The Tunisian Campaign during WWII: Examining Operational Art through the Battle of Kasserine Pass and Battle of El Guettar

A Monograph

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Abstract

The Tunisian Campaign during WWII: Examining Operational Art through the Battle of Kasserine Pass and Battle of El Guettar, by MAJ Joshua E. Bobbitt, 45 pages.

This study explores how Allied operational-level commanders and staffs in the Tunisian Campaign of World War II understood and applied what is known today as operational art. Case studies of the Battles of Kasserine Pass and El Guettar illustrate how the Anglo-American Allies combined tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to achieve strategic objectives. Each case study assesses the Allies' operational-level planning and decision making through the lens of three elements of operational art—end state and conditions, tempo, and operational reach—focusing on the US II Corps' operations. The monograph contributes to the ongoing debate on whether the Battle of Kasserine Pass resulted in an operational level victory or defeat. The analysis reveals how components of operational art can exist, even in the event of a tactical failure.

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Abbreviations

1st AD	1st Armored Division
1st ID	1st Infantry Division
10th PD	10th Panzer Division
21st PD	21st Panzer Division
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AFHQ	Allied Forces Headquarters
CCA	Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division
CCB	Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division
CCC	Combat Command C, 1st Armored Division
CCD	Combat Command D, 1st Armored Division
FM	Field Manual
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
TF	Task Force

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Introduction

> A victorious battle cannot be evaluated the moment it is concluded but only after subsequent events unfold. Each tactical event has a value that is dependent on future developments. The commander who contrives to control not just the order of his own or the enemy's actions, but more importantly, the order of the two combined, will be the one who emerges victorious.
>
> ——Robert R. Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes*

The United States is in a transition to a renewed focus on great power competition and conflict, which establishes a need for the US Army to align doctrine with a strategic environment characterized by peer threat competition and conflict. In doing so, the US Army in 2017 changed its doctrinal focus from conducting limited contingency operations to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) by revising Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*. The new doctrinal approach emphasizes conventional forms of warfighting to meet the challenges of peer threats, and redefines the decisive organization on the battlefield as larger echelon units like divisions and corps. Given this context, analyzing historical large-scale combat operations as a point of reference will bring out implications for a future engagement that the US Army might encounter with a peer threat.

The combat experience of the US Army's II Corps in Tunisia during World War II is one such example that offers an analysis of operational art against a peer threat in large-scale combat. From November 1942 to May 1943, II Corps engaged in a series of battles in the Mediterranean Theater, experiencing both successes and failures. During that time, the Anglo-American Allied forces conducted large-scale combat operations in which the Americans saw their first combat in North Africa against Germans, Italians, and Vichy French. In November 1942, the Americans entered the war conducting three amphibious landings in Morocco and Algeria, along with other Allied forces that participated in Operation Torch.[1] Upon the successful Allied landings in

[1] Alan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012* (New York: Free Press, 2012), 397.

Morocco and Algeria, Allied and Axis forces engaged in a race to capture Tunis, a key port city in northeast Tunisia. The Allies lost the race, settling instead in early January 1943 for less favorable positions in central Tunisia.[2] The German forces, under the command of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, saw an opportunity to seize the Allied rear, which led to the Battle of Kasserine Pass. The Germans defeated the Americans at the Battle of Kasserine Pass, but the American and British forces at Thala and Tebessa rebounded to deny Rommel's attempt to advance to Morocco on February 21 and 22, 1943.[3]

One month later, in late March 1943, the Allies arrayed themselves opposite the Axis lines in north and central Tunisia in preparation for the final assaults of the campaign. II Corps' assault ran into German defenses at Maknassy and El Guettar.[4] II Corps' operations escalated at El Guettar, resulting in the Americans' first victory against the Germans. II Corps' success set the conditions for the British Eighth Army under General Bernard Montgomery to assault from the south to penetrate the Mareth line. The penetration at Mareth allowed the Allies to seize the initiative, ultimately leading to the surrender of the Axis forces in North Africa on May 13, 1943.[5]

The study examines how the US Army conducted operations in Tunisia during the Battles of Kasserine Pass and El Guettar in a manner resembling the modern-day concept of operational art, and what can this tell us about future LSCO. Given the US Army's transition of operational focus from limited contingency operations back to LSCO, a new challenge now presents itself at the operational level. That is, how do commanders and staffs replicate the scope and scale

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[2] Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 442.

[3] Ibid., 443.

[4] George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations*, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (1957, Repr.; Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1978), 553.

[5] Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, 443.

associated with a large-scale conflict? Aside from a simulated division and corps level training exercise, LSCO is unfamiliar territory to current operational level commanders and their staffs. The lack of operational-level commanders and staffs with experience in LSCO creates a greater reliance on leaders to gain knowledge through doctrine and history to more effectively apply operational art. Carl von Clausewitz in *On War* referred military practitioners to the study of historical events to expand upon their combat experience.[6] Clausewitz described military genius, in part, as a commander's *coup d'oeil*, a military intellect for recognizing what to do in certain situations, whether tactical, operational, or strategic.[7] Since physical combat experiences may be impossible at times, a commander can gain further intuition, *coup d'oeil*, through reading, and using military history to reflect upon past events. Thus, evaluation of the Tunisian Campaign through the lens of today's elements of operational art can help commanders and staffs solve operational problems by seeing how their World War II predecessors linked strategic objectives to tactical actions through an operational framework.

Analysis of the Battles of Kasserine Pass and El Guettar with a focus on three particular elements of operational art illustrates how II Corps commanders and their staffs employed operational art during the Tunisian Campaign, thereby enabling II Corps to: create the conditions needed to achieve the campaign's end state and political objectives; maintain an appropriate operational tempo throughout the campaign to respond quickly to control actions and deny the enemy positions of advantage; and extend its operational reach without culminating. The historical case studies below present evidence supporting these findings, revealing how II Corps commanders and staff used elements of operational art like those reflected in modern doctrine, in both planning and execution.

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[6] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 171.

[7] Ibid., 102.

The monograph consists of four sections. After the introduction, the monograph's first section reviews literature relevant to the development of the theory of operational art, the parallel evolution of US Army doctrine, and the history of the Tunisian Campaign. The second section describes the historical case study methodology and measurement criteria used to evaluate the battles through the lens of operational art. The third section consists of the two case studies, and the fourth section presents relevant findings and a conclusion.

Literature Review

The literature review consists of three sections: theoretical, doctrine and concepts, and historical. The theoretical section gives an overview of the origins of operational art and highlights several key theorists who contributed to the theory of operational art throughout the twentieth century. The section on doctrine and concepts begins with the origins of operational art in US doctrine. It provides a doctrinal review of the elements of operational art that are used as the foundational criteria to analyze the study's implications. The historical section reviews other authors' research in the Tunisian Campaign, focusing on the links between those authors' deductions as they relate to end state, tempo, and operational reach.

Theory

The theory of operational art is a relatively new concept that appeared in the twentieth century and is still a topic of debate among military historians and practitioners. Even though the theory of operational art did not exist in the United States before WWII, commanders and staff applied tenets that reflected aspects of modern operational art. Nonetheless, the theory of operational art first grew roots during the interwar period in the Soviet Union. Soviet military theorists of this period, including M. N. Tukhachevsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov, M. V. Frunze, A. A. Svechin, V. K. Triandafillov, and G. S. Isserson, sought a more maneuver-centric focus to conduct operations after World War I, where armies and their frontages grew so large that flank

attacks were no longer a viable option.[8] The Soviet military theorists contributed to the idea of restoring maneuver on the battlefield by breaking the stalemate of positional warfare.

The term *operational art* first appeared in lectures given by Soviet military theorist and tsarist general Aleksandr A. Svechin at the Military Academy of the Red Army Workers and Peasants in 1922.[9] Svechin focused on three areas: tactics, operational art, and strategy. He sought to describe how these three areas overlap through its interplay among all three. He viewed operational art as the tactical creativity that guides tactical actions to form a campaign to achieve a strategic aim.[10] Svechin wrote, "Just as tactics is an extension of operational art and operational art is an extension of strategy, strategy is an extension of politics."[11] Svechin highlighted the intersections between tactics and strategy, emphasizing the military commander's duty to convert conceptual linkages of how tactical successes can achieve strategic objectives.[12] Thus, theoretical thinking about how to achieve strategic objectives through tactical actions began.

Georgii Isserson, a Russian Army brigade commander, advanced the theory of operational art by linking tactical means to achieve strategic objectives through the concept of deep operations. He argued that new technological developments of the industrial revolution and WWI, could deepen the battlefield to annihilate the enemy through maneuver and echelonment.[13] Isserson built upon the deep battle ideas of Soviet theorists Tukhachevsky and Triandafilov to solve the problem of stalemate experienced by armies engaged in a continuous tactical battle on

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[8] Wilson C. Blythe, "A History of Operational Art," *Military Review* (November-December 2018): 39, accessed on 14 September 2020, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art/.

