

The Use of Conscription and the All-Volunteer Force During
Large Scale Combat Operations
A Monograph

by

MAJ Christopher L. Coco
US Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
US Army Command and General Staff College
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Name of Candidate: MAJ Christopher L Cocco

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 //signed/01APR 21/JK// , Monograph Director
Justin E. Kidd, PhD

//signed/29 MAR 21/JQR//, Seminar Leader
Jacob Q. Robinson, LtCol USMC

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
 Brian A. Payne, COL

Accepted this 20th day of May 2021 by:

_____, Assistant Dean of Academics for Degree Programs
Dale F. Spurlin, PhD and Research, CGSC

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Abstract

Utilization of Conscription and the All-Volunteer Force During Large Scale Combat Operations Studies, by Christopher L. Coco, 47 pages.

In the past, large mobilizations had depended on conscription of eligible members of the population and reserve component members. In 1973 the United States created legislation that changed the military to an all-volunteer force and eliminated the policy of conscription. Since the change in policy the Department of Defense had to rely on the recruitment of new soldiers to meet the personnel requirements during times of war. This study examines how the policy change from conscription to an all-volunteer force has affected the ability of the US Army to support mobilization and personnel replacement for LSCO. This was accomplished by using a cross-case analysis of three case studies to compare the use of conscription to a volunteer force to meet LSCO demands. The case studies consisted of three different conflicts, World War Two, the Korean War and Desert Storm. The study found that while a volunteer force is capable of meeting short term LSCO demands, prolonged LSCO would become cost prohibitive, and the US would eventually have to reintroduce conscription to meet manpower demands.

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Abbreviations

AR	Army Reserve
ARNG	Army National Guard
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
BDE	Brigade
BN	Battalion
DOD	Department of Defense
FM	Field Manual
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
SSS	Selective Service System
US	United States
USC	United States Code

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Section I: Introduction

Background of the Study

The twentieth century began with the conscription of young men to meet the manpower needs of the United States military. From World War One through the Vietnam War, the United States relied on conscription to fill critical vacancies in the Army, Army National Guard (ARNG), and Army Reserve (AR) in a short amount of time such as the.¹ Following World War Two, Korea, and the Vietnam War, the American public grew critical of utilizing conscription to fight its wars and desired a way to create a military that better represented the American society.²

The issues regarding the fair and equitable resourcing of manpower for military purposes are contentious. The conscription of citizens supplied a large and predictable source of manpower that the US can count on in the event of a national emergency or declaration of war but is described as a “tax” on our society. Conversely, a volunteer force had to meet its manpower needs through market competition while remaining capable of meeting the military needs when conducting large-scale combat operations.³ In 1970 President Nixon established the Presidential Commission on the All-Volunteer Force to examine how the military would transition from the use of conscription to a voluntary force. The implementation of a voluntary military would create new personnel policies that managed manpower procurement with changes within the civilian population, such as population migration and service eligible men's registration to meet manpower demands.⁴

In 1973, the United States ended its conscription practice by adopting a policy of recruitment of a volunteer military. This transition required significant changes to personnel

¹The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force; Feb., 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1970), 3.

²Ibid., 3

³Ibid., 4

⁴Ibid., 117

recruitment to fill critical vacancies, and how this new volunteer force ensured that it had the manpower needed to fight and win during Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) with a near-peer adversary. The volunteer force has been used in various conflicts since its inception, such as Desert Storm. However, it has yet to compete against a near-peer adversary requiring the procurement of enough personnel to fill the Army, ARNG, and the AR to their authorized strength during LSCO.

This study focused on the manpower procurement method of conscription used during World War Two and the Korean War compared to the recruitment of the voluntary force used during Desert Storm. Additionally, it examined the effects recruiting a voluntary force had on the ARNG and Reserves' role during LSCO. Lastly, it explored current legislation, policies, or doctrine to discover any changes needed to ensure a volunteer force can deploy the manpower necessary during LSCO.

The purpose of this study was to examine a gap in research concerning the volunteer forces' ability to conduct long-term LSCO against a peer adversary. Historically the United States has depended on conscription to fill critical vacancies when called to war. The change to a voluntary force required the army to recruit and retain a force large enough to fill the authorized end strength proposed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and approved by Congress.

This study examined the change from conscription to a volunteer force and its effect on the ability of the US Army to conduct the mobilization and replacement of personnel during LSCO. Additionally, this study investigated the effects of changing to a volunteer force has had on the ARNG and Army Reserve and their role during LSCO. Lastly, this study examined current legislation, policies, or doctrine changes to ensure a volunteer force can deploy the manpower necessary during LSCO when confronted by a near-peer threat.

The significant contribution of this study is to the manpower procurement policies used during LSCO with a near-peer adversary. In this type of conflict, the US will have to mobilize the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve in a short amount of time. This study compared

the conscription policies used during World War Two and the Korean War and the voluntary force used during Desert Storm to determine if the current personnel mobilization legislation, policies, and doctrine will meet LSCO needs.

Definition of Terms

Conscription

Conscription is the compulsory enrollment of persons, especially for military service. This authority comes from section VII, Article I of the Constitution that empowers Congress to raise and support armies.⁵

Selective Service System

The Selective Service System is a federal agency within the executive branch responsible for acquiring qualified civilian men to serve in the armed forces as authorized by Congress.⁶ Men between the ages of 18-26 are required to register with the Selective Service System and be called into the United States military if the President and/or Congress deems it necessary.⁷

All-Volunteer Force

It is a policy change implemented in 1973 to eliminate conscription in the US armed forces making all military service voluntary. It directed the United States Army to recruit the necessary manpower needed to fill its ranks. This policy's change was a significant shift that forced each military branch to compete with the civilian market, and each other.⁸

Reserve Components

⁵Robert K. Griffith, *The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997),42.

⁶U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service , *The Selective Service System and Draft Registration: Issues for Congress*, by Kristy N. Kamarck, R44452, (April 11, 2016): 2.

⁷Elias Huzar, "Selective Service Policy 1940-1942," *The Journal of Politics* 4, no. 2 (1942): 138, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2125771>

The reserve component consists of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Access to the Reserve Components can be authorized by the President and/or Congress during national emergencies or with a declaration of war.⁹

Hypothesis

The United States would have to overcome significant friction to meet the manning requirements needed to support a large-scale combat operation. Since the transition to a volunteer force, the US has not conscripted service members into the military. Initially, the ARNG and AR would mobilize individual soldiers or units to fill vacancies in active-duty formations creating significant personnel turbulence throughout the reserve components. This turbulence would create unplanned personnel attrition resulting in an increased demand for recruitment of new soldiers and a rising cost to retain soldiers currently serving in the ARNG or AR.

Theoretical Framework

This research was based on Molly Clever and David Segal's (2012) study in *After Conscription: the United States and the All-Volunteer Force*, where they determined the Army's transition to a voluntary force created a military that is smaller but capable of recruiting quality applicants and is reflective of American society. Clever and Segal refer to conscription as a “societal tax” paid through the conscription of personnel into the military that otherwise would have added value to the nation’s economy.¹⁰ Clever and Segal support the transition to an all-volunteer force to eliminate this form of tax and force the DOD to compete in the open market for quality personnel. Additionally, the *President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* supported the transition to the recruitment of a volunteer military through market competition by implementing significant policy changes such as increased service member pay and benefits,

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-111 *Army Mobilization, Manning, and Wartime Replacement Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 10.

