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TITLE:

Advanced Advisor Training For the Foreign Security Advisor

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Executive Summary

Title: Advanced Advisor Training for the Foreign Security Force Advisor

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Thesis: The Marine Corps should use the FSF MOS to create a cadre of highly trained advisors with technical and regional skills. In order to do so, it must screen, train and provide continuous advisor education and assignment opportunities as for FSF Advisors.

Discussion: The Marine Corps developed a FSF Advisor MOS to track security cooperation skills. As the demand for FSF advisors continues to increase, the Marine Corps will know which Marines are experienced advisors. But the established new MOS only tracks and does not go far enough to meet future Security Cooperation requirements.

Current training programs do not provide for continuing professional development of FSF advisors. The Marine Corps must establish a systematic and sustained education program for FSF Advisors, rather than merely using the MOS to track trained and experienced Marines with advisor skills. In fact, participation in joint advisor training programs or institutions would form a logical and efficient foundation for the Marine Corps advisor training program.

Conclusion: Establishing an advanced education and training program for the Foreign Security Forces Advisor MOS will enhance the ability of the Marine Corps to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements for Security Cooperation missions.

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Preface

From February 2013 to February 2014, I deployed as a logistics advisor to the Afghan Operational Coordination Center, Regional Command South West, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. This experience helped me develop a deeper understanding and appreciation of the required security force assistance (SFA) mission, required advisor training and education, as well as the associated selection and assessment criteria. This paper will review past advisor training programs, current SFA education and training, and recommend solutions to the shortfalls of the current SFA training programs for Marines.

As the requirements for Security Cooperation (SC) activities in support of the United States' national objectives increase, there is demand to improve advisor and cultural training. The Marine Corps should not degrade future training; rather it should retain, develop and sustain advisor education and training to ensure the Marine Corps possesses a ready advisor skill set.

The research conducted to develop these ideas included a review of national security policies, previous Marine Corps advisor training programs, and current advisor training programs. It also included interviews with key subject matter experts, a review of U.S. Government Accountability Office reports, and published articles related to security force assistance and advising. The MOS Sponsor, Lieutenant Colonel James S. McCormick, USMC, was essential to understanding the free MOS process and requirement for an advanced advisor training program.

INTRODUCTION

“The best way to achieve security is to prevent war when possible and to encourage peaceful change within the international system. Our national strategy emphasizes building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long term security.”

-US National Defense Strategy¹

In 2012, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued report 12-556 on Security Force Assistance (SFA) programs in the services. The report criticized the lack of defined doctrine, training, and organization of SFA units. Additionally, the GAO report noted that the Department of Defense (DoD) did not provide clear objectives for SFA to either the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) or the services.² DoD partially concurred with the findings and began steps to improve doctrine and training for conventional forces to conduct the SFA mission.³ This report resulted in DoD publishing Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, *Security Force Assistance*, which provides overall guidance to SFA training and activities. In 2014, the GAO conducted another assessment of Security Force Assistance, which recommended the establishment of a tracking program as well as briefing advisor experience as a special duty assignment during promotion boards.⁴

A parallel effort in 2012, the Small Wars Center and Irregular Warfare Integration Division (SWC/IWID) generated an Irregular Warfare-Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) survey that reported critical advisor skills were not tracked over the past 10 years.⁵ To remedy this deficiency, the Marine Corps created a Free Military Occupational Specialty to track experienced advisors. The Marine Corps released Marine Administrative Message 472/14, explaining the assignment and tracking of the Foreign Security Force Advisor Military Occupational Specialty (FSF Advisor MOS).⁶ Any Marine with documented advising training and experience will automatically receive the MOS 0570/0571. This MOS is awarded regardless of performance or effectiveness.⁷ The new MOS enables the Marine Corps to track Marines who meet the criteria of advisor training and/or deployed experience. Although the new MOS improves the ability of

the Marine Corps to track experienced advisors, it is not sufficient to ensure that Marine Corps' advising capability will meet the future requirements of the Marine Corps outlined in *Expeditionary Force 21*. The Marine Corps should use the FSF MOS to create a cadre of highly trained advisors with technical and regional skills. In order to do so, it must screen, train and provide continuous advisor education and assignment opportunities as for FSF Advisors.

This paper will explain the strategic importance of SFA, how advising relates to the Marine Corps' future missions, the deficiencies in current advisor training programs, and provide recommendations on how to remedy current deficiencies. The Marine Corps' SFA concept and institutional framework are crucial to U.S. national interests. Screening, tracking and training of essential FSF advisor skills are necessary steps in the development of a solid advisor training program.

