

CASTLES TO CARRIERS: THE TIMELESS NATURE OF
POWER PROJECTION CHALLENGES
IN THE SECOND CRUSADE

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Military History

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

CASTLES TO CARRIERS: THE TIMELESS NATURE OF POWER PROJECTION CHALLENGES IN THE SECOND CRUSADE, by Matthew H. Templeton, 185 pages.

The Second Crusade saw the mobilization and projection of a massive Western European coalition on an expedition to stem the Turkish Muslim onslaught on the Crusader States of the Holy Land. The informational power of the Church's recruitment efforts yielded huge returns. The Crusade to the Holy Land was entering a mature theater, with a friendly "inside force" already well established in the political and military landscape. Christian allies along the deployment route, and half a century of proven capabilities in the operational level of war also made the expedition's success seem likely. For all its promise, however, the Holy Land Crusade failed to achieve any strategic impact. The root of the failure lay, not in any lack of force projection capability or operational-level soundness, but in constraints on the crusaders' instruments of power. Diplomatic and ideological-informational constraints and imperatives cornered the leaders into certain strategic choices. These choices compounded with military logistical and intelligence constraints, and set the crusaders at odds with the complex security interests of the allies on whom the expedition most relied for success, causing the entire venture to unravel.

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ACRONYMS

ATP	Army Techniques Publication
EABO	Expeditionary Advance Base Operations
FM	Field Manual
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
ILH	<i>In laudem Hierosolymitani</i>
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JP	Joint Publication
LOC	Line of Communication
NDS	National Defense Strategy 2018
PPP	Power Projection Platform
SLOC	Sea Line of Communication
USMC	United States Marine Corps

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CHAPTER 1

CASTLES TO CARRIERS

The whole globe would be shaken in uproar and battles.

—Ricardus, *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*

Power Projection is a cornerstone of American foreign policy. Without the instruments of power to undergird the nation’s strategic will, the United States would rapidly lose its position of leadership on the world stage. More than just the extension of a nation’s will by means of military might or the threat thereof, power projection involves leveraging *all* the instruments of national power in the pursuit of strategic ends.¹ Since the Spanish-American War, the United States has demonstrated its capability to leverage every type of resource to exert its influence, many times expertly employing other-than-military power to pursue its objectives, though it has the unique capability to use that military power at scale in any region in the world.² As long as the US maintains global security interests, power projection will be a vital component of policy. But the current strategic power scene has evolved since the catalyzation of the American way of war. The complexity of the modern operational environment (OE) requires military theorists

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: JCS, January 17, 2017; incorporating Change 1, October 22, 2018), I-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910.

² David Ochmanek, “Restoring US Power Projection Capabilities: Responding to the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, July 2018, accessed October 13, 2020, 3, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE260.html>; Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 460-477.

and leaders to consider both historical international expeditionary actions, as well as the ways strategic power projection dynamics may evolve from here. Examining an often-overlooked period, this thesis looks to the twelfth century for such historical insight. Though twelfth century crusading warfare demonstrated strong capabilities in power projection and the operational level of war, the Second Crusade showed that constraints on the instruments of power, whether internally or externally imposed, can prevent even powerful state coalitions from achieving their desired strategic effect.

Purpose and Methodology

During the two-decade Global War on Terror, near-peer adversaries exploited the gap in the United States' attention to build their capacity to target historically assumed US advantages. In the current environment of expanding great power competition, one of the most decisive American advantages is now at risk- the ability to project power, in pursuit of achieving national and strategic objectives.³ Conventional near-peer nations have developed sophisticated, layered Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) networks that may constrict and contest US forces' capability to establish effective theater footholds, for the massing and employment of troops and equipment. Further complicating the OE is the diffusion of power to non-state actors, through the constant emergence and proliferation of new, accessible technologies, and the cluttered complexity that brings to

³ United States Marine Corps (USMC) Warfighting Lab, Concepts and Plans Division, *Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations* (EABO) (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 2018), 7.

all domains of warfare.⁴ The complex and crowded power stage increases the challenges to the traditional methods and theories of US power projection and will require a holistic, multi-instrumental approach to revitalize that advantage.⁵

As the US pursues solutions to this challenge, leaders and planners must consider the examples and lessons of history, where governments both succeeded, and failed, at power projection, particularly in similarly complex and challenging circumstances. Herein lies the first of two gaps that this thesis seeks to help fill. While much has been written on the concept of power projection, few works leverage in-depth studies of historical examples to inform the modern concept. Those studies that do employ historical analysis tend to focus on the era since the Napoleonic military revolution, since the notion of national power and the components of warfare appear more contiguous since that period.

However, the crusades of the medieval era (500-1500) provide excellent case studies in power projection, with valuable similarities to the modern era, especially in terms of complexity. This thesis recurrently asserts that the state and military leaders of twelfth century crusading warfare faced many operational and strategic challenges that share a striking resemblance to today—in nature, if not in form—and are therefore useful to modern strategic and operational analysis. In the process, the thesis fills a second gap, which lies in the historical conversation on the crusades themselves: an analysis of the

⁴ Secretary of Defense (SecDef), *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (NDS), (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), iii, 6.

⁵ Ochmanek, “Restoring US Power Projection Capabilities,” 3-6.

crusaders' methods, successes, and failures, *in terms of power projection* as a unifying, synthesized theme. Specifically, this examination of the Second Crusade (1146-49) informs a holistic approach to the future of US power projection by demonstrating how and why the expedition failed.

The thesis proceeds in six parts. The present introduction establishes key definitions and links modern concepts to their medieval analogues. It then frames the broad operating environment of the Second Crusade by providing an overview of the contrasts and similarities between the medieval and modern worlds from a military vantage point. Chapter Two outlines the complex strategic context for the Second Crusade specifically, including a brief overview of the First Crusade and an introductory analysis of the operational variables of the twelfth century Crusader States in the Holy Land. Chapter Three provides a concise campaign narrative of the expedition, from its inception in the cathedrals of Western Europe to its dissolution before the walls of Damascus. The fourth chapter comprises an analysis of the crusade's power projection actions, through the filter of the instruments of national power, with an eye towards identifying the causes of success and failure. As this campaign has been thoroughly researched by established scholars, it is not the intent of this work to craft an original exhaustive history of the crusade. Rather, the intent of the narrative is to provide a baseline understanding of the sequence of events, with a specific focus on the power projection aspects of the campaign.

Chapter Five contrasts the outcome of the Second Crusade with a survey of demonstrable strategic and operational-level soundness in twelfth century crusading warfare. While maintaining a focus on power projection, it also examines the

employment of the military instrument of power at the operational level of war, to demonstrate a general alignment of ends, ways, and means. Chapter Six concludes the thesis with a synthesis that extracts timeless generalizations from the failure of the Second Crusade and relevant continuities between twelfth century crusading warfare and the modern era.

Process and Terminology

This study focuses on both aspects of the overall topic (power and projection). Each term must be defined in the way the thesis will use them, in both the medieval and modern context. In this way, *timeless* characteristics of success and failure can be distilled from the research and offered for consideration in the modern strategic discourse.

Current U.S. strategic security documents abound with definitions of power centering on the national instruments that undergird it. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) establishes the multi-faceted nature of the instruments of national power and sets the required scope for any complete analysis of power projection:

A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space, seizing the initiative to challenge our competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength.⁶

The 2018 NDS, therefore, sees power projection as a given in an environment of strategic competition. Further, it defines that power as this multi-instrumental, interconnected array of functions and levers available for the nation to bring to bear.

⁶ SecDef, NDS, 4.

According to *Joint Publication 3-0 Operations*, “US instruments of national power are the national level means our national leaders can apply in various ways to achieve strategic objectives (ends).”⁷ American Joint doctrine also espouses the notion that “nearly all international and interpersonal relationships are based on power and self-interests manifested through politics.”⁸ This is the type of power this thesis will examine—power that provides a position of advantage or dominance of any kind, within an inter-state relationship.

In spite of the heavy attention paid to power projection theory in many recent publications, *Joint Publication 3-0* does not contain the term; it does, however, define “force projection” as “The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations.”⁹ In most instances, this thesis will use the term “force projection” to describe the employment of specifically the military instrument of power in an international theater to achieve strategic ends. This is really what most modern military leaders and theorists are referring to by power projection—and usually in the sense of *moving* some form of physical power in some physical way (the cyber domain notwithstanding). In the thesis, this term will also be used synonymously with the concept of “hard power.”

⁷ JCS, JP 3-0, x.

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: JCS, March 25, 2013; incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017), I-2 – I-3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf?ver=2019-02-11-174350-967.

⁹ JCS, JP 3-0, GL-9; VIII-12 – VIII-18.

While the military instrument will receive more in-depth attention in this work, it does not represent the full extent of power projection. As the study aims to inform a *holistic approach* to US power projection, the term force projection will only be used in the sense established in the *JP 3-0* definition above. When this study uses the term “power projection” it encompasses a broader meaning that integrates the modern definition of *power* cited above, and all the associated instruments a nation can employ to achieve its strategic objectives in an international theater. *Joint Publication 1* expresses the fuller connotation of power projection when it states,

The ability of the US to advance its national interests is dependent on the effectiveness of the United States Government (USG) in *employing the instruments of national power* to achieve national strategic objectives. The military instrument of national power can be used in a wide variety of ways that vary in purpose, scale, *risk, and combat intensity* [emphasis added].¹⁰

While this statement clearly includes the military instrument (force projection), it also expands the scope of power projection to include the “soft” instruments of national power. This includes both the activities that establish actual advantage or dominance in a non-military domain (diplomatic, information, and economic), as well as activities that *communicate* power—threatening or demonstrating the nation’s ability to employ a given instrument or combination thereof. The thesis will analyze the Second Crusade’s projection of power using the modern construct of the basic instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, or DIME).

Equally important is to establish how the crusading powers manifested these concepts while not using the same terminology. First, the western medieval notion of

¹⁰ JCS, JP 1, xi.

power was inextricably linked with the idea of “right.”¹¹ As far as is possible to tell, this was true of every level of rulership, tracing all the way to the rule of God—the source of power to the western European mind of the era. God was the ultimate source of power, and ruled the world because of the natural right inherent in being its creator and sovereign. Every church and secular ruler then viewed himself as possessing inherent rights of rulership granted by God (or at least traced from God), by virtue of his achieving said position of rulership. For most rulers, this applied whether his position was gained by inheritance, conquest, legitimate payment, bribery, assassination, or promotion by any other means.¹² The regularity of the more provocative means of promotion demonstrates that the concept of right was clearly informed by expediency. Whatever was possible to gain or seize by any means established the proof of divine right. This could then be additionally reinforced by convincing other powerful leaders or entities to support the aggressor’s claims to legitimacy—particularly the Church. While it must certainly be true that both magnates and churchmen held wildly varying degrees of

¹¹ H. B. Feiss and Corliss Konwiser Slack, *Crusade Charters, 1138-1270* (Tempe, AZ: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2001), 9; Susan Reynolds, “Did all the Land Belong to the King?,” in *In Laudem Hierosolymitani: Studies in Crusades and Medieval Culture in Honour of Benjamin Z. Kedar*, ed. Iris Shagrir, Roni Ellenblum, and Jonathan Riley-Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 263.

¹² Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 12-13; John France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1999), 39-52; Ricardus, *Chronicle of the Third Crusade: A Translation of the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, ed. and trans. Helen J. Nicholson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 302-315.

personal belief as to whether or not the divine right's legitimacy was important, they routinely sought to use the concept as a stated justification for their source of power.¹³

This view of power is vital to understand the crusades as power projection enterprises. Whenever a lord or monarch went to war against an adversary, he sought to extend the principle of divine right to the conflict, to demonstrate the legitimacy of his cause. This applied to a hyper degree in the crusades. The crusading powers saw themselves (again, in varying degrees of idealistic belief vs opportunism), as the divinely appointed lords of the Christian lands, and therefore, the protectors of the Holy Land. To this belief was added the enormous weight of papal messaging to confirm the notion of the divine rights and spiritual privileges waiting to be realized there. A sense of power—undergirded by divine right—is therefore palpable in the roots of the crusades.¹⁴ This is the power that they sought to leverage and project to achieve their objectives.

A final note is necessary to clarify disparities in the medieval instruments of power, as they relate to the modern model used in this thesis. While the diplomatic, military, and economic instruments all have clear parallels in the crusading era, the

¹³ Feiss and Slack, *Crusade Charters*, 3, 13, 44, 49, 55, 80, 86; Christopher Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (Cambridge: Belknap-Harvard, 2006), 4-8, 14, 33-38, 45. This practice, as well as the entire medieval conflation of church and state power can be traced back to the legalization of Christianity under the Roman Emperor Constantine around 312. This event, and Rome's subsequent Christianization combined the informational power of the church and the mobilizational power of the Roman Empire. Later, as the non-Roman inheritors of Europe embraced Christianity and began the continent's long transition to decentralized power, the concept of divine right, passed down through the old Roman Emperors and the Roman Church, was already deeply imprinted on their understanding of power.

¹⁴ France, *Western Warfare*, 1-6, 39-40, 204-206; Tyerman, *God's War*, 38-42, 48-51.

informational instrument appears less analogous. Coordinated information operations and lines of effort against adversary forces were mostly limited to the tactical context, such as macabre uses of enemy corpses to inspire fear in an opponent.¹⁵ Another, more impactful aspect of information power is displayed through the crusades' leveraging of religion. Given the man-powered nature of medieval warfare, and the constraints on raising armies during the era, the preaching and written letter campaigns of the crusades can easily be characterized as massively successful recruitment campaigns— information operations on the home front that were directly tied to force generation, without which there would have been no force projection.

Herein is a second manifestation of the “divine right”-based power that has no real equivalent in the modern discussion of national power- that of the medieval Church. The institutional power of the Church wielded substantial influence in the twelfth century, especially on the crusading expeditions in this study.¹⁶ In general, the thesis will analyze papal and Church impacts on power projection under the informational instrument of power.

Whereas “power” requires a significant introduction to distinguish its modern and medieval understanding, projection is more straightforward in the medieval context. The above definitions of both force projection and the broader power projection will be

¹⁵ Steven Tibble, *The Crusader Armies: 1099-1187* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 23-25. Although, there are definite examples of official diplomatic communications that could be seen as coercive, information-based efforts. See Ricardus, *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, 49-51.

¹⁶ Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books, 1951), 90-109.

applied to the Second Crusade, through the construct of DIME. To introduce the more important distinctions of medieval projection, the following section on the operational environment of the crusades will, in part, outline complexities and obstacles surrounding twelfth century international projection.

Relevance: Contrasts and Similarities between the Medieval and Modern Operating Environments

There are both vast differences and surprising similarities between the medieval and modern OE. This chapter highlights three significant categories for comparison: the diffusion of power in twelfth century governance; the inherent physical challenges and limitations of force projection; and medieval power projection platforms.

First, the setting in which the western European forces undertook their international expeditions known as the crusades was characterized by fractious and decentralized political power. The notion of a centralized state government bringing to bear coordinated and standardized resources to project the instruments of national power would have been completely the exception for the crusader commanders and kings. The general notions of rulership that had solidified by this period saw kings greatly diminished in the amount and type of central authority they could realistically wield.¹⁷ This was a marked divergence from the days when Rome could more easily marshal the instruments of power under a relatively greater unity of command. Now, the real power lay with local and regional lords who exerted control within their lands—which could be

¹⁷ John France, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6-7.

inconveniently noncontiguous—frequently without strong oversight.¹⁸ The magnate’s lands were his source of wealth, resources stemming from tenant agriculture, trade transactions, travel and passage tolls, and other features which were taxable at the lord’s discretion. In return the lord provided security, order, and protection to his tenants.¹⁹

There were, of course, vast degrees of control on this spectrum according to region; there were even true exceptions. On the geographic periphery of western Europe, the Eastern Roman Empire (also referred to in this study as Byzantium, the Greek Empire, and—representatively—Constantinople) was the direct descendant of the Roman Empire. Even though forced adaptations had introduced some significant new components to its administration, the Byzantine Empire still posed a definite example of centralized rulership of a multi-ethnic, maritime state. Even as the empire faced changes during the eleventh century that destabilized its control, on the whole Byzantium wielded a relatively strong, centralized form of power through the period of this thesis.²⁰

England was generally another example of greater centralization than its continental western counterparts. Here, the power of the king was still more real and

¹⁸ Richard Abels, “The Historiography of a Construct: ‘Feudalism’ and the Medieval Historian,” *History Compass* 7, no. 3 (May 2009): 1017-1018; France, *Western Warfare*, 39-44.

¹⁹ France, *Western Warfare*, 9-11; David Jacoby, “The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant: a New Approach,” *Relazioni Economiche Tra Europa E Mondo Islamico, Secc. 13.-18 Serie II*, no. 38 (2007): 169-170; Helen Nicholson, *The Knights Templar: A New History* (Stroud: Sutton, 2004), 182-191; Reynolds, “Did all the Land belong to the King?,” 264.

²⁰ Ann Hyland, *Medieval Warhorse: From Byzantium to the Crusades* (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1994), 48-53; Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 51-53.

tangible, and local rulers were more constrained in their judicial privileges than their peers in what is now France.²¹ However, even in England, the general system of administration revolved around a regionally specific network of magnates, with the most powerful controlling the greatest earldoms (in England), duchies, and great counties, and successively lesser lords controlling successively lesser tracts of land. Across Europe, the terms of subordinate obligation to a lord for military aid varied widely. Everywhere though, the rights of land ownership meant a measure of power and wealth-building opportunities. Most nobles had come to see these rights as hereditary, and therefore more inherent to their person, as opposed to a transferrable position coming from the continued good grace of the king.²²

Beyond the loosely similar systems of medieval European governance, a second phenomenon and resultant entity developed prior to the Second Crusade that further contributed to the diffused power array of the OE. The military religious orders became major power brokers in the world of the crusades, the states of the Latin East, and even the West at large. These relatively small groups of warriors, religious clerics, and administrators wielded considerable power in both the military and economic domains, and thus eventually grew to impact both diplomatic and informational power as well.²³ As a representative of this phenomenon—essentially a medieval multinational corporation—the Knights Templar played a role in enabling “state” power projection.

²¹ Reynolds, “Did all the Land belong to the King?,” 267-269.

²² France, *Western Warfare*, 40-49, 130-131.

²³ Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 12-15.

Taken as a whole, the diffused power array of the crusades, characterized by a fractious political environment and the introduction of non-state actors bears a semblance in nature to the modern power scene.²⁴

The second major element of the medieval OE that requires introductory framing is the logistical challenge presented by projecting military force. Physically moving significant military power (force projection) in the age of the crusades was a monumental task in itself. Over land routes, the movement phase of a campaign was limited to the walking speed of the infantry, although, in practice, cavalry might ignore the imperative of mutual support, to the peril of one or both of the contingents (as happened at the 1097 Battle of Dorylaeum). Route options were further constrained by the requirement to move through areas that could supply both men and horses from the locale. While this local resupply could occur by purchasing necessities from the local economy, very many times it devolved into foraging and pillaging along the route.²⁵ At worst, even a modest force (by international standards) of less than 5,000 could move as slow as six to seven kilometers per day; at best, that same force was only likely to achieve 21-22 kilometers.²⁶

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Joint Operating Environment 2035* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2016), 4-14 describes near future conditions that will produce a reduced capability for state governments to monopolize global competition and retain their previous centralized authority, as the proliferation of technology and ideas exponentially increases, enabling non-state actors to take increasingly powerful roles at regional and global levels of influence.

²⁵ John H. Pryor, "Introduction: Modelling Bohemond's March to Thessalonike," in *The Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 1-9 provides a wealth of introductory information on overland logistics by means of a case study on Bohemond of Taranto's march to Thessalonike in the First Crusade.

²⁶ Pryor, "Introduction," 2, 9. There were of course exceptions to Pryor's planning pace, particularly among non-European cultures, where many variables diverged

Both of these rates assume a permissive environment. Famously, in the case of the German and French march through Anatolia in the Second Crusade, more fighting and losses may have taken place there than in combat actions within the Holy Land.²⁷

While routes that made use of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) presented greater capacity for troop and supply movement, they were only slightly less plagued with challenges than their land-based alternatives.²⁸ Sailing technology during the twelfth century demonstrated that ships' ability to stay a course in the Mediterranean remained very much at the mercy of the weather. To mitigate the risk, maritime travel was frequently bound to the coast, where vessels could put in on a daily basis.²⁹ The Mediterranean was also home to several rival maritime powers (such as Byzantium, Venice, Genoa, Norman Sicily, and even Fatimid Egypt in the early twelfth century).³⁰ This meant that both rival "state" powers as well as pirates posed a significant threat,

significantly from those of western European crusaders. Hyland highlights records of a 13th century Mongol force of 40,000 cavalry travelling over 96 kilometers per day just prior to a battle with their Hungarian opponents in Hyland, *Medieval Warhorse*, 137. See also John Haldon, "Roads and Communications in the Byzantine Empire," in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 142.

²⁷ Jonathan Phillips, *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christianity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 175-203.

²⁸ Bernard S. Bachrach, "Crusader Logistics: from Victory at Nicaea to Resupply at Dorylaion," in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 51-53; Susan Rose, *Medieval Naval Warfare 1000—1500* (London: Routledge, 2005) 37-38.

²⁹ Ruthy Gertwagen, "Harbors and Facilities along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea Lanes to Outremer," in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 98.

³⁰ Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (Oxford: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 562-564; Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 35.

especially as storms frequently separated fleet elements and turned isolated ships or groups into attractive targets for attack.³¹

A third factor of the medieval OE made international military campaigns exceedingly difficult- that of the disjointed, temporary nature of armies. Given the highly local and agrarian nature of medieval life, economy, and governance, contingents of fighting men and their local lords could typically only afford to be away from their farms and seats of power for short amounts of time, before risking serious consequences to their cumulative livelihood. The crusades were to push that tolerance far beyond the normal limits. There was also the issue of quality. Though the armored mounted knight was the pride of western European military power during the period, they were the “exquisite” military unit, and therefore, terribly expensive and in short supply. Because of this, the vast majority of soldiers in any western force were poorly trained and equipped infantry, though better versions of infantry also existed, particularly in the Latin states of Outremer, after the First Crusade.³²

Whenever a lord or king raised forces for a campaign, the resulting army could typically only be considered a loose coalition with a tenuous unifying loyalty and, usually, a pressing need to return home as quickly as possible. Largely amateur and simply equipped infantry stood in stark contrast to elite knights, which might be drawn from obligated landowners or increasingly important semi-professional mercenary ranks.

³¹ Gertwagen, “Harbors and Facilities along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea Lanes to Outremer,” 98-105; Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 37, 43.

³² Pryor, “Introduction,” 2, 9; Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 337; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 36-37.

Some leaders had access to highly valuable specialized infantry mercenaries.³³ From this type of fragile unity within “state” armies, the modern OE is happily divergent. To highlight the unlikely achievement that the Second Crusade represents (other shortcomings aside), it is worth noting that its leaders organized and projected the combined forces of several of these “national” hosts.³⁴ In this kind of coalition, strategic unity of command and unity of effort could hardly be assumed for any royal military campaign, let alone one so complex and far-reaching as an international crusade. With so many divergent agendas and loyalties, even tactical unity of effort was only possible by careful diplomacy and sheer force of will.

One final OE comparison theme that receives recurring treatment throughout this thesis is the medieval power projection platform (PPP). Again, the medieval and modern platforms are vastly different. The modern OE boasts a large array of projection platforms. Aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, cruise missile-equipped surface vessels, amphibious assault ships, strategic bomber aircraft, and multi-modal deployment installations represent just a few of the options available to strategists and national leaders. The medieval options were understandably fewer. Some platforms have parallels in both time periods. Modern amphibious assault ships may possess many thousands of times the capability of their medieval predecessors, but the function was still the same. Transport ships frequently carried crusaders as well as their horses into amphibious

³³ Stephen D.B. Brown, “Military Service and Monetary Reward in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” in *Medieval Warfare 1000—1300*, ed. John France (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 36-41; France, *Western Warfare*, 8, 128-133.

³⁴ Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 40.

operations in the Levant and were a much more efficient means of projection than overland march routes.³⁵ War galleys and other types of battle ships in the Mediterranean were a clear extension of a state's power to protect or vie for control of SLOCs vital to commerce, similar to the modern Freedom of Navigation concept.³⁶

While the maritime domain provides several functionally analogous power projection platforms between the medieval and modern operational environments, this thesis concludes that the major medieval land-based PPP equivalent was the castle. Though an intuitive role of the medieval castle was defense, the study argues that the castle was also a platform for both operational and tactical projection. Especially in Outremer, castles were part of the operational offense, and contributed to strategic deterrence, not discounting their inherent defensive "holding" qualities. Taking their cumulative effects together, moving into an area and establishing castles (as the crusader states and military religious orders did in the Levant) bears a thread of resemblance to a

³⁵ Hyland, *The Medieval Warhorse*, 144-145.

³⁶ Richard W. Unger, "The Northern Crusaders: the Logistics of English and other Northern Crusader fleets," in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor, 251-274 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 255-263. In the case of the Italian city states, the proportionally much lower investment in land power than sea power created a unique dynamic. For the modern summary of Freedom of Navigation, see United States Marine Corps (USMC), United States Navy (USN), and United States Coast Guard (USCG), *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, March 2015), 9, <http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo56257>. However, for the necessary conditionality on the twelfth century version of the concepts of "sea control" and maritime patrolling, see Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 37-38; John H. Pryor, Elizabeth Jeffreys, Ġalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Manklī, and Ahmad M.H. Shboul. *The Age of the Dromōn: The Byzantine Navy Ca 500-1204* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 388-392.

modern carrier strike group moving into a theater of operations- a hallmark of modern power projection.³⁷

Key Sources and Notes

This thesis relies on a handful of primary sources and a higher volume of secondary sources to provide context, depth, and scholarly perspective. All primary sources consulted are works in translation. Given the heavily ideological overtones and known inconsistencies in much medieval chronicling, the translated editions of the primary sources, with the translators' notes, as well as Jonathan Phillips' principal monograph that closely traces several originals, are the most critical works for this thesis.³⁸ Generally, the large volume of other secondary works provides the thesis with both depth—where journal articles and more specialized books are concerned—and breadth of interpretation—where broader books offer unified synthesis on thematic elements of the crusading era.

Several debates remain ongoing amongst historians of the Second Crusade. Jason Roche's work on the historiography of these debates succinctly outlines the differing points of view and their constituents.³⁹ This thesis offers minimal summaries on these

³⁷ Stephen Morillo, "Battle Seeking," in *Journal of Medieval Military History*, vol. 1, eds. Bernard S. Bachrach, Kelly DeVries, and Clifford J. Rogers (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2002), 23-28; Nicholas Morton, *The Field of Blood: The Battle for Aleppo and the Remaking of the Medieval Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 100; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 191, 197.

³⁸ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*.

³⁹ J. T. Roche, "The Second Crusade: Main Debates and New Horizons," in *The Second Crusade: Holy War on the Periphery of Latin Christendom*, eds. J. T. Roche and J. M. Jensen (Belgium: Brepols Publishers, 2015), 1-32.

issues throughout the body of the work, as they are encountered, but generally avoids arguing definitively for a particular position. Such focus facilitates maintaining greater clarity on the themes and assertions more integral to this study—strategic logistics, the instruments of power, medieval operational warfare, and the timeless continuity of the nature of war.

Three books form the core narrations for the thesis's analysis. First, Virginia Berry's translation of *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem: The Journey of Louis VII to the East* provides a firsthand account of the French contingent in the eastern theater of the Second Crusade. The chronicler, Odo of Deuil, was the personal chaplain of King Louis VII of France, and thus offers a crucial perspective of the long, fraught march through Europe to the Levant. Though clearly biased against the Byzantine Empire as the cause for the Crusade's demise, Odo's foundational narrative is generally trustworthy in its relation of the events themselves.

The second core work is Charles W. David and Jonathan Phillips's translation of Raol and David's *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The Conquest of Lisbon*. It gives a thorough primary account of the Lisbon contingent of the Crusade. The eyewitness chronicle is useful beyond a description of the campaign's events; it gives insight into several important themes that continued to develop during the Second Crusade—namely the crusaders' struggle over the legitimacy of the campaign regarding papal crusading doctrine. This narrative is essential reading for the thesis, as the Iberian campaign represents one of the few operational successes of the Crusade.

The principle secondary study is *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christianity* by Jonathan Phillips. One of the few Second Crusade monographs ever

written, it is a thoroughly researched and in-depth survey, from the fall of Edessa and the coordinated preaching campaigns of Bernard of Clairvaux, to the aftermath and impact of the expedition on the collective psyche of western Europe and future crusades.

Particularly useful to this thesis is Phillips's detailed account of the long process of force generation within the coalition kingdoms, highlighting the domestic side of the information and economic instruments of power.

Eric Christiansen's *The Northern Crusades* provides a survey of the final (Northern) theater of the Second Crusade. Due to its coverage of several hundred years and multiple crusades, its utility toward any particular crusade is as an overview. Christiansen provides a good explanation of how the Second Crusade's northern theater came about, not only as a pragmatic spiritual excuse for a political land grab, but also as a sincere, expanding papal concept of spiritual warfare by physical means on all fronts of Christianity.

