recent years has been influenced not only by the modernization of the Russian armed forces and the restoration of its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area, but also by the use of ‘active measures,’ such as the Russian disinformation campaigns, and the special services’ actions in the UK (the use of the ‘Novichok’ combat nerve agent in Salisbury in 2018).”¹⁸⁹ The British Parliamentary Committee investigated Russian influence on the BREXIT vote; however, PM Boris Johnson recently denied the claim and delayed the release of the report.¹⁹⁰ This would not be the first or last incident of Russian activity in the UK. Additionally, according to British financier William Browder Russian backed oligarchs have compensated British politicians, lawyers, and former security service officials to gain Russian influence.¹⁹¹

Even with Britain having one of the largest defense budgets and armed forces in Europe, it remains significantly smaller than Russia’s.¹⁹² Without Trident, Britain will be even more

vulnerable and would be left to rely on the US and France for nuclear support. This is important concerning defense of the British Isles and especially important to the United States, as the UK is the last line of European defense in the North Atlantic. It is well-known that European defense has underspent for decades, extending their militaries too far, while failing to modernize capabilities to meet current threats.¹⁹³ Moscow, especially under Putin's rule, pays close attention to what happens in the West and is willing to put more pressure on western democracies. After the initial BREXIT vote, Putin told PM Theresa May that she "must implement the will of the people as expressed in the referendum, or that is no referendum as all."¹⁹⁴ Putin then followed it up by taking a shot at the western states by asking, "is this democracy?"¹⁹⁵ It is obvious, Putin knew the implications of the UK leaving the EU and he had no issue with mocking them. Mark Galotti, an author who has covered Putin extensively, believes "Putin's strategy is essentially to divide, distract and demoralize the West, so that either we are sufficiently worn down to strike a deal that grants Russia the status he craves."¹⁹⁶ Dividing the people and creating chaos is a tactic we have seen within the US and now within the UK.

Conclusion

The UK's vote on BREXIT created a situation that will have long term political, economic, and military repercussions. With a steady decline in GDP over the past three years, economic downturn is expected to continue.¹⁹⁷ It is likely the UK will continue to reach out with neighboring states and the EU to establish trade deals to reduce to amount of tariff imposed on goods, but this will not reap immediate benefits. As such, the defense budget will continue to dwindle with the economy. Additionally, Scotland will continue to put pressure on London with threats of secession now that BREXIT is a reality. In order to maintain a balanced

defense budget and appease Scottish popular sentiment the UK will be forced to terminate the Trident program. Overall, the UK can focus on their conventional force in order to maintain a valuable role within NATO and European Security. The loss of a third nuclear deterrent is significant, but survivable for both NATO and European Security as they have the capability to endure as they continue to fend off Russian aggression. At the time of this research, the impact of BREXIT continues to unfold and the COVID-19 pandemic adds an additional factor. The UK 2020 budget highlights the National Health Services as the “number one spending priority” and will likely require additional resources and funding to address COVID-19 treatment and prevention efforts.¹⁹⁸ The suspension of Trident warrants additional research as security and defense around the world continues to shift its approach as a result of the current pandemic.

APPENDIX A – UK CONTRIBUTIONS TO CSDP OPERATIONS

Table 3: UK Contributions to CSDP Military Operations

Operation	Summary	Dates	Total Personnel	UK Personnel	Total Annual Budget	UK Contribution to Military Common Funding
EUFOR <i>Althea</i>	Capacity building and training to armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 2004–present	803	1 x intermediate reserve company (up to 120 personnel) 6 x staff officers	€14.1 million	€2.22 million
EU NAVFOR <i>Atalanta</i>	Protects vessels in Somalia, deters and disrupts piracy and armed robbery at sea and monitors fishing activities off the coast of Somalia	December 2008–present	c. 1,050	Hosts Operational HQ (Northwood) Operation Commander Major General Martin Smith RM and core OHQ staff	€7.4 million	€1.2 million
EUTM Somalia	Contributes to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia	April 2010–present	171	1 x logistics officer; 1 x MA to Somali CHOD 1 x civilian security sector reform adviser	€11.3 million	€1.8 million
EUTM Mali	Trains and advises the Malian armed forces (MAF)	February 2013–present	578	3 x force HQ staff; 27 x training team personnel; 2 x civilian humanitarian law trainers	€15.0 million	€2.4 million
EUMAM RCA	Plays a role in strengthening the security sector in close cooperation with the UN	April 2014–present	c. 700	None	€29.6 million	€4.4 million
EUNAVFOR MED <i>Sophia</i>	Contributes to disrupting the business model of human-smuggling and trafficking networks in the Mediterranean	June 2015–present	1,137	2 x Royal Navy vessels; core OHQ staff (subject to review 30 November)	€7.5 million	€1.2 million

Source: Sara Lain and Veerle Nouwens. “The Consequences of BREXIT for European Defence and Security.” RUSI. Royal United Services Institute, August 2017. p. 27-28

https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201704_08_rusi-fes_brexit_defence_and_security_lain_and_nouwens.pdf.