BACKGROUND

The *National Security Strategy* (NSS) and the *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) both identify Security Force Assistance (SFA) as a critical component of the U.S. strategy to enhance global security by building the capacity of partner states.⁸ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines SFA as “DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security force and their supporting institution.”⁹ Furthermore, SFA is nested under the umbrella of Security Cooperation (SC) and sponsored by Security Assistance (SA) appropriated sources; to “directly” support only activities that develop the host nation's capability and capacity to defend against a threat.¹⁰ The term SFA will be used throughout this document to describe SC activities, while theater security cooperation (TSC) will be used to explain the shift in security cooperation.

Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD 23), issued 25 April 2013, outlines specific U.S. policy on Security Sector Assistance, the general framework into which SFA fits. Security Sector Assistance applies a whole of government approach, involving the Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other government agencies, along with the DoD.¹¹ The DoD's *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2010* provides specific guidance to the Service Chiefs on developing training programs to prepare their services to train, advise and assist foreign security forces.¹² In October 2010, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.68 clarified terminology and instructions to the Service Chiefs on implementing SFA training.¹³

The Marine Corps must prepare to perform the SC mission in accord with the NSS, NDS, and *PPD 23*. The Marine Corps' focus is to align its current Security Cooperation program with the Security Sector Assistance framework defined in *PPD 23*. It must, therefore, ensure that Marine advisors function effectively in the interagency environment that *PPD 23* considers essential.¹⁴ The Marine Corps current Capstone Concept, *Expeditionary Force 21*, released in March 2014, is in line with the National Defense Strategy by emphasizing the importance of theater security cooperation activities.¹⁵

Recognizing the need as early as 2006, the Marine Corps invested substantial resources into developing a formalized advisor training program. This program, the Marine Corps Advisor Training Group (ATG), supported the SFA mission deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. The purpose of ATG was to assess advisor teams before deployment. The drawn down of forces in Afghanistan and the Coalition transfer of authority to Afghanistan National Security Forces decreased the demand for advisors. This decrease in demand for advisors eventually led to the closure of ATG, and signaled a need to retain and track advisor experience for use in future advisor activities. Despite the closure of ATG, the Marine Corps remains committed to the train, assist, and advise activities in support of the U.S. national interests. This commitment is evident

through the FSF Advisor MOS assignment process to track experienced advisors. However, establishing the new MOS is only a beginning. The Marine Corps must align the appropriate resources to screen and support the FSF Advisor and establish an advanced advisor training program that sustains advisor experience and core skills.

Despite the decreased demand for advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD's guidance and the *PPD-23* principles have not changed. They still focus on global security through SC activities. However, ATG closed due to limited resources to support post OEF advisor training, which transferred future advisor training requirements to the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG). As global security continues to influence strategic relationships with various partner states, there will be a requirement for an enduring advisor training program.

EF21 explains the Marine Corps concepts required to achieve the DoD's Security Cooperation initiatives. The Marine Corps must have the capacity to execute partnered security activities, and to be in the right place at the right time to execute the right mission.¹⁶ As a result, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs) are forward deployed units task organized to accomplish theater security cooperation. *EF 21* requires the Marine Corps to be prepared to perform SFA at any time, primarily through SPMAGTFs and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs).¹⁷ The Marine Corps, working with the other services, must develop and sustain an institutional educational and training capability required to support the evolving FSF Advisor mission.

The TSC activities that SPMAGTFs and MEUs perform differ substantially from the SFA activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, SFA was an enduring advising effort to build, develop, and sustain a foreign security force against a current threat. TSC missions are short-term exercises incorporated into Geographic Combatant Commander (GCCs) theater security campaign plans (TSCP) that train and advise foreign security forces on a wide variety of missions, ranging from conventional operations to counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance,

and disaster response. The SPMAGTF is organized to shape and train, but can transition to a crisis response as needed to deter or respond to conflicts.

The FSF advisor must possess the ability to understand political objectives, manage available resources, and cooperate closely with partner forces. These skills require quality assessment, selection, education training, and evaluation. It is imperative for the Marine Corps to build, develop, and sustain a FSF advisor training program to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

Over the years, poorly developed SFA training programs hindered advisors relationships with foreign security forces, which limited sufficient support to area commanders. From two-week programs to six-month programs, insufficient pre-deployment training failed to prepare advisors for interaction with the FSF. One advisor team received training to advise Foreign Security Force on combat skills, but upon arrival learned the FSF was ready to develop command and control and planning skills.¹⁸ These skills were not taught during pre-deployment training and the advisor team found it difficult to adapt to the new requirement.

