HISTORY OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1775–1945

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 20–212

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 20–212

HISTORY OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1775-1945

By
MARVIN A. KREIDBERG
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, United States Army
and
MERTON G. HENRY
First Lieutenant, AGC, United States Army

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY NOVEMBER 1955

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., *30 November 1955*

DA Pamphlet 20–212 is published for the information and use of all concerned.

[AG 370.01 (14 Sep 54)]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

M. B. RIDGWAY,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

JOHN A. KLEIN,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army:

Gen Staff, DA (5)	Armies (5)
SS, DA (5)	Corps (3)
Tec Svc, DA (5)	Div (1)
Admin & Tec Svc Bd (1)	Gen & Br Svc Sch (5)
AFF (25)	PMST ROTC units (1)
OS Maj Comd (10)	Mil Dist (1)
MDW (1)	

NG: Div (1); State AG (1)

USAR: Div (1)

Unless otherwise noted, distribution applies to ConUS and overseas.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.

FOREWORD

The Office of the Chief of Military History of the Department of the Army is currently preparing a series of special studies which was undertaken to implement the Army's policy of exploiting historical data that may be of practical value. The studies already completed include "The History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army" and "The Personnel Replacement System in the U. S. Army."

This monograph is essentially a treatment of the manpower aspects of military mobilization. Its primary object is to provide a more comprehensive record of military mobilizations in the United States for the use of General Staff officers and students in the Army school system than has been available before in a single work. Since it is undoubtedly true that mobilization errors have been repeated because the lessons of previous mobilizations have not been readily available, it is hoped that this study will assist the mobilization planners of the future in eliminating such errors. The material will also assist the thoughtful civilian in understanding some of the basic problems of national security.

The study ends with the mobilization for World War II. Because of the swift flow of events since 1945, it is merely background for the rearmament of the United States culminating in the Korean operations, and an additional monograph will be necessary to record the mobilization developments and lessons up to the present time.

PREFACE

Mobilization is the assembling and organizing of troops, materiel, and equipment for active military service in time of war or other national emergency; it is the basic factor on which depends the successful prosecution of any war. There has never been readily available a record of mobilization planning nor of the procedures which were eventually used during mobilizations by the United States Army. The purpose of this study is to provide staff officers, students at Army schools, and other interested persons with usable and detailed information on the procedures of past mobilizations and the lessons learned. The accounts of the early mobilizations are necessarily brief: for the most part they are limited to the basic lessons both of interest and value to the military staff planner. The material on developments since 1900 is more detailed. The footnotes will guide anyone who wishes to make a more complete study of individual phases of the subject matter. It is hoped that some of the errors of previous wars may be avoided by this account of the history of military mobilization in the United States Army.

The manuscript is divided into four parts, roughly equal in length. Part I, "Mobilization in an Emerging World Power," contains five chapters covering the period from the Revolutionary War through the Spanish-American War. Part II, "World War I: Preparations and Mobilization," contains six chapters covering the period from 1900 through World War I. Part III, "Mobilization Activities Between World Wars I and II," contains four chapters covering the planning agencies and plans developed between 1920 and 1940. Part IV, "World War II," contains six chapters on the actual mobilization for World War II.

In writing this study there has been no desire to place blame for errors on individuals. Where errors have been made, they have been shown—but only for the object lesson. The authors have attempted to analyze events in the light of the period during which they took place. To judge an action which occurred in 1778 in accordance with 20th century standards and vision is neither sound historically nor is it just.

A sincere attempt has been made to present an objective account devoid of bias. The authors have been allowed complete freedom in research and the developing of ideas. Consequently, it must be em-

phasized that the opinions expressed and the conclusions reached in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Department of the Army nor of the Office of the Chief of Military History.

Lt. Col. Marvin A. Kreidberg initiated the project and wrote the first draft of chapters I–III and XII–XXI before being transferred to another assignment. 1st Lt. Merton G. Henry researched and wrote chapters IV–XI. Since Colonel Kriedberg's reassignment, Lieutenant Henry has made extensive revisions in the manuscript.

CONTENTS

CHARTS

TABLES

APPENDIXES

ILLUSTRATIONS

Credit—

Photographs are from the files of the Department of Defense.

PART ONE

MOBILIZATION IN AN EMERGING WORLD POWER

CHAPTER I

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The Roots of Military Preparedness in the United States

The disagreements and grievances which led to the Revolutionary War came to the fore after the removal of the threat of an immediate French invasion at the end of the French and Indian War (Seven Years War: 1756–1763). The resentment caused by the Stamp Act of 1765 and subsequent legislation did not, at first, envisage a break with England nor any lessening of allegiance to the Crown. Indeed, the Colonies were still concerned with the possibilities of another war with France and as late as 12 September 1768, a Boston town meeting used the French as a pretext for stockpiling arms by advising all persons without arms to procure them "in consequence of prevailing apprehensions of a war with France." [1]

The entire matter of concerted defense of colonial North America had always been under the guidance and administration of England. The royal governors and to a greater extent the captain-generals on duty in America planned the war operations and supervised the war administration. Each colonial assembly insisted on being consulted concerning the funds, materiel, and men which the colony was expected to furnish for military operations, but this interest was colored more by economics than by military concern. Defense on a united colonies concept had not yet become part of colonial thinking, but was still a problem for Great Britain. After the Albany Congress in 1754, Benjamin Franklin had despaired of ever uniting the Colonies, which seemed to have more grievances against each other than against England. Ironically, it was England's insistence that a unified common defense establishment be created for all the Colonies after the Seven Years War that contributed to the growing resentment in the Colonies, for included in this defense establishment was a projected standing army of 10,000 men to be supported and quartered by the Colonies.[2]

---

[1] Richard Hildreth, *The History of the United States of America* (Rev. ed.; New York, 1860), II, p. 546.

[2] Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry S. Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic* (4th ed.; New York, 1950), I, pp. 142–43.

Franklin in 1770 voiced the widespread colonial antipathy to being compelled to help pay for the united common defense when he suggested that the keeping of standing armies in the Colonies without the consent of the assemblies ". . . is not agreeable to the Constitution."[3] The First Continental Congress, in a 1774 memorial to the King, asserted: "A standing army has been kept in these colonies, ever since the conclusion of the late [French and Indian] war, without the consent of our assemblies; and this army with a considerable naval armament has been employed to enforce the collection of taxes."[4] The Colonies, far from planning for common united defense or mobilization measures from 1763–1775, were disturbed that Great Britain was doing it for them.

Concerning its own defense, however, every colony had from its inception a deep concern and interest. To the militant Puritan, defense by arms of his property was not only a temporal necessity but a religious duty. The Massachusetts Colonial General Court voiced the feeling of all the Colonies in the preamble to its militia law of 1643: ". . . as piety cannot bee maintained without church ordinances & officers, nor justice without lawes & magistracy, no more can our safety & peace be preserved without millitary orders & officers."[5]

The charter of Massachusetts, which was characteristic of all the royal charters on the matter of defense, expressly empowered the governor and the company ". . . for their speciall defence and safety, to incounter, expulse, repell, and resist by force of armes, as well by sea as by lande, . . . all such person or persons as shall at any tyme hereafter attempt or enterprise the destruction, invasion, detriment, or annoyance to the said plantation or inhabitants."[6] This explicit authority to formulate a military system within the colony was implicitly assumed by all the Colonies.

In keeping with a traditional English veneration for precedent, the Colonies, and later the United States, based their theories and enactments for military mobilization on what have been believed to be English laws and customs. Since the primary commodity of any military mobilization is manpower, consideration of the military manpower doctrines of the Colonies is necessary not only for a proper evaluation of mobilization during the Revolution but also for a determination of their effect on later history.

---

[3] Albert H. Smyth (ed.), *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin* (New York, 1906), V, p. 259.

[4] Worthington C. Ford and Others (eds.), *Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789* (Washington, 1904–37), I, p. 116.

[5] Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (New York, 1904), I, p. 497. A discussion of military affairs in the colonies is found in vol. I, ch. XIII, "The System of Defence in the New England Colonies," and vol. II, ch. XV, "The System of Defence in the Later Proprietary Provinces." Professor Osgood's *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1924), I–IV, contains frequent references to military activities.

[6] *Ibid.*, I, p. 496.

There can be no controversy concerning the fear and aversion in the Colonies to what was termed a "standing army." The congressional sentiments cited in the memorial to the King were reiterated even more strongly by the Continental Congress in 1784: ". . . standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism." [7] Erroneous conclusions drawn from this and similar statements, declarations, and memorials made by the colonial leaders and legislative bodies have resulted in the fallacious belief that the American tradition has been against a military component and against military preparedness in peacetime.

The opposition in the Colonies to a "standing army" could be traced to the unfortunate experiences of the English Civil War. Both Puritans and Cavaliers remembered with loathing Cromwell and his New Model Army which emerged from the Civil War as the prototype of a "standing army." Parliament did not secure control of the "standing army" until the passage of the Mutiny Act of 1697, a development which was too recent to establish a precedent in English views. The military system which had been established in each of the Colonies at the time of their establishment, which had been legally authorized by the charters, and which had the traditions of centuries behind it, was an all-embracing, compulsory *Militia.*[8] Following the destruction of the feudal armies, during the Wars of the Roses, the Militia had been the only military force remaining in England. The insulation of the seas surrounding England and the efficiency of a professional navy-in-being tended to diminish the reliance placed on the Militia, which inevitably deteriorated in efficiency but not in popularity. It was this Militia system which came to the Americas with the colonists.

Initially the Militia system in the Colonies was strong and efficient. It was not a *voluntary* force composed of a few citizens who liked to play soldier; rather the Militia meant every able-bodied man, within prescribed age limits, who was required by *compulsion* to possess arms, to be carried on muster rolls, to train periodically, and to be mustered into service for military operations whenever necessary.

The earliest enactments in all of the Colonies definitely made compulsory military training the law of the day. The wording of the laws in the different Colonies varied to an extent consistent with human differences, but the intent and, in general, the provisions of the

[7] *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XXVII, p. 433.

[8] Earlier names for militia were the *"fyrd,"* the *"levee en masse,"* and the *"posse comitatus":* in effect, the entire body of inhabitants who might be summoned to preserve the peace. Under English Common Law, all able-bodied males over 15 years of age could be called.

laws followed the same pattern. The age limits for military service, in most instances, included all males from 16 to 60, with certain understandable exceptions such as justices, sheriffs, ministers, constables, physicians, schoolmasters, ship masters, notaries, and similar public servants. The laws, at first, required small unit training once monthly. Each man was required to possess his own firearm, of a musket type, and a definitely stipulated minimum amount of powder, flint, and bullets. In some of the Colonies, the legislators, with a keen awareness that some men are militarily inept, authorized extra training for the awkward. To ensure that no man escape his military obligations, muster rolls were required wherein every male was listed.[9]

Well over six hundred colonial laws were enacted and reenacted concerning the compulsory militia. Exemptions were changed and changed again; the number of training days was periodically varied; compulsory bearing of arms was directed for Indians, then was forbidden when fears of possible uprisings suddenly occurred to the colonists.[10]

The employment of Negroes in the armed forces was a matter for considerable thought and concern in most of the Colonies. Many of the Colonies, at first, were disposed to include Negroes among those compelled by law to bear arms for defense. But very quickly there developed disquietude concerning possible dangers from slaves bearing arms. The laws were accordingly changed to exclude Negroes from military service; to justify this action it was remembered and pointed out that service in the traditional English Militia had been the compulsory prerogative of freemen only. Thus the exclusion of slaves from bearing arms was in the accepted legal tradition.[11]

There were two kinds of unit mobilization. First, there was the mobilization or assembly of the unit for routine, specified training which took place on muster days set aside for regular training. This training was entirely local, each band or company meeting in its local village directed by the local captain. More sudden and expeditious was the unit's mobilization in the event of an emergency. To signal a general alarm requiring full mobilization, discharge of a musket three times and at night beating a drum continuously, firing a beacon, or discharging a piece of ordnance were the usual methods, supplemented, where necessary, by mounted messengers between towns. The warning usually spread rapidly. The local alarm was given by fir-

[9] Osgood, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 505–09.

[10] For a comprehensive compilation of colonial military enactments see: *Military Obligation: The American Tradition* ("Backgrounds of Selective Service," Monograph No. I, vol. II, pts. I–XIV [Washington, 1947]).

[11] Stanley M. Pargellis, *Military Affairs in North America, 1748–1765* (New York, 1936), pp. 174–75; Osgood, *op. cit.*, II, p. 385.

ing a musket once.[12] At the general alarm, every Militiaman had to assemble at his unit's assembly area without delay on penalty of being fined £5—a salutary fine for that time.

As the Colonies grew in population, regimental organizations of the Militia came into being: in Massachusetts regiments were established by law as early as 1636. The regimental sergeant majors (the chief military officer of a county in New England but more conventionally called "colonels" elsewhere) played an important role in mobilization planning and implementation. In Massachusetts the sergeant major was required to mobilize his regiment for training once a year, but in Connecticut regimental training was conducted only once every four years. The chief Militia officer in Massachusetts was the sergeant-major general who regulated the Militia, formed rural and small town Militiamen into 64-man companies, and mobilized the Militia or parts of it as directed by the governor or general court (colonial legislature). He moved Militia units to threatened areas and kept the governor, the council, and the general court informed of the military situation. Sometimes, as during King Philip's War, he raised, equipped, and conducted expeditions.[13]

The British provided the Colonies with the staff planners, the administration, the skilled artillerymen, and the engineers for combined operations against a foreign foe. Periodically it was required in most of the colonies that the military officers meet in so-called councils of war wherein common military problems were discussed and decisions theoretically made to promote Militia efficiency and skill. Colonial staff planners, as such, were nonexistent.

In none of the Colonies was there a commissary or quartermaster staff, nor was there any need for one: the expeditions against the Indians never required many men or much time. The Militiamen reported in with their own arms, their own clothes, and their own provisions. If the expedition were to last longer than a very few days, then the general court would appoint one or more commissaries, *pro tempore*, with the specific mission of purchasing set amounts of specific food items. Rations were easily secured locally and involved no prior logistic planning. Regimental quartermasters existed in colonial regiments, but their mission never went beyond distribution of supplies within their units.

The colonial legislative bodies from the earliest times were careful to assert and maintain civilian control over the military, particularly in the expenditures of funds. Whenever any military action or expedition was undertaken, there was a military committee, a committee of war, a committee of safety, or a committee of Militia, selected by

[12] Alarm procedures varied somewhat in the different colonies, but followed a similar pattern.

[13] Osgood, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 511–13.

the colonial general court from its membership, to supervise the conduct of the expedition. The general court, with the traditional concern of English legislative bodies for military affairs, checked closely not only on the conduct of military affairs, intervening directly on the decisions of military commanders, but even on the operations and decisions of its own committee. The commander on the battlefield, it may be readily assumed, was sometimes forced to temper tactical wisdom with political expediency.

The custom of popular election of Militia officers was early established in the Colonies. The Militiamen of the bands selected the company grade officers whose commissions were then issued by the governor and general court. The company officers similarly elected the field grade officers below the grade of general. This system, inherited from the English Militia, introduced politics into the military system and thereby proved a powerful deterrent to the development of an efficient officer corps. Indeed, an efficient officer who insisted on rigorous training and proper discipline would quickly be voted back into the ranks. The officers, therefore, were in many instances more concerned with political fence-building than with learning mobilization procedures. This system of officer selection was, however, a logical method for the period. The difficulties of land transportation made it extremely difficult for any governor, legislature, or board to examine and become familiar with officer material throughout a colony. The judgment of the community had to be relied upon and the custom was to exercise such judgment by popular vote. It was an age of localism: men did not trust strangers. A thoroughly competent officer sent to command a local company to which he was unknown would have been ridden out of town on a rail borne by indignant privates.[14]

The general officers were appointed by the royal governors, generally on the advice of the colonial assemblies. Key field officers, such as adjutants, were similarly appointed. An example was the appointment by Gov. Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia in 1752 of George Washington as major and district adjutant. Washington had no military experience at the time of the appointment, but he had lobbied for a commission to serve as colonial adjutant.[15]

As immediate Indian dangers moved westward with the advancing frontier, colonial interest in military affairs waned and the colonists

[14] Osgood, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 524–26. Even Washington, whose judgment and breadth of outlook were considerably in advance of his day, was not free from predisposed prejudice against Massachusetts; their officers, he complained, "are the most indifferent kind of People I ever saw." With evident repugnance, he grudgingly conceded that Massachusetts privates would fight well, if properly officered, ". . . although they are an exceedingly dirty and nasty people." John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *The Writings of George Washington* (Washington, 1931–40), III, pp. 433, 450. Later, as he came to know his Massachusetts men better, his attitude changed.

[15] Douglas S. Freeman, *George Washington* (New York, 1948), I, pp. 266–68.

became increasingly civilian. They were still members of the compulsory Militia, but the growing sense of security brought with it a diminishing interest in martial skill and prowess. There were many evidences of the trend: the training days and muster days were cut down more and more with the passing years; in too many instances, they no longer involved military training or maneuvers but degenerated into lodge frolics. An amazed spectator who saw a Virginia Militia company drilling in what was fondly termed "the Prussian exercise" described the performance as a "mere burlesque." [16]

Timothy Pickering, later a quartermaster general of the Revolutionary Army, described a Massachusetts muster of mid-18th century: ". . . some strangers, one of them a woman, were passing through town on a training-day morning just as the soldiers were assembling. They were fired at, and thereby, and by various motions and flourishes of the guns, their horses were excessively frightened, insomuch that the woman was in imminent danger of her life." [17] The training was made up of a few short drills, a day's musketry practice, and two sham battles—colorful, noisy, but useless as a standard of military effectivesness.[18]

The declining efficiency of the Militia and the fact that it could not be used outside the colony without legislative permission made it necessary for England to devise other means of recruiting colonials to fight against the French in Canada after the middle of the 17th century. The contingency was partially solved by the creation in the Colonies of provisional infantry regiments for field service made up of volunteers whose officers and cadre were appointed by the royal governor and then sent out to gather recruits.[19] The enlisting orders, "beating orders" as they were literally called, were colorfully executed. Massachusetts' Governor Shirley in 1755 had issued such an order to a Lt. John Thomas: "I do hereby authorize and impower John Thomas Junr. of Marshfield, Gent., to beat his drums anywhere within this Province for enlisting Volunteers for His Majesty's Service in a Regiment of Foot to be forthwith raised for the Service and Defense of His Majesty's Colonies in North America." [20] The order further enjoined colonels and officers of Militia regiments from molesting or obstructing John Thomas wherever he might go to accomplish his mission.

At first the Volunteer reverted to the Militia when he returned from the campaign because the Volunteer regiments were temporary, emer-

[16] Sir George Otto Trevelyan, *The American Revolution* (New York, 1921), II, p. 187.
[17] Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington* (Boston, 1925), p. 43.
[18] Contemporary accounts of the gala "training days" are numerous. See: H. Telfer Mook, "Training Days in New England," *The New England Quarterly*, XI (1938), pp. 675–97; Abby M. Hemenway (ed.), *Vermont Historical Gazetteer* (Burlington, 1871), II.
[19] Allen French, *The First Year of the American Revolution* (Cambridge), 1934, p. 34.
[20] Thomas Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, as cited in *ibid.*

gency units disbanded when the emergency was over. In several of the Colonies the greater efficiency of the Volunteer units made sufficient impression to ensure their continuation as a permanent part of the defense establishment.[21] It is from these organizations that the National Guard developed.[22] The Volunteer regiments from the middle Colonies in general appear to have been distinctly more efficient than common Militia units. Their regimental cadres were made up of selected individuals who were interested in the military profession; they were distinctively uniformed, better armed and equipped, generally better officered and trained, and of considerable *esprit*. The New Jersey Blues, the Volunteer regiment from that colony, was, on the occasion of its passing through New York City in 1758, well lauded by the local newspapers as of "handsome appearance . . . the likeliest well-set Men as has perhaps turned out on any Campaign." New Jersey's colonial Governor Bernard proudly reported to the royal government that the Blues was "universally allowed to be the best Provincial Regiment in America." [23]

In no instance was there a full-scale mobilization of a colony's Militia for a foreign war outside that colony. But there were innumerable instances of set numbers of Militia ordered to be compulsively impressed or drafted for specific campaigns.[24]

It can be assumed that ingenious methods were used to get farm boys, apprentices, and village loafers to "volunteer" for foreign service. Poorly trained, sometimes ineptly officered, ill-clothed and equipped, they deserted or died of disease or battle. The initial 20 miles a day to the rendezvous area might well have seen many an embryonic soldier collapse by the wayside. They were not efficient troops on the whole.[25] One literate deserter from such a Militia at Fort Ontario in 1756 courteously left a note of farewell tied to a stone: "Gentlemen, you seem surprized at our Desertion, but youl not be surprized if youl Consider that we have been starved with Hunger & Cold in the Winter, and that we have received no pay for seven or eight Months; Now we have no Cloaths and you cheat us out of our allowance of Rum and half our Working Money." [26]

There was still a third class of military unit employed in colonial expeditions: the Rangers. These were the frontier scouts and hunters who customarily fought their battles as individuals, but who had the good sense to realize that they could be helped by organized military

[21] Frederick P. Todd, "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," *Military Affairs*, V, No. 2 (1941) p. 75.

[22] *Ibid.*, The distinction between the Common Militia and the Volunteer units is brought out clearly in this article.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[24] Connecticut General Court, Act of June 19, 1711, as cited in "Backgrounds of Selective Service," Monograph No. I, vol. II, pt. II, pp. 103–04.

[25] Todd, "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[26] Pargellis, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

expeditions. The Rangers served as scouts and patrols for the expeditions and then melted back into the forests on the frontier and beyond once the battle was over.

With the increasing disinterest for military training in the Militia, there was a growing uneasiness in some of the general courts concerning security. The lawmakers tried to revive the effectiveness of the military by instituting alert organizations from the Militia, the forerunner of the later "Minutemen." [27] On 13 October 1675, at the outbreak of King Philip's War, the jittery Massachusetts General Court ordered the mobilization of the Militia of Suffolk and Middlesex counties "in their complete armes, and be ready to march on a moments warning." [28] These latter troops, however, inasmuch as they were already mobilized, differed from the Revolutionary Minutemen who were to seize arms and move from their plows, smithies, and other civilian pursuits to war on a minute's notice. In 1743, Governor Shirley of Massachusetts enlisted Snoeshoemen "whose duty it is to hold themselves ready at the Shortest Warning to go in pursuit of any Party of Indians." [29] In 1756, Capt. Obadiah Cooley's company on the Crown Point expedition called themselves "Minnit Men." The value of prompt mobilization was thoroughly known in the Colonies.

The Colonies Revolt

The actions of King and Parliament brought about a trend toward unity in the Colonies after 1765 and caused the institution of some preparedness measures. Committees of observation and safety sprang up in all the Colonies following a suggestion of the Virginia House of Burgesses in March 1773. The Militia was somewhat belatedly overhauled and refurbished in several colonies in an effort to improve its efficiency. Military stores of all kinds—munitions, engineer tools, linen, military accoutrements, provisions—were collected; and as "The calls for arms became constant, . . . manufactories sprang up . . . to answer them." [30] Massachusetts, which initially bore the brunt of English displeasure, took the lead in preparing for armed resistance. A Massachusetts Provincial Congress was organized on 7 October 1774 and a Committee of Safety appointed. The Massachusetts Militia was reorganized to remove any royal taint; Minutemen units were provisionally constituted; funds were voted; military stores were purchased and collected in the neighborhood of Concord; provisional resolves toward the establishment of a New England army were drawn up.

---

[27] As early as 12 August 1645, Massachusetts Bay authorized the chief commander of every company to choose 30 soldiers out of their companies to be ready "at halfe an howers warning" for any service. See: French, *The First Year of the American Revolution*, p. 33.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] George W. Greene, *The Life of Nathanael Greene* (Cambridge, 1871), I, p. 75.

