

GO/NO-GO PROCESS STANDARDIZATION ACROSS AMC'S C-17 FLEET

Graduate Research Paper

Kevin W. Brooks, Major, USAF

AFIT-ENS-MS-21-J-037

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED The views expressed in this Graduate Research Paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United States Government. This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.

GO/NO-GO PROCESS STANDARDIZATION ACROSS AMC'S C-17 FLEET

Graduate Research Paper

Presented to the Faculty

Department of Operational Sciences

Graduate School of Engineering and Management

Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

Air Education and Training Command

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Science in Operations Management

Kevin W. Brooks, BA, MBA, MS

Major, USAF

June 2021

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

GO/NO-GO PROCESS STANDARDIZATION ACROSS AMC'S C-17 FLEET

Kevin W. Brooks, BA, MBA, MS

Major, USAF

Committee Membership:

Jason R. Anderson

Lt Col, Ph.D.

Chair

Abstract

The increasing world population, modernization, and globalization continue to increase the strain on the global transportation resources. Both infrastructure, vehicles, and personnel continue to operate at higher rates. It is imperative to ensure those operating vehicles that are massive in scale are qualified and capable of carrying out their critical role in transportation activities with an enormous impact on the global economy to meet the demands of international logistics.

This research, in particular, focuses on the pre-mission currency and qualification verification of the United States Air Force's C-17 Globemaster III aircrew. By conducting a case study on the current processes in place by six C-17 units and codifying and analyzing commonalities and differences across these units to determine the efficiencies and wasted efforts across Air Mobility Command's strategic logistic assets. This study uncovers the need for standardization in the pre-mission aircrew qualification procedures based on process improvement principles.

For my wife and children, who have provided me with continual and unwavering support.

Acknowledgments

I want to express my sincere appreciation to my research advisor, Lt Col Jason Anderson, for his guidance and support throughout this research project. His direction and influence enabled me to thoroughly dissect the complex aspects of the problem and shape this paper appropriately.

I am also immensely thankful to the Standardization and Evaluations professionals across the Air Mobility Command enterprise. Without their cooperation, the collection and analysis of critical process documentation would not have been possible.

Kevin W. Brooks

Table of Contents

Abstract iv
Acknowledgmentsvi
List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
I. Introduction
II. Literature Review
2.1 General42.2 Go/No-Go Guidance52.3 Theory52.3.1 Scientific Management System (Taylorism)62.3.2 Six Sigma Approach82.4 Applicability9
III. Methodology
3.1 Overview113.2 Study Current Procedures113.2.1 Within-Case Analysis123.2.2 Cross-Case Analysis123.3 Analyze Inspection Data133.3.1 Unit Effectiveness Inspection Reports133.3.2 Standardization and Evaluation Visit Reports13
IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Case Analyses 14 4.1.1 Checklist Structure 14 4.1.2 Scheduler 15 4.1.3 SARM 16 4.1.4 SOC/ADO 17 4.1.5 FAAO 17 4.1.6 Aircraft Commander 18 4.2 UEI and SAV Findings Analysis 19 4.2.1 UEI Findings 19 4.2.2 SAV Findings 20
V. Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions of Research

5.2 Significance of Research	23
5.3 Recommendations for Action	
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research	24
Appendix A. Charleston Go/No-Go Checklist	26
Appendix B. Dover Go/No-Go Checklist	27
Appendix C. Hickam Go/No-Go Checklist	29
Appendix D. McChord Go/No-Go Checklist	31
Appendix E. McGuire Go/No-Go Checklist	33
Appendix F. Travis Go/No-Go Checklist	35
BIBLIOGRAPHY	37

List of Figures

Figure 1: Individual Unit Process Analysis	15
--	----

List of Tables

Table 1: Individual Unit Step Analysis
--

GO/NO-GO PROCESS STANDARDIZATION ACROSS AMC'S C-17 FLEET

I. Introduction

The effects of ever-increasing globalization and population growth undeniably increase the strain on the logistics networks worldwide. These factors, combined with urbanization increases in developing nations, add to the demand for transportation sources (Ivanova, 2014). This increasing demand will increase demand for operators of all modes of transportation to keep up with the flow of goods, even as transport infrastructure is approaching capacity levels globally(Müller et al., 2012). As the demand for logistics operators increases and the capacity of infrastructure decreases, it is everimportant that we ensure the operators are qualified to safely employ their modes of transportation in increasingly congested sea lanes, roads, rails, and airspace.

All forms of commercial transportation require additional licenses or credentials to operate commercial vehicles. Truck drivers, for example, are required to obtain a Commercial Driver's License (CDL), which requires them to complete specialized training both in a classroom setting and hands-on driving experience. Similarly, to pilot a commercial ship, Merchant Mariners must have a mix of practical experience and classroom training before taking the licensure examination for a First-Classpilot's license. Pilots of aircraft also have specialized requirements, both in the civilian industry and within the military. Along with licensure requirements, there are ongoing training and currency requirements to ensure our transportation operators can perform their jobs. The impact of unqualified personnel operating large vehicles could result in delay or damage of equipment and cargo or even the loss of life for the crew and general populous. Each

industry is responsible for installing checks and balances to ensure all licensure and requisite events are compliant.

Currently, the C-17 community in Air Mobility Command (AMC) does not have a standardized aircrew pre-mission qualification and currency verification or "Go/No-G" process. There are several tools that a unit's scheduling, Squadron Aircrew Resource Management (SARM), Training (DOT), Standardization and Evaluation (CCV or DOV) sections. Ultimately, the Operations Officer (DO) or other Flight Authorization Authenticating Official (FAAO) must review to verify that all aircrew requirements are complete.

Due to the lack of interoperability of these systems, many units resort to locally generated checklists to ensure all required items are complete. These checklists help determine if an aircrew member is qualified for the proposed mission or training event. Additionally, they determine the need for supervision by an instructor certified in that crew position. Furthermore, local bases host the databases that track currency and qualification events. Lack of database visibility across bases frustrates the Go/No-Go process when reassigning an aircrew member through a Permanent Change of Station (PCS), Permanent Change of Assignment (PCA), or scheduled with another unit as part of an inter-fly agreement. Codifying standardized mission generation procedures could increase the efficiency of scheduling and guarantee aircrews are fully qualified and current to execute the mission.

This research aims to identify C-17 community best practices for ensuring premission currency and qualification events are complied with before mission execution. Some limitations exist concerning access to critical systems utilized throughout the

process. For example, permissions limit access to Go/No-Go tracking databases, reducing the ability to analyze their effectiveness. These databases include the Aviation Resource Management System (ARMS), as well as the Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) system, and Training Management System (TMS). ARMS is the current record system for tracking aircrew training and currency requirements. Likewise, IMR is the system that displays the medical readiness of all airmen, including Physical Health Assessments (PHA) and immunization records. Finally, TMS is the contracted system in which aircrew members complete their Computer-Based Training (CBT), and scheduling and feedback for simulator events are stored. Additionally, the data systems and permissions that connect each unique software system are beyond the scope of this research.

