REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
04/27/2017	Master's Thesis	SEP 2016 - APR 2017

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
The Philippines Constabulary: An Example of American Command of Indigenous Forces

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
N/A

5b. GRANT NUMBER
N/A

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
N/A

6. AUTHOR(S)
Cross, William, A., Major, USA

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
N/A

5e. TASK NUMBER
N/A

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
USMC Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5068

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
N/A

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
From 1901-1917 the Philippine Constabulary, led by US Army officers, showed that Americans could exercise effective command of indigenous forces. Communicating with and influencing both indigenous and American elites to secure the resources necessary to align ends, ways, and means meant these officers could set a solid political and strategic foundation for an indigenous force. Further, developing an organization that embraced flexibility and mobility at the operational level and exuded esprit de corps at the tactical level ensured development of a force that the Filipinos came to not only be proud of, but also saw as essential to their future.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Philippines Constabulary, Command, Effective Command, Indigenous Forces, Henry T. Allen

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			USMC Command and Staff College
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	36	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include area code)* (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: The Philippines Constabulary: An Example of American Command of Indigenous Forces

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR: MAJ W. Aaron Cross

AY 16-17

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: CHARLES D. MCKENNA, PH.D.
Approved: Charles D. McKenna
Date: 27 APRIL 2017

Oral Defense Committee Member: Craig A. Swanson PhD
Approved:
Date: 27 April 2017

DISCLAIMER

Table of Contents

Page

In the past fifteen years of conflict, military thinkers and practitioners looked to the examples of America's small wars to garner lessons about the techniques and tactics of counterinsurgency. The assumption underpinning these inquiries revolved around the United States (US) military, as an outside entity, working in coordination with host-nation forces to suppress such insurgencies and insurrections. However, in an era with diminished support for extended nation-building projects involving large numbers of US soldiers, the appeal of an alternative way to establish an effective fighting force in developing nations where there is an interest in stability could prove fruitful. America's history provides such an option to satisfy these conditions. From 1901-1917 the Philippine Constabulary,[1] led by a cadre of US Army officers, showed that Americans could exercise effective command[2] of indigenous forces.

The case of the Philippine Constabulary provides an excellent study in the ability of American military officers to exercise effective command over indigenous forces. To adequately draw out these lessons, it first is necessary to examine the historical precedents for external command of indigenous forces, both within the American experience and that of other colonial powers. Next, a sufficient definition of effective command is required to evaluate the Philippine Constabulary case. Due to the sparse

---

1 In the course of this paper, I will equate the Philippine Constabulary with a military organization. While the definition of a constabulary is usually a military-style police force, the Philippine Constabulary from 1901-1917 mostly operated as a military organization fighting an insurgency and demonstrates that American officers can command a military force of mainly indigenous soldiers.

2 For this paper, I will use the word command rather than leadership. While one can debate the appropriateness of either term, I find command to encompass both the responsibility to inspire men to action and to develop effective organizations. It is outside the scope of this work to debate the appropriateness of either. For one take on this, see G.D. Sheffield's introduction to *Leadership and Command.* Other authors on the subject tend to use the term interchangeably, such as John Keegan in his introduction to *The Mask of Command.*

nature of the literature on effective command, Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman's definition of military effectiveness, tweaked to consider the things a commander must do to make a military organization effective, will serve such a purpose. Using this construct, evaluation of the inspiration, organization, and effectiveness of the Philippine Constabulary through official and personal accounts of key individuals is possible. The views of Henry T. Allen, first commander of the Philippine Constabulary, and other constabulary and civil government officials helps demonstrate the case for effectiveness. Last, the constabulary offers several implications for the potential use of contemporary American officers to command indigenous forces.

Before annexation of the Philippines, the US military had limited experience with commanding indigenous forces. Since colonial days the US military utilized Native Americans as auxiliaries, but these forces typically either participated as a separate entity, found employment as individual guides or scouts, or became incorporated into the existing military structure (such as the Apache Scouts).[3] Thus, a model for keeping internal order would need to come from somewhere else, despite the desire of some in the US to use our Territorial model to govern overseas holdings.[4] Two recent contemporary examples to the Americans, that of the German military in the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain in India, provided different approaches to advising indigenous forces.

Going back as far as 1835, the Prussians afforded military missions and advice to the Ottoman Empire.[5] The most substantial mission before America's involvement in the

---

3 Richard L. Millett, *Searching for Stability: The U.S. Development of Constabulary Forces in Latin America and the Philippines,* 1.
4 H.K. Carroll, "The Territorial System for Our New Possessions," *The Outlook* 63, no. 17 (December 23, 1899): 966-8, http://www.unz.org
5 Edip Öncü, "The Beginnings of Ottoman-German Partnership: Diplomatic and Military Relations Between Germany and The Ottoman Empire before the First World War"

Philippines occurred in the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 when in 1880 Sultan Abdul Hamid II asked for German officers to help modernize the Ottoman Army.[6] The German officers received commissions in the Turkish Army; however, their influence seemed scarce, and the Sultan disregarded most of their recommendations.[7] In this case, one could not say that the German officers exercised command authority over Turkish troops. While they did hold legitimate commissions in that country's military, they functioned more as advisors. Additionally, this model seems more appropriate between two soverign states of equal power. The Filipino-US relationship had a different character, resembling more of the model of Britain in India.

In stark contrast to the advisor-advisee relationship between German officers and their Ottoman clients, the British Indian Army featured Indian-native troops officered directly by the British. While the British had employed native troops through private armies since their establishment of a colony in India, the Great Mutiny of 1857 caused a shift in colonial army policy. Instead of employing native soldiers as a whole, the Peel Commission recommended that the British should recruit the more "martial" castes of Indians and mix them throughout the regiments. While this policy later switched to employing a company of each class within a regiment, the system of dividing the castes to mitigate rebellion remained.[8] Further, the British defined the more educated classes of

---

(master's thesis, Bilkent University, 2003), 8, http://www.thesis.bilkent.edu.tr/0002417.pdf

6 Jonathan Grant, "The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914," *The Journal of Military History* 66, no. 1 (January 2002): 22, http://search.proquest.com

7 Öncü, 16.

