

# Putting the “T” in IIIM: Developing Army Leaders for Interagency Success

A Monograph

by

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Fort Leavenworth, KS

2021

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 20 05 2021		2. REPORT TYPE MASTER'S MONOGRAPH		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUNE 20-MAY 21	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Putting the "I" in JIIM: Developing Army Leaders for Interagency Success				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Samuel J. Haynes US Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This monograph examines how the US Army prepares officers for assignments that require interagency collaboration. It argues that trends in modern warfare increase the demand for general interagency competencies. Therefore, the Army should emphasize interagency training, education, and experience in officer leader development. The paper consists of three main sections that assess current developmental models, future requirements, and potential policy implications of recommended changes. The monograph addresses domestic, expeditionary, active, reserve, and National Guard considerations throughout its discussion.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Interagency, Officer Education, Officer Training, Officer Development, Collaboration, Modern Warfare					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913 758-3300

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## Abstract

Putting the “I” in JIIM: Developing Army Leaders for Interagency Success, by MAJ Samuel J. Haynes, 59 pages.

This monograph examines how the US Army prepares officers for assignments that require interagency collaboration. It argues that trends in modern warfare increase the demand for general interagency competencies. Therefore, the Army should emphasize interagency training, education, and experience in officer leader development. The paper consists of three main sections that assess current developmental models, future requirements, and potential policy implications of recommended changes. The monograph addresses domestic, expeditionary, active, reserve, and National Guard considerations throughout its discussion.

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## Acknowledgements

I wish to express heartfelt gratitude to the following – National Guard Bureau Joint Staff including LTC John Suprynowicz, Mr. Michael Braun, and CPT Rafael Diaz for their time and insights; Foreign Area Officers COL Eric Larson, COL Ed Evans, and COL Nate Mann for their advice and tutelage; Mr. Stu Blanchard for being a beacon in interagency training and education; my wife for her loving patience and support; and my parents for always encouraging me to learn and grow.

## Abbreviations

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
BAO	Bilateral Affairs Officer
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officers Course
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
DA PAM	Department of the Army Pamphlet
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DoD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
DOPMA	Defense Officer Personnel Management System
DSC	Dual Status Commander
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
DSCU	Defense Security Cooperation University
EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FM	Field Manual
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GO	General Officer
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational
JOE	Joint Operating Environment
JOM	Joint Officer Management
JP	Joint Publication

LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
MDO	Multi-Domain Operations
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NRF	National Response Framework
OPMS	Officer Personnel Management System
ROMO	Range of Military Operations
SCWD	Security Cooperation Workforce Development
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SF	Special Forces
SFQC	Special Forces Qualification Course
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPP	State Partnership Program
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
ULO	Unified Land Operations
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USC	United States Code
USINDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare



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## Introduction: What is “The Interagency?”

I am a great believer that strength and diplomacy go together; it is never one or the other. Today foreign policy is a unified diplomatic, military, and intelligence effort that must be tightly integrated – a team approach. It is wrong to say we have gone as far as we can with diplomacy and it’s now time for the military option. To do so is to fail.

—George P. Schultz, US Secretary of State 1982-1989

Members of the US military often consider *the interagency* as an alien artifact.<sup>1</sup> A common myth is that the interagency consists of pretentious civilians who disdain uniformed personnel and relish creating obstacles for military operations. This narrative supports a popular idea that service members should remain among military circles and avoid dealings with the alien interagency population. In fact, Department of Defense (DoD) doctrine offers a definition of *the interagency* that explicitly *includes* the military – and all other US government agencies and departments.<sup>2</sup> This definition runs counter to the standard military conception. DoD’s definition lays the groundwork for a spirit of camaraderie and cooperation between the unique elements of the interagency. However, US military doctrine is less specific about defining the types and scope of interactions among interagency entities. Doctrine simply provides a circular definition of *interagency coordination* that mentions – somewhat uselessly – the coordination that occurs between interagency elements.<sup>3</sup> However, the broad definition may be intentional because the degree of interagency coordination required varies based on the participating departments and their collective mission.

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<sup>1</sup> Hansen, Rosemary and Rick Rife, “Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus; Improving Communications and Promoting National Security” (Senior Service College Fellow Research Project, US Army War College, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), GL-8.

<sup>3</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), GL-10.

### Doctrinal Definitions Related to Interagency Coordination

**interagency.** Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (*DOD Dictionary*. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

**interagency coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

Figure 1. Doctrinal definitions of interagency and interagency coordination. US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), GL-8; US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), GL-10.

Nonetheless, the definition of interagency cooperation in joint doctrine is a sufficient start point for exploring a central concept of this paper – government agencies working together to achieve common objectives. The US military uses many terms to describe how disparate organizations interface. Interoperability, integration, interdependence, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration lead a shortlist of doctrinal terms and colloquial jargon about cross-organizational projects. These terms form a milieu of words that sometimes have precise meanings, or no meaning at all. For this monograph, *interagency collaboration* encompasses all formal and informal links between the US military and non-military components of the United States.

The purpose for this distinction is twofold. It should be general enough to include the entire swath of unified action partners directly connected to the United States, while excluding multinational forces and international organizations.<sup>4</sup> Due to the limited time and resources available, this project constrained research and analysis to interagency collaboration among US entities. Many of the relevant concepts also apply to international and multinational organizations, albeit with the added nuances of foreign language and cross-cultural

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<sup>4</sup> US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, I-8. “Unified action” refers to the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities to achieve unity of effort.

communication. International and multinational operations likely deserve their own attention in a separate discourse, so this paper deliberately avoids focused attention on those aspects of collaboration. Having established a framework for understanding the meaning of “interagency collaboration,” the next goal is to consider why this topic is important.

## Why Interagency Matters... Matter

In discussing the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) James Mattis remarked that “nations with allies thrive.”<sup>5</sup> The former SECDEF’s statement implies that the Department of Defense helps develop and maintain international alliances, a typical mainstay of the Department of State. However, DoD personnel are not independent agents of diplomacy. They contribute to building alliances by working alongside, in coordination with, or on behalf of the State Department. Hence, according to Secretary Mattis, proper interagency collaboration helps ensure that the United States thrives.

DoD interagency collaboration also has domestic significance, particularly as it relates to the National Guard. The National Guard Bureau’s strategic logo mentions three pillars relevant to interagency collaboration: *Partnerships*, *Warfight*, and *Homeland*.<sup>6</sup> These pillars neatly categorize interagency focus areas and highlight the National Guard’s unique role in the interagency enterprise. *Partnership* specifically relates to the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), but can broadly cover a swath of US government interagency activities aimed at shaping environments and deterring conflict.<sup>7</sup> Regarding the *warfight*, joint doctrine’s notional conflict continuum depicts an escalation from peace to war, interweaved with conflict and

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<sup>5</sup> James N. Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy,” Transcript, US Department of Defense, December 1, 2018, accessed January 10, 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1702965/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-on-national-defense-strategy/>.

<sup>6</sup> “National Guard Strategic Logo,” Graphics Logos and Seals, US National Guard Bureau, accessed January 2, 2021, <https://www.nationalguard.mil/Resources/Image-Gallery/Graphics/>.

<sup>7</sup> US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, V-9.

competition.<sup>8</sup> The Army's multi-domain operations concept further highlights the interagency nature of the Army's role in conflict and competition. For the *homeland*, military forces often conduct Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions where, by definition, the military provides interagency support to an external civilian entity.<sup>9</sup> Given how important interagency collaboration is to the pillars above, the Army should ensure that it prepares leaders to succeed when performing interagency functions.



Figure 2. National Guard strategic logo. "National Guard Strategic Logo," Graphics Logos and Seals, US National Guard Bureau, accessed January 2, 2021, <https://www.nationalguard.mil/Resources/Image-Gallery/Graphics/>.

## Hypothesis

Despite the importance of interagency collaboration, the Army does not provide a sufficient baseline of interagency training, education, and experience to help Army officers succeed in interagency roles. Career fields like Foreign Area Officer, Defense Attaché, and

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., V-4.

<sup>9</sup> US Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), 18.

Special Forces emphasize interagency competence. Adjusting mainstream officer development practices to incorporate developmental models from the specialties above will increase interagency aptitude for Army leaders.

## Army Professional Development Models

In 2013 the Army published the Army Leader Development Strategy that outlined *training, education, and experience* as three distinct lines of effort for developing leaders capable of succeeding in unified land operations (ULO).<sup>10</sup> Clarifying the Army's use of specific terminology in the lines of effort will add context. *Training* teaches specific, repeatable tasks.<sup>11</sup> *Education* imparts knowledge and develops attributes.<sup>12</sup> *Experience* is derived from an individual's participation in personal and professional events.<sup>13</sup>

The Army issued an updated Army Training and Leader Development Strategy in 2018, intended as a bridge from ULO and large scale combat operations (LSCO) to multi-domain operations (MDO).<sup>14</sup> While the premise for Army leader development had evolved, the Army retained the original lines of effort from the 2013 strategy. The consistent lines of effort suggest enduring importance to the Army. Therefore, this paper will assess how the Army provides training, education, and experience to develop interagency competencies among officers throughout their careers.