¹⁰ Molly Clever and David R Segal, “After Conscription: The United States and the All-Volunteer Force,” *Security and Peace* 30, no. 1 (2012): 16.

better housing, and a retention program that utilizes various incentives to keep quality service members in the military.¹¹ While each of these studies supported an all-volunteer force's ability to maintain a military large enough to meet today's military needs. However, a gap in research exists concerning a voluntary force's ability to maintain a military large enough to conduct LSCO with a near-peer adversary.

Research Questions

One primary and three secondary research questions guided this study. First, how did the change from conscription to a volunteer force affect the army's ability to support personnel mobilization and replacement during LSCO? Second, in comparison, how did the policy change from conscription used during World War Two and the Korean War to the voluntary force used during Desert Storm impact the army's ability to meet LSCO demands? Third, how was the reserve components' role during LSCO affected by the policy change from conscription to a volunteer force? Finally, was there legislation, policies, or doctrine changes needed to ensure a volunteer force could deploy the manpower necessary during LSCO when confronted by a near-peer adversary?

The delimitations used in this study were determined by the need to examine the relationship between personnel conscription, the voluntary force, and the army's ability to meet the demands of LSCO with a near-peer adversary. Additionally, it provided a personnel policy comparison between conscription and a voluntary force within an appropriate time; the researcher limited research to World War Two, the Korean War, and Desert Storm.

A second delimitation was confining the personnel policy analysis to the US Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. While both conscription and the all-volunteer force are DOD-wide policies, the relationship examined is limited in scope. The examinations of the

¹¹ The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed *Force*; Feb., 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1970), 55.

US Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve use in all three conflicts examined and were significant personnel recipients through conscription and the all-voluntary force implementation.

This study relied on two assumptions. First, the authorized strength of the Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve's current authorized strength is large enough to conduct LSCO against a peer adversary. Second, the amount of time between notification of mobilization and the deployment of units in support of LSCO will be short-notice and require changes in the current mobilization and deployment doctrine, particularly concerning reserve component forces' mobilization.

This study is divided into five different sections. The first section includes the background, statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, definition of terms, theoretical framework, research questions, delimitations, and assumptions. Section two consists of a review of the relevant literature, focusing on the implications of the transition to a volunteer force and the US Army's ability to procure the needed personnel strength to conduct LSCO. Section three describes the methodology used during this research study, including the selection of three case studies and comparative analysis procedures. Section four presents the final analysis of the study, addresses the hypotheses and subsequent research questions. Lastly, section five summarizes the study and discusses the findings, implications, recommendations, and conclusions.

Section II: Literature Review

This section examines the extent literature on the relationship between the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and its ability to meet Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) manpower needs. It also examines the US Army, Army National Guard (ARNG), and Army Reserve's (AR) ability to mobilize and deploy personnel during previous large scale combat operations during World War Two and The Korean War, compared to the voluntary force used in Desert Storm. Additionally, this section addresses the effects of the transition to a volunteer force on the reserve components,

and examined legislation, policies, and doctrine related to the mobilization and deployment of the Army, ARNG, and AR assigned personnel in response to LSCO.

World War Two and the Korean War

In his book *The Draft and Public Policy* James M. Gerhart provided insight into the implementation of conscription during World War Two and the Korean War.¹² He discussed the Department of Defense's congressional manning reports, followed by the initial manpower estimates leading up to the conflict.¹³ Gerhart documented the political discussion surrounding conscription, its implementation, and the political discourse surrounding the cost of creating such a large force.¹⁴ Much of the political debate surrounding conscription was the balance between citizen's conscription to meet military needs, and maintaining a large enough workforce to continue the economic growth needed to support the war. The 18-35-year-old men being conscripted were the same men that worked on farms, in essential industries, or were business owners, and provided a critical workforce to the US economy.¹⁵ This tension between the conscription of draft-eligible men and keeping essential workers in the economy was a key friction point in the military's ability to meet the requirements to conduct LSCO.

Similarly, Marvin Kreidberg and Merton Henry's *History of Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945* described the process of personnel procurement through conscription used during World War Two.¹⁶ Much like Gerhart, Kriedberg and Henry document the need for conscription during World War Two to fill vacancies and build new force structure, noting that conscription was the only way to procure the manpower necessary at a consistent rate. They

¹² James M. Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970*. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 5-7.

¹³ Ibid., 85.

¹⁴ Ibid., 86.

¹⁵ Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington, , D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1994), 548-556.

¹⁶ Ibid., 552.

highlight the importance of the speed at which manning the force had to occur, the need for conscription to provide a consistent manpower procurement to replace attritted service members and build 100 divisions a year. Additionally, a critical point discussed is the Army National Guard's mobilization to fill critical vacancies and round out active-army formations with qualified soldiers recently transferred from the Army National Guard.

In Russel Weigly's book *The History of the United States Army* discussed the Selective Service's organizational design and function, and how it managed conscription across the country.¹⁷ His description of the conscription process provided an excellent example of implementing the draft for each conflict and how the Selective Service System managed manpower projections and quotas across the country to conscript the necessary manpower needed.¹⁸ While Weigly did support the need for conscription he additionally documents the tension between the building a large military through conscription while keeping the US economy operating at a high level to support war efforts. Weigly describes how this balance was achieved through the use of local draft boards to select eligible men for military service while exempting other citizens because of their employment in war critical industries.

In contrast, Mark A. Olinger's article entitled *US Army Mobilization During the Korean War and Its Aftermath*, published by the Institute of Land Warfare in 2008, described the "friction" of mobilizing the Army, ARNG, and AR, along with the implementation of conscription in support of the Korean War.¹⁹ Olinger described the hollowing out of the army and reserve components because of the demobilization after World War Two, leading to the peacetime draft of 1948 to ensure the Army, ARNG, and AR met their authorized personnel end

¹⁷ Russel Frank Weigley, *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 451-462.

¹⁸ Ibid., 438.

¹⁹ Mark A. Olinger, "US Army Mobilization During the Korean War and Its Aftermath," *The Institute of Land Warfare 70W (OAD)*: 5-6.

strength..²⁰ Olinger writes about the limited public support for the conscription of personnel into the military when Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948. Olinger discussed how this limited public support for conscription limited the ability of congress to increase the number of eligible men conscripted each year forcing the military to deploy forces to Korea as smaller units or individual mobilization to keep the appearance of a limited war. Additionally, Olinger discussed the military's difficulty in training conscripts while also training and mobilizing the ARNG and AR forces preparing to deploy to Korea..²¹ Training the Army National Guard required more NCOs, officers, and resources than training conscripts. Army National Guard units were often not manned to their authorized strength, missing equipment, and critical training when they arrived at their premobilization training..²² Contrarily new conscripts received the necessary skills training at basic entry training, and were manned and equipped to their authorized level requiring fewer resources..²³

Kuan Ho Kim, Susan Farrell, and Ewan Clague's book *The All-Volunteer Army and Analysis of Demand and Supply* analysis of the ARNG and AR found that recent conscription policies had created an environment of draft-induced enlistments..²⁴ Citizens would join the ARNG and AR to avoid conscription into the active-army during World War Two and the Korean War. These draft-induced enlistments allowed the reserve components to meet and maintain their authorized end-strength during conscription..²⁵ Similarly, the Gates Commission found that due to draft-induced enlistments, the typical reservist was older, possessed a higher education level, and

²⁰ Ibid., 5-6.

