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THESIS

**USING SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS TO INFORM
AN EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO COUNTER RADICAL
ISLAMIC GROUPS IN INDONESIA**

by

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March 2022

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ABSTRACT

Violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) by radical Islamic groups is a significant issue in Indonesia: their objective is to change the republic of Indonesia to an Islamic state and to enforce Islamic law as the only law in Indonesia. Their strategy is to build a network to diffuse radical Islamic ideology within Indonesian communities. The Indonesian government works hard to counter VERLT. However, its approach is not maximizing its understanding of its network and should leverage network analysis. This thesis examines how the Indonesian government can better counter VERLT using social network analysis (SNA).

This thesis uses case study analysis to assess the effectiveness of the Indonesian government's effort in countering VERLT. Next, this thesis examines the networks of Indonesian radical Islamic groups and identifies their narrative with SNA and semantic network analysis. It finds that the radical Islamic groups in Indonesia effectively utilized their networks to spread VERLT, especially using social media. This thesis recommends the Indonesian government to develop hybrid kinetic and non-kinetic strategy to disrupt the network of radical Islamic groups and counter VERLT.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BNPT	Badan Nasional Penanganan Terorisme (National Agency for Countering Terrorism)
BPIP	Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila (Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education)
CTO	Counter-Terrorism Operation
DI/TII	Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Darul Islam/Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia)
FPI	Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JAD	Jamaah Ansharut Daulah
JAT	Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
Komji	Komando Jihad
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
SNA	Social Network Analysis
VERLT	Violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) are significant societal issues in Indonesia. This research focuses on VERLT by radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, which consist of politically based radical Islamic groups and terrorist-based radical Islamic groups. Both organization types have the same objective: to build an Islamic state in Indonesia and enforce Islamic law as absolute law in Indonesia even though most people in Indonesia do not wish to adhere to it. The objectives of these radicals are incompatible with the Indonesian constitution and the laws of Indonesia, which is a democratic country. Consequently, such groups execute terror attacks and initiate social movements to attack the Indonesian government. In addition, as part of their strategy to radicalize society as a whole, these groups build networks to attract and connect sympathizers for their radical Islamic ideology.

The Indonesian government works hard to counter VERLT using both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. As VERLT in Indonesia has been strongly influenced by the wave of global jihad since the Soviet-Afghan War in 1979, the Indonesian government has worked to build an alliance with the international community to counter VERLT. Nevertheless, those efforts are only effective to address the VERLT cases in the short term. Meanwhile, radical Islamic groups in Indonesia continue to grow.

This thesis investigates the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia and develops recommendations for the Indonesian government on how to disrupt the networks created by these groups. The research question directing this thesis is: how can the Indonesian government disrupt the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia? To address that question, this research analyzes the effectiveness of the Indonesian government's effort to counter VERLT and determines how social network analysis (SNA) can help the Indonesian government in countering VERLT. The finding of this thesis is that radical Islamic groups utilize social media, mainly Twitter, effectively to develop their networks and spread radicalization. Their networks use social media to recruit new

members and indoctrinate sympathizers to execute terror attacks. Therefore, the Indonesian government needs to maximize its effort in countering VERLT using a network approach.

This thesis first examines the literature about the Islamic organizations in Indonesia to identify the differences between nationalist Islam ideology and radical Islamic ideology. Nationalist Islamic ideology supports the Indonesian constitution and provides civil and moral standards for Muslim communities in Indonesia. By contrast, radical Islamic ideology, which is held by a minority of the population in Indonesia, is highly influenced by the Salafi jihadism ideology and is not compatible with the Indonesian constitution, which is based on democratic values. Salafi jihadism came to Indonesia through the networks of transnational Islamic radicals as a result of the global jihad movement. Furthermore, this thesis's literature review observes how radical Islamic groups gain sympathizers and indoctrinate them using a social identity and social capital theory to diffuse radical Islamic ideology and initiate social movement and terror attacks. Lastly, the literature review identifies a strategy to disrupt the networks of such groups with SNA.

This research then analyzes the origin of radical Islamic ideology in Indonesia, and how that ideology influenced the birth of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. This analysis is important to understand the radical Islamic groups in Indonesia and how to differentiate them from non-radical groups. The terrorist-based Islamic groups in Indonesia subscribe to the idea of a caliphate and Sharia as a narrative to radicalize their sympathizers and inspire them to execute terror attacks. Meanwhile, politically based radical Islamic groups utilize the idea of a caliphate and Sharia to influence and indoctrinate their sympathizers to join their political campaign to change the Indonesian constitution to establish an Islamic state.

In addition, this thesis examines a case study of the Ambon conflict in Indonesia to demonstrate the importance of networks, misinformation, and disinformation in escalating and deescalating the religious conflict between Muslim communities and Christian communities in Ambon. Also, it analyzes the terror attacks executed by radical Islamic groups in Indonesia from 2000 to 2019 to assess the effectiveness of the Indonesian government's efforts in countering VERLT. It finds that these efforts are only effective in

the short term. Therefore, to achieve the long-term objective, the Indonesian government needs to address the influence of radical Islamic ideology from a network perspective.

Next, this research uses SNA to analyze the networks of radical Islamic groups on Twitter. Specifically, it focuses on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), one of the politically based radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, because the organization is well organized and maintains a sophisticated strategy to spread radical Islamic ideology. In addition, HTI has a relationship with international Hizbut Tahrir (HT) networks. The Indonesian government believes many HTI members have a relationship with Indonesian terrorist-based radical Islamic groups because they share the same objectives and ideology. This thesis's SNA examines the network topography of HTI on Twitter and identifies key actors in the networks. Furthermore, it uses semantic network analysis to identify the HTI narrative on Twitter.

It is important to note that because SNA provides possible approaches to counter VERLT solely from a network perspective, the results of that analysis are insufficient to determine a comprehensive long-term solution. Therefore, this research also develops a strategic plan to help the Indonesian government build a robust strategy to achieve short- and long-term objectives in countering VERLT with several components, including a network approach. This final chapter identifies the most effective approach the Indonesian government can adopt to counter VERLT.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has been a global security issue since the beginning of global jihad in 1979 during the Soviet-Afghan War.¹ Since then, many terrorist organizations have emerged around the world, the most influential being Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Al-Qaeda initially focused on liberating Muslim lands from non-Muslim occupation, while ISIS focused on building a caliphate. Both groups have strong ideological influence that they use to radicalize their sympathizers and recruit new members to join the global jihad.

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) spearheaded by the United States and its allies have succeeded in degrading Al Qaeda's and ISIS's influence in the Western world.² Yet, the setbacks these groups have experienced also helped inspire a new wave of terrorism and contributed to the birth of other terrorist organizations in many Muslim countries.³ As a result, the global jihad movement has become decentralized and sparked jihadists worldwide to commit terrorist attacks. Glenn Robinson has referred to this latest wave of global jihadism as "personal jihad."⁴ Its strategy is to create violence using networked cells that perform small, decentralized acts of terror.⁵ To radicalize people to launch such terror attacks requires a robust network of individual cells made up of radical ideologists.

Indonesia is one of the countries threatened by the personal jihad movement. From 2000 to 2019, Indonesia faced many terror attacks.⁶ For example, one Indonesian terrorist

¹ Glenn Robinson, *Global Jihad: A Brief History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021), 24–33.

² Mark Landler, "20 Years On, the War on Terror Grinds Along, With No End in Sight," *New York Times*, September 11, 2021, sec. World, 5–11, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html>.

³ Landler, "20 Years On, the War on Terror Grinds Along, With No End in Sight."

⁴ Robinson, *Global Jihad: A Brief History*, 122–24.

⁵ Robinson, 136–39.

⁶ Global Terrorism Database, "Global Terrorism Database," Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed November 24, 2021, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which executed the Bali bombing on October 12, 2002, has an affiliation with Al-Qaeda and has vast networks throughout Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia and the Philippines.⁷ After facing substantial counterterrorism operations that the Indonesian government conducted for years, JI has faced many setbacks and led to the creation of many splinter organizations such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), both of which are affiliated with ISIS and seek to evade the Indonesian government's pressure.⁸

Besides terrorist organizations, Indonesia faces a threat from highly networked, politically based, radical Islamic organizations that seek to change the Indonesian constitution and democratic system of government to an Islamic state based on Islamic law.⁹ One such organization is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a radical Islamic organization that has nearly one million sympathizers in Indonesia.¹⁰ While the Indonesian government has banned and dissolved HTI, its influence and ideology still exist and are relatively widespread on social media.¹¹ Indeed, both the terrorist organizations and the politically based radical Islamic groups use social media as an important medium to attract and indoctrinate potential supporters in Indonesia.¹²

In response, the Indonesian government has engaged in various efforts, both kinetic and non-kinetic, to combat violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) throughout the country. For example, it not only conducts counterterrorism

⁷ Counter Extremism Project, *Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)* (New York: Counter Extremism Project, 2021), 2–4, https://www.counterextremism.com/taxonomy_term/1021/printable/pdf.

⁸ Counter Extremism Project, 19–22.

⁹ Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?,” *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2004, 104–21, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27913255>.

¹⁰ Hasan Nur and Parmudi Mochamad, *Laporan Penelitian Klaster Penelitian Terapan Dan Pengembangan Nasional* (Semarang: Universitas Islam Negeri Walisongo, 2018), 8, https://eprints.walisongo.ac.id/id/eprint/9494/1/Parmudi_Gerakan_Sosial_Keagamaan.pdf.

¹¹ Bimo Wiwoho, “‘Hantu Khilafah’ Pasca Pembubaran HTI,” CNN Indonesia, July 24, 2017, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170724073604-20-229848/hantu-khilafah-pasca-pembubaran-hti>.

¹² Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, “Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (September 14, 2010): 601–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.496317>.

operations but rewards captured jihadis if they agree to support and participate in deradicalization programs.¹³ Despite these efforts, however, radical Islamic groups' networks continue to grow because the strategy of the current jihad movement is for the groups to build a network to gain sympathizers and inspire individuals to launch personal jihad. Social media is the most popular medium for radical Islamic groups to recruit and radicalize their sympathizers.¹⁴ Despite its other more robust counterterrorism operations, the Indonesian government has not been maximizing its efforts in countering VERLT by identifying social media's dark network of radical Islamic groups and their narratives that radicalize people in Indonesia.¹⁵ Therefore, the Indonesian government needs to address this problem from a network perspective.

A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE

This thesis aims to investigate the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, which consist of such organizations that are terrorist-based and those that are politically based. Both influence the terrorism movement in Indonesia. The terrorist-based radical Islamic organizations create active terrorists, while politically based radical Islamic organizations become a breeding ground for potential terrorists.¹⁶ Furthermore, this research develops recommendations for the Indonesian government on how to disrupt radical Islamic groups' networks that have led to terrorism and how to hamper the development of new radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

¹³ Samto Hadi Isnanto, "Berbagai Masalah Dan Tantangan Radikalisasi Dan Deradikalisasi Terorisme Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Pertahanan & Bela Negara* 5, no. 2 (August 6, 2018): 237, <https://doi.org/10.33172/jpbh.v5i2.366>.

¹⁴ Alif Satria, Pricilia Putri Nirmala Sari, and Rebekha Adriana, "*The Current State of Terrorism in Indonesia: Vulnerable Groups, Networks, and Responses*," CSIS Working Paper Series, February 2018, 15.

¹⁵ Satria, Sari, and Adriana, 15.

¹⁶ General Intelligence and Security Service, *From Dawa to Jihad - the Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order* (Amsterdam: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relationship Netherlands, 2004), 7–8, <https://irp.fas.org/world/netherlands/dawa.pdf>.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

The main question for this thesis is: how can the Indonesian government disrupt the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia? In addition, this research investigates these related research questions:

1. How effective is the Indonesian government's effort to counter violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) by radical Islamic groups?
2. How can the Indonesian government use social network analysis to improve its efforts in countering VERLT by radical Islamic groups?

C. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Network analysis of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia can help the Indonesian government to understand these groups' behavior and thus generate a strategy to disrupt their networks. Therefore, this thesis draws upon scholarly literature to define the Islamic organizations in Indonesia, distinguishing between the nationalist Islamic groups and the radical Islamic groups. Furthermore, it explores the characteristics of radical Islamic terrorist organizations and politically based radical Islamic organizations. Finally, this thesis also investigates how those groups develop dark networks and how social network analysis can help to identify the dark network of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

1. Defining Islamic Organizations in Indonesia

Islam in Indonesia has been polarized since its beginnings in the seventh century, and many examples of Islamic polarization have arisen in Indonesia since the proclamation of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945.¹⁷ This latter polarization is framed in terms of two categories in this thesis: nationalist Islamic groups and radical Islamic groups. The former represents the majority of groups in Indonesia, which support the Indonesian

¹⁷ Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 151.

constitution and democratic system.¹⁸ Nationalist Islam in Indonesia consists of two major Islamic organizations—*Nahdatul Ulama (NU)* and *Muhammadiyah*. NU is the most prominent Islamic non-government organization (NGO) in Indonesia, and it contributed to the Indonesian independence struggle against Dutch colonialism.¹⁹ NU embraces the basic tenets of Islam while supporting the Indonesian national ideology, *Pancasila* (five principles).²⁰ Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic NGO in Indonesia. It also contributed to the Indonesian independence struggle and supports *Pancasila*.²¹ Given their nationalist character, NU and Muhammadiyah do not support radical Islamic ideology in Indonesia. Both have become the foundation for the nationalist Islamic organizations in Indonesia and support the Indonesian government's effort to counter radicalization.

Radical Islamic groups are a minority in Indonesia and do not support the Indonesian constitution or its democratic system. They include both terrorist and politically based groups. There are six characteristics of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia.²²

First, these movements want to make Islam the only and final ideology regulating individual lives and state politics. Second, they have adopted Islamic values from the Middle East without considering social and political developments in the Middle East since the Qur'an and Hadith were first written down. Third, they reject all cultures of non-Islamic (non-Middle Eastern) origin, including local traditions. Fourth, they reject non-Middle Eastern ideologies, including Western ideologies and systems, such as democracy, secularism, and liberalism. Fifth, they often create ideological and physical friction with other groups, including the government. Finally,

¹⁸ Ismail Hasani and Bonar Tigor Naipospos, *Dari radikalisme menuju terorisme: studi relasi dan transformasi organisasi Islam radikal di Jawa Tengah & D.I. Yogyakarta* (Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, 2012), 9.

¹⁹ Faisal Ismail, "The Nahdatul Ulama: Its Early History and Contribution to the Establishment of Indonesian State," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 5, no. 2 (December 1, 2011): 275, <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2011.5.2.247-282>.

²⁰ NU Online, "*NU Menegaskan Hubungan Pancasila dengan Islam*," July 5, 2020, <https://nu.or.id/fragmen/nu-menegaskan-hubungan-pancasila-dengan-islam-xxYAA>.

²¹ Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Universitas Indonesia, "Pancasila Pilihan Terbaik Dan Final Bagi Muhammadiyah Dan NU," fisip.ui.ac.id, July 27, 2020, <https://fisip.ui.ac.id/pancasila-pilihan-terbaik-dan-final-bagi-muhammadiyah-dan-nu/>.

²² Hasani Ahmad Said and Fathurrahman Rauf, "Radikalisme Agama dalam Perspektif Hukum Islam," *UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta* 12, no. 1 (2015): 593–610, <https://doi.org/10.24042/adalah.v12i1.238>.

they frame religious texts as a means of legitimizing or justifying their actions.²³

2. The Fourth Wave of Terrorism and Global Jihad

Most terrorism cases in Indonesia from 2000 to 2019 were executed by radical Islamic terrorist organizations.²⁴ According to David C. Rapoport, there have been four waves of terrorism, each of which has a specific time frame, actors, motivations, strategies, and technologies.²⁵ The fourth wave of terrorism started in 1979, a date which is associated with a religious movement, particularly Islam.²⁶ The strategy of fourth-wave terrorists, notes Rapoport, is using “jihad” as an overarching narrative to recruit members to launch attacks using military strategies and suicide bombings. Moreover, Rapoport argues that radical Islamic terrorists utilize the internet and the globalization of media to spread propaganda. Examples of terrorist organizations in this wave are Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and ISIS.

In line with Rapoport, Glenn Robinson specifically explains Rapoport’s fourth wave of terrorism as four waves of global jihad.²⁷ The first occurred during the Soviet-Afghan War, from 1979 to 1990. The second was the Al-Qaeda jihad movement targeting America and its allies from 1996 to 2011. The third was the rise and fall of ISIS from 2003 to 2017. Finally, the fourth has existed since 2001 and is characterized by a personal jihad strategy.²⁸ According to Robinson, this strategy focuses on decentralized terror attacks carried out by individuals who have become sympathizers of radical Islamic groups.²⁹ Also, according to Robinson, such groups execute terror via small and random attacks worldwide by utilizing information and communication technologies such as social media

²³ Hasani and Naipospos, *Dari radikalisme menuju terorisme*.

²⁴ Global Terrorism Database, “Global Terrorism Database.”

²⁵ David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terror: International Dimensions and Consequences,” in *An International History of Terrorism* (England: Routledge, 2013), 283.

²⁶ Rapoport, 295.

²⁷ Robinson, *Global Jihad: A Brief History*, 24.

²⁸ Robinson, 29.

²⁹ Robinson, 24.

in recruitment to improve the effectiveness of global jihad. In addition, states Robinson, the influence of this information and communication technologies improves the ability of terrorist leaders to motivate potential sympathizers to participate in personal jihad, even though they have usually had no direct contact with those leaders and have not officially become a member of a radical Islamic group.

Nonetheless, experts have different views about the importance of terrorist leaders' influences. Michael Freeman contends that the role of the terrorist leader is to inspire and direct terrorist attacks.³⁰ Moreover, he notes that eliminating terrorist leaders will degrade the strength of terrorist organizations, pointing to the case of Al-Qaeda after the death of Osama bin Laden, which degraded Al-Qaeda and its networks, in part, because bin Laden was the most central actor in Al-Qaeda.³¹ That said, Ganesan Annamalai has highlighted how the death of Osama bin Laden inspired his followers in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia to expand the global jihad movement.³² They believe that bin Laden was a martyr and that they must continue his spirit of jihad.³³

3. The Process to Create Radical Islamic Networks

Creating a radical Islamic network requires the development of a social identity that is connected to radical Islamic ideology and binds radical Islamic sympathizers into groups that define themselves, in part, by their opposition to non-radical Islamic groups.³⁴ According to a survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society UIN Jakarta, the Muslim communities in Indonesia believe that religion is an important factor

³⁰ Michael Freeman, "A Theory of Terrorist Leadership (and Its Consequences for Leadership Targeting)," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 4 (September 1, 2014): 667, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.751912>.

³¹ Freeman, 669.

³² Ganesan Annamalai, "The Impact of Osama Bin Laden's Death on the Landscape of Global Jihad," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 3, no. 8 (2011): 12, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26350999>.

³³ Annamalai, 11.

³⁴ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 117.

for making decisions regarding social and political issues.³⁵ Therefore, Muslim communities in Indonesia have strong social ties with their community that make religion important social capital to gain political support.³⁶ Moreover, Muslim communities in Indonesia use religious networks to disseminate radical Islamic ideology through social ties among their members.³⁷

a. Social Identity and Group Polarization

According to Dina Al Raffie, social identity can be a major factor in the radicalization of communities.³⁸ An individual's social identity is derived from the social groups to which they belong.³⁹ Social identity has three components: *cognitive*—the acknowledgment from the other actors in an actor's groups; *evaluative*—the assessment from both an actor's groups and the outgroups about the suitable groups for the actor; and *emotional*—the emotional ties between the actor and the actor's groups.⁴⁰ A social identity sorts others as being either in-group or out-group members.