II. Literature Review

2.1 General

For this paper, a Go/No-Go process reviews the mandatory ground training requirements, flying training requirements, and medical readiness requirements before participating in flight activities. In a typical C-17 unit, many offices manage the information stored in different databases that contribute to an aircrew member's overall readiness and legality to perform flight duties. Although the process is (informally) called the Go/No-Go process, it also identifies technically legal members to perform flight duties. However, they may not perform their assigned duty positions full spectrum of capabilities. Additionally, they may be allowed to fly as part of a re-qualification program even though they are not currently qualified to perform flight duties. Whether the mission is a local trainer or HHQ tasked mission, it is incumbent on the unit schedulers, SARM personnel, FAAOs, and Operations Officers to validate that the aircrew assigned to the mission is legal to fly.

This scheduling problem is not unique to the C-17 or the USAF and can be a very lengthy and cumbersome process (Ünal & Başçiftçi, 2020). Aircrew availability and training requirements are only two of the variables considered when formulating the flying schedule for a C-17 unit. Aircraft availability, weather, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, range/airspace available are just a few of the possible obstacles for a scheduler to overcome (Nguyen, 2002). Schedulers must also ensure aircrew have accomplished required training events when formulating the flying schedule. Some of

these events are centrally scheduled classes, and others require individual appointments and training resources.

2.2 Go/No-Go Guidance

Aviation requirements for airmen certified to perform flight duties in the United States, outside of the USAF, are governed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and documented in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). Specifically, part 61 of the FAR describes in detail the requirements for issuing certificates (licenses), as well as the responsibilities, privileges, and limitations associated with said certificates. Additionally, Part 61 outlines the medical requirements that an airman must meet and document to exercise their privileges, continuing training, and recent flight experience.

The aviation requirements within the USAF are more complicated than those as directed by the FAA. In contrast to the criteria outlined in the FAA, the requirements for the USAF not only to ensure essential medical readiness and recency of flight events but to encompass every aspect of combat mission employment that an airman is capable of performing. Multiple, dispersed regulations organized into functional areas provide the guidance and requirements for USAF airmen to gain, maintain, and document Go/No-Go events. These guiding regulations define the minimum ground training, flying training, and medical readiness items required for any given airman to certify that they are legal to fly.

2.3 Theory

Regardless of the industry, every organization's goal is to provide a good or service to the end-user or customer. Critical design of the operations and processes that create these goods and services is imperative to maximize efficiency. Another way to

view efficiency is to think about increasing productivity," getting more output out of a given set of inputs" (Schmenner, 2015). To understand an organization's operations, they should be broken down into each process or step along the way. An operation must be composed of processes that reduce cost and minimize errors to increase efficiency and customer satisfaction.

Designing an operation to meet these goals from its inception is the ideal solution. However, reviewing individual processes and entire procedures occasionally is required. Determining whether or not a process is meeting efficiency and cost goals and benchmarks is impossible in the absence of periodic "check-ups." These check-ups are increasingly important when an operation is affected by outside influences, such as changes in requirements, resources, or policies.

2.3.1 Scientific Management System (Taylorism)

One of the significant process improvement theories of the Industrial Revolution is the idea of Scientific Management or Taylorism. In 1911 Frederick Winslow Taylor penned the book *The Principles of Scientific Management*. The result of his studies was to maximize output. Taylor's Scientific Management optimizes production through the observation, measurement, analysis, and improvement of work methods, as well as economic incentives(Taylor, 1911). He describes the need for managers to take on responsibility for planning operations, selecting and hiring the appropriate workers, effectively training those workers, monitoring worker performance, and separating management and worker activities (Masterclass, 2020; "Taylorism | Scientific Management System | Britannica," 2020).

Concerning the Go/No-Go process, the essential element of Taylorism is to develop a science for each aspect of man's work, replacing the former "Rule of Thumb" method. Building upon this idea, (Dooley, 2000) states, "it is reasonable to assume that knowledge which is tacit and not easily imitated, as opposed to explicit knowledge, will grow in importance." Management should be responsible for planning operations breaks from the previous idea that individual workers could choose their own best practice to accomplish their given task. The reason behind the variance in methods to achieve a job is that tradespeople learned through observing those around them rather than through formal instruction(Taylor, 1911). Instead, Taylor believed that management's responsibility is to use science to determine the "one best way," or the most efficient method or implement to accomplish the task that is better than all of the rest. A scientific study and analysis of every technique in use must be performed (Masterclass, 2020).

Increasing productivity through scientific management can be seen since the late 1700s. Richard Arkwright brought together labor, resources, and central power to continuously spin wool, Adam Smith championed labor specialization to increase output while reducing time, Henry Ford's assembly line and lean manufacturing are all examples of this school of thought(Alizon et al., n.d.; Schmenner, 2015; Tann, 2013; Vidal et al., 2007). These examples show that an established framework of responsibilities and processes can and likely increase efficiency and productivity compared to an ad hoc method of accomplishing the same tasks.

2.3.2 Six Sigma Approach

The Six Sigma (6σ) theory has a basis in statistics, hence the name, and is both a business strategy and a process improvement strategy. Initially, Six Sigma was a quality benchmark, introduced in 1986 by Motorola scientist and engineer Bill Smith to address a high instance of warranty claims. The term sigma indicates the deviation in performance of a characteristic from its mean performance. More simply put, sigma is a measure of the variation of the output of a product or service from the average output. The key idea of Six Sigma is that variation of an operation's output is undesirable. Therefore it is imperative to measure variation and then develop and implement strategies to reduce said variation. (Antony, 2006)

Reducing variation is the entire premise of Six Sigma. More specifically, reducing the variation of crucial product quality measurement characteristics around target values to the level at which failures and defects are extremely unlikely. Ideally, the concept of Six Sigma is that specification limits are at least six standard deviations from the target. Assuming a normal distribution, this means that 99.9999% of all observations/opportunities fall within six standard deviations or 6σ of the mean. Another way to view this is that out of 1 million opportunities, only 3.4 should fall outside of 6σ (Montgomery & Woodall, 2008).

Six Sigma, along with Lean principles, is employed by many companies, including very large and very successful, across several industries. In addition to Motorola, companies such as Toyota, General Electric, Danaher Corporation, Honeywell, and even the Department of Defense (Arnheiter & Maleyeff, 2005; Basu, 2001; Harry, 1998; Kumar et al., 2006; Murman et al., 2002; Sharma, 2003; Womack & Jones, 1996).

