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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Department of the Susquehanna Preceding Gettysburg, June 1863: Civil-Military Harmony  
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
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## *Preface*

Homeland defense supported by the militia or National Guard began prior to the Founding Fathers and requires extensive synchronization among local, state, and federal agencies. As a case study, this essay examines the mobilization of the Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia (PVM) for homeland defense during the Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863. Topics for analysis include, the homeland-defense response framework, political/socioeconomic influences, and the operational performance of the militia. Additionally, the essay captures lessons learned and provides a comprehensive review of strategic and operational support the militia provided to the Army of the Potomac, state, and local authorities.

This essay provides historical insight for State Adjutants General, National Guard Commanders/staffs, Active Component Commanders/staffs, and interagency partners on the rapid activation and integration of multi-component forces during future homeland defense and civil-support missions. Ultimately, this essay reveals the enduring requirement to continuously man, train, and equip the Total Force to provide synchronized homeland defense and civil-support response to domestic emergencies in the future.

Throughout the process of composing this essay I had the privilege of working with several members of the Marine Corps University (MCU) and Gray Research Center. Without the support of the aforementioned individuals I would not have been able to complete the essay. First, the continuous mentorship of Dr. Christopher Stowe, the MCU War Studies Department Head, was integral in assisting and guiding my completion of the product herein. As my MMS advisor, his professionalism and expertise facilitated continuous learning and my continuous professional development throughout the AY16-17. As the second reader, Dr. Bradford

Wineman is responsible for initially sparking my interest in the Pennsylvania Militia and he provided valuable insight to support development of the topic. Dr. Linda Di Desidero, Ms. Andrea Hamlen, and Ms. Stase Wells of the MCU Leadership Communication Skills Center spent countless hours reviewing my writing products and proved vital in the development of my written communication skills. Mr. Winston Gould, Gray Research Library Interlibrary Loan Technician, coordinated the exchange of a multitude of the resources used for this essay. His diligent support facilitated exploration of resources from libraries across the east coast and for this I am extremely indebted. Lastly, the extreme generosity and enduring foundation provided by my wife, Kimberly, and parents Barbara and Mike furnished endless indispensable counseling and devotion throughout the research and writing process. Without their support the composition of this essay would not have occurred.



## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** Department of the Susquehanna Preceding Gettysburg, June 1863: Civil-Military Harmony Ensures Reserve Capability

**Author:** Major Michael D. Zultak

**Thesis:** Given the time, resources, and systems available to quickly mobilize, train, and equip homeland-defense forces, the performance of the Pennsylvania militia forces prior to the Battle of Gettysburg was commensurate to the mission.

**Discussion:** The common understanding of the 1863 Pennsylvania Campaign is that the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) crossed the Potomac River relatively uncontested until clashing with the Union Army of the Potomac (AOP) at Gettysburg. To fully grasp the accuracy of this statement, consideration must be given to influencing factors present in Pennsylvania in June 1863. This essay examines how political tension impacted the civil-military mobilization of the Pennsylvania militia. It also analyzes how historical views of the relationship between the militia versus the regular, standing army, as well as the socioeconomic priorities of the populace, influenced the recruitment of the militia. Using modern military homeland-security framework, Army Total Force Policy, and doctrine, the purpose of this essay is to examine the military preparedness of the Department of the Susquehanna and civil authorities in deploying military assets domestically prior to the Battle of Gettysburg in May-July 1863.

**Conclusion:** Considering the Pennsylvania militia's readiness level, political turbulence, and socioeconomic challenges present in south-central Pennsylvania in June 1863, the Department of Susquehanna's performance was commensurate with the homeland-defense mission. Uniform standards, systems, and processes are critical for integration of all military components, services, and civilian partners to maximize national-security capabilities across all domains. The Army Total Force Policy is a means for all Army components to standardize.

## **Introduction**

*Given limited resources, we must strike the right balance of capacity and capability across the Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces, and train and work together as a team. Together we provide the critical land power depth, keep our edge over any adversary, and ensure the Army provides timely global response to support Combatant Commanders.*

– General Mark Milley, Thirty-Ninth Chief of Staff (CSA) of the Army,  
October 1, 2015.<sup>1</sup>

As stated by General Milley because national-security threats develop unproportionally to defense resources, the standing army and militia forces originally envisioned by the Founding Fathers are no longer adequate to support operational demands. General Milley describes that current threats and resource constraints make maintaining both a strong standing army and reserve critical to national security. As such, national security requires cooperation between active-component (AC), reserve-component (RC), and civilian (federal, state, and local) authorities. Recent domestic terrorist attacks inspired by violent extremist organization (VEO) rhetoric, such as the Boston Marathon bombings, San Bernardino shooting, and Orlando night-club shooting, combined with dynamic threats by conventional military powers, provide cause to reflect on historical case studies to garner timeless insights on the employment of National Guard and militia forces for application in current Army Total Force Policy (ATFP) and civil-military operations. Using modern military homeland-security framework, ATFP, and doctrine, the purpose of this essay is to examine the military preparedness of the Department of the Susquehanna and civil authorities in deploying military assets domestically prior to the Battle of Gettysburg in May-July 1863.

The common understanding of the 1863 Pennsylvania Campaign is that the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) crossed the Potomac River relatively uncontested until clashing with the Union Army of the Potomac (AOP) at Gettysburg. To fully grasp the accuracy

of this statement, consideration must be given to influencing factors present in Pennsylvania in June 1863. This essay examines how political tension impacted mobilization of the Pennsylvania militia. It also analyzes how historical views of the relationship between the militia versus the regular, standing army, as well as how the socioeconomic priorities of the populace influenced the recruitment of the militia. Once recruited the citizen-soldier force primarily comprised temporary emergency militia with minimal training. The training readiness level and virtuous discretion of the Pennsylvania citizen-soldiers created leadership challenges that require examination of military leader development during the Civil War.

Evaluation of the Pennsylvania militia's performance warrants consideration as to the militia's readiness level. The task of balancing reserve-component readiness with defense budget constraints continues to challenge modern Army leadership. In accordance with Department of Defense directives, on September 4, 2012, the Secretary of the Army published Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy), which outlines that "As one Total Force, the Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve . . . [are] organized, trained, sustained, equipped, and employed to support combatant commanders requirements . . . [and] that the procedures and processes for validating pre-deployment readiness of assigned forces are uniform for AC and RC units and soldiers."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, this essay also reviews how the Total Army, "in an increasingly complex world of diverse threats at home and abroad,"<sup>3</sup> relates to the Founding Fathers' original vision of the militia and the standing regular army. According to recommendations to the President and Congress from the 2016 National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) to fight and win as a Total Force, the Army "must capitalize on the reserve-components to provide not only needed operational capabilities, but also the strategic depth required for future campaigns."<sup>4</sup> Thus, review of lessons learned from historical Total

Force operations, such as the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863, foster development of modern Total Force solutions.

When activating an Army National Guard (ARNG) force, consideration of the political, economic, and social dynamics optimizes the mobilization process. With that said, did Pennsylvania Governor Andrew G. Curtin and Department of the Susquehanna commander, Major General Darius N. Couch, effectively mobilize, employ, and integrate domestic military forces and capabilities to provide security and prevent the ANV from plundering Pennsylvania? This essay views these challenges through the lenses of modern homeland-security response framework and political/social factors that impacted the mobilization. **Given the time, resources, and systems available to quickly mobilize, train, and equip homeland-defense forces, the performance of the Pennsylvania militia forces prior to the Battle of Gettysburg was commensurate to the mission.**

### **Methodology**

Given the ad hoc establishment and complicated command structure that included civilian authorities (depicted in Figure One) of the Department of the Susquehanna in a time of distress, this essay discusses how the readiness level of the Pennsylvania militia relates to performance, whether the political and social factors inhibited or enhanced the outcome of the campaign, and how employment of a Total Force strengthens defense against national-security threats. Sections One through Four discuss the pre-Civil War Militia construct, the military actions that led to the establishment of the Department of the Susquehanna, and the operational overview of the ANV's plan. Section Five provides analysis of the complexity of historical, political, and socioeconomic factors that influenced Pennsylvania's reaction to Confederate movement into the state. Sections Six and Seven offer contextual background regarding

leadership within the AOP during the campaign. Section Eight reviews the manner in which Curtin and Couch mobilized the Department of the Susquehanna forces. Section Nine discusses the operational performance of the Pennsylvania militia. Section Ten provides lessons learned and practical applications gathered from the campaign.

### **Section 1: The Virtuous Citizen-Soldier – Antebellum Militia Construct**

In view of their experience with the British Army prior to the American Revolution, the Founding Fathers constrained the size of the standing army in exchange for a virtuous citizen-soldiery. Historians James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender describe the views of many Founding Fathers as they relate to the actions against the British standing army by colonists during Lexington and Concord in 1775:

The British army ostensibly invaded a peaceful countryside, thereby provoking the initial provincial response. The British force consisted of well-trained and disciplined *regulars*, representing a textbook *standing army* acting without provocation in time of peace. In turn, swarms of free-loving citizens beat back the regulars by using irregular tactics. *Citizen-soldiers* organized as militia found themselves in the position of fighting defensively to protect their liberties and property. For the colonist, the presence of Britain's standing army symbolized abuse of power. The citizen-soldiers of Massachusetts personified virtuous protectors of liberty.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of the experiences with the British Army in the 1760s and early 1770s, many Americans associated a large regular army with the “suppression of American rights,” enforcement of unfair taxation (such as the Stamp Act of 1765) and the quartering of Redcoat soldiers.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the virtuous citizen-soldier concept flourished in the early stages of U.S. history.

Composition of the early American militia supports the perpetual strengthening of the “propertied and the privileged.” Martin and Lender describe that service in the militia was

frequently restricted to “free, white, adult, propertied males, usually between the ages of 16 and 60.” Martin and Lender continue by explaining that “an active militia . . . indicated that citizens were taking their obligations seriously and behaving virtuously” to protect the equities of the middle- and upper-class land owners, while the lower-classes filled the enlisted ranks of the regular army.<sup>7</sup> Historian Richard H. Kohn further expands on this by noting that “the militia was not a system at all. . . . In reality, it was a concept of defense: the idea of universal obligation for defensive war, a people in arms to ward off an invader.”<sup>8</sup> In addition to this, the customary lack of standardized training and election of officers in most militia organizations resulted in a lack of readiness and unpredictability when employing militia for extended combat operations. In the words of Martin and Lender, the minutemen of Lexington and Concord exemplify the “unique strength” of the early American militia as “propertied freeholders operating locally, actually defending hearth and home.”<sup>9</sup> With this view in mind, a relatively small standing army augmented by state militia or Federal volunteers existed for the majority of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Then, as now, increased investment in training, equipment, and personnel readiness resulted in proportional enhancements of military capability and capacity. Limited federal investment in defense limited the size of the force and the readiness of militia forces and prevented the overextension of the Federal Government in regulating state matters.<sup>10</sup>

As described by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, prior to the Civil War the military’s “lack of professional standards of judgment invited the use of popular standards. Inevitably, the military service, like the civil service, was utilized to serve the ulterior end, honorable or not, of the political leaders of the government.”<sup>11</sup> During the Civil War, this political influence often carried over to the military leaders at both the state and federal levels. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, compulsory enrollment of military-aged males in local militia

units was a necessity to ensure security against threats from Native Americans, foreign incursion, and civil disturbance (such as slave insurrection) in most regions of the United States. However, as industry grew, so too did security, lessening the requirement for all men to serve in the militia. This was due to the removal of Native Americans, maturation of the Regular Army, and decreased threat of European expansion in the eastern United States. Limitations to mobilization of the militia included service within the state, unless called by the President to “suppress insurrection or repel incursion” and length of service.<sup>12</sup> By the 1850s, most local militia organizations consisted of volunteers loosely associated with political civic leadership, who would often elect to formally become a part of the state militia. As part of the state militia, companies would be organized, equipped, and resourced by the state government and subject to federal service outside the state in the event of an emergency. These citizen-soldier militia companies rounded out by new recruits filled the enlistment quotas of President Abraham Lincoln’s call for 75,000 ninety-day militiamen in April 15, 1861, and Governor Curtin’s recruiting proclamations of June 1863.

In support of Federal calls, state governments recruited the majority of volunteers for Federal service rather than for the state militia. Once in Federal status, the national command authority assumed responsibility for funding operations, maintenance, and supplies of the state militia for the duration of the mobilization.<sup>13</sup> For purposes of this essay the following distinctions apply. The term Federal Volunteers refers to “units created in war-time from paid volunteers willing to serve for periods of a year or more wherever required. These units were mustered into the service of the United States, and served their terms of enlistment under control of the War Department.”<sup>14</sup> The terms Militia, State Militia, Volunteer Militia, and National Guard refer to state forces that were in state or federal service for durations of ninety days, six

months, nine months, or “duration of the emergency,” such as the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia (PVM). During the Pennsylvania Campaign, the majority of the forces available in the Department of the Susquehanna were Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia and New York National Guard (NYNG) recruited to respond to the incursion. The level of readiness varied drastically between militia and the Federal volunteer force, the Army of the Potomac (AOP).

Unlike the AC/RC training strategies of today which account for component differences to produce comparable training readiness levels, the PVM was virtually untrained compared to the veteran formations of the AOP. The complexity of modern adversaries requires Total Force solutions to maximize limited resources and sustain readiness. Therefore, military professionals must leverage lessons learned from historical Total Force challenges, such as the Department of the Susquehanna, to prevent errors from occurring in the future. To this end, the Army published ATPF Implementation Guidance, which states, “The Army will ensure that the Total Force is organized, trained, sustained, equipped, and employed to support combatant commander requirements as force packages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives . . . As appropriate, the Army will integrate AC and RC forces and capabilities at the tactical level.”<sup>15</sup> Thus, a large multi-component army is required to fight and win the nation’s wars and provide responsiveness for Governors. In order for this to occur, requisite resources, funding, and time must be provided so that reserve-component forces can gain the appropriate readiness levels commensurate to their assigned mission. The employment of the Department of the Susquehanna represents employment of an ARNG force without resources, funding, and time to obtain readiness levels comparable to the veteran AOP, as well as their ANV adversary .