Several books serve the strategic logistics focus of this thesis. John Pryor's compilation, *The Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades* was indispensable throughout. Multiple chapters, including land-based and sea-based topics, play a vital role in enabling the thesis to connect various logistical functions and capabilities, and construct a fuller picture of crusading power projection. Pryor, Jeffreys, Ǧalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Manklī, and Ahmad M.H. Shboul's *The Age of the Dromōn* and Rose's *Medieval Naval Warfare* are also vital contributors to both technical and conceptual aspects of naval platforms and operations. These works were critical to understand the integral role of sea-power to the crusades as a whole.

A host of works were invaluable to establish the geostrategic context of the Crusader States theater as the destination OE for the Second Crusade. Nicholas Morton's *The Crusader States and their Neighbors*, and *The Field of Blood* provide an excellent overview of Outremer policies and warfare. These themes also receive heavy treatment in Steve Tibble's *Crusader Armies*, and *The Crusader Strategy*, allowing the thesis to reinforce or contrast interpretations between these two authors. Both Tibble and Morton provide accessible works that go beyond a litany of events in Outremer, to connect contiguous lines of interrelated causes and effects. These are critical themes for this thesis, as they help establish the complexity of security interests in the Crusader States at the time of the Second Crusade.

The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple by Malcolm Barber, gives a concise introductory study to the Knights Templar. Half of the book recounts the chronological history of the Order, while the second half describes various aspects and functions of the organization. Barber's thorough but accessible treatment of this multinational "corporation" so integral to the crusades is key to a recurring theme in this thesis of non-state actors in the world of the crusades.

Carole Hillenbrand's *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, and Michael Köhler and Konrad Hirschler's *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East* both provide unique perspectives that draw heavily upon Islamic sources. Hillenbrand gives insight into the Muslim forces and their warfare, as well as a heavy emphasis on their ideological expansion of Islamic Jihad as a gradual response to the crusades. Köhler and Hirschler thoroughly explore the under-emphasized role of the diplomatic instrument of power between crusaders, the Latin Outremer realms, and their

Muslim neighbors. The authors uniquely provide analysis from generally equal proportions of Christian and Muslim sources. This highlight of diplomacy's role in the era is invaluable to the analysis of diplomatic power.

This thesis draws heavily on several works focused on the role of the castle in crusading warfare. Roni Ellenblum's *Crusader Castles and Modern Histories* provides analysis of the fortifications of Outremer, and why they occurred when and where they did. Ellenblum explores the relationship between the cultural clash of the crusades, and the phenomenon and architecture of the Frankish castles. Paul Kennedy's *Crusader Castles* provides additional depth on the topic, establishing the case for castles as a platform for projecting power. *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000—1300* by John France also commits two chapters to the castle discourse, and—even more significantly—thoroughly connects the different roles of the castle within the larger context of the way of war during the period.

Byzantium and the Crusades by Jonathan Harris offers a vital look at Byzantine policy and posture toward the Crusader States and the expeditions and leaders themselves. Harris argues that a key to understanding Byzantine actions is the empire's view of their own role within the Mediterranean and larger Christendom. As the Empire served as a lynchpin for the crusades, particularly in the Second Crusade, this study on their policy and diplomacy is key to the theme of power projection. Harris's assertions on ideological imperatives and complex security interests of the Byzantines allowed this thesis to connect these themes, in part, to the results of the Crusade, and establish a causal relationship with the expedition's failure.

A final peculiarity (albeit not exclusive) of this thesis is its significant infusion of modern American military doctrine. Modern Joint, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps (USMC) doctrinal manuals and strategic resources are used, not as a standard by which to judge history, but as a means of increasing clarity and efficiency, and demonstrating continuity in the nature of warfare. These key sources have been necessary in determining and synthesizing the definitions for both power and projection that are outlined above. Modern publications were also significant in framing the current operational environment as it relates to power projection. The most important publications to this study are Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 *Joint Operations*, JP 5-0 *Joint Planning, Expeditionary Advance Base Operations*, and *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. These modern doctrinal references, along with other articles and studies, serve as a body of common terms for the military community, and enable more concrete visualization of twelfth century warfare.

CHAPTER 2

THE GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT

For...the holy city of Jerusalem . . . we are ready to die . . . Strive to come and join the army of Christ and bring us speedy aid...

—Patriarch Gromond of Jerusalem, quoted in Tyerman, *God's War*

Legacies and Latin States

To analyze the Second Crusade in terms of projection of the instruments of power, it is necessary to first understand the strategic events which precipitated the expedition, and the geostrategic environment in which it operated. A strange new phenomenon emerged in the littorals of the eastern Mediterranean at the turn of the twelfth century.⁴⁰ This landward littoral zone that had been dominated by eastern empires and autocrats for hundreds of years suddenly became the domain of western European (or “Frankish”-heritage) nobles.⁴¹ The formation and unlikely perseverance of these “Crusader States” from 1099-1291 formed the dramatic and kinetic Operational Environment (OE) into which the Second Crusade would crash and ultimately falter.

Western expeditionary powers typically approached their support of the Holy Land from an inherently western paradigm, with its associated set of priorities. The leaders of the Crusader States maintained close ties to their European homeland, in terms of culture and the way they perceived and employed the instruments of power. Yet the

⁴⁰ Regarding the definition of littorals and their relevance to power projection, see JCS, JP 3-0, VIII-11.

⁴¹ Generally speaking, the littoral area between the modern Gulf of Iskenderun to the eastern borders of modern Egypt.

realities of their complex strategic environment also mandated that they adapt to survive. The result was a hybrid of two worlds, and a complex set of security interests—one that was not always compatible with the objectives of their expeditionary partners from the West. This chapter describes the complex strategic context which triggered and ultimately consumed the Second Crusade.

Overview and Impacts of the First Crusade

An understanding of the strategic context for the Second Crusade is impossible without a brief overview of the First Crusade. Pope Urban II called for the First Crusade to come to the aid of the eastern Christian world, in response to Byzantine Emperor Alexios Komnenos's plea for western help. The results achieved by the men and women who answered that call sent shockwaves through the medieval West and Mediterranean world.

The impacts of the First Crusade on the strategic environment in both the Middle East and western Europe were immense. In the West, it codified and mobilized the powerful convergence of the religious and war-like aspects of the culture. The informational power of both the Church and the ideology of crusading warfare itself dramatically increased, catalyzed around the legacy of the First Crusade. Despite the divergence of significant troop numbers to ancillary objectives, on a grand strategic scale the expedition was also characterized by singularity of purpose.⁴² This would prove a difficult quality for future crusades to replicate.

⁴² France, *Victory in the East*, 367. Although Baldwin of Boulogne's Edessa venture was clearly self-serving, most of the other garrisoning actions were necessary, in order to maintain a secure chain of fortresses along the army's LOCs back to the West, and to transition to a permanent holding posture. Even Bohemond's apparently self-

On a more tangible level, the First Crusade established several important conditions and precedents for future expeditions to the Levant. Most importantly, it established four independent, friendly states inside the Middle East theater, with crucial SLOC access via several key ports. This set the stage for the major economic-power growth of maritime states like Genoa, Venice, and Pisa, who could now rely on a friendly link at the heart of the great East-West trading routes.⁴³ The Antioch campaign produced two key long-term impacts. First, Bohemond of Taranto claimed rulership of the city, and refused to hand it over to Alexios as previously agreed. This proved to be a grievous and intolerable affront to the Byzantine Emperor. Second, general crusader sentiment toward the Byzantines severely fractured when Alexios halted an imperial relief army short of Antioch, instead of committing it to aid the crusaders.⁴⁴ Friction over Antioch between the Greeks and crusader princes persisted for at least fifty years, significantly impacting the events of the Second Crusade.

The campaign also revealed several keys to success. Crusader experiences in Hungary and the Byzantine Empire demonstrated the need to effectively leverage diplomatic power with allies along the route and in the vicinity of the theater. The necessity for great “princes” to provide both financing and effective leadership was also

serving power-grab at Antioch was intertwined with a legitimate strategic and operational need.

⁴³ France, *Victory in the East*, 367.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 196-303; Virginia G. Berry, “The Second Crusade,” in *A History of the Crusades*, vol. 1, *The First Hundred Years*, ed. M. W. Baldwin (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 303-325, <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History.CrusOne>. The Byzantine army’s withdrawal was due to faulty intelligence from a retreating crusader’s pessimistic appraisal of the situation.

undeniable, given the expedition's stark contrasts with the disastrous outcome of the People's Crusade.⁴⁵ Finally, nobility across all ranks established the precedent for major property and economic transfers, in order to finance their participation in holy war.

The Complex Security Interests of the Crusader States

The theater of the Levant after the First Crusade became known as Outremer to the western European world. Here, into an already complex OE of fractured Seljuk politics, convoluted Byzantine policies, and Arab Abbasid and Fatimid interests, the First Crusade had violently thrust the entirely alien power dynamic of a multi-state Frankish domain. And here, less than fifty years later, the great western lords would again seek to project a multinational coalition, hoping to replicate the success of their forebears. A massive difference, however, for this Second Crusade, was the Frankish domain itself. It essentially provided an established geographic foothold and an "inside force" within the target OE.⁴⁶ This was a marked advantage over the experience of the First Crusade. For this reason, an understanding of the strategic OE of Outremer prior to the Second Crusade is vital to comprehend that expedition from a power projection standpoint.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ France, *Victory in the East*, 88-95.

⁴⁶ USMC, EABO, 5, 39-40; Tyerman, *God's War*, 178-182.

⁴⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2014), xi-xii. The *JIPOE* uses PMESII-PT (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time) as one common tool to frame this analysis. In the interest of relevance to power projection, this strategic overview introduces Outremer's political, military, economic, and information factors, as the elements most relevant to the instruments of power.

At first, Outremer consisted of the County of Edessa, the Principality of Antioch, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. After 1102, the prominent crusader, Raymond of Toulouse added the County of Tripoli, culminating with the seizure of its namesake city in 1109. Original cultural, religious, and military similarities aside, the politics of these “Crusader States” were characterized by a loosely unifying trait. Each of the states tended to innovate expansionist policies, shaped by both their lack of permanent European manpower and their nuanced self-serving pursuit of power, and tempered by a pragmatic, but real, religious idealism.⁴⁸

The vast majority of fighting men from the First Crusade were unavailable to the newly formed Crusader States. This was due to losses from the expedition and the preponderant remnant returning to the West after the Battle of Ascalon in 1099. However, despite low numbers of western troops, the new magnates of Outremer found themselves in a state of near constant warfare, at least at some point on the conflict continuum.⁴⁹ Two surprising patterns emerged during their first decade of continuous and complex power struggle. First, with sporadic exceptions, the Franks continued to

⁴⁸ Nicholas Morton, *The Crusader States and Their Neighbours: A Military History, 1099-1187* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 1, 22; Tyerman, *God’s War*, 169, 185, 210-211.

⁴⁹ Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 35; France, *Victory in the East*, 372; JCS, JP 1, I-14 illustrates the modern concept of the conflict continuum, overlaid with the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) available to national and military leaders when using the military instrument of power. For a similar medieval construct, see Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 5-12. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations* (Washington, DC: JCS, January 10, 2018), I-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_35.pdf for the connection between power projection and the Range of Military Operations.

dominate their field encounters. Second, their way of war continued to be largely aggressive and offensive in nature. Even their development of castles throughout their domains during the first quarter of the twelfth century reflected an overall offensive, albeit occasionally haphazard, mindset.⁵⁰

The Frankish leaders demonstrated a proclivity for adaptiveness in their quest for military combat power. They quickly tapped indigenous manpower and military experience to supplement their small European retinues, employing troops like the often-indigenous light cavalry Turcoples.⁵¹ Regular injections of European pilgrim groups and even individuals could be recruited under the dual incentive of protecting the Holy Land and receiving the wages of a mercenary. Fulk V of Anjou (the later King of Jerusalem) and Count Thierry of Flanders both undertook such private enterprises with their considerable retinues in 1120 and 1138 respectively.⁵²

The Christian maritime powers of the Mediterranean and beyond provided vital military aid on land and at sea. This aid came in the form of strategic transport, naval blockade, and other tasks across the maritime warfare spectrum. Engineer expertise for land-based siege machinery was also a key capability of the naval powers, as shown at the vital sieges of Tripoli in 1109 and Tyre in 1123-24.⁵³

⁵⁰ Roni Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles and Modern Histories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 206-207; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 173; 183-186.

⁵¹ France, *Western Warfare*, 219-220.

⁵² Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 2.

⁵³ John E. Dotson, "Ship Types and Fleet Composition at Genoa and Venice in the Early Thirteenth Century," in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 64; France, *Victory in the East*, 210-220; Michael

The factors of their persistent-conflict environment, the increased risk incurred by cultural and military asymmetry in the Levant, and their diversity of human resources made Outremer forces distinctive. The armies of the Crusader States comprised some of the most disciplined, adaptive, and battle-hardened troops and commanders in Christendom.⁵⁴ However, the grave risk posed by their numerical disadvantage meant their commanders weighed the perils of open battle very carefully. While they were battle ready, the decision to commit to decisive battle had to be accompanied by favorable conditions. If these conditions were absent, Frankish forces were perfectly prepared to execute a deliberate withdrawal.⁵⁵

Amongst the burgeoning complexity that defined the second decade of Outremer sprang up the non-state actors known as the military religious orders—the Hospital of St. John (or Hospitallers) and the Order of the Temple of Solomon (or Knights Templar). Originally founded in Jerusalem, between 1118 and 1120, with the purpose of keeping the routes between the coast, the Holy City, and Jericho safe for pilgrims, the Templars quickly grew in both numbers and scope of mission.⁵⁶ By the mid twelfth century, the Order had experienced immense growth in economic and informational potential. Added to this was their institutional understanding of politics and warfare in Outremer. This

S. Fulton, *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades: Siege Warfare and the Development of Trebuchet Technology* (Boston: Brill, 2018), 97-98; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 160-169; Tyerman, *God's War*, 178-181.

⁵⁴ Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 34-41, 54-55.

⁵⁵ France, *Western Warfare*, 213-221; Morillo, "Battle Seeking," 25-28.

⁵⁶ Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 8-9; Tyerman, *God's War*, 253-254.

combination of assets put them in a special relationship with the kings and princes of both Frankish Levant and Europe, some rulers employing key Templars as their trusted counsellors, as King Louis VII himself did during the Second Crusade.⁵⁷ By the mid-twelfth century, they were the prized elite in any Frankish army with which they marched.

In a greatly generalized way, the Latin states' economic paradigm centered on controlling and then integrating local, domestic resources. David Jacoby pointedly contrasts this view with the incomplete assumption that the Franks relied solely on western imports to sustain them.⁵⁸ The coast provided a crucial link in the chain, and regional trade between East and West was of course a major pillar of the Mediterranean economic system at large. However, there is substantial evidence that the Frankish-ruled economic system of Outremer was more integrated with the broader eastern Mediterranean system than it was aloof.⁵⁹

Regionally, that system consisted of a mostly rural economy of fruit and olive orchards, vineyards, cereals farms, and sugar cane plantations. Large cities relied on their hinterlands for food stuffs and raw materials, and on the ports for manufactured goods from further afield. The rural communities relied on their cities for specialized and manufactured goods. Those cities not on the coast had habitually associated "maritime outlets" that plugged them into the trans-Mediterranean Sea networks. With the Frankish

⁵⁷ Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic Knights: Images of the Military Orders 1128—1291* (New York: Leicester University Press, 1995), 19-24.

⁵⁸ Jacoby, "The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant," 161.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 163; Tyerman, *God's War*, 177-178.

conquest of the coast, this valve in the pipeline opened widely, the Italian city states being granted exclusive trading privileges and other incentives, as payment for their invaluable military support.⁶⁰ From the East and South, Outremer funneled the goods of several major trade routes—spices and dyes from the far East via Baghdad, and gold from west-central Africa via Egypt. However, two vital nodes in these networks—Aleppo and Damascus—held the key to the full advantages of the region’s wealth. These were large urban centers that generated significant revenue for their rulers. Their economic importance was due to both their sizeable local rural economies, and to their function as great trade route convergence points, with only brief legs to the coast.⁶¹ Figure 1 illustrates how many trade routes of the era converged on the Holy Land.

⁶⁰ Jacoby, “The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant,” 163-165, 177-179; Tyerman, *God’s War*, 232, 238-239.

⁶¹ Jacoby, “The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant,” 166.




Figure 1. Trade Routes of the Mediterranean World

Source: Martin Jan Mansson, “Medieval Trade Route Networks,” Easy Zoom, uploaded May 18, 2018, accessed April 11, 2021, <https://easyzoom.com/imageaccess/ec482e04c2b240d4969c14156bb6836f> (April 11, 2021).

This is an extremely significant factor to both the Crusader States and the early crusading expeditions themselves. Damascus and Aleppo were clear operational objectives of sustained, multi-decade campaigns for the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Principality of Antioch respectively. Taken together with Morton’s statistical analysis of Frankish military offensive actions, the cities’ economic power lends weight to his

conclusion that the Frankish campaigns were heavily motivated by a need to increase their resources in order to stay viable.⁶²

Generically, the Crusader States derived their wealth from extracting tenant-farmer payments and taxation of trade, through control of trade routes and cities.⁶³ Holding either Aleppo or Damascus would vastly increase their resources and, thus, their ability to fund greater military power. Perhaps equally important, these cities were closely integrated with the economic power bases of the eastern Muslims, making them the foci of a strategic zero-sum game. Control of Aleppo or Damascus would allow the Franks to leverage their increased economic power more effectively to secure their interests, and alleviate the exhausting toll on their military power.

Information and messaging were thick in the atmosphere of the Crusader States. The power of ideas helped a seemingly hopeless First Crusade wrest the Holy Land from a numerically superior enemy defending established holdings. Ideas forged the image of Outremer in the minds of thousands of Europeans, underpinned and amplified by the informational juggernaut of the Church.⁶⁴ The notion of the crusades and the ongoing conflict as a clash of ideas and religions was used as an informational appeal from clerics and lay leaders on both sides.⁶⁵ In reality, however, the practices of the Frankish leaders did not align with that narrative, as legal religious tolerance and mixed communities

⁶² Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 144-153.

⁶³ Jacoby, "The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant," 191.

⁶⁴ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 17-36; Tyerman, *God's War*, 167-168, 177.

⁶⁵ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 104; Tyerman, *God's War*, 170-171.

prevailed throughout the period. More practically, the economic trade networks between the two societies enabled regular exchange of ideas, and even intelligence on enemy dispositions.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the decision of so many pilgrims, warriors, and settlers from all walks of life to partake in the unimaginably difficult quest for Jerusalem reveals a high order of idealistic and ethereal magnetism.⁶⁷

Overall, generally skilled and energetic Crusader State rulers pursued a pervasively offensive policy through the mid 1120's.⁶⁸ Contrary to the misconception of the Crusader States as desperately hopeless entities, barely clinging to a toehold in the East, their diplomatic, military, and economic power grew substantially in the decades immediately after the First Crusade.⁶⁹ There were, however, regular reversals. Both Edessa and Antioch were devastated at the Battle of Haran in 1104. Antioch came near to annihilation after the 1119 Battle of the Field of Blood. Jerusalem suffered major defeats at Ramla in 1102 and Mont Ferrand in 1137. Only because of the continued disunity of the Muslims and the dogged recalcitrance of the Antiochenes and Jerusalemites did the Crusader States persist through defeats like these.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Jacoby, "The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant," 190.

⁶⁷ France, *Western Warfare*, 204-206.

⁶⁸ Tyerman, *God's War*, 201-206.

⁶⁹ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 22, 27-28 highlights an instance where Baldwin I almost seems to channel Alexander the Great, when, in an 1103 charter, he refers to himself as king of "Babylon and Asia." Clearly, the new lords of the Levant saw themselves as power projectors.

⁷⁰ Andrew D. Buck, *The Principality of Antioch and Its Frontiers in the Twelfth Century* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2018), 218; Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 109; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 39, 90; Runciman, *A History of the*

It was the fall of the city of Edessa in 1144 that sparked the Second Crusade. The fact that Edessa was the earliest Crusader State to fall owed strongly to its proximity and strategic position relative to the expanding Seljuk city-state of Mosul. The increasingly centralized power of the surrounding Muslim factions, orchestrated by Mosul's *atabeg* (or governor), Imad al-Din Zengi, certainly sealed the county's demise. But this was not necessarily an inevitable final blow to a helplessly embattled Frankish entity. It is true that Edessa had been relentlessly attacked throughout its short history. However, Morton convincingly characterizes Zengi's success as a preemptive strike on a still powerful opponent in a window of vulnerability (Count Joscelin II being away from the city with his forces).⁷¹

For Edessa's part, it was likely a combination of its position and its aggressive power projection policy, allowing it to disrupt Zengi's Jazira-Syrian lines of communication that made it a target. In the end, however, after he captured the capital, Zengi overran the eastern half of the county in a strikingly swift campaign.⁷² The most direct cause for the Second Crusade must ultimately be seen not as the success or failure

Crusades, 148-151; Robert L. Nicholson, "The Growth of the Latin States," in Baldwin, *Hundred Years*, in Setton, *History*, 438; Tyerman, *God's War*, 175, 190-192.

⁷¹ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 44-45, 106; Hamilton A.R. Gibb, "Zengi and the Fall of Edessa," in Baldwin, *Hundred Years*, in Setton, *History*, 455-461.

⁷² Fulton, *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades*, 114-116; Gibb, "Zengi and the Fall of Edessa," 461.

of any one Frankish state's policy, but as the gathering storm of increased Muslim centralization.⁷³

Friends and Foes

The Byzantine Empire

In the half-century between the First and Second Crusade, the Byzantine (or Greek) Empire continued to be a significant factor in the power calculus of the eastern Mediterranean. After the formation of the Crusader States, the Empire never forgot the oaths the crusader princes had taken, to return any conquered lands back to the Emperor's control.⁷⁴ The Greek emperors still viewed themselves as descendants of the might and authority of Rome, and thus saw Palestine as still rightly belonging to them—particularly Antioch. Harris even argues that it was more-so the ideology of imperial status and image, and less the actual loss of land, that drove the convoluted Byzantine policies toward the Crusader States and the Second Crusade.⁷⁵

Both parties had ample cause for animosity and mistrust. Before he became the first Prince of Antioch, Bohemond had prosecuted a full-scale war of conquest against Greek lands in the western Balkans. Emperor Alexios's support of the First Crusade had been mixed. Certainly, it betrayed the crusaders' expectations of what it should have

⁷³ Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 19.

⁷⁴ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 5-6, 208.

⁷⁵ Jonathan Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), xvii. Though Buck sees a more nuanced Byzantine motivation that also includes the land as a serious objective; see Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, 194-195.

been.⁷⁶ The early years of Latin Outremer only exacerbated the diplomatic issues.

Bohemond again attacked Byzantine territory in an 1107 campaign that ended in total failure and his formal submission to Alexios as overlord.⁷⁷

Throughout the other Crusader States, there could be somewhat better Greek relations. Raymond of Toulouse received direct support from Byzantine forces during the siege of Tripoli. Byzantium seems to have been, at worst, indifferent to the Franks of Edessa, except where they interfered with imperial designs on Antioch and Cilicia. While the notion of a Latin King of Jerusalem was at odds with the imperial claim to be the Protector of the Holy Sepulchre, these two parties generally avoided outright hostility.⁷⁸

In 1137, Alexios's son, Emperor John Komnenos launched a major campaign to re-exert imperial control over Cilicia and Antioch. Having briefly besieged the principality's capital, John granted Prince Raymond's request for terms, then led a coalition of Byzantine, Antiochene, and Edessan forces to attack Aleppo and Shayzar. John's terms had offered Raymond a new territory—the to-be-conquered principality of Aleppo—in exchange for the return of Antioch to the Empire. The deal, however, was contingent on Byzantine support to conquer Aleppo, allowing Raymond to keep Antioch until that condition was met. Though this instance highlights the fluidity of Greek and Frankish diplomatic policy, it failed to achieve anything. The coalition fell apart, due to

⁷⁶ France, *Victory in the East*, 196-303; Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 34-36.

⁷⁷ Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 78-79; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 8-9.

⁷⁸ Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, 35, 197-198; Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 74-75.

misalignment between the two factions' proprietorial policies and objectives. Raymond's reportedly lackadaisical performance at Shayzar may have pointed to his hope to play for time to find some way of keeping Antioch. In the end, no cities changed hands, but John seems to have renewed his policy of insistence on imperial control of the Principality. In 1142 John again attempted to strongarm Raymond into handing over Antioch, despite the lack of the promised replacement principality centered on Aleppo.⁷⁹

John soon died unexpectedly, but the following year, his heir, Manuel Komnenos felt secure enough in his new position as Emperor to continue his father's policy toward Antioch. In 1144, with Prince Raymond and Count Joscelin II reeling from the loss of Edessa, Manuel launched a naval raid against the principality's littorals. This would be the tenor of Byzantine-Crusader relations on the eve of the Second Crusade.⁸⁰ The repeated failures to present a greater, united threat to the rising power of the Jazira-Syrian Turks soon had grave impacts on the Franks' future in northern Syria.⁸¹

The Indigenous Civilian Populations

The people over which the crusader lords established their rule in the East were not, generally speaking, the same people they faced on the battlefield. The twelfth century Middle East was home to a confluence of many different ethnic groups.

⁷⁹ Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, 192-198; Jonathan P. Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West, 1119-1187* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 70.

⁸⁰ Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, 200; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 127; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 14-15.

⁸¹ Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 83-84; Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, 31-32.

“Indigenous” can be a misleading term, as its definition is relative to the length of time an ethnic group has inhabited an area. In a widely accepted sense, however, the broad people groups considered indigenous to the Levant included Jews, Syrians (Arameans), Arabs, Armenians, and in the northern marches, Greeks.⁸²

To further complicate this scenario, religious and class fault lines were not always aligned with the various ethnic demographics. Though Muslim Arabs had conquered the region during their early conquests, they were ousted from control in the 1070’s by Turkic invaders who had only recently converted to Islam. Ethnic Arabs now represented a large percentage of the population, but had little control from a governmental perspective. Despite the large Arab representation, Tibble argues that indigenous Christians—themselves divided into many different confessions— were likely still a higher percentage of the population in the Levant than their Muslim neighbors.⁸³

Because of manpower shortages for the Franks, the local populace played a key role in both the daily functioning of the Crusader states, and in the potential of their military and economic instruments of power. The local rural economy supplied much of the westerners’ wealth. Though European settlement became regular in some areas, this economy was mainly operated by the indigenous locals.⁸⁴ The posture of the urban

⁸² Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 33-49; Tyerman, *God’s War*, 215-216; 224-235; Turks, the ruling Muslim class, were the latest comers to the Levant prior to the western crusaders, and are covered in the later section on the Muslim disposition.

⁸³ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 48; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 15-16, 252. The Coptic Christians of Egypt also would have had interactions with the Franks, particularly with the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

⁸⁴ Jacoby, “The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant,” 177-178, 191; Tyerman, *God’s War*, 219-240.

populace of Aleppo and Damascus proved to be a significant factor in the Seljuk retention of those cities. They appear to have been decidedly opposed to Frankish rule, and because their numbers were greater than the littoral cities, they presented an unmanageable threat to any unwanted occupying force. Thus, for crusader leaders, the urban populace of their two primary inland objectives was always part of the risk calculus.⁸⁵

In addition to these roles, the local peoples of Outremer also provided a ready pool to supplement the Latin States' armies. One indigenous group, hailing from the Cilicia region, especially contributed to the power dynamics of the OE. The Armenians had a unique impact on the politics of the Crusader States. Many Armenians overthrew their Seljuk garrisons, and opened city gates to the First Crusaders, as the conquerors slowly worked their way through the passes of the Amanus Mountains.⁸⁶ The County of Edessa was well integrated with a strong Armenian nobility class. Contemporary sources contain frequent mentions of them throughout both the Frankish and Fatimid power structures.⁸⁷ This proliferation of influence on both sides of the conflict highlights its complexity, but also demonstrates Armenian importance to the power dynamics of the region.

⁸⁵ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 259-261.

⁸⁶ France, *Victory in the East*, 185-193.

⁸⁷ John Armenia, *Armenian Cilicia XII-IV Century: Dawn, Splendor, and Twilight of a Christian Kingdom in the East during the Crusades* (John Armenia, 2010), 53-58; William James Hamblin, "The Fatimid Army during the Early Crusades," (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 2007), 19-27; Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 444; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 79-81; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 48.

Kogh Vasil was an Armenian lord who wielded significant influence while he both assisted and fought against the Franks at various times.⁸⁸ When a combined Frankish-Venetian coalition besieged Tyre in 1124, it was unsuccessful against the city's defensive artillery until an Armenian artilleryist, named Havedic, arrived to successfully direct the Christian siege engines.⁸⁹ In 1145, Otto of Freising records an Armenian delegation travelling all the way to Viterbo in Italy, to garner support from the Catholic Church.⁹⁰ A small band of Armenian-Edessan soldiers infiltrated deep into Artuqid Turkish territory in 1123, in a daring rescue attempt of the captive Count Joscelin of Edessa and Baldwin II of Jerusalem.⁹¹ Armenians, and many other indigenous peoples could have a significant impact on the strategic environment of Outremer.