Table 4: UK Contributions to CSDP Civilian Operations

Operation	Summary	Dates	Total Personnel	UK Personnel	Total Annual Budget	UK Contribution to CFSP budget that funds civilian missions
EUPOL Afghanistan	Supports the Afghan government to establish sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements	2007–present	168	1	€57.75 million	€9.24 million
EUBAM Rafah, Occupied Palestinian Territories	Provides border assistance and monitoring at the Rafah crossing point on the Gaza–Egypt border.	2005–present	6	0	€1.27 million	€0.2 million
EUPOL COPPS, OPTs	Contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership	2005–present	50	2	€9.18 million	€1.5 million
EULEX Kosovo	Rule of law mission to monitor, mentor and advise national authorities with regard to police, justice and customs	2008–present	754	18	€77m	€12.3m
EUMM Georgia	Monitors compliance with 2008 six-point plan agreement between Georgia and Russia	October 2008–present	201	11	€18.3m	€2.9m
EUAM Ukraine	Contributes to the development of effective, sustainable and accountable civilian security services	July 2014–present	87	4	€13.1 million	€2.1 million
EUCAP Nestor	Capacity building; regional approach in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean	2012–present	56	2	€17.9 million, to December 2015, then €12.1 million	€2.9 million, then €1.9 million
EUSEC RD Congo	Provides advice and assistance on defence reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo	2005–September 2016	10	2	€2.7 million	€0.4 million
EUCAP Sahel Niger	Capacity building, through training and advising, to improve the capacities of Nigerian security forces	July 2012–present	43	1	€9.8 million	€1.6 million
EUCAP Sahel Mali	Capacity building to enable Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order	January 2015–present	71	1	€5.5 million	€0.9 million
EUBAM Libya	Supports the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya's land, sea and air borders	May 2013–present	3	1	€26.2 million	€4.2 million
EUBAM Libya	Supports the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya's land, sea and air borders	May 2013–present	3	1	€26.2 million	€4.2 million

Source: Sara Lain and Veerle Nouwens. “The Consequences of BREXIT for European Defence and Security.” RUSI. Royal United Services Institute, August 2017. p. 29-30.

https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201704_08_rusi-fes_brexit_defence_and_security_lain_and_nouwens.pdf.

APPENDIX B – BRITAIN’S NUCLEAR HISTORY

Britain's nuclear history A timeline	
<p>August 1945 Prime Minister Clement Attlee sets up a top secret Cabinet committee to examine the feasibility of Britain acquiring the atomic bomb</p>	<p>October 1946 After US ends nuclear co-operation, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin swings the argument in favour of a British bomb declaring: "We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs... we have got to have [a] bloody Union Jack on top of it."</p>
<p>October 1952 Britain becomes the third nation, after the United States and the Soviet Union, to carry out a test of a nuclear weapon. A bomb of about 25 kilotons is detonated off the coast of the Monte Bello Islands, near Australia.</p>	<p>November 1953 Britain's first atomic weapon - the free fall Blue Danube bomb - deployed with the RAF's V-bomber fleet.</p>
<p>May 1957 The first British hydrogen bomb is detonated at high altitude over the sea close to Malden Island, in the Pacific near Papua New Guinea.</p>	<p>July 1958 The US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement is signed allowing the two countries to share nuclear weapons technology and materials.</p>
<p>November 1968 The UK ratifies the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits signatories to pursuing total nuclear disarmament. Earlier that year, the submarine HMS Resolution goes on patrol for the first time armed with Polaris missiles.</p>	<p>July 1980 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher agrees to acquire Trident from the United States as a replacement for Polaris.</p>
<p>December 1994 HMS Vanguard becomes the first Trident submarine to go out on patrol.</p>	<p>April 1998 Britain ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, banning test explosions of all nuclear weapons. Later that year, the Strategic Defence Review withdraws the WE177 free fall nuclear bomb from service and cuts the stockpile of Trident warheads to fewer than 200.</p>
<p>March 2007 MPs vote to support the Labour Government's decision to renew Trident.</p>	<p>May 2011 The go-ahead is given for initial work to begin on the replacement of the Trident nuclear weapon system - costing £3bn. This is known as the "Initial Gate".</p>
<p>July 2016 MPs vote overwhelmingly for renewing the Trident nuclear deterrent by 472 to 117 - a majority of 355 votes - which means it is secure for a generation.</p>	

Source: Allen, Emily, and Ben Farmer. "What Is Trident? Britain's Nuclear Deterrent Explained." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, March 21, 2016.

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/21/what-is-trident-britains-nuclear-deterrent-explained/>

APPENDIX C – PHOTOS OF TRIDENT FACILITIES



Figure 6: RNAD Coulport Explosives Handling Jetty (Trident loading area)

Source: “Why Relocating Trident Away from Scotland Is Virtually Impossible.” Save the Royal Navy, July 22, 2016. <https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/why-relocating-trident-away-from-scotland-is-virtually-impossible/>.



Figure 7: From left to right: Valiant Jetty, Finger Jetty and Shiplift building at Naval Base Clyde in Faslane

Source: “Why Relocating Trident Away from Scotland Is Virtually Impossible.” Save the Royal Navy, July 22, 2016. <https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/why-relocating-trident-away-from-scotland-is-virtually-impossible/>.



Figure 8: Valiant Jetty, Faslane. Attack submarines HMS Ambush and Triumph

Source: “Why Relocating Trident Away from Scotland Is Virtually Impossible.” Save the Royal Navy, July 22, 2016. <https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/why-relocating-trident-away-from-scotland-is-virtually-impossible/>.

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