THE PROBLEM WITH MASS SELECTION

“Advisors, like their successors in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, had to use techniques of persuasion rather than the power of direct command to influence their counterparts.”¹⁹

Over the last 13 years, the advisor role is essential to SFA activities, which focus on teaching, coaching, and assisting FSF to accomplish their missions independently. The Marine Corps draws from U.S. Army and Joint doctrine to establish the foundational guidance for advisors. The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1 *Security Force Assistance* explains the role of an advisor is “to provide relevant and timely advice to FSF.”²⁰ Throughout history, the advisor role has remained unchanged. While the locations and resources have varied, persuasion still is a mainstay in the advisor tool kit. There are several enduring qualities Marines should possess to be a successful advisor. These traits include maturity, combat experience, cultural and language awareness, willingness to learn, persuasiveness, and independence.²¹

Often, the advisor selection process is limited to personnel availability and not skill or potential. The available Marine is not always best suited for advising. The advisor must be patient, humble, teachable, knowledgeable, and willing to advise. Advisors often face challenges that are uncommon, stretch moral decision making capability, and require a keen understanding of cultural differences. Good advisors quickly develop rapport and trust with FSF that allows them to establish effective and professional relationships. Good advisors use the skills introduced in pre-deployment to their advantage by capitalizing on soft and interpersonal skills.²²

Core advisor skills consist of three categories: hard, soft and inter personal skills.²³ Hard skills involve basic military operations such as convoys, patrols, and fire support. These skills are common knowledge to most conventional forces and evaluating proficiency is based on whether or not the task was accomplished. Soft skills are cultural, linguistic, and social skills specific to particular regions. Soft skills assist the advisor in understanding the FSF and local environmental effects on the advisors mission. Although the Marine Corps improved its ability to teach soft skills after establishing Advisor Training Cell (ATC)/ATG programs, the training still lacked the flexibility to train to various fluid mission requirements. Assessment of these skills is more difficult.

Interpersonal skills, however, are the most difficult to teach and measure. They include the ability to develop rapport and win the trust of others through communication and respect. Influencing and mentoring others to make significant changes in their normal practices are essential skills to developing relationships. Interpersonal skills require pre-deployment training that allows for practice, cultivation, and assessment of interpersonal skills through interaction with role players. The challenges of improving interpersonal skills can be overcome if a Marine is willing to learn. The Marine Corps advisor selection process must assess an individual's willingness to become an advisor.

The willingness to become an advisor significantly increases the success of the advisor mission. Throughout the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) was advised by selected and trained advisors, which ensured the success of the VNMC. Conversely, the Combined Action Program (CAP) Marines received minimal in country training, which limited their success. These advisors were often poor performers with a service support MOS. Another example of success was the Marine reserve units that supported Iraq; they were from the same unit and trained together, which ensured unit cohesion.²⁴ Unfortunately, the Marine Corps filled the advisor teams with individual augments that completed pre-deployment training together. The Marines selected for these teams did not always possess good advisor qualities. The Marine Corps must review how advisors are selected and screened to ensure they have effective qualities. The tracked experienced advisor group will assist in identifying qualified individuals.

A LACK OF RESOURCES AND PRIORITIZATION

The current dilemma regarding SFA advising reflects historical precedents as well as current conditions. The United States military has a long history of SFA advising, but has never made it an institutional program or priority. Advising tends to flow in and out of popularity. In 1940, the Marine Corps wrote the Small Wars Manual, which captures a majority of the tactics, techniques and procedures for developing foreign security forces. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the U.S. services did a significant amount of advising, but the services remained focused on the confrontation with the Soviet Union and relegated the SFA mission to special operations forces (SOF). When the demand exceeded SOF capacity, the conventional forces were trained to support.

The Center for Naval Analyses report, *United States Marine Corps Advisor: Past, Present, and Future*, explained how similar the past advisor skills compare to today's capabilities. The report details two types of training courses, both focusing heavily on learning FSF's language and culture. The first advisor school was a three-month course at Marine Corps Base Quantico

that included basic combat skills and intense language training. The other course located at Fort Bragg was “the six-week Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course, which included Vietnamese language and culture orientation, a review of U.S. doctrine, and an overview of Vietnamese military operations and tactics.”²⁵ The advisor lessons learned from Vietnam and Korea did not persuade the services to establish an enduring advisor training program.²⁶ The enormous demand for advisors to support Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM forced the development of a Training and Education Command (TECOM) validated advisor training program. In 2006, DoD instructed conventional forces to initiate training programs to develop military advisors.²⁷

The Marine Corps has a history of security cooperation training programs that constantly adapts to available resources and projected requirements. The Marine Corps’ institutional response to SC requirements began in 1992 with Coalition and Special Warfare Center, which dissolved. In 2004 and 2005, the Marine Corps established three different organizations: the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC) for education and training, the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU) to perform the SFA mission, and the Center for Advance Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) to provide cultural expertise for the Marine Corps as a whole. In 2006, the newly established Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) took over FMTU as part of the special operations mission. However, this lack of institutional stability has hindered development of a coherent advisor training program. In 2007, the Marine Corps formed the Advisor Training Group (ATG) at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, in accord with the DoD directive to develop advising capability within conventional forces. ATG was a TECOM validated advisor training program that supported annually over 200 advisors until 2014. The training program was the last block of advisor training that began with Advisor Training Cell Block II and Block III training. This advisor training was specifically

designed and funded to support SFA mission in Afghanistan. Upon ATG closing transferred all advising training to the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group.