The widespread use of Six Sigma and Lean principles lends credibility and positive effects. Implementing the continuous process improvement procedures explained will increase efficiency and productivity.

2.4 Applicability

The theories discussed above, Taylorism and Six Sigma, assert that standardization is a good thing, and is in fact, desirable. Does this pose the question, is standardization always desirable, or are there instances where it is undesirable? Positive uses of standardization include administrative and financial processes within many industries, including but not limited to healthcare and hospitality (Baum, 1999; Baum & Ingram, 1998; David & Rothwell, 1996; Kamimura et al., 2007; Romanelli, 1991; Tsai, 2001), as well as in factory and mass production settings (Alizon et al., n.d.; Deming, 1986; Taylor, 1911; Vidal et al., 2007). Alternatively, there can be a negative view of standardization when considering the overuse of exploitation (standardization, routinization) of best practices, leading to a reduction of exploration and innovation (Adler et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2006; March, 1991; March & Simon, 1993). Essentially, the overuse of standardization may stifle institutional learning and innovation, causing business processes to stagnate rather than continuously improve.

This research also addresses the number of "touches" involved in the Go/No-Go process. Business Process Management (BPM) strives to lower costs while increasing revenues, employee motivation, and customer satisfaction (Rudden, 2007). One BPM method is Lean manufacturing, which focuses on reducing the waste, or "muda," that is a byproduct of inefficiencies. Specifically, the waste associated with multiple "touches" is over-processing (Arunagiri & Gnanavelbabu, 2014; Azevedo et al., 2019; Moreira et al.,

2010). This over-processing also leads to work duplication and role ambiguity, increasing employee stress and decreasing job satisfaction (Anam et al., 2018; Khuong & Yen, 2016). Furthermore, when role ambiguity occurs, no one may assume direct responsibility for the task, resulting in the absence of task completion (Sword, 2010). The counter to this argument is that there is reduced risk by verifying and validating previously performed steps in the process. Identifying errors earlier in the processes can increase the efficiency of the overall process (Fagan, 1986; Grady, 1992; Madachy, 1995; Radice & Phillips, 1988). By increasing touches, and therefore inspections, the process is less likely to fail.

III. Methodology

3.1 Overview

A case study, or idiographic research methodology, was conducted to meet research objectives. The term "Case Study" is broad and explained to mean different things by different scholars. A case study could be a qualitative study of small sample size, and ethnographic, clinical, or participant observer, research characterized by process tracing, research that investigates the properties of a single case or phenomenon(Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Eckstein, 1975; George & Bennett, 2004; Gerring, 2017; Yin, 1994). For this research, the case is focused on the AMC C-17 enterprise, explicitly reviewing the Go/No-Go procedures of six units.

By focusing on an individual MWS, the consistency of mission requirements and currency requirements do not need to be accounted for when analyzing the differences of current Go/No-Go practices across the various units. The study focuses on 6 cases, with each case composed of between one and three AD C-17 squadrons. Collecting unit Go/No-Go checklists from these squadrons were required to meet the objectives of this study. Additionally, the researcher collected reports from UEIs and SAVs to determine whether the current procedures meet baseline guidance.

3.2 Study Current Procedures

To verify the anecdotal evidence that there is a lack of standardization in the Go/No-Go process across the C-17 enterprise, the first order of business is to collect and compare the pre-mission checklists for each of the current C-17 units. Individual

Operations Group Standardization and Evaluations (OGV) personnel provided their Go/No-Go procedures upon request from the researcher.

3.2.1 Within-Case Analysis

Upon receipt of pre-mission Go/No-Go checklists from each of the C-17 units, a comparison commenced of each process, from beginning to end. These individual cases are of interest as they provide insights based on each case and analyze each case's commonality (Stake, 1995). The within-case analysis process identified the steps required to complete each unit's Go/No-Go process and assess the process's efficiency. By breaking down the overall process into sub-processes owned by different offices, it became possible to code specific tasks to each of these offices. However, the tasks assigned to the offices coded varied from unit to unit, which drove the need for cross-case analysis. Ayers states, "Coding works well to capture the commonalities of experience across cases but less well to capture the individual uniqueness within cases(Ayres et al., 2003). Coding and sorting the individual tasks to these offices also identified areas of redundancy and potential areas for improvement for each separate case. However, the goal of this project was not to improve each unit's checklist individually, instead to find a best practice for all C-17 units.

3.2.2 Cross-Case Analysis

After completing the individual case analyses, a cross-case analysis commenced. By intuiting or reflecting on commonalities found across multiple respondents, themes were found to tie the individual cases together (Ayres et al., 2003; Sarter, 1988). Each office's order completed its sub-processes in and the number of sub-processes, or

"touches," was investigated. Additionally, the researcher compared the total number of steps, and sub-steps, for each office. The total number of touches and steps for each of the units were summed and compared. The author identified both similarities and differences or outliers across the cases. These outliers further focused attention on their effect on the Go/No-Go process as a whole.

3.3 Analyze Inspection Data

3.3.1 Unit Effectiveness Inspection Reports

Besides gathering pre-mission Go/No-Go checklists directly from individual units, Headquarters AMC Standardization and Evaluation (A3V) delivered UEI reports upon request. These reports were reviewed, focusing primarily on the Go/No-Go procedures for each of the C-17 units. This study used only the most recent inspection report for each AMC C-17 unit. Consideration was given to commendable comments and discrepancies concerning the Go/No-Go process.

3.3.2 Standardization and Evaluation Visit Reports

Finally, OGV offices provided SAV reports for review. Unlike UEIs conducted by Headquarters AMC Inspector General (IG) personnel, personnel assigned within individual wings perform SAVs. For SAVs related to the Go/No-Go process, OGV personnel conducts the visits (or inspections), as the Go/No-Go process is a Standardization and Evaluations requirement per AFMAN 11-202V2. As each wing conducted its SAV, the assessments were not standardized, and individual inspection items varied.

IV. Analysis and Results

4.1 Case Analyses

4.1.1 Checklist Structure

Each of the six units utilized five offices (including the AC) except for Dover AFB and JB PH-H. These checklists did not include the SOC position within their checklist but did include the four other core offices utilized by the other bases. Although they did not have the checklist and mission package route through the SOC, other offices covered the steps the SOC was responsible for as part of the checklists used by Dover AFB and JB PH-H. The number of touches of each of the checklists varied from four to eight. The number of checklist steps varied from seventy to ninety-three.