## **Section 2: False Sense of Security**

The War Department established the Department of the Susquehanna and the Department of the Monongahela on June 9-10, 1863, to defend Pennsylvania against incursion by Confederate forces. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton assigned two Regular Army generals formerly assigned to the AOP to command the new departments. The War Department sent Major General William T. H. Brooks to Pittsburg to command the Department of the Monongahela encompassing western Pennsylvania. Former Second Corps Commander in the Army of the Potomac, Darius Couch arrived in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on June 11, 1863, to assume command of the Department of the Susquehanna.<sup>16</sup> Prior to the establishment of the Department of the Susquehanna, south-central Pennsylvania was part of the Middle Department headquartered in Baltimore and commanded by Major General Robert Schenck.

The 1862 Maryland Campaign and Confederate Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Valley Campaign, intensified General Robert E. Lee’s appetite for operations away from his Virginia home.<sup>17</sup> The Mason-Dixon Line is less than thirty miles “as the crow flies” from Northern Virginia. As early as May 24, 1862, Pennsylvania Governor Curtin received communications from President Lincoln advising him to be prepared to mobilize the state militia should Confederate Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s “Foot Cavalry” continue north through the Shenandoah Valley. Despite being rescinded when Federal troops in Washington, D.C., became available, this message opened the governor’s eyes to the potential of Confederate incursion.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless many Pennsylvanians assumed that Confederate movement north of the border would be limited to small-scale raiding similar to cavalry commander Major General J. E. B. Stuart’s raid of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in October 1862, and that Union forces near Washington, D.C., would be able to respond rapidly to suppress

any Confederate infiltration. Unfortunately, the Maryland Campaign of 1862 supported this conclusion, during which time the main body of the ANV remained in Maryland prior to engaging with the AOP at Antietam on September 17, 1862. Thus, the Maryland Campaign reinforced “a false sense of security” for many political and community leaders in Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., that the burden of sustaining large military campaigns would remain south of the Mason-Dixon Line.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, it was not until a penetration north of the Mason-Dixon appeared inevitable that the Federal Government established a formal military department to defend Pennsylvania.

In September 1862, as the ANV initiated the Maryland Campaign, Governor Curtin appealed to the War Department for support in defending Pennsylvania. Curtin requested 80,000 men and a Regular Army general officer to organize the defenses of Pennsylvania.<sup>20</sup> Subsequent to the initial request, Curtin sent Thomas A. Scott (former Assistant Secretary of War, Pennsylvania Central RR President, and PVM Colonel) to Washington to follow up with a more conservative request of “at least one brigade of good disciplined troops to Harrisburg . . . and a competent officer of the Army of the Potomac, to act concert with [Major General George B.] McClellan.”<sup>21</sup> Eventually, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck directed the Pennsylvania Reserves’ Division Commander, Brigadier General John F. Reynolds, to report to Governor Curtin. Though Reynolds’ appointment temporarily fulfilled Curtin’s request, it had little impact on the enduring security of Pennsylvania, as soon as the later returned to northern Virginia for promotion to major general and corps command. Moreover, refusals of Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia forces to leave Pennsylvania marked Reynolds’ tenure. Additionally, Governor Curtin rapidly demobilized all twenty volunteer militia regiments - - independent cavalry, infantry, and artillery companies raised for homeland defense - - as the threat of incursion subsided.<sup>22</sup> Thus,

Pennsylvania retained little from the Maryland Campaign of 1862 to increase homeland-defense capacity and capability in Pennsylvania the following summer. The lack of continuity of military command combined with lackluster popular support foreshadowed the challenges of May-July 1863.<sup>23</sup>

### **Section 3: General Lee's Operational Plans**

*If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it.*

– General Lee to Lieutenant General Ewell, June 22, 1863.<sup>24</sup>

General Lee believed that another incursion into the north combined with Confederate battlefield victory would galvanize the peace movement and bring about a quicker end to the war.<sup>25</sup> In early June, Lee issued initial orders to his corps commanders for offensive movement north. The Second Corps, under Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell,<sup>26</sup> with support from Brigadier General Albert G. Jenkins's Cavalry Brigade, would lead the ANV north through the Shenandoah Valley. On June 13 Ewell's Corps captured Winchester, Virginia, and took 3,300 prisoners of Union Major General Robert Milroy's garrison the following day. This vacated the valley of Union Army resistance.<sup>27</sup> Once across the Potomac, Ewell's divisions under Major General Robert E. Rodes and Brigadier General Edward "Allegheny" Johnson proceeded north through Hagerstown, Maryland, and Greencastle, Chambersburg, Shippensburg, and Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Once in Pennsylvania, Major General Jubal Early's division moved east through Gettysburg and York to destroy the Susquehanna River crossing sites, disrupt lines of communication south of Harrisburg, and support subsequent missions as the campaign developed. Finally, General Lee conveyed to Ewell, "If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it."<sup>28</sup> With Harrisburg as Ewell's initial objective, General Lee employed his remaining forces in a manner that protected against anticipated threats from Major General Joseph Hooker and the AOP, still occupying positions between Virginia's Rappahannock River and

Washington, D.C. These tasks would fall to the First Corps under Lieutenant General James Longstreet and the Third Corps under Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell (A.P.) Hill. Hill initially would observe Hooker's actions. If the AOP withdrew from positions in the vicinity of the Rappahannock River, the Third Corps would follow Ewell into the Shenandoah Valley and proceed north. Longstreet's Corps would support Ewell on the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains to "confuse the Federals about where the army was bound."<sup>29</sup>

Lee's orders to cavalry corps commander J. E. B. Stuart, and Stuart's subsequent actions are a source of controversy and will not be discussed in this essay.<sup>30</sup> Suffice it to say, due to lack of intelligence from Stuart, Lee on June 29 reoriented the ANV from the Harrisburg objective to the AOP, now located east of South Mountain.<sup>31</sup> If Lee did not redirect the ANV, the heart of Ewell's Corps would have been pitted directly against New York and Pennsylvania Militia manning the defenses of Harrisburg and Columbia.

Despite being on the doorstep of Harrisburg and the Susquehanna (see Figure Two), Ewell's Corps turned to consolidate with the rest of the ANV to engage the AOP, which was moving north from Frederick, Maryland.<sup>32</sup> Not only did this change in plans distinctly alter the direction of movement of the ANV, but it also swung the pendulum of the Pennsylvania Campaign toward the AOP and away from the Department of the Susquehanna. From this point through the conclusion of the campaign, engagement between Lee's forces and Department of the Susquehanna militia would be less prominent in the overall outcome as focus shifted to the ridges, hills, and fields of Gettysburg.

#### **Section 4: “Violation of the American Tradition of Volunteerism”: Analysis of Factors that Impacted Pennsylvania’s Response to the Security Threats**

*When the Guard and Reserve go to war, their communities go to war.*

- Congressman Trent Kelly of Mississippi during National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) visit to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, in 2016.<sup>33</sup>

Thorough reflection upon the homeland-security response in Pennsylvania prior to the Battle of Gettysburg requires discussion of political and social factors. These factors shaped the operational environment and established the conditions for the internal strife that Couch and Curtin had to work through to mobilize latent resources and personnel into homeland-defense capabilities. Political and social divisions throughout the population dating back to before the Civil War caused many to view the government and military with contempt. During his change of responsibility ceremony to assume the role as the Army Chief of Staff, on August 14, 2015, General Mark A. Milley described that “war is an act of politics, where one side tries to impose its political will on the other. And politics is all about people. And people live on the ground . . . Wars are ultimately decided on the ground, where people live.”<sup>34</sup> As such, in south-central Pennsylvania in 1863, the reactions to actions by politicians and the civil authorities molded the response and volunteerism of the populace. The evolving direction of the Union strategic objectives, extended duration of the Civil War, and increasing casualties led to many changes in Northern States from 1862 to 1863. In the words of historian Robert Sandow, this included “government mismanagement, arbitrary arrests, military stalemate, and wartime inflation . . . [combined with] policies of emancipation and conscription” exacerbating regional and political differences.<sup>35</sup> In the isolated lumber and coal regions of the state this reinvigorated pre-war “distrust of central authority that made citizens vigilant for signs of political corruption.”<sup>36</sup> Prior to the war, throughout Pennsylvania, farmers and mobile wage workers developed intense self-

reliance due to the remoteness of rural farming and lumber communities. War measures that extended Federal powers disrupted the social and economic fabric of the many rural Pennsylvania communities and revived political tensions, repeating “a pattern of protest that area residents” demonstrated during the lumber industrialization of the 1850s.<sup>37</sup> Not since 1861 had conditions been as optimal for the ANV to succeed in exploiting the vulnerability present in Pennsylvania as in June 1863. Additionally, victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville pushed the momentum of success into General Lee’s favor.

Pennsylvania’s close proximity to the major engagements of the Eastern Theater, combined with regional isolation, political diversity, and lack of standing militia presented a vulnerable military target of untapped resources. Similar to Virginia and Maryland, according to Sandow, “the mountains of Pennsylvania shared characteristics of the southern Appalachians.” Moreover, “the sparsely populated mountains hindered ties to outside markets and fostered a reliance on localism in daily affairs . . . in the hierarchy of allegiance the needs of the real community outweighed those of the ‘imagery community’ of the nation.”<sup>38</sup> However, prior to the Antietam Campaign of 1862, the war remained “at arm’s length,” south of the border aside from the effects of increased centralized government and wartime inflation. Nonetheless, political strife dating back to before the Civil War created “fear in the rear”<sup>39</sup> and accusations of “tyranny” and “despotism,”<sup>40</sup> which the ANV could exploit during combat operations in Pennsylvania.

Sandow describes that the close-knit communities of the rural Susquehanna River valley and Pennsylvania’s Appalachia region prior to the Civil War, “clung tightly to the ideals of limited government” and embraced “ideology joining political and economic considerations together through the slogan ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’”<sup>41</sup> This Jeffersonian ideal

supported the local economies of pre-war Civil War agrarian communities. In addition to agricultural endeavors, farmers often supplemented their incomes by logging. By the 1850s, local raftsmen and farmers began to accuse the lumber industry of encroaching on regional economies, profiting from the land without replenishing it, and monopolizing the lumber at the expense of the livelihood of the local farmers.<sup>42</sup> By 1857, the raftsmen formally submitted their grievances to the state legislature, with the Republican ideological expectation that, as described by Sandow, the government would support the “economic opportunities of the ‘masses of the people’ . . . if government failed to ‘redress our wrongs,’ the people held the right to protect their own freedom through nonpolitical actions.”<sup>43</sup> When the state legislators sided with the lumber industry, Sandow conveys that, in the mind of many rural Pennsylvanians, the state government disregarded the welfare of the virtuous propertied citizenry in exchange for the financial interests of the lumber barons. These government decisions strengthened accusations of despotism and fueled dissent during the Civil War.<sup>44</sup>

As the Lincoln administration began to increase central authority by initiating strategic policy shifts such as emancipation and conscription, pre-war views of contempt toward the government re-emerged, manifesting as a new form of political partisanship. This stemmed from debate over the acceptable levels of loyal opposition versus patriotism. The Republican position that “he who is not for his country is against it” directly clashed with the Democratic desire to prevent the undermining of Constitutional principles.<sup>45</sup> Republicans accused these Democrats as being disloyal and treasonous “Copperheads.”<sup>46</sup> Despite reports of Democrat-sponsored secret societies, such as the “Knights of the Golden Circle,” historian Frank Klement asserts after thirty years of research that “beyond any reasonable doubt, that no systematic organized disloyal opposition to the war existed in the North.”<sup>47</sup> Nonetheless, this essay acknowledges the presence

of “grassroots” level conscription resistance and violence directed against provost marshals in Clearfield, Columbia, and other rural Pennsylvania counties. Though this does provide evidence of dissent, it does not provide evidence of coordinated conspiracy, according to Sandow.<sup>48</sup>

In the midst of a civil war, further internal divisions sparked by political dissent were considered unacceptable by many Republicans. In the words of historian Jennifer Weber, Democrat opposition “was not a ‘fringe’ issue but materially undermined the war effort by curtailing Lincoln’s power, discouraging enlistments, and wasting military resources on the home front.”<sup>49</sup> Historians will continue to debate the nature of this volatile discourse. Nevertheless, the discourse fueled existing pre-war anti-government dissent that threatened rural socioeconomic livelihood. Combined with wartime extension of central government powers, this discourse led some Pennsylvanians to feel a “violation of the American tradition of volunteerism” which hindered the rapid mobilization of virtuous citizen-soldiers in June 1863.<sup>50</sup>

By the summer of 1863, economic interests, personal affairs, and even resistance to the Enrollment Act of March 3, 1863, concerned many Pennsylvania men, aged twenty to forty-five, who had not yet served in the military. Blair also suggests the “pacifist tenets” of the Quakers, Mennonites, Pietists, and Dunkards in south-central Pennsylvania contributed to the slow response.<sup>51</sup> This is reinforced by a diary entry from the British Observer, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Fremantle, traveling with Longstreet’s Corps on July 29, 1863:

The Pennsylvania Dutch don’t seem the least thankful, and really appear to be unaware that their own troops have been for two years treating the Southern towns with ten times more harshness. *They are the most unpatriotic people I ever saw, and openly state that they don’t care which side wins, provided they are left alone.*<sup>52</sup>

According to Sandow, this population “looked upon all warfare as morally wrong.”<sup>53</sup> Blair argues that south-central Pennsylvania residents enjoyed “non-market relations and exchanges,



which created a community tied to town or regional trade . . . that resisted intrusions from outsiders.”<sup>54</sup> Ethnic-group migrations to Pennsylvania added security and stability to the areas settled; however, “during the war ethnic loyalties offered potential to undermine national allegiance,” according to Sandow.<sup>55</sup> This further inhibited volunteerism among a target demographic for enlistment.