As of 2011, the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) at Ft. Story, Virginia combined the functions of SCETC and later in 2014, ATG.²⁸ Currently, MCSCG is the centralized location for advisor training and other security cooperation functions. This reform reflected the change in available resources and led to a significant decrease in capability and capacity to train a large volume of advisors. MCSCG is designed to adapt training programs to support TSC missions and establish procedures to maintain long-term security engagement. Melissa McAdam's article, "Military Advising After Afghanistan," contends that military poor management of recent advisor expertise and advisor-training programs will lead to an "ill prepared" force to support the future directed advisor requirements. She explains that the decrease in resources to support advisor-training programs and track the advisor expertise is detrimental to building partnership capacity.²⁹ The Marine Corps has partially acknowledged this fact by the development of the FSF MOS; however, this must reinforce the advisor training program.

The global security environment demands the Marine Corps build, develop, and sustain FSF advisors by improving training programs and retaining expertise. This task has two primary components, tracking experienced advisors to meet future requirements and developing training, education, and sustainment programs for advisor skills. The military mindset must evolve to build an atmosphere where advisors and non-combatant activities are valued in military operational phases, Phase 0, shape through Phase IV, enable civil authority.³⁰ When the stability operations are properly executed to establish a secure host nation, it minimizes the need for combat troops to return. Consequently, the U.S. Government is developing a better understanding of the importance of SC and SFA by focusing on conflict prevention through instituting strong partnering relationships with military advisors and FSF.

Although the government is developing a better understanding of security partnerships, the training preparation for advisors has been inconsistent and often improvised. The initial demand during Operation Iraq Freedom forced the creation of many ad hoc teams with minimal training.³¹ These Mobile Training Teams (MTT) were composed of Marines without advisor training that were pulled from deployed battalions. This team's experience was derived from on-the-job training. The Mobile Training Teams (MTT) did not understand the SFA concepts of: *organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise (OTERA)*. As advisor training programs developed, much of the situational awareness for future teams came from the MTT after action reports.

Throughout the years of training advisors to support the security cooperation activities, the Marine Corps created various temporary methods and training opportunities for conventional forces. However, a program of record, or training path, for the advisor Marines does not exist. Since the consolidation, MCSCG is responsible for "security cooperation programs, training, planning and activities in order ensure unity of effort in support of USMC and Regional Marine Component Command (MARFOR) objectives and in coordination the operation forces."³² MCSCG coordinates training for SPMAGTFs and provides a basic advisor course, which meets the national, DoD, and Joint Directives' SFA requirements. The MCSCG's "unity of effort" influences the spectrum of Building Partner Capacity, including Security Force Assistance, and Assess, Train, Advise and Assist programs. The MCSCG's goal is to develop a program that supports the development of FSF to accomplish the varied SFA activities. However, MCSCG does not have a standard advisor development program that supports enduring advisor requirements.

CURRENT FSF ADVISOR PROGRAMS

The current FSF Advisor training programs do not go beyond a short preparation for specific short-term missions, a dramatic contrast from the six-month work ups for an Operation Enduring

Freedom SFA mission. In 2011, the SFA Advisor training program for a twelve-month mission lasted six months, and incorporated Afghan role player exercises and Marine Corps Expeditionary Force mission rehearsal exercises. The advisor course included combat and advising skills and concluded with a 29-day assessment.³³ This training, by and large, prepares the individual for deployment to Afghanistan; however, it did not provide training for the individual's specific mission. The training focused on generalities, which did not support the operational level of advising required to interact with actual counterparts and higher headquarter staffs. This reveals the need for advisor training to develop above the tactical level.

Since the transition in October 2014, MCSCG's training courses are mission-oriented and tailored to meet specific security cooperation tasks. The courses are shorter because they do not include the combat skills that are routinely obtained during the unit's pre-deployment training. More importantly only a select group from the deploying unit takes the courses. After completing the BAC program at MCSCG, the attendees are theoretically able to provide unit training to train the trainers. This process is less than ideal considering; that the trainers are receiving a limited class with the expectation that if you can conduct basic training/instructing then you can train FSF. MCSCG's current programs do not provide sufficient advanced advising skills required at the strategic and operational levels.