²¹ Mark A. Olinger, "US Army Mobilization During the Korean War and Its Aftermath ," *The Institute of Land Warfare* 70W (0AD):5-6.

²² Ibid., 8.

²³ Ibid., 10.

²⁴ Kwan Ho Kim, Susan Farrell, and Ewan Clague, *The All-Volunteer Army; an Analysis of Demand and Supply* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 88-90.

²⁵ Ibid., 88-90.

was more affluent than the average conscript.²⁶ Conversely, Molly Clever and David R. Segal's article "After Conscription: The United States and the All-Volunteer Force" discuss the active-army' reliance on the reserve components to fill critical manning shortages.²⁷

Additionally, Clever and Segal describe the friction between the need for personnel to serve in the military and keep personnel in critical industries during large scale mobilization of conscripted service members. Even with the transition to a voluntary force, the manning needs of the military did not change. The difference is that with a voluntary force, needed personnel have to be recruited from the population, forcing the military to compete with critical industries for quality personnel.²⁸

Transition to the All-Volunteer Force

The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (commonly referred to as the Gates Commission) was formed on March 27, 1969, by President Nixon. Its purpose was to examine the creation of a voluntary force, ending America's dependency on conscription to procure military manpower.²⁹ Critics of a volunteer military cited the cost to recruit and retain citizens would increase the defense budget to unacceptable levels.³⁰ However, the Gates Commission found that with an initial increase in junior enlisted pay, improved living conditions, and employment benefits, the defense department could recruit and retain the necessary number of service members to meet the military's authorized end strength up to 2 million service

²⁶*The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force*; Feb. 1970 (Washington, 1970), 111-114.

²⁷ Molly Clever and David R Segal, "After Conscription: The United States and the All-Volunteer Force" *Security and Peace* 30, no. 1 (2012):11.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Kwan Ho Kim, Susan Farrell, and Ewan Clague, *The All-Volunteer Army; an Analysis of Demand and Supply* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 6.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 111.

members.³¹ Kim et al., further supported the Gates Commission's finding.³² They found that with a 38% increase in pay, the army could recruit and maintain a volunteer force of 858,000 enlisted men considering retention and attrition rates at the time.³³ However, the study warned that as military manpower increases recruitment and retention costs could become prohibitive and surpass budgetary limitations.³⁴

This research was based on Molly Clever and David Segal's (2012) study in *After Conscription: the United States and the All-Volunteer Force*, where they determined the army's transition to a voluntary force created a military that is smaller but capable of recruiting quality applicants and is reflective of American society.³⁵ Clever and Segal refer to conscription as a “societal tax” that must be paid through the conscription of personnel into the military that otherwise would have added value to the nation’s economy. Conversely, Clever and Segal noted that while there were significant benefits to this policy change, the voluntary force's ability to grow to meet prolonged conflict would require supplemental forces such as the ARNG and AR and would risk becoming cost-prohibitive.³⁶ Additionally, K.H. Kim, Susan Clague, and Ewan Farrell's *The All-Volunteer Army: An analysis of Demand and Supply* identified similar challenges for maintaining a voluntary force by examining the loss of draft induced enlistments caused by the desire of citizens to avoid conscription by joining the ARNG or AR.³⁷ However, the analysis used in the *President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* supported the

³¹ Ibid., 122.

³² Ibid., 117.

³³ Kwan Ho Kim, Susan Farrell, and Ewan Clague, *The All-Volunteer Army; an Analysis of Demand and Supply* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 117.

³⁴ Ibid., 117.

³⁵ Molly Clever and David R Segal, “After Conscription: The United States and the All-Volunteer Force,” *Security and Peace* 30, no. 1 (2012):16.

³⁶ Ibid., 17.

³⁷ Kwan Ho Kim, Ewan Clague, and Susan Farrell, *The All-Volunteer Army: An Analysis of Demand and Supply* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1971), 118.

transition to the recruitment of a volunteer military through market competition by implementing significant policy changes such as increased service member pay and benefits, better housing, and a retention program that utilizes various incentives to keep quality service members in the military.³⁸ Each of these studies supported an all-volunteer force's ability to maintain a military large enough to meet today's military needs. However, a gap in research exists concerning a voluntary force's ability to maintain a military large enough to conduct LSCO with a near-peer adversary.

The All-Volunteer Force in Desert Storm

Robert Goldich's article, "The Army's Round out Concept after the Persian Gulf War," examined the total force concept of an active component division supported by a large ARNG and AR contingent during Desert Storm.³⁹ Goldich found that despite deploying multiple ARNG battalions and companies to support Desert Storm, the two ARNG armored brigades designated to deploy with an active component division could not meet mobilization benchmarks in time to deploy.⁴⁰ He found that this was mostly due to the lack of presidential authority to activate ARNG brigades leading up to Desert Storm. This lack of presidential or congressional authority to begin premobilization training impacted their ability to improve readiness, training, and the facilitation of personnel cross-leveling leading up to deployment.⁴¹ Similarly, Joshua Klimas and Gian Gentile's article titled "Planning an Army for the 21st Century" examined the ARNG division model force structure, and the round-out brigade concept used by the ARNG during

³⁸ *The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force*; Feb., 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1970), 110.

³⁹ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The Army's Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War*, by Robert L. Goldich, LTR91-1481 (1991), 6-8.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

Desert Storm.⁴² Klimas and Gentile identify that the lack of readiness and the dispersion of ARNG force structure prohibited ARNG divisions and brigades from deploying in support of Desert Storm as initially planned.⁴³ They continued their analysis by discussing the post Desert Storm ARNG force structure changes that reduced ARNG Divisions from ten to eight.⁴⁴ Additionally, Klimas et al. discussed the ARNG re-focus from the deployment of divisions or brigades to smaller formations that required fewer resources to deploy, and less state by state coordination for personnel and equipment cross leveling.⁴⁵ The inability of the reserve component BDEs to deploy in a no-notice or short-notice scenario forced the ARNG to prioritize BDE or smaller mobilizations by focusing on individual readiness and pre-planned mobilizations.⁴⁶

Legislation, Policy, and Doctrine

Elias Huzar's article "Selective Service Policy, 1940-1942," describes the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 as a law that leaves most of the discretion of conscription policy to the President. The 1940 Selective Service Act, commonly known as the Burke – Wadsworth Act, allowed conscription of men 18-36-years-old, requiring the draft registration of approximately 23,000,000 men across the US. Huzar begins by defining the duties and responsibilities of the Selective Service Agency and the immediate pressure that was applied to conscript as many eligible men as possible to ensure manning requirements were met.⁴⁷

⁴² Joshua Klimas and Gian Gentile, "Planning an Army for the 21st Century: Principles to Guide U.S. Army Force Size, Mix, and Component Distribution," *RAND Cooperation*, (2018): 6, <https://doi.org/10.7249/pe291>

⁴³ Joshua Klimas and Gian Gentile, "Planning an Army for the 21st Century: Principles to Guide U.S. Army Force Size, Mix, and Component Distribution," *RAND Cooperation*, (2018): 6, <https://doi.org/10.7249/pe291>.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 7.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 7.