Charleston - 8 Touches, 70 Steps

Figure 1: Individual Unit Process Analysis

4.1.2 Scheduler

The scheduler's role in the Go/No-Go processes carried the most weight of responsibility across all units. On average, the scheduler is responsible for 23.8 individual

checklist items to close out their checklist portion(s). Half of the units utilize the schedulers in two separate touches, with one of the touches being focused on distilling mission information and requirements. A number of the steps completed by the schedulers have more to do with scheduling rather than Go/No-Go verification. Furthermore, many units use the scheduler to perform a cursory review of currency and grounding items before SARM completing their review. The scheduler acted as a liaison between the DOT and CCV/DOV offices for missions that include training and evaluations during the event. In the cases where the scheduler had two touches on the checklist, they typically reviewed the work SARM had performed and subsequently duplicated SARM's work as a form of verification.

4.1.3 SARM

The SARM is the only office with members that can access the ARMS database, the record system for aircrew member currencies. They, along with the HARM, are responsible for inputting data into the database to populate the Individual Training Summary (ITS) product that encompasses all of the currencies an aircrew member is responsible for maintaining. Many tracking, tasking, and scheduling use the ARMS database to generate currency reports and notifications. In line with the purpose of their office, the SARM office generates currency reports for each crew member assigned to a mission. Subsequently, it reviews those products to ensure they will be current and qualified through the scheduled duration of the mission. SARM also has access to the databases that record medical readiness items, physiological readiness, and flying hour reports for each crew member. SARM is responsible for ensuring each of these items will

be current through mission duration. Finally, SARM is a critical facilitator in the creation of the FA. They generate and track FA numbers and are signatory (in the form of initials) on the FA.

4.1.4 SOC/ADO

As noted above, only four of the six units utilize the SOC as part of the Go/No-Go checklist. The units that use the SOC have them perform a few primarily administrative tasks. In this role, the SOC is another source of review for "all previous checklist steps," adding value through verification of other's work. In addition to their review, they are utilized to complete the ORM worksheet, print and sign DTS authorizations and NATO orders, and compile mission binders for crews. On average, the SOC has the fewest steps of any of the offices.

4.1.5 FAAO

The FAAO is ultimately responsible for ensuring all aircrew members are current and qualified to perform their duties. As they are responsible for the final validation of aircrew readiness, nearly all of the steps they complete are reviewing other office's work. The FAAO reviews the currency and qualification of individual aircrew members and ensures all required paperwork is in place for mission execution. For example, the FAAO verifies MEP and interfly memorandums along with all waivers and higher-level approval coordination are complete and signed. They also review ORM and mission complexity and ensure the fitting crew complement is assigned to mitigate as much risk as possible. Like SARM, they are a signatory on the FA, and once they sign, the FA is valid.

4.1.6 Aircraft Commander

The AC is utilized in two separate ways during the Go/No-Go process by most units. Four of the six units have the AC review mission paperwork immediately following the SARM review. The AC prioritizes currency and training events during mission planning. They review the currency products SARM has provided and any TMS writeups or other comments and concerns from DOT. Additionally, this is a chance for the AC to verify the work that SARM has already completed, hopefully decreasing the chances for any errors that the FAAO must catch.

The AC is also part of the Go/No-Go process during the beginning steps of mission execution. Every base except McChord has steps listed for the AC to complete when the mission leaves the home station. Although omitted in the Go/No-Go Checklist, McChord does have a separate "Departing AC Checklist" that includes most of the steps the other units include in their Go/No-Go checklists. The AC's responsibilities ensure their mission binder is complete, they have all of the support equipment required, and the orders are accurate. Furthermore, the AC must ensure no significant events have occurred to any crew member since the FAAO signed the. This review includes signing off any FCIFs, and more importantly, any change in their medical status that would render them DNIF.

The variation in the number of checklist steps, number of touches, and even Go/No-Go structure was wide across the different units. Although there was such variation, the items accomplished within the process did not have much variation. Each unit emphasized the same items, and most units re-accomplished what they likely determined as critical items across the varying steps in the checklist.

	SARM	Scheduler	Operations Center	FAAO	Aircraft Commander	Total]
	2	2	1	1	2	8	Touches
Charleston	8	11	5	12	11	47	Steps
Charleston	6	12	0	0	5	23	Sub-Steps
	14	23	5	12	16	70	Total Steps
	1	1	0	1	1	4	Touches
Dover	10	15	0	18	8	51	Steps
Dover	13	13	0	11	5	42	Sub-Steps
	23	28	0	29	13	93	Total Steps
	1	2	0	1	1	5	Touches
Hickam	17	26	0	16	8	67	Steps
HICKall	0	8	0	0	8	16	Sub-Steps
	17	34	0	16	16	83	Total Steps
	1	1	1	1	1	5	Touches
McChord	15	24	8	15	8	70	Steps
wicchord	0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Steps
	15	24	8	15	8	70	Total Steps
	2	1	2	1	1	7	Touches
McGuire	17	16	11	16	8	68	Steps
wicduire	0	0	0	0	12	12	Sub-Steps
	17	16	11	16	20	80	Total Steps
	2	2	1	1	2	8	Touches
Travia	11	15	5	14	19	64	Steps
Travis	6	3	0	2	3	14	Sub-Steps
	17	18	5	16	22	78	Total Steps
	1.5	1.5	0.8	1.0	1.0 1.3 6	6.2	Touches
Aueroac	13.0	17.8	4.8	15.2	10.3	61.2	Steps
Average	4.2	6.0	0.0	2.2	5.5	17.8	Sub-Steps
	17.2	23.8	4.8	17.3	15.8	79.0	Total Steps

Table 1: Individual Unit Step Analysis

4.2 UEI and SAV Findings Analysis

4.2.1 UEI Findings

Headquarters AMC/A3V provided the most recent UEI results for each of the five AMC C-17 bases. Of the five bases, only four had strengths or deficiencies identified in the results of the inspections. Of the four, only three had Go/No-Go items explicitly

identified for the C-17 units (JB MDL identified deficiencies in the KC-10 Go/No-Go process). Furthermore, the identified area at Dover AFB had to do with SARM but focused on the post-mission review rather than the Go/No-Go process. Although not directly related, inaccuracies in ARMS input could result in members showing current and qualified when they are not. Erroneous currency reports would be a significant issue for grounding items once the currency has lapsed. The only other deficiency noted was at JB Charleston and was related to the DNIF log utilized during the Go/No-Go process. Specifically, verification for five of the thirteen aircrew members listed the DNIF status was impossible, as the log was out of date.

The major limitation of using UEI data to analyze the unit's Go/No-Go programs is that it is not a Major Graded Area (MGA). The MGAs for these UEIs are Managing Resources, Leading People, Improving the Unit, and Executing the Mission. Although the Go/No-Go process is part of executing the mission, all of the strengths identified fell under Improving the Unit. Without emphasizing the Go/No-Go process explicitly, a deep inspection of the process will not likely occur during a UEI.

