Assurance Case (AC) Role in DevSecOps Pipeline: An Example

John Goodenough Chuck Weinstock Carol Woody Bob Ellison

Softw are Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213



Document Markings

Copyright 2021 Carnegie Mellon University.

This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0002 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center.

The view, opinions, and/or findings contained in this material are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other documentation.

NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.

[DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. Please see Copyright notice for non-US Government use and distribution.

This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission. Permission is required for any other use. Requests for permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at permission@sei.cmu.edu.

DM21-1074

Goals of Presentation

Show potential role of a pipeline-oriented (DevSecOps) assurance case (AC)

- Prior use of ACs focused on gaining release decision from oversight body
- Show potential value/benefits of a pipeline-oriented AC
- Justify exit criteria for pipeline stages
- Define evidence needed to meet (evolving) exit criteria
- Provide basis for reassurance activity, e.g.,
 - What evidence needs to be refreshed to maintain confidence that (relevant) exit criteria continue to be met

A properly annotated AC defines exit criteria for each pipeline stage as well as showing how each stage contributes to overall system assurance

Presentation Approach

Show (by example) how AC helps define exit criteria for the PLAN phase

- AC justifies what we need to know before something can be released to the IMPL phase
 - Show how the AC could be used in the PLAN phase on each iteration of the DevSecOps loop

Construct an example for the PLAN phase

- Choose a desired system property, e.g., availability
- Focus on one class of reasons why the property might not hold, e.g.,
 - Resource exhaustion (due to poor design or unauthorized user actions)
- Show part of a possible AC for this situation (use CWE to start with)
- Contrast exit criteria for the PLAN phase from criteria for the IMPL phase
- Postulate a change to the system and show the reassurance case


The Common Weakness Enumeration

The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)


- A list of commonly seen types of SW/HW design and implementation weaknesses
- Examples of categories: Authentication Errors, Authorization Errors, Bad Coding Practices, Concurrency Issues, Data Validation Issues, Privilege Issues, Resource Management Errors
- There are 21 CWEs in the **Resource Management Errors** category (CWE 399)
 - We have grouped these into
 - Resource Exhaustion Errors (4 CWEs)
 - Initialization Errors (3 CWEs)
 - Other Issues (14)
- In this presentation we focus on Resource Exhaustion Errors

Exploit CWE

Use CWE to identify possible problems, e.g.:




Exploit CWE




CWE 410: **Insufficient Resource Pool** - The software's resource pool is not large enough to handle peak demand, which allows an attacker to prevent others from accessing the resource by using a (relatively) large number of requests for resources.


CWE 770: **Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling** - The software allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated, in violation of the intended security policy for that actor.


Exploit CWE








Confidence increases as doubts are reduced












Reassurance Case Example



Summary

We have shown:

- How an AC based on CWEs can suggest the evidence that needs to be gathered to increase confidence in a system's behavior
- How the AC can identify exit criteria for a stage in the DevSecOps pipeline
- What evidence needs to be refreshed to maintain confidence that (relevant) exit criteria continue to be met after a change (the reassurance case)