The British in Boston were well aware of these potentially unfriendly preparations. Lt. Col. Francis Smith, in command of several companies of British Regulars, was ordered to move from Boston to Concord to seize and destroy military stores concentrated there to interrupt the progress of these preparations. Colonel Smith accomplished his mission on 19 April 1775, but he also precipitated a war.

The Massachusetts Minutemen and Militia seized their muskets and rushed off to resist—a mobilization so spontaneous as to make detailed plans unnecessary. A coordinated series of express riders carried the news from Massachusetts to the other colonies. These colonies, less in danger but enraged by the use of British Regulars against a sister colony, mobilized Militia units and gathered supplies more slowly but no less surely.[31]

The Continental Congress Assumes the Responsibility

The Second Continental Congress took over the combined war effort in June 1775, although the general order so stating was not published until 4 July 1775. On 15 June 1775, this Congress appointed one of its own members, George Washington of Virginia, Commander in Chief.

The efforts of the Continental Congress to mobilize troops and materiel for the war have generally been damned as inept. John Adams' plaintive summation of the difficulties, however, is pertinent: "When fifty or sixty men have a constitution to form for a great empire, at the same time that they have a country of fifteen hundred miles extent to fortify, millions to arm and train, a naval power to begin, an extensive commerce to regulate, numerous tribes of Indians to negotiate with, a standing army of twenty-seven thousand men to raise, pay, victual, and officer, I really shall pity those fifty or sixty men." [32]

The members of the Continental Congress made many mistakes in the prosecution of the war, but it must be remembered that the Congress had little centralized authority or power; this had been retained by the individual Colonies. The Congress could recommend, it could even enact, but it could not enforce. Furthermore, a demand by Congress for more power might not have been well-received by colonists who were fighting against a principle of centralized governmental power. The fact, too, that a considerable percentage of the population—more than a third of the influential men by John

[31] For a detailed review of activities before 19 April 1775 see: French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington.* See also: Spencer P. Mead, "The First American Soldiers," *The Journal of American History,* I (1907), pp. 123–28; French, *The First Year of the American Revolution,* pp. 22–46. For the organization and administration of the Revolutionary Army see: Louis C. Hatch, *The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army* (New York, 1904).

[32] Charles F. Adams (ed.), *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1850–56), II, p. 412.

Adams' estimate—were opposed to armed resistance constituted a baleful weakness. These were formidable handicaps even for a group of men experienced in public affairs although for the most part untrained in the conduct of military operations.

Such planning and preparations as had been done prior to active hostilities had been done by the individual colonies. The Second Continental Congress, acting for the concerted Colonies, had to start almost from scratch. The mobilization materials which then existed in the Colonies consisted, in manpower, of some 2,500,000 males, one-fifth of whom were Negroes. Further deductible from this pool were the Tories, who fought against the revolutionists; the indifferent, who were sure only that they wanted no war against Britain; and the conscientious objectors who did not want a war against anyone. (Some Quakers, like Nathanael Greene, gave up a sect for a cause.)

When the Continental Congress took over the war in June 1775, there were some 14,500 colonists in arms besieging the British in Boston. The initial flush of enthusiasm continued at least until the end of 1775, by which time Washington had nearly 19,000 effectives around Boston.[33] But these men had rushed to the fray without any immediate thought of a protracted war. Indeed, the term of the initial enlistments specifically ended with the last day of December 1775.

In the planning for the Army to be recruited for service beginning in 1776, there was no question but what the value of long enlistments (preferably for the duration of the war) was clearly understood, not only by Washington, and the other military men but also by many members of the Congress. This latter group saw the desirability of a Continental Army recruited and administered under Congressional auspices, rather than a conglomeration of forces recruited and administered under the control of the independent Colonies. The recommendation of the Congress to Massachusetts and Connecticut late in 1775 that enlistments be for one or two years is, therefore, difficult to understand until it is remembered that the Congress had to consider not only what should be done, but what *could* be done. There were few colonists who would have enlisted for the duration of the war. John Adams estimated that in Massachusetts not over a regiment ". . . of the meanest, idlest, most intemperate and worthless . . ." would have enlisted for the duration.[34] Joseph Hawley, a member of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, was even more pessimistic: in his opinion, no bounty would induce New England men to enlist for more than two years.[35]

---

[33] Jared Sparks (ed.), *The Writings of George Washington* (Boston, 1834) III, p. 493.
[34] Adams, *op. cit.*, III, p. 48.
[35] Peter Force (ed.), *American Archives* (Washington, 1837–53), 5th Series, I, p. 404.

Although in the abstract it is unquestionable that an army composed of well-trained soldiers enlisted for the duration would have been of inestimable value, it seems doubtful if such a force could have been logistically maintained. The small forces which were available to Washington were so frequently hungry, barefoot, shirtless, and otherwise ill-supplied that it is difficult to believe that a large permanent force could have been sustained (i. e. fed, clothed, and equipped). The men in the Continental Congress were certainly practical and hardheaded. How could they hope to supply, for example, 20,000 men daily for several years when they could not provide for 2,000 men for a few months each year? Nor did it make sense to them to feed, clothe, and equip hordes of men during the severe winter months when armies, in those days, did not fight much. Assuming, too, that it would have been possible to sustain a large colonial army for the duration, how could that army have been transported from New England to New Jersey and farther south, to engage the British whose control of the waterways made them vastly more mobile? An army of trained soldiers enlisted for the duration was an impossibility in the revolutionary Colonies.

Many of the desertions which so plagued Washington and his generals were due to the Colonies' inability to supply men when they had them.[36] Some of the desertions were due also to the fact that there was usually nothing for the soldier to do between battles. Few of the officers knew how to carry on any kind of a training program. To the discomforts from the lack of food, clothing, pay, and housing, there was added the even more unendurable ill of boredom. The records are replete with instances of Militiamen acquitting themselves well when they were hurriedly mobilized to strike at the enemy invading their area. Once the battle was over, they melted back to their homes ready to be called to fight another day, but unwilling to stay assembled for the battle which *might* come next month, or the month after. The battles of Bennington, Oriskany, Saratoga, King's Mountain, and the Cowpens, as well as innumerable minor engagements, illustrated the Militia's will to fight today's battle, but its disinclination to remain in an organized army after the battle was over.

Procurement of Military Manpower

The Second Continental Congress, in October 1775, on the advice of a council of general officers and a committee of Congress, authorized for 1776 a Continental Army of 20,372 men organized into 26 regiments of 728 officers and men each. Washington's tribulations in the recruiting of this force were many and bitter. On 19 November 1775, when only 966 men had enlisted for 1776, Washington somberly in-

[36] Sparks, *op. cit.*, VII, pp. 287, 300.

formed the President of the Congress: "There must be some other stimulus, besides love for their country, to make men fond of the service." [37] By the 28th of November, Washington could report some progress, but his discouragement was plain: "The number enlisted since my last is two thousand five hundred and forty men. I am sorry to be necessitated to mention to you the egregious want of public spirit, which reigns here." [38] With recruiting progressing at a snail's pace, Washington, using the authority granted him by the Congress, had to request short-term Militiamen from several colonies before 1775 was over.

The Continentals were recruited, in most instances, by a judicious combination of emotionalism, martial psychology, and rum.[39] The recruiting officer, when he was abetted by a pleasantly warm day, would make his stirring speech before the village tavern, whereafter the unwary listeners would be regaled with a few glasses of ale or, perhaps, something stronger. The enlistment papers were then passed about. It was a simple formula, basically still used (less the grog) whenever voluntary enlistment is employed. But it didn't work in appreciable numbers. The farmer's sons had work to do on the farm which might not get done without them. The young apprentices in the towns had good jobs and good prospects, for these were boom times.[40] Patriotism played its part to a degree, but, looking closely, General Greene perceived of New Englanders, "The common people are exceedingly avaricious; the genius of the people is commercial . . ." [41]

The fierce desire of the recruiting officers to meet quotas, then as now, sometimes overcame their judgment. Many a rascal was enlisted who should more properly have been jailed. And many a jailbird was enlisted who should more properly have been hanged. The prison as a recruiting source was put off limits by the Congress in January 1776.[42]

---

[37] *Ibid.*, III, p. 165

[38] *Ibid.*, III, p. 176.

[39] Allen Bowman, *The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army* (Washington, 1943), p. 14.

[40] "Efforts at [currency] stabilization, fairly successful for several year, were defeated by the Revolution, when values were again completely upset. . . . Then wage rates appear in pounds per day instead of shillings, and all wages and prices mount to fanciful heights. . . . " *History of Wages in the U. S. from Colonial Times to 1928* (Bulletin of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 604 [Washington, 1934], p. 18). Wages during the Revolution soared to a dollar a day and more depending on the occupation. The soldier's pay was $6.66 per month, when he could get it.

[41] Greene, *op. cit.*, I, p. 126.

[42] The shoddiness of some of the recruits enlisted by tricky recruiting officers was a matter of incessant complaint and reproach by American commanders. Henry Knox stated: ". . . the army . . . is only a receptacle for ragamuffins." (See Noah Brooks, *Henry Knox, A Soldier of the Revolution* [New York, 1900], p. 71). Anthony Wayne called them: *"Food for Worms*—miserable sharp looking Caitiffs, hungry lean fac'd Villians." (See Charles J. Stillé, *Major-General Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army* [Philadelphia, 1893], p. 44). Nathanael Greene said:

The officers recruiting for Continental soldiers had much less to offer than the Militia recruiters, with their short-term enlistments and high bounties, and the privateersmen, with their glamorized booty inducements. Bounties to encourage enlistments were used from the outset by several colonies, to the scandalized indignation of the Congress, which disapproved of the practice and principle by a resolve on 6 December 1775. The Congress felt that the pay of the private, six and two-thirds dollars monthly, was a munificence adequate to inspire men to flock to the service in so worthy a cause. The pay, indeed, was higher than in European armies, but to the American, weighing the factors involved, it was too little.[43] The Congress seeing recruiting at a standstill and the Army dribbling away sacrificed principle to expediency by authorizing a Continental bounty of $10 scrip in June 1776. At a time when the Colonies were offering as much as $150 in specie for short-term enlistments in the Militia, this gesture had an effect considerably less than enthusiastic. The Congress by subsequent enactments increased the bounty successively through the war to $20, $80, $100, and $200 for the private soldier. Accompanying these money grants for "duration" enlistment and service were land grants, proportioned to rank and grade, suits of clothes, amelioration from small claims legal difficulties, and some pension provisions.[44]

The Special Problems of Mobilization

Mobilization in the Revolutionary War was accomplished on a trial and error basis. The problems encountered by the Continental Con-

"the worst in the world . . . of no more use than if they were in the moon." (See Greene Papers as cited in Bowman, *op. cit.*, p. 13). Washington and Greene, among others, bitterly protested the enlistment of convicts which, in several of the southern colonies, was considered an excellent solution. See: Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 56, 78; Greene, *op. cit.*, I, p. 559.

[43] The pay of a private soldier in the British Army during the Revolutionary War was 8 pence a day—about $1.20 per month. But from this was deducted so many charges, for subsistence, uniforms, clothing, arms repair, medical care, etc., as to leave the foot soldier no coin and very little food and drink. See: Edward E. Curtis, *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution* (New Haven, 1926), p. 158.

[44] The Second Continental Congress first offered a land bounty to Hessians and others in the service of the British Crown if they would desert to Americans. This offer, made in August 1776, made little impression on the British soldiery, since the Continental Congress had no land to grant, and might have encountered spirited resistance from the land-owning states who conceivably would have objected to giving their land away. There is record of only one Hessian who yielded to this lure and who finally got his 50 acres in 1792. In September 1776, the same Second Continental Congress made its first offer of land bounties to officers and men who would enlist for the duration in the Continental Army. This offer was, by later resolution, expanded to include all officers and men who had previously enlisted in the Continental Army for the duration. These promises, too, were empty since the Congress still had no lands to give. However, the successful conclusion of the war made the promises obligations which, after years of haggling and bickering between the Federal Government and the states, were finally honored beginning in 1796 and ultimately liquidated in 1907, by which time nearly 3,000,000 acres had been so disposed. The principal beneficiaries were speculators who bought up the bounty warrants from soldiers and their heirs who grew weary waiting for the land and who, for the most part, had no desire to move to the frontier areas where the lands were located. See: Payson J. Treat, *The National Land System, 1785–1820* (New York, 1910), ch. X.

gress were new and surpassed the previous experience of any of its members. Of greater importance, however, was the fact that the Continental Congress had no real power and had to rely on the voluntary cooperation of the states for the implementation of its plans.

The mobilization of the short-term Militia throughout the Revolution was accomplished by the respective Colonies on quotas recommended by the Continental Congress. The Continental Army was recruited in the same manner, except that Continental officers and soldiers were at first detailed as recruiters in their respective colonies. By July 1777, Congress came to realize that experienced Continental officers could no longer be spared for recruiting. The Colonies were then divided into districts, each with its local officer who would receive $8 for every enlistee secured and $15 for every deserter apprehended.

To meet their quotas the states had to resort to a spiraling series of bonuses which, varying from state to state, enabled the pleased soldier to sell himself to the highest bidder, and sometimes by well-contrived desertions enabled him to sell himself two, three, or more times.[45] The quotas still could not be filled until the states, on advice of Washington and on the recommendation of the Continental Congress, resorted to coercion—a draft.[46] [See table 1.] This draft was a state Militia draft and varied from state to state as to details. Most of the states reluctantly resorted to a draft after exhausting all other possible methods of raising the men requested by the Continental Congress. The draft was never all-embracing because of the means of evading it, such as the payment of a fee in lieu of service or the furnishing of a substitute. The draft's operations, in most instances, involved a drawing by lot of all eligibles on the muster rolls. The drawing was from a hat, which the statutes admonished had to be held by an important person who would periodically shake the hat to insure fairness. In general, draft rolls included only single men. Three of the principles of selective service—impartiality, selection by lot, and married exemption—were here stablished.[47]

---

[45] Desertion was a peculiarly pressing problem of increasing severity as the war continued. It was most persistent in the Militia but was also serious in the Continental Army. The causes were the usual ones, plus inadequate food and clothing, arrears in pay, etc. The references to this plague of armies during the Revolution are so many as to make unnecessary their listing here. The cures attempted included reprimands and fines and later flogging and the death penalty, but even these extreme penalties failed to have the desired effect. Of some 225 men whose court-martial sentences for desertion were death, only 40 are definitely known to have been executed, but many more may have been, since the records are fragmentary. See: Bowman, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–92; Worthington C. Ford (ed.), *General Order Issued by Major-General William Heath* (Brooklyn, 1890), p. 78; Edward W. Hocker, *The Fighting Parson of the American Revolution: A Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg* (Privately published, Philadelphia, 1936), p. 116.

[46] Sparks, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 96-97.

[47] For a discussion of the Maryland Militia draft see: Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," *Maryland Historical Magazine,* XIII (1947), pp. 193–95; for Pennsylvania see: Arthur J. Alexander, "Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Militia," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography,* LXIX (1945), pp. 15–25.

The issue of Negro service caused many a vexatious conference.[48] In the northern colonies, resistance to Negro recruitment dissipated quite early. In the southernmost colonies there were divergent opinions, but sentiment was predominantly against the enlistment of Negroes. It was not then so much a social or moral issue as an economic one. The enlistment or drafting of large numbers of Negroes off the southern farms, it was argued in a letter to Madison, would: ". . . ruin individuals, distress the State, and perhaps the Continent, when all that can be raised by their assistance is but barely sufficient to keep us jogging along with the great expense of the war." [49] Madison, a southerner, had suggested the employment of Negroes in regiments with white officers and a leavening proportion of white soldiers.

Of much greater concern to the Americans' struggle was the lack of artillery, skilled artillerymen, and, to a lesser degree, competent military engineers. The British, it will be recalled, had furnished the artillery and the military specialists during the colonial wars in America. The Common Militia was comprised of the relatively inexpensive and more readily procurable infantry foot soldiers and cavalry. There were few artillery pieces available in the Colonies in 1775, and many of these few were unserviceable. The supply of artillery was but slowly increased during the war, principally by capture from the British, and there remained a dearth of artillerymen skilled enough to fire the cumbersome cannon and to train others. In August 1776, well over a year after the war had begun, shortages of artillery and artillerymen were still so chronic that the *one* regiment of artillery in the Continental Army had but 585 men. Even that was an achievement attributed to the great energy of Col. Henry Knox, the first chief of Artillery in the American Army.[50]

The development of a corps of Light Infantry in the Continental Army was initially a tactical innovation based on European precepts and combat experience. It became, however, an elite corps of men picked from all other units and maintained at full strength. A precedent was hereby established in the American Army for such elite, specially selected organizations as the Rangers and Paratroopers of World War II. Similarly, the selection of men from other units to provide a nucleus for the Continental Artillery, when it was being organized, was a forerunner of the cadre system which later became an integral part of mobilization planning and practice.

---

[48] *American Archives,* 4th Series, II, p. 762; Worthington C. Ford (ed.) *The Writings of Washington* (New York, 1889), III, p. 162n.

[49] Ltr, Joseph Jones to James Madison in: Gaillard Hunt, *The Writings of James Madison* (New York, 1900), I, p. 106.

[50] French, *First Year of the American Revolution,* pp. 43, 73, 180; Trevelyan, *op. cit.,* II, pp. 205–08.

*Table 1. Troops Furnished in the Revolutionary War, by Year**

Year	Total troops furnished [a]	From returns of the Army			Additional short-term militia [b]
		Total	In Continental pay	Militia [b]	
1775	37, 623	27, 443	[c] 27, 443	0	10, 180
1776	89, 651	72, 951	46, 891	26, 060	16, 700
1777	68, 720	44, 920	34, 820	10, 100	23, 800
1778	51, 052	37, 252	32, 899	4, 353	13, 800
1779	45, 184	32, 834	27, 699	5, 135	12, 350
1780	42, 826	26, 826	21, 015	5, 811	16, 000
1781	29, 340	20, 590	13, 292	7, 298	8, 750
1782	18, 006	14, 256	0	0	[d] 3, 750
1783 [e]	13, 477	13, 477	13, 477	0	0

[a] Because of short terms of service and reenlistments, these figures are considerably higher than the average size of the Army for any one year.

[b] Militia service, due to fragmentary records, short terms of service, and repeated terms of service, is difficult to estimate accurately. Those figures are based on records available to the Secretary of War in 1790 and constitute a conjectural estimate. The data in the last column are estimates of additional Militia employed for short periods which were not shown in the returns of the Army.

[c] Enlisted to serve to 31 December 1775.

[d] Not separately shown.

[e] The Army in the Northern Department was discharged on 5 November 1783, and that in the Southern Department on 15 November 1783.

**Source*: *American State Papers, Military Affairs* (Washington, 1832), I, pp. 14-19.

Mobilization of Materiel for War

As in the mobilization of manpower, mobilization of materiel for the greater part of the war was a state prerogative and function. Just before actual hostilities all of the colonies had made some effort to collect military stores and to a limited extent some increase in manufacturing facilities had occurred even before Lexington and Concord; but there had been no concerted plan for industrial mobilization or for long-range procurement. The concept of industrial mobilization was not to be conceived anywhere in the world for 85 years when it was to be stillborn in the Confederacy. As for long-range procurement, there was no preconceived idea that fighting would be protracted if it should occur. The First Continental Congress was not a planning agency; it was a grievance forum. Even the Second Continental Congress, in 1775, was not initially prepared to plan, legislate, or to operate. When the emergency in Massachusetts occurred, the Second Continental Congress simultaneously began planning and legislating—but hobbled all the time by its inability to execute *forcibly*.

The Colonies in no instance had accumulated sufficient military stores to supply the forces which they were mobilizing. The first men mobilized had their own arms and accoutrements, their uniform being whatever clothes they had been wearing when the alarm sounded.

But later levies had neither arms, accoutrements, nor clothes to speak of. There was an understandable reluctance on the part of a Militiaman to yield his musket or his personal property at the conclusion of a short tour for reissue to a recruit. There was a less understandable design of many Militiamen, on the conclusion of a short tour or on deserting, to depart with the musket which had been issued to them. Shortages of all kinds of military stores, accoutrements, and supplies were quick to occur.[51]

At first, the Colonies were expected not only to mobilize their troop quotas but also to equip them. Even the few colonies which zealously tried to fulfill these obligations soon found it difficult to procure all the necessary materiel for their men and even more arduous to get procured equipment to them during the fluid periods of the war. The competition between colonies to purchase materiel and munitions understandably had an unhealthy effect on overall supply and costs.

There was no War Department on the Continental level when Washington took command at Cambridge, nor was there any agency approximating it. Washington was expected to coordinate and to supervise the overall war effort, but Washington first found his time fully occupied recruiting and organizing an army without which there would have been little need for supplies. To fill the void for an overall supervising agency, the Second Continental Congress established many committees, and assigned one war problem to each. The shortage of salt was assigned to a Committee for Salt, the shortage of meat to a Committee for Meat, clothing to a Committee for Clothing. The committees were ineffective to an even greater extent than the Congress because they had no power to compel and because they were restricted in their actions by the zealous Congress as a whole.

Congress, in spite of weaknesses of which it was well aware, had to assume not only legislative functions but executive ones, too. This assumption of executive power was unquestionably a source of weakness and one which has been well exposed and analytically criticized. But who was to exercise executive authority? It is very well to speak of proper systems of government, but the mechanics for such a system had not yet been worked out in America and were not worked out until the adoption of the Constitution a few years after the war. Furthermore, in the British tradition Parliament contained within itself the executive authority which had been wrested from the King over a span of centuries. In assuming executive functions, the Second Continental Congress was filling a vacuum according to English governmental tradition. The United States Constitution in its separation of the executive and legislative branches broke with English tradition.

[51] See : Bowman, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–20 ; Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 30–36.

The Congress quickly realized the necessity for some kind of centralized supervisory civil agency for the Army and the war effort. As early as 24 January 1776 a committee was appointed to draw up a plan for a war office. By June 1776 the committee had made its recommendations and Congress enacted into existence a Board of War consisting of five members of Congress plus one paid secretary.[52] This Board was charged with the mobilizing of land forces, their equipment and supplies, the supervision of all military stores, the keeping of officer registers, etc. In 1777 Congress removed some of the political discord of the Board by eliminating members of Congress from its composition. In the five years of its existence, the Board of War—the direct ancestor of the Department of the Army—did a somewhat better job than the committee it had superseded. In October 1781, Congress, moving slowly towards centralization and away from divided authority, abolished the Board and appointed Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln Secretary of War.[53] Mobilization machinery evolved about the time when demobilization was to occur.

The principal supply problems of the war were procurement and transportation which were initially mobilization problems. Adversely affecting a solution to the problem of procurement was a domestic economy which produced few surpluses for war. Even where surpluses existed, however, as in agricultural products of various kinds, the want of an acceptable monetary medium to pay for them was a serious handicap. The Continental Congress had no power to levy taxes. It could request money from the Colonies, which did exercise taxing powers to a limited extent, but there was no way to compel a colony to furnish the money requested. Specie (hard metallic money) was limited. The Congress, perforce, resorted to paper scrip, a type of exchange which deteriorated in value as rapidly as the printing presses turned it out. Prices soared as supplies dwindled and paper money became more and more worthless. Even farmers loyal to the revolutionary cause were unwilling to yield up their produce without getting paid for it—and paid at a profit.

The Congress recommended to the states that prices be fixed by law to discourage profiteering, and although generally unsuccessful, there were some price controls. Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam, as early as 8 August 1777, by a military edict at Peekskill established prices for farm produce for his army and made his edict reasonably effective, for a time, by confiscating produce purchased at prices above the maximums he had established.[54] The Congress recommended to Washington that he confiscate farm produce where and when neces-

[52] *Journals of Continental Congress*, IV, p. 85 ; V, pp. 434–35.

[53] *Ibid.*, XXI, pp. 1030, 1087.

