

Consolidating Gains in Large-Scale Combat Operations: A Theoretical Framework for Operational Planners

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Consolidating Gains in Large-Scale Combat Operations: A Theoretical Framework for Operational Planners, by LTC Christopher E. Fowler, 53 pages.

Field Manual (FM) 3-0 addresses consolidation of gains mostly at the tactical level for large-scale combat operations, providing frameworks for corps and division level formations. There is currently a gap in FM 3-0 and Army doctrine for how the Army will link tactical success to achieving strategic aims through the operational level of war. Field Manual 3-0 states that, “the theater army has the most significant role in planning, coordination, and allocation of resources.” However, it does not provide the necessary framework that enables the operational level planner to plan for consolidation of gains that link tactical success to strategic aims. This study will attempt to close the doctrinal gap and develop a framework for the operational level planner for consolidation of gains at the operational level.

In synthesizing the material from the research on consolidating gains, six themes emerge. The first theme that emerges is that politics and war are intertwined and cannot be separate. Politics provide the purpose for war; therefore, political leaders must provide the desired political end state. The second theme is that consolidating gains are decisive to the long-term success of the political goal following conflict. Third, despite consolidation of gains being decisive, political leaders and military planners fail to account for consolidating gains prior to the start of conflict. The fourth theme is that when consolidation of gains is planned for, they must be accounted for before, during, and after the conflict. The fifth theme is enemy forces must be defeated to a state that they can no longer produce the means to resist. Lastly, military governance is a viable solution for consolidating gains at the operational and strategic levels to ensure decisive and long-term success after conflict.

The proposed theoretical framework developed will assist operational planners in consolidating tactical success into achieving strategic aims. The framework is examined through the historical lens of how the US Army consolidated gains at the operational level to link tactical success to achieve national and strategic objectives during the Italy campaign in World War II.

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Abbreviations

ACC	Army Component Commands
AFHQ	Anglo-American Allied Force Headquarters
AMG	Allied Military Government
AMGOT	Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory
COCOMS	Combatant Commands
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
COA	Course of Action
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
NSS	National Security Strategy
OETA	Occupied Enemy Territories Administration
PME	Professional Military Education
PMESII-PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time
SCAO	Senior Civil Affairs Officer

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Introduction

Following the surrender of the last German unit in Tunisia on May 13, 1943, the North Africa campaign of World War II came to an end. The Allied coalition of the United States and Britain had differences of opinion concerning the follow-on strategy of the war. The US Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall favored the buildup of forces in England to conduct a cross-channel invasion into Northern France. Britain's Prime Minister, Winston Churchill favored a peripheral strategy of draining German resources and morale by attacking deeper into the Mediterranean and the Balkans. At the TRIDENT conference in May, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Great Britain came to an agreement that the cross-channel attack would occur on May 1, 1944 and that operations in the Mediterranean would continue through 1943, with the goal of eliminating Italy from the war immediately.¹

On July 10, 1943, the Allies began Operation Husky, the code name for the assault on the island of Sicily and the beginning of the Italy campaign. The strategic aim of the Italy campaign was to secure Allied sea lines of communication through the Mediterranean, knock Italy out of the war, and divert German strength from the Russian front.² During the planning process, the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Great Britain planned for an Allied Military Government (AMG) to oversee the occupation of Italy. The AMG's responsibility was to secure the fighting forces' lines of communication, stabilize and help the population, and eventually turn over territory to the Italian government. Despite Italy signing an armistice of unconditional surrender on September 3, 1943, the Allies remained engaged in combat operations with Germany through the fall of Rome on June 5, 1944 and the German surrender on May 2, 1945.

¹ Albert N. Garland, and Howard McGraw Smyth., *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965), 22.

² Ibid., 52.

While engaged in combat operations with Germany, the Allies were able to consolidate gains throughout Italy while dealing with a refugee crisis, critical food shortages for the Italian people, and the eruption of the Vesuvius volcano, which destroyed large amounts of the Italian farmland.

Consolidation of gains is a new term to US Army doctrine, first appearing in 2017 with the updated publication of US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*. It is the fourth strategic role that the Army conducts as part of the joint force, following shape the environment, prevent conflict, and prevail in large-scale combat operations.³ The doctrinal definition of consolidate gains according to FM 3-0 is: “activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.”⁴ Consolidation of gains is about exploiting tactical success by establishing security and stability in a manner decisive enough to achieve national strategic aims.⁵ Simply put, it is the actions we take during and after successful combat operations to ensure that our initial success translates into lasting political goals and objectives.

Field Manual 3-0 addresses consolidation of gains mostly at the tactical level for large-scale combat operations, providing frameworks for corps and division level formations. There is currently a gap in FM 3-0 and Army doctrine for how the Army will link tactical success to achieving strategic aims through the operational level of war. Field Manual 3-0 states that, “the theater army has the most significant role in planning, coordination, and allocation of resources.” However, it does not provide the necessary framework that enables the operational level planner to plan for consolidation of gains that link tactical success to strategic aims.⁶ This study will

³ US Department of the Army, ADP 3-0 *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2019), 1-5-1-6.

⁴ US Department of the Army, FM 3-0 *Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2017), 8-1.

⁵ Ibid., 8-2.

⁶ US Army, FM 3-0, 8-2.

attempt to close the doctrinal gap and develop a framework for the operational level planner for consolidation of gains at the operational level. It will accomplish it by examining how the US Army consolidated gains at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels during the Italy campaign in World War II to achieve national and strategic objectives.

In the context of enduring great power competition and potential large-scale combat operations against a near-peer competitor, policy makers, military leaders, and operational planners must set the necessary conditions for successful consolidation of gains prior to a campaign. First, policy makers must define clear strategic aims and war termination criteria. Operational level planners must understand the desired outcome of the war and the conditions needed to terminate hostilities prior to using operational art to develop a campaign plan. Second, during the development of the campaign plan, operational level planners must plan to conduct consolidation of gains early in the campaign throughout the rear areas at all echelons, even while large-scale combat operations continue. The window of opportunity for setting a geographic area on a desirable path to consolidate gains is potentially narrow.⁷ Third, operational planners must account for the appropriate type and number of units needed necessary to build the force structure required to conduct consolidation of gains. Fourth, there must be an assessment of consolidation of gains based on unplanned tactical success, or setbacks, to ensure that the consolidation plan remains feasible to reach the desired end state and termination criteria.

To test the thesis, two hypotheses were developed. The first hypothesis argues that when policy makers establish defined strategic aims and termination criteria, operational planners are able to nest military objectives with strategic aims prior to the start of the campaign and allocate the appropriate and necessary forces with the proper capabilities to consolidate gains. The second hypothesis argues that when consolidation of gains in rear areas begin early in the campaign and

⁷ Ibid., 8-3.

assessments are conducted after unplanned tactical success or shortfalls, that the US Army can consolidate gains that link tactical actions to strategic aims.

To test the hypothesis, four research questions are applied to the case study. First, what were the strategic aims and termination criteria given to allied planners? Second, what forces did allied planners allocate to consolidating gains at the start of the Italy campaign? Third, at what phase of the operation did consolidation of gains begin? Finally, what role did the theater army play in the consolidation of gains?