4.2.2 SAV Findings

Only three of the six bases provided SAV results. JB LM and JB Charleston provided SAV reports for each of their three squadrons, and JB MDL provided an SAV report for their only C-17 squadron. The SAV area with the most impact on the Go/No-Go is AF Form 4324 and LOX discrepancies. JB Charleston's SAV results are not valueadding for the Go/No-Go analysis, as there was only an open-ended question on the topic "What is CCV's role in go-no-go?" Each of the four remaining squadrons had issues with

both areas, which may have resulted in aircrew members either flying when they were not qualified or flying in a higher crew qualification than they should have. JB LM's SAV reports identify that GITMS generates the LOX. There is currently a known issue with the program resulting in issues generating a document free from errors. Additionally, they noted permissions issues within GTIMS that prevented the LOX from being signed by the required official. Although this is a small sample size, issues across these seven squadrons were uniform.

V. Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusions of Research

This study resulted in a few conclusions following the within-case and cross-case analyses of the Go/No-Go procedures of C-17 units. The first conclusion is that there are inefficiencies in every unit concerning multiple offices completing the same work. There are several items that the FAAO must review before signing the FA, including medical, ground training, flying training, and mobility readiness items. It would be exhaustive for the FAAO to complete a thorough review of every aircrew member's reports with no support. For this reason, the initial evaluation of currency and qualification items is accomplished by at least one other office before the FAAO completing the final verification.

Although the purpose of the Go/No-Go process is to ensure all crew members are current and qualified, there are steps within each of the individual unit checklists that miss that goal. Specifically, administrative items such as completing DTS orders, assigning physical responsibility of controlled items, signing out MREs and additional gear have no impact on whether the crew can legally fly the mission. Furthermore, tasks completed by the AC before FAAO signature are focused on reviewing crewmember training writeups and identifying training goals or priorities for individuals. These tasks should be placed on a separate mission planning checklist rather than adding touches and steps to the Go/No-Go process.

Finally, a cross-case analysis did not uncover any unique requirements at any individual base. JB Charleston has the Special Operations Low-Level II (SOLL II) mission, and JB LM has the Primary Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Ice missions. Neither base had Go/No-Go items unique to these missions. Similarly, there were no items on the Go/No-Go checklist that addressed the differences between Airland-Only bases and Airland-Airdrop bases. Thus, this study determined no reason for variation across the units concerning Go/No-Go processes or checklists. A standardized checklist would be appropriate for the C-17 enterprise. This conclusion aligns with previous literature on standardization and its proper use. Ensuring aircrew are qualified to operate the aircraft requires no need for innovation or specialization at the individual unit level. Units could argue against standardization if there was such a need.

5.2 Significance of Research

The focus of this research was solely on the C-17 enterprise; however, transferring these results to other MWSs is possible. Although each MWS has unique currency items, the process of verifying that aircrew members are current and qualified is consistent, especially within AMC. The development of a standardized Go/No-Go process would provide consistency across the MAJCOM and increase interoperability between units. Without an investigation into the Go/No-Go processes, it is difficult to assess the current processes' validity and efficiency, especially since UEIs do not thoroughly review them. Additionally, units conducting SAV inspections are not required to submit their results to any organization outside their wing.

5.3 Recommendations for Action

To provide a standardized Go/No-Go process for subordinate units, Headquarters AMC/A3V should consider implementing their guidance. Higher-level regulations dictate the requirements included in unit-developed procedures and checklists. However, units are required to consolidate this information for ease of use. The deviations across different units were additional administrative tasks and locally developed verification systems. This guidance should include the systems of record used to complete the process and a review of the effectiveness of those systems. For example, JB Charleston's UEI report suggests using GTIMS to input training accomplishments to ARMS; however, the SAV reports from JB LM identified that there were issues with GTIMS causing errors within the LOX module.

The Go/No-Go process design should include an analysis of risk that AMC/A3V is willing to assume. There is a variation in the number of touches and steps across the bases studied. The argument for efficiency states that there should be a streamlined process that equally tasks the offices concerning time, with the least number of transfers. Additionally, to reduce the number of steps, there should be a minimal duplication of tasks and efforts across the process. Although this would make a more efficient process, reducing the number of inspections results in additional assumed. If the goal of the process design is to minimize the risk at the expense of efficiency, the process should include or maintain the duplication of tasks in the spirit of risk reduction.


5.4 Recommendations for Future Research

To design the most efficient Go/No-Go process, researching the current procedures for at least one unit must be accomplished. The designer should apply

Taylorism and Six Sigma tools to complete such a process, to reduce the variation within a process. As part of the Six Sigma project, the researcher should consider conducting a time-and-motion study of the Go/No-Go process from start to finish. This study would help establish a baseline for the process, identify unnecessary movements and steps, and further reduce variation. After identifying inefficiencies, it is possible to remove the requirement for multiple iterations of review.

The application of the methodology used for the C-17 is transferrable to other MWSs, both within and outside AMC. Removing variation and increasing the ability to determine the legality of an aircrew member to execute a mission applies to all USAF aircraft. Once used across the inventory of AMC MWSs, evaluating the effectiveness of the command's Go/No-Go processes is possible.