8 Amar Farooqui, "'Divide and Rule'? Race, Military Recruitment and Society in Late Nineteenth Century Colonial India," *Social Scientist* 43, nos. 3-4 (March-April, 2015): 50, 54, http://www.jstor.org

Indians as non-martial, granting them leave to deny entry of the educated into officer ranks and assure the loyalty of the "martial" and less educated soldiers to white British officers.[9] This loyalty of a soldier to an officer, as former Indian Civil Service officer and scholar on the British Indian Army Philip Mason observes, is summed up by the statement: "I am your man; I will serve you in any way you command and you will protect me against everyone else."[10] While no doubt colored by culture on both sides of the equation,[11] the statement provides an intriguing invitation to consider the exact meaning of command and what it means for an officer to exercise effective command over any soldier, indigenous or otherwise.

According to US joint doctrine, "Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions."[12] This doctrine provides a measure to evaluate effectiveness but seems incomplete in that it does not adequately define the relationship between commander and subordinate other than a legal right to give orders. In US Army doctrine, the relationship between commander and subordinate seems clearer: "The key elements of command are authority and responsibility…The commander is responsible for establishing [the] leadership climate of the unit and

---

9 Jeffrey Greenhut, "Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army," *Military* Affairs 48, no. 1 (January 1984): 15-6, http://www.jstor.org

10 Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men* (London: Purnell Book Services, Ltd., 1974), 406.

11 Greenhut, 17.

12 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP 1 (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), xx.

developing disciplined and cohesive units. This sets the parameters within which command will be exercised and, therefore, sets the tone for social and duty relationships within the command. Commanders are also responsible for the professional development of their [s]oldiers. To this end, they encourage self-study, professional development, and continued growth of their subordinates' military careers."[13] From a combination of the two definitions, a clearer picture emerges of the dual nature of command.

A commander has responsibility for mission completion and the authority to direct subordinates to this end, but also has a responsibility to provide an environment where subordinates can grow professionally and create units that demonstrate discipline and cohesiveness. Put more simply: command has an output component (mission accomplishment) and a functional component (provide support for the organization).[14] While these definitions can provide a basic, subjective way to determine if a commander is effective or not, considering these in light of the things necessary to make a military organization effective can provide a better measure.

In the introduction to the three-volume series entitled *Military Effectiveness,* Allan Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman recognized assessing military effectiveness as complex. According to the authors, military effectiveness is "the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically

---

13 Headquarters Department of the Army, *Army Command Policy,* AR 600-20 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, November 6, 2014), 2.
14 Martin Van Creveld discusses these as the two responsibilities of command. While he states they are mutually dependent, it is useful to consider them separately as they frequently end up being delegated to different parts of the organization. Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 6.

available. Effectiveness thus incorporates some notion of efficiency."[15] To deal with such a large problem, they identified the output and functional dimensions (they termed them as vertical and horizontal dimensions) and set out to define effectiveness across both dimensions. For the authors, the vertical dimension consisted of the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, while the horizontal dimension encompassed all of the functional things an organization needed to do, at each level, to achieve its goals.[16] To build a framework for evaluation, the authors developed questions to draw out whether an organization is effective or not at each level of war. These questions, modified to ask how the commander of an organization performed in making his/her organization effective or not, serves as the framework for evaluating effective command in this paper.

To demonstrate the practical application at the political level, assessment of military effectiveness revolves around three questions. To what extent can military organizations assure themselves a regular share of the national budget sufficient to meet their major needs? To what extent do military organizations have access to the industrial and technological resources necessary to produce equipment needed? And, to what extent do military organizations have access to manpower in the required quantity and quality?[17] Translating these into criteria for effective command: To what extent does the commander take actions to assure the organization a regular share of the national budget

---

15 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," in *Military Effectiveness*, vol. 1, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2.
16 Ibid. An organization, however, does not need to be effective at each level to be overall effective. On the contrary, most military organizations are never able to achieve effectiveness in all categories.
17 Ibid., 4-6.

sufficient to meet their major needs?; To what extent does the commander have access to the industrial and technological resources necessary to produce equipment needed?; and, To what extent does the commander advocate for access to manpower in the required quantity and quality? Appendix 1 provides a breakout of each question with its analogous command effectiveness criteria. It is important to note that while these questions will serve as the skeleton for evaluation of effective command, one may not answer all issues at each level. For instance, the political question, "To what extent does the commander have access to the industrial and technological resources necessary to produce equipment needs?" does not have an answer in the context of the American occupation of the Philippines. While the commander of the constabulary did ask for advanced weapons (as discussed later), he received arms from the US instead of producing them indigenously.

With a framework of command effectiveness established, the question turns to the inspiration, organization, and effectiveness of the Philippine Constabulary. With the capture of the Philippine Islands during the Spanish-American War, the US, in essence, became a colonial power. President William McKinley saw the need for a civil government to administer the Philippines as a mandate until Filipinos could govern themselves.[18] The Filipinos, however, understood that their liberation would mean immediate independence.[19] Thus, the misunderstandings resulted in an insurgency that necessitated the first few years of occupation coming under the administration of the US Army, with the commander of the Philippine Division as military governor. The Army

18 W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands,* vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), 130-4.
19 Ibid., 88-92.

had added 35,000 volunteers in 1899, with their terms of service expiring in July 1901, with the assumption they would conclude operations by that time.[20] Indeed, President McKinley set in motion establishing civil government before the insurrection by sending the first Philippine Commission in January 1899, under the direction of Jacob Schurman, to determine the conditions in the islands and recommend a way forward.[21]

The Schurman Commission concluded that, "The United States cannot withdraw from the Philippines," and, "The Filipinos are wholly unprepared for independence, and if independence were given to them they could not maintain it."[22] Further, the Schurman Commission's recommendations relied heavily on the British model of governing their colonies.[23] The Schurman report convinced President McKinley he must establish a civil government and, in April 1900, sent a commission under the direction of William Taft to create a civil government that would take control of the Philippines on July 4, 1901. President McKinley did not explicitly state the commission should set up a constabulary force, but he did instruct them to take all measures to ensure local Filipinos governed themselves, that any civil government should take precautions to protect the people, and they should follow the recommendations of the Schurman Commission.[24] Thus, the later

---

20 Brian Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 11, 13.
21 Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 1.
22 Ibid., 121.
23 Ibid., 97-106. Also see Exhibit VIII in the same volume, "Kirkwood's memorandum on the administration of British dependencies in the Orient (prepared at request of commission)." Montague Kirkwood, a Briton, lived in Japan and had advised the Japanese government on colonies as well. See Christopher A. Morrison, "A World of Empires: United States Rule in the Philippines, 1898-1913" (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2009), 45, http://search.proquest.com
24 Philippine Commission, *Reports of the Philippine Commission, The Civil Governor, and the Head of the Executive Departments of the Civil Government of the Philippine*

decision for a constabulary force seems to rest more with the plans of Taft's Commission, although they did indeed receive instruction from Secretary of War Elihu Root that they should, "take the lessons we could get from the colonial policy of other countries, especially Great Britain."[25] Hence, examining the logic of the commission members for the institution of a constabulary is necessary.