In spite of this, once a citizen decided to volunteer, conflicting federal and state calls for militia confused enrollment officers and volunteers alike. As early as 1861, Governor Curtin identified the “cumbersome militia system” as “wholly inefficient” and implored the legislature to improve weaponry and updated militia laws.<sup>56</sup> The volatile partisanship associated with two years of war and tightening federal government authorities minimized any militia improvements by 1863. Eventually, on June 26, Couch and Curtin were able to fully clarify terms of enlistment. However, according to Sandow, citizen-soldiers “were not able to disengage soldiering from politics, and volunteering was a clear statement in support of the war.”<sup>57</sup> This civic mindedness continued into military service. Therefore, in June 1863, increased political opposition to the Federal imposed war measures led to a lethargic response to President Lincoln’s and Governor Curtin’s calls for militia volunteers.

Consideration of Pennsylvania’s volunteerism in 1861-62 is necessary to grasp the nature of the response to Governor Curtin’s June 1863 Proclamations for volunteers. In 1861, President Lincoln asked Pennsylvania for fourteen volunteer regiments, and the state provided twenty-five regiments.<sup>58</sup> In light of this, Secretary of War Simon Cameron, also from Pennsylvania, refused to federalize the additional regiments. In turn, rather than sending the regiments home, Governor Curtin established the Pennsylvania Volunteer Reserve Corps and trained and equipped the additional regiments at the cost of the state of Pennsylvania. When the President eventually

federalized the Pennsylvania Reserve Regiments, these units formed the only Division in the AOP comprised of men solely from one state. The creation of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division and rapid mobilization of the emergency volunteer militia in 1862, confirmed the presence of fervent unionist sentiment in Pennsylvania. By 1863, most fervent unionists had already volunteered and had been wounded, had been killed, returned home, or were in hospitals recovering.<sup>59</sup> In sum, a significant portion of the military manpower of the state was already on duty in the AOP.

In addition, the industrial base provided inconsistent support to the mobilization effort. Support from the coal-mine industry in Schuylkill, Luzerne, and Carbon counties was virtually nonexistent. Governor Curtin's enforcement of the Federal Militia Act, passed on July 17, 1862, angered Democrats throughout the state who opposed emancipation and further expansion of centralized government.<sup>60</sup> Not only did the bill empower "the president to enroll 'persons of African descent' for 'any war service'" but the act also, "defined the militia as comprising all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five and empowered the president to call state militia into federal service for a period of up to nine months."<sup>61</sup> Due to Governor Curtin's description of "the Militia Laws of Pennsylvania . . . [as being] extremely defective," he obtained the support of United States Marshals to conduct a "state draft" to fill the quotas.<sup>62</sup> This resulted in armed resistance across the three coal counties, and Curtin twice requested 1,000 federal troops to "crush the resistance so effectually that the like will not occur again." The Federal Government suspended habeas corpus, which authorized arrest of "all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to the rebels."<sup>63</sup> Federalized Pennsylvania troops from the Middle Department eventually helped Governor Curtin resolve the resistance.<sup>64</sup> However, this set a precedent for

resistance to future calls for support and further divided the Republicans and Democrats throughout the state.<sup>65</sup> Thus, in June 1863, when Governor Curtin called for volunteers, historical opposition and dissent toward the government intrusion required clear and distinct definition of the terms of service, regardless of the evolving reality of homeland security posed by Lee's approaching Army.

Employers often concealed employee information in order to inhibit Federal provost marshals from enrolling employees in the draft. Once the initial surge of 1861 patriotism had worn off, the migrant workers in remote mountain and coal regions were not attracted to the low pay and possibility of death offered by military service. According to Sandow, their mobility enabled them to disappear leaving "little record of their efforts" when word of federal authorities' arrival came.<sup>66</sup>

In light of contemptuous Pennsylvanians' views regarding calls for militia service, the Governor and President's proclamations needed to assure volunteers that terms limited service to within state borders for the duration of the emergency. Curtin, Couch, and Stanton wrangled over whether to muster the volunteers into Federal or state service. To obtain clarification and avoid conflicting state and Federal terms, Governor Curtin dispatched Thomas A. Scott to Washington, D.C., to meet with President Lincoln. Following the meeting President Lincoln decided to include in the June 15 Presidential Call a request for 100,000 six-month militiamen with a clause stating, "unless sooner discharged."<sup>67</sup> Despite this, volunteers questioned the proclamation duration of service. In response, Secretary of War Stanton eventually telegraphed General Couch, "Let them be called upon to muster under the President's call. If they refuse, then muster them in whichever way you can."<sup>68</sup> Thus, the Governor on June 16 issued another call stating the duration of service would be, "only while the danger to the State is imminent."<sup>69</sup>

Lastly, on June 26, to provide final confirmation that militia duty was for service in the state, Curtin issued a proclamation for 60,000 volunteers for ninety days or as long as the “safety of our people and honor of our State may require.”<sup>70</sup>

By June 30, 1863, the citizens of Pennsylvania suffered through Confederate divisions tramping over their property, demanding payment of tributes, confiscating livestock and food stores, seizing public and private municipal infrastructure, and shipping free African Americans into slavery. This led some historians to ask whether some members of the populace succumbed to secessionism, or was this “support” out of necessity to prevent destruction of personal property?

The sixteen thousand militia volunteers and countless civilian laborers, scouts, and railroad workers mobilized for homeland defense in June 1863 refute the thesis that Pennsylvania would willfully transfer support to the Confederacy. However, the risk to personal and financial interests posed by ANV movements in south-central Pennsylvania enhanced “Copperhead,” anti-conscription, anti-emancipation, and anti-war sentiments for many Pennsylvanians, preventing many citizens from volunteering. In some cases, individuals previously not interested in the war became sympathetic to the Confederacy to avoid personal loss. This essay acknowledges lack of volunteerism throughout the region stemmed from localism, socioeconomic self-interest, and opposition to expanded Federal authorities. These factors did enable Confederate freedom of movement south of the Susquehanna River. However, these sentiments were not universal. As described by Sandow, “motives for individual actions are complex; none of these can be mutually exclusive” and in many cases divided communities.<sup>71</sup> For example, Altoona resident Charlotte Lewis bitterly described her neighbors to a sister in a June 26 letter stating, “I hope they’ll [Rebels] rob the Bedford County people well,

for they are secessionist and wouldn't turn out a man for the emergency and some objected to furnishing any eatables to our men."<sup>72</sup> Embarrassed that his fellow citizens surrendered York to Early without a fight, resident James Latimer admonished his neighbors in correspondence with his brother by writing, "If men won't go to the defense of their own State . . . they don't deserve to be called patriots. I am ashamed of myself and my town."<sup>73</sup> Nonetheless, whether neighbors viewed the conflict from opposing sides or not, throughout Pennsylvania, many communities came together, resulting in unified action for the general welfare and prevented movement of the ANV east of the Susquehanna River.

As stated in the 2016 National Commission of the Future of the Army Report, when mobilizing reserve-component formations, synchronized community "support is necessary for the Joint Force to be able to effectively and rapidly counter threats to the nation."<sup>74</sup> ARNG units today, similar to the militia units of the Civil War, are scattered in communities throughout the heartland of America. ARNG units are entrenched in the local fabric of their communities, much closer to the deep divisions in American society than those active-component forces located on large military installations which support communities where they reside. In 1863, as the Pennsylvania militia mobilized, enrollment officers encountered dissent and resistance confirming what Sandow describes as a "widespread myth that Americans have generally put aside differences in times of war to support the national cause."<sup>75</sup> The tenuous environment brought the simmering pre-war dissent of the populace to the forefront which hampered volunteerism and provides political, social, and economic setting for the Pennsylvania militia mobilization of June 1863.

Therefore, this essay acknowledges that the conditions for rapid mobilization of the militia were not present in Pennsylvania in 1863. Democrats viewed political measures as a

strategic shift that had changed the conflict from a limited war with limited ends to a “total” or “hard war” to free the slaves. Additionally, the 1863 gubernatorial election year in Pennsylvania further magnified political strife between Republican Governor Curtin and Democrats through the state. Innate mistrust of the government lingered due to aggressive enforcement of conscription by Federal Government-appointed provost marshals in the fall of 1862.<sup>76</sup> For these reasons and due to fear of loss of personal property many Pennsylvanians hesitated to volunteer for the militia. As stated by General Dwight D. Eisenhower while Supreme Allied Commander in 1944, “public opinion wins wars” and in 1863 the public opinion was skeptical of the direction of the war.<sup>77</sup> Therefore, in the words of historian William A. Blair, volunteerism really did not increase until “it became clear that service would last solely for the emergency and within the state’s borders.”<sup>78</sup>

### **Section 5: General Hooker’s Operational Plans**

*“It is not in my power to prevent it.”*

- Major General Hooker to President Lincoln in response to suspected ANV movements across the Potomac River on June 15, 1863.<sup>79</sup>

With the civil-military situation in Pennsylvania being so tenuous, why did the AOP not move into Pennsylvania earlier? Major General Joseph Hooker’s vision for the actions of the AOP following the defeat at Chancellorsville differed significantly from the strategic objectives of President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton. Despite indications that the ANV was moving into the Shenandoah Valley, Hooker intended to allow the ANV to move into Maryland and Pennsylvania, to the extent that he told President Lincoln, “it is not my power to prevent it [Lee’s Incursion].”<sup>80</sup> Ultimately, Hooker planned to prevent a “running battle” in the Valley and preferred to engage the ANV on ground his of own choosing. He would not commit to moving a large portion of the AOP until he could determine the size of the Confederate force

moving north.<sup>81</sup> The strength of the force crossing the Potomac River would inform Hooker on the ANV objectives. A sizeable force crossing the Potomac indicated objectives in Maryland or Pennsylvania rather than direct movement against Washington, D.C. Once the ANV was across the Potomac, Hooker intended to send a force west in the valley and block the ANV's lines of communication over the Potomac. Next, Hooker would place the AOP in advantageous defensive positions which would force Lee to attack.<sup>82</sup> On June 24 Hooker received reliable intelligence from his Bureau of Military Information (BMI) that all ANV Corps had crossed the Potomac. Gaining this intelligence, Hooker initiated movement of the AOP across the Potomac. Despite Hooker's logic, the War Department and President Lincoln clamored for action sooner. They viewed any incursion on northern soil as a threat to the nation and capital. In sum, Hooker's plan was not aligned with the strategic objectives of the civil authorities to protect Washington, D.C. Hooker further highlighted his lack of alignment with the administration by requesting to abandon the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. This appears to have been the last straw. Therefore on the night of June 27-28 he was replaced as the AOP commander by Major General George G. Meade.<sup>83</sup>

#### **Section 6: General Meade's Appointment to Command**

*"I must move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered."*

– Major General George G. Meade message to General-in-Chief Halleck after assuming command of the AOP on June 28, 1863.<sup>84</sup>

When he received command of the AOP, Meade was encamped outside of Frederick, Maryland, with his corps. His orders from General-in-Chief Halleck were clear and aimed to prevent the errors of the previous commander. First, Meade was given complete authority over "all forces within the sphere of [your] operations." This included Harpers Ferry and the Department of the Susquehanna, thus preventing the disconnect experienced with Hooker.

Halleck also directed Meade to “anticipate him [Lee] or arrive with him so as to give him battle.”<sup>85</sup> Meade, one of the most combat-experienced corps commanders in the AOP, immediately internalized the scope of the task at hand. In his telegraph response to Halleck he stated, “it appears to me I must move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered.”<sup>86</sup> On June 29, with knowledge of the ANV’s movement in the Cumberland Valley and Ewell’s corps north of his army, Meade outlined his plan to the Union corps commanders. Meade intended to move north to locate and engage the ANV. During the march into Pennsylvania, Meade planned to fan out the AOP Corps moving along multiple axes of advance from Emmitsburg, Maryland, east to Manchester, Maryland.<sup>87</sup> Once the ANV’s location was pinpointed, Meade desired to select advantageous terrain from which to establish defensive positions and force Lee to attack. However, before Meade’s plan came to fruition the two grand armies collided at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on July 1.<sup>88</sup> Had the battle occurred in Maryland rather than Pennsylvania, the involvement of the Department of the Susquehanna in the campaign may have evolved in another manner.

Despite this, one difference between the new and old AOP commanders was their relationship with Couch. Couch’s disdain and lack of trust for Hooker led to the former’s resignation as the Second Corps commander and reassignment to the Department of the Susquehanna. In fact, when President Lincoln asked Couch who he recommended to command the AOP, if Hooker were to be replaced, Couch stated that Meade was the worthiest Union general for the position.<sup>89</sup> Meade’s appointment opened lines of communication between the Department of Susquehanna and the AOP that were nonexistent under Hooker’s tenure. Lines of communication between the AOP and the Department of the Susquehanna facilitated the flow of



critical information throughout the campaign as Confederate General Stuart's cavalry cut several telegraph lines between Washington and the AOP.

## **Section 7: Department of the Susquehanna Mobilization**

### **Operational Analysis of Mobilization**

*There is danger that we may be disposed to rely too much on General Hooker's army, and not sufficiently upon our own strength and resources, which alone should be equal to the task if stout hearts direct them . . . There is danger that, having been so frequently alarmed by reports of previous raids that have proved unfounded, our people may allow themselves to rest in a false sense of security. There is danger that, from these causes, the response to the Governor's proclamation may not be so prompt and unanimous as the emergency demands.*

*- Philadelphia Press editor, June 16, 1863.<sup>90</sup>*

On June 10, when Couch was informed that he had been selected to command the Department of the Susquehanna, Ewell's Second Corps was entering the Shenandoah Valley to initiate the ANV movement north. The following day, Couch arrived to Pennsylvania amid a flurry of commotion associated with the large rebel force in the northern Shenandoah Valley as depicted in Figure One. Despite a convoluted web of military, political, social, and economic challenges, often exacerbated by competing local, state, and federal interests, Governor Curtin and General Couch began the task of converting latent civil resources and population into homeland-defense capability.