This study seeks to answer these questions given four major limitations. First, this study only utilizes open source and unclassified documents. This limitation particularly applies to the case study when examining the historiography and the methods in which consolidating gains were conducted. Second, the term consolidation of gains as defined above did not exist at the time of the case study. Therefore, a deliberate methodology is necessary not to conflate historic actions with current terms and understanding. Thirdly, the use of doctrine as a central source requires careful handling of definitions. Doctrinal definitions are temporal and their underlying concepts change over time. Consolidation of gains, due to its very recent codification in doctrine, is an excellent example for that doctrinal dynamic. Finally, in developing a theory of consolidating gains from the tactical level through the operational level to achieve strategic aims, the study will focus primarily on the military and diplomatic elements of national power. Prussian General and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz asserts that “the reason for war always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to a political object. War therefore, is a political object.”⁸ In following Clausewitz’s theory, war and politics are two phenomena that cannot be isolated from one another and must be examined simultaneously, as one, within the same context in order to understand the type of war you are fighting and why the war is being fought. The other two elements of national power, information and economic, will be discussed in limited scope

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 86-87.

and more in a supporting role to the diplomatic and military elements. These supporting roles will be discussed mostly in the doctrine section of this study as army stability tasks are examined.

The study consists of seven sections. Following this introduction, the literature review will examine the relevant research material that provides the foundation for the theory to consolidate gains and primary sources for the case study. The third section will develop a theory for consolidation of gains from the tactical to strategic level based on the findings from the literature review. Section four will test the theoretical model through the historical lens of examining how the US Army consolidated gains during the Italy campaign from 1943-1945. The fifth section will examine past and current doctrine to compare and contrast the Army's actions in WW2 compared to today's doctrine. Section six will compose of a synthesis of the theory, history, and doctrine examined throughout the study to provide the necessary analysis to provide findings and recommendations in section seven.

Literature Review

This section covers the review of relevant literature and provides the fundamental basis for the theoretical development for consolidation of gains and case study analysis by exploring the lessons drawn by other scholars regarding consolidation of gains. This study examines consolidation of gains through the lenses of theory, history, and doctrine from the start of large-scale combat operations through the achievement of the desired strategic aims and meeting the terms of war termination.

Army doctrine, particularly FM 3-0, were the first documents referenced for this study to gain an understanding of what consolidation of gains is and why it was added to Army doctrine. As stated in the introduction, gaps were found in FM 3-0 with regards to consolidating gains beyond the tactical level. In July 2019 the Army published Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 *Operations*, which supersedes FM 3-0. ADP 3-0 provides some updates and clarification of some

of the gaps in FM 3-0; however, ADP 3-0 adds some definitions that are not precise and leaves room for loose interpretations, which will be examined further in the theory section.

The Commanding General of the US Army Combined Arms Center and principle author of FM 3-0, LTG Michael Lundy, has published the most recent work on consolidating gains. In his article, “Three Perspectives on Consolidating Gains,” he examines the role of the tactician, operational planner, and the strategist in consolidating gains. His thesis is that planning to consolidate gains is integral to prevail in armed conflict, therefore, planning must account for the desired end state of military operations and work backward.⁹ Planning at the tactical level, Lundy states that initially enemy forces must be defeated, but that the ultimate objective is to consolidate gains in a way that ensures the enemy no longer has the means to resist.¹⁰ At the operational level, Lundy emphasized the need to adequately determine the means (forces) to not only defeat enemy forces, but also those required to establish physical control of the entire country.¹¹ From the strategist’s view, Lundy asserts that planners must account for consolidating gains before, during, and after conflict. He states that military governance is a good example of strategic-level consideration to consolidate gains. He believes that a lack of forethought at the strategic level about military governance has made the consolidation of gains during and after large-scale combat markedly more difficult.¹²

Consolidating gains set the necessary conditions to end conflict once military and political objectives are met. Examining theory relating to how wars end and war termination is the basis to developing a theory for consolidating gains. In his book on *Every War Must End*,

⁹ Michael Lundy, “Three Perspectives on Consolidating Gains,” *Military Review* (September-October 2019): 23.

¹⁰ Ibid., 19.

¹¹ Ibid., 23.

¹² Ibid., 24.

strategist and scholar Fred Ikle observes that how wars end has the most decisive long-term impact for achieving political goals, however, studying the planning and efforts for terminating wars receives much less attention than the study of how they begin.¹³ He believes, particularly in the case of Vietnam, that political leaders order the initiation of a military campaign without a plan for bringing the war to a close to achieve the political objective.¹⁴ This practice would not fall in line with Clausewitz's theory that the political object is the goal, war is just the means to achieve it.¹⁵ If political leaders developed clear objectives and used the military as the means to achieve the objectives, then one would deduce that there would be a plan to end the war.

Editor of *Foreign Affairs* and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Gideon Rose, addresses this issue in his book, *How Wars End*. He asserts that the dual political and military nature of war is messy. To clear up the mess governments create a clear division in responsibility. Civilians deal with political matters; military leaders deal with military matters. Rose believes that clear division of labor approach is inherently flawed, because political issues can permeate every aspect of war.¹⁶ Rose proposes that there is a Clausewitzian challenge, in which force (the military) must serve politics.¹⁷ Rose's view is aligned with Clausewitz's theory that "there is a unity in the concept that war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous."¹⁸ To close the divide, Clausewitz states, "the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that he can share in the major aspects of his activities."¹⁹

¹³ Fred C. Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), vii.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

¹⁶ Gideon Rose, *How Wars End* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2010), 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-11.

¹⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 605.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 608.

Some experts believe that the US military should play a more prominent role in political matters. Former National Security Council member, and primary author of the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), Nadia Shadlow, observes that the “US Army has served as the critical operational link in shaping transitions from a militarily defeated regime to one more compatible with US interests.”²⁰ Shadlow notes that the Army has played a leading role in the establishment of political and economic order in states or territories in which it has fought.²¹ Her thesis is that political and military leaders have developed a “denial syndrome” of governance operations as integral to war and, thus of the need to prepare for and set aside resources for them.²² Shadlow’s views align with Lundy’s strategic view when she argues that the military, particularly the US Army, should plan and be resourced to conduct military governance during and after large-scale combat operations.²³

Former director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at the Army War College, Conrad Crane, supports the arguments of both Shadlow and Lundy. In 2004, he wrote, “the harsh reality is that the world's greatest nation-building institution, when properly resourced and motivated, is the American military, especially the Army...there has rarely been any accomplishment of long-term US policy goals from any conflict without an extended American military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.”²⁴ Conrad also aligns with Lundy’s

²⁰ Naida Shadlow, *War and the Art of Governance* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 14.

²¹ Ibid., 14.

²² Ibid., 15.

²³ Ibid., 274-278.

²⁴ Conrad Crane, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won,” in *Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign*, ed. Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 2.

strategist view when he states, “planning as well as execution of Phase III and Phase IV must occur simultaneously, not sequentially.”²⁵

In addition to the secondary sources, articles, and Army doctrine mentioned in this literature review, primary research was conducted in the WW II Operational Documents archive at Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Primary sources include unit after action reports, intelligence reports, official memorandums, and most notably the *Review of Allied Military Government and of the Allied Commission of Italy, 1945*, conducted by the Public Relations Branch of the Allied Commission of the United States Army at the end of the war. This primary document, supplemented by official unit history and complemented by official publications from the US Army Center of Military History, such as the official “Green Books,” provide the necessary historiography for the case study.

In synthesizing the material from the literature review, six common themes emerge. The first theme that emerges is that politics and war are intertwined and cannot be separate. Politics provide the purpose for war; therefore, political leaders must provide the desired political end state. The second theme is that consolidating gains are decisive to the long-term success of the political goal following conflict. Third, despite consolidation of gains being decisive, political leaders and military planners fail to account for consolidating gains prior to the start of conflict. The fourth theme is that when consolidation of gains is planned for, they must be accounted for before, during, and after the conflict. The fifth theme is enemy forces must be defeated to a state that they can no longer produce the means to resist. Lastly, military governance is a viable solution for consolidating gains at the operational and strategic levels to ensure decisive and long-term success after conflict.