Army officers specialize in one of several branches and functional areas with varying degrees of inherent interagency interaction. The Army Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) incorporates all the policies and procedures that govern officer professional development.<sup>15</sup> Within the OPMS, the Army explains officer development and career

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<sup>10</sup> US Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 10.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>14</sup> US Department of the Army, *Army Training and Leader Development Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), 4.

<sup>15</sup> US Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 3.

management models in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 (DA PAM 600-3).<sup>16</sup> Army leaders and personnel managers consider this document as a foundational reference for officer professional development.<sup>17</sup>

DA PAM 600-3 first mentions interagency considerations in its section on *broadening experiences*. Broadening experiences are available throughout an officer's career and expose officers to diverse organizational cultures and environments. Interagency broadening assignments will generally focus on the political and policy aspects of DoD contributions to national efforts.<sup>18</sup> An example interagency broadening assignment is the Army Congressional Fellowship, where officers are legislative liaisons to the US Congress. Another example is the Interagency Broadening Fellowship that assigns officers to government agencies spanning the spectrum from law enforcement to intelligence and international development.

In addition to broadening assignments, the Army officer professional development manual mentions interagency training as an opportunity for officers who have met the minimum education and experience requirements for their career field. The manual only mentions a training duration of 90-180 days, but it does not provide specifics on available training opportunities.<sup>19</sup> The reference to training may be a general placeholder for a variety of programs that are available outside of the DoD. A current interagency training program allows eligible Military Police officers to attend the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, a premier venue for law enforcement training and education.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> US Army, DA PAM 600-3, i.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>20</sup> "National Academy," Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed January 12, 2021, <https://www.fbi.gov/services/training-academy/national-academy>.



## Foreign Area Officers

The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) functional area is home to some of the Army's best interagency experts. The Army purposefully recruits, selects, trains, educates, and employs FAOs to lead in diverse interagency environments.<sup>21</sup> They are often permanently assigned to US embassies overseas, working directly under the Department of State's auspices and alongside interagency counterparts from across the federal government. Among other functions, FAO duties include: (1) advise senior military and civilian leaders as political-military officers; (2) serve as security cooperation officers; (3) perform attaché duties.<sup>22</sup> These roles involve significant interagency interaction, and the Army makes considerable investments to prepare foreign area officers for duty throughout their careers.

To equip FAOs with the desired level of interagency knowledge, the Army conducts an extensive developmental program that includes institutional training, operational assignments, and structured self-development.<sup>23</sup> This program moves FAOs through progressive *Regional Proficiency Skill Levels* (RP Levels) linked to continually acquiring regional and interagency expertise. The RP Levels range from Level 1 (Novice) to Level 5 (Expert).<sup>24</sup> Newly recruited FAOs achieve RP Level 3 after completing their initial training, and this is a high threshold for entry-level capability in a new career field.<sup>25</sup>

The qualification path includes FAO training, advanced language training, regional and cultural immersion, graduate school, and intermediate military education. Due to the breadth and

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<sup>21</sup> US Department of the Army, Smartbook Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Foreign Area Officer Functional Area* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), 1. FAO is commonly pronounced as the acronym "fay-yo."

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>24</sup> US Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5160.70, *Management of Language and Regional Expertise* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2016), 26.

<sup>25</sup> US Army, Smartbook DA PAM 600-3 Foreign Area Officer, 7.

depth of requirements, an officer without existing qualifications will likely take more than two years to complete the training and education milestones. Interagency awareness and experience are included in FAO training, and often in the regional immersion that may involve spending time at a US diplomatic mission overseas. These immersive internship-like interagency experiences – dubbed *in-region training* – expose aspiring FAOs to the full scope of their future responsibilities and are an incredibly practical introduction to the inner workings of an embassy country team.<sup>26</sup>

Despite a lengthy initial qualification program, the required capabilities are commensurate with duties FAOs are expected to perform when they arrive at their first assignment. Furthermore, FAO development is continuous throughout an officer's career and they should strive to achieve RP Level 5 by the time they advance to colonel.<sup>27</sup> The Foreign Area Officer proponent takes a thoughtful and precise approach to equip new FAOs with the tools they will need to perform in their field. The Army continually provides training, education, and experience to ensure that FAOs remain capable of serving in roles with increasing responsibility for interagency collaboration, like serving as an Attaché or Senior Defense Official.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> US Army, Smartbook DA PAM 600-3 Foreign Area Officer, 4.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 5.

## Special Forces Officers

Army Special Forces (SF) officers perform a myriad of roles that often combine the diplomatic and military elements of national power. The Army specifically selects, trains, and educates SF officers to shape foreign political and military environments by working with and through host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations. SF provides a persistent global presence during peacetime, competition, and conflict, including interagency-led operations.<sup>29</sup>

Unconventional Warfare (UW), a principal task for Special Forces, is defined as “activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”<sup>30</sup> The political sensitivity of UW and the methods required to successfully partner with oppressed networks in denied territory make UW an inherently interagency mission. While special operations forces (SOF) from across the joint services often have overlapping capabilities, UW is unique to Army Special Forces as its core task and organizing principle.<sup>31</sup>



Figure 3. Special Forces principal tasks. US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-18, *Special Forces Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2014), 3-4.

<sup>29</sup> US Department of the Army, Smartbook Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Special Forces Branch* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 1.

<sup>30</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2014), GL-12.

<sup>31</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-18, *Special Forces Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2014), 3-4.

The Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) provides Special Forces trainees their first introduction to the interagency nature of life as a Special Forces officer.<sup>32</sup> Officers learn about the host of agencies with whom they may potentially interact, the organization and function of an embassy country team, and the authorities and permissions associated with military participation in interagency operations. A staple of Special Forces training is live-action role play. The SFQC goes to great lengths to provide students with immersive practical applications of concepts from the academic curriculum. For example, students may need to orchestrate interagency coordination and linkup with fictitious resistance forces, similar to the real-life insertions of Special Forces detachments into Afghanistan to spearhead operations with the Northern Alliance in 2001.<sup>33</sup> To add depth to the training scenarios' realism, experienced interagency veterans serve as role players to provide in-role teaching and coaching. There is no substitute for this type of experiential learning, and it pays massive dividends for Special Forces officers when they encounter similar operational situations in future assignments.

Interagency development continues after officers graduate from the SFQC. By design, Special Forces officers continue to enhance familiarity with interagency aspects of special operations as they progress through positions of increasing responsibility.<sup>34</sup> Unlike other Army career fields where interagency broadening is optional when circumstances allow, the SF career development model includes interagency training, education, and experience as important career milestones. Examples include the following: (1) *training* – attending technical and tactical courses led by interagency experts; (2) *education* – participation in the University of Kansas Interagency Studies Program; (3) *experience* – service in interagency positions as key developmental or preferred developmental assignments.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> US Army, Smartbook DA PAM 600-3 Special Forces, 5.

<sup>33</sup> Gary Schroen, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, Amazon Kindle Edition, 2005), 215.

<sup>34</sup> US Army, Smartbook DA PAM 600-3 Special Forces, 6.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 8-10.

## National Guard Bilateral Affairs Officers

The Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) is unique to the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), a vital element of US security cooperation efforts.<sup>36</sup> The SPP pairs the National Guard of a US state or territory with a partner nation's military, security forces, and government agencies responsible for emergency management and disaster response. The SPP is overseen by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, managed and administered by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, executed by the commanders of the geographic combatant commands (GCCs), and sourced by each state National Guard.<sup>37</sup> As of June 2020, there are 82 partnerships with countries spanning all six GCCs.<sup>38</sup>

Duty as a Bilateral Affairs Officer is a temporary assignment that generally lasts from one year to three years and BAOs are not part of an established career field. National Guard states and territories select BAOs from among a pool of available officers regardless of their specialty. BAOs perform functions with some similarity to FAOs, serving in overseas embassies to provide forward representation and assist with coordinating SPP requirements.<sup>39</sup> Their in-country presence allows for frequent interaction with the partner nation along with direct links to the country team and supporting agencies. Therefore, the National Guard should provide BAOs with the required orientation to operate effectively in an interagency environment.

Standards for BAO selection and preparatory training have evolved in recent years, partly due to prescriptive Congressional mandates in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).<sup>40</sup> NGB's current BAO Business Rules state that the officer is preferably a major,

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<sup>36</sup> BAO is pronounced as the initialism "B A O."

<sup>37</sup> US Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, *State Partnership Program 2030 Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 1.

<sup>38</sup> US Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, *82 State Partnerships* (Arlington: National Guard Bureau).

<sup>39</sup> US Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, *BAO Business Rules* (Arlington: National Guard Bureau, 2018), 4.

