

MONT BLANC

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BLANC MONT
(MEUSE-ARGONNE-CHAMPAGNE)

MONOGRAPH NO. 9

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OPERATIONS OF THE 2D AND 36TH DIVISIONS WITH THE FOURTH FRENCH ARMY IN CHAMPAGNE IN OCTOBER, 1918.

Maps: Tahure, 1/20000; Attigny, 1/20000; Ste. Marie,
1/20000.

The Blanc Mont operation is classed by the Americans as a part of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, but in a broader sense it was a part of the general offensive that extended along the entire front of the Allied Armies between Switzerland and the English Channel. All of the armies were engaged in a converging attack -- the British toward Cambrai, the French east and west of Rheims toward the Aisne, and the Americans toward Sedan and Mezieres. The result of these operations, if successful, would be to clear the Germans from France and Belgium, prevent the withdrawal of a large part of them into Germany, and also prevent the removal of the supplies accumulated in Belgium. This would be effected by the cutting of the Carignan-Sedan Mezieres railway system, and the cutting or threatening of the northern system through Liege.

The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was preliminary to the main operation, which commenced on September 26. In the main operation the First American Army advanced in and east of the Argonne forest. The Fourth French Army, in whose sector the Blanc Mont operation occurred, advanced west of the forest. Thus a successful advance by both armies would lessen German resistance in the difficult country covered by the woods.

When the Germans were thrown back in the first battle of the Marne in 1914, the line stabilized in Champagne about halfway between Souain (5 kilometers north of Suippes) and Somme-Py. It passed through Navarin Farm and it was in this vicinity that the 21st Corps of the Fourth French Army attacked when the Meuse-Argonne operation started on September 26.

The French, prior to their attack in this quarter, had called upon Gen Pershing for assistance, and the orders transferring the two divisions that later on participated in it were issued by general headquarters on September 23.

Attacking September 26 on the Navarin Farm line, the 21st French Corps had succeeded in advancing about 5 kilometers, forcing the Germans to abandon their successive lines until, on September 30, the latter were holding the rearmost line of the main position. North of Somme-Py this line consisted of the Prussian, Elbe, and Essen trenches and it was the resistance offered by these trenches that had stopped the French advance when the 2d American Division relieved them here on the night of October 1-2.

The 2d Division had participated in the St. Mihiel offensive, September 12-15, 1918. On the night of September 15-16 the division marched from its position in the front line of the Thiaucourt sector to the Ansaerville-Royaumeix area, 12 kilometers north of Toul.

On September 20 and 21 the division marched to the vicinity of Toul, where it reorganized and received new clothing and equipment.

On September 23 the chief of staff, First Army, sent a telegram to the 2d Division informing it that it would proceed to a new area, and on the same date issued Special Order 285, which prescribed the details of the move. The movement was made by rail (except motor transport by marching) starting on September 25 and terminating on September 28. A special order, Fourth French Army, directed detrainment near Chalons, where the division passed into the reserve of the Group of Armies of the Center (G.A.C.)

On September 23 the 36th Division, which was undergoing training in the Bar-sur-Aube area and which had not yet been in line, was notified by wire from First Army headquarters that it would proceed to a new area. Special Order 286 prescribed the details of the movement which was made by rail. The divisional artillery was not serving with the division at this time and did not join it until after the armistice. The strength of the 36th Division on September 26 was 656 officers and 15,590 enlisted. Besides a shortage of 20 per cent in strength, there was lacking a great deal of equipment, which was only partially supplied upon the arrival of the division in the battle area. The movement commenced on September 26 and terminated on September 28. The division then occupied billets south of the Marne River between Epernay Chalons, where it formed a part of the reserve of the

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French Group of Armies of the Center. For purposes of supply it was attached to the Fifth French Army.

On September 28 the 2d Division was placed in the reserve of the Fourth French Army and on September 29-30 moved by marching and trucks to the Souain-Suippes area, 10 kilometers south of Somme-Py, where the Fourth Army was, with little success, attacking the German line.

On October 1 orders from the Fourth French Army assigned the 2d Division to the 21st French Corps, and orders from the latter directed the division to relieve the 61st French Division in the front line. The relief was effected the night of October 1-2. The 4th Brigade (5th and 6th Marines) occupied the front line trenches just north of Somme-Py between the Boyau de Custrine (right) and Boyau de Bromberg (left), a front of over 3 kilometers. The 5th Marines relieved the 219th and 265th French Infantry; the 6th Marines, the 264th French Infantry and a battalion of the 21st French Division which was on the left of the 61st French Division.

The formation of the brigade in line was as follows:

LEFT	;	RIGHT.
2d Battalion 6th Marines and 81st Machine Gun Company.	;	1st Battalion 5th Marines and Regimental Machine Gun Company.
1st Battalion 6th Marines and Regimental Machine Gun Company.	;	2d Battalion 5th Marines and 23d Machine Gun Company.
3d Battalion 6th Marines and 15th Machine Gun Company	;	3d Battalion 5th Marines and 77th Machine Gun Company.

The Front line lay in the German trenches Pacha, Elbe, and Essen. On the right of the sector the 4th Brigade occupied the Essen trench, which had been a support trench when the German front line ran through Navarin Farm, 5 kilometers to the south. It was practically the rearmost trench of the German main line, the next trenches to the north being along the Blanc Mont ridge, 3 kilometers farther back. On the left of the sector west of the Boyau de la Pirna the Germans still occupied the Essen trench to include a bend in this half a kilometer to the west of the American boundary. This bend occupied an elevation from which flanking fire was delivered on the Americans in their initial advance, which greatly retarded the operations of the division. It was known to the Americans as "Essen Hook."

The 3d Brigade (9th and 23d Infantry) was placed in reserve south of the Navarin Farm ridge.

The artillery of the 61st French Division remained in place. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade moved into the sector October 1. Both came under the 2d Division when the command passed at 8 a.m., October 2/

Divisional Headquarters were established at 8 a.m., October 2d, in a dugout (Wagram) on the Souain-Somme-Py road 1 kilometer north of Souain.

The relief of the 61st French Division by the 2d Division was made on verbal orders, the written orders not arriving at 4th Brigade headquarters until 4.40 a.m. - after the relief was effected.

The 2d Division, after taking its position in line, was the left (west) division of the 21st French Corps. The 67th French Division was on its right and the 21st French Division on its left.

A general attack had been contemplated for October 2d, but it was postponed until the 3d, and the day of the 2d and the night of the 2d-3d was devoted to clearing out those portions of Essen trench still occupied by the Germans. This was accomplished easily, as the Germans withdrew from the front of the 4th Brigade during the night, allowing the 5th Marines to occupy Essen trench north of Somme-Py without difficulty, while the 6th Marines lost 15 men by fire from Essen Hook.

Field Orders No. 35, which prescribed the attack of the 2d Division on October 3, was issued at 11 p.m. October 2. The proposed plans had been discussed by the division and brigade commanders the afternoon of October 2. The written order did not reach 4th Brigade headquarters until 4.40 a.m. October 3, and the commanding officer of the leading battalion of the 6th Marines did not receive his copy until 11 hour and did not read it until he had attained his objective.

The division was to attack with both brigades in line, 3d Brigade and 3d Battalion French tanks on right, 4th Brigade and 2d Battalion French tanks on left; each brigade in column of regiments, the leading regiment in three lines of one battalion each, and the rear regiment in reserve. The division objective was the road from (exclusive) to Blanc Mont (inclusive) with an outpost line a kilometer in advance of the road.¹

2A.

¹ At 6.20 p.m. October 2, G-3, 2d Division, received the following message from Lieut. White, liaison officer with the 21st French Division: "The 21st Division attacks the enemy on its front to-morrow at 5.30 a.m. supported by tanks. Its immediate objectives are at Elbe trench and the Essen trench. It was stopped by the Essen trench, which it has been attacking to-day" In other words, the objective of the 21st French Division was 2 kilometers in rear of the objective of the 2d Division.

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The 2d Field Artillery Brigade assisted by the artillery of the 61st French Division was to support the attack by a preparation of 5 minutes, a creeping barrage to 300 meters beyond the objective, a standing barrage of 30 minutes on this line after the arrival of the left brigade on the objective, or until H plus 2 hours and 38 minutes, and a creeping barrage to a line 1,300 meters beyond the objective. Here the barrage was to rest until the Infantry outpost line was established. The 252d French Aviation Squadron was attached to the Division.

H hour, originally set for 6:30 a.m., was advanced 40 minutes and the troops moved out at 5:50 a.m. The artillery preparation was made 15 minutes longer than originally ordered, or 20 minutes in all, commencing at 5:30 a.m.

The 4th Brigade's parallel of departure was the Essen trench, which it was already occupying, the 5th Marines on the right and the 6th Marines on the left. At H hour the 6th Marines were to advance while the 5th Marines, waiting until the 6th should clear, were to move by the left flank and follow in their rear as reserve.

The "jump off" was a much more difficult matter for the 3d Brigade, which was some 7 kilometers in rear of its designated parallel of departure, to which place it had to proceed by a night march. This parallel, which was designated as "Present front on the general line: 03.1.0-Altona" (northeast corner Bois-des-Pins - Altona), lay in territory still in the enemy's hands, though that fact was unknown when the order was issued. A staff officer of the 170th French Division had promised to furnish guides who were to meet the brigade near Butte-de-Souain (in the Bois du Moineau and Clairière des Aimees), but these guides failed to appear. The result of this was that the 3d Brigade spent most of the night of October 2-3 in getting to the position from which the attack was delivered; and when it finally got there, it was not the position ordered by Field Orders No.35, but one-half a kilometer in rear of it, north of the Essen trench and east of the Somme-Py - Medeah Farm road. Most of the brigade arrived only a few minutes before H hour. At 3.07 a.m. October 3 the chief of staff received the following message from Gen. Ely, commanding the 3d Brigade:

Units in place as follows: Two battalions 9th in communication with other battalion of 9th. Not in communication with 23d. Guides did not report at points given by staff officer of 170th French Division.

The 24d Infantry, after failing to find the guides near the Butte de Souain, had struck out across country in an effort to reach its position. Shortly before H hour officers from the reconnaissance party located the regiment and at H hour the regimental commander, Col. Stuart, reported his regiment in position ready to advance.

According to Field Orders No.35, the right of the 4th Brigade was to start from a point in the Essen trench (82.81) just east of the Somme-Py-St. Etienne road, while the left of the 3d Brigade was to start from "Altona", 2 kilometers to the northeast. The 3d Brigade really started from a line one-half kilometer in rear of the one indicated, but nevertheless a gap of over a kilometer existed between the two brigades who were to converge on the objective. This might have proved a dangerous operation had the Germans not withdrawn quite generally from the front of the 2d Division before the attack started. As it turned out the two brigades joined on the objective and the Germans who remained in the pocket were captured.

The 3d Brigade advanced with the 9th Infantry leading and the 23d Infantry in reserve. The 67th French Division attacked on its right. The first objective, the road from Medeah Farm to the crossroads 2 kilometers to the southwest (73.11) was taken at 8:30 a.m. and outposts were established on the northern slope of Blanc Mont-Medeah Farm ridge.

The 67th French Division on the right connected with the 3d Brigade slightly in advance of Medeah Farm, its line including Bois du Chien. Connection was also made with the Marines on the left.

Casualties were few.

At 10.15 a.m. a battalion of the 23d Infantry was placed at the disposal of Maj. Baker, of the 5th Marines, to resist a counterattack. This attack did not develop and the battalion rejoined its regiment.

At 10:30 a.m. Gen. Ely reported by phone to G3:

Third Brigade objective reached at 8:30 a.m. and consolidated by 9th Infantry. A battalion of 23d Infantry sent forward about 1 kilometer as outpost.

When the 2d Division entered the line on the night of Oct. 1-2, the 4th Brigade occupied the entire front of the division sector. Field Order No.35, 2d Division, directed the attack of Oct 3 to be made in column of regiments in each brigade, the 4th Brigade parallel of

departure to extend from the crossroads (82.81), 1 kilometer northwest of Somme-Py, to the Bpyau de Bromberg. This was a front of a little more than a kilometer and lay in the sector of the 6th Marines which led the advance followed by the 5th Marines, in reserve. Each regiment was in three lines a battalion in each line and a machine gun company attached to each battalion. To the leading (2d) battalion of the 6th Marines was attached a French company of 12 light tanks and one was also attached to the following battalion (1st).

The troops advanced at 5:30 a.m., and by 8:30 were on their objective, but Blanc Mont itself was still controlled by the Germans, who occupied the woods on the western slope and had not been dislodged. This territory lay within the sector of the French who were still south of the Elbe and Essen trenches. The French tanks moved forward with the leading battalions. The advance was opposed by machine-gun nests in front and in the triangular area between the brigades, which space had not been covered in the attack. It was later cleaned up by the 4th Marines, assisted by two companies of the 3d Brigade. Before reaching the objective the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, came up on the right of the leading (second) battalions, and both advanced together to the objective.

The greatest obstacle to the advance of the 4th Brigade was the German possession of Essen Hook. This was a system of trenches and dugouts forming a part of the Elbe and Essen line--the rearmost line of the main German position. The Hook formed a bend to the north in the line and was located on a hill 20 meters above the country across which the 4th Brigade was ordered to advance and one half kilometer to the west of its sector. It flanked this country perfectly and the left of each battalion suffered from the machine guns located on the Hook. The French had unsuccessfully attacked this position of the line on October 2, in an effort to expel the Germans from Essen trench. On October 3, the 21st French Division renewed the operation and at 7:45 AM was attacking Essen Trench. At about 8:30 a.m., the French were still fighting in the Saale and Minden trenches just south and west of Essen Hook, and a platoon of 5th Marines and some French tanks were reported to be assisting them from the 2d Division sector.

The platoon of the 5th Marines mentioned above was in reality the 17th Company, 5th Marines, reinforced by a section from the 8th Machine Gun company and a 37-millimeter gun. This detachment belonged to the 1st (rear) battalion of the 5th Marines, and early on October 3 was ordered to clean out the Hook after the other five battalions of the brigade had advanced beyond the trenches. The Hook was captured and turned over to the French, along with about 100 prisoners, before 11 a.m., and the detachment rejoined its battalion.

The French did not retain possession of the Hook, and the Germans re-occupied it the afternoon of October 3.

At 5:10 p.m., the chief of staff, 2d Division, informed Col Lay, information officer with 21st French Corps, that the 2d Division was under artillery fire from the west and that the 21st French Division had not advanced beyond Essen Trench and requested that orders be given it to do so. At 7:45 p.m., Lieut White reports the 21st Division line to be running north from (and including) Essen Hook to some patches of woods one-half kilometer northwest of the Hook, and to be in communication with the Americans 1 kilometer north of the Hook. As a matter of fact the French line did not include Essen Hook, but ran northwest from the Hook which was still occupied by the Germans the night of October 3-4. This retarded the operations of the 4th Brigade on October 3, and enabled the Germans to cling to the ~~western~~ eastern slopes of Blanc Mont, from which the 4th Brigade had to dislodge them on October 4; from here they fell back to St Etienne line, where they made a second stand until October 11.

The second attack on the afternoon of October 3 was made pursuant to instructions from Gen. Naulin, commanding the 21st Corps, which directed the 2d Division to advance, leaving one battalion to support the left. Gen. Naulin then knew that the 2d Division had gained its first objective. A message to the 2d Div from the information officer with the 21st French Div at 11:20 am., stated that the latter division had taken the German trenches in its front and was advancing northward.

The attack was ordered by F.O. 36, 2d Div., issued at 4 PM which prescribed merely that two brigades should move forward from their present positions to a line extending from the road fork about 1 kilometer SW of Scay Farm to a point on Blanc Mont-St Etienne road about 1 km south of that village, there to establish and hold a line of resistance. The 2d FA Brig was to support the movement, but a battalion of the 35th French Arty that supported the first attack was withdrawn from the control of the 2d Div during the second attack in order to assist the French attack against Essen trench.

H hour was given as 4PM, but the 23d Inf which made the attack in the 3d Brig sector, did not pass through the 9th Inf until 5PM, and the attack proper was made by the 1st Bn at 6PM. Some distance was gained and the leading bn reached the high ground southeast of St Etienne, where it occupied a salient with both flanks exposed. This position was in the 4th Brigade sector, as the dividing line between brigades ran just to the east of hill 160, which was the high ground, occupied.

In the 5th Brig the advance prescribed by FO 36 was made by the 5th Marines which passed through the 6th, and was able to advance only about 1½ kms where it hung on under fire. Two companies of the 6th Marines were ordered up to protect the left flank.

At midnight the line of the 2d Div was approximately as follows: The 9th Inf on the road from Medeah Farm to the crossroads 2 kms to the SW. The 23d Inf between this road and the hill 1 km SE of St. Etienne. The leading bn on this hill was over 2 kms in advance of the 9th Inf and not in communication with either the French 67th Div on the right or the 4th Brig on the left. The 5th Marines a little north of the Blanc Mont ridge road NE of Blanc Mont. The 6th Marines south of Blanc Mont Ridge, road. The left of the 4th Brig line was refused because of the Germans still on the western slopes, of Blanc Mont.

The area occupied by the Inf was a triangle, its base line from Medeah Farm to the southeastern slope of Blanc Mont and its apex the hill 1 km SE of St. Etienne. The difficulty of this position is evident, as on the right the French had not advanced as far as Medeah Farm and on the left they were still south of Blanc Mont.

On Oct 3 the 36th Div was transferred from the reserve of the Group of Armies of the Center to the reserve of the 4th French Army effective on Oct 4.

On the night Oct 4-5 the 71st Inf Brig and the 111th FS Bn were transferred by truck from the region Tours-sur-Marne to the Suippes-Somme-Suippe area.

FO 37, 2d Div issued at 6 AM, Oct 4, directed a resumption of the advance to the north. The designation at H hour was postponed until aeroplanes should report as to the position of the divisions on the flanks--whether or not these divisions were abreast of the 2d Div.

At daybreak Oct 4, the Germans counterattacked the 23d Inf in its advanced position and were repulsed. This regiment also suffered considerably from fire in therear, from machine guns that had been passed by during its advance of the previous evening or that had slipped thro the line. At 2 PM the 1st Bn was holding the front in some old German trenches SE of St. Etienne while the 3d Bn and a part of the 2d were protecting the flanks. Connection with the 67th French Div on the right had not been established, but the 5th Marines advancing along the Somme Py-St Etienne road north of Blanc Mont during the morning had relieved the situation on that flank.

During the night Oct 3-4 the 22d French Div relieved the 21st French Div S of Blanc Mont. The 22d Div advanced the morning of Oct 4 along the Boyaux Beyreuth and Nuremburg; it did not take as its objective the western slopes of Blanc Mont, which were still occupied by the Germans, but bore away toward the NW. At about 10AM, a bn of the 22d Div was arriving at the St. Pierre-St Etienne road, and other French troops were approaching the Arne river to the northwest of St. Pierre. Thus the advance of this division did not immediately relieve the situation on the left flank of the 4th Brig altho it undoubtedly made the Germans on Blanc Mont apprehensive as they were now occupying a salient position and this made the final operations against the hill much easier for the 4th Brig.

The 67th Division (French) on the right of the 3d Brig also advanced the morning of October 4, but was stopped before noon on the line Orfeuil-Bemont Vhateau. This division seems to have been in communication with

with the 9th Inf near Meheah Farm; but not with the 23d Inf in its advanced position.

At about 12:30 PM, the division commander, 2d Div designated H hour as 2:30 PM. The 1st Bn 23d Inf, which was occupying a salient position southeast of St. Etienne advanced toward the ridge NE of the village. This attack was not supported on either flank, as the 4th Brig. did not advance at all, and the French 67th Div. fighting south of Bement Chateau was too far away to render assistance. The attacking waves came immediately under heavy machine gun fire as well as a counter barrage. Casualties were numerous, the bn commander was killed, and after an advance of only 300 yards, the battalion withdrew to its former position in the German trenches SE of St. Etienne.

The attack ordered by FO 37, 2d Div for Oct 4, was not carried out by the 4th Brig because "it was considered inadvisable to advance leaving the machine gun nests on the western slopes of Blanc Mont intact." Some operations were undertaken against these nests without much success. The 4th Brig commander reports that they were reconnoitered the afternoon of Oct 4 and unsuccessfully attacked during the evening. The reconnaissance evidently involved some hard fighting. At 2:20 PM the regimental commander, 4th Marines ~~dephytsh~~ "Marines badly shot up", and requests artillery fire north of Blanc Mont. At 2:40 PM the adjutant, 4th Brigade reports Marines held up by fire from east end of Blanc Mont and at 3:05 PM the division information officer with the 4th Brig reports that machine gun nests on west end of Blanc Mont are causing heavy casualties in 4th Brigade.

At 3 PM the chief of Staff, 2d Division informed G3 21st French Corps, that the 2d Div was unable to advance because the divisions on its flanks had failed to keep abreast and that the 22d French Div on the left had advanced west instead of north. He also told him that the 2d Div could not maintain its position north of Blanc Mont and Medeah Farm, unless its flanks were covered.

Late in the afternoon, however, the situation on the western slopes of Blanc Mont eased up somewhat. At 4 PM the resistance there had ceased and the 6th Marines were advancing, having cleaned up the machine guns, in this the 17th French Inf assisted.

At 9:05 PM the regimental comdr 6th Marines reports a gap of 400 to 500 yds between his regiment and the 22d French Div and the information officer with the 22d ~~xxxxx~~ Div reports that at 5:40 PM the division is in communication with the Marines at a point 400 meters north of Blanc Mont.

At midnight Oct 4, the situation in the 3d Bde was practically the same as on Oct 3. In the 4th Brig the 5th Marines were still on the Blanc Mont-Medeah Farm ridge, their right near the crossroads on the Somme-Py-St. Etienne road and their left refused so as to face the eastern slopes of Blanc Mont. The 6th Marines had passed Blanc Mont and were in communication with the 22d French Div which was near St. Pierre. The Germans still held the crest and eastern slopes of Blanc Mont but they were practically surrounded there. They held St. Etienne, whence they had driven back patrols of the 23d Inf. In the front of the 2d Div, the Germans were holding a line from St. Etienne through the cemetery to the east.

At 11 PM the 3d Bn 341st French FA was placed at the disposal of the 2d Div.

FO 38, 2d Div issued at 4 am., Oct 5 directed the division to continue its advance toward the same objective given in FO 37-Machault-Vauroy. H hr was not given, and at 9:05 a.m., the division commander in a telephone conversation with the division commander, of the 3d Brig said "H hr will not be given". In the same conversation he describes the cleaning up of Blanc Mont and says that all the 2d Div will do on Oct 5 will be to keep abreast of the French Divs on the flanks-that no formal attacks will take place. Thus, FO 38, was practically revoked as far as the 3d Brig was concerned. The 23d Inf made no attempt to advance. At 3:40 PM the line of the 3d Brig extended 2 km SE of St. Etienne to SE Medeah Farm practically the same as on Oct 4. The 23d Inf was still occupying the right of the 4th Brigades sector at 4:05 PM.

At 6:15 a.m. October 5, the 3d Bn 6th Marines, attacked the German machine guns on Blanc Mont and with no casualties carried the hill and captured 209 prisoners, besides much materiel, including 75 machine guns and trench mortars. The bloodless character of this enterprise was due to the efficient artillery preparation by the 2d Field Artillery Brigade.

This operation was preliminary to the advance prescribed by FO 38, the provisions of which could not have been carried out as long as the Germans occupied the Blanc Mont.

The operation report of the 4th Brig states that pursuant to FO No 38, the 4th Brig attacked in the direction Machault- Cauroy on the afternoon of Oct 5. The 6th Marines passed thru the 5th Marines, the 2d Bn leading, and the attack was stopped by machine gun fire 2 kms SE of St Etienne, where the troops dug in. The records do not show that H hour was designated to the 4th Brig and it is probable that this movement was in line with Gen Lejeunes intention not to make any formal attacks on Oct 5, but merely to keep his line abreast of the French Divisions on the flanks. This advance relieved the situation on the left of the 23d Infantry which had been occupying an advanced position, partly in the 4th Brigs sector, since October 3.

On the right of the 2d Div the French 73d Div attacked at 5:15 a.m. October 5, and at 6:10 A.M., had reached Wallmuller Lager, about 1 km NE of Medeah Farm. Here it was stopped and then fell back to its line of departure. The 170th Div (French) was then put in at 11 am., evidently without success, as at 8:25 pm., the information officer with the French reports to G3 that the French hope for success and will do their best. Gen Naulin, comdg the 21st Corps, was evidently apprehensive about the situation on the right of the 2d Div. In a message to Gen Lejeune at 12:40 pm, he tells him that a French div had been ordered to send assistance to the 73d Div and he requests the 2d Div not to hesitate to engage its reserves on that flank. The right flank of the 3d Brig was still resting on Medeah Farm the evening of Oct 5.

On the left of the 2d Div the French situation was more favorable. The 22d Div advanced with little opposition at 6 a.m., and 10:55 a.m. had reached St. Pierre-a-Arnes, its right extending about 1 km toward St Etienne. This it was able to do because Blanc Mont had been cleared of the Germans machine guns. At 3:40 PM St Etienne was erroneously reported captured. While patrols may have entered the western part of the village on Oct 5, there was fighting back and forth in the town and cemetery on Oct-5-6-7 and the place was not definitely taken until Oct 8. However, the advance of the 22d Div brought the French line abreast of the 2d Div so that at 1:45 PM the two divs were in communication about one half km S of St. Etienne.

At 3 pm the 4th MG Bn until then in reserve received orders to report to the 3d Brig. Company B was sent to the 23d Inf and Co A was held at Brigade Headquarters.

The line of the 3d Brigade was unchanged the night of Oct-5-6. The 4th Brig had advanced on its line so that it connected with the 23d INF on the ridge SE of St. Etienne, whence it extended west and connected with the French about one half km S of that village.

The French 22d Div had experienced so little opposition in its advance that it believed the same conditions existed on the 2d Divs front. The 118th French Inf finding nothing in front as it to the west of St. Etienne, sent a message at 4:55 PM to the 2d Div recommending that the latter advance also, as probably little resistance would be met. The events of Oct 6-7 were to prove that the German main effort was directed against the 2d Div front, as this division was the most dangerous to the German plan of withdrawal.

The 71st Inf Brigade and the 111th FS Bn of the 36th American Div were placed at the disposal of the 21st French Corps at 8 a.m., Oct 5. On October 6, they were placed at the disposal of the 2d Division. The remainder of the 36th Division (less artillery) was on Oct 6 and 7 moved by marching to the Suippes area.

The 36th Division during its operations in Champagne was short a large amount of transportation. This shortage was supplied in part by the French and in part by the 2d Division, but at all times its movements were hampered.

JWV/bmmad

On October 6 the only fighting consisting of small local actions in which the line was slightly advanced. These local actions involved an Attack of 6:30 a.m. by the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, on machine-gun nests southeast of St. Etienne, which were captured at 9:30 a.m., thus cleaning up the country south of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road. The 23d Infantry also participated in this attack, which the 3d Brigade commander states was necessary because during the attacks on October 3-5 a part of the 22d Infantry had gotten into the Marine sector, and when moved out of it the night of October 5-6 in compliance with division orders, the vacated space was not occupied promptly by the Marines; the Germans therefore came back and delivered flanking fire from the west on the 3d Brigade. The result of this attack was to bring the front of the 2d Division up to the General line of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, which is where the 71st Brigade relieved it the night of October 6-7. The line was not continuous, nor were the troops sheltered, except in shell holes or foxholes made by the men themselves. Neither did it follow the road exactly but departed from it at places by several hundred meters. On the right the line connected with the 73d French Division northwest of Medeah Farm, and on the left with the 7th French Division about one-half kilometer south of St. Etienne. The Germans still occupied the cemetery and the eastern part of St. Etienne, and the French line was bent around it to the west and north.

The relief of the front line of the 2d Division by the 71st Brigade was effected the night of October 6-7, pursuant to Field Order No. 39, 2d Division, which directed the 3d and 4th Brigades to leave one battalion in each brigade sector until further orders. The brigade machine-gun battalions, Stokes mortar, and the 37 millimeter detachments were to remain for 24 hours with the incoming brigade. Mortars and 37 millimeter guns were to be turned over to the 71st Brigade when the 2d Division personnel withdrew.

The 71st Brigade, which had had a difficult march on October 6 from Somme-Suippes to south of Somme-Py, started for the front line at 5:30 p.m. Guides from the 2d Division were to have met it in Somme-Py, but some did not turn up and those that did were not well acquainted with the country. The result was that the entire night was spent by the troops in marching and counter-marching through the rough country between Somme-Py and the front line. By daylight, however, all troops were in position except the Headquarters Company of the 142d Infantry, which wandered around until afternoon.

The 141st Infantry relieved the 23d Infantry, which withdrew to the Pylone Hill. The 9th Infantry was left in line, each of its battalions being put alongside a corresponding battalion of the 141st Infantry, which had its 1st Battalion in front, 2d Battalion in support, and 3d in reserve. The 142d Infantry relieved the 6th Marines, putting its 2d Battalion in front, its 1st in support, and its 3d in reserve. The 6th Marines withdrew to Blanc Mont ridge and the 5th Marines remained in support. Companies B and C, 132d Machine Gun Battalion, were attached to the 141st Infantry, and Companies A and D to the 142d Infantry.

The commanding general, 3d Brigade, retained command of his brigade sector. At 12:10 p.m. October 7 he informed the commanding general, 71st Brigade of the fact and directed that the sector, which included the 141st Infantry, be extended 500 yards to the right so as to take over ground held by the French. This anomalous state of affairs might have had serious consequences but it does not seem to have done so.

No fighting occurred in the American Front on October 7. The time was utilized in reorganizing the line with the 71st Brigade, in the front line, and making arrangements for the next attack, which all knew to be impending.

During the day conflicting reports were received as to the possession of St. Etienne by the French. The information officer with the 22d French Division reports that the Germans took the town in a fog at 6:20 a.m., but that the French recaptured it at 8:30. The town is reported to be occupied by Germans before 8:40 a.m. These two reports agree, but at 11:50 a.m. a patrol of the 6th Marines was fired on from cemetery and western (eastern?) edge of the town and at 1:15 a.m. the 6th Marines reported that they estimated 200 Germans in St. Etienne and more coming over the hill. They believed that the Germans were trying to filter into the town and drive the remaining French out. The 21st Corps believed that the French held the town, as it sent two messages to the 2d Division requesting the latter to take it over. The facts are that the Germans held the cemetery and the greater part of St. Etienne while the French had a precarious footing in the western part of it.

During the afternoon reports were received that the Germans were digging in 1 1/2 kilometers northeast of St. Etienne, and that they were massing in the woods northeast of the town. Also that their heavy artillery had been ordered back and that the infantry was to make a two days' stand. There was every indication that the Germans intended to hold on a line running from St. Etienne through the cemetery and thence to the northeast along the ridge toward Semide.

The 7th French Division relieved the 22d on the left of the 2d Division the night of October 7-8.

The attack of October 8 was made pursuant to Field Order No. 40, 2d Division², which prescribed an advance in the direction Machault-Cauroy. The infantry attack was to be made by the 71st Brigade on the front it was occupying. The 2d Division was to constitute the reserve and furnish the troops for flank protection and connection with adjacent divisions. Two battalions of French tanks were assigned to the 71st Brigade. The 36th Division had no artillery, and the 2d Field Artillery Brigade with attached French Artillery (29th, 341st, 452d F.A.) was to support the attack. The written order was issued at 11 p.m. October 7, but on the afternoon of the 7th the commanding general of the 71st Brigade was summoned to the 2d Division headquarters where he received verbal orders for the attack.

The field order issued by the 71st Brigade for the attack on October 8 was practically a copy of Field Order No. 40, 2d Division,³ except that the tasks of the two infantry regiments were prescribed. These were to attack in column of battalions, which were to "leapfrog" as each successive objective was gained, the leading battalion becoming the rear battalion after the first objective was gained, the second battalion becoming the leading one, and the rear one becoming the second, etc.

H hour was designated as 5:15 a.m.

The commanding general, 71st Brigade, assembled his regimental commanders during the evening of October 7, discussed the plans for the attack, and issued a warning order. He dismissed them about 9 p.m. and they returned to their headquarters and assembled the battalion commanders, who after receiving their orders returned to battalion headquarters and assembled the company commanders. All orders were based upon the verbal instructions given to Gen.

Whitworth at 2d Division headquarters, as Field Order No. 40 (with a memorandum giving H hour attached) did not reach the 71st Brigade until after midnight and Field Order No. 1, 71st Brigade (with Field Order No. 40 attached), was not sent out until 3 a.m. and apparently got no farther than regimental headquarters. The result of all this was that the company commanders received verbal orders that had been four times verbally transmitted, those of the 141st Infantry (except Company A) receiving them between 1 and 3 a.m., while the 142d Infantry did not receive theirs until about 5 a.m. H hour seems to have reached the troops just before the attack was to start. The leading battalion of the 141st Infantry received it at about 5:11 a.m. The battalion commander of the leading battalion of the 142d Infantry was still giving his instruction to his company commanders when the barrage started.

The 141st Infantry attacked in the sector formerly occupied by the 3d Brigade (right of the division sector). The leading battalion (1st) started on time, and immediately encountered heavy artillery and machine gun fire. The battalion commander was killed. However, the troops advanced a short distance north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, where they were definitely stopped.

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 141st Infantry, followed the 1st in the order named. Neither was ready to move at H hour - the 2d because the battalion commander decided to shift his companies in line at the last moment, and the 3d because of the failure of the companies to receive notification of H hour. Both battalions soon became disorganized. However, groups of them kept on and joined the 1st Battalion, north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road. Here the regiment hung on the rest of the day. Company A, 141st Infantry, had been on the

² In the records of the 36th Division this order appears as F.O. 39. The 2d Div. issued two field orders numbered 39, and subsequently renumbered the second one "40", but this change was not made in the copies sent to the 36th Division.

³ F.O. 40, 2d Div, is made a part of F.O. 1, 71st Brigade, by notations such as the following: "As per F.O. 40, Headquarters 2d Div attached." This necessitated distributing the divisional field order to all who received the brigade order, which is not only likely to be confusing but dangerous if the former should be lost or not received.

extreme right of the battalion sector prior to the attack and runners with orders had failed to reach it. Nevertheless, it advanced shortly after H hour also to a position north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, where it seems to have formed some kind of flank protection for the advanced elements of the regiment.

The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, which had been designated to connect the 71st Brigade and the 73d French Division, had become considerably involved. At 8:40 a.m. its commanding officer reported that the 141st Infantry had been stopped, that his losses were heavy, and that he must have assistance, and at 9 a.m. he asked for relief. The French 73d Division is reported to have advanced and then retired through the line of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry. This report is not substantiated, but it is true that they did not advance sufficiently to better conditions on the right of the 71st Brigade. At 11:14 a.m. the information officer with the 73d Division reported that the French line extended west from Bois du Coq, which would be a prolongation of the line to which the fragments of the 141st Infantry were clinging.

At 2:40 p.m. the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers, reported to his regimental commander that the battalion had relieved a battalion of the 9th Infantry and stated that the American line was ahead of the French line. A company of the 4th Machine Gun Battalion was also placed at the disposal of the Engineer Battalion, which took over the duties of flank protection and connection between 71st Brigade and 73d French Division.

A battalion of French tanks was assigned to the 141st Infantry. The following report as to their operations is an extract from the History of the 36th Division:

It was about this time (6:30 a.m.) that the tanks attached to the regiment came into action. *** Their commanding officer, however, had not learned the time of H hour, as the runner who was sent to him with the information did not reach his post of command. In consequence the tanks did not begin their advance on time and first made their appearance on the left flank of the 141st Infantry some 15 minutes after the 2d Battalion had started the assault. They seem to have given some little assistance to various detachments of the 2d Battalion as it came forward, but as there was no liaison between the infantry and the tanks, and as the latter seemed to have no concerted plan of action their assistance was negligible * * * Worst of all, * * * they twice fired into that detachment (3d Battalion Headquarters and group of B Company), killing and wounding quite a number of men. * * * All the tanks shortly thereafter left the field. * * * During the course of the following afternoon (Oct 8) with the consent of the commanding officer, 141st Infantry, the tanks were withdrawn entirely from action.

The 141st Infantry had a hard time on Oct 8, but the 142d had a harder. To begin with, the company commanders did not receive their orders until about 5 a.m. - too late to allow them to digest the orders properly and transmit them to their companies. Consequently the advance was from 5 to 15 minutes late in starting, which largely nullified the effects of the artillery barrage.

The 2d Battalion advancing northwest fought its way past Hill 160. After it had overcome the German resistance on the Hill 160 ridge, the principal obstacle to the battalion's advance was the cemetery at the northeastern corner of St. Etienne, which was a mass of machine gun nests dug among and through the graves, and which had a field of fire of from 500 to 1,000 meters through an arc of 180 degrees from southwest to northeast. Parts of the battalion finally arrived on the St. Etienne-Semide road about 1 kilometer northeast of St. Etienne. Here it was joined by portions of the other battalions and a line was established which seems to have extended from the northeastern corner of St. Etienne, through the cemetery toward Semide. Here the troops dug in. The left of the line was secured at first by the French 7th Division, whose line at 10:20 a.m. was northwest of St. Etienne, and later on by the occupation of the town by American troops. But the right was absolutely uncovered, as a gap of more than 2 kilometers existed between the 142d and 141st Infantry Regiments, and moreover, the latter's most advanced elements were more than a kilometer in rear. This fact, and the disorganization of the troops caused the withdrawal of the 142d Infantry during the late afternoon to the ridge through Hill 160. Communication with the French 7th Division was established through the American troops in and north of St. Etienne, but connection with the 141st Infantry was not obtained until the next day.

The tanks attached to the 142d Infantry rendered no more service than those with the 141st Infantry. The tank commander was killed early in the morning while the infantry was attacking Hill 160, and one tank disabled. The others then withdrew.

St. Etienne itself does not seem to have caused much difficulty during the fighting on October 8. A platoon of Company 1, 142d Infantry, is reported to have entered the town during the morning, established connection with the French, "who were found there in light force," and to have remained there the remainder of the day. A patrol of the 142d Infantry probably entered St. Etienne, but the town can not be said to have been in American possession until about 11 a.m., when the 1st Battalion 6th Marines, which was designated for liaison duty on the left of the 71st Brigade, entered the town without difficulty. Two of the companies of this battalion attempted to occupy trenches to the north of the town, but were unable to do so, whereupon they fell back on the other two companies and occupied trenches to the south, connecting with the 7th French Division. At 4.40 p.m. the American line included St. Etienne. The evening of October 8, a battalion of the 2d Engineers reinforced the Marine battalion.

The 71st Brigade had been roughly handled in its first active service. Its losses from all causes--killed, wounded, missing, and gassed--amounted to 75 officers and 1,314 enlisted men, a percentage of 33 for officers and 23 for enlisted. These losses were high, and appeared higher. Exaggeration of losses always occurs especially in new troops, and this action was no exception. At 8.45 a.m. a message from the 71st Brigade to G-3 states that the losses had been 50 per cent. This and other discouraging reports caused considerable apprehension as to the safety of the right flank of the 71st Brigade, and the brigade commander requested that the 72d Brigade and 131st Machine Gun Battalion be ordered to reinforce him. Gen. Lejeune repeated this request to the 21st Corps, at the same time telling Gen. Whitworth that he had ordered Gen. Ely to put in everything he had. In the meantime the 71st Brigade had stopped advancing, and as the Germans did not counter attack, reinforcements were unnecessary.