The Muslim Disposition

The state of Muslim socio-political geography in the Middle East during the first quarter of the twelfth century was comparable in complexity to that of western Europe. Fractured social, religious, and political dynamics of the decades immediately preceding the First Crusade left the Levant region broken, and characterized by the rival agendas of locally powerful governors and warlords.⁹² These divisions decidedly offset the

⁸⁸ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 78-85.

⁸⁹ Fulton, *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades*, 99-102; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 79, 163-164.

⁹⁰ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 47.

⁹¹ Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 80-81.

⁹² Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 15-20; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 13.

disadvantage faced by the forces of the First Crusade and early Crusader States, relative to the overwhelming numbers of the Muslims. Here, a brief introduction to the Fatimids and Turkic factions provide the final piece of the puzzle that comprised the Second Crusade's strategic OE.

Although the Fatimids of Egypt were not directly involved in the combat actions of the Second Crusade, their status in the region may have factored in the operational calculus of the expedition.⁹³ The Fatimids were an ethnically Arab dynasty of rulers who controlled a once-great Muslim empire, based around Egypt. Though up to 1060, they held sway over most of Syria, the latter decades of the eleventh century saw migrating waves of Sunni Seljuk Turkic invaders achieve dominance there, except along the Palestinian coast. The Turkish invasions, along with Fatimid subscription to Shi'ite Islam, set conditions for a long, bitter struggle between the Turks and Fatimids, with Outremer as the frontier of conflict.⁹⁴

Despite repeated tactical losses to the Franks, the Fatimids were proactive and aggressive during the early years of the Crusader States, in contrast to a much slower Seljuk response. After Baldwin I's shallow incursion into Egypt in 1107, Fatimid aggression ceased altogether, and policy toward the Franks shifted to a decidedly defensive one, focused on protecting their strong economic power base.⁹⁵ Despite

⁹³ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 217, 226.

⁹⁴ Hamblin, "The Fatimid Army during the Early Crusades," 6-12; Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 17; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 253-256.

⁹⁵ Hamblin, "The Fatimid Army during the Early Crusades," 236-293; Jacoby, "The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant," 166; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 56-59, 77.

maintaining a diverse, well armored and equipped army, the Fatimids' land-ward strategic withdrawal into Egypt ensured that their army would not play a role in the Second Crusade. With Ascalon as their sole remaining possession in Palestine, and that in serious peril, no less, no hope of amphibious projection through that port remained (see Figure 2). With a severely underpowered navy, the Fatimid maritime presence posed only a peripheral threat by the second time the lords of the West descended on the Holy Land.⁹⁶



Figure 2. The Strategic Crossroads between Egypt and Outremer

Source: Created by author using map from Google Maps.

⁹⁶ Hamblin, "The Fatimid Army during the Early Crusades," 186-192, 207-208, 215-234; Jacoby, "The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant," 178-179; Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 562-564; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 59-62, 77; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 211-221; Tyerman, *God's War*, 179-181.

The real enemy of the Second Crusade forces were not ethnic Arabs, but Seljuk-heritage Turkic war-lords. Originally establishing a power base in Baghdad and Mosul, throughout the second half of the eleventh century, the Seljuks extended their control to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, checked only by the coastal strongholds of the Byzantines and Fatimids, in Anatolia and Palestine respectively.⁹⁷

It was these recent conquests that pitted them against the First Crusaders and the Crusader States. Just prior to the First Crusade, the relatively more centralized influence of the Seljuk Empire had completely fractured, with the death of many key leaders throughout the Muslim world. Thus, the First Crusade had entered an OE where Anatolian Turks, Danishmends (in eastern Anatolia), Syrian-Seljuk atabegs, and Mesopotamian atabegs and sultans all vied to secure their own independent interests, or exert control over the others.⁹⁸

This was only the strategic surface of the complexity. At a more intricate and local level, other sub-groups—both ethnic and religious—also undermined any chance of Muslim cohesion. Ridwan, a Seljuk ruler of Aleppo (many of whose residents were Isma'ili Shi'ites) harbored a splinter Isma'ili sect, known as the Nizaris, for several years. When this minority group could not make its voice heard within the regional Islamic establishment, it resorted to political assassinations, which Ridwan was able to harness

⁹⁷ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 439-446; Claude Cahen, "The Turkish Invasion: the Selchukids," in Baldwin, *Hundred Years*, in Setton, *History*, 135-148; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 18.

⁹⁸ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 62, 65; Cahen, "The Turkish Invasion," 151-152.

several times for his own political gain.⁹⁹ The Assassins went on to carve out a small enclave in the mountains to the east of Tripoli, and play the role of violent extremist organization (VEO) in the power dynamics of Outremer well into the thirteenth century.¹⁰⁰

Turks more freshly migrated from the steppe, known as Turcomans, added another layer of complexity into the OE. Readily available in large numbers, these groups tended to retain much more of their nomadic heritage, tribal culture, and practices. This difference sometimes put them at odds with their frequent employers, the more culturally adapted Syrian-Seljuk dynasties. Typically, though, as long as the Seljuk atabegs could keep their nomadic brethren occupied with combat and booty, the Turcomans were happy to serve in the many factional armies of the region.¹⁰¹

The advent of Zengi to the position of atabeg of Mosul in the mid 1120's signalled the turning of the tide for the Muslims.¹⁰² Zengi brought a ruthless and aggressive leadership style to his political and military activities. He harnessed and coalesced a hybrid army system that combined professionalized slave-troops (*askar* cavalry), specialized urban militia corps, and Turcoman tribal contingents. Every

⁹⁹ Bernard Lewis, "The Ismā'īlites and the Assassins," in Baldwin, *Hundred Years*, in Setton, *History*, 108. The word "assassin" comes from the Nizaris' moniker, *Hashashin*, after a drug they purportedly took prior to their acts of murder.

¹⁰⁰ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 43-44, 76; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 64; Tyerman, *God's War*, 199.

¹⁰¹ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 441-443; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 254-256.

¹⁰² Michael Köhler, and Konrad Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East: Cross-Cultural Diplomacy in the Period of the Crusades* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 127-128.

additional city that Zengi annexed added to his economic power, further enabling his war machine, while simultaneously fine-tuning its prowess. Thus, when Zengi saw his window of opportunity at Edessa in 1144, it was a powerful combined arms force of diverse cavalry, infantry, missile troops, and siege artists that took the city in four short weeks.¹⁰³

Though Zengi was murdered in 1146, his son, Nur al-Din, seized power in both Edessa and Aleppo, and proved equal to the task of carrying on his father's legacy. In other frontiers, just prior to the fall of Edessa, Anatolian Turcomans had renewed attacks from the North on Antioch. Byzantine Emperor, Manuel Komnenos, had recently reconfirmed imperial suzerainty over the principality, backed by the threat of significant military action.

Internal Frankish strife and (later) Seljuk Damascene realignment toward Aleppo under Nur al-Din were also increasing the Latins' vulnerability.¹⁰⁴ The fall of Edessa and subsequent unification of three major city-states under the sway of Nur al-Din sounded a grave alarm for the Frankish leaders, who perceived an increasingly difficult security

¹⁰³ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 218-219; Fulton, *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades*, 102-116; Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 110-115; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 19, 254-259.

¹⁰⁴ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 116-117; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 100-105; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 208.

situation.¹⁰⁵ The Crusader States needed help, and the call went out to the West. The response would be both a triumph and a catastrophe.

¹⁰⁵ Köhler, and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 149-157; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 116. The three cities referred to here are Aleppo, Edessa, and Damascus. While Damascus was not yet directly ruled by Nur al-Din, the Damascenes had shifted their alliance policy, and now were definitely under much greater influence of the Zengid ruler of Aleppo. Sayf al-Din, another of Zengi's heirs, controlled Mosul separately, but also still remained a threat.

CHAPTER 3

THE SECOND CRUSADE: A TRIUMPH AND CATASTROPHE

The cost is small the reward is great. Venture with devotion and the gain will be God's kingdom.

—Bernard of Clairvaux, quoted in Phillips, *Second Crusade*

Power Generation: The Recruitment Campaign and Strategic Preparations

Bernard of Clairvaux's words proved to be overly optimistic from the perspective of the many crusaders who starved and fought their way through the horrors of Anatolia in 1147-1148. Yet the Second Crusade also expanded the concepts of crusading to other theaters as well, where the recruitment appeal seemingly held true for those who answered its call. This multi-theater crusade deployed the instruments of power across vast distances, by multiple modes, at the three farthest corners of Christendom.

The inception of the West's response to the fall of Edessa originated with two Cistercians. Along with Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, Pope Eugenius III effected the mobilization of the Church's informational power on an unprecedented scale, in order to generate the Second Crusade. Though the resulting impressive multi-theater war was most likely not the original intent of the pope, his adept integration of secular military opportunism into the mainstream of crusading effort is perhaps a more noteworthy accomplishment.¹⁰⁶

The Principality of Antioch and Kingdom of Jerusalem had sent appeals to the West in the Spring of 1145, after news of Edessa's demise reached their domains. By

¹⁰⁶ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, xxv.

December of that year, Pope Eugenius had crafted and issued the papal bull called *Quantum Praedecessores*, which challenged the faithful of the West to come to the aid of their fellow Christians in the East.¹⁰⁷ Set against the backdrop of the First Crusade fifty years earlier, the pope's call to arms relied heavily on both the precedents and extraordinary power of the psychological and religious idealism of that legendary expedition. Further incentivized by the distinctive remission of all sins, the papal message was tailored and poised to light a fire under the great lords of western Europe.¹⁰⁸

One of the first of those lords to respond was the King of France himself, Louis VII. Still a young man in his twenties, Louis and many of his great nobles took the cross after a sermon by Bernard of Clairvaux, at a pre-determined ceremony at Vézelay, on Easter day 1146, and began the year-long process of generating the astronomical economic, diplomatic, and military power required to undertake an international crusade. During the course of 1146, Bernard embarked on a papal-directed, nearly year-long preaching tour throughout continental Europe, to raise support and forces for the expedition. At this time, two other important developments in the relationship between papal authority, geopolitics, and crusade theology took shape. Pope Eugenius extended the award of crusader privileges, both spiritual and temporal, to those who would assist the Iberian Christian kingdoms in their ongoing war with the Muslim Almoravids to their

¹⁰⁷ Phillips, *Defenders*, 76-77.

¹⁰⁸ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, xxiv-xxv, 37-39, 51.

South.¹⁰⁹ Across Europe, on the eastern frontier of the Holy Roman Empire, Bernard made a similar proclamation (later captured in the papal bull *Divina dispensatione II*) on behalf of German nobles and other Northern Europeans planning a campaign against their pagan Wendish neighbors. By these actions, Pope and Abbot capitalized on the opportunism of secular leaders, to further consolidate their own Church influence over what could now be presented as a three-fold assault on the pagan enemies of Christendom.¹¹⁰

First completing a circuit through France, then moving toward Germany via Flanders and the Low Countries, Bernard employed his ample gifts as an orator to spread the news of the crusade and recruit as many soldiers of the cross as possible. Both Eugenius and Bernard displayed particular adeptness at tailoring the appeal to their specific audience. For the urban trade centers of the Low Countries, Bernard articulated the crusade in terms of a smart business transaction—the “small” cost of a crusade for the infinite benefit of eternal forgiveness of sins.¹¹¹

Another major example of tailored messaging was papal (and Bernardine) emphasis to many great houses on the family legacy of crusading. For many who took the cross after the fall of Edessa, the crusade was about more than a general concern over the

¹⁰⁹ John France, “Logistics and the Second Crusade,” in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 87-88; Tyerman, *God’s War*, 311.

¹¹⁰ Eric Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1997), 53; Odo of Deuill, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem: The Journey of Louis VII to the East*, trans. Virginia Gingerick Berry (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), 7-9; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 45-47, 67, 141.

¹¹¹ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 69-74.

increased Muslim threat to an eastern Christian state. By this point, both the legacy of the First Crusade and the existence of the Crusader States had become a family affair for many Europe's leading nobility. A prime example is Thierry Count of Flanders. His uncle, Robert II was a First Crusader. His wife, Sybil, was the daughter of Count Fulk of Anjou, who later succeeded to the throne of Jerusalem (1131-1143). As Count of Flanders, Thierry also owed obligation to King Louis VII, who was wholeheartedly committed to the expedition.¹¹² These were the kinds of men who had the military skills, command of manpower, motivation, and financial means required for a crusade like this. Having thus secured the fertile "heartlands" of support for crusader ideology, Bernard set his recruitment sights on the German King, Conrad III, and the largely untapped human resources of his Holy Roman Empire.¹¹³

Before this could happen, Bernard was forced to demonstrate his masterful adaptiveness in building consensus and maintaining clarity of messaging. A radical French Cistercian monk named Radulf had moved into the Rhineland ahead of Bernard, propagating the crusade, but also fomenting unrest and persecution against the local Jewish populations. This unsanctioned phenomenon became fairly severe in isolated areas, wherever a crowd latched onto it. Bernard again turned this surprise development into an opportunity. He personally rebuked and disavowed Radulf's actions in the strongest possible terms. He ensured that the Germans and Jews alike who had heard the monk's vitriol understood that it was not sanctioned by the Church. This counter

¹¹² Runciman, *History*, vol. 2, 493; Feiss and Slack, *Crusade Charters*, 20-21, 176.

¹¹³ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 61, 82, 88-89.

eventually destroyed Radulf's credibility and prevented his message from becoming a sweeping movement.¹¹⁴

After dealing with the Radulf scandal, Bernard was free to focus his preaching campaign on the great houses of Germany. Conrad III ruled over the largest political entity in Western Europe, and Bernard's intense recruitment in the cities of Germany shows that he understood the military potential of the Empire. The Holy Roman Emperor-in-waiting also maintained two diplomatic postures that aligned with papal interests: enmity with Roger II, the Norman King of Sicily; and positive relations with Manuel Komnenos, the Byzantine Emperor. These relationships, which could have a real impact on the upcoming crusade, made Conrad's partnership an even greater priority for the pope and Bernard. Though Conrad initially rejected Bernard's appeal at their first meeting in November 1146, hasty settlement of internal conflicts in his realm during December enabled him to take the cross in a public Mass at Speyer on 28 December. With Conrad's acceptance of the crusader vow, along with his main political rival, Welf VI of Bavaria, a cascade of German nobility followed the cue. Among these was Frederick of Swabia, Conrad's nephew—the future Frederick Barbarossa. Whether it was in preparation for the eastern or northern Wendish campaigns, Bernard's preaching and diplomacy had successfully mobilized the flower of German nobility.¹¹⁵

As Bernard closed his nearly year-long tour, preaching in many more towns along his route home, many additional lay and church leaders took crusader vows in other

¹¹⁴ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 83-87.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 88-95.

areas, thanks to all the various modes of messaging. In addition to Bernard’s preaching, there were other, lesser churchmen sanctioned to spread the message, which was then further propagated by local priests. Both Pope Eugenius and Bernard had dispatched letters to regions to which they could not personally travel as well.¹¹⁶ The fruit of this coordinated information campaign was rich. The roster for the venture included the kings of France and Germany, a future German king, many of the greatest French and German princes, and the sea-faring commercialist English, Normans, and Flemings.¹¹⁷ Though the English had a strong representation in the sea-borne contingent, the otherwise absence of greater English nobility—and even King Stephen himself—in the wider crusade, may have been due to unease over still-fresh memories of political turmoil caused by the recent English civil war.¹¹⁸ In all, there were three forces preparing for two known theaters (with most historians agreeing that the Lisbon campaign was, at least, not a foregone conclusion, even if it did include some premeditation).¹¹⁹

This study assumes a total force of between 55,000 and 60,000 starting for the Holy Land.¹²⁰ Armies of this size and diversity required extraordinary levels of logistical, financial, and diplomatic preparation. Kings and princes could not always rely on the

¹¹⁶ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 69-76.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 137.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 97-98; John D. Hosler, “Why Didn’t King Stephen Crusade?,” in *Travels and mobilities in the Middle Ages: from the Atlantic to the Black Sea*, eds. Marianne O’Doherty and Felicitas Schmieder (Turnhout: Brepols, DL, 2015), 10-14.

¹¹⁹ Berry, “The Second Crusade,” 487-483; France, “Logistics and the Second Crusade,” 87-91; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 138-142; Tyerman, *God’s War*, 309-311.

¹²⁰ See page 87.

military services of their politically obligated dependents, especially since crusading was generally accepted as an individual voluntary undertaking. For this reason, monarchs and great lords required mercenaries or paid specialists to supplement their forces (often in great numbers).¹²¹ Many of the wealthier lords also strove to provide at some level for their voluntary subordinates as well, who took the cross out of personal loyalty. Beyond manpower, there were the cold, hard practicalities of medieval warfare to procure: personal weapons, to include stocks of missile weapons, armor, tools and vessels, horses (in all their roles, and with all their associated tack and gear), pack animals, tentage, clothing, supply wagons to transport money and valuables for trade, replacements for all the above, and most importantly, the tyrannical requirement of food.¹²²

All these requirements needed funding. During the Second Crusade, financing was a non-standardized affair. Even the unprecedented participation of monarchs in the Second Crusade did not automatically change this paradigm. Twelfth century Europe was long before the advent of the nation-state, where strong central governments levied and legislated taxes with predictable results. Even the crusader-kings of the Third Crusade, forty years later, enjoyed a much greater consolidation of economic power, relative to their predecessors.¹²³ The kings could rely on income from the lands they personally held, but beyond that, revenues were need-driven, rather than generalized and constant

¹²¹ Alan V. Murray, "Money and Logistics in the First Crusade: Coinage, Bullion, Service, and Supply," in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 246-248; France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 82; Tyerman, *God's War*, 20-24.

¹²² Murray, "Money and Logistics in the First Crusade," 229-232, 245-246.

¹²³ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 107.

streams. Even when specific events required greater resources than a king's own holdings could provide, successful collection was still contingent on the king's personal power relative to that of his dukes, counts, barons, and ecclesiastical leaders. This personal power (typically defined by military or some other power) varied widely between domains and over the course of time.¹²⁴ Louis VII himself was forced to negotiate with an Abbot Macharius for the latter's financial support of the crusade; and Louis's other surviving financial arrangements come across as more request than demand.¹²⁵ These conditions ensured that the methods of financing an international expedition were as varied as the people taking part in it. While the most common form of crusade financing was the sale of land, many other creative means also developed—some as a direct result of the crusades.¹²⁶

Beyond army-financing, there were also extensive diplomatic preparations for the monarchs and magnates to make. For the French and Germans planning to travel overland to the Levant, they would have to cross Germany, Hungary, the Byzantine Empire, and the hostile lands of Seljuk Anatolia. In the final six months before the forces departed, Conrad III and Louis VII each demonstrated their grasp of diplomacy's role in

¹²⁴ Abels, "The Historiography of a Construct," 1017-1018; France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 82.

¹²⁵ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 106-107.

¹²⁶ Lisa Blaydes and Christopher Paik, "The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in Medieval Europe," *International Organization* 70, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 6-10, accessed December 18, 2020, <https://www.academia.edu/32844049/>; Murray, "Money and Logistics in the First Crusade," 230-232. Murray estimates that a fully equipped knight would require between four and seven times his annual income in order to finance his participation in a crusade. Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 106-107.

this undertaking. Both current geopolitics and practical supply considerations impacted heavily on the nature of the groundworks they had to lay.¹²⁷ The greatest lynchpin in the contemporary geopolitical situation was Manuel Komnenos and his Byzantine Empire.

Louis apparently first considered a southerly route, in some way facilitated by the Sicilians. To this end, he had written King Roger II in mid-1146, asking for his help. However, Louis abandoned this course of action, likely after his assemblies with a German delegation at Chalons-sur-Marne on 2 February 1147.¹²⁸ Both Conrad III and Eugenius III shared the Greeks' enmity with Roger, and Louis's decision to avoid further pursuit of the Sicilian partnership likely stemmed from a prudent desire to maintain good relations with Conrad, Eugenius, and Manuel.

Given the geographical siting of Byzantium at the crossroads of the Middle East and Europe, any land-based deployment from French and German lands required Byzantine approval and safe passage. However, such measures of Greek good-will were jeopardized by both the precedent of First Crusader tensions and flashpoints, and the ongoing menace of Roger II of Sicily, who now posed an imminent western threat to the empire.¹²⁹ Also, as previously described, Byzantine relations with the Crusader Principality of Antioch had remained on a spectrum between deep suspicion and outright

¹²⁷ France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 80-82.

¹²⁸ For a concise thematic review of Louis's frequent recourse to communal deliberations, see John D. Hosler, "The War Councils and Military Advisers of Louis VII," in *Louis VII and his World*, eds. Michael L. Bardot and Laurence W. Marvin (Boston: Brill, 2018), 14-15, 18 for a brief highlight of several instances of this in the Second Crusade. Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 115-117.

¹²⁹ Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 34-36, 94-95.

hostility.¹³⁰ Thus, when both King Louis VII and Pope Eugenius III wrote to Manuel, requesting support and passage for the crusade, the Emperor's reply was to invoke the policy of his grandfather, Alexios Komnenos, and ask for oaths of loyalty from the crusade leaders.¹³¹ Even that response highlighted another facet of the Second Crusade that may have skewed Manuel's policy toward it—Alexios had *asked* Pope Urban II for help prior to the First Crusade; Manuel had asked no such help from Eugenius III. The challenge of Manuel's demands, Louis elected to put off for later; though he did not neglect securing diplomatic clearances with the German magnates along his line of march, nor with Geza II, King of Hungary.¹³²

Conrad and his German contingent, for their part, began the enterprise with positive Byzantine relations, enhanced by shared anti-Sicilian alignment and by the recent marriage of Conrad's sister-in-law to Manuel in January 1146. The German king's primary tension at this stage was with Geza II of Hungary. As late as September 1146, Conrad had backed a political rival to Geza, named Boris, whose failed attempt to seize power left German-Hungarian relations on edge. Nevertheless, Conrad, perhaps through his rival-turned-fellow-crusader, Welf of Bavaria, managed to secure the rights for passage through the Kingdom of Hungary.¹³³

¹³⁰ Tyerman, *God's War*, 319.

¹³¹ France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 80.

¹³² Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 11.

¹³³ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 120, 132-133.

Finally, the real importance of all the diplomatic effort was not solely to ensure safe passage for the crusader host, but to secure reliable sources of food and supplies along the way. Given the decision to march by land, it was impossible to carry all the needed food-stores for the entire expedition—the army required the ability to conduct regular resupply from the local economy.¹³⁴ It could acquire such necessities by either foraging—also associated with “plunder” or “pillaging,” which routinely turned violent—or by purchasing supplies from the locals along the route. Both recourses incurred distinctive risks.

Pillaging naturally attracted the ire and potential reprisal of locals as well as imperial troops, as occurred with Raymond of Toulouse’s forces in April 1097, during the First Crusade.¹³⁵ For this reason, travelling through Christian, ostensibly “friendly” lands complicated the planning considerations of the crusade greatly, since pillaging as a resupply option became untenable. Purchasing the basic necessities for survival, though more likely to preserve diplomatic relations, exposed the army to the risks of exchange rate exploitation and price gouging, such as notoriously plagued the French during their stay near Constantinople in the autumn of 1147.¹³⁶ And there were other complications. In the human endeavor of medieval warfare, even if a passing army’s leaders

¹³⁴ Alan V. Murray, “Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa,” in *In LAUDEM Hierosolymitani: Studies in Crusades and Medieval Culture in Honour of Benjamin Z. Kedar*, eds. Iris Shagrir, Roni Ellenblum, and Jonathan Riley-Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 358; Bachrach, “Crusader Logistics,” 45-46; Haldon, “Roads and Communications in the Byzantine Empire,” 131-132.

¹³⁵ Tyerman, *God’s War*, 115-116.

¹³⁶ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 74-75.

contractually agreed to purchase everything they consumed, this was difficult to control, particularly if the army was allowed to spread out during extended rest stops or staging areas, as in the German experience outside Constantinople.¹³⁷ The diplomatic approach also brought the increased logistical burden of carrying enough coinage and valuable goods (by the wagon-load) to purchase consumables on the march.¹³⁸ Finally, there was the broader effect of imperial political dominance and leverage. The hosting ruler (in this case the Byzantine Emperor) could withdraw, not only the direct support of special supply dumps, but also the crucial provision of markets from the local economy farther away from the capital. As will be shown, Manuel Komnenos was not averse to using this tactic.¹³⁹

Final preparations saw a crescendo of both political and Church actions to ensure the crusade was postured for success. Crusader lords and their retinues of both mercenaries and true volunteers made their own preparations, and set off for the established muster cities. The main German host gathered at Nuremberg, and departed from there in late May.¹⁴⁰ The coalition fleet of sea-borne crusaders from northern

¹³⁷ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 173-175.

¹³⁸ Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 358. Though Murray's work uses the Third Crusade as the case study, all the same supply considerations applied to the Second Crusade.

¹³⁹ France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 84-85; Haldon, "Roads and Communications in the Byzantine Empire," 158; Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 364; Murray, "Money and Logistics in the Forces of the First Crusade," 242-249.

¹⁴⁰ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 134-135.

Europe assembled at the port of Dartmouth in southern England, and sailed on 23 May.¹⁴¹ At Magdeburg in German lands, Wibald, along with the papal legate Anselm of Havelberg, mustered the German contingent bound for the Baltic campaign.¹⁴² On 11 June 1147, King Louis participated in a grand ceremony at the Abbey of St. Denis, culminating with his dramatic acceptance of the *Vexillum*, the king's banner that held strong symbolic value for the Franks.¹⁴³ Whether by grand design, opportunistic harnessing, or by tacit acquiescence, forces from all over western Europe had mobilized all the instruments of power.¹⁴⁴ For better or worse, the conditions for the Second Crusade were meticulously set.

The Operational Campaigns

“The Javelin of Phinehas:” Lisbon and East Iberia

On 23 May 1147, a combined fleet of Anglo-Normans, Flemish, Rhinelanders, Scots, Bretons, and Aquitanians sailed from the English port of Dartmouth. Within five months it had sacked the city of Lisbon in partnership with the Portuguese king Afonso

¹⁴¹ Raol (Osbernus), *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The Conquest of Lisbon*, ed. Jonathan Phillips, trans. Charles W. David (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 59.

¹⁴² Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 134-135. The Baltic campaign had received papal authorization in the bull *Divina dispensatione II* on 11 April.

¹⁴³ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 15-17; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 127. The *Vexillum* was symbolically associated with Charlemagne's *Oriflamme* banner, assigning it near mythical significance.

¹⁴⁴ A. J. Forey, “The Failure of the Siege of Damascus in 1148,” in *Medieval Warfare 1000—1300*, ed. John France (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 13-23, 171-172; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 134-135.

Henriques, and accomplished one of the few operational-level military successes of the Second Crusade.¹⁴⁵ The intent of this contingent when they set out is one of the major debates between historians of the Second Crusade. One camp posits that this force's only planned objective was the Holy Land, and that Lisbon was a coincidence of Portuguese opportunism without any premeditation by either party. The other view sees at least a degree of forethought by the Portuguese, while some also see a level of prior coordination with Afonso on the crusaders' part.¹⁴⁶

What is certain, however, given the main first-hand account by Anglo-Norman priest, Raol, is that King Afonso anticipated the arrival of the fleet in Oporto in mid-June, as the local bishop had received prior instructions to recruit the army to join the king at Lisbon.¹⁴⁷ Bishop Peter Pitões undertook this task with a fervor and persuasive power reminiscent to Bernard of Clairvaux. Delivering a sermon that was both tightly ordered and emotionally charged, the bishop employed a plethora of biblical analogies to assuage the army's concerns about diverting from their avowed objective in the Levant. Likening the crusaders' military potential to such vivid Jewish examples as "the javelin of

¹⁴⁵ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 59; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 136-137; JCS, JP 3-0, I-13 defines the operational level of war. This definition may be troublesome to historians since it connects the idea of strategic objective to the conquest of Lisbon, when the question of premeditation vs. coincidence remains heavily debated. Here, the intention in using the term is not to suggest a premeditated strategy. Rather, the emphasis is that, at some point and for some reason, the crusader force did ultimately select Lisbon as an objective, and was subsequently successful in seizing it.

¹⁴⁶ Berry, "The Second Crusade," 512; France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 87-93; Alan Forey, "The Second Crusade: Scope and Objectives," *The Durham University Journal* 86, no. 2 (1994): 168; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 139-142; Tyerman, *God's War*, 310-311.

¹⁴⁷ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 67-69.

Phinehas,” he implied an extension of the papally approved holy war to the Portuguese variant of the Iberian Reconquista.¹⁴⁸ Peter seems to have convinced enough crusaders of the justness of anti-Muslim violence in the Iberian theater, that they agreed to sail to Lisbon and discuss the matter with King Afonso. Between Peter’s moral reassurances and the king’s offer of substantial material gain to aid their Holy Land expedition, the Portuguese persuasion won the day. Within a few weeks of meeting Peter at Oporto, the newly enlarged coalition began the siege of Lisbon.¹⁴⁹

Before attacks began, there was a considerable attempt at diplomacy. The Christians demanded a peaceful surrender of the city, with relatively generous terms for the Muslim inhabitants.¹⁵⁰ When the Moorish defenders rejected these terms, the attack commenced. The first real engagements saw the crusaders seize footholds in the suburbs despite heavy Muslim counterattacks. Raol describes extensive defensive archery and anti-personnel artillery, accompanied by dense urban fighting. Ultimately, the crusaders won the day, disaggregated small unit initiative allowing them to seize the key terrain within the suburbs. This was an early milestone, as the suburbs were not only important for tactical dominance of the ingress and egress routes to the gates, but also for the abundant stores of supplies the crusaders discovered there. During this crucial first stage

¹⁴⁸ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 83; Numbers 25:10-13 (ESV Study Bible: English Standard Version).