Appendix A. Charleston Go/No-Go Checklist



Appendix B. Dover Go/No-Go Checklist

436 OG GO/NO-GO CHECKLIST	SCHEDULERS					
Call Sign Mission Number	 Verify crew complement meets mission requirements 					
Aircraft Commander Crew Rest Start (L)	Check grounding items for completion and validity through FSRT:					
Departure Date (L) Alert/Show (L)	 Verify not DNIF (PAC should be A or B) 					
SRT (L) FSRT (L)	b. Aeronautical Order					
SKI (L) FSKI (L)	 verify Security clearance date in GDSS 					
	d. Verify Ground Training Requirements (Grounded) table (Page 2)					
SARM	3. Verify qualification and currencies through FSRT:					
 Check GDSS2 mission detail and setup sheet 	a. Reference signed/live Letter of X for qualifications and certifications					
Check go/no-go browser, individual currency snapshots and 7/30/90 day totals	 Reference NMR and Supervised Status letters for restrictions Reference GTIMS/ARMS for currencies 					
Check grounding items for completion and validity through FSRT:	 c. Reference GTIMS/ARMS forcurrencies d. Ensure unqualified, noncurrent (B), NMR (I), and Supervised 					
a. Current Aeronautical Order	Status (\$) crewmembers are under instructor supervision					
 Second character of ASC should be A, C, D, E, S, T, U, W, orX 	4. Phoenix Banner/Silver/Coppermissions:					
 If B, G, H, J, K, L, R, P, Z or number contact HARM(677-5451) 	 a. AC experienced (≥100 hours in command), CAT II current 					
b. Ensure member is not DNIF	 b. LM requirements met (2 for C-17, 3 for C-5) 					
 Physical availability code should be A orB c. Verify Ground Training Requirements (Grounded) table (Page 2) 	5. Verify combined experience meets SQ guidance					
 verify Ground Training Requirements (Grounded) table (Page 2) verify 7/30/90 day flying times (56/125/330 hours) will not be exceeded 	6. Verify 7/30/90 day flying times (56/125/330 hours) will not be exceeded					
	7. Coordinate passport and visa requirements					
4. Verify qualification and currencies through FSRT:	S. Coordinate passport and visa requirements S. Coordinate with DOT for training and upgrade priorities					
 Reference Signed/Live Letter of X for qualifications and certifications Reference NMR and Supervised Status letters for restrictions 	9. Coordinate with CCV to ensure all evaluation prerequisites are met					
c. Reference GTIMS/ARMS for currencies	10. Enter and verify GDSS2 crewinformation:					
 d. Ensure unqualified, noncurrent (B), NMR (I), and Supervised Status (\$) 	a. Duty positions					
crewmembers are under instructor supervision	b. Flight Authorization remark codes					
5. Verify interfly, attachment, and MEPletters	11. Check itinerary for certification, approved, or special PIC airfields					
6. (If FS flying) Complete 436 OG Flight Surgeon Go/No-Go Checklist	a. Reference ASRR Table 7-1 and AMCII1-211, para 3.5					
7. (For ASFP) Verify valid participant letter, current PHA, and CC/DO FAAO	12. Ensure Pre/Post Mission Crew Rest requirements are met					
8. Verify GDSS2 crewinformation:	13. Notify FCC manager/scheduler					
a. Duty positions	14. Verify scheduling board and binder cover match GDSS2					
b. Flight Authorization remark codes (add remarks for B/I code on FA)	15. Notify crew with LFA times and update GDSS2 with notification					
9. Print NATO/DTS orders	Pilot Signature:					
10. Print/Initial Flight Authorization	Flight Engineer Signature:					
Signature:	Loadmaster Signature:					

OPR: 436 OG/OGV

CAO: 17 Jul 2020

Page 1 of 2

]	FLIGHT AUTHORIZATION AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL		AI	RCRAFT CO	OMMANDER						
1	. Verify crew complement meets mission requirements	1. Verify Flight Authorization for completeness and accuracy:									
2	. Check grounding items for completion and validity through FSRT:			itions and rem							
4					t (B), NMR (I), and	d Supervised S	tatus (\$)				
					ctor supervision	a buper fibea b	(4)				
						1 11 1/					
	 verify Security clearance date in GDSS 				ets for ea. crewmer						
	d. Verify Ground Training Requirements (Grounded) table (Page 2)			ember has sign	ed off the latest FO	CIF and read fi	les				
3	Verify qualification and currencies through FSRT:	in G									
	a. Reference signed/live Letter of X for qualifications and certifications	a. 1	f GTIMS is un	available initial	the original Flight	t Authorization	and				
	 Reference NMR and Supervised Status letters for restrictions 	1	annotate the FC	CIF number							
	c. Reference GTIMS/ARMS for currencies	4. (If FS	S flying) Comp	lete 436 OG Fli	ght Surgeon Go/N	o-GoChecklis	t				
	d. Ensure unqualified, noncurrent (B), NMR (I), and Supervised Status (\$)	5. (For	ASFP) Ensure	participant has	required equipmer	nt and egress tra	aining				
	crewmembers are under instructor supervision	Initia	l Flight Author	rization verifvir	ng go/no-go checks	s have been cor	npleted				
4			ll crewmember		00 0		1				
5		7. Com	plete and print	(as required) a	oplicable mission	or local ORM	worksheet				
6		a. Obtain approval for elevated risk if required									
	Verify duty positions and remark codes in 605552				embers including	FS and MEP					
8		Signature:	,	o for an ere an							
	 Verify compliance with passport and visa requirements Verify compliance with applicable AOR reporting instructions 	÷									
-		C-17 Ground Training Requirements Required for Flight Required to Fly Unsupervised Mobility Requirements					nirements				
	0. Coordinate with DOT for training and upgrade priorities	(Grounded)		(NMR)		(Restrictions May Apply)					
	1. Flight evaluations:	Flight Physical	GC11Y-GC14Y	GD39Y	GX91Y-94Y	GM11Y	LL04				
	 Coordinate with CCV to ensure all prerequisites are met 	Physiological Tng LL01	GD11Y AA01/02	GD27Y SS02	GN03Y GD55Y (P)	GM12Y GE03Y	LL05 SS03				
	 Ensure DO's Review is complete for applicable local TMS/Tng Folder 	LL03	AA01/02 AA11/12	SS02 SS05	GD551 (P)	GE051 GM09Y	SS07				
1	2. Complete applicable mission or local ORM worksheet	LL06		AC27Y		GM21Y	TG03Y				
·	a. Obtain approval for elevated risk if required	LL07				GD17Y	GM03Y				
1	3. <i>(If FS flying)</i> Complete 436 OG Flight Surgeon Go/No-Go Checklist	SS01				GE07Y GH01Y (P)	GD75Y				
	4. (For ASFP) Verify valid participant letter and current PHA	Refer to late	st C-17 RTM. AF	MAN 11-2C-17V	and AFI 11-301V1 f		ions and				
		Refer to latest C-17 RTM, AFMAN 11-2C-17V1 and AFI 11-301V1 for event descriptions and further requirements									
	Verify Flight Authorization is complete and accurate										
1	6 Sime NATO and any in blue inte					C-5 Ground Training Requirements					
	6. Sign NATO orders in blue ink										
1	7. Sign Flight Authorization	Required	for Flight	Required to Fl	y Unsupervised	Mobility Req					
1	7. Sign Flight Authorization 8. (Infectious Disease missions) Comply with guidance ePubs	(Grou	for Flight nded)	Required to Fl (N	y Unsupervised MR)	Mobility Req (Restrictions M GM11Y					
1	7. Sign Flight Authorization	(Grou Flight Physical Physiological Tng	for Flight nded) LL01 LL03	Required to Fl	y Unsupervised MR) GD15Y (FE, L) GD39Y (AC, L)	(Restrictions N	day Apply) LL04 LL05				
1	7. Sign Flight Authorization 8. (Infectious Disease missions) Comply with guidance ePubs All_Global\Infectious Disease) and HQ AMC FCIFs in FCBs	(Grou Flight Physical Physiological Tng GD05Y (MP+, FE)	for Flight nded) LL01 LL03 LL06	Required to FI (N) GC27Y GH01Y (P) GC33Y	y Unsupervised MR) GD15Y (FE, L)	(Restrictions M GM11Y GM12Y GE01Y	LL04 LL05 LL07				
	7. Sign Flight Authorization 8. (Infectious Disease missions) Comply with guidance ePubs All_Global\Infectious Disease) and HQ AMC FCIFs in FCBs	(Grou Flight Physical Physiological Tng GD05Y (MP+, FE) GD55Y (FP+)	for Flight nded) LL01 LL03) LL06 SS01	Required to FI (N) GC27Y GH01Y (P) GC33Y SS02	y Unsupervised MR) GD15Y (FE, L) GD39Y (AC, L)	(Restrictions M GM11Y GM12Y GE01Y GM09Y	LL04 LL05 LL07 SS03				
	7. Sign Flight Authorization 8. (Infectious Disease missions) Comply with guidance ePubs All_Global\Infectious Disease) and HQ AMC FCIFs in FCBs	(Grou Flight Physical Physiological Tng GD05Y (MP+, FE)	for Flight nded) LL01 LL03) LL06 SS01	Required to FI (NI GC27Y GH01Y (P) GC33Y SS02 SS05	y Unsupervised MR) GD15Y (FE, L) GD39Y (AC, L)	(Restrictions M GM11Y GM12Y GE01Y	LL04 LL05 LL07 SS03 SS07				
	7. Sign Flight Authorization 8. (Infectious Disease missions) Comply with guidance ePubs All_Global\Infectious Disease) and HQ AMC FCIFs in FCBs	(Grou Flight Physical Physiological Tng GD05Y (MP+, FE) GD55Y (FP+)	for Flight nded) LL01 LL03) LL06 SS01	Required to FI (N) GC27Y GH01Y (P) GC33Y SS02	y Unsupervised MR) GD15Y (FE, L) GD39Y (AC, L)	(Restrictions M GM11Y GM12Y GE01Y GM09Y GM21Y	LL04 LL05 LL07 SS03				