[9] James W. Kipp, "The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art, 1853-1991," in *The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*, eds. John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 65.

[10] Kipp, *Evolution of Operational Art*, 66.

[11] Aleksandr A. Svechin, *Strategy*, ed. Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992), 70.

[12] Kipp, *Evolution of Operational Art*, 65.

[13] Ibid., 72.

an extended front.[14] Operations were no longer concentrated on a single point, but distributed through numerous efforts along a continuous front with depth beyond the forward edge of the battle area.[15] Isserson wrote, "The challenge [of operational art] was to…[coordinate] purposefully and sequentially along the front and throughout depths to bring about enemy's [strategic] defeat."[16] Modern combat is a continuous series of combat engagements instead of a series of interrupted battles, and operational art links the sequence of successive operations to defeat an enemy through depth.[17] Isserson contributed to the theory of operational art by offering a concept for synchronizing operations through time and space [depth] on the battlefield, thereby shifting from a linear to a deep battle strategy.

Strategist and historian Edward Luttwak identified the operational level of warfare as the most important for modern military thought and the critical domain of generalship.[18] Luttwak argued that from WWII to Vietnam, American ground warfare was conducted primarily at the tactical level with no operational dimension to bridge tactics to the theater strategy.[19] He encouraged the NATO alliance to move away from a defensive orientation that relied upon attrition tactics, applying instead a maneuverist operational approach that "seeks to attain the goals set by theater strategy through the combination of tactics."[20] Luttwak encouraged acceptance of a new paradigm in the theory of operational art by illustrating the usefulness of the

[14] G. S. Isserson, *The Evolution of Military Art*, trans. Bruce Menning, 2nd ed. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2013), xiv, xvi.

[15] Ibid., xvii.

[16] Ibid., 26.

[17] Ibid., 48.

[18] Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History (*New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 201-2; Edward Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," *International Security* 5, no. 3 (Winter 1980-1981): 61, http://www.jstor.com/stable/2538420.

[19] Luttwak, *International Security*, 62.

[20] Ibid., 61.

operational level of war in modern military thought to optimize the interplay of operational art from strategy to tactics.

Dr. James Schneider expanded upon Isserson's deep battle concepts. He argued that the dominant characteristic of the Napoleonic era—concentric maneuver culminating in a single decisive battle—did not encompass a modern concept of operational art as extended maneuver and deep battle.[21] Schneider argued that the modern concept of battle centered on operational maneuver to maximize freedom of action through force flow or pressure, thereby denying the enemy's freedom of action.[22] Schneider continued to build on the theory of operational art by defining the time, space, and purpose of operational art through simultaneous and successive operations via deep maneuver to achieve a common aim.[23] Schneider's work on the theory of operational art contributed to its incorporation into US Army doctrine in the 1980s.

Doctrine and Concepts

Before 1980, the US Army relied on a tactically-focused attritional doctrinal approach for fighting the Soviet Union, presented as "Active Defense" in the 1976 FM 100-5.[24] New technology and an emerging emphasis on maneuver prompted the US Army to rewrite its doctrine to include operational art, thereby describing how to link the new maneuver and technology-focused operations in a given theater, from the tactical to the strategic level.[25] In 1986, the US Army introduced operational art into doctrine in the revised FM 100-5, *Operations*. FM 100-5

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[21] James J. Schneider, "Theoretical Implications of Operational Art," in *On Operational Art*, ed. Clayton R. Newell and Michael D. Krause (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1994), 18.

[22] James J. Schneider, Theoretical Paper Number Four, "Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundations of Operational Art" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992), 31.

[23] Ibid., 36-37.

[24] Blythe, "A History of Operational Art," 43.

[25] Bruce W. Menning, "Operational Art's Origins," in *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art,* edited by Michael D. Krause and Cody Phillips (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 2007), 15.

included the army's new operational construct of AirLand Battle and defined operational art as, "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."[26] Since that publication, the definition and theory of operational art continue to be refined and debated. Today, Army doctrine describes operational art as "the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment – to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means."[27] In this new concept, operational art serves two primary purposes: to ensure "military action supports strategy," and "tactical actions occur under the most advantageous conditions possible."[28] Operational art is not associated with a specific level of war or tied to a certain echelon of command. Commanders and staffs use operational art to link "strategy and tactics through the arrangements of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic goal."[29] Several additional terms require defining to clarify their meaning as the monograph will analyze the Tunisian Campaign through these elements of operational art.

The US Army's ADP 5-0 defines end state as "the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives."[30] The end state and desired future conditions filter down from the political objective to the strategic end state to the military end state. Achieving the

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[26] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 1986), 10.

[27] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 2-1.

[28] Ibid., 2-10.

[29] Blythe, "A History of Operational Art," 47.

[30] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication Manual (ADP) 5-0*, The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 2-11. ADP 5-0 states, "Thus, a desired condition is a sought-after change to an OE. Since every operation should focus on a clearly defined and attainable end state, accurately describing conditions that represent success is important." Military means refers to ensuring you have the means available so your ends are actually attainable and can be reached.

national strategic objective requires a clearly defined military end state and future conditions. An end state must be clearly defined and attainable within the military means available. If not, the military operation will lack purpose and fail to achieve the desired political end state.[31]

ADP 3-0 defines tempo as, "the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy."[32] Tempo establishes the pace of a campaign, operation, or battle. In his book *Tempo*, Venkatesh Rao describes tempo as, "three elements: rhythm, emotion, and energy."[33] Rao describes the rhythm within tempo as pace-setting which, "is the art of harmoniously driving the natural tempo of your environment away from its current state towards your preferred state—slower or faster—in non-disruptive ways."[34] Commanders and staffs can use Rao's concept of pace-setting to gain a relative advantage by establishing the "rhythm" of the battle through pace-setting by either speeding up the tempo to create a relative advantage through tempo or slowing down the tempo to build more combat power and avoid overextending operational reach leading to culmination. Leonhard views tempo similar to frequency, "the number of significant military events per unit time."[35] Leonhard's definition of frequency relates to tempo as "war perceives a given pace of events," and commanders control tempo by synchronization of operations either simultaneously or sequentially in time and space.[36] Ultimately, commanders and staffs use tempo to retain and exploit the initiative to control actions and deny the enemy positions of advantage by managing frequency.[37] Figure 1 depicts the

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[31] US Army, ADP 3-0, 2-6.

[32] Ibid., 2-8. ADP 3-0 states, "Commanders control tempo throughout the conduct of operations. First, they formulate operations that exploit the complementary and reinforcing effects of simultaneous and sequential operations. They synchronize those operations in time and space to degrade enemy capabilities throughout the area of operations. Second, commanders avoid unnecessary engagements. They do this by bypassing resistance and avoiding places not considered decisive. Third, through mission command, commanders enable subordinates to exercise initiative and act independently."

[33] Venkatesh Rao, *Tempo* (RibbonFarm, Inc: Lightning Source, 2011), 17.

[34] Ibid., 26.

[35] Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War,* 2nd ed. (Self-published, 2017), 87.

[36] Ibid., 90-91.

[37] US Army, ADP 3-0, 2-8.

elements that compose the ADP 3-0 definition of tempo, its relationship to Leonhard's concept of frequency, and the elements that compose Rao's definition of tempo.

Tempo		
Doctrine ADP 3-0	Leonhard "Significant military events per unit of time"	Rao " Rhythm, Emotion, and Energy"
Synchronization of simultaneous and sequential operations	The synchronization of simultaneous and sequential operations enhances the significance of military events	Synchronization of simultaneous and sequential operations establishes the harmonious rhythm of the battle and drives the enemy toward your preferred state
Avoiding unnecessary engagements	Conducting in unnecessary engagements would degrade Leonhard's concept and an insignificant military event wasting combat power	Unnecessary engagements detracts from the harmonious rhythm – disrupts rhythm
Enabling subordinates discipline initiative	Intangible aspect that either enhances the frequency of significant military events or can decrease the unit's capacity output if there is a lack of subordinate initiative	Subordinate discipline initiative is an intangible aspect that influences the energy and emotion of an operation

ADP 3-0 defines operational reach as "the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities."[38] Commanders and staff balance the components of endurance, momentum, and protection to extend operational reach. Endurance extends a unit's ability to project combat power during extended operations. Momentum enables control of operations to capitalize on gaining and retaining the initiative. Protection allows units to maintain extended reach to deny the enemy the ability to disrupt friendly operations. When a unit can no longer extend operational reach, it has reached its culmination point. The concepts of operational reach and culmination are closely related. Culmination happens in offensive operations when a unit is unable to continue its attack and happens in defensive operations when a unit can no longer defend an area and must withdraw.[39] Culmination in battle can easily happen when units are unable to support mutually.