<sup>40</sup> National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2017, Public Law 114–328, 114th Cong.

positively represents the US government, and meets eligibility requirements in National Guard full-time personnel policy. Upon selection, standard training includes specialized courses from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the US Department of State, and the BAO's respective combatant command.<sup>41</sup>



Figure 4. State Partnership Program map. US Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, 82 *State Partnerships* (Arlington: National Guard Bureau).

The training requirements mentioned above are similar to standard pre-deployment training requirements for government personnel deploying overseas. They are good primers but, in some cases, represent a “cold-start” approach to developing interagency competence for an important position. BAOs sit in the same spaces and perform some of the same functions as FAOs. However, the former receives a few weeks of orientation to meet minimum deployment

(December 23, 2016), codified at *US Code* 10 (2016), § 384.

<sup>41</sup> US National Guard Bureau, *BAO Business Rules*, 3.

suitability standards, while the latter has knowledge and skills cultivated over several years. The National Guard may find value in considering longer-duration preparatory programs or making the BAO part of an enduring area of specialization that provides long-term interagency development.

By contrast, the US Army Reserve (USAR) has a FAO program with similar qualification requirements as active-duty FAOs. The Army does not provide entry-level training for USAR FAOs and candidates must already possess the required qualifications when they apply. Nonetheless, the USAR has an established cohort of officers qualified to perform FAO duties and places them in a functional area for deliberate professional development and career management.<sup>42</sup> The National Guard could apply a similar model to establish a bench of officers suited to serve as BAOs and SPP Directors, enhancing BAO effectiveness and credibility within the SPP.

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<sup>42</sup> US Army, Smartbook DA PAM 600-3 Foreign Area Officer, 9.

## Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Military interagency operations also occur inside US borders under the auspices of *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*. In short, DSCA includes military support to domestic civil authorities for emergencies, cyberspace incidents, law enforcement, and other activities upon request. A key aspect of DSCA is that, by definition, the DoD acts in support of other primary agencies.<sup>43</sup> Domestic response occurs at the lowest level of jurisdiction, progressing from local municipalities to state governments and other eligible entities who may formally request military support. Consequently, when DoD elements conduct DSCA, they are performing an interagency function.

The Department of Homeland Security and its Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are responsible for *homeland security*, per Presidential Policy Directive 8.<sup>44</sup> While these federal agencies provide national-level oversight, the National Guard also serves an essential role in securing the US homeland. Commonly known as “The 54,” all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands, each have National Guard forces commanded by state governors (or a governor equivalent). National Guard forces from the 54 states and territories provide non-federal support to state and local authorities as directed by their governors, and contribute federal support when requested and approved. At the federal military level, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) have unique authority to execute DSCA functions that protect US interests in their geographic areas of responsibility.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), ix-x.

<sup>44</sup> “Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness,” US Department of Homeland Security, last published August 14, 2018, accessed January 18, 2021, <https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness>.

<sup>45</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 1-13.



Established national policies govern the organization, coordination, and employment of military forces to support civilian authorities. FEMA's *National Incident Management System (NIMS)* provides overarching guidance for all governmental and non-governmental organizations to enable cohesive approaches for incident prevention and response.<sup>46</sup> With the tiered response principle of resolving problems at the lowest level, civilian authorities typically do not request military support unless the scenario exceeds civilian capability and capacity. This method places military DSCA activities in the realm of *response*, governed by FEMA's *National Response Framework (NRF)*.<sup>47</sup>

The military maintains organizational structures and protocols to facilitate rapid coordinated responses when civilian entities request help. Two of the most critical positions that require considerable interagency competence are the *Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)* and the *Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO)*. DCOs are Title 10 active-duty officers assigned to each FEMA region, providing primary liaison between the DoD and the lead agency in crisis or disaster response.<sup>48</sup> The DCO – an individual officer – is the central point of contact regarding formal civilian Requests for Assistance and DoD responses. As a connector between the DoD and external agencies, the DCOs to be intimately aware of federal and regional agency needs, capabilities, structures, procedures, and authorities. In a 2012 paper, Major Tanya Schilling remarked that structural inefficiencies hindered effective interagency actions in the early stages of disaster response for Hurricane Katrina.<sup>49</sup> The DCO's position at the center of an

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<sup>46</sup> US Federal Emergency Management Agency, *National Incident Management System* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), 1.

<sup>47</sup> US Federal Emergency Management Agency, *National Response Framework* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 6.

<sup>48</sup> US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, GL-7.

<sup>49</sup> Tanya L. Schilling, "Reorganization of Defense Coordinating Officer and Element" (Master's Monograph, School for Advanced Military Studies, 2010), 2.

elaborate DoD response network and Major Schilling's analysis underscore the importance of proper personnel preparation and selection for these types of interagency assignments.

In some ways, EPLOs are the state-level equivalent of DCOs. EPLOs establish the principal DoD liaison between state National Guard Joint Force Headquarters and FEMA regional offices.<sup>50</sup> Aligned to a respective FEMA region according to their state, an EPLO's state-level responsibilities and required interagency knowledge are analogous to the DCOs operating at the federal level.




Figure 5. Map of FEMA regions with DCO areas of responsibility. US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), II-15.

<sup>50</sup> US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, II-15.

The Army does not have a basic branch or functional area exclusively devoted to DSCA. Branches and functional areas closely aligned with the *protection* warfighting function may be the closest corollaries since the warfighting function includes “emergency management and response” as a primary way to preserve the force.<sup>51</sup> Associated Army specialties may include Military Police, Engineers, Chemical, Ordnance (which comprises Explosive Ordnance Disposal), medical branches, and Functional Area 52 – Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.<sup>52</sup> The Army also awards the *5Y Emergency Management* skill identifier to officers with graduate degrees in disaster management and related fields.<sup>53</sup> Additionally, the Permanent Duty Skill Identifier *D7A Defense Support of Civil Authorities Specialist* is another qualification that Army officers may earn for completing required FEMA and military courses.<sup>54</sup> The Command and General Staff College offers the D7A program as an elective for resident students.

Due to the absence of an actual DSCA branch or functional area, professional development for DSCA normally occurs ad-hoc or through on-the-job training. FEMA is the governing body for training requirements and civilian emergency management qualifications. Service members performing DSCA-related functions are encouraged to complete FEMA’s programmed training on the NIMS and NRF. National Guard officers often encounter domestic interagency awareness and training as they progress toward senior leadership positions by virtue of state-level emergency planning, rehearsals, exercises, and experience in real-world response operations.

DSCA is fundamentally an interagency activity placing the DoD in a support role to civilian agencies. National Guard forces generally provide the preponderance of DoD homeland

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<sup>51</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, *Protection* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), iv.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 1-5, table 1-1.

<sup>53</sup> US Department of the Army, Smartbook Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), table 4-3.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., table 1-2.

support. By nature of the enduring National Guard mission to support the homeland, National Guard officers incidentally receive valuable interagency training, education, and experience as their careers progress. Many National Guard officers are also civilian emergency management professionals, enhancing their interagency knowledge base. Army officers whose specialties are outside of this niche gain interagency competence when assigned to homeland security organizations.

## The Rest of the Army

Most of the Army basic branches mention the interagency as an aside in their professional development models. This monograph is not an attempt to conduct a detailed analysis of every area of concentration in the Army's officer ranks. However, some generalizations may appear when assessing a thin slice of developmental models representing the majority of active component general officers (GO). Among the active army population, Infantry, Armor, and Logistics are the leading fields that produce GOs. These branches predominate the 311 active component GOs: 21% Infantry, 11% Armor, 9% Logistics, and all other fields individually contribute 6% or less to the remainder of the active component GO population.<sup>55</sup>




Figure 6. Distribution of branches among Army active component generals as of January 20, 2021. US Department of the Army, General Officer Management Office, report of Active Army General Officers by Branch, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://www.gomo.army.mil/ext/portal/Resources/Reports.aspx>.

While the top three branches have some differences in their developmental models, the similarities are striking. Naturally, the models diverge in branch-specific competencies and experiences they require, recommend, and encourage. Differences are most evident in earlier stages of officer development when junior lieutenants should focus on gaining tactical and technical expertise in their designated field.<sup>56</sup> While specialization continues as officers grow in

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<sup>55</sup> US Department of the Army, General Officer Management Office, report of Active Army General Officers by Branch, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://www.gomo.army.mil/ext/portal/Resources/Reports.aspx>.

<sup>56</sup> US Department of the Army, Smartbook Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3,

rank, the differences between branches narrow due to the Army's intent to produce strategic leaders who are generalists.<sup>57</sup>

In their 2020 paper, "Raising the Flag," the RAND Corporation succinctly describes the common developmental pathway for Army officers in branches that statistically represent a majority of the Army's senior leadership:<sup>58</sup>

- Captain – company commander
- Major – battalion/brigade operations officer or executive officer
- Lieutenant Colonel – battalion commander or centrally-selected primary staff officer
- Colonel – brigade commander or centrally-selected primary staff officer

The typical professional military education pattern accompanies advancement, while officers continue to progress via branch development assignments and external broadening experiences.