⁴⁷ Elias Huzar, "Selective Service Policy 1940-1942," *The Journal of Politics* 4, no. 2 (1942): 205, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2125771>

Additionally, Huzar discusses the process of conscription through local draft boards that were required to determine the eligibility of their local population through published conscription policies and exemptions such as draft-age eligible men working in excepted industries and fathers. The initial conscription process helped the army meet its goal of an assigned strength of over 1.2 million service members by 1941..⁴⁸

Conversely, Maurice Matloff's book *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944* describes the policy concerns that encompassed the conscription of the service eligible population considered by draft boards, and the US's ability to continue to maintain the "Arsenal of Democracy." Initial army manning projections estimated 10,200,000 service members, or 7.8% of the population, were needed to win World War Two..⁴⁹ Initially, the estimate failed to consider essential employees in agriculture and other industries that were critical to the war. Military senior leaders and politicians alike believed this number was not sustainable and would have detrimental effects on the nation's economy. In 1942, The War Department created the Manpower Board to review manpower estimates that included other allies' estimates, and considered the need to maintain the economy. The board conducted a review of initial estimates, re-prioritized authorized manning levels across the US military, and created a new manning estimate of 8,208,000 service members..⁵⁰ The War Department Manpower Board met throughout World War Two and continually updated manpower estimates to adjust recruitment and conscription quotas and re-prioritize manning across the military as needed.

Similarly, James Gerhardt's book *The Draft and Public Policy* describes the Selective Service Act of 1948 as a peacetime draft that would ensure the military had met its end strength of 2,000,000, reducing the number of conscripted soldiers each year until 1950 when North Korea

⁴⁸ Elias Huzar, "Selective Service Policy 1940-1942," *The Journal of Politics* 4, no. 2 (1942): 205, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2125771>

⁴⁹ Maurice Matloff, "*Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*," (Washington, , D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1994), 112.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 113.

invaded South Korea.⁵¹ Gerhardt goes on to describe the 1950 extension of the 1948 Selective Service Act as a sudden reactivation of personnel procurement, changing the Selective Service System's yearly quota from 20,000 to 50,000 conscripts. Gerhardt further discusses this surge of conscripts and the increase of the Army's authorized strength of 1.4 million service members on June 30, 1950, to an end strength goal of 3.5 million service members by December 1950.⁵² While this sudden jump is significant, Gerhardt annotates that the Selective Service Agency responded quickly because of the establishment of the 1948 Selective Service Act. Additionally, Gerhardt describes the partial mobilization of the Army National Guard to support the Korean War. Army National Guard soldiers and units filled critical vacancies in active army units deploying to Korea in 1950 on a rotational basis.⁵³

According to Army Regulation 600-8-111, the army can expand its forces in a time of war, crisis, and national emergency. The expansion of military forces includes filling critical manpower shortfalls required to support its missions and requirements and may replace losses as they occur. Replacements for military personnel are procured either through other active- army units or transferred from the reserve components. To access reserve component personnel, the President must declare a state of national emergency or a declaration of war as outlined in Title 10, chapter 12 of the United States Code (USC).⁵⁴ This provision allows the Army National Guard to transition from being governed by their respective state governance under Title 32 of the USC to a "federalized" status under the Headquarters Department of the Army's control where they are assigned or attached to an active army unit. Various sections of Chapter 10 of the USC

⁵¹ James M. Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 123.

⁵² James M. Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 130.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 174.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-111, *Army Mobilization, Manning, and Wartime Replacement Operations*; (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 10.

determine the purpose and duration of a reserve component mobilization and limits the federal government's authority over reserve component personnel. In Weigly's book *History of the United States Army*, he documented the tensions concerning the National Guard and Reserve's mobilization to increase training and readiness leading to World War Two and the Korean War. The next section will discuss the methodology used to conduct this study.

Section III: Methodology

This study used a qualitative case-study methodology utilizing historical documentation focused on personnel procurement during Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). It compared two personnel procurement methods, conscription and recruitment of a volunteer force. Additionally, it examined the effects of implementing the All-Volunteer Force (AFV) in 1973 on the National Guard and Army Reserve. Finally, this study examined current legislation, policies, and doctrine to explore further if a volunteer force can provide the manpower required during LSCO

Case Selection

This study examined three case studies to compare and contrast the utilization of personnel conscription to a volunteer force and its ability to meet the manpower needs during LSCO. Two case studies used conscription as their means for personnel procurement but differed in implementation and personnel policy.

The first case study examined the conscription of personnel in support of World War Two. The Selective Service Act of 1940 created the first peacetime draft to form a 1,000,000-man army by 1941.⁵⁵ To meet this significant increase in authorized personnel end strength, Congress provided the executive branch the authority to begin conscription of men between the ages of 18-25.

⁵⁵ Russel Frank Weigley, *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 451-462.

The second case study explores the Korean War and the use of conscription to fill critical vacancies in the US Army. In 1948, the army was well below the authorized strength of 790,000 soldiers.⁵⁶ Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948, the second peacetime draft in the last decade, conscripting men between the ages of 19-35 for twenty-one months of active service to ensure the military met its authorized end strength. However, citizens could receive a draft deferral if they enlisted in the ARNG or AR.⁵⁷ In 1950 in response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, Congress extended the 1948 Selective Service act to grow the military to over 3.5million service members by 1951. Throughout the Korean War, the US used a partial mobilization strategy that would continuously deploy individual soldiers or small units to the Korean theatre to fight and win the Korean War while maintaining its worldwide strategic foothold.

The third case study was the utilization of a volunteer force to respond to an LSCO event. In 1990, President Bush mobilized 280,000 soldiers, including 144,000 ARNG and AR service members in support of Operation Desert Storm.⁵⁸ The ARNG and AR mobilization used a concept of round out forces to add an ARNG maneuver brigade to three army divisions, and fill specific critical vacancies throughout the ARNG and AR.⁵⁹

Instrumentation

This study used the case study methodology outlined in George and Bennett's *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*.⁶⁰ The methodology used allows for the identification and analysis of within-case studies for cross-case comparison.

⁵⁶ Marvin A. Kreidberg, and Henry G. Merton, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), 548-556.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 552.

⁵⁸ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The Army's Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War*, by Robert L. Goldich, LTR91-1481 (1991), 6-8.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 12.

⁶⁰ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *"Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences"* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 23

Data Collection

The analysis used a qualitative methodology to examine initial manning estimates, such as assigned and authorized strength. Primary and secondary sources were comprised of congressional and historical accounts. The historical analysis examined conflicts in the 20th century that required various personnel conscription levels, recruitment of a volunteer force, and the effects of these personnel procurement methods on legislation, policy, and doctrine compared to the service-eligible population.

Data Analysis

The qualitative analysis examined similarities and differences in personnel procurement methods of conscription and volunteer recruitment used the case study methodology.⁶¹ The data cited in this study used primary and secondary historical accounts of DOD personnel estimates, congressional testimony, and Selective Service Agency records to examine and answer three research questions. First, how did the policy change from conscription, used during World War Two and the Korean War, to a volunteer force, during Desert Storm, impact the US Army's ability to meet LSCO demands? Second, how has the ARNG and AR's role during LSCO been affected by the policy change from selective service to a volunteer force? Finally, what is the current legislation, policies, or doctrine changes needed to ensure a volunteer force can deploy the manpower necessary during LSCO when confronted by a near-peer threat? The results of the data analysis will be presented in the following chapter.

⁶¹ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 26.