[38] US Army, ADP 5-0, 2-14.

[39] US Army, ADP 3-0, 2-10.

Historical

Most military historians do not write in current US Army doctrinal terminology; rather, they use contemporary doctrinal language. This requires translation, as presented here, to enable the assessment of historical military campaigns according to modern doctrinal concepts. Many historians have written about the US Army's campaigns in Tunisia, putting forward ideas that support the findings presented below. With respect to II Corps' establishing the conditions needed to achieve the campaign's end state and political objectives, Martin Blumenson suggested II Corps did not accomplish its end state during the Battle of Kasserine Pass, resulting in a catastrophic defeat, which "decimated" II Corps where "Americans at Kasserine 'paid in blood'".[40] Blumenson continued this narrative in *America's First Battles 1776-1965* that Kasserine "was a disaster for the US Army."[41] Gerhard Weinberg proposed a different view, arguing that Kasserine Pass was only a tactical defeat.[42] Mark Calhoun built upon this view, asserting that the US Army at Kasserine Pass suffered a tactical defeat that lead to an operational victory.[43] Both Blumenson focused on Kasserine Pass as an American failure that did not achieve the desired end state. In contrast, Weinberg and Calhoun asserted that the Battle of Kasserine Pass supported the desired future conditions of the Tunisian Campaign. For the Battle of El Guettar, Alan Moorehead noted that II Corps in the Battle of El Guettar accomplished its "main

[40] Martin Blumenson, *Kasserine Pass: An Epic Saga of Desert War* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1983), 303.

[41] Martin Blumenson, "Kasserine Pass, 30 January – 22 February 1943," In *America's First Battles 1776-1965,* edited by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 261.

[42] Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, 443.

[43] Mark T. Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the US Army* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 276.

job by reducing pressure on Montgomery."[44] This indicates that the Battle of El Guettar met the desired future by relieving pressure off the Eighth Army.

Historians have also debated whether II Corps maintained an appropriate operational tempo throughout the campaign. Weinberg noted how the German forces set a faster pace than the Allies, and everything depended on speed during the Battle of Kasserine Pass. Still, even with these shortcomings, the Americans were able to recover and stop a German breakthrough.[45] Blumenson reinforced the argument that the Axis forces executed a higher tempo than the Allies, but only because they attacked a single Allied army with two converging Axis armies.[46] Blumenson also highlighted Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall's unnecessary engagements before the onset of Kasserine by attacking small Italian detachments at Sened and conducting non-decisive engagements instead of pace-setting and concentrating forces.[47] Weinberg suggested the Germans held a higher tempo tactically, but the Americans kept an appropriate operational tempo. Heller noted American failures in tempo, contrasted with the faster German tempo at the tactical level, but he ignored the successful Allied counterattack and the effect this had on the tempo of the campaign. As for the Battle of El Guettar, Leo Barron in *Patton's First Victory* describes Lieutenant General George S. Patton's order for the 1st Infantry Division to seize El Guettar and Gafsa, with the dual aim of maintaining pressure on the enemy and enabling the synchronization with his adjacent unit, the British Eighth Army.[48] In modern doctrinal terminology, Patton used tempo to stress the German forces through II Corps' operation to enable a successful penetration by Eighth Army.

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[44] Alan Moorehead, *Africa Trilogy: Comprising Mediterranean Front a Year of Battle the End in Africa (*London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945), 513.

[45] Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, 443.

[46] Blumenson, *America's First Battles*, 264-65.

[47] Ibid., 245.

[48] Leo Barron, *Patton's First Victory: How General Patton Turned the Tide in North Africa and Defeated the Afrika Korps at El Guettar* (Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books, 2018), 14-16.

Debate also surrounds the question whether II Corps demonstrated the ability to extend its operational reach without culminating. Blumenson and Calhoun both described dispersed American units lacking mutually supporting positions and pushing military capabilities to the limits or beyond; however, Calhoun also illustrated how Americans massed fire to repel the Germans after Kasserine Pass.[49] Both Blumenson and Calhoun noted that the American troops were overextended, limiting operational reach, at the beginning of Kasserine.[50] Rick Atkinson implied in *An Army at Dawn* that operational reach was a key consideration during the battle for El Guettar, when he described how II Corps and 18th Army Group planners intended for Gafsa to become a supply dump for Eighth Army.[51] Atkinson described how Patton's II Corps sought to achieve operational reach by pushing forces and subordinate command posts close to the front to ensure his military capabilities could achieve the desired effect on the enemy.

Methodology

The monograph employs historical case study methodology to identify how commanders and staff used operational art during one of the US Army's first LSCO campaigns during WWII, thereby revealing continuities that might expose themselves in similar future military operations.[52] The case studies were selected for their relevance. The first case study, the Battle of Kasserine Pass, is notable because many historians view it as a catastrophic defeat of the fledging US Army in its first engagement with the German Army. Further, the battle illustrates the application of key doctrinal concepts relevant to the challenges inherent in LSCO. The second case study, the Battle of El Guettar, reveals how the Allies set the conditions to achieve the

[49] Blumenson, *America's First Battles*, 245, 261; Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair,* 270, 277.

[50] Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair*, 276.

[51] Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 433.

[52] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 93.

initiative for the eventual defeat of the Axis powers in Tunisia. Even though El Guettar took place only one month after Kasserine Pass, it involved a new II Corps commander and significantly different terrain, offering different circumstances to explore the application of operational art during the Tunisian Campaign.

This monograph analyzes the Tunisian Campaign through the modern doctrinal lens of operational art through three operational art elements: end state and conditions, tempo, and operational reach. Figure 2 depicts the measurement criteria for these three elements.

Element of Operational Art	Measurement Criteria
End State and Conditions *Criteria found in ADP 5-0	Measuring end state and conditions of each case study is the product of assessing were the: • Appropriate military means applied by II Corps to achieve the desired conditions of the theater commander.
Tempo *Criteria found in ADP 3-0	Measuring tempo of each case study is the product of assessing if II Corps framed operations in time and space to: • Synchronize simultaneous and sequential operations • Avoiding unnecessary engagements • Enabling subordinates' use of disciplined initiative.
Operational Reach *Criteria found in ADP 3-0	Measuring tempo of each case study is the product of assessing if II Corps skillfully balancing: • Endurance • Momentum • Protection to maximize operational reach while avoiding culmination.

Figure 2. Element of Operational Art Measurement Criteria. Created by author.

US Army forces considered end state and conditions during their first engagement with a peer threat in WWII when selecting the campaign's objectives. As the US Army was in the process of building combat power, it is vital to determine whether US commanders and staff properly aligned objectives in time, space, and purpose throughout the campaign to apply their military means appropriately to achieve their desired future conditions. Operational tempo is significant to the campaign since the Allied forces wanted to seize Tunisia expeditiously but failed to do so after the advance on Tunis ended abruptly due to bad weather. The campaign went through periods of rapid and low tempo, and the American forces had to react and change their tempo when transitioning from defensive to offensive operations at the start of spring. Operational reach

is vital to the campaign because it is this element that links most directly to the historical debate over II Corps' failure during the Battle of Kasserine Pass. Further, an examination of Patton's use of operational reach reveals how he used this element in conjunction with his preferred rapid tempo to employ II Corps' military capabilities effectively.

Analysis of the case studies through the lens of these elements of operation art will provide insight along a range of topics. Each case study is structured similarly to tease out these aspects of operational art. The criteria include strategic aspects of the campaign to establish the strategic context of the battles to include the military and national strategic objectives. Each case study will consist of how both sides viewed North Africa's importance through their alliances, and the objectives both the Allies and Axis hoped to achieve during that stage of the campaign.

Also, each case study focuses on the planning aspects of the commander and staff. The case studies will identify II Corps' understanding of the enemy and the available options they thought the enemy would execute, identify the different courses of action the II Corps' commander and staff had available to execute the battle, and the operational approach the commander took. Finally, the end of each case study focuses on the execution to adjust the operational approach and the result of the battle. The case studies will identify if II Corps adapted to the operating environment to create multiple dilemmas for the enemy and if friendly forces achieved a position of advantage, and if the outcome of the battle influenced the military and strategic objectives of the campaign.

Case Studies

The case studies do not account for all factors in the battle but are used to tease out operational art aspects. Each case study provides an overview of the battle along with the author's analysis to highlight several points within the case study. The following background section places the battles within the larger context of the Tunisian campaign.