[54] Worthington C. Ford (ed.), *General Orders Issued by Major-General Israel Putnam When in Command of the Highlands in the Summer and Fall of 1777* (Brooklyn, 1893), p. 51.

sary. Washington, however, rarely did so, for he wisely realized that the use of force in such a manner would have an adverse effect on civilian good will and would therefore be harmful in the long run.[55]

Transportation throughout the war was for the Americans an unsolvable problem. The poor road net at certain times of the year was impossible. [See *chart 1.*] The sea lanes, the best means of transport, were held to a considerable extent by a British fleet and were therefore inaccessible. The shortage of wagons and teams and the difficulty, due to lack of funds, of procuring more had an adverse influence on mobilization of food and materiel for the war.

The army supply systems which evolved during the war were closely integrated with procurement and mobilization of materiel which, like mobilization of manpower, was never ceasing throughout the war. Mobilization normally can be said to cease, in a sense, when systems of recruiting manpower and utilizing resources have been established, and are functioning. In the Revolution, however, one system succeeded another, with each lasting long enough for its disadvantages to become so glaring as to make another, any other, seem preferable. These trials and errors in what is considered the first war of the United States taught many mobilization lessons which were not too well learned and were remembered even less.

The Continental Congress had quickly set up an army supply system, based on European models, with a quartermaster general to superintend transportation and a commissary general to purchase and issue provisions. These staffs functioned reasonably well during the first phase of the war when the Army was in Massachusetts, which was an excellent larder, and before Continental money tobogganed in value. Within two years Congress, tinkering with the supply system, split the commissary general's department into two parts: a commissary of purchases and a commissary of issues, each with a commissary general and several deputies, the latter appointed by the Congress and not by the commissary general. This separation of procurement from issue and the division of authority within the two new sections led to the resignation of hard working Commissary General Joseph Trumbull; it also led to a rapid decline in supply efficiency. The deputy commissaries within each department bid not only against the other departments but against each other; they were little inclined to heed or show allegiance to their chief since they, like he, were appointed directly by Congress. Congress took proper administrative action to prevent such practices, but integrity and character are qualities difficult to create by legislation.[56]

---

[55] *Journals of Continental Congress,* VII, pp. 283–84; VIII, pp. 751–52; IX, pp. 905, 1013–15.

[56] Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1907), pp. 50–53.

The expanding demands for the Army did provide impetus to manufacturing, particularly for the fabrication of cloths of all kinds—duck, russian sheeting, tow-cloth osnaburgs, ticklenburgs—and to the production of shoes, gunpowder, and small arms. Home industries carded and spun wool, flax, and cotton at a vastly accelerated rate. Home windows and clocks provided their lead weights for rifle and cannon balls.[57] But the increased production, hampered by inefficient supply systems, a depreciated currency, and a woefully inadequate transportation system, frequently was unable to provide the troops even with those surpluses which it did create.

Where the colonies were unable to produce enough materiel or the required kinds of materiel, recourse was had necessarily to friends and allies in Europe. Particularly the influx of French supplies and munitions was a material salvation of the war effort. Gunpowder, an understandably basic and vital munition, for the first two years of the war had to be secured principally abroad. Of some 2,347,455 pounds of gunpowder obtained during those first two years of the war, about 90 percent was imported.[58] After 1778, when France openly entered the war on the side of the States, supplies and credit from Europe became even more appreciable.

The supply and procurement systems evolved during the war were sufficiently varied to provide texts for future mobilization planning. There was the almost completely decentralized system wherein the states and several Continental agencies competed against each other for materiel. The weaknesses of this method were so clearly proved that it might reasonably have been expected that never again would such a mistaken procurement system be employed. Nevertheless, the same system would be tried again at the outset of every war of the United States for the next 139 years. Secondly, there was the requisition system whereby each state was expected to furnish supplies in kind on a fixed quota. This system failed signally and was never tried again. The third system was the civilian contractor system, inherently dangerous and weak for it made supply of the Army a whim and prerogative of individuals who were not part of the Army and not subject to Army control. Such a system did not work at all if the contractor was dishonest and seldom worked more than indifferently well. This system was tried again in later wars. And, finally, there was a centralized system, under unified, coordinated control and supervision. This system, evolved late in the war, worked best of all and has been the system eventually arrived at in all major wars, but only after other systems previously proved failures have been tried again and failed.[59]

[57] *American Archives*, 4th Series, V, p. 1401.

[58] Orlando W. Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in 1776," *American Historical Review*, XXX (1925), p. 278.

[59] See: Hatch, *op. cit.*, ch. VI, "Supplying the Army," pp. 86–123. This chapter contains a comprehensive coverage of supply problems and machinery in the Revolutionary Army.

The Lessons of the War

Most of the mobilization lessons of the Revolutionary War are as immediate as the lessons of the last war. Many of them are the same lessons. The danger of short-term enlistments was incontrovertibly demonstrated. The weakness of the volunteer method of mobilizing manpower and the vices connected with a bounty system were plainly proved. The necessity for conscription in a protracted war was clearly established. The imperative necessity for proper training of recruits before their employment was demonstrated. Short-term enlistments afforded insufficient time for adequate training. Had every man who served in the American forces enlisted for the duration at the outset of the war, the bulk of the force would have continued untrained for there were neither the facilities nor the officers to train them. The few partially trained officers at Washington's disposal were the veterans of the French and Indian Wars. The Militia drills had imparted little military training of value. There were no official training publications or drill manuals and there were few who had the initiative of Nathanael Greene and Henry Knox to pore through bookshops for foreign military texts to study diligently. These texts were few, too, even had there been the initiative. The *British Manual*, the *Norfolk Discipline*, Pickering's *Easy Plan* were some of the current military texts, but in such short supply as to be almost unobtainable. The systems of training were so various, so inept, and so confusing, for the most part, as to have military value principally for the enemy who faced the troops so trained. It was not until Von Steuben's presence and his *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* were felt that improvement in training techniques was discernible. What these early colonial soldiers lacked in military skill they made up in spirit and determination; without these, their early military ineptitude would have lost the war long before they became militarily proficient.

The inescapable value of centralized, coordinated control and supervision of the war effort was proved. The need for control of the national economy and of public opinion was foreshadowed. The fact was established that a nation which can produce only few surpluses for war use must have some other assured source of war material. The lesson was brought home with considerable impact that to wage war, a nation must have a reasonably dependable means of transporting material to the fighting troops. The inferred overall lesson was inescapable: that a mobilization accomplished during a war, without adequate prior planning, is wasteful, clumsy, inefficient, and potentially disastrous.

CHAPTER II

THE WAR OF 1812

The Period Between the Wars

Defense Under the Articles of Confederation

Following the successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War, the new nation almost completely disbanded its military forces. This first demobilization in accordance with disintegration concepts established a precedent and example for all of our later demobilizations. (See *DA Pam 20–210*, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army (*Washington, 1952*).) The Continental Congress on 2 June 1784 limited the Regular force to 80 enlisted men and a handful of officers under the command of Capt. John Doughty. Twenty-five enlisted men were to be stationed at Fort Pitt and 55 at West Point to guard military stores (principally gunpowder).[1]

The Indians in the Northwest were hostile to the Americans and were making raids into Pennsylvania and Kentucky. It therefore became necessary for Congress to provide a force to occupy these posts which the British were expected to evacuate under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. On 3 June 1784, Congress passed a resolution calling for 700 Militia to serve for 1 year: Connecticut to furnish 165; New York, 165; New Jersey, 110; and Pennsylvania, 260. Congress was completely dependent on the states for the implementation of this embryonic mobilization, the results of which emphasized the weaknesses of the Confederation. Pennsylvania supplied its quota promptly; New Jersey furnished a company; Connecticut did not begin recruiting until 1785; and New York ignored the request.[2] Because Pennsylvania was requested to furnish the largest number of men she was permitted to select the commanding officer. For this purpose Josiah Harmar, 31-year-old Revolutionary War veteran, was appointed a lieutenant colonel. Harmar's force numbering approximately 200 men moved to Fort Pitt, and during January 1785 a treaty was concluded at nearby Fort McIntosh with the Indians in adjacent areas.[3]

---

[1] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, XXVII, p. 524.

[2] James Ripley Jacobs, *The Beginning of the U. S. Army 1783–1812* (Princeton, 1947), p. 18.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23. Harmar was made a brevet brigadier general 31 Jul 1787.

Although the Indians around Pittsburgh had been pacified, the rest of the Ohio valley was still subject to frequent depredations. Since Harmar's Militia force was to serve for only one year and most of his command would vanish by the end of the summer, Congress on 12 April 1785 requested the recruiting of a force of 700 men for three years with the same quotas assigned to the states as under the call of 3 June 1784.[4] In the fall of 1785, Harmar moved westward and built three forts near the Ohio River which he garrisoned with his small force.[5]

Indian activities and unrest in western Massachusetts in the fall of 1786 spurred the Continental Congress into passing a resolution on 20 October 1786 for an expanded Army. They requested 1,340 men from the states with quotas assigned as follows:[6]

Infantry and Artillery		*Cavalry*	
New Hampshire	260	Maryland	60
Massachusetts	660	Virginia	60
Rhode Island	120		
Connecticut	180		

THE WAR OF 1812

Only two companies of Artillery were ever raised under this call. On 3 October 1787 Congress passed a resolution continuing the Army as then constituted for three more years. The authorized forces consited of one regiment of Infantry, eight companies of 70 men, and one battalion of Artillery, four companies of 70 men, or a total of 840 men.[7] This was the authorized strength, but the actual strength was always lower.

This regimental Army was too small for even the limited police mission assigned to it. Fortunately the British did not evacuate their forts as provided by the Treaty of Paris until 1796.[8] Knox,[9] Harmer, and their tiny Army would have been unable to take over the forts. Life in the frontier stockades and log forts was strenuous and monotonous; supplies were scarce and poor in quality; pay was almost always in arrears. All of the difficulties of manpower procurement, supply, transportation, and communications which were to be encountered by the Army along the western frontier until after the Civil War were present in the period from 1784–90. The Continental Congress passed a land ordinance in 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance 13 July 1787 which encouraged settlement and promised a civil

[4] *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XXVIII, p. 247.

[5] Jacobs, *op. cit.,* pp. 24–26. Fort Finney at the mouth of the Great Miami River, Fort Steuben above Wheeling, and Fort Harmar at the mouth of the Muskingum River.

[6] *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XXXI, pp. 892–96.

[7] *Ibid.,* XXXIII, pp. 602–03.

[8] The last fort to be turned over by the British was Fort Mackinac evacuated 11 Sep 1796. Jacobs, *op. cit.,* p. 185.

[9] Henry Knox was elected Secretary of War by the Continental Congress 8 Mar 1785 at an annual salary of $2,450. His staff consisted of three clerks and a messenger. *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XXVIII, p. 129.

administration for the area north of the Ohio River. No provision was made, however, for an Army large enough to police the area and control the hostile Indians. The government under the Articles of Confederation was unable to provide for the military, commercial, or financial needs of the new nation. The meeting of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia on 14 May 1787 was to be the beginning of a new order.

The Constitution: "to raise and support armies"

The framers of the Constitution were exceptionally able men who had seen the weaknesses of military mobilizations during the Revolution and under the Articles of Confederation. Six consecutive clauses in section VIII, article I of the Constitution empowered the Congress of the United States:

> To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;
>
> To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use, shall be for a longer term than two years;
>
> To provide and maintain a navy;
>
> To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
>
> To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
>
> To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

The fact that the raising and support of armies was given precedence over powers to employ State Militia has always led to the conclusion that the new Federal Government had authority to raise armies by more direct and powerful methods than by calling for Volunteers and State Militia. The discussions of these military clauses at the Constitutional Convention, the refusal of the Convention to approve a motion proposed by Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts and Luther Martin of Maryland that would amend the military clauses and set a Constitutional limit to the size of the peacetime Army,[10] are further indications of the intent of the authors of the Constitution to make absolute the plenary powers of the Federal Government to mobilize armies.

By 21 June 1788, the Constitution had been ratified by the necessary nine states. The First Congress met in New York 4 March 1789,

---

[10] *Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution* (Washington, 1836–45), V, p. 443, as cited in Joseph C. Duggan, *The Legislative and Statutory Development of the Federal Concept of Conscription for Military Service* (Washington, 1946), p. 7. This is an excellent and succinct dissertation on legal connotations of early Federal military mobilization enactments.

but the new government was not completed until the inauguration of George Washington as first President on 30 April 1789. The first law relative to military affairs was passed by Congress on 7 August 1789, entitled "An Act to establish an Executive Department to be denominated the Department of War." [11] This act continued the Department of War established during the Revolutionary War but transformed it from a legislative to an executive agency. Henry Knox, Secretary of War under the Articles of Confederation since 1785, was continued in that office by President Washington. The creation of a supervisory and controlling agency for the Army was necessarily the first step towards establishing a sound military system. In addition to supervision of the Army, the Secretary of War was also charged with such extraneous duties as land grants, Indian affairs, and naval affairs.[12]

On 29 September 1789, Congress passed an act continuing the Army created by the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation. It also authorized the President to call Militia into service in the event of Indian attacks along the frontier. The authorized strength of the Army was 840 men.[13] On 8 August 1789 Secretary Knox had reported that there were 672 men in the Army: 76 at the West Point and Springfield arsenals and 596 in the Ohio Valley.[14] The act of 29 September was only a temporary measure. The first comprehensive military enactment was passed by Congress 30 April 1790, providing in great detail for an army of 1,273 officers and enlisted men to serve for three years. This force was to be organized into one regiment of Infantry, with three battalions, and one battalion of Artillery. Pay for officers was slightly increased but that for privates was cut to $3 per month. No provision was made for a War Department staff.[15] The legislation of 1789 and 1790 affected the size and organization of the Army; it did not provide machinery to plan or facilitate a mobilization.

President Washington, Secretary of War Knox, and Von Steuben did some independent thinking and made recommendations for a sound military establishment which had within it some farseeing mobilization provisions. With minor variations, each of the three recommended a small, permanent standing army and a well-regulater, well-trained Militia under Federal supervision and required to meet Federal standards. To provide such a Militia, there was recommended a kind of compulsory, universal military training system from which very few of the Nation's youth would have been exempted.

---

[11] Act of Aug 7, 1789, 1 *Stat.* 49. Cited in John F. Callan, *The Military Laws of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1863), pp. 85–86.

[12] A separate Navy Department was established by Congress in Apr 1798.

[13] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

[14] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 6.

[15] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 87–90.

Such a Militia could have been mobilized swiftly when necessary, and would have made the Nation's manpower into an effective military reserve.[16] But at the end of the Revolutionary War as at the end of later wars in the first half of the 20th century, neither the Congress nor the country was disposed to adopt such a policy. Congress did not adopt this plan but merely extended the President's authority to call out the existing Militia in emergencies in the act of 30 April 1790.

Indian Uprisings Give Rise to Mobilization Measures

While Congress debated the national military system, the unsettled frontier was erupting with sporadic Indian troubles. In the summer of 1790 the Government decided to send a punitive expedition against the Miami Indians north of the Ohio River. General Harmar, still the senior officer in the Army, was assigned to command the expedition. The Federal Government had to fall back on the Militia since the Regular Army was too small and scattered to make it available for an offensive military operation. In July 1790 the states of Pennsylvania and the district of Kentucky were called on to furnish quotas of 500 and 1,000 men respectively. This Militia was called out by state general orders issued to various Militia companies. The Militia units were quick to avail themselves of the substitution system so that instead of "the smart active woodsmen, well accustomed to arms, eager and alert to revenge injuries . . . [there] . . . were a great many hardly able to bear arms, such as old, infirm men, and young boys . . . [many of whom] . . . probably had never fired a gun. . . ." [17]

Only 1133 Militia reported to General Harmar out of the 1,500 men called for. With this Militia Force and 320 Regulars, Harmar in late September 1790 moved against the Miami Indians. After two engagements Harmar withdrew back to Fort Washington (later Cincinnati, Ohio).[18]

Harmar's lack of success forced the third session of the First Congress into strengthening the Army, not only in numbers but in recruiting powers. The Act of March 3, 1791, authorized the President, at his discretion, "to employ troops enlisted under the denomination of levies, in addition to, or in place of the militia, . . . to raise . . . a corps" of 2,000 men, and concluded, by empowering him to make up for any deficiencies, ". . . by raising such farther number of levies, or by calling into the service of the United States, such a body of militia as shall be equal thereto." [19] This legislation by the repeated

[16] For discussions of Washington's and Von Steuben's concepts see: John McAuley Palmer, *Americans in Arms* (New Haven, 1941). For Knox's plan see: *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 6–13.

[17] "Testimony of Major Ferguson before a Court of Inquiry on General Harmar," *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 21.

[18] See: *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 20–36; Jacobs *op. cit.,* pp. 52–65.

[19] Callan, *op. cit.,* pp. 90–91.

use of the Constitutional phrasing "to raise" presumedly inferred that the President, under this act, could legally have resorted to a compulsory draft if had so desired.[20]

The force raised under the Act of 1791 consisted principally of volunteer, short-term levies; the Regular Army was also expanded somewhat. Recruits for both the Volunteer short-termers and for the Regular forces were secured in the customary manner. But it was a time of labor shortage in the United States when jobs were plentiful[21] and, in comparison, the military service had little to offer: $2 monthly for the privates (the pay was $3 monthly, but $1 of this was withheld for uniforms and hospital stores), poor uniforms, worse equipment, scanty rations, ill-treatment which conceivably the Indians would terminate by torture and death. The bounty of $6 for enlistment in the Regulars or $3 for enlistment in the short-term Volunteer levies served to continue the pernicious bounty system but was not enough to improve the quality of the recruits. The $2 per recruit bounty which the recruiting officers received sometimes made them overlook noticeable physical defects which should have kept the unfit from the service.

Even from such inferior material, soldiers might conceivably have been made by adequate training, with good equipment, and under competent leadership. But this force raised by the Act of 1791 was intended to punish quickly and drastically the Indians who had forced Harmar to withdraw in 1790. The short enlistment period of the Volunteer levies, the insistence on quick action, the slow rate of recruiting left no time at all for training. Equipment, even including rations (still provided by a civilian contractor), either was wanting entirely or was of poor, wornout substance. And the leadership was as shoddy as the equipment.

The staff created by the Act of 1791 included a general in command, a general as deputy commander, an adjutant general, and, for the first time since the end of the Revolution, a quartermaster. The commanding general selected was Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair, Governor of the Northwest Territory, who had served in the Revolution, but who was now somewhat old for arduous field campaigns.

The strength of the force intended by the Congress for the expedition was three thousand enlisted men. But so slow was the recruiting of the short-term levies and the Regular forces that Knox recommended to St. Clair that he make up shortages by Militia requests on the Governors of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the District of Ken-

[20] Duggan, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[21] Carpenters in 1790–91 were getting about $0.60 daily wage, masons about $1 daily, and common laborers about $0.50 daily. See: Carroll D. Wright, "Historical Review of Wages and Prices, 1752–1860," *Sixteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor* (Boston, 1885), pp. 319, 324, 326.

tucky.[22] When the Army moved against the Indians in mid-September the force was composed of two infantry regiments of some 600 Regulars (the whole of the Infantry in the Regular Army, less some garrison detachments), about 800 short-term levies, and 600 Militia, a combined force of 2,000 men. Except for the Regulars, the troops were untrained; the whole of the force was ill-equipped, poorly supplied, and without adequate transportation. Disease and desertion reduced the Army's strength to 1,700 by 24 October.

The mobilization of this force, the plans for the expedition, and the execution of it were on the same level of ineptitude. The morning of 4 November 1791, after an advance of some 97 miles from Fort Washington northward into Indian country made at the rate of 5 miles per day, the "Army" was ambushed and badly defeated by an Indian force no larger than itself.

A seven-man committee of Congress was promtly appointed to investigate the causes and responsibility for the defeat. On 8 May 1792 the committee's report, submitted to the House of Representatives, found that the disaster was due to the delay in passing the act which provided for the mobilization of St. Clair's expeditionary force, "the gross and various mismanagements and neglects in the Quartermaster's and contractor's departments" and the lack of "discipline and experience in the troops." St. Clair was cleared of all blame, the committee reporting that ". . . the failure of the late expedition can, in no respect, be imputed to his conduct."[23] The committee report, boiled down to its essence, simply states that the massacre was due to faulty mobilization planning, for which the Congress itself and the Secretary of War were held primarily responsible.

The Second Congress, convening on 24 October 1791, was alarmed by St. Clair's defeat, which had led the victorious Indians to more sustained depredations, and upset by the blame imputed to Congress by its own committee. After prolonged discussions, it passed an act on 5 March 1792 providing for the better "protection of the frontiers of the United States." This was not a real mobilization measure, but it authorized the President to more than double the size of the Regular Army temporarily at his discretion.[24]

There were mobilization lessons, however, which could have been learned from the ensuing mobilization of the "Legion of the United States" as the new force was designated.[25] Its strength was recruited by the same methods as St. Clair's army and, in general, secured the same kind of riff-raff. However, the commander, Maj. Gen. Anthony

[22] Ltrs, Knox to St. Clair, *American State Papers, Indian Affairs,* I, pp. 175–82.

[23] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 38–39.

[24] Callan, *op. cit.,* pp. 92–94.

[25] The name "Legion of the United States" originated with Von Steuben. The Legion organization was abolished by an act of Congress effective 31 Oct 1796.

Wayne, used proper mobilization training procedures. He selected and constructed a training camp some twenty miles down the Ohio from Pittsburgh. Here excellent training methods were employed, camp sanitation was insisted upon, proper discipline was enforced, and good leadership was developed and practiced. The end result was the production of fine soldiers who so soundly trounced the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, 20 August 1794, that peace was thereafter ensured for the Northwest Territory. The methods employed by Wayne to receive and train green manpower were so singularly successful that it might have been expected that they would be codified for subsequent use in any kind of mobilization or increase of the Army. Unfortunately this was not done.[26]

The Militia Law of 1792

The Second Congress, bestirred by several messages from President Washington, applied itself to the enactment of a basic defense measure implementing the Constitution's provision for a Militia: "An Act more effectually to provide for the national defense by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States." [27] This long-enduring, but hardly far-sighted measure, reaffirmed the principle so well established in the Colonies, by tradition and custom, of a compulsory, universal military obligation for *all* free, white male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45. (Exemptions from this service in the act reasonably included such personages as the vice president, members of the Congress, certain other governmental employees, and some essential occupations.) Subsequent acts expanded this Militia law in minor essentials, as in provisions for arming the Militia and for establishing a court-martial system for the Militia. A revision of the Militia Law, on 28 February 1795, contained a provision that the Militia, when mobilized, could not be compelled to serve more than three months in any one year.[28] This amazingly destructive limitation was not repealed until 29 July 1861.

The organic Militia law of 1792 required all citizens, within six months after being enrolled in the Militia, to provide themselves, at their own expense, with arms and accoutrements. It was a delusion to suppose that the male population would comply with this requirement when there was no penalty either explicit or implied for failure to do so.

A system of enrollment was also prescribed, the work to be done by the Militia company commander whose duty it would be ". . . to

[26] The authorized strength of the Legion was 5,120 but Wayne only had a force of 2,643 at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. See: William A. Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (New York, 1924), p. 101. Although training had been improved, manpower procurement still was the major problem of mobilization.

[27] Approved May 8, 1792, 2d Cong., 1st sess. Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–100.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

enroll every such citizen [between 18–45 years of age] . . . , and also those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of eighteen years, or, being the age of eighteen years, and under . . . forty-five . . . , shall come to reside within his bounds". The third section of the act provided for the organization of the Militia into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies by the states and provided that the ". . . said militia shall be officered by the respective states." This casual delegation to the states of all power and authority to implement the measure meant that no matter what the zeal and concern of the states for the law, at best there would be as many different standards and procedures as there were states. At worst, it meant that not only would the State Militias be variegated but that they would be inefficient and inept militarily. The lack of teeth in the act and failure to provide Federal standardization and supervision for it doomed it to impotence; but it was to remain a law of the land, the organic mobilization measure in the United States, for 111 years.