William Taft wrote several letters to Secretary Root from July to November of 1900 that outlined his preference for a constabulary force comprised of indigenous personnel. In the letters, Taft used the logic of the Schurman Commission in that constabulary forces would be cheaper than keeping US Army soldiers in the Philippines and that these forces should have US officers.[26] Additionally, Helen Taft recalls that her husband wanted to form, "a force of several thousand Filipinos, trained and commanded by American Army officers."[27] Taft and the commission members voiced the arguments again in their annual report when they stated:

> The question as to whether native troops and a native constabulary is at present practicable has received much thought and a careful investigation by the Commission…We further recommend that a comprehensive scheme of police organization be put in force as rapidly as possible; that it be separate and distinct from the army, having for its head an officer of rank and pay commensurate with the importance of the position, with a sufficient number of assistants and subordinates to exercise thorough direction and control…The chief officers of this organization should be Americans; but some of the subordinate officers should be natives, with proper provision for their advancement as a reward for loyal and efficient services.[28]

Islands: 1900-1903 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 5-11, hereafter *RPC 1900-1903*.

25 Root in a note to Philip Jessup quoted in Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root,* vol. 1 (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938), 345.

26 Morrison, 63.

27 From Mrs. William Howard Taft, *Recollections of Full Years*, quoted in Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, The Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 85.

28 *RPC 1900-1903*, 93, 95.

And further, "The experience of England in dealing with conditions practically the same as those which we are called on to meet, as she has frequently done, and her success, furnishes a precedent for our guidance which should not be overlooked. Though she has had here and there unfortunate experiences, as a general rule she has been served faithfully by her native soldiers, even against their own brethern [sic]."[29] The desire to create a constabulary flowed from the examination of the British experiences in India. Further, W. Cameron Forbes, the future Governor-General of the Philippines from 1909-1913, said that Luke E. Wright served as the impetus for the constabulary. Wright told Taft, "that if he failed to have an insular police force, responsible to him, whose duty it was to maintain public order, his government and the American effort to establish it in the Islands was sure to result in disastrous failure."[30] With these sentiments in mind, the Philippine Commission established the Philippine Constabulary on July 18, 1901.

In Act 175 of the Philippine Commission, the Commission founded a force, "for the purpose of better maintaining peace, law, and order in the various provinces of the Philippine Islands."[31] The Chief of the Insular Constabulary shall, "have general charge and control thereof and shall see that brigandage, insurrection, unlawful assemblies and breaches of the peace and other violations of law are prevented or suppressed and the perpetrators of such offenses arrested, and peace, law and order maintained."[32] Additionally, the Chief of Constabulary will ensure that the force, "is properly selected and organized and that it is suitably armed, uniformed, equipped, governed, disciplined

---

29 Ibid., 97.
30 Forbes, *The Philippine Islands,* vol. 1, 203.
31 Philippine Commission, *Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the United States Philippine Commission, nos. 1-263* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), 369.
32 Ibid., 370.

and in all respects made and kept effective or the performance of its duties."[33] At the outset of the constabulary, it is clear that the commission envisioned the effective command to encompass both the output and functional components. And while not explicitly stated in this report, the commission's assumption was that the chief and assistant chiefs, appointed by the commission, would be American officers, as evidenced by their previous year's report. For such an important post, Taft and the commission needed to select a capable officer sharing their views on natives.

The commission chose Major Henry T. Allen, 6th U.S. Cavalry, as the first chief. According to Allen, "General Chaffee sent several names to the Commission and the latter selected me."[34] General Chaffee selected Allen to put forward based on his prior work with native scouts in Leyte.[35] From Allen's report as commander of the Second Subdistrict of Leyte in October 1900:

> I desire to invite special attention to the value of the native soldiers (Leyte Scouts) and the importance of organizing another company in this subdistrict to garrison certain towns and to replace after a reasonable time American soldiers. It is not my intention to suggest that these scouts are on the whole nearly equal to American soldiers, though in ferreting out insurgents and criminals and in understanding motive and method of the natives with whom we have to deal, they are of inestimable value. With a careful selection of recruits and good through military training they produce an effective military police body at about one-third the cost (or less) of Americans. This effect must eventually have importance in our Philippine policy.[36]

Further, Allen wrote to Taft in February 1901, asking for assistance in elevation in rank for command over native troops. Allen wrote, "Will you kindly inform me with what

---

33 Ibid.
34 Henry T. Allen (HTA) to Caspar Whitney, August 27, 1901, Henry T. Allen Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Box 7.
35 Heath Twichell, Jr., *Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer: 1859-1930* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974), 115-6.
36 War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901,* vol. 1 part 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), 26.

advancement beyond the rank of battalion commander, could successful work with native troops be rewarded. Would there be a career in that branch? So far, I have had good results with Leyte Scouts, and as my health leaves nothing to be desired, I would be disposed to devote all energy to developing native auxiliaries."[37] Allen had both good experiences with and made himself known as interested in the development of native troops to the future governor of the island, thus advertising himself as an ideal candidate. Allen's willingness to be forward with political and civil officials helped spur the effectiveness of the constabulary at the political level.

The American officers were mostly effective in command at the political level. Allen's cordial relations with the civil commission members led to guaranteeing the constabulary had a regular share of the national budget sufficient to meet their needs; Allen advocated for quality individuals for the constabulary; and Allen did have access to the American industrial base, but failed to get the most advanced equipment needed for the mission. In a letter supporting Allen's quest for permanent promotion to brigadier general, Henry Ide, Director of the Department of Finance and Justice and future Governor-General of the Philippines, told Allen, "You know well that your services are thoroughly appreciated by all the civil authorities of the Philippines Islands."[38] Further, Allen knew he had to keep his pulse on politics as well: "In my present position it is not merely with the organization and administration of the Constabulary force that I have to deal, but I have a great deal to do with the manipulation of the "intransigente" [sic] leaders here in Manila and much correspondence with the various governors of the

37 HTA to William H. Taft, February 22, 1901, HTA Papers, Box 7.
38 Henry C. Ide to HTA, November 8, 1904, HTA Papers, Box 8.

provinces and the officials thereof."[39] In Appendix B, the table shows expenditures of the constabulary from 1901 to 1917. Although the constabulary saw a reduction in 1905-1907, the general trend remained either stable or increasing budgets. The cultivation of political relationships no doubt helped secure stable funding.