American forces entered the Mediterranean Theater in November 1942 by an amphibious invasion known as Operation Torch. The campaign that followed was part of a limited war strategy to assist the Russians in Europe by diverting German forces from Stalingrad to weaken the periphery and severing Italy and Vichy France from German control.[53] The three-pronged attack landed at ports in Morocco and Algeria consisting of the following: Western Task Force (Casablanca) commanded by Major General Patton, Central Task Force (Oran) commanded by Major General Fredendall, and Eastern Task Force (Algiers) commanded by Major General Charles W. Ryder.[54]

The conclusion of the landing set the conditions for the next phase, the Tunisian Campaign. Allied planners identified the rapid seizure of Tunis and Bizerte as key to achieving a rapid victory.[55] Rain and poor transportation plagued the Allied advance toward Tunis and Bizerte, giving the German Army time to deploy additional forces to the theater and forestall the attack.[56] Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied supreme commander, to his disappointment, abandoned the original campaign plan.[57] In the early weeks of January 1943, the Allies focused on building combat power, allowing the enemy in Tunisia to focus their attention on the British First Army and American II Corps units, which were dispersed along a broad front (Figure 3).[58]

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[53] Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, 436; Millett, *For the Common Defense,* 396.

[54] *The War in North Africa, Part II: The Allied Invasion* (New York: US Military Academy, 1950), 1-12.

[55] Ibid., 14, 22.

[56] Alfred D. Chandler, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 2, The War Years* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 867; Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, 441.

[57] Chandler, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,* 868; Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 15.

[58] *The War in North Africa*, 28.



Figure 3. Tunisia. "The Race for Tunisia," World War II Europe, US Military Academy Department of Military History, accessed February 19, 2021, https://s3.amazonaws.com/usma-media/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII%20Europe/WWIIEurope40Combined-01.jpg.

The Allies' failure to capture Tunisia through a rapid advance to Tunis resulted in the prolonging of the campaign and therefore led to a modification of Allied strategy. At the Casablanca Conference from January 14 to 23, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed the Allies were to seize Tunisia by spring to facilitate an invasion of Sicily by the end of the summer, followed by an invasion of Italy to knock the Italians out of the war.

Previously, Germany and Italy's representatives met at Adolf Hitler's Rastenburg headquarters from December 18 to 22 to revise their North African plans. Hitler reaffirmed his position that the Axis must keep the increasing Allied power in check by denying their ability to consolidate gains in North Africa. He ordered a buildup of German manpower in Tunisia and the maintenance of Axis air superiority and operational reach from Italy. By the start of January, the demands of Stalingrad meant only a fraction of the necessary material and manpower Hitler had promised made it to North Africa.[59] Regardless, by the end of January, more German and Italian forces arrived in Tunisia, including Rommel's Panzer Army Africa, giving the Axis a numerical advantage of fourteen Axis divisions to nine for the Allies.[60].

Operationally, the Allies' strategy leading up to the Battle of Kasserine Pass was defensively focused, seeking to improve its position; ultimately, the Allies' military objective was to seize Tunisia by going on the offensive upon drier weather.[61] The Allies had to simultaneously prepare for an invasion of Sicily, build up combat power in North Africa, and defeat Axis forces in Tunisia.[62] The Allies had planned to conduct Operation Satin, a II Corps offensive against Gabes and Sfax to deny the line of communication between Rommel's Panzer Army Africa and

[59] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 363-64.

[60] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 319-20.

[61] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 373.

[62] Ibid., 347.

German General Hans-Jurgen von Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army. However, Eisenhower canceled this operation because the Eighth Army would not reach Tripoli until at least a week after the operation's initiation, exposing II Corps to the operational risk of a counterattack by numerically superior German forces.[63]

II Corps under the command of Major General Fredendall consisted of 1st Infantry Division (ID) and 1st Armored Division (AD). The 34th ID was originally under II Corps but now consisted of a composite corps of French and US elements in the Ousseltia area under a French corps commander.[64] II Corps' assigned mission was to protect the right flank of the Allied forces in Tunisia.[65] The French were the first line of defense in front of II Corps at the Eastern Dorsal, which was considered too mountainous for German armor. Two mountain ranges covered central Tunisia in an inverted V. The Eastern Dorsal, the mountain range furthest east, curved southwest ending at Gafsa, and the Western (Grand) Dorsal also ran northeast to southwest, ending along the Algerian border. II Corps' defensive posture spread Fredendall's forces over a vast area (Figure 3). 1st AD headquarters at Sbeitla was split into three parts over a hundred miles, and the 1st ID headquarters at Maktar was spread out over an even larger area.[66]

Operationally the Axis capacity for offensive operations depended on the Tunisian bridgehead and its ability to provide logistical support to forces. The Axis lodgment extended through northeastern Tunisia, covering Bizerte and Tunis. The Axis military objective was to break up the concentration of Allied forces assembled in southwest Tunisia.[67] The Axis sought to hold the country's eastern seaboard by controlling four key passes in the Eastern Dorsal: Pichon-Fondouk to the north and Faid-Rebaou to the south. Holding these passes would provide security,

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[63] Chandler, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,* 908-09.

[64] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 384-85.

[65] Chandler, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,* 922.

[66] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 301-04, 307.

[67] Ibid., 322.

enlarge the bridgehead, and provide a corridor to link Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army to Rommel's Panzer Army Africa, which was withdrawing from Libya to Tunisia.[68] The Axis' immediate objective was to disrupt Allied concentrations at Sidi Bou Zid and Gafsa.[69] The Axis forces were then to seize control of the Tebessa area by attacking through Gafsa and Sbeitla, driving to Bone and Constantine to collapse the Allies' Tunisian front.[70] A breakthrough in the Tebessa area would allow Axis forces to get behind the Allied line in Tunisia and encircle II Corps and British First Army to the coast at Bone. After Rommel had dislocated American forces, he could turn his attention to the British Eighth Army, which was in slow pursuit; meanwhile, Arnim would attack British First Army in northwestern Tunisia. Rommel estimated the Germans had two weeks to dislocate the American forces before the British Eighth Army arrived to reinforce the Allies.[71]

Fredendall had the latitude to conduct limited offensive operations to interfere with the enemy's lines of communications but was told to weigh the risk versus reward for each engagement.[72] Fredendall had three options available before what transformed into the Battle of Kasserine Pass. First, he could strengthen and reinforce the French garrisons at Faid and Rebaou passes. Second, he had the option of striking toward the east coast to take positions from the enemy to sever contact between Arnim and Rommel's armies. Third, he could keep his forces concentrated on conducting a counterattack against any hostile action.[73] Fredendall decided to execute the second option with an offensive against Maknassy, assessing that the seizure of Maknassy would inflict the most destruction on the enemy and indirectly protect Faid Pass.[74]

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[68] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 243.

[69] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 365.

[70] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 322.

[71] Mike Phifer, "Panzer Storm in Tunisia," *Military Heritage*, Winter 2021, 46.

[72] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 385-86.

[73] Ibid., 386; Blumenson, *America's First Battles*, 245

[74] Ibid., 388.

Control of Maknassy would also provide the Allies with an avenue of approach fifty miles to the east of Gafsa and on the road and rail line to Sfax.[75] The plan of attack directed simultaneous assaults by two task forces. On February 1, Colonel Robert Stack's Combat Command C (CCC) was to stage out of Gafsa and travel northward and attack Maknassy from the north. Colonel Robert Maraist, commander of Combat Command D (CCD), 1st AD, also staging out of Gafsa, would attack eastward through Station de Sened to Maknassy. A reserve of 1st AD was staged near Sbeitla.[76]

Fredendall planned for II Corps to attack Maknassy on February 1; in the meantime, he ordered a raid at Sened Station midway between Gafsa and Maknassy. The raid struck a small Italian detachment at Sened on January 24, capturing the station and alerting Arnim, who reinforced his units at the Maknassy Pass and near Sened Station. Arnim feared losing the Faid Pass because of its strategic importance to his effort to control central Tunisia.[77] The raid pushed Arnim to execute a rapid tempo counteroffensive by launching the 21st Panzer Division (PD) to control the pass.[78]

The Battle of Kasserine Pass

Arnim's assault at Faid Pass on the defending French forces became the preliminary phase of what developed into the Battle of Kasserine Pass, beginning January 30. Fredendall tried to restore the French positions at the Faid Pass by ordering Combat Command A (CCA), 1st AD, to counterattack. CCA's strike was poorly coordinated, allowing the Germans to seize the initiative and denying the Americans the ability to achieve their objective of relieving the French

[75] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 306.

[76] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 388. Combat Command D was an ad hoc subordinate organization created for the raid on Maknassy and commanded by the Divisional Artillery Commander, Colonel Robert Maraist.