²⁵ Phase III and Phase IV refer to the joint phases. Phase III is the Dominate phase, which aligns with large-scale combat operations and Phase IV is Stabilize, which aligns with consolidation of gains. For further explanation refer to FM 3-0, p.1-14.

Theory

To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successful close requires a through grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce: the commander-in-chief is simultaneously a statesman.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832

In order to develop a model that links consolidation of gains from the tactical level through the operational level, to achieve strategic aims, the study must build a theoretical framework for consolidation of gains. To develop the theory, the three different levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) must first be clearly defined.

The levels of war are a framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks.²⁶ At the strategic level, leaders develop the strategy for employing the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in a synchronized and integrated fashion to accomplish national objectives. The operational level of war links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives, with the focus being on the design, planning, and conduct of operations using operational art. The tactical level of warfare involves the employment and ordered arrangement of forces to defeat enemy forces. The levels of warfare help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of forces, allocate resources, and assign tasks based on a strategic purpose.²⁷

With the delineation of the levels of war, Army doctrine has codified the consolidation of gains responsibilities at each level by echelon of forces (see figure 2).

²⁶ US Department of the Army, ADP 1-01 *Doctrine Primer* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2019), 4-7.

²⁷ Ibid., 4-7.

Echelon	Tasks to Consolidate Gains
Strategic-operational level (joint force land component commander—corps)	Establishing the security conditions necessary to achieve the desired political end state.
Operational-tactical level (field army—corps)	Exploiting tactical success to ensure the enemy cannot mount protracted resistance by other means.
Tactical level (corps—division)	Maintaining tempo and ensuring the enemy enjoys no respite; defeating the enemy in detail.

Figure 1. Consolidation of Gains by Echelon. US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 3-6.

At the tactical level, corps and division tasks include maintaining tempo and defeating the enemy in detail. This task of focusing on defeating enemy forces falls in-line Lundy and with Clausewitz's theory that, "destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war, and, so far as positive action is concerned, the principle way to achieve our (political) object."²⁸ Everett Carl Dolman, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force Air Command and Staff College, doesn't share Clausewitz's view that the tactical action of defeating an enemy's army achieves strategic aims. Dolman states, "it is quite possible to win the battle and lose the war," implying that there has to be a link between success at the tactical level and achievement of strategic aims.²⁹

The overlapping level of operational-tactical level tasks entail exploiting tactical success to ensure the enemy cannot mount protracted resistance by other means. According to Lundy, this task would fall strictly in the tactical level of war. The operational-tactical task doesn't mention or explain how to link the tactical task to the strategic aims for which the operational level of war is designed. This task is also solely focused on enemy forces and does not address other factors of the operational environment, particularly with regards to the population and the stability of the area in conflict.

²⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 258.

²⁹ Everett C. Dolman, *Pure Strategy* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 3.

At the strategic-operational level tasks from the Corps to Joint Force Land Component Commander are to establish the security conditions necessary to achieve the desired political end state. This task is incomplete and needs further expansion. The task implies that as long as a certain level of security is reached, then the political end state can be met. As with the tactical-operational task, there is no mention of other necessary tasks relating to multiple other factors of the operational environment. Ikle recognized that “most of the exertion is devoted to the means – perfecting the military instruments and deciding on their use in battle and campaigns – and far too little is left for relating these means to their ends.”³⁰ Similar to Shadlow’s thesis, Ikle believes that there is an intellectual difficulty on connecting military plans with their ultimate purpose, consolidating political power.³¹

The proposed framework for consolidation of gains (see figure 2) is built primarily around the common themes deduced from the literature review. The framework must be developed around the three levels of war and interwoven into one system with each level complementing one another. For example, the tactical consolidation of gains cannot be isolated and planned for without consideration in how it effects the operational level of consolidating gains. A system is more than just a set of components and their relationships – it is a complex whole that affects and is affected by its environment.³² Environmental can include a multitude of things. Analysis of these variables provides an understanding of the current environment and provides context for the cognitive process of envisioning the desired future environment, or strategic end state.

³⁰ Ikle, *Every War Must End*, 1.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

³² Alex Ryan. “What is a Systems Approach”, 10 Sep 2008, 9.



Figure 1. Theoretical framework for consolidation of gains. Created by the author.

One of Clausewitz's famous dictums is that, "no one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."³³ The political objective of any war should be framed clearly and defined in such a way as to fit within the country's broader grand strategy.³⁴ Having a clear political objective prescribes the scale of the means and the effort which is required to achieve the objective.³⁵ In this framework, the political objective, or strategic end state, is the starting point for planning the war and consolidation of gains.

³³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 579.

³⁴ Rose, *How Wars End*, 285.

³⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 579.

The role of the military strategist is to consider the ends, ways, and means to formulate a coordinated war plan that conforms to the overall and specific policy directives. The purpose of the military strategist is clear: link military means to the political aims of the state.³⁶ The strategic planner must determine the military objectives that achieve the political end state. Upon achieving the military objectives, there must be a plan to terminate the conflict and transition to peace.

Planning for conflict termination is just as important as designing the military campaign. The whole point of warfare is to seek a better or more permanent political condition. How a nation ends its war with an enemy can determine future relations.³⁷ Historian and military theorist, B.H. Liddell Hart observed,

there is a very natural tendency to lose sight of the basic national object, and identify it with the military aim. In consequence, whenever war has broken out, policy has too often been governed by the military aim - and this has been regarded as an end in itself, instead of as merely a means to an end.³⁸

If the planner focuses exclusively on military action to achieve victory, there is a risk of losing sight of the strategic end state. Properly planning for and executing consolidation of gains before, during, and after the conflict can assist with keeping the end state as the focus.

One option for consolidating gains at the strategic level is military governance. Lundy notes that “the military finds itself governing out of necessity both during and after conflicts even if it is rarely, if ever, labeled as such. This happens because there is no other government entity present to do the job.”³⁹ The role of the operational level planner is to design military campaigns that arrange tactical efforts in time, space, and purpose to achieve strategic goals. In order to

³⁶ Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 27.

³⁷ US Department of Defense. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: *Strategy* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2018), II-5.

³⁸ B.H. Liddell Hart. *Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 338.

³⁹ Lundy, “Three Perspectives”, 25.

accomplish this aim, the operational planner must clearly understand the strategic end state. By understanding the true purpose of war, the campaigns of their armies can be better integrated into a comprehensive national strategy.⁴⁰ Like the strategist, the operational planner must always keep the end state in mind and not just focus on planning and arranging tactical actions. Ikle notes that this is a trap that operational planners fall into. He states, “while skillfully planning their intricate operations and coordinating complicated maneuvers, [planners] remain curiously blind in failing to perceive that it is the outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it, that determines how well their plans server the nation's interests.”⁴¹ Simply put, if the ultimate objective of the strategic end state is not met, the campaigns could be perceived as a waste of time, effort, and military capability.