The first obstacle to overcome was a lack of a standing military force in the Department of the Susquehanna. According to historian Stephen Sears, upon Couch's arrival the Department only consisted of a "token force in Philadelphia – an infantry unit called the Philadelphia Grays, two artillery batteries, and two troops of cavalry."<sup>91</sup> The War Department authorized Couch to recruit a corps in defense of the Keystone State.<sup>92</sup> "In view of the danger of incursion now

threatening the State of Pennsylvania by enemies of the Government,” Couch issued General Order (G.O.) Number 1 on June 11, “to prevent serious raids by the enemy.”<sup>93</sup>

Despite the simplicity of the original plan, Couch quickly became caught in the middle of a struggle between Secretary Stanton and Governor Curtin, which resulted in the ensuing calls for volunteers on June 12 (state call), 15 (federal call), 16 (state call), and 26 (state call). Each call attempted to clarify a fault in the previous call. The actions by the state and Federal Government in enforcing the Enrollment Act, Militia Act, and the state militia draft, when coupled with antebellum frictions and resentments, caused citizens to view any call to service with contempt. In order to break through this barrier, Couch and Curtin had to work diligently with President Lincoln and the War Department to deconflict the terms of militia service in Pennsylvania as a result of the emergency. This was initially met with staunch resistance from Stanton, who was responsible for filling the dwindling ranks of the Federal Armies brought on by the expiring enlistments of thirty-eight two-year regiments and ninety-two nine-month militia regiments in the summer of 1863.<sup>94</sup> Governor Curtin followed this with a June 12 Proclamation of Volunteers to “give permanent security to our borders . . . [and] defense of our homes, firesides, and property from devastation.”<sup>95</sup> The call for volunteers escalated on June 15, as President Lincoln called for 100,000 militia (Pennsylvania – 50,000; Ohio – 30,000; Maryland – 10,000; West Virginia – 10,000) for six months of federal service “unless sooner discharged.”<sup>96</sup>

Debate over duration of service, location of service, Federal-versus-state service, and resourcing of the militia began following the first proclamation and G.O. Despite this, as stated in Couch’s G.O. Number 1, “when not required for active service to defend the department, they [volunteers of the department] will be returned to their homes, subject to the call of the general commanding.” This reflects Couch’s understanding of the requirement that the Corps of the

Susquehanna would be a militia force mobilized for temporary service within the department.<sup>97</sup>

Governor Curtin supported Couch, explaining to Stanton, “If the organization of both [Federal and state service] should be started now, General Couch will be deprived of the best material in the State to make his force efficient, and both branches of service be delayed.” Couch continued that if the Department of the Susquehanna forces were needed for the AOP, they could be reassigned later.<sup>98</sup> This however, was exactly what many citizen-soldier volunteers were concerned would occur. Therefore, until Governor Curtin could confidently pledge that militia volunteers would not be transferred into the AOP, recruitment was slow. Civilian confidence was restored with the June 26 Proclamation. Thus, the lack of unified action between the state and Federal Government bogged down Couch’s and Governor Curtin’s mobilization plans and fueled the anti-war rhetoric pumped into south-central Pennsylvania by Democratic Pennsylvania publications such as the Harrisburg *Patriot and Union* and the Bellefonte *Democrat Watchman*. These newspapers published scathing accusations directed at Republicans such as Curtin and Lincoln arguing that if the threat to Pennsylvania were legitimate, Pennsylvania Reserve troops then defending Washington should be sent to defend their home state.<sup>99</sup> As with modern employment of military capabilities during homeland-defense missions, timely manner of mobilization requires that all internal and external threats be addressed so as not to impede employment capabilities.

Despite this, military necessity prompted Governor Curtin again, on June 26, to appeal to the populace with another formal proclamation. The proclamation outlined the enemy forces were within “23 miles of Harrisburg . . . [and called] for 60,000 men . . . to muster to the service of the State for a period of ninety days, but will be required to serve only so much of the period of muster as the safety of our people and honor of our State may require.”<sup>100</sup>

From an administrative, organizational, and leadership perspective, Couch's experience as a corps and division commander proved extremely valuable in transitioning the Department of the Susquehanna into a functioning military district within days of assuming command. Couch worked closely with the state government, War Department, adjacent commanders, and local civic leaders to construct a framework for homeland defense by integrating civil and military systems and resources to provide security. For example, he coordinated with Thomas A. Scott of the Pennsylvania Central RR to provide work crews to construct defenses, and he mobilized civilian safety committees. Through a series of general and special orders, Couch established subordinate defense sectors along the Susquehanna River and rendezvous points where citizen and militia volunteers could report to organize and enroll into militia companies. On June 16, with a clear grasp of the nature of the emergency and limitations facing his command, Couch and the commander of defenses of Lancaster County directed that "each citizen shall provide his own arms and ammunition, until a sufficient supply of arms reaches this department, also his own rations for three days to be carried with him; also entrenching tools, either an axe, shovel, or pick."<sup>101</sup> The military department assumed control of the railroad system, river crossings, and bridges to increase the transportability of forces and the distribution supplies in the first weeks of the campaign. Couch censored the telegraph systems, coordinated civilian scouts, and served as a critical communication link and intelligence provider for both AOP and War Department through the duration of the campaign.<sup>102</sup> Couch's leadership was crucial to the success to the Department of the Susquehanna because it enabled the mobilization despite initial disorganization and lack of training. If Couch had not done this, Meade and Washington would not have been as well informed on the ANV movements, and Harrisburg could have been captured before the arrival of the AOP. Thus, the militia served as buffer preventing Lee's Army

from moving directly to Harrisburg prior to the arrival of the AOP. Improved synchronization with the War Department and a more experienced veteran force could have further impeded ANV movements in Pennsylvania.

Once volunteers reported to rendezvous points, Couch's detailed instructions provided for rapid mobilization. Historian Glenn E. Billet describes that G.O. Number 1 appealed to civil leaders and military veterans by using commissioned-officer rank as a bounty for organizing volunteers. Recruitment of forty or more volunteers warranted a captain's commission. Once organized into a company, the Department coordinated rail transportation of the company to Harrisburg to be consolidated with other companies to form a Pennsylvania volunteer militia regiment.<sup>103</sup> A direct convergence of civilian and military domains occurred as military officers of the Department of the Susquehanna coordinated with civilian officials in their areas of responsibility which ultimately minimized the destruction and ceded some aspects of the homeland-defense control to the civilian authorities. In Lancaster County, cooperation between civil and military authorities mitigated shortages by unifying to build fortifications and feed the volunteers. In Philadelphia, the City Council "voted \$500,000 to recruit, equip, and pay volunteers."<sup>104</sup>

Without mature staff systems and few training military staff personnel, Couch and Curtin faced sustainment and logistics challenges throughout the month of June 1863. As described by historian Edwin Coddington, "to try to recruit, muster in, equip, and send to the front such numbers in short time caused boundless confusion. Neither Couch or Curtin had a large enough staff of administrators trained in military affairs."<sup>105</sup> Couch regularly communicated with Army Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs to provide support to the Department. However, due to inexperienced staff and his own lack of desire to use what the Meigs' aide-de-camp called

“coercive measures” to get the civilian populace to comply with supply requirements, the Department would not thoroughly resolve logistics shortfalls prior to the Battle of Gettysburg.<sup>106</sup> Officially the Department provided equipment and subsistence to the volunteers, but in the uncertain days when state-versus-federal service was being clarified, some discouraged volunteers departed rendezvous points and went home. In other locations, such as Columbia and Wrightsville, communities did band together to provide rations for the recruits as the dispute was settled between Harrisburg and Washington, D.C.<sup>107</sup> Governor Curtin’s innovative solution was required to pay the state militia because Federal funds were not available and Secretary of War Stanton was not inclined to appeal for a special session of Congress for this purpose. Therefore Governor Curtin, “and committee of citizens made arrangements with certain banks of Philadelphia to advance sufficient funds.”<sup>108</sup> Without appropriated funds for the Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia beyond the duration of the emergency, Governor Curtin quickly demobilized the militia following Gettysburg.

Though Lincoln’s proclamation did not call for support from New York, evidence indicates a higher level of readiness in the New York National Guard than in the Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia. In support of the Department of the Susquehanna, Secretary Stanton informed Couch that Democratic New York Governor Horatio Seymour would forward, train, and equip militia regiments to defend Pennsylvania. Brigadier General Joseph F. Knipe arrived in Harrisburg with 800 New York National Guardsmen before Pennsylvania had mustered a single regiment. By June 30, the state of New York sent a total of sixteen regiments to the Department of the Susquehanna, more than doubling the seven volunteer militia regiments and mixed independent companies that Pennsylvania mobilized.<sup>109</sup>

In response to calls for support from Governor Curtin, New Jersey Governor Joel Parker issued a proclamation for volunteers from his state on June 17. Eventually New Jersey would send a militia battalion and two New Jersey Volunteer Regiments that were preparing to be mustered out of service. However, the regiments would have little impact on the campaign as they departed after spending less than a week in Pennsylvania.

### **General Couch's Operational Plans**

An experienced graduate of the famed West Point class of 1846, General Couch quickly recognized the limitations of his force, which grew to a strength of 16,000. Comprised of militia from Pennsylvania, New York, and eventually New Jersey, it included an invalid battalion from the military hospital in York, an African-American company from Franklin County, students and professors from local colleges, and even seventeen War of 1812 veterans.<sup>110</sup> Veterans who had returned home from the war after completing their terms of service and officers who resided in the region also filled out the officer and enlisted ranks of the Department of the Susquehanna. From June 15 through the first week of July, the Department assembled forces in Harrisburg and throughout the threatened border counties. During this time, Couch planned, coordinated, and executed the employment forces as they became available.

Minimal response occurred by June 15, leading Couch to conclude, based on initial survey of the terrain and knowledge of Milroy's loss of Winchester, that his state of affairs was dire.<sup>111</sup> Couch's indignation was best summarized in a telegraph to Secretary Stanton stating, "All is being done that is in our power to resist the incursion, but, as matters look now, all south of the Susquehanna will be swept. Orders are being sent to run out all horses &c."<sup>112</sup> In addition to this, he requested 10,000 rifles and 2,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition from the War Department.<sup>113</sup>

With NYNG regiments present and Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia companies being assembled into regiments at Camp Curtin, Couch initiated construction of Harrisburg defenses on June 19. Considering the Department's lack of experience, vast terrain, and proximity of Ewell's approaching Corps, Couch's plan aimed to prevent the ANV from crossing the Susquehanna River. From the state line, the river ran northwesterly past Columbia-Wrightsville and Harrisburg, and intersected with the Juniata River seventeen miles north of the state capital. Couch intended to use this ninety-mile stretch of the Susquehanna River as the Department's "main defensive line." Using railroad crews and civilian volunteer laborers, Couch fortified the areas west of the main bridges in Harrisburg and Columbia-Wrightsville. However, understanding the limitations of his green volunteer force, he informed Stanton, "I have made every exertion to protect the bridges across the Susquehanna, but they are to be fired, if it becomes necessary."<sup>114</sup> In June 1863, the depth of the river was low and offered fording opportunities at several locations. To decrease the potential of the ANV fording the river, all boats were ordered to the eastern shore.

Considering the criticality of the bridges, road intersections, and railroad junctions, Couch assigned veterans and officers with Regular Army experience to command the key terrain. Former 129 Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiment commander and Medal of Honor recipient, Colonel Jacob G. Frick, commanded the Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia (PVM) and was assigned to oversee the defenses of Lancaster County and the Columbia-Wrightsville Bridge.<sup>115</sup> On June 26, Couch received support from Stanton with the assignment of former AOP Major Generals Napoleon J.T. Dana and William F. "Baldy" Smith. Supporting the generals, many veteran company-grade and field-grade officers answered the calls for volunteers, and eventually filled integral staff and leadership positions coordinating defense of



the Department.<sup>116</sup> Couch designated Dana as commander of the Philadelphia defenses and Smith to lead the First Division of the Department of the Susquehanna, which was responsible for all defenses south and west of the Susquehanna.<sup>117</sup>

General Smith's area of operations included the new entrenchments at Fort Washington and Fort Couch astride Bridgeport Heights on the western shore of the Susquehanna, overlooking Harrisburg on the eastern shore. Occupation of this key terrain was required to maintain control of Harrisburg and the western Carlisle Turnpike/Cumberland Valley RR approaches to the city. To delay Ewell's advances toward the river, maintain lines of communication, and provide information on ANV movements, Couch deployed the Eighth and Seventy-first NYNG regiments to Franklin County, and the newly formed Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia Regiments to York and Adams Counties. Additionally, NYNG Regiments remained in Harrisburg and at Fort Washington and Fort Couch.

The Twentieth PVM under Colonel William B. Thomas defended the RR Junction of York. After the campaign, Couch described York as "a strategic point. It covered the approaches to [the] Columbia Bridge, one of the important crossings of the Susquehanna and it gave me more anxiety than any other point in Pennsylvania excepting Chambersburg."<sup>118</sup> To reduce risk and secure the vital North Central RR running southwest from Harrisburg through York toward Baltimore, the Twentieth was pushed south of York toward Hanover Junction.<sup>119</sup>

Rounding out the forces that comprised the Department of the Susquehanna west of York, the Twenty-sixth PVM commanded by Colonel W.W. Jennings arrived in Gettysburg on June 26 and formed the first belt of militia forces east of South Mountain. West of South Mountain and the Cumberland Valley, the demoralized remnants of Milroy's Division commanded by Colonel Lewis B. Pierce occupied the Bear Pond Mountain passes in the vicinity

of Bloody Run (modern day Everett, Pennsylvania). His cavalry, specifically the First New York and Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, provided Couch with pertinent reports on ANV movements throughout the campaign.<sup>120</sup> North of Harrisburg, Colonel Joseph Hawley commanded two NYNG regiments and the Twenty-ninth PVM in Mount Union. This force was mobilized and equipped for emergency, but lacked the benefit of time to train and build collective readiness; nonetheless military necessity required their diligent service.