[77] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 306-08.

[78] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 388.

in the Faid Pass.[79] To make matters worse, on January 31 Fredendall directed CCD, 1st AD, to conduct a raid on Maknassy, which failed. The American attack reached within six miles of Maknassy but lost momentum when disrupted by German Stukas. Also, poor American air-ground coordination led to planes mistakenly bombing positions near Sened Station. These setbacks forced Fredendall to abandon the Maknassy operation and go over to the defensive on February 1-2.[80] On February 3, the II Corps command post directed CCD to withdraw to Gafsa. The American offensive did not achieve any significant objectives; Maknassy and Faid Pass remained in Axis control.[81]

The second phase of Kasserine began with the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid on February 14. In the II Corps sector, 1st AD held an assigned front of about fifty miles from Fondouk to south of Faid Pass, while CCA and the 168th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of 34th ID occupied Djebel Lessouda and Djebel Ksaira respectively, north and south of Faid Pass. The two hilltops were not mutually supporting and silhouetted troops from ten miles across the desert. CCC was located at Hadjeb el Aioun, while the rest of the 1st AD was at Sbeitla (Figure 4).[82] At 0630 on February 14, the German panzers crossed the Eastern Dorsal onto the plains. The 10th and 21st PDs split into several groups east of Djebel Lessouda, generally attacking west and northwest. The Axis forces achieved a double envelopment of the Sidi Bou Zid area in less than twelve hours, when elements of the two divisions met two miles east of the town on Highway 125.[83] On February 15, Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, British First Army, issued a warning order

[79] Ibid., 391-92; Blumenson, *America's First Battles*, 245-46.

[80] Howe, *Northwest Africa*, 396.

[81] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 314-16.

[82] *The War in North Africa,* 28.

[83] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 339-43.

to II Corps to withdraw all forces from the Sidi Bou Zid area and fall back to the Western Dorsal, where they would provide security at Sbeitla, Kasserine, and Feriana.[84]



Figure 4. Battle of Kasserine Pass, "Campaign in Northwest Africa," World War II Europe, US Military Academy Department of Military History, accessed February 16, 2021, https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inlineimages/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII%20Europe/WWIIEurope41.pdf.

The Allies believed the main attack was coming through Faid Pass, leading CCB to reposition south to Sbeitla. General Orlando Ward, 1st AD's commander, established a covering force to fight a delaying action from Djebel Hamara to Sbeitla against 21st PD. CCB held the southern sector and CCA the northern sector with Highway 13 as the boundary between them. Ward held Sbeitla to buy time for the troops at Kasserine Pass and Sbiba to dig fortifications. On February 17, Fredendall ordered Ward to withdraw his command at Sbeitla and reassemble to

[84] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 423.

protect the supply dumps at Tebessa. Ward carried this out effectively and efficiently, allowing CCA, CCB, and CCC to consolidate from one defensive position to fight in another.[85]

With Sidi Bou Zid captured by Axis forces, Rommel's Panzer Army Africa, moving into the Kasserine Pass area from the southeast, took command of the 10th and 21st PDs to mass for the upcoming attack. Rommel wanted to conduct an envelopment through Tebessa with the ultimate objective of Bone, to force the Allies to withdraw out of Tunisia; however, Field Marshal Albert Kesserling, German Army Command South, directed him to attack Le Kef as his initial objective. Rommel attacked on February 19. The 21st PD was to attack north on Highway 71 from Sbeitla to Sbiba, the German Africa Corps to strike west and clear Kasserine Pass, and the 10th PD to stage at Sbeitla to exploit either through Sbiba or Kasserine to seize Le Kef. II Corps was split into three forces along the Western Dorsal near Kasserine Pass: northwest of Feriana, guarding routes from Feriana to Tebessa through Bou Chebka, and on the 1st AD's southwestern flank south of El Ma el Abiod. Kasserine Pass offered advantages to the defender with its heights on either side. A defensive force could dominate the approach from the east if well-coordinated and mutually supporting. Colonel Alexander Stark's 26th RCT held Kasserine Pass, but with inadequate combat power to take full advantage of the surrounding heights. Rommel shifted 10th PD's attack from Sbeitla to Kasserine, where the division achieved a breakthrough on February 20, leading to an uncoordinated withdrawal of Stark's 26th RCT. Rommel ordered the 10th PD, his main effort, to pass through the Africa Corps at Kasserine and advance north toward Thala to seize Le Kef (see Figure 4).[86]

Rommel's success to this point resulted in part from differing views at Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ), British First Army, and II Corps regarding how the enemy would fight. Eisenhower and Anderson were convinced by Ultra intercepts that the Axis forces faced serious

[85] Howe, *Northwest Africa*, 432-36.

[86] Howe, *Northwest Africa*, 438-55.

supply difficulties. They believed Rommel would pursue limited operations to improve his defensive operation, and if he attacked, he would do so through Fondouk to destroy French forces, followed by an attack north against the British right flank.[87] Their judgment was reasonable, except it did not account for Rommel's offensive spirit. Colonel Monk Dickson, II Corps intelligence officer (G-2), believed Rommel would act decisively in southern Tunisia, and the Axis' most likely course of action was an attack through Gafsa or Faid Pass. Still, Anderson, who believed any attack through Gafsa or Faid Pass would be a diversion, ultimately accepted risk in the south by keeping CCB and portions of 1st ID as reserves positioned in the north.[88] Eisenhower tried to account for risk by directing Frendendall to be prepared for II Corps to abandon Gafsa and withdraw to the Western Dorsal to defend at Kasserine and Sbiba passes. Regardless, the Allies' initial disposition was set, which led to a tactical defeat. It would take a great deal of effort among the Allies to correct their mistakes.

Still, the Axis offensive at the Sbiba gap achieved limited success, mainly due to the Allied artillery's devastating volume and accuracy, which led Rommel to order the 21st PD to take up an active defense. This allowed the Allies to shift forces westward on February 20. The initiative still rested with Rommel's forces. However, the Allies now had a slight advantage, because to continue the attack, the Axis forces would have to advance deep along two divergent roads where they could not mutually support one another. Also, Rommel lacked enough forces for a strong attack at both locations. II Corps' new arrangements allowed for two distinct defensive forces. General Terry Allen's 1st ID and General Paul Robinett's CCB defended vicinity Tebessa, while the British 26th Armoured Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Charles Dunphie, defended Thala. On February 21, 10th PD attacked south of Thala, and the Africa Corps advanced to seize the passes near Tebessa at Djebel el Hamra to secure the western flank. The

[87] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn,* 323-24; Blumenson, *America's First Battles*, 247

[88] Ibid., 332.

The German Africa Corps was met by intense artillery fire from the defending forces of 1st ID and CCB. Rommel's troops were accustomed to open desert; they could not seize the high ground and avoid vulnerable valleys. 1st ID and CCB skillfully executed their defense, denying the German ability to seize the Djebel el Hamra passes. At Thala, Dunphie fought a delaying action, and soon the British were drawing on every resource to hold the enemy back. The arrival late on February 21 of Brigadier General S. Le-Roy Irwin's 9th ID Artillery helped give Dunphie's forces the advantage at Thala. The Allied and Axis lines at Thala remained static throughout February 22, resulting in a stalemate. Rommel recognized his offensive could not continue for the following reasons: German troops were low on ammunition, fuel, and rations, and the Allied repositioning of forces exposed the German western flank to a potential counterattack. On February 22, Rommel ordered a general withdrawal to the east, and Axis forces began their retirement through the Kasserine Pass. In the end, Rommel could not hold the ground to consolidate his limited gains in west-central Tunisia, much less continue the attack west to Bone and Constantine.[89]

The above case study illustrates how II Corps learned from its initial tactical shortcomings. After suffering terrible losses from an overextended defense at Faid Pass and Sidi Bou Zid, II Corps withdrew to the west, establishing a concentrated defense near Tebessa and fighting a delaying action to buy time and space. By repositioning forces, the Allies achieved positions of advantage that enabled them to gain the initiative and form a defense in depth.[90] The most evident example of this was the effective integration of Robinett's CCB and Allen's 1st ID to establish a strong combined arms defensive position capable of concentrating combat power at locations of key terrain. Adjacent units were mutually supportive. Infantrymen were supported by antitank guns and tanks in defilade positions, with forward observers in key positions to enable

[89] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 369-89.