To avoid falling into Ikle’s noted trap, planning to consolidate gains throughout the campaign must have enduring effects and lead to accomplishment of the strategic end state. To exploit temporary operational success, the Army must quickly seize the initiative to improve the civil situation while preventing conditions from deteriorating further. The Army accomplishes this by conducting stability tasks that include protecting the population from violence and restoring public order while providing for immediate needs.⁴² Consolidating gains is demonstrated by the execution of tasks that address the needs of the host nation and its population. Military governance executed at the operational level is a means to consolidating gains before, during, and after large-scale combat operations. Military governance that is nested with tactical actions at the operational level can provide decisive and enduring outcomes that achieve the strategic end state. To accomplish this, the operational planner must analyze the means, or forces available, to ensure the capabilities required are available. If not, forces must be

⁴⁰ Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 17.

⁴¹ Ikle, *Every War Must End*, 2.

⁴² For further explanation of Army stability tasks, refer to Army Doctrinal Publication 3-07, *Stability*, 2019 page 2-4.

requested to ensure they are available at the onset of the conflict. Failure to do so could lead to an inability to properly consolidate gains before or during large-scale combat operations.

Consolidating gains afterwards may be too late.

At the tactical level, the ultimate objective is to consolidate gains in a way to ensure the enemy no longer has the means or will to continue the conflict.⁴³ Initially, the focus is defeat of enemy forces. Clausewitz notes that, “the fighting force must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a state that they can no longer carry on the fight.”⁴⁴ While destroying the enemy’s forces may reduce his means to pursue his strategic end state, it does not ensure success. If the temporary tactical success of defeating the enemy’s forces is not promptly followed by consolidating gains and exploited at the operational and strategic level, the temporary tactical gains may be lost.

The theoretical system for consolidating gains is a complex system. The three levels of war are intertwined with each other and each level of war is a complex system itself with multiple factors that effect it. The operational level of war is the point at which we attempt to bring the system together as a whole. The operational planner is the orchestrator who arranges tactical actions and campaigns during large-scale combat operations, always keeping the strategic end state at the front of the mind. The operational planner must assess the results of the tactical actions and apply the appropriate means to consolidate success. This framework will be analyzed in the case study in the next section. The assessment of the theoretical framework through the case study produces a theoretical model for consolidation of gains that will assist the operational planner in thinking through consolidation of gains before, during, and after large-scale combat operations.

⁴³ Lundy, “Three Perspectives”, 19.

⁴⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 90.

This section analyzes how the US Army consolidated gains at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels during the Italy campaign in WW2. The intent is to analyze the consolidation of gains at all three levels of war, with an emphasis at the operational level to determine how planners linked tactical success to achieving the desired strategic end state. To accomplish this, the case study will seek to answer the research questions outlined in the introduction. The case study is comprised of three sections. The first will focus on the pre-invasion plan in an attempt to identify the guidance given to planners by the Allied Supreme Command and the assumptions that planners used to inform their plan. The focus will be primarily on the planning for mainland Italy, however, lessons learned from North Africa and Sicily will have to be examined to inform how they effected planning for the Italian mainland. The second section will focus on Operation Avalanche and the Allied actions to consolidate gains between September 9th to October 31, 1943, which is the start of the allied invasion of mainland Italy and 5th Army's seizure of Naples. Section three will focus primarily between May to July 1944 as the Allies seized Rome and began to transfer provinces under the control of the Allied Military Government (AMG) back to the Italian government. The assessment at the end of the case study will analyze the research questions to test the validity of the hypothesis.

The Plan

Planning for the military governance of Italy began in 1942, when the School of Military Government released its initial report on the estimate for the number of civil affairs officers potentially needed for Italy. Planners started the assessment with two main assumptions: 1) An armistice has been signed and hostilities have ceased. 2) The United States has been directed to occupy the entire territory of Italy and establish military government, pending the final terms of the Peace Conference and restoration of civil government. It was also presumed that the purpose of the military government would be to: first, carry out terms of armistice; second, prevent

resumption of hostilities; third, facilitate economic restoration of Italy; and finally assist the Italian people with emergency needs such as food and medical supplies.⁴⁵ The AMG was organized into ten different departments, which were, legal, public health, fiscal, welfare, public safety, public works, education, economics, communications, and field offices. In all, it was estimated that 1,037 officers would be needed to administer military government over ninety-three provinces for Italy's forty-two million people.⁴⁶

In planning for consolidating gains in Italy, the War Department was opposed to repeating the unsatisfactory arrangement that was in place for French North Africa. Civilian agencies had planned and administered all nonmilitary phases of civil affairs in north Africa. There was friction with the divi of responsibility and no overall commander overseeing the efforts. In some cases, civilian agencies did not have the capacity to conduct their missions, forcing the military to take over.⁴⁷ In February, 1943, General Marshall sent a message to General Eisenhower stating that the State Department desired the War Department to begin planning for and executing all civil relief for the last part of the North Africa campaign in Tunisia. Marshall's view was that since these activities during the initial stages of occupation would be so closely linked to military operations, that they should be under the responsibility of one commander that planned and executes the tasks.⁴⁸ While the US military did not want to assume full responsibility for civil affairs, they felt it was needed. This belief would be one of the

⁴⁵ US Army, School of Military Government, *Preliminary Estimate of Civil Affairs Officers Required for the Military Government of Italy* (World War II Operational Documents 1942. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 1.

⁴⁶ US Army, School of Military Government, *Preliminary Estimate of Civil Affairs Officers Required for the Military Government of Italy*, 3.

⁴⁷ Robert W. Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1950), II-5.

⁴⁸ Harry L. Coles, and Albert K Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964), 54.

major planning factors for the rest of the war. As planning began for the invasion of Sicily, civil affairs planning began to be conducted solely by the military, excluding all civilian agencies.⁴⁹

The initial planning estimates for Sicily anticipated that there would be serious destruction of cities, industries, transportation facilities, and other resources throughout Sicily. It was also assumed that there would be a severe shortage of food and medical supplies. The initial plan for Civil Affairs officers was to establish a headquarters in their assigned town's city hall and post proclamations 1, 2, and 3, which covered the establishment of military government, the punishment for war crimes and the regulation of currency and exchange.⁵⁰ The Carabinieri would then be instructed to guard banks and local food stocks. Local transportation would then be gathered in order to distribute food and other emergency needs.⁵¹ After essential needs were met, Civil Affairs officers began restoring governance through opening of banks, courts, and other governmental needs.

There were seventeen civil affairs officers that participated in the initial landings in Sicily with the Seventh Army assault forces on July 10, 1943. By July 28, over 250 Civil Affairs officers were across Sicily establishing military governance and providing essential needs to the Sicilian people. While the AMG in Sicily went generally according to plan, several lessons were learned that were incorporated for the mainland invasion. The headquarters staffs of both the Seventh and Eighth Armies insisted on reducing the number of civil affairs officers which AMG assigned them for the first phase of occupation. Both headquarters were unwilling to allow above the bare minimum number of officers to participate in the initial invasion in favor of more fighting soldiers. The initial phases were carried out with insufficient civil affairs personnel. Once

⁴⁹ Ibid, 164.

⁵⁰ US Army, School of Military Government, *Preliminary Estimate of Civil Affairs Officers Required for the Military Government of Italy*, 1.

⁵¹ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, II-35.

the difficulties of administering Sicilian towns became apparent, Commanders began to prioritize civil affairs officers.⁵²

Detailed planning for the invasion of mainland Italy began in June 1943. One of the planning constraints was the number of troops available. General Eisenhower knew that he would lose seven divisions on November 1st when they would be shipped to England to prepare for the invasion of France.⁵³ Because of the anticipated troop restrictions, the original plan was to occupy southern Italy only, advancing just north of Rome. Planners decided that AMG would be established in a series of seven regions.⁵⁴ As allies moved up the peninsula, regional headquarters which oversaw several provinces would be established under a national headquarters located in Rome.