GD75Y GD17Y Refer to latest C-5 RTM, AFMAN 11-2C-5V1 and AFI 11-301V1 for event descriptions and further requirements


OPR: 436 OG/OGV

CAO: 17 Jul 2020


Page 2 of 2

Appendix C. Hickam Go/No-Go Checklist






Appendix D. McChord Go/No-Go Checklist



File with flight orders for 1 year per AFI 33-364

Version 9.4, 30 Oct 19




File with flight orders for 1 year per AFI 33-364

Version 9.4, 30 Oct 19

Appendix E. McGuire Go/No-Go Checklist


Mission Alias:

6 AS Go/No-Go Checklist (Page 1)




Mission Alias:

6 AS Go/No-Go Checklist (Page 2)




OPR 6 AS/DO 305 OG/OGV approved

Appendix F. Travis Go/No-Go Checklist



60 OG PRE-MISSION SCHEDULING & EXECUTION CHECKLIST





Page 2 of 2

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adler, P. S., Benner, M., James, D., Paul, J., Osono, E., Staats, B. R., Takeuchi, H., Tushman, M. L., Winter, S. G., Brunner, D. J., Staats, B. R., & Tush-, M. L. (2009). Perspectives on the Productivity Dilemma. *Journal of Operations Management*, 27(2), 99–113. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2009.01.004
- Alizon, F., Shooter, S. B., & Simpson, T. W. (n.d.). Henry Ford and the Model T: lessons for product platforming and mass customization. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.destud.2009.03.003

Anam, K., Zafar, S., & Qaiser, S. (2018). Impact of Workload and Work Duplication on Employee's Performance. *Journal of Strategy and Performance Management*, 6(2), 65–76.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339077476_IMPACT_OF_WORKLOAD _AND_WORK_DUPLICATION_ON_EMPLOYEE%27S_PERFORMANCE

- Antony, J. (2006). Six Sigma for service processes The Application of Lean Six Sigma in Policing Services View project Lean Business Models in Healthcare View project. *Article in Business Process Management Journal*. https://doi.org/10.1108/14637150610657558
- Arnheiter, E. D., & Maleyeff, J. (2005). The integration of lean management and Six Sigma. *The TQM Magazine*, *17*(1), 5–18.
- Arunagiri, P., & Gnanavelbabu, A. (2014). Identification of major lean production waste in automobile industries using weighted average method. *Procedia Engineering*, 97, 2167–2175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2014.12.460
- Ayres, L., Kavanaugh, K., & Knafl, K. A. (2003). Within-case and across-case approaches to qualitative data analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*, 13(6), 871– 883. https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732303013006008
- Azevedo, J., Sá, J. C., Ferreira, L. P., Santos, G., Cruz, F. M., Jimenez, G., & Silva, F. J. G. (2019). Improvement of production line in the automotive industry through lean philosophy. *Procedia Manufacturing*, 41, 1023–1030. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.promfg.2019.10.029

Basu, R. (2001). Six Sigma to fit Sigma. IIE Solutions, 33(7), 28–33.

Baum, J. A. C. (1999). The Rise of Chain Nursing Homes in Ontario, 1971-1996:

Discovery Service for Air Force Institute of Technology. *Social Forces*, 78(2), 543–583. https://doi.org/10.2307/3005567

- Baum, J. A. C., & Ingram, P. (1998). Survival-Enhancing Learning in the Manhattan Hotel Industry, 1898-1980: Discovery Service for Air Force Institute of Technology. *Management Science*, 44, 996–1016.
- Campbell, D. T., & Stanley, J. (1963). *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*. Houghton Mifflin.
- David, P. A., & Rothwell, G. S. (1996). Standardization, diversity and learning: Strategies for the coevolution of technology and industrial capacity. *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 14(2), 181–201. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(95)00475-0

Deming, W. E. (1986). Out of the Crisis | The MIT Press. MIT-CAES.

- Dooley, K. (2000). The Paradigms of Quality : Evolution and Revolution in the History of the Discipline. *Advances in the Management of Organizational Quality*, 5(April), 1–28.
- Eckstein, H. (1975). *Case Studies and Theory in Political Science*. University of California Press.
- Fagan, M. E. (1986). Advances in Software Inspections. *IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering*, SE-12(7), 744–751.
- George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2004). Case Studies and Theory Development. MIT Press.
- Gerring, J. (2017). What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? *American Political Science Review*, *98*(2). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001182
- Grady, R. B. (1992). Practical Software Metrics for Project Management and Process Improvement. Prentice-Hall.
- Gupta, A. K., Smith, K. G., & Shalley, C. E. (2006). The interplay between exploration and exploitation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 49(4), 693–706. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2006.22083026
- Harry, M. J. (1998). Six Sigma: a breakthrough strategy for profitability. *Quality Progress*, *31*(5), 60–64.