The failure of the 71st Brigade is not fully explained by its heavy losses. The chief of Staff of the 36th Division states that the failure of the attack was largely due to the fact that the line of departure was given as the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, whereas the true line was generally some distance in rear of that road; the artillery barrage thus left untouched the advanced German machine-gun groups, which were able to oppose and disorganize the advance of the 71st Brigade from the very beginning of the attack.

The sketch referred to in the Artillery Annex to Field Order No. 40, 2d Division, shows that the barrage came down on a line between 300 and 400 meters north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road. The irregular front line of the 71st Brigade, while it followed the general line of this road, departed from it in places by several hundred meters, and was in advance of it only in the left of the sector. It is therefore certain that a strip several hundred meters wide in front of the 71st Brigade was untouched by the barrage and the events of the battle indicate that the Germans had machine guns in this area. Such a situation was not uncommon during the war, and was usually met by withdrawing the troops from the front line before an attack in order to allow the barrage to cover doubtful territory. Had this been done, the barrage could have been placed as far south of where it actually fell as desired. Why this was not done it is impossible to say, except that haste seems to have characterized this whole attack.

The front line of the 71st Brigade on the night of October 8-9 ran generally east and west from a point about 2 kilometers northwest of Medeah Farm to the western slope of Hill 160. In the sector of the 141st Infantry it was parallel to the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road and about 400 meters north of it. In that of the 142d Infantry it was bent to the north around Hill 160. The line was held by provisional organizations composed of such men as could be assembled. It was not continuous and the two infantry regiments were not in communication. The battalion of the 2d Engineers maintained communication with the 73d French Division on the right, and a battalion of the 6th Marines, reinforced by a Battalion of the 2d Engineers, held St. Etienne and the cemetery and were in communication with the French 7th Division. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The line was supported by the infantry of the 2d Division on Blanc Mont-Medeah Farm ridge.

Instructions received by the commander of the 71st Brigade early on October 9 directed him to rectify his line and organize it in depth; to maintain contact with the enemy and adjacent divisions; to reconnoiter the trench system 800 meters north of St. Etienne and to take it over.

if unoccupied and to prepare to attack it at 10 a.m. if occupied; to prepare to take over entire sector of 2d Division, which was to be withdrawn on the night of October 9-10/

The 71st Brigade, however, was in no condition to attack. It devoted the day to the reorganization of its troops, who were stretched across the divisional sector in a single line without either supports or reserves except those furnished by the 2d Division. There was no mixing of regiments, but within each regimental sector battalions, companies, and platoons had lost all signs of organization. Provisional units were formed, and were placed so as to fill up gaps in the line, rectify it, and secure communication with adjacent units.

The line of the 142d Infantry had been erroneously reported as in rear of that of the 141st Infantry. In order to correct this a provisional battalion of the 142d Infantry, accompanied by a platoon of Stokes mortars and one of machine guns, attempted to advance toward St. Etienne about 11.30 a.m., but did not get far beyond the crest of the Hill 160 ridge. Here it took shelter and waited until night, when it returned to Hill 160. This was the only offensive operation during the day.

There was no change in the position of the 71st Brigade's line of October 9. A battalion of the 2d Engineers still was connecting the 141st Infantry with the French 73d Division on the right. On the left, however, the battalion of the 6th Marines had occupied the trenches 700 meters north of St. Etienne. This left flank information group, composed of Marines and Engineers, was relieved the night of October 9-10 and on October 10 by detachments of the 142d Infantry taken from Hill 160. The front line of the 36th Division then included St. Etienne and the cemetery, two points that had given so much trouble to both French and Americans.

The Fourth French Army "Order of the day," for October 9, stated that the fraction of the 36th Division north of Suippes (the part not already engaged) was placed at the disposal of the 21st Corps, and that it would relieve the 2d Division except artillery. On October 8 the commanding general, 21st Corps, directed the 36th Division to relieve the 2d Division the evening of October 9.

The relief was effected by Field Order No. 41, 2d Division, which prescribed that it should be completed before 5 a.m. October 10. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade, the 2d Engineers, and certain supply and sanitary units and materiel, were to remain with the 36th Division, and the machine guns in the front line and support positions were to remain for 24 hours. Command was to pass to the 36th Division at 10 a.m. October 10.

The 36th Division (less artillery, field signal battalion, and 71st Brigade) at the time of receipt of General Order No. 41, 2d Division, was in the area Suippes-Souain. The 72d Brigade and the 131st Machine Gun Battalion were ordered to concentrate during the day of October 9 in the vicinity of Navarin Farm preparatory to effecting the relief. The signal battalion was already in this vicinity. Thence conducted by guides from the troops to be relieved, they proceeded at 9 p.m. to their respective areas.

The 143d Infantry relieved the 3d Brigade in its support and reserve positions. The 2d and 3d Battalions relieved the 23d Infantry about 2 kilometers southeast of St. Etienne, south of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road and east of the St. Etienne-Somme-Py road. The 1st Battalion took position near Pylone.

The 144th Infantry relieved the 4th Brigade. Its 1st Battalion relieved the 6th Marines southeast of St. Etienne and west of the St. Etienne-Somme-Py road. The 2d and 3d Battalions relieved the 5th Marines just north of Blanc Mont.

Both regiments stated that they were able to obtain but little information from the troops relieved.

Companies C and D, 133d Machine Gun Battalion, were attached to the 143d Infantry, and Companies A and B to the 144th Infantry.

The 72d Brigade headquarters were established about 1½ kilometers southwest of Somme-Py, at the former headquarters of the 4th Brigade.

The relief was completed by 2.30 a.m. October 10, except that the 131st Machine Gun Battalion did not get into position until late the same morning. Company B seems to have been held near headquarters of the 71st Brigade, while Company A was sent north of Medeah Farm as an information group on the right of the 141st Infantry.

Orders issued by the 21st French Corps for October 10 contemplated the cleaning up by the 36th Division of certain trenches 1,200 meters north of St. Etienne. This operation was to commence at 9.30 a.m. October 10, and when the orders for it were received at headquarters of the 71st Brigade the relief of the 2d Division had not been completed. Thus the order, if obeyed, would have necessitated an advance and probably an attack by the 71st Brigade, and its commanding general, believing his brigade not sufficiently recovered from its efforts of November 8, went to headquarters of the 2d Division and had the contemplated attack abandoned.

The command of the sector passed from the 2d to the 36th Division at 10 a.m. October 10, and the 36th Division headquarters was established at the former headquarters of the 2d Division at Somme-Py. The commanding general, 2d Division, and his assistant chief of staff, G-3, remained with the commanding general, 36th Division, for 24 hours longer.

The 2d Division (less the units to remain with the 36th Division)⁴ was assembled near Navarin Farm, whence it marched to the Suippes-Somme Suippes area. The 3d Brigade marched to billets 4 kilometers northeast of Suippes and the 4th Brigade to the Suippes-Nantivet-Somme-Suippes area, where it passed to the reserve of the Fourth Army. The 2d Division machine gun units were relieved from duty with the 36th Division on October 10 and rejoined their division.

The opinion held by the French on the operations of the 2d Division in Champagne is shown by the following extracts:

Up to October 4, at which date the present bulletin is written, the Fourth Army has pushed its advance up to the objectives of the very highest importance. A splendid American division, full of dash and ardor, the 2d Division, U.S., placed at the disposition of the 21st Corps on October 3, made itself master of Massif du Blanc Mont, which dominates the valley of the Suippes in rear of the region of Monts; this conquest rapidly brought about the downfall of Notre Dame des Champs and the Grand Bois de St. Souplet.

The Intelligence Report of the 21st Corps for October 6 states:

Despite the flank fire of extremely numerous machine guns, artillery, and even minenwerfers, both on its right and left flanks, the 2d Division, U.S. was able to maintain in toto its advance, and thus made possible the advance of the 11th Corps on the morning of the 5th to the River Arnes.

The severity of the fighting of the 2d Division is evidenced by the following casualty list, which includes the losses October 2-10, inclusive:

	Officers	Enlisted
Killed	41	685
Missing	6	579
Severely wounded	48	926
Slightly wounded	102	2,367
Gasped	12	207
Total	209	4,771

The division captured 1,963 prisoners, including 48 officers. It reports the capture of 25 guns, 332 machine guns, 20 trench mortars, 6 antitank guns, besides great quantities of ammunition, tools, lumber, signal property, railroad equipment, etc.

During its operations near Blanc Mont the 2d Division was opposed by the 200th and 213th German Division, both of which were reported to be fresh. In addition prisoners were reported to have been captured from six other divisions, but it is impossible to ascertain what portions of these divisions were put into the line. About this time the Germans commenced to reinforce weak places by bringing up whatever troops they could lay hands on, which evidently accounts for the large number of divisions seemingly opposed to the 2d Division from October 2 to 10.

Early in the morning of October 10, unmistakable signs pointed to a withdrawal of the enemy along the entire front of the Fourth Army. In front of the 21st Corps enemy batteries were firing at long range, and batteries previously reported in the immediate vicinity had not fired for 12 hours. French patrols sent out from the 73d Division had lost touch with the enemy north of Medeah Farm. Later these patrols reported that they had gone 500 meters north of Belmont Chateau without gaining contact. The 7th French Division was reported to have advanced 3 kilometers north of St. Etienne, where it encountered fire from its right flank.

⁴The units of the 2d Division which remained with the 36th Division were the 2d F. A. Brigade, part of the 2d Ammunition Train, 2d Engineers, 30 trucks of 2d Supply Train, 19 water carts, and certain ordnance materiel.

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The assistant chief of staff, 2d Division, informed the 1st Brigade that the enemy was evidently retreating and ordered energetic patrolling to verify this. During the afternoon indications of the enemy's retreat multiplied. The French divisions on the flanks of the 36th Division had passed the front of the 71st Brigade during the morning, but no general attack was ordered by that brigade, which merely maintained contact. In doing this the provisional units of the 141st Infantry made a slight advance of about 300 meters, which brought its front line to the unimproved road leading due east from St. Etienne, where they "dug in". This operation was in the nature of a reconnaissance in force. The 142d Infantry is reported to have sent out patrols which "met with such heavy enemy fire from the trenches north of St. Etienne # # # # that no further advance was attempted, and throughout the remainder of the day the regiment remained in its position".

On October 10, the 141st Infantry reported casualties of 6 killed and 12 wounded, and the 142d Infantry, 2 killed and 58 wounded.

Orders from the 21st Corps, received by the 36th Division shortly before noon on October 10, gave information of the enemy's withdrawal and of the advance of the 73d and 124th French Divisions (the center and right divisions of the 21st Corps), and directed the 36th Division to advance its lines and keep abreast of the 11th Corps.

In compliance with the corps order, the 36th Division issued Field Order No 6, which directed the advance of the 36th Division to a line even with the French divisions on its flanks. The attack was to be made at 5 p.m. October 10 by the 72d Brigade, regiments abreast, which was to pass through the 71st Brigade, 143d Infantry on the right and 144th Infantry on the left, each regiment in column of battalions. After the passage of the lines the 71st Brigade and the 2d Engineers were to constitute the reserve.

Arrangements for artillery support were made verbally with the commanding officer, 2d Field Artillery Brigade, whose regiments, in view of uncertainty as to the location of both the French and the 71st Brigade, were ordered to communicate directly with the infantry and to give them the necessary support.

The above order (Field Order No 6) was distributed and discussed at division headquarters at about 2 p.m. October 10, the commanding general, 72d Brigade, and his regimental and machine gun battalion commanders being present.

The orders of the commanding general, 72d Brigade, are probably embodied in Field Order No 1, 72d Brigade, no copy of which can be located.

The attack order of the commanding officer, 143d Infantry, assigned the 2d Battalion as the assaulting battalion, Companies L and M to the support and the 1st Battalion to the reserve. Companies I and K, and Company D, 133d Machine Gun Battalion, formed the right information group and a platoon of Company G plus two machine guns the left detachment. The 144th Infantry was expected to furnish like troops to the interregimental information group.

The advance started about 6 p.m., delayed, it appears, by artillery fire during the preparatory arrangements and by the distances separating the troops. But little progress was made. The 2d and 3d Battalions soon became intermingled with the 141st Infantry and their most advanced elements got only as far as the St. Etienne-Scay Farm road, where they dug in, thus prolonging to the west the front line of the 141st Infantry, which had reached that point during its reconnaissance in force. The 1st Battalion, in reserve, did not move. Neither the Regimental Machine Gun Company nor Company D, 133d Machine Gun Battalion participated in the attack. Casualties in the 143d Infantry consisted of 8 killed and 83 wounded.

The 1st Battalion, 144th Infantry, which was on the southwest slope of Hill 160, had during the afternoon of October 10, been ordered to relieve the troops of the 142d Infantry on St. Etienne, and Company B was engaged in this operation when the battalion commander received an order placing his battalion in reserve for an attack, to be delivered at 5 p.m. Company B was withdrawn and the battalion resumed its original position.

The attack order of the commanding officer, 144th Infantry, designated the 2d Battalion plus the Regimental Machine Gun Company, the 37 millimeter guns and Stokes mortars as the assaulting battalion, the 3d as the support and the 1st as reserve. No instructions for connection with adjacent troops or for flank protection were given.

The 144th Infantry also advanced at about 6 p.m. It made no better progress than the 143 Infantry. The leading battalion seems to have reached a system of old German trenches southwest of St. Etienne from which position it was moved to the right in rear (south) of Hill 160. The support battalion (3d) conformed to the movements of the 2d, and morning found both battalions well within the lines of the 142d Infantry. The reserve battalion (1st) did not move from its position on Blanc Mont.

Casualties in the 144th Infantry were 31 wounded.

Field Order No 6, 36th Division, directed the 72d Brigade to pass through the lines of the 71st Brigade. There was no passage of lines, and on the morning of October 11 the 71st Brigade was still holding the front line of the division sector, and the 72d Brigade was in its rear, except for detachments of the 143d Infantry, who were along the Scay Farm-St. Etienne road between the 141st and 142d regiments.

At 5 p.m. October 10 the 21st Corps issued Operation Order No 3.806/3, which gave the information that the enemy was withdrawing along the entire corps front and directed an energetic pursuit toward Attigny. The 36th Division was directed to conform to the movements of the 73d Division, which was reported to have advanced to the north edge of the woods north of Bemont Chateau.

The above order was received at division headquarters some time during the evening of October 10, and upon it was based Field Order No 7, which was issued at 11:30 p.m., and was almost identical with Field Order No 6, except that it assigned objectives. H hour was 9:30 a.m. October 11.

In compliance with Field Order No 7, the 72d Brigade advanced the morning of October 11 from its position of the night before. The 144th Infantry (whose 1st Battalion had relieved the mixed troops of the 142d Infantry in St. Etienne early on October 11) seems to have started on time, but the 143d Infantry did not start until some time after H hour, thus leaving uncovered the left flank of the 73d French Division and the right flank of the 144th Infantry. However, there was practically no opposition on either the French or American front and the attack ordered by Field Order No 7 became an easy but very slow pursuit. Upon arriving at the second objective named in Field Order No 7, line Machault-Semide, the troops halted and bivouacked for the night. The 144th Infantry had lost 3 killed and 26 wounded during the day and the 143d Infantry 1 killed and 70 "wounded or gassed".

The front line of the 36th Division had been advanced 4 kilometers. Why the 72d Brigade halted on the second objective does not appear, but it may be because the French divisions on its flanks halted also, although somewhat in advance of the 36th Division.

The 71st Brigade did not move on October 11, but devoted the day to reorganizing and supplying its still intermingled troops.

Corps orders for October 12 directed the resumption of the pursuit, the day's objective being the heights Chardeny-Vaux. The 36th Division objective included Vaux and Hill 167 to the northwest thereof.

The 36th Division orders directed the 72d Brigade to continue the pursuit, with the 71st Brigade and 131st Machine Gun Battalion following in reserve at 4 kilometers. H hour was 6 a.m.

Field Order No 2, 72d Brigade, directed the brigade to advance with its units in the same relative position in which they had halted for the night, and emphasized connection with the adjoining French divisions which were in advance of the 72d Brigade.

Pursuant to the above orders, the advance was resumed at 6 a.m. October 12 by the 144th Infantry. The 143d Infantry, not having received its orders, was slow in starting, but took up the march, as the commanding officer of the leading battalion understood that he was to advance the morning of the 12th, in connection with adjacent troops. Little opposition was encountered, the casualties for the day in the brigade being 9 killed and 58 wounded. The brigade halted late in the afternoon and established outposts just north of Hill 167. Communication with the adjacent French divisions, the 73d and 7th, was maintained during the advance. Both of these divisions, in compliance with a corps order issued at 1:30 a.m. October 12, passed beyond the day's objective and reached the canal which parallels the Aisne River on its south bank.

The 71st Brigade bivouacked the night of October 11-12 $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers southeast of Dricourt.

The corps operation order for October 13 directed that the south bank of the Aisne be cleared of the enemy and that arrangements be made to cross the river. During the night October 13-14 the 124th French Division was to be relieved, the 73d Division was to take over its front, and the 36th Division was to extend its line to the right to take over the sector of the 73d Division to include the Briqueterie, 1,000 meters east of Attigny.

The 72d Brigade was given the task of reconnoitering to the river, clearing the south shore, and in case the north bank was not strongly held, of establishing bridgeheads. The 71st Brigade was to make arrangements to take over the left of the 73d Division's sector.

Complying with Field Order 9, the 1st Battalion 143d Infantry, advanced to the canal during the late morning of October 13, its right resting on Attigny. The 1st Battalion, 144th Infantry, also advanced to the canal and dug in, its left resting on Givry. The 3d Battalion followed the 1st and was also near Givry. The remainder of the brigade was distributed in depth between the canal and the line of resistance, which was on the heights south of Attigny.

The above-described movements drew fire from the north bank of the Aisne and the brigade's casualties for the day were 29 killed and 207 wounded, most of them being in the 144th Infantry. This and other signs indicated that the Germans intended to make a stand on the Aisne.

During the night of October 13-14 the 71st Brigade took over the front of the 124th French Division to include the Briqueterie, and the troops in the divisional sector were rearranged so that the infantry brigades were side by side, 71st on the right and the 72d on the left. From right to left the regiments held the line as follows: 141st, 142d, 143d, 144th. The sector from front to rear was divided into three zones -- outpost, support and reserve zones. Each regiment had a battalion in the outpost zone (which extended from the river to the line of resistance on Hill 167), and a battalion and a machine-gun company in regimental reserve. Each brigade had a battalion and a machine-gun company in brigade reserve and the division reserve consisted of a battalion and a machine-gun company from each brigade and the 131st Machine Gun Battalion. The ground between the river and the heights was held lightly, the bulk of the troops being held in rear of the line of resistance. The division reserve was located near Dricourt.

A light regiment of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade supported each brigade and the heavy regiment the entire divisional sector.

The divisional front line after the above dispositions were completed extended from the Briqueterie, inclusive (1 kilometer east of Attigny), to Givry, inclusive.

The rearrangement of the troops of the 36th Division was completed by daylight October 14, except that considerable confusion existed in the 144th Infantry, whose 1st and 3d Battalions were near Givry, and this regiment was not in its proper position until the night of October 15-16.

The period from October 14 to October 26 was one of comparative inactivity in the sector of the 36th Division and resembled the former trench warfare. The division took advantage of the suspension of operations to reequip its troops, police the battle fields near St. Etienne, and bury its dead. Patrolling went on constantly and exposure always drew fire from the north bank of the Aisne. Possible crossing places were reconnoitered and preparations were made to cross the river when the advance should be resumed.

Effective noon October 18, the headquarters and corps troops of the 21st Corps were withdrawn from the Fourth Army for operations elsewhere. The 36th Division became the right division of the 11th Corps, and the 73d French Division became the left division of the 9th Corps. These reassignments made no change in the front occupied by the 36th Division except to shift the eastern boundary slightly to the east.

On the night October 20-21 the 7th French Division was withdrawn from the line and its sector was taken over by the 61st French and 36th American Divisions. To accomplish this both of the brigades of the 36th Division extended their areas to the west, the 71st Brigade taking over a portion of the area of the 72d Brigade and the latter taking over a portion of the area of the 7th French Division. After the change was made the west-

ern boundary of the 36th Division ran approximately north and south along the map line 266. Near the Aisne the 36th Division sector included the village La Charite but not Ambly-Haut or Fleury.

The 36th Division was again shifted the night of October 22-23. The 73d French Division was withdrawn from the line, the 36th Division took over its area, and the 61st French Division took over the front of the 36th Division to Givry, exclusive. This change practically reestablished the former western boundary of the 36th Division. The eastern boundary, after the shift, was Vonceq (exclusive)-Coigny-Chardeny-Quilly (all inclusive). In making the change the regiments were also shifted in line and occupied the sector in the following order from right to left: 142d, 141st, 144th, 143d. The 53d French Division was on the right of the 36th.

This last shift to the east brought the 71st Brigade opposite a horseshoe bend in the Aisne, 3 kilometers east of Attigny. This bend was formed by a swing of the river to the north and was 3 kilometers broad at the base and about the same distance in depth. The ground within the loop was higher than the country to the south, and itself was dominated by the hills to the north and east of the river. The Germans, in their withdrawal across the river, had not relinquished the ground within this loop, but had constructed a trench across its base which was protected by several belts of wire and by strong points. The French 73d Division attacked this position unsuccessfully on October 16 and 17. This was known as the Forest Farm position by reason of a farm situated near the base of the loop. On October 23 the 36th Division was directed to prepare a plan for the reduction of this position, and on October 24 orders from the 11th Corps directed the division to take the position before February 27, and assigned additional artillery for that purpose.

On the same day, October 24, a corps order directed the relief of the 36th Division by the 61st and 22d French Divisions the nights of October 26-27 and 27-28. When it was decided to attack the Forest Farm position on October 27, the relief of the attacking units, two battalions, was postponed until the night October 28-29, while the 2d Field Artillery Brigade's relief was postponed until the night October 27-28.

The actual relief was accomplished as follows:

The night of October 26-27 the 143d Infantry was relieved by the 61st French Division and marched to the vicinity of St. Marie-a-Py. The same division relieved the 144th Infantry the night of October 27-28, and the regiment marched to Machault. The reserve battalions of the 71st Brigade, the 1st of the 142d Infantry and the 3d of the 141st, were relieved by the 22d French Division the same night and marched to Somme-Py.

The support battalions of the 71st Brigade, the 1st of the 141st Infantry and the 2d of the 142d Infantry, each having two platoons of the 13d Machine Gun Battalion, were relieved the night of October 28-29 by the 22d French Division and marched to the Somme-Py area.

The relief of the reserve and support battalions of the 71st Brigade was not effected until after the success of the attack upon Forest Farm had been assured.

The capture of the Forest Farm position was assigned to the 71st Brigade, supported by the 2d Field Artillery Brigade and the artillery of the 9th and 11th Corps and the 61st and 53d Divisions.

It is not clear just what French artillery actually participated in this occasion. The orders drawn up by the commander of the artillery of the 11th Corps, who had been loaned to the 36th Division to coordinate the action of the French artillery, specify the duties to be performed by the artillery of the 9th Corps, the heavy artillery of "the Army Corps" (the 11th) and by the artillery of the 61st Division. Hour was at 4:30 PM, October 27. The artillery preparation commenced 20 minutes earlier and was directed on the German positions within the bend in the river, and upon the batteries located north of the river within the sector Semuy-Givry. Its effectiveness was such that the infantry advanced to the objective with almost no casualties.

The infantry attack was made by the two regiments of the 71st Brig abreast, the 142d on the right and the 141st on the left. Each regiment had a company of the 132d MG Bn attached, and was formed in three lines with a battalion as attacking unit, one in support, and one in reserve. The attacking battalions, 3d of the 142d Inf and 2d of the 141st Inf., each had attached a platoon of machine guns and in addition Co D, 141st Inf., was attached to the assaulting battalion of its regiment.

The parallel of departure followed the road from the Briqueterie to Roche. The line held by the 71st Brigade was generally in advance of this road, and was withdrawn thereto the night of October 26-27. Promptly at H hour on October 27, the infantry advanced, following the barrage which drove the Germans to their dugouts and kept them there until they surrendered. Within an hour the troops were on the objective, a line running southeast through Forest Farm, with a loss of but 11 killed and 36 wounded. One hundred and ninety-four prisoners were captured.

The support battalions, 1st of the 141st Infantry and 2d of the 142d, were used as information groups and to clean up in rear of the attacking battalions. The reserve battalions did not participate in the fight at all.

The command of the 36th Division sector passed to the 22d French Division at 8 a.m. October 28. At this time all of the organizations of the 36th Division had been relieved except the troops occupying the captured Forest Farm position and the two battalions supporting them. The latter were relieved the night of October 28-29. The former remained in position until between 3 and 5 a.m. October 29, when they were relieved by the 22d French Division and proceeded, some by truck and some by marching, to the camps near Somme-Suippes, where the remainder of the division had preceded them. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade and the 2d Engineers rejoined their division in the Argonne.

The contrast between the first and last operations of the 36th Division is great. The former were characterized by orders hastily given and transmitted, imperfectly understood, and consequently poorly executed. The latter operation was carefully planned and the orders were so given as to allow them to reach and be understood by the troops who were to execute them. The result was almost a bloodless victory. To be sure the troops had been seasoned by over two weeks' experience in what approximated to sector warfare, but that alone would not account for the difference. Had the attack of October 8 been as thoroughly planned and prepared as that of October 27 it would have stood a chance of success even with inexperienced troops, remembering that the Germans were in retreat when the 36th Division entered the line.

During its operations, October 6-28, the 36th Division was opposed by the 17th and 213th German Divisions, the former reported as "tired" and the latter as "fresh". Besides the above, reports indicate that parts, at least, of the 195th, 242d, and 239th Divisions were in line, but it is impossible to verify this. They were probably there as the Germans were then throwing into line whatever troops they could lay their hands on.

The casualties of the 36th Division while in line October 6-28 were as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted.
Killed	23	486
Wounded	64	1,450
Missing	80
Gassed	35	427
Total	122	2,443

On October 28 the 36th Division was transferred to the First American Army and ordered to proceed to the Dampierre-le-Chateau area, there to await orders. The movement was made by marching on October 30 and 31. There the division passed into the reserve of the First Army and was attached to the 1st Corps.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS (OCTOBER, 1918).

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2d DIVISION

Commanding General:

Maj. Gen. J.A. Lejeune, U.S.M.C.

Chief of Staff:

Col. J.S. Rhea, G.S.

G-1:

Major Bennett Puryear

G-2:

Major R.S. Keyser

G-3:

Col. H.B. Myers.

3d Infantry Brigade:

Brig. Gen. H.E. Ely.

9th Infantry:

Col. G. W. Stuart

23rd Infantry:

Col. E. R. Stone.

5th Machine Gun Battalion:

Maj. H. T. Lewis.

4th Infantry Brigade:

5th Marines:

Col. Logan Feland.

6th Marines:

Col. Harry Lee.

6th Machine Gun Battalion:

Maj. L.W.T. Waller, jr.

2d Field Artillery Brigade:

Brig. Gen. A.J. Bowley.

12th Field Artillery:

Lt. Col. J.A. Holabird.

15th Field Artillery:

Col. J. R. Davis.

17th Field Artillery:

Lt. Col. L. C. Sparks.

4th (Divisional) Machine Gun Bn.:

Maj. A. D. Bruce.

1st Field Signal Battalion:

Maj. Charles Murphy.

2d Engineers:

Col. W. A. Mitchell.

36th DIVISION

Commanding General:

Maj. Gen. W.R. Smith.

Chief of Staff:

Col. E.J. Williams, G.S.

G-1:

Col. W.G. Sills, (Oct. 12-25)

Lt. Col. C.W. Neal, F.A.

G-2:

Lieut. Col. C.H. Mason, G.S.

G-3:

Lt. Col. J.A. Atkins, G.S.

71st Infantry Brigade:

Brig. Gen. Pegram Whitworth.

141st Infantry:

Col. W.E. Jackson.

Lt. Col. L. R. James (commanding after
October 19th).

142d Infantry:

Col. A. W. Bloor.

132d Machine Gun Battalion:

Maj. P. A. Weatherred (commanding
until Oct. 21).

72d Infantry Brigade:

Brig. Gen. J. A. Hulen.

143d Infantry:

Col. J. S. Hoover (commanding until
Oct. 18).Lt. Col. I. J. Phillipson (commanding
after Oct. 18).

144th Infantry:

Col. J.S. Parker (commanding until
Oct. 14).Lt. Col. O. E. Roberts (commanding after
Oct. 14).

133d Machine Gun Battalion:

Maj. L. S. Davidsoh.

131st (Divisional) Machine Gun Battalion:

Maj. Ellis Stephenson.

111th Field Signal Battalion:

Maj. G. A. Robinson.

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B L A N C M O N T.

LECTURE DELIVERED ON

INFANTRY IN RECENT OPERATIONS

BY

BRIG. GENERAL WENDELL C. NEVILLE, U.S.M.C.

TO THE

STUDENTS, ARMY CENTER OF ARTILLERY STUDIES,

THIRD COURSE, APRIL 21, 1919

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B L A N C M O N T

--- 1 ---

After the drive on Thiacourt, in the St Mihiel Salient the 4th Brigade withdrew to the Bois des Minverville. Brigade P.C. at Mononville. The personnel was in very bad condition due to the strain of battle and the continual living in the woods in mud and rain. At this time several hundred men were evacuated for sickness due directly to this exposure. However, on the 20th of September, in accordance with Field Orders from 2nd Division the brigade moved by marching to an area south of Toul, where the personnel was given an opportunity to "clean up" and "sleep warm" for a few days. The brigade remained in this area until September 25th when in accordance with orders from 2nd Division it moved by rail to an area south of Chalons with the Brigade P.C. at Sarrey.

The Brigade (as part of the 2nd Division) remained in the Chalons area in reserve of the Group of Armies of the center until September 28th when in accordance with orders from 2nd Division it moved by bus and marching to the Souain-Suippes Area, with Brigade P.C. at Suippes. The 4th Brigade forming the leading brigade of the 2nd Division, was disposed to the northward of Suippes so as to be able to reach the front line, then near Somme-Py, in a single night's march.

On October 1st in accordance with orders from 2nd Division the brigade marched to the line on the night of October 1-2 and relieved elements of the 61st D.I. French in its position near Somme-Py. The 5th Regiment relieved the 219th and 265th Infantry regiments, and the 6th Regiment the 264th Infantry Regiment, all of the 61st D.I. French. In addition the 6th Regiment took over a battalion sector of the 21st DI French on the left of the 61st D I. The brigade was disposed with both regiments in line, 5th on right and 6th on left, each regiment in column of battalion. A machine gun company was attached to each infantry battalion. The order of battalions from front to rear was as follows :-

5th Regiment -

1st Battalion	-	Regimental M G Co
2nd Battalion	-	23rd M G Co
3rd Battalion	-	77th M G Co

6th Regiment -

2nd Battalion	-	81st M G Co
1st Battalion	-	Regimental M G Co
3rd Battalion	-	15th M G Co

The Brigade P.C. was located in the trenches at point 263.2-274.6, two and one-half kilometers south of Somme-Py.

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B L A N C M O N T

--- 2 ---

The relief was effected before daylight without incident. Steps were taken immediately to rectify positions and perfect combat liaison with organizations on right and left. This was not particularly easy as the line occupied ran thru a system of Boche trenches (third and last line) not completely "cleaned up". The trenches "Pacha", "Elab" and "Essen" were very strong and portions of them were still held by the enemy.

Although the Brigade and Regimental Commanders took over P.C.'s then used by the French, telephone communication was practically impossible during the relief - in fact the Brigade Commander was able to communicate by telephonewith his regimental commanders only at rare intervals up to 10:50 AM, October 2nd. Communication was rendered all the more difficult on account of having occupied a position in an elaborate enemy trench system -this cause many runners to go astray, especially those of the 2nd Division. However, the liaison personnel of the brigade organizations reported generally on time with the location of their own P.C.'s well fixed in their minds. Liaison with flank brigades, 170 I D on right and 21st on left, was established by liaison officers (in company with French Liaison Officer, 61st I D) in the early morning of October 2nd. The command passed at 8:30 AM/

The Brigade Commander had received verbal notification during the night that an attack was to be made on the morning of the 2nd of October. The attack to be made by the 4th Brigade in support; a battalion of the latter to be attached to the former as a combat liaison force to maintain liaison with the 21st I D on left. This battalion actually began movement to position. However, word was received later in the morning that the attack was postponed 24 hours.

As noted above, the Boche trench system had not been entirely "cleaned up". Besides sections of the "Pacha", "Elba" and "Essen" trenches in our own lines there remained the "Hook" of the "Essen" trench about 300 yards to our left flank. The "Hook" was a very strong machine gun nest with an extensive all around field of fire which up to this time had successfully resisted all efforts of the French to take it. The line on the left of our sector was therefore retired about one kilometer. On our right the line was well advanced - about 2 kilometers. It was deemed necessary that for a clean "jump off" the entire system in our sector should be occupied and that the "Essen" Hook should be taken. Orders were issued for these operations to take place before zero hour on October 3rd. The 5th Regiment found the trenches to their front evacuated and occupied them without incident. The 6th Regiment found their problem a little more difficult (being flanked on the left by the "Essen Hook") but by evening, supported by fire, (machine gun and artillery), had gone "over the top" and occupied the forward trenches with a loss of only 15 casualties. The French on our left, supported by fire from the 6th regiment, attacked the "Essen Hook" again but without results. Special artillery fire had to be provided to neutralize it during the coming attack.

During the afternoon of the 2nd Verbal orders were received to the effect that the attack was to take place the next morning. The plan provided for a converging attack by the two brigades of the 2nd Division, in concert with a general attack by the French 4th Army.

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B L A N C M O N T

--- 3 ---

The objective of the 2nd Division was line: -Road from Medesh Farm (exclusive) thru Point 73.11 to Blanc Mont (inclusive). The 4th Brigade was to attack within the Sector of the 6th Regiment. in column of regiments.- the 6th in front line and the 5th in support. Both regiments were in form in column of battalions with a machine gun company attached to each battalion. In forming for the attack the 5th was to move by the flank and follow in rear of the 6th when it had gained its distance. The infantry attack was to be preceded by five minutes artillery preparation and be supported by a rolling barrage, rate of advance 100 meters in 4 minutes. Two companies of light tanks were assigned to the 4th Brigade which were disposed $\frac{1}{2}$ One company (12) with the leading battalion and one company (12) with the support battalion of the 6th Regiment. The rear battalion of the 5th was especially charged with cooperation with the French to reduce "Essen Hook" and protecting the left flank during the night of October 2-3 troops were placed in position for the event and reconnaissances made of the immediate front. All preparations for the attack were made on verbal orders. Written orders from the 2nd Division did not arrive at Brigade Headquarters until 4:40 AM on October 3rd.

Promptly at zero hour the brigade advanced in the following battle order: -

6th Regiment -

2nd Battalion - 81st M G Co
1st Battalion - Regt M G Co
3rd Battalion - 15th M G Co

5th Regiment -

2nd Battalion - 23rd M G Co
3rd Battalion - 77th M G Co
1st Battalion - Regt. M G Co

The principal resistance encountered was from machine gun nests. Machine gun fire was encountered from the front, the right flank where the middle ground between the two brigades was not completely covered, and especially from the left flank where the French advance was delayed by "Essen Hook". The left flank of each battalion was successively retarded by heavy fire from the left flank. Although the French made every effort and the Marine one pounders did excellent work it was not until 3.00 P M that "ESSEN HOOK" was under control and then many more hours elapsed before it was finally "cleaned up."

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Generally during the advance our losses were light - the men doing excellent work with their rifles in sniping machine gun crews. Several hundred prisoners were captured. They stated that their losses had been heavy due to our rifle and artillery fire (our own infantry testified to the excellency of the rolling barrage and accuracy of special fire). All battalions of the 5th Regiment met machine gun resistance in Somme-Py woods. The support battalion (1st) pressed forward on the leading battalion (2nd) which was held up, and, advanced on its right to the objective. The reserve battalion (3rd) was assigned the task of cleaning up.

The objective was reached at 8:30 a.m. and the work of consolidating the position and the establishing the line of outposts to the front was begun. The advance of the French on the left being still delayed, the 5th Regiment made dispositions to protect the left flank and support the advance of the French. A special flank barrage was arranged for in case of counter-attack. During the afternoon orders were received to continue the advance to the northwest and establish a position of resistance on the general line: Road fork about one kilometer southwest of Scay Farm - Point on Blanc Mont - St Etienne Road about one kilometer south of St Etienne. An outpost line was to be pushed forward to a distance of about one kilometer and the town of St Etienne reconnoitered. The Brigade Commander ordered the 5th Regiment to pass thru the 6th Regiment and continue the advance in concert with the 3rd Brigade on to the right and the French who were coming up on the left.

The 5th Regiment passed thru and continued the advance at 7:30 p.m. October 3rd, and immediately met with strong machine gun resistance north of Mont Blanc - both front and flanks. They pushed forward about 1-1/2 kilometers, however, and held on although subjected to heavy artillery and machine gun fire and two enemy counter-attacks during the night. Two companies of the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, were ordered forward to support them and cover their left flank. The 5th was in a very exposed position and liaison was extremely difficult but they finally connected up with the 3rd Brigade on the right and with the 6th Regiment to the rear. The front line of the 3rd Brigade retired once but later resumed its position on the right. Owing to enemy pressure on its right flank it had been flung back upon the 4th Brigade sector.

At 6:00 a.m., October 4th, orders were issued by the 2nd Division for a further advance, in the direction of Machault - Caucy where a position of resistance was to be established and held. This attack, however, was not carried out until the next day - the French had not advanced on the left and the enemy resistance on that flank was too great to disregard. It had to be "cleaned up" to some extent before the advance could be continued. The next (or nests) causing the most damage were close up to the west of Mont Blanc. These were well reconnoitered during the afternoon and evening of October 4th by the 3rd Battalion, 6th Regiment, and an attack was made in the evening after artillery preparation. This attack was not carried to a conclusion as it developed that the position was very strong and special preparations would be required if undue loss in man power was to be avoided.

Accordingly further plans were made. Harassing fire was laid down on the position during the night and at 6:15., October 5th, after an hour's artillery preparation, the 3rd Battalion, 6th Regiment attacked (in concert with volunteers from the 17th Regiment French supporting the left rear of the 2nd Division) and captured it without loss. The garrison, 4 officers and 209 men, were taken prisoners and a great deal of material, including 75 light and heavy machine guns, and the capture of this nest reduced to a great extent the fire to which the 5th Regiment was subject and eased the advance of the French on the left flank.

On October 5th the French Division (fresh) on the flanks were ordered to advance to the line of the 2nd Division. Thereupon the 2nd Division ordered the advance continued in the direction of the Machault - Caurcy. The brigade Commander ordered the 6th Regiment (reorganized) to advance thru the 5th and continue the advance - the 5th Regiment to reorganize when the 6th had passed thru and follow in support. The 6th Regiment advanced and passed the 5th Regiment positions in battle order as follows:

2nd Battalion - 81st M G Co
3rd Battalion - 15th M G Co
1st Battalion - Regt. M G Co

The Brigade P C moved to Point 267.8-275.7 at 5:00 p.m. October 5th. At 5:40 p.m. the leading battalion (2nd) was held up by strong machine gun nests and heavy wire about two kilometers southeast of St Etienne. The entire 6th Regiment was being shot up from the front and both flanks. The enemy was advancing and filling up trenches near the nests and bringing in machine guns. Artillery fire was requested and the Marines dug in. Counter-attacks were broken up or beaten off. During the night of October 5-6 the Commanding officers, 6th Regiment, perfected plans for the reduction of the nests. The attack was made at 6:30 a.m. October 6th by the 3rd Battalion, 6th Regiment (in conjunction with the 23rd Infantry on the right) proceeded by one hour's artillery preparation. The infantry advance being

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proceeded by original objective by a rolling barrage. The attack was a success and the objective was reached at 9:30 a.m. The position attained (high ground southeast of St Etienne) was found to be a very strong one and was immediately consolidated and the forces organized for a strong defense. Just as the position was occupied a threatened counter-attack of the Boche was broken up by a special barrage which was laid within eight minutes after receipt of request.