In the estimate that the School of Military Government conducted in 1942, there was an assumption that the civilian population would suffer great privation due to food shortages. The assumption was that as Allied forces advanced, the enemy would strip the country of most of its food supply.⁵⁵ The AMG estimated that during the first ninety days, fifteen percent of the estimated sixteen million population south of Rome would need supplemental feeding in order to meet the minimal needs of the population, which amounted to 144,200 long tons of supplies.⁵⁶

Due to the size of Italy and the limited number of Civil Affairs officers available, personnel would be spread more thinly than in Sicily. To compensate, higher quality officers with

⁵² Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, II-42.

⁵³ Garland, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 22.

⁵⁴ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, III-4. The seven regions planned were: Region I (Sicily), Region II (Calabria, Lucania, Apulia), Region III (Campania), Region IV (Abruzzi and Lazio), Region V (Umbria and Marzia), Region VI (Sardina), and Region VII (Rome).

⁵⁵ US Army, School of Military Government, *Preliminary Estimate of Civil Affairs Officers Required for the Military Government of Italy*, problem IV, page 1.

⁵⁶ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, III-9. Items provided for subsistence included flour, dehydrated soup, evaporated milk, dried vegetables, cheese, laundry soap, and household matches.

experience working in civil government were drafted to be civil affairs officers. One example was the drafting of Major Raymond Wilson, a WWI veteran, the former Civic Secretary of the Kansas City, Missouri Chamber of Commerce and Assistant City Manager from 1939-1942. He was given a direct commission and sent to the Military Government School. He served as the Provincial Commissioner of Trapani from September 1943 to November of 1944.⁵⁷

In addition to procuring personnel with civilian experience, an additional school was established in Tizi Ouzou, Algeria to prepare officers for their mission. The school served two functions. First, it served as a holding area and training center for personnel assembling for future civil affairs operations in Italy. Officers were given a week long orientation course on the theory and practice of military government in Italy. The second function was to prepare detailed operational plans for units assigned regions.⁵⁸ Fifth Army and its assigned AMG, conducted planning for Region III (Campania), which included Salerno, the site of their invasion of the Italian mainland, codenamed Operation Avalanche.

Emergent Plan for Armistice Control

On July 25th, 1943, Prime Minister Mussolini was removed from office, the Fascist party was abolished, and Marshall Pietro Badoglio named the new Prime Minister. This change in regime forced Allied planners to develop a plan of armistice control in addition to the plan of direct military government.⁵⁹ An armistice would keep some form of the Italian government intact to administer the country under Allied supervision and control. With Mussolini out, the Allies now had that option to consider.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ US Army, Army Services Forces, *Allied Military Government*. World War II Operational Documents, 1945 (Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 2.

⁵⁸ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, III-7.

⁵⁹ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, III-12.

⁶⁰ Ibid., III-13.

As Allied planners conducted their analysis, they developed a third plan that was a blend of AMG and armistice control. Planners assessed that AMG would be needed in forward areas where LSCO was on-going, and armistice control in rear areas. It called for AMG to assume control in combat zones and maintain control until local governance could be established. Once local governance was capable of administration and the area was transferred to Italian control, armistice control would provide oversight.⁶¹

The Allies began armistice negotiations with Italy on August 17, 1943 in Lisbon, Portugal. Italy signed the initial surrender, called the “short-terms” on September 3rd.⁶² The Allies decided to wait to announce the surrender until September 8th, the night prior to beginning Operation Avalanche, the assault on the Italian mainland.

Operation Avalanche

On July 27, 1943, Fifth Army was directed to develop plans for the seizure of Naples and the nearby airfields.⁶³ Fifth Army’s plan called for coordinated assaults on the Salerno beaches by two corps, one British and one American. The American VI Corps consisted of the 34th and 36th Infantry divisions, the 1st Armored division, and the 82nd Airborne Division. The British 10 Corps consisted of 46th and 56th Infantry divisions, the 7th Armored division, and the 1st Airborne division. After securing the beaches, the objective was to advance inland to the mountains, then swing northwest to Naples.⁶⁴ Once captured, Naples would provide the Allies

⁶¹ Ibid., III-20.

⁶² Garland, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 484.

⁶³ Chester G. Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps: A History of the Fifth Army 1943-1945*, (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), 6.

⁶⁴ US Department of the Army, Center of Military History. *Salerno: American Operations from the Beaches to the Volturno, 9 September-6 October 1943* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), 7.

with a deep-water port on Italy's west coast to bring in material, men, and supplies to sustain operations as the Allies advanced towards Rome.

Fifth Army estimated that the Germans had over eight divisions defending in their area of operations. Two divisions were north of Rome, two others were in the vicinity of Naples, and the other four were south of Naples.⁶⁵ The Fifth Army planners estimated that on D-Day there were over 39,000 Germans in the Salerno area, with the possibility of being reinforced up to 100,000 by D plus 3. The Germans were expected to desperately hold the Salerno plain until their units from the south could pass north, then across the Volturno River.⁶⁶ The 16th Panzer division was assigned the defense of the beaches in Salerno, sharing the defense of the coast with Italian troops. When the German High Command learned of the Italian surrender on September 8th, they ordered the 16th Panzer division to disarm the Italian 222nd coastal division and assume the entire coastal defense.⁶⁷

At 0330hrs on September 9th, the first wave of assault forces left the marshalling area twelve miles off the shore of Salerno to begin the assault.⁶⁸ The British 10th Corps attacked the Salerno beaches north of the Sele River and the American VI corps attacked to the south of the river at the Paestum beaches. VI Corps, led by the 36th Infantry Division, made its assault on the beaches of Paestum without any naval preparatory fires or air bombardment.⁶⁹ As the first wave landed, the Germans opened fire with artillery, machine guns and mortars. The three invading

⁶⁵ Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps*, 13.

⁶⁶ US Army, *Salerno*, 14.

⁶⁷ George F. Botier, *Sideshow War: The Italian Campaign, 1943-1945* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), 51.

⁶⁸ Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps*, 16.

⁶⁹ US Army, *Salerno*, 19.

divisions were expected to clear the beach by mid-morning and seize their objectives several miles inland.



Figure 2. Initial Enemy Situation and Fifth Army Landings. Author additions to base graphic from Martin Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), Map I

The 16th Panzer division had 17,000 men and more than 100 tanks. They deployed in four combat teams composed of infantry, tanks, and artillery. Three were positioned two miles from the coast, prepared to conduct counter attacks and one was in reserve. On the coast line, the division constructed eight strongpoints manned by a platoon of infantry and supported by

machine guns, mortars, and anti-tank pieces. With the Italian surrender, and the loss of the Italian 222nd coastal division, the 16th Panzer division was at a disadvantage securing the entire coastline.⁷⁰ The commander of the 16th Panzers, General Rudolf Sieckenius, was prepared to abandon the beach after only a few hours of defense during the landings. His initial aim was to inflict maximum casualties while the Allies were vulnerable on the beach to slow their progress towards Naples. He would then withdraw to conduct a counterattack on D+1 after being reinforced.⁷¹

At the end of D-day all units had reached their initial objectives with the exception of the 141st Infantry, which remained pinned down near the beaches. The British 10 Corps on the Fifth Army left flank advanced over three miles inland and seized the Montecorvino airfield. VI Corps pushed almost five miles inland, securing high ground that provided overwatch for the beaches.⁷²

⁷⁰ Martin Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), 79.

⁷¹ Botier, *Sideshow War*, 55.