[90] Howe, *Northwest Africa*, 435-36.

massed fires. The key to their defense was their ability to mass artillery with preregistered fires along the enemy's most likely approaches to rapidly and effectively deny the enemy's ability to seize the heights.[91]

A significant outcome of the Battle of Kasserine Pass was that it influenced the war's strategic and military objectives by denying Rommel's ability to conduct a turning movement or envelopment in the Tebessa area. The German offensive at Kasserine inflicted a temporary tactical setback on the Allies, but when viewed through the lens of operational art, one can see that this resulted in no operational or strategic advantage.[92] The Germans were unable to achieve their strategic and military objectives. They failed to reach the Allied supply depots and could not force the Allies to withdraw from Tunisia.[93] Therefore, the Allies remained a force that could go on the offensive when the weather changed in the spring to seize Tunisia. The Battle of Kasserine Pass operationally stopped the German offensive and gave the Allies the initiative, which played a role in setting the conditions for the final drive to seize Tunisia.

Battle of El Guettar Overview

The Axis strategic leadership was fragmented after Kasserine Pass. Even after the defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler held out hope for a new offensive in the east. Germany's outlook was fading in North Africa, but the longer the campaign dragged on, the more it would delay the inevitable Allied invasion of France. Additionally, Hitler found hope in producing new weapons, submarines, and manpower, employing prisoners of war and slave laborers, thus enabling his army to grow to its size two years earlier. Italy was dependent on Germany and urged Germany, along with Japan, to make peace with the Soviet Union, which Hitler was unwilling to do, so

[91] Orr Kelly, *Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia* (New York: Wiley, 2002), 227-48.

[92] Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair*, 276.

[93] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 390.

more forces could concentrate in the Mediterranean theater against the Anglo-American Allies.[94] In Tunisia, the Axis shifted its military objective to Medjaz el Bab and the British First Army operating in the vicinity.[95] The Axis sought to gain the initiative by forcing Allied lines back in the north. This would expand the bridgehead and protect the Axis bases at Tunis and Bizerte.[96]

The Allied command reorganized with the stand-up of 18th Army Group, commanded by General Harold Alexander, with the three subordinate headquarters: British First Army, US II Corps, and British Eighth Army.[97] Lieutenant General George S. Patton took over command of II Corps from Fredendall on March 6 for the upcoming II Corps operation.[98] The Allies' military objective was still the seizure of Bizerte and Tunis to facilitate Tunisia's seizure.

18th Army Group had to decide between two strategic options. The first option would consist of isolating Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army in the north from General Giovanni Messe's First Italian Army in the south. II Corps and British First Army would split the armies into two segments to lead to their destruction. The second option entailed shrinking the Axis lodgment, with the British Eighth Army attacking northward as the Allies' main effort.[99] Alexander chose the second option, which focused on isolating the Axis forces in a narrow cordon in northeast Tunisia to lead to their defeat. In this option, British First Army would conduct holding attacks along the northern front. II Corps would conduct timely and controlled attacks to seize decisive terrain on the enemy's lines of communications to squeeze the enemy from the west and draw off

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[94] Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, 587-89.

[95] *The War in North Africa,* 36; Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 178-79. Atkinson mentions northern Tunisia is strategically important because of Medjaz el Bab. Medjaz el Bab is on the Medjerda River, thirty miles from Tunis and a rare entrance through the Eastern Dorsal. "Hannibal supposedly declared, 'Whoever has Medjez el Bab has the key to the door, and is the master of all Tunisia.'".

[96] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 501.

[97] Ibid., 485-86.

[98] Barron, *Patton's First Victory,* 8-9.

[99] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 432.

reserves to support Eighth Army's attack. There was no plan for II Corps to go beyond the Eastern Dorsal.[100]

II Corps consisted of 1st, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions, 1st Armored Division, and the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. II Corps plan was code-named Operation WOP.[101] II Corps' mission was to recapture Gafsa, establish a forward supply dump to support Eighth Army's forces, and on-order advance to Maknassy to threaten Axis lines of communications.[102] II Corps course of action consisted of a two-pronged attack with 1st ID to seize Gafsa and 1st AD demonstrating at Maknassy. 1st ID needed to be prepared to defend Gafsa, and 1st AD prepared to protect the corps' northeastern flank, seize Station de Sened, and on-order exploit east to Maknassy.[103] The 9th and 34th ID were to remain the reserve element for II Corps.[104] The operational approach highlighted improving the 18th Army Group's operational reach by building a maintenance facility at Gafsa to support the momentum of Eighth Army's advance.[105] Patton emphasized tempo in the operational approach. On March 15, Patton changed the 1st ID mission to include seizure of El Guettar without waiting for further orders to advance southeast of Gafsa, highlighting his desire to keep a rapid tempo and aggressiveness towards the enemy. II Corps' intelligence estimates assessed a weak enemy defense at Gafsa.[106]

Allied intelligence officers expected Axis forces to fight a delaying action and then fall back to prepared defensive positions near Gabes or Maknassy to shorten their lines and deny an Allied attempt to disrupt the Italian First Army's rear. Allied analysts assessed that the enemy

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[100] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 485.

[101] Barron, *Patton's First Victory*, 11.

[102] II Corps, AAR, "Report on Operation, 15 March – 10 April 1943," (1943; repr., Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College, 1947), 3.

[103] Barron, *Patton's First Victory,* 11.

[104] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 433; Ibid., 11-13.

[105] II Corps, AAR, "Report on Operation, 15 March – 10 April 1943," 3.

[106] Barron, *Patton's First Victory,* 16.

could use their reserve in several ways. The Axis could reinforce with 3,000 German airborne, or 15th PD could send seventy panzers and 5,000 panzer-grenadiers to defensive positions at Gafsa or Maknassy in seven to twelve hours by vehicle. In reality, Arnim retained the 10th PD as the reserve, to be committed if he assessed the Italian First Army was threatened.[107]

On March 16-17, 1st ID executed its approach march to Gafsa along Highway 15. The Italian garrison from Centauro Division withdrew, booby-trapping the area. On March 18, the 1st Ranger Battalion, which reinforced 1st ID, was sent to El Guettar to establish contact with the enemy. 1st ID followed, clearing from Gafsa to El Guettar and then preparing for a counterattack.[108] The second phase of II Corps' attack started on March 19-20 at Station de Sened. 1st AD initiated its operation with 60th Combat Team and CCC approaching north of the objective to cut off the enemy force defending Station de Sened. CCA attacked west from Gafsa towards Station de Sened to exploit enemy withdrawal from the northern approach, seizing Station de Sened on March 21.[109] The American forces had covered seventy-five miles in five days, claiming more than two-thousand square miles of territory with the seizure of Gafsa, El Guettar, and Sened Station (Figure 5).[110] To better support Eighth Army's penetration at the Mareth line, 18th Army Group modified II Corps' role. On March 22, Alexander issued instructions to Patton to threaten the Axis lines of communications by cutting the Sfax-Gabes road with an armored thrust through Maknassy.[111] The enemy recognized that II Corps' advance could threaten First Italian Army's rear. Kesserling decided to commit the Fifth Panzer Army's

[107] Barron, *Patton's First Victory,* 14-16.

[108] II Corps, AAR, "Report on Operation, 15 March – 10 April 1943," 5-6; Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 434.

[109] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 549-50.

[110] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 438.

[111] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 552.

reserves to defend the heights of Maknassy, while ordering 10th PD to counterattack at El Guettar.[112]

[112] Ibid., 553.

Figure 5. Battle of El Guettar "Tunisia Situation," World War II Europe, US Military Academy Department of Military History, accessed February 24, 2021, https://s3.amazonaws. com/ usma-media /inline images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII%20Europe/ WWIIEurope42Combined.pdf.

On March 22, as 1st ID consolidated its gains at El Guettar, 10th PD was advancing along Gabes-Gafsa road.[113] II Corps unwittingly created a dilemma for the Axis forces by what Clausewitz would describe as "chance."[114] By luck, Patton exploited a seam between the Fifth Panzer Army and the Italian First Army by choosing an axis of advance that ran along their boundary. This created confusion between the two armies as to who was responsible for II Corps. Kesselring sought to support the Axis problem by sending reinforcements.[115] Early morning on March 23, the first engagements favored the 10th PD, which penetrated American forward positions. The attack was later repulsed, and 10th PD pulled back to the east to prepare for a second attack. 1st ID again successfully repelled the German armored counterattack. The Battle of El Guettar resulted in the US Army's first tactical victory against the German Army by stopping a German spoiling attack with a reinforced infantry division supported by air and artillery.[116] The revised II Corps plan now directed 1st AD to occupy the Maknassy heights and conduct small-scale raids of the German airfield at Mezzouna.[117] On March 22, General Ward directed CCC to attack north and southeast of the pass, while 60th Combat Team fought to gain control to the south and CCB protected the northern flank.[118] 1st AD's attack was slow and failed to maintain a rapid tempo, letting the initiative slip to Axis forces as they built up their combat power east of the heights. 1st AD succeeded in gaining a temporary foothold at Djebel Naemia's crest, but German mortar and direct tank fire led to a stalemate, denying 1st AD the heights.[119]

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[113] Howe, *Northwest Africa*, 559.