The inadequacies and weaknesses of the Militia law were regularly brought to the attention of Congress by many of the Presidents beginning with Washington. As early as 29 December 1794, Rep. (later Sen.) William B. Giles, chairman of a congressional committee appointed to investigate these manifest deficiencies, reported to the House of Representatives that: ". . . further provision ought to be made, by law, . . . for enforcing the execution of the existing militia laws, by adequate and uniform penalties." [29] It was over a hundred years, however, before action was taken.

During the uneasily peaceful years which lasted until 1812, there was concern and limited planning in the War Department for what might have to be done in the event of war. In February 1796, Secretary of War Timothy Pickering reported to the Senate that the Army should not be reduced in strength because of its multiple missions.[30]

War With France or England: Preparedness Legislation

The increasing tension with both France and England following John Adam's inauguration as President occasioned some mobilization planning. Secretary of War James McHenry, on the advice of Hamilton, recommended to the Congress on 27 February 1798 and again on 9 April 1798 an increase in the Regular Army, authorization for a Provisional army of 20,000 and for military supplies in the amount of $1,108,900.[31] Congress was reasonably quick to act, not to the letter of McHenry's recommendation, but well within the spirit of it. On 27 April 1798, the Regular Army was increased by a regiment of artillerists and engineers. One week later, the Congress also increased

[29] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 107.
[30] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 112–13.
[31] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 119–23.

military appropriations by nearly $1,200,000 for fortifications, arms, and other military munitions. On 28 May, the Congress provided the President with discretionary authority for the desired Provisional army which it limited to 10,000 men to be enlisted for three years. The act granting this authority to the President also gave him power to commission all officers for this force, to organize it in accord with his judgment into infantry, artillery, and cavalry units, and with good foresight appropriated some $600,000 to arm and equip the force. The same act also authorized the President, at his discretion, to accept for Federal service any company or companies of infantry, cavalry, or artillery who should arm, clothe, and equip themselves and offer themselves for service. By implication, the President was authorized to commission the officers of the Volunteer companies also and, expressly, to commission the field officers necessary for the Volunteers. On 16 July 1798, the Congress expanded the Regular Army again by increasing the size of existing regiments and authorizing the recruitment of twelve additional infantry regiments and six troops of light dragoons.

The preparedness legislation of 1798 is notable in several particulars: first, the Congress soundly legislated to rely on Regular Army and Federal Volunteers exclusively, without resort to Militia; second, officers for Provisional and Volunteer units were to be commissioned by the President, not by the states nor by popular election; third, short-term enlistments were eliminated. Less commendatory were the undeniable facts that the legislation was enacted piecemeal, over a period of several months, and contained no provision for compulsory service. The continuance of a bounty for enlistment also was not desirable.[32]

To head the force authorized, Washington, then retired at Mount Vernon, was appealed to by President Adams. His appointment as lieutenant general in command was enthusiastically approved by the Senate on 7 July 1798. Washington accepted only on the proviso that he assume no duties and receive no pay until he took the field to repel invasion. To assist him and to do the spade work of organization and supply, Alexander Hamilton and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney were appointed major generals.[33] James Wilkinson re-

[32] The legislation of 1798 included: "An Act to provide an additional regiment of artillerists and engineers," Apr. 27, 1798; "An Act supplementary to the Act providing for the further defence of the ports and harbors of the United States," May 3, 1798 [$250,000]; "An Act to enable the President of the United States to procure cannon, arms, and ammunition; and for other purposes," May 4, 1798 [$800,000]; "An Act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a provisional army," May 28, 1798; "An Act providing arms for the militia throughout the United States," July 6, 1798; "An Act to augment the army of the United States, and for other purposes," July 16, 1798. See: Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 119–29.

[33] Henry Knox was also recalled to duty as the third ranking major general, but, incensed at being made junior to Hamilton and Pinckney, he declared he never would serve and never did.

mained a brigadier general and by the 1798 legislation was demoted from commanding general of the Army into a subordinate position ranked by three seniors.

Hamilton and Pinckney labored at the job of preparedness. As a major general, Hamilton's perspective was different from what it had been when he was Secretary of the Treasury. He was decidedly for military control of military expenditures and on his prompting the Congress on 16 July 1798 by law transferred the purchase of army supplies back to the War Department from the Treasury Department.[34] Actual purchasing was still done by the Purveyor of Public Supplies, a Treasury official, but at the direction of the Secretary of War. The Treasury Department retained only the right to inspect and to revise the expenditures and accounts of the War Department.[35]

The military legislation of 1798, in spite of defects already touched upon, was sound: certainly the best mobilization measures the United States had had up to that time or was to have for many years afterwards. However, very little of the legislation was implemented by President Adams. The threat of war subsided enough so that the Provisional army of Volunteers was never mobilized. Recruiting for the 12 additional Regular Army regiments had just become appreciable (3,399 had enlisted by January 1800) when it was discontinued; the 6 cavalry troops were not activated at all.[36]

On 2 March 1799, a law was enacted which created a medical department for the Army. The framework of the department was properly made flexible enough to permit its expansion in the event of war. Heading the new department were to be a physician general, a purveyor, and an apothecary general; hospitals, properly staffed, were provided. This law envisaged a medical department not only geared for a small peacetime army, but for an army vastly expanded in wartime.[37]

The same day the Congress renewed the President's authority to augment the Army but with some changes. The Congress now gave the President authority in the event of war or imminent danger of invasion, ". . . to organize and cause to be raised . . . twenty-four regiments of infantry, a regiment and a battalion of riflemen, a battalion of artillerists and engineers, and three regiments of cavalry . . . for a term not exceeding three years," and ". . . to appoint and commission all officers for the said troops." Sections 6–8 of the same act further authorized the President to accept and organize a Provisional army of 75,000 Volunteers, apportioned specifically to the states and

[34] By the Act of May 8, 1792, purchasing for the Army was made a function of the Treasury Department.

[35] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

[36] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 132, 137.

[37] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–31.

territories, and ". . . to appoint all officers thereof." But there was a fatal restriction placed on the employment of these Volunteers: ". . . the said volunteers shall not be compelled to serve out of the state in which they reside, a longer time than three months after their arrival at the place of rendezvous." [38] By this clause, effective use of the Provisional army was destroyed before the army was created.

On the following day, 3 March 1799, the Congress enacted most of the additional recommendations made by McHenry 10 weeks before. The strength of regiments in the combat arms was raised as requested; some military pay increases were granted; the army ranks of ensign and cornet were abolished in favor of second lieutenant; the ration was changed so as to reduce the whiskey allowance to a half gill daily, issue of which was no longer mandatory but discretionary with commanding officers; the staff of the Army was augmented so that it consisted of a quartermaster general, adjutant general, paymaster general (directed to be close enough to the troops to pay them on time), all of whom were provided with a reasonable number of assistants.[39]

Recruiting would be conducted in the customary manner, i. e., by recruiting officers who had the usual bounty bait to lure the prospects. To recruit the Provisional Army, the recruiting officers would be company grade officers commissioned for that Provisional army—an excellent idea since these officers would presumably use judgment enlisting men for their own companies. These measures, had they been implemented, would have provided a Regular Army of 40,000 men and a Provisional army of 75,000 Federal Volunteers. Again, in the 1799 legislation, the employment of Militia was not provided for. The legislation, except for the unfortunate restriction on the use of the Volunteers and for its failure to include provisions for compulsory service, was sound policy. But the war danger had again receded. None of the troops authorized by the Congress were ever mobilized, neither Regulars nor Volunteers. The Congress, be it noted, had acted with unusual speed in 1799; preparedness legislation requested by the President was enacted 10 weeks after his request was received. It had taken four months for similar legislation in 1798. The acceleration in 1799 may conceivably have been sparked by the desire of the members of Congress to go home, for 3 March 1799 marked the last session of the Fifth Congress.

Hamilton continued his planning. With commendable good sense, he summoned Wilkinson to return from the West to assist in the Army reorganization enacted by the flurry of legislation and to give advice on the military situation on the frontiers. On 1 August 1799 Wilkinson arrived in New York to confer with Hamilton, his sub-

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–33.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 133- 39.

ordinate officer during the Revolution but now his senior. The tact of Hamilton mollified Wilkinson to such a degree that he appears to have given excellent information and advice not only concerning the political and tactical situation on the frontiers, but also concerning morale and combat efficiency of the troops stationed there.[40] Acting on this advice and on his own observations, Hamilton informed the Secretary of War that the management of the supply agents was ". . . rediculously bad. Besides the extreme delay, which attends every operation, articles go forward in the most incomplete manner. . . ." McHenry, beyond giving the Purveyor, Tench Francis, an additional assistant, took no remedial action, so that Hamilton was again moved to write angrily to the Secretary of War that supply proceeded ". . . heavily and without order or punctuality . . . ill adapted to economy . . . and the contentment of the army . . . disjointed and piece-meal."[41] In addition to incompetence, lack of materials added to the supply difficulties which would have been acute had war required the mobilization of the full force authorized. The changes in uniform which Hamilton had adopted, while they bedizened the troops in a remarkable manner, tended further to complicate the supply situation without making any notable improvement in combat efficiency.

But the military system set up by the legislation and planning of 1798 and 1799 was never put into effect. The fall of the Directory in France in November 1799 and the emergence of the firmer, abler, conciliatory Napoleon soothed President Adams and the Congress into a pacific mood. Preparations for war ceased forthwith. Recruiting for the expanded force not only ceased, but the 3,399 already enlisted were ordered mustered out by 15 June 1800. To assuage the presumable grief of the officers and enlisted men at their abrupt dismissal from the Army, the Congress granted to each of them three months' pay, in addition to the allowance to get them home.[42] The Army, from its paper dream of 40,000 Regulars and 75,000 Provisionals, awakened to the dismal reality of 3,429 Regulars in mid-1800, and this handful of Regulars was scattered all over the frontier and Atlantic seaboard. The plans for mobilization in 1798–99 were abandoned as the emergency which had made them necessary ended. The War Department, suddenly stripped of its expansive legislation and its generals,[43] ceased to plan for mobilization, for preparedness, or for anything else, except current routine operations.

[40] Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–28.

[41] Ltrs, Hamilton to McHenry, 14 Jun 1799; McHenry to Hamilton, 15 Jun 1799; Hamilton to McHenry 13 Aug 1799. Cited in Bernard C. Steiner, *The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry* (Cleveland, 1907), pp. 390–91, 409.

[42] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

[43] Washington had died at Mount Vernon on 14 Dec 1799. The commissions of the other generals expired with the legislation which had created them.

A New President Prepares the Army for Perpetual Peace

The inauguration of Jefferson on 4 March 1801 was not an auspicious event for the Army. The New President had an abiding conviction that professional armies were wrong; he had, too, a sublime faith that a citizen soldiery was the hope and bulwark of any honorably efficient military system. Acting on his convictions and his faith, Jefferson propounded his "chaste reformation" of the Army which included a reduction in the size of the already tiny Regular Army, whose continuance as a permanent institution he seriously questioned, and the improvement of the Militia by whatever aid was required to accomplish that purpose.

The Congress acceded to the first thesis: the Army was reduced. The Act of March 16, 1802, eliminated the Cavalry entirely, cut the Infantry strength from four regiments to two, Artillery from two to one, and cut down the General Staff.[44] Authorized strength of the Army, by this act, went from 5,438 officers and men (of whom 4,051 only were in ranks on 19 December 1801, recruiting to fill vacancies having been halted) to 3,312 officers and men (of whom only 2,732 were in ranks by 4 February 1805).[45] And the horse-drawn Artillery's horses were sold, an economy which immobilized the Artillery for 10 years. But the act which whittled the Army almost into nothingness did contain one section of lasting significance: the creation of a military academy at West Point. This act specified that ". . . the said corps, when so organized, shall be stationed at West Point, in the state of New York, and shall constitute a military academy; and the engineers, assistant engineers, and cadets of the said corps, shall be subject, at all times, to do duty in such places and on such service, as the President of the United States shall direct."

The most important event in Jefferson's first administration was the purchase of the Louisiana Territory on 30 April 1803. Only a little more than a year after the reduction of the Army, the territory of the United States was doubled and vast new military responsibilities acquired. The boundaries of the territory were uncertain particularly in the region around the mouth of the Mississippi; the population in the New Orleans area was principally French; the rest of the territory was populated only by Indians about whom little was known. The military implications of the Louisiana Purchase were ignored.

During the early years of Jefferson's administration, war with France, Spain, or England was possible. The Regular Army, however, was scattered over an ever increasing number of small posts, most of them on the expanding frontier. For some years, the public believed that strong fortifications could protect the country from invasion. The Congress appropriated considerable sums of money for

[44] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 141–49.
[45] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 155, 175–77.

these seaboard fortifications and took a keen interest in their state of readiness. To supplement the land batteries in their fortresses, Jefferson became convinced that a fleet of shallow draft gun boats was the economical and practical solution. The Congress concurred with the President[46] and some 69 of these tubby little gunboats were constructed by the end of 1807, each schooner rigged and armed with a battery of two guns, which, in any kind of sea, had to be stowed below decks to keep the little craft from capsizing. Secretary of War Henry Dearborn estimated that 257 gunboats were needed to protect the country, but production was stopped well short of that number.

Fortresses require cannons, and Dearborn, after some study, was concerned about the ability of American manufacturers to meet demands. He accordingly suggested to a master armorer, Henry Foxhall, that he build at his own expense on public land in Washington a foundry for the manufacture of heavy ordnance. Foxhall, with considerable reason, objected to such a proposal since, were Government orders to cease for any reason, he would be unable to keep the foundry in operation, thereby suffering great financial loss. Foxhall recommended instead that the Government build its own armory which, he urged, was "absolutely necessary" in any event as a yardstick to determine fair cost of ordnance and to enable standardization of artillery.[47] Dearborn's planning and concern, however, did not go so far as to spend public money for an ordnance foundry and the project was dropped. The United States, all through the War of 1812, was to suffer from want of artillery which the five hundred private foundries in the country were not able to manufacture fast enough or in sufficient quantity.[48]

Mobilization Measures, 1803–1808

The need for mobilization of ground forces in the event of war was apparently not deemed a matter of moment by the President from 1803 to 1808. There were several laws passed by the Congress which authorized some mobilization measures, but they created only paper soldiers for Jefferson failed to implement them.

On 3 March 1803 the Congress granted to the President authority to requisition from the states ". . . a detachment of militia not exceeding eighty thousand, officers included" to be held ". . . in readiness to march at a moment's warning." The act also provided that the detachments be officered out of the "present militia officers, or others, at the option and discretion of the constitutional authority in each state . . .; the President of the United States apportioning the general officers among the respective states." An appropriation of

[46] *Ibid,* I, p. 217.
[47] *Ibid.,* I, pp. 215–17.
[48] Jacobs, *op. cit.,* p. 277.

$1,500,000 to pay these troops, if mobilized, to purchase ordnance and military stores, and for other defense purposes, to be used at the discretion of the President, was included. The Militia detachments, if the President judged it expedient, could be composed of Volunteers, who would serve not more than 12 months.[49] This act was never implemented. It was significant only because it appropriated money and reverted to that Revolutionary War-proved weakness: selection of officers by the states. This lesson of the Revolution, remembered in the 1790's, was forgotten by 1803 and was not to be recalled until the next century. The increasing confidence of the Congress in the Volunteer Militia, rather than in the Common Militia, was also evident in legislation.

On 18 April 1806, in words almost exactly the same as the Act of March 3, 1803, the Congress renewed the President's authority to requisition up to 80,000 Militia from the states and appropriated $2,000,000 to cover expenses of mobilization. Period of service, however, was reduced to six months from the already weak one-year term.[50] Again, the President did not exercise the authority granted him: not a man was mobilized. Indeed, it was well over a year before the Secretary of War wrote to the governors informing them of their respective state quotas.

By the end of 1806, the Congress was becoming increasingly worried about defense but the War Department seemed less concerned. Dearborn continued vague and planless about troop mobilization and defense preparations.[51] In the meantime the Congress continued to legislate preparedness measures. The strength of the Regular Army, on 2 December 1807, as nearly as can be determined from War Department files, was about 3,338 officers, cadets, and enlisted men.[52] At the same time, Dearborn at the request of Congress estimated annual costs for a balanced army of 32,800 men which came to $8,087,943.[53]

While the United States considered its military establishment, France and Great Britain were fighting for supremacy in Europe. Great Britain had begun blockading the continent in May 1806 with its Orders in Council. Napoleon retaliated by setting up his Continental System, which decreed a paper blockade of Great Britain and closed the continent to British trade. American shipping fell prey to the competing forces, and to avoid war the Congress at the Administration's suggestion passed the Embargo Act of December 22, 1807, forbidding the departure of ships for foreign ports.

---

[49] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 198.
[51] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 206–07.
[52] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 222–23.
[53] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 224–27.

The issue of *physically* increasing the army, rather than just increasing it on paper, was debated in Congress through 1806, 1807, and the first two months of 1808. Finally on 26 February 1808 an aroused Jefferson, for the first time in his administration, formally requested the Congress to increase the Regular Army by 6,000 men.[54] He also recommended some augmentation of Volunteer Militia but on 3 March 1808 Congress reenacted the old standby legislation of March 3, 1803 (renewed in 1806) which provided a paper army of 80,000 Militia.[55] The Regular Army bill was passed by comfortable majorities and became law on 12 April 1808.

Act of April 12, 1808 and its Aftermath

The Regular Army increase voted was substantially as recommended by Dearborn and approved by the President. There were provided 6,000 troops which when added to the 3,300 Regulars already in the service would provide a Regular Army of 9,900 men.[56]

The Act of April 12, 1808, authorized a light artillery regiment, but since artillery units were expensive Secretary of War Dearborn, treading cautiously, authorized only one battery, whose horses were purchased in May 1808. The enthusiastic battery commander, Capt. George Peter, labored arduously to recruit and train his men, to assemble his equipment, and to train his animals. This promising beginning towards mobile artillery fire support came to an untimely and abrupt end in the spring of 1809 when a new Secretary of War, William Eustis, in the interest of economy ordered the artillery horses sold. This economy completely immobilized the artillery for three more years at a time when mobilization measures should have been emerging.[57]

President Jefferson, unpleasantly aware of the danger of war, was again urging some constructive legislation to strengthen the Militia. In his Eighth Annual Message to Congress he asked if the Militia could "repel a powerful enemy at every point of our territories exposed to invasion." [58] The Congress pondered this query and came to its customary decision in the matter on 3 January 1809. The members of a House Committee, ". . . have carefully examined the subject referred to them, are of the opinion that it would not be proper, at this time, to make any alteration in the militia system of the United States." [59]

---

[54] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 227–28.

[55] Callan, *op. cit.,* p. 200.

[56] *Ibid.,* pp. 200–05.

[57] William E. Birkhimer, *Historical Sketch of the Organization, Administration, Materiel and Tactics of the Artillery, United States Army* (Washington, 1884), pp. 34–36.

[58] Thomas Jefferson, *Eighth Annual Message to Congress,* 8 Nov 1808, in James D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1902* (Washington 1897), I, p. 443.

[59] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 236.

One additional provision of the Act of April 12, 1808, can be construed as a mobilization measure: it provided for the creation of two additional brigadier generals. With a fine weighing of political factors, the stars were given to Wade Hampton, from South Carolina, and to Peter Gansvoort, from New York. Political expediency was satisfied, but military ability was hardly considered.[60]

The administration of Jefferson terminated on 3 March 1809. During the last four years of that administration, the United States had teetered on the brink of war. Preparedness legislation had been enacted, but, in a practical sense, there had been no mobilization plans. Jefferson, during most of his years as President, had refused to plan for war; nor had he exercised the leadership which was his to secure from the Congress implementing mobilization legislation, except for recommending a more efficient Militia system, and on that subject the Congress was not disposed to heed him. At the same time Jefferson had multiplied the military responsibilities of the country by the vast Louisiana Purchase in 1803. Dearborn, Jefferson's Secretary of War for eight years, was completely loyal to his policies. He turned the Army into a kind of constabulary to police the Indians but left it unprepared and ill-equipped for war.

President Madison began his administration by reversing the already motionless preparedness measures. Under the pleasing misapprehension that relations with England and France had improved, the President ordered the gunboats still afloat to be tied up and released the Militia from alert status. Inasmuch as the gunboats were useless and the Militia something less than alert, the actions of the President were more indicative of a kindly, pacific nature than of any firm grasp of realities. In his first message to the Congress, which met on 22 May 1809, Madison went so far as to wonder whether it might not be feasible to reduce the Army and the Navy.

The Congress was not reluctant to consider the matter of reducing the Army. John Randolph promptly and enthusiastically demanded two days later that all Regular Army units raised under the Act of April 12, 1808, be discharged forthwith, and that the funds thereby saved be used to buy more arms for the Militia. The Secretary of War felt ". . . it expedient to reduce the military establishment at this time," but suggested that recruiting for the Army might be suspended provided the President was given discretionary power to renew it.

The Congress defeated Randolph's bill to abrogate the Act of April 12, 1808, but more for political reasons than for any considered concern for defense. (The bill would have diverted most of the money saved to the Militia of the southern states, a maneuver ex-

[60] Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

tremely repugnant to northern Congressman.)[61] A few days later a measure was enacted suspending any more enlistments for the force, the suspension to continue until at least 20 days after the next meeting of Congress.[62] The President was *not* given discretionary power to resume enlistments; this Congress, like some that were to come later, was of the firm but fallacious impression that no emergency could occur so rapidly that the Congress could not move fast enough to cope with it.

The 11th Congress, in its several sessions, sat for 285 days without passing a single practical military preparedness measure. The President had vainly tried to lead the Congress to an awareness of possible war and to prepare for it to some extent, but Madison as a leader was ineffectual. Eustis had made some sensible recommendations to Congress which were not followed, but in the main Eustis was so lost in a morass of inconsequential detail that he was incapable of leading or advising the Congress on military matters. The War Department was without an adequate staff, headed by a confused Secretary, and undermanned in even clerical help; it stumbled along, inadequate to create a dynamic peacetime army and totally unprepared to fashion an army for war purposes. The 11th Congress conducted many a bitter investigation, engaged in many acid debates, but accomplished nothing practical as far as mobilization measures were concerned. On 30 January 1810 Eustis reported to the House that the "Peace Establishment" Regular Army now had an aggregate strength of 2,765 and that the "Additional Military Force" authorized by the Act of April 12, 1808, but for which recruiting had been suspended by Congress in 1809, had an aggregate strength of 4,189 or about two-thirds of the authorized strength. Out of the combined Regular Army strength, some 2,772 had been concentrated in the Orleans area by the early summer of 1809.[63]

The Indians Go On the Warpath

While Congress talked and Madison bickered with the British, war erupted on the frontier. William Henry Harrison, Governor of Indiana Territory, had been pushing westward with an acceleration which stripped the Indians of 48,000,000 acres of land in 14 years (1795–1809). The discontent of the Indians was unified and sharpened by the able chief Tecumseh and his brother the Prophet, a combination of sword and mysticism that kindled a crusading fervor in the Indians and alarmed the frontier. The War Department was to-

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 343.

[62] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[63] The returns for 31 Oct 1809 reported that out of 1,667 men assigned to the Orleans area, 745 were sick, 9 confined, 499 absent, and 414 present for duty. A total of 686 died between May 1809 and March 1810. See: *Ibid.*, I, pp. 249–53, 270.

tally unprepared to solve the crisis except by leaving it to the man on the spot to improvise his own plans and to implement his own actions. The man on the spot this time was Harrison. Eustis gave tacit approval to some kind of military action by directing one company of the 4th Infantry to report to Harrison at Vincennes, but the rest of the regiment was to halt near Cincinnati; the Secretary also directed Harrison to mobilize four companies of the Indiana Militia. Disturbed by the War Department's inadequate measures, Harrison, on his own initiative, mobilized the *entire* Indiana Militia and ordered the *entire* 4th Infantry to report to him at Vincennes. With a 1,000-man force, rather than the 300 men authorized initially by Eustis, Harrison took off to reason with the Indians. His force had been strengthened by Kentucky volunteers when the Indians attacked at Tippecanoe and were soundly defeated on 7 November 1811.[64] Peace was restored on the frontier; the Indians sadly resumed their withdrawal to the west; and Harrison had established himself as a national hero at Tippecanoe. Mobilization of the force and conduct of this brief military campaign had been accomplished by Harrison without any plans or appreciable assistance from the War Department. Decentralization of authority to the man on the spot was complete.