Furthermore, distinct social identities can lead to an increase in polarization in a society if there is no interaction between groups, a lack of social norms to blend the communities, and/or no group that connects the polarized groups.⁴¹ According to Cass R. Sunstein, group polarization can occur when a group is characterized by informational or social isolation, that is when a group is isolated within a particular closed network. Sunstein defines group polarization as a group formed by the people with the same idea and perspective toward something, in which the group thinking that they build shifts to a more extreme idea from the common belief and tends to attack the idea and perspective of

³⁵ Jamhari, "Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 10, no. 3 (2003): 20, <https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v10i3.622>.

³⁶ Jamhari, 21.

³⁷ Jamhari, 8.

³⁸ Dina Al Raffie, "Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora," *Journal of Strategic Security* 6, no. 4 (2013): 67–91, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26466750>.

³⁹ Lilliana Mason, *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity* (USA: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 24, <https://books.google.com/books?id=R29RDwAAQBAJ>.

⁴⁰ Mason, 24–26.

⁴¹ Mason, 28.

other groups.⁴² In other words, he states, because of social or informational isolation, they more easily gravitate to a more extreme position. As such, informational isolation can help spread radicalism and extremism by blending radical theological beliefs and sociopolitical factors in a closed network and so increase the likelihood that its members embrace terrorism.

b. Social Capital and Terrorist Networks

Social capital is an asset derived from trust and social ties from which an actor can benefit. High levels of social capital can result in various social benefits, such as safer neighborhoods and more efficient democracies.⁴³ On the other hand, social capital can have a dark side. For example, Victor Asal et al. have explored how social capital contributed to the rise of the Jewish Underground, a terrorist network that sought to destroy the Dome on the Rock, as well as carry out various other attacks.⁴⁴ The authors used quantitative data to analyze how the role of trust, solidarity, and shared values increased social capital among the group's members.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Asal et al. used social network analysis to explore the role of social ties in initiating the terrorists' operational network. They also examined how an individual actor's social capital played a key role in recruiting individuals for specific operations. Like Asal et al., Johannes Saal examined the role of social capital in radicalizing ordinary people and recruiting them to be jihadis.⁴⁶ He argued that radicalization requires a social process of personal or group isolation from previous social contacts to penetrate the social capital investment and affiliate individuals with new radical religious groups.⁴⁷ Furthermore, radicalization uses the transformation of social

⁴² Cass R. Sunstein, "The Law of Group Polarization," *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 10, no. 2 (December 16, 2002): 186, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00148>.

⁴³ Sunstein, 187.

⁴⁴ Victor H. Asal, Na'ama Nagar, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "Building Terrorism from Social Ties: The Dark Side of Social Capital," *Civil Wars* 16, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 403, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2014.981942>.

⁴⁵ Asal, Nagar, and Rethemeyer, 410.

⁴⁶ Johannes Saal, *The Dark Social Capital of Religious Radicals, 1st ed.* (Singapore: Springer, 2021), 34, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-658-32842-9>.

⁴⁷ Saal, 48.

capital through which group members develop a strong relationship within the bonds of radical religious group members.

c. *Social Networks and Diffusion of Radical Islamic Ideology*

A strong social identity and robust social capital enable a favorable situation for social diffusion, meaning that ideology is more easily spread in the community. Sean Everton and Steven Pfaff have described diffusion as a process by which new ideas, behavior, technology, and institutions spread across society.⁴⁸ The spread of religion, radicalism and social movements are examples of diffusion. In general, people with a higher proportion of ties to prior adopters are more likely to adopt a belief or practice than those with fewer ties.⁴⁹ However, Everton and Pfaff suggested that diffusion is also related to individuals' thresholds for adopting a belief or practice.⁵⁰ They stated that people with low thresholds need fewer contacts with prior adopters to adopt a new belief or practice than do people with high thresholds. Moreover, while weak ties are sufficient for "simple diffusion," such as ideas and information, strong ties are necessary for complex diffusion, that is, situations in which a change in behavior or personal association may encounter resistance, such as converting to an unpopular religious group, associating with a risky social movement, or joining a terrorist organization.

d. *Social Movements and Social Networks*

Social movements are more likely to emerge when three sets of factors fall into place: sufficient mobilizing structures (i.e., resources), expanding political opportunities (i.e., vulnerabilities in the status quo), and the framing of grievances in ways that resonate with the aggrieved population.⁵¹ John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald were the first to

⁴⁸ Sean F. Everton and Steven Pfaff, "Historical and Comparative Research on Social Diffusion: Mechanisms, Methods and Data," *Social Science History*, 1-42. doi:10.1017/ssh.2021.46.

⁴⁹ Damon Centola, *How Behavior Spreads: The Science of Complex Contagions*, Princeton Analytical Sociology Series (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 143, <https://books.google.com/books?id=szNEDwAAQBAJ>.

⁵⁰ Everton and Pfaff, "Historical and Comparative Research on Social Diffusion: Mechanisms, Methods and Data."

⁵¹ Glenn E. Robinson, " Hamas as Social Movement," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 116.

note that there is almost always plenty of dissatisfaction with the status quo, but most disgruntled groups do not mobilize as a social movement.⁵² The difference, they argued, was that some groups have enough resources (funding and organizations) to mobilize while most do not.⁵³ Doug McAdam contended that resources, by themselves, are not enough to initiate social movements, because it is challenging for an alienated group, even one with ample resources, to launch a social movement without a significant political opportunity to do so.⁵⁴ According to McAdam, factors that lead to the expansion of opportunities include:

Any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities. Among the events and processes likely to prove disruptive of the political status quo are wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic changes.⁵⁵

Finally, social movement scholars have noted the importance of framing grievances in ways that motivate individuals to mobilize.⁵⁶ Robinson has explained that in its initial stage, a social movement is focused on gaining sympathizers rather than on building an understanding of the group's ideology.⁵⁷ Therefore, the social movement leader often frames the group's ideology with a semantic message to create effective communication and influence networks of sympathizers to engage in the movement.⁵⁸

As an example, consider Douglas Borer, Sean Everton, and Moises Nayve, Jr.'s use of social movement theory to investigate the Northern Philippine Rajah Solaiman movement (RSM), which took hold among Filipino workers returning from the Middle

⁵² John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (1977): 1219, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2777934>.

⁵³ McCarthy and Zald, 1224.

⁵⁴ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (USA: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 5, <https://books.google.com/books?id=ADiJTD8s4KYC>.

⁵⁵ McAdam, 41.

⁵⁶ David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095581>.

⁵⁷ Robinson, " Hamas as Social Movement."

⁵⁸ Robinson, 129.

East.⁵⁹ Resources for the movement came primarily from Saudi-affiliated NGOs such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) led by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa—Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law.⁶⁰ Furthermore, in the early 1970s, radical Islamic groups in the Philippines gained political opportunities from the rise in student activism that created political instability in the Philippines.⁶¹ A faltering Philippine economy also contributed to peace talks between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). As the MILF negotiated with the Philippine government, its foreign partners, such as Jamaah Islamiyah, began to look for new groups such as RSM with which to partner. Ultimately, the group then framed its grievances as following in the footsteps of Rajah Solaiman, a Filipino Muslim ruler of Manila before the Spanish conquest in the 15th century, to highlight its connection with the islands’ Islamic past.⁶²

To understand the relationship between social movements and social networks within Islamic society, it is useful to consult Quintan Wiktorowicz.⁶³ According to him, social movements within Islamic society are generated by personal relationships in a dense network of informal organizations that connect activists to other Islamists, friends, families, and associates.⁶⁴ Moreover, Wiktorowicz has explained that the networks are developed not only from repeated interactions between the actors but also the cultivation of trust and friendship over time through patience and endurance, which involve the political and social aspects. Furthermore, continued interactions build social structures within the network, which establishes the organization of social movements.

⁵⁹ Douglas A. Borer, Sean F. Everton, and Moises M. Nayve, “Global Development and Human (In)Security: Understanding the Rise of the Rajah Solaiman Movement and Balik Islam in the Philippines,” *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (February 1, 2009): 181, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802622615>.

⁶⁰ Borer, Everton, and Nayve, 184.

⁶¹ Borer, Everton, and Nayve, 187.

⁶² International Crisis Group, “Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts,” Crisis Group, December 19, 2005, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/philippines-terrorism-role-militant-islamic-converts>.

⁶³ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Indiana Series in Middle East Studies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 143, <https://books.google.com/books?id=0Oljj6FhZZ4C>.

⁶⁴ Wiktorowicz, 23.

4. Dark Networks and Social Network Analysis

According to Rene M. Baker et al., a dark network is a covert and illegal group held together by ties between actors in a specific social relationship.⁶⁵ Put simply, a dark network is a group that seeks to remain hidden from wider society. Examples of dark networks are terrorist organizations, gangsters, drug cartels, criminal organizations, and white-collar conspirators.⁶⁶ Similarly, radical Islamic terrorist organizations and politically based radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia utilize dark networks to operate and develop their networks.

Social network analysis (SNA) can help researchers map and analyze dark networks, as well as help, inform the development of strategies to disrupt them.⁶⁷ For this discussion, a few basic terms related to SNA are explained here: actor, ties, path, network topography.⁶⁸ (A glossary of additional SNA-related terms relevant for this study is provided in the appendix.) SNA assumes actors' behavior is influenced by their relationship with the other actors in their networks.⁶⁹ According to Daniel Cunningham et al., an actor is referred to as a node or vertex set in the network and can be an individual, group, organization, or even non-human entities such as IEDs, social media platforms, and websites.⁷⁰ Ties refer to the relationships between actors.⁷¹ A path is a sequence of actors

⁶⁵ René M. Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, "A Preliminary Theory of Dark Network Resilience," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 31, no. 1 (2012): 50, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41429257>.

⁶⁶ Bakker, Raab, and Milward, 34.

⁶⁷ Bakker, Raab, and Milward, 33.

⁶⁸ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 8–12, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139136877>.

⁶⁹ Everton, 170.

⁷⁰ Daniel T. Cunningham, Sean F. Everton, and Philip Murphy, *Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016), 10.

⁷¹ Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 10.

and ties in which each actor only appears once in the sequence.⁷² Network topography refers to networks' aggregate structure such as density and centralization.⁷³

The basic assumptions of SNA are that actors are interdependent with one another and mutually reinforcing. Thus, actors' behavior results from the interactions between themselves and other actors in a network.⁷⁴ Furthermore, as Everton explained, the ties connecting actors facilitate the transfer of material and non-material goods such as ideology, sentiment, religion, and trust.⁷⁵ Moreover, he argued that ties can also help generate solidarity and trust between actors. Where actors are located in networks (that is, their "structural location") also influences their behavior and their roles within networks. Networks are also dynamic. Over time, actors join and leave networks, and ties form and dissolve.⁷⁶

Examples of where SNA has been used to analyze dark networks include Valdis Krebs's analysis of the 9/11 bombers⁷⁷ and Stuart Koschade's exploration of the first Bali bombing.⁷⁸ In one study, Jytte Klausen analyzed the Twitter network of 59 Westerners who became ISIS foreign fighters from January to March 2014.⁷⁹ Klausen used SNA to identify the network of ISIS Western jihadists by determining the number of their followers and tweets. Klausen also analyzed the content of their tweets, which they used for religious instruction, reporting from battle, interpersonal communication, and propaganda. These studies effectively mapped the dark networks of terrorists using SNA.

⁷² Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 11.

⁷³ Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 13.

⁷⁴ Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 8.

⁷⁵ Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*.

⁷⁶ Everton.

⁷⁷ Valdis E. Krebs, "Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells," *Connections* 24, no. 3 (2002): 43, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/ACLURM002810.pdf.

⁷⁸ Stuart Koschade, "A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 6 (September 2006): 562, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100600798418>.

⁷⁹ Jytte Klausen, "Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.974948>.

5. Disrupting Dark Networks

Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton have identified several strategies for disrupting dark networks using both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches.⁸⁰ As explained by Roberts and Everton, kinetic strategies target the individual, group, or organizations to degrade the influence of those actors in dark networks. Another kinetic strategy is capacity-building, which they noted, focuses on training and advising security officers outside the United States to enhance their professional capabilities and enable them to collaborate with the United States to counter dark networks. Moreover, Roberts and Everton explained that non-kinetic approaches use a persuasive approach to counter dark networks such as institution building, information operations, psychological operations, and rehabilitation. Furthermore, the authors argued that,

in order to effectively use SNA to combat terrorist networks, analysts need to collect multi-relational (i.e., multiplex) data, be explicit about the various types of ties they code and examine, analyze data at multiple levels of analysis (i.e., individual, subgroup, and organizational/institutional), and use the wide variety of SNA algorithms available to them.⁸¹

This thesis's literature review has explored the characteristics and classification of Muslim communities in Indonesia, consisting of polarized groups—the nationalist Islamic group and radical Islamic group—both of which maintain their robust networks. The networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, which include radical Islamic terrorist organizations and politically based radical Islamic organizations, are influenced and amplified by the global jihad. Despite their differences, both types of groups have the same objective: to build a caliphate in Indonesia. Moreover, both groups employ identical methods for using information and communication technology, especially social media, to spread a radical Islamic narrative and gain sympathizers to develop their networks. Therefore, the analysis of radical Islamic groups' networks in Indonesia can help the Indonesian government determine how best to disrupt those networks.

⁸⁰ Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks," *Journal of Social Structure* 12, no. 1 (2020): 32, <https://doi.org/10.21307/joss-2019-030>.

⁸¹ Roberts and Everton, 7.

D. METHODOLOGY

Using SNA to identify actors and their relationships, this thesis examines the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. It focuses on aggregate data; therefore, SNA can help reveal the aggregated patterns of how the radical Islamic actors (individuals or organizations) in Indonesia create networks. Furthermore, the analysis examines the communication content that radical Islamic groups use to form and expand those networks with radical ideology.

The data sources include the tweets, hashtags, and trending topics on Twitter related to Indonesia's radical Islamic movements. Data collection follows the Twitter privacy policy and does not focus on individual data and personal information. This research uses Twitter's Academic API to collect data. In terms of domestic factors in the country, the research analyzes tweets from 2013 until 2019 because radicalization on Twitter led to terrorist attacks in Indonesia during that period. Moreover, in 2017, the Indonesian government banned and dissolved HTI, one of Indonesia's largest radical Islamic organizations.⁸² HTI then pivoted to social media and dark networks to spread its ideology of an Indonesian caliphate. Concerning external factors, 2013–2019 was the lifespan of the ISIS movement in Iraq and Syria. During that period, U.S. and Coalition forces succeeded in seizing most of the area occupied by ISIS. As a result, the ISIS movement moved from the battlefield to social media and succeeded in inspiring people in ISIS's cell networks to launch personal jihad worldwide, including in Indonesia. For example, the Surabaya bombing on May 13, 2018, was executed by one family of five who had been radicalized via social media by JAD, the ISIS affiliate organization in Indonesia.⁸³

This research finds that there is a relationship between the politically based radical Islamic groups and the terrorist-based radical Islamic groups because they share the same ideology of radical Islam to build a caliphate and implement Islamic law in Indonesia. Using Twitter data, SNA helps to identify the networks of politically based radical Islamic

⁸² Aljazeera, "Indonesia Bans Islamic Group 'to Protect Unity,'" Aljazeera.com, July 19, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/19/hizb-ut-tahrir-indonesia-banned-to-protect-unity>.

⁸³ BBC News, "Surabaya Attacks: Family of Five Bomb Indonesia Police Headquarters," BBC News, May 14, 2018, sec. Asia, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44105279>.

groups and to understand the actors' behavior and roles in the network. Specifically, SNA helps to find key actors in the networks and the themes of their tweets on Twitter to radicalize their audience. Lastly, this research finds that radicalization is a strategic issue in Indonesia because radicalization itself is an entry gate to terrorism that can endanger Indonesian security and stability. Therefore, the Indonesian government needs to formulate strategic approaches to counter the radicalization tactics used by radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

E. CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is organized into five chapters. This chapter, Chapter I, serves as an introduction and has set the stage for the remainder of the thesis. Chapter II explores the emergence of radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia since the country gained independence on August 17, 1945, and the study analyzes the influence of the wave of global jihad on the continued rise and fall of radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Chapter III provides the case study analysis of the Ambon conflict to demonstrate the importance of networks in escalating and deescalating conflict. Furthermore, Chapter III provides a case study analysis of terrorism executed by radical Islamic groups in Indonesia from 2000 to 2019 to assess the Indonesian government's effort to counter-terrorism and radicalization in Indonesia. Chapter IV conducts SNA of HTI's Twitter activity to trace how HTI develops its networks and spreads its radical ideology via Twitter. Finally, Chapter V provides recommendations to the Indonesian government on how to develop strategic planning to counter VERLT in Indonesia.

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II. GLOBAL JIHAD AND THE EMERGENCE OF RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS IN INDONESIA

To understand the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia via social network analysis, we first need to explore the origins and emergence of radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Likewise, it is important to analyze the history of the networks' formation process as well as the relationships among the radical Islamic organizations. As the previous chapter explained, the radical Islamic organizations analyzed in this thesis consist of two broad types: terrorist-based organizations and politically based organizations. This chapter explores how transnational radical Islamic organizations' ideologies spread to Indonesia and how their networks connected to radical Islamic groups in Indonesia in the waves of global jihad.

A. THE ORIGINS OF RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS IN INDONESIA

Radical Islamic ideology in Indonesia is based on the radical Islamic ideology that was created in the Middle East. According to Shiraz Maher,

Salafi-Jihadism is a thought, or ideological strain, with which individuals can identify. It does not belong to a particular group or movement although there are certain actors who have been particularly influential in the formation of certain ideas.⁸⁴

Salafi Jihadism was introduced to Indonesia in 1803 by Haji Miskin, who completed his education in Saudi Arabia.⁸⁵ Over time, jihadist ideology spread to Indonesia through the networks of *da'wah* (missionary endeavors) and *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) by Islamic clerics. In 1942, this ideology was adopted by the first terrorist organization in Indonesia, Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII). Since then, many radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia have adopted the same ideology.

⁸⁴ Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 16.

⁸⁵ Solahudin, Greg Fealy, and Dave McRae, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah* (London: Cornell University Press, 2013), 23, <https://read.amazon.com/?asin=B00H4VV2IW>.

The leader of DI/TII, Soekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo, is considered the godfather of the jihadist movement in Indonesia. Kartosuwiryo utilized the widespread Salafi-Jihadism ideology in Indonesia to boost the number of DI/TII sympathizers.⁸⁶ Having succeeded, by 1949, Kartosuwiryo had enough troops to launch a rebellion against the Indonesian government in Aceh, West Java, Central Java, Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi.⁸⁷ The Indonesian government's military operation, however, prevailed, capturing and killing Kartosuwiryo on September 5, 1962, and completely eradicating the DI/TII rebellion in 1965. Nonetheless, DI/TII and Kartosuwiryo's sympathizers have survived across generations and continue to maintain their jihadist cell in dark networks. Furthermore, DI/TII sympathizers were influenced by transnational radical Islamic organizations during the first wave of global jihad in 1979 and spawned many radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

B. TERRORIST-BASED RADICAL ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS

Terrorist-based radical Islamic organizations emerged in Indonesia with the first wave of global jihad in 1979. The strategy of terrorist-based radical Islamic groups in Indonesia is to build a network of terrorist cells to execute decentralized terror in Indonesia. Because these groups in Indonesia have a relationship with transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, it is important to understand the networks of terrorist-based radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

1. Komando Jihad

Komando Jihad (Komji) was formed in 1973 by former members of DI/TII who refused to surrender to the Indonesian government and wanted to continue their jihad to build an Islamic state and enforce Islamic law.⁸⁸ This organization adopted the ideas of the

⁸⁶ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, 34.

⁸⁷ Soraya and Abdurakhman, "Jalan Panjang Penumpasan Pemberontakan DI/TII Jawa Barat, 1949 – 1962," *Jurnal Middle East and Islamic Studies* 6, no. 1 (December 16, 2019): 123, <https://doi.org/10.7454/meis.v6i1.83>.

⁸⁸ Quinton Temby, "Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah," *Indonesia*, no. 89 (2010): 3, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20798213>.