⁷² US Army, *Salerno*, 36.




Figure 3. Fifth Army Landings and Beachhead D+1. Martin Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), Map I.

Fifth Army consolidated the beach head at Salerno from September 10th-11th as supplies and additional units came ashore in order to prepare to continue their attack to Naples. Small attacks were conducted to capture the town of Altavilla and hill 424 which gave them control over all the routes with access to the beachhead.⁷³ By the evening of the 11th, Fifth Army had expanded the beachhead along a thirty-mile coastline and six to seven miles inland. The greatest vulnerability was in the center at the Sele-Calore corridor occupied by the 45th Division.⁷⁴

The Sele-Calore corridor is exactly where elements of the 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division attacked to reinforce the 16th Panzer Division. The German objective was the town of Altavilla and hill 424, which the 45th Division had taken the day prior.

⁷³ Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps*, 22.

⁷⁴ US Army, *Salerno*, 50.

By seizing this objective, the Germans would have observation of the beach and would control the routes for their units retrograding from southern Italy to the north. The 26th Panzer Division captured hill 424 on September 12, defeating 1st Battalion, 142nd Infantry and inflicting heavy casualties. The following day, the 45th Infantry division conducted a counterattack, but failed to retake hill 424.⁷⁵



Figure 4. German counter attack on September 12th, 1943. Author additions to base graphic from Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, Map I.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 60.

On September 15, Field Marshall Kesselring authorized the disengagement of his units from Salerno in order to move north to the Volturno River, also known as the Volturno line.⁷⁶ The Germans fought a series of delaying actions from Salerno to the Volturno line, slowing the Allied advance. The German's evacuated Naples on September 30th, allowing the Allies to seize it the following day.




Figure 5. Fifth Army Consolidation Areas 15SEP1943-06OCT1943. Author additions to base graphic from Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, Map II.

On October 1, Brigadier General Hume, the Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAO) of the Fifth Army AMG, entered Naples with the first Fifth Army patrols to begin administering the city and assisting the population.⁷⁷ Naples was utterly destroyed. Allied bombing flattened most of

⁷⁶ Kesselring, *A Soldier's Record*, 226.

⁷⁷ Public Relations Branch, Allied Commission, US Army, *A Review of Allied Military Government and of the Allied Commission of Italy, 1945* (World War II Operational Documents. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 19.

the industrial centers. Prior to evacuating, the Germans removed all transportation facilities, blasted communication installations, knocked out water and power systems, and broke open sewer mains. They demolished bridges, mined buildings, burned hotels and university buildings, and ripped up rails.⁷⁸ The port sustained the worst destruction. The Germans sunk over 100 vessels ranging from ocean-going liner to small harbor craft to block the harbor, and destroyed all seventy-three electric cranes needed for unloading materials and supplies from ships.⁷⁹

As planned, most critical issue for the AMG in Naples was food shortages for the 800,000 inhabitants. While the AMG planned for and resourced the food shortages, getting the food ashore and distributing supplies to the population was severely constrained by the state of the port. Two weeks after the capture of Naples, the Allies were unloading 3,500 tons of cargo daily at the port, almost half of the prewar capability.⁸⁰ By October 22, ships were unloading nearly 7,000 tons of supplies a day, enough to become the principle supply base and staging area for reinforcements for the duration of the Italian campaign.⁸¹

The AMG restored water to parts of the city by October 10, and rest of the city by the end of the month. By the end of October electricity was restored, banks were open, air raid signals were operational, hospitals and ambulance services were restored.⁸² Fifth Army AMG's greatest achievement in Naples was the prevention of a Typhus fever epidemic in the winter of 1943-44. An epidemic of some sort was one of the planning assumptions of the AMG.⁸³ Because of the

⁷⁸ Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, 166.

⁷⁹ Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, 168.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁸¹ Botier, *Sideshow War*, 64.

⁸² Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps*, 485.

⁸³ US Army, School of Military Government, *Preliminary Estimate of Civil Affairs Officers Required for the Military Government of Italy* (World War II Operational Documents 1942. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 1.

foresight by AMG planners, trained medical teams were forward to stop the epidemic before it became an emergency and effected combat operations.⁸⁴

Due to the destruction of the city, the AMG of Naples had a monumental task of restoring basic necessities and services for the population and building infrastructure for the sustainment of combat operations. The task was complicated even further due to the fact that the war with Germany was still on-going. On October 21, a series of German air attacks struck the city, and German artillery continued to shell Naples for days as the Germans conducted their retrograde north. Despite the shelling, workers continued to clear the port to bring in supplies. Although attacks were not frequent, they inflicted casualties and fear on the population and troops.⁸⁵ Even though combat operations continued, Fifth Army was able to consolidate gains at the operational level in Naples, ending Operation Avalanche. Fifth Army set the conditions for consolidating gains at the strategic level.

Rome

The drive to capture Rome proved to be a long, tough road for Fifth Army. In the eight months following Operation Avalanche and the approach to Rome, Fifth Army sustained over fifty-two thousand casualties.⁸⁶ Following Operation Avalanche, Fifth Army pursued the German army across the Volturno River. The Germans established a series of defensive positions built in depth and tied to the natural terrain of mountains and rivers known as the Gustav line. The Gustav Line blocked Highway 6, the main route north to Rome.⁸⁷ Field Marshall Kesselring's intent was to hold the initial lines until January 1, in order to buy time to strengthen in depth.⁸⁸ Despite a

⁸⁴ Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps*, 485.

⁸⁵ Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, 168.

⁸⁶ Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps*, 176.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁸⁸ Kesselring, *A Soldier's Record*, 226.

series of offensive operations by Fifth Army, including Operation Shingle, the amphibious landing at Anzio designed to outflank the Gustav Line, the Germans held their positions until the end of May.

After Fifth Army broke through the Gustav Line and consolidated their Corps at Anzio, the fall of Rome became inevitable. Field Marshall Kesselring evacuated Rome on June 3rd and established new defensive positions north of the Tiber River.⁸⁹ On that same day, the advanced detachments of the Fifth Army approached Rome. Understanding the political implications of capturing Rome intact, General Clark did not immediately pursue German forces. This would later become controversial, as some felt the destruction of the German Tenth Army would have ended the war in Italy sooner.⁹⁰

On the night of June 4, Fifth Army entered Rome unopposed. The first elements to enter were the 1st Armored Division. They moved through Rome during the night with the mission of seizing the nineteen bridges in and around Rome that crossed the Tiber.⁹¹ As the remaining units of Fifth Army entered Rome on the morning of June 5th, the citizens of Rome lined the streets and gave them a hysterical welcome.⁹²

As he had in Salerno, MG Hume entered Rome on the day it was liberated to begin establishing administrative control of the city. Due to the rapid advance north by Fifth Army in pursuit of the Germans, he would only govern for the first ten days before moving north to

⁸⁹ Ernest F. Fischer, *Cassino to the Alps* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1977), 206.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 221.

⁹¹ Fischer, *Cassino to the Alps*, 220.

⁹² Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps*, 267.

continue to consolidate gains of liberated territory.⁹³ On June 15, the city became AMG Rome Region and the headquarters of the AMG.⁹⁴

Rome was home to a large number of civil servants and the strongest political leaders. The legitimacy and prestige of the Italian government depended in large measure upon its administering from the capital.⁹⁵ With Rome liberated, the AMG recommended to the Supreme Allied Commander that the Italian Government move from Naples to the capital. Rome was captured intact, with public utilities and communications functioning adequately, all the ministries available for use, and large numbers of civil servants ready to resume work. The Italian Government moved to Rome on July 15, 1944.⁹⁶

As the Italian Government became capable of administration under the observation of the AMG, provinces began to be transferred back to the control of the Italian Government. On February 11th, 1944, AMG transferred the provinces of Lucania, Calabria, and Salerno. On July 20th, the provinces of Foggia, Campobasso, Benevento, Avellino, and Naples province were transferred.⁹⁷

⁹³ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, VIII-3.