The developmental models uniformly express a desire to produce officers who can function in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environments.<sup>59</sup> However, JIIM experience appears to be aspirational for most branches, rather than the specific emphasis seen in interagency-focused branches. Branch models often reference *interagency* when grouped within the catchall term JIIM. Furthermore, references are sometimes hidden among other opportunities that may be more desirable for officers to remain competitive for promotion.<sup>60</sup>

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*Infantry* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017); US Department of the Army, Smartbook Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Armor* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017); US Department of the Army, Smartbook Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Sustainment* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2020).

<sup>57</sup> Thomas Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, Amazon Kindle Edition, 2012), 9.

<sup>58</sup> RAND Corporation, *Raising the Flag: Implications of U.S. Military Approaches to General and Flag Officer Development* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), 53.

<sup>59</sup> Pronounced like the name, "Jim."

<sup>60</sup> US Army, DA PAM 600-3, 14. The subordinate branch-specific smartbooks generally only mention *interagency* when referring to the "JIIM" aggregate.

## The State of Army Interagency Development

The Army is biased, perhaps unintentionally, against deliberately developing interagency competency for most of its officers. A small number of branches and functional areas purposefully develop interagency skills. The Army pays lip service to the interagency with glancing mentions to JIIM experiences in professional development regulations for the remaining branches. Officers who explore JIIM opportunities will likely prioritize *joint* experiences above all other members of the JIIM quartet. The reason for this is clear – joint education and experience are directly linked to an officer’s potential for senior-level promotion. DoD instructions on joint officer management formalize this linkage.<sup>61</sup> The officer personnel management system generally does not reward most officers for seeking interagency experience and may inadvertently punish officers who do.

The RAND Corporation draws similar conclusions. In their 2020 study on how the US military develops senior uniformed talent, RAND identified empirical and anecdotal evidence that suggests a bias against the types of developmental assignments that enhance interagency knowledge.<sup>62</sup> RAND also found that functional specialists with the most interagency knowledge historically have much lower chances of achieving general officer rank.<sup>63</sup> This correlation implies an inverse relationship between tactical proficiency and interagency competency. Assuming that the concepts above are mutually exclusive, an Army primarily responsible for conducting (and winning) land warfare will undoubtedly choose strong tactics over interagency elan.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> US Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1300.19, *DoD Joint Officer Management (JOM) Program* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), 24.

<sup>62</sup> RAND Corporation, *Raising the Flag*, 64.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>64</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 1-1.

This incongruence is partly due to force structure; fewer top-level billets are available for functional area officers than for basic branch officers. However, that factor is just the tip of the iceberg. The Army's service culture also prefers rugged "Spartans" over cerebral "Athenians."<sup>65</sup> Most combat arms officers are of a Spartan background that focuses on warfighting. This cultural preference is encouraged by more advancement opportunities and increased representation at senior ranks for Spartan combat arms officers who adhere to their branch career path with few deviations.<sup>66</sup>

The Sparta-Athens analogy does not need to be a binary choice. The Army can produce competent warfighters able to navigate interagency structures. It already does this for some officers and may consider expanding comparable development to a larger share of its officer population. With uncertain futures and increased convergence of warfighting domains, the Army seeks to develop senior leaders with both breadth and depth to operate in various conditions. Recent guidance for the Army brigadier general promotion board reiterates the same goals of agility and adaptiveness. The guidance required that selected officers be "capable of leading our forces in combat under conditions of uncertainty, leading joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations and of running the Army."<sup>67</sup>

General officers do not grow overnight, and officers gain the desired qualities for promotion from colonel to brigadier general over several decades of training, education, and experience. Personnel policy that applies to today's company-grade officers determines the characteristics Army senior leaders will possess in twenty years. The Army's cyclical operations process (plan, prepare, execute, assess) warrants continual evaluation and reframing of requirements to achieve desired developmental objectives.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Susan Bryant and Heidi A. Urban, "Reconnecting Athens and Sparta: A Review of OPMS XXI at 20 Years," *Land Warfare Papers*, no. 114 (October 2017): 3.

<sup>66</sup> RAND Corporation, *Raising the Flag*, 50.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>68</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*



Part of the evaluation and reframing process should incorporate an assessment of current and – more importantly – future requirements for interagency competency. Connections between US government departments and agencies have steadily increased since World War II, sometimes due to epochal shifts like the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. The trend toward intragovernmental coherence suggests a growing demand for interagency skills and the Army is not keeping pace with the changing environment. Strategic foresight is a challenging task, and tomorrow’s hindsight is perhaps the best way to evaluate the validity of today’s decisions.<sup>69</sup> Despite the uncertainty of what the future holds, *today’s hindsight* may provide clues to help determine future requirements.

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(Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 1-4.

<sup>69</sup> Maree Conway, *Foresight Infused Strategy Development: A How-To Guide for Using Foresight in Practice* (Melbourne, Australia: Thinking Futures, Amazon Kindle Edition, 2016), 23.

## What the Army Needs

As mentioned earlier, the Army establishes its personnel management policy under the Officer Personnel Management System umbrella. The Army created OPMS to align officer lifecycle management processes (including accession, training/education, development, assignment, evaluation, promotion, and separation) with the Army's needs.<sup>70</sup> The OPMS has undergone several iterations in response to evolving strategic conditions, assessments of potential futures, and guidance from national leaders. Finalized in 1997, OPMS XXI is the Army's most recent landmark personnel reform.<sup>71</sup> It is the result of findings from a yearlong study that the OPMS XXI Task Force published under direction from the former Chief of Staff of the Army. The OPMS XXI Task Force proposed several recommendations relevant to interagency development.

*Implement a personnel management system based on career fields, with distinct groupings of branches and functional areas, to reflect the evolving needs of the Army today and into the future.*<sup>72</sup> This suggestion reemphasized specialization within distinct functional areas, and today's personnel system reflects the recommendation. It was a deliberate turn away from a system that gave officers the flexibility to "sample" several areas of interest throughout their careers. The impetus for this change was an assessment that the Army required field-grade officers to be good at so many things that they were not great at any specific thing.<sup>73</sup> A 2017 academic review of OPMS XXI posits that the current system does well at producing specialists but fails to produce strategic leaders with a broad base of experiences. An unintended design consequence of the push toward specialization may be a lack of generalization caused by positive

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<sup>70</sup> Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI Task Force, *Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study: Final Report*, July 1997, v.

<sup>71</sup> Bryant and Urben, 1.

<sup>72</sup> OPMS XXI Task Force, *OPMS XXI Study*, iv.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, iii.

feedback loops for specialist career paths, with corresponding negative feedback loops for taking a generalist approach.<sup>74</sup>

*Establish new functional areas and eliminate others to address changing requirements.*<sup>75</sup>

Reorganizing the functional area structure likely increased aggregate interagency competency across the overall population of Army officers. Before this change, areas that required significant specialization suffered from an insufficient inventory of capable officers, coupled with low promotion ceilings for the minority of officers who possessed the required expertise.<sup>76</sup> Officers did not have enough time to develop, and the few who did squandered their chances of advancement to senior levels. The functional area reorganization recalibrated personnel structures to address these deficiencies. While not a perfect solution, today's functional area system develops experts, provides a home for specialists, and better defines their developmental tracks.

*Send all officers selected for promotion to major to resident intermediate-level military education and all officers selected for promotion to colonel to resident senior service college-level education.*<sup>77</sup> OPMS XXI acknowledges the importance of joint and interagency collaboration to support land combat operations.<sup>78</sup> The task force sought to balance “muddy boots” warfighting capabilities with niche areas of specialization, while also providing a common educational standard for all officers regardless of career field.<sup>79</sup> OPMS XXI recommended sending all officers selected for major to a common educational experience at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) to increase interoperability among branches and functional areas. The recommendation recognized bifurcation between warfighters and enablers, and sought to

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<sup>74</sup> Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity* (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2011), 136.

<sup>75</sup> OPMS XXI Task Force, *OPMS XXI Study*, iv.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, viii.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, iv.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, xviii.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, xvii.

cross-pollinate each track with an understanding and appreciation of its counterpart.<sup>80</sup> To achieve this goal, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) assessed the costs and curriculum changes associated with increasing attendance at its premier intermediate education venue to meet evolving demands.

In summary, OPMS XXI proposed that the Army needs three types of officers: (1) *warfighters* who can gain decisive victory in the land domain; (2) *enabler integrators* to shape strategic conditions (interagency primarily lives here); (3) *generators* to build the future force.<sup>81</sup> The OPMS XXI task force took a “system of systems” approach to develop and employ officers. The task force recommended developing cohorts of officers with deep branch-specific expertise, providing the joint force with specialists from various warfighting and functional disciplines.<sup>82</sup> Task force members discussed several interrelated aspects of the personnel system including structure, accessions, promotions, education, and force requirements. The OPMS XXI findings and recommendations have significantly impacted officer development over the past two decades, with enduring effects as officers of its progeny rise to Army senior leadership positions today. Future adjustments to officer professional development are unlikely to be complete makeovers. Instead, updates will inherit elements of and influences from OPMS XXI.