Muslim Brotherhood, Jamiat al-Islamy, and Sayyid Qutb as doctrines for its movement.⁸⁹ Komji's recruitment process used the regeneration method, radicalizing youth and leveraging former DI/TII cells in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi.⁹⁰ Its strategy initially promoted a *jihad fillah*—a spiritual jihad without armed forces. When it gained enough power, however, the group began to promote *jihad fisabilillah*—using armed forces to attack the Indonesian government.⁹¹ To resist the authoritarian government's pressure under President Soeharto, Komji developed a clandestine organization (*tanzim siri*). Furthermore, Komji infiltrated an existing political party, *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, and influenced government officials in developing their networks.⁹² In addition, Komji built international networks with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, *Rabitah al-Alam al-Islamy* in Saudi Arabia, and the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations.⁹³

Komji's clandestine organizations made many prominent attempts to attack the Indonesian government under President Soeharto. For example, Komji tried to overthrow Soeharto by capitalizing on the momentum of the Iranian revolution in 1978, which changed Iran from a constitutional monarchy to an Islamic state.⁹⁴ Developing narratives to resemble those of the Iranian revolution, Komji positioned itself as a mass movement organized to overthrow the government and assassinate Soeharto. However, this attempt failed because the Soeharto regime arrested several Komji leaders before the group could execute its plan.

⁸⁹ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah*, 74.

⁹⁰ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, 39.

⁹¹ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, 49.

⁹² Angel Damayanti et al., *Perkembangan Terorisme Di Indonesia* (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), 2013), 67, <http://repository.uki.ac.id/432/1/Buku%20Perkembangan%20Terorisme%20di%20Indonesi.pdf>.

⁹³ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah*, 58.

⁹⁴ Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002): 128, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43818511>.

Komji was also responsible for several terrorist attacks and violent religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. Komando Jihad even carried out terrorist attacks against the Muslim community and then pretended to be a Christian terrorist group to provoke the Muslim community and create a religiously based communal conflict.⁹⁵ For example, the Nurul Iman mosque bombing on November 11, 1976, in Padang, West Sumatera, was executed by Komji to create a narrative for religious conflict.⁹⁶ Moreover, Komji hijacked Garuda Indonesia Flight 206 in 1981 to humiliate the Indonesian government in the eyes of the international community.⁹⁷ To finance the movement's activities, Komji committed robberies and other crimes.⁹⁸

In terms of international terrorist networks, Komji had a connection to the global jihad movement in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet War. Ten groups of Komando Jihad members went to Afghanistan between 1985 and 1991 to fight the Soviet invasion.⁹⁹ Indonesian mujahideen in Afghanistan gained military expertise and adopted the religious doctrine of Salafi Jihadism. Some Indonesian mujahideen, like Mukhlas (the Bali bombing mastermind), fought together with Osama bin Laden in the Jaji Battle.¹⁰⁰ The mujahideen's victory over the Soviets aroused the jihadist spirit to continue the jihad movement. Abdullah Azzam, a founding member of Al-Qaeda, recommended that foreign mujahideen—including Komando Jihad mujahideen—return to their home countries to wage jihad on the apostate governments there.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah*, 63.

⁹⁶ Indiwan S. Wahjuwibowo, *Media Dan Terorisme: Analisis Wacana Terorisme, Analisis Wacana Kulaitatif* (Indonesia: Diva Press, 2019), 13, <https://books.google.com/books?id=7GmHDwAAQBAJ>.

⁹⁷ New York Times, "Indonesians Storm Jet in Bangkok, Freeing All 55 Captives," *New York Times*, March 31, 1981, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/31/world/indonesians-storm-jet-in-bangkok-freeing-all-55-captives.html>.

⁹⁸ Damayanti et al., *Perkembangan Terorisme Di Indonesia*, 17.

⁹⁹ Muhammad Zaki Mubarak, "Dari NII Ke ISIS: Transformasi Ideologi Dan Gerakan Dalam Islam Radikal Di Indonesia Kontemporer," *Episteme: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman* 10 (June 13, 2015): 81, <https://doi.org/10.21274/EPIS.2015.10.1.77-98>.

¹⁰⁰ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah*, 136.

¹⁰¹ Robinson, *Global Jihad: A Brief History*, 58.

2. Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was established in 1992 by Abdulah Sungkar, a former Indonesian mujahideen in the Afghan-Soviet war who returned home to Indonesia and heeded Azzam's calls to continue jihad against the apostate government.¹⁰² JI was also inspired by the radical Egyptian group *al-Gama'ah al-Islamiyah* to develop an Islamic state organization and developed a master plan to build a strong JI base in Indonesia by 2025.¹⁰³ Abdulah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir became the masterminds of modern Salafi Jihadism in Indonesia. Sungkar developed JI by adopting Salafi views, as well as introducing the idea that "our path is faith, hijra, and jihad in the way of God."¹⁰⁴

JI used a different strategy from its predecessor, Komji. Whereas Komji's focus was on developing centralized clandestine organizations, JI's strategy was to develop its organization into four *mantiqi* (areas of operation) in Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁵ *Mantiqi ula* would cover peninsular Singapore and Malaysia. *Mantiqi tsani* would oversee Indonesia, except for parts of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Ambon, and Papua. The third area of operation, *Mantiqi tsalis*, would cover Sabah Malaysia, East Kalimantan, North and Central Sulawesi, and Mindanao, Philippines, while the fourth, *mantiqi ukhro*, was assigned to Papua and Australia. This method has enabled JI to effectively coordinate its networks in Southeast Asia. JI uses the educational systems in these territories to recruit new members from neutral communities and convince them to become active JI sympathizers. Specifically, JI's radicalization strategy principally relies on the use of *pesantren* as a means of spreading its ideology. Students at JI-affiliated *pesantren* undergo radicalization by adopting the Islamic state's living conditions in *pesantren* which disseminates the radical Islamic ideology along with military education.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² David Gordon and Samuel Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 3, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/jemaah-islamiyah>.

¹⁰³ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah*, 153.

¹⁰⁴ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, 154.

¹⁰⁵ Damayanti et al., *Perkembangan Terorisme Di Indonesia*, 47.

¹⁰⁶ DS Narendra, *Teror Bom Jamaah Islamiyah* (Pionir Ebook, 2015), 132, <https://books.google.com/books?id=tc8FCgAAQBAJ>.

Domestically, JI was responsible for supporting religiously based communal conflicts in Poso (1998) and Ambon (1999), which killed thousands of people.¹⁰⁷ Also, several bombings in Indonesia involved JI members, including the Bali bombings on October 12, 2002, and October 1, 2005, which killed hundreds of foreign tourists and local people. These tragedies made the Indonesian government aware of the JI movement and the need to improve its counterterrorism effort. In response, in 2007 the Indonesian government banned and dissolved the JI organization and all organizations affiliated with JI. Despite these government measures, the JI movement continues to covertly radicalize people and carry out terrorism in Indonesia.

Internationally, JI's leaders had a direct network connection with Al-Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden. On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa, asserting it was every Muslim's obligation to kill Americans and their allies. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir were invited to meet directly with bin Laden in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁸ This invitation expanded JI's jihad from local jihad to international jihad targeting America, which focused on Southeast Asia.

As already mentioned, the Indonesian government's effort to ban and dissolve JI did not completely disrupt JI networks. There were many subsequent instances of terrorism in Indonesia, which were executed by JI's terrorist cells. In December 2020, the Indonesian National Police estimated that there were approximately 6,000 active JI sympathizers in Indonesia.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, some organizations, such as Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid, have emerged as splinter groups of JI.

¹⁰⁷ Kirsten E. Schulze, "From Ambon to Poso," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41, no. 1 (2019): 35, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664204>.

¹⁰⁸ Julie Chernov Hwang, "Dakwah before Jihad," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41, no. 1 (2019): 18, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664203>.

¹⁰⁹ CNN Indonesia, "Polri Perkirakan Anggota Aktif Jamaah Islamiyah 6.000 Orang," <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20201218204541-12-584071/polri-perkirakan-anggota-aktif-jamaah-islamiyah-6000-orang>.

3. Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid

Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) was formed in 2008 by JI sympathizers who had a different concept of jihad from the one espoused by JI. Specifically, a debate among the JI sympathizers focused on the idea of *qital nikayah* (fighting to weaken the enemy) versus *qital tamkin* (fighting to seize territory and uphold Islamic law).¹¹⁰ JI members who agreed with *qital tamkin* created a new terrorist organization, JAT, under Abu Bakar Baasyir.¹¹¹ JAT's ideology, though, is in many respects the same as the JI ideology of Salafi Jihadism. Thus, it promotes terrorism in Indonesia and supports Al-Qaeda. In addition, JAT has adopted Imaroh Islam's concept that the global jihad movement must enter an alliance to build a caliphate. It hopes various jihad groups in Indonesia do the same to unite Imaroh Islam and build a caliphate. Therefore, JAT has formed relationships with other radical Islamic organizations like Mujahidin KOMPAK, Darul Islam Ring Banten, and Front Pembela Islam Aceh (FPI Aceh).¹¹² At the same time, JAT influenced JI members to join its organization because the JI movement does not plan to seize territory to create the caliphate. Furthermore, JAT also recruits members from neutral communities by radicalizing people with a narrative that paints democracy as unjust, corrupt, and apostate.

JAT has promoted the caliphate idea as a solution for every problem in the Muslim community. Given its goals, JAT saw Aceh as the best place for a base because it is the only province in Indonesia that can apply Islamic law as its regional law under the secular Indonesian constitution. Therefore, Aceh provided the ideal environment for JAT to build a training camp in a remote area and radicalize its members. The Indonesian government eventually discovered the camp and arrested 71 terrorists there in March 2010.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah*, 197.

¹¹¹ United Nations Security Council, "Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)," un.org, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/jemmah-anshorut-tauhid.

¹¹² Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah*, 198.

¹¹³ Detik News, "Daftar Nama 71 Tersangka Teroris Aceh," detiknews, March 19, 2010, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1320783/daftar-nama-71-tersangka-teroris-aceh>.

Nevertheless, JAT was later responsible for numerous terrorist attacks on Indonesian civilians, military, and police personnel. On September 25, 2011, a JAT member launched a suicide bombing inside a Christian church in Central Java. Indonesian police arrested JAT members connected with these bombings and uncovered plans for further suicide attacks.¹¹⁴ In April 2011, a suicide bomber attacked a mosque in a police compound in West Java.¹¹⁵ Police arrested several JAT members in connection with this bombing as well. Beyond these incidents, JAT has also conducted bank robberies and other illegal activities to fund its terror attacks.¹¹⁶

As with the JI, the JAT movement has also been influenced by external organizations, including the ISIS movement in Syria. The Syrian civil war in 2013 forced ISIS to focus on state-building in the territory it controlled in eastern Syria.¹¹⁷ In this respect, JAT felt that the ISIS movement's objective was similar to its campaign of *jihad qital tamkin*. Therefore, JAT leader Abu Bakar Baasyir swore allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the ISIS leader. However, not all JAT members agreed with Baasyir's strategy to ally with ISIS.¹¹⁸ Among these dissenters was Baasyir's son, Abdul Rosyid Ridho Ba'asyir, along with others split who from JAT and established many terrorist groups in Indonesia.

4. Jamaah Ansharut Daulah

Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) was established in 2015 by Oman Rochman, JAD's ideological leader.¹¹⁹ JAD is an umbrella organization for numerous Indonesian extremist groups that have a direct or indirect connection to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ United Nations Security Council, "Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)."

¹¹⁵ United Nations Security Council.

¹¹⁶ United Nations Security Council.

¹¹⁷ Robinson, *Global Jihad: A Brief History*, 101.

¹¹⁸ Jakarta Post, "Sons, Top Aides Abandon Ba'asyir over ISIL, Form New Jihadist Group," *Jakarta Post*, August 13, 2014, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/13/sons-top-aides-abandon-ba-asyir-over-isil-form-new-jihadist-group.html>.

¹¹⁹ United Nations Security Council, "Jamaah Ansharut Daulah," un.org, accessed November 17, 2021, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/jamaah-ansharut-daulah>.

¹²⁰ United Nations Security Council.

Currently, JAD is the largest ISIS-affiliated terrorist group in Indonesia.¹²¹ JAD adopted ISIS's strategies to recruit new members. Indonesia's youth and radical Islamic sympathizers have been the primary targets for JAD recruitment because they strongly agree with the caliphate's ideas.

While JAD's ideology and objectives align with JAT's, it differs in its strategic approach. JAD focuses on creating spontaneous terror and lone-wolf terrorists, and it is also the most digitally savvy terrorist organization in Indonesia. It uses social media effectively to radicalize ordinary people into becoming lone-wolf terrorists without any direct contact with the JAD organization.¹²² The chief goal of JAD is to create fear in society, degrade the government's legitimacy, maintain its existence, and gain support from other terrorist organizations. It thus exhibits the defining characteristic of the fourth wave of global jihad, personal jihad.¹²³ The JAD movement adopted personal jihad to maintain its existence by creating small and episodic terrorist acts within a broad, sustainable network of radical Islamic terrorist resistance.

The most frequent JAD terror attacks have targeted security officers, whom JAD believes are *thagut* (worshipping gods other than Allah). In addition, JAD targets non-Muslim communities, which JAD considers to be *kafirs* (non-believers or infidels), and any Muslim communities that do not support JAD.¹²⁴ For example, JAD initiated a riot in a jail for terrorists on May 5, 2018, in Depok, Indonesia, which killed five police officers

¹²¹ United Nations Security Council.

¹²² Achmad Huda and Muhamad Syauqillah, "Forecast the End of the Anshorut Daulah (JAD) in Indonesia" (*Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on Strategic and Global Studies*, ICSGS 2019, 6-7 November 2019, Sari Pacific, Jakarta, Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia: EAI, 2020), 269, <https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.6-11-2019.2297279>.

¹²³ Robinson, *Global Jihad: A Brief History*, 122.

¹²⁴ Aysha Rizki Ramadhyas, "Menelaah Aksi Penargetan Dan Pola Strategi Penyerangan Terorisme," *Journal of Terrorism Studies* 2, no. 1 (May 20, 2020): 79, <https://doi.org/10.7454/jts.v2i1.1018>.

and one terrorist.¹²⁵ That same day, JAD executed a bombing that targeted three churches in Surabaya, killing 13 people.¹²⁶

The JAD movement now focuses on radicalizing youth as well as infiltrating the politically based radical Islamic organizations. For example, on February 4, 2021, the Indonesian government arrested 26 JAD members, 19 of whom were members of the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), a politically based radical Islamic organization in Indonesia that has a goal of enforcing Islamic law.¹²⁷ This incident confirms that JAD is still active in radicalizing people and waiting for the right time to execute its lone-wolf terrorism.

C. POLITICALLY BASED RADICAL ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS

Politically based radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, as the term implies, use a political approach to gain their objectives to implement Islamic law and build a caliphate in Indonesia. Their strategy is using the narrative of radical Islamic ideology to indoctrinate people and generate social unrest to degrade the Indonesian government's legitimacy and promote radical Islamic ideology in Indonesia. Examples of this type of organization are Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Front Pembela Islam.

1. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, or HTI, is affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir (HT), which was founded in Palestine in 1953 by Shaykh Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani to promote the idea of a caliphate globally and to challenge the Western culture and democratic system.¹²⁸ HT believed Islamic civilization had reached its lowest point since the 19th century. The

¹²⁵ BBC Indonesia, "Rusuh Mako Brimob: Akankah polisi persuasif terhadap para napi teroris?," BBC News Indonesia, May 9, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-44047325>.

¹²⁶ Kirsten E. Schulze, "The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia," *CTC Sentinel* 11, no. 6 (June 22, 2018): 2, <https://ctc.usma.edu/surabaya-bombings-evolution-jihadi-threat-indonesia/>.

¹²⁷ Jawa Post, "26 Teroris JAD Tiba Di Jakarta, 19 Orang Adalah Anggota FPI," *Jawa Post*, February 4, 2021, <https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/04/02/2021/26-teroris-jad-tiba-di-jakarta-19-orang-adalah-anggota-fpi/>.

¹²⁸ Mohamad Rafiuddin, "Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir (Studi Analisis Ideologi Hizbut Tahrir vis a vis NU)," *Islamuna: Jurnal Studi Islam* 2, no. 1 (June 5, 2015): 29, <https://doi.org/10.19105/islamuna.v2i1.653>.

Islamic world was under the weight of Western colonial domination. In response, HT promoted the concepts of the caliphate and Sharia law as solutions for every problem—breaking through the geographical, cultural, and political boundaries of nations.¹²⁹ HT's strategy used systematic political approaches to build its global networks.

As of 2017, “the Method” of Hizb ut-Tahrir outlined online included the statement that Party members “consider that Islamic law forbids violence or armed struggle against the regime as a method to reestablish the Islamic State,” however, the most recent update of this website in 2020 gives some indication of when taking up arms is in the Party's purview.¹³⁰

As the statement indicates, there was a shift in HT strategy that incorporated jihad approaches to gain the group's objective and build an Islamic state globally. This shift can pose a serious threat to global security, particularly in Muslim countries like Indonesia.

HT came to Indonesia in 1983 via Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, who started by teaching his understanding of HT at several Indonesian college campuses. Once he attracted many followers, he established HTI and developed an HTI network by recruiting some local leadership.¹³¹ The recruitment method of HTI uses a systematic *da'wah* to gain support and sympathizers.¹³² The *da'wah* has three stages. The first, the *tatsqif* (coaching and cadre), is designed to produce cadres who believe in the Islamic *fikrah* (idea). The second, *tafā'ul* (interaction), involves working with the Indonesian *ummah* (Muslim community) to make Islam the primary guide in their lives and try to apply it in the reality of their lives. In the third and final stage, *istilām al-hukm* (receiving power), the *ummah* implement Islam practically and thoroughly while disseminating Islamic states throughout the world.¹³³

¹²⁹ Rafiuddin, 34.

¹³⁰ Meerim Aitkulova, “Hizb Ut-Tahrir: Dreaming of Caliphate,” in *Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements*, ed. Muhammad Afzal Upal and Carole M. Cusack (London: Brill, 2021), 410, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv1v7zbv8.24>.

¹³¹ Ahmad Khadafi, “Sejarah Kemunculan HTI Hingga Akhirnya Dibubarkan,” News, Tirta.id, May 8, 2017, <https://tirta.id/sejarah-kemunculan-hti-hingga-akhirnya-dibubarkan-coiC>.

¹³² Rafiuddin, “Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir (Studi Analisis Ideologi Hizbut Tahrir vis a vis NU),” 51.

¹³³ Rafiuddin, 37.

HTI asserts that its ideology is a pure belief of Islam. However, the objective of HTI is to establish a caliphate. Therefore, Indonesia's society recognizes the HTI ideology as the caliphate's ideology, which is not in harmony with the Indonesian constitution. The HTI's narratives about establishing a caliphate resemble many terrorist groups' narratives. Furthermore, the HTI ideology of creating a caliphate can be used to justify terrorist groups conducting terrorist attacks in the name of jihad. Some of the terrorists who have been arrested by Indonesian police are members of HTI, or people who have been members of HTI.¹³⁴ As a result, the Indonesian government dissolved and banned HTI in Indonesia on July 19, 2017. This approach was based on three judgments of the Indonesian government: First, as a legal entity, HTI does not play a positive role in the Indonesian national development process. Second, HTI activities conflict with the objectives, principles, and characteristics of *Pancasila* (Indonesian national ideology) and the 1945 Constitution of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Finally, HTI activities have caused clashes in the community that could threaten public security and order, as well as endangers the Republic of Indonesia's integrity.¹³⁵

Indonesia is not the only state to dissolve and ban HT. Many Muslim-majority countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, have banned HT, and so have China and Russia. Zeyno Baran, a researcher at the Hudson Institute, has called HT a "conveyor belt" for terrorists. Yet, the United Kingdom (UK) has not banned HT, which has enabled HT there to become the "nerve center" of the international movement.¹³⁶ Even though HTI was formally disbanded through the actions of the Indonesian government, the group continues to spread its influence, especially on social media. Notably, Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) in Indonesia estimated the number of HTI sympathizers at nearly a million people as recently as 2021.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ CNN Indonesia, "Eks Kepala BNPT Ungkap Kaitan HTI Dan Radikalisme," accessed December 26, 2021, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180301195549-12-279820/eks-kepala-bnpt-ungkap-kaitan-hti-dan-radikalisme>.

