

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction

APR 30
2018

SUPPLEMENT TO SIGAR'S APRIL 2018
QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



SUPPLEMENT
APRIL 2018



The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

SIGAR's oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective

- conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
- leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations.
- means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.

Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No. 115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

Source: Pub.L. No. 110-181, "National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008," 1/28/2008, Pub. L. No. 115-91, "National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018," 12/12/2017.

(For a list of the congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Appendix A.)

Cover photo:

An Afghan shop owner arranges cages in his shop at Kabul's bird market. (AFP photo by Wakil Kohsar)



SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

I hereby submit to Congress and the Secretaries of State and Defense this supplement to SIGAR's 39th quarterly report on the status of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.

On May 10, 2018, United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) informed SIGAR that they had provided SIGAR with incorrect personnel strength figures for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for use in SIGAR's quarterly report published on April 30, 2018. The revised figures provided by USFOR-A are published in this supplement. USFOR-A said that they initially provided incorrect personnel strength figures largely because they neglected to account for the transfer of most of the Afghan Border Force from the Afghan National Police to the Afghan National Army. This is the latest in a series of problems SIGAR has faced over the last three quarters with DOD's responses to our requests for ANDSF information.

SIGAR's enabling legislation, Pub. L. No 110-181, requires us to produce publicly available quarterly reports concerning "the activities under programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan." The statutory deadline for producing these reports is not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter.

Our enabling legislation also requires federal agencies to provide us with timely information and assistance. SIGAR requests data concerning the ANDSF from DOD in the form of a quarterly data call. SIGAR asks DOD elements, such as USFOR-A, questions in the data call and they submit data in response. SIGAR drafts its report using the data supplied to it and submits the draft security section of the report to DOD for vetting before publication.

Since SIGAR was established in 2008, DOD has usually provided accurate and timely information for the quarterly report. However, for the last three quarters, NATO's Resolute Support (RS) mission, which is under American command, and USFOR-A have classified or marked not releasable to the public large amounts of data in a seemingly haphazard fashion. For example, in October 2017, USFOR-A retroactively classified data that it had already provided in response to SIGAR's data call. Since USFOR-A had already supplied the data unmarked over the unclassified network, this caused a classified information "spillage" onto our and other agencies' unclassified networks, creating a sizable, multi-agency network security issue.

In January 2018, USFOR-A and RS marked their district control and population control figures NATO unclassified and "not releasable to the public," and our report duly reported that restriction. However, after the press reported that the figures had not been released, RS issued a press statement releasing the figures and saying that "human error" had led to their being designated as not releasable to the public. SIGAR was obliged to issue an addendum to its quarterly report to account for the change.

This quarter, USFOR-A sent SIGAR some data marked "For Official Use Only" (FOUO), a marking that can be used to indicate unclassified information the government does not want released to the public. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy (OSD-P) informed SIGAR in writing that the information was unclassified and publicly releasable and that they had consulted with the data originator and obtained the latter's

approval to release the data. Unfortunately, after the report had already been submitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and to Congress, USFOR-A communicated to SIGAR that the data was not publicly releasable and should be removed from the quarterly report. OSD-P acknowledged that they were in error to claim the material was releasable and not FOUO.

In an effort to ensure that SIGAR receives timely and accurate information for its publicly releasable report, a team from our Research and Analysis Directorate traveled to Kabul in March to meet with USFOR-A to discuss their process for providing and classifying data for the report.

RS and USFOR-A commander General John W. Nicholson Jr. and his staff indicated that they shared our concerns about the problems that had arisen with the data-call process in recent quarters. They shared a letter General Nicholson had written to Afghan National Security Advisor Mohammad Haneef Atmar requesting that some of the ANDSF data classified at the request of the Afghan government be unclassified.

In a welcome change, this quarter less data was classified for the April report than had been during the previous two quarters. More recently, SIGAR has sought to reduce the apparent confusion at DOD by informing USFOR-A that henceforth we will rely on them as the principal point of contact concerning what restrictions DOD may be seeking to apply to information regarding the ANDSF. SIGAR is following up with other DOD components, such as OSD-P, to ensure that DOD understands and agrees with this approach.

Nevertheless, in light of the problems described above, SIGAR respectfully requests the appropriate Congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense remind all DOD components of their statutory duty to provide accurate and timely data concerning the ANDSF for SIGAR's quarterly reports.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'JF Sopko', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

ANDSF STRENGTH

On May 10, 2018, United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) informed SIGAR in the attached letter that the figures they had previously provided to SIGAR for the assigned (actual) force strength of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for its quarterly report published on April 30 were incorrect.

USFOR-A said the error in their original figures had been mostly due to their failure to account for the transfer of most of the Afghan Border Force (ABF), previously an Afghan National Police (ANP) force element, from the ANP to the Afghan National Army (ANA). While the ABF personnel had already been dropped from the original ANP figure, they had not been added to the ANA figure. USFOR-A did not indicate what other factors contributed to their erroneous reporting.

The **incorrect** numbers SIGAR received on March 23, 2018, for its April 2018 quarterly report, for ANDSF assigned (actual) strength, as of January 31, 2018, were:

Total ANA: 165,622

Total ANP: 130,787

Total ANDSF: 296,409

The **new** ANDSF strength figures, as of January 31, 2018, according to USFOR-A, are:

Total ANA: 184,572 (including transferred ABF personnel)

Total ANP: 129,156 (accounting for the transferred ABF personnel)

Total ANDSF: 313,728

SIGAR receives all of the ANDSF personnel strength numbers published in the quarterly report from USFOR-A and has no means of independently verifying them.

Compared to January 2017 numbers, the revised January 2018 figures represent a 6,861-person gain for the ANA and a 24,841-person reduction for the ANP (both figures accounting for the ABF transfer).

The new numbers still show that overall ANDSF strength declined sharply from January 2017 to January 2018 (by 17,980 personnel), though not as sharply as USFOR-A originally reported to SIGAR in the April 2018 quarterly report based on the erroneous information provided by USFOR-A.

USFOR-A has not yet explained the reasons for the decline in the ANDSF force strength; SIGAR is following up with them.



UNCLASSIFIED

**DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356**

DCOS SA/CSTC-A

10 May 2018

MEMORANDUM THRU USFOR-A DCDR-S

FOR United States Central Command Inspector General (CCIG), MacDill Air Force Base,
FL 33261

SUBJECT: SIGAR 2Q18 Data Call ANDSF Strength Revision

1. The below information is forwarded to provide clarity on SIGAR 2Q18 data call Sec-01.
 - a. The known authorized strength - 352,000 (military) – 363,495 (military + Civilian).
 - b. ANDSF manning as of January 2017 (military only) – 331,708.
 - c. ANDSF manning as of January 2018 (military only) – 313,728.
 - (1) ANA 184,572 (ABF transfer included).
 - (2) ANP 129,156 (minus ABF transfer).
2. The above numbers account for ABF transfer that was not accurately reported during 2Q18 data call.
3. The POC is [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]
**ANDREW KELLY
COL (OF-5), USA
Chief of Staff, CSTC-A**



Carpets—Afghanistan's best-known export—await shoppers' attention in a shop in the northwestern city of Herat. (AFP photo by Behrouz Mehri)

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FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR'S HOTLINE

By phone: Afghanistan
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DSN: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303
All voicemail is in Dari, Pashto, and English.

By phone: United States
Toll-free: 866-329-8893
DSN: 312-664-0378
All voicemail is in English and answered during business hours.

By fax: 703-601-4065
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By Web submission: www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx



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