The 23rd Infantry also attained its objective and the French on the left flank had advanced to St Etienne and beyond. Good combat liaison was immediately established on both flanks; on the left to the south of St Etienne.

It was persistently reported on October 5-6 by the French that their forces occupied the town of St Etienne, but on the morning of the 6th our troops observed both French and Boche troops in the town and it was well known that the Boche occupied the cemetery to the Northwest of town as a machine gun nest. To ascertain the true situation in the town the Commanding General, 2nd Division, ordered a patrol to reconnoiter. This patrol advanced from the left front at 11:20 a.m. and was severely fired into from the cemetery (or east end of town) while crossing the open ground to the southeast. The patrol was held up and remained in place during daylight. The fighting in and around the town and cemetery continued thru the day, both sides taking turns in filtering in and retiring in the face of intense artillery barrages and counter-attacks.

At 4:00 p.m. on October 6th, the Commanding General, 2nd Division, issued orders for the relief of the front line, 6th Regiment by the 142nd Regiment, 71st Infantry Brigade on the night of October 6-7 to be completed by 3:00 a.m., on the 7th. The orders were provided for the 4th Brigade leaving one battalion in front line until further orders and machine gun, stokes mortar and one pounder troops in position for 24 hours, and withdrawing the remainder of the Brigade to covered positions, in rear of Mont Blanc. The command of the brigade sector was to pass to the Commanding General, 71st Brigade, upon completion of the relief. The relief was effected in accordance with orders and without unusual incident. The 5th Regiment withdrew to the trenches of Mont Blanc Ridge. The 6th Regiment remained in place.

During the day of October 7th the fighting between the French and Boche still continued in and around St Etienne. During the afternoon several hundreds of Boche were feared. It was almost necessary that we advance or at least dispatch a force to occupy trenches near the town to prevent the Boche filtering thru south of it. This ground had been covered by firing during the day and patrols at night.

At 11:00 p.m. October 7th, orders were issued by the Commanding General, 2nd Division for an attack by the 71st Brigade on the morning of the 8th. The orders provided for a left flank guard of one battalion from the 4th Brigade to maintain combat liaison between the 142nd Regiment and the 7th Division French during the attack. The 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, was assigned for this purpose. At zero hour, 5:15 a.m., the attack was launched, the infantry advance preceded by a rolling barrage and supported by tanks. The 142nd Infantry advanced on an average of one-half kilometer when the advance was stopped by Boche machine gun fire along the wooded ravine running to the northeast of St Etienne. The 142nd held to this position until about 4:00 p.m. when elements badly disorganized recoiled on the position occupied by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Regiment, which had remained in place at the "Jump-off".

At zero hour the liaison battalion (1st Battalion, 6th Regiment) advanced and occupied St Etienne, connecting up with the French 7th Division. Very little resistance was encountered until debouching from the north of town two companies were badly "shot up" by machine gun fire from the northeast. The remnants of these companies were ultimately retired to trenches near the position occupied by the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment. The remainder of the battalion occupied the town of St Etienne and trenches just to southward and established combat liaison with the French 7th Division via the St Etienne-Cauroy road. Repeated attempts of the Boche to mass to the northwest of St Etienne were broken up by machine gun fire and special barrages. At 4:40 p.m., October 8th, the Commanding General, 2nd Division, ordered a battalion of the 2nd Engineers to reinforce the left flank liaison battalion and occupy the trenches north of St Etienne. These operations were in process when at 5:05 p.m. the Boche laid down. The French 7th Division was heavily counter-attacked on its right front at this time. Later in the afternoon the operations in view for the liaison battalion were carried out, but not without some hard fighting.

During the evening of October 8th efforts were made to form combat liaison with the 142nd Regiment but with little success. Conditions were the same in the 3rd Brigade sector where the 141st Regiment of the 71st Brigade had attacked. However, there was good combat liaison between the 3rd Brigade and 4th Brigade and the 7th French Division on the left; the situation was not critical.

At 4:00 p.m., October 9th, the Commanding General, 2nd Division issued orders for the relief of the 2nd Division by the 36th Division (to which the 71st Brigade belonged). The orders provided for the relief of the infantry brigades on October 9-10 the artillery and engineer troops in front lines and support to remain in place for 24 hours, or pending the arrival of those elements of the 36th Division. The 5th Regiment was to be relieved by the 144th Regiment, 72nd Brigade and when that was completed the command of the 4th Brigade sector was to pass to the Commanding General, 72nd Brigade, and the entire 4th

(less machine gun troops mentioned above) was to be withdrawn to the north of Navarie Farm by daylight on the 10th, and thence to the Suippes-Nantivat-Somme-Suippes area in Army Reserve. The relief and movement to the new area was carried out as ordered without unusual incident, considering that the 72nd Brigade was composed of green troops. The command passed to the Commanding General 72nd Brigade, at 2:30 a.m., October 10th, and P.C. 4th Brigade opened at Suippes at same time.

OPERATIONS AT BLANC MONT.

The necessity for a feeling of comradeship and personal interest between the infantry and artillery cannot be too strongly emphasized and every effort should be made to create a feeling of confidence and respect between the two arms. The 2nd Division is very fortunate in being harmonious to a remarkable degree, the infantry always being content when it knew that our own artillery was supporting them, and our artillery never cared how forward they were placed as long as our own infantry was in front of them. Such confidence between the two arms permitted the artillery to give no thought to the security and close defense of their positions and all their efforts could be centered, on the actual work of supplying the artillery fire required. The fact that cordiality, confidence and comradeship

The 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, consisting of the 12th, 15th and 17th, have served the Division from the middle of March 1918 until now. The 12th supported the Fourth Brigade, the 15th the Third Brigade and the 17th both. During that time the infantry and artillery got to know each other and close association of the two arms of the service, each imbued with a spirit to win, could not have produced any other result. Our mutual action was intelligent, the spirit admirable and co-operation thoroughly successful.

This may sound like a glorification of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade but they certainly deserve all praise that can be given them. The best is none too good for the best.

DISCUSSION OF THE OPERATION OF INFANTRY IN RELATION WITH THE ARTILLERY.

The infantry should be trained to follow the barrage whatever happens because a barrage once lost is worse than useless. Aside from the tremendous waste of ammunition the success of the operations is endangered and the consequent casualties are largely increased. The enemy

soon grasps the significance of a lost barrage and hold up an advancing line for a long time before special fire can be directed on the nest thus permitted to get into action, or until flank attacks can be made. After a first day's attack, when counter attacks become only too numerous, the information given by the infantry to the artillery must be most accurate, particularly as to front line positions, and positions of the enemy. Such information should always be given by coordinates, if possible, or by some distinct object of terrain. Observation posts, both artillery and infantry should always be established first of all as the best of artillery support can only be furnished when there is direct observation and good communications. Prompt notice of all movements and changes in the lines, outpost, etc., in fact any information that permits the artillery to act intelligently and efficiently so as not to endanger our own forces in laying down a barrage or in delivering harassing fire. For instance when a halt is made the artillery should be informed of the exact positions of the lines so that a properly placed defense barrage can be prepared. A barrage to be effective must be close up to the lines.

Accuracy of location of infantry lines is necessary where the artillery has had no opportunity to register the guns. During the advance, if the infantry requires artillery preparation or neutralization, the request should be absolutely explicit as to place to be fired upon. Artillery not properly placed is wasted. The artillery should be informed of the exact positions of enemy machine gun nests or other obstacles and of the hour until which the infantry will remain halted awaiting artillery fire. Otherwise, the infantry may have outflanked the enemy or otherwise disposed of the obstacle and advanced. The liaison officer with the infantry could give him a fairly accurate estimate of the time it would take for the commencement of fire on a given objective.

WHAT INFANTRY GOT FROM ARTILLERY IN THE WAY OF SUPPORT AND WHAT THEY EXPECTED.

At the beginning of the campaign when most of the officers, particularly below the rank of major, and most of the men had had very little experience, there was a tendency on the part of infantry to expect about everything in creation of the artillery. Some demands were unreasonable and when not forth-coming considerable comment ensued. We found afterwards that most of the failure to receive what was expected was due principally to the infantry themselves. Poor observation posts, poor equipment (the 5th Regiment, I remember, had a pair of eight power binoculars as their equipment), untrained observers, officers ignorant of the powers and limitations of artillery who made requests that were useless because inexact, inaccurate and not giving sufficient information. A request for a barrage "on such and such a road" means nothing but waste to the artillery. Without co-ordinates or some definite description of the exact line on which to place the artillery fire, the demand might as well not be made.

I know of one instance--- not in our division---where an infantry officer demanded of the artillery liaison officer for the seventy-fives to fire at enemy aeroplanes flying overhead. A demand was also made for a barrage every half hour all night (a mere matter of expending 9000 rounds)

Another error made by infantry was in calling for fire and not designating the target, so the artillery could decide exactly what kind of ammunition to use. Too often the demand would be made for harassing fire on such and such a cross roads or back of such and such a woods, giving the co-ordinates properly but not the target. The infantry officer would make the demand not realizing that high explosive shrapnel, seventy-fives or 155's are not always the best shells against certain objectives. Given the accurate place and naming the target we always found that our artillery attended to the rest.

We hadn't been in action very long before the infantry discovered that a continuous improvement was made as each succeeding battle was gained.

At Soissons, St Mihiel, Champagne and the Argonne-Meuse our artillery responded promptly to all our demands and then some. Our infantry officers learned by bitter experience just about what the artillery could do and what they couldn't do and did not make unreasonable demands. When we made reasonable demands that were clear, concise and explicit our artillery never yet has failed to deliver.

The first requisite to a complete success in any attack is a good rolling barrage, and to start with the infantry lines should be most clearly delineated and also stabilized long enough to permit the concentration of the artillery and the supply of the necessarily large amount of ammunition to give the barrage the proper density. It is essential that the infantry lines be known accurately in order that the initial start of the barrage should be properly placed. If possible registration should be done.

In our attack at Blanc Mont and also at St Georges and Landres St George, one gun was reported as always firing short, though always advancing with the barrage. It had the effect of indenting the infantry line but, fortunately, didn't give any advantage to the enemy.

This brings up the subject of "firing short", an unfortunate occurrence, liable to happen in the best regulated divisions which can generally be traced to the faulty formation sent to the artillery

defining the infantry lines. My brigade had very little short firing, because I insisted on accurate position reports--tracing paper places--and often division would rave because I didn't send in "liver pads" saying the first battalion of the Sixth was "about here" or the Third Battalion in an area resembling a crooked stem gourd. They were as useful to the artillery as a spare handle to a pump.

At Blanc Mont it was reported that we were "short fired" but we were so far out in front that the Boche batteries fired in from the flanks and were ~~appropriately~~ reported as our men.

After the advance has been completed for the first day, rolling barrages are to my mind, out of the question for a continuation of the attack unless sufficient time has been taken to clearly define the infantry lines and to bring up the artillery and ammunition sufficient to make barrage "dense" enough. In the subsequent war of movement, the artillery, being no longer concentrated, as batteries are moved up separately, is limited in its movements by road space and also as regards the supply of ammunition. This limits the concentration of sufficient artillery to put down a really efficient rolling barrage, except on roads in woods, defiled, etc. After the principal positions of resistance of the enemy have been passed a rolling barrage is a waste of ammunition as we found the enemy's nests scattered and when we were unable to out-flank them special fire was arranged with the artillery.

Therefore, after the initial attack, following a regular barrage the infantry didn't demand or expect a barrage for further advance in open warfare.

When the lines were established for the night, the artillery was informed of the positions of our outposts and line, as nearly accurate as possible, and arrangements made for barrage to respond to rocket signals. The infantry expected it promptly, and got, as a rule.

One exception was a barrage demanded at night on Blanc Mont when rocket after rocket had been fired but no response was coming, due we afterwards found out to the rockets not rising high enough for the artillery to see. (Crossing the Meuse incident)/

In open warfare when lines are not definitely fixed, shortage of ammunition, dispersion of artillery, lack of information of exact positions and difficulty of informing infantry lines at H-hour all preclude the putting down of an efficient rolling barrage.

Our experience has shown--as at Blanc Mont and in the Argonne -- that the best way to capture and destroy machine gun nests was to arrange with the artillery fire. Nests having been located by scouts or the more expensive way of bumping into them, they were located almost exactly by the infantry Commander and the artillery liaison officer and exact data sent to the artillery and on hour set. Invariably it succeeded. It requires, however, batteries very far forward and good observation posts and efficient liaison.

The infantry expected close support of the artillery in open warfare. The advance of the infantry at times was so rapid that they sometimes got beyond the safe support of the 75s, but our artillery never allowed that condition to last. The artillery deserves much commendation for its ability to move forward, and closely follow the infantry. The 12th Field Artillery--with which Regiment I have so closely worked--never failed to fire proper support and were always in striking distance when needed. During the Argonne-Meuse battle on Nov 2-3rd, three batteries of the 12th were even advancing ahead of the support troops and went into action about one kilometer in rear of the leading attacking lines. Such close support the infantry didn't expect, but got it nevertheless and were grateful.

LIAISON BETWEEN ARMS.

Liaison was one of the words developed during this war and so pounded into us that at first it was regarded as a mystery, then a nuisance and eventually a joke- Better experience taught its importance, both as regards information, communication and physical contact. A commander who has seen his troops far in advance, no liaison with troops on the flanks, no liaison with his artillery badly needed perhaps and no liaison with his own advanced infantry themselves will never forget the word nor its importance.

I will make no discussion here of the liaison methods--axis of liaison, telegraph, telephone, wireless, T.P.S., etc ---except as it pertains to the liaison between the artillery and infantry.

The efficiency of liaison like almost everything developed between the artillery and infantry during this war depends on the confidence that each has in the other. No matter who the particular liaison officer is if that confidence that each arm should have in the other arm is lacking good results cannot be expected.

Some advocate more liaison agents even down to and including Companies. I don't believe that it should go below the battalion because if the calls on the artillery were made by company commanders on limited front the artillery fire might become so dispersed as to be

out of hand and not immediately available on more important targets suddenly presented. Then, too, a battalion of infantry in attack covers so much front that a company commander, not knowing the positions of adjacent units might call for a fire on our own men, particularly on the flanks, mistaking them for the enemy. This could have happened in the Champagne where the 3rd Brigade side slipped over into our sector.

The post of the artillery commander at the jump-off should be as near the infantry commander and in the advance as near as may be. That is if a battalion or regiment of artillery is supporting an infantry regiment the artillery commander should be with the regimental commander of infantry. In that way he is enabled to get first hand information as to the needs of the infantry and can immediately advise as to what can and cannot be done by the artillery. After the war of movement has begun, however, it is unreasonable to expect the artillery commander to remain at the infantry headquarters purely for advisory purposes. His batteries have already begun to move forward and to be dispersed. Questions of locations of advancing elements, the order in which they should move, questions of supply etc., continually crop up and often require his presence and personal attention. Often the infantry headquarters will move forward long before the artillery is ready and the move and consequent loss of touch might be disastrous. The artillery commander should be foot free, but there should always be a competent liaison officer present at the Brigade and regimental headquarters.

The artillery liaison officer whether with Brigade, Regimental or Battalion headquarters, should always be informed of the situation of the lines at all times. Very often the artillery may be called upon to perform a mission and then in the stress of other important happenings the infantry commander may forget for the moment the artillery and either much valuable ammunition is expended or, worse yet, there is the ever present danger of shooting up our own infantry.

Liaison in stable warfare is a comparatively easy proposition. Telephone lines are in conduits or protected or duplicated many times. Switch boards are in well prepared dugouts and very seldom is this method of communication interrupted; wireless sets are in protected places and it is an easy matter to tune them to their proper wave length; T.P.S. sets are useful because permanent; carrier pigeons accustomed to their routes; runners soon know the established, permanent, always protected, routes to fixed P.Cs.

Open warfare changes all this. Before the jump off in an attack we found new and unknown sectors, suddenly occupied with telephone systems hardly recognizable; wireless not set up or yet brought up;

and a new terrain, intricate trenches generally shattered, that made it a difficult task for the different runners to locate the P C's Flag and projector in our experience were little used on account of the weather.

After the jump off it was even worse because wires had to be laid under constant firing and consequent destruction of both line and linemen; runners do not know the ground; both artillery and infantry P C's are on the move so that runners do not know where to find them.

To overcome some of these difficulties it has been suggested that artillery liaison parties with infantry should be more numerous (2 officers and 2 non-coms) more dismounted runners; mounted couriers and motorcycles should follow as closely as possible.

Routes should be selected on which liaison runners would return with messages and watch should be kept on these routes in order to inform runners of changes in P.C's.

Connections made with the axis of liaison by both infantry and artillery as often as possible. Direct telephone lines to infantry P.C's and O.P. as quickly as possible.

Wireless should be used more and I think in the future improvements will be made so that it can be. The transfer of the message into code militated against it because of time lost in coding it in the first place and also the codes, as a rule, were not to be taken in the "front line trenches."

Infantry-artillery liaison had for its sole mission the delivery of exact demands of the infantry commander to the artillery commander. These demands must be exact as to locations and concise as to fire and time. Their exactness depended upon good observation posts that could see the targets and locate them by co-ordinates. This information must be gotten to the infantry commander by telephone or by runner. Their conciseness depended upon the efficiency of the artillery liaison officer who should be so selected that the infantry commander has every confidence in his judgment. The message then goes to the artillery commander who is able to comply in an intelligent and efficient manner.

In other words, the measure of artillery support depends on direct observation (not direct fire) and quick communication. The better the communication to the O.P. the better the results.

WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE MUTUAL ACTION OF THE TWO ARMS
IN THE FUTURE

One result of the war to date has been the removal to a large degree of the mutual distrust and petty jealousies of the various arms of the service. We have seen officers of one branch commanding elements of another; cavalrymen commanding artillery regiments; artillerymen commanding infantry brigades, and it is to be hoped that these old jealousies produced by a general rush for glory and jobs after the civil war will never again prevail in our Army. It has been evident over here that each branch of the service has its mission and that each is dependent on the others, and the sooner we realize how much this is so the better it will be for the service and for the country.

There is no mystery, no other super-natural or super-human in the duties or the education of the different branches of the service. There should be an interchange of officers in the different branches and particularly between the infantry and the artillery. We of the Marines have been blessed in that respect for a Marine Officer could be ordered to sea, to an infantry outfit, to an artillery regiment, to a signal or mining battalion, yet always remained a Marine Officer.

Our infantry-artillery work during the late campaign constantly and consistently improved, and, as I said before, it was greatly due to the confidence (and admiration) each had in the other. This confidence was due to the fact that we got to know one another personally and to talk things over, discussing pretty largely everything that tended to improve our mutual effort and to increase our united efficiency.

In the future, all infantry officers should go to artillery schools for instructions and vice-versa. It is necessary for all infantry officers to know the powers and limitations of artillery and the difficulties of advance and supply of the artillery so that they will not expect the impossible or ask for unnecessary fire. So that they will know the absolute necessity of correct data in order to get efficient results. In other words, the infantry officer could place himself in his mind's eye in the place of the artillery commander and know exactly what information was wanted in order to deliver the required support.

The artillery officer should similarly have instructions in infantry work so that he could judge just what the fellow on the front line meant when he requested a counter barrage or harassing or neutralizing fire and wanted it quick.

In the future the mutual action of the infantry and artillery is going to further improve (I speak for the Marine Brigade end of the combination). Because of our close comradeship we are interested in every man of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade and this interest is not only personal but extends to our profession. We have a constant exchange of ideas and criticisms, which being friendly cannot but help us in co-operation and insure success.

ACCOMPANYING ARTILLERY

The term "Accompanying Gun" must be understood to mean gun or platoon which are pushed forward in support of an attack of infantry and at a closer distance than would be possible for such larger and more conspicuous artillery units such as batteries, battalions, regiments, etc. Its value is two-fold, the moral effect on our own infantry and in the destruction of enemy machine gun nests, troops or other vulnerable targets. They should follow the infantry at such a distance as will afford reasonable protection to animals and personnel, and that depends upon the terrain.

Accompanying artillery was one of the results of open warfare after a series of years of trench warfare. Its origin, I believe was due to the insatiable desire of the infantry for artillery support, that they had had for so long a time. I believe the Germans were the originators of it because they saw the necessity of the assistance of artillery to reduce the machine gun nests they encountered during their great drive in the spring of 1918. Their advance was so rapid that they soon outdistanced their artillery and it required days to bring the artillery forward and the necessary supply of artillery ammunition. During this time, the Allies were able to concentrate their troops and stabilize the line. We had exactly the same experience and tried the same expedience.

There is no doubt that the accompanying artillery, in sufficient numbers where possible is a good thing but there are so many "buts" to their use that to say accompanying artillery is always necessary or feasible is a decidedly difficult question. We have to consider the "Nature of terrain", "Composition and strength of enemy troops", "Magnitude and nature of attack launched by our own troops", and many other odd cut and dried bromides that really are important. In the first place 75s horse drawn guns found hardly feasible except on rare occasions. They could not follow the infantry lines quickly enough as they necessarily had to go by roads that are always under enemy fire and as a consequence lost heavily both in animals and in personnel.

Following as they had to, the road they often lost touch with the particular units to whom they were attached. The incident in the Argonne-Meuse on November 2nd and 3rd is a good example of the accompanying artillery. Although they were not detailed for this purpose they were so far adward they could fulfill their mission as such. Another objection to the detailing of the regular artillery as accompanying guns is the dispersion of the artillery which to my mind is a very serious objection as the artillery should be at all times ready to deliver a concentrated fire on dangerous points. The terrain has a great bearing on the use of accompanying guns especially if it is an open country and void of proper cover. There the losses due to good observation of the enemy makes it a question whether the good accomplished was worth the sacrifice. In the Argonne-Meuse with its hills and woods accompanying artillery, where roads permitted its advance, was well worth their use. If accompanying artillery is to be used heretofore, however, I believe heavy losses should be expected and if plenty of artillery is available to replace losses, it may be advisable to detail guns for that purpose. When accompanying guns are used, perfect liaison is absolutely essential for its success. The artillery officer of the accompanying guns must accompany the front line battalion commander or be in close touch with him, and the infantry commander must have sufficient knowledge of artillery to know what he can expect of them. Proper trained details can maintain telephone communication between the front line and artillery and the guns can be used to good advantage on strong points and machine gun nests. Of course as the artillery at present is used cannot keep up with the barrage but can move up after the attack has been successful and can be used in exploiting the line in front where strong enemy resistance has been encountered. The position of the front line is so indefinite that as a rule it is not possible for the artillery in the rear to render this assistance.

Indirect fire will be the rule and direct fire the rare exception. In other words we come back to the original assertion of direct observation and good communication. The personnel of each accompanying gun and platoon detachment should include two well trained officers. One as I said before should accompany the commander of the infantry and the other should remain with the gun and if possible each should try to have an observation post, where the enemy's lines could be seen. It has been suggested and I believe it should be tried, the breast reels and light field wires should be run in both directions, thereby having a double line of communication by telephone which should be augmented by a double set of runners.

I believe that the accompanying guns has come to stay, but I also believe that the divisional artillery should not be utilized for that purpose.

JWW

A large use of divisional artillery for accompanying gun purposes tends to disperse them and they thereby lose their efficiency as such. To my mind the ideal accompanying gun during the recent campaign would have been a mountain battery. Very mobile as they are they do not depend upon roads and they could have been moved across fields, by trails, through woods, over hills, in fact anywhere the infantry could, and in some of our attacks I am sure could have kept up with the infantry. It may have been remarked that this would simply increase the already enormous number in the Division.

As the result of trench warfare, the trench mortar was developed and came to stay. When the war of movement began attempts were made to utilize the trench mortar very much in the same manner as accompanying artillery. The difficulty of its use was the supply of ammunition. No arrangements had been made for this except that carried by hand, therefore it became restricted to a small supply. Towards the latter part of the campaign small hand-drawn carts similar to machine gun carts were used, but there the same difficulty of keeping up with the infantry was encountered. It has been proposed to combine the two. Why not have the mile batteries trained for trench mortars in trench warfare and for mountain guns in open warfare. I suggest ^{for} this argument and perhaps something can be evolved along these lines. The tank development of this war and at first they were armed with machine guns, later with one-pounders and afterwards increased to, I believe, 75's. At first the tanks were looked upon as scants and by many thought a failure. As the war progressed, however, their value was realized and they were used and used effectively in ever increased numbers, and I believe that the accompanying gun proposition will be solved by the development of a tank armed with at least caliber 75 and machine guns. We have seen them advance across all kinds of terrain, the only thing holding them up being large streams and woods.

Whatever the solution, accompanying guns must be under the command of the infantry commander, but he must be so trained as to have absolute confidence in the artillery commander as to trust his judgment in the ultimate use of the accompanying guns once his orders have been issued.

Coming as this lecture does, as the end of the course, you must be pretty well filled up with latitudes such as I know I have spoken today but for the moment you must all become Marines, as is universally known, we have always suffered by having everything told to us and I hope that you have not unduly suffered by having this Marine tell it to you.

MONT BLANC

ARMY CENTER OF ARTILLERY STUDIES,

A. E. F. TREVES, GERMANY.

STAFF RIDE.

ATTACK ON BLANC MONT BY 2nd DIVISION (AMERICAN) Oct 3-7-1918.

CASSTNER.

JWV

References: Lecture by Gen. Neville and attached sketches.
Map - Reims and Verdun - 1/80,000.

ATTACK ON BLANC MONT BY 2ND AMERICAN DIVISION.
OCTOBER 3 -- 7, 1918.

In the combined grand offensive of the French in the Champagne and the American in the Meuse Argonne which started September 26th, the French had reached the line to the north of Somme Py and had taken the Essen Trench.

All further advance had been held up by the enemy works on Blanc Mont and at Medeah Farm.

The 2nd Division, in army reserve near Chalons, moved to Souain-Suippes area on Sept 28th, 4th Brigade being disposed north of Suippes so as to reach the front line near Somme Py in a single night march.

On Oct 1st the Division relieved the 61st French Division and part of the 21st French Division on the left of the 61st D.I. the 4th Brigaderelieving the troops in the front line.

The original intention was to attack on the morning of Oct 2d, the 4th Brigade in front and the 3d Brigade in support, but this order was revoked. The Corps Comdr decided that a frontal attack was impossible, especially on the front of the 5th Regiment through the Bois de la Vipere and a conveying attack was planned by the C O 2d Division. The 3d Brigade was moved the evening of Oct 2d to the position assigned (See map).

The 2nd Division was the left (west) division of three divisions in the frontline of the 21st Army Corps (French) and the General line Blanc Mont -Medeah Farm (both inclusive) was the objective. It was afterwards to be consolidated and outpost elements pushed down the slope to the N.W.

The formation for the attack was each brigade in column of regiments with the leading regiments formed in three lines of one battalion each. The rear regiments followed in reserve in such formation prescribed by the brigade commanders.

The advance of each brigade was made without reference to the troops on its right or left.

The 2nd FA Brigade (US) Reinforced by the artillery of the 61st Division (French) supported the attack.

Both brigades maintained combat liaison on the right and left flanks of the division with the adjoining divisions (French) That of the 4th Brigade was a battalion with one machine gun company with orders to protect the flank of the division.

JWV

The Boche trench system had not been entirely cleaned up. Besides sections of the "Pacha", "Elba" and "Essen" trenches in our own lines, there remained the "Hook" of the "Essen" trench about 300 yards from our left flank. This "Hook" was a very strong machine gun nest with an extensive all around fire which up to this time had successfully resisted all efforts of the French to take it. The line on the left of our sector was therefore retired about one kilometer. Special artillery fire had to be provided to neutralize the "Hook" during the attack. The rear battalion of this 5th Regiment was especially changed with cooperation with the French to reduce Essen Hook.

H hour was set for 5.50 a.m. October 3d. The infantry attack was preceded by 5 minutes artillery preparation, and was supported by a rolling barrage, rate of advance 100 meters in 4 minutes. Two companies of light tanks were assigned to each Brigade.

Promptly at H hour the division attacked. The principal resistance encountered was from machine gun nests and this fire came from the front, the Grand Bois du Carrefour on the right flank, the left flank, principally from the Essen Hook and Blanc Mont, and on both brigade fronts from the middle ground between the two brigades.

The right flank of each battalion of the 3d Brigade and the left flank of those of the 4th Brigade were successively retarded by heavy fire and it caused each line to side slip to the left or right.

Great machine gun resistance was encountered in the Bois des Piris and in the Grande Bois de Sorume Py. Several thousand prisoners were captured. They stated that their losses had been heavy due to our rifle and artillery fire. Our own infantry testified to the excellence of the rolling barrage and accuracy of special fire.

The division objective was taken by both brigades at 8:30 a.m., and the work of consolidation began.

Although the French made every effort and the marine one-pounders did excellent work, the Essen Hook was not under control until 3:00 p.m., and many more hours elapsed before it was completely cleaned up.

During the afternoon orders were received to continue the advance to the NW and establish a position of resistance on the general line: Road fork about 1 km. SW of Scay Farm - Point on Mont Blanc St Etienne road, about 1 km south of St Etienne. An outpost line was to be pushed forward to a distance of about 1 km and St Etienne reconnoitered.

The 23d Infantry and 6th Marines passed thru the 9th Infantry and 6th Marines respectively, and immediately met with strong machine gun resistance both front flanks. They pushed forward about 1½ kilometers and held on although subjected to heavy artillery and machine gun fire and two enemy counter attacks during the night.

The divisions on the right and left had not come up and both the 23rd and 5th were in very exposed positions and liaison was extremely difficult, but the two brigades finally connected up.

At 6:00 a.m. Oct 5th orders were issued for a further advance in the direction of Machault-Courcy where a position of resistance was to be established and held. This attack, however, was not carried out. The divisions on the right and left had not come up and the enemy resistance on both flanks could not be disregarded.

The nest (or nests) causing the most damage was close up the west of Mont Blanc. Special preparation was made by the artillery harassing fire being laid down during the night and at 6:15 October 5th, after an hours preparation, the 3d Battalion, 6th Reg attacked and captured it without loss. 4 officers and 209 men were taken prisoners and one 125 light and heavy machine-guns taken. This operation reduced to a great extent the fire to which the advance regiment was subjected and cleared the flank of the division on the left.

On October 5th the divisions on the flanks were ordered to advance to the line of the 2nd Division. The 2nd Division was ordered to continue in the direction of Machault Courcy.

OPERATIONS OF THE 2nd UNITED STATES DIVISION
WITH THE IV FRENCH ARMY IN CHAMPAGNE.

How division got there:- The 2nd United States and the 36th United States divisions were assigned to the French for use by them in their attack in Champagne, which started September 26th. They were sent by Marshal Foch, to add strength to this attack and for purposes of morale.

Previous fighting in sector:- On September 26th the IV French Army had attacked in conjunction with the attack of the 1st United States Army. Both attacks had progressed about the same rate. At the time the 2nd Division went into action the French lines were in front of the last organized German position, south of the Aisne River. The French had been steadily making small gains.

Sector of Advance:- The sector assigned to the 2nd Division was as important as any on the front. If the 2nd Division made a deep penetration and held, it would cause a large retirement of the German forces to the west. This sector is shown on Map No 1. The sector was fairly wooded.

Progress of the attack:- The 2nd Division attacked on the morning of October 3rd., as part of the 21st French Corps. The 11th Corps also took part in the attack.

The 2nd Division advanced for an average distance of $4\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers. The Division on its left failed to advance. The French division on its right advanced about two kilometers.

The 2nd Division held to the ground it gained. The French division on its left sent troops in behind the 2nd Division and succeeded in advancing its lines.

Map No 3 indicates the effect of this advance upon the operations in Champagne.

FROM FRENCH IVTH ARMY BULLETIN, NOVEMBER 9, 1918.
Brief Review of the Offensive of the IV Army in Champagne.

"From October 1 to 12 the fighting went on without a pause, but with two distinct phases:

(a) From the 1st to the 3d, we were assaulting in the last organized position of the enemy. The day of the 3rd, which stands out preeminently assured the breaking of that position.

(b) From the 4th to the 12th we were still carrying on heavy fighting, but after the 10th the enemy, defeated, retreated by echelons under the protection of rear-guards and withdrew beyond the Aisne.

If September 26, which saw the collapse of the old Champagne front, marked by the celebrated names of Navarin, Buttes de Souain, Tahure, Le Mesnil, Mont Macherin and Mont Tetu, was the first great day of the battle, October 3 was only second to it in the importance of the results achieved. It was distinguished by a sharp surprise attack with tanks, carried out by the 11th and 21st Corps, reinforced by the 2nd American Division, which aimed at breaking the hostile front and exploiting the success.

The attack was launched at 5:50 AM, after a violent artillery preparation lasting not more than five minutes.

The 11th Corps found itself at the very beginning stopped before the formidable slopes of Le Fourmilier. On the other hand, the 21st Corps progressed rapidly; with magnificent dash the 2nd American Division and the 167th took the crest of Blanc Mont as far as Medeah. The French Divisions on their right carried the attack to the crest of Orfeuil, which was the scene of hard fighting throughout the day.

The 11th Corps gave up the idea of making the formidable position of Le Fourmilier by frontal attack and resorted to a maneuver; it slipped its advanced elements into the wake of the 2nd American Division so as to flank Le Fourmilier, and take it by an action from east to west. This movement, however, took time. At the end of the day, the eastern part of the crest at Notre-Dame-des-Champs remained in our hands.

The maneuver so well begun on September 26 by the IVth Army of which the action on October 3rd marked the full development commenced to bear its fruits on October 4th. The pressure of our troops, and especially the rapid progress of the 21st Corps towards the Arnes, had put the enemy in a difficult situation. He decided to retreat before our left, abandoning the whole of the Fourmilier ridge on the night of October 3-4, and permitting the successive capture of the wood of Saint Souplet and Grand and Petit Bellois by the 11th and 14th Corps.

On the 5th, the enemy continued his retreat before our left; he evacuated in a single movement the whole region of the Monts de Moronvilliers, a name rendered famous by our fierce offensive of April 1917, Mont-sans-Nom, Le Tetan, Le Casque, Mont Haut, Mont Bland, the Cornillet. Following up the retreat, the 4th Corps advanced, crossed the mountains, drove in some rear-guards, took Nauroy and Moronvilliers, and finally rested on the line BEINE-BETHENIVILLE.

JWV

T R A N S L A T I O N.

4th Army
General Staff.
3rd Bureau

RESUME of the OPERATIONS of the SECOND AMERICAN DIVISION

In CHAMPAGNE from OCTOBER 2 to OCTOBER 9, 1918.

The offensive undertaken by the 4th Army, between the AISNE and the SUIPPE, during the latter part of September, 1918, pursuant to the orders of the Marshal Commander-in-Chief, had, as its aim, first, the capture of the formidable positions of the Germans on the Champagne front, and then the advance through the unfortified terrain in a northerly direction.

The first part of this task was almost entirely accomplished between September 26 and October 1. Upon the 2nd of October, the left of the Army reached the stream "PY", to the north of which the enemy still held the heights of NOTRE-DAME-des-CHAMPS; farther west, the center had progressed more rapidly, and had pushed up to the outskirts of ORFEUIL and MONTHOIS, and the right had formed a junction with the American Army in the ARGONNE, near BINARVILLE.

The last organized positions which remained to be carried were exceptionally strong. In particular, the MASSIF de NOTRE-DAME-des-CHAMPS had already repulsed several attacks, that MASSIS de NOTRE-DAME-des-CHAMPS with its precipitous slopes, swept and laid bare by machine guns.

The Commanding General of the 4th Army, in order to carry the last German line in front of his center, between ORFEUIL and BLANC MONT, and thus to permit the positions of the MASSIF de NOTRE-DAME-des-CHAMPS to be flanked from the east, issued orders for a general attack to be executed on October 3.

Tanks were placed at the disposition of the 11th and 21st Corps in order to assure the success of this operation which should have decisive results.

Moreover, to facilitate the task of the 21st Army Corps, whose regiments had fought since the beginning of the operation, it was reinforced by the 2nd American Division. This Division, detraining to the south of CHALONS upon the 27th of September, and assembling first in the zone of MAIRY-sur-MARNE, had been drawn nearer the front on the 30th and billeted in the SQUAIS-SUIPPES region. In view of the projected attack, it entered the sector during the night of October 1st and 2nd, to the left of the 21st Army Corps.

The mission assigned to the Army Corps was to attack in the general direction ORFEUIL-FERME MEDEAH -BLANC MONT, with the 43rd Division the 167th Infantry Division, and the 2nd U.S. Division. This latter division was in liaison to the west with the 11th Corps.

The two brigades were side by side, the 5th Brigade of Marines on the left, and the 3rd Brigade of Infantry on the right. Each of these two brigades had at its disposition a battalion of light tanks. The first objective to attain was the powerfully organized German positions on the crest of BLANC MONT -MEDEAH; and, afterwards, the division was to advance as rapidly as possible in the direction of ST. ETIENNE-a-ARNES - FERME SCAY.

After a short but extremely violent artillery preparation, the attack started at 5:50 hours upon the 3rd of October. Despite a considerable number of machine guns and a heavy artillery fire, the two brigades, with an admirable dash, attained the assigned objective, BLANC MONT -MEDEAH. In the course of its advance, the 5th Regiment of Marines sent a detachment to the 11th Army Corps to help it clean out the German trenches. During this time, the division was subjected to a violent artillery fire, as well as a machine gun fire upon its left flank.

At 16 hours the attack started anew. In the woods, filled with machine guns, the advance continued and, at 18:30 hours, the forward elements of the 2nd American Division reached the line marked by the FERME SCAY and the crossroads at a point one kilometer south of ST. ETIENNE-a-ARNES.

The advance realized by the 2nd U.S. Division during the course of the day was remarkable, and reached a depth of about 6 kilometers. Numerous prisoners, cannon, machine guns, and material of all kinds, fell into its hands.

The rapid advance of the 21st Army Corps, and, in particular, that of the 2nd U.S. Division, during October 3rd, brought about the most favorable results.

The enemy, placed by this rapid advance of the center of the 4th Army in a very difficult position upon the MONTs, as well as in the Valley of the SUIPPES, decided to evacuate the MONTs and to retreat upon the ARNES and the SUIPPE.

The execution of this movement was begun during the night of the 3rd and 4th. But to cover their retreat on the west of the SUIPPE, the Germans, during the day of the 4th, re-acted violently and resisted desperately the units of the 21st Army Corps, which sought to continue their advance of the preceding days. The attack of the 2nd U.S. Division, which was delivered at 14:30 hours upon the 4th of October, was received with a violent artillery and machine

The 5th, 6th and 7th of October were utilized for organizing the ground conquered during the preceding days, and for carrying out minor operations of detail upon the division front.