¹⁴⁹ For the entire sermon of Bishop Peter, see Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 71-85. For the description of Lisbon’s wealth and Afonso’s proposals, see Raol, 91-101. For the equally important internal deliberations of the crusader coalition, see Raol, 101-115; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 145-149.

¹⁵⁰ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 115-125.

of exchanges, the crusaders demonstrated strong military discipline, establishing a robust night-watch rotation, and assigning a small squadron of boats to patrol the shoreline of their camp, against a riverine infiltration by the enemy.¹⁵¹

The next several months saw the Lisbon campaign develop into a classic twelfth century siege, in the sense of the range of tactics employed by both sides. Both the Anglo-Norman contingent and the Flemings and Germans made several attempts each at undermining the walls and employing various types of siege engines against the city. The first round of all these methods was decisively defeated by the Muslims. The defenders managed to burn all the original siege machines before the crusaders could bring them to bear. All mining operations faltered. Crusader artillery failed to achieve effective suppression of the city's long-range defenses—enemy mangonels (or trebuchets) continued to menace all attempts at assault, regardless of what offensive engines the Christians used in support.¹⁵²

During this time, the Moors instigated psychological attacks on their besiegers. This came in the form of both theological and moral challenges, as well as more practical psychological operations. Two examples were the Muslims' sneering predictions that the Christians would meet certain failure and destitution in the course of their undertaking, and the defenders' mock warnings against the increasing likelihood of unfaithful wives at

¹⁵¹ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 125-131.

¹⁵² Fulton, *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades*, 116, 360-362. Depending on the type and positioning of the enemy machines employed at Lisbon, they would have been able to strike crusader targets at ranges between 220 and 264 meters; Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 135-137; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 159.

home, while the crusaders tarried at a fruitless siege.¹⁵³ The crusaders would repay the psychological torment later, albeit more gruesomely, with a display of spear-impaled Muslim heads, acquired during a skirmish across the bay near Almada.¹⁵⁴

A shift occurred when the crusaders' riverine patrols intercepted a Muslim courier's skiff attempting to run their blockade, and subsequently found the body of another messenger in the Tagus River, with correspondence attached. The intelligence gained from these two communiques showed that the Lisboners were increasingly desperate for help, and that their closest potential ally (by distance) was unable to come to their relief.¹⁵⁵

Armed with such information, early September saw the crusaders renew their attack with increased pressure. Raol writes of new artillery engines in his English camp, with better rates of fire, endlessly bombarding the defenders. More mines went in against both eastern and western sides of the city. The Anglo-Norman mine in the west was rendered obsolete by Muslim trebuchet batteries, but the Flemish and German mines on the East finally effected a significant breach in the wall. While the crusaders were unable to exploit this gap, the decisive point came when the Anglo-Normans maneuvered a new and improved siege tower to a dominant position against the western wall. The defenders

¹⁵³ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 131-133.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 141.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 137-139.

grasped their plight and prudently sued for peace before the crusaders could mount the final assault.¹⁵⁶

After several days of deliberation over terms, the gates of Lisbon were opened on 24 October 1147. The crusader coalition began a systematic sack of the city according to the terms established with the Muslims. Surprisingly, the sack only turned violent for an isolated period, which was perpetrated by an isolated group of rogue crusaders.¹⁵⁷ With Lisbon secured, King Afonso also gained control of many of the surrounding Muslim cities and their associated provinces that were effectively compromised by the Christian possession of Lisbon. From such a position, Afonso could offer his conquering allies rewards of land and lordships—a seduction that proved too strong for some to resist. Many crusaders elected to take Afonso’s offer, and settle in Lisbon or its surrounding areas, Gilbert of Hastings serving as a prime example. The rest of the original coalition fleet wintered at Lisbon, then sailed on 1 February, 1148 for either the Holy Land or the eastern coast of Iberia.¹⁵⁸

The conquest of Lisbon never received specific papal approval in terms of crusade privileges, except by implied indirect association with Eugenius’s blessing, since mid-1145, of the overall war against the Moors in Iberia.¹⁵⁹ However, separate actions in the East of Iberia did receive such recognition, albeit in a retroactive way. Through the long

¹⁵⁶ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 143-165; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 160-163.

¹⁵⁷ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 165-177.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 179; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 165, 262.

¹⁵⁹ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 50, 253.

development of geostrategic conditions and crusading precedent on the Iberian Peninsula, one final campaign coincided with the timing of the Second Crusade. And, similarly to the Baltic theater, this action was the result of opportunistic harnessing by both the Christian lords of northern Iberia and, again, Pope Eugenius III.¹⁶⁰

The papal bull *Divina dispensatione II*, issued 11 April 1147 in the context of the Baltic theater, also demonstrated specific papal approval of a coming campaign of King Alfonso VII of Leon-Castile. The plans consisted of a joint venture between Alfonso, his magnates, and the Genoese, to seize the large Muslim port city of Almeria, deep on the southeastern corner of the peninsula. Following this, the Genoese would then also support Ramon Berenguer IV, Count of Barcelona, in another joint operation to take the city of Tortosa, over 300 miles north of Almeria, near the mouth of the Ebro River. In late June, the campaign commenced, with a powerful Genoese fleet setting sail to link up with Alfonso near Almeria.¹⁶¹

The operations at Almeria, and subsequently at Tortosa the following June (1148) proceeded in much the same pattern as Lisbon.¹⁶² The Christian coalition first gained footholds adjacent to the cities, with swift, decisive actions that incorporated both land and sea forces (notably including a deception operation during the landing at Almeria).

¹⁶⁰ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 244-250, 257.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 250-257. See also 257-258, 261 for Phillips's further argument for the likelihood of a formal papal bull for the Almeria/Tortosa campaign, though none survives today).

¹⁶² A contingent of unknown size from the Anglo-Normans and Flemings that had conquered Lisbon also took part in the siege of Tortosa. Some even settled there after the operation concluded Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 262, 266.

The next phase at both locations consisted of coalition siege-craft and defensive counters by the defenders. The final stage saw a divergence between Almeria in October 1147 and Tortosa in December 1148. The coalition put many inhabitants of Almeria to the sword and sent thousands into captivity, following the seizure of the city by assault; whereas Tortosa's citadel capitulated by diplomacy with the Christians, when it was clear they dominated both the city and its external reinforcement routes.¹⁶³

Though often overlooked as elements of the Second Crusade, the Catalan-Genoese expeditions of 1147-1148 clearly had strong papal support in conjunction with the crusade's other officially sanctioned theaters, as evidenced by the *Divina dispensatione II*. Both campaigns served as significant episodes in the ongoing crusades of the Reconquista. Both were also typical of the Iberian Christian understanding of a seamless union of secular political-economic motivations with the notion of holy war.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 258-260, 262-263. See also 261-262 for Alfonso VII's failed attack on the castle of Jaen, and 266-267 for Ramon Berenguer IV's seizure of the town of Lerida, both of which Phillips argues should also be considered part of the Second Crusade umbrella, though Lerida was in June 1149, outside the conventionally accepted range of Second Crusade-associated actions.

¹⁶⁴ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 263-268.

“Our Jerusalem:” The Baltic Campaign¹⁶⁵

The Wends were a group of pagan tribes that lived along the Baltic shores of Northeastern Germany and Western Poland.¹⁶⁶ Their economy consisted of trade in game and game products, and, as would put them at odds with their neighbors, slaves. Another point of contention was their staunch ideological opposition toward Christianity. They had a reputation for brutalizing Christians within or near their frontiers, and a tendency to revert away from Christian faith and rule, even in places that had supposedly been “Christianized.”¹⁶⁷

The Wendish people had been in and out of Christian influence or subjugation since 936, and since 1107/8, there had been a precedent of holy war against them (at least in concept), articulated in the Magdeburg Charter.¹⁶⁸ The early links between holy war and the Baltic theater also bore a key similarity to the First Crusade—the mixture of secular, land-based motives with the merits of spiritual blessing. This common crusading phenomenon is evident in such instances as Duke Lothar of Saxony’s raids between 1110 and 1124, and the Danish Eric Emune’s conquest of the island of Rugen in the mid-1130’s.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 231. These words are from the 1107/8 Magdeburg Charter, which first linked the (then) newly conquered Jerusalem with the pagan lands on the Northern shores of Germany, to emphasize the opportunities for the spiritual benefits of holy war against these pagan neighbors.

¹⁶⁶ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 228.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 228, 230-231, 233.

¹⁶⁸ Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 52; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 230.

¹⁶⁹ Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades* 47-49. Christiansen details a way of warfare among the Baltic powers that was necessarily limited in scope by the region’s

In the decades immediately preceding the Second Crusade, a stronger emphasis on conversion prevailed. Until the Second Crusade to the Levant however, all previous “holy war” campaigns in the North had been devoid of papal recognition. That changed with the 1147 bull *Divina dispensatione*, which was precipitated by Bernard of Clairvaux’s independent approval of the Saxon noblemen who requested to crusade against the Wends, instead of against the Muslims of the Levant. In a letter likely written shortly after Conrad’s council at Frankfurt in March 1147, Bernard introduced another divergence from the historic Baltic notions of holy war—the absolute ultimatum: “convert or die.” This was not to be a war to gain tribute from live people who remained pagan. Bernard’s standard for this campaign was a zero tolerance for the mingling of material motivations with the spiritual.¹⁷⁰

To promote papal interests to this very end, Anselm of Havelberg, a bishop who had spent time conducting mission work among the Slavs, was selected as the legate for the crusade.¹⁷¹ In June 1147, Niclot, the Wendish prince whose lands were to be the target of the crusade, launched a spoiling attack to disrupt the alliance’s cohesion while they mustered at Magdeburg.¹⁷² With an agile force of both infantry and cavalry, he

broken coastal terrain and harsh climate. Invading armies therefore tended to be satisfied with the booty from a raiding season, or tribute from a weaker enemy. Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 231-233.

¹⁷⁰ Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 54; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 236-238. Pope Eugenius’s official bull, however, did not include the explicit ultimatum for destruction, though it did prohibit, like Bernard’s letter, any kind of tribute or other compromise that left the “Slavs” in their current religious state.

¹⁷¹ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 233.

¹⁷² Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1, *Operational Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 2019), 1-96

raided the city of Lübeck, and drew the forces of German Count Adolph of Holsatia out on a relief march, before withdrawing to his recently fortified stronghold of Dobin, about eight miles upriver from Wismar Bay.¹⁷³

Against Dobin in mid-July came a coalition of seaborne Danes, under the co-rivals for the Danish throne, Sweyn III and Canute V, in cooperation with the land-based Saxons, marching under several bishops and dukes, like Henry the Lion of Saxony.¹⁷⁴ Reliable numbers are unavailable for this combined force, but given the number and status of its leaders, they were likely impressive. However, before the sea and land contingents could converge on the city, Niclot again launched a preemptive sally from his stronghold. This attack badly disrupted the Danish forces that were still attempting to deploy troops from their anchored fleets, and Niclot ensured that the complex hydrology of the area prevented the Saxons from reinforcing their allies. The Wendish attack was enough to undermine the fragile trust and mixed motivations of the coalition. After a brief period of wavering, the Danes sailed home and the Saxons struck a peace deal with Niclot, the latter becoming a paying tributary once more—in stark violation of Bernard of Clairvaux’s wishes.¹⁷⁵

defines spoiling attack as “a tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile attack while the enemy is in the process of forming or assembling for an attack.”

¹⁷³ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 240.

¹⁷⁴ Tyerman, *God’s War*, 306.

¹⁷⁵ Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 54-55; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 240-241.

During this time, a second, and no less impressive army marched East from Magdeburg under Anselm the papal legate, Wibald, King Conrad's regent, and many other senior Saxon nobles. Augmented by a Polish contingent, this force marched 130 miles into enemy territory to the town of Demmin, capturing Havelberg, burning a pagan temple, and destroying Wendish infrastructure sequentially along the way.¹⁷⁶ At Demmin, a third host splintered from the second, and continued even further east to besiege the town of Stettin. Once outside the walls of the town, however, the army appeared shocked to learn that the local prince, Ratibor of Pomerania, and ostensibly all his people, were already Christian converts, and thus, could not be attacked by soldiers under crusader vows.¹⁷⁷

After settling for a pact that required Ratibor to publicly confirm his creed back in Havelberg, the eastern arm of the Baltic expedition withdrew back to German lands in September 1147. Despite its more significant ramifications for future operations in the Baltic, overall, the campaign had failed to achieve the immediate expansion of Christian influence hoped for by the pope and St. Bernard. Instead, its secular leaders reverted back to what was probably their original intent in the first place: their customary pragmatic, economic-driven, limited way of war, that could settle for a draw in anticipation of the next fighting season.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 242.

¹⁷⁷ Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 55; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 242; Tyerman, *God's War*, 307.

¹⁷⁸ Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 55-56, 59; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 242-243.

The Eastern Campaign: The Long March of the Germans

Setting out from Nuremburg in late May 1147, the Germans moved to Regensburg on the Danube, where a company of Bavarian crusaders joined them. On the way to Regensburg, Conrad demonstrated his logistical planning, his army constructing new bridges at some of the rivers along their route, which also facilitated the French rate of march after them.¹⁷⁹ From Regensburg, Conrad's host followed the Danube, with a river fleet carrying the nobles and presumably a great deal of the army's supplies, while the main body paralleled the river on foot and hoof. At least one more significant contingent joined the army near Vienna, just before the now complete German force entered Hungary on 8 June.¹⁸⁰

Despite the political tensions with King Geza II, the Germans safely and efficiently passed the realm of Hungary without incident, due to bilateral diplomacy, motivated by the threat each side posed to the other. At a town called Branitz, where the Danube turns East along the northern border of Bulgaria, the army left the river and took to the road, where it was met by Byzantine envoys. The delegates reiterated Manuel's conditions for the crusaders to travel his lands. Conrad judiciously confirmed his agreement, and was allowed to proceed without issue into the Emperor's domain.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ John W. Nesbitt, "The Rate of March of Crusading Armies in Europe: A Study and Computation," in *Medieval Warfare 1000—1300*, ed. John France (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 579-580; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 33.

¹⁸⁰ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 168.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 169-170.

Around this time, Roger of Sicily, already an enemy of Manuel, opened an active campaign against Byzantium, just as the crusade was passing through Greek lands. The Sicilian fleet attacked several islands and coastal targets along the empire's Western Balkan territory. Though Conrad and Manuel were mutual enemies of Roger, the timing of this attack in relation to the crusade wreaked havoc on the Byzantine predisposition to suspicion of western forces, and negatively impacted subsequent Greek treatment of the German army.¹⁸²

It was also around this time that one of the Greeks' longest-standing and highest priority policies became at odds with the crusade. Both Harris and Phillips concur that the protection of Constantinople was a constant security imperative that shaped all other Byzantine foreign policy. Though Manuel had a veritable chessboard of geopolitical tensions to manage at the time, the large German army marching straight for the imperial capitol, under the shadow of possible Sicilian collusion, brought the Germans into sharp relief as a the most immediate potential threat, and changed their status in the eyes of the Greeks.¹⁸³

From this point forward, the relationship spiraled downward. Greek officials regularly demanded reassurance of German good faith, and later, even tried to persuade them to take an alternate route that would altogether bypass Constantinople to the South. German crusaders mistreated Greek market vendors. The Germans murdered a civilian

¹⁸² Berry, "The Second Crusade," 486; Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 94-95; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 170-171.

¹⁸³ Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 22-24; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 172.

entertainer at Philippopolis, resulting in an armed skirmish, and German losses. The crusaders subsequently burned parts of the city that were unprotected by the walls.¹⁸⁴ Byzantine soldiers murdered a sick German noble at Adrianople, triggering Frederick of Swabia to lead a reprisal attempt against the town. This event ended in another skirmish with imperial troops, who apparently won the engagement yet again. Manuel then deployed greater numbers of Byzantine troops to parallel the Germans' march, as well as to supplement the garrison at Constantinople. Judging by presumed Byzantine knowledge of the terrain and seasonal weather, the Greek guides may have even deliberately perpetrated bad intelligence as to where the Germans should site their camp, when the crusaders were devastated by a flash flood from the Melas River on 7 September 1147.¹⁸⁵

Shortly after the Melas River calamity, the German army reached Constantinople. After further tense diplomatic salvos with Manuel, and another open skirmish with imperial troops based on supply conflicts, Conrad made the decision to push his army across the Bosphorus strait toward the end of September—before his planned linkup with Louis VII and the French. Possibly he felt the situation around Constantinople getting out of hand, and knew his army's continued presence on the European side of the strait only invited heightened risk and further potential attrition of his combat power.¹⁸⁶ Harris insinuates that the Greeks, knowing of Louis' approach, deliberately fomented these

¹⁸⁴ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 43.

¹⁸⁵ France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 82-83; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 31; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 171-173.

¹⁸⁶ Every skirmish cited up to this point included casualties among the German crusaders.

conditions to drive the early departure of the Germans, for fear of a combined crusader coalition outside the walls of the imperial city.¹⁸⁷

Whatever the Greek motivation, they were only too happy to facilitate this strait-crossing. Their understated hasty ferry operation shows the wealth of logistical resources and expertise available to the Byzantines, especially in the vicinity of their capitol. One Greek chronicler, Niketas, mentions that many different types of small craft, including “horse transports” were hastily marshalled for the task of moving the Germans across.¹⁸⁸ Without knowing Niketas’s specific meaning, this may have been a general term, used simply to imply any vessel in the vicinity of Constantinople that could carry horses, and not strictly a craft dedicated to this purpose. In either case, however, Hyland’s well detailed work on the challenges of equestrian sea-lift demonstrates that this was an impressive feat from a force projection standpoint.¹⁸⁹

In order to understand rates of march, and the effects of logistical requirements on route planning for strategic marches, John Haldon draws several vital connections. Haldon stresses the interrelation between supply constraints, route terrain and quality, logistical capacity of areas along the route, and army size and composition. These were undoubtedly the considerations of the German army as they finalized preparations and route plans on the Asian shores of the Bosphorus. These were also the considerations that would wreck Conrad’s army in short order. For reasons unknown, but possibly as a

¹⁸⁷ Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 95; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 173-175.

¹⁸⁸ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 174.

¹⁸⁹ Hyland, *The Medieval Warhorse*, 143-148.

matter of simple pride, after he determined his route plan with Byzantine guides, Conrad elected to move on into Anatolia without his French allies.¹⁹⁰

At Nicaea, the noncombatant camp followers split off and took the coastal road, where they could remain in lands more under Byzantine control, and retain the all-important SLOC access via the ports of western Anatolia.¹⁹¹ Conrad took the main army on the route that led southeast across Anatolia, straight through the heart of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum. During this leg of the march, the crusaders began to run dangerously low on food, having only provisioned themselves for roughly half of the time required to reach Iconium, their next destination. It was also here that the march of the Germans became contested.

Near Dorylaeum, around the Byzantine frontier with the Turks, Odo describes Turkish warriors suddenly occupying the hills on the crusader line of march, driving the Germans to eventually decide to withdraw back towards the coast after much deliberation.¹⁹² Over the next few days, the return toward the coast became a dire operational-level retreat, hunger and dehydration plaguing the Germans and compounding their inability to respond to the constant pressure from the Turkish horse archers haunting their every move. John Kinnamos, a contemporary Greek source, describes several instances in which some of the German heavy cavalry fell prey to the

¹⁹⁰ Haldon, "Roads and Communications in the Byzantine Empire," 132-158; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 45-49.

¹⁹¹ Odo adds that this force, led by Conrad's brother, Otto of Freising, also included "many nobles." See Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 51.

¹⁹² Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 91-97; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 177-181.

classic Turkish feigned retreat, paying the price with their lives.¹⁹³ Thus, in November 1147, the greatest Christian incursion into Anatolia since the First Crusade stumbled back to the shores of a lake outside Nicaea, a broken shell of their former potential less than three weeks prior.¹⁹⁴

The Eastern Campaign: The Long March of The French

Louis VII and his army deployed from Metz on 29 June 1147. At Worms, they encountered their only significant strife with the local populace, but this was aptly assuaged by Bishop Alvisus of Arras.¹⁹⁵ However, the apparent source of the conflict—the high price of food—caused an entire contingent to separate from the main force in favor of taking a southerly route through Italy and the Adriatic.¹⁹⁶ At Regensburg, they were provided with a river fleet, just as the Germans, which facilitated their movement along the Danube as far as Bulgaria. Also, at Regensburg, Byzantine envoys greeted Louis and asked again for compliance to Emperor Manuel's requests—that the French

¹⁹³ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 68.

¹⁹⁴ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 92-93; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 179-180. Phillips suggests total losses of about 17 percent among German nobility, and 49 percent of the less well-equipped infantry—a crushing depletion. Odo unequivocally lays the blame for the German disaster on Greek treachery. While modern historians generally challenge this assumption based on Odo's open anti-Byzantine bias, it is fair to note that Odo claims the Byzantine guides were the ones who told the Germans how many days of supply to carry from Nicaea, which again, only got them through about half of their journey to Iconium. As this found them in the middle of the dry, mountainous Anatolian wilderness, with little ability to forage for food, such a claim, if accurate, would call into question the guides' motives.

¹⁹⁵ The Bishop of Arras must have been a skilled negotiator, as Louis frequently employed him in several roles.

¹⁹⁶ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 21-23.

seek no conquests of current Byzantine territory, and that any formerly imperial possessions conquered during the crusade be duly returned to the empire. Louis and his councilors placated the Byzantine delegation without committing to the second point, and again dispatched Alvisus as an advance diplomat, this time to Constantinople.¹⁹⁷

Aside from the one incident at Worms, diplomacy paved the way through the remainder of Germany and Hungary, the latter including a potential flashpoint with Boris, the rival claimant to Hungary's throne. This situation was also carefully defused by Louis and his councilors.¹⁹⁸ After crossing into Greek lands however, the French found it necessary to supplement Byzantine markets with pillaging for their sustainment, due to what Odo describes as the stinginess and mistrust with which the locals treated the Franks. This situation he plausibly attributes to the poor German behavior ahead of them. Aside from the aforementioned examples of hostile relations between Byzantines and Germans, the French also apparently experienced some mistreatment at the hands of their German coalitionists.¹⁹⁹

While the main force continued through imperial lands, Louis detailed a French advance force to Constantinople, travelling with the Germans, presumably to quarter the army's camp there. When this French quartering party refused Byzantine demands for them to cross the Bosphorus with Conrad's force in September 1147, they were attacked

¹⁹⁷ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 29. He died in September 1147, while at Constantinople. Hosler, "The War Councils and Military Advisers of Louis VII," 18.

¹⁹⁸ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 35-39.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 43-45.

by Pecheneg and Cuman mercenaries. The small French party resorted to laagering their supply wagons on high ground in order to defend themselves, until the Templar Master, Everard of Barres, and other French emissaries persuaded Manuel to call off the assailants. Odo claims this was not an isolated incident of its type during their crossing of Byzantine lands. Though there was clearly a sense of foreboding, angst, and hostility among the Frankish crusaders toward their Greek hosts, Phillips insightfully notes that the letters of King Louis himself never mention these incidents. In any event, Manuel later treated Louis as a privileged and honored guest for the duration of the French layover outside the walls of Constantinople.²⁰⁰

During this layover, French impatience began to mount due to increasing Byzantine messaging about German successes against the Turks in Anatolia. Eventually, this drove another rapid ferry operation—this time of the French troops. A subsequent violent riot against Greek moneychangers and increasing anti-byzantine sentiment among some powerful French nobles further encouraged Louis to hasten his army's departure in October 1147. After acquiescing to Manuel's demands of ill-defined homage, and receiving the French contingent that had taken the alternate route by way of the Adriatic, Louis's host set off on a route that lay geographically in between the two German marches. Here, just past Nicaea, they met the battered remnants of Conrad's army, fresh from their desperate flight through the mountain passes.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 189-192.

²⁰¹ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 73-91; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 193-195.

Once at Nicaea, many Germans chose to abandon the crusade based on their early traumas in Anatolia. The rest regrouped, resupplied, and rejoined the French several days later, travelling toward the coast with them as far as Ephesus. Here, Conrad, unable to continue due to sickness and arrow wounds from the Dorylaeum retreat, took a ship provided by Emperor Manuel, to convalesce in Constantinople.²⁰²

The route to Ephesus too turned into a trial of will all its own. Between the difficult terrain of the broken coastline, logistics constrained by local Greek extortion, potential enemy harassment of stragglers, and splinter groups departing by ship when able, this leg of the journey took another toll on the combined coalition march. An apparently significant number of French crusaders even lost their way, due to their inability to track the dilapidated road along the coast.²⁰³

The first real combat for the French forces occurred on the route from Ephesus to Laodicea, along the Maeander valley. This wide river valley was enclosed by mountains, which were penetrated by the road only at narrow passes. These passes, as well as ford sites on the river, the Turks began to challenge, having distributed their forces at key terrain all along the coalition line of march. Here, Louis and his commanders demonstrated both their discipline and offensive striking ability in battle, first patiently

²⁰² Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 99, 109; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 180, 183-184.

²⁰³ Haldon, "Roads and Communications in the Byzantine Empire," 138-139; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 102-106.

employing a fighting-box march formation, and then timing a pair of counter-charges perfectly, resulting in a general Turkish withdrawal and short Christian reprieve.²⁰⁴

For the first week of January 1148, the crusader army advanced under increasingly harrowing conditions, until they reached the culmination of eerie foreboding—the site where many of Otto of Freising’s column had been ambushed and massacred just weeks before.²⁰⁵ Around 8 January, on the route between Laodicea and Adalia, another port city on the south-central coast of Anatolia, the Second Crusaders encountered the second great disaster of the expedition. At Mount Cadmus, the cavalry vanguard of the army outpaced and broke contact with the central body of mostly infantry and supply train vehicles. King Louis, heading the rearguard with his royal knight contingent, was still encamped on the near side base of the mountain. As the vulnerable center column became hopelessly mired with just the task of getting up the steep slopes and narrow cliff-side switchbacks, the break in contact with both the advance and rear cavalry elements increased to a critical distance. The ever-present Turks pounced on this golden opportunity, and a great massacre followed. Only an aggressive counterattack by Louis’s rearguard prevented total annihilation of the center. Even the cost of the

²⁰⁴ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 109-111; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 197-198.

²⁰⁵ Odo and Berry, *Profectione*, 115; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 199. The French scorn for cooperation with the Byzantines by this point had caused them to rely solely on resupply from the local economy—purchased where able, but pillaged just as readily. Because of this however, the local populace was now making both nearly impossible, having deserted and stripped the towns and outposts along the march route. Odo also describes both Seljuks and Byzantines now actively threatening the march.

counterattack was high—Louis lost most of his elite household guard, and barely escaped with his own life.²⁰⁶

At this low state, and still twelve days short of Adalia, Louis handed both the general and subordinate commands of the army over to the small Templar contingent accompanying the expedition. In an impressive example of reorganization and retraining under combat conditions, this change made the difference for the crusaders. Though dangerously short of food and horses, the Templars' hasty leadership and tactical reforms saw the army score no less than four victories against the Turks by the time they reached Adalia.²⁰⁷

After suffering further diplomatic and economic extortion at the hands of the local imperial envoy and Adalian populace, Louis and his barons finally decided to abandon the remainder of the overland route to Outremer. Ships were contracted through the local economy, and carried an unspecified number of the host to Antioch on two different trips, by way of the port of St. Symeon. A large part of the army that had reached Adalia, however, never reached the Holy Land. Most of those who could not fit in the fleet's two trips before winter perished in subsequent Turkish attacks, starved to death, succumbed to disease, or were taken as slaves by the Turks or Greeks. A small element likely managed

²⁰⁶ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 115-121; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 199-201.

²⁰⁷ Laurence W. Marvin, "Medieval and Modern C2: Command and Control in the Field during Western Europe's Long Twelfth Century (1095–1225)," *War & Society* 35, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 167-168, DOI: 10.1080/07292473.2016.1196921; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 125-129.

to reach Antioch by a long and harrowing march, but their numbers are unknown.²⁰⁸

Figure 3 illustrates the routes and movements of all the elements of the Second Crusade, with the exception of the few who made the march from Adalia to Antioch.




Figure 3. Strategic Movements of the Second Crusade

Source: Created by author using image from Shutterstock.

NOTE: Not all of the English contingent travelled all the way to the Holy Land; some stayed at Lisbon, and some may have remained at Tortosa.

²⁰⁸ Berry, “The Second Crusade,” 503; France, “Logistics and the Second Crusade,” 86; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 130-143; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 203-205. Phillips is understandably suspicious of Odo’s claim that the Greeks actually pressed any French stragglers into slavery, as by this point, Odo had already taken sail himself for Antioch. Berry also opts for a less sensational interpretation—that of destitute and optionless crusaders willfully entering Greek service in order to survive.