MCSCG provides training on how to plan and coordinate security cooperation with Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs).³⁴ The SC planners must understand how SFA activities support the theater campaign plan to ensure the whole-of-government approach is resourced, implemented and effective. Throughout the strategic documents, the goal of SFA is to develop a "Force Security Force that are competent, capable, sustainable, committed, and confident, and have a security apparatus tied to regional stability."³⁵ Joint Doctrine Note 1-13's *Security Force Assistance*, focuses on the range of military operations. Phase 0 and I (shape and deter) develop host nation force capabilities in order to prevent conflicts. Phase II and III (seize

the initiative and dominate) assist friendly forces with freedom of movement to maintain control of operational environment. Phase IV (stabilize) SFA focuses on training and transitioning host nation forces to sustain the infrastructure and security. In Phase V (enable civil authorities), the host nation has the lead and coordinates with DoS for support of security activities.³⁶ However, transitioning through the various phases of warfare requires various types of security cooperation training based on partnered engagements.

The advisor training program requires a MOS road map to guide the advanced training for FSF Advisors to strengthen the advisor skills and improve the Marine Corps SFA training program. TECOM would provide a FSF Advisor MOS road map to assist Marines with required advisor skill training, recommended advisor skill training, recommended advisor distance learning training, and recommended advisor billets to support development and mastery of MOS skills.³⁷ Based on the current available training, the MOS roadmap would have to draw from multiple external sources to support an enduring program because of the Marine Corps limited courses and billets available. Despite the fact that the advisor MOS roadmap does not exist, MCSCG currently provides various advisor skill training courses to accommodate the required SC activities. Selected Marines from SPMAGTFs or any unit may attend the Basic Advisor Course (BAC), which consists of advisor skills, FSF training management, and force protection, which will develop instructors for Basic Engagement Skills. The BAC occurs nine times a year and supports MEUs, SPMAGTFs, and Unit Deployment Program with special packages for each unique requirement. MCSCG also provides opportunities for commands to develop customized training program to meet the unit's SFA mission. MCSCG's current programs have the necessary flexibility to support the current security environments that allows units to customize training. However, unlike ATG the current programs are not TECOM validated, which allows for flexibility but does not ensure the content is consistent.

As an illustration of the lack of advisor specific content, the December 2014 Georgian Advisor Team's After Action Report highlighted a deficiency in the training program of the advisor training techniques. This advisor team requested MCSCG provide additional training that would focus on teaching and training the FSF on how to execute range operations. The Georgian Advisor Team was trained on how to execute range operations, but not how to teach the range execution to FSF.³⁸ As this advisor team prepares for the next deployment, MCSCG can adjust the training program to fit the needs of its mission. The flexibility has advantages in this manner. On the other hand, limited course structure is often the result of lack of guidance and doctrine. MCSCG and TECOM currently do not have sufficient guidance from Headquarters Marine Corps Plans, Policy, and Operations to establish advisor training requirements for a MOS road map. Although, the SC activities vary to develop the FSF, the basic core advisor skills remain the same. MCSCG must begin with these core skills, which include the aforementioned, hard, soft, and interpersonal skills.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FSF ADVISOR MOS

The importance of maintaining experienced advisors is crucial, especially as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan transitions to stability operations. The skills learned over the last ten years will atrophy if the Marine Corps do not retain the training for this skill. The GAO report 14-482 reviewed the Army and the Marine Corps' retention plan for experienced SFA advisors; the GAO assessed that the services needed to develop a tracking program and a method to capture advisor experience in the promotion process. As a result the GAO recommended that DoD implement a tracking policy that would record the experienced SFA advisors.³⁹ Thus, the Marine Corps created the FSF advisor MOS. The initial assessment of advisors from the last ten years of SFA activities totaled only 448 Marines, which includes Advisor Training Group graduates, Marines with two advisor assignments, and Afghan/Pakistan

Hands program.⁴⁰ This number was significantly less than trained. So in December 2014, the Marine Corps released a second Marine Corps Administrative Message to request other qualified personnel to submit documentation to receive the FSF advisor MOS. As the number of tracked advisors increases, the way forward for the FSF advisor MOS is to develop a training plan that maintains advisor skills.

MCSCG has programs in place to maintain the current basic training requirements and the capacity to develop and implement an advanced advisor training program. However, a MOS roadmap based on the current *NAVMC 3500.59B*, the *Marine Corps Security Cooperation Training and Readiness Manual*, and incorporation with after actions of recent advisors would support future advising engagements. The justification for establishing advanced training programs to develop and sustain FSF advisors is apparent in the requirement for advisors to support every phase of military operations. The FSF advisor must have a foundational understanding of the SC activities from the national strategy perspective to the GCC' TSCP. Then the advisor must have the capacity to process national goals into action at the phases of military operations.⁴¹ It is imperative that the FSF advisors begin to develop a stronger position in the planning and execution of security operations within the conventional Marine forces missions.