Upon the 8th of October, a new attack took place upon the whole Army front; the 21st Corps, strengthened by tanks, was directed to advance in the direction of MACHAULT. The attack started at 8:15 hours. The 2nd Division occupied ST. ETIENNE-a-ARNES.

Beginning the 9th of October, the 2nd U.S. Division was relieved by the 36th American Division, and moved to the region of SUIPPES for re-organization. It was then sent into the zone of VADENAY-la-CHEPPE, where it remained until the 22nd of October, upon which date it marched to rejoin the American Army.

FIELD ORDERS

THE SECOND DIVISION

for the BLANC MONT

ATTACK.

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION (REGULAR)
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

France, 1 October 1918
17:00 hours

~~SECRET~~
FIELD ORDERS)
Nom 34) "

MAPS: TAHURE -1/20000

- I. The 2nd Division relieves the 61st French Division in its position in the front line near SOMMERPY.
- II. The relief begins at once and will be completed by 2:00 AM 2 October 1918, in accordance with March and Relief Table "A", hereto attached.
- III. (a) Details of relief will be arranged by the Commanders of units concerned. Command passes when relief of infantry sub-sector is complete.
(b) The Division Engineer and Division Signal Officer will confer with corresponding officers of the 61st French Division and arrange for the work of their Departments, for taking over documents, stores, etc., reporting action taken to these HEADQUARTERS.
(c) The artillery of the relieved division (61st French) will remain in place and continue to cover the front. It passes under the command of the Commanding General, 2nd Division, when the command of the sector passes to him. Orders for the movements of the 2nd French Mortar battery and M.O.R.S. will be given later.
(d) All units of the 2nd Division, entering into the sector of the 61st French Division, come under the command of the Commanding General of the 61st French Division until the command of the sector passes to the Commanding General, 2nd Division.
(e) Reconnaissance parties will be sent at once to the new sector. Arrangements will be made to secure guides from the 61st French Division to lead elements of the 2nd Division into position.
(f) PLAN OF INTELLIGENCE: Daily Intelligence reports will be made from 12 H. to 12 H. and are to be in the hands of the Divisional Intelligence Officer at the Division P.C. by 4:00 o'clock PM.
- IV. The Division Surgeon will confer with the Medical Director of the 64th French Division and organize the medical service in the sector, reporting dispositions and movements of sanitary trains to these headquarters.
Administrative details by G-1, in separate memorandum.
- V. The Division Commander, 2nd Division, will assume command of the new sector at 8:00 A.M. 2 October, 1918.
Division P.C. moves to WAGRAM (dugout), on the SOUAIN-SOMME PY road, one kilometer north of SOUAIN at 8:00 AM., October 2nd, at which time it closes at its present location.

By command of Major General LEJEUNE;

J. C. RHEA,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

-----J. W. V.-----

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

FRANCE, September 29th, 1918.

Midnight.

ORDERS }
No. 25. }

1. The division moves to another area.
2. The reserve ration will not be used except in emergency.
3. Organization commanders of the NINTH INFANTRY, TWENTY THIRD INFANTRY, FIFTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINES and SECOND ENGINEERS will have dinner and supper for their organizations for the twenty ninth (29th) cooked in the rolling kitchens before the kitchens move. These meals will be kept in containers. Trucks will be provided for transportation of empty containers to the new area.
4. Field Trains of all organizations marching on September twenty ninth (29th) before Five (5) P.M. will draw on that date one (1) day's rations and forage for the full strength of their organizations at the railhead, LEPINE, enroute through COURTISOLS.
5. On arrival of field trains at destination, SUPPLY OFFICERS will immediately get in contact with their organizations and will take the necessary steps to supply cooked meals to their organizations in the new area with the least possible delay. Connections should be established and breakfast served to organizations on the morning of the thirtieth (30th).
6. Organizations of the SECOND FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE will draw rations on September Twenty-ninth (29th) at the railhead, LEPINE.
7. Information as to distributing points for rations and forage in the new area for September Thirtieth (30th) will be communicated in subsequent memorandum.

By command of Major General LEJEUNE:

HUGH MATHEWS,
Lieut. Col., General Staff, A. E. F.,
A. C. of S., G-1.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION (REGULAR)
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

France, 28 September 1918.

Field Orders }
No. 33. }

MAPS: France 1/80,000 - sheets 34-35-50-51.
Carte de France et des Frontieres 1/200,000 sheet 17.

1. The Division moves to the SOMME-SUIPPES area September 28th, 29th and 30th. The Division remains in reserve of the group of armies of the center.
2. Movement will be by marching and by busses, according to movement table hereto appended marked "a2."
3. (a) Embussing will take place on the night of September 29th - 30th. The embussing points will be designated later.
(b) The responsibility for detailed arrangements with respect to march to embussing points and to embussing thereat, rests with the Commanding Generals of the 3d and 4th Brigades and of the 2d Engineers, each for the troops of his command.
(c) Orders for debussing will be issued later.
4. (a) Field and combat trains will be allowed to march during daylight hours but must be divided into groups of not to exceed 15 vehicles, separated by a distance of at least 300 yards. Machine gun units similarly divided into groups may march during daylight hours as far north as COURTISOLS. They will proceed by roads which take them through COURTISOLS and SOMME SUIPPE. At SOMME SUIPPE they will be given instructions by the regulating officer with respect to their march thence to destination.
(b) The use of the CHALONS-SUIPPES road and the CHALONS bridge is prohibited for the movement.
(c) Further administrative instructions will be issued by A. C. of S. G-1.
5. Division Headquarters will close at its present location at 10:00 AM September 30th, 1918 and will open at SUIPPE at the same hour and date.

By command of Major General LEJEUNE:

J. C. RHEA.
Colonel, General Staff
Chief of Staff.

MOVEMENT TABLE (a) TO ACCOMPANY FIELD ORDER #33 SECOND DIVISION.

No.:	Date & Hour	Organization	From	To	Route	Bus or March	Remarks
1	: Sept. 29th : 1:00 A.M.	: 2d F.A. Brig. : T.M. Bty. : M.O. R.S. Horse : Bn. 2nd Am. Tn.	: Billets	: COURTISOL	: As convient	: March	:
2	: Sept. 29th : 7:00 AM	: 5th M.G. Bn.	: "	: "	: "	: March	: Leave COURTISOL at 8:00 PM : Sept. 20th, march to SOMME : RIXIER SUIPPE via TILLOY and : ST. REMY.
3	: Sept. 29th : 7:00 AM	: 6th M.G. Bn.	: Same as No. 2.				
4	: Sept. 29th : 7:00 AM.	: M.G. Cos. 5th and : 6th Mar. : 9th & 23rd Inf.	: Same as No. 2.				
5	: Sept. 29th : 11:00 AM	: Field Train : 5th Marines	: Billets	: Destination	: TILLOY et BELLAY: : St. Remy Somme- : Suippes.	: March	:
6	: Sept. 29th : 8:00 PM	: 5th Marines : less Field Tns.	: "	: "	: Courtisol north : via Bussy : Suippes.	: March	:
7	: Sept. 29th : 7:30 PM	: 4th Brig. less : 5th Marines, M.G. : units and Field Tn.	: "	: "	: As ordered.	: Bus	:
8	: Sept. 29th : 7:30 PM	: 3d Brig. Less : Field Tn., MG Units	: Same as No. 7.				
9	: Sept. 29th : 7330 PM	: Co. A-M.P. less : trains and mounted : detachment.	: Same as No. 7.				: Mounted detachment to pro- : ceed to Somme-Suippes during : day pf Sept. 29th.

MPVEMENT TABLE (a) TO ACCOMPANY FIELD ORDER #33 SECOND DIVISION.

Sheet #2.

No.	DATE & HOUR of departure:	Organization	From	To	Route	Bus or March	Remarks
10	Sept. 29th 9:30 AM	Trains of M.P.	Billets	Destination	MARSON-COURTISOL TILLOY-ST.REMY-SOMME SUIPPES.	march	
11	Sept. 29th 7:30 PM	2d Engineers less Field Tn.	Same as No. 7			Bus	
12	Sept. 29th 9:00 AM	2nd Engr Train and 2nd Engr Field Train (Notes)	Billets	Destination	Route as convenient to COURTISOL hence TILLOY-ST. REMY-SOMME SUIPPE.	March	
13	Sept. 29th 7:00 PM	2nd Engr Train and 2nd Engr Field Train (Motor)	Billets	D estination	POGNY-ST.JEAN-sur-MOIVRE- MARSON-COURTISOL-TILLOU- ST.REMY-SOMME SUIPPE.	March	
14	Sept. 29th 7:30 PM	1st F.S. Bn. less Trains	Same as No. 7			Bus	
15	Sept. 29th 1:00 P.M.	Trains FS Bn.	Same as No. 10.			March	
16	-----	Hospitals and Ambulances.	Billets	Destination	As convenient	-----	As arranged by Surgeon.

MOVEMENT TABLE (a) TO ACCOMPANY FIELD ORDER No. 33 SECOND DIVISION

Sheet #3.

No.	Date & Hour :of Departure.	Organization	From	To	Route	Bus or March	Remarks.
17	:Sept. 29th :7:00 PM	: 4th MG Bn	: Billets	: Destination	: As convenient to :SOMME SUIPPES	: March	:
18	:Sept. 29th :7:00 PM	:2nd Am. Train :(Motor Bn.)	: Same as No. 17				
19	:Sept. 29th :1:00 PM	:Hqrs Tr Mounted :Detached and Tns.	: Same as No. 10.				
20	:Sept. 29th : :	:Hqs 2nd Div & :Hq. Troop (dis- :mounted men.)	: Billets	: Destination	: As ordered	: Bus	:

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION (REGULAR) AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

France, 2 October, 1918 23 hours.

FIELD ORDERS
NO. 35

MAP: TAHURE -1/20,000

1. The enemy has been driven from the TRENCH D'ESSEN which on our front has been occupied by our troops. The French on our right have advanced to the general line: Point 06.14; Hook of NATIONALE ROUTE, about 2-1/2 kilometers north of SOMME-PY: BOY. de la PIRNA. The French 4th Army attacks.

2. (a) The 2d Division, as the left (west) division of the three divisions in the front line of the 21st Army Corps (French) attacks the general line; MEDEAH FME (exclusive); BLANC MONT (inclusive); takes and consolidates that line, and pushes its outpost elements down the slope to the northwest.

The 170th Division (French) attacks on our right; the 21st Division (French) both at the same time. on our left;

(b) LIMITS OF ACTION: Division Limits:

Right (east) Limits: Line: Point 03.10; MEDEAH FARM (exclusive).

Left (west) Limit : Line: BOY. de VROMBERG; BLANC MONT (inclusive)

Brigade Limits:

Right (East) Brigade:

Right (east) Limit: The right limit of the Division.

Left (west) limit : General Line: ALTONA, near Point 93.97; Crossroads at Point 73.11.

Left (West) Brigade:

Right (west) Limit: The left (west) limit of the Division.

PARALLELS OF DEPARTURE:

Right (east) Brigade: Present front on the general line; 03.10; ALTONA.

Left (west) Brigade: TRENCH d'ESSEN, within the limits of that Brigade.

GENERAL DIRECTION OF ADVANCE: Above NORTHWEST.

OBJECTIVE:

Road from MEDEAH FME. (exclusive); through point 73.11, to BLANC MONT (inclusive).

- (c) The Division makes a converging attack; its infantry brigades, with attached troops, converging on the Division Objective, each brigade within the limits assigned it. In each brigade, the formation for attack will be in column of regiments, with the leading regiment formed in three (3) lines of one (1) battalion each; The rear regiment, following as reserve, in such formation as may be prescribed by the Brigade Commander.

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All troops will be in position on "D" day at "H" hour, at which time the attack will begin from the Parallels of Departure.

The advance in each brigade will be made without reference to the troops on its right and left.

Upon reaching the Division Objective, that line will be organized as our main line of resistance and must be held. Patrols will be pushed forward of the line of resistance to a distance approximating one (1) kilometer, and will establish an outpost line. The Brigades will be at once reorganized and made ready for a further advance upon orders from the Division Commander to do so.

3. (a) The 2d F.A. Brigade (U S) and the artillery of the 61st Division (French), Brigadier General Bowley, Commanding, will, from positions in the area of the 2d Division, support the attack.

The artillery action will be as follows; A preparation beginning at "H" minus five (5) minutes, will terminate at "H" hour, at which time a creeping barrage will start in front of each Parallel of Departure, and move at the rate of one hundred (100) meters in four (4) minutes to a general line 300 meters beyond the Division Objective, where it will remain for thirty (30) minutes after the arrival on that objective of the left (west) brigade, or, until "H" plus Two (2) hours, thirty-eight (38) minutes. At "H" plus Two (2) hours, thirty-eight (38) minutes, the barrage will start forward again and moving at the rate of one hundred (100) meters in four (4) minutes to a line 1,300 meters beyond the Division Objective, will stop and remain on that line until the infantry has established its forward patrols.

During the progress of the infantry from the Parallels of Departure to the Division Objective, the artillery will take as special targets: MEDEAH FME; enemy strong point in the vicinity of SOHWAKEN-KONIG; PYLONE; strong point in vicinity of BLANC MONT, and B. dela VIPERE. Some smoke shells will be employed in this fire.

Troops of the right (east) brigade will be cautioned not to follow the barrage too closely, because the guns with which this barrage is made will not fire in the axis of the advance, but at an angle thereto. Upon arriving on the Division Objective, troops of the right (east) brigade will be held strictly within that part of the objective assigned to that brigade, until the arrival of the left (west) Brigade.

The Infantry will stake out their front lines at 8:00 o'clock and at 15:00 o'clock.

The light artillery will be brought forward in echelon as the attack progresses, so as to support the new line of resistance, or to assist in a subsequent advance of the Division.

(b) TROOPS:

Right (east) Brigade: Brigadier General ELY,
Commanding.
3d Infantry Brigade,
3d Battalion tanks (French) attached,
will be in position at "H" minus Two (2) hours.

Left (west) Brigade: Brigadier General Neville,
Commanding.
4th Infantry Brigade,
2d Battalion tanks (French), attached,
will be in position at "H" minus Two (2) hours.

(c) COMBAT LIAISON:

Brigades will maintain on the right (east), and left (west) limits of the Division sector, combat liaison with the adjoining French troops by means of provisional organizations of mixed infantry and machine guns, the left (west) brigade providing for this purpose a force approximating a battalion in strength, the commander of which will be instructed to take proper steps to protect the left of the Division. In case the 11th Corps, on our left, should meet with difficulties, in the region of FOURMILLER, which retards its progress this flank covering detachment will be prepared to face in that direction and assist the progress of the 11th Corps. Upon arriving on the Division Objective this left flank covering detachment will be called upon to protect the left flank of the division until the arrival of the 11th Corps (French), and in case of a subsequent advance of the Division to continue its action in covering the left flank thereof. The commander of the right (east) Brigade, on his left, and the commander of the left (west) brigade, on his right, will especially provide for flank protection until these brigades arrive on the Division objective. Upon arriving on its objective the right (east) Brigade will assist the progress of the left (west) brigade by employing enfilade, infantry and machine gun fire on the enemy's positions within the objective of the left (west) brigade.

(d) AVIATION:

The 252d Aviation Squadron assists the Division by reporting progress and location of front lines, and by observation of artillery fire. (See Plan of Liaison).

(e) ENGINEERS:

The 2d Engineers will continue their work in improving roads in the Divisional area, but will be ready, on short notice, for use as reserves.

(f) MACHINE GUNS:

The 4th M.G. Bn to a covering position near NAVARIN Fme, at the disposition of the Division Commander.

(g) PLAN OF LIAISON (See Plan of Liaison, issued 30 September, 1918). Attention is called to change in Code, Chapter VI.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS: See Administrative Order.

5. P.C., 2d Division: WAGRAM, east of SOUAIN-SOMME-PY Road, about 1 kilometer north of SOUAIN.
- P.C., 3d Brigade : Near road fork, at Point 07.88 5
- P.C., 4th Brigade: East of SOUAIN-SOMME-PY Road about 1 Kilometer north of NAVARIN FME.

Changes of P.C.'s will be announced later.

John A. Lajeune,
Major General, U.S.M.G.
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION (REGULAR) AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

France, 3 October 1918-14 hours.

FIELD ORDERS)
NO 36)

MAP: TAHURE -1/20,000

- I. The attack on the morning of Oct 3 was a complete success. The 21st Division (French) has passed TRENCH d'ESSEN and is moving upon our left; another French Division from the 21st Corps is moving to support of our left.
- II. The 2nd Division advances its line to the northwest.
- III. (a) The 3rd and 4th Brigades, in the formation employed in the attack this morning, will move forward (hour to be communicated later) from their present positions on the line; MEDEAH GME; BLANC MONT, in the direction of MACHAULT (inclusive) ST ETIENNE-a-ARNES (inclusive).
Upon reaching the General Line: Road fork about 1 kilometer southwest of SOAY FME; Point on BLANC MONT -ST ETIENNE Road, about one kilometer south of ST. ETIENNE-a-ARNES, a position of resistance will be established and held. An outpost line will be pushed forward a distance of approximately one kilometer in front of this line.
ST. ETIENNE a-ARNES will be reconnoitered.
The right flank of the 3rd Brigade and the left flank of the 4th Brigade must be carefully guarded.
Combat liaison will be provided between brigades by arrangement between the commanders thereof.
The boundary between brigades will be the general line:
Present boundary: Point 63.40.
(b) The 2nd F.A. Brigade will support the movement.
(c) The Engineers will establish an engineer dump in the vicinity of the cross roads at Point 73.11.
- IV. The P.C. of the Division will remain at its present location.

JOHN A. LEJEUNE,
Major General, U.S.M.C.
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG
Chief of Staff
A.C. of S., G-1
A.C. of S., G-2
A.C. of S., G-3
CG 3rd Brigade
CG 4th Brigade
CG 2nd FA Brigade

CO 2nd Engineers
CO Tanks
CO Aeroplane Squadron
Surgeon.

-----OOO-----
J. W. V.

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TABLE "A"

Sheet No 2.

Unit and location		R O U T E	
at beginning of movement:		October 1st	
5th MG Bn	: Marches to relieve machine gun units of	:	:
(Present bivouac)	: 61st French Division as directed by CG	:	:
	: 3rd Brigade	:	:
	: Move by marching to a covered position near:	:	:
2nd Engineers	: SOUAIN -NAVARIN FARM road, north of SOUAIN.::	CHALONS-SUIPPES-SOUAIN ROAD.	:
(present bivouac)	: To clear bivouac by 7:00 PM.	:	:
	:	:	:
2nd F. A. Brigade	: Move by marching so that they will be in	: 17th Artillery Regiment by CHALONS-SUIPPES-SOUAIN road, thence to	:
(present bivouac)	: position in time to support the 2nd	: destination . 12th and 15th Artillery Regiments by SUIPPES-	:
	: Division in action by noon October 2.	: SOUAIN road to SOUAIN; thence N.E. from middle of SOUAIN on the	:
	:	: SOUAIN-TAHURE road to a point north of 91. (1½ kms from SOUAIN);	:
	:	: thence to position	:
	:	:	:
	:	:	:
	:	:	:
	: Moves by marching into position agreed	:	:
4th MG Bn	: upon	: AS convenient	:

TABLE "A"

Unit and location at beginning of movement.	October 1st	ROUTE
5th Marines, accompanied by M. G. Co. (Present bivouac)	Marches to Trench LEUSSI ^{ER} and relieves the unit of the 61st French Division, clearing t present bivouac by 6:00 PM.	SUIPPES-SOUAIN road to SOUAIN; thence NE from middle of SOUAIN on the SOUAIN-TAHURE road, to a point north of 91. (1½ kms from SOUAIN); thence north on PISTE de IMMES Road to destination.
6th Marines accompanied by MG Co (Present bivouac)	Marches to front line and relieves the left unit of the 61st French Division, and 1 bn of the 64th French Division clearing present bivouac by 6:30 PM	SUIPPES-SOUAIN Road; thence to Destination
6th MG Bn (Present bivouac)	Marches to relieve MG Units of 61st French Divi- sion as directed by CG 4th Brigade	
9th Infantry, accompanied by MG Co. (Present bivouac)	Marches to relieve support troops of 61st French Division in the Trenches BUTTE de SOUAIN NAVARIN FARM, clearing bivouac by 5:30 PM	SUIPPES-SOUAIN road to SOUAIN; thence NE from middle of SOUAIN on the SOUAIN-TAHURE road, to a point north of 91. (1½ kms from SOUAIN) thence N on PISTE de HIMES road to destination
23rd Infantry, accompanied by M.G. Co (Present bivouac)	Marches to relieve support troops of 61st French Division in trenches BUTTE de SOUAIN-NAVARIN FARM, clearing bivouac by 6:00 PM	CHALONS-SUIPPES -SOUAIN road, thence to destination.

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION (REGULAR)
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

France, 4 October, 1918-6:00 Hours.

~~SECRET~~
FIELD ORDERS :

NO. 37 :

MAP: TAHURE -1/20,000.

1. In its attacks of October 3, 1918, the 2d Division was entirely successful. Its advance into the enemy's position approximates seven (7) kilometers. It captures about 2,000 prisoners.

The 107th Division (French) has been brought into the GRAND BOIS de SOMME PY for the purpose of protecting our left and rear. The 73d Division (French) on the night of October 3-4 relieved the 167th Division (French) on the line: south of OREEUL: MEDEAH FME, and from that line attacks on our right flank on the morning of October 4.

2. (a) the 2d Division continues its advance in the direction of the line; MACHAUL T: CAUROY.

(b) LIMITS OF ACTION:
Division Limits:

Right (east) Limit : Line connecting road fork about 1 kilometer southwest of SEAY FME, and Point 60-80.

Left (west) Limit : Line: Present (west) Limit of the of resistance-western outskirts of ST. ETOENNE-a-ARNES: western outskirts of CAUROY.

Dividing Line between Brigades: General line connecting present Dividing line and short rail-road spur at Point 46.71.

Parallel of Departure: Line from Point on road at Point 73.54 to road fork about 1/2 kilometer south of St. ETOENNE-a-ARNES. at Point 45.5-34.

General Direction of Advance: About Northwest.

Objective: General line through Points 65-66 and 35-55.

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3.(a) INFANTRY:

The attack will be made with a formation similar to that employed in the two attacks of October 3; the 3d Brigade on the right and the 4th Brigade on the left. The advance will be made by the division at an hour to be communicated later, and will be pushed forward without regard to the progress of the divisions on the right and left. The brigades will, however, advance in close liaison with each other. Upon reaching the Division objective, that line will be organized as our main line of resistance and must be held. Patrols will be pushed forward of the line of resistance to a distance of approximately one kilometer, and will establish an outpost line. The brigades will be at once reorganized and made ready for any action which may be come necessary.

During the advance, combat liaison will be provided by a mixed detachment of one platoon of infantry and two machine guns furnished by each brigade, the whole commanded by an officer detailed by the Commanding General, 4th Brigade. Each brigade commander is charged with the protection of his outer flank. They will provide special detachments for this purpose.

The infantry will stake out their front lines at "H" hour plus 45 minutes, at "H" plus 2 hours, and at such other time as they may be called upon to do so by the division aeroplane.

(b) ARTILLERY

The 2d F.A. Brigade, Brigadier General Bowley, Commanding, will support the attack. The artillery will be brought forward in echelon as the attack progresses, so as to support the new line of resistance. (See ANNEX 1, of Artillery Plan).

(c) AVIATION:

The 252d Aviation Squadron assists the division by reporting progress and location of front line and by observation of artillery fire.

(d) ENGINEERS:

The 2d Engineers will continue their present work, but will be prepared to be called upon as Divisional reserves upon short notice.

(e) MACHINE GUNS:

The 4th M.G. Bn. to a covered position near point 59.26, at the disposition of the Division Commander.

(f) PLAN OF LIAISON: - No Change.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS: See Administrative Order, to be issued later.

5. P.C., 2d Division: No Change.

Location of P.C.'s for infantry brigades and changes in P.C.'s will be announced later.

John A. Lejeune,
Major General, U.S.M.C.
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:

1st Army, U.S.-----1.	4th M.G. Bn.....1.
4th U.S. Corps.....1.	A.C. of S G-1.....5.
21st French Corps.....1.	A.C. of S.G-2.....1.
21st French Division...1.	A.C. of S. G-3.....3.
22d French Division....1.	Div Engineer.....1.
63d French Division....1.	Div M.G. Officer.....1.
170th French Division..1.	Div Signal Officer....1.
C.G.....1.	Div Surgeon.....1.
3d Brigade.....2.	Div Inspector.....1.
9th Infantry.....4.	A.P.M.....1.
23d Infantry.....4.	Gas Officer.....1.
4th Brigade.....2.	G.M.....1.
5th Marines.....2.	Air Squadron 252....1.
6th Marines.....4.	Balloon Co.....1.
2d Engineers.....3.	Adjutant.....1.
2d F.A. Brigade12.	
5th M.G. Bn.....1.	
6th M.G. Bn.....1.	

NOTE: Because of the limited supply of tracing paper, copies of the barrage table are furnished to Commanders of combatant units only.

Headquarters 2nd F.A. Brigade;
4 October 1918.
4:00 AM.

ANNEX NO 1-To Field Order No 37

ARTILLERY PLAN.

1. The 2nd F.A. Brigade supported attack of 2nd Division. Line of departure and Final objective as per attached sketch. Route of advance: 100 meters in 4 minutes.
2. MISSIONS AS FOLLOWS:
 - 12th Art (Light) Rolling barrage and standing barrage.
 - 15th Art (Light)
 - 17th Art (Heavy) special missions as per attached sketch.
3. Upon the attainment of the objective, the standing barragde will establish the protective barrage, until the rear battalion of the 12th F.A. is in a position to cover the front, when the normal protective barrages will be taken over.
4. Rates of fire to be under direction of Regimental Commanders, and in such a manner as to preserve sufficient reserve for emergency.
5. Hour "H" to be announced later.
Day "D" October 4th, 1918.

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France, 5 October 1918-4 hrs.

~~SECRET~~

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FIELD ORDERS)
NO 38)

MAPS: ATTIGNY)
JUNIVILLE) 1:20,000
TAHURE)

1. The enemy has been forced back all along the front of the 17th Army. It is reported that he is preparing to retreat from the left on the ARMY to the region of MORNVILLERS.

The XXist Corps d'Armee attacks on the line: ORGEUIL-PYLONE-GRENADIER LAGER-Southern outskirts of ST ETIENNE-d'ARNES-BLANC MONT.

The XXII Division of the XIth Corps d'Armee attacks on our left on a line extending to the west from BLANC MONT.

Divisions of the XXist Corps from right to left: First line: 124th (French)-73rd (French)-2nd (U.S.)-Second Line: 13th (French)-167th (French)-170th (French).

The divisions on our right and left are ordered to carry their attacks to the line of the 2nd Division.

2. The 2nd Division at "H" hour continues its advance towards MACHAULT-CAUROY.

3. (a) The 2nd F.A. Brigade, reinforced by the 3rd Group, 341st R.A.L.) supports the attack and advances by echelon as the infantry progresses.

(b) The Infantry attacks in line of brigades, in column of regiments, regulating its advance on that of the divisions on the right and left.

(c) The 27th Aero Squadron will report the alignment hourly, beginning at 2H⁰⁰ plus One-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) hour, and will adjust artillery fire as directed.

(d) The 2nd Engineers (U.S.) completes the road and bridge work upon which engaged and then passes to division reserves.

(e) The 4th Machine Gun Battalion remains in reserve.

4. Advance dressing and ambulance station at SCHWABENKONIG dugouts; One field hospital to SOMME-PY; Engineer dump at SCHWABENKONIG Dugouts; small arms ammunition dumps at SOMME-PY-MEDEAH FARM and SCHWABENKONIG dugouts; Combat wagons, ration carts, water carts and rolling kitchens to proximity of troops.

5. Command Post: WAGRAM
ADVANCE MESSAGE CENTER -SOMME-PY.

By command of Major General LEJEUNE,

J. O. RHEA,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

IVth French Army--1 ----
XIth French Army--1
XXist French Army Corps--1
73rd French Division--1
22nd French Division--1
C.G. 1
C.of S. 1
A.C. of S. G-1 -1
Chief Tanks--1
1st Amer. Army--1
4th Amer Corps--1

A.C. of S. G-2--1 6th MG Bn--1
A.C. of S. G-3--1 Div Engr--1
2nd FA BRIG & Fr Art Units--20
3rd Brigade--12 Div MG Off--1
4th Brigade--12 Div Gas Off--1
2nd Engineers--1 Div Sig Off--1
4th MG Bn --1 Div Surg--1
5th MG Bn --1 Div Inspector--1
Hdq Troop--1 Div APM--1
Broadville--No 27-1 Div OM--1
Balloon Co--1 1st Fld Sig Bn--1

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION (REGULAR)

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

France, 6 October 1918-18 hrs.

~~SECRET~~
FIELD ORDERS)
NO 39)

MAPS: TAHURE-1/20,000
ATTIGNY-1/20,000

1. The 71st Infantry Brigade relieves front line of the 2nd Division in its position north of BLANC MONT RIDGE on the night of October 6-7.
2. The relief begins after dusk on the evening of October 6, and will be completed by 3:00 AM, October 7. The 71st Brigade will not pass north of the BLANC MONT RIDGE before dusk.
- 3.(a) The 2nd Division will leave one (1) battalion in the front line of each brigade sector until further orders; the remaining battalions from the 3rd and 4th Brigades, when relieved by the 71st Brigade, will be marched back to covered positions and not more than one and one-half kilometers south of BLANC MONT RIDGE, where they will remain at the disposition of the Division Commander.
(b) The Commanding Generals of the 3rd and 4th Brigades will each cause his Brigade Machine Gun battalions to remain in position at the disposal of the Commanding General, 71st Brigade, for 24 hours after the relief is completed, at which time, unless they receive orders to the contrary, they will be withdrawn.
(c) Stokes Mortar and 37 mm gun units of the front line regiment in each of the brigades of the 2nd Division will remain in position for 24 hours after the relief is completed. These units will be reinforced by the personnel of the incoming organizations. At the end of the 24 hours the personnel of the relieved units will withdraw during their material over to the units of the 71st Brigade.
(d) Guides from the 3rd and 4th Brigades will, by arrangement between the commanders of brigades, be sent to guide the 71st Brigade to its positions.
(e) The Division Engineers, the Division Signal Officer, and the Division Surgeon, will not be relieved until further orders. They will each continue to perform his functions with personnel pertaining to the 2nd Division, reinforced by that of the 71st Brigade.
(f) The artillery of the 2nd Division will remain in place and continue to cover the front. It remains under the command of the Commanding General, 2nd Division.
(g) All units of the 71st Brigade, entering into the sectors of the 3rd and 4th Brigades, come under the command of the Commanding Generals of the 3rd and 4th Brigades, each in his sector, until the relief is completed, at which time the command of the front line passes to the Commanding General, 71st Brigade.

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(h) Reconnaissance parties will be sent at once to the new Sector.

(i) Further details will be arranged between commands of units concerned.

4. (a) PLAN OF LIAISON:- That now in effect in the sector of the 2nd Division.

(b) Administrative instructions to be issued later.

5. P.C., 2nd Division: moves to SOMME-PY at 6:00 PM October 6, 1918, at which time it closes at its present locations.

By command of Major General Lejeune;

J. C. RHEA,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

Chief of Staff - - - - -5
71st Brigade - - - - -15
3rd Brigade - - - - -15
4th Brigade - - - - -15
2nd F.A. Brigade - - - -3
Division Engineer - - - -1
Division Surgeon - - - -1;
Division Sig Officer - - -1
11th French A.C. - - - -1
1st American Army - - - -1
4th American Corps - - -1
File - - - - -20

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND FA BRIGADE
SECOND DIVISION, 7th October 1918,

Annex 1 to Field Order No 39
Artillery Plan.

1. The 2nd F.A. Brigade supports the attack of the 2nd Div.,
per Field Order, Second Division, this date:

2. Missions assigned as follows:

12 F.A.) Standing and rolling barrages as per attached
15th F.A.) sketch.

29th F.A.) Standing barrages and smoke screens, as per
) attached sketch.

17th F.A.) Special missions of destruction as per
341st F.A.) attached sketch.

452nd F.A.) Neutralization and Interdiction per instructions
) given by Commanding General, 2nd F.A. Brigade.

3. Rates of fire as per table of "Rates of Fire". In case of
shortage of ammunition, Regimental Commanders are authorized to vary
the rates of fire to ensure sufficient reserve for emergency.

4. The attack will be divided into two phases, viz. 1st phase
from line of departure to first objective; 2nd phase, from 1st objective
to final objective.

The attack from the first objective towards the final objective
will be launched at X hour. Barrages will be prepared and attack will be
launched upon order from these Headquarters.

Regimental Commanders will be prepared to move one Battalion
of their regiment forward upon the attainment of the first objective.
Reconnaissance parties will be pushed well to the front behind the
infantry to locate positions. Movement of Battalions will take place
upon order from these Headquarters.

5. During the attack close observation from the present C.P.'s
towards the flanks will be maintained and Regimental Headquarters
Commanders are authorized to withdraw batteries from the barrage in
order to protect our flanks from flank counter-attacks during the advance.

6. Day D is October 8th. Hour H to be announced later. Watches
to be synchronized from these headquarters.

7. Brigade P.C. remains the same.

By command of Brigadier General Bowley,

J.C.RHEA
Colonel, General Staff
Chief of Staff.

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HEADQUARTERS, SECOND DIVISION (REGULAR)
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

France, 7 October 1918-23:00 hrs.

MEMORANDUM: TO ACCOMPANY FIELD ORDER NO 39

(a) "D" day October 8, 1918.

"H" hour // 5:15 hours.

(b) The troops will be in position for the attack at "H"
minus one (1) hour.

JOHN A. LEJEUNE,
Major General, U.S.M.C.
COMMANDING.

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION (REGULAR) AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

France, 7 Oct-1918-23 hours.

FIELD ORDERS)
NO 40)

MAPS: TAHURE - 1:20,000
ATTIGNY 1:20,000
JUNIVILLE-1:20,000

1. The enemy, in an attempt to protect his withdrawal from the vicinity of RHETIMS, is resisting the advance of the FRANCO-AMERICAN troops north of SOMME-PY.

2 (a) The second division, with the 71st Infantry Brigade attached, attacks on "D" day at "H" hour, and advances in the direction of MACHAULT-CAUDROY.

The 73rd Division (french) attacks on our right (east); the 7th Division (French) on our left (west)

(b) LIMITS OF ACTION:
Division Limits:

Right (east) Limit:

Line: The present right limit of the division--thence thru roadfork about 1 kilometer west and a little south of SCAY FARM road for about 2 kilometers north west of SCAY FARM, co-ordinates: 266.9-286.3--road fork, co-ordinates: 266.0-287.7--road fork at letter "H" in the word "MACHAULT", co-ordinates 265.6-288.9.

Left (east) Limit:

Line: The present west limit of our present front line--thence slightly west of north thru roadfork 500 yards ^{North} west of ST ETIENNE, co-ordinates: 263.95-284.7--thence along the road to cross roads about 2 kilometers south of CAUDROY, co-ordinates: 263.4-286.3--eastern outskirts of CAUDROY.

Regimental limits:

Right (east Regiment) East limit:

East Limits of Division sector.

Left (west Regiment) West Limit:

West limits of Division sector.

DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN REGIMENTS:

Road fork about 1 1/2 kms southwest of ST ETIENNE, on ST ETIENNE - ORTEUIL road, co-ordinates 266.2-283.35--thence about 1 1/2 kms northeast of ST ETIENNE, co-ordinates 265.95-284.9--- railroad and road crossing about 2 kilometers south of MACHAULT, on ST ETIENNE - MACHAULT road, road, co-ordinates 264.6-288.6 MACHAULT, on MACHAULT- CHAUDROY road, co-ordinates 264.6-288.6

II.

PARALLEL OF DEPARTURE:

ST ETIENNE-ORFÈUIL road, along present front of Division.

INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE:

Line connecting point on road about 1 kilometer southwest of SCAY FARM, coordinates ; 267.95-284.2---thence along road in a northwesterly direction to point 266.7-284.55---thence to point on road at north end of small woods about 1 kilometer north of ST ETIENNE, co-ordinates; 263.8-285.4,

OBJECTIVE:

Line: Western edge of woods, co-ordinates; 267.1-284.65---cross roads at point 266.25-285.9--Point on road at eastern edge of small woods at 263.45-287.3.

POSSIBLE OBJECTIVE:

MAGHAULT (inclusive)-Northwest edge of CAUROY.

3 (a) INFANTRY:

The attack will be made by the 71st Infantry Brigade, with its two regiments abreast; each regiment in three (3) lines one of its battalions in each line.

During the advance, combat liaison between the regiments of the 71st Brigade will be provided by a mixed detachment consisting of one platoon and two (2) machine guns from each regiment, under the command of an officer to be designated by the Brigade Commander.

On the right of the Division sector, there will be provided for flank protection and combat liaison with the 73rd Division (French), the 4th M.G.Bn, and one battalion from the 3rd Infantry Brigade, to be designated by the Commanding General of the brigade. Similarly, on the left, one battalion of the 4th Infantry Brigade will be designated by the Brigade Commander to protect the left flank and to maintain combat liaison with the 7th Division (French).

The infantry will stake out its front lines at 7:30 9:30, 12 and 17 hours, and at such other times as they may be called upon to do so by the division aeroplane.

The 2nd Division (less two (2) battalions infantry, and 4th M G Battalion) will constitute the reserve. It will remain in its present position at the disposal of the Division Commander.

(b) TANKS:

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, tanks (French) are attached to the 71st Infantry Brigade.

(c) ARTILLERY:

The 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, Brigadier General Bowley, Commanding, with attached French Artillery, will support the attack, (see Annex No 1 for Artillery Plan).

(d) AVIATION:

The 27th Aero Squadron assists the division by reporting progress and location of front line, and by observation of artillery fire.

- (e) AERO STATION: 45th Balloon Co, will assist by observation .
- (f) ENGINEERS: The 2nd Engineers will continue their present work.

PLAN OF LIAISON: Present plan with the following added:

- (1) Radio calls assigned to the 71st Brigade:

Damped Waves.

P.C. 71st Brigade	C 1 (one)
P.C. 141st Infantry	C 6
1st Bn	C 9
2nd Bn	D 1 (one)
3rd Bn	D 6
P.C. 142nd Infantry	D 9
1st Bn	N 1 (one)
2nd Bn	N 6
3rd Bn	P 1.

- (2) Key of co-ordinates No 327 will be used until further orders.

4. Advance dressing and ambulance station at SCHWABENKONIG Dugouts; One field Hospital at SOMME-PY; Engineer dump at SCHWABENKONIG-Dugouts; small arms ammunition dumps at SOMME-PY-MEDEAH FARM and SCHWABENKONIG Dugouts; combat wagons, ration carts and rolling kitchens to proximity of troops.

Other administrative details will be issued later.

- 5. P.C's --- 2nd Division and of Brigades: NO CHANGE
Advance Message Center: At cross roads near SCHWABENKONIG.

John A. Lejeune,
Major General, U.S.M.S.
Commanding.

NOTE: Attention of all men will be called to the fact that the artillery will use some smoke shells in the barrage and a smoke screen about the eastern edge of ST ETIENNE.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Staff15
2nd FA Brigade15
3rd Brigade15
4th Brigade15
71st Brigade	1
4th MG Bn	1
73rd Division (French)	1
21st A.C. (French)	1
1st American Army	11
4th American Corps	1

D day Oct 8, 1918
H hour 5:15 hours

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION (REGULAR) AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

France, 9 October, 1918, --16:00.