Section IV: Findings and Analysis

Conscription during World War Two

While watching events unfold in Europe, President Roosevelt declared a limited national emergency on September 8, 1939. He asked Congress to increase the active army's end strength to 227,000 soldiers, and the Army National Guard to 235,000 soldiers.⁶² While this act did increase the authorized end strength of both the active army and the ARNG, it fell short of what many senior military leaders felt necessary to fight a war in Europe. In response to senior military leader's concerns, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1940 on September 16, 1940. Known as the Burke-Wadsworth Bill, it called for a 1,000,000-man army by 1941.⁶³ The bill also authorized the President to mobilize the ARNG, which allowed for the additional manpower and materials needed to train and man reserve component formations across the country, and establish a viable reserve force. In addition to enabling conscription and mobilizing portions of the reserve component, the Burke-Wadsworth Bill created significant policy changes by giving the executive branch the power to conscript citizens, increasing pay for conscripts to match soldiers currently serving, and providing civilian employment rights for conscripts.⁶⁴

The Selective Service System managed conscription through county draft boards consisting of three citizens nominated by the state's Governor and appointed by the President.⁶⁵ These individuals were responsible for the management and execution of local conscription

⁶² James M. Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970*. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 5-7.

⁶³ Ibid., 5-7.

⁶⁴ Elias Huzar, "Selective Service Policy 1940-1942," *The Journal of Politics* 4, no. 2 (1942): 203, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2125771>

⁶⁵ Russell Frank Weigley. *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 425.

policies. Exclusion policies allowed for draft-eligible young men employed in critical jobs, attending college, or married with a family to be exempt. Despite these exclusions, conscription policy created a large pool of eligible men between 18 and 25, allowing the army's strength to reach over 1,900,000 by the close of 1942.⁶⁶ A government manpower study, known as the Victory Program, predicted that the total number of soldiers needed to defeat Nazi Germany in Europe was approximately 8,795,658.⁶⁷ At the onset of the war, the War Department estimated that the army would require 200 divisions before opening ground combat operations in Europe; only 36 Divisions were available when Pearl Harbor occurred.⁶⁸ The War Department developed a plan that would activate four divisions per month beginning in the spring of 1942.⁶⁹ The initial plan allowed for twelve months manning and equipping each division, and to be declared combat-ready. Manpower procurement leaned heavily on enlisted personnel conscription, assigning many inexperienced soldiers within the divisions. Upon completing the ground conflict in Europe, only 89 of the planned 213 divisions were in existence. By the end of the war, the United States had mobilized 8,291,336 service members.⁷⁰ In comparison, Germany mobilized over 300 divisions, while Russia and Japan mobilized 100 each.⁷¹

Replacing manpower and equipment attrited by deployed forces, as well as the manning and equipping of new divisions proved a significant challenge for the US Army during World War Two. This required the US to balance conscripting eligible men into the military and retaining a large enough population to keep the US economy operating at a high level. The 1939 Lend-Lease program committed the US to become a large supplier of equipment to allied forces,

⁶⁶ Russell Frank Weigley. *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 438.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 435.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 435.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 439.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 425.

⁷¹ Ibid., 439.

but maintaining those commitments throughout the war strained the ability to equip additional US forces.⁷² An additional limiting factor in manning newly formed divisions was maintaining the American way of life.⁷³ The desire to maintain economic growth and a high standard of living created economic and social friction and limited support from the American populous for mass mobilization to support a war in Europe and Asia.

Conscription during the Korean War

At the conclusion of World War Two, the country was eager to demobilize service members that had volunteered or been conscripted during World War Two. In the three years after the war, the army had shrunk from 8.2 million to 2.1 million service members.⁷⁴ By March 1948, the army consisted of 540,000 active-duty service members. With the passing of the Selective Training and Service act of 1948, the army's authorized end strength was increased by 337,000 service members to 837,000 soldiers.⁷⁵ The Selective Service Act of 1948 provided the authorization to conscript men between the ages of 19-25 for twenty-one months of active service.⁷⁶ Potential conscripts could avoid the draft by enlisting in an organize reserve unit for three years, re-enlist in an organized reserve unit for three years if prior service, or join the ARNG with one year of active service followed by four years in an organized reserve unit.⁷⁷

On 30 June 1950, President Truman responded to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, by deploying the Far East Command to Korea.⁷⁸ The Far East Command comprised of 4

⁷² Russell Frank Weigley. *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 425.

⁷³ Ibid., 440.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 440.

⁷⁵ James M. Gerhardt. *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970*. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 123.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 124-126.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 153.

⁷⁸ Mark A. Olinger, "US Army Mobilization During the Korean War and Its Aftermath," *The Institute of Land Warfare 70W (OAD)*: 4.

Divisions manned at approximately 93% of their authorized Strength.⁷⁹ President Truman quickly realized that a broad mobilization of forces would be required after November 1950, when China entered the war.⁸⁰ The United States' immediate response was to extend all enlistments set to expire, and to begin transferring personnel from current active-army formations to bring units bound for Korea to combat strength. By July 1950 all four divisions were manned to their authorized strength by cannibalizing other formations outside of the Far East Command and the temporary assignment of Korean Nationals to US formations.⁸¹ In June 1951, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1951, extending the same policies as the 1948 Selective Service Act. This new act changed the draft age from 19 to 18, and began the conscription of medical professionals such as doctors, dentists, and nurses.⁸² More importantly, it allowed the President the authority to mobilize the ARNG for twenty-one months.⁸³

Soldiers conscripted during this period deployed to Korea as individual replacements.⁸⁴ This limited mobilization method ensured a constant flow of fresh and ready soldiers to units deployed forward to Korea. The concept of individual rotations was a system that awarded soldiers points for service in combat units, support units, or active service deployed to a theatre as part of a strategic reserve. Once a soldier accumulated sixteen points, they would be re-assigned to the strategic reserve or demobilized and reassigned to their original formation.⁸⁵ The military objective behind this method of personnel assignment allowed for continuity of command,

⁷⁹ Mark A. Olinger, "US Army Mobilization During the Korean War and Its Aftermath," *The Institute of Land Warfare* 70W (OAD): 3.

⁸⁰ Russel Frank Weigley, *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 451-462.

⁸¹ Mark A. Olinger, "US Army Mobilization During the Korean War and Its Aftermath," *The Institute of Land Warfare* 70W (OAD): 4.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸⁴ Russel Frank Weigley, *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 507-510.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 509.

keeping the same divisions, brigades, and battalions in theater while ensuring forces assigned to these formations remained at a heightened rate of readiness.

Additionally, this method of personnel procurement allowed for the appearance of a limited mobilization of forces in Korea while supplying the necessary manpower needed. This mobilization method allowed the Truman administration to conduct large-scale mobilizations without deploying large portions of the active-army or reserve component as witnessed during World War Two five years earlier.⁸⁶ Upon conclusion of the Korean War, 2,834,000 service members had served in Korea or as part of the strategic reserve, preventing what the Truman administration feared would be a Soviet advance.⁸⁷

All-Volunteer-Force during Desert Storm

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In response, President Bush ordered Saudi Arabia's defense from a potential Iraqi invasion on August 6, 1990. By August 13, the US began deploying Army divisions to Saudi Arabia, two of which were assigned ARNG round-out brigades in preparation for Operation Desert Storm.⁸⁸ This conflict was the first significant combat operation that tested the All-Volunteer Force's ability to respond to a crisis.