The War Hawks

Conditions in Europe were still chaotic; the struggle for supremacy between Great Britain and France continued. The Embargo Act of 1807 had proved ineffective as far as forcing France and England to respect neutral shipping, but it had seriously hurt American shipping and was repealed 15 March 1809. It was followed by the Non-Intercourse Act of May 20, 1809, which permitted commerce with all countries except France and England; this act was in turn repealed in May 1810. Old disputes over the rights of neutral shipping remained unsettled, and the resumption of trade brought new ones.

The Congressional elections of 1810–11 changed not only the complexion but the spirit of the Congress. Almost 50 per cent of the members of the 11th Congress were defeated for reelection. There can be but little question that Madison's confused foreign and military policies, which were reflected in the leaderless 11th Congress, had aroused public opinion and brought into the 12th Congress the "War Hawks." These newly elected members included Henry Clay from Kentucky, John Sevier from Tennessee, John C. Calhoun from western South Carolina, and Peter P. Porter from western New York. Although the "War Hawks" did not have a majority in the House, they were politically clever enough to have Clay made Speaker, a vantage

[64] At Tippecanoe, Harrison had about 250 Regulars of the 4th Infantry, 600 Indiana Militia, 60 Kentucky Volunteers, and 270 assorted Mounted Dragoons from Indiana and Kentucky.

point that then controlled appointment to all important committees. The leadership of the 12th Congress steered for the war, beyond which they saw Canada ripe for annexation. This Congress first assembled on 4 November 1811 and it began to pass preparedness legislation before the year was over.

On 24 December 1811 the suspension of enlistments directed by the 11th Congress in 1809 was lifted.[65] On 2 January 1812 the President was given authority to raise six companies of Rangers for frontier duty.[66] On 11 January 1812 the Regular Army was authorized ten more regiments of Infantry, two of Artillery, and one of Light Dragoons, all to be enlisted for five years.[67] On 6 February 1812 the President was authorized to call for Volunteer companies up to 30,000 men, officers to come with the companies as appointed in the respective states; $1,000,000 was appropriated to provide for these Volunteers.[68] On 24 February 1812 the Congress authorized the President to buy horses and equipage for the Light Artillery which had been afoot and immobile since their horses had been sold in 1809.[69] And on 28 March 1812 the Army got a quartermaster general again, with a reasonable number of deputies and clerical help. The same act created a commissary general of purchases, under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War, thereby removing entirely the Treasury Department's hand from the War Department purse strings.[70]

The evident intent of the Congress—that the emergency be met by an expanded Regular Army—could not be complied with. The inadequate recruiting system and the antipathy throughout the country to Regular Army service made it impossible to increase the Regulars as fast or as much as the Congress had hoped. In this unforeseen emergency Congress continued to legislate. On 10 April 1812 the President was authorized to call out up to 100,000 Militia men for a period of six months.[71] Militia service was, as usual, more popular than the Regular Army. Still trying to make the service more desirable, this enactment also suspended flogging as an authorized punishment.

War With England: 1812

A flood of legislation [72] which was in keeping with public opinion perhaps weakened Madison's desire for peace. Castlereagh's reluc-

[65] Callan, *op cit.*, p. 211.
[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 211–12.
[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 212–15.
[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 215–16.
[69] *Ibid.*, pp. 216.
[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 217–20.
[71] *Ibid.*, pp. 222.
[72] On 23 Apr 1812 an act authorized a corps of artificers to be attached to the quartermaster general's department. Six days later, the Military Academy at West Point, which had come close to extinction during Eustis' waning months at the War Department, was revitalized by additional funds and other remedial legislation. The improvements legis-

tance to repeal the Orders in Council washed away with what was left of Madison's aversion to war. On 1 June 1812 the President sent the Congress a message recommending war against Great Britain for four reasons: impressment, violations of the three-mile limit, paper blockades, Orders in Council. On 18 June 1812 war was declared.[73] The vote in the House was 79 to 49 for war; 19 to 13 in the Senate. It was an amazing vote, for a majority of the Congressmen from New England, New York, and New Jersey, the maritime states which owned three-fourths of the Nation's ship tonnage and in whose supposed interest the war was declared, voted *against* the war. The inland and western states of Vermont, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, few of whose inhabitants had ever seen the sea and whose communities were both immune from Orders in Council and safe from the British fleet, came within one vote of unanimity for war.[74]

Mobilization Legislation Enacted on Advent of War

The 12th Congress, in its first session, had enacted 15 mobilization measures culminating in the war declaration. Following that declaration, the Congress passed six more military measures, one of which gave the President authority to commission officers for the Federal Volunteers. This authority had formerly been a prerogative of the governors. On 6 July 1812, with sublime assurance that the necessary legislation had been provided to ensure a quick and easy victory in a short war, the first session of the 12th Congress adjourned. It did not vote any new taxes nor any increase in the Navy. Public and legislative opinion was of the belief that the march to Canada would be an easy one.

On 18 June 1812, the day war was declared, the legislation which immediately preceded it had increased the *authorized* Regular Army strength to 35,603 officers and enlisted men. In addition, the President had been authorized to mobilize 30,000 Federal Volunteers, 100,000 State Militia, and a handful of Federal Rangers, making a total authorized strength for the land forces of about 166,000 men. The staff of the Army had been expanded so that there were now authorized two major generals, nine brigadier generals, a quartermaster general, a commissary general of purchases, a commissary of ordnance, an inspector general, an adjutant, a judge advocate general, a paymaster general and a surgeon general. The military academy at West Point had been strengthened and improved. Funds had been allotted

---

lated for West Point came too late to influence the war but would be felt later. By Jun 1812, only 89 cadets had finished a course at the Military Academy and of these only 65 were still in the Army. On 14 May 1812, the Congress further increased the Army's staff by creating an Ordnance Department to be headed by a commissary of ordnance. See Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 223, 226.

[73] Two days earlier, on 16 Jun Castlereagh had announced in the House of Commons that the Orders in Council were suspended.

[74] Samuel E. Morison, *Oxford History of the United States* (London, 1927), I, p. 283.

to purchase arms, equipment, and clothing for the expanded force. These were mobilization measures which on the surface were sound, but in their execution something was lacking.

The immediate and clearest weakness of this legislation was that it came too late. The war and the legislation to prepare for war came almost simultaneously. There did not exist in the War Department a planning group of any kind which could match mobilization legislation with implementing mobilization plans. When the 12th Congress first assembled, the War Department consisted of Secretary Eustis and a staff of seven clerks. The senior general in the Army, Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson, had been away from Washington for most of his service and had had little influence on war policy or planning; questionable activities had incurred for him so much enmity that during the 1810–11 period he was kept busy defending himself before a court-martial and a Congressional investigating committee. The staff, before 1812, had been reduced to an adjutant-inspector general, a paymaster, and an adjutant. The expanded staff provided by the 12th Congress was, in the short time it existed before it was confronted with a war, hardly able to organize, let alone function.[75]

Furthermore, there had been no opportunity for staff training on any level, since regiments and battalions had no staff at all up to 1812. The heads of the staff departments on 18 June 1812 were not particularly capable men; the staff posts had been filled by men who lacked both training and experience, but it is doubtful if any better men were available. The tiny Regular Army, scattered in small detachments all over the frontier, had not provided the kind of service which trained officers to be leaders in large scale operations. The men commissioned for the expanded Army in many instances lacked military training and in most instances were political appointees. As Lt. Col. Winfield Scott described them, the older officers had ". . . very generally sunk into either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking"; the new officers were ". . . coarse and ignorant men . . . swaggerers . . . decayed gentlemen, and others—'fit for nothing else', which always turned out *utterly unfit for any military purpose whatever.*" [76]

---

[75] Eustis wrote to General Pinckney on 13 Jun 1812: "The late periods at which the laws respecting the several staff departments have passed, and the supplementary acts which became necessary, have delayed their organization and produced great embarrassments to the service. . . . In the present state of the several Staff Departments, extra official duties will devolve on commanding officers, requiring the exercise of great discretion, and involving no small degree of Responsibility. To organize them [the staff departments] as soon as possible, and in the best manner which the Law will admit, is the constant object of this Department." *Military Book No. 5, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War,* pp. 441–42. Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives. Eustis' hopes were impossible to achieve, for there were so few commanding officers with enough experience to be able to exercise discretion or who were capable of assuming great responsibility.

[76] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL. D.* (New York, 1864), pp. 31–35.

The dearth of leaders for the Army was as acute on the highest stratum of command as in the staff and small unit echelons. The expanded Army authorized by Congress in 1812 provided two major generals, where there had been none, and nine additional brigadier generals, where there had been three.[77] Eustis was able to fill these senior vacancies faster than the recruiting service could fill the ranks, but the selections were politically influenced. The appointees were old men, most of whom had not had military service for many years.[78] The ranking major general was Henry Dearborn, who had been Secretary of War himself for eight years and who was, in 1812, Collector of the Port of Boston, an assignment befitting his 62 years. The second major general, Thomas Pinckney, had served ably in the Revolution but had had no military service since then; he was now 61 years old.

Laws had been passed creating a Regular Army of over 35,000 men, but Eustis reported to the Congress on 5 June 1812 that the Army numbered 6,744 men and his breakdown, showing where they were stationed, accounted for only 5,087; the discrepancy of 1,657 consisted presumably of recruits not yet present with their units.[79] This was hardly indicative of an enthusiastic flocking to the Colors. It was easy to understand this reluctance to enlist for eighteen months or for five years when glory, martial ardour, and financial enrichment could be satisfied by a two- or three-month tour in the Militia. But difficulties were quick to occur in the mobilization of the Militia too. Eustis had allocated the quotas to the states to raise the 100,000 Militia authorized by the Congress on 10 April 1812 and had written to the governors directing them to mobilize and equip their allotted number.[80] The governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island promptly refused to obey the order, which, they maintained, was not constitutional and therefore illegal. This depletion of 13,500 men cut down the 100,000 Militia by nearly 15 per cent. There were im-

[77] Two of the three had been created by the Act of April 12, 1808; until 1808, Wilkinson had been the only active general officer in the Army.

[78] The Navy, on the other hand, during the Barbary campaigns had developed young, vigorous leaders: John Rodgers, David Porter, James Lawrence, Oliver H. Perry, Isaac Hull, Stephen Decatur, but these capable naval commanders were handicapped by the absence of a Navy. The strategists in Congress and the elder statesmen, from Jefferson down, had decreed that this was to be a land war.

[79] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 319–20.

[80] The state quotas were as follows:

New Hampshire	3,500	Maryland	6,000
Massachusetts	10,000	Virginia	12,000
Connecticut	3,000	No. Carolina	7,000
Rhode Island	500	So. Carolina	5,000
Vermont	3,000	Georgia	3,500
New York	13,500	Kentucky	5,500
Pennsylvania	14,000	Ohio	5,000
Delaware	1,000	Tennessee	2,500
New Jersey	5,000		

See: *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 319.

mediate questions raised, too, concerning the legality of the Federal Government's employing Militia outside the United States or even outside its home state.[81]

Manpower Mobilization: Problems and Procedures

Recruiting for the Regular Army was as slow and discouraging as it had been during the Revolutionary War and for the same reasons. The greater attractiveness of short-term Militia tours with their high bonuses and the absence of any kind of compulsion to bring men into the service were handicaps which the Regular Army recruiting teams with small immediate $16 bonuses and nebulous future land grants could not overcome. Disturbed by the emptiness of the Regular regiments, the Congress, again in session, tried to remedy the situation by such expedients as increasing the pay for all enlisted grades; exempting enlisted men from arrest for debt; making the term of enlistment the duration of the war instead of five years; advancing the enlistees $24 of their pay; and increasing the premium for enlistees from $2 to $4.[82]

To ease the situation further, the Act of January 20, 1813, authorized recruiting officers to enlist for the Regular Army any man then performing Militia service. Having taken these measures which, in a more diluted form had already proved ineffective, the Congress optimistically voted on 29 January to increase the Regular Army by six major generals, six brigadier generals, and by twenty additional regiments (the latter for one year).[83] This brought the total authorized strength of the Regular Army to 58,354; but in February 1813 only 19,036 men were in regular service.

The President had also been authorized to raise up to 30,000 Federal Volunteers and 17 companies of Rangers.[84] Recruits were as reluctant to join these Federal Volunteer forces as they were to join the Regular Army. The *Army Register*, an innovation of 29 December 1813, listed enough officers of Volunteer units for perhaps 12 companies of Rangers, 46 companies of United States Volunteers, and 5 companies of Sea Fencibles (a specially qualified volunteer organization for seacoast defense).[85] Even assuming that these companies were full strength, their total in 1813 could not have been much more than five thousand men, hardly enough to make them an appreciable factor. These Federal Volunteer units took over some of the seacoast fortifications and a few frontier posts, thereby relieving Regular troops to fight.

---

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 321–26.
[82] Acts of Dec. 12, 1812 and Jan. 20, 1813. See: Callan, *op cit.*, pp. 236–38.
[83] Act of Jan. 29, 1813. *Ibid.*, pp. 238–40.
[84] Federal Volunteers should not be confused with State Volunteers or Volunteer Militia.
[85] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 421–23.

This amusing caricature of the men recruited for the War of 1812 is the work of D. C. Johnston and was first published in 1832. This form of art was popular during the early nineteenth century.

Figure 1. Caricature of 1812.

Eustis was succeeded in the War Department by Maj. Gen. John Armstrong on 13 January 1813 and the negative weaknesses of Eustis gave way to the positive weaknesses of Armstrong. Armstrong did have some understanding of military administration which may have been responsible for the publication of the *Army Register* and of the vastly more important *Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States*, dated 1 May 1813.[86] This forerunner of *Army Regulations*, published eleven months after the war began, contained such valuable information as the duties of the different staff officers, rules for promotion, uniform regulations (in great detail), pay scales, clothing allowances and costs, recruiting instructions, rules for Militia drafts, etc. The exigencies of administering an expanded wartime Army through a newly created and not yet actively competent staff had become so manifold and disturbing that decentralization was the only solution. The *Rules and Regulations* divided the country into nine military administrative districts with a brigadier general in command of each district.[87]

Recruiting for the Regular Army and for the Federal Volunteers, being an administrative function, was made a responsibility of the military district commander who was directed to set up a principal

[86] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 425–38.

[87] Division of the country into supply districts for the letting of ration contracts had been found so practical during the Revolution that the system had been continued and was still in effect; there was no apparent planned effort made in 1813, however, to make the military districts and ration supply districts correspond. Where they were the same that sensible uniformity was the result of blending of coincidence with geography.

rendezvous and such minor depots for recruits as he deemed necessary. The Commissary General of Purchases was directed to deposit at each principal recruit rendezvous, a "sufficient quantity of clothing, arms, accoutrements, ammunition, camp equipage, and medicine" [88] for the quota of regulars to be recruited in the district. Replenishment of these recruit supplies was to be on requisitions made by the district commander, who also was given bounty and premium funds to allot to the recruiting teams. These teams were composed of officers and enlisted men from Regular Army regiments who were charged with recruiting men for their own units.[89] The recruiters were enjoined not to accept any ". . . person . . . who has sore legs, scurvy, scald head, ruptures, or other infirmities . . . No objection is to be made to a recruit for want of size, provided he be strong, active, well made, and healthy." [90] The oath of service was subscribed to before a civil magistrate within six days of enlistment. Recruiting parties were to report the following week to the district commander: the strength of the recruiting party; the number, names, and description of recruits enlisted the past week; and an accounting for funds, property, and recruit clothing. The recruits, with their up-to-date service records, were forwarded from local depots to the principal recruit rendezvous, within seven days of enlistment, where they would be formed into squads or companies for basic training and disciplining. District commanders were held responsible for the good conduct, order, and discipline of recruiting parties and for the efficiency of the recruiting system. It was a reasonably efficient and simple mobilization system, but general unfamiliarity with it due to its late promulgation and even more general failure to comply with all of its provisions sometimes made it extremely difficult for the War Department to keep informed of the status of enlistments. On 22 October 1814 The Adjutant-Inspector General was aggrievedly informing a committee of the Senate that two regiments (the 40th Infantry and the 46th Infantry) had not submitted any recruit returns at all and that several other regiments were late submitting their returns.[91] The concern of the War Department and of Congress over possible misuse of bounty funds by recruiting officers appears to have been unfounded; the number of recruits closely approximated the bounty and premium funds expended for such purposes.[92]

The dearth of Regulars and Federal Volunteers was to continue during the entire war. [See *table 2.*] There was again proved the immu-

[88] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 432.

[89] The methods used by the recruiting teams included the familiar fife and drum psychology, appeals to patriotism and self-interest, plus the usual judicious application of rum.

[90] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 432–33.

[91] *Ibid.,* I, p. 518.

[92] *Ibid.,* I, pp. 518–19.

table fact that a man, when given a choice, would choose a short-term enlistment with a high bounty in a Militia unit rather than a long-term enlistment with a relatively small bounty in a Regular Army unit. James Monroe relieved Armstrong as Secretary of War 27 September 1814 after the Bladensburg debacle which Armstrong and President Madison had witnessed first hand. Monroe soon became convinced that the failures in the recruiting service were due in most states ". . . principally to the high bounty given for substitutes by the detached Militia. Many of the Militia detached for six months have given a greater sum for substitutes than the bounty allowed by the United States for a recruit to serve for the war." [93] The Congress made some attempts to correct this defect by increasing the bounty (in 1814) to $124 payable in three installments; by increasing the land grant, on honorable discharge, to 320 acres; and by raising the premium for recruits to $8.[94] These measures increased the cost of Volunteer enlistments but did not materially increase their numbers.

Table 2. Number of Troops Employed in the War of 1812.[a]*

Type of troops	Number	Term of service	Number
Total	527, 654	Total	527, 654
Regulars [b]	56, 032	12 months or more [b]	63, 179
Special Federal Volunteers [c]	13, 159	6–12 months	66, 325
Federal Volunteers	10, 110	3–6 months	125, 643
Rangers	3, 049	1–3 months	125, 307
Militia [c]	458, 463	Less than 1 month	147, 200

[a] Audited statistics for the War of 1812 are not available, but figures quoted are the ones most generally accepted.

[b] Includes 5,000 sailors and marines.

[c] Since the majority of this force was employed for short intervals at various times and some served or enlisted many times, the number of individuals who actually served cannot be estimated.

**Source:* Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1907), p. 137.

The lack of Regulars and Federal Volunteers during the war made it necessary for the President to have recourse to Militia calls which had been authorized by the Congress under the Act of April 10, 1812. In general, the state governors, after receiving notice of the quota of the state's Militia which *might* be required and which they were directed to have in readiness for immediate mobilization, took no action other than the publication of a state general order, until a specific request to furnish the whole or part of the quota was made. These state general orders subdivided the state's quota to various divisions and brigades and directed the commanders thereof to furnish the

[93] *Ibid.*, I, p. 519.

[94] Callan, *op cit.*, p. 250.

required number whenever called on by the authorized Regular Army officer. When that call came, Militiamen were directed to come furnished with arms and equipment, but the orders provided that those who were short would be supplied on their arrival at designated rendezvous points where depositories of arms and equipment were kept. The Militiamen were required to march to the rendezvous area where they would be inspected and mustered into the Federal service.

The specific call or request for Militia from a state would be made by an Army officer, usually of general's rank, to whom the President especially delegated the authority to call on certain governors for a stipulated number of Militia. The United States officer would issue his requisition to the governor, expressing the number of privates, non-commissioned officers, and officers required.[95] The Militia unit commanders, on receipt of a call for a detachment, would assemble their commands and call for volunteers to meet the quota. When oratory and exhortation failed to produce the required number of Militia volunteers, a judicious threat of a draft and, if need be, the carrying out of the threat supplied the men, who were then "in the Army" for the customary short tour. Usually the drafted Militiaman had the option of furnishing a substitute. As soon as 100 privates, 11 non-commissioned officers, and 5 officers were mobilized and formed into a company, they were inspected by an inspector general or other designated Regular Army officer, and mustered into the Federal service.[96]

There had been little advance preparation for the selection of sites for recruit rendezvous depots or for necessary construction there of barracks and other facilities. In March of 1812, the Secretary of War, suddenly realizing that some kind of camps would be necessary and that some kind of troop housing thereat would be desirable, wrote

[95] The former practice of requisitioning so many companies, battalions, regiments, or brigades had been found so loose and inefficient that it had been discontinued.

[96] *The Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States for 1813* contained a section entitled "Rules with Regard to Militia Draughts";

1st. All militia detachments for the service of the United States must be made under the requisition of some officer of the United States, (to be hereafter authorized to make such requisition) on the Executive authority of the State, or of the territory from which the detachments shall be drawn.

2d. In these requisitions shall be expressed the number of privates, non-commissioned and commissioned officers required; which shall be in the same proportions to each other as obtain in the regular army. The looser method of requiring regiments or brigades will be discontinued.

3d. So soon as one hundred privates, eleven non-commissioned, and five commissioned officers, shall have been organized as a company, under any requisition as aforesaid, they will be mustered and inspected by an Inspector General, or his assistant, or some other officer of the army of the United States, thereto specially appointed; upon whose rolls and reports they will be entitled to pay, &c.

4th. It shall be the duty of the officer so mustering and inspecting militia detachments, to make immediate report thereof to the War Department; and

5th. Payment will be made through the regimental paymaster, in all cases in which the corps shall be organized as a regiment; and in all cases in which it shall fall short of the number necessary to that organization, by the Paymaster accompanying the army or division to which it may belong.

See: *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 443.

to the military agents and to the senior Army and Militia officers directing them to select camp sites and to begin construction or to rent suitable buildings; but the instructions were both broad and vague.

Training at first was omitted almost entirely. There were few officers or noncommissioned officers qualified to instruct recruits. The Military Academy at West Point which had been established in 1802 had graduated only 89 officers by the beginning of the War of 1812; 73 of these graduates served in the Army during the war years, but most of them held low rank. So few men, trained only for a year or two at West Point, could have had little effect on the wartime Army.[97] There was also a dearth of training literature. So apparent was the unfortunate effect of the lack of training on recruits that there were repercussions on the floors of Congress.[98]

In the field, there were a few efforts to rectify the poor or absent training procedures. Brig. Gen. George McClure in December 1813, at Batavia, N. Y., set up a kind of recruit training camp under the command of 1st Lt. David Riddle, a Regular officer of some ability.[99] This effort, however significant it may have been as the first replacement training camp in the United States, was on too limited a scale to influence appreciably the Army's efficiency. Far more important was the training camp set up by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott near Buffalo, in 1914. Here officers were put through a practical training program at the conclusion of which they gave the same training to their men. The beneficial aspects of this training were notable in those units which were subject to it, but the program was late and certainly not Army-wide.[100] Its importance lay in the fact that the concept of proper training methods was taking root in American military consciousness. During the War of 1812, there were still not enough officers imbued with that concept, but the foundation was laid.

Training literature, although more extensive than it had been during the Revolutionary War, was not readily available, nor was it of much tactical value. Besides the *Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States* and the *Army Register*, there were some stilted manuals on formal infantry and field artillery parade-ground drill formations.[101]

So short were the enlistment periods of many Militia units that the Militiamen were ready for discharge before an attempt could be

---

[97] George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy* (Cambridge 1891), I. In addition to the 73 graduates from the 1802–12 classes, 1 man was graduated in 1813 and 30 in 1814, all of whom served in the closing months of the war.