FIELD ORDERS

No. 41.

MAP: TAHURE -1/20,000.
ATTIGNY-1/20,000
JUNIVILLE-1/20,000

1. The 36th Division relieves the 2d Division in the BLANC MONT sector on the night of 9-10 October, 1918.

2. The relief begins immediately after dusk on the evening of October 9, and will be completed before 5:00 hour, October 10.

3.(a) The 36th Division (less the 71st Infantry Brigade, 61st Field Artillery Brigade, and the 111th Engineers), will march from their positions near NAVAR in at 17:30 hours, October 9, and proceed to the vicinity of SOMME-PY; the 143d Infantry marching by the PISTE de NIMES; the other units by the SOUAIN-SOMME PY road.

Upon arriving at SOMME-PY, they will be met by guides from the 2d Division, who will conduct them to their positions in the area, where they will relieve the 2d Division; the 143d Infantry going into support and reserve positions in the sector now occupied by the 3d Brigade; the 144th Infantry to similar positions in the present sector of the 4th Brigade. Other units relieve corresponding units, 2d Division.

(b) Upon being relieved by the 36th Division, the 3d and 4th Infantry Brigades will proceed, so as to arrive before dawn, October 10, to a position south of the NAVARIN RIDGE: thence to the new area.

The 3d Infantry Brigade, 1st Field Signal Battalion and Headquarters Troop, march by the PISTE des CUISINES; the remainder of the division by the SOMME-PY SOUADE-SUPPES road.

The 4th Brigade will be regrouped in the zone SUIPPES-NANTIVET-SOMME SUIPPES, in Army Reserve; the 2d Division, (less 4th Brigade and those elements left in the SOMME-PY sector) as Reserve XI Corps, will be regrouped in the zone limited on the west by the SOUAIN-SUIPPES road; on the north by the SOUAIN-PERTHES road; on the east, by the MARCHAND road; on the south, by Parallel 265.

(c) The 2d Division will leave in the SOMME-PY area, at the disposal of the Commanding General, 36th Division, the 2d Engineers Regiment; 2d Field Artillery Brigade, and certain sanitary and supply units and material, these latter by arrangement between the proper staff officers of the two divisions.

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(d) Machine guns pertaining to the 2d Division, and the personnel on duty with them, now in position in front line and support positions, will remain in place for 24 hours after the relief is completed.

(e) One staff officer from division headquarters; one from each brigade regiment and Battalion; one officer from each company, and one non-commissioned officer from each platoon, to serve as guides for the incoming organization, will be left in the area for 24 hours by the 2d Division.

(f) Billeting parties from organizations, 2d Division, will proceed to new area on October 10, under arrangements made by A.C. of S., G-1.

(g) All units of the 36th Division entering into the SOMME-PY area come under the command of the Commanding General, 2d Division, until the relief is completed, at which time the command of the sector passes to the Commanding General, 36th Division.

The command passes at 10:00 AM, October, 19, 1918.

The Commanding General, 2d Division, remains with the Commanding General, 36th Division, until 10:00 AM, October 11, 1918.

4. Field Trains will march with their organizations.

Other administrative details later.

5. The P.C., 2d Division, opens at P.C. TARBES, at CAMP MONTPELTER, at 10:00 A.M. October 10, at which time it closes at its present location.

P.C. 4th Brigade, SUIPPES.

John A. Lejaune,
Major General, U.S.M.C.,
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Staff.....	20.
2d F.A. Brigade.....	10.
3d Brigade.....	15.
4th Brigade.....	15.
36th Division.....	40.
4th M.G. Bn.....	1.
73d Division (French).....	1.
7th Division (French).....	1.
21st A.C.....	1.
1st American Army.....	1.
4th American Corps.....	1.
Hq. Troop.....	1.
1st Fld. Signal Bn.....	1.

JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS

OF

2d DIV for

SEPTEMBER 24 - Oct 25th.

September 24, 1918.

Weather fair.

In compliance with memorandum #128, from 4th A.C., 2nd Division moves to new area, destined for service under French command.

F.O. # 32, these Headquarters issued. Division to move by rail except motorized service which proceeds by marching.

Entrainment takes place on the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th of September. Entrainment points -

VOUCOULEURS
TOUL
SORCEY-sur-MEUSE
DOMGERMAIN

Duration of journey about 10 hours. 3rd Brigade entrains at Toul ; 4th Brigade entrains at Domgermain ; 2nd F.A. Brigade entrains at Voucouleurs and Corcey-sur-Meuse and the Engineers entrain at Toul.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

September 25, 1918.

Weather : fair.

Movement of 2nd Division by rail and motorized units by marching continued.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

September 26, 1918.

Weather : Fair.

Movements of 2nd Division continues.

Division Headquarters established at MAIRY-sur-MEUSE at 12:00 Noon.

Annex orders reports and sketches.

to relieve the 61st D.I. (French) in front line near SOMME PY. Division passed from Army Reserve 4th Army (French) to 21st Corps (French), the 4th Infantry Brigade taking over front line trenches and the 3rd Brigade going into reserve south of ridge at NAVARIN. The 2nd Artillery Brigade going into position to support these units.

Weather rainy/.

Movement of 2nd Division to new area continues.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

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September 28th, 1918.

Weather Cloudy.

Movement of 2nd Division to new area continues.

On the afternoon of September 28th the 2nd Division under order No. 9489/3 from 4th French Army was ordered from the CHALON MAIRY to the SOUAIN SUIPPES area. In compliance with this order Field Order 33 these Headquarters was issued and units were moved to new area by bus during night of September 28th.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

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September 29, 1918.

Weather rainy.

Movement of 2nd Division continues to new area by bus and marching during the night.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

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September 30th, 1918.

Weather fair.

Movement of 2nd Division to new area completed. Division Headquarters closes at MAIRY 10.00 a.m. and opens at SUIPPES SOMME BY same day and hour.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

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October 1st, 1918.

Weather fair.

Complying with orders from 4th French Army, Field Order 34 of these Headquarters was issued and the 2nd Division prepared

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 2nd, 1918.

Weather cloudy.

The 2nd Division is in position in front line near SOMME PY. Esquadrille No. 27 (French) was assigned to the 2nd Division and were very active locating enemy batteries, machine gun nests, strong points and general reconnaissance work. During the day many French bombing planes bombed the enemy front line and enemy troop concentrations. Enemy air activity very limited on account of French aeroplanes excellent work in keeping the enemy planes out of the air making it impossible for him to do much in the way of reconnaissance work. The 2nd Field Artillery Brigade very active during day, harassing, demolition, counter battery and barrage work. Enemy artillery laid down several severe barrages and shelled roads in both forward and rear areas, causing only small losses to 2nd Division. The 2nd Division was ordered to attack by the Commanding General 21st Army Corps (French) and at 23 hours 2nd of October Field Order 35 was issued, covering the attack.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 3rd, 1918.

Weather fair.

The attack ordered by Field Order 35, 2nd of October was launched this a.m., 2nd Division jumping off on schedule time, reaching its objective, it consolidated its new position. The 170th D.I. (French) on our right pushed up and joined our line, but the 21st D.I. (French) on our left were unable to take the "hook" in the ESSEN TRENCH and made little if any advance. Under instructions from General NAULIN, Commanding General 21st Corps (French), Field Order 36 these Headquarters was issued and the advance of the 2nd Division was continued shortly after 14 hours October 3rd. This advance was retarded by severe fire from machine gun nests and artillery on our flanks. The 4th Brigade assisted the French on our left in cleaning up the ESSEN TRENCH. A counter-attack by the enemy later recaptured this trench from the French. During the night the French by passing on the flanks of the hook in the ESSEN TRENCH were able to reestablish their line and drive the enemy from the hook. Our aerial forces and artillery continued very active. The aerial activity of the enemy was very limited, but his machine guns and artillery were quite active. The 2nd Division captured about 2000 prisoners during the day and made an advance of about 7 kilometers.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 4th, 1918.

Weather fair.

Under Field Order No. 37 issued in compliance to orders 3720/3 and 3722/3 from 81st Corps (French), the 2nd Division attempted to advance, but after making a small gain were held up by severe artillery and machine gun fire on their flanks both flanks being refused on account of the inability of the French troops on our right and left to advance. Our aerial forces and artillery were very active. Enemy aerial activity increased and their artillery and machine gun fire quite severe. The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the position held by the Division and in perfecting of plans for the reduction of a strong point and machine gun nest on the west side of BLANC MONT.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 5th, 1918.

Weather cloudy.

In compliance with orders from 21st Corps (French) Field Order No. 386 these Headquarters was issued and after 30 minutes artillery preparation the Division continued its advance, the 4th Brigade advancing behind a barrage captured a strong point on the west of BLANC MONT, taking 209 prisoners including 4 officers. 75 light and heavy machine guns, some trench mortars, a large quantity of ammunition and stores without any loss to the Brigade. The reduction of this strong point enabled the 22nd D.I. (French) to advance its line to ST. PIERRE -a-ARNES. Normal amount of aerial and artillery activity on our part. Enemy aerial and artillery activity normal. General Gouraud, commanding the 4th Army (French) congratulated the 2nd Division on their fine success in their actions of October 4th.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 6th, 1918.

Weather cloudy.

The 2nd Division by a series of local attacks advanced and strengthened its front all along its line, taking 30 prisoners.

Field Order No. 39 these Headquarters was issued and relief of the front line elements of the 2nd Division by the 71st Brigade U.S., began after dark. The relieved units formed back in the reserve and support positions. The P.C. of the 2nd Division was closed at P.C. Wagram and opened at SOMMEPY at 22 hours this date.

Annex Orders, reports and sketches.

October 7th, 1918.

Weather rainy.

The 71st Brigade attached to the 2nd Division spent the day in consolidation and improvement of line in preparation for an attack on 8th of October. Aerial and artillery activity normal.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

October 8th, 1918.

Weather fair.

In compliance with orders No. 3760/3, 3770/3 21st Corps (French) Field Order No. 40 these Headquarters was issued and the 71st Brigade (U.S) attached to and supported by the 2nd Division attacked. In the general direction CAUKOT MACHAULT the succeeded in advancing about one kilometer when counterattacks by the enemy pushed them back. During the early hours of the evening the right and left flanks of the front line were reinforced by the 2nd Engineers and 4th Machine Gun Battalion. The whole of the Division line was subjected to very severe artillery fire, but maintained its position. Enemy aerial and artillery activity very great. Our own air forces very active and our artillery keeping up almost a continuous bombardment of the enemy front lines and rear positions.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

October 9th, 1918.

Weather Fair.

The Division spent the day in local attacks in order to improve and strengthen its positions. Complying with order No. 3781/3 and 3793/3 21st Corps (French), Field Order No. 41 these Headquarters was issued and the relief of the 2nd Division less the attached troops (71st Brigade U.S) and the 2nd Field Artillery, 2nd Engineers, Fifth Machine Gun Battalion and 2nd Ammunition Train commenced, the troops being relieved by the 36th Division U.S.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

October 10th, 1918.

Weather fair.

The 2nd Division less the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, 2nd Engineers, 2nd Ammunition Train now attached to 36th Division U.S. and the 5th Machine Gun Battalion moved to the SOUAIN SUIPPES area bounded on the north by a line through the Fme DE WACQUES, P.C. Alma on the east, by P.C. Sapping-Crapouillet on the south, by ST. REMY-LA CHEPPE on the west by Camp PIENROT-CAMP de SUIPPES OUST. The Division P.C. closed at SOMME PY 10.00 a.m., and opened at Camp MONTPELLIER same date and hour. Command of BLANC MONT-SOMME PY sector passing to commanding general 36th Division same hour and date.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 11th, 1918.

Weather fair.

The 2nd Division less units attached to 36th Division and 5th Machine Gun Battalion enroute to new area.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 12th, 1918.

Weather cloudy.

The Division less units attached to 36th Division spent the day in billets resting and policing.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 13th, 1918.

Weather rainy.

The Division less units attached to 36th Division spent the day in billets resting. In compliance with order 9776/3 4th Army (French) Field Order 42 these Headquarters was issued ordering 2nd Division to proceed by marching to BOUY-VADENAY-ST. ETIENNE area.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

October 14th, 1918.

Weather cloudy.

The Division less units attached to 36th Division proceeded by marching to new area. Movement completed during the evening of this day.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 15th, 1918.

Weather Cloudy.

The Division spent the day in billets and policing.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

October 16th, 1918.

Weather rainy.

The Division spent the day in training.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

October 17th, 1918.

Weather rainy.

The Division spent the day in training.

Annex : Orders, reports, and sketches.

October 18th, 1918.

Weather fair.

The Division spent the day in training.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 19th, 1918.

Weather rainy.

Pursuant to order No. 133/3 4th Army (French) Field Order No. 43 these Headquarters was issued and the 4th Brigade with necessary Signal and Medical personnel were detached to the 9th

Army Corps (French) and were ordered to move on October 20th to the SUIPPES where further orders would be given them by the 9th Army Corps (French). Three batteries of the 17th Field Artillery attached to the 36th Division U.S. were detached to a regiment of French artillery.

Admiral Mayo and Staff of the U.S. Navy visited Headquarters 2nd Division this day.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 20th, 1918.

Weather rainy.

The 2nd Division less units detached to the 36th Division U.S. and the 9th Army Corps (French) spent the day in billets resting.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 21st, 1918.

Weather fair.

The 2nd Division less units detached to the 36th Division U.S. and the 9th Army Corps (French) spent the day in training.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

October 22nd, 1918.

Weather cloudy.

In compliance with order from 4th French Army the 2nd Division was relieved from duty under this command and placed under orders of the 1st American Army. Field Order No. 44 was issued and the Division less detached units proceeded by marching to the HERPONT AUVE area. The Division P.C. closed at FINE VADENAY 5.00 p.m. October 22nd and opened the same hour and date at HERPONT. In compliance to Order No. 209/3 4th Army (French) Field Order No. 45 these Headquarters was issued directing the movement of the Infantry Brigade to be located at LA CLAON. The P.C. of the 2nd Division remains in place.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 23rd, 1918.

Weather fair.

The 3rd Infantry Brigade enroute to the LES ISLETTES area. In compliance with orders from First Army U.S., the 4th Brigade moved from the SUIPPES area to the VALMY area. Memorandum from First Army U.S. received instructing the 2nd Division less the

units attached to 36th Division U.S. to prepare for movement to new area.

Annex : Orders, reports and sketches.

October 24th, 1918.

Weather cloudy.

Pursuant to Special Order 480 First Army U.S. dated Oct. 23rd, 1918, the 2nd Division was ordered to move to the LES ISLETTES area, on the 24th and 25th of October, 1918. In compliance with above order Field Order 46 these Headquarters was issued directing the movement of the Division less the detached units by bus and marching to the new area. Movement to commence at 6.30 hours 25th of October.

Annex: Orders, reports and sketches.

October 25th, 1918

Weather cloudy.

In compliance with Field Order No. 46 these Headquarters, the 2nd Division less detached units (and the 3rd Brigade already in new area) moved to the LES ISLETTES area. The following units being in position in the LES ISLETTES area at 18 hours October 25th at Division Headquarters : Headquarters Troop, Company A Military Police, Second Supply Train less detached

HEADQUARTERS THIRDS BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION.
AMER. E. F. October 13th, 1918.

From : Commanding General, 3rd Brigade.
To: Commanding General, 2nd Division.
Subject: Report of Operations October 1-8th, 1918.

1. Movements Prior to the Attack.

On the 28th of September the movement of this Brigade from TOUL to the area immediately south of CHALONS was completed. On night of September 28-29th orders were received by telephone directing the animal drawn transportation of the brigade to proceed to the vicinity of SUIPPES; later written orders directed the movement of the remainder of the Brigade by buss during the night of 29-30th September to camps situated from two to four kilometers south of SUIPPES. This move was made as ordered; Brigade Headquarters moved to SUIPPES at 10:00 A.M. September 30th. On 1st October the Brigade was ordered to move to the reverse slope of NAVARIN FME Ridge, preparatory to movement to attack position, by Field Order 34, 2nd Division. This position was held during the night 1-2nd October and the day of 2nd October.

2. Forming up for the Attack.

The Plan of Attack as given by verbal instructions during forenoon 2nd October contemplated the attack by the 4th Brigade, with this Brigade in support. Field Orders 35, 2nd Division, 2nd October '18, changed this plan and directed this Brigade to attack in the sector as shown by attached map. The movement to this new sector was made during the night 2-3rd October. A staff officer of the 170th French Division promised that guides would meet troops at BOIS de MOINEAU and at CLARIERE des ALILEES at 6:30 P.M. 2nd October. These guides did not appear and troops were forced to spend most of the night in the search for the jumping-off trenches. At "H" hour minus 45 minutes only six companies had arrived; at "H" hour all were approximately in position.

3. The 1st Attack on October 3rd.

The morning attack on 3rd October was made in accordance with F.O. 35, 2nd Division and F.O. #37, Hq 3rd Brigade. The line of departure marked "B" on attached map as given by orders was found to be held by the enemy and troops were forced to form up on line marked "A" extending northeast on 2 kilometers from a point about 2 kilometers northeast of SOMME-PY, 9th Infantry was leading, 23rd Infantry in support. "H" hour was 5:50 A.M. The barrage went down promptly and the troops went over in good shape. Heavy resistance, both artillery and machine gun, was encountered and overcome. The tanks rendered some service in reducing machine gun nests; for the most part they were behind the leading battalion.

The first objective, marked "D" was taken at 8:38 A.M. This includes strong points PYLONE and MEDEAH FME. Outposts were immediately pushed forward about 1 kilometer to the front. Tanks entered MEDEAH FME. French came upon the right and marines on left. At 10:15 P.M. one Bn. of the 23rd Infantry was placed at disposal of Major Barker, 5th Marines, to resist an expected counter-attack. This attack did not develop and the Battalion was returned to the 23rd Infantry. The position along the line "D" was held by the 9th Infantry, until 4:00 p.m. 3rd October. P.C. 3rd Brigade was moved to 268.6-280.7 at 10:00 p.m. and was not changed again until the relief of the Division.

4. Second Attack on 3rd October.

This attack was made in the afternoon of the 1st Day, in compliance with Field Order 36, 2nd Division. The advance was made by 23rd Infantry, which passed thru the 9th Infantry on the 1st objective. "H" hour was at 4:00 p.m. The attack progressed as far as the Blue Line "F" where it was held up due to the failure of the French Division on our right to advance; this exposed my right flank to heavy machine gun fire and necessitated throwing in two battalions of the 9th Infantry to protect that flank. In addition the Marine Brigade was held up at about yellow line "H" necessitating the refusal of the left flank of the 23rd Infantry. I issued an order to C.O. 23rd Infantry directing that the high ground south of ST. ETIENNE be occupied in case the Marines did not come up. This ground was in the Marine sector, but must be held to protect my left flank. It was occupied and held by the 23rd Infantry. At 8:55, 4th October, one company of the 5th Marines came up on the left connecting with 23rd Infantry reserve Bn. As shown above the Brigade front on the night of 3-4th October was about $5\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers long, in a position exposed to hostile fire on the front and both flanks. At 3:22 a.m. 4th October, Major Barker, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, requested our aid in case of a counter attack from the west. This aid was promised.

5. Operations on 5/6 October.

In compliance with F.O. 27, 2nd Division, the 23rd Infantry, supported by 9th Infantry, attacked in the direction of MACHAULT, at 2:30 p.m. The attack started promptly on the hour. The French on our right, jumped off at the same hour, advanced 300 yards and fell back; the Marine Brigade on our left did not advance, this being explained by the statement of the C.O. 5th Marines that he was under the impression that "H" hour would never be given. The fact that troops on my right and left remained in position, made a further advance by this Brigade impossible; all available troops for covering flanks had previously been used up, and it was not deemed practicable to further expose this command to counter-attack from three sides. As soon as conditions were known, Colonel Stone, 23rd Infantry, was ordered to discontinue the advance and fall back to his line of departure; this order was misinterpreted by him to mean that he should fall back to the "D" line, and a backward movement was begun.

The misunderstanding was soon cleared up and troops of the 23rd Infantry were stopped on the approximate line held by them a few hours earlier, the "F" line. Orders were received from 2nd Division during the night to clear the 23rd Infantry out of the Marine sector so that the 6th Marines could take over proper sector. Part of the 23rd Infantry was moved, but due to the fact that the 6th Marines were late coming up, there was some infiltration by the enemy. Heavy flanking machine guns fire resulted and it was necessary to move the lines forward on the morning of the 6th to clear out the woods in my front and in the front of the 6th Marines. This was done at 6:30 A.M. by 23rd Infantry and 6th Marines, after hard fighting. At the end of this operation the lines held were that part of the "F" line in the Marine sector and the "K" line in the 3rd Brigade sector. The French advanced to the yellow "N" line at 2:00 p.m. At about this time orders from 2nd Division Headquarters directed that the 3rd Brigade withdraw all troops from Marine sector. This was done and the final Third Brigade line of the day is shown by the "K" line and the "L" line.

6. Relief by 71st Brigade

On night of October 6/7, the 141st Infantry was put in position in the sector of the 3rd Brigade, with one Battalion in front line, one battalion in support, and one battalion in reserve. To accomplish this, and to give stability to the line, the 23rd Infantry was withdrawn to vicinity of PYLONE and the Battalions of the 141st Infantry were placed alongside the corresponding Battalions of the 9th Infantry. This position was held during the day October 7th and the night of October 7/8th. An attack was ordered for the morning of October 8th, the attack to be made by the 141st Infantry passing thru the 3rd Brigade. One battalion 9th Infantry was assigned the duty of keeping liaison between the French on our right and the 141st Infantry. This battalion did excellent work when the French failed to advance at "H" hour. Two companies of 4th Machine Gun Battalion and 1 Battalion Engineers took over that part of the line held by 9th Infantry during the afternoon of 8th October and the 9th was then regrouped on the 1st objective in reserve. During the night of 8/9th October two battalions of the 23rd were ordered back to a support position on the "K" line, which position they held until relieved on the night of 9th/10th October.

The relief of the Brigade by the 143d Infantry was made on the night of 9/10th October and the troops were taken back to the vicinity of NA VARIN FME. During the day of October 10th they were marched to billets about 4 kilometers Northeast of SUIPPES.

7. Counter-attacks.

Three counter-attacks were reported, one on the afternoon of 3rd October, one on the afternoon of the 5th October and one, -the most serious- on the late afternoon of the 9th October. All were repulsed. The last was broken up due to the very good work of the Liaison Battalion of the 9th Infantry operating with the 71st Brigade; the attack was caught in flank fire and counter-attack from this Battalion and stopped; it resulted in heavy losses to the enemy.

Besides the counter-attacks mentioned above, many attempts at infiltration were made, amounting to small scale counter-attacks. The enemy was aggressive and great vigilance was necessary to prevent his machine gunners in small groups from penetrating our lines.

8. Miscellaneous.

The Brigade went into the attack with approximately 5500 men and 160 officers. Casualties reported to date are as follows :

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted men</u>
Killed	21	292
Wounded	69	1587
Missing	5	445
	<u>95</u>	<u>2324</u>
Total		

Captures as follows : 1410 prisoners; 17 guns, 13-3" trench mortars, 4-6" Trench Mortars and about 200 machine guns ; coordinates showing locations of guns mentioned above have been sent to 2nd Division.

The captures above, with 2600 prisoners and 32 guns taken at VIERZY on July 18th, and the 3000 prisoners and 92 guns taken at THIAUCOURT on 12th September make a total for this Brigade since July 15th of 7010 prisoners and 154 guns (3" or larger) .

ARTILLERY.

The 15th Field Artillery, supporting this Brigade, did excellent work. Close liaison was established and maintained and Infantry and artillery worked well together. The artillery supporting the Marine Brigade sector did not do satisfactory work. The Twenty-third Infantry was fired into by friendly artillery on six different occasions causing casualties estimated at 100. The line held by this Brigade was known to the artillery in spite of this fact efforts to stop fire falling as far short as Regimental Headquarters 23rd Infantry, 1 kilometer in rear of front line, were without results. This short fire continued at intervals for 36 hours after Artillery Brigade Headquarters had been notified of it. No short fire is attributed to 15th Field Artillery.

LIAISON

Due to rapid movement of troops the late hour at which they could be formed up for attack and the lack of time for proper reconnaissance, the initial installation of mechanical liaison was late. However, once established it was maintained in an excellent manner. Telephone lines from these headquarters were cut 22 times during one night by shell fire, but communication was never lost for longer than 30 minutes with either regiments of division. Liaison with the Marine Brigade was established but was valueless due to the distance to the P.C. Marine Brigade, near NAVARIN FME. It was found to be more satisfactory to maintain liaison with the leading Marine regiment whose P.C. was practically as far advanced as was this Brigade P.C.

Liaison with the 15th Artillery was thoroughly satisfactory. The liaison officer attached to these headquarters rendered excellent service. It is not believed that closer cooperation between Infantry and Artillery could have been obtained.

ENGINEERS.

The Battalion Engineers attached to this Brigade on 9th October relieved at Battalion of 9th Infantry in liaison between French and our 71st Brigade. They hold this line in the face of heavy machine gun and artillery fire. Their work was satisfactory.

AEROPLANES.

At no time during the recent operations did the enemy have air superiority. Our planes were always put and kept the enemy planes away. This prevented the enemy from bombing our infantry and shooting them up with machine guns.

TANKS

Tanks reported on time and jumped off with the infantry. They kept well up and it is believed that they were of some real value in cleaning up machine gun nests during the advance on the first day. It is believed that better results can be obtained by assigning American tanks to work with American Infantry; otherwise there is likely to exist a lack of understanding and cooperation, due to difference in language and temperament.

SUPPLY.

It is not believed that food dumps were established as far forward as they should have been. Food and water were supplied to troops but in most cases the haul was long and entailed a severe tax on animals and men. Closer food dumps would have guaranteed a surer and prompter supply. Difficulty was experienced in many cases by Supply Officers in locating troops and getting food to them. This is a problem that each Supply Officer should work out with his Battalion Commander; proper guides should be arranged for and close liaison should always be maintained by a Battalion Supply Officer and his Battalion Commander.

H. E. ELY,
Brigadier General,
Commanding.

MESSAGES, SENT AND RECEIVED, OCTOBER 1st, 1918.

Hour.

20210 to C. G. 2nd Div. - 3rd Brig. Hdq. now located at point near NAVARIN FME. 50 yards E of main SOUAIN-SOMME -PY ROAD; come to south end of corduroy road then turn right to dugout. Guide will be found at south end of corduroy road.

ELY.

October 2nd, '18.

2:25P. to C.G. 2nd Div. Correction in Operation Memo 3rd Brigade No 20 giving P.C.'s as follows:

Change 1st P.C. to read 270.5-278.8. Will be established there at 7:00 p m unless we receive further orders. Will take H hour as 6:30 a m. 3rd Oct. Please notify us if any change in your advance P.C. from 7910.

Ely-Brig. Gen'l.

4:05P. to C O 5th M G Bn. Your liaison officer was directed at 8:00 a m to tell you to move your P.C. forward. The C G directs that never under any circumstances hereafter will your headquarters be in rear of his P.C. 3rd Brig. moves to 270.5-278.8 at 5:00 p m. Your companies will remain with hrs. on 8-30 P.M. -Arrived at P.C. in trenches north of Somme-Py.

October 3rd, '18

0.15 To C. of S. 2nd Div. Am sending officer as requested by Lt. Livingston by telephone from 170th Div. Request that these Headquarters be furnished with a liaison officer with necessary runners from Div. Hdq. None available here. Request signal officer send out two telephones. Request officer coming for orders be given transportation as far as Somme-Py as otherwise it will be physically impossible to transmit information in your orders to my regiments before H hour. Total round trip distance is between 12 and 15 miles, much of which is thru trenches. Will carry out attack as planned unless other orders received. You can reach me by telephone thru P.C. Smidt (Lt Livingston) or thru 170th Div. (174th Reg. 1st Bn) where my P.C. is located (Same as shown in B.P. Memo 20)

Ely-Comdg.

3:20 To C O 9th Inf -"H" hour 5:50 A M artillery preparation begins
5:45 A.M.

Ely-Comdg.

3:07 To C of S. Units in place as follows: 2 bns 9th in communication with other bn, 9th -not in communication with 23rd Guides did not report at points given by Staff Officer of 170th French Div.

Ely-Brig. Gen'l.

5:10 To C.G. 2nd Div. Jumped off at H hour. Progressing well and troops reaching objective. Prisoners coming in. Casualties slight, but cannot tell percentage. Objective believed to be taken.

Ely-Comdg.

5:15 To Snowl - The Brig. Comdr. directs that you have all available

officers go out in search of the remainder of your command and report to him at once any elements found. Sink 7.

7:70 From Myers to Sink 1 (in code) report when thirdbrigade attacks how progressing.

7:50 From Myers to Sink 1 (in code) report situation of your tanks.

8:15 Notified Div. moving to P.C. 3 and will return 1st P.C. at noon.

8:30 To Regt Hq. 9th Inf from Capt. A. A. Flatnes -Objective taken at 8:30 a.m.

8:40 To 3rd Brig. from R.I.O 9th Inf -9th held up slightly by barrage one half kilometer to south of Medeah Farme. At present one Co. is advancing in flanking movement to west of Farm and barrage has practically ceased.

MESSAGES SENT AND RECEIVED (& INCIDENTS)

OCTOBER 3rd '18.

8-59Am To Sink 1 (in code) report of your station. Myers.

9-15 AM. First Bn put in line by French last night reached objective at 8-30 a.m. 2nd and 3rd Bns in support and reserve. What orders? MacNider.

9-50 Am to C.G. 2nd Div Reached objective at 8-30 a.m. Am consolidating using 9th Inf for that purpose. The 23rd Inf is pushing one bn. forward for 2 kilometer to establish 3rd maintained outpost. We can move forward. Casualties estimated 20%. Prisoners estimated at 1000 or more. Message sent to P.C. 1 will reach me. Ely.

9-45 Am. To C.O. 9th Inf-Consolidate the objective organizing in depth; objective will be in line of resistance. 23rd Inf will be ordered to push 1 bn thru you to distance of one kilometer to form outpost. Ely.

10:15 A To Sink 1 -Give location of P.C. -Surprise.

10:25 A 5th & 6th Marines on left of 9th Inf claim counter-attack is threatened on their left flank. They have no support. Major Barker asks for one bn. I have detailed 2nd bn to report to him. Stone.

11:00A To C.O. 9th Inf. P.C. back at P.C. 1 until further orders. Give coordinates your P.C. Request casualties and prisoners. Ammunition dump at SOMME-PY. Ely.

11:40-A To C.G. 3d Brig. Organized in depth. digging in. Hostile planes at low altitude directing artillery fire accurately. Whole regiment together. Went over together. We need water, ammunition and our kitchens. Have no transportation here for liaison. MacNider.

11:55A To C.O. 23d -The attack will probably be pushed your regt. will pass thru the 9th when we move forward. Push out strong patrols toward ST. ENTIENNE to see if boshe is pulling back. Reorganize your bns. and prepare for the move forward!! Details as soon as known. Small A. A. dump SOMME-PY. Ely

1:20Pm -We are being heavily shelled in front lines -1st Bn

1:20Pm.-Surprise 1 desires conference you at P.C. Sister as early as possible. Answer giving hour. Sister is moping up in area passed over by your troops and sisters. You will assist this with two companies. Surprise 7.

1-25Pm. We are being heavily shelled in front lines -1st bn requests counter-battery work. Have liaison with marines who reached objective immediately on our left with us. Whole area being heavily shelled. Unable to get data on prisoners. Regt'l Surgeon estimates 20% casualties. Stuart.

2:10 Pm. Temporary P.C. at this point. (268.45-280.8) Can receive orders here who can't locate Col. Stuart at present time. Holding objective with 1st Bn. as reported, 2nd in support, 3rd in reserve. Signed) MacNider.

2:05 PM No prisoners reported. Estimate casualties at 150. Stone.

2-10 pm Received message from Division to attack at 4:00 p.m.

2-30pm to C.O. 9th Inf. Attack resumed at 4:00 p.m. 23rd will pass thru you and lead. You will follow until your bns in column. Direction of attack - St. Etienne ridge. 1 km south of St. Etienne will be held and consolidated by 23rd. You will dig in behind them. Notify tanks to get with Stone and Support him. You will follow. P.C. 3rd Brig. will join your P.C. at 5:00 P.M. Ely.

2-34 Pm. Artillery Liaison Officer sent message to 15th Art. that Sink would attack at 4:00 P.M. and requested rolling barrage, pounding St. Etienne and 500 meters beyond.

3-00Pm. To same. Barrage for attack will start to move forward at 4:05 p.m. after five minutes preparation. Barrage will start from place it last stopped this A.M. in front of exploitation line 1380 meters in front of objective. Barrage will advance 500 meters beyond ST. ETIENNE remain there until taken. Advance rate 4 minutes 100 meters. Sink 7. 6-10 Verbal message by Col. Arnold received. Attack started 6-05 Pm. Stone.

7-15 Pm. Attained objective 7-10 pm Have consolidated. Sketches and details by daylight. Losses moderate, largely from MG fire St. Etienne reconnoitered. Bosche strong entrenched on south side of village. Requests -amm. s.a. stokes, chauchot, hand and V B grenades. No water here. Request that artillery liaison officer be furnished copy of this message. My men had only reserve rations today. Must have food for tomorrow.

STONE.

8-00 pm. To Same 1. There is a possibility of a counter attack tonight from our left front.

Regt Comdrs. will make proper plans for meeting such an attack.

The 23rd Inf will be charged with protection of our fronts.

The 9th Inf will be prepared to reinforce front, throw a bn. or two bns, to left to protect left flank or to counter-attack. These hdqrs will be at once notified of any attack. P.C. 3rd Brig. 86.05 near 9th Inf. P.C. on hill 208.

Ely-Comdg.

8-30 pm From Col Mitchell to C. 3rd Brig. Two engineer wagons of tools containing 300 picks, 600 shovels and 52 axes have been started for SOMME-PY for you. Traffic is jammed and they may be slow in arriving. Tools will be unloaded at north end of bridge near church in SOMME-Py. You must send for tools as engineers have no men to bring them to you. Same number were sent to same place this P.M. for Marines. (Sgd) Mitchell.

10-50 Pm. To Same 1. Your message 7:15 P.M. just received. Small arm ammunition dump for your regt. established near here now. Designate location and can have ammunition sent further forward to you in morning. Some ration carts of yours have passed here don't know where they went -will try to get them rounded up in daylight. Some water carts here now. Advise exact location.

Sink 7.

OCTOBER 4th, 1918.

3-22 am. We are expecting a strong attack by a fresh Bosche Division this morning between 4:00 a.m. and daybreak. Our left flank is badly exposed and we would appreciate any help you could give us there. Our left flank (2nd Bn) is approximately at 265.8-280.7 but expects to fall back to the trenches directly south of this point. We fear an attack in an easterly direction south of the trenches where our left now lies. Would you help our left if the attack develops by taking up a position along the road running north and south (app) at 266.4-280.0 from this point to the south along this road, (From F.A. Barker, Major comd'g 1st Bn 6th Marines) (Sent to C.O. 9th Inf)

6-30A -Heavy enemy artillery fire on my front since 5:00 o'clock. Enemy counter-attack opening from direction of ST. ETIENNE. Ammunition badly needed. Nothing serious yet. We have practically no pyrotechnics. Stone- Col.

7-15 A. No counter attack during night. We are on objective and patrolling to front. St. Etienne strongly held. New attack order received. Will Division move up today? Entirely too far now to maintain effective liaison with you WAGRAM therefore request you establish advance center at SOMME-PY or further forward. One bn 9th reports 50% losses. Not believed to be above 20% in other bns. How many prisoners did we get? We need counter-battery work. Heavy shelling on us, All night and morning. Conditions in general-satisfactory. Ely-Comdg. (To C.G. 2nd Div)

7-50 am. Counterattack on our left broken up by our fire. Everything all right. Great amount of machine gun fire from distant nests in left and right rear. Losses moderate. Stone -Colonel.

8-55 am. One company marines now on our left. Others moving up. I am now correcting my line extending right. No further enemy activity except artillery from left. We have no doctors with the regiment. They were taken yesterday for aid station of Division.

Stone - Colonel.

OCTOBER 4th, '18.

9-05 AM. To youn left generally along the line from Mont Blanc to direction ST. ETIENNE there is the 170th Div. French. From Mont Blanc it has elements to south for protection. I am going to 6th Regt Hdqr which is about 4 kilometers from my present position (Sgd) Martin (To C.G. 3rd Brig)

9-30 Am. To Same 1 - Sink 1 directs that you pull over and get into sector you are supposed to occupy. so as to be where you belong when next attack starts. Your map showed your front extending to west of wood to ST. ETIENNE and not far enough to east. Check up and report -Sink 7 !

9-40 Am. To C.G. 2nd Div. Counter attack on our left broken up at 7-50 am M G fire from left rear and right rear. Are marines up? We are on objective and occupy it to our left, holding about 2/3 of Division Sector. Left south of St. Etienne. Practically all of 9th in line protecting right and right rear. Line as follows : 23rd Inf. (264.0-283.0) to (265.0-283.4) to (266.0-283.0) 9th protecting right front and right from 266.0-283.0 thence two kilometers to (267.7-282.7) thence south to (268.8-282.0) A plot of above line will show large front we are forced to hold counter-attack on our right holding well. Message from Stone says one company marines came up 8:55 am and others moving up. There is no doctor with 23rd Inf. All being taken by Division yesterday for rear aid stations. Send up more ammunition by truck.

Ely.

9-40am. From Hq. 1st Bn 9th Inf. Shelling and gas seriously hindering 1st bn. Cannot be counted on for action.

Platnes -Ives-Adjt.

10:00am- Sketch shows corrected position. Are on our objective. Have received no water, food or ammunition yet. Am making all possible effort to get same and ammunition is reported on the way. Five runners on their way. Regtl. Signal officer ordered to report to you. Have liaison with marines on left -no liaison on right. Stone-Colonel.

10:15 am. Small arms ammunition will be placed or has been placed at SOMME-PY. (Sgd) Surprise 3.

4:00 pm -To Surprise 1 (no time) 5th marines reported falling back Boche making heavy attack on their flank. Our right flank being shelled. We carry out F. O. 37. Sink 1.

7-15 am. To First Aid station. Both 23rd & 9th had heavy losses today and need litter bearers and ambulances. Can you get your ambulances closer to them if you have extra ambulances? They need them badly. Even a station on the MEDEAH FME-MONT BLANC line would be nearer them.

Ely per Hall.

12 Noon -To same. If you are short pyrotechnics send for them at once. If they have not arrived at dump near their P.C. by time you send for them, dump is at SOMME-PY. Push reorganization for attack so same can be carried out on short notice. Sink 7.

1:07 pm. To C.O. 23rd Inf. The C. G. 3rd Brig. directs that you detail 1/2 platoon to combine with 1/2 platoon marines to act as liaison group. Keep connection with 4th Brigade. Shovels etc. SOMME-PY. Ely.

2:40pm. To Surprise 1. Same reports strong attack from left on flank We carry out 3%. Sink 1.