Convergence and Endgame: Damascus

The arrival of King Louis and the remnant of his army on the shores of Palestine in March 1148, triggered somewhat of a pan-Outremer competition for the prize of partnership with the western forces. Shattered though they were—Berry estimates only ten percent of the original French host made it to Antioch—it is important to remember that even a force of only a few thousand quality troops could have a major operational impact in the Frankish Levant.²⁰⁹ It is at this point the historical narratives reveal four separate Latin states, with four separate ideas on how to employ the crusaders, instead of a unified polity or objectives. Raymond, Prince of Antioch, the initial host of the French, held high hopes of the king's forces enabling him to seize Aleppo and Shayzar. These towns represented both the Antiochene version of the Crusader States' inland urban center strategy, as well as an opportunity for Antioch to win back greater independence from the encroachments of Byzantium. An 1137 treaty with the Greeks made the restoration of Antioch to Byzantium contingent on Imperial assistance in the seizure of Aleppo and Shayzar. Ultimately Louis rejected Raymond's plan, and the two parted ways sharply. Each of the other Crusader States also had designs on Louis's support, but the

²⁰⁹ Berry, "The Second Crusade," 503; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 1, 22. This thesis has used 25,000 combatants as a rough estimate for the French army that set out from Metz. This is based on Phillips' assumption of 30,000-35,000 in the original German host, and a relatively smaller French contingent. Therefore, applying Berry's figure of roughly 90 percent casualties along the journey, the number 2,500-3,000 is assumed here for French crusaders arriving in the Holy Land from the overland march.

recovery of Edessa was simply no longer tenable. Louis shifted his focus to the south, and completed his pilgrimage vow at Jerusalem.²¹⁰

By this time, Conrad III had also arrived from Constantinople by ship, at the port of Acre. Byzantine emperor Manuel Komnenos had completely shifted his stance toward Conrad during his convalescence in the imperial capitol. After establishing several diplomatic agreements and sealing them accordingly, he provided a fleet to carry the German monarch to Palestine. Interestingly, the *Annales Herbipolenses* also describes Manuel sending the German retinue off with “2,000 finely equipped horses.” Though a spring storm dispersed the fleet into separately arriving contingents along the Levantine coast, Conrad arrived at Acre without much trouble. He met King Baldwin III and Queen Regent Melisende of Jerusalem, and then made his way back to Acre to prepare for the upcoming campaign. Also arrived by sea ahead of Conrad, were those of the victorious Lisbon crusaders who continued on to the Holy Land. Some, if not all of these joined with the forces of Conrad and Louis.²¹¹

On 24 June 1148, both crusading monarchs, the King and Queen of Jerusalem, many of Baldwin’s lords, the masters of both the Templar and Hospitaller orders, and key prelates all met at the Council of Palmarea. In a decision surrounded by much historical

²¹⁰ Jacoby, “The Economic Function of the Crusader States of the Levant,” 166; Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, 74-75, 90-97; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 36-39; 144-153; Steven Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2020), 66-79.

²¹¹ France, “Logistics and the Second Crusade,” 91-92; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 212-213.

scholarly debate, they decided on Damascus as the terminal objective of the coalition.²¹² After a general muster of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the coalition of western crusaders, newly hired mercenaries from local Syrian and Frankish populations, and unspecified numbers from the military orders, Antioch, and perhaps some from Tripoli and Edessa, this multinational force marched to Damascus in late July.

Arriving in the area on 24 July, the crusader host immediately deployed to close the distance on the North side of the city walls, and faced a difficult fight through vast tracts of tightly clustered orchards that invested the city. This tactical battle devolved into decentralized small unit actions, with crusaders facing the confusing terrain of thick groves, tight paths, small *qalat*-wall partitions, irrigation ditches, and distributed, fortified guard towers filled with Turkish archers. Winning through this maze, the army next faced and overcame a contested crossing of the River Barada, seizing the far bank and securing a strong foothold from which they could assault the walls in the coming days.²¹³

Over the next three days, however, the situation developed badly for the crusader army. Though they had won a strong position, with defensible terrain and good access to sustenance, they had nowhere near the numbers to surround the city. This meant that the

²¹² Berry, “The Second Crusade,” 505-507; Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 155-157; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 114-116; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 216-218; Tibble, *Strategy*, 80-81, 88-89. Of note, Berry’s tacit acceptance, in this passage, of William of Tyre’s claim that the coalition forces numbered 50,000 should be viewed as problematic, given the recorded totals of even the largest Crusader State armies over many different campaigns, and the numbers of losses among the western crusaders already suggested.

²¹³ Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 89-91; John D. Hosler, “Gap-Crossing Operations Medieval and Modern,” *Military Review* (March/April 2020): 8-9.

Damascene defenders were able to both concentrate offensive sorties against the Christian camp, and receive streams of reinforcements from the countryside through the other gates of the city. Eventually it became clear that the crusaders themselves were being surrounded, and the Muslims began long-range bombardment of their besiegers' fortified camp. This, along with possible reports of a large army from Mosul massing for a counterattack from the North, drove a hotly debated decision to dislocate to a new position on the opposite (southern) side of the city, presumably in hopes of a rapid assault from that point.²¹⁴

Within one day at this new site, however, the imminent failure of the expedition became transparent. At their new assault position, the army faced stronger defenses than previously anticipated.²¹⁵ They were also now exposed, without the cover and logistical benefits of the northern orchards. Their supply train was inadequate to cover the basic needs of the army for a long siege, nor did it contain the materials for siege engines.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 158-159. The Muslim chronicler Ibn Al-Athir is the sole source to record that Unur, the Damascene governor and former ally of Jerusalem, used the approach of the Zengid army to convince the Outremer Franks, through diplomacy, to withdraw. Even if this lone, uncorroborated source is inaccurate regarding Unur's communications to the Latins, relief armies were undeniably a constant threat for any force conducting siege operations, and it is highly likely that the Christian coalition learned of the Zengid army by some means—even if it was not Unur. Another contemporary Muslim source places the relief army at 30,000. This would have posed an existential threat to the coalition force, especially as they were now poorly supplied, and still faced a strong enemy inside Damascus. See also Tibble, *Strategy*, 92-95.

²¹⁵ For the definition of “assault position” see HQDA, FM 1-02.1, 1-7.

²¹⁶ Or, alternatively, the tactical conditions might simply have prevented the Christian army from constructing any siege machines thus far, even if they had the materials in their supply train. Either way, no machines were employed during the

Any return to their previous foothold was denied by all new units of Turkish archers infesting the orchard complexes. And the threat of a relief army under the Zengids loomed ever larger the longer the besiegers were in place. Therefore, on Wednesday, 28 July 1148, the coalition army lifted the siege of Damascus, and amid intense frustration and conjectures of treachery within the ranks, marched back to Jerusalem.²¹⁷ Like Anatolia, Outremer had consumed all the best hopes of the once-great forces of the Second Crusade. It would take forty years and the loss of Jerusalem before western rulers were willing to fight again in the Holy Land.

crusader army's short-lived attack on Damascus. See Fulton, *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades*, 116.

²¹⁷ Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 157-164; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 221-226; Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 95-100. The western crusader-kings and their men harbored extreme suspicions of betrayal by the Franks of Outremer. This controversy, and the reason why the eastern Franks suggested a move they knew would fail, has been one of the greatest sources of scholarly debate regarding all of the Second Crusade.

CHAPTER 4

A COMPLEX FAILURE: THE INSTRUMENTS OF POWER IN THE SECOND CRUSADE

And thus all, equally indignant grieved, returned, leaving the undertaking
uncompleted.

—Conrad III, Second Letter to Abbot Wibald, quoted
in Dana Munro, “Letters of the Crusaders”

Introduction to Analysis of the Instruments of Power

Examining how the leaders of the Second Crusade projected the instruments of power to advance their interests in an international theater yields important insights. As in every age of history, there is a significant amount of overlap in the application of these instruments. However, in this expedition, the combined effects of the strategic environment on the interrelated instruments of power transcended their effects in isolation from one another. The Second Crusade failed to achieve any strategic impact because the diplomatic, military, and informational constraints of its leaders set it at odds with the complex security interests of the allies upon whom the expedition most relied.

In analyzing the preparation and execution of the crusade, using the modern construct of DIME as well as other modern military doctrinal concepts, this study does not assume or argue for a presentist reflection on the historical narrative. Rather, the study employs elements of modern constructs for clarity of transmission to modern audiences—both scholarly and military. This demonstrates the common nature of the challenges and concepts between the two eras and highlights the value of studying medieval warfare for modern students and practitioners of war. Finally, the study

examines how the impacts of the instruments of power converged, to propose a reason for the overall strategic failure of the enterprise.

Though the Second Crusade failed to achieve decisive results and displayed confused, conflicting agendas, there was a unifying strategic objective that accounts for all these characteristics. Eugenius III and Bernard of Clairvaux, the co-architects of the venture, initially envisioned the objective as Edessa. However, their propensity to adapt to the pragmatic needs or desires of secular rulers, based on geo-strategic realities, indicates they would have lauded any anti-Muslim objective in Outremer that ended in success as meeting their original intent. Likewise, while Conrad III and Louis VII also saw Edessa as the strategic objective, neither of them seemed bothered over the pragmatic shift to Damascus. Conrad, at length, was even willing to shift objectives yet again to Ascalon.²¹⁸ These reactions reflect an attitude in the crusader kings that was most concerned with serving a purpose in Outremer commensurate with both their standing and the measure of their sacrifices in getting to the Holy Land. Both kings were flexible in regards to where that purpose was best served. Simply stated, then, the goal of the Second Crusade leaders was to make a strategic impact for Christendom within the Holy Land.

The Diplomatic Instrument of Power in the Second Crusade

Diplomacy was a both critical enabler and constraint of power projection in the Second Crusade. It comprised an extraordinary amount of cumulative effort across all the theaters of operations between 1147-1149. A majority of this effort had a degree of

²¹⁸ Tyerman, *God's War*, 330-332, 335.

convergence with military operations, where diplomacy served to enable either force projection or actions within the terminal sphere of that projection—the sphere modern joint doctrine refers to as the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). Sufficient detail is preserved in contemporary chronicles to determine how the crusaders leveraged diplomacy to secure their interests.

The best example of diplomacy's role in enabling the Second Crusade is the long march of the French and German armies from western Europe through Anatolia. First are the extensive diplomatic preparations by Louis and Conrad. The groundwork displayed by the French through Hungary and Byzantine lands, and the Germans through Hungary, was one of the triumphs of the entire expedition. Without the prior forethought and planning displayed during the spring of 1147, it is doubtful that either army could have traversed through Christian lands, especially once the march became contested.²¹⁹

Frankish-German relations were the first piece to the puzzle. Louis VII's near seamless march through German lands reveals that these relations were strong and terms well-articulated. For instance, the new bridges the Germans laid en route through the Rhineland enabled the rapid rate of march by the French. John France sees these bridges as sets of prefabricated segments, which seems plausible, given the Germans' knowledge of their homeland terrain, the number of rivers that would transect the route, and the abundant supply of local wood.²²⁰ Engineering and ingenuity on this scale represents

²¹⁹ France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 80-82.

²²⁰ Ibid., 80-81; Nesbitt, "The Rate of March of Crusading Armies in Europe," 579-580; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 33.

such a significant investment of time and resources that it was surely pre-arranged as part of intra-coalition diplomacy.

French diplomacy also smoothed the way ahead. Louis employed Bishop Alvisus of Arras and Abbot Leo of St. Bertin at least twice as an advance diplomatic and logistics team—from Metz to Worms, and Worms to Regensburg. The first mission was to facilitate crossing the Rhine; the second, to coordinate with the German river fleet to carry an unknown number of crusaders by boat, via the Danube, to the Byzantine border.²²¹ Odo of Deuil specifically details 2-horse and 4-horse carts being loaded onto the boats, the latter listed at “a very great number.”²²² The operation would have required such coordination, and political and financial capital, that it indicates diplomatic agreements between Louis and Conrad, which were further refined by Louis’s internal advance quartering party.

Both armies’ crossing of Hungary presents another instance of successful “in-stride” diplomacy directly enabling force projection. Geza II actually paid Conrad to deny sanctuary to Boris, Geza’s rogue rival. That Conrad and his magnates managed to avert any known tiffs with Hungarian troops or populace is a testament to both his clear understanding of the fragile diplomatic situation and his effective control of the army. Welf VI’s involvement in the Hungarian agreements may also suggest Conrad’s ability to

²²¹ Hosler, “The War Councils and Military Advisers of Louis VII,” 18; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 21-23.

²²² Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 25.

cross intra-German conflict lines and build consensus across the disparate contingents of his army.²²³

Louis's management of Hungarian relations also required a degree of skill. Refused travel with the Germans, Boris infiltrated the French march to attempt a discreet escape into Byzantine lands. Once Louis discovered this, he was unwilling to hand Boris over to Geza (out of a sense of honor under his crusader vows), but he still managed to preserve the peaceful traversing of Hungary, despite the increased tension. These results demonstrate careful diplomatic maneuvers that ultimately maintained the strategic movement through Europe while preserving maximum combat power.²²⁴

When it came to Byzantine diplomatic relations, early efforts were efficacious. From the crusade's inception, both French and German kings prioritized diplomatic and logistical arrangements with the Byzantines.²²⁵ Louis and Conrad were received favorably by the advance Greek envoys at Regensburg and Branitz respectively. At this meeting Louis and the French also demonstrated sound diplomatic practice, requesting clarification in the definition of the emperor's terms—specifically the “formerly Byzantine lands” that they would be required to return to Constantinople.²²⁶ Yet it was partially diplomatic constraints that drove the crusaders to take the Byzantine march route

²²³ France, *Western Warfare*, 209-211; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 120, 132-133; Tyerman, *God's War*, 292-294.

²²⁴ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 35-39.

²²⁵ France “Logistics and the Second Crusade,” 80; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 132-133.

²²⁶ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 23- 29; Phillips, *The Second Crusade* 169-170, 186-187.

in the first place, which ultimately brought them into conflict with Greek policies. And efforts to maintain functional relations could never fully recover once logistical and informational constraints revealed tangible conflicts of interest. As the narrative shows, crusader-Byzantine relations eventually became a case study in diplomatic failure. Combined with the effects of the other instruments of power, this failure played a majority role in the overall doom of the crusade.

Diplomatic power within the Levant theater was another major constraint for the crusaders. When the western kings made it to the Holy Land, they found themselves in a foreign setting, and with only a fraction of their original military power. As a result, their real diplomatic power was likewise diminished, though the elite of Outremer still showed due deference to the monarchs.²²⁷ As a consequence, Louis and Conrad had a poor understanding of the subtleties of political relationships between the regional Frankish and Muslim states. Like with the Byzantines, this created a dependency on the real brokers of diplomatic power in the coalition, the eastern Franks themselves.²²⁸ The result was further constraint on the western kings' ability to leverage diplomatic power.

Byzantine entanglement in the affairs of Antioch also likely weighed on Louis's reluctance to join Prince Raymond. Though Raymond clearly saw the crusaders as a means to seize Aleppo and Shayzar without Byzantine aid, and thereby nullify the 1137 treaty's requirement to hand over his capital, the prospect must have struck Louis as another thread in the web of Byzantine security interests, of which he likely wanted no

²²⁷ Berry, "The Second Crusade," 503.

²²⁸ Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 155-157.

more part.²²⁹ Thus his options for political alliance were narrowed to the south. All these diplomatic constraints converged with the dynamics of the other instruments of power to play a role in the failure of the crusade.

The Informational Instrument of Power

The informational instrument of power is broad in its modern applications, and requires specified focus when analyzing its use in the power projection of the crusades: the means and ability of ideas, perceptions, and knowledge to influence motivations and decisions, to accomplish strategic objectives.²³⁰ In the Second Crusade, informational power massively enabled force generation, but it later became a constraint in relation to the expedition's key allies.

The wide enthusiasm for the expedition owes to the intense informational power of crusading, as mobilized by the Church. Given the enormous difficulties, risks, and costs of an international military expedition, the size and dedication of the Second Crusade armies demonstrate the Church's ability to effectively engage the deep-seated ideologies, beliefs, values, and motivations of medieval Christendom. Pope Eugenius's papal bulls and Bernard of Clairvaux's exhaustive preaching campaign poignantly illustrate this.

²²⁹ Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, 90-97.

²³⁰ Donald M. Bishop, long-time Foreign Service Public Diplomacy officer defines information as "embracing facts, knowledge, logic, argument, education, theory, beliefs, judgment, interpretation, opinion, thought, narrative, norms, values, ideas, Jefferson's 'facts submitted to a candid world,' and, yes, truth." Donald M. Bishop, "DIME, not DiME: Time to Align the Instruments of U.S. Informational Power," *The Strategy Bridge (blog)*, June 20, 2018, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/6/20/dime-not-dime-time-to-align-the-instruments-of-us-informational-power>.

There is a common misconception that sincere religious or ideological motivation was really absent from the consciousness of the power-brokers who directed the course of major events in the medieval world. That perception owes to a hindsight perspective that sees a duality between the modern ideal of church and state separation, and the clear medieval reality of a close integration of power between secular and clerical leaders. The misconception is further informed by a few famous crusaders' obviously self-interested actions, and the mixture of violent and sacred that is so contradictory to modern norms.

However, it is a mistake to assume that these factors precluded rulers and leaders from maintaining a very real and powerful, if confused and pragmatic, idealism. First, to the minds of medieval magnates, secular authority, divine right, and military conquest were naturally intertwined.²³¹ Second, although a venture to the Holy Land might hold the allure of temporal promises for European nobles who desired to improve their condition or those who had something to prove, the risks were astronomical. And the majority of the leaders of the Second Crusade had much to lose indeed, with little temporal benefit to gain by their great campaign.²³² This dispels the inaccurate overgeneralization of crusaders as being solely motivated by greed, conquest, or hatred of the infidel. Despite all their ideological conflations and opportunism, there was, among the Second Crusaders, a strong sense of sincere belief in the cause of crusading, and the

²³¹ France, *Western Warfare*, 39-47, 205.

²³² *Ibid.*, 189; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 106-107.

spiritual benefits it incurred for the individual.²³³ This was the cognitive ground that Eugenius and Bernard so masterfully targeted.

The first papal bull, *Quantum praedecessores*, established the core informational catalyst around which the forces of the expedition rallied. The major themes of this document demonstrate not only the weight of papal informational power at the time but the skill with which Eugenius wielded it. Three of the bull's themes in particular—the precedent of the First Crusade, family crusading legacy, and spiritual absolution—indicate an especially perceptive grasp of the values, beliefs, and motivations of the pope's audience.²³⁴

The First Crusade had attained near-legendary status for the generation of warriors and pilgrims of 1147-1148. It had such a powerful influence that it even informed the kings' decision to take the overland route. Both Conrad and Louis rejected Manuel's pleas for them to bypass Constantinople and use the Dardanelles Strait to cross to Anatolia. Taking this route would undoubtedly ease tensions with Manuel and presented almost no real negative impacts to the crusaders. Yet, they chose to follow the route of the First Crusaders, and Louis specifically indicated his motivation was historical

²³³ On the proof of such belief, especially with regard to the First Crusade as a precedent, see France, *Victory in the East*, 367; See also for the Second Crusade, Roche, "The Second Crusade," 21-22. Even King Louis VII and King Conrad III would countenance no other actions in the Holy Land until they had visited Jerusalem to fulfil their vow, and seal the spiritual privileges of their crusade. On this, see Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 155-156; Tyerman, *God's War*, 329-330.

²³⁴ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 51.

precedent.²³⁵ In this case, the ideological (or informational) imperatives of the crusaders had a self-limiting effect, causing them to discard other viable options.

In a more personal appeal, *Quantum praedecessores* engaged potential recruits on the basis of their family history and associations with crusading efforts. As outlined in chapter three, the family connections to crusading and the Holy Land for Thierry of Flanders and Louis VII illustrate the immense validity of this appeal.²³⁶ Spiritual absolution also touched a key belief-based and motivational nerve for the mid-twelfth century man.²³⁷ For this incentive, Eugenius was able to draw on the precedent of Urban II, author of the First Crusade. However, Eugenius and Bernard also demonstrate a keen adaptiveness in their application of 1095's winning formula. Not only did they replicate their forebear's appeal, but *Quantum praedecessores* gave finer details of crusader privileges—namely, Church protection of family and material assets, certain legal reprieves or exemptions, and clarified terms for absolution.²³⁸

Bernard of Clairvaux's preaching campaign of 1146-1147 demonstrated both the power and efficiency of the Church's informational apparatus. The abbot was clearly a dynamic and effective communicator, both in mass messaging with large crowds—as seen in his dramatic sermons at Vézelay and Speyer—and in more personalized communications with key recruits—as seen in his targeted letter campaign. Also

²³⁵ See Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 46-47; 58-59.

²³⁶ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 61; Feiss and Slack, *Crusade Charters*, 20-21, 176.

²³⁷ France, *Western Warfare*, 204-205.

²³⁸ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 51-58.

informative is the contrast between Bernard's suppression of the renegade preacher Radulf and his grant of crusader privileges to the Saxon nobles seeking war in the Baltics. It shows that the Church could be selective in its sanction and assimilation of informational power. Perhaps equally important was the distributed preaching of Bernard's trusted agents.²³⁹ In an age without modern technological platforms for information projection, the organization and legitimacy of the Church proved the key to the crusade's force generation.

Later, informational power again featured in the form of constraints. The crusader barons' own ideological sense of image and superiority became a constraint on their willingness to cooperate with Byzantine demands—perhaps even trickling down to negatively impact the attitudes and discipline of their troops.²⁴⁰ The ideological imperative of image and prestige may have also driven Conrad to proceed into Anatolia without French aid. Interestingly, because of this action, the Byzantines were able to employ deception operations against the French, such as via providing false reports on the successes of the Germans.²⁴¹ As a result, the kings could only project a fraction of their informational power, which would ultimately affect their ability to maneuver in the complex OE of Outremer, where lack of knowledge and understanding of the local political web sealed their fate.

²³⁹ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 67-68, 69-77, 95.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 194-195.

²⁴¹ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 57, 73.

The Military Instrument of Power

The military instrument of power in the Second Crusade was composed of two parts: force projection enablers, and force projection constraints. Force projection is intuitive to the broader study of power projection, and in its nature, reveals many of the same challenges that modern armed forces face. While force employment (the *terminal application* of military power inside a theater, using a range of military operations to achieve strategic objectives) is a critical part of power projection, the Second Crusade showcases only a stunted version of this aspect that is covered separately. The present section analyzes the rich force projection aspects of the crusade's military power. Militarily, the Second Crusade accomplished an extraordinary strategic movement, but it ultimately could not overcome the impacts of its logistical and intelligence constraints.

Force Projection Enablers

The crusaders' journey from Metz and Nuremburg to Constantinople illustrates the quality, ingenuity, and constraints of their logistics. The new German bridges elicits only a passing comment in most sources.²⁴² These structures enabled an impressive rate of march of 14-15 miles per day for both the French and Germans.²⁴³ Using only existing bridges would have created a significantly greater bottle-neck effect for armies that were already strung between 23 and 28 kilometers on the march, with a pass time of around

²⁴² Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 39; France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 80-81.

²⁴³ Nesbitt, "The Rate of March of Crusading Armies in Europe," 580, 582.

4.5—5.5 hours from front to rear on a single road.²⁴⁴ The German hasty bridges set conditions for a rapid movement by enabling distributed crossing operations, thereby reducing delays at the points of greatest friction.

Military logistics also supported force projection during the movement on and along the Danube River. The river fleet that carried the heavy supply assets from Regensburg to Branitz, on the Byzantine border, further illustrates the sound planning and coordination on the part of both Conrad and Louis. This use of a major inland waterway as a mode of travel and transport may have allowed both crusader armies to ship their animal-powered vehicles, such as 4-horse wagons cited by Odo.²⁴⁵ He describes these vehicles' tendency to break down *en route* and cause major traffic issues; however, the army appears to have maintained its pace very well as it moved in tandem down the river nonetheless. This may indicate that many of the wagons were loaded onto the river ships, thereby avoiding all the maintenance issues they might have incurred had they been on the road. The mode-transfer for the heavy supplies from land to waterway was an operation in itself. Given the space and infrastructure required to load all these

²⁴⁴ Assuming a 25,000-man French army and a 30,000-man German army, and using the rates provided by Haldon, "Roads and Communications in the Byzantine Empire," 142-143. Haldon's description of a medieval march is remarkably similar to US Army methods of planning for operational mounted march tables. Haldon literally describes march column passing times and "supply dumps"—easily relatable to modern Convoy Support Centers. See Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-90.2, *Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks*, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 2013), 3-1 - 3-6; JCS, JP 3-35, VI-21 - VI-22.

²⁴⁵ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 24-25.

supplies and vehicles while the ships remained stable, Regensburg stands out as a homeland power projection platform.

One final example of the ingenuity and projection capacity of the crusaders and their allies are the Byzantine sea-lift operations from Constantinople. Manuel quickly mustered a ferry fleet for two separate armies that almost certainly totaled more than 50,000 in all. This is impressive, both for the sheer numbers of crusaders transported and for the number of primary and remount horses, pack animals, supplies, and potentially their wagons. Source details on vessel types in this operation are scant, but John Pryor points out that the Byzantium maintained a robust horse-transport capability during this exact period, as demonstrated by their retaliatory expedition against Roger II of Sicily in 1149.²⁴⁶

Remarkable as these two ferry operations were, the prime example of Byzantine sea-power is the much-overlooked reference to Conrad's sea-voyage from Constantinople to Acre in the spring of 1148. The *Annales Herbipolenses* mentions that Manuel provided Conrad with "2,000 finely equipped horses."²⁴⁷ Though this detail is uncorroborated in other sources, there is no reason to doubt its authenticity. Both the First Crusade and the latest French and German foray into Anatolia had experienced terrible losses in their

²⁴⁶ Hyland, *The Medieval Warhorse*, 165-168; Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, 87-88; John H. Pryor, "Transportation of Horses by Sea during the Era of the Crusades: Eighth Century to 1285 A.D.," in *Medieval Warfare 1000—1300*, ed. John France (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 531.

²⁴⁷ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 212.

horse stocks.²⁴⁸ Manuel might very well have sought to seal his restored friendship with Conrad by providing such a lavish and desperately needed gift.

While the Bosphorus ferry operations required a significant amount of watercraft in a short amount of time, the crusader horses could have easily managed in non-standard horse transports, as the strait presents a very brief transit. However, any fleet carrying 2,000 horses over the much longer distance from Constantinople to Antioch would have required an altogether different kind of logistical capability. Again, the 1149 Sicilian expedition supports the naval feasibility of this claim, but so does the 1169 Frankish-Byzantine campaign against Egypt, where the Greeks employed 60 horse transports to carry Frankish knights.²⁴⁹

If Manuel did send 2,000 horses along with Conrad, presumably as warhorses for the campaign in Palestine, this constituted a significant investment of resources—at least 50 specialized horse transports, and at most over 150.²⁵⁰ This gesture represents both a highly specialized capability and extreme logistical expenditure. Horse transports required specially built, higher hold ceilings than normal war galleys, to account for the horses' height. The hull floors were modified down the center, to allow the horses' urine

²⁴⁸ France, *Victory in the East*, 185-193; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 123-129.

²⁴⁹ Pryor, "Transportation of Horses by Sea during the Era of the Crusades," 531-532.

²⁵⁰ This range assumes that the carrying capacity of Byzantine horse transports in 1147 was somewhere between the known capacity since at least the year 763 of 12 horses per ship, and the known capacity by the last quarter of the twelfth century of 40 horses per ship, though this latter figure is derived from examples in Sicilian, Genoese, and Venetian campaigns. Pryor, "Transportation of Horses by Sea during the Era of the Crusades," 523, 533-535.

to drain and be emptied, to prevent the animals from slipping. The ships also required rigging for canvas equine stabilizer slings to be built into the stalls. On top of these specialized requirements, each horse required between 5 and 8 gallons of water per day, barrels to hold it, and 20-22 pounds of food per day.²⁵¹ For a 12-horse ship, that equates to 60-96 gallons of water and 240-264 pounds of food per day at sea. For a 40-horse ship, it equates to 200-320 gallons of water and 800-880 pounds of food per day. These figures account for none of the sustainment requirements for the human rowing and sailing crews, nor any other kinds of cargo. These figures illustrate why medieval ships with any kind of large sustainment requirements had to put into harbor frequently for provision, very few ships having the capacity to carry more than a few days of supply at this rate. Such restocking requirements essentially restricted them to routes where they could “hop” from sea-base to sea-base.²⁵²

Sea-based power projection clearly required extensive reserves of logistics and expertise, just as it does today. If anything remotely close to this kind of transport fleet accompanied Conrad from Constantinople, it demonstrates what further Manuel might have done for the crusade, had the constraints of both sides not brought their interests so sharply into conflict.

²⁵¹ Haldon, “Roads and Communications in the Byzantine Empire,” 144-145; Hyland, *The Medieval Warhorse*, 64; Pryor et al., *The Age of the Dromōn*, 317-329.

²⁵² For a detailed explanation of this in the sea routes to Outremer, see Gertwagen, “Harbors and Facilities along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea Lanes to Outremer,” 96-106.