### **Section 8: Department of the Susquehanna Operations: Defensive Line and Intelligence**

*The homeland is confronted by a variety of disparate and interrelated threats that demand coordinated procedures and synchronized efforts among interagency partners responsible for law enforcement (LE) national defense, particularly those who have overlapping roles, responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities.*

-Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, *Homeland Defense (HLD)*<sup>121</sup>

Though the threats posed to Pennsylvania homeland security by the ANV in June-July 1863 were less abstract and more tangible than most modern threats, the demand to coordinate and synchronize efforts effectively between military and civilian partners was just as necessary then as it is today. Actions by the Federal Government in 1862-63, including Federal conscription legislation and the Emancipation Proclamation, deepened pre-existing contempt toward the government causing many to believe the expanding power of the Federal Government was a greater threat to homeland security than the ANV. This slowed recruitment and volunteerism of the citizen-soldier force who largely viewed military service as political support for the war.

Bearing these challenges in mind Couch established an operational approach feasible for inexperienced militia to execute. On June 11, Couch in G.O. Number 1 specified that volunteers were needed “to prevent serious raids by the enemy.” To effectively accomplish this, Couch

concluded a “serious raid” qualified as penetration across the Susquehanna defensive line. In order to prevent this within the constraints of time, resources, and systems available to quickly mobilize, train, and equip his force, Couch concluded the Department of the Susquehanna had to delay the ANV long enough to allow the AOP time to engage Lee. Critical to success of this mission were the defense of the Susquehanna River crossing sites and maintaining a continuous flow of intelligence to the AOP, which required synchronization and coordination of all military and civilian capabilities that could be mustered within the department.

Following initial confirmation of ANV movement north, General-in-Chief Halleck anticipated that the target would be west toward the industrial base of Pittsburgh and the newly established Department of the Monongahela.<sup>122</sup> This incorrect assumption was reinforced by initial movement of Confederate Brigadier General Alfred Jenkins’ Cavalry Brigade which crossed into Pennsylvania raiding farms, hamlets, and communities as far as north as Chambersburg and west to McConnellsburg in Fulton County, Pennsylvania. There he acquired \$12,000 in cattle, 120 horses, and several African Americans on June 17, which were all sent south.<sup>123</sup> Accounts of these exploits gripped residents of the Cumberland Valley, causing them to conceal livestock and valuables in wood lots, cellars, and all manner of other locations. Not only were citizens hearing of the fall of Winchester, but they also witnessed the flood of refugees, fleeing their homes in the valley, descending on Susquehanna River crossing sites.<sup>124</sup> African Americans fled out of concern that their capture would result in them being sent south into slavery. General pandemonium rippled through the Valley. Charles Coffin of the Boston *Morning Journal* described citizens “here and there in a frantic manner; shouting, screaming, as if the Rebels were about to rush into town and lay it in ashes.”<sup>125</sup> In Harrisburg, the State Government boxed official records and “28,000 volumes from the State Library and shipped

them to Philadelphia.”<sup>126</sup> The editor of the Harrisburg *Evening Telegraph* reported that “all sorts of vehicles, droves of cattle, horses, sheep, and swine” were streaming across the Camelback Bridge over the Susquehanna.<sup>127</sup>

In addition to panic among the civilian population, strife over of the length of service and federal/state status of volunteers was not resolved quickly. Without a comprehensive process to call and assemble state volunteers and Federal volunteers simultaneously, units and individuals reported to Harrisburg and were often discouraged upon arrival to find that the state service for which they intended to volunteer for was in reality a Federal designation for longer duration, placing them potentially at risk to lose their civilian employment. This was the case for employees of Phoenix Iron Company, as the company refused “to reserve the jobs of those who joined the federal service.”<sup>128</sup> Concern over loss of civilian job security combined with lack of clarity of the militia enrollment process caused some volunteers to depart Harrisburg and reduced volunteerism throughout the state.<sup>129</sup> Subsequently, by June 17, after a week in command, Couch reported only 250 men ready for service. By June 21, the arrival of the NYNG, the mobilization of one PVM regiment, and the establishment of civilian safety committees in several communities strengthened the Department. These forces mobilized and equipped to form the core of the Department of the Susquehanna and served as the buffer between General Lee and Harrisburg.

### **First Battle of Gettysburg**

On June 24 Ewell established headquarters in Chambersburg. Two days later, the Twenty-sixth PVM experienced a baptism of fire on the Goldenville Road northwest of Gettysburg. Prior to departing Harrisburg for Gettysburg, Colonel W.W. Jennings, commanding the Twenty-sixth PVM, received the following instructions from Couch:

Colonel Jennings will use his best efforts to hold the country, *harass the enemy*, attacking him at exposed points or *falling back in order*- and advancing his force or part of it, making flank attacks, etc., doing everything in his power to weaken [and] mislead the enemy and protect the country.<sup>130</sup>

In order to ascertain the disposition and location of the ANV, the Twenty-sixth reconnoitered the South Mountain gaps. During that time, it ran into the lead elements of Major General Jubal Early's division.<sup>131</sup> After recognizing that the majority of Early's division supported by artillery and cavalry were to his front, Colonel Jennings ordered his green militia regiment to withdraw. Outnumbered by a veteran force over four times the strength of his regiment, Colonel Jennings' withdrawal was disrupted by the Seventeenth Virginia Cavalry Regiment, resulting in the capture of one hundred seventy-six militiamen.<sup>132</sup> Despite the disorganized nature of the retreat and the prisoners taken, it must be acknowledged that most of the Twenty-sixth PVM militiamen had been leading civilian lives two weeks earlier, while the veterans of Early's division had been fighting the war for two years. Thus, by mere comparison of the training readiness level of Early's division to Jennings' regiment, it was an achievement that the Twenty-sixth PVM remained intact for future employment by the Department, gained the valuable intelligence regarding the direction and composition Early's force for the AOP and War Department, and accomplished the intent of Couch's orders. Though history often paints the actions of the Twenty-sixth PVM in a negative manner, a deeper understanding of the regiment's mission, adversary, and readiness level reveals that the PVM performed within the scope of its capabilities. It provided valuable information for the Department and slowed ANV movement to support the homeland defense of south-central Pennsylvania.<sup>133</sup>

## **York Surrenders**

In Gettysburg, Early required an \$11,000 tribute to be paid by the local populace. However, the townspeople claimed that Gettysburg's resources had been evacuated along with its citizens due to the military campaign. Early's division then proceeded toward York, where on June 27 the York Committee of Safety coordinated to hand the town over to Early's division to prevent unnecessary destruction. Despite Couch's desire to maintain control of York as a strategic rail junction, the local populace wanted to prevent the town from being destroyed. Prior to Early's arrival, the Pennsylvania militia forces evacuated and proceeded to Wrightsville to support Colonel Frick. David Small, the Chief Burgess of York and Safety Committee Chair, coordinated the payment of "\$28,000, one thousand hats, pairs of shoes and socks and three days' supplies" in tribute to Early.<sup>134</sup> This highlighted the superiority of civilian authority over military in the execution of the homeland-defense mission.

Similar to modern volunteer public safety organizations, safety of communities led by local civic leaders aimed to provide security and protection to vital interests and resources. In York, for example, the Committee of Safety organized the resourcing of \$5000 in bounties to encourage militia enrollment. The strength of the committee was in organizing grassroots support in areas viewed most critical by the local populace. In June 1863, this was primarily focused on protecting local economic resources and infrastructure (such as agricultural equipment, livestock, farm fields, local factories, and stores), not necessarily military objectives. For example, in York, committee members provided early warning of General Early's Division movements toward the city but disregarded Major Granville Haller's request to fell trees and establish barricades to impede Confederate movement. Ultimately, the Committee of Safety surrendered the town to Early and provided him with tribute payments to secure the safety of the

town and their homes. The safety committees looked beyond the military objectives and focused on the sustainment of the resources to maintain economic posterity after the armies departed. Their objectives often differed based on political sentiments and economic stability. In the case of York, the objective of the civil authorities was to prevent the destruction of the town. The military objective was to prevent Confederate access to the North Central RR and roads to Harrisburg. Though the result was surrender of the town, the actions of the safety committee did prevent unnecessary destruction and infrastructure damage that could have impacted York for years. This is a key lesson applicable for military professionals during modern homeland-defense operations. Military service resides under the authority of the civilian executive to ensure accountability. During homeland-defense operations, having the military in support of or working in parallel with civil authorities ensures that the proper amount of the military element of national power is applied domestically. In the case of York, withdrawal of the Department of the Susquehanna's military forces enabled the civilian authorities to coordinate under amicable terms.<sup>135</sup> Thus, despite the tactical military commander's desire to not surrender the town of York, the greater strategic-level objectives of the Department were not violated by surrendering the town and the civilian authorities were able to maintain all municipal and private infrastructure.

By June 28, Ewell and the majority of the Second Corps were in Carlisle with control of the Federal Barracks (see Figure Two). With Harrisburg within Ewell's grasp, Brigadier General Jenkins' Artillery bombarded Couch's pickets from the Eighth, Twenty-third, and Fifty-sixth New York National Guard (NYNG) at Oyster Point, less than two miles west of Harrisburg (the nearest the ANV ventured to Harrisburg during the campaign). Ewell ordered Rodes' Division to be prepared to lead the assault on Harrisburg.<sup>136</sup>

## **Columbia-Wrightsville Defense**

Also on June 28, Brigadier General John B. Gordon's Georgia Brigade of Early's Division proceeded east from York and encountered at Wrightsville the Susquehanna River crossing defenses of Colonel Jacob B. Frick's Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia. Second in importance only to defenses outside Harrisburg, residents of the surrounding counties understood the military significance of the crossing as well as the critical connection it provided for the local economy. As the only bridge between Harrisburg and the Maryland border, it provided a vital link for the commerce that traversed through one of the three sections of the bridge: the Pennsylvania Central RR track, a wagon/foot path, and the Pennsylvania – Susquehanna & Tide Water Canal towpath.<sup>137</sup> Since June 19, community members from across Lancaster and the surrounding counties rendezvoused at Columbia-Wrightsville to construct defense works. Expecting to be confronted with a numerically superior and better-equipped Confederate force, Colonel Frick ordered the bridge to be prepared for destruction and ordered his three artillery pieces (manned by civilian crews) to be transported to the eastern shore. Frick's small militia force consisted of his regiment, the Twenty-seventh PVM, three companies of the Twentieth PVM, the invalid battalion/York garrison, local independent cavalry scouts, an African-American militia company, and three artillery pieces totaling approximately 1,500 men.<sup>138</sup> This was not adequate to man the defense works constructed over the previous week. Therefore, Frick planned to delay the Confederate force as long as possible and then retreat across the bridge, burning it during the withdrawal.<sup>139</sup> Out of effective range of his artillery support on the Columbia shore, Colonel Frick's force skirmished with the opposing 2,200 Georgians of Gordon's brigade until Confederate artillery fire and a flanking force threatened to sever Colonel Frick's lines of communication. At this point, Colonel Frick ordered the retreat and



destruction of the bridge to prevent the Confederate force from crossing the Susquehanna.<sup>140</sup>

Thus, understanding Couch's intent and objective, Colonel Frick employed a simple withdrawal plan that was within the capacities of his force and effectively prevented the ANV from crossing the Susquehanna. As the flames of the burning Columbia-Wrightsville Bridge reflected off the river, Union casualties from the engagement included one African-American volunteer killed, fourteen wounded (including one civilian child), and twenty captured. Confederate casualties were one wounded and an unknown number captured.<sup>141</sup> With the Susquehanna bridge sites blocked and new intelligence on the location of the AOP General Lee, on June 29, transferred the focus of the ANV toward the AOP. This positioned Couch and the Department of the Susquehanna at a crucial position to provide intelligence to both Washington, D.C. and the AOP.

### **Vital Information and Intelligence**

More than any other operation conducted by PVM and NYNG during the Pennsylvania Campaign, the information and intelligence provided by the militia and civilian scouts proved to be a distinct contribution of the Department of the Susquehanna. By June 21, J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry cut the majority of the telegraph lines connecting the AOP to Washington, D.C. Therefore, with telegraph lines destroyed, Couch's Department collected, coordinated, and consolidated intelligence reports from across south-central Pennsylvania. These reports were integral in describing campaign details and movements of the armies to President Lincoln, Secretary of War Stanton, and General-in-Chief Halleck.<sup>142</sup> Historian Glenn E. Billet described the Department of the Susquehanna as a "clearing house" for all manner of intelligence reporting, which frequently resulted in Meade receiving information about his own force prior to receiving the report from internal AOP reporting channels. Couch commandeered the telegraph and railroad system in Pennsylvania to support all war efforts and in so doing leveraged the

leadership to report information on Confederate movements their staff and employees encountered. In addition to this, uniformed military cavalry scouts such as Captain William H. Boyd (Milroy's Division) and PVM commanders coordinated with local agents to ascertain valuable intelligence throughout the campaign. Thomas A. Scott and William B. Wilson of the Pennsylvania Central RR coordinated a civilian scout organization which provided information on Ewell's Corps until it was within a few miles of Harrisburg.<sup>143</sup> PVM Colonel A.K. McClure managed civilian agents in Chambersburg and Alexander Lloyd led valuable scouting operations west of the Cumberland Valley.<sup>144</sup> From all such sources, Couch consolidated and cross-referenced the information to develop detailed reports for the War Department and AOP on a daily basis. The cooperation Couch received from civilian RR and telegraph services stemmed from the mutual understanding that communication with the AOP increased the likelihood of AOP protection of infrastructure and resources.<sup>145</sup> In the words of Edwin Coddington, "when the civil and military authorities wanted reliable knowledge, they would turn to Couch."<sup>146</sup> By leveraging civilian influence, industry, and leadership, the Department of the Susquehanna provided integral intelligence necessary to steer the AOP toward the ANV and inform the War Department.