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, consolidates information to support the advisor community and provides an outlet for the SFA advisor to share experiences.⁴² JCISFA is a great source for the development of SFA planners and FSF advisors because it consolidates SFA information across the services and provides consolidated after actions. The JCISFA staff is comprised of service members and civilians tasked to maintain the development of SFA doctrine. The Marine Corps ability to leverage JCISFA resources will improve the SFA programs and assist in the development of the

FSF Advisor MOS. The JCISFA is currently updating the *SFA Planning Guide* that will assist SFA planners with coordinating with the GCC's TSCP.

The implementation of the FSF advisor MOS requires an effective training program to support the development of advisors and institutionalization of advisors as a Marine Corps core competency. From interviews with experienced advisors, there is a concern that the Marine Corps is not embracing the main effort of SFA sufficiently because of the recent changes in advising training. The designation of the FSF advisor MOS places a label on a skill set, which is progress on the right path to developing an FSF advisor training program that transitions advising from a temporary assignment to an enduring skill set and program of record. An article by Capitan Scott Lasswell, USMC, "Permanent Advising Equals Permanent Marine Corps," argues that the Marine Corps must take this post-Afghanistan advising skill set and make it a permanent core competency.⁴³ The training required to implement FSF MOS will require planning and coordinating with several organizations, such as MCSCG, CAOCL, JCISFA, Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM), Small Wars Center and Irregular Warfare Integration Division (SWC/IWID), and Training and Education Command (TECOM) to develop a program of record.

FSF ADVISOR TRAINING PROGRAM RECCOMENDATIONS

The Marine Corps needs to develop a systematic FSF advisor MOS training program. There are several options available, including: the establishment of a Joint Military Advisor Training course, a Joint Advising Battalion, or an individually paced advisor continuing education program. Many MOSs have joint entry level MOS schools, which have proven effective in establishing MOS skills at the entry level. Lieutenant Colonel James Buchman proposes a similar joint course for advisor training recommendation in his paper, "Filling the Toolkits: The case for Joint Military Advisors," to provide a common advisor skillset across services. He

contends that the joint course should provide the cultural and interpersonal capabilities necessary for successful advising while service specific courses cover particular combat skills. It would thus create a cadre of trained advisors to meet worldwide SFA requirements. Since SC is a DoD-wide activity, it is a logical candidate for a joint training program. A Joint Military Advisor Training Program would meet the Marine Corps need and facilitate inter-service cooperation.⁴⁴

Dr. Gordon Rudd of Marine Corps University School of Advance Warfighting advocates a different joint solution, namely a Joint Advising Battalion.⁴⁵ The Battalion would consist of three companies, one for initial training of advisors, one for executing SC missions, and one for post deployment and refresher training. The Battalion leadership positions should be staffed with experienced advisors. The companies would consist of personnel that are executing their B-Billets, similar to a tour at Recruit Training Regiment, Parris Island, as Series Commanders. Dr. Rudd further explained that the mission and location of the advisor team would influence the basic advisor training course and additional soft skills training. The advisor skills and interpersonal relationships developed would create a strong team, which is able to speak the language, understand the culture, and influence the host nation FSF. The initial training company is foundational to the development of effective advisors who are trained to provide unity of effort and collaboration with other agencies to ensure strategic goals are understood.

The joint training environment requires FSF advisors to develop cohesion to accomplish the mission. One method of organizing advisor teams is to focus on service integrity within the training process, essentially a squad of 13-16 personnel that is organized to create an advisor team from the same service. They would arrive together, train together, and execute the mission together. The rapid requirement for the advisor teams and missions may challenge that construct; however, cohesion is essential to maintain an effective advisor team. Teams sometimes resist the introduction of additional personnel that did not conduct initial team training, especially when the individuals are from different services and countries. This is a part

of the forming and storming that occurs when any team forms and must be managed quickly to prevent delays to the mission. However, a joint team that trains together will create the necessary cohesion to be an effective advisor team and influence the environment.

The training process is integral in establishing advisor teams' ability to work in a fluid FSF environment. The intrapersonal skills of the team working together are imperative to success. Similar to how a football or basketball player is able to anticipate another teammate's actions, an advisor team must build the same action and reaction responses while influencing FSF. The team's intuition is essential to ensuring an invaluable and rewarding experience. The joint advisor training environment would establish unity of effort among services, other agencies, and possibly coalition partners in support of strategic SC goals.