Force Projection Constraints

Though the crusader and Greek logistical feats reveal a strong military capacity for force projection, there were also crucial vulnerabilities along the same lines. Within the military instrument of power, the crusaders had inherent logistical and intelligence limitations outside of western Europe. These limitations produced a reliance on their allies—as evidenced by the market (and occasional pillage) method of supply through German, Hungarian, and Byzantine lands, and the dependence on Greek scouts in Anatolia. No western army marching overland to the Levant through the Balkans, so far from their homeland, could do without allies’ logistical and intelligence support.²⁵³

Regarding the overland march route from the First Crusade, which the Germans mirrored in 1147, Bernard Bachrach is “virtually certain that the crusaders relied completely upon the Byzantines for logistical support during the two weeks following the victory at Nicaea.”²⁵⁴ Using Bachrach’s assessments of logistical requirements in 1097, the Germans of 1147 would have required around 1,250 wagons of food supplies to make a 10-day march without resupply. Such intensive requirements make it clear how heavily the crusaders had to rely on Byzantine logistical support, in an age before modern food storage technology and mass distribution systems. Given Odo’s emphasis on markets, as opposed to some sort of state-centralized supply train, it also demonstrates the amount of

²⁵³ JCS, JP 3-0, III-4 distinctly illustrates this point in the very same geographic context. USCENTCOM relied on movement, staging, and intelligence support from USEUCOM, for the ability to project forces from Turkey into Northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

²⁵⁴ Bachrach, “Crusader Logistics,” 57-58.

strain such a force would put on a local economy.²⁵⁵ So, whether or not the crusaders' cool reception by the Greeks of Anatolia was due to imperial design, as per Odo of Deuil's accusation, the local populace could not have viewed the passing of such a host with great welcome. Thus, the crusaders' logistical limitations imposed a serious constraint to rely on the Byzantines; they also produced tensions with those critical allies. In Outremer, the same logistical constraint produced a logistical reliance on the Frankish States, although it does not appear to have sparked tension in that theater.

Regarding force projection, the crusaders were subject to gaps in intelligence at all levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. The modern doctrinal definitions are useful here. *JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence* defines strategic intelligence as that which “supports joint operations across the range of military operations, assesses the current situation, and estimates future capabilities and intentions of adversaries that could affect the national security and [state] or allied interests.” Tactical intelligence is that which is used “for planning and conducting battles, engagements, and special missions.”²⁵⁶ Army doctrine provides a more relevant description of operational intelligence, defining it as “Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas.”²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ John H. Pryor, “Digest,” in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 287.

²⁵⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Joint Intelligence* (Washington, DC: JCS, October 22, 2013), x, I-23 – I-25, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0.pdf.

²⁵⁷ HQDA, FM 1-02.1, 1-76.

Strategically and operationally, crusader intelligence gaps manifested on several occasions. They failed to understand the nature of the Byzantine-Seljuk relationship throughout the frontier lands of Anatolia. They apparently had an inadequate perception of the disposition and readiness level of the various Seljuk forces. Already a diplomatic constraint, the limited understanding of the political dynamics in Outremer was also a strategic intelligence gap that limited military power.

Another intelligence issue that straddles the border between operational and tactical, due to its context within a march-deployment, was poor knowledge of suitable march routes and terrain. The armies' line of march had to consider the availability of local resources, particularly if the route under consideration passed through terrain that precluded the use of wheeled vehicles to transport food and supplies. Suitable camp sites, river crossings, and locals' dispositions all had an effect on an operational deployment via ground. Such questions demanded detailed analysis of potential routes.²⁵⁸ As there is no indication of Conrad or Louis collecting this information through organic reconnaissance operations, Odo's frequent mention of Byzantine guides suggests that the crusaders relied completely on Greek scouts for these critical information requirements.²⁵⁹

Tactical intelligence gaps were also evident. The Seljuks seem to have achieved surprise in their actions at the Second Battle of Dorylaeum; during the Germans' fraught multi-day retreat, the knightly cavalry repeatedly charged too far into the teeth of

²⁵⁸ Haldon, "Roads and Communications in the Byzantine Empire," 131, 138-140.

²⁵⁹ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 102-106.

unforeseen Seljuk ambushes.²⁶⁰ At Damascus, faulty intelligence on the weakness of the city's defenses, and the plausibility of an eastern point of assault played a major role in the failure of the attack.²⁶¹ The crusaders constraints in both the intelligence and logistical aspects of military power created ally-dependency, which then put them on a collision course with their allies' own security constraints.

The Economic Instrument of Power

The monarchs, magnates, and military religious orders who led the Second Crusade also served as its financiers. The innovation and flexibility with which these leaders leveraged the European economy of the mid-twelfth century was remarkable. Their financial preparations enabled the power generation and projection of a multi-national expedition that took place hundreds of years before the emergence of the true European nation state.²⁶² The lords of the Crusader States were also integrated into the interconnected economic world of the Middle East. That said, direct leveraging of economic power as a weapon by the western crusaders in the distant theater of Outremer remained out of reach.

The organizers and leaders of the Second Crusade followed the economic precedents of the First Crusade but also developed new, innovative methods for converting economic power into military potential. With the participation of Louis VII

²⁶⁰ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 179; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 91-97.

²⁶¹ Forey, "The Failure of the Siege of Damascus in 1148," 418-419.

²⁶² Blaydes and Paik, "The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation," 2-4; Gilbert, "Machiavelli," 13-16.

and Conrad III came the first chance for a western king to leverage his economic power in support of a papally-sanctioned crusade. The twelfth century saw gradual movement back toward greater centralization of power and resources, and the efforts of both Louis VII and Conrad III to subsidize their armies were a testament to that growth.²⁶³ Louis levied a general tax of his subjects, the first such attempt for a crusade, and an unusual one for the time, at that. French royal power by no means guaranteed compliance in such a widespread taxation effort.²⁶⁴ Louis's other fundraising attempts, such as his request for funds from Abbot Macharius and his frequent orders for additional funds from Abbot Suger, testify to the apparent lackluster results of his general tax.²⁶⁵

Louis was also able to tap the resources of the Templars. The prominent and rising military religious order held assets, lands, and revenue-collection rights all over Europe by the time of Second Crusade. More importantly, due to the noncontiguous nature of their holdings, they maintained an organizational and architectural aspect of economic power that was unique to their order at the time. This feature proved critical to Louis's involvement in the crusade, as evidenced by the Templar loan he secured through Everard de Barres in the spring of 1148.²⁶⁶ That organizational structure gave the Templars the immediacy of economic power that Louis required when he reached the

²⁶³ Abels, "The Historiography of a Construct," 1017-1018.

²⁶⁴ France, *Western Warfare*, 42.

²⁶⁵ Blaydes and Paik, "The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation," 8-9; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 106-107.

²⁶⁶ Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 67-68; Nicholson, *The Knights Templar*, 182-192.

Levant. While illustrating the important capability of the Templar order, this event also highlights the limits of royal economic power, and the continued need for others to share the immense cost.

The greater weight of crusade financing still fell on individual magnates and knights. Their primary financing method for the expedition was the sale of land and other personal assets. In the twelfth century, land ownership translated easily into wealth, and thus could be transferred to eager parties looking to increase both their standing and perpetual income. Many other types of revenue-earning properties were also liquidated. These mostly took the form of assets that could convert raw sustenance potential into actual usable products, such as grain mills and vineyards. While these were obviously useful for the maintenance of one's own estate, they could also function as cash-earning commodities—less fortunate neighbors paying fees to use them. Besides outright sales of land and property, collateral-based mortgage and leasing were also viable options. Significantly, papal-granted crusader privileges also expanded in 1145, to remove customary restrictions on the sale of these assets, thereby streamlining the economic power available to crusade leaders.²⁶⁷

Aside from these traditional features, the crusade showcased other examples of economic power. The Lisbon crusaders frequently centered their decisions on the best operational course of action around the issue of booty as a financing method. The sack of Lisbon itself most clearly offered this potential. Yet all of the western examples cited to this point deal essentially with using economic power to project military power. In

²⁶⁷ Blaydes and Paik, “The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation,” 7-8.

contrast, Manuel Komnenos displayed a masterful ability to directly leverage the economic power of his empire against a foreign entity to achieve his strategic goals. When Louis and Conrad failed to satisfactorily conform to Manuel's diplomatic requests, he frequently withheld or threatened to withhold supplies and logistical arrangements. As France cogently asserts, "Logistical support was clearly a key weapon in the Byzantine armoury."²⁶⁸ Such a weaponized economic instrument was simply not on the table for the western crusaders.

A Complex Failure

The crusaders' diplomatic, logistical, intelligence, and informational constraints created a dependency on Byzantine cooperation. A series of external factors as well as crusader failures then put the expedition at odds with the Greeks' complex security interests. So, the overall failure of the crusade started in the tangled web of Byzantine relations. The crusaders did at least start out with the benefit of open diplomatic lines with Manuel. This factor was a clear advantage over the alternative scenario of neutral or hostile initial diplomatic relations—a scenario, for instance, that Conrad faced with Geza II.²⁶⁹

As seen above, Louis and Conrad had exhibited tremendous foresight and planning in relation to the success of their march. They were even clearly conscious of the immediate impacts of their troops' behavior within Byzantine lands. For example,

²⁶⁸ France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 80-81.

²⁶⁹ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 132-133.

Louis hanged a Flemish troublemaker before the walls of Constantinople.²⁷⁰ Louis also had the situational understanding to avoid a Sicilian partnership in the crusade, likely because he understood the hostile relations between Eugenius, Conrad, and Manuel on the one side, and Roger II of Sicily on the other.²⁷¹ It is unknown whether Roger was willing or able to transport Louis's entire army to Palestine, or if the Sicilian had a more limited role in mind. Either way, Louis judiciously ruled out the Sicilian option, and this diplomatic constraint resulted in his collision course with later Byzantine woes. In fact, Sicily's proven strength in naval projection highlights how large of a constraint Louis was placing on himself by rejecting Roger's support for the sake of diplomacy.²⁷² On Conrad's part, there was seemingly never another option besides the Byzantine route, his recent alliance with Manuel likely narrowing his already limited options.

Yet despite these early displays of good insight, the crusaders' ability to deal effectively with Manuel began to derail. A foundational issue was the presence of unrealized ideological differences that resulted in degraded communication between the western crusaders and the Byzantines. The crusader kings failed to understand the perceptions of their actions from the Byzantine perspective, along with the political realities of the Empire. Sicily again featured here. Once Roger began his independent attacks on the Empire's western flanks, crusader diplomacy with Manuel appears devoid

²⁷⁰ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 72-77.

²⁷¹ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 115-117.

²⁷² Pryor, *The Age of the Dromon*, 106-107 highlights the strong naval projection capabilities that Sicily did indeed have during this period.

of any acknowledgment of how Sicilian actions might affect their standing in Byzantine perceptions.²⁷³

As previously established, protection of Constantinople was the paramount Byzantine security imperative. That, along with the Byzantine premium on the emperor's prestige of title, was Manuel's ideological constraint that likely drove his actions.²⁷⁴ Those preoccupations became the centerpiece of conflict with the crusaders' interests. Yet there is little record of any sort of proactive messaging in the course of French or German diplomacy, to reassure Manuel of their intentions as they approached Constantinople. Louis dispatched Bishop Alvisus to Constantinople well in advance of the main army, but there is no indication of what his purpose was.²⁷⁵ If the pattern of Worms and Regensburg held true, his most likely mission was to negotiate the finer details of fair market provisions, and potentially, coordinate for a means of crossing the Bosphorus. Manuel even advocated to both the Germans and French for taking a route and crossing that would bypass Constantinople to the south, which, presumably, would have allayed some of his fears and suspicion. This plea was summarily ignored.²⁷⁶ The focus of the kings seems to have been solely on responding to immediate tensions over supply problems, and Manuel's frequent demands for adherence to his terms. Such a focus came at the expense of understanding the broader security interests behind those demands.

²⁷³ Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 94-95.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, XVII, 79-82.

²⁷⁵ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 29.

²⁷⁶ France, "Logistics and the Second Crusade," 80-81; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 29, 57; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 187.

Besides the Sicilian invasion that coincided with the crusaders' arrival, and its effect on the paradigm Byzantine policy of protection of Constantinople, additional strategic complexities also shaped Manuel's calculus. There was the long Byzantine memory of the abrasiveness of the First Crusade.²⁷⁷ Also, Manuel had just entered a twelve-year truce with the Anatolian Sultanate of Rum as of 1147, which may have also constituted a diplomatic constraint for him, not wanting to endanger the peace on his Anatolian border.²⁷⁸ Adding a further complexity, thus far the Crusader States had mostly degraded or resisted Byzantine power in Syria, rather than supporting or restoring it. Ostensibly, a successful Second Crusade would greatly strengthen the power of the Crusader States, and expand their zone of influence toward Byzantium.²⁷⁹ A final reality of Byzantine dynamics that was misunderstood by the crusader kings was the porous nature of imperial control in its western Anatolian holdings.²⁸⁰ Unless one assumes a wholesale policy of deliberate subversion on Manuel's part, mixed imperial control in Anatolia provides the best explanation for the crusaders' experience of increased local populace hostility and decreasing logistical cooperation the further they marched from Constantinople.²⁸¹

²⁷⁷ France, *Victory in the East*, 108-121; Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 34-36.

²⁷⁸ Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 99-100.

²⁷⁹ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 127; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 14-15; 207-208.

²⁸⁰ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 178, 197.

²⁸¹ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 102-106, 132-141.

Once Louis and Conrad were committed to travelling through Byzantium, their inherent reliance on Byzantine logistics and intelligence became a tremendous liability of their military power. The western forces' logistical dependence on the Byzantines led to many of the spiraling local conflicts—the crusaders finding it difficult to control their large armies' immediate recourse to pillaging, when Byzantine markets were deemed unacceptable.²⁸² These logistics-related conflicts came to a head during the tense crusader staging operations around Constantinople.²⁸³ The crusaders' reliance on Byzantine intelligence produced the final constraint to their military power. Whether intentionally subversive, apathetically negligent, or simply incompetent, the Greek guides failed to paint an accurate picture of the complex situation in the frontier zones of Anatolia. This lack of situational understanding resulted in both the logistical strains previously described for both crusader hosts in Anatolia, as well as the Turks' ability to seize and maintain tactical surprise and initiative.²⁸⁴

²⁸² Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 188, 193-194, 196-197.

²⁸³ Berry “The Second Crusade,” 486. In an intriguing demonstration of the timelessness of logistical concerns in force projection, modern US Army doctrine echoes similar challenges of converging logistical and diplomatic constraints to those the crusaders faced at Constantinople. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 2015), 4-3 states, “Major differences in logistics doctrine, mobility, resources, interoperability, culture, and language create problems in coordinating the use of highways, rail lines, seaports, inland waterways, and airfields, as well as providing support and services for multinational RSOI operations. Considerable planning is required to integrate multinational forces requirements for ship berthing and unloading facilities, port staging space, transportation, and labor which are critical elements of RSOI [Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration]”.

²⁸⁴ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 91-97. Though the failure at Dorylaeum and the subsequent fighting retreat can also be attributed to poor German reconnaissance. The argument here is that they seemingly relied too heavily on Byzantine

Prior to the crusaders' arrival in Anatolia, the dynamics of their converging diplomatic, military, and informational constraints had driven them to the overland route, and triggered Greek animosity because of complex Byzantine security interests. In such an intricate web of relationships, threats, priorities, cultural ideologies, and mass human mobilization, it is difficult to envisage a scenario in which either party could have navigated to a different outcome. However, once in Seljuk Anatolia, the crusaders may have missed the opportunity to retake the initiative.

The example of both the First and Third Crusades suggests that the difference between success and failure in land-based penetration of Anatolia was military initiative against enemy cities along the route.²⁸⁵ Engaging a Seljuk town early on in their march, on their own terms, would have at least given the crusaders the possibility of getting the Turks to the negotiation table. From there, they might have increased options through greater diplomatic power, bolstered by imminent military power. Lack of military initiative resulted in no diplomatic leverage with the Turks, in contrast to the First and Third Crusaders' ability to come to terms with the Turks by seizing the military initiative, as at Nicaea in June 1097, and Iconium in 1190. In these cases, not only did such diplomatic power alleviate military pressure from the Turks, it also helped improved the supply situation. Were the Second Crusaders able to achieve similar results, it might have

support, as there is no mention of German outriders or screening elements. Their apparent surprise at the Turkish appearance on dominant terrain near Dorylaeum would also indicate a failure to employ their own forces in a reconnaissance role.

²⁸⁵ Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 367-368.

mitigated their logistical constraint of total dependence on the unpredictable Greek populace.²⁸⁶

While his intentions are unknowable, Conrad III may indeed have been planning on just such a course of action. Conrad's army of 1147 was headed for Iconium, when they were blocked along the way at Dorylaeum. In the Third Crusade, Frederick of Swabia would, in his role as Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, make it through to Iconium and captured it, thus bringing the Seljuk Sultan to terms. Given this similarity, it is entirely conceivable that Conrad had planned to take Iconium, and that, in 1190, Barbarossa simply applied yet another lesson out of his Second Crusade experience forty years earlier.

Regardless of their intentions, the Germans of 1147 never reached Iconium, and were not really allowed the opportunity to seize the military initiative against any other Seljuk town prior to that point. Both these results certainly owed to the strong Seljuk resistance at their frontier. Another contributing factor, though, was their inadequate intelligence and supplies. And these were at least partially the result of the chain of crusader-Greek conflicts triggered by the crusaders' converging constraints. Without a doubt, the kings' original diplomatic constraints to take the Byzantine—Anatolian route versus a Sicilian sea-based option had exposed them to the variables of a contested passage through Seljuk lands. The additional option of a Byzantine sea-based

²⁸⁶ France, *Western Warfare*, 209; Murray, "Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa," 367; Bachrach, "Crusader Logistics," 57-58; Odo, *De Professione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 111-115.

deployment, although clearly viable, was also ruled out, likely because of the crusaders' ideological constraints.

Despite the active Byzantine—Seljuk truce and Odo's pervasive accusations of collusion, there is no proof the Byzantine actions toward the crusade were directly coordinated with the Seljuks. While that scenario seems more plausible as a spontaneous phenomenon at the local frontier level than the official "state" policy level, even this is educated conjecture. What is clear is the Byzantine actions served to disrupt, attrit, and weaken the crusaders prior to their arrival in Seljuk territory. Regarding the First Crusade, Bachrach makes the unequivocal assertion that "The intelligence and good will of the Byzantines and the emperor's edict permitting markets to be made available were the operational essentials that made the march of the Crusaders both possible and successful."²⁸⁷ This statement provides a powerful variable when applied to the Second Crusade. The generally mixed Byzantine sentiment (at best) toward the Crusade was disastrous on an equally essential level.

All the actions and failures of the crusaders up through Anatolia were just in an effort to get to their destination theater. Once arrived they were also unable to succeed in the terminal phase of force projection—successfully employing the military instrument of power, using an appropriate range of operations, to achieve a strategically aligned objective. This failure too was the result of diplomatic, logistical, and informational constraints. The crusaders were reliant on the eastern Franks in much the same ways they

²⁸⁷ Bachrach, "Crusader Logistics," 61; For another concise summary of the effects of Byzantine diplomatic policy on the crusade, see Tyerman, *God's War*, 325-332.

had been reliant on the Byzantines. Ultimately, that reliance put them at the mercy of the eastern Franks' changing agenda, based on the complex security situation in Outremer.

Conrad and Louis had arrived at a moment of extreme geostrategic complexity for the eastern Franks. In the first half of the twelfth century, the Kingdom of Jerusalem sought to expand its influence through campaigns in every direction. To the West, enormous, long-term political and military effort saw the eventual conquest of every city on the coast of the Mediterranean except Ascalon.²⁸⁸ To the East, military and diplomatic efforts centered around Damascus. In the area that would become the Principality of Galilee, castles were built early in the 1110s in an effort to slowly constrict and then dominate Damascus's Hawran hinterland. This was always with an eye towards eventual conquest of the city itself, which, from 1124, became the real strategic priority— after a failed attempt to culminate Antioch's long efforts to seize Aleppo.²⁸⁹ Throughout the 1140s Kings Fulk and Baldwin III engaged in fluid agreements with the Muslim leaders of Damascus, their traditional enemy, in order to hedge against growing consolidation by the far stronger Zengid faction to the North and East.²⁹⁰ In fact the tense balance of power in central Syria was essentially secured by a long-running, if somewhat fluid, diplomatic understanding between Jerusalem and Damascus that was only broken the

²⁸⁸ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 563-564. Ascalon finally fell in 1153, after the Second Crusade, and therefore outside the period of context relevant in this chapter.

²⁸⁹ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 23-24; Morton, *The Field of Blood*, 154-155.

²⁹⁰ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 116-117; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 131-134; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 217-226; Tyerman, *God's War*, 330-334. The Kings of Jerusalem prior to the Second Crusade were Baldwin I, his cousin Baldwin II, Fulk (originally the Count of Anjou), then Fulk's son, Baldwin III.

year the Second Crusaders undertook their great strategic march. Oultrejordan was another eastern target for Jerusalem, likely to exert control over the lucrative trans-Egyptian commercial caravan routes.²⁹¹ In the North, Jerusalem focused on supporting the other three Crusader States through either diplomatic relations (with Jerusalem typically seeking to assert its overall leadership) or direct military support against northern threats. In 1124, Baldwin II even allied with the Arab emir Dubais against the Turkish rulers of Aleppo, during Baldwin's regency of Antioch.²⁹² Finally, the Kingdom's southern operations were directed against Fatimid Egypt, primarily defending against or attacking forces emanating from the remaining Muslim coastal foothold at Ascalon—which, by 1148 was greatly weakened by a strategic encirclement of Frankish fortresses.²⁹³

Antioch's leaders displayed enduring commitment to the same two generic fronts as Jerusalem (and the County of Tripoli). Specific to Antioch, these fronts manifested as the coastal environs of Latakia and Cilicia in the West, and Aleppo as the strategic key terrain to the East.²⁹⁴ Antioch also traces the other Crusader States in terms of aggressive expansion across a wide range of military and diplomatic activities, especially in the first

²⁹¹ Tyerman, *God's War*, 203. "Oultrejordan" was the Frankish designation for the zone just to the East of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea—also referred to as Transjordan in modern works. Along with its Edessan counterpart in the North, this was the farthest forward edge of Christendom in the east.

²⁹² Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 115-119; Tyerman, *God's War*, 205-208.

²⁹³ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 22-28; Tyerman, *God's War*, 176-182.

²⁹⁴ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 36-39.

quarter of the twelfth century. The Battle of Tel Danith in 1115 cemented Antioch's authority in Northern Syria for several years.²⁹⁵ Through 1118, the principality pushed steadily toward its prize of Aleppo, capturing many of its supporting fortresses and towns, and effecting a strategic siege that nearly saw the city's total capitulation.²⁹⁶ The Principality sat squarely at a crossroads that represented the height of geopolitical complexity for the entire region. Byzantine designs on Antioch and Cilicia (which was also contested by local Armenian lords) perpetually plagued the Principality.²⁹⁷

Unsurprisingly, the Northern Crusader States' geo-political conditions also produced an extraordinarily pragmatic policy on diplomatic and military alliances. Tel Danith saw them aligned with Il-Ghazi of Mardin against the Seljuks of Baghdad, just four years before Il-Ghazi annihilated the Antiochene army at the Field of Blood in 1119. In relation to the Byzantine Empire, the principality easily vacillated many times throughout its history, between diplomatic subservience and partnership, and hostile military action.²⁹⁸ That particular dynamic for Antioch factored heavily into the last years before the Second Crusade arrived. The height of Byzantine pressure also coincided with

²⁹⁵ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 109; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 39, 90; Tyerman, *God's War*, 190-192.

²⁹⁶ Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, 24.

²⁹⁷ Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 76-82; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 36-43; Tyerman, *God's War*, 189-190.

²⁹⁸ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 36, 43; Morton, *The Field of Blood*, 66-69; Tyerman, *God's War*, 191-192.

the alarming rise of the powerful Turkish atabeg, Zengi, who had seized power in Aleppo during Antioch's recovery years following the Field of Blood.²⁹⁹

The “inside force” of the Crusader States held a wealth of informational power through their intimate intelligence on the complexities of Outremer, which gave them considerable leverage in diplomatic power. The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Principality of Antioch are known to have sent the initial call for help to the pope, after the fall of Edessa.³⁰⁰ The crusader kings' sojourn in Antioch and Jerusalem demonstrate that these two Crusader States had firm expectations for partnership with the western armies.³⁰¹ There were obvious advantages to having strong diplomatic relations with the Frankish rulers already established inside the Crusade's destination theater.

To these rulers, the coalition campaign was not about opening a new theater or starting a new war. It was an opportunity to target a high value, and previously out-of-reach, objective that best aligned with their active strategy in an ongoing conflict.³⁰² The eastern Frankish rulers were best in position to determine what the objective of a

²⁹⁹ Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, 24-35; Morton, *Field of Blood*, 160-161.

³⁰⁰ USMC, EABO, 5, 39-40; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 38; Kohler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 155 assume the initial messages came from “northern Syria”—presumably they refer to Antioch and Edessa.

³⁰¹ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 112; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 207-209.

³⁰² Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 67-69. This statement, although a generalization of two states with independent agendas, holds true even though Antioch and Jerusalem had two different objectives in mind. Both Aleppo and Damascus were part of the general contemporary Outremer focus on what Tibble calls “the hinterland strategy.”

coalition campaign should be. That position came, not just from their regional military power and intelligence, but from their established diplomatic power and their knowledge of the political dynamics within the OE. The Crusader States were thoroughly integrated in the diplomatic world of the Muslim city-states around them—Jerusalem having only recently broken a long-standing alliance with Damascus in the spring of 1147.³⁰³

Such a partnership provided the western crusader kings with the potential for a marked increase of diplomatic power in their Holy Land operations. Louis and Conrad were at a disadvantage when it came to the inner workings of the complex power scene in the Levant. In Baldwin III and the other lords of Outremer, the western kings gained partners with an understanding of the fluid political culture among the Latins and Muslims, and with shared interests in a Christian Holy Land.³⁰⁴ On top of these subtle diplomatic and informational power dynamics was the crusaders' inevitable reliance on the Crusader States for logistics. Literally thousands of miles from home, the fractured and cobbled western contingents had little ability to remain self-sustaining, particularly for any sort of military campaign. Conrad apparently had to raise more troops from the

³⁰³ Berry, "the Second Crusade," 507; Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 132-133, 150, 152-155.

³⁰⁴ France, *Western Warfare*, 207-208; Yvonne Friedman, "Gestures of Conciliation: Peacemaking Endeavors in the Latin East," in *In laudem Hierosolymitani: Studies in Crusades and Medieval Culture in Honour of Benjamin Z. Kedar*, eds. Iris Shagrir, Roni Ellenblum, and Jonathan Riley-Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 31-48; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 114.

local Frankish (and possibly indigenous) population.³⁰⁵ Louis VII relied on Everard de Barres and the Templars at Acre to fund his ongoing participation in the crusade.³⁰⁶

However, despite the symbiotic nature of the relationship on the surface, the security interests of the Crusader States were more nuanced and complex.³⁰⁷ Intra-Frankish relations went through a period of change during the late 1140's. Raymond of Antioch had recently submitted to Byzantine suzerainty, while potentially harboring an agenda of independence.³⁰⁸ Baldwin III was currently in an unspoken power struggle with his mother, Queen Melisende.³⁰⁹ The 1146 death of Zengi, and the partition of Mosul and Aleppo between his sons Sayf al-Din and Nur al-Din respectively, had changed the balance of power across Syria. Jerusalem and Damascus slid to opposing sides of that fulcrum, yet still retained open lines of communication.³¹⁰ And pervasive in

³⁰⁵ Forey, "The Failure of the Siege of Damascus in 1148," 418.

³⁰⁶ Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 67-68.

³⁰⁷ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 259.

³⁰⁸ Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, 195-201; Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 85-94; Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 150-151.

³⁰⁹ Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 151; Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, 98.

³¹⁰ Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 149-154.

the mindset of the eastern Franks was the imperative to preserve their fragile diplomatic and military power through limited liability and risk.³¹¹

The decision to throw the weight of the coalition behind the Damascus campaign fit the current operational approach of the Crusader States. For Louis VII, it conformed with his constraint to stay out of further embroilment in Greek security interests, which a joint campaign with Antioch in northern Syria would have triggered.³¹² However, they were unable to achieve a rapid breakthrough as they perhaps expected, with the added support of the western forces. Then, whether it was the threat of significant attrition by the mounting local reinforcements, simple tactical intelligence failure, the threat of an approaching Zengid relief army, or Damascene messaging and bribery, something clearly changed the eastern Franks' calculus.³¹³ And when the siege of Damascus no longer aligned with their complex security interests, their priority reoriented to one of preservation. The "inside" force's shifted agenda broke with the western crusaders' goals

³¹¹ France, *Western Warfare*, 213-214, 229; Morillo, "Battle Seeking," 24-29; Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 144-153; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 9-13.

³¹² Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, 90-98.