⁹⁴ Harry L. Coles, and Albert K Weinberg. *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964), 454.

⁹⁵ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, VIII-1.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, VIII-11.

⁹⁷ Coles, *Soldiers Become Governors*, 469.



Figure 6. AMG and Italian government consolidation area. Original graphic from Public Relations Branch, Allied Commission, United States Army *A Review of Allied Military Government and of the Allied Commission of Italy*, 1945 (World War II Operational Documents. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 63. Modified by Author.

On September 26, 1944, the Allies announced a change in their policy from control to rehabilitation.⁹⁸ The new policy called for the relaxation of both political and economic controls over the Italian Government while simultaneously increasing its responsibilities. Early relaxation of political controls was more important from the point of view of augmenting the prestige of the Italian Government and restoring their ability to self-govern.⁹⁹

The Allies continued combat operations against the Germans in Italy until the German Army surrender on May 2, 1945. Although the fighting continued, the Allies consolidated gains

⁹⁸ Coles, *Soldiers Become Governors*, 492.

⁹⁹ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, X-1.

at the strategic level by providing oversight establishing a new Italian government free of Fascist rule. Although self-governing, Italy remained under Allied control until the ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty on September 15th, 1947..¹⁰⁰

Assessment

This section will answer the proposed research questions originally outlined in the introduction to test the hypothesis on consolidating gains. Question one is, what were the strategic aims and termination criteria given to allied planners? General Eisenhower was given three strategic aims by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca. The strategic aims were approved by both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. The first was to secure Allied shipping lanes through the Mediterranean..¹⁰¹ Lieutenant General Somerville, the Commanding General of the Services and Supply, estimated that the Allies would save 1,825,000 tons of shipping in the first five months that the Mediterranean was open and it would eliminate the long voyage around Africa and the Cape of Good Hope..¹⁰² The second was to eliminate Italy from the war. It was estimated that if Italy lost Sardinia or Sicily, they would collapse. This would boost the morale of the American people and continued build of confidence for US troops after success in Africa. Italy's surrender could likely lead to strategic aim number three of diverting German strength from the Russian front..¹⁰³ After the Italian collapse, Germany would be forced to reinforce Italy in order to protect Germany's southern border.

The termination criteria given to Allied planners was the unconditional surrender of Italy. President Roosevelt declared that he wanted no negotiated armistice after their collapse. As part of the unconditional surrender the entire Fascist party member from the highest to the lowest

¹⁰⁰ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, XX-57.

¹⁰¹ Garland, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 52.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 52.

would be removed from and post of government authority.¹⁰⁴ That was the political standing in May of 1943.

The operating environment changed on July 25 when Prime Minister Mussolini was removed from power and replaced by General Badoglio. With the emerging option that the Allies could leave part of the existing government in place, preventing the need to completely rebuild it, the option of not insisting for unconditional surrender became an option. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill both agreed that if Italy participated in the war against Germany, that an armistice could be met without unconditional surrender.¹⁰⁵ As part of the “long-terms” that Eisenhower and Badoglio signed on September 29th, 1943, Italy did not have to agree to unconditional surrender.¹⁰⁶

The second research question concerns the forces Allied planners allocated to consolidate gains at the start of the Italy campaign? The only primary resource document discovered during the research of this monograph that provided empirical evidence to units conducting consolidation of gains came from the School of Military Government. The *Estimate of Civil Affairs Officers Required for the Military Government of Italy* was published in 1942 estimated that 1,037 officers would be needed as part of the AMG to govern Italy.¹⁰⁷ Official military history publications provided limited details on particular units conducting consolidation. Blumenson did note that the 540th and 343rd Engineer Regiments were responsible for clearing obstacles, streets, and fixed sewer lines in Naples, however, detailed task organizations or other

¹⁰⁴ Garland, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 19.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 458.

¹⁰⁶ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, IV-9.

¹⁰⁷ US Army, School of Military Government, *Preliminary Estimate of Civil Affairs Officers Required for the Military Government of Italy*, 3.

empirical evidence indicating what units were designated for consolidation of gains was not found during the research for this monograph.¹⁰⁸

Research question three asked, what phase of the operation did consolidation of gains begin? From the histography and research of primary source documents in the WW II operational documents at the Combined Arms Research Library, consolidation of gains was conducted before, during, and after LSCO in Italy. The planning for consolidation of gains in Italy has been thoroughly demonstrated through the case study. Initial planning began one year prior to Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily. When General Eisenhower decided to invade mainland Italy, previous plans were refined to account for lessons learned from Operation Husky. Each of the AMG divisions were instructed to update their sections of the AMGOT handbook based on lessons learned in Sicily.¹⁰⁹ As emerging events took place, such as the overthrow of Mussolini and the change of Italian government, Allied planners incorporated the emerging events into their deliberate strategy to develop the realized strategy.¹¹⁰ Strategy Philosopher Henry Mintzberg's emergent strategy concept was exhibited at the highest levels of government when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill changed their position of insisting on Italy's unconditional surrender. Due to the unforeseen events of Mussolini's downfall, an emergent strategy provided new opportunities to gain a better position of advantage.

During LSCO, consolidation of gains was conducted often before areas were secure. Civil Affairs officers were often attached to the first patrols that entered towns. In Naples, units began consolidating gains by clearing the port while still under fire from German artillery.¹¹¹ As

¹⁰⁸ Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, 167.

¹⁰⁹ US Army, Combined Civil Affairs Committee. *Memorandum for Information No. 13, Operation of AMG in Sicily and Italy* (World War II Operational Documents 1943, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 12.

¹¹⁰ Henry Mintzberg, *Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, and Planners* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 24-25.

¹¹¹ Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, 168.

combat zones became rear areas the AMG continued to consolidate gains by improving essential services and governance. After LSCO, the Allies consolidated gains at the strategic level providing oversight to the Italian government as they gained the capability to self-govern.

The fourth and final research question asks, what role did the Theater Army play in consolidating gains? The Theater Army has the most significant role in the planning, coordination, and allocation of resources.¹¹² Throughout the Italy campaign, Fifth Army planned and coordinated civil affairs requirements and capabilities for infrastructure development, and other critical capabilities. The AMG of Fifth Army enabled the Italian government to provide essential services to the population. Once the Italian government proved proficient, authority of governance was transferred from the AMG to the Italian government.

Analysis

This section will synthesize the presented history, theory, and doctrine for consolidation of gains by applying the assessment of the case study and research questions to the two hypotheses outlined in section one. The first hypothesis argues that when policy makers establish defined strategic aims and termination criteria, operational planners are able to nest military objectives within strategic aims prior to the start of the campaign and allocate the appropriate and necessary forces with the proper capabilities to consolidate gains. The assessment from the case study shows that strategic political aims and termination criteria were given to planners early. Planners developed a systematic campaign from North Africa, to Sicily, and the Italian mainland that nested with the desired political objectives and were able to allocate the appropriate resources in advance. The Allied planners developed the plan for AMG to consolidate gains and political power during and after LSCO. The analysis conducted by the School of Military Government to estimate the number of Civil Affairs officers needed for Italy demonstrates that planners

¹¹² US Army, FM 3-0, 8-2.

understood the desired political outcome and worked to properly resource the means to reach the desired ends. As policy changed or emerging events took place, such as the over throw of Mussolini and the change of Italian government, Allied planners incorporated the emerging events into their deliberate strategy to develop the realized strategy.¹¹³

If planners are given an initial strategic end state and termination criteria, they will be able to develop nested operational plans and campaigns that achieve the desired outcomes and allocate the appropriate means to achieve the end state. When allocating the appropriate capabilities to consolidate gains, planners must understand that the end state will likely change, so additional capabilities must be anticipated and accounted for.