The last phase of the joint training advisor course includes post deployment and refresher training, specifically to improve the training curriculum and ensure advisors receive proper rest and recovery. The Joint Advisor Battalion would include a post deployment phase that integrates the advisor team's experiences, situational reports, and recommendations into a period of instruction for the next team. The recently returned advisor teams would provide updated information about the current environment and concerns about FSF counterparts and the SC activities. The FSF advisors' after action assessments would be used to develop and sustain current advisor training. After the FSF advisors return from leave and conduct any annual training, the team would begin refresher training and receive a mission. The program's intent is for the team to retain the same construct if possible, especially if the team executed their mission effectively. This is similar to how the SOF community keeps the same group of soldiers together to execute the Foreign Internal Defense mission.¹ After the second deployment, the team would disaggregate and become trainers or transfer to the next duty station. However, this

¹ See Glossary.

recommendation is not an immediate alternative to the current situation in the FSF advisor realm of insufficient training programs.

The short-term solution for the Marine Corps FSF advisor training program includes the current basic advisor training course, establishing a continuous education program, and creating a residential advanced advisor training equivalent course requirement to sustain advisor skills. The Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) provides an online security cooperation continuing learning point program that would support the development of the FSF advisor continuous education program.⁴⁶ Currently, DISAM provides training to MCSCG Security Cooperation Planners Course as required, which develops a security cooperation planner. For instance, the Marine Corps could coordinate with DISAM to determine which courses would be required to support the FSF advisor training program. While JCISFA would still provide basic support to the warfighter for doctrine development and compilation of after actions, DISAM would provide online and resident training opportunities.⁴⁷

The DISAM is an extensive resource to develop an advanced advisor training sustainment program, without additional training resource. The three service departments issued a memorandum in 2012 mandating that 95 percent of security cooperation personnel complete 80 hours of training every two years when assigned to a SC billet; this online and resident training currently exists.⁴⁸ The current program is beyond just SFA activities but covers the security assistance programs. Some of the basic programs would effectively build the next level of advising skill after the MCSCG's BAC. Also, the DISAM website provides additional resources from an online journal to the only security assistance library.⁴⁹ DISAM resources will set a great example for FSF Advisor training, while the Marine Corps develops an enduring program. The DISAM program will expand the FSF advisors understanding beyond the Marine Corps into whole-of-government training programs.

The advisor continuing education and training credits can be obtained from a variety of sources from reading books and articles, attending SFA conferences, writing about SFA advisor experiences, to completing online culture, language, or advising computer based training. However, these need to be consolidated, vetted and increased access offered to advisors. The management of the continuing education credits could be associated with MCSCG through Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS), individually submitted documentation of completed advisor activities. There are similar requirements in other MOSs, such as Contingency Contracting, which in accord with DoD Instruction 5000.66 requires contracting Marines to complete 80 continuing learning credits every two years to maintain their skills in the contracting competencies. MCSCG can provide additional guidance on programs that foster FSF Advisor Marines to establish lifelong learning of regions, similar to Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning (CAOCL) Regional, Cultural and Language Familiarization program (RCLF).⁵⁰

Lastly, the advance advisor training course would support the advisor program road map for future MOS training. The MOS road map would organize a planning course that will lead to a SFA planners' advance course, which would include coordination of the Security Sector Assistance organizations and joint military advisor experience with a thread of DoS/USAID presentations. The advance level advisor training will focus on FSF advising and whole-of-government approach. The target audiences are U.S. military senior and mid-grade leaders who require the ability to influence senior FSF leaders and local governments. The advance advisor course objectives would include coordination with GCC TSCP, strategic influence of host nation government, working with USAID, understanding DoS mission for the region, and developing diplomatic influence as a direct SC activity. This strategic program requires support from the other agencies to manage lessons from senior advisors that are returning from operations to provide updated situational reports.

Additionally, the CAOCL would support the development of a cultural and language package to develop specific regional understanding and skills to maximize working with a linguist. Specifically, CAOCL will be instrumental in strengthening the soft skills throughout the continuing learning program through providing updated regional cultural education. MCSCG must coordinate with CAOCL the program objectives for advanced advisor course to provide an enduring cultural capability.

An advanced advisor course would include joint components focusing on collaboration of resources and coordination of tasks to support the overall mission of the Geographic Combatant Commander. These thoughts are feasible. However, they would require coordination on multiple levels and with various agencies to accomplish the end state of a solid advisor training program with a logical roadmap.

RISKS

However, the risks associated with creating a substantial program to support the FSF MOS includes screening, training and continuing education program as well as establishing special duty billets. The Marine Corps must prioritize the development of the FSF MOS beyond just tracking the experienced advisor, but sustaining a core competency to support security cooperation activities. The primary risk is the historic disregard for the quality of advisors required to accomplish this advisor task. This risk is mitigated by developing a screening program for advisors that assesses the advisor qualities and a Marine's willingness. Another risk is maintaining advanced advisor continuing education and training program that would develop an effective advisor. Based on recent SFA experiences and historical studies, there is sufficient information to develop advisor continuing education programs; however, the Marine Corps has not made it a priority because of the cost associated with training advisors. Unless, the FSF Advisors MOS becomes a primary billet that would allow Marines conduct advisor training.