In August 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published the Total Force concept integrating ARNG, AR, and active-duty forces within army divisions.⁸⁹ This concept resulted in three ARNG brigades assigned to two active duty divisions where they were expected to maintain a high readiness to deploy with their active duty counterparts in the event of LSCO. In July 1990, at the start of Operation Desert Shield, three active duty divisions had an ARNG maneuver brigade

⁸⁶ Russel Frank Weigley, *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 507-510.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 508.

⁸⁸ Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The Army's Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War*, by Robert L. Goldich, LTR91-1481 (1991), 4.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 4.

assigned as one of their roundout brigades..⁹⁰ This roundout concept allowed the army to expand from 13 to 18 divisions without requesting additional force structure from Congress by using the reserve component as a sizeable strategic reserve. Additionally, the ARNG used this opportunity for their brigades to become a part of active duty divisions and receive additional resources to maintain a higher level of readiness associated with being a roundout brigade..⁹¹

In August 1990, President Bush and Congress authorized the deployment of over 228,000 soldiers, of which 140,000 were reserve component soldiers..⁹² Three active army divisions with ARNG roundout brigades assigned to them received notification of a short-notice deployment to Kuwait. The original roundout concept was designed on the premise that notification of deployment would occur following pre-planned LSCO timelines that provided ample time to conduct pre-mobilization tasks required for deployment. In the case of Desert Storm, the time between notification of mobilization and the actual deployment was only a few months, far short of the original roundout brigade timeline. The additional time was needed to allow the Army National Guard to cross-level personnel into critical vacancies, train newly assigned personnel, and validate a readiness level high enough to meet mobilization standards. The initial activations of the roundout brigades occurred on November 30 and December 7, 1990 respectively. However, on February 28, 1991, a ceasefire with Iraq was established, bringing an end to the ground war. Only one of the three activated roundout brigades had reached a combat readiness level acceptable for deployment before the ceasefire, but never deployed to Kuwait..⁹³ The mobilization lasted roughly six months, with significant ground combat only lasting three

⁹⁰ Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The Army's Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War*, by Robert L. Goldich, LTR91-1481 (1991), 4.

⁹¹ Ibid., 9.

⁹² Ibid., 9.

⁹³ Ibid., 4.

weeks. Upon Operation Desert Storm's conclusion, the US Army had defeated the world's fifth-largest army without significant loss.

Cross Case Analysis and Findings

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects the change from conscription to a volunteer force has had on the Army, ARNG, and AR's ability to meet LSCO demands. The hypothesis stated that the United States would have to overcome significant friction to meet the manning requirements to support LSCO that lasts multiple years.

Research Question #1

In Comparison, how did the change from conscription to a volunteer force affect the army's ability to support personnel mobilization and replacement during LSCO?

In both World War Two and the Korean War, the US faced a near-peer adversary. Initial World War Two planning estimates determined Germany's military establishment contained 9.8 million members, roughly 10.9% of its population.⁹⁴ Likewise, the North Korean and Chinese People's Liberation Army was estimated to be over 1.1 million service members at the height of the Korean War. At the onslaught of both conflicts, the United States had a small active army supported by a strategic reserve in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Additionally, in each conflict, Congress passed selective service legislation that provided a steady supply of needed manpower to fill critical vacancies, and fill new force structures as needed to fight and win a conflict with a peer adversary.⁹⁵ In each case, the US engaged in large scale combat operations that required the military's significant growth through reserve component mobilization and conscription while the US economy fueled the "arsenal of democracy" to defeat a near-peer adversary.

⁹⁴ Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington, , D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1994), 112.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 112.

In 1968, the government began personnel studies to determine if the eligible population's size had become large enough to meet the military's needs after transitioning to a volunteer force.⁹⁶ These estimates determined that a force of over two million volunteers, combined with an established Selective Service System that could execute a standby draft, would be needed to meet immediate threats that required a force of over an estimated 2 million service members.⁹⁷ Despite the loss of draft-induced enlistments, the volunteer force has witnessed great initial success by implementing policy changes such as increased pay and incentives for junior soldiers, and quality retention programs for officers and non-commissioned officers. Since the change to a volunteer military, the US Army has only missed its recruitment goal four times, and continually meets its retention aim points. However, the volunteer military has yet to confront a threat large enough to implement conscription.⁹⁸ The 2020 Selective Service System report to Congress annotates that 16,322,956 men between the ages of 18-25 registered with the Selective Service System resulting in a 92% registration rate.⁹⁹

Research Question #2

In comparison, how did the policy change from conscription utilized during World War Two and the Korean War to the voluntary force utilized during Desert Storm impact the army's ability to meet LSCO demands?

In comparison, how did the policy change from conscription used during World War Two and the Korean War to the voluntary force used during Desert Storm impact the army's ability to meet LSCO demands? Third, how was the reserve components' role during LSCO affected by the policy change from conscription to a volunteer force?

⁹⁶ *The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force; Feb., 1970* (Washington, 1970),

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁹⁸ Curtis Gilroy et al., "The All-Volunteer Force and the Need for Sustained Investment in Recruiting," *Center for Naval Analysis*, (2020): 7.

⁹⁹ Selective Service System, *Annual report to the Congress of the United States from the director of the Selective Service System* § (2020), 2-6.

The Selective Service Acts of 1940 and 1948 allowed the Selective Service System to begin conscripting citizens into the military. Conscription provided the steady and predictable stream of new personnel needed to fill critical vacancies in deploying units. The elimination of conscription eliminated draft-induced enlistments, along with a steady predictable stream of new conscripts. This change forced the army's manning strategy to become heavily dependent on the reserve components to fill critical vacancies in a national emergency or a declaration of war.¹⁰⁰

Today the National Defense Strategy focuses on the great power conflict and integrates the ARNG and AR. While the round out concept of Desert Storm is described as a flawed plan because of the round out brigade's inability to mobilize, Army National Guard BCTs and other brigade-size elements have successfully deployed to various theatres and have proven to be a critical part of LSCO planning. Although the challenges of mobilizing reserve component forces remain, with the implantation of critical readiness reporting and the steady planning that the Army Strategic and Operational Readiness cycle provided, the ARNG and AR forces can identify manning and equipment challenges before mobilization, shortening the amount of time needed to reach a deployable readiness level.¹⁰¹

Utilizing the reserve component as a strategic reserve for a national emergency or time of war keeps personnel costs low since most personnel assigned to reserve component units serve only in a part-time status.¹⁰² While this is a cost-effective method of managing a "fleet in being," it provides many unique challenges to maintaining personnel and equipment readiness. Historically reserve component units are often not manned to their full authorized strength, and their force structure was not always consolidated in the same geographical location. This

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-111, *Army Mobilization, Manning, and Wartime Replacement Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 5.

¹⁰¹ U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 525-30, *Army Strategic and Operational Readiness*, (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2020), 15-19.

¹⁰² *The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force*; Feb., 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1970), 98.

necessitated the need for additional or updated equipment when mobilizing.¹⁰³ Issues such as manning and equipping the reserve component for mobilization extended the amount of time needed for units to reach an acceptable readiness level to be considered deployable.¹⁰⁴

Research Question #3

How was the reserve components' role during LSCO affected by the policy change from conscription to a volunteer force?