[114] Clausewitz, *On War*, 86. Chance is described by Clausewitz as an "interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad...in the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards."

[115] Barron, *Patton's First Victory,* 53.

[116] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 443.

[117] Ibid., 444.

[118] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 554.

[119] II Corps, AAR, "Report on Operation, 15 March – 10 April 1943," 8.

On March 25, 18th Army Group again revised the plan for II Corps, this time with an offensive focused on the south, aiming beyond El Guettar to draw off and fix German armored divisions positioned to oppose Eighth Army's penetration. Alexander released the 9th and 34th IDs to II Corps for employment in the operation. 1st and 9th ID, the decisive operation, were to attack simultaneously to open the pass southeast of El Guettar. The shaping operations included an attack by 34th ID at Fondouk, an attack by a 1st ID mobile column at El Guettar to exploit the opening of the pass, and an advance north from Maknassy by a small diversionary force from 1st AD. II Corps phased the operation as follows: 1) secure the road junction and hills north of Djebel Berda; 2) secure positions far forward of the pass; 3) pass 1st AD through to attack German lines of communication.[120] During the prior weeks, the enemy, consisting of 10th PD and Centauro Division, established a well-coordinated strongpoint defense effectively interlaced with artillery.[121] On March 28, 1st and 9th ID launched their attack, encountering firm resistance from prepared defenses.[122]

On March 29, 18th Army Group modified II Corps' plan for a fourth time due to 34th ID's unsuccessful attack at Fondouk and 1st and 9th ID's inability to open a path for the mobile column Task Force (TF) led by Colonel Clarence Benson. Alexander decided to abandon the Fondouk and Maknassy attacks and focus on El Guettar, directing Patton to launch an armored spearhead to break its own way through on March 30.[123] 1st and 9th ID had some success but did not achieve all their objectives to divert enemy forces away to support TF Benson's assault.[124] The Allies' advance did force the Axis defense to drawback two miles north and a mile in the south at El Guettar. Still, the Axis defense held with reinforcements from the Africa Corps'

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[120] II Corps, AAR, "Report on Operation, 15 March – 10 April 1943," 9.

[121] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 564-65.

[122] II Corps, AAR, "Report on Operation, 15 March – 10 April 1943," 9-10.

[123] Moorehead, *Africa Trilogy,* 509.

[124] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 569-71.

Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 21st PD, and the Luftwaffe. On April 1, Alexander directed Patton to execute the original plan for an attack by two infantry divisions to open the gap for TF Benson.[125] From April 2 to 6, II Corps forces mopped up small pockets of enemy resistance on the hills in the mountainous positions along Highway 15 to Gabes. TF Benson followed, ready to push through 1st ID to exploit success or react to a counterattack.[126] II Corps made slow progress, and the hope to break through to attack the Italian First Army's rear was wavering.[127]

Eighth Army's battle was in a critical phase, and to support their engagement, 18th Army Group instructed Patton to attack in the morning on April 7. II Corps was to advance without regard to casualties to break the Axis flank and push eastward. TF Benson was to proceed to the north vigorously until making contact with the Germans or reaching the Mediterranean.[128] On April 5, II Corps observed and interpreted the Axis' actions as the beginning of another counterattack like the one that took place on March 23, but the enemy was in fact preparing for a withdrawal. Axis forces disengaged on the night of April 6-7 amid a heavy artillery bombardment, leaving behind little resistance.[129] TF Benson pushed eastward and drove twenty miles to make contact with Eighth Army at 1600 on April 7. After five months of fighting, the Allied forces of the west and east joined together. In the Maknassy area, US tanks and Allied fixed-wing aircraft tormented the German rearguard that stayed behind to assist in the withdrawal of 10th PD, 21st PD, and Centauro Division. 1st AD finally occupied the pass east of Maknassy on April 8.[130]

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[125] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn,* 458.

[126] II Corps, AAR, "Report on Operation, 15 March – 10 April 1943," 11.

[127] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 575.

[128] II Corps, AAR, "Report on Operation, 15 March – 10 April 1943," 15.

[129] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 574, 576.

[130] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 464-65.

18th Army Group and II Corps adapted to the operating environment to create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. On March 25, 18th Army Group and II Corps learned that their operational approach had to account for branches and sequels to do more than draw the Axis reserve to El Guetter. Despite successfully drawing the theater reserve into an engagement, II Corps needed to advance further southeast to put more pressure on the Axis flank. II Corps reacted by using diversionary and supporting attacks to distract the enemy's attention from the decisive operation. While the 1st and 9th IDs executed the decisive operation at El Guettar, shaping operations consisted of a feint by 34th ID at Fondouk, and a demonstration by a contingent of 1st AD at Maknassy. These operations disrupted the enemy's decision cycle by causing confusion over what the Allies were doing. The enemy incorrectly assumed the Allies sought to establish a defense in Maknassy and planned to launch attacks at the passes between Gumtree Road and Highway 14 located at Meich, Sened, or Sakket.

Additionally, 18th Army Group and II Corps sought to maintain a rapid tempo of operations to pressure the Axis forces in the El Guettar area. Alexander and Patton synchronized horizontal engagements to simultaneously engage separate Axis formations to prevent cooperation among them. This led to the commitment of the Axis operational reserve to the fight with II Corps, segregating it from the rear to disrupt Axis operational depth. 18th Army Group and II Corps changed their plan three separate times to keep the pressure on the enemy and find a different approach that could work against the enemy's defense.[131] Even though the case study highlights how II Corps' approach at El Guettar was changed numerous times to react to the operational environment, it is also worth noting the counterpoint. Alexander's command and control approach was very directed, stifling subordinate decision-making and occasionally micro-managing Patton.[132]

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[131] Howe, *Northwest Africa*, 570, 572, 576.

[132] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 457. Patton makes the following comment about Alexander's command and control style, "I feel I must respectfully call General Alexander's attention to the fact that in

The Battle of El Guettar influenced the war's strategic and military objectives by setting the conditions for the Tunisian Campaign's end. Strategically, II Corps, in conjunction with Eighth Army's operation, closed the expanded Axis bridgehead in the south, degrading the Axis' ability to continue operations in North Africa. Immediately after El Guettar, Axis forces began a headlong retreat as II Corps and British First Army elements attacked through the Pinchon-Fondouk Pass, forcing both Axis armies into northern Tunisia. Axis forces' defeat was assured, and the campaign would last only another month into early May.[133] Operationally, after El Guettar, offensive operations in southern or central Tunisia ended for II Corps.[134] One should recall that II Corps successfully completed its shaping operation of squeezing the Axis flank and diverting two panzer divisions and more from Eighth Army.[135] After El Guettar, there was no longer a question if the Tunisian campaign would conclude in a victory, but only when.[136]

Findings and Analysis: Tunisian Campaign Reflections on Operational Art

The Tunisian Campaign taught the US Army much about its doctrine and operational concepts, including command relationships, logistical support, tactics, equipment, and soldier performance in fighting a peer threat. [137] The US Army anticipates several alternative futures in LSCO; therefore, examining the lessons of such operations in the past is informative for today's study of operational concepts and doctrine. The Tunisian Campaign provides important and timeless lessons that can be applied to future operational environments. The data collected in each

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the United States we tell officers what to do, not how to do it, that to do otherwise suggests lack of confidence in the officer."

[133] Barron, *Patton's First Victory,* 186.

[134] Howe, *Northwest Africa,* 577.

[135] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 459.

[136] Barron, *Patton's First Victory,* 203.

[137] Michael D. Doubler, *Closing with the Enemy: How G.I.s Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 2.

case study helps to tease out how US Army conducted operations in Tunisia in a manner resembling the modern-day concept of operational art, and what can this tell us about future LSCO through end state, tempo, and operational reach.