The second hypothesis argues that when consolidation of gains in rear areas begin early in the campaign and assessments are conducted after unplanned tactical success or shortfalls, the US Army can consolidate gains that link tactical actions to strategic aims. Research question three examined in what phase did consolidations of gains began in Italy. In addition to early planning, consolidation of gains began during the initial assault on Sicily when seventeen civil affairs officers landed with Seventh Army.¹¹⁴ As demonstrated in the case study, civil affairs officers were present the first day each town was seized to begin military governance and alleviate the needs of the population before they affected combat operations.

Assessments for the effectiveness of the AMG were conducted following the invasion of Sicily. Changes in doctrine and plans were made prior to the start of Operation Avalanche, the invasion of the Italian mainland. The assessments and adjustments to plans and doctrine ensured that the means and ways were appropriate to achieve the desired ends.

¹¹³ Mintzberg, *Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, and Planners* 24-25.

¹¹⁴ Komer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater*, II-42.

The Allies were successful in consolidating gains at the tactical through strategic levels in Italy campaign. They were successful because Allied planners were given a clearly articulated and understood strategic end state. Operational planners were able to develop campaigns and allocate the necessary resources and capabilities to consolidate gains early and throughout the operation, achieving the end state. When the end state changed, or emerging events took place, planners were able to conduct assessments to adjust the means and ways to achieve the ends.

Conclusion

Success in war ultimately depends on the consolidation of political power

—Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*

Findings

In synthesizing the six common themes that emerged from the literature review with the case study, one over-arching deduction is present to successfully consolidate gains from the tactical through strategic level. The link to connect tactical level gains to the strategic political aims at the operational level of war is to conduct temporary military governance through a whole of government approach. While military governance is not the norm, it was proven successful during the Italy campaign to consolidate tactical gains into enduring strategic political gains. The operational-strategic level of war is where military members given stability and governance tasks integrate with other government agencies to perform governance to establish enduring political aims. In addition to the over-arching deduction, lessons were learned from the six common themes from the literature review.

The first theme stated that politics and war are intertwined and cannot be separated and political leaders must provide their future desired end state. While this theme was validated through the case study, it should be expanded to include the need for a continuous dialogue throughout the conflict. The civil-military dialogue is critical as the military and political

environment change throughout the conflict. In the case of the Italy campaign, the political situation changed with the fall of the Mussolini government. The second order effect was a change in Allied strategy and course of action. Without a constant dialogue, military actions may become disconnected with political aims.

The second theme stated that consolidating gains are decisive to long-term political success following conflict. This is evident in the Italy campaign and successful because the consolidation of gains began immediately after, or sometimes during, tactical actions. The third theme stated that, historically, the United States did not account for consolidating gains prior to the start of conflict. In the case study, consolidation of gains was planned for prior to the start of conflict, resulting in deliberate actions to consolidate gains. The fourth theme stressed the importance of accounting for the consolidation of gains before, during, and after LSCO. It is evident from the case study that to successfully consolidate political power, a deliberate plan with the appropriate resources and capabilities must be accounted for. The fifth theme emphasized the requirement for enemy forces to be defeated to a state where they can no longer produce means to resist. While the Allies remained engaged in LSCO with the Germans until the end of the war, rear areas were protected allowing governance to take place. During LSCO a combat force must be allocated to rear area security to defeat any by-passed or emergent enemy threats. The final theme stated that military governance was a viable means for consolidating gains. As stated in the opening of this section, the findings from the research and case study conclude that conducting military governance during LSCO should be considered to ensure that temporary tactical success is consolidated to lasting strategic political gains.

Recommendations Findings and Analysis

There are several low-cost actions that could be taken across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) that could set the foundation for the Army to consolidate gains before, during, and after LSCO. First, as the

discussion continues on how the Army should consolidate gains, doctrine must be continually refined and updated. Lesson's learned from historical cases, world events, and emerging trends must be analyzed and incorporated into doctrine. Doctrine is the starting point for planners when developing a campaign plan at the operational level and the tactical actions within the campaign plan. It is recommended that the framework for consolidation of gains developed in this paper be added to doctrine to fulfill the existing gap. As part of that framework, the responsibilities by echelon in ADP 3-0 should be refined to provide the potential of temporary military governance at the operational and strategic level.

<i>Echelon</i>	<i>Task to Consolidate Gains</i>
Strategic-operational level (joint force land component command – corps)	Conduct temporary military governance and whole of government approach with government agencies until the host nation proves capable of administering itself and the security situation allows for parts or all territory to be returned to the host nation.
Operational-tactical level (field army-corps)	Exploit tactical success to ensure the enemy cannot mount protracted resistance by other means. Conduct stability tasks and temporary military governance at the local and provincial level until the host nation is capable of self-administration.
Tactical level (corps-division)	Maintain tempo, defeat the enemy in detail to prevent protracted conflict

Figure 7. Proposed tasks by echelons for consolidation of gains. Original graphic from Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations, 3-6. Author modified proposed definitions.

Improving our Leadership and Education in military governance as a method to consolidate gains, through Professional Military Education (PME) is also an effective way to familiarize and generate discussion amongst field grade officers and senior leaders. Mastery of the topic is not necessary. The study of historical case studies during wars, campaigns and other military action already discussed during Command and General Staff College or the Army War College could easily be expanded to include the study of consolidation of gains and military governance. Although only one case study was highlighted in this monograph, history is full of other examples. Guest speakers augmented with classroom discussion is a low cost and immediate solution to create a dialogue and exploring the topic further across the Army.

In an attempt to build an initial and low-cost capability to conduct military governance as part of consolidation of gains in LSCO, it is possible to identify and recruit current governance professionals to join the Army Reserves and National Guard to serve as Civil Affairs officers. Through the Army's Talent Management Task Force, current mayors, city governance administrators and professionals could be given direct commissions commensurate to their level of civilian employment. These individuals could serve as guest speakers at PME or part-time planners at Army Component Commands (ACCs) or Combatant Commands (COCOMS) to assist with consolidation within OPLANs to fulfill their monthly and yearly military obligations. They can be mobilized in the event of LSCO and provide Theater Army Commanders with experienced staff members capable of conducting governance. They could also develop and serve as instructors for an AMG indoctrination course, such as described in the case study, to expand the capability across the Army in the event of LSCO.

Further Study

The objective of this study was to develop a framework for the operational level planner to link consolidation of gains at the tactical level to achieving strategic political aims. Throughout the research, military governance was a recurring theme that scholars and military professionals referenced as a viable option. Based on the deductions from the research, a proposed framework was developed to assist operational level planners in providing options for consolidating gains and achieving enduring political success. Applying the framework in examining the case study, temporary military governance is a viable option for military planners. While consolidation of gains through military governance is not new concept, it is a current gap in our doctrine, training, and Leadership and education. As a result, further study should be conducted on how to build capability to conduct consolidation of gains through military governance before, during, and after LSCO.

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