[98] Speech, Thomas R. Gold, 29 Dec. 1812, in *Abridgement of the Debates of Congress* (Washington, 1861), IV, p. 615.

[99] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 487.

[100] Charles Winslow Elliott, *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man,* (New York, 1937), p. 146.

[101] Amasa Smith, *A Short Compendium of the Duty of Artillerists* (2d ed.; Boston, 1813), was typical of the training literature available.

made to accomplish the mission for which they had been mobilized. Time was always so short that there was almost no opportunity for training. It is no wonder that the untrained, often shoddily equipped Militia frequently deserted on contact with uncomfortable field service or broke on contact with danger. Commanders were constantly harassed by the uneasy choice of using untrained, undisciplined, untrustworthy, poorly equipped Militia, or of seeing them go home, unused, after a few weeks. Neither solution was beneficial to military reputations.

The Monroe Proposals for a National Military Policy

The difficulty securing Regulars and unfortunate reverses suffered by the Militia at Bladensburg so concerned the Congress that Sen. William B. Giles, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, in September 1814 appealed to Secretary of War Monroe for information on two points: what was wrong with the military establishment and what legislation was needed to correct defects.[102]

Monroe, after three weeks' deliberation, responded in some detail. After recommending some staff augmentations and increases for the Engineer Corps and the Ordnance Department, he made his strongest recommendation for necessary measures to fill the Regular Army and to expand it by a force of 40,000 men specially trained for ". . . defence of our cities and frontiers." To bring the Regular Army to authorized strength, Monroe submitted four alternate plans for the consideration of the congressional committee. The first and preferred plan outlined a sort of Federal draft, applying to all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45. For the implementation of this draft, the entire free male population between 18 and 45 would be divided into classes of 100 men each, the classification to be based on equal distribution of property among the several classes. Each class would furnish four men for the war, and would ". . . replace them in the event of casualty." If any class failed to provide the men required of it within the time specified, then four men from the class would be drafted (anyone so drafted could furnish a substitute). Bounties of money and land for each recruit would be furnished by a tax levied on ". . . all the inhabitants within the precinct of the class within which the draught may be made, equally, according to the value of the property which they may respectively possess." To execute such a law, Monroe suggested three alternative bodies: (1) the county courts through the United States; (2) the Militia officers in each county; (3) *particular* persons appointed for that purpose in each county.[103]

These recommendations, which called for Federal legislation embodying national obligation to serve. selective service, local administra-

[102] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 514.

[103] The entire plan submitted by Monroe to Senator Giles is in *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 514–21.

tion, and imposition of military duty directly on the citizen without the states as intermediaries, form the first Federal selective service plan in United States history. Except for the unfortunate substitute provision, the recommendations of Monroe contain most of the principles of the selective service system which finally evolved in the United States in the 20th century world wars.[104] Tremendously significant is the legal reasoning with which Monroe buttressed his plan for a compulsive draft:

> Nor does there appear to be any well founded objection to the right in Congress to adopt this plan, or to its equality in its application to our fellow-citizens individually. Congress have [*sic*] a right, by the constitution, to raise regular armies, and no restraint is imposed on the exercise of it, except in the provisions which are intended to guard generally against the abuse of power, with none of which does this plan interfere. It is proposed that it shall operate on all alike; that none shall be exempted from it except the Chief Magistrate of the United States and the Governors of the several States.
>
> It would be absurd to suppose that Congress could not carry this power into effect, otherwise than by accepting the voluntary service of individuals. It might happen that an army could not be raised in that mode, whence the power would have been granted in vain. The safety of the State might depend on such an army. Long continued invasions, conducted by regular, well disciplined troops, can best be repelled by troops kept constantly in the field, and equally well disciplined. . . . The grant to Congress to raise armies, [*sic*] was made with a knowledge of all these circumstances, and with an intention that it should take effect. The framers of the constitution, and the States who ratified it, knew the advantage which an enemy might have over us, by regular forces, and intended to place their country on an equal footing.
>
> The idea that the United States cannot raise a regular army in any other mode than by accepting the voluntary service of individuals, is believed to be repugnant to the uniform construction of all grants of power, and equally so to the first principles and leading objects of the federal compact. An unqualified grant of power gives the means necessary to carry it into effect. This is a universal maxim, which admits of no exception. Equally true is it, that the conservation of the State is a duty paramount to all others. The commonwealth has a right to the service of all its citizens; or rather, the citizens composing the commonwealth have a right, collectively and individually, to the service of each other, to repel any danger which may be menaced. The manner in which the service is to be apportioned among the citizens, and rendered by them, are objects of legislation. . . .
>
> The plan proposed is not more compulsive than the militia service, while it is free from most of the objections to it. The militia service calls from home, for long terms, whole districts of county. None can elude the call. Few can avoid the service; and those who do are compelled to pay great sums for substitutes. This plan fixes on no one personally . . . It is a principal object of this plan to engage in the defense of the State the unmarried and youthful, who can best defend it, and best be spared, and to secure to those who render this important service an adequate compensation from the voluntary contributions of the more wealthy, in every class. . . .
>
> The limited powers which the United States have in organizing the militia may be urged as an argument against their right to raise regular troops in

[104] Duggan, *op cit.*, pp. 13–14.

the mode proposed. If any argument could be drawn from that circumstance, I should suppose that it would be in favor of an opposite conclusion. The power of the United States over the militia has been limited, and that for raising regular armies granted without limitation. There was doubtless some object in this arrangement. The fair inference seems to be, that it was made on great consideration; that the limitation, in the first instance, was intentional, the consequence of the unqualified grant in the second. But it is said, that, by drawing the men from the militia service into the regular army, and putting them under regular officers, you violate a principle of the constitution, which provides that the militia shall be commanded by their own officers. If this was the fact, the conclusion would follow. But it is not the fact. The men are now drawn from the militia but from the population of the country. When they enlist voluntarily, it is not as militia men that they act, but as citizens. If they are draughted [*sic*] it must be in the same sense. In both instances, they are enrolled in the militia corps; but that, as is presumed, cannot prevent the voluntary act in the one instance or the compulsive in the other. The whole population of the United States, within certain ages, belong to these corps. If the United States could not form regular armies from them, they could raise none.[105]

In assessing the proper weight of these constitutional arguments by Monroe for a compulsive mobilization of manpower, it must be remembered that he was Secretary of War in Madison's cabinet. The inference is that Madison approved his Secretary's reasoning; and since Madison was one of the framers of the Constitution, Monroe's interpretations in all probability were in accord with those of the Constitution makers.[106]

In the second of his four plans, Monroe recommended the classification of the Militia into three age groups: 18 to 25; 25 to 32; and 32 to 45. The President would have authority to call into service any portion of one or more of these classes, as he deemed necessary, for two years of service, with no provision for substitution.[107] This second plan thus also contained Federal compulsion applied directly on citizens.

The third plan provided for the exemption from Militia service of every five men who could find one man to enlist for the war. Plan four, a last alternative in the event the Congress was unable to concur with any of the first three plans, would continue the system already unsuccessfully in effect, but with an increase in the land bounties for en-

[105] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 515–16.

[106] In further support of this intent of the framers of the Constitution is one of Hamilton's arguments in the pre-United States *Federalist Papers:* ". . . if we are in earnest about giving the union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the states in their collective capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of America." *The Federalist, op. cit.*, No. XXIII, p. 197. So shaken had Jefferson been by some of the catastrophies of the war that on 1 Jan 1815 he wrote approvingly to Monroe: "But you have two more causes of uneasiness; the want of men and money. For the former, nothing more wise or efficient could have been imagined than what you proposed. It would have filled our ranks with regulars, and . . . it would have rendered our militia, like those of the Greeks and Romans, a nation of warriors." Paul L. Ford, (ed.) *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1892–99), IX, p. 497.

[107] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 516.

listment. Plans three and four were not recommended by Monroe with any enthusiasm or apparent hope that they would ameliorate the situation.

After considerable debate, in which the opposition to the plans was ably led by Daniel Webster, the Congress finally enacted plan four of Monroe's proposals just before the war was terminated on 24 December 1814 by the Treaty of Ghent. By this treaty, both sides agreed to disagree on all important matters except the termination of hostilities and the restoration of the prewar boundaries. The victory of Jackson at New Orleans, two weeks after the war was over, was indicative of the slowness of communications.

Procurement for the War

There was no adequate planning for procurement and supply either before or during the war. There had been some concern in the War Department, prior to the beginning of the war, concerning the adequacies of small arms and cannon manufacture. Government armories for the manufacture of small arms had been established and were believed adequate, as indeed they were, for this war. However, the statement that the Nation's civilian foundries could produce sufficient artillery ordnance was too optimistic. The War Department's appraisal of the ordnance situation was based on an inadequate survey of the situation.[108] There was no ordnance staff officer or department until the passage of an act on 14 May 1812 on the eve of the war.[109] The recommendation of Henry Foxhall, made to Secretary of War Dearborn in 1807, that a national cannon foundry be constructed had been filed but not acted upon.[110] The value of educational orders had been sensed in the War Department quite early, and before 1812 some contracts had been let with this principle in mind. But these contracts had been so few and small as to have no effect on procurement during the war.

All stores, other than rations, for the peacetime Regular Army were sent to the depot at Philadelphia and were issued from there. The Superintendent of Military Stores at Philadelphia, therefore, was a key man in the supply system.[111] Callender Irvine, who became the first Commissary General of Purchases when that staff department was created in 1812, had been Superintendent of Military Stores from 24 October 1804 to 8 August 1812. During that period he had made some surveys on the capacity of American manufacturers to produce adequate amounts of military supplies, particularly uniform materials, and had come to the conclusion that American industry could *not* produce enough pants, coats, and shirts even for the peacetime

[108] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 303–07.
[109] Callan, *op cit.*, pp. 226–27.
[110] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 215–17.
[111] Jacobs, *op cit.*, pp. 259–60.

Army, let alone an expanded Army. Unwilling to accept so gloomy an estimate, Eustis, in 1811, had directed Tench Coxe, Purveyor of Public Supplies (the Treasury official then responsible for Army procurement and purchasing), to make an effort to clothe the Army, employing only United States manufacturers.[112] Coxe, after a hurried survey confidentially assured Eustis that the country's manufacturers could produce enough woolen, cotton, and linen textiles to meet the needs of the Army, but that prices might be exorbitant. But Coxe was basing his estimates on the peacetime Army of 5,000 men, so that his planning, fallacious for 5,000, became ludicrous for several hundred thousand.[113]

Unheeding the warnings from Irvine, textile manufacturers agreed with Coxe and boasted of their patriotic determination to furnish all the cloth the Army required. The Nation's press, overcome with an overdose of pride, was quoting statements in the spring of 1812 that abundant provision had been made to supply the Army with clothing of "American manufacture." [114] Not to be outdone, the legislature of Massachusetts (the state whose governor refused to provide any Militia to fight in the war) proudly asserted that Massachusetts alone could supply the central Government with all necessary clothing for any emergency.[115]

In contrast with these claims, Commissary General of Purchases Irvine in 1814 informed the Congress that in 1813 he had been forced to purchase over 26 per cent of the cloth for the Army abroad.[116] There is strong evidence, too, that a measurable proportion of the 74 per cent purchased in the United States had been manufactured abroad and smuggled in. This disturbing failure to achieve the claims made becomes all the more reprehensible when it is realized that the country could have done better: many United States textile manufacturers, able to sell their cloth in a rising civilian market, refused to sell to the Army.[117]

As the war fronts expanded, the Commissary General of Purchases had to decentralize his purchasing to the nine military districts. Depots were established in all of those districts, and supplies were eventually delivered to the nearest depot rather than to the main

---

[112] *Military Book No. 5, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War,* Eustis to Coxe, 24 May 1811 and 14 Jun 1811, pp. 138–39, 157. Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives.

[113] In a comprehensive report, "Digest of Manufacturers," prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury 21 Jun 1813, Coxe reaffirmed his previous estimate by stating: "It may be safely affirmed, that there is no irremovable obstacle to the manufacture of every species of arms, and almost every supply of war, of good qualities, and in sufficient quantities." *American State Papers, Finance.* II, pp. 675–76.

[114] Hezekiah Niles, *The Weekly Register* (Baltimore, 1811–49), III, p. 6.

[115] *Ibid.,* II, p. 17.

[116] *American State Papers, Finance,* II, p. 818.

[117] Ltr, Commissary General of Purchases Callender Irvine to SW John C. Calhoun, 3 Jun 1819, in *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* II, p. 43.

depot at Philadelphia, thereby expediting supply handling by cutting down transportation distances. But with no kind of stock accounting system in effect at the subdepots. military commanders simply drew what they desired at the nearest depot without hampering formality of written requisitions, and supply became not only unaccountable but chaotic.

The supply of rations by civilian contract, a dubious holdover from the Revolutionary War, had been a matter of complaint and dissatisfaction before the second war with England. The War Department, however, had made no plans to change the system. Ration contracts during the War of 1812 were let in the ration supply districts to civilians who would then supply rations to all troops stationed in or moving through the district. With an amazing lack of planning vision, there was no provision made for rationing troops who might, during the course of invading enemy territory, get outside of the United States. The patent weaknesses of this method of supplying food to troops in wartime were summed up in 1818 by the Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, in a letter to the House of Representatives:

> The defects of the mere contract system is so universally acknowledged by those who have experienced its operation in the late war, that it cannot be necessary to make many observations in relation to it. Nothing can appear more absurd than that the success of the most important military operations, on which the very fate of the country may depend, should ultimately rest on men who are subject to no military responsibility, and on whom there is no other hold than the penalty of a bond. When we add to this observation, that it is often the interest of a contractor to fail at the most critical juncture, when the means of supply become the most expensive, it seems strange that the system should have continued for a single campaign.[118]

The supply of rations to the Army by civilian contractors continued until 14 April 1818 when a staff Subsistence Department, headed by a Commissary General of Subsistence, was created by the Congress.[119]

Further complicating the procurement of supplies was the authority granted to myriads of individuals—commanding officers, deputy quartermasters, etc.—to make emergency purchases of any supplies not furnished through the regular channels. Officers unfamiliar with Army accounting procedures frequently had difficulty keeping their records accurately. The purchase and issue of these emergency supplies would have completely confused any supply accounting had not the condition of that accounting already been chaotic. The Congress, dimly aware of this unhealthy condition, attempted to rectify it in mid-war by the creation of the Office of Superintendent General of Military Supplies, whose mission was to keep accounts of all military supplies and stores purchased or distributed for the use of the Army

[118] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 781–82.
[119] Callan, *op cit.*, p. 286.

of the United States, for the Militia and Volunteers, by the various officers of the Quartermaster's Department, by the regimental quartermaster, by hospital surgeons, officers of the Hospital Department and Medical Department, and by all other persons, officers, or agents who should have received, distributed, or been entrusted with such stores and supplies.[120]

This war, for the first time in United States history, saw women and children utilized in the manufacture of munitions. Their employment, however, was not due to a shortage of manpower, but rather to the fact that women and children were far less expensive as labor than were men. Nevertheless, the lesson was indicated that in the event of war, the manpower availability pool could be expanded by the inclusion of women and, if need be, children.

Transportation, which had been so serious a problem during the Revolutionary War, was again troublesome and difficult in the War of 1812. Not only were the roads to the fighting fronts almost as poor as they had been 35 years before, but there had been no plans made for procuring horses and wagons. Transportation had to be secured in emergencies at exorbitant cost and with great difficulty.

Both the United States and Canada considered control of the Great Lakes a vital adjunct to the fighting of a successful war. But until March 1813, there had been no plans made or action taken in the United States towards building the ships which would be needed for this purpose. The ships with which Capt. Oliver H. Perry and Comdr. Thomas Macdonough won their notable success on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain were not built until 1813. Here again, lack of mobilization planning to provide the necessary tools of war impeded the war effort and contributed to several months of military disasters for the United States along the Lakes front.

The overall summation of mobilization planning and execution in the United States during the War of 1812 not only showed inefficiency and errors but indicated that nothing had been learned from the lessons of the Revolutionary War and the campaigns in the Northwest Territory.

The Lessons of the War

The lessons of the Revolutionary War, which were repeated and intensified in the War of 1812, are reasonably obvious:

1. Mobilization of manpower and resources for war must be planned in advance to avoid inefficiency, waste, and defeats.

2. Mobilization planning and implementation can never be accomplished in advance without an integrated, well-coordinated staff to which that mission has been assigned.

---

[120] Act of March 3, 1813; See: Callan, *op cit.*, pp. 242–44.

3. Unity of command and coordinated staff planning, rather than independent staff bureaus, are vitally necessary for efficient military operations.

4. Volunteering will not provide sufficient manpower for the armed services in a protracted war: some kind of compulsion must be resorted to.

5. Untrained troops of any classification, be it Militia, Volunteers, or Regulars, are unsatisfactory and expensive. The inescapable corollary of this is that proper training of troops requires a certain minimum time and that if Militia are to be employed as soon as they are mobilized, their peacetime training must be efficient.

6. Short-term enlistments are harmful because they allow time neither for efficient training of the men nor for long-range tactical planning for their employment.

7. Procurement for the armed forces in war must be based on sound assessment of the nation's economic and industrial capacity and must include some arbitrary allocation of resources to ensure a flow of supplies to sustain the war effort. Where critical shortages exist in national resources, some assured means of supply must be secured, whether it be by stockpiling or other means.

8. Women and, if need be, children, can be advantageously employed in the manpower availability pool, particularly in farming and industry.

9. The supply of rations to the armed forces by the civilian contract system is unserviceable at any time and perniciously dangerous in wartime.

10. Transportation and routes of supply must indispensably be provided for in war planning.

11. Military leaders cannot be trained overnight. Aptitude in business or in politics is not necessarily a sound indicator of military leadership qualifications.

12. Military training, to be truly efficient, must have adequate training literature and competent instructors.

These were the lessons, twice taught in the first two major wars of the United States. Only lesson 9 was well learned, for the contract ration supply system was abandoned in 1818. The other lessons were to be taught again many times in succeeding wars, but they were never to be learned until the world wars of the 20th century.

CHAPTER III

THE WAR WITH MEXICO

The end of the War of 1812 was also the end of the military establishment that had been created to fight that war. On 3 March 1815, Congress passed "An Act fixing the Military Peace Establishment of the United States" which limited the Army to a maximum of 10,000 men. Reductions were also made in the size of the staff when it was reorganized by the Act of April 24, 1816.[1] When the Army resumed its principal function as an Indian-fighting constabulary, the staff readjusted its vision to the operation of the small peacetime Army. Each bureau was completely independent, responsible only and directly to the Secretary of War.

During the period between the War of 1812 and the War with Mexico, few people in the War Department were concerned with the possibility of a future mobilization. John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War from 1817 to 1825, was a notable exception. The mobilization plan advocated by Calhoun in 1820 contemplated an efficient staff and a peacetime Regular Army so organized that it would provide the skeleton framework for a wartime expanded Army, the padding to be provided by the mass of recruits who would be brought into service during war. The Calhoun "Expansible Plan" (which many years later became a military cult with Emory Upton as its major proponent) did not have any provision for the improvement or utilization of the Militia. Perhaps its greatest weakness was its failure to foresee that a small Regular Army would not be able to provide sufficient cadres for a huge mass Army and that the organization would crack under the weight of too many recruits. An additional weakness of Calhoun's plan was the fact that a peacetime Regular Army company consisting of some thirty cadre specialists would be difficult to employ tactically in the sporadic skirmishes with the Indians. Calhoun's mobilization proposals for an "expansible army" were adopted in part by Congress when it approved on 2 March 1821 that portion of his plan which reduced the size of the Army from 12,664 men to 6,183.[2]

Of considerable practical significance in this period was the establishment in July 1822 of general recruiting rendezvous for the Reg-

[1] Act of March 3, 1815, cited in Callan, *op cit.*, pp. 266–67; Act of April 24, 1816, pp. 272–76.

[2] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* II, pp. 189–94, 452; Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 306–09.

ular Army in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The first three were so successful that in 1823 three more rendezvous were set up in Boston, Providence, and Albany.[3] The General Recruiting Service, thus created, fulfilled the replacement needs of the peacetime Army until the Mexican War when it was somewhat shaken by the manpower demands of the Regular Army. Although the General Recruiting Service weathered the Mexican War, the Civil War was to prove too much for it.[4]

The Period Before Hostilities

The Mexican War began 24 April 1846, after prolonged grievances and bitterness on both sides. The agitation for Texan independence and possible annexation by the United States had caused rising tension between the United States and Mexico throughout the 1830's and early 1840's. Texas won its independence in 1836, and after lengthy negotiations it was offered annexation by the United States in a joint resolution of Congress, 1 March 1845. Texas accepted the offer on 4 July 1845 and was admitted to the Union 29 December 1845. Mexico, however, had never recognized Texan independence and broke diplomatic relations with the United States 31 March 1845. War fervor, fanned by newspaper comment, burned throughout the United States and Mexico.[5]

Although the Government in Washington was outwardly serene in its protestations of peace, steps were taken to put both the Army and the Navy in a better defensive position. From the distant frontier posts, the scattered, skeleton Regular Army companies were gradually assembled near Fort Jesup, in western Louisiana. By the end of June 1845, the entire 3d Infantry Regiment (10 companies), 8 companies of the 4th Infantry Regiment, and 7 companies of the 2d Dragoons were assembled there under the command of Brevet Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor and dubbed the "Army of Observation." The total number of troops in this concentration of 25 companies was well under fifteen hundred men. The lack of manpower in the Army, in view of the considerable number of companies, was due to the Act of August 23, 1842, which had reduced the maximum number of privates in an infantry or artillery company to 42 and in a dragoon company to 50.[6] This enactment was an economy measure taken by

[3] WD GO 34, 1822; *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* II, p. 457.

[4] For discussion of the General Recruiting Service in this period see: Lt Col Leonard L. Lerwill, "History of Personnel Replacement System, U. S. Army" (Special Studies Series, OCMH), ch. I.

[5] For newspaper comments and public opinion in general see: Justin H. Smith, *The War With Mexico* (New York, 1919), I, ch. VI, "The American Attitude on the Eve of War", pp. 117–37.

[6] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 358–61. The Act of March 2, 1821, had reduced companies to 42 privates, but during the Seminole War and the dispute with Great Britain over the Maine boundary 16 privates were added to artillery companies and 38 to infantry companies by the Act of July 5, 1838. *Ibid.*, pp. 341–49.

Congress when there was little danger of war and was passed over the protests of the War Department.[7]

In November 1845 Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, Commanding General of the Army, suggested a prompt increase of the Regular Army, or, as a less desirable alternative, the creation and filling of new regiments.[8] No action was taken on General Scott's recommendations, and the War Department budget estimates in 1845 were not appreciably greater than they had been the year before.[9]

The concentration of the Regular Army in Louisiana left many posts along the Gulf, the Atlantic, and the frontiers almost completely stripped of their garrisons. Had the danger been only Mexico, this weakening of the defense structure might have been costly only in a monetary sense since the Army posts would deteriorate rapidly when abandoned. But in the waning days of 1845 the Administration became increasingly convinced of the grave contingency of war with either Great Britain (about Oregon) or Mexico or both. The Cabinet, on 23 December 1845, not only agreed that the situation was grave but that vigorous preparations for defense should be made. President Polk was in full accord with his Cabinet on these issues.[10]

The Secretary of War, William Learned Marcy, and the Secretary of the Navy, George Bancroft, implemented this cabinet decision by messages to the Military and Naval Committees of both Houses of Congress. The messages from Marcy to the Military Committees reiterated the recommendations made a month earlier for expanding the Regular Army by increasing the authorized strength of companies and batteries and expanded his previous arguments by specific requests for more ordnance and engineer funds. Also included was a plan for granting the President discretionary authority to call up fifty thousand Volunteers for a year's service. The Volunteers, Marcy advised, would probably be more efficient than state drafts of Militia.[11] The pattern of the coming mobilization was herein foretold: the war, when it came, would be fought by Regulars and Volunteers, the latter to be enlisted for one year.