¹³⁵ Khadafi, "Sejarah Kemunculan HTI Hingga Akhirnya Dibubarkan."

¹³⁶ Counter Extremism Project, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir," accessed November 17, 2021, <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/hizb-ut-tahrir>.

¹³⁷ Isyana Artharini, "Lebih dari 90% orang Indonesia dukung penolakan HTI dan ISIS," BBC News Indonesia, accessed November 17, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40153060>.

2. Front Pembela Islam

FPI was established on August 17, 1998, in Tangerang Selatan by Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, three months after the resignation of President Soeharto.¹³⁸ The fall of the Soeharto regime provided political opportunities for FPI to muster its strength to take a more strategic political role and promote its idea of Islamic law as the solution for any problem caused by the Indonesian secular constitution.¹³⁹ The birth of FPI was inspired by militant movements in other countries, such as the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the Philippines, which have the same political objectives to enforce Islamic law and build a caliphate. These organizations act militantly, driven by dissatisfaction with Indonesian government rule, which does not implement Islamic law.¹⁴⁰

FPI resembles HTI in that it claims its ideology is a pure ideology of Islam. However, the movement's objective is primarily to enforce Islamic law in Indonesian communities. Therefore, FPI sympathizers actively persecute groups that do not agree with the implementation of Islamic law, even though Indonesia is not an Islamic state. FPI carries out violent action against all activities that are not permitted under Islamic law, such as prostitution, drug abuse, and the consumption of liquor. To draw attention to its existence, FPI has participated in many prominent political events. For example, FPI was involved in the effort to secure the extraordinary trial of the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly that established BJ Habibie as president, replacing Soeharto in 1998. Since then, FPI leaders have had close ties with political and government officials.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Al-Zastrouw Ngatawi, *Gerakan Islam Simbolik ; Politik Kepentingan FPI* (Indonesia: LKiS, 2006), 90, <https://books.google.com/books?id=SYBoDwAAQBAJ>.

¹³⁹ Syalaby Ichsan, "Jejak Sejarah Pendirian FPI, Dideklarasikan Saat 17 Agustus," *Republika Online*, December 31, 2020, <https://republika.co.id/share/qm6glo483>.

¹⁴⁰ Ichsan.

¹⁴¹ Maulida Sri Handayani, "FPI dalam Lintasan Sejarah," *tirto.id*, November 4, 2016, <https://tirto.id/fpi-dalam-lintasan-sejarah-b1NT>.

The FPI leader, Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, uses hate speech to radicalize his followers and incite them to use violence to enforce Sharia law against what he claims is apostasy.¹⁴² Shihab also declares his support to the ISIS movement to implement Islamic law and build a caliphate to fight the United States and its allies' tyranny.¹⁴³ Based on Indonesian National Police data, 35 members of FPI have been involved in criminal acts of terrorism.¹⁴⁴ Of these, 29 have been convicted. Based on this judgment, the Indonesian government dissolved and prohibited all FPI activities on December 30, 2020.¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, the dissolution and prohibition of FPI have not stopped FPI activities in Indonesia. FPI has transformed its organization into another form to operate underground and continue to spread its ideas on social media. To develop its networks, FPI has infiltrated other organizations, including terrorist organizations such as JAD. For example, on February 4, 2021, the Indonesian government arrested 26 JAD members, 19 of whom were also members of FPI.¹⁴⁶ This evidence suggests the FPI movement is still alive and waiting for the right time and political opportunities to reemerge.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that the Indonesian government's effort to dissolve and ban radical Islamic organizations has not entirely succeeded; it has only splintered the organizations and created new radical Islamic groups with the same objective of establishing an Islamic state. In addition, there is evidence of developing relationships between terrorist-based radical Islamic groups and politically based radical Islamic groups. The radical Islamic groups' objectives to build a caliphate and implement Islamic law

¹⁴² Mark Woodward et al., "The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the State in Indonesia," *Contemporary Islam* 8, no. 2 (May 1, 2014): 155, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-013-0288-1>.

¹⁴³ Detik News, "Ini Pernyataan Habib Rizieq Dukung ISIS Yang Jadi Alasan Pelarangan FPI," December 31, 2020, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5316418/ini-pernyataan-habib-rizieq-dukung-isis-yang-jadi-alasan-pelarangan-fpi>.

¹⁴⁴ Kompas, "6 Alasan Pemerintah Bubarkan Dan Larang Kegiatan FPI," December 30, 2020, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/30/14545951/6-alasan-pemerintah-bubarkan-dan-larang-kegiatan-fpi?page=all>.

¹⁴⁵ Kompas.

¹⁴⁶ Jawa Post, "26 Teroris JAD Tiba Di Jakarta, 19 Orang Adalah Anggota FPI."

connect both groups to spread their radical Islamic ideology in Indonesia. This chapter has not covered all radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, because many of them operate in the dark. However, this chapter provided sufficient background information on how radical Islamic groups in Indonesia emerged and maintain their networks to survive under the pressure of the Indonesian government. In addition, this chapter has provided general information on the networks of transnational radical Islamic organizations with connections to the local radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

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III. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN AMBON AND TERRORISM BY RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS IN INDONESIA

Since the Soeharto regime's collapse in 1998, Indonesia has faced community-based conflicts fueled by religious politicization. In addition, the country has experienced many terrorist attacks influenced by the fourth wave of global jihad. To analyze the effectiveness of the Indonesian government's effort in countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, referred to hereafter as VERLT, this chapter analyzes two case studies about religious identity and networks. The first is the Ambon conflict, which illustrates the role that networks play in a polarized community, escalating conflict based on religious politicization. The case study also analyzes the roles that politicians and media networks play in the spread of misinformation and disinformation.

The second case study examines terrorism incidents in Indonesia from 2000 to 2019 carried out by radical Islamic groups and assesses the Indonesian government's efforts in countering VERLT. It explores the importance of networks in the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. Also, it explores the summary of the Terrorism Database in Indonesia from 2002 to 2019¹⁴⁷ to highlight the importance of disrupting the networks of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia.

This chapter finds that networks play an important role in escalating and deescalating conflict. Misinformation and disinformation can spread through religious networks and be a catalyst of conflict escalation. In addition, the influence of international terrorist networks contributes to the development of strategy of and recruitment by radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. Therefore, knowledge about network analysis is important to address VERLT.

¹⁴⁷ Global Terrorism Database, "Global Terrorism Database."

A. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF THE AMBON CONFLICT, JANUARY 1999–FEBRUARY 2002

The Ambon conflict occurred between Muslim and Christian communities in Ambon, in the Maluku province of Indonesia. The conflict was initiated by a trivial dispute between a Christian bus driver and a Muslim passenger when they argued regarding the bus fare. This small disagreement sparked a community conflict that lasted from January 1999 to February 2002.¹⁴⁸ Several factors escalated the conflict, such as the political instability that occurred after the collapse of President Soeharto's regime, the social identity politics of Muslim and Christian communities that increased polarization in Ambon society, the weakened social structures that resulted from the collapse of the Soeharto regime, and misinformation and disinformation from local media that provoked mass movements across Indonesia.¹⁴⁹ As the conflict escalated, the radical Islamic groups initiated a jihadist movement, known as *Laskar Jihad*, to support Muslim communities in Ambon.¹⁵⁰ The Laskar Jihad movement adopted Salafi-Wahabi ideology as its narrative.¹⁵¹ One group affiliated with the Laskar Jihad movement was JI.¹⁵² On the other side, the Christian communities appealed for international help.¹⁵³

As previously mentioned, the Ambon conflict lasted for about four years, and it was marked by many prominent incidents that reveal how the conflict developed. Therefore, this case study analysis explores the conflict in four phases, based on conflict escalation and de-escalation. Furthermore, this case study analyzes the importance of networks in every phase of the conflict. It shows that the networks of actors involved were essential in spreading the unrest to neighboring areas. In addition, the misinformation and

¹⁴⁸ Graham Brown, Christopher Wilson, and Suprayoga Hadi, eds., *Overcoming Violent Conflict* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Kementerian PPN/BAPPENAS : UNDP : LabSosio, 2005), 15.

¹⁴⁹ Brown, Wilson, and Hadi, 34.

¹⁵⁰ Saiful Umam, "Radical Muslim in Indonesia," *University of Hawaii at Manoa* 6, no. 1 (2006): 2, <https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/2255/Exp6n1-1%20Umam.pdf>.

¹⁵¹ Din Wahid, "Pentas Jihad Gerakan Salafi Radikal Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 14, no. 2 (2007): 345, <https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v14i2.552>.

¹⁵² Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 6.

¹⁵³ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia's Maluku Crisis: The Issues," Crisis Group, July 19, 2000, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesias-maluku-crisis-issues>.

disinformation spread through the channel of social identity based on religion significantly escalated the conflict.

1. Phase I: January–March 1999

The first phase of the Ambon conflict, which began on January 19, 1999, was triggered by a clash between the Batumerah (Muslim) and Mardika (Christian) gangs.¹⁵⁴ The first phase demonstrated how a conflict driven by religious identity can spread through the religious network to escalate the conflict. A religious network is a network based on religious identity, which is important for recruiting new members, retaining existing members, and disseminating its ideas and ideology to accomplish its religious goal, whether for good or bad, such as collective action leading to violent conflict.¹⁵⁵ The narrative of religious conflict flowed through religious networks and helped escalate the conflict across Ambon Island between Muslim and Christian communities.¹⁵⁶ More than 50 people were killed and many more were evacuated to a refugee camp in Ambon.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, group members' ties with family and friends outside of Ambon facilitated the spread of the conflict to other areas in Maluku. As a result, in March 1999, the conflict engulfed the areas around Ambon, such as Tual, Kei Island, and Southeast Maluku.¹⁵⁸

This phase also demonstrated how a strong social identity in a polarized setting during the conflict increased the solidarity of people against their opponents. For example, in this phase, societies and social structures in Ambon became increasingly separated based on religious networks, as evidenced by the emergence of separate markets, harbors,

¹⁵⁴ John Pieris, *Tragedi Maluku Sebuah Krisis Peradaban : Analisis Kritis Aspek Politik, Ekonomi, Sosial Budaya, Dan Keamanan* (Indonesia: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2004), 120.

¹⁵⁵ Sean Everton, "Networks and Religion: Ties That Bind, Loose, Build Up, and Tear Down," *Journal of Social Structure* 16 (January 1, 2019): 8, <https://doi.org/10.21307/joss-2019-020>.

¹⁵⁶ Pieris, *Tragedi Maluku Sebuah Krisis Peradaban : Analisis Kritis Aspek Politik, Ekonomi, Sosial Budaya, Dan Keamanan*, 122.

¹⁵⁷ BBC News, "Uneasy Calm in Indonesia," BBC, January 24, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/indonesia/latest_news/262008.stm.

¹⁵⁸ S. Hadi, *Disintegrasi Pasca Orde Baru: Negara, Konflik Lokal, Dan Dinamika Internasional* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Centre for International Relations Studies, FISIP UI bekerja sama dengan Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2007), 153, <https://books.google.com/books?id=LrzqhrdIqJYC>.

transportation, banks, hospitals, and many more institutions for Muslims and Christians.¹⁵⁹ This increased polarization of the two groups prevented them from communicating and de-escalating the conflict. The local government, security officers, and religious leaders' efforts to deescalate the conflict using a traditional local approach were ineffective because of this widespread polarization, which led to a cycle of revenge between Muslim and Christian communities in Ambon.

2. Phase II: July–November 1999

The second phase of the conflict exploded in the aftermath of the general election result in Ambon. From this phase, it is possible to trace how the blend of political and religious identity within a hostile atmosphere increased the groups' polarization and escalated the religious conflict in Ambon. On June 7, 1999, the Indonesian government held the first general election in the reform era.¹⁶⁰ PDI Perjuangan, an Indonesian political party mainly supported by the Christian community, won the election in Ambon. This led many Ambon communities to consider the PDI Perjuangan victory as a major win for Christian communities.¹⁶¹ Therefore, the Christian group became more assertive and the Muslim group become more aggressive, which escalated the conflict to a broader area in Ambon. Moreover, the areas in Ambon were already segregated and polarized into Muslim and Christian groups.¹⁶² In addition, the refugee camp there was also segregated in terms of religion, which led to polarization among the refugees, even though most of them wanted to avoid the conflict.¹⁶³

This phase also illustrates how mistrust of security forces can influence the behavior of warring communities. The Indonesian government responded to the conflict

¹⁵⁹ Hadi, 161.

¹⁶⁰ Tempo, "7 Juni, Pemilu Pertama Era Reformasi 1999 Dilaksanakan, Perolehan 5 Partai Besar - Nasional," Tempo, June 7, 2021, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1469717/7-juni-pemilu-pertama-era-reformasi-1999-dilaksanakan-perolehan-5-partai-besar>.

¹⁶¹ Debora Sanur Lindawaty, "Konflik Ambon: Kajian terhadap beberapa akar permasalahan dan solusinya," *Jurnal Politika Dinamika Masalah Politik Dalam Negeri dan Hubungan Internasional* 2, no. 2 (August 9, 2016): 281, <https://doi.org/10.22212/jp.v2i2.295>.

¹⁶² Lindawaty, 288.

¹⁶³ Lindawaty, 289.

by sending more security forces to Ambon. However, both the Christian and the Muslim groups believed that the forces were taking a side based on their own religious identity and that they had become involved in the hostilities. Indeed, the Christian security officers took the side of the Christians, and the Muslim security officers took the side of the Muslims.¹⁶⁴ This situation eroded Ambon citizens' trust in the ability of security officers to deescalate the conflict. Consequently, both religious communities created militia groups and armed themselves to protect their members from the opposing groups' attacks.¹⁶⁵

3. Phase III: December 1999–January 2000

The conflict's third phase demonstrates how failing to involve key individuals from warring communities can escalate a conflict. For example, on December 7, 1999, the Ambon governor issued the Declaration of Refraining from Violence and Ending the Conflict.¹⁶⁶ The declaration, however, did not involve senior religious leaders from both sides, the two groups' most influential and central actors.¹⁶⁷ This offended them and led them and their sympathizers to continue hostilities

This phase also demonstrates the role religious narratives can play in escalating such conflicts. In December 1999, Muslim communities entered Ramadhan—a holy month in the Islamic calendar. Meanwhile, the Christian communities were preparing to celebrate Christmas. This situation was liable to trigger further religious violence between Muslim and Christian communities because the celebrations were taking place at the same time and location under a hostile atmosphere wrapped in religious trappings. As a result, on December 26, 1999, violence erupted again, leading to significant human loss on both sides. A Muslim group attacked and destroyed a Silo church, killing many Christians, and Christian groups attacked mosques in Tobelo village, killing many Muslims.

¹⁶⁴ Jamin Safi, "Konflik Komunal: Maluku 1999-2000," *ISTORIA: Jurnal Pendidikan Dan Sejarah* 13, no. 1 (December 28, 2017): 37, <https://doi.org/10.21831/istoria.v13i1.17615>.

¹⁶⁵ Sukidi Mulyadi, "Violence under the Banner of Religion: The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus," *Studia Islamika* 10, no. 2 (2003): 76, <https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v10i2.631>.

¹⁶⁶ John Braithwaite et al., "*Maluku and North Maluku*," in *Anomie and Violence, Non-Truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding* (Australia: ANU Press, 2010), 170, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hf62.9>.

¹⁶⁷ Braithwaite et al., 170.

Moreover, both communities continued to question the neutrality of the security forces and, therefore, their ability to deescalate the conflict. This situation intensified under the influence of militia groups from both groups. The Muslim fighter group named itself *Laskar Jihad* and the Christian fighter group called itself *Laskar Kristus*. The security troops could not handle the conflict because neither group was neutral: the security officers' religious identity superseded their nationalist identity as security officers.¹⁶⁸ Consequently, it escalated exponentially until January 2000 and created a massive wave of refugees inside and outside of Maluku.

4. Phase IV: April 2000–February 2002

The conflict's fourth phase shows how misinformation and disinformation by local media and national media can lead to more violence as inaccurate information spreads and increases anger and rage. For example, the Christian group established FKM (Maluku Sovereign Front), which used the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) flag, a separatist group in Maluku, to attract sympathizers. The local media's reporting led the public to assume that Christian communities supported separatism in Maluku, even though they only used the RMS flag to attract sympathizers.¹⁶⁹ Additionally, some national and Muslim media outlets broadcasted biased news and took the side of Muslim communities.¹⁷⁰ These broadcasts directly influenced emotions and solidarity among Indonesian viewers, as most of them are Muslim. Networks' local and national media also became a means of radicalizing Indonesian society and spreading the seeds of hostility, not only in the Ambon and Maluku communities but across most of Indonesia. As a result, jihadist movements from outside Ambon, in areas such as Yogyakarta, Jakarta, and Bogor, supported the fight in Ambon.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ Safi, "Konflik Komunal," 37.

¹⁶⁹ Lindawaty, "Konflik Ambon," 282.

¹⁷⁰ Nurul Siti Naziah, "Konflik Ambon dalam pemberitaan media cetak Islam dan media cetak umum (1999)" (UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, 2021), 72, <http://digilib.uinsgd.ac.id/41584/>.

¹⁷¹ Kirsten E. Schulze, "Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9, no. 1 (2002): 58, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590272>.

The fourth phase also demonstrates the importance of trust in deescalating conflict. Through several actions that increased the level of neutrality, the Indonesian government tried to restore the trust of Ambon communities in the security officers who worked to mitigate the conflict in Ambon. On June 26, 2000, the Indonesian Army replaced the senior military commander in Ambon, Brigadier-General Max Tamaela—a Christian—with Colonel I Made Yasa—a Hindu. Also, the Indonesian government withdrew all Muslim and Christian security officers and replaced them with Hindu security officers to bridge the two communities.¹⁷² This approach significantly improved warring parties' trust in security officer independence to deescalate the Ambon conflict.

The Indonesian government also involved a “neutral bridge group,” namely Hindu leaders, who successfully brought the warring parties together to initiate the Malino II peace talks. The Malino peace agreement focused on restoring security, rehabilitating socioeconomic conditions in Maluku, and restoring the law in Ambon under the Indonesian national constitution and national ideology of Pancasila.¹⁷³ The agreement effectively deescalated the conflict and brought peace to Ambon. Nonetheless, the peace is fragile and vulnerable to religious-based conflict because the communities remain polarized along religious lines; for example, neighborhoods are still classified by the residents' religion.

5. Discussion

The Ambon conflict's case study analysis demonstrates the failure of the Indonesian government to address the conflict by focusing on a reactive kinetic approach rather than a proactive non-kinetic approach based on network analysis. The role of social networks was central in the escalation and deescalation of the hostilities in Ambon because social identity based on religion served as the major source of conflict and a key factor in polarization. Furthermore, social identity based on religion expanded the local religious networks to communities outside Ambon; it even divided the security officers who were

¹⁷² H. Israr, *Ops Maluku: Catatan Seorang Prajurit Di Daerah Konflik Ambon* (Jakarta: Budaya Media, 2012), 35, <https://books.google.com/books?id=IMdTLwEACAAJ>.

¹⁷³ Saidin Ernas, “Policy of Social Conflict Resolution: Implementation of The Malino Agreement in Maluku,” *Jurnal Studi Pemerintahan* 3, no. 2 (August 16, 2012): 319, <https://doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2012.0017>.

tasked with restoring the peace. Misinformation and disinformation provoked the communities to escalate the conflict and involve a broader network of actors.