Current legal authorities listed in 10 USC Chapter 12 require the President to declare a state of national emergency, or Congress must pass a declaration of war to mobilize the reserve component.¹⁰⁵ Weigly's *History of the United States Army* documents the tensions concerning National Guard and Army Reserve mobilization times to increase training and readiness.¹⁰⁶ Congress was hesitant to pass the 1940 Selective Service Act until portions of the reserve components were activated for a one-year mobilization for training to increase unit readiness, and limit the impact of conscription on the nation.¹⁰⁷ In World War Two, The Korean War and Dessert Storm, the challenge to a reserve component mobilization was the lack of a declaration of war or national emergency to authorize reserve component activation. In August 1990, President Bush had to seek congressional approval to mobilize 144,000 ARNG and AR soldiers to support Desert Storm. The ARNG mobilization used round out forces to add additional ARNG maneuver brigades, and individual mobilizations to fill specific critical vacancies throughout the force

¹⁰³ Joshua Klimas and Gian Gentile, "Planning an Army for the 21st Century: Principles to Guide U.S. Army Force Size, Mix, and Component Distribution," *Rand Corporation*, (2018): 6, <https://doi.org/10.7249/pe291>

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-111, *Army Mobilization, Manning, and Wartime Replacement Operation*, (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 10.

¹⁰⁶ Russel Frank Weigley, *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 433.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 507-510.

deploying for Desert Storm.¹⁰⁸ Round out personnel could have provided the necessary manpower needed to fight and win Desert Storm; however, without a declaration of war the mobilization of the reserve component mobilization was delayed and, in some cases, never occurred.

The Gates Commission suggested that the necessary manpower needed to create a sufficient fighting force could be established and maintained through market competition.¹⁰⁹ High enlistment standards, and increased pay and incentives coupled with investment in military housing and infrastructure would create the market dynamics needed to attract volunteers.¹¹⁰ The Gates Commission recommended four changes to personnel policy. First, increase junior enlisted pay to match civilian markets for the skills acquired. This pay increase provided the DOD the ability to compete for quality applicants on the open market by offering better wages and benefits than civilian counterparts. The second policy recommendation allowed soldiers to choose their military career path upon qualification. Job vacancies and quotas would be based on army attrition modeling and allow applicants to choose their military career path.¹¹¹ The third recommendation was to establish a transparent payment schedule, allowing soldiers to choose how to use their pay and benefits such as housing allowance and subsistence.¹¹² The fourth recommendation was to create a vested retirement program that allowed soldiers to retire at specific benchmarks in their careers. Retirement benefits would create an incentive for soldiers to serve a full career (20+ years), knowing they would earn a government pension upon retirement.¹¹³ The chart below displays the increase in pay and benefits provided to the US

¹⁰⁸ Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The Army's Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War*, by Robert L. Goldich, LTR91-1481 (1991): 4.

¹⁰⁹ *The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force; Feb., 1970*. (Washington, DC, 1970.), 105.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 106.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 107.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 108.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 108.

military to attract quality volunteers. Since 1965, pay and benefits have increased over 166%, and are well above the federal minimum wage..¹¹⁴




Figure 1. Molly Clever and David R Segal, "After Conscription: The United States and the All-Volunteer Force," *Security and Peace* 30, no. 1 (2012): 28.

Since the transition away from conscription to a voluntary force, the US military has invested in retention benefits to increase retention rates above 50% versus the 15% average retention rate of conscripts and draft induced enlistees..¹¹⁵ The US military has significantly invested in benefits to increase retention of the volunteer force. These efforts have led retention of volunteers to be above 50% versus the 15% average previously seen for conscripts and draft induced enlistees. In the years that the DOD did not make its recruiting requirements recruiting, retention, pay, and incentive programs were easy targets for budgetary cuts during congressional budgetary reform..¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Molly Clever and David R Segal, "After Conscription: The United States and the All-Volunteer Force," *Security and Peace* 30, no. 1 (2012):28.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹¹⁶ Curtis Gilroy et al., "The All-Volunteer Force and the Need for Sustained Investment in Recruiting," *Center for Naval Analysis* (2020): 23.

The transition to a volunteer force significantly impacted how the US Army, Army National Guard, and Army reserve would respond to LSCO. Historically the nation has turned to conscription to create a military large enough to defeat near-peer adversaries during World War Two and the Korean War. However, conscription created friction between the need for military manpower procurement and the nation's ability to maintain its status as the "arsenal of democracy" through its economic might. The voluntary force's implementation created friction between the US economy and the need to expand the military in the onslaught of LSCO with a near-peer adversary. A voluntary military has to compete with market forces to entice quality applicants to join the military rather than other industries through increased pay, incentives, and benefits. If the US were to undertake LSCO with a peer adversary, a volunteer forces' cost would significantly limit the nation's ability to support war efforts because of market competition. Additionally, military recruiting budgets would soar, and critical industries would have to raise wages and benefits to compete with the government's efforts to expand the military. To manage the military and economic friction, Congress would have to authorize conscription once again, and manage conscription rates much like the manpower boards of World War Two and the Korean War.

Section V: Conclusion

Discussion of the Findings

In comparison, how did the policy change from conscription utilized during World War Two and the Korean War to the All-Volunteer Force utilized during Desert Storm impact the US Army's ability to meet LSCO demands?

The policy change from conscription to the recruitment of a volunteer force impacted how personnel were assessed into the military and how the ARNG and AR personnel were used

but did not affect the army's ability to conduct LSCO during Desert Storm.¹¹⁷ During World War Two conscription accounted for 60% of the 8,200,000 service members serving.¹¹⁸ Similarly, the army deployed over 2.4 million service members during the Korean War.¹¹⁹ The initial mobilization and deployment of both volunteers and conscripts were conducted at a unit or individual level, and were rotational.¹²⁰ The rotational deployment concept mobilized individual soldiers from active duty units and the reserve component while keeping the same Corps and Division headquarters in theatre. Soldiers would receive points based on the number of months deployed, type of service (combat arms and support branches), and deployment location. Once a soldier achieved enough points, they would be demobilized and returned to their parent unit. This limited mobilization strategy allowed the army to deploy the manpower needed while not conducting what many would see as LSCO in an already war-weary country.

In August 1990, President Bush requested and received authorization to deploy 244,000 service members to execute Desert Storm. On February 28, 1991, a ceasefire with Iraq was established and concluded the ground war. The deployment for Desert Storm lasted roughly six months, with significant ground combat only lasting three weeks. After Operation Desert Storm, the army had executed the largest mobilization since the Korean War. It had also defeated the world's fifth-largest army within six months without significant loss.¹²¹ In comparison, the mobilization in support of Desert Storm displayed the volunteer force's ability to conduct LSCO against a significant threat over a short time.

¹¹⁷ Molly Clever and David R Segal, "After Conscription: The United States and the All-Volunteer Force," *Security and Peace* 30, no. 1 (2012):12.

¹¹⁸ Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington, , D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1994).

¹¹⁹ James M. Gerhardt," *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970*". (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 5-7.

¹²⁰ Russel Frank Weigley,. *History of the United States Army*. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1982), 435.

¹²¹ Mark A. Olinger, "US Army Mobilization During the Korean War and Its Aftermath ," *The Institute of Land Warfare* 70W (OAD): 6.