### **Harrisburg and Carlisle**

With Susquehanna River crossing sites still in possession of the Department of the Susquehanna, on June 29 Couch wired Meade regarding the experience level of his force, which further exemplified Couch's keen awareness of the limited capability his citizen-soldiers. Though the strength of the Department had grown to 16,000, he told Meade, "five thousand regulars will whip them all to pieces in an open field."<sup>147</sup> Meade then conveyed his desire for

Couch to harass Lee until the AOP could engage the ANV. In the spirit of this directive, on June 30 a NYNG Brigade under Colonel John Ewen marginally defeated Confederate mounted infantry from Jenkins' brigade lingering five miles west of Harrisburg. The minor affair had little bearing on the outcome of the campaign. Known as the Battle of Sporting Hill, it was the farthest north a Confederate Army ventured during the war.<sup>148</sup> Following Sporting Hill, Jenkins' force joined the rest of Ewell's Corps moving toward Gettysburg.

Since the threat to the Susquehanna crossing sites reduced with every approaching mile of the AOP's movement north, Halleck conveyed instructions to Couch to threaten Ewell's flank and rear. On the July 1, "Baldy" Smith moved his division from the forts on Bridgeport Heights to Carlisle in an attempt to engage Ewell's rear. After Smith's forces occupied the town, Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee's Confederate Cavalry brigade of J. E. B. Stuart's Corps arrived on the outskirts of Carlisle. On three separate occasions Brigadier General Lee demanded Smith surrender the town. During this process J. E. B. Stuart ordered the Federal Barracks to be burnt. Despite this targeted act against Federal property and an artillery bombardment from Lee's Horse Artillery, Smith maintained control of Carlisle until Stuart and Lee departed during the predawn hours of July 2 to link-up with the rest of the ANV at Gettysburg. Though hampered by the inexperience and logistical problems during movement, the PVM and NYNG successfully maintained control of Carlisle and were postured for future homeland-defense operations.<sup>149</sup>

From July 1-3, the Department of the Susquehanna forces monitored the dull sounds of the battle raging at Gettysburg. However, they would play a less prominent role for the remainder of the campaign. Following the battle, the presence of the AOP and defeat of the ANV led many Department of the Susquehanna volunteers to believe that the "emergency" no longer existed, thus concluding their terms of enlistment. This combined with conflicting

civilian pursuits, such as agricultural harvesting and industrial production, led to the rapid demobilization of the Department. By August 1863, the strength of the Department of Susquehanna reduced to less than 12,000 volunteers and by December less than 4,000 were present for duty.<sup>150</sup> Through coordinated civil-military operations in south-central Pennsylvania, the Department of the Susquehanna succeeded in preventing “serious raids” east of the Susquehanna River and provided critical intelligence reports to the AOP and War Department which facilitated the defeat of the ANV at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Another essay could be composed on the performance and longevity of the volunteer militia forces following the Battle of Gettysburg. However, since this discussion would follow the ANV retreat south into Maryland and across the Potomac River, it extends beyond the scope of this study. This would warrant several additional considerations regarding the training, readiness, and role of the Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia.

### **Section 9: Lessons Learned and Practical Applications**

*The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support calls for securing against attack through an active, layered defense . . . the Department of Defense must be postured to take immediate, decisive action to defend against and defeat the threat in the homeland.*

- Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, *Homeland Defense (HLD)*<sup>151</sup>

Over one hundred and fifty years after the event, military professional can garner several lessons from the mobilization of the Pennsylvania militia in 1863 for modern military professionals employing ARNG forces. Bearing in mind the mission, enemy, time available, terrain, troops available, and civilian considerations, the situation was full of undeniable challenges. Within a week of the establishment of the Department of the Susquehanna, militia needed to be recruited, trained, equipped, and deployed. Little could be gained from the militia mobilization of the previous year as the political situation had worsened and the militia

regiments had been disbanded. Additionally, lines of communication, supplies, and key infrastructure needed to be secured. In view of this, Darius N. Couch simplified the mission into two essential tasks: to prevent the Susquehanna River from being crossed and to provide intelligence for the AOP and War Department to expedite their movement to engage the ANV. From an operational perspective, the fact that Harrisburg was not captured and Susquehanna River was not crossed indicated that the mission was successful.

However, from a civil-military operations perspective, the campaign was less than desirable, despite admirable conduct by communities, units, and individuals. Lack of maturity and military readiness of the Department combined with the contemptuous views of the populace resulted in a sluggish response throughout the state. This contradicted the oft-perceived myth that the government received universal support in the time of war. Blind patriotism was not and continues to not be the nature of many Americans. Whether it was truly misguided patriotism or not, during the Civil War attitudes that questioned the government elicited charges of treason and disloyalty from Republican officials. In the words of historian Robert Sandow, “more accurately, the Civil War had much in common with the Vietnam War, during which widespread protest confounded governing authorities and directly affected the conduct of the war.”<sup>152</sup> The deep-rooted views of pre-war dissent toward the central government, especially in rural areas, took extensive prodding to dislodge in order to mobilize the masses. Edwin Coddington concludes that the “invasion of Pennsylvania failed to spur the people of the North to new heights of patriotic devotion and sacrifice . . . [the] response to the challenge was barely adequate and certainly uninspiring.”<sup>153</sup> With warfighting resources in short supply, the Department of the Susquehanna, with a little luck, did just enough to avoid defeat, to the credit of combined military and civil leadership at all levels.

This does bring to light lessons learned for modern military professionals when considering the employment of ARNG forces. The first lesson involves the readiness of ARNG forces. Both military and civil authorities must acknowledge that mobilization of an ARNG force requires time and resources. Unless high readiness is maintained, rapid mobilization of RC forces does not occur without the assumption of risk. In the words of thirty-first Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Carl E. Vuono, “Training is the cornerstone of readiness – it is the top priority of the total Army.”<sup>154</sup> As described by historian Carol Reardon, the volunteer armies of the Civil War era lacked training, and forged most development through battlefield experience. The all-volunteer and highly technological forces of today are exponentially more reliant on training to develop collective unit readiness. A typical ARNG brigade or division trains thirty-nine days per year and progressively builds individual training readiness to collective training readiness over a three-to-five-year training cycle. Unlike AC units, which are available year round for training and have a much shorter training cycle, training readiness development of national guard units is spread across multiple training years. Even in the less-complex training environment of the Civil War, with volunteer armies, the expectation for training readiness to develop in days or weeks was unrealistic. However, this was the military necessity confronting the Department of the Susquehanna because PVM readiness was not sustained between the fall of 1862 and summer of 1863. Today, in order to prevent atrophy of skills gained during the last sixteen years of conflict, the 2017 ARNG Vision and Strategy aims to “incrementally increase total readiness to assist the Army in reducing risk against peer military powers.” The Strategy describes that “increased ARNG readiness reduces post-mobilization training days, translating into faster relief and response capability for Combatant Commanders.”<sup>155</sup> This mitigates the loss of ARNG warfighting capability and governor responsiveness experienced in the 1863 PVM.

The evolution in warfare and national-security threats over the last one hundred and fifty plus years warranted development of a large standing army in spite of the initial expectations of many of the Founding Fathers. Budgetary constraints limit the size of the standing army. Operational demands both globally and in the homeland require the employment of a versatile reserve. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army mandate “Total Force” integration, requiring “military departments to organize, man, train, and equip their active and reserve-components as an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities.”<sup>156</sup> As such, the Army requires uniform standards across all components to support geographic combatant commander’s operational requirements. However, both in 1863 and in modern times, Federal and State authorities must coordinate appropriate operations-maintenance (O&M) and pay-allowance (P&A) funding requirements to support ARNG/militia mobilizations. Due to the nature of the emergency, this did not occur with the Pennsylvania militia in 1863. Without effective planning, programming, and budgeting to synchronize funding for homeland-defense contingencies, the twenty-first century emergency response will be extremely degraded.

Moreover, employment of the ARNG formations must be measured and aligned with the readiness level of the unit. When employing an ARNG unit for a Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) emergency (such as disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and state level mobilization) the unit leader must evaluate the training and readiness level, assume risk, and adjust employment based on the strengths of the unit. ARNG units activated for these types of emergencies are activated based on their proximity to the event, a specific capability that resides in the unit, or because the mission does not require a specific level of collective training readiness. The depth and scope of homeland defense and DSCA missions often does not require a collective training readiness level above company level proficiency (typically conducted by

ARNG units as the culmination of a three-to-five year training cycle prior to deployment). Therefore, if a unit is mobilized prior to achieving company level proficiency, the commander assumes risks during the mobilization.<sup>157</sup> In mobilizing the Pennsylvania militia in June 1863, Couch had to assume risk at the corps level without the advantage of already having an established force structure and readiness level available today in the RC. Therefore, with this high level of assumed risk, it is significant that the Department of the Susquehanna was able to establish a defensive military posture. This is a testament to the leadership, intellect, and resolve of the volunteers that answered the call.

As stated in Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-0 *Mission Command*, the outcome of Army Leader Development doctrine is to develop “competent leaders of character, able to seize, retain, and exploit initiative while exemplifying the tenets of mission command. Leaders ready to win and thrive in uncertain conditions.”<sup>158</sup> The tenets of mission command require leaders who “build cohesive teams through mutual trust, provide commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, accept prudent risk, use mission orders, and create shared understanding.”<sup>159</sup> Like unit readiness, these leadership competencies develop over time and refine through professional development, experience, and training. Commissioned officers of the twenty-first century are ingrained with these principles regardless of component -- citizen-soldier or regular army. During the Civil War and specifically in the emergency mobilization of the Department of the Susquehanna, the impending military necessity truncated training and progressive development of militia readiness. Therefore, due to the lack of militia readiness, military leaders such as General Couch were forced to “seize” and “exercise disciplined initiative,” as well as “accept prudent risk,” among other timeless tenets of mission command.



As during the Mexican War and War of 1812, the lack of a large standing army at the outbreak of the Civil War required mobilization of Federal Volunteers, and in the case of the Department of the Susquehanna, the state militia. Political officials appointed or the volunteers elected the officers on account of political or socioeconomic influence or civilian profession. This sparked debate regarding the requirement for a standing army and validity of professional military education. As described by historian Carol Reardon and rooted in the works of Swiss-born nineteenth century military theorist Antione-Henri Jomini, some antebellum Americans viewed “military genius” as the “innate quality present in an individual at birth” that would emerge in times of strife. They claimed that military geniuses such as Generals George Washington and Andrew Jackson had no formal military education, and “complained of its [the United States Military Academy’s] expense . . . [and] opposed any institution that supported a standing army.” In contrast to this, the proponents of professional military education, such as then Captain Henry W. Halleck in 1846 asked:

If professional ignorance be a recommendation in our generals, why not also in our lawyers and surgeons? . . . Is it less important to have competent [officers] to command where the lives of thousands, the honor of the flag, safety of the country depend upon their judgement and conduct, than it is to have competent surgeons to attend the sick and wounded?”<sup>160</sup>

Jomini describes that military education enables generals to “know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it to a successful termination.” Jomini’s triad of military genius, intellect, and/or character, when combined with application of military knowledge, physical courage, and moral courage form the essential requirements of successful generalship.<sup>161</sup>

Though General Couch was not a military genius, the Department of the Susquehanna was well served by his courage, character, intellect, and military knowledge forged through formal military education at West Point, and command experiences at all levels, from regiment

to corps leadership. He understood that military proficiency did not just appear on the battlefield without training, drill, and education. Occasionally, a spark of excellence emerged from minimal training, as was the case with the famed minutemen at Lexington and Concord in 1775. However, typically this involved employment of guerilla/irregular tactics, required coordination with a regular force, or included another distinct advantage on behalf of the irregular force (such as a fortified position or an equally inexperienced adversary). Couch's comprehension of the low readiness of the Pennsylvania militia compared to the experienced veterans of the ANV, focused his planning on missions the militia were capable of accomplishing: intelligence gathering and defensive missions.

Reardon describes that those who denounced professional education of the officer corps "did not understand time, effort, specialized knowledge, or resources required to build, train, move, and command a people's army. Instead, they regularly attributed a general's delay, missteps, or defeats to a real or alleged political allegiance."<sup>162</sup> Political affiliations often influenced the type of warfare generals were willing to conduct. Similarly, enlisted soldiers frequently saw the act of volunteering as political support for the war.<sup>163</sup> As such, the all-volunteer armies "had a mind of their own" and could no longer be treated as simple pawns to maneuver on a military map. Reardon describes their conviction and sentiments influenced the outcomes of battles. They required leadership from men of intellect. Respect had to be earned and was not simply given due to rank.<sup>164</sup> Reardon argues that, as the war progressed, Lincoln gravitated toward generals willing embrace to a "hard war" philosophy and generals of intellect rather than genius.<sup>165</sup> The rare occurrence of genius required more frequent reliance on intellect and character. Reardon explains that intellect developed through a combination of military education and training, and grew with experiences. However, with "knowledge of the human

nature and the habit of dealing with the mankind in masses” the human factor is much more challenging to teach. Therefore, Reardon concludes that military officers should be recruited and drawn from both civilian life and formal military education programs.<sup>166</sup> Diversity within the military leadership embraced the cultural differences present in the force so as to be able to “build cohesive teams through mutual trust, provide [clear] commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, ...and create shared understanding,” thus exemplifying the tenets of mission command<sup>167</sup> as well as the convergence of civil and military domains to ensure synchronized lines of effort. Lack of alignment of the civil and military domains inhibited the ability of Department of the Susquehanna leadership to rapidly harmonize all aspects of the layered approach to homeland defense prescribed by Joint Publication 3-27. Nonetheless, leader intellect and tactical initiative neutralized the homeland-security threat posed by the ANV prior to the arrival of the AOP.