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<sup>80</sup> OPMS XXI Task Force, *OPMS XXI Study*, xvii-xviii.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, pg ix.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pg xviii.

## OPMS XXXV?...

The title above is rather ambitious. This monograph is not meant to comprehensively assess all requirements for future Army officers like the OPMS XXI Task Force. The personnel and time required for such an endeavor would need to approximate OPMS XXI's team of fifty military and civilian personnel who worked collectively for an entire year.<sup>83</sup> Despite these shortfalls, it may be feasible to assess interagency factors of officer development that will be relevant in future years. Germane to this assessment, the US Army and the US Joint Force have published strategic outlooks that forecast potential environments and force requirements in 2028 and 2035, respectively.

In 2018, the Army released a revised concept for multi-domain operations. The new concept expanded its predecessor's theme from multi-domain *battle* to multi-domain *operations*, signaling a broader scope of future Army operations that will span the range of military operations (ROMO) and the conflict continuum.<sup>84</sup> *Competition* is a feature in the MDO concept's central idea, which describes competition as a persistent activity that may be punctuated by periods of conflict.<sup>85</sup>

Competition is an interesting proposition for an Army designed to dominate in ground combat. Given the US Army's penchant for a Western way of war, distinct conflict or combat operations are relatively easy for an Army to conceptualize and execute. Contrast this comparatively simple and violent "first grammar" of war with a more complicated "second grammar" called irregular warfare.<sup>86</sup> A ground fighting force oriented on destroying the enemy

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<sup>83</sup> OPMS XXI Task Force, *OPMS XXI Study*, iii.

<sup>84</sup> US Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), 5.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, vii.

<sup>86</sup> Antulio J. Echevarria II, "American Operational Art: 1917-2008," in *The Evolution of Operational Art: from Napoleon to the Present*, ed. John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 137-61.

and seizing terrain may have difficulty competing below the threshold of conflict across multiple domains as described in the MDO concept. The Army's preferred modes of employment are misaligned with future operational realities, calling for different skills and new operational approaches.




Figure 7. The conflict continuum and the range of military operations. US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), V-4.

Viewed simplistically in relation to the ROMO and the conflict continuum, competition could include military activities that are not combat or war. Since these “second grammar” actions often do not involve maneuver warfare in the land domain, the Army suffers a kind of identity crisis trying to match its strategic roles to non-combat activities against adversaries.<sup>87</sup> The Army MDO concept says that the dissonance described above caused the military to be reactive in the face of adversary competition. However, the concept offers some assistance by describing the Army as enabling the Joint Force and the interagency to seize and sustain the initiative in competition.<sup>88</sup> The concept clearly tells the Army to support the interagency. This instruction

<sup>87</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), 1-14.

<sup>88</sup> US Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, viii.

should compel the Army to prepare for the future by developing officers who can competently interface with the external agencies.




Figure 8. US Army strategic roles. US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), 1-14.

Furthermore, the MDO concept projects an emerging operational environment severely contested in informational and technical arenas.<sup>89</sup> Information operations, cyber, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum are not typical mainstays of the average officer from combat arms, combat support, or combat service support branches. Following the linguistic analogy, competition's grammar is from a different language in which most officers have minimal literacy. 21st Century technological evolutions have expanded the means and methods of warfare far beyond the physical space of land combat operations. Areas of expertise that previously resided in non-military agencies now influence or exist alongside land warfare. Army officers must now be proficient in their traditional specialties and also be aware of converging cross-domain capabilities and vulnerabilities.<sup>90</sup>

Some exquisite tools do not even belong to the Army. National-level space and cyber effects may have tactical utility in modern competition and conflict. Army officers must be literate in interagency affairs to leverage convergence and synergize whole-of-government

<sup>89</sup> US Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, vi.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., vii.

efforts. This knowledge will help officers know where to find assets, their governing authorities, appropriate uses, and how to request them.

Convergence also significantly increases the speed and tempo of operations. A related future concept called *Mosaic Warfare* espouses using multiple domains simultaneously to overwhelm an adversary's ability to make critical decisions and limit the menu of available counteractions.<sup>91</sup> Without corresponding increases in US agility, competition and conflict's rapidity may incur fragility in a warfare system built on single-purpose components. Developing officers with more malleability and interagency broadness will bolster the Army's robustness in facing complex and novel challenges.<sup>92</sup>




Figure 9. Mosaic Warfare imposing multiple dilemmas. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, *Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), 23.

<sup>91</sup> Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, *Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), 23.

<sup>92</sup> Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder* (New York, NY: Random House, 2012), 20.



The Joint Force strategic outlook, *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035*, echoes many themes in the Army MDO concept. JOE 2035 imagines a future military environment that will require the Joint Force to pursue the strategic goal of adapting to changing conditions.<sup>93</sup> At face value, “adapting” hardly seems like a serious strategic goal but its inclusion in the future outlook indicates acceptance that the US military cannot *solve* every problem. Instead, the more prudent option may be to manage or cope with particular situations.<sup>94</sup> Adaptability may also be the most relevant characteristic for a future Army, allowing the force to pivot in response to new challenges.

The JOE 2035 tasks of *shape* and *contain* are associated with a future posture of adaptation.<sup>95</sup> *Shape* is similar to the current joint operation model that involves setting conditions through long-term persistent regional engagement.<sup>96</sup> *Contain* limits adversary influence and control or reduces the adverse effects of collapsed foreign governments.<sup>97</sup> Army operations contribute to the Joint Force, and these JOE 2035 tasks rely heavily on interagency collaboration. Under today’s force design, FAOs, attachés, and SOF will be the primary executors for shape and contain activities.

However, the Army can amplify performance and effectiveness by giving non-specialist officers more interagency know-how. Additional knowledge will enable disaggregated elements to seize fleeting opportunities and also promote unity of effort. For example, a tank company commander participating in multinational live-fire exercises can better advance partnership and diplomacy goals when training with partner nation forces. The sponsoring FAO need not be the

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<sup>93</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035, *The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2016), 41.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> US Joint Staff, JOE 2035, 41-42.

<sup>96</sup> US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, V-9.

<sup>97</sup> US Joint Staff, JOE 2035, 42.

sole arbiter of interagency acumen to support US diplomatic objectives. Distributed knowledge can produce distributed effects.




Figure 10. Future Joint Force interagency missions. US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035, *The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2016), 51.

The Army should adjust now to prepare for 2035. Proper adjustments will account for 2028 as an interim point along the path to 2035. Possible changes include the following: (1) expand broadening opportunities for senior captains (captains who have completed a branch-qualifying assignment); (2) bolster interagency familiarization during professional military education; (3) increase interagency fellowships and exchanges.

Ascending to the rank of captain is a significant point in a junior officer's career. Colloquially known as "the rank of command," captain is typically the first rank when an officer

assumes the authority and responsibility to command troops.<sup>98</sup> Hence, many branches require captains to command successfully within their specialty to be “branch qualified.” Most officers seek to command early during their tenure as captains, since they are generally ineligible for broadening opportunities until they achieve branch qualification.<sup>99</sup> Officers have a significant incentive to complete branch requirements early so they can pursue post-command interests while waiting to be considered for promotion to major. The interim period averages around three years, wherein officers may seek advanced education and other broadening opportunities. The Army can capitalize on this window of time by directing officers to take interagency broadening assignments before their promotion selection for major. Officers would get some initial exposure to the interagency before accepting staff roles as field grade officers, where they are more likely to contend with the challenges presented in the MDO concept and JOE 2035.

Interagency service as a senior captain or junior major provides an excellent segue to mid-career education that reinforces interagency competence. The Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) provides several touchpoints to JIIM, and interagency electives are available for Fort Leavenworth resident students. Interagency classes usually expose uninitiated students to interagency topics with a learning objective of *comprehension*.<sup>100</sup> While comprehension exists on the lower spectrum of Bloom’s Taxonomy, it may be a realistic goal given the volume and breadth of education packed into CGSOC’s 10-month resident program.<sup>101</sup>

The Army should augment CGSOC with a planning exercise that invites non-resident civilian interagency personnel to collaborate with military students tackling a relevant national

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<sup>98</sup> US Army, DA PAM 600-3, 13.

<sup>99</sup> US Army, DA PAM 600-3, 6.

<sup>100</sup> US Department of the Army, Command and General Staff School, *C300 Unified Action Block Advance Sheet* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2020); US Department of the Army, Command and General Staff School, *Advance Sheet for Lesson C305 Interorganizational Cooperation and Considerations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2020).

<sup>101</sup> Peter C. Brown, Henry L. Roediger, and Mark A. McDaniel, *Make it Stick: The Science of Successful Learning* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 228.

security problem. This exercise would satisfy experiential demands in the *operational domain* of leader development espoused in the Army's leader development strategies and doctrine.<sup>102</sup> In addition to inviting civilians to a CGSOC exercise, the Army may pursue increasing the number of officers it selects for unique exchange programs like the CGSC Interagency Fellowship and Training with Industry.