The failure of the Indonesian government to deescalate the conflict with a proactive approach using social networks exacerbated the conflict and expanded it to a broader area in Ambon. From a network perspective, the Indonesian government was too late in bridging the warring parties with a neutral group, even though there were many indications of security officers taking a side in the conflict based on their religion during phase II. To make matters worse, the Indonesian government sheltered refugees in camps in Ambon based on their religion, which polarized Muslim and Christian communities in the camps and drew even more people into the conflict. Unfortunately, the Indonesian government missed the opportunity to use the refugees as agents of peace by putting both Muslim and Christian refugees together in the same place and initiating peace talks among them. A peace agreement in the refugee group could have possibly spread to the networks of the warring parties.

In addition, the Indonesian government failed to neutralize the misinformation and disinformation spread by the media, including religious groups' media. Furthermore, it failed to stop the infiltration of *Laskar Jihad* from other Indonesian provinces into Ambon. Both situations made the networks of the conflict's actors broader and more complicated. Consequently, the conflict harmed security not only in Ambon but in wider Indonesia.

This case study reveals that the religious narratives in communities with a solid social identity based on religion can escalate group polarization and competition. Such competition strengthens the social ties between actors within their groups and can lead them to collective action against their competitors. Competition and collective action can explode into a communal conflict if it adopts a suitable narrative under certain political conditions that radicalize actors within the groups. Furthermore, the conflict travels through the channel of religious social identity and brings the conflict to a wider community. Therefore, to mitigate the Ambon conflict, it was important to disrupt the networks of key actors involved in the conflict and neutralize the radicalization narratives that provoked the actors to get involved. The failure to address the conflict in Ambon with

a social network approach may have led to conflict escalation and threatened Indonesian national stability and security.

B. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORIST GROUPS' ATTACKS, 2000–2019

Indonesia has faced many terrorist attacks since the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998. The most prominent terrorist groups in Indonesia have been radical Islamic groups influenced by the networks of Middle Eastern transnational radical Islamic terrorist groups—for example, JI, which had a relationship with Al-Qaeda. This case study observes the progress of the Indonesian government's efforts to counter VERLT to identify gaps in those efforts from a network perspective and demonstrates the importance of analyzing networks in countering VERLT. It examines VERLT efforts under four presidencies—Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Megawati Soekarno Putri (Megawati), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), and Joko Widodo (Jokowi). It finds that although the Indonesian government has made significant progress in countering VERLT since the Gus Dur presidency, it needs to improve its effort from a network perspective. The radical Islamic group networks continue to grow and develop more sophisticated strategies. Therefore, the Indonesian government needs better tools to track and disrupt the networks of radical Islamic groups.

1. Radical Islamic Terrorism during Gus Dur Presidency (October 1999–July 2001)

During Gus Dur's presidency, there were 104 incidents related to terrorism executed by radical Islamic terrorist groups in Indonesia.¹⁷⁴ The most prominent group in these attacks was JI, which executed a series of bombings on Christmas Eve 2000 targeting churches in areas of Indonesia such as Medan, Pematang Siantar, Batam, Pekanbaru, Jakarta, Bekasi, Sukabumi, Bandung, Pangandaran, Kudus, Mojokerto, and Mataram.¹⁷⁵ However, the Indonesian government could not uncover JI's networks after the attacks

¹⁷⁴ Global Terrorism Database, "Global Terrorism Database."

¹⁷⁵ Ivan Aulia Ahsan, "Bom Natal 2000: Sejarah Kelam di Malam Kudus," *tirto.id*, December 24, 2018, <https://tirto.id/bom-natal-2000-sejarah-kelam-di-malam-kudus-cklZ>.

because many factors, such as political factors, government policy, and external factors, prevented the security officers and government from detecting and mapping the JI network. As a result, JI easily conducted terror attacks in Indonesia and expanded its network throughout Indonesia.

During Gus Dur's presidency, Indonesian politics entered the first period of governance in an era of reformation after the collapse of the Soeharto authoritarian regime. Gus Dur reformed Indonesia's political system to eliminate the role of security officers in politics because, during the Soeharto regime, the security officers had a role as a "power tool" for the regime. Gus Dur also initiated the separation of the military from the police on August 18, 2000.¹⁷⁶ This act consequently created a "power vacuum" in counterterrorism operations because the main element of counterterrorism was the military organization. The military could not execute counterterrorism operations because the Indonesian government categorized terrorism as a criminal act that the police must combat. However, the Indonesian police lacked the capabilities to execute counterterrorism operations.¹⁷⁷

In addition, the lack of policies and regulation hindered Indonesia's counterterrorism effort when the previous regulation, known as the subversion law, had been abolished because the Soeharto regime used it to persecute anti-Soeharto groups.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, the security officers could not uncover JI because no laws and regulations regulated the role of military and police in countering terrorism, following the separation of military and police. The Indonesian government did not issue a law to regulate the role of police until January 2002, and a law to regulate the role of the military until October 2004.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Pusat Sejarah Polri, "Sejarah Polri - Museum Polri," museumpolri.org, accessed November 24, 2021, <https://museumpolri.org/sejarah/posting/8/masa-reformasi>.

¹⁷⁷ Greg Barton, "How Indonesia's Counter-Terrorism Force Has Become a Model for the Region," *The Conversation*, July 1, 2018, <http://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368>.

¹⁷⁸ BNPT, "Sejarah Penanggulangan Terorisme," *Damailah Indonesiaku*, accessed November 24, 2021, <https://damailahindonesiaku.com/terorisme/sejarah-terorisme>.

¹⁷⁹ Republik Indonesia, "UU No. 34 Tahun 2004 Tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia," *Database Peraturan*, October 16, 2004, <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/40774/uu-no-34-tahun-2004>.

Gus Dur's deep intervention in military and police organizations eroded his political support among high-ranking officers in the military and police organization, which made his government unable to effectively utilize the military and police to maintain national security.¹⁸⁰ Thus, JI and other terrorist groups effectively exploited the vacuum in national security and defense law to launch terror attacks.

Furthermore, JI exploited Gus Dur's policy to protect freedom of speech to spread its radical Ideology. M Nurul Huda summarizes the results of an expert discussion on this issue at the Wahid Foundation:¹⁸¹

Gus Dur allowed people to express a desire to establish an Islamic state, but he refused actions that endanger the existence of the State of the Indonesian republic based on Pancasila.¹⁸²

His views about the freedom of radical Islamic groups to express their ideas provided an opportunity for JI to expand its campaign and therefore its networks. By contrast, Indonesia's neighboring countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines were already cracking down on JI networks.¹⁸³

Gus Dur used his relationship with Nahdatul Ulama (NU) to promote tolerance and avoid polarization between Muslim and Christian communities in Indonesia during the Ambon conflict. Gus Dur had a strong relationship with NU and support from all organizations affiliated with NU, the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia and the world. This relationship allowed him to effectively involve the networks of "Banser" (a multipurpose front of the Ansor youth movement) and the youth organizations under NU to support security officers securing non-Muslim communities from radical Islamic

¹⁸⁰ Erik Purnama Putra, "Acak-Acak TNI dan Polri Satu Pemicu Penggulingan Gus Dur," *Republika Online*, July 24, 2021, <https://republika.co.id/share/qwqbwz484>.

¹⁸¹ Wahid Foundation, "Gus Dur Dan Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan," Wahid Foundation, February 6, 2018, <https://wahidfoundation.org/index.php/publication/detail/Gus-Dur-dan-Pencegahan-Ekstremisme-Kekerasan>.

¹⁸² M. Nurul Huda, *Gus Dur Dan Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan* (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation, 2017), 7, https://drive.google.com/file/d/13PMc90YAYhuikAC49fzfoaM71bgzKRS6/view?usp=sharing&usp=embed_facebook.

¹⁸³ Council on Foreign Relations, "Jemaah Islamiyah (a.k.a. Jemaah Islamiah)," Council on Foreign Relations, June 19, 2009, <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/jemaah-islamiyah-aka-jemaah-islamiah>.

groups.¹⁸⁴ This effort effectively prevented the polarization between Muslim and Christian communities in Indonesia that were influenced by the Ambon conflict. Furthermore, Gus Dur promoted tolerance in the religious life and passed a regulation to protect the rights of the minority groups and eliminate discrimination based on ethnic group, religion, and race.¹⁸⁵

Yet, the wave of global jihad improved the JI network with international terrorist groups. JI leadership had a connection with Al Qaeda dating from the Soviet-Afghan war in 1979. Therefore, during the Gus Dur administration JI had a close relationship with Al-Qaeda, which supported JI with finances, military training, and propaganda.¹⁸⁶ Because the Indonesian government could not track the networks of Indonesians who connected with Al-Qaeda and JI, it could not track the financial support from Al-Qaeda to Indonesia. Thus, JI had adequate resources to execute terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

2. Radical Islamic Terrorism during Megawati Soekarno Putri (Megawati) Presidency (July 2001–October 2004)

Gus Dur's presidency ended early because of the national political instability in Indonesia, and he was replaced by his vice president, Megawati. The Megawati administration entered office two months before the 9/11 tragedy in the United States. For the three years and three months of the Megawati administration, there were 114 terrorism cases related to radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.¹⁸⁷ The most prominent terrorist group during the Megawati era was JI, which carried out the first bombing in Bali, which occurred in 2002.¹⁸⁸ The bombing forced the Indonesian government to take JI and other radical

¹⁸⁴ Paul Marshall, "Islamic Militias Are Protecting Churches In Indonesia," Hudson Institute, December 21, 2020, <http://www.hudson.org/research/16581-islamic-militias-are-protecting-churches-in-indonesia>.

¹⁸⁵ Fathiyah Wardah, "Ajaran Gus Dur Mengenai Toleransi Melekat," VOA Indonesia, November 23, 2018, <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/ajaran-gus-dur-mengenai-toleransi-melekat/4670672.html>.

¹⁸⁶ Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah*, 162.

¹⁸⁷ Global Terrorism Database, "Global Terrorism Database."

¹⁸⁸ BBC News, "The 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing Plot," BBC News, October 11, 2012, sec. Asia, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138>.

jihadist groups more seriously. As a result, the Indonesian government started to investigate the JI network. However, JI networks still grew to threaten Indonesian security because several factors hampered the government's effort to disrupt the JI network, such as politics and propaganda from radical Islamic groups about the U.S. Global War on Terror (GWOT).

Megawati continued political reform from the previous president and supported the U.S. GWOT, which generated friction between radical Islamic groups and the Indonesian government.¹⁸⁹ That support created a wave of demonstrations in Indonesia because the politically based radical Islamic groups assumed that the GWOT was a war on Muslim communities and influenced other communities to participate in the demonstrations.¹⁹⁰ In addition, political opposition groups in Indonesia exploited Megawati's support of the U.S. GWOT to degrade public support for the government and prevent investigations into the element of radical Islamic groups that executed much terror during Gus Dur's administration.¹⁹¹ At this point, the Indonesian government made an effort to capture and disrupt radical Islamic networks but faced significant resistance from opposition groups and radical Islamic groups.

The Indonesian government's perception of terrorism was further increased by the Bali bombing tragedy on October 12, 2002, that killed 102 people, most of them Australian tourists.¹⁹² This attack degraded Indonesia's reputation globally and was a starting point for the Indonesian government to address JI seriously. For instance, the government issued a regulation to counter-terrorism, which authorized the Indonesian Police to conduct counterterrorism operations (CTO).¹⁹³ Moreover, the Indonesian Police received support

¹⁸⁹ Anthony L. Smith, "A Glass Half Full: Indonesia-U.S. Relations in the Age of Terror," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no. 3 (2003): 454, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798657>.

¹⁹⁰ Smith, 455.

¹⁹¹ Anthony L. Smith, "Indonesia in 2002: Megawati's Way," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2003, 104, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27913229>.

¹⁹² Smith, "A Glass Half Full," 458.

¹⁹³ Hukum Online, "Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2003," hukumonline.com, accessed November 25, 2021, <https://hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/13284/undangundang-nomor-15-tahun-2003/document>.

from the Australian and American governments to improve its CTO capabilities.¹⁹⁴ However, rather than a broad spectrum of approaches, the Indonesian government's CTO focused on kinetic approaches to kill and capture the terrorists.¹⁹⁵ This focus enabled JI sympathizers to create further propaganda that portrayed the Indonesian CTO as waging a war against Muslim communities. In addition, the support from the United States and Australia to the Indonesian CTO generated propaganda from JI sympathizers that portrayed the Indonesian government as minions of Washington and Canberra.

Nevertheless, these developments enabled the Indonesian government to track and identify JI's networks. For instance, it arrested Abu Bakar Baasyir, the leader of JI, after discovering the networks of the actors who carried out the first Bali bombing.¹⁹⁶ On October 23, 2002, the U.S. Department of State designated JI as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.¹⁹⁷ Nonetheless, the Indonesian government still did not act to ban and disrupt JI, because some Indonesian officials believed that banning radical Islamic groups could generate public sympathy for JI and, therefore, broaden its networks.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, some Indonesian politicians and religious figures denied the existence of JI in Indonesia.¹⁹⁹ Even though Megawati gained support from a majority of the Indonesian Muslim organizations, the minority political parties that adopted Wahabism exploited terrorism for their political objectives.

3. Radical Islamic Terrorism during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) Presidency (October 2004–October 2014)

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono replaced Megawati in 2004. He was a former Indonesian Army General and Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security in the

¹⁹⁴ Adhi Cahya Fahadayna, "Australia-Indonesia Counter-Terrorism Cooperation," *Transformasi Global* 5, no. 2 (March 8, 2021): 69, <https://transformasiglobal.ub.ac.id/index.php/trans/article/view/102>.

¹⁹⁵ Endi Haryono, "Kebijakan Anti-Terrorisme Indonesia: Dilema Demokrasi Dan Represi," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik* 14, no. 2 (November 1, 2010): 240, <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.10938>.

¹⁹⁶ Council on Foreign Relations, "Jemaah Islamiyah (a.k.a. Jemaah Islamiah)."

¹⁹⁷ Council on Foreign Relations.

¹⁹⁸ Council on Foreign Relations.

¹⁹⁹ Smith, "A Glass Half Full," 456.

Megawati administration. During SBY's administration, there were 78 terrorism cases related to radical Islamic groups.²⁰⁰ JI remained the most prominent group during the SBY administration and executed several attacks during that time, including the bombing in Tentena,²⁰¹ the second bombing in Bali Bombing,²⁰² and the Mega Kuningan bombing.²⁰³ During SBY's administration, JI operations peaked until the death of Noordin M. Top, the most wanted terrorist in Indonesia.²⁰⁴ The SBY administration's effort to neutralize JI's key leaders and eradicate terrorism in Indonesia faced several challenges, such as the evolution of terrorist recruitment and terror attack strategies. In addition, the U.S. war in Iraq influenced the escalation of global terrorism in the Middle East and led to the development of new terrorist organizations in Indonesia.

As a response to JI's escalation of terrorist attacks, SBY's administration improved the government's CTO to track and disrupt JI's network. In 2006, SBY ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1999,²⁰⁵ which improved the ability of the Indonesian CTO to prevent, eradicate, and overcome terrorism and declared that terrorism was a serious threat to Indonesian national security. It asserted that to address terrorism and eradicate the network of terrorists, Indonesia needed to form global alliances with other countries through bilateral, regional, and international cooperation. In addition, SBY ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of

²⁰⁰ Global Terrorism Database, "Global Terrorism Database."

²⁰¹ Liputan 6, "28 Mei 2005: Ledakan 2 Bom di Pasar Tentena Tewaskan Puluhan Orang," liputan6.com, May 28, 2019, <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3970002/28-mei-2005-ledakan-2-bom-di-pasar-tentena-tewaskan-puluhan-orang>.

²⁰² Kompas, "Hari Ini Dalam Sejarah: Tragedi Bom Bali II, 23 Orang Meninggal," Kompas.com, accessed November 25, 2021, <https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2019/10/01/061000565/hari-ini-dalam-sejarah-tragedi-bom-bali-ii-23-orang-meninggal?page=all>.

²⁰³ Ivan Aulia Ahsan, "Bom JW Marriott & Ritz-Carlton, Teror Terakhir Noordin M. Top," tirto.id, July 17, 2020, <https://tirto.id/bom-jw-mariott-ritz-carlton-teror-terakhir-noordin-m-top-fRpf>.

²⁰⁴ BBC News, "Noordin Top dipastikan tewas," BBC News Indonesia, February 1, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2010/02/100201_noordin.

²⁰⁵ Setjen DPR RI, *Pengesahan International convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; 1997* (konvensi Internasional Pemberantasan Pengeboman oleh Teroris, 1997), dpr.go.id, accessed November 25, 2021, <https://www.dpr.go.id/jdih/index/id/61>.

the Financing of Terrorism, 1999,²⁰⁶ which improved the Indonesian CTO's ability to prevent the financing of terrorism by local and international terrorists. It also improved Indonesia's participation in the GWOT. Moreover, in 2007, seven years after JI's major attack on Christmas Eve 2000, SBY declared JI and all its affiliate organizations a terrorist organization and banned all JI operations in Indonesia.²⁰⁷ This action forced JI sympathizers and affiliated organizations to move "underground" to continue their campaign.

At the same time, the prohibition of JI and its affiliated organizations created many splinter terrorist organizations from JI that spread across Indonesia. Furthermore, some Indonesian terrorist groups formed alliances with international terrorist groups such as ISIS, leading radical Islamic terrorist groups in Indonesia to become more digitized in their recruitment practices and adopt the personal jihad strategy, which changed terrorist tactics in Indonesia.²⁰⁸ The terrorist organizations in Indonesia effectively utilized social media to recruit new members and develop their networks. In addition, they began to use social media to radicalize their members to be lone-wolf terrorists.

To address the development of terrorist strategies and disrupt the influence of international terrorism, SBY established the national counterterrorism agency (BNPT) to create sustainable CTO in Indonesia.²⁰⁹ The main task of BNPT was to manage CTO in Indonesia and to balance the use of kinetic and non-kinetic approaches in CTO to maintain national security and government legitimacy. In addition, BNPT enabled the coordination between police, military, NGOs, and other elements to participate in CTO. BNPT also facilitated the development of international CTO networks through activities such as the

²⁰⁶ Setjen DPR RI, *Pengesahan International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999* (Konvensi Internasional Pemberantasan Pendanaan Terorisme, 1999), dpr.go.id, accessed November 25, 2021, <https://www.dpr.go.id/jdih/index/id/62>.

²⁰⁷ CNN Indonesia, "Deret Organisasi Terlarang Di Indonesia: FPI, HTI, Hingga PKI," [cnnindonesia.com](https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20201230193358-20-588055/deret-organisasi-terlarang-di-indonesia-fpi-hti-hingga-pki), December 30, 2020, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20201230193358-20-588055/deret-organisasi-terlarang-di-indonesia-fpi-hti-hingga-pki>.

²⁰⁸ Sidney Jones, "How ISIS Has Changed Terrorism in Indonesia," *New York Times*, May 22, 2018, sec. Opinion, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/opinion/isis-terrorism-indonesia-women.html>.

²⁰⁹ BNPT, "Tugas Pokok dan Fungsi - Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme," BNPT, accessed November 25, 2021, <https://www.bnpt.go.id/>.

sharing of terrorism intelligence information, which have had a positive outcome to improve Indonesia's CTO.

4. Radical Islamic Terrorism during Joko Widodo (Jokowi) Presidency (October 2014–Present Day)

After ten years of SBY's leadership, Jokowi replaced the SBY administration in October 2014. Jokowi's administration continued and broadened SBY's CTO approach to address politically based radical Islamic groups that shared ideology with radical Islamic terrorist groups. During the first period of his presidency (2014–2019), there were 52 terrorism cases related to radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.²¹⁰ Several terrorist groups emerged that had splintered from JI and were influenced by the rise of ISIS in the Middle East. Jokowi used kinetic and non-kinetic approaches to target radical Islamic terrorist groups and politically based radical Islamic groups because there were connections between these groups and terrorist attacks.