Both General Scott and Secretary of War Marcy could recall the Militia difficulties during the War of 1812. That experience had convinced Scott that the Militia was irredeemable; Marcy, somewhat more clear-thinking in this matter, believed that the Militia could be reformed into an efficient force, but that such reforms were then politically unachievable. The end result of the different reasonings of

[7] For the staff feeling see: "Report of The Adjutant General to the Secretary of War," 30 Nov 1848, in H Ex Doc 1, 30th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 165–68.

[8] "Annual Report of the Commanding General of the Army to the Secretary of War," 20 Nov 1845, in Sen Doc 1, 29th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 208–10.

[9] "Report of the Secretary of War to the President," 29 Nov 1845, in Sen Doc 1, 29th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 193–206.

[10] Allan Nevins (ed.), *Polk, The Diary of a President, 1845–1849* (New York, 1952), p. 36.

[11] Ltr, SW to Chm, SMAC, 29 Dec 1845, in Sen Doc 255, 29th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1–3.

Marcy and Scott was that they both were opposed to using Militia as such if and when mobilization became necessary.

The messages of Marcy and Bancroft to the congressional committees were clear enough but they lacked immediacy. If the emergency were severe, the Congress reasoned, surely the President would have pointed out the dangers with greater emphasis than he had used in his State of the Union Message the preceding December. The Congress consequently took no action to vote more funds or men for defense. On the advice of his Cabinet, however, President Polk reluctantly sent a special message to the Senate on 24 March 1846, which concluded: ". . . it is my 'judgment' that 'an increase of our naval and military force is at this time required,' to place the country in a suitable state of defence." [12] The message did not panic the country; neither did it arouse the Congress to action.

"The Army of Observation"

While these activities were taking place in Washington, the concentration of the available Regular Army units in the south was completed and a forward movement toward the border undertaken. Secretary Marcy had instructed General Taylor in May and June 1845 to dispose his Army closer to Mexico in order to be ready for any hostile Mexican activity if and when Texas were annexed to the United States.[13] Taylor promptly displaced forward from Fort Jesup to Corpus Christi, a small seacoast town on the Texas mainland near the south side of the Nueces River. By the end of August all of Taylor's Regulars had closed at Corpus Christi. In addition, two Volunteer companies of artillery arrived unexpectedly from New Orleans where they had been illegally mustered into service by Brevet Maj. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines, then commanding the Department of the West. Gaines was an elderly officer whose enthusiasm for mobilizing Militia without authorization was well known.[14] Additional Regular Army units continued to stream into Corpus Christi until on 15 October 1845 Taylor had there 3,860 troops, more than 50 per cent of the total Regular Army strength.[15] The Government's policy was truly anomalous, for even as it publicly foresaw no danger of war, over 50 per cent of the Regular Army was concentrated for war.

On 6 August 1845, The Adjutant General had instructed Taylor:

> . . . to learn from the authorities of Texas what auxiliary forces, volunteers, &c., could be placed at your disposal in case any additional troops may be needed; and how soon they would be able to take the field upon any emer-

[12] Sen Doc 248, 29th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2.
[13] H Ex Doc 60, 30th Cong., 1st sess., "Mexican War Correspondence," pp. 79–82.
[14] Upton, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
[15] H Ex Doc 60, p. 111.

gency . . . for such procedure on your part the requisite authority is now conferred. . . .

In view of further precautionary measures, I am instructed by the Secretary of War to learn from you, at the earliest date, what other force and munitions . . . you deem it necessary to be sent to Texas; that is to say, what additional troops, designating the arms of the service; what supply and description of ordnance and advance stores, small arms, &c.

It is deemed expedient to establish in Texas one or more depots of ordnance and other supplies, for which purpose you will please report the proper points to be occupied. Orders have already been issued to send 10,000 muskets and 1,000 rifles into Texas. . . .

Officers of the corps of engineers, topographical engineers, and ordnance, have been ordered to Texas, with instructions to report to you without delay.[16]

On 23 August Marcy informed Taylor that in addition to the auxiliary force which he could raise in Texas, he was also authorized in an emergency:

. . . to accept volunters from the States of Louisiana and Alabama, and even from Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Should Mexico declare war, or commence hostilities . . . you are instructed to lose no time in giving information to the authorities of each or any of the above mentioned States as to the number of volunteers you may want from them respectively. . . . Arms, ammunition, and camp equipage for the auxiliary troops that you may require, will be sent forward subject to your orders. . . . Orders have been issued to the naval force on the Gulf of Mexico to co-operate with you. You will, as far as practicable, hold communication with the commanders of our national vessels in your vicinity, and avail yourself of any assistance that can be derived from their co-operation.[17]

Secretary Marcy's directives to General Taylor during the last months of 1845 had some elements of mobilization planning. In many respects, this delegation of implementing mobilization powers to Taylor was necessary and proper. The distance from Washington to the Texas-Mexican boundary, the slowness of transportation and communication, the complete lack of any intelligence agencies, the absence of any creditable information concerning the topography, climatology, people, and resources of these newly acquired areas made it impossible for the War Department in Washington to make sound logistical and tactical decisions. The characteristic attitude of the United States that Mexico strike a first blow before calling out Volunteers from the states made it imperative that the call, when made, be made quickly. Only Taylor could do that. The directed coordination of the land and naval forces of the United States was also good, common sense forethought. But there were clearly discernible flaws in the planning. The strict enjoinders to Taylor not to call for state Volunteers until

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

some definite aggression was committed by Mexico meant that Taylor, after calling for Volunteers, could not possibly receive those Volunteer reinforcements from any state, except perhaps Texas, in time to meet any impending attack by whatever forces the Mexicans might mobilize. The vagueness in these early directives concerning a definition of aggression probably put too great a responsibility on Taylor.

On 30 August Marcy was more specific: ". . . the assembling [of] a large Mexican army on the borders of Texas, and crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded by the Executive here as an invasion of the United States, and the commencement of hostilities. . . . Should depredations be committed on our commerce by her public armed vessels, or privateers, . . . this will constitute a state of war." Marcy, in the same communication, further charged Taylor: "In case of war, either declared or made manifest by hostile acts, your main object will be the protection of Texas; but the pursuit of this object will not necessarily confine your action within the territory of Texas. Mexico having thus commenced hostilities, you may . . . cross the Rio Grande, disperse or capture the forces assembling to invade Texas, defeat the junction of troops, uniting for that purpose . . . take, and hold possession of, Matamoras and other places in the country." [18] These instructions not only made clearer to Taylor what constituted aggression but also gave him assurance that in defending himself, he could attack the enemy on his own grounds. The somewhat dubious legality of employing Militia to invade a foreign nation—a legal distinction which had so severely impeded American operations in Canada during the war of 1812—did not disturb Marcy in 1845, nor was it likely even to occur to Taylor. Taylor's response was confident and reassuring: he considered his forces adequate. Almost as an afterthought, he suggested that some heavy artillery might be necessary for siege operations and that a supply of pontons and ponton wagons might be helpful.[19]

During this period, when the Secretary of War and General Taylor were engaged with the probabilities of mobilization and war, there does not appear to have been a single directive to any of the War Department staff bureaus calling for procurement or logistics planning of any kind, nor is there any indication that any of the bureaus prepared mobilization plans on their own initiative.[20] Even the concentration of the "Army of Observation" (which, after Texas' annexation, was redesignated the "Army of Occupation") was not provided for in the budget. Consequently, the quartermaster transportation funds

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 88–89.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 103–106.

[20] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, p. 478, n. 30, asserts that Scott *was* planning during this period, but there is no record available to support this surmise.

for the fiscal year 1845 were almost completely exhausted during the first quarter.[21]

As he had assured Taylor he would, the Secretary of War on 25 August 1845 advised the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana that General Taylor was authorized to call on them for Militia Volunteers in the event of war with Mexico. Marcy enclosed with the letters organizational charts to assist the governors in mobilizing the Militia. But the War Department did not include any instructions concerning how the forces were to be mobilized, equipped, initially supplied, and basically trained. These matters, it was apparent from the lack of Federal instructions, were to be left to the discretion of state authorities. The customary state procedures in mobilizing Militiamen were to be employed, including state selection of the officers. Marcy's statement that the Congress had not foreseen the emergency and had not appropriated money to pay these Militiamen should they be mustered into Federal service was hardly fair to the Congress. With the Administration's talk of peace and with no record of any request to either House of Congress for mobilization measures of any kind, prior to President Polk's State of the Union Message in December 1845, the Congress can not reasonably be charged with neglect for its failure to enact legislation. On 28 August 1845, Marcy dispatched similar letters to the governors of Tennessee and Kentucky concerning Taylor's authority to call for Militia in the event of war with Mexico.[22]

The Regulars at Corpus Christi, meanwhile, idled in their tent encampments; training was sketchy and discipline poor.[23] The lack of practical logistics planning by the War Department had already resulted in some unnecessary discomforts. The Quartermaster, suddenly faced with the problem of providing tents, could not find proper linen cloth to manufacture them from and was compelled to substitute inferior cotton materials, which were hardly shelter against the morning dews. Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup later tried to shift blame for this particular deficiency on the Congress which, in the 1845 budget, had stricken out a quartermaster request for camp equipage. But this routine economy in peacetime hardly excused The Quartermaster General from not determining in advance at least a source of supply.

---

[21] "Report of the Secretary of War to the President," 29 Nov 1845, in Sen Doc 1, 29th Cong., 1st sess., p. 197.

[22] Ltrs, SW to Govs of Ala., La., Miss., Tenn., Ky., 25 and 28 Aug 1845, in *Military Book No. 26, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War,* pp. 64–67. Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives.

[23] "Despite orders from the President, military exercises were given up after a time; a sullen torpor and silence reigned in the camp and many deserted. Meanwhile a horde of gamblers and liquor-sellers opened booths near by; and the soldiers, driven to desperation, paid what little money they had to be drugged into insensibility or crazed into brawls and orgies." Smith, *op. cit.,* I, pp. 143–44.

Taylor, in spite of some command and morale difficulties at Corpus Christi, continued to show confidence. On 4 October 1845, he suggested by letter that it might be advisable to move his force to the Rio Grande River to impress the Mexicans with the desirability of peace by visibly showing them the instruments of war. He added: ". . . should any auxiliary force be required, I propose to draw it wholly from Texas. I do not conceive that it will become necessary, under any circumstances, to call for volunteers from the United States." [24] By 15 October 1845, Taylor's force, present and absent, numbered 3,860 men, but was already short 300 replacements to bring units to full, authorized strength, and would, Taylor estimated, be short 500 replacements by the end of the year.[25]

By the end of January 1846, it seemed certain that Mexico was not disposed to peaceful settlement of the Texas issue. Marcy, on President Polk's instructions, ordered Taylor to move his force to the Rio Grande where he arrived on 25 March 1846.[26] For the first time Taylor showed some uneasiness, as he came face to face with "decidedly hostile" Mexican military forces. "Under this state of things," he tardily warned, "I must again and urgently call your attention to the necessity of speedily sending recruits to this army. The militia of Texas are so remote from the border . . . that we cannot depend upon their aid." [27]

The number of reinforcements which could be sent to Taylor was negligible. Although the Regular Army had an authorized maximum strength in April 1846 of 734 officers and 7,885 enlisted men or a total of 8,619, the actual total strength both present (6,562) and absent (803) was only 7,365 which was 1,254 short of the maximum authorized strength for the *skeletonized* Army. In May 1846, 3,554 officers and men were assigned to Taylor's "Army of Occupation" on the Rio Grande. The staff of the Army in this period consisted of 3 general officers, 9 staff departments (Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, Quartermaster, Subsistence, Medical, Pay, Engineer Corps, Corps of Topographical Engineers, and Ordnance) with 259 officers, and 17 military storekeepers.[28]

War Begins

On 24 April 1846, a 63-man dragoon patrol commanded by Capt. Seth B. Thornton on a reconnaissance mission from General Taylor's

[24] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 107–09.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 129.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[28] TAG to SW, "Report of The Adjutant General in reply to Resolution of the House of Representatives dated July 31, 1848," 3 Dec 1849, General Reports No. 69, Records of AGO. National Archives; *Army Register for 1846* (Washington, Jan 1846). The three general officers were Maj Gen Winfield Scott, Brig Gen (Brevet Maj Gen) Edmund P. Gaines and Brig Gen John E. Wool; Zachary Taylor was only a brevet brigadier general with the permanent rank of colonel.

"Army of Occupation" was surrounded by a sizable Mexican force on the north side of the Rio Grande. When the dust cleared, 16 United States dragoons were dead or wounded, and the rest captured. Taylor reported to Washington:

> Hostilities may now be considered as commenced, and I have this day [26 April 1846] deemed it necessary to call upon the governor of Texas for four regiments of volunteers—two to be mounted and two to serve as foot. As some delay must occur in collecting these troops, I have also desired the governor of Louisiana to send out four regiments of infantry as soon as practicable . . . I trust the department . . . will give the necessary orders to the staff departments for the supply of this large additional force.
>
> If a law could be passed authorizing the President to raise volunteers for twelve months, it would be of the greatest importance for a service so remote from support as this.[29]

Taylor's advocacy of a one-year enlistment has been part of the basis of later critical comments about his judgment and military competence. However, in 1846 the concepts of war and mobilization had not materially changed from what they had been in the colonial days and during the Revolution. When danger threatened at any point, the citizens nearest that point would seize arms, fight until the danger was removed, and then return to their homes. Taylor's experience in warfare had been limited to small engagements during the War of 1812 and his Indian fighting. He could not readily conceive the necessity for maintaining large armies in the field for protracted periods, nor did he have any idea of the complex problems of a war on foreign soil. A year's service for Volunteers was not a short enlistment to Taylor, Polk, and the country at large; it was a long enlistment.

Taylor's early April dispatches, which arrived in Washington about one month after they were written, were so alarming that the President seriously considered asking Congress in advance for a declaration of war on Mexico, to be promulgated by him the moment Mexico committed a definitely overt act. Polk finally decided, however, to wait for the overt act to come before he asked for the declaration of war.[30]

When news of the dragoon patrol incident arrived in Washington the President hesitated no longer. Acting decisively and with keen political insight he consulted with his Cabinet and with Congressional leaders as he prepared the war message which was read to both Houses of Congress on 11 May 1846: ". . . Mexico . . . has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon the American soil. . . . war exists . . . notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself."[31] A declaration of war was quickly passed by Congress, and signed by the President on 13 May 1846.

---

[29] H Ex Doc 60, p. 288.
[30] Nevins, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82.
[31] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 8–9.

The Act of May 13, 1846

The President, in his message, had recommended to the Congress the mobilizing of ". . . a large body of volunteers, to serve for not less than six or twelve months. . . . A volunteer force is, beyond question, more efficient than any other description of citizen soldiers; . . . I further recommend . . . liberal provision be made for sustaining our entire military force and furnishing it with supplies and munitions of war." [32]

These recommendations were broad enough, but vague and nebulous. For detailed recommendations, the Congress turned to the reports which Secretary of War Marcy and General Scott had made during 1845 and included them in "An Act providing for the prosecution of the existing war between the United States and the Republic of Mexico" passed on 13 May 1846. The act contained the following provisions:

1. It authorized the President to call for and accept the services of any number of Volunteers, not exceeding 50,000 ". . . to serve twelve months . . . or to the end of the war, unless sooner discharged, . . . and that the sum of $10,000,000 . . . is hereby, appropriated for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this act into effect."

2. It extended the Militia's term of service from three to six months, at the discretion of the President.

3. It required the Volunteers to furnish their own uniforms and clothes and, if cavalry, their own mounts and horse equipage, but arms to be furnished by the United States. Volunteers would receive a money commutation to reimburse them for their purchase of uniform and clothes.

4. Company, battalion, squadron, and regimental officers were to be appointed as provided for in the [Militia] laws of the respective states.

5. The President, at his discretion, was to apportion staff, field and general officers among the respective states furnishing Volunteers.

6. The Volunteers in service were to be subject to the articles of war, have disability pension benefits, and receive the same pay as Regulars, except mounted Volunteers furnishing their own horses who were to receive 40 cents per day additional for the animal.[33]

This measure repeated many of the errors of the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Indian Wars, but the Congress was acting on the advice of the President, the Secretary of War, and the Commanding General of the Army. The maximum number of Volunteers recommended by Marcy and Scott was 50,000 which was granted. The $10,000,000 was not niggardly. Polk had suggested an enlistment term of six months to a year. The Congress made the

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[33] Callan, *op. cit.*, I, p. 367–68.

term a year *or for the duration*, at the option of the President. The provision delegating to the states authority to select officers for the Volunteers was not a good one, but it was in accordance with the concepts of the period. Daniel Webster felt that it was better for Americans to die under ignorant officers of their own choosing than be degraded by being compelled to serve under strange officers.[34] There had been no official recommendation by Polk, Marcy, or Scott for Federal selection of officers, nor is there anything to indicate that such selection would have produced officers materially better than those furnished by the states. The United States then had no Reserve Officers Training Corps nor was there any plan for selecting or training officers. Even the Regular Army, which was so small that it could not have been spread very far, was kept an integral force. Regular officers were kept with Regular units, which were expanded so slowly during the war that many well-trained, capable junior Regular Army officers never got higher than company grade.

Some of the Volunteer officers elected by their men and given commissions by their governors were young, capable, enthusiastic military men who had graduated from West Point and then later resigned from the Army. Such men as Albert Sydney Johnston, Jefferson Davis, Jubal Early, and Alexander Mitchell were among the Academy graduates who were given field grade commissions in the Volunteers. Where competent, trained men were available, they generally received officer commissions in the Volunteer forces and were properly utilized in field grades.[35] It was in junior officers that the Volunteers were woefully deficient. It was a curious anomaly that the Volunteer units had many excellent field officers, a good proportion of whom had been graduated from West Point, but had few capable junior officers; the Regular Army, on the other hand, had many excellent junior officers, most of whom had been trained at West Point, but few capable field officers, hardly any of whom had been trained at the Military Academy and many of whom were decrepit.[36] Junior Regular Army

[34] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, p. 192.

[35] The number of such men available, however, was small. West Point graduated 1330 men up to 1847; of those still alive, 523 were in the Army and some 500 more returned to the service from civil life. Private military schools had not yet become an important source of officer material. The two most prominent schools of this type then in operation were Norwich University in Vermont, founded in 1819, which had some 50 alumni in the Mexican War, and the Virginia Military Institute, founded in 1835, which had only 14 alumni in the war. The Citadel at Charleston, S. C., and the Kentucky Military Institute were among the schools established just before the war began. West Point figures from George W. Callum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy* (Cambridge, 1891), I–II, and from Richard Ernest Dupuy, *Men of West Point* (New York, 1951), p. 455; Norwich University material is from William A. Ellis, *History of Norwich University 1819–1911* (Montpelier, Vt., 1911); Virginia Military Institute information is from Ira L. Reeves, *Military Education in the United States* (Burlington, Vt., 1914).

[36] On 30 July 1846, the AG reported that of 36 Regular Army field grade officers, one-third were unfit for field duty. "Report of The Adjutant General to the Secretary of War," 5 Dec 1846. H Ex Doc 4, 29th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 72–75.

officers were unwilling to accept service with Volunteer units, in spite of the almost certain rapid promotion there, because they would be demobilized along with their units at the end of the war.

The provision that Volunteers furnish their own clothes and uniforms was to work out poorly, but there did not appear to be any other solution. The Quartermaster General's Department was already swamped by the necessity of providing uniforms for the modest Regular Army increases and by the other logistics problems of the war. No other solution to the problem of clothing and uniforming the Volunteers was suggested to the Congress other than the one adopted.

The Act of May 13, 1846, in the light of later day judgment, was not a good mobilization measure. But in the confusion of that day, when plans were absent and when most of the recommendations suggested were not good, it was as good as could be reasonably expected from Congress. The Congress, as is its custom during war emergencies, continued to legislate with speed. On that same day, 13 May 1846, another act authorized the President to increase by voluntary enlistment the number of privates in each or any of the companies of infantry, dragoons, and artillery up to 100, thereby doubling the authorized enlisted strength of the Regular Army without requiring any additional officers.[37] Other mobilization legislation in 1846 authorized an additional Regular regiment of mounted riflemen for service in Oregon; increased the staff of the Pay and Quartermaster Departments; authorized additional general officers; and reimbursed states and individuals for expenses incurred in fitting out Volunteers.[38] The legislative branch of the Government had quickly given the executive branch the legal authority and the money to prosecute the war. Whether the Congress had given enough could only be determined by results; certainly the Congress had given all that was asked at the time.

The Mobilization Is Planned

President Polk, Secretary of War Marcy, and General Scott had two conferences during which ". . . the whole field of operations was examined."[39] Scott was ready at the first conference with a recommendation for calling out 20,000 men apportioned among the states; at the second conference, he had ready additional recommendations for receiving the men, housing them in the United States for several months of training, after which there would be campaigns to Santa Fe, Chihuahua, and along the lower Rio Grande.[40]

---

[37] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 369.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 371–78.
[39] Nevins, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[40] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, p. 478, n. 30, believes that Scott must have been working on these plans for some time, but there is no evidence that he had.

The President distrusted Scott politically and was not inclined to delay operations in order to train and equip men, nor did he think favorably of Scott for having made such recommendations. The personality clash between Polk and Scott, fanned into a white-hot feud by Scott's injudicious pen,[41] resulted in Taylor's continuance in command of the field forces for over a year while Scott remained in Washington to oversee the now accelerating mobilization.

The mobilization of manpower got under way with reasonable promptness. The first calls for Volunteers were issued to the governors by the Secretary of War on 15 May 1846; four days later, the rest of the calls were dispatched. The states closest to Mexico were requested to make their 20,000 Volunteers immediately available; the more distant states were given alert warnings to have their quotas for 25,000 additional men ready for later call.[42] The proportion of Cavalry to Infantry was set by Scott at roughly one to three. In spite of his differences with the President and the Secretary of War, Scott was now issuing plans and directives with enthusiasm, energy, and skill, although he was considerably hampered by lack of information of the situation in the war zone.

On 3 June 1846, the Secretary of War directed Col. Stephen W. Kearny to move his regiment, First Dragoons, from Fort Leavenworth to Santa Fe, and to arrange with the Governor of Missouri to augment the dragoons with 1,000 mounted Volunteers already called for. Details concerning supplies and transportation for this force was left to Kearny, but he was assured that necessary arms, ordnance, war munitions, and provisions, in addition to what he could procure locally, would be sent by sea transport for delivery to him in California. Kearny was also authorized to increase his force by one-third of its strength by adding Mormon Volunteers. Some well-considered instructions concerning military government and treatment of Mexicans in areas conquered were also given Kearny.[43]

At the same time, the Secretary of the Navy directed Commodore David Connor to blockade Mexican ports and assist Army operations. Commodore John D. Sloat, commanding United States naval forces in the Pacific, was ordered to seize the San Francisco Bay area and to establish friendly relations with the inhabitants there.[44]

---

[41] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–200, has a brief but adequate account of Scott's "suicide with a goose-quill."

[42] Ltrs, SW to Govs, 15, 16, and 19 May 1846, in *Military Book No. 26, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War,* pp. 220–40. Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives.

[43] Ltr, SW to Kearny, 3 Jun 46, in H Ex Doc 60, pp. 153–55.

[44] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 232–39. After seizing San Francisco in Jul 1846, Sloat, in poor health, turned over his command to Commodore Robert F. Stockton. See: Smith, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 334–36.