³¹³ In regards to the principal arguments on the abandonment of the Damascus siege: see Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 218-226, and France, *Western Warfare*, 215-216 for the argument of simple military failure, as well as Forey, "The Failure of the Siege of Damascus in 1148," 418-419, who especially emphasizes the deteriorating tactical conditions. See Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 114-121 and Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 97-98 for the explanation of eastern Frankish interference, but only based on their internal imperative to preserve their limited manpower. See Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 155-163, for eastern Frankish sabotage based on the full array of their diplomatic and military concerns.

to have an impact worthy of all their efforts since Europe.³¹⁴ At that point, the eastern Franks' diplomatic power, underpinned by their informational power and control of logistics, won out.

Even if the coalition was more united in the decisions that led to the abandonment of the siege (which is not the historical impression), the subsequent plan to attack Ascalon, and its pre-execution abandonment, are also telling. The dearth of unity and solidarity with the discarded Ascalon campaign shows unequivocally that the crusaders and the eastern Franks were no longer in alignment.³¹⁵ Conrad was the only one of the principal rulers on record to adhere to the pre-arranged muster for the Ascalon venture. His priority was clearly still to have some sort of strategic impact in the Holy Land—apparently regardless of the location, as he appears totally reliant on the Outremer Franks to identify such an objective.³¹⁶

Without attempting to answer the question of why the coalition abandoned the Ascalon objective shortly after planning it, one thing is safe to say.³¹⁷ There was open

³¹⁴ Forey, "The Failure of the Siege of Damascus in 1148," 419; Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 98.

³¹⁵ Berry, "The Second Crusade," 510.

³¹⁶ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 226-227.

³¹⁷ The most straightforward answer to this question is probably that the intense hostility that arose over Damascus had fractured intra-coalition relations so badly that the vast majority were simply not willing to work together again. This is Berry's point of view. See, Berry, "The Second Crusade," 510. Phillips suggests that it was a combination of shaken Christian confidence, intra-coalition conflict, and inadequate naval assets for a blockade. See Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 226. An alternative explanation is that the eastern Franks (primarily Baldwin III and his court) felt that the threat to their eastern flanks was, at the moment, too great to embroil themselves in a lengthy siege on the coast. Such a perception would require them to keep their forces unengaged, to be able to

disparity between the complex security interests of the eastern Franks, and the crusader goals for strategic impact.³¹⁸ When these conflicts of interest were exposed, the crusaders' diplomatic, informational, and logistical reliance on their allies again became a critically constraining liability, and resulted in their final, and frustrated, return to the West.

The failure of the Second Crusade to achieve any strategic impact therefore had its roots in many overwhelmingly complex factors. The heart of the failure was the expedition's reliance on partners whose complex security interests became incompatible with the crusaders' agenda. The western kings' diplomatic, logistical, and informational constraints set them on a collision course with those partners, and with the conflicts of interest that undid their best efforts.

respond to an eastern threat, at least until the diplomatic balance of power could be restored with Damascus.

³¹⁸ For the most thorough analysis of the dynamics of Outremer policies during this time, and their divergences from western crusader priorities, see Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 159-165.

CHAPTER 5

POWER PROJECTION AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR THROUGH THE SECOND CRUSADE

The Lord has bent his bow, and made it ready; he has also prepared for him the instruments of death.

—Psalm 7 vv. 12-13, quoted in Ricardus, *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*

Context and Introduction

Power projection is inherently part of the strategic discourse for states with intercontinental objectives. Twelfth century crusading warfare was certainly no exception. Yet any discussion of strategy in medieval warfare requires clear definitions, as the complexities of medieval society often drove actions that come across to modern analysts as random, and lacking in any sort of strategic planning. Yet, no matter how diverted, random, or incompetently pursued a strategy becomes, every endeavor has some original objective in mind. This remains true even if that goal can only be extrapolated as a generalization from layers of conflicting agendas, confused actions, course of action changes, and failure to achieve decisive results.³¹⁹

Power projection is also inseparable from the operational level of war, where the military instrument of power is *applied* (in concert with the other instruments). The previous chapter's discussion on the military instrument of power dealt mainly with force *projection* in one complete crusade. This chapter presents a survey of force *employment* in the context of power projection and the operational level of war, across the first half of

³¹⁹ Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 8-9.

the twelfth century. Power projection in any age—including the twelfth century—is not solely concerned with deploying a force to a given theater. Because the broader goal of power projection is to use the instruments of power to achieve strategic ends, the success or failure of the military instrument to accomplish the state’s given objectives must also be analyzed, to measure its effectiveness as a projection tool. Examination of this terminal sphere of power projection must focus on the objectives the crusaders chose, how those objectives were aligned with their strategic *ends*, and the military operations they selected (*ways*), to achieve the desired effect, using an available range of capabilities (*means*).³²⁰ This framing exemplifies the key elements of the modern construct of the operational level of war, and how it is inextricably linked to power projection.³²¹

There is a common misconception among modern military theorists that the operational level of war somehow did not exist prior to the advent of the Napoleonic or Industrial military revolution.³²² However, this chapter highlights many instances in twelfth century crusading warfare where commanders demonstrated a clear cognitive ability to bridge the strategic and the tactical, and “organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.”³²³

³²⁰ JCS, JP 3-0, II-4 - II-5.

³²¹ See *Ibid.*, I-4 - I-5 for the most salient and succinct description of ends, ways, and means, and their connection to the instruments of power, operational design, and the range of military operations. On the links between these concepts JCS, JP 1, I-1, I-12 is also instructive. JCS, JP 3-0, V-4 continues the line of logic for the military instrument, resulting in the Range of Military Operations.

³²² Chad Buckel, “A New Look at Operational Art: How We View War Dictates How We Fight It,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 100, no. 1 (January 2021): 95.

³²³ JCS, JP 3-0 GL-14. This clause is part of the definition of operational art.

The retrospective nature of this synthesis is key as a baseline understanding. Even given the above assertions about a clear operational approach, this thesis recognizes that the Crusader States, and often the Western crusading expeditions, were frequently characterized by competing—rather than unifying—sets of interests.³²⁴ The analysis offered here, therefore, is broad, to show a unity of effort over time. It is a generalization based on hindsight, not a reflection of a contemporarily articulated theory.³²⁵ Nonetheless, the evidence of action reveals long-term priorities as well as methods that lead to the conclusion that twelfth century crusading warfare demonstrates both cognitive and material capabilities in strategic power projection and the operational level of military-power employment.

Range of Military Operations

The Crusader States

First, naval actions comprise a rich dataset to demonstrate the range of Crusader State operations during the twelfth century. Due to the geostrategic context of the Latin States, naval operations were a staple feature of their existence. France goes so far as to

³²⁴ For a summary on that reality of crusader warfare, see Tyerman, *God's War*, 200. Also, no Latin manuals or guiding documents such as the Byzantine *Strategikon* or *Taktikon* survive from crusading warfare, with the exception of *The Rule of the Templars*, which is inherently inward-focused. Crusader rulers' lack of records on warfare theory also precludes certainty on their strategic consciousness.

³²⁵ Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 9 describes this as “deconstructing the actions that took place on the ground, [in order to] arrive at a far more realistic assessment of what was actually intended . . . And . . . working back from that, we can examine the patterns of real behaviour as they played out over time, and deduce . . . the broad lines of strategic thinking that underpinned military and political activity.”

assert that “maritime supremacy was the very condition of survival for the newly established western enclaves.”³²⁶

Naval operations—in particular, close blockades—abound in the twelfth century history of the Crusader States, especially in the first decade, when the majority of the Levant coastal cities were still under Fatimid Egyptian control. The Italian City States proved invaluable in more of these operations than not. A joint Genoese-Frankish-Jerusalemite force captured Arsuf with a short siege in April 1101. In 1103, King Baldwin I of Jerusalem besieged the port of Acre with his full army, supported by a rare organic-Frankish ad hoc squadron running the naval blockade. This scenario perhaps speaks to the superior quality of Italian fleets, as the siege was abandoned until the following year when another Genoese fleet enabled the city’s capture. In the North, a Pisan-Antiochene force besieged and took Byzantine Latakia by land and sea in 1108.³²⁷ Both the Genoese and Pisans provided naval support during the seizure of the long-besieged town of Tripoli in 1109, followed by Beirut and Sidon in 1110. 1124 saw the key port of Tyre fall to another land and sea blockade—this time by the ground forces of Jerusalem and a major Venetian fleet.³²⁸ That same Venetian fleet of 1123-1124 also

³²⁶ John France, “Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century,” in *Medieval Warfare 1000—1300*, ed. John France (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 454.

³²⁷ Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 39-47.

³²⁸ Pryor, *The Age of the Dromon*, 106. Though the siege of Acre during 1189-1191 represents the most climactic example of Crusader State naval close blockade in the twelfth century, its dates fall outside the period of consideration for this study. On the seminal work for Acre, see John D. Hosler, *The Siege of Acre 1189—1191: Saladin, Richard the Lionheart, and the Battle that Decided the Third Crusade* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 2-6.

demonstrated a twelfth century version of naval surface warfare, decisively destroying a Fatimid fleet off the coast of Ascalon.³²⁹

Within the land domain, the Latin States boasted a broad range of operational options. Prominent among these was the siege. The First Crusade's Antioch campaign, from October 1097 to June 1098, was one of the great sieges of the late eleventh century and would not be replicated in scale or importance in Outremer until far into the twelfth century. Jerusalem itself was won by assault after a brief siege in 1099.³³⁰ Nearly all the naval operations listed above were executed in support of the siege of some littoral town or city.

Some sieges targeted cities so valuable and well-defended that they required serious investment of blood and treasure for years. The siege of Tripoli lasted from 1102—1109. Antioch's multi-year campaign to isolate Aleppo by capturing its supporting satellite towns began as early as 1110. The decades-long strategic effort was only abandoned after two failed close sieges in 1124—25 and 1138.³³¹ Ascalon fell after nearly two decades of ground isolation, effected by a set of dedicated Frankish siege

³²⁹ Rose, *Medieval Naval Warfare*, 36-37; On the role of modern surface warfare in sea control—one of four essential functions of the US Navy—see USMC, USN, and USCG, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. 2015, 22.

³³⁰ For the seminal work on both of these campaigns, see France, *Victory in the East*, 196-355.

³³¹ Buck, *The Principality of Antioch*, 24; Morton, *Field of Blood*, 39-45; Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 68-76.

castles. Sieges were perhaps second only to one other type of operation in terms of frequency—the raid.³³²

Raids were a ubiquitous recourse of twelfth century warfare in general. Outremer, with its fractious ethno-political landscape, fluid frontier zones, and semi-independent lordships, was no exception to the raiding paradigm. Raids served a multitude of mutually supporting purposes, while exposing their sponsor to less risk than full scale battle. Raiders could destroy or seize an enemy's crops in the field or in the storehouse, thereby undermining the foe's economic base, while simultaneously self-sustaining the raid force, and retrieving foodstuffs and other booty for the raiders' own coffers or storehouses. Mounted raiding parties were also difficult to intercept, resulting in a sort of informational power—undercutting the legitimacy of the enemy ruler's ability to protect and secure his lands, and projecting an intimidation factor among the hostile civilian populace.³³³

Particularly because of the Levant's areas of greater barrenness and logistical inhospitableness relative to western Europe, the fast moving, far-ranging mounted raid became an even more necessary staple of crusading warfare.³³⁴ Hugh, the lord of Tiberias, was killed on a resource-driven raid in 1106. In the first decade of the twelfth

³³² Morton, *Field of Blood*, 35; Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 121-138.

³³³ France, *Western Warfare*, 9-13; Clifford J. Rogers, "The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare'," in *Journal of Medieval Military History*, vol. 1, eds. Bernard S. Bachrach, Kelly DeVries, and Clifford J. Rogers (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2002), 5-9; Morillo, "Battle Seeking," 23-25.

³³⁴ France "Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century," 458-459.

century, the Kingdom of Jerusalem and Damascus exchanged frequent raids into each other's territory.³³⁵ King Baldwin I died *en route* to Jerusalem from a raid into the Fatimid Nile region in 1118.³³⁶ Morton sees a distinctive propensity in Edessan operations for longer-range raids, and a less restrictive operational reach, relative to the other Crusader States.³³⁷

Beyond raid operations, the Outremer Franks had recourse to other, more specialized types of actions short of larger-scale combat. In 1124, Baldwin II's support of and alliance with Arab emir Dubais ibn Sadaqa, and deposed Aleppan ruler Prince Sultanshah, could be described as a support-to-insurgency operation against Aleppo.³³⁸ There were also examples of *fait accompli* operations as well. As we have seen, whether by land or sea, generating, moving, and sustaining an army represented a tremendous investment of economic and political capital, just as it does today. Therefore, crusading warfare produced incidents where combatants seized territory by exploiting moments of adversary weakness or diversion, or by gambling on the adversary's unwillingness to pay the cost of large-scale power projection to respond. Latakia offers a prime example. The Byzantine port had been captured by Tancred, the regent of Antioch in 1102. In 1104, the Byzantines retook the port, taking advantage of Antioch's inability to respond after the

³³⁵ Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 83.

³³⁶ Tyerman, *God's War*, 203.

³³⁷ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 44-45.

³³⁸ Köhler and Hirschler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East*, 115-119; Morton, *Field of Blood*, 136-144; Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 68-74.

battle of Harran. In 1108, Tancred replicated the same strategic move, using his Pisan allies to take the port back—even before the Byzantine navy could respond from their strong nearby base at Cyprus.

The show of force was another operational tool in the Crusader State “kit-bag.” Especially in their highly vulnerable early years in Outremer, this approach allowed Frankish leaders to ride their seemingly unstoppable aura, and collect tribute from areas or cities that were not explicitly under their control. Antioch again features here. In April 1101, Tancred undertook a brief expedition through the neighboring Cilician lands as “a forcible restatement of his authority backed by military force rather than a straightforward military reconquest (which would have taken far longer).”³³⁹ Several of the siege castles had the same effect on the cities for whose isolation and intimidation they were built.³⁴⁰

The Crusader States also produced instances of twelfth century special operations. Espionage seems to have been a given between the various factions. Hillenbrand assumes that both Franks and Muslims employed spy networks.³⁴¹

Another clear example of a special operation comes from the County of Edessa in 1123. After Artuqid Turks captured Joscelin Count of Edessa, King Baldwin II of Jerusalem launched a campaign to the North to secure Joscelin’s release. Baldwin, in

³³⁹ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 37.

³⁴⁰ See the examples of Tripoli, Tyre, and Ascalon in Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 53-57, 126-132.

³⁴¹ Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 548-549. See also Pryor, *The Age of the Dromon*, 393-394.

turn, was taken unawares by an ambush, and likewise captured. The Turks then moved him to Kharput, a castle deep inside Turkish highland territory, where Joscelin was already imprisoned. A platoon-sized element of Armenian-Edessan troops undertook an operation to infiltrate Turkish territory some 150 kilometers from the Edessan frontier, seize the castle by deception, and rescue the king. This operation ultimately resulted in failure, as the Turks eventually stormed the castle before a relief army could arrive to rescue the beleaguered rescue force. Once the prison was again in Turkish hands, they spared only King Baldwin along with “two other valuable hostages.”³⁴² A striking feature of the incident is its apparent confirmation of an Edessan (or perhaps Armenian) martial mindset of deep raiding.³⁴³ The audacity, reach, and politically strategic importance of this operation frame it as a lean form of limited-scale military power projection.³⁴⁴

Crusader State warfare also had its share of large-scale combat operations. In fact, large-scale combat readiness was generally a required distinctive of crusading warfare, relative to its European counterpart.³⁴⁵ The 1119 Battle of the Field of Blood was a prominent example of large-scale, decisive battle. The Turks, under the Artuquid

³⁴² Nicholson, “The Growth of the Latin States,” 419-420; Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 80-81.

³⁴³ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 44.

³⁴⁴ Modern Joint doctrine uses the term “personnel recovery” as the parent category for a rescue operation. JP 3-0 lists personnel recovery under the broader category of crisis response and limited contingency operations. JCS, JP 3-0, VII-1 - VII-3.

³⁴⁵ France, “Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century,” 60-62; France, *Western Warfare*, 13-15; Morillo, “Battle Seeking,” 25-41.

warlord-governor Ilghazi of Mardin, numbered at least around 20,000; opposing them was the Antiochene army under Prince Roger, numbering around 10,000. This was a battle that represented the higher end of resources, commitment, and risk, and illustrates the magnitude of the latter: the Turks decimated the Frankish army; most of the leaders, including Roger of Antioch, were killed; Antioch was severely crippled, and its long-cultivated geo-strategic prize of Aleppo became hopelessly out of reach.³⁴⁶

The armies of the Crusader States, therefore, applied a wide range of operations to different types of situations. Given their endemic lack of manpower relative to their enemies, they had to scale their “ways” to operate within their “means.” Only in the most extreme points in their history were they able to increase their options dramatically, through the projection of major Western coalition armies into their theater.

Western Crusading Actions

Naval operations also figured prominently in western crusades sanctioned by Rome. Intriguingly, the 1097—1098 siege of Antioch, though not centered on a port city, was a flash point in this respect. In November 1097, a Genoese fleet reinforced the First Crusaders through Antioch’s maritime outlet of St. Symeon.³⁴⁷ A squadron of northern crusaders had seized the ports of Latakia and St. Symeon to serve as inbound support nodes, where they could transfer vital supplies upriver to Antioch.³⁴⁸ Another fleet would

³⁴⁶ Morton, *Field of Blood*, 102-116.

³⁴⁷ Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 35.

³⁴⁸ Bernard S. Bachrach, “Some Observations on the Role of the Byzantine Navy in the Success of the First Crusade,” in *Journal of Medieval Military History*, vol. 1, eds.

provide similar sea-based logistics months later—through the port of Jaffa, traveling overland to the besiegers of Jerusalem.³⁴⁹

Naval support saw roles during both the Iberian and Baltic campaigns associated with the Second Crusade. The Danish contingent of the Wendish Crusade coalition conducted a shallow riverine infiltration and amphibious landing in the opening phase of the 1147 attack on Dobin. Though an early Wendish counterattack foiled this effort, the landing force appears to have been part of a double envelopment plan in concert with the land-based Saxon force.³⁵⁰ The entire crusader contingent involved in the siege of Lisbon in 1147 was transported entirely by sea. The ships then performed the critical function of close blockade, completing the multi-domain isolation of the city.³⁵¹ For the initial assault on Almeria in that same year, the Genoese flawlessly executed an elaborate amphibious demonstration landing. The operation succeeded in drawing out, encircling, and destroying a sizeable portion of the city's garrison, thereby undoubtedly hastening its capture in October.³⁵²

Bernard S. Bachrach, Kelly DeVries, and Clifford J. Rogers (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2002), 90.

³⁴⁹ Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 35.

³⁵⁰ Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 54; Tyerman, *God's War*, 306.

³⁵¹ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 125-131, 137-139.

³⁵² Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 258-260; See Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-02, *Amphibious Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 4, 2019; validated on January 21, 2021), II-6 – II-8, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_02.pdf?ver=2019-01-25-123300-223, for a description of amphibious demonstration.

On land, the fighting march became an important capability for western crusading armies. The maneuver featured protective infantry boxes or screens (depending on the terrain) around the cavalry and sustainment elements, all arrayed in a long, convoy-like formation that could quickly pivot into a workable battle line. The heavier infantry—with spears and shields, posted around the front ranks—supported by dismounted archers and crossbowmen, could fend off enemy cavalry sorties. This “walking wall” protected the “soft” elements, while also preserving the combat power of the decisive cavalry arm, allowing the commander the flexibility to order a decisive cavalry counterattack.³⁵³ In 1147, Evrard de Barres, the Templar Master, organized the French army of the Second Crusade into a fighting march, to ensure its survival during a grueling, twelve-day march following a disastrous defeat at Mt. Cadmus.³⁵⁴ These fighting marches were focused on movement, not necessarily combat, and their ability to move a force to a new, more threatening position, while under attack, could cause an enemy to reposition or even withdraw. These examples represented repositioning of large forces to threaten a major strategic objective, or to project a force into theater. Louis VII’s fraught march from Cadmus to Adalia became a contested strategic movement, as the army plowed its way through to the seaport by which it would embark for the Levant theater.

³⁵³ France, “Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century,” 60-61.

³⁵⁴ Marvin, “Medieval and Modern C2,” 167-168; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 125-129.

Complexity and Innovation: Power Projection Enablers and Challenges,
and the Operational Level of War

The practitioners of twelfth century warfare faced a complex environment in which to project the military instruments of power beyond their own frontiers. Crusading warfare (at least in the East) took that complexity to the extreme, as it comprised by far the most distant and asymmetric theaters of war. Many features of the age complicated projection issues for any “state” with international ambitions. Some features, both human and geographic, were rapidly evolving enablers of strategic power projection. However, many times, even these enablers themselves became part of the force *employment* aspect of projection, requiring increasingly sophisticated application of military operations to secure the necessary lines of communication or sustainment nodes that could support a campaign. The increased complexity forced an intuitive understanding of the zone in which power projection overlapped with the operational level of war—campaign and major operation planning. Anti-access / area-denial (A2/AD), and power projection architecture were both features that figured strongly into the calculus for force projection.

Anti-Access and Area-Denial Effects

Crusading power projectors had to contend with twelfth century versions of anti-access / area-denial strategies from their enemies. These enemy efforts produced both operational and strategic effects that any expeditionary force had to overcome.³⁵⁵ At the

³⁵⁵ On the meanings behind the modern term “A2/AD,” and its operational and strategic implications, see Michael Kofman, “It’s Time to Talk About A2/AD: Rethinking the Russian Military Challenge,” *War on the Rocks (blog)*, September 5, 2019, accessed January 11, 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/its-time-to-talk-about-a2-ad-rethinking-the-russian-military-challenge/>.

operational level, area-denial measures manifested in the form of port and inland-waterway denial. Strategically, the crusaders' enemies sought to prevent military access to the theater by means of forward-positioned allies, who could either deny access diplomatically, or through the use of military force. From the Zengid perspective, this was the effect both the Byzantines and Anatolian Seljuks had on the Second Crusaders, even though neither was likely coordinated.

Enemies achieved operational area-denial through both harbor and river chains, as well as defensive artillery. Without secure terminals in their strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the fledgling Frankish states would have been untenable. Tibble has argued that the eastern Franks were coherently aware of the strategic importance of the coastal foothold.³⁵⁶ From the Muslim perspective, not only would denial of a port block that vital terminal access for the Christians, but in the first decade of the century, the ability of the Fatimid navy to continue operating in the eastern Mediterranean also hinged on retaining their ports. Fatimid galley crews could not transport the massive volumes of food and water required for long voyages, and thus relied on secure havens at which they could resupply.³⁵⁷ Thus, when the crusaders besieged a coastal port city, the stakes transcended the tactical level of war. Therefore, the key defensive counters to Frankish assaults—anti-ship chains and counter-engine

³⁵⁶ Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 24-25, 28-32, 60-61.

³⁵⁷ Gertwagen, "Harbors and Facilities along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea Lanes to Outremer," 95-102; Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, 561-564; Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 35-38.

artillery—became part of a larger system, denying a regional foothold. In this light, such measures achieved operational-level importance.

Port sieges undertaken by the crusaders are rife with examples of the effects of defensive artillery, and the frustrating dilemma of anti-ship chains. Defensive artillery in crusader warfare was very often used to destroy high value targets supporting offensive operations, or disrupt the targets' crews. Attackers' trebuchets, siege towers, rams, and covered sap-tunnel entrances were frequent recipients of defending artillerists' strikes. The Franks in the 1124 siege of Tyre had to bring in an expert Armenian artillerist to successfully target a particularly effective traction trebuchet that was "wreaking havoc on the Frankish siege towers."³⁵⁸ Tyre was also apparently equipped with a harbor chain to prevent an amphibious incursion into the heart of the city.³⁵⁹

The operational-level impact of coastal defenses was amplified when they were located at the mouth of rivers. Rivers presented an even greater prospect to attackers—in terms of theater access—than a port with no freshwater outlet, such as Tyre or Acre. The Second Crusade demonstrated the utility of inland waterways for power projection, when both German and French contingents used the Danube to move supplies, and possibly even whole wheeled vehicles, alongside their marching main body.³⁶⁰ Navigable rivers held the potential to extend operational reach. For example, Afonso Henriques, the Portuguese ruler who recruited the sea-borne contingent of the Second Crusade, clearly

³⁵⁸ Fulton, *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades*, 100.

³⁵⁹ Gertwagen, "Harbors and Facilities along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea Lanes to Outremer," 114.

³⁶⁰ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 21-23.

valued the siting of Lisbon. The city was situated at the mouth of the Tagus river, a waterway that allowed access deep into the hinterland of Iberia. Lisbon's importance is evident in that many of the surrounding cities surrendered to Afonso after Lisbon fell.³⁶¹ Control of Lisbon could go a long way toward control of the larger Tagus valley. Although lacking an anti-ship chain, Lisbon's defensive artillery was extremely effective at striking high-value targets, and nearly caused the crusaders to despair of taking the city.³⁶²

Defensive artillery, at least that which operated in a counter-siege-engine role, could achieve an area-denial effect. In so doing, it achieved operational-level importance. The above instances reveal an artillery function that moved from the micro-tactical—simply trying to kill or attrit attacking forces—to an operational function—destroying key assets that otherwise enabled attackers to gain access to strategic sites like seaports. Such effects gave harbor and river chains the same weight of importance, denying vital fleet support to armies seeking to project far beyond the normal range of their sustainment.

Power Projection Architecture in a Contested Environment

Throughout the twelfth century, crusader forces took advantage of, and intentionally cultivated a robust power projection architecture throughout the greater Mediterranean world. Broadly, the architecture consisted of power projection platforms

³⁶¹ Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 179; Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 165, 262.

³⁶² Fulton, *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades*, 116, 360-362.

(PPPs), intermediate staging bases (ISBs), and theater footholds. To facilitate a conceptual picture of force projection flow in a logical sequence, this section surveys maritime projection platforms (ships, seaports of embarkation, and theater footholds—seaports of debarkation), ISBs, then finally, land-based PPPs (castles).

One of the principal projection platforms was the collective capability of crusader ships. Generally, ships were the vehicles on the SLOC lifeline that sustained and enabled the existence of the Crusader States.³⁶³ Modern naval doctrine highlights a truth the crusaders would have recognized intuitively: “Historically, the capability to sustain distant operations has served as a cornerstone of naval power projection.”³⁶⁴ The statement could not more accurately represent the nature of the relationship between the Crusades and Crusader States, and their naval allies. Ships also took on a more significant role as a projection platform in the twelfth century in particular, as there were major developments in naval technology during the period.³⁶⁵ Several very different types of ships developed for different roles during this century and played a part in the overall development of naval projection capability in the Mediterranean. From the lighter Byzantine *monereis* or *galeai*, used for scouting and screening, to the heavy combat ships—Latin *galiots* and Greek *dromons*—to the modified horse transport galleys known by several names, the galley was an indispensable platform.³⁶⁶ Larger, sail powered

³⁶³ Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 37.

³⁶⁴ USMC, USN, and USCG, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, 24.

³⁶⁵ Pryor, *The Age of the Dromon*, 106.

³⁶⁶ Ambroise, *The History of the Holy War: Ambroise’s Estoire De La Guerre Sainte*, eds. Marianne Ailes and Malcolm Barber, trans. Marianne Ailes (Woodbridge:

busses and *navi*, “kamikaze” fire ships, and specially modified siege-tower galleys also supported force projection in the maritime domain.³⁶⁷

Sea ports were another power projection platform. During the First Crusade, supply boats used the Orontes River as an inland waterway logistical system to transfer supplies sent from Cyprus to the crusader siege camps at Antioch. This line of communication would have been impossible without the port of St. Symeon being in friendly hands.³⁶⁸ Though this is a “receiving end” example of power projection, it illustrates the value of the well-connected port.

Given the importance of connectivity to both land and sea lines of communication, the ports that emerged as major power projection platforms in the twelfth century are not surprising. Constantinople stands out as an exquisite and long-developed port that was both strategically located and extremely well-connected to both ground and sea routes. There was enough maritime culture and resources within the city’s immediate environs, that Manuel Komnenos could quickly mass a ferry fleet to transport

Boydell Press, 2003), 47-48; Hosler, *The Siege of Acre*, 50; Pryor, *The Age of the Dromon*, 396. For a detailed analysis of ship-to-ship engagements, and their role in sea-power, see Rolf Fabricius Warming, “An Introduction to Hand-to-Hand Combat at Sea—General Characteristics and Shipborne Technologies from c. 1210 BCE to 1600 CE,” in *On War On Board: Archaeological and Historical Perspectives on Early Modern Maritime Violence and Warfare*, ed. Johan Rönby (Stockholm: Södertörns Högskola, 2020), 99-124.

³⁶⁷ On the later employment of fire ships and floating siege towers at Acre and Constantinople, see Hosler, *The Siege of Acre*, 80-82, 114, and Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 124. For the other types of ships, see Dotson, “Ship Types and Fleet Composition at Genoa and Venice in the Early Thirteenth Century,” 63-67, and Pryor, *The Age of the Dromon*, 101-122.

³⁶⁸ Bachrach, “Some Observations on the Role of the Byzantine Navy in the Success of the First Crusade,” 91.

the large armies of the Second Crusade across the Bosphorus on very short notice.³⁶⁹

Messina and the Italian maritime city-states were also major western power projecting seaports in the period. As we have seen, the sheer volume of expeditions undertaken by Genoa, Pisa, and Venice as part of crusading warfare is staggering.