As time went on, the Philippine Assembly took more power over appropriations. The demonstration of the necessity of a constabulary, however, made their political access to resources secure. According to James G. Harbord, a constabulary officer and later chief, when the Assembly confronted budget problems, "I have been assured by Quezon that there is no feeling of hostility toward the Constabulary that will manifest itself by action in the Assembly."[40] Further, "The Assembly I think will not attack the Constabulary very much, perhaps may urge its 'Filipinization', but the idea of the Constabulary as the nucleus of their army when they get their independence has taken hold on the native mind, and its existence will not be threatened in my judgment."[41] Thus, a guarantee of perpetuation initially relied upon cordial relations between the constabulary officers and the civil commission, but over time this transitioned to pride and necessity in the minds of Filipinos.

Allen held the recruitment of quality individuals for service in the constabulary in high regard. With reference to officers, he stated, "The greatest amount of care has been taken in the selection of each individual member of the force, and as regards the officers every one of them has had from one to three years military service in the Philippine Islands, and should therefore be acquainted with the native character and the handling of

---

39 HTA to Clarence R. Edwards, February 21, 1902, HTA Papers, Box 7.
40 James G. Harbord (JGH) to H.H. Bandholtz, April 5, 1908, James G. Harbord Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Box 2.
41 JGH to David Baker, June 14, 1907, JGH Papers, Box 2.

them."[42] Further, "It is therefore of the utmost importance that high-grade officers, thoroughly courageous, upright, sober, intelligent, and energetic, be placed over them [Filipinos]."[43] To ensure such qualities, Allen personally interviewed prospective officers to identify their fitness for duty.[44] As time went on, however, Allen had to expand his search for qualified officers,[45] going as far as placing ads in newspapers in the US urging colleges and military academies to impress upon their youth the chance to serve in the constabulary.[46] This did not always have the effect he wished, as Allen noted in his journal, "Native press objects to my sending to the States for officers for constabulary."[47] Nonetheless, Allen sought out quality manpower for his force.

Concerning equipment, however, Allen failed to get access to necessary rifles and ammunition. In 1901, the Army turned over all Remington shotguns and .45 caliber pistols to the constabulary. These weapons, however, were not adequate due to their single-shot nature and inaccuracy at long ranges.[48] Further, General Adna Chaffee, military commander in the Philippines in 1901, wrote to the Adjutant General, "Even now it is self evident that 50, 100, or 200 men, with hostile intent, armed with rifle or carbine, constitute a force that takes thousands of troops and months of time to overcome."[49] Fear of constabulary defections drove opposition to arming the Filipinos with newer and better rifles. Allen continued to write about the need for superior

---

42 HTA to Henry C. Corbin, February 1, 1902, HTA Papers, Box 7.
43 *RPC 1903, Part 3,* 46.
44 John R. White, *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands* (New York: The Century Co., 1928), 9.
45 "Various constabulary officers are being dropped out as unfit for the higher standard that is being reached." HTA Journal, November 2, 1904, HTA Papers, Box 1.
46 Undated and unknown newspaper clipping, HTA Journal, HTA Papers, Box 1.
47 HTA Journal, July 15, 1904, HTA Papers, Box 1.
48 *RPC 1901, Part 2,* 389.
49 Adna R. Chaffee to AG, July 30, 1901, quoted in Twichell, *Allen,* 124.

weapons but did not receive rifles until 1907. In his 1907 report, he stated, "During the year the enlisted personnel has been partially armed with the Krag carbine, modified by the addition of the rifle bayonet—a most important change…He no longer must depend on firing one shot and then clubbing his gun in the almost inevitable bolo rush."[50] Allen's political connections did not suffice to overcome deep suspicion of arming natives with advanced weaponry.

At the strategic level, the Philippine Constabulary also mostly achieved effectiveness. Allen often communicated with leaders, influenced opinion on strategic goals, and developed relationships to force the Army's integration into his strategic framework. He did not balance, on the other hand, strategic goals and the force size as he allowed mission creep. In his letters from 1901 to 1903, Allen corresponded with President Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Albert Beveridge, General Henry Corbin (Adjutant General of the Army), Colonel Clarence Edwards (Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs), among others. Most of the letters pertain to the cost-savings of a reduction in Regular Army soldiers in combination with maintaining a strong constabulary, ending a split in civil and military government, and placing the Philippine Scouts at the disposal of the constabulary rather than the Army.[51] While Senator Beveridge admonished Allen for being too hasty about the end of military governance, his correspondence certainly had an effect.[52] From 1902 to 1907, the number of US

---

50 *RPC 1907, Part 2*, 295.
51 HTA to Theodore Roosevelt, November 7, 1901; HTA to Albert J. Beveridge, December 5, 1901; HTA to Henry C. Corbin, February 1, 1902; HTA to Clarence Edwards, February 21, 1902, HTA Papers, Box 7.
52 "I hope you are not too sanguine in thinking that the Military Governor should be withdrawn at present…I think the greatest possible mistake and the greatest possible injury to the Filipino people can be done by going too fast at the present moment." Albert J. Beveridge to HTA, March 19, 1902, HTA Papers, Box 7.

Army troops in the Philippines reduced from 24,238 to 11,508.[53] Allen's greatest influence, however, came with the detail of Philippine Scouts to the constabulary.

On January 30, 1903, Congress, "authorized the detail of companies of scouts to cooperate with the Philippine Constabulary when detailed for that purpose by the commanding general upon the request of the civil governor, and to be under the command for tactical purposes of the chief and assistant chiefs of the Philippines Constabulary, who are officers in the United States Army."[54] Through this maneuvering, Allen had almost doubled the amount of manpower available to him. Understandably, the Army had significant issues with this construct as they believed commanders lost, "the troops of their command whom they had organized, instructed for years, brought to a high state of efficiency, and whose material wants, under other leadership, they must still supply."[55] According to Allen, this was nonsense: "We are now trying to use the Scouts, which General Davis apprehends is fraught with much trouble to both the branches, but, in my opinion, this apprehension is largely due to the conservatism that necessarily is a characteristic of every old soldier."[56] By August 1904, Allen noted in his journal, "Constabulary from 7200 to 6000. I have taken over five companies giving me now 35 of the 50. The Gen. order (99) War Dept. authorizing me to order scouts has changed the aspect of affairs considerably."[57] Regardless of the internal squabbling, Allen's ability to influence those people necessary to allocate more resources towards his strategic goal of quelling violence in the islands demonstrates effective command at the strategic level.