### **Conclusion**

The factors that impacted response to the security threats in June 1863 Pennsylvania (e.g. contempt of the populace, political dissent, ad-hoc militia system, deterioration of unionist volunteers, limited time, and popular emphasis on personal economic interests) garner several lessons learned regarding the relationship between civil authorities and the military. The fact that the Department of the Susquehanna and the Pennsylvania government were able to assemble a military force despite these challenges is a testament to the leadership abilities of Couch and Curtin. A fracture in the vital linkage between the military strategy, government policy, and civilian populace was evident in June 1863. As is evident by the complex web of civilian, military, and governmental personalities depicted in Figure One, the Department lacked an organized structure to rapidly mobilize for an emergency. The situation became further

complicated by competing calls for volunteers which added to popular skepticism of the government's intentions. To avoid less-than-optimal circumstances, similar to Pennsylvania in June 1863, and because modern VEO and conventional threats require even greater rapid response capability, the era of maintaining a small standing army is long past. Due to this, the U.S. Government must maintain "collaborative frameworks" between civil and military agencies to efficiently "conduct integrated civil-military planning and implementation" against homeland and national security threats.<sup>168</sup>

For the modern military professional, study of the Department of the Susquehanna reveals how domestic political tension during homeland defense missions can threaten national security. In June 1863, Republican Governor Curtin and General Couch, a Democrat, put politics aside to address the security threats. The unity displayed between Couch and Curtin is an exception rather than a rule in domestic civil-military operations. Unfortunately, the negative impact of political allegiances on civil-military operations is more common. To ameliorate this, bipartisan organizations, similar to the National Council of Governors established by President Barack Obama's Executive Order 13528, facilitate coordination between Governors, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, and President's National Security and Homeland Security Advisors.<sup>169</sup> Through these types of forums, modern political and military leadership separate political ideology from national security and homeland defense "in order to strengthen further the partnership between the Federal Government and State governments to protect our Nation and its people and property." Additionally, this fosters joint accountability, minimizes divergence of political and military domains, and encourages "mutual interest pertaining to National Guard, homeland defense, and civil support activities."<sup>170</sup> To further diminish the


impact of political partisanship, command relationships and authorities must be leveraged to prevent unnecessary risks and support contingency planning.

The command relationship in the Department of the Susquehanna between Couch, a federally commissioned general officer, and the state militia directly conflicts with modern Title 10 U.S. Code (T10 - Federal) and Title 32 U.S. Code (T32 – State National Guard) authorities.<sup>171</sup> National Guardsmen “supporting a state-managed emergency response” under a governor’s T32 authority cannot be directed by a T10 commander unless they are federalized under the authority of the President or Secretary of Defense.<sup>172</sup> Joint doctrine describes that legal status restrictions on state and Federal forces can be managed by creating a joint task force (JTF) with a dual-status commander (DSC).<sup>173</sup> A DSC provides single command authority during civil-military operations for T10 and T32 forces. The DSC is “an intermediate link in two distinct, separate chains of command flowing from different federal, territorial, and state governments” and minimizes the complexity associated with having multiple or parallel chains of command. For example, in domestic civil-military operations in the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) area of responsibility the JTF-Civil Support (JTF-CS) is “primarily designed for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management (CBRN CM), JTF-CS provides C2 for DSCA for natural disasters that may not involve CBRN response (e.g., Hurricane SANDY in 2012).”<sup>174</sup> Governors or adjutants general can also establish JTFs at the state level to provide requested DSCA.<sup>175</sup> A parallel command structure provides an alternative to utilizing a DSC structure with separate chains of command for T32 forces and T10 forces. Parallel command structures require close coordination to ensure unity of effort.<sup>176</sup> Regardless of the command structure selected, trust must be cultivated between civil and military authorities through enduring civil-military training and integrated planning which tests emergency


management assistance compacts/mutual support agreements between states and federal government to ensure emergency response preparedness and civil-military response capability.

Couch recognized the importance of civil-military collaboration of resources and time in the employment of his militia force, and did not over commit to decisive force-on-force engagement. Considering the militia's readiness level, political turbulence, and socioeconomic challenges, the Department of the Susquehanna's performance was commensurate with the assigned homeland-defense mission and readiness level. However, this does not provide a mobilization model for future generations. This does reinforce that integration of all military components and civil authorities is required to provide national security. Uniform standards, systems, and processes that can integrate, add, and remove capability as the situation requires must be developed to maximize national security across all domains. The Army Total Force Policy is a means for all Army components to standardize. However, as recommended to the U.S. Congress by the National Commission on the Future of the Army, in January 2016, "the reserve-components must be resourced to provide both needed operational capability and the strategic depth the nation requires in the event of a full mobilization for unforeseen requirements."<sup>177</sup>

Figure 1



**Figure 2**





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<sup>1</sup> Mark A. Milley, "In a Complex World, Winning Matters." October 1, 2015.

<https://www.army.mil/article/156478>.

<sup>2</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy)*, September 4, 2012, 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> National Commission on the Future of the Army. *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 28, 2016) 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>5</sup> James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, *A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789*, 3rd ed. The American History Series (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Wiley Blackwell. 1982) 4-5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 15; Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789* (Boston: Northeastern Press, 1975), 33. The presence of the British Army in North America was to protect against threats from the Native Americans and French rather than internal threats from colonists.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 16 & 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 17; Richard H. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Military Federalist and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802* (New York, Free Press 1975), 7.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>10</sup> Prior to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1916, state militias/national guard adhered to the training and readiness levels deemed acceptable by state authorities rather than the Federal Government.

<sup>11</sup> Samuel P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belk Press of Harvard University Press. 1957), 203.

<sup>12</sup> Allan Satin, "Understanding the Militia of the Northern States, 1861-1865,"

[http://www.cincinnaticwrt.org/data/articles/Satin\\_final\\_UNDERSTANDING%20THE%20MILITIA%20OF%20THE%20NORTHERN%20STATES.pdf](http://www.cincinnaticwrt.org/data/articles/Satin_final_UNDERSTANDING%20THE%20MILITIA%20OF%20THE%20NORTHERN%20STATES.pdf). Length of militia service was limited to three months per year in accordance with Militia Act of 1792.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* As described by Satin, "they [Federal Volunteers] would be mustered into the service of the United States, and would serve their three-year terms under control of the War Department." In the early stages of June-July 1861, Union forces in the field were a combination of two-to-three-year Federal Volunteer Regiments called by President Lincoln on May 3, 1861, and ninety-day federalized state militia.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Army Total Force Policy Implementation Council of Colonels* (Headquarters Department of the Army. Washington, DC, July 10, 2015), PowerPoint Presentation.

<sup>16</sup> United States War Department. *The War of the Rebellion. A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1889) volume 27, part 3, pages 54-55 (hereafter cited as OR); William J. Miller, *The Training of an Army: Camp Curtin and the North's Civil War*, (Shippensburg, PA: White Maine, 1940) 1-13; Scott L. Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg: The Confederate Expedition to the Susquehanna River, June 1863*, (New York: Savas Beatie. 2011) 3. The Department of the Susquehanna comprised the eastern three quarters of Pennsylvania, including the Mason-Dixon Line border counties of Somerset, Bedford, Fulton, Franklin, Adams, York, Lancaster, and

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Chester. The state capital of Harrisburg, industrial hub of Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania extension of the Shenandoah Valley, known as the Cumberland Valley, were included in the Department. The Cumberland Valley extended from the state line northeasterly to Harrisburg. The Cumberland Valley was bordered on the west by Bear Pond Mountains of the Ridge and Valley Appalachians, and on the east by South Mountain, the Pennsylvania-Maryland extension of the Blue Ridge Mountains. South Mountain provided a formidable natural barrier to conceal nineteenth-century north-south movement into the heart of Pennsylvania and its capital. Paralleled by the Valley Pike Road, the Cumberland Valley Railroad (RR) ran the length of the valley from Greencastle through Chambersburg to Shippensburg where it transferred into Cumberland County, passed through Carlisle, and continued across the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg. The environs of south-central Pennsylvania surrounding Harrisburg were a hub of railroad and road systems and the seat of state government. Camp Curtin was also located in Harrisburg. This training base was used to mobilize regiments for Pennsylvania and other states prior to moving to Virginia. The Cumberland and Shenandoah Valleys not only provided for the agricultural and economic resources, they served as vital avenues of approach for future incursions of Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, this foreshadowed the significance the Shenandoah and Cumberland Valley would have on future incursions north of the Potomac River. In 1862, Confederate Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson recognized the strategic significance of the valley not only for the agricultural and economic resources it provided, but also a vital avenue of approach for future incursions of Pennsylvania. During that year, he charged the chief topographical engineer, Confederate cartographer Jedediah Hotchkiss, with building maps of the valley, which were used throughout the war.

<sup>17</sup> During the March-June 1862 Valley Campaign, Confederate Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s “Foot Cavalry” maneuvered as far north as Winchester, Virginia, and threatened to cross the Potomac River. In September 1862, the ANV’s thrust across the Potomac River resulted in the bloodiest day in American history at the Battle of Antietam. With the momentum gained by the defeat of the AOP at Chancellorsville on the first days of May 1863, General Lee and the ANV would once again struck out to the North using the Shenandoah and the Cumberland Valley as the primary line of advance.

<sup>18</sup> OR, I, 27, pt. 3, 68-69 & 80.

<sup>19</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 23.

<sup>20</sup> Samuel Richey Kamm, “The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott,” (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1940) 140.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

<sup>22</sup> Cooper H. Wingett, *Emergency Men! The 26th Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia and Gettysburg Campaign*, (Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Printing, 2013) 9.

<sup>23</sup> Kamm, “The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott,” 139-149.

<sup>24</sup> OR, I, 27, pt. 3, 905 & 914-915; Stephen W. Sears, *Gettysburg* (New York: Mariner Books, 2004) 103.

<sup>25</sup> OR, I, 27, pt. 3, 880-882; OR, I, 25 pt. 2. 81. Union officials received the first intelligence reports of General Robert E. Lee’s desires to invade the North on May 27, 1863. After two years of intense conflict, anti-war peace-seeking political movements, such as the Copperheads, were gaining popularity in many northern states.

<sup>26</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 18. Ewell worked on Columbia RR before the war, was stationed at the Carlisle Barracks. Thus he knew the South-central Pennsylvania RR and road

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system well which impacted Lee's decision to place Second Corp at the lead of the ANV. Additionally, expanded Confederate offensive operations in Pennsylvania and Maryland during the summer of 1863 would minimized the burden on Virginia farmers supporting the war effort for a third summer and allow the agricultural base to recover.

<sup>27</sup>Edward J. Stackpole, *They Met at Gettysburg*, (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1956)

13, The fall of Winchester vacated the Shenandoah and Cumberland Valley of any Union Army resistance as the remnants of Milroy's disorganized force retreated toward Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and Bedford, Pennsylvania.

<sup>28</sup>OR, I, 27, pt. 3, 905 & 914-915; Sears, *Gettysburg*, 103.

<sup>29</sup>Sears, *Gettysburg*, 94.

<sup>30</sup>Stackpole, *They Met at Gettysburg*, 13. Stackpole summarizes that Lee's orders to Stuart were to serve as the "Eyes of the Army" by guarding the right flank, "Recon and keep Lee informed... [and] collect horses, cattle, and flour." This resulted in Lee receiving limited intelligence from Stuart on the movements of the AOP in the early stages of the Pennsylvania Campaign. It was not until June 28, when a spy reported the AOP was concentrated around Frederick, Maryland and heading north, that Lee received formidable intelligence on the enemy location. This alarmed Lee because he expected information of this nature to come from Stuart. Also see works by Eric Wittenberg including: Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David. Petruzzi, *Plenty of Blame to Go Around : Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg*. (New York: Savas Beatie 2006).

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 124. General Longstreet's spy and Alabama actor, Henry Thomas Harrison reported, that the AOP was north of the Potomac River concentrated around Frederick, Maryland, heading north, and commanded by Major General George G. Meade on June 28.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 117, 133; Uzal Ent, "Rebels in Pennsylvania," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1998): 52; Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 239-280.

<sup>33</sup>National Commission on the Future of the Army. *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 28, 2016) 49.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>35</sup>Robert M. Sandow, *Deserter Country: Civil War Opposition in the Pennsylvania Appalachians*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009) 73.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 8-9.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 11&15.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>40</sup>Andrew L. Slap and Michael Thomas Smith, *This Distracted and Anarchical People : New Answers for Old Questions About the Civil War-Era North*, (New York: Fordham University, 2013) 43.

<sup>41</sup>Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 9-10. After felling trees, raftsmen would float the logs down tributaries of the Alleghany and Susquehanna rivers to local sawmills. By the 1850s this abundant resource developed into a twenty million dollar lumber industry and resulted in conflicts between the lumber barons and raftsmen and farmers.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 28-31.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 28-29.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 28, 36-40. This "rhetoric of republicanism" fueled the ensuing Raftsmen's Rebellion of 1857 and future feuds between citizens "who lived there and those who did not" which perpetuated political dissent during the Civil War. When the state legislators sided with lumber

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industry, raftsmen confronted corporate loggers at Clearfield Creek. Following a brief skirmish resulting in the injury of three lumberjacks and destruction of the logger's camp, a series of court decisions ushered in a new era favoring the corporate lumber industry.

<sup>45</sup> Slap and Smith, *This Distracted and Anarchical People*, 43,49.

<sup>46</sup> Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 81.

<sup>47</sup> Slap and Smith, *This Distracted and Anarchical People*, 47.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 50-51.

<sup>49</sup> Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 7.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>51</sup> William Alan Blair, "'A Source of Amusement': Pennsylvania versus Lee, 1863," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 115, no. 3 (1991): 336.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20092629>.

<sup>52</sup> Arthur James Lyon Fremantle and Walter Lord, *The Fremantle Diary : Being the Journal of Lieutenant Colonel Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, Coldstream Guards, on His Three Months in the Southern States*, (Short Hills, NJ: Burford Books. 2001) 196.

<sup>53</sup> Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 58.

<sup>54</sup> Blair, 'A Source of Amusement,' 337.

<sup>55</sup> Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 18.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>58</sup> William J. Miller, *The Training of an Army: Camp Curtin and the North's Civil War*. (Shippensburg, PA: White Maine, 1940) IV.

<sup>59</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 217. As an example of this, all company-grade officers in the Twenty-seventh PVM served in Pennsylvania regiments earlier in the war. Thus, military experience and loyal unionism were present throughout Pennsylvania militia.

<sup>60</sup> James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford Press, 1989) 506.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 492 & 500. This included "persons of African descent" for "any war service for which they may be found competent" – including service as soldiers." The Militia Act was followed on August 4, 1862, with President Lincoln's call for 300,000 nine-month militia, which was in addition to the 300,000 three-year federal volunteers called the previous month.