The terrorist attacks during Jokowi's presidency used a personal jihad strategy that utilized random terror attacks consisting of small episodes and high frequency. For example, a series of terrorist attacks in 2016 used a personal jihad strategy.²¹¹ The effect and casualties from these attacks were less devastating than those caused by terrorist attacks during the SBY era,²¹² but they effectively created a narrative that radicalized ordinary people to join the terrorist groups and launch suicide attacks. For example, the Surabaya bombings on May 13 and 14, 2018, were executed by a family of five. This family had been radicalized by JAD, an affiliate of ISIS.²¹³

²¹⁰ Global Terrorism Database, "Global Terrorism Database."

²¹¹ Antara News, "Aksi Dan Rencana Teror Sepanjang 2016," Antara News, December 25, 2016, <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/603469/aksi-dan-rencana-teror-sepanjang-2016>.

²¹² Tempo, "LIPI: Penanganan Terorisme Era Jokowi Lebih Baik Ketimbang SBY," nasional.tempo.co, January 15, 2019, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1164931/lipi-penanganan-terorisme-era-jokowi-lebih-baik-ketimbang-sby>.

²¹³ Danu Damarjati, "Terorisme Terlaknat 2018: Bom Sekeluarga Mengguncang Surabaya," [detiknews](https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4358370/terorisme-terlaknat-2018-bom-sekeluarga-mengguncang-surabaya), December 25, 2018, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4358370/terorisme-terlaknat-2018-bom-sekeluarga-mengguncang-surabaya>.

The Jokowi administration implemented several approaches in CTO that helped disrupt the networks of radical Islamic groups. Under Jokowi, CTO power was increased over previous terrorism-related regulations with the establishment of the law eradicating terrorism in 2018.²¹⁴ This new regulation enabled the government to capture terrorists before they executed an attack. Moreover, it accommodated the involvement of various actors within networks in CTO and rehabilitated terrorists after CTO.²¹⁵ In addition, Jokowi enhanced the collaboration between police and military units, which effectively dismantled the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) terrorist network in Poso, which was affiliated with ISIS.²¹⁶

The Jokowi administration institutionalized the effort to promote the Indonesian national ideology and neutralized radical ideology in Indonesia. Jokowi established the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP) in February 2018 to neutralize the spread of radical ideologies such as communism and jihadism in Indonesia.²¹⁷ This agency increased the actualization of Pancasila values in the life of the nation and state.²¹⁸ Moreover, Jokowi's BPIP collaborates with Islamic NGOs such as NU and Muhammadiyah to support the Indonesian campaign to counter radical Islamic groups' narratives in Indonesia using Indonesian nationalist Islam perspectives.²¹⁹ This approach has effectively neutralized the radical Islamic narrative to establish a caliphate in Indonesia and promotes national ideology.

²¹⁴ Republic Indonesia, *UU No. 5 Tahun 2018 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2003 Tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2002 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme Menjadi Undang-Undang*, JDIH-BPK RI, accessed November 25, 2021, <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/82689/uu-no-5-tahun-2018>.

²¹⁵ Liputan 6, "3 Hal Ini Membedakan UU Antiterorisme dengan Revisinya," *liputan6.com*, May 19, 2018, <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3531149/3-hal-ini-membedakan-uu-antiterorisme-dengan-revisinya>.

²¹⁶ Kompas, "Kapolri: Seperti Operasi Tinombala, TNI-Polri Bergabung Lawan Terorisme," *Kompas.com*, May 22, 2018, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/22/17520701/kapolri-seperti-operasi-tinombala-tni-polri-bergabung-lawan-terorisme>.

²¹⁷ USCIRF, "Indonesia's State Ideology of Pancasila," April 9, 2021, <https://www.uscifr.gov/news-room/uscifr-spotlight/indonesias-state-ideology-pancasila>.

²¹⁸ BPIP RI, "Profil BPIP," BPIP, accessed November 25, 2021, <https://bpip.go.id/bpip/>.

²¹⁹ Aditya Himawan and Erick Tanjung, "Dalam KTT G20, Presiden Jokowi Puji Peran NU Dan Muhammadiyah," *suara.com*, July 8, 2017, <https://www.suara.com/news/2017/07/08/071834/dalam-kt-g20-presiden-jokowi-puji-peran-nu-dan-muhammadiyah>.

The Jokowi administration took a serious effort to neutralize radicalism and violent extremism in Indonesia, which had been spread through radical Islamic networks. Jokowi banned politically based Islamic organizations such as HTI and FPI, whose objective is to establish an Islamic state and enforce Islamic law.²²⁰ This action forced those organizations to go underground, where their network connected to other Islamic organizations to develop dark networks.²²¹ Radical Islamic groups responded to Jokowi's effort to ban HTI and FPI as an act of discrimination and Islamic religious blasphemy. However, based on an independent research agency's survey in Indonesia, most of Indonesian society has agreed with the government's banning of HTI²²² and FPI²²³ because those groups caused considerable conflict and spread radicalism with terrorist groups. Moreover, Jokowi established a presidential regulation, the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Combating of Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism,²²⁴ which has enabled the Indonesian government to prevent and address extremism and build the capacity of the whole state apparatus to counter extremism and terrorism networks.

Jokowi has effectively improved the CTO strategy of his predecessor; however, the terrorist-based and politically based radical Islamic groups still survive despite the pressure of the Indonesian government. Such groups continue their campaign to recruit sympathizers using social media. Moreover, they covertly infiltrate NGOs and state organizations to continue their campaign.²²⁵ This issue has become sensitive in Indonesia

²²⁰ Fikri Faqih, "HTI Dan FPI Berhenti Di Era Jokowi," *merdeka.com*, December 30, 2020, <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/hti-dan-fpi-berhenti-di-era-jokowi-hot-issue.html>.

²²¹ Zulfadli, "Infiltrasi Gerakan Hizbut Tahrir: Studi Terhadap Gerakan Hizbut Tahrir di Yogyakarta," *Turast: Jurnal Penelitian dan Pengabdian* 1, no. 1 (2013): 18, <https://doi.org/10.15548/turast.v1i1.470>.

²²² *Merdeka*, "Survei SMRC: Mayoritas Warga Setuju HTI Dibubarkan Pemerintah," *merdeka.com*, June 4, 2017, <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/survei-smrc-mayoritas-warga-setuju-hti-dibubarkan-pemerintah.html>.

²²³ *Warta Ekonomi*, "Survei: Mayoritas Publik Setuju Pembubaran FPI," *Warta Ekonomi*, April 6, 2021, <https://wartaekonomi.co.id/read335638/survei-mayoritas-publik-setuju-pembubaran-fpi>.

²²⁴ *CNN Indonesia*, "Jokowi Teken Perpres Penanggulangan Ekstremisme-Terrorisme," *CNN Indonesia*, January 15, 2021, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210115181110-20-594330/jokowi-teken-perpres-penanggulangan-ekstremisme-terrorisme>.

²²⁵ *Berita Satu*, "Hendropriyono: Negara Sedang Diserang Pemikiran Ideologi Khilafah," *beritasatu.com*, May 18, 2021, <https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/775527/hendropriyono-negara-sedang-diserang-pemikiran-ideologi-khilafah>.

because some politicians use the issue of radicalism to attack the Jokowi administration as anti-Islamic. In this regard, the network of radical Islamic groups has survived and likely awaits the opportune time to launch another attack.

5. Discussion

To assess the effectiveness of the Indonesian government in countering VERLT through the lens of case study analysis, key indicators are presented in Table 1. The summary of data begins with the year 2002 because based on case study analysis, the Indonesian government started to address radical Islamic groups in earnest after the first Bali bombing, which occurred in October 2002. The summary of data ends in 2019 to reflect the time frame of the downturn of ISIS and Al Qaeda as global influences.

Table 1. Summary of Terror Attacks by Radical Islamic Groups in Indonesia. Adapted from Global Terrorism Database²²⁶

Year	Successful Terror Attacks	Attacks by Individuals	Civilian Deaths	Terrorists Killed	Sum of Affected Region
2002	39	0	243	7	42
2003	14	0	25	2	16
2004	12	0	30	1	15
2005	14	0	66	5	15
2006	7	0	2	0	9
2007	2	0	0	0	2
2008	8	0	0	0	12
2009	9	0	13	2	11
2010	3	0	0	0	3
2011	6	0	2	2	12
2012	18	0	8	0	27
2013	17	0	6	2	23
2014	23	0	9	0	26
2015	15	0	14	1	19
2016	10	1	12	7	16
2017	14	0	18	13	17
2018	17	1	38	14	22
2019	6	1	2	1	10

²²⁶ Global Terrorism Database, "Global Terrorism Database."

As reflected in Table 1, the number of terror attacks declined from 39 to six in 2019, suggesting that the Indonesian government made significant progress in improving its capabilities in countering VERLT. Nonetheless, its success in reducing the number of terrorist attacks also influenced terrorists to change their strategies. The pressure from the Indonesian government on radical Islamic groups forced them to develop the dark network to survive and adopt a new strategy of focusing on radicalizing individual sympathizers to launch personal jihad attacks. The personal jihad strategy in Indonesia emerged in 2016 and continues to grow. Therefore, the government's success in disrupting terrorist attacks directly led to the formation of the dark network of radical Islamic groups.

Furthermore, the Indonesian government's success in reducing the number of terrorist attacks directly reduced the number of casualties resulting from terrorism. By contrast, there has been an uptick in the number of terrorists killed by the Indonesian government's CTO. That means the Indonesian government's efforts to counter VERLT is still focused on the kinetic approach of killing and capturing the terrorists. That approach may degrade the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the public because the population may see the government's effort as an anti-Islamic campaign. In addition, based on case study analysis, killing and capturing terrorists directly increases the influence of terrorists on the public, which may strengthen the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

The Indonesian government's efforts to counter VERLT effectively reduce the number of regions affected by terrorist attacks. However, since 2013 the terrorist groups have been focusing on launching terrorist attacks in key regions in Indonesia, such as Java Island, Aceh and North Sumatera, South Sulawesi, and Central Sulawesi. Figure 1 shows a heatmap of terrorist attacks in Indonesia (Generated with QGIS²²⁷), which shows that terrorists centralize their attacks in important areas in Indonesia to boost the effects of their attacks. The capital of Indonesia, Jakarta, is the area with the most terrorist attacks in Indonesia because Jakarta is the country's nerve center and center of gravity. The

²²⁷ QGIS, *Welcome to the QGIS Project!*, version 3.22.2, accessed January 2, 2022, <https://www.qgis.org/en/site/index.html>.

instability and chaos in Jakarta may spill over to spark instability and chaos in other areas in Indonesia. For example, the chaos in Jakarta during the reformation movement in 1998 influenced the chaos in most of the regions of Indonesia. There is a dense network of radical Islamic groups in Java Island, Aceh and North Sumatera, South Sulawesi, and Central Sulawesi, which enables them to launch terrorist attacks.




Figure 1. Heatmap of Terror Attacks by Radical Islamic Groups in Indonesia from 2013 to 2019

This analysis shows that the Indonesian government’s effort in countering VERLT is effective for achieving short-term objectives, but not for achieving the long-term objective of eradicating radical Islamic terrorism from the country. The Indonesian government’s effort in countering VERLT has focused on specific groups and on reacting to specific events. From the network perspective, the Indonesian government is not maximizing its effort in countering VERLT, which enables radical Islamic groups to continue to grow despite many pressures from the Indonesian government. Based on this analysis, the Indonesian government needs to learn from the Ambon conflict how to mitigate terrorism and radicalism from a network perspective and neutralize radical ideology, which has proven effective in maintaining security and stability in Ambon since 2002. In addition, this analysis provides significant evidence about the crucial role networks play in facilitating attacks or in sustaining terrorism in Indonesia. Therefore, it is

essential for the Indonesian government to improve its ability to disrupt the dark networks of radical Islamic groups, because the current strategy of these terrorist groups is to recruit new members using social media and then radicalize them to be lone-wolf terrorists.

C. CONCLUSION

Indonesia has a dark history of communal conflict based on religious politicization and terrorist attacks by radical Islamic groups. This chapter has analyzed the communal conflict in Ambon and the history of terrorist attacks in Indonesia since the collapse of the Soeharto regime. It highlighted the role of networks in conflict escalation. In addition, political opportunities proved an important factor in preventing and addressing conflict and terror escalation. Furthermore, the analysis showed how misinformation and disinformation can provoke communities to become involved in a conflict as sympathizers of radical Islamic groups or to act as terrorists. Although terrorist attacks in Indonesia have declined over the last two decades (2000–2019), a threat remains from the development of dark networks of radical Islamic groups that promote a personal jihad strategy to launch attacks. In addition, radical Islamic groups use political approaches to promote their ideology and develop their networks. Against this backdrop, Chapter IV provides a social network analysis of the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia as a guide for how the Indonesian government can uncover and disrupt radical Islamic networks.

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IV. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA

This chapter explores the activity of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, including terrorist-based radical Islamic groups and politically based radical Islamic groups. Specifically, it focuses on the politically based radical Islamic groups because they are a breeding ground for terrorist-based radical Islamic groups. In addition, both groups' narratives spread the idea of VERLT. This analysis provides information about actors' behavior, themes of narratives, and key actors in the networks. The results help to develop strategies on how to disrupt the networks and prevent the development of radical Islamic ideology in Indonesia, which can lead to terrorism.

HTI is the most well-organized radical Islamic group in Indonesia, and it is affiliated with global HT networks. Middle East-based leadership directly controls HTI in Indonesia, including its operations, strategies, and funding.²²⁸ The group's recruitment strategies are comprehensive, reaching every generation through various means, such as social movements, education, social media, and political opportunity. Furthermore, HTI systematically infiltrates every society's institution to develop networks for short- and long-term objectives. Therefore, a social network analysis of HTI can provide insight into radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

SNA of HTI is important because according to As'ad Said Ali—former deputy chief of Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (2001–2010) and former deputy chief of Nahdatul Ulama (2010–2015)—ISIS sympathizers in Indonesia have built an alliance formed from JI splinter groups and the Al-Muhajirun group, which emerged from ex-HTI sympathizers. This alliance built a terrorist organization known as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah or JAD.²²⁹ As is evident, it is important to analyze the HTI network because there is a relationship between HTI members and terrorist-based radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

²²⁸ Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, "Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 7 (July 29, 2009): 647, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100902945527>.

²²⁹ Anton Septian, "Pengikut ISIS Di Indonesia Deklarasikan Jemaah Baru," *Tempo*, March 21, 2015, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/651676/pengikut-isis-di-indonesia-deklarasikan-jemaah-baru>.

The complexity of HTI's strategies to develop its networks necessitates the use of various approaches to disrupt those networks. In this chapter, however, the focus is on analyzing the HTI network on social media because HTI effectively uses platforms to reach its sympathizers and attract support for its objective to build a caliphate in Indonesia.²³⁰ In addition, HTI networks are strongly connected and cover various levels of society. According to HTI spokesperson Ismail Yusanto, he can arrange a nationwide demonstration and mass movement in two hours using only email and phone text messages.²³¹ This thesis uses SNA specifically to identify key actors in the HTI networks who spread its narrative on Twitter, focusing on the network during a particular political opportunity in Indonesia, which HTI used to develop its networks and promulgate its radical ideology.

A. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF HTI ON TWITTER, 2013–2021

HT, the parent organization of HTI, uses the internet to maintain its global networks.²³² One approach is to use social media outlets, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, to spread its narratives and develop its networks on social media. This paper, however, only analyzes HTI's networks on Twitter because it is a valid representation of HTI activities and the platform provides academic researchers access to their data through an application programming interface (API).²³³ This research has gone through Twitter verification to create a Twitter API token linked to an account. It also has gone through an Institutional Review Board (IRB) determination verification process from the

²³⁰ Paelani Setia, "Islamic-buzzer dan hoaks: Propaganda khilafah oleh eks HTI Kota Bandung di Jawa Barat" (diploma, UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, 2020), 2, <http://digilib.uinsgd.ac.id/33053/>.

²³¹ Frank Hairgrove, Douglas Mcloed, and Davan Shah, "Strategic Uses of the Internet by Hizbut Tahrir-Indonesia," in *Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas* (Praeger, 2009), 331, <http://publisher.abc-clio.com/9780313347320>.

²³² Hairgrove, Mcloed, and Shah, 333.

²³³ Twitter, "Twitter API," Developer Platform, accessed December 19, 2021, <https://developer.twitter.com/en/products/twitter-api>.

Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to ensure that it meets NPS standards for research involving human subjects.²³⁴

The data is based on an Indonesian HTI influencer's prominent hashtags that have been used to spread HTI's ideology in Indonesia and frame the origin of Islam in Indonesia. The HTI influencer's screenname is kept anonymous to adhere to Twitter's privacy policy and to align with IRB protocols. The hashtags are in the Indonesian language to ensure they are targeted to the Indonesian Twitter community. The time frame for Twitter data in this research is from January 25, 2013, to August 28, 2021, which covers the rise and fall of ISIS organizations and its caliphate ideology in Indonesia.²³⁵ Moreover, it covers the dynamics of the HTI campaign in Indonesia as the group's status shifted from a legal to an illegal organization.²³⁶ The data was processed using R and Gephi to generate and analyze the networks.²³⁷ Table 2 lists the prominent hashtags related to HTI's narrative on Twitter.

The list of hashtags in Table 2 was used to pull network data from Twitter and extract the main weak component, which is the largest number of actors that can reach one another (i.e., they are connected) either directly or indirectly. This thesis provides visualizations and leverages various centrality metrics to identify accounts in key network positions from which they could exert influence. Lastly, it conducts semantic network analysis on a snapshot of HTI's networks during a specific political opportunity in Indonesia to understand the themes in conversations on HTI's networks.

A limitation of this analysis is that many hashtags are pulled from only one HTI influencer, albeit a prominent one. There are many HTI influencers, including politicians, artists, public figures, etc., who may have created and/or shared other hashtags not included here, which suggests this study may not capture all conversations pertaining to

²³⁴ Naval Postgraduate School, "Human Research Protection Program Office & Institutional Review Board (IRB)," accessed December 19, 2021, <https://nps.edu/web/research/irb-home>.

²³⁵ Willem Theo Oosterveld et al., "The Rise and Fall of ISIS: From Evitability to Inevitability" (Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017), 11, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12613>.

²³⁶ Masdar Hilmy, "The Rise and Fall of 'Transnational' Islam in Indonesia: The Future of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)," in *Rising Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia* (Routledge, 2020).

²³⁷ Mathieu Bastian, Sebastien Heymann, and Mathieu Jacomy (Gephi.org, 2009), <https://gephi.org/>.

HTI.²³⁸ Lastly, most influencers utilize many social media platforms to promote HTI’s radical ideology, while this study focuses on Twitter.

Table 2. List of the Hashtags Related to HTI in Indonesia.

HASHTAGS
#MuktamarKhilafah2013
#MengapaHarusKhilafah
#KhilafahBagiPemula
#KhilafahUntukPemula
#KhilafahAjaranIslam
#HariMoektiPejuangKhilafah
#KhilafahRemake
#IslamicKhilafahState
#MuktamarKhilafah
#Khilafah

1. Descriptive Measures of HTI Network

The initial data pulled from Twitter’s API contained 42,787 nodes (accounts) and 18,140 edges. All relations are directed retweet ties. In an attempt to focus only on Indonesia, I deleted 888 nodes known to be or whose profiles indicated they were outside of the country. Then, I extracted the main component (i.e., the largest weak component), which consists of 10,845 nodes and 16,400 directed edges. The Louvain community detection algorithm identified 47 communities within the main component, suggesting

²³⁸ In addition, it is also important to note that this research does not distinguish between Twitter accounts controlled by humans and by bot.

numerous clusters of conversations existed. Figure 2 shows the HTI network with nodes sized by in-degree centrality (see description of in-degree centrality below).




Figure 2. HTI Network; Nodes Sized by In-Degree Centrality

The analysis of HTI (Figure 2) suggests that the network is compact, because the average path length 2.018 steps. In other words, on average, each account can reach any other through a single intermediary. That may lead to the speedy dissemination of information from one actor to another actor. In addition, the potential speed at which information is passed influences the group's ability to reach a wider audience on Twitter and facilitate the spread of HTI's radical ideology.