---

53 Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 253.
54 *RPC 1903, Part 3*, 9.
55 General George W. Davis, quoted in *RPC 1903, Part 3*, 9.
56 HTA to Luke E. Wright, February 19, 1903, HTA Papers, Box 8.
57 HTA Journal, August 21, 1904, HTA Papers, Box 1.

Allen failed at the strategic level, however, in his inability to stem mission creep. Over time, the constabulary took on more and more requirements. In the 1903 report, Commissioner Wright outlined that in addition to other duties, the constabulary also had responsibility for the telegraph division and, "the bureau of constabulary has also imposed upon it the duty of running a supply store, through which is furnished not only the constabulary forces, but also all civil employees of the government outside the city of Manila."[58] In the same vein, Forbes states that in addition to the telegraph lines, supply stores, a band, and medical services during epidemics, "In short, the Constabulary at one time or another rendered service to practically every branch of government. It furnished guards for collectors of public revenue, disbursing officers, public land surveyors, and scientific parties on explorations, and for the transportation of lepers."[59] The accumulation of duties resulted in a need for augmentation. According to Chief Bandholtz in 1907, "The number of officers authorized is barely sufficient to meet the demands upon the service if all were present for duty."[60] While some of these duties were arguably necessary for carrying out the mission of the constabulary, the accumulation over time stretched resources thin without a proper accounting by the leadership to the government of a need for increase.

The ability of the constabulary to perform so many functions did, however, demonstrate that the organization was mobile, flexible, and thought about combined arms; and that commanders placed their strengths against the enemy's weaknesses by assigning soldiers in their home province. The mobile and flexible organization at the

58 *RPC 1903, Part 3*, 11-2.
59 Forbes, *The Philippine Islands,* vol. 1, 208-13.
60 *RPC 1907, Part 2*, 296.

operational level resulted from the ability of the constabulary to use the roads and telegraph lines built in the Philippines since the commencement of the occupation. When the constabulary turned over the telegraph service to the Bureau of Posts in 1906, it included 307 operators and 4933 miles of telegraph lines.[61] The outbreak of violence in Samar in late 1904 demonstrated the ability for the organization to move forces around the archipelago. According to Allen, "Reenforcements [sic] of constabulary from many of the other provinces were hurried to Samar," with more than 747 officers and enlisted detailed to the province.[62] While the uprising ended up too much for the constabulary to handle and the US Army had to take responsibility for suppression, the ability to move a significant number of constabulary companies shows the mobility of the organization.

According to Allen, the flexibility of the constabulary came from its organization: "As organized and utilized at present the constabulary has greater mobility than the scouts. This is due chiefly to three reasons: First, a greater percentage of officers; secondly, a greater period of field service in small detachments; and, thirdly, greater facility in subsistence."[63] The constabulary's agility resulted from the more decentralized operations and oversight by officers. Further, the organization also thought about the importance of incorporating combined arms. For example, in 1907, James Harbord wrote to H.H. Bandholtz, "I have seen enough of this District in the five days it has had its present size to be sure that it cannot be handled without a coast guard cutter and I wish that you would bear that in mind when appropriations are asked. We shall fall down if we don't have such a boat, and we will not fall down if we do."[64] While traditional

---

61 Forbes, *The Philippine Islands,* vol. 1, 210n.
62 *RPC 1905, Part 3,* 4, 28.
63 *RPC 1903, Part 3,* 47.
64 JGH to HHB, April 5, 1907, JGH Papers, Box 2.

combined arms such as artillery are unsuitable in this context, the constabulary did take into account other means of ensuring their success.

The constabulary gained an operational advantage by the decision to assign soldiers to their home province. According to Commissioner Wright:

> That each province should furnish its quota of men, whose operations ordinarily were to be confined to their province. This latter principle involved a departure from the rule which had invariably controlled the English in their colonial possessions and the Spaniards in their dealing with the Filipinos, their policy having been to utilize native troops and constabulary in other sections than that from which they were drawn, thereby taking advantage of supposed tribal prejudices and, as it was believed, removing the tendency to disloyalty or inefficiency which would exist when dealing with their own immediate friends and neighbors. The Commission, however, thought that as against these possible disadvantages there were substantial benefits to be derived from pursuing the opposite course. It was believed that with proper treatment there need be no fear of treachery, that there was a great advantage in having the police operating in a particular province familiar with its terrain and the people living therein, and finally that in view of the fact that these people were kinsmen and neighbors of the constabulary there would be absent that disposition to abuse and oppression, which has always been found to exist when native military or constabulary forces were operating among strangers and often hereditary enemies.[65]

While many colonial powers had policies of dividing ethnic groups to exploit differences and minimize corruption, the American decision to do the opposite had operational benefits. While preventing abuses of their own neighbors certainly helped operations, the fact that soldiers who grew up in a particular area had an intimate knowledge of terrain negated this advantage for the enemy.

Closeness with the people held potential to help with tactical effectiveness, but the decisions by Allen led to some inefficiencies. The failure to institute a training program from the beginning resulted in tactical inefficiencies and abuses and the focus on chasing bandits rather than police work engendered ill feelings. Allen's command was

---

65 *RPC 1903, Part 3*, 4.

effective at the tactical level, however, in instilling cohesion and *esprit de corps* from the willingness of constabulary officers to lead their men from the front. In early 1903, Allen recounted, "I have here now in Manila a so-called Headquarters Troop wherein I am educating non-commissioned officers and also giving Inspectors a chance to learn what is to be the standard of officers in the Constabulary."[66] He tempered this feeling, however, with the admission that, "It has been impossible up to the present time to make much headway with this matter owing to the fact that every officer and man available have been required in the 'bosque', and it has been a question of hustle from the day of organization until now, and that on the part of each and every one."[67] Thus, while being founded in 1901, Allen did not create an actual constabulary school until 1906.[68] Most likely, Allen took this action due to increasing criticism of the constabulary by both indigenous and domestic audiences. In 1905, Dr. Henry P. Willis published *Our Philippine Problem*, a critique of American policies in the islands, in which he said:

> A glance at a constabulary outpost conveys an unfavorable impression, to be strengthened upon closer inspection. The men are manifestly untrained in soldierly qualities and lack pride in the standing of their organisation. They feel the hostility of their countrymen, and repay it with the disregard of individual rights which can be found only among a subject people.[69]

While the truth is most likely somewhere in between the two extremes painted by Allen and Willis, the little amount of training in police duties and focus on bandit hunting in the early days certainly contributed to ineffectiveness of supporting strategic goals vis-à-vis the population at the tactical level.