Even though logistical issues hampered Allied operations throughout the campaign, Eisenhower and AFHQ built up the military means to create the conditions needed to achieve the campaign's end state.[138] By the start of 1943, the logistical support in North Africa was stable and routine.[139] Still, the military means applied by II Corps leading up to Kasserine did not initially meet the desired future conditions. Partially this was out of II Corps hands, having been directed by AFHQ to occupy an excessively large amount of territory given the military forces II Corps had available. This led to a defense that was not realistic and attainable as an operational aim. However, despite the Axis' initial tactical successes, II Corps adapted to the operational environment by concentrating combat power, denying Rommel the ability to breakthrough to Le Kef or inflict long-term damage to Allied combat power. Also, the Allies' success was partially due to an Axis failure in aligning their military means to achieve their strategic objectives. As Rommel's strategic assessment stated, "high command must provide sufficient supplies to the two African armies or abandon Tunisia altogether."[140] The Germans' failure in the campaign shows they knew they needed more supplies and forces but were unwilling to abandon or seek more limited objectives. Ultimately, politics can interfere much like Hitler's poor strategy, which

[138] Douglas Porch, *The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004), 375. AFHQ, from the start of Torch to the beginning of operations in Tunisia, cautiously applied military means to create the conditions needed to achieve the campaign's end state and political objectives. During Operation Torch, Eisenhower opted for a slower, more methodical tempo and an extended operational reach, which cost the Allies the race for Tunisia. Operation Torch's fate was sealed with the use of three western landing locations instead of locations further east, such as Bone, which would have enable the Allies to reach Tunis before the Axis forces could build up their bridgehead. However, the far western basing of Casablanca, Oran, Algiers enabled the Allies to avoid both building up combat power under contested air space and extending basing further east as the build-up of combat power continued.

[139] Robert M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943* (Washington: Center for Military History, 1955), 478.

[140] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 321.

influenced the prospect of success and resulted in the failure in the Germans' ends, ways, and means. Even though Rommel's assessment was correct to an Axis ends, ways, means mismatch, it would be wrong to downplay the Allies' success entirely. The Allies accomplished attainable objectives by linking tactical actions of their military means to seize Tunisia by the spring, enabling Operation Husky's execution in the summer.

Furthermore, Patton had the military means available to link tactical actions to accomplish the desired conditions. II Corps used its military means available to relieve pressure off of the 18th Army Group's decisive operation, diverting two panzer divisions away from Eighth Army's southern penetration, which forced the retreat and closure of the Axis lodgment in the south. To choose reasonable and attainable objectives, planners must consider their military means available and evaluate the plan's suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Both case studies demonstrated that II Corps used the military means necessary to create the conditions to achieve the campaign's end state.

Planners must understand the natural tempo of the operational environment. Shimon Naveh argued that the German Blitzkrieg lacked operational art because it pushed beyond operational limits, only relying on tempo without balancing operational reach, end state, and risk.[141] The tempo of AFHQ trended to a slow and methodical pace due to operational reach from basing. Algiers was 500 miles from Tunis, and the nearest all-weather base was Bone, 120 miles from the front.[142] With AFHQ's extended operational reach, II Corps had to conserve resources by ensuring each engagement had a purpose while building its combat power for an offensive. One of the more commonly overlooked components of tempo is avoiding unnecessary engagements by avoiding non-decisive engagements. Leading up to Kasserine Pass, Fredendall

[141] Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), xvii.

[142] Porch, *The Path to Victory*, 375, 377.

spoiled his operational approach by conducting an unnecessary engagement at Sened Station before seizing Maknassy. Fredendall had the right mindset to stay on the offensive per the established doctrine before WWII, even though his forces were in the defense.[143] However, his engagement lacked purpose resulting in a tempo of operations that his forces could not handle. In response, the Germans attacked Faid pass before Fredendall initiated his operation. Fredendall was reluctant to abandon his planned attack on Maknassy. A powerful counterattack at Faid could have restored the situation and stopped the German advance, but the counterattack launched by 1st AD CCA was slow and methodical instead of rapid and forceful. Fredendall missed an opportunity to seize the initiative and deny the enemy a position of advantage.

Conversely, Patton's operational plans at El Guettar and Maknassy focused on a rapid tempo to keep constant pressure on the enemy to disrupt their decision-making, force their use of the reserve, and enable his forces to maintain a position of advantage. The attacks at El Guettar and Maknassy proceeded more methodically than Patton planned.[144] Regardless, Patton's operational approach denied Axis forces the ability to build combat power and forced the reserve's commitment away from Eighth Army. He synchronized simultaneous operations to pressure the Axis front horizontally and created multiple dilemmas by simultaneously threatening Maknassy and El Guettar. Patton's operational framework disrupted the Axis time, space, and purpose, forcing them to deploy their operational reserve prematurely.

The culmination of II Corps defensive operations at Faid, Sidi Bou Zid, and Kasserine resulted from II Corps' limited operational reach, which made it impossible to sustain operational

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[143] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 22. The 1941 FM 100-5 states, "A strategically defensive mission is frequently most effectively executed through offensive action. It is often necessary for an inferior force to strike at an early moment in order to secure initial advantages or to prevent itself from being overwhelmed by a growing superiority in the hostile forces."

[144] Porch, *The Path to Victory*, 401-02. AFHQ and 18th Army Group in the spring established more basing and built enough combat power to support a more rapid tempo. Two reasons led to the actual slow tempo of II Corps. First, the Axis forces had a staunch defense. Second, Patton had orders not to proceed past the Eastern Dorsal, which caused him to lose the opportunity to attack the Italian First Army from the rear.

endurance and project combat for prolonged operations. AFHQ's stretched-out lines of communications from Algiers and Bone to the front compounded the problems caused by II Corps' overextended lines across open terrain, which prevented the concentration of combat power and allowed the Axis forces to defeat American combat units in detail. By February 20, II Corps managed to balance endurance, momentum, and protection by shifting forces to concentrate combat power and shorten their lines of communications. II Corps commanders and staff learned from their mistakes, avoiding culmination by concentrating combat power and forming a reserve, thereby repairing initial setbacks over time and space.

By March 1943, AFHQ was able to enhance 18th Army Group's operational reach, exploiting their control of the sea and air to degrade Axis capabilities to sustain a bridgehead.[145] At El Guettar, II Corps extended its operational reach and threatened the Axis lines of communications by establishing a forward supply dump to project combat power forward. Patton established his command post close to the front, using personal leadership to push his forces and stretched his operational reach. The seizure of towns along his subordinate units' lines of operation allowed for the consolidation of forces and supplies after movements to keep pressure on the German front. At El Guettar, Patton used a simple line of operation and kept key capabilities close to the front so that operational reach was never an issue.

The Tunisian Campaign shows the value of initially fighting a limited campaign on the periphery, overcoming the German advantage of greater combat experience by capitalizing on lessons learned before transitioning to decisive operations. However, the United States may not always have that option. Today's peer threat adversaries employ anti-access aerial denial capabilities that seek to disrupt US forces entering a theater of war, deny their objectives, and

[145] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 415. North Africa provided AFHQ a logistic hub for basing, ports and airfields, and a launch point to target strikes against Germany and Eastern Europe to extend operational reach. The Allies basing in North Africa extended operational reach for the theater. It was not until March 1943 when the Allies had enough aircraft to support the land and attack Axis shipping. In North Africa from Torch to May 1943 Allied air would destroy 243 and damage another 242 Italian ships and boats.

force them to culminate early. Commanders and staff must consider branches and sequels to be successful. The key to victory could be the application of operational art to anticipate and control future events.[146] By sequencing operations, planners think beyond tactical engagements and envision the whole campaign. In LSCO, planners must realize that failure to achieve a particular tactical victory should not negate their intended strategy.[147] The tactical failure at Kasserine illustrates the value of a decision support matrix with branches and sequels to anticipate and control events.

Conclusion

The operations II Corps conducted in Tunisia contributed significantly to the Allied campaign's success in North Africa. The Americans were fighting the best-trained and most experienced army in the world. In the Battle of Kasserine Pass, the engagement itself was a tactical defeat and setback, but this minor action contributed to the campaign's successful outcome at the operational and strategic levels. In analyzing the Battle of Kasserine Pass, it is essential to acknowledge that the whole is greater than the sums of the parts. II Corps was able to correct initial mistakes and stop the Germans from achieving their operational objectives. At El Guettar, Patton's attempts to pressure the enemy's front and synchronize operations through multiple approaches is worth noting. Even though II Corps never was able to break through the enemy's defense, they successfully diverted forces away from Eighth Army to allow the campaign's greater success. In both cases, US forces were ultimately successful in their ability to employ operational concepts.

Military planners use operational art to link tactics to strategy. In a campaign, planners must assess the means they have available to accomplish their ends. Achieving tactical success

[146] Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes*, 115.

[147] Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principles in the Space and Information Age* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 18.

but exhausting your resources will lead to an operational or strategic failure. Clausewitz asserts, "If we do not regard a war, and the separate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, but instead succumb to the idea that the capture of certain geographical points or the seizure of undefeated provinces are of value in themselves, we are liable to regard them as windfall profits."[148] Victory or defeat in a particular tactical engagement means nothing if the commander fails to achieve the desired end state. II Corps in the Tunisian Campaign encountered numerous challenges, but in the end, the corps' commander and staff learned from their mistakes and arranged operations that linked their tactics to the Allied strategy through a successful operational campaign.

[148] Clausewitz, *On War*, 182.

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