Marines do not have enough time to manage continuing advisor education and training in addition to additional to normal duties. Finally, there is no tangible incentive for Marines to maintain advisor skills that would advance the FSF advisor's career. Therefore, establishing a permanent FSF advisor billet with a three-year obligation would provide opportunity to enhance advisor skills and support the Marine Corp's *EF21* goals. Currently, the only positions that could maintain continuing education advisor requirements are billets assigned to MCSCG.

CONCLUSION

In alignment with the National Defense Strategy, the Department of Defense (DoD) must ensure that U.S. military forces are capable of effectively working with foreign security forces to build partner capacity. For the past ten years, the Marine Corps has worked with foreign forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, while simultaneously conducting SC activities in various locations around the world. However, this work has not always been effective and the long-term stability of these foreign forces is in question.

The FSF advisor MOS is the first large step in the direction of developing a program of record to influence future SC missions. The FSF advisor MOS will help track qualified Marines that will comprise of future advisor teams to execute effective SC activities. The Marine Corps possesses the capability to develop a simple program to meet the needs of *EF 21*, which is to support theater security cooperation objectives. These short, recurring exercise engagements are great opportunities for training and advising. However, the ability to support another conflict simultaneous with SFA activities will require experienced and capable advisors. From the two previously mentioned GAO reports and the U.S. national security strategy, the goal of the Marine Corps is to be ready to conduct SFA activities at various phases of the range of military operations.

Therefore, the Marine Corps must develop a FSF advisor training plan to support an expeditionary mission and maintain a relevant perspective on worldwide SC opportunities. The best recommendation is for the Marine Corps to develop a MOS roadmap that includes a FSF advisor continuing education program, which will sustain the experienced advisors core skills. The Marine Corps must embrace the FSF advisor MOS through improving MCSCG's capabilities to maintain an advanced advisor training program in support of the MOS roadmap. This improvement would immediately benefit the FSF advisors assigned to SPMAGTF and MEUs to support TSC and build partnership capacity. The focus of training must include essential operational planning in Phase 0 operations and coordination of exercises to establish long-term host nation and interagency relationships. The planning for SFA activities must tie into the GCC's TSCP and the DoS regional strategic objectives. Expertise provided by FSF Advisors is crucial to ensure national security objectives are realized; therefore, it is imperative for the Marine Corps to build, develop, and sustain the FSF advisor training program.

The FSF advisor training program with continuous learning points will ensure the professional development of the advisors so that the Marine Corps will always have trained personnel for the SFA missions that permeate the operational pattern described in *Expeditionary Force 21*.

Glossary from Security Force Assistance Guide (DISAM)⁵¹

Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 1-02)

Foreign Security Forces (FSF): FSF include but are not limited to military forces; police forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; paramilitary forces; interior and intelligence services; forces peculiar to specific nations, states, tribes, or ethnic groups; prison, correctional, and penal services; and the government ministries or departments responsible for the above services. (JP 3-05 19 APR 2011)

Host Nation (HN): A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)

Mobile Training Team (MTT): A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host-nation requests (JP 1-02).

Security Assistance (SA): A group of programs authorized by Title 22, USC, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The Department of Defense does not administer all security assistance programs. Those security assistance programs that are administered by the Department are a subset of security cooperation. (DoDD 5132.03)

Security Sector Reform (SSR): The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-24)

Security Sector Assistance (SSA): A collection of the activities that a donor country takes ISO SSR aimed to ensure that all security forces operate within the bounds of domestic and international law, and that they support wide-ranging efforts to enforce and promote the rule of law. (Security Sector Reform paper, USAID/DoD/DOS, Feb 2009)

Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO). Those DoD organizations permanently located in a foreign country and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions under section 515 of Title 22 USC and under Joint Publication 1-02, regardless of the actual name given to such DoD Component. SCOs include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and DATT personnel designated to perform security cooperation functions. The term “SCO” does not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities such as mobile training teams, mobile education teams, or operational units conducting security cooperation activities. (DoDD 5132.03)

Security Cooperation (SC): Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. (DoDD 5132.03)

Security Cooperation Activity (SCA): Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (TSCP) (JP 3-0)

Security Cooperation Planning (SCP): The subset of joint strategic planning conducted to support the DoD’s security cooperation program. This planning supports a combatant commander’s theater strategy (JP 5-0). Each theater is required to write a TCP, which is supposed to link and coordinate all DoD activity within the theater with national and theater strategic and operational objectives. Every training or advising mission should support the TCP.

Security Force Assistance (SFA): The DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 1-02)

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