---

66 HTA to Clarence R. Edwards, January 31, 1903, HTA Papers, Box 8.
67 HTA to Arthur Murray, January 31, 1903, HTA Papers, Box 8.
68 *RPC 1906, Part 2*, 232.
69 Henry P. Willis, *Our Philippine Problem: A Study of American Colonial* Policy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1905), 143.

Compounding the inefficiency due to low training levels, the decision to pursue the tactic of "reconcentration" caused serious fractures with the population. In the 1903 commission report:

> It was exceedingly difficult for the constabulary to come in contact with these outlaws, the latter receiving information from the people of the towns of the movements of the former, and thereby being enabled readily to evade them. As this was an intolerable state of things, which could not be prolonged without immense damage to the province, it was determined to draw in the people from the remote and outlying barrios pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 781, which authorizes this step, and thereby cut off the source of supplies of the outlaws…They were thus concentrated for several months.[70]

The resort to physically isolating the population from the bandits had resulted in cutting off supplies and making the constabulary's job of pursuit easier, but it caused serious disruptions and engendered the hatred of the people. According to Willis' own personal observations and estimates from reports, he concluded that the constabulary put more than 450,000 inhabitants in reconcentration areas from 1902-1904.[71] The indigenous elites began to grow tired of these tactics as well. According to Attorney General Wilfley in 1906, "Chief Justice Arellano…thinks that the Insular Government is too elaborate for the resources of the country, and fears a quasi-military regime unless the Constabulary is put in good condition soon."[72] The semi-military tactics, use of scouts along with the constabulary, and reconcentration resulted in very hard feelings of the indigenous peoples toward government efforts.

Allen did achieve tactical success, however, in making sure his officers led from the front and instilled in the organization a feeling of *esprit de corps* that drove mission success. One of the best measures in the installation of *esprit de corps* was the desertion

---

70 *RPC 1903, Part 3*, 6.
71 Willis, *Our Philippine Problem*, 132.
72 Lebbeus R. Wilfley to William H. Taft, June 2, 1906, JGH Papers, Box 2.

rate of the constabulary. Allen continually referred to the low desertion rate of his soldiers versus that of other military organizations. For instance, Allen wrote to Senator Beveridge, "Out of the total number of our Constabulary [4,000] we have up to the present time lost only three members,--a record that can scarcely be equaled anywhere."[73] In the years of his tenure, the desertion rate was seven-tenths of one percent, nine-times below that of the Army in the Philippines.[74] The willingness of soldiers to stay with their units demonstrates the cohesion within the constabulary, propelled by the willingness of the officers to lead from the front. An example of this (if somewhat romanticized) comes from Vic Hurley's *Jungle Patrol*:

> We are to see Allen later in the course of the fierce fighting in Samar, ploughing his way through high *cogon* grass, three feet to the rear of Captain Cary Crockett, on patrol in very hostile country. He wears the full dress uniform of a brigadier-general; he insists that his officers go into battle clothed as becomes their rank. When grimacing and shouting *pulajans* rise all about the party there in that tangled grass, Captain and Private and Brigadier-General fight for their lives. But always, Allen is the General; if the *pulajans* wish to kill him, there he is, silver stars and all. Allen was a soldier in the grand manner; he was a dashing cavalryman who refused to let the glamour and romance of campaigning ever die.[75]

Further, in an Army report of the actions of Captain John R. White and his constables at Bud Dajo in 1906, Colonel J.W. Duncan stated, "The 51 men of the Sulu and Zamboanga Constabulary were distinguished for their work. Led by that fearless soldier, Captain White, and Second Lieutenant Sowers, these men fought like demons, the per cent of their casualty list exceeding all others."[76] Indeed, both bandits and soldiers received high

---

73 HTA to Albert J. Beveridge, February 13, 1902, HTA Papers, Box 7.
74 Twichell, *Allen,* 136.
75 Vic Hurley, *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary 1901-1936* (Salem, OR: Cerberus Books, 2011), 61.
76 Bureau of Constabulary, *General Orders No. 19,* May 23, 1906 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1907), 64.

casualty counts. In the years of Allen's tenure, the constabulary killed 3,153 and captured 10,755 bandits, confiscated 5,341 weapons, with nearly 1,000 constabulary soldiers dead.[77] According to Forbes, "The Filipino enlisted men respected their officers, and, when properly trained, commanded, and led, performed gallant service in the field," and, "The story of the Constabulary is one of heroism, endurance, and loyalty to ideals under great difficulties, of which the American people should be very proud."[78] The ability of the American commanders to develop the cohesion of their indigenous soldiers provided them with the means towards tactical success in suppressing insurrection.

The Philippine Constabulary offers several implications for the potential use of contemporary American officers to command indigenous forces. First, effective commanders must cultivate political connections to ensure success of their organization. In the case of the Philippine Constabulary, US civil leadership in the archipelago made things much easier for Allen and his subordinates. Indeed, this example could provide evidence for the argument that the US should only command indigenous forces if they hold civil power as well (a case such as the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq). Even if that were the circumstance, the Philippine Constabulary offers that a commander must cultivate relationships with the indigenous elite, as did Allen, Bandholtz, Harbord, and their subordinates. While the colonial authority rested with the US commission, each province had native elites elected to office with which the constabulary officials had to cooperate.

A further issue in dealing with political elites is language fluency. Allen put a premium on ensuring that his officers could speak or learn Spanish. While the emphasis

77 Twichell, *Allen,* 143.
78 Forbes, *The Philippine Islands,* vol. 1, 235, 219.

placed on multilingualism stemmed from a desire for the officers to communicate with their soldiers and the citizens of the island, the fact also arises that to cultivate closer political bonds it helps to communicate without a translator. In both cases, the fact that you can talk directly with either elites or your own soldiers develops a closer bond and lessens the impulse to look down on indigenous peoples.