Despite the previous critiques, the Army is taking positive actions to keep pace with current needs and future estimates. DoD guidance on Joint Professional Military Education directs service schools to maintain specific ratios to ensure interagency representation among students and faculty. Incorporating civilians fosters interagency diversity in courses that lead to joint qualification and enhances the collaborative learning environment typical of most service schools.<sup>103</sup> Students and faculty can infuse courses with relevant real-world experience, adding an operational component to institutional learning. The interagency awareness and relationships students gain will garner benefits as officers rise to more senior positions.

In 2035, today's lieutenants will be majors, and today's majors will be general officers. Envisioned future environments for the Army and the Joint Force imply increased demand for interagency competence and collaboration. Futurist, Marie Conway, advises that we do not consider the future for consideration's sake alone. Rather, she asserts that we use future assessments to help us make decisions about today.<sup>104</sup> The Army should apply its "reverse planning" doctrine to determine where it wants to be in 2035 and implement plans that will propel it toward that destination.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), 4.

<sup>103</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01F, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2020), A-8.

<sup>104</sup> Conway, *Foresight Infused Strategy*, 57.

<sup>105</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2016), 10-6; Conway, *Foresight Infused Strategy*, 163.

## SPP 2030

The National Guard State Partnership Program aligns with future operating concepts and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Unifying themes include international partnership, interoperability, and strategic access. In this regard, SPP requirements are nested within general military requirements. However, the SPP is oriented on Security Cooperation and its unique areas of emphasis.<sup>106</sup> Interagency collaboration is intrinsic to Security Cooperation because the Department of State establishes foreign policy direction that governs DoD security cooperation efforts. Per DoD policy, the National Guard has service-like responsibilities to provide qualified personnel to conduct security cooperation activities.<sup>107</sup>

### **Doctrinal Definition of Security Cooperation**

**security cooperation.** All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called **SC**.

Figure 11. Joint definition of Security Cooperation. US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), GL-5.

In recent years, the US Congress had growing concerns about professionalism among the DoD Security Cooperation Workforce. To address these concerns, Congress used the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act to direct the Department of Defense to formalize Security Cooperation Workforce Development (SCWD). In response, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is orchestrating DoD-wide efforts to identify Security Cooperation positions, required competencies, and certification pathways to comply with Congressional mandates.<sup>108</sup> The

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<sup>106</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), vi.

<sup>107</sup> US Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2016), 11.

<sup>108</sup> NDAA 2017.

Defense Department moved quickly. Within three years, it established the Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU), performed a comprehensive review of the Security Cooperation Workforce, and instituted measurable competency goals aligned with specific security cooperation positions.<sup>109</sup>

These changes are a welcome update for SPP. The Department of Defense is a capabilities-oriented institution. Defining the requisite capabilities associated with SPP helps military leaders plan and justify the associated resources needed to provide that capability, including operational budgets, personnel authorizations, training, and education.<sup>110</sup> The National Guard recently updated the SPP Program Management Guide to account for new legislation and DoD policy; more updates are likely pending.<sup>111</sup> One change is that BAOs must attend courses with the DSCU to receive the same orientation to Security Cooperation Offices as other DoD embassy personnel. Interagency familiarity is baked into this education, and it helps offset the disparities between SPP officers and other DoD interagency professionals.

Whereas SPP personnel previously received little guidance or conducted ad hoc preparation, the DoD and the National Guard are taking action to codify developmental objectives for SPP personnel. The National Guard's SPP 2030 strategy lists *develop and implement a human capital plan* as a supporting task. Such a plan might be the missing piece to ensure that the future SPP workforce is viable and sustainable. Writing directives and providing resources may still be marginally effective without a corresponding force structure and personnel policy. A developmental framework exists, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency gives the

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<sup>109</sup> Samuel J. Haynes, "The Army National Guard Security Cooperation Workforce" (master's research project, University of Kansas, 2020), 15.

<sup>110</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5123.01H, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), A-5.

<sup>111</sup> US Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, *Fiscal Year 2021 State Partnership Program (SPP) Program Management Guide* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2021), 47.

services plenty of latitude to implement it according to their internal policies. Flexibility promotes decentralized execution, but is also a potential shortcoming without controls to ensure compliance with personnel management policies that promote interagency development.

John Kotter discusses this in *Heart of Change*, where he describes making organizational changes stick.<sup>112</sup> He mentions embedding changes in the organization's culture by linking new requirements to the promotion process. It may sound like distilling complex organizational change to a simple rubric of carrots and sticks. However, there is significant academic and anecdotal evidence to support Kotter's claims. OPMS XXI and the current preference for command career pathways are one example. To make SCWD work for SPP, stated requirements should have incentives – both positive and negative. Two recommendations are likely to have value: (1) create a distinct SPP career path in the National Guard; (2) link SCWD certification to favorable promotion opportunities.

From a force structure perspective, today's SPP is similar to the non-specialized areas that OPMS XXI recommended should become separate branches or functional areas. This problem applies to the Army Security Cooperation Workforce in general – SPP simply inherited this condition. Without an established “home,” security cooperation will remain an area for most Army officers to dabble in for a short time until they return to their assigned career field. Some branches are exceptions, but they are outliers in the Army's total force.

The National Guard previously examined how to develop an SPP career path, and it is worth reconsidering this idea in light of updated legislation and policy.<sup>113</sup> A career path would support the progressive development of SPP expertise through successive assignments and education. Hypothetically, a captain can serve as a state SPP coordinator, become a BAO overseas as a major, then return as their state's SPP Director after promotion to lieutenant

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<sup>112</sup> John Kotter and Dan Cohen, *Heart of Change: Real-Life Stories of How People Change Their Organizations* (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2002), 159.

<sup>113</sup> Michael Braun, conversation with the author, February 9, 2021.

colonel. Senior field grade assignments could be with the National Guard Joint Staff orchestrating national-level SPP policy, or service with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Within an SPP-oriented career field, an officer who takes the hypothetical path above will still be competitive for promotion and command opportunities, versus today's construct of taking fleeting broadening opportunities as developmental assignments at each grade. The pinnacle for SPP progression would be promotion to general officer. This pathway would make it possible for a seasoned SPP expert to serve as a state Adjutant General and the senior military representative between a National Guard state and their SPP partner nation.

Personnel policy changes are still possible without creating a distinct career field for SPP or Security Cooperation. The Army and Joint Force have seen success with creating skill identifiers, making specific qualifications prerequisites for promotion or assignment, and weighting certain experiences in guidance to promotion boards. A shining example is the current system for joint officer management (JOM). Some staff positions in joint organizations are designated for officers who are "joint qualified" with a skill identifier in the officer's file. Officers seeking joint qualification must complete a prescribed set of education and experiences to accumulate *joint qualification points*.<sup>114</sup> The points and resultant joint qualification levels follow an officer throughout their career and may influence selection for senior leadership positions like command as a colonel and promotion to general officer.<sup>115</sup> Therefore, officers who wish to remain competitive at the field grade level and beyond have significant incentive to become joint qualified. SPP and Security Cooperation writ large could adopt similar techniques to advance efforts to professionalize the Security Cooperation Workforce.

Current strategic documents and policies are orienting the SPP force to meet 2030 requirements. The DoD and National Guard are moving in the right direction, but successful

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<sup>114</sup> US Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DODI 1300.19, 10-13.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 12, Table 1; Frank Hooker, email message to the author, January 26, 2021.



implementation remains to be seen. Human capital management policy and plans should evolve accordingly to facilitate execution. One inherent difficulty in standardizing requirements across the National Guard is the self-determination afforded to each of the 54 National Guard states, territories, and the District of Columbia. Despite this challenge, the National Guard should incentivize a progressive pathway for SPP officer development and its attendant interagency competencies.

## The Evolving Role of DSCA

2020 was a unique year for DSCA, and it may portend the future of civil-military relationships in the continental United States. The DoD was more active than usual on the home front, responding to a global pandemic, civil unrest, federal elections, border operations, and the annual assortment of natural disasters. Some DSCA operations were routine. Others – like deploying a brigade from the 82d Airborne Division to Washington, DC – were uncharacteristic of typical DSCA missions. The Army MDO concept describes an extended battlefield with multi-domain threats emanating from the Strategic Support Area, which includes the US homeland.<sup>116</sup> Future interagency collaboration for DSCA is likely to increase both in kind and degree. The Army must prepare officers for new kinds of domestic support operations that involve significant interaction with external agencies.

The US Army is accustomed to expeditionary operations. Using a sports analogy, most soldiers foresee playing “away games” while domestic authorities take care of “home games.” This mindset forms a mental divide between overseas operational deployments and homeland garrison activities. Military lexicon supports this narrative, with a distinction between *deployment* and *dwell time*. Although many soldiers consider deployment as overseas operations, the statutory definition includes any operation that takes a soldier away from their home residence.<sup>117</sup> Units may need to support more homeland contingency operations in the future.