<sup>62</sup> OR, I, 27, pt. 2: 291; William A. Itter, "Conscription in Pennsylvania during the Civil War," Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, August 1941, 54-55.

<sup>63</sup> McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 493.

<sup>64</sup> Itter, "Conscription in Pennsylvania during the Civil War," 57-58.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 61. Therefore on March 3, 1863, the Federal Enrollment Act which gave control of the volunteer system to the Federal Government (previously control resided with the Governors) and assigned provost marshals to enroll all eligible men, age twenty to forty-five onto the draft rolls for potential federal service, was met with opposition.

<sup>66</sup> Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 9&21.

<sup>67</sup> OR I, 27, pt. 3: 136-137.

<sup>68</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 26-27.

<sup>69</sup> OR I, 27, pt. 3: 169.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 185.

<sup>71</sup> Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 4.

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<sup>72</sup> A.M. Gambone, *Enigmatic Valor: Major-General Darius Nash Couch*. (Baltimore, MD: Scriber's Sons, 1951) 163.

<sup>73</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 44-45.

<sup>74</sup> National Commission on the Future of the Army. *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 28, 2016) 49.

<sup>75</sup> Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 145.

<sup>76</sup> McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 493.

<sup>77</sup> Caldwell, William B., Shawn Stroud, and Anton Menning, "Fostering a Culture of Engagement," *Military Review* 89, no. 5 (2009): 10-18.

<sup>78</sup> Blair, 'A Source of Amusement,' 320.

<sup>79</sup> O.R. I, 27, pt. 1: 43.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 43; Sears, *Gettysburg*, 93. Hooker would not direct the AOP until he was certain the direction and objective of the ANV was north of the Potomac River.

<sup>81</sup> Sears, *Gettysburg*, 93, 99-101. On June 19, Hooker ordered Cavalry Commander Major General Alfred Pleasonton to determine the size of the Confederate force moving north in order to form his next decision. However, due to the screening actions of J. E. B. Stuart's Confederate Cavalry near Aldie, Upperville, and Ashby's Gap, Virginia, Pleasonton's Cavalry became bogged down for five days and was unable to complete this mission.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>83</sup> O.R. I, 27, pt. 1: 60-61; Sears, *Gettysburg*, 93-123; Edwin B. Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign*, (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1968) 131-313; U.S. Congress. Senate. *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, at the Second Session Thirty-Eighth Congress Army of the Potomac. Battle of Petersburg*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1865) 173-175.

<sup>84</sup> O.R. I, 27, pt. 1: 61.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 61; Sears, *Gettysburg*, 129. Additionally, to ensure top performing officers were placed in impactful positions, Halleck authorized Meade to "to appoint and remove officers without regard for seniority."

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>87</sup> Sears, *Gettysburg*, 129-131, Meade's plan called for the left flank led by John F. Reynolds would parallel the eastern slopes of South Mountain. In addition to Reynolds' First Corps, Major General Daniel Sickles' Third Corps, and Major General Otis O. Howard's Eleventh Corps comprised the Union left. This wing was supported by Winfield Hancock's Second Corps and Henry W. Slocum's Twelfth Corps. Major General George Sykes' Fifth Corps and Major General John Sedgewick's Sixth Corps comprised the right flank.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 129-150. The location Meade desired to engage the ANV was south of Taneytown, Maryland, at Pipe Creek. However, before Meade's plan, known as the Pipe Creek Plan, was published and disseminated the armies collided at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on July 1.

<sup>89</sup> Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign*, 36; Gambone, *Enigmatic Valor*, 137. Following the Battle of Chancellorsville, Couch resigned from command of Second Corps (second in the AOP succession of command) in part due to lack of trust and confidence Hooker's leadership and his conduct during at Chancellorsville. Follow his resignation President Lincoln impertinently considered, Couch to command the AOP, however, Couch cited recurring health concerns which plagued him since the Mexican War and consequently declined the offer.

<sup>90</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 23.

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- <sup>91</sup> Sears, *Gettysburg*, 91.
- <sup>92</sup> OR, I, 27, pt. 3:68.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid., 68.
- <sup>94</sup> McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 600.
- <sup>95</sup> OR, I, 27, pt. 3:79-80.
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid., 136-137.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid., 68.
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid., 76.
- <sup>99</sup> Blair, "'A Source of Amusement,' 324.
- <sup>100</sup> OR, I, 27, pt. 3: 347-348.
- <sup>101</sup> Glenn E. Billet, "The Department of the Susquehanna," *Journal of the Lancaster County Historical Society* 66, No. 1 (1962): 23.
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid., 19-23.
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid., 5.
- <sup>104</sup> Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign*, 144.
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid., 145.
- <sup>106</sup> Billet, "The Department of the Susquehanna," 21-22. Lack of trained artillerists, artillery, rations, and weapons, equipment and uniforms plagued the Department for the duration of the campaign.
- <sup>107</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 43-44.
- <sup>108</sup> OR, I, 27, pt. 3, 532, 550, 554; Itter, "Conscription in Pennsylvania during the Civil War," 193.
- <sup>109</sup> Uzal Ent, "Rebels in Pennsylvania," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1998): 48.
- <sup>110</sup> Jack Brubaker, "Defending the Susquehanna," *Civil War Times* 42, no. 3 (2003): 76-77.
- <sup>111</sup> OR, I, 27, pt 3: 129-131. Couch's concern was evident in telegraph communications throughout that day with Major General Robert C. Schenck, commander of the Middle Department (Eighth Corps) at Baltimore, as the two generals exchanged details regarding enemy movements in western Maryland and de-conflicted reports of the status of Milroy's forces.
- <sup>112</sup> OR, I, 27, pt. 3: 129-131.
- <sup>113</sup> Ibid., 132.
- <sup>114</sup> Ibid., 163.
- <sup>115</sup> Ibid., 297-298; Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 213. On June 7, 1892, received the Congressional Medal of Honor for actions while commanding the 129<sup>th</sup> PA at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg.
- <sup>116</sup> Uzal, "Rebels in Pennsylvania," 48.
- <sup>117</sup> Russell F. Weigley, "Emergency Troops in the Gettysburg Campaign." *Pennsylvania History* 25, no. 1 (January 1958): 43-44. <https://journals.psu.edu/phj/article/download/22576/22345>.
- <sup>118</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 30.
- <sup>119</sup> Ibid., 150 & 166. Defense of the town transferred to the York Safety Committee and hastily assembled military garrison (consisting of a sixty-man Maryland militia company known as the Pastpsco Guards, a 238-man Invalid Battalion hastily assembled from members of the Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment, Penn Common U.S. Army Hospital staff, and recovering patients and staff) under the command of Regular Army Major Granville Haller.
- <sup>120</sup> OR, I, 27, pt.3, 203; Gambone, *Enigmatic Valor*, 54. General Milroy was not clear as to who he reported to after the Department of the Susquehanna was established on June 10. Prior to June

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10, he reported to General Schenck. This causes further disorganization as Milroy retreated from Winchester with the remnants of his force. Following establishment of the Department of the Susquehanna he was to fall under Couch's command.

<sup>121</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Homeland Defense*, Joint Publication 3-27, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, July 2, 2013) viii.

<sup>122</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 19.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>124</sup> Blair, "'A Source of Amusement,'" 328.

<sup>125</sup> Jack Brubaker, "Defending the Susquehanna," *Civil War Times* 42, no. 3 (2003) 78.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 78.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>128</sup> Blair, "'A Source of Amusement,'" 329-330.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 329-330.

<sup>130</sup> Cooper H. Wingert, *Emergency Men! The 26th Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia and Gettysburg Campaign*. (Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Printing, 2013) 55.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 73. Early's flanking column consisted of the Seventeenth Virginia Cavalry Regiment, "Brigadier General Harry Hays' 'Louisiana Tigers' Brigade, Colonel Isaac Avery's (Hoke's) North Carolina Brigade, and Brigadier General William "Extra Billy" Smith's Virginia Brigade – all told nearly 4,000 men." John B. Gordon's Georgia Brigade with the Thirty-fifth Virginia Cavalry Battalion attacked down the Chambersburg Pike toward Gettysburg.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 72-79 & 92-97.

<sup>133</sup> Sears, *Gettysburg*, 113; Blair, "'A Source of Amusement,'" 332.

<sup>134</sup> Billet, "The Department of the Susquehanna," 30.

<sup>135</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 44-45; Blair, "'A Source of Amusement,'" 324.

<sup>136</sup> Billet, "The Department of the Susquehanna," 30; Cooper H. Wingert, *The Confederate Approach on Harrisburg: The Gettysburg Campaign's Northernmost Reaches*, (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2012) 53-84.

<sup>137</sup> Billet, "The Department of the Susquehanna," 35.

<sup>138</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 339-341.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 243.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 239-281; Billet, "The Department of the Susquehanna," 31-36; Russell F. Weigley, "Emergency Troops in the Gettysburg Campaign." *Pennsylvania History* 25, no. 1 (January 1958): 45-50. <https://journals.psu.edu/phj/article/download/22576/22345>.

<sup>141</sup> Mingus, *Flames Beyond Gettysburg*, 342-343.

<sup>142</sup> Sears, *Gettysburg*, 141.

<sup>143</sup> Billet, "The Department of the Susquehanna," 15.

<sup>144</sup> Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign*, 139-140.

<sup>145</sup> Billet, "The Department of the Susquehanna," 15.

<sup>146</sup> Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign*, 140.

<sup>147</sup> Blair, "'A Source of Amusement,'" 330.

<sup>148</sup> Wingert, *The Confederate Approach on Harrisburg*, 133.

<sup>149</sup> Blair, "'A Source of Amusement,'" 333; Gambone, *Enigmatic Valor*, 173-174.

<sup>150</sup> Billet, "The Department of the Susquehanna," 56-57.

<sup>151</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Homeland Defense*, Joint Publication 3-27, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, July 2, 2013) I-9.



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- <sup>152</sup> Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 139.
- <sup>153</sup> Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign*, 152.
- <sup>154</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army. *Leader's Guide to Objective Assessment of Training Proficiency (DRAFT)* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army. February 2017) 8.
- <sup>155</sup> Headquarters Army National Guard Directorate, *Army National Guard Vision & Strategy*, (Arlington, VA: Headquarters Army National Guard Directorate, February 2017) 6-7.
- <sup>156</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy)* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 4, 2012) 1.
- <sup>157</sup> For example, if a flood washed out a road in Michigan and caused the Governor to activate a platoon from a Michigan Army National Guard engineer company to repair a section of the road. If the task to conduct road repair is an individual-crew-squad (ICS) level task for Engineer company, then since ICS level training readiness maintained regardless of where the company is in the training cycle, little risk would be assumed by the commander and the Company could repair the road relatively easily with requisite resources.
- <sup>158</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, ADP 6-0, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, May 17, 2012) 22-31.
- <sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 22-31.
- <sup>160</sup> Carol Reardon, *With a Sword in One Hand & Jomini in the Other : The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012) 56-58.
- <sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.
- <sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.
- <sup>163</sup> Sandow, *Deserter Country*, 51.
- <sup>164</sup> Carol Reardon, "1323-Carol Reardon-With a Sword in One Hand & Jomini in the Other : The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North," Season 13, *Civil War Talk Radio*, podcast audio, March 1, 2017, <http://www.impedimentsofwar.org/> .
- <sup>165</sup> Reardon, *With a Sword in One Hand*, 73-75.
- <sup>166</sup> Reardon, "1323-Carol Reardon-With a Sword in One Hand."
- <sup>167</sup> *Mission Command*, ADP 6-0, 22-31.
- <sup>168</sup> United States Department of Defense. *Joint Operating Concept Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats*. (Version 2.0), Washington, DC: 17 May 2010, 26.
- <sup>169</sup> United States President. "Executive Order 13528 – Establishment of the Council of Governors." The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. January 11, 2010, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-signs-executive-order-establishing-council-governors> .
- <sup>170</sup> United States President. "Executive Order 13528."
- <sup>171</sup> 10 U.S. Code (2011)  
<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?collectionCode=USCODE&searchPath=Title+32%2FCHAPTER+1&granuleId=USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleE-partII-chap1209-sec12301&packageId=USCODE-2011-title10&oldPath=Title+32&fromPageDetails=true&collapse=true&ycord=1950> .; 32 U.S. Code (2011)  
<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?collectionCode=USCODE&searchPath=Title+32%2FCHAPTER+1&granuleId=USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleE-partII-chap1209-sec12301&packageId=USCODE-2011-title10&oldPath=Title+32&fromPageDetails=true&collapse=true&ycord=1950>



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[sec12301&packageId=USCODE-2011-title10&oldPath=Title+32&fromPageDetails=true&collapse=true&ycord=1950](#) .

<sup>172</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, Joint Publication 3-33, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, July 30, 2012) E-1 – E-2.

<sup>173</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, Joint Publication 3-28, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, July 31, 2013) C-1. As defined by JP 3-28, “a dual status commander (DSC) is a commissioned officer of the Regular Army or Air Force or a federally recognized ARNG or ANG officer authorized, pursuant to Title 32, USC, Section 315 or 325, by SecDef, with the consent of the applicable governor of a state, to exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from, a federal chain of command and exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from, a state chain of command. A DSC is an intermediate link in two distinct, separate chains of command flowing from different federal, territorial, and state governments. Although the DSC is empowered to exercise command on behalf of, and may receive orders from, two separate chains of command, those chains of command must recognize and respect the DSC’s duty to exercise all authority in a completely mutually exclusive manner, i.e., either in a federal or state capacity, giving orders on behalf of or relaying orders from the federal chain of command to federal military forces and giving orders on behalf of or relaying orders from the state chain of command to state military forces, but never relaying federal orders to state military forces or state orders to federal military forces.”

<sup>174</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Homeland Defense*, Joint Publication 3-27, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, July 2, 2013) II-9.

<sup>175</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, Joint Publication 3-33, E-5.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, E-3.

<sup>177</sup> National Commission on the Future of the Army. *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 28, 2016) 2.

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