Language fluency relates to another important lesson—that these assignments be long term. First, cultivation of fluency (especially outside of the European family of languages) takes a long time. If a cadre of American officers takes the time and effort to learn more difficult dialects, then the probability arises that there will be fewer of them. A smart return on such an investment lies with placing these individuals in positions to use that skill over an extended period. Second, to cultivate the relationships necessary and set the organization on the right track, it will take a matter of years. Allen spent six years as commander of the constabulary; his two successors spent more than a decade each in the Philippines. American commitment to a course of action such as this relies on a cadre dedicated to the long march.

The constabulary case also highlights a concern for station in the native force. Allen and all Regular Army officers detailed to the constabulary remained on active duty. Further, they retained their sequence in seniority.[79] Translating that to today's system, the officers would need to remain in their year group and be competitive at each promotion board. While there are numerous ways one could configure the service for this (separate branches, for instance), these officers took such a position for so long

79 At the time, promotion rested not on merit, but on seniority. Once a person of the next higher rank advanced, retired, or died, the number one person in line advanced.

because they had a guarantee that they would not lose their spot for advancement. Otherwise, the cadre would not attract the caliber of officer needed for such a task.

Finally, a cadre of American officers over indigenous forces allows younger officers to experience leadership of larger organizations at an earlier time in their career. For instance, Allen was a captain when first detailed to the constabulary; he held the temporary rank of brigadier general as a result of his position, reverting to a major when he left the Philippines. His subordinates all held higher temporary positions as a consequence of the number of soldiers entrusted to their care. This experience boded well for the US when commencing their involvement in World War I. Of former constabulary officers, twelve reached the rank of general during the war.[80] These officers either already displayed the necessary abilities to become a general officer, or their time in the constabulary molded them into better leaders. The truth is probably both.

From 1901-1917 the Philippine Constabulary, led by a cadre of US Army officers, showed that Americans could exercise effective command of indigenous forces. The ability to communicate with and influence both indigenous and American elites and competing to secure the resources necessary to align ends, ways, and means meant that US Army officers could set a solid political and strategic foundation for an indigenous force. Further, developing an organization that embraced flexibility and mobility at the operational level and exuded *esprit de corps* at the tactical level ensured development of a force that the Filipinos came to not only be proud of, but also saw as essential to their future. While not appropriate in every contemporary circumstance, the case of the

---

80 Henry T. Allen, H.H. Bandholtz, James G. Harbord, Mark L. Hersey, Peter E. Traub, Dennis E. Nolan, William C. Rivers, Herman Hall, William S. Scott, John B. Bennet, C.E. Kilbourne, and Marcus D. Cronin. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands,* vol. 1, 236-8.

Philippine Constabulary demonstrates that American military officers can exercise effective command over indigenous forces.

APPENDIX A: EFFECTIVE COMMAND CRITERIA

Military Organization Effectiveness	Commander Effectiveness
Political Level	
To what extent can military organizations assure themselves a regular share of the national budget sufficient to meet their major needs?	To what extent does the commander take actions to assure the organization a regular share of the national budget sufficient to meet their major needs?
To what extent do military organizations have access to the industrial and technological resources necessary to produce the equipment needed?	To what extent does the commander have access to the industrial and technological resources necessary to produce equipment needed?
To what extent do military organizations have access to manpower in the required quantity and quality?	To what extent does the commander advocate for access to manpower in the required quantity and quality?
Strategic Level	
To what degree would achievement of the organization's strategic objectives result in securing the political goals of the nation?	To what degree did the commander consider strategic goals' achievement balanced against political goals?
To what degree were the leaders of the military organization able to communicate with and influence the political leadership to seek militarily logical national goals?	To what degree were the leaders of the military organization able to communicate with and influence the political leadership to seek militarily logical national goals?
To what degree are strategic goals and courses of action consistent with force size and structure?	To what degree did the commander balance strategic goals and courses of action with force size and structure?
To what degree are the military's strategic objectives consistent with the logistical infrastructure and the national industrial and technical base?	To what degree did the commander set strategic objectives consistent with the logistical infrastructure?

To what degree are military organizations successful at integrating their strategic objectives with those of their allies and/or persuading them to adopt consistent strategic objectives?	To what degree did the military commander integrate their strategic objectives with those of allies and/or persuade them to adopt consistent strategic objectives?
To what degree do the strategic plans and objectives place the strengths of military organizations against the critical weaknesses of their adversary?	To what degree did the commander consider strategic plans that placed his organization's strengths against the enemy's weaknesses?
Operational Level	
To what extent do the military organizations of a nation possess a professional ethos and integrity that allows them to deal with operational problems in a realistic fashion?	To what extent did the commander develop a professional ethos and integrity to allow them to deal with operational problems in a realistic fashion?
To what degree are the military organization's operational methods integrated? To what degree do organizations attempt to combine combat arms to take full advantage of their strengths while covering their weaknesses?	To what degree did the commander attempt to combine combat arms to take full advantage of their strengths while covering their weaknesses?
To what extent are the military organizations mobile and flexible at the operational level? Can the organization move rapidly both intellectually and physically in either anticipated or unanticipated directions?	To what extent did the commander develop a mobile and flexible organization at the operational level?
To what extent are a military organization's operational concepts and decisions consistent with available technology?	To what extent did the commander develop concepts consistent with available technology?
To what extent is supporting activities well integrated with the operational concepts of the military organization?	To what extent did the commander integrate supporting activities with operational concepts?
To what extent is the military organization's operational concept consistent with the strategic objectives assigned to it?	To what extent did the commander develop operational concepts consistent with the strategic objectives?
To what degree does the operational doctrine of military organizations place their strengths against their adversary's weaknesses?	To what degree did the commander consider operational doctrine that placed their strengths against enemy weaknesses?
Tactical Level	

To what extent are the military organization's tactical approaches consistent with their strategic objectives?	To what extent did the commander encourage tactical approaches consistent with strategic objectives?
To what extent are tactical concepts consistent with operational capabilities?	To what extent did the commander encourage tactical concepts consistent with operational capability?
To what extent does the military organization's tactical system emphasize integration of all arms?	To what extent did the commander develop tactical concepts that emphasized integration of all arms?
To what extent do a military organization's tactical conceptions emphasize surprise and a rapid exploitation of opportunities?	To what extent did the commander emphasize tactical surprise and exploitation of opportunities?
To what extent is the military organization's tactical system consistent with its approach to morale, unit cohesion, and relations between officers, NCOs, and the enlisted ranks?	To what extent did the commander develop a tactical system consistent with its approach to morale, unit cohesion, and relations between officers, NCOs, and the enlisted ranks?
To what extent is the military organization's approach to training consistent with its tactical system?	To what extent did the commander develop a training program consistent with their tactical system?
To what extent are military organizations' tactical systems consistent with support capabilities?	To what extent did the commander develop tactical systems consistent with support capabilities?
To what extent do tactical systems place the strengths of military organizations against their adversary's weaknesses?	To what extent did the commander emphasize placing tactical strengths against the adversary's weaknesses?