4-40 pm. To C.G. 3d Brig. Have withdrawn to defensive position. Am holding and digging in. All right but can not advance with the severe m.g. fire from r flank. This m g was directed equally against A, B and C Bns. Comes from sector on right. Apparently Boche have filtered in from sector where French attack was reported. Have not gained liaison with Marines. Major of "A" Battalion led off without contact with Stone and in disobedience of orders. Losses about 70% officers and 60% men. Request orders. Will hold till I head. Need litter bearers.

Stone-Col.

4-05pm. To C O 1st Bn. 15th F.A. CC to C O 15th F A - 23rd encountered extremely heavy resistance and suffered heavy losses and were unable to advance but a very short distance beyond jumping off point. Give us a heavy and continuous fire on the starting point of our barrage. Our front is the right half of the barrage. Barrage is furnished by Brig, Hdqrs. Use more than your bn. if possible. (Sgd) Palmer.

6:15 pm. To C.G. 3rd Brig. Line indicated on map in red 23rd and 9th. Marines west of our northern extremities. Am suffering some losses from heavy artillery fire and continued M G fire. Will fall back to old position starting at 7.00. Could not resist attack of any strength in present position. Barrage has been requested by art. liaison officer. Stone -Colonel.

6-35pm. Your message of 5:35 P.M. Rec'd. After order for withdrawal was given, 9th Inf and marines have been notified.

Stone-Colonel.

OCTOBER 5th '18

4-50 am. 1st Bn 9th to C. G. 9th Inf. 1st Bn. short on ammunition. Other 2 bns received all of it (2 and 3rd) last night. Our casualties are now nearer 50% percent. This for your information. Captain A.A. Platnes - Lt. Ives -adjt.

1:55-am. Friendly artillery firing directly into us. 155's are doing great harm. 10 casualties already. Green and red rockets have no effect. They are not observed.

Stone -Colonel.

9-20 am. Our left elements reports objectives obtained after hard fighting and severe losses. Right element has not attained objective but reports progress. Left element in liaison with marines. Ten companies now engaged.

Stone -Colonel.

9:30 Am. Your message regarding advance just received. Present position of line. 1st bn. on objective east and west road 283.4. This is left element. Then digging on. Right element exact locality can't be made out from reports, but is slightly in rear of left.

Stone-Colonel.

10 am. From C.O. 6th Marines to C.G. 4th Brig. Subject: report of operations and present position. 1. Inclosed herewith sketch of position of this regiment, then approximate position of the 23rd Inf. on our right and the 22nd Div. French on our left, with both of which organizations we are in liaison, the latter around our left rear from the fact that the enemy occupy the eastern portions of the town. 2. Our operations against the enemy in our front in their M.G. nests began at 6:30 a.m. on time, and have been highly successful. Our objective has been attained, consolidated and strengthened with outposts to the front. The number of guns and prisoners taken will be communicated later. Casualties in the 3rd Bn. which so successfully executed this attack amount to approximately 30 percent. 3. Two days in succession this splendid battalion has demonstrated its thorough efficiency in dealing with machine gun nests. (sgd) LEE.

10:40am. Have directed 3rd Bn 9th to support and protect my right flank. My 1st and 2nd Bns. are now in the line indicated on map; east and west road 283.3. They are consolidating and are in touch with Marines. Do not know exact extent of line. Have sent B for same. Two co's of 3rd Bn. have been sent to reinforce 1st Bn. who suffered heavily. Other 2 Co's of 3rd Bn. total strength 100 men are held at P.C. Telephoned Watson this morning about litter bearers and he promised to send some. None have reported. Need same badly.

Stone - Colonel.

11:02am. Strongly urge that 4th M G Bn be sent to me. M G Co's with me badly disrupted. Organization of Regiment going well but all companies much reduced in strength. Stone -Colonel.

2:20 am. Report new P.C. No 7, Coordinates 266.80-281.60. This is out of my sector but not far distant, from P.C.36. Change was necessary in order that I have a place where I can light a candle in view of possibility of working tonight. Request approval of change. Have ordered 3rd Bn 9th Inf. to report to P.C. 9th Inf. Everything O.K. Have telephone here. Stone-Colonel.

2:50-pm. A & B Co's Divisional M G Bn. reported. A co. assigned to cover right of Brigade Sector toward Medeah Fme. About 1 km S. of Brigade P.C. B co. ordered to report to 9th Infantry.

6-05Pm. A rechecking of the coordinates of this P.C. indicates that there was a slight error in the first figures. Corrected they read 266.80-281.40. We have no scale and have to estimate the tenths.

Stone - Colonel.

9-30 Pm. Rec'd instr. to cooperate with sister in clearing out woods. Shooting up marines. Instr. from Col. Myers. Gen'l Ely has conversation with him.

10Pm. Talk to Colonel Ellis reference above..

10:30 PM. Capt Martin returned and gave location of woods. Colonel Stone notified to see Col. Lee, 6th Marines to complete arrangements.

1:45 Pm. (Oct 5) Art. fire reported short 23rd Infantry. 75 shellcase found. Liaison officer notified Surprised A.

6:25 Pm. 4 salvos on P.C. 23rd. Surprise A1 notified.

7:25 Pm. Firing again on P.C. 23rd. Gen'l Bowley notified personally by Gen'l Ely. None of the above firing was done by 15th Art. or attached troops.

OCTOBER 6th, '18.

210 Am. Col. Stone telephoned saying all arrangements made except Art. which was being arranged for.

8:06 am. (By phone) Is 9th Inf. instructed to reinforce me if necessary? Unable to gain contact with them last night. Have an officer out looking for them now. Two bns. now engaged. Strong M G and heavy artillery on right flank. Stone- Colonel.

(Replied) 9th ordered to move up on right to connect with you. They will move forward to line East and West 282.7.

11-25 pm. Gen'l Lejeune says some of our own friends will come up tonight and pass on thru. We stay here in support.

12:45 pm (Phone) C.O. 23d P.c. to C.G. 3rd Brig. Personal report of C.O. 2nd Bn (A bn) confirms line indicated on map covering our sector with liaison established with marines on left and with 9th Inf on right rear. Line of observation 300 meters North of road. He has his right slightly efused. Present situation entirely satisfactory. Stone. Estimate casualties 50%.

12:50pm. MawNider says on phone that no casualties that he knows of and Liaison with 23d on left and French on right point 267.9-282.9 established.

11:55 phoned G-3 reference Line of observation and contact with marines and 9th left and right respectively and report 50% casualties 23rd - none 9th.

2:15Pm ro Snow and Same - Send 1 officer and 1 NCO from each bn. to report to these hdqrs as soon as possible to be sent back in trucks as guides to Brig. passing thru.

3:10 Pm. Artillery again falling short on 23rd.

3:20 Pm. Gen'l Eay phoned Gen'l Lejeune asking him to instruct Gen'l Bowley to stop firing short as killing many men.

---Gen'l Lejeune says pull back to original 1st position back to ridge. Leave men of our brig. in front line tonight and relieving brigade will pass thru.

3:10 Pm. Col Stones P.C. 266.8-281.6 moved out of old P.C. to above. Bn. of 9th Inf. placed at Col. Stones disposal.

6:45 pm. the General commanding the relieving Brigade arrived at our P.C.

7-30pm. found out that of guides sent out in accordance with operations memo #21 only marines arrived. Ours sent in truck and not yet located.

OCTOBER 7th '18.

1-55am from Samel (phone) Happy day arrived 1:00 A.M.

1-55am Snow says "nothing yet".

(message received from C.O. 1st Bn. 9th)

Runner from below SOMME-PY reports that hundreds of soldiers from 142d Inf are scarrered along road south of SOMME-PY

AA Platner--Capt.

(This message turned over to Capt, Martin for transmission).

3-10am Insp. Gen'l 36th Div. came by said 142nd was lost -10 Co's on road north of SOMME-PY. Notified 6th Marines and told them where to find them.

3-55am reported Happy Day to Surprise.

5-12am Lt. Campbell to Sink 11 reports everything O.K.

3-00pm - to Surprise 7 by Sink 11. Report that have gotten out of Marine Sector on left entirely. On right being taken care of and will be accomplished Also informs new people in position to jump-off, if necessary. Are dispersed among our own.

OCTOBER 8th '18

8-10am. Colorado says going good. Lost one Major.

8-10am. Called Snow to ask if can get any information from Liaison bn.

9-20am. Patrols to go back as far as SOMME-PY and to go thru all dugouts, getting all stragglers and have them join their outfits. (This sent to Same and Snow by phone.)

9-30am. Our barrage short, killing Liaison agents and section leaders, French tanks with Col. Jackson, French tank commander. (This transmitted to Div. Hq)

9-45am Liaison bn. just went up. Did not go before because French were not up with them.

9-50am. Surprise 7 asks reports from Regtl Comdrs and M G Bn. C.O. are all casualties, i.e., killed, wounded, sick, missing. Major Hall called up C.O's for data -think for relief.

10:15am. Snow reports French held up on fight 500 meters from objective by heavy M G fire. Out liaison bn. 250 meters from objective. Division notified thru liaison officer.

10-55 am - Gen'l Ely tells 71st Brig. to throw in support and reserve where French have fallen back thru our Liaison bn. Will throw in men if necessary but only if absolutely necessary. Heard that Lieut. Col. Arnold severely wounded and probably missing.

11-15am. Colonel Stuart ordered to hold one bn in readiness to support right flank should it become necessary. One Co 4th M G Bn ordered to take position in support. 4th M G Bn. placed under direct command C.G. 71st Brigade for its further orders.

11-30am. Gen'l Ely to Gen'l Lejeune same as on previous message re Col. Stuart holding one bn. etc. Suggests sending trucks to help other brigade up here or send in a French Division to relieve the French Division now here who run all the time. Asked for relief. Says men all in but can hold on. Gen'l Lejeune sending 2 Co's Engineers. Gen'l Ely going to have them relieve bn.

12-00 Noon Surprise 7 to Major Hall re sending too many men back with prisoners. Gen'l Ely told C.G. 71st Brig. to gather up prisoners and then send them back. Two or three per 100 prisoners. We can send them back if desired. Gave him location of our Liaison Bn. Found Lt. Col. Arnold and he is not killed.

3-45pm. Oct 8th, Col. Rhea says due to General Ely having so many troops here will take command in case of an emergency but present policy is to send troops to General Ely to be passed over to 71st Brigade.

4-35pm Counter-attack reported on left flank of Marines.

5-50pm. Received order from Division C.O. to place two bns. on line from which 71st Brigade jumped-off.

5-50pm Rhoned Same 1 to comply with above. This is to be used as support for 71st front line. Are not to advance under any circumstances. Establish Liaison with Col. Jackson (141st) put senior in command of both bns.

6-15pm. 4th M G Bn platoon was driven back on right but 2nd held. Engineers going up and Colorado notified.

1-15pm Wearing sending guides back 5-30pm for new outfit coming in.

1-15pm One officer and 4 men to go to SOMME-PY as billeting party. Same and Snow told that billeting party of 10 men or less to report to Division Headquarters by 4-00 P.M.

OCTOBER 7th '18

To C O 9th Inf. Runner from below (south) of SOMME-PY reports that hundreds of soldiers from 142nd Inf are scattered along road south of SOMME-PY. A. A. Platnes -Capt Comdg (timed 850) 413pm to C O 9th Inf. The Brigade in our front 71st -will attack at hour on morning of Oct. 8th. Elements of this Brig 3rd U S will remain in place with exception of one bn. of 9th Inf. That bn after 9th Inf occupying front line trenches will act as liaison bn. with French on our right keeping actual connection between French on our right and 71st-C.O. of leading Bn. 9th will report to C.G. 71st Brigade (near 9th Inf hdq.) and to C.G. 3rd Brig. Ely.

11-55pm October 8th

To C. G. 3rd Brig. Front line withdrawn from small strip of wood
 Line then 283.5-267.0 287.9-263.9 283.3-267.94 - 283.3-268.1 283.34-
 268.35. Line being consolidated. Much sniping both rifles and machine guns.
 No evidence since morning of enemy in large force (Signed) A. E. Arnold-
 Lt. Col.

12-00 Noon 2 Co's Engineers to relieve 1 bn 9th on right flank as soon as
 possible. 2 Co's 4th MG Bn to remain. Provide guides for engineers and see
 if supplied with ammunition. Another bn. 9th held in readiness.

OCTOBER 9th '18

14 hrs. You guessed it. Orders going out. C.G. 73rd Brig. reforms his lines
 today. 9th may march back of Navarin at dusk. 23rd when relieved. M G in
 front line or support remain in position 24 hours after our relief. Re-
 connaissance officers from Brig. Regt Bns and 1 officer each sent +
 reconnaissance officers have been sent for. Staff officer from Brig. Regt.
 Bns and 1 officer each company and 1 NCO each Platoon remain for 24 hrs.

Rhea.

OCTOBER 3 '18

To C. G. 3rd Brig. Attacking line drawing fire from enemy strong points.
 Tanks must moving out from trench system in which P.C'S were placed. Stuart Col

6-40 am To C.G. 3rd Brig - 1st Bn arrived. Stone -Col.

6-50am To C.G. 3rd Brig. 3rd Bn moving out P.C. remains in rear of 3rd
 Bn. Stone-Colonel.

8-50pm. To C.O. 9th. 23rd were withdrawing to 1st objective of yesterday.
 My orders move them back to positions occupied before 2:00 P.M. today. Do
 not let them pass back thru your regiment. You will remain in line ex-
 plained to Capt. MacNider tonight with rear bn. on yesterday's 1st objective
 the same as before H hour today. There is to be no withdrawal back of line
 held at noon today.

Understand clearly that 23rd has been ordered to move forward any troops which have withdrawn thru you and that you will occupy approximately your old positions of noon today. Ely-commanding.

OCTOBER 4 '18

6:00 P.M. Snow 1. Echelon troops back on right until you connect with French near MEDEAH FARM and prepare to hold against counter attack from east. Have ordered artillery to fire barrage 300 yards to east of Division Sector to protect right flank. Ely/

3-50pm Ro C.G. 3rd Brit. Attack absolutely held up by heavy m.g. fire from both flanks and front. Germans strongly organized just north of jumping off place. Wire heavy. No sign of Marines on my left. All efforts to locate them unsuccessful. Need tanks and new barrage to push attack successfully. Losses heavy. Messages will reaphymertaneP.C. #6. Stone- Colonel.

8-35pm. You will keep your line in advance of 9th Inf positions. It is not believed necessary to withdraw thru 9th Inf. you will keep entire 23rd Infantry north of east and west line 282.5. This will be done (To C.O. 23rd Inf. Signed Ely)

OCTOBER 5 '18.

9-45am To C.O. 9th Inf F.O. 38, 2nd Div. enclosed. Sector limits 3rd Brig. Right Medeah Fme. (exclusive) Marchault (incl). Left a parallel line about 1 3/4 km to west thru 63.40. Twenty-third Inf. will lead, 9th Inf. in support. Orders given 23rd Infantry will direct them to advance North until they are on sector, then conform to sector limits. We will not advance until French are up on right and left. Ely-comdg.

10-00am. To C.O. 23rd Inf. F.O. 38 2nd Div. sent you. H hour later. Sector limits 3rd Brigade! Right Medeah Fme (excl) Marchault inclusive, left limit, a parallel line about 1 3/8 km west, thru point 63.40. 23rd Inf will attempt today to edge over on proper sector before H hour if this can be done without fighting. In case this cannot be done without fighting the advance at H hour will be north for 23rd Inf until on sector, then conform to sector limits as given above. Marines have been notified of a possible shift to left by you, so that they can move over and cover their proper sector. Gen. Lejeune informs me that H hour will probably not be given; that it will not be given until French are well up on in advance on both right and left flanks. We will not be ordered to advance until they are up. "H" hour will probably never come but try to edge over to right today to get on sector. Artillery firing on you was French Battery. Was located and stopped. Our Artillery was not firing on you. Ely-comdg.

12-25pm. To C.O. 9th Inf. The French on our left are up. The French on our right attacked at 11-pm. No news from them. The 6th Marines are now passing thru 5th Marines, keeping up with French. We will not advance until French are up and going on our right. Push out patrols to N E (northeast) to determine resistance. Boche is pulling out. Keep connection with French on right. ELY.

4-01pm. Ro C.O. 23rd Inf. Report from 2nd Div. at 3-45pm states that French are in St. Etienne. We know that French patrol (cavalry) and armored cars have been in that village. Make sure that marines know where your front line is so that they will not shoot your front line up (by phone) Sink 11.

To C. O. 9th Inf. You will advance your line to North edge reaching to east and west of line 282.2 without artillery preparation and your connection with French is 267.9-283.0. They will connect with 23rd on right and send them 1 bn. if necessary. Ely-comdg.

2-00pm. October 6th.

To C. O. 23rd. Send the following personnel to these headquarters as soon as possible. Per bn. 1 officer and 1 N C O making in all 3 officers and 3 N C O's. These are to be sent here to be sent back to Div. Hq by trucks from these hdqrs. to guide troops to your front line tonight. Send experienced officers who will not lose way. This imperative that these men reach here as soon as possible. You can arrange for company guides at such points as you desire.

Ely-comdg.

Memo for Col. Stone - please send someone at old P.C. to guide our runners to new P.C. Hall -adjt.

OCTOBER 7th '18

11-09 - To Gen. Whitworth. The Div. Comdr directs that the dividing line between the sector of the 3rd Brigade including 141st Inf. and the sector of the 4th Brig. including 142nd Inf. be clearly established; the Int. Officer 3rd Brigade; a staff officer from your Hdqr. and the Intelligence Officer of the 6th Marines will determine this point on the ground. Your staff officer should be given authority to direct immediate movement of your troops to ensure proper troops being in proper sector. The movement of your troops necessary should be completed at earliest practical time. Ely-comdg.

11-20am. To C.O. 6th Marines. Gen Lejeune has directed that the exact point of the dividing line between Brigade sectors be established on the ground - that troops be moved accordingly. I am sending my Intelligence Officer, Lt. Molloy and a staff officer 71st Brig. to do this; request you send your Intelligence Officer in order that point may be clearly known. Have directed Gen. Whitworth to withdraw any of 141st Inf. in your sector when point is located. Ely.

10-00am. To C.G. 71st Brig. C.G. 2nd Div. has placed me in command of this Brigade sector as long as my troops are in it. I have placed troops in 1st position under command of Colonel Stuart, 19th Inf. front. This includes your 141st. I am directing Colonel Stuart to move front line to right about 500 yards, taking over the part of our sector now held by French. Notify your leading bn. comdr. to take orders from Lt. Col. Arnold in reference to this move. H. E. Ely-Brig. Gen'l Comdg.

10-00am. August 8th '18 To C. O. 5th M G Bn Send in in writing casualty list for your command, showing number killed, wounded, and evacuated in hospital, also number men missing. This must be rushed as it may effect the relief of the division. Expedite and show hour report is submitted. Ely-comdg.

8-00pm October 8th '18 Lieut. Heinsick Blandes, 368th Regt. Infantry (Boche) reported yesterday that his watch and personal property including a wedding ring was taken from him by a soldier of your Brigade. Probably from 142nd Regt. It is suggested that the regimental commander be required to trace and return the same, as personal property of no military value is never taken away from prisoners. Ely-comdg.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION.

AMER. A. E. F. October 15th, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS)

No 10.)

To the officers and men of the 3rd Infantry Brigade.

B. You have just emerged from seven days and night of continuous battle. October 3rd to October 9th; constantly under intense artillery and machine gun fire; -you have captured the east half of BLANC MONT RIDGE including two of the strong points on the Ridge, PYLONE and MEDEAH FARME; in successive attacks you pierced three kilometers into the enemy's lines - for four days and nights you maintained your position as point of the salient projecting into the enemy's lines as you did at VIERZY and THIAUCOURT, - you held a line five and a half kilometers in length, 1 1/2 kilometers in front of friendly troops on the left and 4 kilometers ahead of friendly troops on the right, resisting repeated heavy artillery attacks and yielding not one inch of conquered ground.

Your losses were heavy such as few troops would stand but your accomplishment was great. General Courond, the renowned commander of the 4th French Army of which we are temporarily a part, stated "The Massif de Blanc Mont dominates the Valley of the ARNES and gives us excellent outlook on the valley of the SUIPPE in rear of the region of Monts; this conquest (by 2nd division) rapidly brought about the downfall of NOTRE DAME des CHAMPS and the GRAND BOIS de SAINT SUPPILT2."

Your captures in this battle were 1410 prisoners, 17 guns, 3 inch and larger, 17 trench mortars, about 200 machine guns and many large ammunition dumps. Considering the 2500 prisoners and 32 guns taken south of SOISSONS July 18-19 and 3100 prisoners and 92 pieces of artillery taken at THIAUCOURT September 12-14, this brigade now has to its credit in its last three engagements 7010 prisoners, 141 guns from 3 inch up to 210 m/m, over 400 machine guns, and large quantities of ammunition and supplies.

It is safe to say that no brigade in our forces has a better record.

H. E. ELY,
Brigadier General
Commanding.

(HISTORY OF THE THIRD INFANTRY BRIGADE -)

The following table shows the total losses in killed, wounded, etc., and total captures. In addition to the guns and prisoners reported, there were uncounted machine guns, trench mortars and material of all kinds. It will be noticed that the number of prisoners captured more than equals the total strength of the Brigade.

666.

KILLED	WOUNDED & MISSING	Prisoners Captured	Guns captured 3" or larger
Verdun----- 42	: 173	: 13	: 0
Chateau Thierry---204	: 3048	: 588	: 0
Soissons-----258	: 1575	: 2600	: 32
Pont-a-Mousson---- 3	: 21	: 0	: 0
St. Mihiel-----96	: 618	: 3100	: 92
Blanc Mont.....328	: 2046	: 1050	: 28
Meuse-Argonne-----223	: 1693	: 700	: 36
TOTAL	: 9017	: 8151	: 183

TOTAL LOSSES IN OFFICERS 308 ; 91 of these were killed

In closing this synopsis of the 3rd Brigade's part in the war, it is only fitting and proper that we mention, in words of respect and admiration, the wonderful loyal and brave spirit of its gallant members.

Throughout all their hardships they were ever cheerful, loyal and self-sacrificing. They were never required to do anything, however difficult, that they even thought to question, -but without food, drink and sleep for days at a time, scornful of self consideration, they successfully accomplished every mission entrusted to them, and the gallant fallen who in executing their orders made them "Supreme Sacrifice" will always be tenderly remembered. The remaining original members are few but their "esprit des corps" was en- fused into the newer men, received to fill the vacant files of the fallen and who successfully continued to hold the Brigade's honor high - too much credit cannot be paid to members, both fallen and living, each played his part in the fulfillment of the great mission confidently entrusted to them by their loved ones and the "colors".

It may be truly said that this Brigade had had as much service in actual battle, as any American Brigade in the American Expeditionary Forces.

Its members should not be forgotten, and in the construction of the "History of the War", the Brigade can say with pride and truthfulness, that it did everything and more than was required of it and in more than fulfilling the expectations of its commanders it will go down on record as "having done its bit".

C. P. HALL,
Major, Infantry.
Brig. Adjutant.

NARRATIVE OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE

2nd BATTALION OF THE 9th

INFANTRY, 2d DIV. AT MONT BLANC

Oct 1-9-1918.

Operations of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry

at Mont Blanc, October 1 - 9, 1918.

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Alfred C. Arnold, Lieut. Col. 9th Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

The original plan of attack of the Second Division at Mont Blanc provided for the 4th Brigade to make the attack and the 3rd Brigade to follow in Reserve. After a difficult march from Camp Piemont thru a constricted area on the Night of October 1-2, the Infantry arrived just after daylight at Navarin Farm and took shelter in some old trenches which were badly knocked to pieces. Owing to the enemy having direct observation on these trenches, a number of casualties occurred while going in and during the rest of the Day.

On the afternoon of October 2nd, the 9th Infantry was informed that the plan of attack had been changed and that both Brigades would attack at the same time, October 3rd, H hour, 6:30 A.M.; the 3rd Brigade (9th Infantry attacking followed by the 23rd Infantry) to the right of the 4th Brigade, leaving a triangular space (about 2½ kilometers wide at the base) between the brigades against which no troops would attack but which would be neutralized by artillery fire. The objective, Medeah Farm (Excl.) -- Mont Blanc Road (incl.), was about equally divided between the brigades and directions of attack given to converge the brigades so that they would join at the objective.

Details were sent at about 2 PM to reconnoiter the position of the jump off and the route of approach thereto. When they arrived near the line, they found that the position assigned for the jump off was more than a kilometer within the German Lines. Rolling kitchens had come up in rear of the troops and were about to serve the first meal for the day but the troops had no opportunity to eat.

About 5 PM, orders were received to move at once to the south edge of the Bois du Moineux where French guides would meet and guide the troops to their jumping off positions. To reach this Wood required a flank march to the right for about three kilometers, and as much of the ground was under direct enemy observation, the troops had to filter across this ground, by platoons. Darkness coming on when the leading elements were about one third of the way across this ground, the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Battalion, and Headquarters Company assembled in a valley and moved in single file along a narrow road. At a French Artillery

observation post, it was discovered that the column was on the wrong road and had gone a considerable distance out of its way. By a dim light, compass bearings were taken from a map to the Bois du Moineux and marching by compass straight across country, the column reached the Wood. The night was pitch dark and the march most difficult, crossing deep trenches, large shell holes, mine craters and masses of wire.

The French guides were not at the Wood but, after some delay, the French Liaison Officer with the Regiment got into communication with the French Commander and then led the troops to their position. There were a number of small roads crossing back and forth thru this section, which with the terrible destruction of the terrain, made it a difficult task to get to the right place. The speed at the head of the column caused the column to break several times. The column was halted the first time and the rear companies caught up but at a later time the two companies, H and E, in rear were lost. H Company found the proper road and got up about an hour before the time for the jump off. E Company took a wrong road but fortunately joined the 1st Battalion which earlier in the evening had taken some road to the left of the one it should have taken.

The order of the battalions for the attack, given on the preceding Afternoon, had been 1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion, and 3rd Battalion in column with 500 meters between Battalions, and the H hour, 6 :30 A.M. October 3rd. The 1st Battalion was commanded by a valiant and energetic officer, who in spite of all difficulties, had reached the line, about 500 yards to the left of the designated position, and was ready to attack. Regimental Headquarters, being unable to get into communication with the 1st Battalion, believed that the Battalion was lost.

At 5 AM., the 2nd Battalion was assigned to make the attack in place of the 1st Battalion, and was advised that the H hour was 5:30 AM instead of 6:30 AM. Not knowing that H company had just arrived at the line, the 2nd Battalion, apparently having only two companies, M Company and the Machine Gun Company were to be loaned to it but they were not used. The area and roads were being heavily shelled by the enemy and many casualties were occurring. With only fifty minutes to get from the regimental P.C. to where the battalion was located in two different woods, notify the companies of the change setting H hour ahead, reassign order of companies and get them forward to where the barrage would start, was a tremendous task. The sending of runners or messages at a time like this would have been useless.

A five minute preparation was fired by the American Artillery and the German counter fire was quite severe. The 2nd Battalion encountered stubborn resistance from Machine guns at the start, but smashed its way thru. H Company, altho in support, suffered most severely about 200 yards beyond the jump off from an indirect machine gun barrage which killed or wounded all of its officers except one Lieutenant. Patches of woods obstructed all view to the flanks for about 600 yards of the advance when some clear space was reached, and to the left the 1st Battalion could be seen advancing in splendid

order. As it had not been known up to this time that the 1st Battalion had gotten into the fight, it was a most enjoyable sight.

The two battalions continued in the attack, and both were necessary, until the objective (which was the road from Medeah Farm to the cross-road at Schwaben Konig) was reached at 8:37 A.M. Two French Tanks rendered valuable service during the advance against several machine gun nests. After the objective was taken, the 1st Battalion extended to its right and covered the whole objective and the 2nd Battalion moved back in support about 100 yards in rear to trenches on the hill (Schwaben Konig). The 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry and also the 23rd Infantry came forward and occupied old German Trenches close to the line. During the day, the 23rd Infantry pushed forward an outpost which was ordered to establish a line of observation one kilometer in front of the road that had been taken as the objective.

About 6 PM, October 3rd, another attack was made with the 23rd Infantry leading and the 9th Infantry following. The Commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry received a verbal order from the Brigade Commander: "Follow the 23rd Infantry at one kilometer and jump off at the road at 6:30 P.M. towards St. Etienne Ridge." The Battalion had to form hastily to comply with this order. From the hill, the 23rd infantry could be seen advancing, but only indistinctly owing to the patches of woods in front.

As only about 25 minutes of light remained, the one kilometer was not observed, and the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry advanced rapidly in order to see and familiarize itself with the most ground possible before it became night, which was very fortunate as later developments showed. Just as darkness was falling, a light railroad was crossed with a large ditch on the south side, some woods to the rear, and the ground falling away to the north and east. It was an almost perfect defensive position. Shortly after crossing the railroad, darkness had enveloped the terrain. Two wounded 23rd Infantry soldiers were lying near the railroad, but from that point there was no other evidence of this regiment to the front and right altho they appeared to be in strength to the left and left front. After moving about 500 yards north of the railroad, the Battalion was halted with its front at the edge of a narrow clearing running east and west, to make sure that none of the organizations had gotten out of place while passing through the woods.

While the front of the Battalion was being checked up, an Officer of the 23rd Infantry came to the Battalion Commander and stated that the 23rd was about 500 yards to the left and desired its right flank covered. It was rather surprising to learn that this Regiment was so far to the West, but it later appeared that no advance had been made by troops on its left, and owing to the strong enemy forces on that flank, it had been necessary to form a defensive flank to West. More definite information was brought by the intelligence Officer of the 23rd infantry, who, with the aid of a fading flash light concealed under a Boche blanket, pointed out on the map the position of the 23rd infantry. Enemy patrols were moving about in the immediate front at this time.

It became evident that not only protection was needed for the right of the 23rd Infantry, but that the right of the Division was seriously involved owing to the length and narrowness of the salient that had pushed into the German Lines. It was most fortunate that the best position to accomplish this had been seen while it was still light enough to recognize it. This position extended from the 23rd Infantry to a junction (Medeah Weiche) on the railroad, then along the railroad for about 500 yards and refusing the right flank back to a ravine. About the center of this position, at the railroad junction, a branch of the railroad ran south and made a good switch position.

E Company (what remained of H Company had been consolidated and continued the remainder of the action as a part of E Company) was assigned the left half of the sector and G Company the right half, with F Company in reserve in a small wood just on the west side of the railroad branch running south. The Scout officer of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry came forward and reported that the 3rd Battalion had crossed and halted on the northern side of the large ravine that was just in front on the morning's objective. This placed that battalion in good supporting distance in the woods to the rear and extending beyond the right flank of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion was later reported as holding at Medeah Farm with its right facing to the east as in the French had not come up.

The enemy began shelling this area quite heavily before daylight on October 4th, and shortly after daylight launched a counter-attack against the railroad from the northeast. Machine gun fire was very severe at the same time from the west, and it soon became apparent that another counter-attack was taking place on the other side of the salient. The enemy were attempting to pinch off the salient by driving in a Wedge on each side near the base.

After reconnoitering the position of G Company on the track, the Battalion Commander started with the Adjutant and an F Company Officer from the junction to go to some high ground in rear of the right flank where a good view could be had to the east, as it appeared that more support might be required there. The route taken along the switch track south was wooded for about a hundred yards, then a clearing to the east with a screen of small trees and bushes about 50 yards from the track and another dense wood about 150 yards to the east. At this clearing the railroad passed into a cut about four feet deep. Just as the reconnoitering party was climbing out of the cut to go east, eight or ten men came thru the screen and turned north into the wood. A heavy mist made it impossible to distinguish the color of uniform even at that short distance, but the form and shape of individuals with differences in equipment quickly distinguished them as Germans. In a few seconds machine guns began firing across the track from the screen of bushes. It later developed, that at the same time, the right platoon of G Company (together with two 37 M.M. guns of the 23rd Infantry that came into the line just before daylight) had suffered severe casualties and had been driven back west into the wood and along the track by superior enemy forces who were attacking on about a 600 yard front and in heavy column.

When the firing started across the track, which was the switch position, it was evident that the enemy had broken in behind the right flank of the battalion. A rapid movement of the right flank was therefore necessary to the switch position, not only to prevent the immediate capture of a part of G Company, but much more to stop the enemy's further progress west, which with his other attack coming from the west threatened to cut off the whole salient. This was accomplished by calling to the Company Commander of G Company, who was standing on the track only a short distance, to bring his company on a run and face it east. Two machine guns were brought up at the same time and fired from the west back of the cut to cover the ground to the east. The F Company Officer, who was present at the time, was ordered to take two platoons of F Company and counter-attack north from the woods just south of the clearing. There was a good covered approach for this movement and when it was made the enemy retreated in a very precipitous manner leaving a number of dead and wounded and much equipment including one heavy machine gun with the ammunition belt nearly full and ready to feed.

Examination of the ground showed that when the enemy stopped just behind the screen of bushes they had started digging fox holes for more than two hundred men, and evidence of supports just in rear in the woods. This attack had been massed against G Company, as only a few patrols appeared in front of E Company and they quickly withdrew into a wood when fired upon.

Marmet cans were brought up about 1 PM October 4th, and the battalion had their first prepared meal since supper on October 1st. Water had been almost unobtainable since October 1st but water carts came up in rear of the position on the 4th and canteens were sent back to be filled.

Another advance of the 23rd Infantry was ordered for October 4th, H hour, 2:30 PM. This was a very costly and serious mistake with the salient so narrow and extended. The 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry was ordered to follow the 23rd Infantry at one kilometer. The Battalion formed up ready to move, but the attack was suspended and it returned to its position on the railroad.

At 7 PM. the liaison runner, who had been sent to the 23rd Infantry P.C. returned with the message : "The 23rd Infantry is ordered to take up position and hold on the first days' objective." At 7:30 PM a message was received from the Regimental Commander : "Conform to movement of 23rd Infantry, move without lights and bring in all wounded." Patrols reported the movement of the 23rd. At about 11 PM heavy shells began falling on the area and when it was verified by the Artillery liaison officer that the shells were coming from the rear, the Battalion conformed to the movement of the 23rd Infantry and took up position at the road on the 1st days' objective. During the night, the 23rd Infantry received orders to reoccupy its former position and the 35d Battalion, 9th Infantry was ordered to occupy the position on the railroad.

On October 6th, the French had advanced on the right, and the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry moved at 10 AM. To extend the right flank of the 23rd Infantry and form a junction with the French on the right. E and F Companies occupied the front line about 200 yards south of the St Etienne-Orfeuil Road with G Company on the railroad in support. Much sniping took place between the two lines, and it is with reluctance that the writer had to acknowledge that the enemy was much better prepared with "trained" snipers and that the Nation which prides itself on its marksmanship has not made full use of it. Enemy machine guns, placed on ground in front of the sector to the right, had direct observation on much of the ground in rear of the Battalion and were able to enfilade this ground, but the Battalion was not affected by it, for since October 3rd it had become accustomed to fire from the front, flanks and rear.

The 141st Infantry was ordered to be placed on the line during the night, October 6-7, and the 2nd Battalion to remain with them. A Company, 141st Infantry, after much difficulty, was placed in the line at 8 AM October 7th. A very heavy fog continued until after 9 AM so their entry was not observed by the enemy. This was fortunate, for if the day had been clear, it would have been impossible to have prevented them from being seen and shelled by the enemy. During the afternoon, when the 2nd Battalion expected to be withdrawn, recommendation was made to place E Company, 141st Infantry, in the front line as A Company had only about 120 men and was considered too small to hold this part of the line. E Company was placed in the line about 6 PM.

The 36th Division, in conjunction with the French, were ordered to attack on the morning of October 8th. The 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry was ordered to act as liaison battalion covering the junction between the right of the 36th Division and the left of the French. Directions were received from the Commander of the 3rd Brigade to occupy a position at the jump off about 300 yards in rear of the front line, and fill any break if one should occur.

A five minute preparation was put down by the American Artillery and the enemy's counter-fire which came promptly, was very heavy and vicious. The sector line between the Americans and French passed thru the center of a very strong redoubt which was further covered by fire from high ground on the ridge at Belmont Chateau where the enemy had many machine guns and mortars.

The French advanced about 200 yards and were held up. The 141st Infantry, in front of the redoubt, were held up at the start and allowed their barrage to get away from them. Some of them were urged across the road but could not be moved further thru the heavy machine gun fire. Their lines were too dense and they were attempting to advance by rushes. The outcome of advance by rushes under fire of hidden machine guns is that after a very few rushes men do not care to rise and continue the advance but show the strongest inclination to keep their faces and bodies glued to the ground. These troops were for the first time near a battle line and had to learn by bitter experience. Undoubtedly many losses could have been avoided with better instruction.

Seeing a probability of further great loss of American lives with nothing accomplished, decision was made to attack with the Liaison Battalion of the 9th Infantry and to seize the enemies redoubt which was holding up the line. Calling to E Company to come ahead the

Battalion advanced in column of Companies, E, G, and F, taking advantage of a slight dip in the ground that allowed access into the position with most of the bullets going just overhead. E Company crossed the fire swept zone quickly in thin lines and captured a number of machine guns.

As soon as the 9th Infantry attacked, the 141st Infantry joined in, and, as if by inspiration, seemed to catch the spirit and morale of the Fighting Ninth. During the remainder of the day, no better or braver troops could have been desired except for their one tendency to bunch up, due to lack of experience.

The advance continued 700 meters north from the road when it stopped on account of enfilading fire from both flanks. Both flanks of the Battalion at this time were bent back with the troops fighting in three directions, west, north and east. The enemy appeared determined not to give up this position, fighting most stubbornly, and making immediate small counter-attacks. In the first counter-attack which came from the east against the hill in the right rear, the enemy dislodged the French on their part of the hill and almost succeeded in seizing the hill, but were completely driven off about an hour later. The French then reoccupied their part of the hill connecting with F Company. During this occupation of the hill by the enemy, a small number of F Company and the Battalion Commander were cut off by the enemy and surrounded in a small strip of woods in front of the hill in the French Sector.

The lines were reorganized about Noon, for considerable mixing of men of different companies had occurred during the severe fighting, and too many men were holding the front of the salient. G Company which occupied a small strip of woods north of the large woods was brought back in support near the road, leaving only two outposts of four men each in the small strip of woods. A strong concealed line of fox holes was dug in about five yards back from the edge of the woods, E Company holding to the west and north, The 141st Infantry to the east, and F Company still on the hill to the right rear and connecting up with the French. The salient then projected out about six hundred meters in front of the position on the hill, the eastern side forming almost a right angle with the line on the hill.

From about 10 Am to 5 PM, the enemy remained quiet, except that his snipers were very busy with their rifles and machine guns. Some of his snipers were in concealed positions within our own lines and altho a continued search was made they were not all discovered.

About 5 PM the enemy began shelling the lines, and at 5 :30 PM attacked in strong force from the northeast, concentrating against the hill where considerable hand to hand fighting took place. The French were forced back, and the right flank of F Company driven back, At this stage G Company was sent forward on a run to cover the corner and reenforce F Company.

As the enemy was advancing against the hill, his right flank became exposed to the 141st Infantry in the wood, and on their own initiative the 141st Infantry performed as brilliant a bit of work as was probably done by any small body of American Troops in the War when they advanced with walking fire against the enemy's flank. As this occurred at the same time that G Company, just to the right

of them, caught the enemy with a severe oblique fire his lines retreated in great disorder leaving the field covered with dead and wounded. The Regimental Burial Officer, who buried the dead at this place, reported 156 dead Germans just in front of the hill.