Conscription had provided a large and predictable pool of personnel that could fill vacancies in the military or create a new force structure as witnessed during World War Two. With the end of conscription and the transition to a voluntary force, the ARNG and AR became not only a strategic reserve, but an operational reserve as well. The Total Force concept integrated the ARNG and AR into current planning and began using the reserve component to fill critical vacancies and round out active-duty units.¹²² This form of integration was a way for the army to fill critical vacancies and provide force structure without requiring additional manpower. The round out concept did provide the necessary manpower needed to fight and win Desert Storm; however, the inability to mobilize the reserve component on a short-notice mobilization was a cause for concern and eventually ended the round out concept. Today the reserve component is a critical partner in the National Defense Strategy and has taken on a role as a force provider for CCOMs worldwide. While friction remains concerning the time required to mobilize the reserve component, it has proven to mobilize BDE size elements on pre-planned deployments with great success.

How was the ARNG and AR's role during LSCO affected by the policy change from conscription to a volunteer force?

The policy change from conscription to a volunteer force changed the ARNG and ARs role during LSCO to an integrated strategic partnership providing additional strength and capability to the army. To keep the costs of a voluntary active-duty force down, the ARNG and AR took on an operational role in strategic LSCO plans while still providing individual mobilizations of personnel to fill critical vacancies to their active-duty counterparts. In 1973, the army began the round-out program, integrating three ARNG ABCT's as round-out brigades in

¹²² Joshua Klimas and Gian Gentile, "Planning an Army for the 21st Century: Principles to Guide U.S. Army Force Size, Mix, and Component Distribution," *Rand Corporation*, (2018):6, <https://doi.org/10.7249/pe291>

two active-duty divisions.¹²³ This integration added one additional brigade to each parent division while also providing additional resources to the assigned ARNG brigades to achieve a high readiness level.

In 1991, CENTCOM requested three armored divisions to mobilize for Desert Storm on a short-notice mobilization. However, due to this short-notice, the three ARNG round-out brigades could not mobilize in time to deploy with their assigned active duty division due to low initial readiness ratings, and were replaced by active-duty brigades.¹²⁴ While Desert Storm validated the volunteer force's ability to produce a large enough force to meet LSCO demand, many questions remained concerning the ARNG and AR's role. The ARNG's brigade's inability to mobilize was due to the speed which a large force was needed to conduct Desert Storm and the frictions of deploying the ARNG. The initial criticism of the round-out brigades was their lack of readiness previous to Desert Storm, leading to their inability to deploy with their parent divisions.¹²⁵ However, the mobilization strategy designed for the round-out brigades called for enough time for post mobilization training and was not intended to deploy in a little or no notice deployment.¹²⁶

What legislation, policies, or doctrine changes needed to ensure a volunteer force can deploy the manpower necessary during LSCO when confronted by a near-peer threat?

If extended LSCOs occur, however, significant legislation will have to be changed or created to sustain the appropriate manning levels needed through increased funding in the form of

¹²³ Les Melnyk, "Mobilizing for the Storm the Army National Guard in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm" *National Guard Bureau Office of Public Affairs Historical Services Division* (2001): 6-7.

¹²⁴ Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The Army's Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War*, by Robert L. Goldich, LTR91-1481 (1991), 4.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 12.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 12.

enlistment incentives and retention bonuses or if necessary conscription implementation.¹²⁷ As the demand for new force structure and personnel replacements increases new legislation would have to be passed to increase the military authorized strength, allow for the creation of new force structure and increase of recruitment quotas. Additionally, Congress would have to consider assess at what point will a volunteer Army become too cost prohibitive during LSCO that a new Selective Service Act would need to be considered.

Since 1980 the US Army has missed its accessions goal four times due to a budget decreases that negatively impacted recruiting and retention incentives. This focus on accessions and retention has decreased the need for new accessions each year and has maintained a reliable manning level within the army. While the recruiting and retention effort is a success, the ability to recruit a force large enough to sustain LSCO in a great power conflict remains a debate. The volunteer force concept was meant to create a military that could recruit and maintain up to two million service members.¹²⁸ With any significant increase in manning or force structure demands, the cost of recruiting and maintaining such a large force will become prohibitive.¹²⁹ The tension between the demand for military service members and employees needed in critical industries remains an issue today. To manage this, congress would have to expand the Selective Service System, pass legislation that reinstates conscription, and establish governing manpower boards whose job is to balance the need for military personnel and the workforce that powers the economy.

¹²⁷ Molly Clever and David R Segal, "After Conscription: The United States and the All-Volunteer Force," *Security and Peace* 30, no. 1 (2012): 17.

¹²⁸ *The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force; Feb., 1970.* (Washington, DC, 1970.): 122.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 123.

Implications for Practice

The Selective Service System remains relevant today and is responsible for registering 16 million men between 18 and 25.¹³⁰ In the case of LSCO with a peer adversary, the current manpower in the active army and reserve components would be enough to sustain operations for a relatively short amount of time. As documented in both the Gates Commission and Kim et al., a prolonged LSCO would require additional manpower.¹³¹ In this situation, the nation would then have two choices, first, utilize the current recruitment system and draw new enlistments from market forces and compete with US critical industries, or enable the Selective Service System and begin conscription of US citizens to procure the manpower needed while managing the friction between military service and economic strength.

Recommendation for Further Research

The ability to mobilize ARNG and AR brigades or larger elements is critical to the army's ability to conduct LSCO and requires a significantly longer timeline than their active-duty counterparts to reach a readiness level appropriate for mobilization and deployment. To meet pre-determined timelines for mobilization, the ARNG will need to ensure that designated unit's readiness levels meet deployment standards and are sustained. To ensure manning standards are met, personnel analysis identifies critical vacancies and possible cross-leveling scenarios in advance of mobilization. Continued legislative (budgetary) and policy (accession/retention) efforts must be maintained to continue recruiting necessary personnel. Historically, all three army components reached their accession mission and continued recruitment and retention success to maintain a large enough force to meet current defense requirements.¹³²

¹³⁰ Selective Service System, Annual report to the Congress of the United States from the director of the Selective Service System § (2020), 6.

¹³¹ Kwan Ho Kim, Ewan Clague, and Susan Farrell, *The All-Volunteer Army: an Analysis of Demand and Supply* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1971), 117.

¹³² Curtis Gilroy et al., "The All-Volunteer Force and the Need for Sustained Investment in Recruiting," Center for Naval Analysis, (2020): 23

Historically, the army has turned to the ARNG and AR for personnel replacement operations during LSCO.¹³³ With the ARNG and AR operating as a strategic partner, the ARNG and AR would be less capable of providing replacement personnel without creating critical capability gaps in their formations. Further examination of personnel procurement, cross leveling, and replacement operations during LSCO is needed to determine the threshold for continuing to pay a high financial cost during extended LSCO for a volunteer force and whether or not there is a time where conscription becomes a method of personnel procurement again.

The failure of the roundout brigades to mobilize in a short amount of time was caused by additional friction created by mobilization legislation that limits the ability to mobilize the ARNG for more than a year without a formal declaration of war or a national emergency.¹³⁴ Further integration of ARNG and AR forces into strategic planning must continue to ensure ARNG and AR units receive post mobilization training before deployment. Additionally, while the army has maintained its current manning levels, LSCO lasting for a significant amount of time would increase manning demands due to personnel cross leveling and replacement operations.

¹³³ James M. Gerhardt, *"The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970"* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 121.

¹³⁴ Les Melnyk, "Mobilizing for the Storm the Army National Guard in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," *National Guard Bureau Office of Public Affairs Historical Services Division*, (2001): 6-7.

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