Source: Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," in *Military Effectiveness,* vol. 1, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Introduction.

APPENDIX B: CONSTABULARY FIGURES FROM 1901-1917

Year	Number of Stations	Number of Officers		Number of Enlisted Men	Numbers of Deaths in Service			Expenditures ($)
		American	Filipino		AO	FO	FE	
1901	94	156	27	2417	0	0	6	-
1902	202	165	28	5317	4	2	286	684,958.08
1903	228	204	67	6805	9	0	288	1,810,009.06
1904	220	262	73	6729	8	1	129	2,051,744.10
1905	172	264	76	6852	6	0	119	2,107,061.39
1906	155	244	69	4773	3	0	116	1,889,254.74
1907	157	242	75	4778	2	0	50	1,581,602.61
1908	163	241	79	4723	2	1	52	1,710,539.32
1909	134	251	66	4267	2	0	58	1,831,505.44
1910	138	262	64	4067	5	1	33	1,510,309.11
1911	119	257	65	4159	4	1	23	1,531,480.46
1912	129	262	60	4283	0	0	22	1,575,848.95
1913	120	261	65	4621	5	1	41	1,672,327.56
1914	131	240	88	4793	3	0	47	1,789,783.59
1915	124	231	118	5002	1	0	55	1,593,241.21
1916	124	190	159	5105	0	3	35	1,899,250.89
1917	112	102	256	5505	2	1	41	1,894,704.88

Source: W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands,* vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), 227.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Henry T. Papers. Manuscripts Division. Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Boot, Max. *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power.* New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Bureau of Constabulary, *General Orders No. 19.* May 23, 1906. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1907. https://www.hathitrust.org/

Carroll, H.K. "The Territorial System for Our New Possessions." *The Outlook* 63, no. 17 (December 23, 1899): 966-8. http://www.unz.org

Coats, George Y. "The Philippine Constabulary: 1901-1917." PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1968. http://search.proquest.com

Farooqui, Amar. "'Divide and Rule'? Race, Military Recruitment and Society in Late Nineteenth Century Colonial India." *Social Scientist* 43, nos. 3-4 (March-April, 2015): 49-59. http://www.jstor.org

Forbes, W. Cameron. *The Philippine Islands.* 2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928.

Grant, Jonathan. "The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914." *The Journal of Military History* 66, no. 1 (January 2002): 9-36. http://search.proquest.com

Greenhut, Jeffrey. "Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the

British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army." *Military* Affairs 48, no. 1 (January 1984): 15-8. http://www.jstor.org

Harbord, James G. Papers. Manuscripts Division. Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Headquarters Department of the Army. *Army Command Policy.* AR 600-20. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, November 6, 2014.

Headquarters Philippine Constabulary. *Manual for the Philippine Constabulary 1915.* Manila, Philippine Islands: Headquarters Philippine Constabulary, June 1, 1915.

Hurley, Vic. *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary 1901-1936.* Salem, OR: Cerberus Books, 2011. Google Books

Jessup, Philip C. *Elihu Root.* 2 vols. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938. https://www.hathitrust.org/

Keegan, John. *The Mask of Command.* New York: Viking Press, 1987.

Linn, Brian. *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940.* Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997.

Mason, Philip. *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men.* London: Purnell Book Services, Ltd., 1974.

McCoy, Alfred W. *Policing America's Empire: The United States, The Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.

Meixsel, Richard B. "An Army for Independence: The American Roots of the Philippine Army." PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1993. http://search.proquest.com

—. *Philippine-American Military History, 1902-1942: An Annotated Bibliography.* Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003.

Milan, Primitivo de Castro. "The Personnel Administration of the Philippine Constabulary." Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1962. http://search.proquest.com

Millett, Allan R., Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman. "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations." In *Military Effectiveness*, 3 vols., edited by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, 1-30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Millett, Richard L. *Searching for Stability: The U.S. Development of Constabulary*

Forces in Latin America and the Philippines. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010. PDF e-book.

Morrison, Christopher A. "A World of Empires: United States Rule in the Philippines, 1898-1913." PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2009. http://search.proquest.com

Ng, Franklin Chew Lun. "Governance of American Empire: American Colonial Administration and Attitudes, 1898-1917." PhD dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1975. http://search.proquest.com

Öncü, Edip. "The Beginnings of Ottoman-German Partnership: Diplomatic and Military Relations Between Germany and The Ottoman Empire before the First World War." Master's thesis, Bilkent University, 2003. http://www.thesis.bilkent.edu.tr/0002417.pdf

Philippine Commission. *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President*, 4 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900. https://www.hathitrust.org/

Sheffield, GD, ed. *Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military Experience Since 1861.* London: Brassey's, 1997.

Taft, William H. Papers. Manuscripts Division. Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Twichell, Jr., Heath. *Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer: 1859-1930.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.* JP 1. Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013.

US War Department. *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901.* 3 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901. https://www.hathitrust.org/

US War Department. *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1907.* 3 Parts. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908. https://www.hathitrust.org/

US War Department. *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1903.* 3 Parts. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904. https://www.hathitrust.org/

US War Department. *Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the United States Philippine Commission*. Nos. 1-263. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901. https://www.hathitrust.org/

US War Department. *Report of the Philippine Commission. 1901*, 2 Parts.

Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901. https://www.hathitrust.org/

US War Department. *Reports of the Philippine Commission, The Civil Governor, and the Head of the Executive Departments of the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands: 1900-1903*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904. https://www.hathitrust.org/

US War Department. *Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1906.* 3 Parts. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1907. https://www.hathitrust.org/

US War Department. *Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission. 1905.* 4 Parts. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906. https://www.hathitrust.org/

Van Creveld, Martin. *Command in War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.

White, John R. *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands.* New York: The Century Co., 1928. PDF e-book.

Willis, Henry P. *Our Philippine Problem: A Study of American Colonial* Policy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1905. https://www.hathitrust.org/