At 9: 30 PM the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry was relieved by two Companies of the 2nd Engineers and moved to Pylone. During the night of October 9-10, the Battalion moved back to Navarin Farm and on the 10th left the sector.

Alfred C. Arnold

Captain Infantry

April 27, 1920

x Map, Page 11.

OPERATIONS OF 36TH DIVISION WITH IV FRENCH
ARMY IN CHAMPAGNE

The 36th Division began its movement to Champagne from the 13th U.S. Training Area (Headquarters at Bar-sur-Aube), on September 26, 1918 was placed under the orders of the French Group of Armies of the Center. The movement was completed on September 29th and the Headquarters of the division was established at Pocancy.

On October 4th, 1918, the division was placed at the disposition of the 4th French Army, and in the same order one brigade was ordered to the region of Suippes. Upon arrival there this brigade was placed in the 21st French Corps and by them was assigned to the 2nd U.S. Division. On the night of October 6-7 this brigade relieved the troops of the 2nd Division then in line. An attack was ordered for October 8th. It was made under unfavorable conditions, and although some ground was gained it was subsequently abandoned.

The following are quotations from the Divisional Report: "The advance of the 73rd Division (French) on the right flank was held up, thus exposing the American troops to flank fire from the right flank. "As the French divisions on either side had been unable to make progress, no further attempts to advance had been ordered for the night."

At midnight October 9-10 the corps announced that information had been obtained from the prisoners which indicated that the enemy intended to withdraw. On October 10 the command of the divisional sector passed to the Commanding General, 36th Division; the rest of the division having been previously brought up behind the line. On this same day the corps informed the division that the 73rd French Division on their right was advancing and that the 36th Division should keep up with the division on its left, the 7th French Division, in case it advanced.

At about 5 PM, the 36th Division attacked with but slight success. The attack was resumed the following day and met but little resistance. This progress is shown on Map No 1. By October 12 the advance had become a pursuit. The report of the 36th Division says the 73rd French Division on its right moved forward preceded by cavalry patrols. The advance of this day is shown on the accompanying maps. In conformation with orders from the 21st French Corps, the ground south of the Aisne Canal was cleared on October 13th and a defensive position organized.

On October 18th the 21st French Corps was relieved from line and the 36th Division was assigned to the 11th French Corps.

The 36th Division was relieved from line between the 25th and 29th of October, the relief being completed on the 29th. The period between October 13th and October 29th was spent by the division in patrolling and making plans to cross the Aisne River. During this period many minor changes in sector were made, all of these being shown on map No 1. The division was relieved by the 22nd French Division.

This was the first time the 36th Division had ever been in action.

P.C. 36th Division
10 October 1918,
14 hours

FIELD ORDERS)
NO 6)

MAPS: TAHURE)
ATTIGNY) 1:20,000
JUNIVILLE)

1. It is reported that the enemy is withdrawing and covering his withdrawal by only machine gun nests. On our right the French 73rd Division has progressed considerably and now holds a line approximately East and West about 1/2 km north of BEMONT CHATEAU and is still progressing. The French 7th Division on our left is advancing and has attained an advance to a point about 3 kms northwest of ST ETIENNE. Our 71st Brigade is in contact with the French divisions on right and left. The contact with the 7th French Division is just north of ST ETIENNE. The 71st Brigade is moving forward from present lines to regain contact with the enemy.

2. This division will attack and progress to the same distance North as the 7th Division on the left, and continue to go forward in liaison with the 73rd French Division on the right.

3.(a) Attack will be made at 17:00 hour. The 72nd Brigade will make the attack by passing thru the 71st Brigade--the 143rd Infantry on the right, the 144th on the left.

(b) Limits of Division:

East Limit-MEDEA FARM (8-9-1-9)--Eastern edge of MACHAULT, incl.
West Limit-ST ETIENNE inclusive--Eastern edge, COUROY excl.

Regimental Limits:

Right, 143rd Infantry (East Regiment) East Limit--
East limits of Division sector.

Left, 144th Infantry (West regiment) West limit -
West limits of Division sector.

Boundary between regiments:

Northwest thru crossroads about 1-1/4 kms northeast of ST ETIENNE (Co-ordinates 265.95-284.9-Railroad and road crossing about 2 kms south of MACHAULT on ST ETIENNE-MACHAULT ROAD (co-ordinates 264.6-288.6)

Passage of Lines:

Line occupied at time of passage by 71st Brigade.

4.(a) INFANTRY.

Attack will be made by 72nd Infantry Brigade with its two regiments abreast. Each regiment in three lines, one of its battalions in each line, each battalion echeloned in depth. During the advance, combat liaison between the regiments of the 72nd Brigade will be provided by a mixed detachment, consisting of one platoon and two machine guns from each regiment under the command of an officer to be designated by the Brigade Commander. On the right of the division sector provisions will be made for flank protection and combat liaison with the 73rd French Division. One company of the 133rd Machine Gun Battalion and two companies from the 72nd Infantry Brigade will be designated for this purpose by the Commanding General of the 72nd Infantry Brigade. Similarly on the left two companies of infantry from the 72nd Brigade and one company of machine guns from the 133rd Machine Gun Battalion will be designated by the Brigade Commander to protect the left flank and to maintain combat liaison with the 7th French Division.

II.

(b) DIVISION RESERVE (Gen P. Whitworth).

The 71st Brigade, 2nd Engineers and 131st Machine Gun Bn will constitute the Divisional Reserve.

(c) ARTILLERY:

The 2nd Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General Bowley, commanding) will support the attack.

(d) AVIATION:

The infantry will stake out its front line at 11:00 AM and 4:00 PM daily and automatically, and when called for by infantry planes, marked with one pennant on left wing. The 27th Aero Squadron assists the Division by reporting progress and location of front line by observation of artillery fire.

(e) ENGINEERS:

The 2nd Engineers will be part of the reserve and remain in their present position.

(f) SIGNAL TROOPS:

- (a) See the plan of Liaison, 36th Division, 10th October '18.
- (b) Signal detachments attached to Division and Brigade P.C.'s will provide mechanical liaison. Commanding General 72nd Infantry Brigade will provide for necessary communication by wire, visual and runner system within his brigade.

(g) AXIS OF LIAISON:

Boundary between regiments.

(h) RESERVE AFTER PASSAGE OF LINES:

The 71st Infantry will be reorganized in depth in their present positions--141st on the right and 142nd Infantry on the left--and prepare to advance and support the 72nd Infantry Brigade. The 2nd Engineers and 131st Machine Gun Battalion will remain in their present positions.

(i) RESERVE RATIONS will be carried in haversack. Packs or rolls will be piled in organizations and left under charge of a guard, and will be sent for later by organization commanders.

Combat trains and rolling kitchens will follow troops under cover of darkness and guides by personnel furnished by their respective unit commanders.

Field trains under direction of G-1

Sanitary Trains: The Division Surgeon will make necessary preparation for caring for sick and wounded.

Other administrative instructions By G-1

5. P.C. Division --	SOMME PT
P.C. 71st Brigade--	Present location
P.C. 72nd Brigade--	First position, dugouts North and West of crossroads SCHABENKONIG (co-ordinates of crossroads, 6814)

Wm. R. Smith,
Major General.

DISTRIBUTION: Through Bns and Separate Units.

JWV

SPECIAL REPORT OF TOUR IN LINE OF SEVENTY-FIRST BRIGADE

1. On October 3rd, 1918, the 36th Division was billeted in an area halfway between ERPERNAY and CHALONS-sur-MARNE, where it had been since about the 28th of September. Division P.C. was at POCANCY; 71st Brigade P.C. was at MATOUGUES. Units of the brigade in the area south of MATOUGUES.

2. On October 5th a warning order received, followed by Field Order No 2, announced that the 36th Division was transferred to the Fourth French Army (General Gouraud). In accordance with this order the 71st Brigade and a detachment of the Field Signal Battalion were embussed in French trucks, embussing beginning at 20:00 o'clock October 4th. Debussing at SUIPPES was completed October 5th. By 15:00 o'clock that day the troops were camped north and northeast of SUIPPES and SOMME-SUIPPE. Brigade P.C. at SUIPPES after noon October 5th. This move was made in two echelons, the truck train first taking up the 142nd Infantry and the 132nd machine gun Battalion, and returning for the 141st Infantry and the detachment from the Field Signal Battalion. The Field and combat trains marched from the MATOUGUES area, leaving at 10:00 o'clock October 5th and joining their organization at 11:00 o'clock the next day.

3. Brigadier General P. Whitworth, in command of the 71st Brigade, on reporting to Major General Lejeune, commanding the 2nd Division, at SOMME-PY. P.C. 2nd Division, at 15:00 o'clock October 5th. At 20:00 that day this advanced echelon of the Division was put at the disposal of the 21st French Army Corps (General Maulin), in which Corps was the 2nd Division also. At 22:00 o'clock that evening at a conference of General Lejeune with General Whitworth and his regimental commanders, General Lejeune announced that the brigade had been put at the disposition of the 2nd Division, as a result of which the commanding general, 2nd Division decided that the 71st Brigade would relieve the 3rd and 4th Brigades from the line the next night. The 2nd Division agreed to supply the 71st Brigade with 1,000,000 rounds of caliber .30, 4 hand grenades per man, 1 V.B. grenade per man, and a supply of pyrotechnics. The 71st Brigade would take over the trench mortars, and 37 mm guns of the 2nd Division, as the Brigade had no animals with which to haul up their material. The 2nd Division would furnish them twenty-five (25) trucks. At a conference at Brigade Headquarters, ending at 3:00 o'clock October 6th, General Whitworth ordered his Brigade to proceed to the vicinity of NAVARIN FARM, midway between SOUAIN and SOMME-PY, to arrive there by 16:00 o'clock that afternoon.

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4. The Brigade P.C. was established in a German dugout on the forward slope of HILL 210, at POINT 268.7-280.7, on the afternoon of October 6th. This location was within 1500 meters of the front line at that time, but had good observation. The front line at the end of the day was 500 meters south of ST ETIENNE on the left, thence due east for two kilometers, thence curving to the south to a point 400 meters north of MEDEAH FARM. The 142nd Infantry was to relieve the 4th Brigade, Marines, on the left, and the 141st Infantry was to relieve the 3rd Brigade, consisting of the 9th and 23rd Infantry, on the right. It was arranged that guides would meet the 71st Brigade that evening at SOMME-PY, to lead them into position, but considerable delay was caused by our regiments not finding the guides promptly, as the latter had sought shelter in dugouts to escape from the shelling. The relief of the 4th Brigade by the 142nd Infantry was completed at 3:00 o'clock, that of the 3rd Brigade by the 141st Infantry at 3:20 o'clock. The 2nd F.A. Brigade (Brigadier General Bowley) was left in line to act as our Divisional artillery while we were in line. Attached to it was the third group of the 341st French Artillery (155 Howitzer), and the 29th Regiment of motorized 75's (French).

5. During the day of October 7th there was continual shelling of the 71st Brigade P.C. After conference of the Commanding General of the 2nd Division with General Whitworth and his regimental and machine gun battalion commanders, a warning order for an attack the next morning in the direction of MACHAULT (inclusive)--CAUROY (exclusive), was issued at 19:45 o'clock October 7th. The 71st Brigade F.O. #3 was issued at 3:00 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. The 71st Brigade F.O. having been received two hours earlier.

6. The parallel of departure was given in orders as the road ST ETIENNE--ORFEUIL, but later events indicate that the take-off was from the line described in paragraph 4. The capture of the town of ST ETIENNE was ordered to be effected by a Battalion of Marines, which was acting as combat liaison on our left. This battalion of marines was relieved on the night October 9-10. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of light tanks (French) were attached to the 71st Brigade before the attack, giving about 25 tanks to each regiment, General Whitworth wanted the tanks to precede the infantry, but the tank commander insisted that they should follow the first waves of the infantry, which they did, and in which position they were of little use, as they were soon left behind. It was very difficult to keep lines of communication open at this time on account of the heavy shelling on the forward slope of the hill and on the main road SOMME-PY -MAZAGRAN. During the afternoon and night of October 7-9 enemy infantry and machine gun activity was very slight. The 71st brigade attacked at 5:15 o'clock October 8th, with the 141st Infantry on the right and the 142nd Infantry on the left. Battalions echeloned in depth. The attack was preceded by a four-minute barrage, and was accompanied by a rolling barrage at a speed of 100 meters in four minutes, which however, started several hundred meters too far to the north.

III.

due to the mistake in the parallel of departure. A heavy hostile counter-preparation was put down just before "H" hour, but did little harm as our supports had been placed well forward in anticipation of such action by the enemy. By 5:45 o'clock the first wounded and prisoners came in to Brigade P.C. During the attack the front line was advanced about a kilometer, to a line just north of ST ETIENNE-CEMETERY-POINT 52.35-60. 3900 middle of Square 73--POINT 83.34. Our first line had reached the creek northeast of ST ETIENNE, but had been driven back by counter-attack. Liaison was very hard to maintain during the action. Very exaggerated reports of casualties were received at Brigade P.C. There was an enemy counter attack on our right, but this was repulsed. Enemy's resistance consisting of artillery and machine guns was very heavy during this entire action.

7. The 73rd Division (French) (General Lebocq) on our right was able to progress slightly. The commander of the Tanks operating with the 71st Brigade and anti-tank rifles which opposed them, and to a lack of liaison with the infantry. Due to a combination of over-enthusiasm and lack of liaison with the units. Brigade got into the first line during the night, thus leaving only one line of troops between the enemy and Brigade P.C. In answer to a request the 2nd Division sent up one battalion of the 2nd Engineers in support of each regiment. Orders were issued from Brigade P.C. for a reorganization to be made during the night 8-9. The summary of Intelligence of the 2nd Division, from October 8th to noon October 9th, credited the 71st Brigade with the capture of 381 prisoners, including 14 officers.

8. The 7th Division (French) on the left of the 71st Brigade was held up in its advance but contact was maintained at all times. Combat liaison was maintained on our right by one battalion of the 9th Infantry and on the left by a battalion of marines. Both groups maintained at all times contact with the French right and left flanks.

9. List of casualties of the 71st Brigade cannot be given, as the Brigade Commander has at no time been able to procure an accurate list.

10. October 9th was spent mostly in an attempt to locate all units of the Brigade, as officers were apparently unable to locate on the map their position on the ground. A sergeant of the 23rd Infantry and several N.C.O's of the 2nd Engineers were able to give valuable assistance. General Whitworth ordered that sketches of locations of all units be submitted to Brigade P.C. By 7:00 o'clock October 10th.

11. At about midnight October 9-10, the 71st Brigade received an order from the 2nd Division to advance their line to include the islet of trenches 1200 meters north of ST ETIENNE, so as to protect the right flank of the 11th Army Corps on their left. The line was advanced to the creek northeast of town, but was driven back from the latter position by H.E. and gas shelling, which apparently preceded a counter attack, which latter however never materialized. At this time, 5:20 o'clock, October 10th, the Commanding General, 71st Brigade, put in one company of the 1st battalion of the 14th Infantry to strengthen this part of the line. October 10th at 10:00 o'clock the command of the Division sector passed to Major General William R. Smith of the 36th Division. At 13:35 hours October 10th this Brigade was advised by Chief of Staff that the French Division on each flank had advanced, and that this Brigade should take up the advance so as to keep up with them--at this time also stated that the Brigade (71st) would be relieved as soon as human effort could do so. These orders were issued to regiments of this brigade and contact maintained with the enemy. Very little advance however, was made.

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Field Order No 6, 36th Division dated 10 October 14 o'clock was received, which ordered the 72nd Brigade to pass through the 71st Brigade at 17:00 o'clock, thus relieving the 71st Brigade from the line and transferring them to Divisional Reserve. The forward echelons of the 72nd Brigade passed through the front line of the 71st Brigade sometime during the night 10-11.

12. About 2:00 o'clock October 11th received Field Order #1, issued at 23:00 o'clock 10th October, directing the 72nd Brigade to pursue and attack the enemy, operation to start 9:30 o'clock 11th October. The 71st Brigade, 2nd Engineers and 131st Machine Gun Battalion were announced as Divisional Reserves. The 71st Brigade did not make any advance on the 11th. This day was spent in re-organization of its units to follow the advance of the 72nd Brigade.

13. October 12th, received Field Order No 8; dated 1:00 o'clock October 12th, which ordered the 72nd Brigade to continue the pursuit, beginning at 6:00 o'clock. The 71st Brigade as Divisional Headquarters Reserve was ordered to follow at an approximate distance of 4 kilometers. This order was carried out.

14. This brigade bivouaced on the banks of the LA RETOURNE River 1 kilometer south of DRICOURT, October 12th.

15. October 13th. Received Field Order No 9, which directed that the 71st Brigade take over a part of the sector along the river Aisne, approximately 1000 meters east and west of ATTIGNY. The taking over of this sector was done during the night October 13-14. In taking over this sector it relieved part of the 72nd (American) Brigade and the 73rd (French) Division.

16. A message issued at 2:30 o'clock, October 14th, ordered Brigade Commanders to push patrols across the River, to secure a footing there if possible and to secure prisoners. If justifiable, stronger detachments should exploit to the line ALLANDHSUY-et-SAUCEUIL-CHARBOGNE (exclusive)

17. The units of the 71st Brigade were distributed as follows: the 141st Infantry had one battalion on the line of resistance just north of VAUX, one battalion in Square 97, and one battalion in woods in Square 84. The 142nd Infantry had one battalion on the line of resistance, one battalion in Square 87, and one battalion in Division reserve on banks of creek one kilometer south of DRICOURT. There was a Regimental or Brigade Machine Company with each Battalion. Both Brigade P.C.'s. both Regimental P. C's of the 71st Brigade, and the P.C. 12TH Field Artillery were in VAUX.

18. At about 20:40 o'clock six men of the 141st Infantry captured six prisoners and four machine guns of the 6th light M.G.CO., 89th Regiment, 17th Division without loss of a man.

These men gave information that their battalions had only three infantry companies of about 30 men each, and that their rolling kitchens were 20 kilometers north of the river. The 142nd Infantry made three attempts to cross the canal this day, but were repulsed by snipers south of the river. There was intermittent shelling on VAUX and ATTIGNY.

19. On October 15th the Brigades were ordered to report on what material there was near the river suitable for building bridges over the canal and river. The 71st Brigade reported that there were many felled trees between the canal and the river and that there was some lumber in the neighborhood of the sugar factory.

20. October 16th. There was intermittent shelling in ATTIGNY. There was little air activity. Several patrols were turned back by machine gun fire. A patrol of the 142nd Infantry however crossed the river half a kilometer east of ATTIGNY after dark this day and brought back two prisoners.

21. On October 27th, Memorandum No 4 was issued, prescribing four-~~ty~~ reliefs for Battalions; a Battalion relieved from the front line would drop back to reserve, then to support, and so on. Battalions in Brigade Reserve were to be stationed in FAUVRES. Division Reserves was to consist of the 131st Machine Gun Battalion about one kilometer south of DRICOURT, and one Battalion from each Brigade, one of these Battalions to be in ST REMY, the other in barracks halfway between ST REMY and FAUVRES. Machine guns Bulletin No 5, was issued putting the six Regimental and Brigade machine gun companies on one roster in each Brigade, only the one company on duty with the front line battalion of each regiment to be under the orders of the Regimental Commander. P.C. 71st Brigade was changed from VAUX to FAUVRES on account of shelling in the latter place. Training Memorandum No 5 was issued directing that a certain amount of training be pursued by battalions in reserve.

22. October 18th. Message ordered that the 71st Brigade to take over part of the 72nd Brigade sector by extending its western boundary approximately 500 meters, this to occur on the night 20-21 October. As in the occupation of our sector the troops were not yet exheloned in sufficient depth, Memorandum No 5, October 18th, again prescribed the division of the sector into outpost, support and reserve zones. The line of resistance was the zone as previously announced; The Military crest of Hill 167, near contour 120 from CHAMPENOISE to VAUX and thence southeast to COULOMMES-et-MARQUENY.

23. October 19th. No activity other than spasmodic shelling along brigade sector. Two enlisted men of the Second Battalion 142nd Infantry reported wounded by shrapnel.

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VI.

24. October 29th. Shelling along entire brigade sector, also in the vicinity of VAUX-CHAMPAGNE. Patrols sent out from 142nd Infantry reconnoiter sites for bridge crossings; turned back on account of enemy machine gun fire and snipers.

25. October 21st. Enemy machine guns and snipers active. Enemy artillery very active between the hours of 1:00 to 3:30. Villages of VAUBOURG and ATTIGNY shelled. On this date a patrol from the 141st Infantry took a position just south of the river where it bends furthest to the north, a kilometer east of ATTIGNY. This patrol lay in hiding all day and returned after dark bringing information as to the location of five machine guns, two light and one heavy battery of artillery, which information was given to the artillery.

26. October 22nd. Spasmodic shelling of front line positions. Patrol from 142nd Infantry rushed by superior force of enemy who wounded three of patrol, two of wounded being captured. Orders received from 36th Division for a sideslip to the east, in which the 71st Brigade was to relieve the 73rd Division. The reliefs to be made during the night 22-23.

27. October 23rd. Considerable enemy machine gun activity during the night. Sideslipping as per orders of yesterday successfully completed. Four men wounded and one killed in Third Battalion 142nd Infantry, and one wounded in 141st Infantry. The commanding general 71st Brigade directed to prepare plans for crossing river, and attacking with a first objective of ALLAND'HUY-CHARBOGNE-ST LAMBERT-MONT de JEUX-second objective ECORDAY-SUZANNE.

28. October 24th. Heavy machine gun and snipers fire along the whole front of the brigade sector. Artillery activity very light. The commander 71st Brigade directed to prepare plans for the occupation of FOREST FARM, to take place on night 26-27, and to submit said plans by noon October 25th.

29. October 25th. Very little infantry activity. Artillery activity increased. Our patrols very active securing information relative to FOREST FARM and TRANCHEE-du-FOREST.

30. October 26th. Infantry and machine gun activity of enemy somewhat decreased. Enemy artillery fairly active as a result of the splashing of mustard gas shells, caused 30 casualties, and two from inhaling, total 32. Patrols very active securing information for attack night October 27th.

31. At 16:30 o'clock on the 27th, the 71st Brigade executed successfully its attack on FOREST FARM. The attack was made by one battalion of each regiment. Parallel of departure, the road ATTIGNY-ROCHE-road running east to river, was left at 16:30. A large concentration of artillery made 20 minute preparation, followed by a rolling barrage. The objective, POINT 3722-FOREST FARM-POINT 6211, was reached in a little over half an hour and immediately organized. Patrols advanced and cleared up most of the ground between the objective and RILLY-aux-OLCE. Detailed report of this operation attached. This night the support and reserve battalions of the 141st and 142nd Infantries were relieved by the 22nd Division (French).

32. October 28th. Command of the sector passed to the Commanding General 22nd Division at 8:00 o'clock. The 71st Brigade P.C, and Headquarters were relieved and moved to SOMME-PY.

VII.

33. October 29th. Front line battalions of the 71st Brigade were relieved on the night-28th-29th October, thus completing the relief of the entire Brigade.

34. During the entire operations of this Brigade, relations between the French units and my brigade were of the best. Representatives from the 73rd Division personally visited my P.C. and gave me at all times information as to their movements. The French Divisions on our left did likewise to the Commanding Officer of the 142nd Infantry.

35. I do not feel that my brigade played any important part over that of the French during the operation of October 8th, but as to the operation of FOREST FARM, personally I feel that the French Division that occupied this sector prior to the time that we sideslipped, could have as easily taken this position as we did, and from the results of this operation, I feel that this Brigade played a far more important part than did the French. The French had made at least one attack on this position and had failed to take it.

36. As to the relative efficiency of our troops compared to those with whom we were serving, I will say that I did not have a chance to observe them work except from the viewpoint of results attained. The ST ETIENNE fight was the first time that my brigade was under fire and they went in and relieved a unit at night under heavy shell fire and made the attack for the first time. It was a fact that our right flank advanced farther than the French and our liaison combat group (1st battalion, 9th Infantry) had to reject our exposed flank due to failure of French to advance. I do not believe that the resistance the French met was stiffer than what we encountered. In this instance our green troops showed up better than theirs. At the FOREST FARM and in the vicinity of ATTIGNY I think our troops, after having had the experience at ST ETIENNE were better than the French.

37. There were no real difficulties which arose due to difference of language except small things and the loss of time spent in use of interpreters which were liberally furnished.

P. Whitworth,
Brigadier, General.

JWV

SECOND DIVISION HISTORY

1919

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MEUSE-ARGONNE.

Upon withdrawal from the Blanc Mont sector the Second Division moved by easy stages to the Vadenay-Bouq-la-Veuve-Dampierre area, north of Chalons-sur-Marne, where it was held as Fourth Army (French) reserve. The Fourth Brigade was placed at the disposal of the Ninth Army Corps (French) on October 19th, and on October 21st started forward to relieve the 73d Division (French) in the region of Attigny. Orders for the relief were countermanded the night of the 21st, and the Brigade was returned to the Second Division, which had been relieved from duty with the Fourth French Army and assigned to the First American Army.

Movement to the First Army front was started on October 22d. The Division passed through St. Menneould, les Islettes and the Argonne Forest, concentrating in and around Exarmont. It was a part of the Fifth Army Corps, commanded by Major-General Sumnerall.

The Second Engineers and Second Field Artillery Brigade were not relieved from duty with the 36th Division until October 27th-28th. They had been fighting for 27 successive days and when relieved to rejoin the Second Division had to travel 90 kilometers, the greater part of the distance under fire, in two days, in order to support the Division in the great attack which was to be launched on November 1st. They accomplished this tremendously difficult task and at H-2 hours (2:30 AM), November 1st, all the batteries of the brigade were in position and firing, and wire-cutting platoons from the Engineers were with all the attacking companies of infantry.

November 1st, at 5:30 AM, the Division attacked on a front of four kilometers, having as initial objectives the towns of St. George and Landres-et-St. George and the Bois Hazois, these three points constituting the principal centers of resistance in the powerful positions known as the Kreimheld Stellung. The attack was preceded by two hours of preparatory fire, delivered by three brigades of field artillery, the First, Second and Sixty-Seventh, and by several heavy batteries of corps and army artillery. The Second Division was in line with the Eightieth Division on its left and Eighty-ninth on its right.

CHI/bmmnd

Previous attacks had revealed the strength of the German positions, particularly in the neighborhood of Landres-et-St. George and St. George. The enemy was occupying strongly fortified trenches and had fought desperately to hold them. The difficulties of the attack were fully appreciated by the entire Division; in fact it was expected that the fight would be even more bitter than the battle of Blanc Mont.

Everything possible to assure success was done. The artillery concentration was tremendous, greater than in any other drive in which the Division had participated. The barrage was to be intensified by indirect fire from several battalions of machine guns, machine gun nests were to be deluged with high explosive from the artillery and phosphorous bombs from trench mortars, and a large number of American-manned tanks were to support the attack. All plans were worked with the utmost care and were thoroughly understood by everybody. Reconnaissance had been thorough and all officers were familiar with the terrain over which they were to advance.

Completing the relief of the Forty-second Division on the night of October 31st-November 1st, the infantry regiments of the Second Division were in position at the jump-off line at 2 AM., November 1st. The Fourth Brigade, with the Fifth Regiment, Marines, on the right and the Sixth Marines on the left, jumped off on an east and west line one kilometer south of St. George, starting on a front of two kilometers. The Ninth Infantry supported the Marines. The Twenty-third Infantry, with two battalions in line, jumped off on a northeast-southwest line in front of Cote de Chatillon, about one kilometer south of Landres-et-St. George. The mission of the Twenty-third was the capture of Landres-et-St. George, Bois Hamois and Bois de l'Epassse, advancing three kilometers to the line of the first objective, where it would be pinched off between the Fifth Marines and Eighty-ninth Division, whose lines converged on the first objective.

The attack developed precisely as planned, the infantry following the barrage and holding their direction perfectly, in spite of an extremely dense fog. St. George and Landres-et-St. George were captured in less than an hour and the attack pushed swiftly to the heights of Barri-court. Resistance in the Bois des Gazeis was very stubborn, the enemy machine gunners and artillerymen fighting bravely until they were killed. At 7:30 AM, the wood was completely cleared of the enemy. Never had the infantry of the Second Division advanced behind a barrage of such wonderful precision and deadly effect. Splendid service was rendered by the tanks, not only in the reduction of strong points but also in the capture of enemy batteries.

At 8:30 AM, the Division had gained its first objective, exactly on schedule. The Eighty-ninth, swinging forward with similar dash, had converged with the Fifth Marines and at 9 AM, the advance was resumed.

After passing the first objective line the Marine Brigade sector was widened to three kilometers and included the towns of Landreville, Chennery and Bayonville. The Marines encountered little serious resistance after passing the Freya Stellung, except at Landreville and Hill 289. Those two points were stoutly held, but they were quickly over run.

CHL/ bmd

At 2:30 PM the Fourth Brigade had reached its final objective and strong patrols were pushing through the Bois de la Folie to the exploitation line. Enemy resistance in the Folie woods proved to be more substantial than expected. Fire from machine guns and artillery was heavy, and from statements of prisoners it was learned that fresh troops had been thrown in to oppose the advance. No attempt was made to advance the line beyond the Army objective on the night of November 1st.

During the day, November 2d, the Third Brigade took over the front line and that night advanced the line to the Nouart-Fosse road, advancing three kilometers. This advance was the first of a series of night maneuvers which were carried out with unsurpassed audacity and skill. The Ninth and Twenty-third Regiments, marching in regular advance guard formation, stole silently through the Bois de la Folie, gaining a position in rear of Boche batteries which were still firing into Bayonville. Small parties of intrepid scouts preceded the columns, disposing of the Boche sentries with such quiet efficiency that the main body of the enemy remained in complete ignorance of their predicament until the next morning, when they were captured on their way to breakfast. Many of them, running into the rear guards of the Ninth and Twenty-third fled back towards their support front line, only to encounter the Marines advancing in support.

Fosse and Nouart were mopped up at daybreak and the Third Brigade continued its advance towards the Bois de Belval. An advance of nearly four kilometers was effected, and at noontime, November 3d, the two regiments were digging in on a line running southeast from Vaux-en-Dieulet to le Champey Bas. In twelve hours the brigade had penetrated the enemy line to a depth of six kilometers, accomplishing this with very little artillery support and with slight casualties. Enemy machine guns and artillery had been captured and destroyed with the rifle and auxiliary arms alone.

Up to this time the attack had been resisted by seven German divisions, the 15th Bavarian Division and the 13th, 28th, 31st, 41st, 52d and 88th Divisions. Prisoners from all of these organizations had been so disputed as to lose all integrity of organization. A complete collapse of the German forces west of the Meuse appeared imminent.

On November 3d, however, the enemy resistance stiffened considerably, particularly in the southern edge of the Bois de Belval. Several small counter-attacks were launched against the Third Brigade and the Boche batteries opened very heavy harassing fire. It was apparent that, unless the Bois de Belval could be seized by a maneuver similar to the one of the preceding night, the capture of the woods would involve very heavy fighting. Accordingly, the Third Brigade was ordered to continue the advance.

Immediately after dark the troops started forward, employing the tactics which had succeeded so remarkably the night before. With the Ninth Infantry leading the entire brigade marched along the Beaumont road. The night was very dark and a heavy rain was falling, making it fairly easy to slip through without being observed, and all enemy sentries were quietly rendered "hors de combat" before they could give the alarm. No resistance was encountered until the advance guard reached the la Forge Ferme. This was cleared after a few minutes of sharp fighting and the column moved rapidly forward.

At 11 PM November 3d the advance units of the Ninth were firmly established in the northern edge of the Bois du Sort Gerache, with their P.C. located in the main building of la Tuilerie Ferme, where, less than one hour before, a German division commander and his staff had been drawing up plans for resisting the attack which they expected the Americans to make the following day. The Twenty-Third had a similar experience at Beausejour Ferme, capturing the general's automobile, but not the general. At daybreak, November 4th, the Third Brigade was holding the line of heights less than two kilometers south of Beaumont.

While the Third Brigade was moving on Beaumont, the Fifth Marines struck off through the Bois du Dieulet and advanced up to the Farm de Belle Tour, establishing liaison with the Ninth Infantry and stretching in a southeasterly direction through the Forêt de Dieulet to connect with the 89th Division. Thus, on the evening of November 4th the Division was holding a line of six kilometers, running southeast from a point one kilometer west and north of Beausejour Ferme. Casualties during the day had been heavier than on any day since November 1st. German batteries and machine gun west and north of Beaumont maintained terrific fire all day long and their batteries massed on the heights east of the Meuse were able to fire with deadly accuracy. Reports indicated, however, that the German forces were retreating across the Meuse with all possible speed, and on the night of November 4th the Twenty-third Infantry leap-frogged the Ninth Infantry and pushed on towards the river. One battalion moved straight east to the Bois de la Vache and then north to Letanne. Another battalion seized the heights east and northeast of Beaumont, the column striking squarely into, and scattering widely, a column of German infantry marching out of Beaumont. Letanne and Beaumont were mopped up at daybreak November 5th and nearly two hundred prisoners captured. Patrols from Twenty-third Infantry and Fifth Marines reconnoitered the Meuse from Pouilly to a point two kilometers north of Letanne, finding that the Germans had destroyed all the bridges and were holding strongly on the east bank of the river.

The Ninth Infantry made another jump on the night of November 5th-6th, slipping through the Boche lines to la Sartelle Farm in the Bois de l'Hospice, the Bois de Fond de Limon and Villemonty, an advance of five kilometers. Very little resistance was encountered, the move being undertaken largely for the protection of the right flank of the 26th Infantry of the First Division. This regiment passed through the Second Division lines that night, striking in a northerly direction towards Sedan.

From November 6th to November 10th the activity of the Division was limited to a vigorous patrolling of the Meuse and the preparations for the crossing of the river. The town of La Faubourg (Mouzon) was occupied.

THE CROSSING OF THE MEUSE.

A crossing of the Meuse was ordered for the night of November 10th-11th. The attack order called for a crossing near Mouzon and one near Letanne and placed the commanding general of the Fourth Brigade in charge of the operations, with the following special troops at his disposal:

CHL/brand

Fourth Machine Gun Battalion.

Companies A and B of the Second Engineers, augmented by Companies C and H of the Ninth Infantry.

Company D of the First Gas Regiment.

All available artillery.

All available signal troops.

One regiment was to cross in the vicinity of Mouzon and one battalion, together with one battalion from the 89th Division, was to cross in the vicinity of Letanne. Zero hour was to be 8 PM. The Sixth Marines, with the third battalion of the Fifth Marines, were designated as the Mouzon force, and the first battalion of the Fifth Marines as the Letanne force. Later it developed that the battalion from the 89th Division would not arrive in time to be properly instructed, and the second battalion of the Fifth Marines was substituted on the Letanne force.

So we came to the dramatic last fight of the Second Division in the great war. Historians will record it as but one of the countless minor feats of skill and daring, and yet already have our best story writers immortalized this crossing of the Meuse. The difficulties of the task that confronted this small band of Yanks when the end of the hell-fight was almost at hand, made the situation peculiarly tragic and heroic. Probably never before had any units of the Second Division faced a few hours so full of vital consequences.

The onus of this last exploit fell upon the shoulders of the two companies of the Engineers. The problem was the construction and maintenance of bridges across the Meuse. Given the means of crossing the river and of maintaining a line of communication rearward and 'twas just a nasty job for the intrepid Marines. The Meuse--a beautiful, whispering stream, it has been called, but, for military purposes, a most effective obstacle, sixty yards of water too deep to ford--had to be bridged, while the rocky slopes of the far side swarmed with fearfully expert machine gunners, and the wooded heights beyond, which commanded the valley, hid the countless batteries of an enemy at bay.

The telling of the story is simple if we leave out the details of preparation. A mere mention will do of the tests and drills in the Champagne sector that gave the Engineers two companies of footbridge builders--for they do not just happen--of the construction of the raft sections in Beaumont, six kilometers back of the river, of the transporting of these sections by wagon train on the evening of November 10th to within 400 yards of the water's edge--how the "muleskinners" blessed the fog that had settled protectingly over the valley--but from that point, well--the work of assembling had hardly begun on the flat by the river side when a suspicious Heinie sent up a rocket and the fireworks started.

The Huns immediately laid down a violent counter-artillery and machine gun barrage along the entire river front. Their fire near Mouzon was particularly deadly and blotted out all attempts to throw bridges across. Continued efforts were made by the Engineers throughout the night, but the bridges were destroyed by direct hits from the enemy artillery as fast as they were put down, and the Mouzon force returned to its original position in the Bois-de-Ford-de-Limon before dawn.

The Letanne force was more fortunate. Heinis had only a suspicion, no definite knowledge or clue, and so the fire was concentrated, not on the river and flat, but upon a roadway that paralleled the flat near the point chosen for the bridge sites, and on the area leading to the roadway. This made the approach of the Marines exceedingly bitter, but saved the bridges.

When the first Marines filed silently out on the flat, they found two completed footbridges, a dry dock as it were, resting perpendicular to the water's edge. They were some two hundred yards apart. On each side of each bridge crouched a line of tense figures, awaiting the signal for the launching. The sections were all securely lashed together and the last detail had been carefully arranged.

The signal followed the appearance of the first Marine and his word that all was well, and the kneeling figures arose together and marched toward the water. As each man's raft entered the stream he released his hold and, turning to the right and left--depending on his side of the bridge--dropped to shelter. One man paid out a rope attached to the foremost raft and anchored the bridge against the current; one man rode the leading raft to make it fast to the further shore. Quietly and with clock-like precision until the frail structure had reached mid-stream. The machine gun bullets still sang harmlessly overhead.

Then a lashing snapped and one bridge threatened to close like a jack-knife. The lone anchor man was pulled into the stream and a catastrophe was imminent. In this crisis the resourceful sergeant in charge pulled a spare lashing from somewhere about his person, rushed out on the unsteady span and repaired the break. The bridge again moved forward with only four minutes lost by the accident.

These four minutes, plus the additional noise caused by the break and its repair, was, however, all the warning needed by a vigilant Boche patrol, and no sooner had the bridge been made fast on the enemy shore than it was covered by an impassible machine gun fire.

No marring incident befell the work of the second bridge gang, and seven minutes after the launching--a record time--a thin line of Marines had started over it undetected. Probably the discovery of the first bridge was in reality an aid to the enterprise, for the Leathernecks had surprised and silenced all of the Boche in the immediate area before they became aware of the second bridge.

Two battalions of the Fifth Marines were on the east bank at 11:30 PM. They immediately started to advance through the Bois d'Alma Gisors, cleaning up machine gun nests. Strong resistance held them until daylight. Then, with a battalion of the Ninth Infantry following in support, they advanced through the Bois d'Alma Gisors and the Bois de Flaviers, and at 10 AM November 11th, had gained their objectives. Exploitation patrols started forward, but were recalled when instructions to cease firing at 11AM were received.

CHL/bmmmd

Between November 1st and November 11th, the Second Division advanced 32 kilometers, capturing St. Georges, Landres-et-St. George, Landreville, Chemery, Bayonville, Fosse, Nouart, Beaumont, Letanne and Videmonty, winding up with a brilliant crossing of the Meuse. One thousand seven hundred and twelve prisoners, from ten enemy divisions were captured. The November 1st advance of nine kilometers through enemy positions, heretofore considered impregnable, was a remarkable exploit. For the first time during the war the German High Command admitted officially that their lines had been broken.