The cyber and space domains of warfare reduce the physical, cognitive, and temporal distance between the United States and its adversaries, making the US homeland an increasingly active military operational area. The homeland is no longer a sanctuary, and Army culture will need to shift appropriately for ongoing competition and conflict at home. Blurred lines between home, abroad, peace, and war complicate the Army’s approach to force posture and response.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> US Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, vi.

<sup>117</sup> *US Code* 10 (2011), § 991.

<sup>118</sup> US Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, vi.

Military homeland defense and homeland security concerns will no longer be the exclusive purview of USNORTHCOM, USINDOPACOM, and reserve component forces.<sup>119</sup> The Army Total Force will likely continue to integrate with the Department of Homeland Security and other civil entities. Army officers will need to be versed in the authorities that govern DSCA. Units often conduct DSCA in response to emergencies, and officers with existing knowledge of how the DoD interacts with civil authority will be better enabled for crisis response. Adapting an established SOF truth, “competent [DSCA leaders] cannot be created after emergencies occur.”<sup>120</sup>

One crucial authority is the role of the dual status commander (DSC). A DSC is a general officer who can simultaneously command federal (Title 10) and state (Title 32) forces.<sup>121</sup> By law, federal officers cannot command state forces and vice versa. The DoD uses DSC authority somewhat sparingly, but it enables unity of command in domestic response operations that employ federal and state forces. Joint doctrine expresses a need to train and certify DSCs before an emergency so that they can merely be activated as needed.<sup>122</sup> DSCs provide a critical interagency link between the military and civil authorities, evidenced by the prevalence of DSCs used nationwide to enable hurricane response in 2018 and pandemic response in 2020.<sup>123</sup> Preparing senior leaders is only part of the equation. Future brigade, battalion, and company

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<sup>119</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, *Homeland Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), Executive Summary.

<sup>120</sup> “SOF Truths,” US Special Operations Command, accessed February 14, 2021, <https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths>. The actual SOF truth is, “Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.”

<sup>121</sup> US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, D-1.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, D-6.

<sup>123</sup> Joe Lacdan, “With Hurricane Michael Hitting, Army Leaders Stress Cohesion among Relief Efforts,” Army News Service, October 11, 2018, [https://www.army.mil/article/212229/with\\_hurricane\\_michael\\_hitting\\_army\\_leaders\\_stress\\_cohesion\\_among\\_relief\\_efforts](https://www.army.mil/article/212229/with_hurricane_michael_hitting_army_leaders_stress_cohesion_among_relief_efforts); Eric B. Smith and Jon Soucy, “Dual-Status Commanders Appointed in 8 States for COVID-19 Response,” Army News Service, March 26, 2020, [https://www.army.mil/article/234010/dual\\_status\\_commanders\\_appointed\\_in\\_8\\_states\\_for\\_covid\\_19\\_response](https://www.army.mil/article/234010/dual_status_commanders_appointed_in_8_states_for_covid_19_response)

leaders will need education on how their units may operate under a dual status command relationship.




Figure 12. Dual Status Commander relationships. US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), D-2.

Recognizing increased demand for military support to civil authorities and a supporting role when employed, Army officers should also become attuned to FEMA's National Response Framework. *DSCA Level II* is a desired FEMA qualification for the NGB Joint Staff, state national guard emergency managers, and officers assigned to USNORTHCOM and its service

component commands. There may be value in encouraging the general population of officers to gain similar familiarity. The Army has effectively crafted personnel policy by making DSCA Level II part of the requirement to earn the D7A Permanent Duty Skill Identifier.<sup>124</sup> A further benefit would be to reward DSCA certified officers with favorable consideration on promotion and assignment selection boards. The change would move D7A qualification from the niche into the mainstream, helping to permeate the force with desirable DSCA and interagency knowledge.

The Army's future force will need to be agile both at home and abroad. The Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve will continue to make enormous contributions to DSCA and related activities. As the Army adapts to face new problems, its officers will need a cultural shift that elevates the importance of homeland support operations. America's adversaries will continue to seek asymmetric advantages and leverage the US homeland to create dilemmas that preclude expeditionary operations. Domain convergence implies interagency convergence, and officers should prepare now for tomorrow's homeland interagency challenges.

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<sup>124</sup> US Army, DA PAM 600-3, Table 1-2; US Department of the Army, Command and General Staff School, *AY20 Enclosure 3 Course Description and MOD Information as of 10 FEB 20* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2020), 46.

## Policy Implications

Policy is the alpha and omega for all DoD activities. An Army adage professes that everything in the Army can be referenced in a field manual – even mundane activities like taking out the trash.<sup>125</sup> With this in mind, it is worth looking at how current policies affect interagency leader development and the potential implications of recommended changes. To clarify terms, the discussion on policy will cover the three areas of *law*, *policy*, and *regulations*.

*Law* generally refers to federal statutes or the US Constitution, since everything the DoD does lawfully has a legal basis. Commonly referenced laws include the Constitution and US Code in Title 10, Title 32, Title 50, Title 22, and Title 18, covering a range of topics from national defense to law enforcement. *Policy* includes national and agency strategies, senior leader guidance from policy letters or memoranda, and unwritten “rules of the road.” *Regulations* are documents including doctrine, directives, instructions, and – unsurprisingly – Army regulations. The law-policy-regulation triad forms an imperfect hierarchy of documentation that authorizes, prohibits, or constrains every activity within the DoD.

### Law

After graduating from the glory days of company-grade rank, staff majors are often advised not to rest until they find a way to implement their commander’s vision. “Get to yes,” is a common phrase adopted from the Harvard Business School, albeit originally more about negotiation than perseverance.<sup>126</sup> Sometimes a leader wants something that is simply not possible under existing legal frameworks. Instead of telling their boss about impossibilities, enterprising

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<sup>125</sup> US Department of the Army, “Solid Waste (Nonhazardous),” in Technical Bulletin Medical (TB MED) 593, *Guidelines for Field Waste Management* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 5.

<sup>126</sup> Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2011).

majors may tell their supervisor, “yes we can! – *if* we change the law.” Sometimes, this actually leads to new legislation that brings innovative ideas to fruition.

One such possible legislative change is amending the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). Enacted in 1980, DOPMA is the capstone legislation that governs military officer personnel management. It notably establishes age limits on how long officers can serve according to their highest attained rank.<sup>127</sup> This monograph previously discussed that it takes twenty-five years to produce a full-fledged interagency expert. Under DOPMA, senior field grade officers are limited to twenty-eight or thirty years of service, leaving only three to five years of possible utilization after achieving interagency mastery.<sup>128</sup>

In some cases, this mandatory separation requirement illustrates poor personnel management. Although an officer contributes throughout a decades-long journey toward refined interagency competency, arbitrarily forcing them to retire based on legislated service limits may prohibit access to senior-level talent. Each year, valuable officers are forced out of military service simply because they have committed *too much* of their lives to the Army, even though they would offer much more if given the opportunity. The DOPMA should make exceptions for niche specialties (some exceptions already exist) that will allow senior interagency experts to continue serving. The “up or out” policy should become an “up or stay” program for high-value low-density specialties.

## Policy

Joint officer management is a key policy with direct links to Title 10 in US Code. Interestingly, the DoD instruction that requires officers to be versed in *joint matters* does not define the term’s meaning.<sup>129</sup> Instead, the DoD instruction references the statute containing the

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<sup>127</sup> Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, Public Law 96–513, *US Code* 10 (1980), § 633 et seq.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> US Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DODI 1300.19, 5.

definition of “joint matters.”<sup>130</sup> Joint officer management policy is rooted in the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, which was very explicit about using personnel policy to strengthen inter-service capabilities.<sup>131</sup>

Thirty-five years later, and after several revisions to JOM, the military still seeks a balance between joint requirements, positions, education, training, and personnel policy to make joint service appealing. Several research studies have been commissioned over the years, and a recent report suggests that the system is still misaligned.<sup>132</sup> To propose a counterfactual, swapping the words “joint” and “interagency” throughout JOM’s history would present the same issues. The military already has a significant undertaking with optimizing the JOM system. Adding the interagency as an additional developmental priority will likely dilute management efforts and produce more of the same problems.

However, all is not lost for the interagency. The DoD could leverage the “JIIM” grouping to adapt ongoing personnel reforms for increased interagency demands. Fortunately, this monograph is not the first paper to argue for the need. RAND’s 2019 study on producing joint qualified officers suggests expanding the concept of “jointness” from mere multiservice interactions to include the interagency due to emerging domains and threats.<sup>133</sup> Current military talent management initiatives may choose to incrementally expand the “joint” idea to emphasize interagency development.

This approach might be less disruptive and more appealing to the government bureaucracy that manages military professionals. Although descriptions of jointness often include the interagency, the military’s cultural narrative favors *interservice* collaboration. This narrative,

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<sup>130</sup> Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99–433, *US Code* 10 (1986), § 668.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> RAND Corporation, *A Framework for Joint Officer Management: A Strategic Approach* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 2.