- Ivanova, O. (2014). Modelling Inter-Regional Freight Demand with Input–Output, Gravity and SCGE Methodologies. In *Modeling Freight Transport* (pp. 13–42). Elsevier. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-410400-6.00002-1
- Kamimura, A., Banaszak-Holl, J., Berta, W., Baum, J. A. C., Weigelt, C., & Mitchell, W. (2007). Do corporate chains affect quality of care in nursing homes? The role of corporate standardization. *Health Care Management Review*, 32(2), 168–178. https://doi.org/10.1097/01.HMR.0000267794.55427.52
- Khuong, M. N., & Yen, V. H. (2016). Investigate the Effects of Job Stress on Employee Job Performance — A Case Study at Dong Xuyen Industrial Zone, Vietnam. *International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance*, 7(2), 31–37. https://doi.org/10.18178/ijtef.2016.7.2.495
- Kumar, M., Antony, J., Singh, R. K., Tiwari, M. K., & Perry, D. (2006). Implementing the lean sigma framework in an Indian SME: A case study. *Production Planning* and Control, 17(4), 407–423. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537280500483350
- Madachy, R. J. (1995). System dynamics modeling of an inspection-based process. Proceedings - International Conference on Software Engineering, 376–386. https://doi.org/10.1109/icse.1996.493432
- March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. *Organizational Science*, 2(1), 71–87.
- March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1993). Organizations. Blackwell.
- Masterclass. (2020). Understanding Taylorism: The History of Scientific Management Theory - 2021 - MasterClass. https://www.masterclass.com/articles/understandingtaylorism-the-history-of-scientific-management-theory
- Montgomery, D. C., & Woodall, W. H. (2008). An Overview of Six Sigma. *International Statistical Review*, *76*, 329–346. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-5823.2008.00061.x
- Moreira, F., Alves, A. C., & Sousa, R. M. (2010). Anabela Etall, 2009. 100-108.
- Müller, S., Wolfermann, A., & Huber, S. (2012). A Nation-wide Macroscopic Freight Traffic Model. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, *54*, 221–230. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.09.741
- Murman, E., Allen, T., Bozdogan, K., & Cutch, J. (2002). Lean Enterprise Value: Insights from MIT's Lean Aerospace Initiative. Palgrave.

- Nguyen, C. T. (2002). An interactive decision support system for scheduling fighter pilot training. Air Force Institute of Technology.
- Radice, R. A., & Phillips, R. W. (1988). *Software Engineering An Industrial Approach*. Prentice-Hall.
- Romanelli, E. (1991). The Evolution of New Organizational Forms. In *Annual Review of Sociology* (Vol. 17, Issue 1, pp. 79–103).
- Rudden, J. (2007). Making the Case for BPM : A Benefits Checklist. *BPTrends*, *January*, 1–8. www.bptrends.com
- Sarter, B. (1988). *Paths to knowledge: Innovative research methods for nursing*. National League for Nursing.
- Schmenner, R. W. (2015). The pursuit of productivity. Production and Operations Management, 24(2), 341–350. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12230
- Sharma, U. (2003). Implementing Lean principles with the Six Sigma advantage: How a battery company realized significant improvements. *Journal of Organizational Excellence*, *22*(3), 43–52.
- Stake, R. E. (1995). The art of Case Study Research. Sage.
- Sword, D. (2010). Conflicts from confused roles and responsibilities. https://deborahsword.com/2010/07/26/conflicts-from-confused-roles-and-responsibilities/
- Tann, J. (2013). RICHARD ARKWRIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY. Journal of Chemical Information and Modeling, 53(9), 1689–1699. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24408232
- Taylor, F. W. (1911). *THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT* (p. 144). Harper & Brothers.
- Taylorism | scientific management system | Britannica. (2020). In *Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/science/Taylorism
- Tsai, W. (2001). Knowledge transfer in intraorganizational networks: Effects of network position and absorptive capacity on business unit innovation and performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44(5), 996–1004. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069443

- Ünal, H. T., & Başçiftçi, F. (2020). Using evolutionary algorithms for the scheduling of aircrew on airborne early warning and control system. *Defence Science Journal*, 70(3), 240–248. https://doi.org/10.14429/dsj.70.15055
- Vidal, M., Farnham, J., Handel, M., Luria, D., Peck, J., Rogers, J., & White, R. (2007). Lean Production, Worker Empowerment, and Job Satisfaction: A Qualitative Analysis and Critique*. *Critical Sociology*, 33, 247–278. https://doi.org/10.1163/156916307X168656
- Womack, J. P., & Jones, D. T. (1996). Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in Your Corporation. Simon and Schuster.

Yin, R. K. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE					Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188			
The public reporting burden for this collection gathering and maintaining the data needed, and information, including suggestions for reducing 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, <i>A</i> penalty for failing to comply with a collection on PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR	of information completing and the burden, to rlington, VA 2 f information if ORM TO TH	is estimated to average 1 hour d reviewing the collection of infor Department of Defense, Washin 2202-4302. Respondents shou it does not display a currently val IE ABOVE ADDRESS.	per response, incl mation. Send com ngton Headquarters d be aware that no id OMB control nur	uding the tir ments regard Services, Di otwithstandir nber.	me for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, ding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of irectorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), ng any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any			
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)	2. REPC	DRT TYPE			3. DATES COVERED (From - To)			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a.					a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
5b. G				RANT NUMBER				
5c. PRO					GRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PRO				5d. PRC	PROJECT NUMBER			
5e. TA					ASK NUMBER			
5f. WOF					RK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION	NAME(S) AN	ND ADDRESS(ES)			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AG	ENCY NAM	IE(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
					11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY	STATEMEN	Г						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES								
14. ABSTRACT								
15. SUBJECT TERMS								
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION O	F:	17. LIMITATION OF		19a. NAI	ME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON			
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c.	THIS PAGE	ABSTRACT	OF PAGES	19b. TEL	EPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)			

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

1. REPORT DATE. Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g. 30-06-1998; xx-06-1998; xx-x2-1998.

2. REPORT TYPE. State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master's thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.

3. DATES COVERED. Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.

4. TITLE. Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER. Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33615-86-C-5169.

5b. GRANT NUMBER. Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER. Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 61101A.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER. Enter all project numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257; ILIR.

5e. TASK NUMBER. Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 05; RF0330201; T4112.

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER. Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.

6. AUTHOR(S). Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, J, Jr.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Self-explanatory.

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER. Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S). Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S). Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/ monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/ restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.

14. ABSTRACT. A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.

15. SUBJECT TERMS. Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT. This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.