Weather conditions made the advance difficult and the men suffered many hardships in the rapid movements in cold rain over roads that were quagmires of thick mud. The night maneuvers were especially trying and a large number of men were evacuated sick. Ration wagons and kitchens could not keep up and the troops during the first six days subsisted largely on their iron rations and food which they captured from the Germans. Losses during the eleven days, November 1st-11th, were 3,233.

H HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY
SECOND SECTION GENERAL STAFF.

3rd Army (German)
Headquarters

Army Headquarters,
October 25, 1918.

THE
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
IN THE
C H A M P A G N E
MONT BLANC OPERATIONS.

September 26, 1918 to October 9, 1918.

From German view point.

Translated from original German
document by Second Section,
General Staff, Headquarters
American Forces in Germany.

Report of
September 26, 1918.

Morning Report.

Heavy artillery bombardment directed against left flank of first army - Groups Py and Perthes, and lively harassing fire on ARGONNE Group, commencing at 11 P.M.

Local gas attacks. Range of Bombardment northwards; southern ETIENNE-MONTHOIS-SENUÉ and SUGNY (station). Bombardment intensified towards morning, especially against Groups Py and Perthes. Enemy artillery concentrated in Souain-Perthes sector.

Yesterdays' report of enemy activities showed: no noticeable traffic on roads, moderate railroad traffic from ST. DIZIER westerly and southerly no recognizable main direction; station ST. DIZIER unusually full. Two new aviation bases to north and south of ST. QUEN, 21 sheds and aerial activity. Between COMBLES and TREMONT, southwest of BAR-LEC-DUC, new aviation field with 10 sheds, Americans observed on evening of Sept. 25th seemingly near the heavy mortar emplacement at VAUQUOIS in front of Tiefland Division.

Afternoon Report.

Attack by enemy infantry at 10 A.M. after 11 hours of artillery preparation. Attack directed against Groups Py and Perthes and against left flank of ARGONNE Groups with the assistance of numerous tanks and air squadrons.

The 2nd and 9th Line Divisions and the 76th Reserve Division were only partially engaged.

Results on front line (1 P.M.): 200th and 7th Infantry Divisions: On main line of resistance, Bavarian Ersatz Division forced back into and behind Perthes-Position. Counter-attack under way. 42nd Division forced back behind BUTTE de TAHURE-north edge of TAHURE. 103rd Infantry Division is holding most of the main line of resistance #1; bending back from there to the west of RIPONT and west and north of FONTAINE. 9th Landwehr Division still in front line north of CERNAY-north edge of BOIS de VILLE, also 76th Reserve and 2nd Landwehr Divisions.

On the left flank-2nd Landwehr Division front line bends back from the east side of the ARGONNE to main line of resistance II near MONTEBLAIN-VILLE, then via CHARPENTRAY (south edge) EPOMONVILLE, there connecting with the Fifth Army.

Evening Report.

In the afternoon renewed powerful attacks, supported by tanks, against the whole front of Group Py. They were repulsed in counter-attack by the 200th and 7th Infantry Divisions. The Bavarian Ersatz Division retired to the Perthes-Position, large parts of it behind this position.

Groups Perthes, owing to the pressure against both flanks of 103rd Division, had to retire across the DORMOISE. The 42nd Infantry Division was forced back to main line of resistance II by enemy who attacked the Perthes-Position, after renewed artillery preparation, with the support of 60 tanks. The right wing of the 103rd Infantry Division, 202nd Infantry Division, 9th Landwehr Division, 76th Reserve Division and 2nd Landwehr Division remained in position reported this afternoon. 9th Landwehr Division repulsed repeated local attacks north of CERNAY. In the evening, on the left flank of the ARGONNE Groups, the enemy, supported by tanks, forced his way up the AIRE VALLEY as far as BAULNY. Counter-attack under way. Contact maintained within army and with the 1st and 5th armies.

1:30 P.M. : Air attack in force, heavy bombardment directed against the inside flanks of Py and Perthes Groups. Squadrons of over 100 aeroplanes, flying in close order. Approximately 600 bombs dropped on Group Py alone. Three aeroplanes shot down. Sixteen balloons (enemy) on army front, of which five were shot down. Four of our balloons shot down.

Aeroplane observations: Troops unloading at BUSSY LE CHATEAU. Strong occupation at HURLUS-LAVAL-MAFFRECOURT and MOIREMONTIN in the afternoon.

3 P.M. : Truck trains on way from MENEHOULD to BERZIEUX and from COURTEMONT to MINAUCOURT. No other road traffic observed.

Army counts upon continuance of attack on its whole front.

From 6:40 P.M. on, renewed heavy artillery fire directed at middle of Py Group.

Newly determined from prisoners - 154th Division and 77th American Division. Confirmed - 161st, 22nd and 1st Cuirassier Division. Seemingly, only Americans east of AISNE - West of the AISNE 9 - 10 French Divisions attacked, 10 - 12 more divisions are expected in the second attack. 185 prisoners taken to date.

To the Third Army: -

The enemy attacked the front of the 1st and 3rd armies today with overwhelmingly superior forces.

Leaders and troops have again shown that their spirit is not dismayed by the superior forces of the enemy. The enemy did not reach his goal. Your devotion to duty and spirit of sacrifice brought his attack to a standstill. The first hard day has been weathered. We must count on further fighting. After what you have accomplished today, you can face any further storms with full confidence and full trust in your strength.

The Fatherland and the whole world is watching the fight in the CHAMPAGNE. The enemy cannot break through if every leader and every man holds his place to the last. That is our duty. - This command is to be published at once.

William - Crown Prince.

September 27, 1918.

Morning Report.

Heights of BAULNY retaken by counter-attack in the evening. Night quiet, in general, only harassing artillery fire. 5 A.M. - Fire in front of Py group, on inner flanks of Perthes and AISNE groups and on 2nd Landwehr Division of ARGONNE Group intensified. No enemy attacks as yet reported.

During the night, aeroplane activity along railroads as far as CHARLEVILLE - SEDAN. Few bombs were dropped.

Own night reconnaissance did not show any unusual activity behind enemy's front. Lively traffic south of CERNAY.

Ammunition dump MONTHOIS blown up by enemy artillery.

Afternoon Report.

According to captured maps and prisoners' statements, the goal of the enemy attack of yesterday morning seems to have been a line thru AUBERIVE-heights north of ST. MARIE-a-PY - heights north of SOMME-PY, northeast in the general direction of CHALLERANGE. In the afternoon, evening or this morning (27th), the divisions in the second line should take position with left flank extending toward BETHINIVILLE - ST ETIENNE and the attack should be carried to the northwest, thus opening up the heights of MORONVILLERS. Plan shown on the map. This plan failed in spite of the use of many tanks and numerous divisions - west of the AISNE at least 12 divisions attacking. According to prisoners' statements and our own intelligence reports, strong reserves (about 8-10 divisions) massed against our right flank are still to be reckoned with.

According to prisoners' statements, the enemy suffered heavy losses, especially by machine-gun fire. Many tanks were destroyed. In front of the 4th Grenadier Regiment alone, 26 destroyed tanks are said to be lying, 12 are in front of Infantry Regiment 26. Up to the present time, only these figures have been reported from certain sectors.

East of the ARGONNE, at least 4 American divisions in front of the 1st Guard Division, 2 of these in the first and 2 in the second line (Reserves).

The small use of battle planes and failure of the heaviest flat-trajectory fire are noteworthy.

Enemy renewed his attack against the whole front of Groups Py and Perthes, using fresh troops and numerous tanks on the morning of September 27th. The attack against the 200th and the right flank of the 7th Infantry Division was repulsed although some ground was lost. Center and left flank of the 7th Division were forced back against railroad east of SOMME-PY; the left flank of the 15th Bavarian Division even across this line. Powerful tank attacks were. 103rd Infantry Division lost main line of resistance 2 east of BREITENHOF so that the enemy was able to advance as far as KOENIGSBERG. 42nd Infantry Division was forced back by outflanking attack; it was able, however, to hold the ground southwest of MANRE.

Counter attacks by the 200th and 7th Infantry Divisions regained parts of the lost ground. Counter attacks by the 3rd Guard Infantry Division, 42nd Division, Assault Battalion 2 and by parts of the 45th Reserve Division, for retaking main line of resistance, 2, under way. The 202nd Division repulsed powerful attacks against the heights north of FONTAINE. Group AISNE, little activity. At CERNAY, an attack of the 14th French Division seems to be in preparation (newly learnt from prisoners). Division Hochwald, fighting in "No Man's Land" only.

East of ARCONNE, enemy attacking since 10.00 A.M. west of AIRE RIVER and in the AIRE VALLEY. Attack against line CHARPENTRY-ECLISFONTAINE is expected.

Owing to the fog and cloudy weather, little activity of aeroplanes and balloons.

According to intelligence reports, 2 new corps headquarters have been established between the 4th and 21st and the 21st and 8th French Army Corps.

Evening Report.

In Group Py, the 200th and 7th Infantry Divisions have repulsed repeated powerful attacks supported by tanks. Counterattack of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division and 15th Bavarian Division retook the Engelbrachten Heights, but in the evening they were forced back as far as road SOMME-PY - AURE by a renewed attack supported by tanks. Counter-attack ordered for September 28th.

Group Perthes took KOENIGSBERG and north side of BREITFIRST by counter-attack. At present, 202nd Division is still engaged in fighting on the heights north of FONTAINE. Left flank forced back to the road FONTAINE-BOUCHONVILLE. Counter-attack under way.

Powerful attacks against 9th Landwehr Division west of the AISNE were repulsed, likewise a local attack against the left flank of the 76th Reserve Division.

In the afternoon, enemy attacked the left flank of Tiefland Division in force, supported by tanks. After an initial success, the attack was stopped by counter-attacks. As it grew dark, a renewed attack was under way. Situation still uncertain.

Aeroplane activity in the afternoon. Strong squadrons of bombing planes once more took part in the combat on the ground. On Sept. 26th eleven enemy planes; today, Sept. 27th, two enemy observation balloons were shot down.

In the afternoon, little traffic back of enemy lines and in front of Group Py and Perthes. Until dark, lively traffic in the direction of the front of Tiefland Sector.

According to Intelligence reports, 10 divisions were engaged in Sector ST. HILAIRE - MASSIGES. Newly ascertained from prisoners, 74th Division at CERNAY, 76th American Division east of the AISNE, 91st and 28th American Divisions in front of Tiefland.

September 28, 1918.

Morning Report.

Group Py was forced back to the MARIE A PY-SOMME-Py road by repeated tank attacks which were continued until evening. The 200th and 7th Infantry Divisions, which offered an heroic resistance, succeeded in holding the position on the right flank north of main line of resistance 1, and farther east to the south edge of Py-Valley. During these combats, the 1st Battery of Field Artillery Regiment 40 (Lieut. Keibel) destroyed 7 tanks; 9th Battery, Field Artillery Regiment 40 (Corporal Thele) 2 tanks. Beginning at 6 A.M., a renewed tank attack took place on the whole front of the group after heavy artillery fire throughout the night, under cover of smoke screens in the Py-Valley and on the eastern heights. It was repulsed by artillery fire and counter attack. Counter-attack against SOMME-Py, into which the enemy forced his way, still under way.

Yesterday afternoon, Group Perthes repulsed an attack against its right flank. Enemy suffered heavy losses. During an enemy drive which was carried out against the 103rd Infantry Division this morning, KOENIGSBERG was temporarily lost, but it was regained by a counter-attack. The enemy stormed the position of the 9th Landwehr Division four times, but was always repulsed with heavy losses. At the same time, the 76th Reserve Division was fighting in "No Man's Land".

Beginning at 4:30 A.M., concentrated artillery fire on L'ECHELLE and CERNAY woods. An attack seems to be in preparation there.

In accordance with orders, the Hochwald Division retired to the line BOUZON-main line of resistance 2 as far as 1.5 Km. west of the HALBERSTAEDTER road, from there connecting with main line of resistance 1 to the southwest, without being disturbed by the enemy. Outposts remained in the original front line. During combats with changing success, Division Tiefland was forced back approximately to the southern edge of MONTREBEAU-south of LA GRANGE AUX BOIS. At the present time, powerful infantry attack, supported by cavalry and tanks under way against this front, and from the AIRE-valley against the BOUZON.

Very little activity of enemy planes.

A later report says: During the attacks on Sept. 26th against Group Perthes, the 6th Company, Infantry Regiment 138, together with an anti-tank section of the 1st Battery, Field Artillery Regiment 15 maintained their position on main line of resistance 1 southeast of TAHURE, after the enemy had already been in the Perthes position for some time. They successfully broke through after they had been surrounded on all sides.

The 3rd Guard Infantry Division was moved into a new position between Groups Py and Perthes. The Bavarian Ersatz Division is assembling at ORFEUIL for the purpose of reorganizing.

Situation: Further attacks are expected today west of the AISNE; east of the ARGONNE very strong American forces seemingly intend to continue the drive toward the north.

Afternoon Report.

Since dawn, the French have been attacking Groups Py and Perthes with the support of numerous tanks. The right wing is maintaining its position without change. The enemy has taken the SOMME-Py position. Counter-attack under way. The main attack of the enemy is directed against this position and to the south of the village. Fresh enemy forces assembling between SOMME-PY and ENGELBRECHT HEIGHTS. Strong tank attack also in progress against the whole of Group Perthes. Attack for the most part easily repulsed with appreciable loss of enemy. We hold substantially the same line as this morning. Counter-attacks under way against local advances. Enemy forces attacking CERNAY forest did not reach our lines.

French wireless report of the capture of the CERNAY and L'ECHELLE forests is false. Coming enemy attack against the left flank of the 76th Reserve Division indicated by preparatory artillery fire. ARGONNE group engaged in heavy fighting since early morning. Attempted tank attack against CHATEL in AIRE-Valley under way. The Guard Divisions are approximately in their old position. Fresh enemy forces being sent against this front, according to observation. Numerous destroyed tanks in front of and behind our lines. There are 100 tanks reported in Group Py's territory alone; 7th Infantry Division accounted for 33 yesterday. Major Csander with his 15th F.A. especially distinguished himself in anti-tank operations. - Fighting is very heavy. The troops are behaving splendidly.

Enemy aeroplane attacks in force on balloons. Three of our balloons shot down. Besides this, only protective flights. Battle and pursuit units repeatedly entered into combat in the fighting against Groups Py and Argonne. One enemy balloon shot down. Aeroplane observations immediately behind battle zone showed heavy traffic northward on the LE CLAON-CHALADE road through the ARGONNE. Large troop movements observed crossing the DORMOISE on both sides of CERNAY.

Long distance observations impossible because of heavy clouds.

According to Intelligence reports, the staff of the 2nd Moroccan Division is in MINAUCOURT and a General Headquarters in COURTEMONT. Newly recognized -28th Division west of SOMME-Py and 14th Division at GRATEUIL. According to a report, the 13th Division was back of the 43d Division on Sept. 26th. Probably take position to the east of SOMME-Py today. Assumed disposition of enemy at present before Py, west to east:- 154, 151, 23, 22; doubtful:-167, 43, 13; from Perthes to AISNE:-4th Division, doubtful: 2nd Moroccan Division, 14, 861, 74, 1st Cuirassier; east of the AISNE, 76th Am. 28th Am., 77th Am., 91st Am., 35th A., probable reserves; Σ 21, 170, 3, 6, 126, 124; possible reserves:-71, 120, 153, 164, 40 Am. 7 Am., 81 Am., and II H.K.K. (?)

Evening report.

The battle was continued in the afternoon. With superior and in part fresh forces, under cover of an attack by numerous tanks, the French attacked repeatedly. The preparations for these attacks consisted of a violent artillery bombardment. The right flank of Group Py (200th and 7th Divisions), maintaining contact with the advanced left wing of the first army, repulsed the enemy with heavy losses. Another attack from SOMME-Py was also repulsed. The front of the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division and the 3rd Guard Infantry Division is unshaken. In places where the enemy had entered our position, he was driven out by counter-attacks. Small assault detachments under resolute commanders often stopped for superior enemy forces. The battalion staffs of the 7th Infantry Division, supported only by runners, held their ground. Bavarian Infantry Regiment 30 four times drove out the enemy who had forced his way in. The Guard Fusilier Regiment repulsed six successive attacks. In Group Py, the 42nd Division is still holding its position. Captain Behrend, commander of the 1st Batt. of Infantry Regiment 138 especially distinguished himself here by personal energy and initiative. After having repulsed repeated attacks, the 103rd Infantry Division was finally forced back to the ULIN BROOK. A counter-attack under the direct leadership of the division commander regained the position of this division on the heights. In addition, parts of the 202nd Infantry Division temporarily retired, after an initial successful defense on the heights between GRATEUIL AND EDOUVILLE, to SECHAULT. During a new counter-attack, companies of the 9th Landwehr Division carried them back and regained the position for them. A repeated powerful tank attack forced back the right flank to SECHAULT once more. Repeated powerful ^{tank} attack forced back determined attacks against the ECHELLE and CERNAY Forests were stopped by an effective defensive fire.

Local attacks against the 76th Reserve Division came to a standstill in "No Man's Land."

In the Argonne Group, Wuerttemberg Landwehr troops repeatedly repulsed the enemy, who stormed the Bouzon, supported by tanks. Tank attacks in the AIRE-VALLEY against APREMONT and beyond were repulsed by a powerful counter-attack delivered by the 4th Foot Guard Regiment and parts of the 2nd Landwehr Division. We held the village. In spite of repeated assaults by fresh troops, the brave but greatly weakened Guard Divisions held their place in the line East of CHATEL -North-west of CIERGES, with the exception of unimportant losses of ground.

The enemy suffered heavy losses in men and tanks today without gaining much ground. Report of tanks destroyed today:- Group Py, at least 70, Group Perthes, approximately 40, Group Argonne, approximately 30. Infantry and Artillery share the honors in their destruction.

4 officers and 351 men from 14 different enemy divisions passed through the "prisoner of war" receiving stations.

In spite of heavy clouds and rain, the aviators untiringly carried out their assignments. Between 1 and 2 P.M., aerial battle units successfully attacked the enemy units engaged east of APREMENT. The enemy attack was not carried out. The American troops fled before the planes. 2 enemy planes and 2 enemy balloons were shot down by our planes; one enemy plane by anti-aircraft guns.

Enemy planes bombed roads and villages in the vicinity of VOUIERS and GRANDPRE this afternoon.

The army expects a continuance of the offensive, especially east of the Argonne, and extension of the attack on the front to the west of the Argonne, towards which strong enemy forces are reported to be marching.

3rd Army Headquarters
Ia #10322 sp.

Army Headquarters
Sept 28, 1918,

Army Order.
(For immediate publication)

The French attack in the Champagne and the American attack between the Argonne and the MEUSE were the beginning of the great decisive battle in the west by which the war is to be ended.

In three days, of heavy fighting, the army has withstood the attacks of a highly superior enemy force. The losses of the enemy extraordinarily heavy. Destroyed tanks lie in front of our lines by the hundred.

Leaders and troops have their full share in this check of the enemy; my thanks and acknowledgements are due you. I know that your accomplishments in the coming battles will surpass those of previous ones.

I ask that each man be told that this battle will decide the fate of our fatherland.

The Commander-in-Chief.
von Einem.

September 29, 1918.

Morning Report.

Counter-attacks by our troops for the purpose of retaking local gains by the enemy in ST. MARIE-A-REY and on the left flank of Group Perthes were successful. An attempt to retake SOMME-Py was not successful, because the enemy was advancing at the same time with superior forces.

At the close of yesterday's fighting, the right flank of the 202nd Infantry Division was resting on SECHAULT. For this reason, MT. CUVELET was evacuated as planned, and the left flank of the division drawn back of the SECHAULT-BOUCONVILLE ROAD. The attack against the 5th and 1st Guard Infantry Divisions, prepared yesterday afternoon was not fully carried out because of effective counter-barrage. It split up into local attacks which were repulsed.

Lively harassing fire during the night on our lines. Enemy infantry quiet.

Barrage intensified toward morning on various sectors. Tank attacks against 7th Infantry Division under way; so far repulsed. Enemy attack seems to be in preparation against BOUCONVILLE-ECHELLE FOREST front.

The main body of the troops in the BOUZON salient were withdrawn by night, according to orders, to a reserve line across the mouth of the salient. Patrols under command of officers remained in the abandoned lines.

Fighting has begun south of EXERMONT after a heavy preparatory barrage by enemy artillery; still going on.

Little activity in air. 8 enemy planes shot down yesterday. We lost 2.

Afternoon Report.

Heavy fighting from SOMME-Py to BOUCONVILLE and in the Argonne.

At 8 A.M., after heavy artillery bombardment, an attack in many waves under cover of a rolling barrage, was made against the 7th Infantry Division. Caught by his own enfilading artillery fire even before the attack, the enemy was repulsed in a counter-attack. More to the east, advancing enemy tanks were scattered. At the present time, fresh enemy troops are again attacking the 7th Infantry Division. Another attack, made at the same time against the 3rd Guard Infantry Division under the protection of a smoke screen, was totally repulsed. The 103rd and 202nd Infantry Divisions are being attacked. On the front of the 202nd Division, the enemy was stopped by accurate artillery fire. The 103rd Division seems to have been forced back of ALINCOURT. No later reports. Enemy has entered BOUCONVILLE. Counter attack begun.

Repeated enemy assaults, directed against the heights southwest of APREMONT and supported by tanks, were repulsed. Tanks penetrated line northeast of MONTREBEAU; counter-attack under way. Enemy reserves suffered heavy losses from their own artillery fire.

Moderate activity of enemy planes. Pursuit and battle units repeatedly and successfully took part in the combats at SOMME-Py ARDEUIL and MONTREBEAU. Observations to the rear could not be made because of very cloudy weather. One enemy plane was shot down.

Newly ascertained from prisoners taken today: 22nd Division near SOMME-Py and 161st Division (north of FONTAINE EN DORMOISE).

Evening Report.

After a heavy bombardment, the French this afternoon continued their powerful attacks, supported by squadrons and tanks and aeroplanes, against Groups Py and Perthes. The 200th and 7th Infantry Division repulsed them bravely. Unimportant local losses are being regained by counter attacks. The enemy directed his main attack today against the front from SOMME-Py to ARDEUIL. The enemy sent his best divisions into the battle at this point. During the combat, which swayed backward and forward, the enemy finally succeeded, owing to his great superiority in numbers, in forcing the 15th Bavarian Division, which was reenforced by parts of the 15th Bavarian Reserve Division, and the right flank of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division, back to the north. The left flank of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division repulsed repeated massed assaults. About midday, the 103rd Infantry Division gave way to a powerful assault and retired behind the ALIN BROOK on Blitzhuegel (Lightning Hill).

Because of the danger of being surrounded and a lack of fresh reserves, Army Headquarters ordered the retreat of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division and the 42nd Infantry Division behind the AURE VALLEY. This retreat is now being carried out. Subsequently, our line extended from the heights 1 km northeast of SOMME-Py, which were held, across the AURE, to the southern half of Blitchoche, the railway embankment east of Vieux, the northern edge of SECHAULT, and the northern edge of BOUCONVILLE.

Another heavy attack is now going on against the 7th and 15th Bavarian Division.

Our counter-attack against BOUCONVILLE could not be carried out because of heavy enemy artillery fire. The enemy is working his way forward against the inner flank of the 202nd Infantry Division, which suffered heavily in the last battles, and against the 9th Line Division, in small groups. A new attack is to be expected here.

Only patrols and local attacks in which prisoners were frequently taken on the front of group AISNE.

On the south and southeast front of the Argonne Group, fighting in "No Man's Land."

The counter-attack of the 52nd Infantry Division against the enemy who broke through at EXERMONT under cover of tanks was successful. The two Guard Divisions regained contact. For a short time, the whole American front between the AIRE and the left flank of the army was in retreat. Concentrated artillery fire did great damage among the retreating enemy masses.

By quickly bringing up strong reserves, the enemy, who saw his line yielding just in time, brought the Guard Division to a stop east of APREMONT and south of MONTREBEAU. At the same time, the left flank of the 2nd line Division took APREMONT.

Today's fighting was fully as severe as that of yesterday. Our troops, who remained unshaken, in spite of heavy losses and continuous fighting, are to be thanked that many crises were successfully lived through. Many tanks destroyed today also. More heavy fighting is to be expected tomorrow with certainty. Great activity of enemy planes. Strong anti-aircraft barrage again noticeable back of enemy lines. Many balloons attacked without result. Our troops in the AIRE VALLEY were attacked by enemy planes in force during the afternoon.

Our own concentrated aerial pursuit and battle forces attacked the enemy who had forced his way in between Groups By and Perthes. The scout, pursuit and battle planes brilliantly assisted our officers and infantry in spite of rain and clouds. The balloons observers went up in spite of unfavorable weather and enemy attacks. Tanks coming up into position were fired on successfully with the help of balloon observation. Motorized anti-aircraft guns were used in defense against tanks. Eight enemy planes were shot down; four by anti-aircraft guns. One of our planes missing.

Local reconnaissance. At noon and in the afternoon, strong reserves advancing against Group Perthes. Lively railroad traffic in vicinity of SUIPPES. Evening - lively traffic in front of Group AISNE from ST. THOMAS toward SERVON.

No reconnaissance at a distance.

Newly ascertained from prisoners: 61st Division at Somme, 43th Division southwest of Meuse. 71st Division southeast of BOUCONVILLE. 92nd American Negro Division east of the AISNE; through intelligence reports, 14th Army Corps Headquarters southwest of SUIPPES. 21st Army Corps Headquarters north of SOMME-SUIPPES, 11th Army Corps Headquarters, ST. JEAN, an unknown corps at HANS. Doubtful: 8th Army Corps Headquarters in MENNEHOULD.

3rd Army Headquarters.

Army Headquarters,
Oct 2, 1918.

To Group Perthes.

I wish to express my great appreciation to Group Perthes, especially to Inf. Regt. 114, and to the 1st Bn of Bavarian Inf. Regt. #9, as well as to the artillery, for the repulse of today's powerful attacks, and am convinced that further attacks will also fail against the tenacious resistance of the Army Corps.

The Commander-in-Chief,
v. Einem.

Army Headquarters,
Oct 2, 1918.

3rd Army Headquarters,
la #10555 sp.

To Group Aisne.

By means of desperate fighting, the divisions of the AISNE have repulsed all enemy attacks during the past days.

The Landw. Inf. Regt, 118, which frequently stood the test, has especially distinguished itself. Especial mention has been made of regiment 254 and the 1st Bn. Inf. Regt. 252, both belonging to the 76th Reserve Division, because of their brave conduct.

I send my greetings to these brave troops and wish to express to them my most sincere thanks because of their conduct in this hard battle.

The Commander-in-Chief,
v. Einem.

3rd Army Headquarters,
la #10557

Army Headquarters,
Oct 2, 1918.

To Group Argonne.

As was reported to me, the Guard has again shown itself to be worthy of its great name during the battles of the past days.

The 3rd Guard Regiment and the 4th Foot Guard Regiment made use of the opportunity to especially distinguish themselves.

The 2nd Württemberg Landwehr Division accomplished fully as much. Among the brave ARGONNE fighters, Landw. Inf. Regt. 125 and Landw. Field Art. Regt #2 have especially distinguished themselves.

I wish to express my most sincere thanks to the brave divisions and especially to the above mentioned troops, and am convinced that they will stand firmly as a rock in further combats, even against a far superior enemy.

The Commander-in-Chief,
v. Einem,

October 3, 1918.

Morning Report.

On the evening of October 2nd, powerful attacks against the left flank of the 203rd Infantry Division south of ORFEUIL failed.

Additional reports from Group Py and Perthes say that the enemy artillery fire was more intense than during the past days.

Fighting going on in "No Man's Land" in the AUTRY Forest in front of the 9th Landwehr Division.

During yesterday's counter-attack, the 76th Reserve Division took 3 officers and 58 men as prisoners. On the left flank, where the enemy has entered the main line of resistance in the evening after hard fighting, a counter attack has been ordered for this morning.

During the night, rapid harassing fire, especially directed on the back areas. Since 5:45 A.M., heavy bombardment on MEDEAH Sector and south of ORFEUIL as well as on the whole front of Group Perthes (MT. LIRY-CHARLERANGE). Renewed powerful attacks are to be expected. No activity east of the ARGONNE.

Afternoon Report.

After extremely heavy preparatory artillery fire, the enemy attacked the whole front of Groups Py and Perthes, engaging fresh divisions and with the support of tanks. The attacks were repulsed on the whole front up to the 51st Reserve Division, which was forced back to BLANC-MONT and MEDEAH Heights after heavy fighting. Counter-attacks are under way, Height 185 (1 km south of BLANC MONT) was regained. Powerful attacks against MT. LIRY in the Perthes Sector failed. The Wittelsbach Heights were regained by counter-attack, fighting is still going on for the possession of the FLIEGER Heights. The losses of the enemy are heavy, ours considerable. In the AISNE Sector, violent local fighting along the whole front of the Group, during which the 9th Landwehr Division and the 76th Reserve Division captured 2 officers and 97 men.

The 76th Reserve Division is holding the main line of resistance, with the exception of a local loss of ground on the extreme left flank. Counter-attack on the left flank under way.

Little activity in ARGONNE Sector. The enemy is entrenching on the heights north of CHARPENTRY, and at ECLISFONTAINE.

According to an order, captured on October 22nd, the enemy planned to erect telephone lines via FLEVILLE-IMMECOURT-BUZANCY-PIERREMONT.

Strong protective squadrons up, which also try to prevent our infantry and artillery aeroplanes from operating. Enemy anti-aircraft batteries are now firing far behind our lines.

According to reports from the front northwest of SOMME-Py prisoners of the 2nd American Division were taken, and at MONTHOIS prisoners of the 157th Franco-American (both newly ascertained).

Enemy Report.

Before the enemy could make full use of his success of the morning in the position of the 151st Reserve Division, he was driven back via BLANC MONT and MEDEAH Heights by the concentrated counter-attack of parts of the 213th Division which was immediately carried out. On their own initiative, parts of the 200th Infantry Division successfully took part in the combat, outflanking the enemy from the south.

After the heaviest possible preparatory artillery bombardment, the enemy, supported by tanks and squadrons of bombing planes, renewed his powerful attacks against the front of Groups Py and Barthes in the afternoon. After fighting with changing success, we succeeded at 6 P.M. in holding BLANC MONT, MEDEAH Heights, STEINBERG southwest of ORFEUIL and the village of ORFEUIL in the Py Sector. Since 7 P.M. renewed powerful attacks against our front BLANC MONT MEDEAH Heights are under way. The MEDEAH Heights were regained after a counter-attack from the north, which was carried out by 2 regiments of the 17th Infantry Division; fighting is still going on for the possession of the SCHLESIER HOHE (Silesian Heights).

In Sector Perthes, the enemy succeeded at first in forcing his way into positions of the 199th and 4th Bavarian Divisions on the heights south of LIRY and southwest of MONTHOIS. By a counter-attack the enemy was not only driven from the heights, but also a small part of "No Man's Land" was gained in front of the main line of resistance. The enemy suffered extraordinary heavy losses, especially by enfilading artillery fire from BRECY.

Local attacks east of MONTHOIS were repulsed with heavy losses on the part of the enemy, and observed positions of readiness on the southern end of CHARLERANGE were subjected to a concentrated artillery fire.

At the 9th Landwehr Division, the enemy forced his way into the main line of resistance west of AUTRY; he was immediately driven back by counter-attack. An enemy attack north of CONDE'LES AUTRY could not be carried out owing to artillery fire.

The enemy forces which had forced their way into the positions on the left flank of the 76th Reserve Division are surrounded; they are still offering a desperate resistance. Connection exists with the 2nd Landwehr Division.

Little activity of artillery in the ARFONNE Group, apparent registration.

Lively activity of enemy planes. Our own local observation had to be obtained by fighting because of operations of superior enemy plane squadrons. Artillery Battle Group 3 twice took part in the combats north of SOMME-Py, with success. Four enemy and one of our planes were shot down.

Local observation showed lively traffic from BOUAIN to SOMME-Py and from CERNAY to SECHAULT. Unusually brisk traffic was observed in the AIRE-Valley in front of the ARFONNE Group.

Intelligence reports confirm the presence of the Headquarters of the XXI Army Corps.

The brave troops, who have fought brilliantly with a minimum of strength against unusual numerical superiority, and who have shown a great combative spirit, are deserving of and highest commendation. All fronts report the enemy artillery fire to be especially heavy. Many shells of heavy calibre.

The Army Headquarters are convinced that the enemy continually brings up fresh reserves from the north. Columns of troops were observed marching through the ARGONNE to the west. Enemy quiet in front of ARGONNE Group. Only light artillery fire and digging-in operations.

3rd Army Headquarters
1a #10514 sp.

Army Headquarters,
October 4, 1918.

To Group Perthes.

During the past three days, the divisions of Group Perthes have borne the brunt of the battle, and have fought against a stubborn enemy, superior in numbers.

It gives me especial pleasure to hear that a great many units have gloriously distinguished themselves in these severe combats.

They are: Inf. Regiments 32, 71 and 144 of the 103rd Inf. Div., Inf. Regiments 17, 131, 138, of the 42nd Division, the Bavarian Inf. Regiment 2, and the 3rd Bn. of the Bavarian Inf. Regiment 1, the Field Art. Regiments 205 and 255 and the Machine Gun Marksman Section 1.

I wish to express my sincere thanks and full appreciation to them all for their conduct in the heavy defensive fighting.

May it be a proud reward for them to know that they have helped to break the enemy's will at the critical moment.

The Commander-in-Chief.
v. Einem,

October 4, 1918.

Morning Report.

Yesterday afternoon, the enemy, supported by tanks, attacked the position of Group Py, southeast of ORFEUIL, but without success. A second attack, which was carried out here, after extremely heavy artillery fire, likewise failed. Between BLANC MONT and MEDEAH Heights, enemy ~~units~~ succeeded in reaching ETIENNE along the SOMME-Py ETIENNE Road. BLANC MONT and MEDEAH Heights are in our possession. The enemy was blocked to the east and south of ST. ETIENNE. Counter-attack for the purpose of crushing enemy troops which have entered our position has been ordered. Up to the present time, no report has come in concerning the withdrawal of the right flank of Group Py to main line of resistance 3 as ordered.

In Perthes Sector, the two Pioneer Companies of the 4th Bavarian Division and one company of the 202nd Division recaptured the village and the railroad station of CHALLERANGE from the enemy in the afternoon and captured one French battalion commander and 75 men. Yesterday, this group also captured one officer and 25 men; one of our own anti-tank guns and several of our machine guns, which had been lost during the enemy attack, were recaptured.

A local attack against Group AISNE was repulsed.

A local attack against the position of the ARGONNE Group southwest of APREMONT was repulsed by a counter-attack.

Fighting in "No Man's Land" on the left flank.

During the night, powerful enemy artillery fire at intervals along the whole front of the army; partially directed far into our rear areas.

Since 5:15 A.M., very heavy artillery fire directed on our positions from the western edge of the ARGONNE as far as the MEUSE.

Afternoon Report.

The SCHELIER-Hoehe (SILESIAN Heights) between BLANC MONT and MEDEAH-FE was regained this morning by a powerful counter-attack of the 51st Reserve Division and the Fusileer Regiment "Kaiser Wilhelm."

At 9:45 A.M. heavy artillery fire was resumed against our positions from the right flank of the army as far as the heights southwest of MONTHOIS. Attacks are under way.

The removal of the main line of resistance of the right flank of Group Py to main line of resistance 3 was carried out without being disturbed by the enemy. Outposts are still on the heights north of MARIE A'-Py.

Several local attacks against Group AISNE this morning, preceded by a strong artillery preparation, failed.

After extremely heavy artillery bombardment and local gas attacks, the enemy also attacked the whole front of the ARGONNE Group. The 2nd Landwehr Division repulsed all attacks.

In addition, all attacks against the left flank failed, owing to our fire except for a small local gain which is being cleared.

In the center, the enemy succeeded in forcing back our front line and west of EXERMONT to the northern edge of the valley; counter-attack under way.

Evening Report:

After heavy artillery preparation, the enemy today renewed his attacks against the positions of Groups Py and Perthes west of the Aisne, in part with new divisions, protecting himself against the AISNE Group by enfilading fire, and at the same time preparing attacks in the ARGONNE and to the east. The enemy plans were again fully shattered.

His massed attacks against the whole front of Group Py and the right flank of Group Perthes failed owing to our concentrated artillery and machine gun fire. On the SILESIAN Heights, he forced his way through the main line of resistance; an immediate counter-attack brought his attack to a standstill. East of the ARGONNE the 5th Guard Infantry Division was forced back behind the valley west of EXERMONT; the counter-attack which was immediately carried out at this point also, by parts of the 1st Guard Infantry Division and the 37th Infantry Division, brought the advance of the enemy forces to FELVILLE to a stop. Our attack to the south is progressing favorably. Infantry Regiment #111 regained EXERMONT in a brisk attack.

All attacks against the 2nd Landwehr Division failed, owing to the bravery and the violent resistance of the "Wurttemberg Landwehr."

The enemy suffered just as crushing a defeat on the left flank where the 52nd Infantry Division repulsed seven most powerful attacks, which were supported by numerous tanks. Lieut. Niklassen with the 4th Batt., Guard Field Artillery Regiment 4, destroyed 6, Lieut. Schaefer with the 8th Batt., Field Art. Regt, 104, accounted for 5, Lieut. Shehlin with the 1st Batt, Guard Field Art. Regt 4, 4 more tanks; the troops of the division report extraordinarily heavy losses on the part of the enemy; our losses are also very heavy.

Ascertained as being on the front: 73rd French Division in front of Py Group, 3rd French Division in front of Perthes Group. According to prisoners' statements, not only the 2nd but also the 1st, 26th and 89th American Divisions are in reserve position opposite Group Py.

Ascertained as being on the front: 33rd French Division in front of Py Group, 3rd French Division in front of Perthes Group. According to prisoners' statements, not only the 2nd but also the 1st 26th and 89th American Divisions are in reserve position opposite Group Py.

During today's fighting, the following units have especially distinguished themselves: 203rd Infantry Division, Infantry Regiments 406 and 409, 3rd Guard Inf. Div., Grenadier Regt. 9 and Guard Fusilier Regt. All three Inf. Regiments of the 199th Infantry Div., as well as the 2nd Landwehr Div., and the 52nd Infantry Division.

Strong enemy aerial barrage in the morning. Squadrons of enemy bombing planes took part in the combat in Sector Py and dropped bombs on roads and rest billets. Six enemy planes were shot down up to this time. In the afternoon, artillery Combat Group 3 bombarded enemy reserves in the FIRE VALLEY, with success.

According to Intelligence reports, the army headquarters at HANS were transferred to MINAUCOURT.

Local observation showed lively traffic to the front and heavy occupation of the villages in front of the ARGONNE Group. Observations west of the AISNE could not be made owing to foggy weather.

3rd Army Headquarters,
La #10669 sp.

Army Headquarters,
October 4th, 1918.

To Group Py.

I wish to express my full appreciation to the divisions of Group Py for their stubborn resistance during yesterday's repeated assaults on the part of an enemy superior in numbers, and for their combative spirit during the counter-attacks.

The Commander-in-Chief,
v. Einem.

3rd Army Headquarters.

Army Headquarters
October 4, 1918.

To Group Perthes.

The brave divisions of Group Perthes have repulsed all of the heavy enemy attacks and have kept their positions intact. I express my special appreciation to leaders and troops for their excellent performance.

The Commander-in-Chief,
v. Einem.