2. HTI's Network Centrality and Prestige

This research analyzes the centrality of prominent actors in the HTI network. Centrality is a concept and set of statistics that can indicate the social prestige and power

of actors in the network based on their positions, number of ties to others, etc. When applied to directed networks, such as the HTI network, centrality is often interpreted as an indicator of actor prestige. For instance, an individual may be considered prestigious when many others consider him or her a friend.

Specifically, this thesis calculates out-degree and in-degree centrality. Out-degree centrality measure can help to identify actors who actively retweeted HTI narratives to attract audiences and create interactions with other Twitter users. In-degree centrality can help identify actors who became HTI influencers through the process of many others retweeting their tweets.

Also, this research uses several other measures to capture actor prestige and potential influence in the network, namely proximity prestige, authority, and hubs. An actor's proximity prestige equals the number of incoming ties, weighted by the average distance of the actor to all other actors in the network.²³⁹ Authority and hub scores are dependent upon each other. A good authority is pointed to many hubs, and a good hub points to many authorities. Thus, in this network, an authority is an actor who has the information and resources that can be used by other Twitter accounts as a reference, while a hub identifies actors who help other Twitter accounts to refer the information from the authority. Authority and hubs measurements can help to identify the Twitter accounts that create HTI's narrative and spread it to their network.

Table 3 shows the comparison of centrality and prestige scores. Names are not shown to protect accounts' privacy. In addition, to identify those actors' status as "Pro-HTI" or "Anti-HTI" in the network, this research assessed each account and their tweets and retweets about caliphate, HTI, and the Indonesian government. The examination of HTI's network centrality and prestige shows that the HTI network produces tweets that are mainly related to HTI's radical ideology. Those tweets are retweeted by pro-HTI accounts to HTI's networks and persuade other actors to follow their tweets.

²³⁹ Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 329.

Table 3. Top Ten Actors with the Highest Degree Centrality and Prestige Score

Out-Degree Centrality (Score) (Role)	In-Degree Centrality (Score) (Role)	Proximity Prestige (Score) (Role)	Authority (Score) (Role)	Hubs (Score) (Role)
(33) (Pro-HTI)	(25) (Pro-HTI)	(0.003244) (Pro-HTI)	(0.404903) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)
(32) (Unknown)	(25) (Pro-HTI)	(0.003128) (Pro-HTI)	(0.350049) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)
(28) (Pro-HTI)	(25) (Pro-HTI)	(0.002963) (Pro-HTI)	(0.3213) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)
(28) (Pro-HTI)	(21) (Pro-HTI)	(0.002961) (Pro-HTI)	(0.3213) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)
(27) (Pro-HTI)	(21) (Anti-HTI)	(0.002927) (Pro-HTI)	(0.31819) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)
(27) (Pro-HTI)	(20) (Pro-HTI)	(0.002784) (Pro-HTI)	(0.31819) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)
(27) (Anti-HTI)	(19) (Anti-HTI)	(0.002753) (Pro-HTI)	(0.31819) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)
(26) (Pro-HTI)	(19) (Anti-HTI)	(0.002753) (Pro-HTI)	(0.31819) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)
(26) (Pro-HTI)	(19) (Pro-HTI)	(0.00268) (Pro-HTI)	(0.31819) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)
(25) (Pro-HTI)	(19) (Pro-HTI)	(0.0024) (Pro-HTI)	(0.012435) (Pro-HTI)	(0.294018) (Pro-HTI)

3. HTI's Network Centrality and Power

When applied to undirected networks, centrality is often interpreted as an indicator of actors' structural power in a network. For example, it can be used to measure the number of ties an actor has, how close they are to others in terms of path distance, who is positioned between many pairs, and who knows relatively well-connected nodes.²⁴⁰ This research focuses on two measures: degree and betweenness centrality.

Degree centrality is the number of an actor's relationships with others. It may be used to identify active nodes in a network and actors' potential power to influence or be influenced by other actors.²⁴¹ In this network, degree centrality focuses on identifying actors who have either retweeted or been retweeted relatively frequently.

Betweenness centrality measures how often an actor lies in the shortest path between other pairs of actors. Those that often do may be in a position to function as brokers in the network.²⁴² The brokers in this network have a role to facilitate the flow of material that is the tweets that contain the HTI's narratives.

Table 4 shows the top ten actors with the highest degree and betweenness centrality. Again, the names of those actors are hidden to adhere to Twitter's privacy policy and their preferences (i.e., pro-HTI or anti-HTI) are based on each account's opinions about the caliphate, HTI, and the Indonesian government in their tweets and retweets. Based on degree centrality, the top ten actors are all Indonesian, 80% of whom are pro-HTI with a degree score ranging from 26 to 33, and only 20% of them are anti-HTI with a degree score ranging from 27 to 30. The domination of pro-HTI actors in the network may reenforce the pro-HTI ties and influence the anti-HTI actors in the network to become pro-HTI.

²⁴⁰ Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 143.

²⁴¹ Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 154.

²⁴² Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 145.

Table 4. Top Ten Actors with the Highest Degree and Betweenness Centrality

Degree (Score) (Role)	Betweenness Centrality (Score) (Role)
(33) (Pro-HTI)	(1331607.2) (Pro-HTI)
(32) (Pro-HTI)	(1136507.7) (Pro-HTI)
(30) (Anti-HTI)	(1059610.3) (Anti-HTI)
(28) (Pro-HTI)	(1054347.8) (Pro-HTI)
(28) (Pro-HTI)	(981427.3) (Pro-HTI)
(27) (Pro-HTI)	(978291.2) (Pro-HTI)
(27) (Pro-HTI)	(973122.9) (Pro-HTI)
(27) (Anti-HTI)	(785766.6) (Pro-HTI)
(26) (Pro-HTI)	(762231.2) (Pro-HTI)
(26) (Pro-HTI)	(761136.9) (Pro-HTI)

Based on betweenness centrality, the top ten actors are all Indonesian, 90% of whom are pro-HTI and 10% of whom are anti-HTI. The domination of pro-HTI actors to broker the information about HTI may boost the influence of HTI ideology in the networks and outside HTI networks, especially among those following the conversations

on Twitter. Moreover, like with the degree centrality results, some anti-HTI actors may gradually become pro-HTI.

B. SNAPSHOT OF HTI NETWORK DURING A SPECIFIC POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY IN INDONESIA

As mentioned in Chapter II, HTI is effectively using social media to synchronize its movement with real-world situations and frame the Indonesian political situation according to radical Islamic narratives. HTI mobilizes resources to gain sympathizers and develop its networks. The organization also utilizes political opportunities to generate a social movement to discredit the government and promote the idea of the Islamic state. This section explores the HTI narrative on Twitter that utilizes political opportunity in Indonesia to generate their social movement. The purpose of analyzing HTI's network within the context of political opportunity is to identify the network's behavior and the themes of the conversations in the network. It uses the same data from the previous the chapters as well as additional data from Twitter using the hashtag #HTI and #HizbutTahrirIndonesia. Furthermore, it focuses on two prominent events that provided political opportunities for HTI to develop its networks. Namely, Muktamar Khilafah 2013 and Aksi 212 in 2016, which both took place in Jakarta.²⁴³

1. Muktamar Khilafah 2013 (Caliphate Conference 2013)

Muktamar Khilafah 2013 was the biggest event HTI conducted as a legal organization in Indonesia before being banned by the Indonesian government on July 19, 2017. This event was held by HTI and its international HT networks in Jakarta on June 2,

²⁴³ The limitation of using Twitter data for this research is that the data covers only 17.55 million active Twitter user in Indonesia. In addition, the limitation of Twitter's privacy policy may be a boundary in preventing full exploration of the HTI network. The challenge to using Twitter data in this research is that the tweet text data may contain the combination of words, numbers, special characters or emojis that are hard to parse.

2013,²⁴⁴ as part of HTI's strategy to mobilize resources and maintain interaction with Muslim communities in Indonesia and develop its networks. The event was attended by more than 100,000 people consisting of HTI's leaders, members, sympathizers, and audience—including politicians and public figures.²⁴⁵ Despite not all attendees being members of HTI, their appearance at Mukhtar Khilafah 2013 created an interaction between attendees through which HTI's ideology could spread. Additionally, the appearance of political and public figures became a catalyst to boost HTI's popularity in Indonesia.

To promote Mukhtar Khilafah 2013, HTI effectively used the media as an echo chamber. The group successfully broadcasted Mukhtar Khilafah 2013 through the Indonesian government's national television station, TVRI, which created a perception to Indonesian audiences that the Indonesian government authorized and supported the event.²⁴⁶ Similarly, before and after Mukhtar Khilafah 2013, HTI promoted the hashtag #MukhtarKhilafah2013 on Twitter, which involved many of HTI's social media influencers.²⁴⁷

This research section observes the HTI network on Twitter from May 1 to June 30, 2013, which covers the time before and after Mukhtar Khilafah 2013. This analysis uses semantic network analysis to identify the themes of the conversations between the actors in the network by analyzing the network structure of the tweets and retweets. The nodes in the network represent the terms, themes, and concepts embedded in the tweets (e.g., #HTI), and a relationship between the nodes indicates when two terms appeared

²⁴⁴ Republika, "Mukhtar Khilafah, 100 Ribu Warga Hizbut Tahrir Penuhi GBK," Republika Online, June 2, 2013, <https://republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/13/06/02/mnqzdo-mukhtar-khilafah-100-ribu-warga-hizbut-tahrir-penuhi-gbk>.

²⁴⁵ Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Political Islam: Identity, Ideology and Religio-Political Mobilization* (London: Routledge, 2018), 3, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351240222>.

²⁴⁶ Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia, "TVRI Klarifikasi Penayangan 'Mukhtar Khilafah 2013,'" Government Official, Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia, June 10, 2013, <http://www.kpi.go.id/index.php/id/umum/40-topik-pilihan-2/31424-tvri-klarifikasi-penayangan-mukhtar-khilafah-2013>.

²⁴⁷ Twitter, "#MukhtarKhilafah2013 - Twitter Search," Twitter, accessed December 24, 2021, https://twitter.com/hashtag/muktamarkhilafah2013?src=hashtag_click.

adjunct to one another in a tweet (i.e., bigrams) after removing stop words and preprocessing the text data.²⁴⁸ For instance, a tweet that says, “#HTI is great!,” would turn into “HTI” and “great” serving as nodes with a connection to one another, mainly because the “#” and “is” would be removed during preprocessing.




Figure 3. Words Most Frequently Used on HTI Network during Muktamar Khilafah 2013

This analysis begins with mining the tweets to observe the important terms that were frequently used in conversations within HTI’s Twitter network during Muktamar Khalifah 2013. As seen in Figure 3, some of the most prominent words that pertain to HTI narratives are “Muktamar Khilafah 2013” (the name of the event and a prominent hashtag), the screen name of the HTI influencer (hidden by the red line in the second row of the list), “*Khilafah*” (the HTI’s objectives), and “*Makassar*” (the name of the city in

²⁴⁸ The bigram data is saved in csv file and processed that data on Gephi to generate a semantic network. The semantic network is filtered with K-core to identify the core message in the semantic network.

South Sulawesi which belongs to the red zone on the heatmap of terrorism shown in Figure 1 in Chapter III).

To expand on the word frequency analysis, this work extracts bigrams, or word pairs, to visualize how the combination of words was used to express ideas or sentiments.²⁴⁹ The bigram network shows the most prominent word pairs are *MuktamarKhilafah2013 sby* and *MuktamarKhilafah2013 Makassar*, which means Muktamar Khilafah was held in Surabaya (*sby* is an acronym for Surabaya) and Makasar. Both areas belong to the red zone in the heatmap of terrorism in Indonesia (Figure 1 in Chapter III). In addition, the bigram shows the words *MuktamarKhilafah2013 fb and live streaming*, which means HTI was using a live-streaming feature on Facebook (*fb* is an acronym for Facebook in Indonesia) to broadcast the event to the wider community on Facebook, which is one of the most popular social media platforms in Indonesia.

The semantic analysis shows the other areas in Indonesia that held Muktamar Khilafah 2013 as well, such as Kendari, Semarang, and Yogyakarta. All those areas belong to the red zone in the heatmap of terrorism in Indonesia (Figure 1 in Chapter III). In addition, there is a hashtag, *women4khilafah* (i.e., women for Khilafah), which promotes the idea of a caliphate to women. HTI systematically recruits women, mainly those who have strong influence such as politicians and public figures, to promote the idea of a caliphate to women.²⁵⁰ The network of women in HTI's network can help to disseminate HTI's ideology to every family member across generations.

This research uses k-core analysis to identify the most embedded terms in the tweets and retweets during Muktamar Khilafah 2013. A "*k*-core is a maximal group of actors, all of whom are connected to some number (*k*) of other group members."²⁵¹ Figure 4 shows the plot of the semantic network with *k* value 11, meaning it shows terms that have at least 11 connections to other terms. This k-core was selected because it represents the most

²⁴⁹ Julia Silge and David Robinson, *4 Relationships between Words: N-Grams and Correlations: Text Mining with R*, accessed March 7, 2022, <https://www.tidytextmining.com/ngrams.html>.

²⁵⁰ HWMI, "*Jejak Muslimah HTI Di Balik Insiden Di DPRD Kota Cirebon - HWMI.or.Id.*," accessed January 26, 2022, <https://www.hwmi.or.id/2020/07/jejak-muslimah-hti-di-balik-insiden-di.html>.

²⁵¹ Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, *Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis*, 328.

was held at GBK Stadium in Jakarta and South Kalimantan. Figure 4 also shows that the word *HizbutTahrirID* has a connection with the word *GBK, Semarang* (the capital of Central Java in Indonesia), *Samarinda* (the capital of East Kalimantan in Indonesia), *Makasar* (the capital of South Sulawesi), and *Khilafah*. Those words' connection helps to identify the areas in Indonesia that held Muktamar Khilafah in 2013.

The semantic network related to HTI during Muktamar Khilafah 2013 shows that HTI was focused on promoting Muktamar Khilafah on Twitter. HTI effectively utilized its Twitter network to influence sympathizers to hold Muktamar Khilafah in certain areas of Indonesia. In addition, HTI focused on promoting Muktamar Khilafah in the capital cities of provinces in Indonesia to develop a center of influence in every province to spread the group's radical ideology. Therefore, the analysis of the semantic network helped to identify the areas in Indonesia that became a nerve center for the HTI campaign. The areas that became nerve centers also belong to the red area on the heatmap of terrorism in Indonesia presented in Figure 1 in Chapter III. Therefore, there is a connection between the influence of HTI's radical ideology and the intensity of terror attacks in Indonesia.

2. Aksi 212 in Jakarta

Aksi 212 was a social movement event held by several Islamic groups in Indonesia on December 2, 2016. The event was held to force the Indonesian government to punish Jakarta's governor, who was Christian, for blasphemy against Islam.²⁵² This social movement consisted of mass demonstrations and religious speeches around the Jakarta National Monument, the center point of Jakarta. Aksi 212 began with a mass demonstration on November 4, 2016 that continued to expand into the mass demonstration at the Jakarta National Monument on December 2, 2016.²⁵³ Aksi 212 involved many nationalist Muslim and radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia.

²⁵² BBC News, "Jakarta Governor Ahok Found Guilty of Blasphemy," BBC News, May 9, 2017, sec. Asia, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39853280>.

²⁵³ KumparanNews, "Ahok dan Lahirnya Gerakan 212," kumparan, January 24, 2019, <https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/ahok-dan-lahirnya-gerakan-212-1548294737862673070>.

However, radical Islamic organizations such as FPI and HTI were the most active and enthusiastic to initiate this social movement.²⁵⁴

One of HTI's vital strategies is to build an umbrella organization for all Muslim organizations in Indonesia, which consist of nationalist Islamic and radical Islamic organizations.²⁵⁵ HTI uses the umbrella organization as a medium through which to infiltrate nationalist Islamic organizations with its members and use its radical ideology to influence them into supporting HTI's ideology to build a caliphate in Indonesia. One of the most influential HTI leaders, Muhammad Al-Khaththath,²⁵⁶ utilized Aksi 212 to build an umbrella organization, *GNPF-MUI* (the National Movement to Defend MUI's Fatwa), which blended nationalist and radical Islamic organizations to manage and control Aksi 212.²⁵⁷ Al-Khaththath approached the other Islamic groups to build GNPF-MUI and successfully mobilized people to participate in Aksi 212, improving HTI's popularity among Muslim communities in Indonesia.

This research section observes the HTI network on Twitter using tweets with the hashtags #HTI and #HizbutTahrirIndonesia. The time frame of this analysis is from November 15 to December 15, 2016, to cover the time before and after Aksi 212. This research uses an analysis of the semantic network of tweets to identify and understand the themes of the conversations between the actors in the network during Aksi 212. Like the other event, it began with data preprocessing, such as removing English and Indonesian stop words, before identifying frequent terms, themes, and concepts. Finally, this research establishes a semantic network based on bigrams to perform semantic network analysis.

As depicted in Figure 5, the most frequent words that pertain to HTI's narrative are *HizbutTahrirIndonesia* and *HTI*. That means HTI networks continuously wrote the hashtag of *HizbutTahrirIndonesia* and *HTI* in nearly every tweet that they made during

²⁵⁴ Kukuluh Bhimo Nugroho, "Mereka yang Bersatu dan Berseteru dalam Aksi Bela Islam II," *tirto.id*, November 4, 2016, <https://tirto.id/mereka-yang-bersatu-dan-berseteru-dalam-aksi-bela-islam-ii-blNY>.

²⁵⁵ Osman, *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Political Islam*, 61.

²⁵⁶ Osman, 59.

²⁵⁷ Marcus Mietzner, "Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 91, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 271, <https://doi.org/10.5509/2018912261>.

the period of Aksi 212 to promote the organization and its radical ideology. These terms contrast with the goal of Aksi 212, which is to push the Indonesian government to punish the Jakarta governor, Ahok. The word *Ahok* is not the dominant word during this event. Figure 5 shows the list of words that were frequently used by the HTI network during Aksi 212.




Figure 5. Words Most Frequently Used on HTI Network during Aksi 212

Like with Muktamar Khilafah 2013, this thesis focuses on k-cores to identify the most nested terms in the tweets and retweets during Aksi 2012. Again, the 11-core was selected because it reflects the most embedded terms in the tweets, all of which have at

least 11 connections. Figure 6 shows the plot of HTI's semantic network during *Aksi 212* at an 11-core.²⁵⁸




Figure 6. Plot of the Semantic Network Analysis of HTI's Network during Aksi 212

The simplified semantic network visualization with 11-core shows that the words in Figure 6 have a connection that formed an aggregate theme of the message. The word *Ahok* (the name of a former Jakarta governor) has a connection with the words *aksi* (movement), *HTI* (*Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*), and *foto* (photos). This word connection helps to analyze the aggregate theme of the HTI conversation to promote Aksi 212 against *Ahok*. That means, HTI implicitly promotes its organization during Aksi 212 to boost its recruitment campaign. On the other side, the word *keluarga* (family) has a connection with the words *Muslim*, *Indonesia*, *Negara* (state), *Khilafah*, and *MHTI* (*Muslimah HTI*, a

²⁵⁸ The nodes with a row of squares are the nodes that use special characters or emojis that cannot identify with R.

women's organization of HTI).²⁵⁹ The connections among these words help to identify the aggregate theme of the HTI conversation, which was to utilize MHTI to promote the caliphate to women's communities and implement Islamic law in their families. Furthermore, the implementation of Islamic law in Muslim families would help to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state implicitly.