<sup>133</sup> RAND Corporation, *Producing Joint Qualified Officers: FY 2008 to FY 2017 Trends* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), xiv.



supported by Congressional impetus, cannot be simply ignored or replaced. Organizations exhibit a natural tension between the *operational system* representing the status-quo and the *entrepreneurial system* that reflects new innovations.<sup>134</sup> The DoD monolith may respond better to small system inputs that do not offend its cultural predisposition for joint officer development.<sup>135</sup>

## Regulations

As the principal professional development guide for Army officers, DA PAM 600-3 would be heavily involved in personnel reforms that promote interagency competency.<sup>136</sup> The pamphlet links to other regulations that specifically address training, education, assignments, evaluations, promotions, skill identifiers, and other personnel management areas. Overlaid against Simon Sinek's Golden Circle, DA PAM 600-3 gives an overview of the *why* and *what* for Army officer leader development, while other documents detail the *how*.<sup>137</sup> Army regulations that implement change will begin in the middle of the circle to explain why the interagency is important, which will prepare the way for supporting regulations on technical and administrative details.

Put simply, DA PAM 600-3 and its branch-specific smartbooks will need to emphasize interagency development. Army personnel regulations already do this for joint development. However, DA PAM 600-3 is not the single or final determinant for officer career decisions. Mentors, assignment slating guidance, selection board instructions, senior leader pronouncements, and family considerations all influence officers' paths during their careers. Nonetheless, the officer professional development guide serves as a point of departure and a stable reference.

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<sup>134</sup> Michael J. Arena and Mary Uhl-Bien, "Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting from Human Capital to Social Capital," *People + Strategy* 39, no. 2 (Spring 2016).

<sup>135</sup> Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking*, 4.2.

<sup>136</sup> US Army, DA PAM 600-3, 1.

<sup>137</sup> Simon Sinek, *Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action* (New York, NY: Penguin Group, Amazon Kindle Edition, 2009), 37.




Figure 13. Simon Sinek's Golden Circle. Simon Sinek, *Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action* (New York, NY: Penguin Group, Amazon Kindle Edition, 2009), 37.

The US Army Special Forces 4th Battalion redesign is a contemporary example of how the Army and its branch proponents use DA PAM 600-3 to amplify personnel policy changes and support emergent strategy. In 2013, active Army Special Forces Groups began formally transitioning their 4th Battalions to include new types of units. Somewhat typical for SOF, force structure changed first, pulling personnel policies along in tow. The temporary incongruence between *actual* positions and *documented* positions created uneasiness among officers seeking assignments in the reorganized battalion.

Previous policies did not account for the new positions, so some officers initially viewed service in the 4th Battalion as a career risk or a mere broadening assignment. To counteract this perception, Army SOF leaders published memoranda highlighting the battalion's importance and prioritizing certain positions. However, many officers were not confident that a memorandum from an SF commander (not even the most senior SF commander) would credibly inform centralized Army promotion boards. In 2014, the Army released an updated DA PAM 600-3. Among other changes, the revision explicitly stated that new command slots in the 4th Battalions

were *equivalent* to previously established key developmental assignments.<sup>138</sup> The regulatory update used less than two lines of text, but it sent a powerful signal to the force legitimizing the restructured battalion and giving officers an incentive to compete for service in the unit. The Army will likely follow a similar pattern of using DA PAM 600-3 to enhance the credibility of changes if leader development pivots toward the interagency.

## Money Talks

With ultimate control over monetary expenditures, the US Congress plays a special role in policymaking. DoD activities with Congressional *authorization* (normally conveyed in annual NDAs) cannot be executed without an accompanying Congressional *appropriation*. The legal vehicle of Congressional appropriation allows the expenditure of US Treasury funds for express purposes.<sup>139</sup> The author witnessed the drawbacks of authorizations without appropriations firsthand while managing overseas security cooperation activities in 2017. The military could not execute some exercises *authorized* in the NDAA until it received enacted *appropriations* designating funds for authorized activities. A memorable exchange involved a senior officer who was frustrated because the GCC canceled their event when funding did not arrive on time. After inquiring about funding constraints, the senior officer frustratedly exclaimed, “well who gives us the money?!” to which the author responded, “Congress.”<sup>140</sup>

Recommendations for increased training, education, and longer terms of military service have an associated cost. A lingering question for most things related to the federal government is, “who is going to pay for it?” Constitutionally, Congress must appropriate the funds for any policy adjustments.<sup>141</sup> Despite recent largesse, the US defense budget is finite. Increases in some areas

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<sup>138</sup> US Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2014), 169.

<sup>139</sup> US Constitution, art. 1, sec. 7, cl. 1.

<sup>140</sup> Anonymous senior officer, conversation with the author, 2017.

<sup>141</sup> US Constitution, Article 1.

may result in decreases elsewhere. Force design updates to promote interagency leader development will always contend with the competing demands of today's readiness and future modernization.

## Conclusion: The Future is Now

The services face evolving threats and the need for more advanced joint operational concepts. Jointness is progressing beyond interservice capability to include interagency, multinational, and coalition jointness for expanding mission areas (space and cyberwarfare).

—RAND Corporation, Producing Joint Qualified Officers

The Army must prioritize interagency knowledge in leader development to remain ready and relevant for future operational demands. Interagency collaboration is important now, and its prominence will continue to grow in the 21st Century. The Department of Defense enables international partnerships in collaboration with the Department of State.<sup>142</sup> Local, state, and national civilian agencies request DoD support for routine and emergent homeland security missions via DSCA.<sup>143</sup> Future operating concepts highlight competition below the threshold of war and the increasing application of warfighting domains that leverage interagency expertise.<sup>144</sup> How the Army prepares its officers through training, education, and experience will determine how effectively leaders conduct interagency operations.

Current Army leader development models mention the interagency, but few career fields emphasize gaining interagency competency during an officer's career. DA PAM 600-3 generally describes exposure to the interagency as a broadening experience. However, it provides few incentives for officers to include those experiences in a tight career timeline that favors command for aspiring senior leaders.<sup>145</sup> *Interagency* is often grouped into the aggregate JIIM construct and personnel policy favors *joint* development among all others in the JIIM family.<sup>146</sup> With few exceptions for some specialized branches and functional areas, interagency development is a low

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<sup>142</sup> US Joint Staff, JP 3-20, vi.

<sup>143</sup> US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, ix-x.

<sup>144</sup> US Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, vii; US Joint Staff, JOE 2035, 41-42.

<sup>145</sup> US Army, DA PAM 600-3, i; RAND Corporation, *Raising the Flag*, 64.

<sup>146</sup> US Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DODI 1300.19, 24.

priority, executed ad-hoc, and not rewarded. The Army should consider adjusting its leader development approach to make current models congruent with future requirements.

Several opportunities exist for the Army and DoD to enhance interagency leader development. Officer career timelines can adjust to encourage senior branch-qualified captains to take interagency broadening opportunities before they are promoted to major. Intermediate level education could include exercises that portray an interagency task force, with visiting civilian participants from external agencies. The DoD may expand its JOM program to emphasize interagency experiences in addition to joint service experiences. The Army might offer skill identifiers for interagency-related fields like DSCA and security cooperation, or even create new branches with distinct career paths. To be enduring, changes must anchor to Army culture by linking interagency knowledge accumulation with favorable consideration in assignment and promotion selection boards.

Law, policy, and regulations carry associated implications for the recommendations above. Congress sets limits for force structure, length of service, and military operating budgets.<sup>147</sup> Grounded in capabilities assessments, DoD guidance influences how many officers should have a particular specialty, how much time to spend on their development, and how much money their training and education should cost.<sup>148</sup> In addition to legal restrictions, revising policies and regulations can sometimes be a tedious incremental process given the Army's dense bureaucracy and strong cultural narratives.<sup>149</sup> However, these aspects should not prevent the Army from making necessary modifications.

Interagency requirements are trending upwards. If the Army does not adapt, it risks being unprepared to contribute to the future joint force. Bilateral relations and multinational operations are a strategic mainstay for the United States. Defense officers should have more interagency

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<sup>147</sup> US Constitution, Article 1; Defense Officer Personnel Management Act.

<sup>148</sup> US Joint Staff, CJCSI 5123.01H, A-5.

<sup>149</sup> Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking*, 4.2.

knowledge to enable diplomatic initiatives. The Army performs an ever-expanding assortment of homeland missions with more frequency and for longer durations. National domestic reliance on Title 10 and Title 32 Army forces will not decrease, and all Army officers should be familiar with the nuances involved in support homeland security missions with interagency counterparts. The force America needs during future homeland crises may not exist if the Army remains oriented on expeditionary operations. Finally, competition and multi-domain operations are a new style of warfare for a different kind of officer. Army officers with sufficient interagency development will improve adaptability as the nation responds to new challenges. Despite the constant challenge of limited resources and competing demands, the Army must begin now to develop competent strategic leaders who are effective interagency collaborators in the next two decades.

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