Yet all the growing capability to project power from the West would have been severely undermined without adequate seaports on the receiving end securing the theater foothold. This is where the established “inside force” of the Crusader States paid dividends in the power projection architecture of crusading warfare. It is often correctly stated that the Western maritime powers were the lifeline of the Frankish states. Yet there was also a symbiotic relationship between the two entities. The Outremer coastline, in the hands of allies, provided a valuable commercial market, with privileged trade arrangements, for the supporting naval powers—Venice, Genoa, and Pisa.³⁷⁰ Blaydes and Paik even argue convincingly that the crusades deserve credit for a major role in catalyzing early development of state power in Europe, in a particularly direct way for the Italian city states.³⁷¹

Crusading warfare contains many clear examples of expeditionary forces utilizing the islands and enroute continental ports of the Mediterranean as what modern doctrine calls intermediate staging bases (ISBs). In the First Crusade, Cyprus functioned as a coalition ISB. At the time, it was owned by the Byzantine Empire, who used it to launch

³⁶⁹ Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 73-91.

³⁷⁰ Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 37.

³⁷¹ Blaydes and Paik, “The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation,” 10-11, 13.

supply shipments to the Crusaders via the ports of Palestine—notably at St. Symeon during the siege of Antioch. After the capture of Jerusalem, Cyprus was still advantageous. Despite the Fatimid fleet based out of Egypt, the Imperial naval base at Cyprus could help achieve local naval superiority in a day when galley fleets could not project far from friendly bases and freshwater resupply points. Even if the Fatimids were able to project to their farthest reach into northeastern Mediterranean waters, via their as-yet secure port at Tripoli (as their own ISB), the Byzantine fleet out of Cyprus would have an exponential advantage in terms of on-board days of supply alone, and close access to safe-haven and reinforcements.³⁷² Throughout the twelfth century, control of Cyprus as an ISB was a decisive factor for force projection.³⁷³

As a strategically located PPP, Constantinople also functioned as a land based ISB within the projection architecture of the First and Second Crusades.³⁷⁴ It was a major waypoint, a natural linkup location for converging armies, a secure (in theory) theater sustainment area, and a mode-of-transportation transfer point. The Genoese allies of Alfonso VII used Minorca as an ISB, enroute to their attack on Almeria.³⁷⁵ Portugal became an ISB for Northern-based sea-borne projection into the Mediterranean.³⁷⁶

³⁷² Bachrach, “Some Observations on the Role of the Byzantine Navy in the Success of the First Crusade,” 90-91.

³⁷³ Gertwagen, “Harbors and Facilities along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea Lanes to Outremer,” 115-118; Ricardus, *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, 178-195.

³⁷⁴ France, *Victory in the East*, 108-135; Odo, *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, 73-89.

³⁷⁵ Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, p. 252.

³⁷⁶ Pryor, “Digest,” 291; Tyerman, *God’s War*, 436-437.

The final key to twelfth century projection architecture was the castle. Castles were the primary land-based power projection platform of crusading warfare. While the castle accommodated many needs and took on many roles during medieval history, the principal concern here is their role as a projection instrument.³⁷⁷

Specifically in Outremer, beyond a military function, castles provided centers and catalysts for Frankish settlement and economic infrastructure growth.³⁷⁸ They provided a secure place from which to administer governmental control of a region or locality—especially a newly conquered one. Castles projected an informational power—a psychological message—of strength, authority, security, and permanence to both friend and foe.³⁷⁹ The Antiochenes' seizure of Aleppo's surrounding fortresses had achieved this intimidation effect in the 1110's.³⁸⁰ The same concept could be applied to non-urban areas that presented lucrative targets for exploitation. A prime example was the Transjordan trade routes to Egypt, where Baldwin I rapidly established the castles at Montreal and Li Vaux Moise.³⁸¹

But the most fundamental reason for the castle's importance, both to the early consolidation phase of the Crusader States, and to their subsequent trajectory, was the

³⁷⁷ France, *Western Warfare*, 77-106 has two entire chapters succinctly describing these roles.

³⁷⁸ Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 178-181.

³⁷⁹ France, *Western Warfare*, 77-78; Hugh Kennedy, *Crusader Castles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21.

³⁸⁰ France, *Western Warfare*, 96; Morton, *Field of Blood*, 39-45, 82.

³⁸¹ Fulton, *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades*, 139-141; Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 258-265; Tyerman, *God's War*, 203.

issue of logistics. From small-scale, limited liability raiding operations to large-scale ground combat with major field armies, humans needed to be sustained. We have seen the inherent difficulties in projecting an army overland away from their home bases. Carrying the supplies required extreme expenditures and exposed the vulnerable supply trains to considerable risk.³⁸² Raiding enemy territory both solved the sustainment issue and stripped the enemy's economic resources. However, the greater the range of the raid from a secure home base, the greater the risk of defeat or destruction before they could return to safety.

Thus, pushing forward into a frontier zone with a new castle (or capturing an existing one) extended the range of a raiding force, expanding the ruler's overall operational reach.³⁸³ Aggressor castles within an enemy city's hinterland and along its major routes could achieve a limited isolation effect.³⁸⁴ More importantly, they allowed the castle garrison to execute raids and other attritional actions. Such castle-based projection gradually weakened the city over time, through the stripping of its resources and an ever-encroaching enemy encirclement.³⁸⁵ This is the point Aleppo was at just prior to the Battle of the Field of Blood in 1119, when Ilghazi's victory undercut Antioch's ability to follow through with a final, decisive seizure of total control over the

³⁸² Bachrach, "Crusader Logistics," 57-58.

³⁸³ Morton, *Field of Blood*, 99-100.

³⁸⁴ HQDA, FM 1-02.1, 1-57 defines the tactical task of isolation as "... separat[ing] a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat."

³⁸⁵ Kennedy, *Crusader Castles*, 21-62; Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles and Modern Histories*, 238-239.

city. Morton astutely contrasts the success of the “siege castles” near Ascalon with the abject failure of the 1148 siege of Damascus, which utilized no supporting castles or preparatory objectives—the nearest Frankish base being over 60 kilometers away at Banyas.³⁸⁶ Moreover, as castles were arrayed in depth throughout the Crusader States rather than a static line, their role as secure logistics magazines meant that relief armies could use them as a “projection network” to quickly march from muster to a position of advantage.³⁸⁷

So, this was not a single-threat approach to projection, deterrence, or defense, but a system of mutually supporting threats that, together, presented an attacker with a complicated series of decisions—each successive one representing escalated cost and risk. These decisions were mostly apparent well in advance, as their focal points—the castles or cities—were fixed positions. Unless conditions were already established heavily in his favor, the attacker could clearly envisage his path to defeat—a key characteristic of any strategy of deterrence.³⁸⁸ Thus, castle building, and its shallow projection approach, contributed strongly to a positional way of war for the crusaders.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁶ Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours*, 114-115.

³⁸⁷ Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles and Modern Histories*, 291; Kennedy, *Crusader Castles*, 99.

³⁸⁸ Morillo, “Battle Seeking,” 23-28; Morton, *Field of Blood*, 100.

³⁸⁹ For a succinct explanation of positional warfare and its close associations with Vegetian strategy, see Morillo, “Battle Seeking,” 36-37, R. R. Palmer. “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 1986), 91-95.

The increasing defensive power of the crusader castles beginning in the middle of the century, amplified their value as projection platforms. Their real deterrent power was in their garrisons' ability to transition into small aggressive strike forces if bypassed, and in the castles' ability to fix a besieger in place while a field army assembled.³⁹⁰ Thus, building or occupation of a new castle seized initiative in the challenge-and-response dynamic, forcing the opponent to respond, while raising the cost of that response considerably.³⁹¹

Synthesis and Conclusion: Power Projection and Operational Approach

A brief survey of crusading warfare during the first half of the twelfth century reveals robust cognitive and material capabilities in strategic power projection and the operational level of military-power employment. As one of the instruments of power available to the state, military force projection involves not only getting into a theater with the right capabilities (means), but also employing those capabilities as one of the *ways* to accomplish or enable the accomplishment of strategic and operational objectives (ends). Herein lies the overlap between power projection and the operational level of war.³⁹² To help frame operational-level warfare, modern joint doctrine provides the useful constructs of operational art, design, and approach.³⁹³

³⁹⁰ Tibble, *The Crusader Armies*, 191, 197; Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 228-238.

³⁹¹ Kennedy, *Crusader Castles*, 98, 119.

³⁹² Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2017), I-1 - I-2, IV-8.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, xxi.

To pursue their strategic objectives, crusading warfare practitioners understood how to select and innovate intelligent, tailored military solutions from a range of operations still familiar in nature to modern warfare.³⁹⁴ Even when confronted with strategic anti-access effects outside the theater and area-denial effects from defensive artillery and anti-ship chains at key foothold objectives, crusading armies developed innovative solutions to overcome or bypass these obstacles. Crusading expeditions made cogent use of their available force projection architecture, including power projection platforms on both land and sea, theater reception nodes, and ISBs.

Broadly, maintaining Latin control of the Holy Land, and growing dynastic power come across as consistently traceable end state objectives, and more mutually supporting than they might appear to modern sentiments.³⁹⁵ For the Crusader States, there were clear centers of gravity. Strategically, western manpower, as delivered by naval power, was perhaps the primary critical capability. Both the crusade expeditions from the West, and the coastal campaigns in the first decade of the century demonstrate the Latin States' conscious alignment of priorities to facilitate a ready stream of Western aid. Castles may be considered operational centers of gravity, providing another critical capability to expand power and project forces on land.

³⁹⁴ Notably, the initial reference to the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) in JP 3-0 Operations occurs in the same paragraph as the definition of the instruments of national power, establishing a firm linkage between power projection, the ROMO, and the operational level of war. See JCS, JP 3-0, x.

³⁹⁵ France also posits “the maintenance of Latin domination over the Holy Land” as the “most characteristic purpose” and “end” objective of the entire crusading enterprise—see France, *Western Warfare*, 207-208. The assertion of the secondary objective—dynastic power—also finds agreement with France’s repeated emphasis that all medieval warfare was “proprietary.” See France, *Western Warfare*, 6-7, 205-206.

Decisive points are also apparent. Seizure of the coast, particularly Tripoli and Ascalon, both ensured access to Western aid (the center of gravity) and denied the Fatimid Navy the two ports that enabled it to continue operating in the Northern and Southern coastal waters respectively.³⁹⁶ Given the amount of time and resources the Eastern Franks invested in attempting to capture the major economic centers of the littorals (Aleppo and Damascus during this period), they likely viewed ownership of such cities as also decisive to their overall strategic end state.³⁹⁷

Three broad lines of effort (LOEs) become intelligible as well: (1) Maintain & improve relations with potential partners; (2) Maintain ability to project & receive Western forces; and (3) Build regional Economic power to fund military and diplomatic power. All the military operations and campaigns surveyed here (and much of the activity from the other instruments of power) are traceable back to these enduring efforts.

Moreover, force projection capabilities from the West and the importance of the theater foothold are clear in both the Second Crusade and the coastal operations surveyed in this chapter. The third LOE—building regional economic power—is evident in the high volume of economic warfare targets. This manifested most clearly in the enduring focus on the key economic urban centers identified here as decisive points. Supporting each line of effort, one or more lines of operation (LOO) may also be discernable. For instance, “control major economic urban centers” and “dominate Egypt-Syrian trade route” might summarize sustained lines of operations that each supported the third line of

³⁹⁶ Rose, *Naval Warfare*, 38.

³⁹⁷ Morton, *Field of Blood*, 124-126; Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 68-76.

effort, “build economic power to fund military and diplomatic power.” In turn, each of those lines of operations logically linked its own set of operational objectives or milestones—for instance, Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo for the “control economic urban centers” LOO.³⁹⁸

Many other aspects of operational design are clear. An understanding of culmination is evident at the operational level, in the abandonment of many sieges that did not involve tactical defeat—notably at Damascus in 1148. Strategic culmination and branch plans (part of arranging operations) are both evident in the general shift of focus from Aleppo and Damascus to Egypt in the 1160s. Sequels (another aspect of arranging operations) were also common in the “castle encroachment” approach during multi-year strategic sieges, where castles such as Blanchegard, Bethgibelin, and Gaza functioned as offensive forward bases to set long-term conditions for follow-on seizure of the strategic target—in this case, Ascalon.³⁹⁹ The frequent counter-A2/AD fights at sieges like Tyre in 1123 allowed the besiegers to gain effective suppression for follow-on assaults—reflecting decision points. The more aggressive aspects of castle-building (and seizing) represent an exceptional commitment to extending or ensuring operational reach through strategic and operational basing.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁸ JCS, JP 5-0, IV-28 - IV-30.

³⁹⁹ JCS, JP 5-0, IV-36 states “Culmination is that point in time and/or space at which the operation can no longer maintain momentum.” See JCS, JP 5-0, IV-36 - IV-39 for arranging operations. On the “siege castles” of Ascalon, see Tibble, *The Crusader Strategy*, 127-132.

⁴⁰⁰ See JCS, JP 5-0, IV-35 - IV-36 for operational reach.

Evidence for intentional choices on approach is unmistakable. The positional warfare dominated by castles and cities, raids, sieges, and countermarches, relates to the choice between attacking an enemy's forces or functions. The prevailing choice by the practitioners of crusading warfare was to attack the enemy's functions—primarily economic—however the examples of Antioch 1097—1098 and the Field of Blood demonstrate the flexibility to transition to a focus on enemy forces.⁴⁰¹

Crusading warfare in the twelfth century demonstrated strong capabilities in power projection and the operational level of war. Though often constrained by the limitations and ideology of their time, leaders possessed clear cognitive and material capabilities to both project and employ the military instrument of power, in a logical pursuit of their objectives. The broad survey offered here illustrates both their capacity for bridging strategic objectives with tactical actions, and the modern familiarity with many features of their environment that affected power projection and the operational level of war.

⁴⁰¹ For direct and indirect approach, see JCS, JP 5-0, IV-33 - IV-34. For functions and forces, see JCS, JP 5-0, IV-39 - IV-40.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: CASTLES TO CARRIERS

Regardless of temporal context, effective strategy is always a calculated employment of force and statecraft for a political end.

—Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert,
“Reflections on Strategy in the Present and Future”

Summary and Synthesis

The twelfth century Crusader States and the western powers that supported them were power projectors. The Second Crusade of 1146-1149 saw the marshaling and propulsion of the resources of two of the major monarchies in Europe on a scale that at least equaled the First Crusade, and probably surpassed it in terms of organization and planning. While the impetus for the Crusade, the fall of Edessa, represented a clear and present danger to the Crusader States, Western ambitions ran hot with the expectations of a repeat of their forefathers' legendary deeds. Through both pragmatism and true devotion, the papal crusade sanction extended to cover two new theaters. The Iberian theater saw important successes for the ongoing war of expansion against Muslim Al Andalus. A northeastern European coalition opened a new crusading theater in the remote Baltic Sea region in the far North of the German lands.

Yet, despite the presence of two kings, a thorough information campaign to support force generation, the historical lessons of the First Crusade, more advanced naval transport capabilities, and a ready inside force within the theater, the Second Crusade was an unequivocal failure. Military reasons alone cannot explain the shocking reversal of expectations—not when both the First and Third Crusades saw successful penetrations to the Holy Land. Though twelfth century warfare demonstrated strong capabilities in power

projection and the operational level of war, the Second Crusade showed that constraints on the instruments of power, whether self-imposed or externally imposed, can prevent even powerful state coalitions from achieving their desired strategic effect. The underlying causes of failure lay in the expedition's complex geostrategic context, shaped by 50 years of precipitous history.

The forces of the First Crusade had successfully exploited extreme Muslim disunity to seize Jerusalem and many of the towns and fortresses securing their LOCs back to the West. The expedition of 1096-1099 set precedents that carried repercussions through the twelfth century. For the West, there was intoxication with a victory so profound that it appeared miraculous. The informational power of the Church was deeply strengthened by the development of such tangible and unlikely results. Many great houses of Europe had financed and led major or minor contingents on the campaign, setting in motion a powerful "family history" motivational cycle. A mythic tradition grew up around the First Crusade, establishing unassailable cognitive paradigms for all future crusades to follow.

The Byzantine Empire had provided important logistical and diplomatic aid to the First Crusade, but real and perceived hostilities on the part of both Byzantines and some of the crusaders had set the stage for an overall suspicious relationship between Constantinople and the crusading enterprise. Its relationship with the Crusader States could never be characterized as fully trusting, even when they formed coalitions to pursue mutually beneficial objectives, such as Aleppo in 1138.⁴⁰² As the twelfth century wore

⁴⁰² Morton, *Field of Blood*, 162-163; Pryor, *The Age of the Dromon*, 114-115.

on, Constantinople's strategic position at the convergence of so many frontiers produced an ever more complicated set of security interests for the Greek Emperors.

The most important legacy of the First Crusade was the Crusader States. The Eastern Franks maintained close ties to their European homeland, including many cultural traits and their concepts of the instruments of power. Yet their complex strategic environment required them to adapt their perspectives and innovate their practices to survive. European manpower was critically short. The Eastern Franks had to leverage the local resources while awaiting slow streams and episodic windfalls of Western reinforcements. Crucially, they relied on the Italian city-states for naval support. Military religious orders like the Knights Templar developed autonomously but became vital partners in the defense of the Holy Land. Frankish leaders had to be willing to work with both Arab and Turkic Muslims one day, who may very well be their enemy within a few months. The resulting political, economic, and military hybrid system meant a set of security interests unique to the complex geostrategic world of Outremer.

The body of evidence from crusading warfare across the twelfth century shows a special depth and breadth in capability. Power projection was a strong and growing enterprise, including the employment of the military instrument of power as a tool to meet strategic objectives. Still operating within the many constraints of their day—technology, disunity produced by “proprietary” warfare, and a complex, diffused power array—crusading leaders clearly demonstrated a capacity to plan and execute campaigns and major operations that aligned their limited resources with a wide, intelligent array of employment options to achieve strategic effects. Their range of military options was broad, and well-practiced. Limited warfare, with its raids, special operations, offensive

and defensive sieges, and fortification-based projection could also quickly transition into large-scale decisive combat operations. There were many tactical failures, but for the most part, a strategic and operational-level soundness prevailed, where leaders clearly aligned ends, ways, and means. A robust force projection architecture formed an essential part of the calculus of both power projection and a broad operational approach across a century of crusading warfare.

Yet, even in the middle of this century with strong projection and operational capability, the Crusade's main effort fell woefully short. The cause of failure was a series of constraints and imperatives on the Crusade leaders' instruments of power. Some were self-imposed; others were nearly impossible to avoid, given the external strategic situation. Geographic location, good diplomatic relations with Constantinople, difficulties with the Normans of Sicily, and possibly, First Crusade precedent all limited the West's designs. Despite sound diplomatic preparation, the difficulties of controlling and sustaining large armies through friendly territory produced resentment and suspicion on both Greek and Latin sides. These developments only served to awaken deeper-seated, competing ideological imperatives of sovereignty and superiority between erstwhile allies.

Once in Anatolia, military logistics and intelligence—both completely reliant on the Byzantines—proved to be critical constraints. Greek guides and local populace were unmotivated to help, and occasionally actively denied support. Whether their posture was part of imperial design or simply their own survival imperatives as members of a fluid frontier with the Seljuk Turkic enemies of the crusaders, Greek actions eroded the armies' strength, discipline, and situational awareness. These conditions proved

disastrous when the Seljuks layered them with a strategic mobile defense and shattered both crusader armies in detail. Crusader conflict with the complex Greek security interests turned key partners into coincidental, if not deliberate, inhibitors.

Losses in Anatolia produced a lack of informational power within the Levant theater of operations. Without their originally impressive strength, the Western kings simply projected a much-degraded perception of power. That degraded perception undermined the crusaders' diplomatic power relative to their Eastern Frankish counterparts. In the military instrument of power, total logistical and intelligence dependence on their "inside force" allies constrained them to the operational campaign agendas of the Eastern Franks. Here, the crusaders kings' relative disadvantage in terms of informational and diplomatic power likely allowed the nobility of Jerusalem and the military religious orders to gain easier consensus on targets like Damascus. Given the crusader kings' constraint of total reliance on their eastern allies due to the prior losses in Byzantium and Anatolia, any hope of strategic impact in the Holy Land evaporated.

Overwhelmingly complex factors therefore contributed to the failure of the Second Crusade to achieve any strategic impact. An analysis on the projection of the instruments of power in the Crusade reveals the heart of the failure was the expedition's reliance on partners whose complex security interests became incompatible with the crusaders' agenda. Whether self-imposed or externally produced, the diplomatic, informational, and military constraints of the crusader kings narrowed their options to a head-on collision of contradictory strategic priorities with those partners. In other words, it was not a lack of competence or capability that brought down the expedition of 1146-1149.

Further Research and Modern Relevance

This study has focused on the strategic and operational levels of crusading warfare in the twelfth century, with analysis of the instruments of power projection in the Second Crusade as its centerpiece. In so doing, several important research gaps have been encountered. First, two entire theaters of the Second Crusade have been sidelined here, but the Iberian and Baltic campaigns each warrants its own in-depth study in terms of instruments of power, strategic logistics (force projection), and the operational level of war. Iberia may prove especially fruitful, given the greater relative unity of effort that appears transparent in the Eastern Iberian campaigns. There is even the possibility of some level of cooperation between Afonso Henriques and Ramon Berenguer, as some of the non-Iberian Lisbon crusaders also joined the Tortosa campaign on the opposite side of the peninsula. Second, a similar study of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Crusades will no doubt yield rich fruits. Third, there is still a significant need to explore the operational level of war during the main and later crusading periods.

This thesis has applied the historical case study methodology to a period of history thoroughly undervalued by modern military theorists and practitioners. Yet the complex, competitive, geostrategic context in which the United States anticipates operating for the foreseeable future demands that military leaders and theorists glean lessons from all relevant case studies that commend themselves through similar strategic conditions. The current prevailing paradigm is to relegate all historical periods prior to Napoleon to practical irrelevance. The logic behind that paradigm, however, fails to see the continuity of the nature of warfare when the historical form of warfare differs wildly

from today.⁴⁰³ While it is true that nearly all the physical accoutrements of medieval warfare are unrecognizable in terms of utility to modern and future conflict, this thesis has focused on important similarities that are indisputable in the conceptual domain of war.

The failure of the Second Crusade to achieve strategic success despite the unique power projection capabilities of the Western—Outremer network serves as a cautionary tale to American power projection strategy. The strategic objective shortfalls of the international coalition in 1146-1149 were more a result of geostrategic conditions and constraints on the instruments of power than of leadership failures or incompetency. For any state or military, at any time in history, some of the timelessly restated, self-imposed constraints of coalitions may impose limits on strategic freedom of action, and potentially expose the state to contradictory security interests of partners who understand they hold the leverage. Such was certainly the case between the Western Kings and Byzantine Emperor Manuel I.

Moreover, considering the complexity of the modern strategic environment and its characteristic diffusion of power (two variables also characteristic of the twelfth century), allied security interests may not always align with those of the US. Further, those misalignments may be produced by changes in the ally's security interests at the most inopportune time for US concerns, as happened at Damascus in 1148.⁴⁰⁴ Modern doctrine is replete with both explicit and implicit emphasis on American reliance on allies

⁴⁰³ Craig and Gilbert, "Reflections on Strategy in the Present and Future," 863-871.

⁴⁰⁴ JCS, JP 5-0, IV-22.

for its global power projection capability.⁴⁰⁵ US adversaries and competitors understand that reliance, and may increase their attempts to target that vulnerability, in order to deny basing capabilities critical to force projection.⁴⁰⁶ Adversaries may quickly leverage the diffusion of informational power, non-state actors, or economic power, as “hybrid-power” instruments to sway critical US allies to prohibit or disrupt US projection—effectively employing “diplomatic A2/AD.”⁴⁰⁷ Deliberately or not, the Byzantines had a similar effect on the armies of Conrad III and Louis VII from the perspective of the crusaders’ Syrian adversaries.

The conclusions on self-imposed ideological constraints also certainly hold value in a timeless extrapolation. First, strategic leaders who ignore or fail to recognize the capacity for their own ideological imperatives to negatively impact their decisions do so at their own risk. The role of ideological imperatives in the tensions between the Western Kings and Manuel I is not irrelevant for modern reflection. At the state and institutional

⁴⁰⁵ JCS, JP 5-0, IV-35.

⁴⁰⁶ T. X. Hammes, “Key Technologies and the Revolution of Small, Smart, and Cheap in the Future of Warfare,” in *Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition*, ed. Thomas F. Lynch III (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2020), 131-132.

⁴⁰⁷ “By 2025, the proliferation of technology propelled by the explosion of available information enables enemies or adversaries, including non-state actors and super-empowered individuals, to aggressively contest operations across all domains and environments. A growing global interconnectivity fueled by advances in electronics increases rapid access to information and, consequently, increases the velocity and momentum of human interaction and events. Technology previously unavailable to less-resourced nations and individuals are now available on the internet and used with little regard for the moral or ethical consequences.” Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), *The U.S. Army Concept for Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations at Echelons Above Brigade 2025-2045* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Directorate, 2018), 6.

level, ideology and the cognitive maneuver space are complex parts of informational power. While the context, methods, and form of homeland ideological engagement by Bernard of Clairvaux and Eugenius III are not compatible with modern western democracies, the Crusade's force generation campaign does illustrate the advantage of marshalling and aligning a state's informational power.⁴⁰⁸ Whether on an individual or institutional level, constraints and imperatives on informational power—even when self-imposed—may prove at least a necessary part of the calculus in any state's ability to maneuver or “project” in the cognitive space.⁴⁰⁹

Several relevant continuities between the periods also emerge in force projection and operational employment. Because of the complexity, diffusion of power and diffusion of competition, the twelfth century crusades featured expeditionary warfare that required the power projectors to “fight to get there.” Their OE required them to converge strategic deployment with operational campaign plans, not see them as two separate phases, as has been America's privileged position for the past 30 years—but is no longer an assumed advantage.⁴¹⁰ Finally, the supremacy of maneuver as the sole relevant form of operational warfare may not be a forgone conclusion in the current strategic environment. The current strategic and operational context is framed by nuclear weapons,

⁴⁰⁸ Bishop, “DIME, not DiME.”

⁴⁰⁹ Patricia DeGennaro, “The Power of Cognitive Maneuver: Don't Underestimate its Value,” *Small Wars Journal (blog)*, September 19, 2017, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jml/art/the-power-of-cognitive-maneuver>.

⁴¹⁰ Hammes, “Key Technologies and the Revolution of Small, Smart, and Cheap in the Future of Warfare,” 131. See also JCS, JP 3-35, I-1 for the connection between power projection and the Range of Military Operations.

the complex diffusion of power, smart drone proliferation, and the importance of dispersed expeditionary basing for global projection and access. These conditions may commend consideration of forms of strategic and operational warfare that better reflect modern challenges than sweeping Napoleonic-style maneuver to achieve unequivocal decisive victory.⁴¹¹ Limited, positional warfare in conjunction with the other instruments of power, rather than large scale maneuver, may increase in utility as a broad strategic and operational paradigm to mitigate future power projection challenges.⁴¹² If so, the utility of studying medieval crusading warfare, with its emphasis on position and hybrid deterrence through the cumulative effects of dispersed hardened strongpoints projecting highly effective strike forces, becomes even more clear.⁴¹³

Despite sound strategic projection and operational employment capabilities, the powerful international coalition of the Second Crusade failed to achieve its strategic objectives because constraints on its instruments of power—both externally and self-imposed—set the coalition at odds with the complex security interests of the partners on whom the expedition most relied. Though separated by nearly 900 years and multiple

⁴¹¹ JCS, JP 5-0, IV-35; Hammes, “Key Technologies and the Revolution of Small, Smart, and Cheap in the Future of Warfare,” 135; USMC, EABO, 45-49.

⁴¹² Hammes, “Key Technologies and the Revolution of Small, Smart, and Cheap in the Future of Warfare,” 132-133.

⁴¹³ Morgan P. Lohse, “Power Projection to Power Protection,” (Master’s thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, June 2016), 10-13, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Mar/21/2002104239/-1/-1/0/DP_0033. For a more succinct summary on the current US perspective on strategic deterrence operations, see Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Washington, DC: JCS, October 12, 2016; validated on October 18, 2017), II-5, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_08pa.pdf?ver=2018-02-08-091414-467.

iterations of military revolution, twelfth century warfare has many similarities in nature to the modern OE that commend its utility. The diffusion of power; the complex effects of allied security interests; the potential for unintended self-constraints on the instruments of power; the challenges for states seeking to project the military instrument for strategic ends in international theaters—these timeless human phenomena bear continuity that modern leaders ignore at their peril.⁴¹⁴ The study of medieval crusading warfare may yield important insight to inform holistic approaches to modern and future power projection theory.

⁴¹⁴ Thomas F. Lynch III and Phillip C. Saunders, “Contemporary Great Power Geostrategic Dynamics Relations and Strategies,” in *Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition*, ed. Thomas F. Lynch III (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2020), 84.

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