Semantic network analysis of the HTI network during Aksi 212 shows that HTI effectively promotes its organization and ideology on Twitter to initiated social movement to hold a mass demonstration in Jakarta to push the Indonesian government to punish Ahok, the former governor of Jakarta. Furthermore, during this event, HTI also inserted its radical views to promote its ideology to the people who joined the demonstration. Aksi 212 provided political opportunities for HTI to initiate social movement, build a network to blend nationalist Muslim groups with radical Islamic groups, and promote the caliphate. In addition, the semantic network analysis explained how HTI formed a women's organization to institutionalize the women's role in building a caliphate in Indonesia.

C. CONCLUSION

This chapter examined HTI's social network on Twitter to demonstrate how the Indonesian government can use SNA to disrupt the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. It found that the HTI Twitter network is compact and capable of spreading HTI narratives. In addition, HTI effectively utilized political opportunities to promote its organization and radical ideology to Indonesian society.

SNA, and its sister-technique for semantic networks (i.e., semantic network analysis), are useful tools for examining other radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. They help analysts take a broader system view by focusing on relations among social actors rather than actor attributes. Similarly, they help researchers understand how actors might be in structurally advantageous positions to influence others, including on social media.

²⁵⁹ Syamsam Syamsam, "'MHTI' in Indonesia: The Role of Political Awareness for Indonesian Muslim Women," *IJASOS- International E-Journal of Advances in Social Sciences*, August 31, 2017, 1, <https://doi.org/10.18769/ijasos.337335>.

That said, the weakness in applying SNA to disrupt the networks of radical Islamic groups is that the focus is more on the individual-level network than the organizational-level one. The clarity of the relationship between each actor in the network needs to be observed in more detail with other ties. In addition, SNA is not the only tool for determining the decision process for strategic issues; instead, it provides valuable information on the crafting of strategies, but other sources of intelligence also need to be taken into consideration.²⁶⁰

²⁶⁰ Roberts and Everton, 4.

V. STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO DISRUPT THE DARK NETWORK OF RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS IN INDONESIA

The network of radical Islamic groups is a major mechanism to spread violent extremism and radicalization that can lead to terrorism (VERLT). Disrupting this network is one way to counter VERLT in Indonesia, which is a strategic issue in Indonesia that requires a strategic approach to mitigate its threat. Consequently, this chapter provides strategic approaches that can help the Indonesian government to counter VERLT in Indonesia.

This chapter uses the data and analyses from the previous chapters. Chapter II observed and analyzed the list of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, including their strategies, narratives, and relationships with other such groups within and outside of Indonesia. Chapter III used case studies to explore the importance of networks to escalate and deescalate religious conflict in Ambon. Also, it explored the Indonesian government's effort to counter VERLT by radical Islamic groups and assess its effectiveness at doing so. Chapter III's analysis provides useful data to develop strategic approaches to improve counter-radicalization in Indonesia. Chapter IV provided an insight into how to counter VERLT in Indonesia from a network perspective, as well as examined HTI's narrative using a similar network perspective. All of these chapters provided useful insights to help inform the development of strategic approaches to improve the Indonesian government's efforts to counter VERLT.

A. STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

This chapter focuses on developing a strategy to counter VERLT with a kinetic approach, a non-kinetic approach, and a hybrid approach. Each of those approaches has a characteristic to achieve specific objectives to counter VERLT. Furthermore, this research compares each approach to find the best course of action to counter VERLT.

1. Kinetic Approach

The Indonesian government can implement the kinetic approach in two ways: targeting and capacity building. Targeting is capturing or eliminating key actors in the networks. Chapter II showed how the Indonesian government has killed or captured key actors, such as Noordin M. Top, a JI recruiter and bomb maker. The death of Noordin M. Top significantly degraded JI networks. However, this strategic approach has had the side effect of strengthening JI's resiliency and has inspired the birth of other terrorist groups. In addition, the Indonesian government's targeting of politically based radical Islamic groups such as HTI and FPI has resulted not only in the development of these and other groups in dark networks but also provided them with a narrative to attack the Indonesian government's legitimacy.

Based on case study analysis in Chapter III, the Indonesian government upgraded its counterterrorism law and ratified the international convention in countering terrorism, which boosted targeting capabilities. This approach can reduce the presence of radical Islamic groups. However, it can push these groups underground as well, making them harder to detect and identify. In addition, radical groups in Indonesia maintain their connection with international terrorist groups to survive the government's pressure. The radical Islamic network has enabled these groups to launch a campaign to discredit the Indonesian government with misinformation and disinformation. Therefore, targeting these groups in the public eye can have unintended consequences and can contribute to the growing wave of misinformation and disinformation about the government's actions.

Furthermore, targeting requires a diverse organization to work effectively. The case studies in Chapter III show that the key actors in countering terrorism and VERLT are the Indonesian National Police and BNPT. The lack of diversity in these organizations is one factor that may hamper the chances of disrupting the dark network. In addition, the Indonesian National Police conduct CTO directly under the order of the president, which may degrade the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of Indonesian society.

The second kinetic approach is capacity building, which seeks to improve the capability and capacity of partners to cooperate with the Indonesian government in

countering VERLT. The case study analysis in Chapter III shows the government's attempts to build the capacity of Islamic NGOs to support its counter-VERLT efforts. This effort also supports the Indonesian government's campaign to neutralize radical Islamic ideology. Building the capacity of nationalist Islamic NGOs can help to promote public trust in the government and maintain its legitimacy.

2. Non-kinetic Approach

The term non-kinetic approach denotes the battle between the Indonesian government and radical Islamic groups for strategic influence. Such a battle requires the effective use of the information domain to develop communication with the audience to muster support and recruit new members to reach their objectives.²⁶¹ Media and the internet constitute an important means of developing strategies for radical Islamic groups because those means facilitate interaction with the groups' audience to spread radicalization and influence the audience to support their objectives.²⁶² The non-kinetic approach to countering VERLT and winning the battle for strategic influence includes institution-building, psychological operations, information operations, and rehabilitation.

Institution building is an approach that requires collaboration between every stakeholder in the Indonesian government because its goal is to establish a healthy government, the supremacy of law, and economic development. Successful institution building in the Indonesian government can help neutralize radical propaganda that discredits it and promotes ideas about the caliphate and absolute implementation of Islamic law. Yet, a single mistake from a government official can provide many narratives for radical Islamic groups to discredit and degrade the government's influence through social media. Institution building also needs supervision to control the government and avoid authoritarian governance, which can provide a narrative for radical groups to discredit the government and promote their Islamic ideology.

²⁶¹ James J. F. Forest and Frank Honkus, *Influence Warfare: How Terrorist and Government Fight to Shape Perception in a War of Ideas* (London: Praeger Security International, 2009), 1.

²⁶² Forest and Honkus, 16.

The psychological operation (psyops) approach requires Indonesian society to trust in government institutions because the goal of psyops is to create a perspective, sentiment, emotion, and behavior that supports the government and rejects radical ideology. Currently, the Indonesian government has not established an organization to conduct and oversee psychological operations, which hinders control and supervision. An uncontrolled psychological operation can degrade society's trust in it and can enable the influence of radical propaganda. In addition, psychological operations require strong institution building to provide a narrative to influence support for the Indonesian government and reject radical influence.

The Indonesian government has the strength and opportunity to conduct psyops because it has support from the majority of Indonesian communities to ban radical Islamic groups in the country. In addition, the government has support from the international community to counter VERLT. However, as of the end of 2021, the government has not determined which state agency is responsible for conducting and coordinating psyops, and even if it had, there are not enough resources and expertise to conduct psyops in Indonesia. Therefore, the government must determine the state agency or government institution to take on this responsibility.

Information operations can be a tool to counter radical Islamic groups' influence through social media and other information and communication platforms. However, an uncontrolled information operation may degrade the democratic principle of freedom of speech in Indonesia. This situation could consequently provide a narrative for radical Islamic groups to spread propaganda to discredit the government. Therefore, the Indonesian government needs to establish an organization not only to conduct information operations but to control and supervise them. The focus on neutralizing radical Islamic ideology requires collaboration with nationalist Islamic NGOs to prevent the negative side effects of information operations, which can generate perceptions of anti-Islam sentiment, Islamophobia, and friction between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

Ultimately, the goal of rehabilitation of the people who have been exposed to radical Islamic ideology is complicated, because it is hard to measure the level of success

in this undertaking. Similarly, it is difficult to determine standard criteria for determining who has already been exposed to radical Islamic ideology. Therefore, the rehabilitation program to counter VERLT requires a general approach targeting all communities in Indonesia. In addition, strategic communication that involves a key national leader, nationalist popular Islamic cleric, mainstream media, and a leading government official can help to disrupt the spread of radical Islamic ideology.

3. Hybrid Strategy of Kinetic and Non-kinetic Approach

This research recommends a hybrid strategy that combines kinetic and non-kinetic approaches to disrupting the networks of radical Islamic groups and countering VERLT. The hybrid strategy combines targeting and capacity building (kinetic approach) with institution building, psyops, information operations, and rehabilitation (non-kinetic approach) in a series of operations to achieve the short- and long-term objectives. The hybrid strategy in this research was based on combining kinetic and non-kinetic approaches into one system with input from case study analysis and social network analysis. Figure 7 shows the relationship between each element in the kinetic approach and non-kinetic approach in building a hybrid strategy.




Figure 7. Visualization of Hybrid Kinetic and Non-kinetic Strategy

Figure 7 provides a series of approaches to disrupting the network of radical Islamic groups to achieve short- and long-term objectives. Institution building and capacity building are strategies that need to work sustainably and adaptively to respond to the feedback from the internal and external environment. Institution and capacity building are the basic layers to enable the execution of another approach because they shape the government's legitimacy, society's trust in government, the public understanding of radical Islamic ideology, and the community's social resilience to every sociopolitical change. Therefore, the execution of institution and capacity building needs diverse stakeholders.

Targeting is an effective approach to disrupt the network of radical Islamic groups to achieve short-term objectives. Targeting cannot be executed alone without support from psyops and information operation before and after the targeting operation. Psyops and information operations can help to shape the information environment to prevent radical Islamic groups from distributing misinformation and disinformation. In addition, targeting must be followed by rehabilitation operations to restore the damage and loss (material or non-material) after the targeting operation.

The execution of the targeting, psyops, information operations, and rehabilitation approaches provides feedback to the institution and a capacity-building approach to adapt to changes in the internal and external environments. Furthermore, the case study analysis can help to assess the successful hybrid approach by comparing the outcome of the strategy to the outcomes in the past. Table 5 summarizes kinetic, non-kinetic, and hybrid approaches to disrupt the network of radical Islamic groups and counter VERLT in Indonesia.

Table 5. Summary of Kinetic, Non-kinetic, and Hybrid Approaches

	Kinetic Approach	Non-kinetic Approach	Hybrid Kinetic and Non-kinetic Approach
Strategy	-Targeting -Capacity building	-Institution building -Psyops -Information operation -Rehabilitation	-Layer 1: institution building and capacity building -Layer 2: Psyops and information operation -Layer 3: Targeting and rehabilitation
Pro	Neutralize key actors in radical Islamic campaign	Maintain government legitimacy	-Maintain government legitimacy -Achieve short- and long-term objectives -Align with the national development program
Cons	Degrade government legitimacy and only achieve a short-term objective	Time and resources intensive effort for short-term objectives	Time and resources intensive effort
Time Horizon	Less than a year	1–2 years	5–10 years
Measure of Effectiveness	Elimination of the key actors in radical Islamic campaign	-Elimination of misinformation and disinformation -Downturn in radical Islamic ideology influence	-Good governance and democracy -Elimination of misinformation and disinformation -Downturn in radical Islamic ideology influence -Elimination of the key actors in radical Islamic campaign
Methods of Analysis	-Social network analysis -Observation and investigation	-Social network analysis -Semantic network analysis -Sentiment analysis	-Social network analysis -Semantic network analysis -Sentiment analysis -System dynamic modeling -Human development index -Global democracy index

Table 5 describes each approach with its characteristics and seeks to identify the best approach that can help improve the Indonesian government’s effort in disrupting radical Islamic networks and countering VERLT. Table 6 compares the kinetic, non-kinetic, and hybrid approaches based on seven criteria. The scoring ranges from 1

(lowest) to 3 (highest) to assess the effectiveness of each approach. Some elements are more important than others. Thus, two criteria—government legitimacy and society’s trust in government—are weighted higher (i.e., multiplied by two), and one—risk management—is weighted (i.e., multiplied by three) as the most important.

This research determines the best approach based on the total score of the assessment. Table 6 shows that the hybrid kinetic and non-kinetic approach is the best approach to disrupt the network of radical Islamic groups and counter VERLT in Indonesia. Therefore, the government needs to engage in strategic planning to conduct a hybrid approach, which is very complex and involves a variety of diverse stakeholders. The hybrid kinetic and non-kinetic approach can be executed in line with the Indonesian national development program to accommodate diverse stakeholders and improve resource efficiencies.

Table 6. Comparison of Approaches to Disrupt the Networks of Radical Islamic Groups

	Kinetic Approach	Non-kinetic Approach	Hybrid Approach
Time Required	3	2	1
Government legitimacy (x 2)	1 x 2	2 x 2	3 x 2
Flexibility	1	2	3
Simplicity	3	2	1
Resources	3	2	1
Society’s trust in government (x 2)	1 x 2	2 x 2	3 x 2
Risk (x 3)	1 x 3	1 x 3	3 x 3
Total	17	19	26

B. CONCLUSION

This chapter has developed strategic planning to guide the Indonesian government on how to disrupt the networks of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. Based on the analysis in this chapter, the best strategy to disrupt these groups is a hybrid kinetic and non-kinetic approach because it enables the government to achieve its short- and long-term objectives. In addition, the hybrid approach can bring together the stakeholders of the Indonesian national development plan to establish good governance and improve Indonesian society's prosperity.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

This thesis provides recommendations for the Indonesian government based on SNA. The main recommendation for the Indonesian government is to disrupt the network of radical Islamic groups using a hybrid kinetic and non-kinetic approach. The hybrid strategy consists of targeting and capacity building (kinetic) and institution building, psyops, information operation, and rehabilitation (non-kinetic). SNA demonstrates how the Indonesian government can disrupt the radical networks with a network approach and provides recommendations on how to develop a strategy to disrupt the networks based on strategic SNA. There are two recommendations for the Indonesian government:

First, to execute psyops, the government needs to introduce psyops to the Indonesian Army because it has the resources, network, and influence to execute this type of operation. In addition, it is not involved in Indonesian politics and will maintain the neutrality of psyops from political influences and will keep the focus on disrupting the network of radical Islamic groups that have become a booster for VERLT in Indonesia. Nevertheless, under the constitution, no institution or agency could execute psyops in Indonesia until the end of 2021. Therefore, the government needs to assign an organization, such as the Indonesian Army, to execute psyops under the Indonesian constitution in the first half of 2022.

Second, to execute information operations, the government needs to develop a network of local and international mass media and news agencies, government institutions, and NGOs to conduct information operations focused on neutralizing the

misinformation and disinformation propagated by radical Islamic groups. The information operation is not intended to censor the media or limit press freedom. The focus of the information operation is to establish credibility and influence society to avoid or disengage from the influence of radical Islamic ideology which is causing VERLT in Indonesia.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

Indonesia is one of the United States' key partners in INDOPACOM to establish security and peace in the region and support the U.S. campaign on GWOT. Most of the terrorist organizations and politically based radical Islamic groups in Indonesia are targeting the U.S. government and citizens. Therefore, the U.S. government needs to maintain and improve its cooperation with the Indonesian government to disrupt the Islamic groups' network and to counter VERLT in Indonesia which is also targeting the U.S. government and its citizens. The two areas of support that are needed by the Indonesian government are as follows:

First, the U.S. government should provide support for the Indonesian military, especially the Indonesian Army, to build capacity in countering terrorism. The Indonesian military capabilities in countering terrorism must be adjusted to adopt the strategy and equipment from the U.S. SOCOM to enable collaboration and integration in countering terrorism.

Second, the U.S. government should provide training and support for the Indonesian government, especially the Indonesian Army, to execute a psychological operation. As of the end of 2021, no organization in Indonesia has been conducting psyops. The U.S. government should provide training and support to the Indonesian Army to execute psyops to enable joint operation with U.S. forces in the future.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis has conducted a social network analysis of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) activities on Twitter and developed a strategy to disrupt the network of radical

Islamic groups. This research recommends the following areas for future research related to disrupting these networks and countering VERLT in Indonesia.

First, this research conducts SNA for the HTI network only on Twitter. Future research can analyze HTI's network on another online platform (social media, news agencies, blog, website, etc.) or offline platform (HTI's network within a government institution, nationalist Islamic NGOs, state-owned enterprises, Islamic boarding school, political party, etc.). In addition, future research can explore the relationship of HTI's network with that of another radical Islamic group in Indonesia.

Second, this thesis used SNA to develop strategies in disrupting the network of radical Islamic groups and countering VERLT without modeling system dynamics with SNA data. Future research can combine SNA with a system dynamics model to improve the Indonesian government's analysis and the decision-making process. The combination of SNA and the system dynamics model will help the government to analyze the dynamics in the strategic environment and quickly adapt to changes in the internal and external factors that influence the operation.

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APPENDIX. GLOSSARY OF TERMS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

Social network analysis has many terms that may be unfamiliar to the general reader. Therefore, this glossary of terms about social network analysis and used in this thesis is provided to help the general reader understand the meaning and context of these terms. The glossary is adapted from Cunningham et al.²⁶³

Actor: A person, organization, group, social media account, community, news agency, government agency, nation-state, NGO, etc., that participates in a network.

Attribute: A non-relational characteristic of actors in a network that defines them from others or classifies them into certain groups (e.g., gender, religion, ethnicity, race, etc.).

Average Degree: The average number of relationships of all actors in a network. The average degree is useful to measure the network density.

Average Distance: The average distance of the shortest paths between all pairs of actors in the network. The average distance is useful to measure the speed of information in the network.

Betweenness Centrality: A statistical measurement that captures the degree to which actors sit on the shortest path between all pairs of actors in the network.

Bridge: The relationship or ties between actors that connect clusters in the network. Deleting a bridge may disconnect the network.

Broker: An actor whose position in the network facilitates the flow of material and non-material goods (e.g., information) in a network.

Centrality: Refers to the potential social power of an actor based on the actor's position in the network. See betweenness, closeness, degree, and eigenvector centrality.

²⁶³ Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, *Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis*.

Centralization: Centralization equals the variation in actor centrality within the network. More variation yields higher centralization scores; less variation yields lower ones. The higher the centralization, the more likely a single actor is very central while others are not.

Closeness Centrality: Measures the average path distance that each actor is to every other actor in a network.

Community Detection Algorithms: Clustering algorithms that identify subgroups in the network where the density of ties within the cluster is higher than the density of ties across clusters than one would expect in a random graph of the same size and density.

Component: A part of the network in which its members can directly or indirectly reach one another.

Complete Network: A network that contains all relevant actors and ties.

Cutpoint: The actor who has a significant role in connecting each actor in the network. Formally, deleting a cutpoint disconnect a network.

Cutset: The optimal set of actors required to maximally fragment a network.

Degree Centrality: The number of an actor's ties (relationships). See in-degree and out-degree centrality.

Density: The number of actual ties in a network expressed as a proportion of the maximum number of ties.

Eigenvector Centrality: Assumes that ties to central actors are more important and thus weights each actor's summed connections to others (degree centrality) by their (i.e., the others) degree centrality scores.

Hubs and Authorities: Initially developed for identifying influential web pages where a good hub was defined as a web page that points to many good authorities, and a good authority is a web page that is pointed to by many good hubs. It is the equivalent of eigenvector centrality for directed networks.

In-degree Centrality: The number of an actor's incoming ties.

K-core: A maximal group of actors, all of whom are connected to some number (k) of other group members.

Out-degree Centrality: The number of an actor's outgoing ties.

Path: A path is a sequence of actors and ties in which no actor and no tie occur more than once.

Path Distance: The distance between pairs of actors in a network. The shortest path is known as the geodesic.

Proximity Prestige: An actor's proximity prestige equals the number of incoming ties, weighted by the average distance of the actor to all other actors in the network.

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