On 15 May 1846, Scott issued a warning memorandum to the chiefs of the supply bureaus in Washington which was, in effect, a directive for them to bestir themselves to provide for the Army:

> An army of some twenty odd thousand men, regulars and volunteers, including the troops already in Texas, is almost to be directed against Mexico, in several columns.
>
> For the numbers of troops yet to be sent into Texas, the rendezvous or points of departure, and the routes of march thither, each chief of the general staff will obtain the information needful . . . from the . . . calls upon the governors of several states, and from the adjutant general.
>
> Arms, accoutrements, ammunition, and camp equipage [and] . . . Subsistence will . . . be thrown in advance upon the several rendezvous given, and as far as practicable on the several routes thence to be given to both regulars and volunteers. Hard bread and bacon (side pieces or middlings) are suggested . . . for marches, both on account of health and comparative lightness of transportation. On many of the routes it is supposed beef cattle may be obtained in tolerable abundance.
>
> With the means of transportation by water and land, according to the several routes to be given to the troops—and, on land, whether wagons or pack mules, or both wheels and packs—the quartermaster general will charge himself at once, and as fast as the necessary data can be settled or known. It may, however, be now assumed by him, and the two other chiefs of staff in question, that Cincinnati, and Newport (Kentucky); Madison or Jefferson, Indiana; Louisville and Smithland, Kentucky; Quincy or Alton, Illinois; Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee; Washington or Fulton, on the Red River, and Natchez, Mississippi, will be appointed as places of rendezvous for . . . volunteers . . . For marches by land, a *projet* for the means of transportation, by company, battalion, or regiment, according to route, is requested, as a general plan. The means of transportation on and beyond the Rio Grande, . . . will require a particular study; but boats for transporting supplies on that river should be early provided.[45]

This memorandum, comprehensive as it was, cannot be considered an implementing plan. It was rather a directive to the staff bureaus to begin planning and operating along indicated lines.

The Manpower Mobilization in Operation

The initial mobilization of manpower was accomplished with amazing celerity. The Militia whom Taylor had called from Louisiana and Texas began to report to him by 22 May 1845, less than a month after his call. Unexpectedly, there began to report to Taylor considerable numbers of six months' Volunteer Militia whom General Gaines, without informing either the War Department or Taylor, had illegally but enthusiastically mobilized by calls on various governors. The first two battles of the war, however, were fought and won by Taylor's 3,000 Regulars at Palo Alto (8 May 1846) and Resaca

[45] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 546–47. The memorandum was addressed to Gen T. S. Jesup, Quartermaster General; Gen George Gibson, Commissary General of Subsistence; Gen N. Towson, Paymaster General; Col George Talcott, Ordnance Department; Dr. Thomas Lawson, Surgeon General.

de la Palma (9 May 1846) before any of the Militia or Volunteers had arrived on the scene.

On 3 June 1846, Taylor reported to the War Department that he had nearly 8,000 men in his force, and he did not know how many more were coming. Since all the new troops were coming without transportation, Taylor complained that they would ". . . embarrass rather than facilitate our operations." [46] The total number of Militia who responded to the calls of Generals Taylor and Gaines was as follows: [47]

Total	12,601
Three months' Militia called by General Taylor	1,390
Six months' Militia (released after 3 months) called by General Gaines	11,211

Immobilized by their lack of transport and other equipment, all 12,601 Militiamen were demobilized without having been tactically employed and General Gaines was relieved from command.

The response of the governors to the call for 12 months' Volunteers was quick and energetic. The quotas were easily and speedily filled in spite of many minor problems. There was some confusion concerning the expenses of mobilizing men prior to their muster into Federal service. The Secretary of War had no funds available to cover transportation from local rendezvous to muster points. While the state and Federal governments bickered, necessary funds were provided by state and local appropriations, by bank loans to states, and by public subscription.[48] There were some minor difficulties, too, because in many of the states the Militia system had deteriorated so badly that procedures for Militia mobilization had been forgotten. Research for precedents was required in several states to determine how company officers should be elected, whether field officers should be elected or appointed by the governor, whom to accept, whom *not* to accept, etc.[49]

---

[46] Ltr, Taylor to TAG, 3 Jun 1845, in H Ex Doc 60, pp. 305–06.

[47] TAG to SW, "Report of The Adjutant General in reply to Resolution of the House of Representatives dated July 31, 1848," 3 Dec 1849. General Reports No. 69, Records of AGO. National Archives.

[48] Gov Thomas Ford's GO No. 2 to the Illinois Militia, 5 June 1846, printed in the *Illinois State Register* (Springfield, 1846); also editorial in *Illinois State Register,* 29 May 1846. Kentucky, Federal Writers' Project, *Military History of Kentucky* (Frankfort, 1939), p. 123; ltr, SW to Gov of Kentucky 25 May 1846, *Military Book No. 26, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War* p. 246, Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives; ltr, SW to Gov. of Mississippi, 12 June 1846, p. 311, *Ibid.; The Southern Recorder* [Milledgeville, Ga.], 16 June 1846. Library of Congress.

[49] Message from Gov Graham to the Legislature of North Carolina, 1846–47 Session (Raleigh, 1847); Message from Gov Whitcomb to the General Assembly of Indiana, 6 Dec 1846, in *Documents of General Assembly of Indiana, 30th Session Commencing December 7, 1846,* Part First (Indianapolis, 1847). [Both of these references are on microfilm at the Library of Congress.] Message of the Governor to the Legislature of Georgia, 2 Nov 1847, reprinted in The Columbus [Ga.] *Enquirer,* 9 Nov 1847. Library of Congress.

In general, the initial procedure in most states for mobilizing Volunteers was for the governor to issue a proclamation directing Militia officers to assemble their units at local rendezvous points. If the Militia system was in such a state of disuse that there were no officers available, then the county sheriffs convened the Militia units of their county.[50] At this assembly, Volunteers from the Militia were called for. The men volunteering were forwarded to a state rendezvous point where, under state control, they were formed into companies, battalions, and regiments, and were enrolled. In some instances, whole units volunteered, thereby simplifying the organizational problems. It was during this formative period when the states were struggling to assemble and organize their forces that financial difficulties were pressing. The Federal paymasters and mustering officers generally refused to provide rations or money for any Volunteers until they were mustered into the Federal service; nor would they muster Volunteers into Federal service until they were properly organized into regiments, with the stipulated number of companies and with officers duly elected or appointed. Where too many units volunteered, thereby oversubscribing the state's quota, units were accepted by the state either on the basis of first ready, first accepted or, in a few instances, by lot, which caused some bitterness.[51]

The men were required to furnish their uniforms for which they were later reimbursed by the Federal government. These uniforms were of amazing variation. Some of these resplendent trappings were provided by public subscription and made up by the patriotic ladies of the town.[52] After a state had properly organized and enrolled its quota, it was mustered into Federal service by a Regular Army officer. Weapons and other individual equipment were then issued to the men who were now United States Volunteers.[53] The responsibility of the state authorities for the men ended once they were mustered into Federal service, but most states also assisted the Federal government in getting the men to ports where they were loaded aboard steamboats or sailing ships for the trip to New Orleans and the mouth of the Rio Grande. The steamboat and the sailing ships were the chief means of transportation; ". . . the War with Mexico was the first steamboat war." [54]

As was to be expected, Volunteer units were far easier to fill, at first, than the Regular Army regiments. The one-year enlistment and easy service in the Volunteer units were far more attractive than the

[50] Gov. Thomas Ford's GO No. 1 to the Illinois Militia, in *Illinois State Register,* 29 May 1846.

[51] Smith, *op. cit.,* I, p. 195.

[52] Kentucky, *Federal Writers Project, op. cit.,* p. 125.

[53] Callan, *op. cit.,* p. 367 ; Albert G. Brackett, *General Lane's Brigade in Central Mexico* (Cincinnati, 1854), p. 19. Rare Book Collection, Library of Congress.

[54] Robert S. Henry, *The Story of the Mexican War* (New York, 1950), p. 85.

five-year enlistment and reputedly strict discipline of the Regulars. Recruiting for the Regular service, however, picked up when Congress authorized a $12 enlistment bounty and changed the enlistment period to five years or the duration of the war, at the option of the soldier.[55] General Scott in several general orders exhorted the recruiting superintendents to use diligence but economy in meeting their recruit quotas. The Regular Army recruiters were authorized to use newspaper advertisements to extol the merits and advantages, especially financial advantages, of Regular Army service.[56] Subsequently, the Congress authorized a land bounty of 160 acres for all men, Regulars and Volunteers, who served for 12 months or more; 40 acres for those who served less than 12 months; but in both instances, the service had to be in the war zone.[57] These measures helped to secure adequate numbers of men for the war for both the Regular and Volunteer units. During the war, however, it was again found difficult to secure replacements for Volunteer units already organized and in combat; it was easier to fill new Volunteer units than to refill old ones.[58]

The severest manpower crisis of the war occurred in May 1847 when General Scott (then somewhat precariously restored to the President's good graces) had to send home some 3,700 men whose year's enlistment was about to expire. At the time, Scott, then halfway between Vera Cruz and Mexico City, had just routed the Mexican Army opposing him and was ready to march on the Mexican capital. The demobilization of over one-third of his army made it necessary for Scott to wait for reinforcements.[59] The Act of February 11, 1847, had authorized ten new Regular Army regiments (one dragoons, nine infantry), and the Act of March 3, 1847, had authorized the President to accept Volunteers both individually and in units to replace men and units in Mexico. The Congress, in its provisions for the new regiments to be mobilized in 1847, made the term of service for the duration of the war. Thus at least one lesson had been learned.[60] [See *table 3* for over-all manpower statistics.]

Logistics Problems

The staff bureaus were not prepared for the war with either supplies or plans for the procurement of supplies. When the war came, the bureaus were faced with the uncomfortable necessity of procuring supplies without being able to delay long enough to make any plans for that procurement. But in this war, as in others, although The

[55] Act of January 12, 1847, in China, *op. cit.*, pp. 378–79.
[56] WD GO 26, 23 Jul 1847; WD GO 17, 15 Apr 1847.
[57] Act of February 11, 1847, in Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 379–82.
[58] Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. I.
[59] Smith, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 63–64.
[60] Callan *op. cit.*, pp. 379–87.

*Table 3. Number of Troops Mobilized During the War with Mexico: 1846–48**

Type of troops	Number
Total number of troops mobilized	115, 906
Regular Army	42, 374
Strength as of May 1846	[a] 7, 365
Recruits for Old Establishment, May 1846–July 1848	[b] 21, 018
Recruits for New Establishment, March 1847–July 1848	[b] 13, 991
Militia (Militia Volunteers)	12, 601
Called by Taylor for 3 months	1, 390
Called by Gaines for 6 months (held 3 months)	11, 211
Volunteers (under Act of 13 May 1846)	60, 931
On General Staff duty	272
Volunteered for 12 months	27, 063
Volunteered for duration	33, 596

[a] Includes 3,554 men with Taylor's "Army of Occupation' in May 1846.

[b] These data are believed to exclude officer accessions, the number of which is not furnished in the basic source. All other figures include officers.

**Source:* "Report of The Adjutant General in reply to Resolution of the House of Representatives dated July 31, 1848," General Reports No. 69, TAG to SW, 3 Dec 1849. National Archives.

Quartermaster General was willing "to pay for *time*," that commodity could not be readily purchased.[61]

The immediate and overwhelming shortage was transportation: wagon transport, shallow draft steamboats, and animal transport. Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup, during 1845, had apparently been completely unaware that extraordinary demands for wagons and steamboats were going to be made. During the period from July to December 1845, contracts for only 110 wagons had been let by The Quartermaster General, and so little was the sense of impending urgency that a quartermaster officer in Philadelphia was advised that: "The making of the wagons should not be hurried: see that they, as well as the harness, be of the best materials and workmanship."[62] With some justice, General Jesup later complained that there was no information in Washington to enable the War Department to determine whether wagons could be used in Mexico.[63] Indeed, even after the war had begun, Jesup was unable to furnish a map of Texas to one of his inquisitive officers, "there being none on hand for distribution." [64]

Col. Thomas Cross, the quartermaster officer with General Taylor's Army, appears to have been a most energetic and competent supply

[61] H Ex Doc 60, p. 605.
[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 576, 577, 579.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 560.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 592.

officer. From September 1845 on, he continually requested that additional wagons be sent to Texas. His other recommendations to Washington concerning supply preparations were sound, particularly the one advocating a wagon train with enlisted drivers as an organic part of the Army. The civilian teamsters who had been so unsatisfactory during the Revolutionary War and War of 1812 were still as unruly, undependable, and unsatisfactory in 1845–46. This recommendation, reiterated by later quartermaster officers with Taylor, was subsequently heeded by Congress when enlisted teamsters were added to dragoon, artillery, and mounted regiments and companies.[65] Colonel Cross' recommendation for a service train of three to four hundred wagons made in an established pattern so their parts would be interchangeable was too far in advance of his day for approval.[66]

Once war had been declared, Taylor was frantically calling for wagons; The Quartermaster-General had officers at every possible procurement point in the United States ordering and purchasing wagons. Philadelphia, New York, Pittsburgh, Troy, Columbus (Ga.), Savannah, Buffalo, Cincinnati, all were thoroughly canvassed by quartermaster officers willing to buy wagons at any price. A large number of mules was purchased also. By the end of August 1846, the wagon supply situation was under control.[67] Camp equipage was procured in the same manner by decentralized purchasing at centers of supply, but for most of these items, supply was adequate. The problem was principally procurement. When the need for steamboats became crucial, again quartermaster agents scoured every available market; the boats were procured but at exorbitant cost.[68] General Jesup had recommended to Col. J. J. Abert of the Topographical Engineers that a railroad be built to haul supplies from Brazos San Iago to the mouth of the Rio Grande, but this farsighted recommendation, like General Taylor's casual request for a ponton train, became so tangled in interbureau red tape that it was not implemented.[69]

The difficulties of The Quartermaster General in the war were intensified by the failure of the Army commanders to realize the need for mobility. There is no question but what the number of wagons utilized in the service trains was far greater than was necessary for maintaining the force at combat efficiency. In this war, there developed the practice of bringing the civilian standards of living along with the field forces. The troops in the field were provided with dancing girls, bars, theaters, newspapers, ice, liquor, vaudeville, gam-

[65] Act of March 3, 1847, in Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

[66] H Ex Doc 60, p. 646.

[67] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 490–91, n. 5; see: H Ex Doc 60, pp. 638–745, for letters on transportation problems.

[68] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 482–83, n. 13; H Ex Doc 60, pp. 690–91.

[69] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 571–72, 103; Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 76. The ponton train made of India rubber was finally delivered in Oct 1846 when it was no longer needed.

bling houses, fancy tobaccos, fancy groceries, camp followers, Bibles, souvenir items, etc. These conveniences required transport far in excess of that needed by an Army in the field.[70]

The provision that the Volunteers furnish their own uniforms, which had resulted at first in such a gaudy profusion of colorful garb, was impossible to continue when the uniforms needed replacement. There were no private sources of supply available in the field. Unit commanders, understandably unwilling to let the men face the rigors of a campaign without clothes or shoes, drew uniforms for the Volunteers from the Regular Army supply depots, although legally there was no basis for such issue. Some of the Volunteers were at first averse to the Regular's uniform, but most of them wound up wearing it.[71] The Quartermaster General thus had to provide uniforms far in excess of anticipated needs. The Congress legalized this *fait accompli* when, on 26 January 1848, Volunteers were provided uniforms instead of the commutation in lieu thereof.[72]

The supply bureaus eventually procured all of the supplies that were needed; but the lack of data on what was needed, the lack of procurement plans, the lack of cooperation between bureaus added tremendously to the cost of the war and could have been disastrous had it not been for the even greater confusion of the enemy.[73]

Training

There was a relative improvement in training in the Mexican War. The Regular Army units which composed General Taylor's "Army of Occupation" at the beginning of the war were reasonably well-drilled and disciplined. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant who had served as a second lieutenant in Taylor's Army wrote in his memoirs:

> . . . At the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. Every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars. . . . A better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest two engagements of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. They were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. They became soldiers themselves almost at once.[74]

---

[70] Henry, *op. cit.*, ch. V, pp. 80–95, has a good brief account of the Army's "morale" appendages.

[71] Brackett, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[72] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

[73] For the difficulties and procedures of The Quartermaster General during the mobilization see correspondence in H Ex Doc 60, pp. 549–769.

[74] Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* (New York, 1885), I, pp. 167–68.

The first Volunteer units raised during the Mexican War were rushed to the Rio Grande without any preliminary training; during May and June 1846 the only thought was to forward men to General Taylor. General Taylor prescribed six hours of daily drilling for the Volunteers once they reached Mexico.[75] Later in the war Volunteer regiments were sent to schools of instruction in Mexico where they were drilled with Regular regiments, and the officers received instruction in tactics.[76] Drill was, of course, the chief element of the training program.

Regular Army recruits received basic training at camps of instruction, which were part of the General Recruiting Service, before being sent to Mexico. On their arrival at their assigned units, training was facilitated by the considerable number of trained junior officers in the Regular Army during the weeks between active campaigns. The Volunteers were not as well trained as the Regulars because of the inexperience of the Junior officers and noncommissioned officers (the backbone of training programs) in the Volunteer units.[77]

There was a slight improvement in training literature during this period, notably General Scott's regulations entitled *Instructions for Field Artillery, Horse and Foot* which was made standard for the Army and the Militia in 1845.[78] This manual undoubtedly contributed to the fine performance of the Regular Army artillery during the Mexican War. Although the quality of training literature was somewhat better, the supply was still extremely limited. The most common training text was General Scott's three volume *Infantry Tactics.* Another forward step was made with the publication of *The General Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1847* by the War Department, which contained detailed military information on organization and administration.

The Lessons of the War

The lessons of the Mexican War were never studied a great deal, probably because the war had been so brief and successful. The victory expanded the United States to the Pacific Ocean, thus fulfilling Manifest Destiny, and put Zachary Taylor and Franklin Pierce in the White House. Those results were remembered, but most of the mobilization lessons were forgotten.

The old lessons which were repeated again were:

1. Military policy and foreign policy must be coordinated at all times.

---

[75] Upton, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

[76] Brackett, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 25. See also: Francis Baylies, *Narrative of Major General Wool's Campaign in Mexico* (Albany, 1851).

[77] See also: Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. I

[78] Ganoe, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

2. Staff planning for war in advance of the war itself is most necessary, but will never be accomplished until a specific agency is charged with that planning.

3. The departments which control and accomplish mobilization must be coordinated in their operations to prevent confusion and inefficiency.

4. Unplanned for, piecemeal activities in wartime are costly, slow, wasteful, and confusing.

5. The ability, experience, and leadership of the peactime Regular Army must be more effectively diffused through the entire wartime army.

6. Training can be effectively accomplished only when there is time, a program, and sufficient capable instructors and instructional material.

7. Adequate means of transportation must be provided for military purposes. The importance of transportation was becoming even greater as the transportation media became faster. The need for organic transportation in a military force was reemphasized.

8. War plans must be based on adequate and accurate intelligence information.

9. The inability of the Militia as organized to provide a reservoir of military manpower was not only reaffirmed but was emphasized, for by 1846 the Militia was not only inefficient, it was verging closely on extinction.

10. The accepted system of election of officers by their men was inefficient and needed replacement by a system of Federal selection of officers, selection to be based on impartial standards. Federal rather than state control of officer selection was better because only under Federal control could officer standards be made uniform.

11. The complexity of this war made it even more necessary than in previous wars that the term of service be for the duration of the war.

Lessons which were perhaps new or which first acquired major significance in this war were:

1. The extent to which civilian luxury services accompany troops in the field must be strictly limited, or the weight of those luxury services will immobilize the Army.

2. Supply planning for a mobilizing Army must be based on the total force. The assumption that elements of the force could provide for their own equipment and uniforms or else obtain them from their states was not only fallacious but led to procurement competition which impeded the overall procurement effort.

3. Joint operations of the Army and Navy can be successfully accomplished when there is cooperative planning, and a sincere cooperative effort made by the commanders of the units of the respective services.

CHAPTER IV

THE CIVIL WAR

The American Civil War, 1861–65, was the last of the old wars as well as the first of the modern wars by 20th century standards. Its modernity extended from the comprehensiveness of its mobilization to the grim tragedy of its final casualty lists. The problems of Civil War mobilization in both the United States and the Confederate States were problems of mobilization for modern warfare. The solutions to those problems, finally reached after devious confused improvisations, were essentially solutions still applicable to the problems of World Wars I and II.[1]

No two wars have ever been alike; indeed, a common military error has been to expect the next war to be the exact counterpart of the last war. The major difference between the Civil War and the World Wars is inherent in the very name—*Civil* War. This was a war between component parts of one nation in which the overriding basic issue, once the contest was joined, was whether that nation was to exist as one. In that elemental factor can be found extenuating reasons for the failure of both sides to prepare with reasonable adequacy for the conflict which they knew was surely coming. Extensive preparation for war by either side would have precipitated the conflict. The bitter critics of the Buchanan administration are justified when they point out its weakness and lack of decisive leadership; but they should temper their criticisms with the political, social, and military crosscurrents of 1860–61.

The important role which state governments played in the Civil War mobilization was another factor which distinguished the Civil War from the World Wars. Both the North and the South used the state governments as the medium for recruiting and equipping manpower in the early part of the war. In the South this reliance on the states was due primarily to the states' rights theory, while in the North

[1] "Although mistakes were made by both sides in the Civil War, invaluable lessons were learned and recorded. In 1861 Brig. Gen. James Oakes, who, as Assistant Provost Marshal General for Illinois, administered the draft in that State, wrote an exhaustive report enumerating the mistakes and making definite recommendations for any future mobilization. . . . Many of the ideas and principles embodied in the Oakes report were incorporated in the Selective Service Act of 1917 and later in the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended." See *The Army Almanac* (Washington, 1950), p. 836; for Oakes Report see: *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* hereafter referred to as *Official Records* (Washington, 1880–1901), ser. III, vol. V, pp. 825–35.

it was due more to inability to devise a better system for raising armies at the outset of the war.[2] It was a curious anomaly that centralized control over mobilization processes was asserted first by the Confederacy whose existence was predicated on state sovereignty rather than by the North which was fighting to maintain the Federal Union.

Centralization increased steadily throughout the war until the Federal Government became the dominant agency for raising and maintaining armies in war as well as in peace. The arguments of Washington, Hamilton, and Monroe that the Federal Government could under the Constitution raise armies by direct call on the citizens rather than through the states became the established national policy.

The United States Forces in Being, Spring 1861

The Leaders

The military forces in being in the United States in 1861 which were to serve as the nucleus for the Civil War mobilization had changed very little organizationally or numerically since the close of the Mexican War in 1848. The four Secretaries of War from 1849 to the end of 1860 all came from the South,[3] and all subsequently held office in the Confederacy. None of them during their respective terms as Secretary of War had been disposed to resolve the mounting intransigency of the Southern states by military coercion. Even planning for civil war was impossible with such men at the head of the War Department. When a pro-Union Secretary, Joseph Holt, was finally appointed by Buchanan two months before the end of his administration, it was too late to act even if Buchanan had been so disposed.[4]

On 4 March 1861, Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States and became Commander in Chief. Lincoln was a relatively obscure Illinois lawyer whose qualities for meeting the great problems facing the Union were unknown. He had served one

[2] "To an alert secretary the call for a vounteer army might have offered an opportunity to set up a national system of recruiting, but Cameron made no effort to take responsibilities from the governors. Inertia, rather than any respect for state's rights led the Secretary to use militia system and to rely on the governors in raising the new army." See: William B. Hasseltine, *Lincoln and the War Governors* (New York, 1948), p. 176.

[3]

Sec. of War	*State*	*From*	*To*
George W. Crawford	Georgia	8 Mar 1849	23 Jul 1850
Charles M. Conrad	Louisiana	15 Aug 1850	7 Mar 1853
Jefferson Davis	Mississippi	7 Mar 1853	6 Mar 1857
John B. Floyd	Virginia	6 Mar 1857	29 Dec 1860

The often repeated charge that Floyd treasonably diverted United States arms and equipment to the Southern States during his term as Secretary of War is disproven by the records. See: Alexander Howard Meneely, *The War Department, 1861* (New York, 1928), pp. 40–42.

[4] Joseph Holt of Kentucky was Secretary of War from 18 Jan 1861 to 5 Mar 1861. Holt was an able man and a strong Unionist. After serving the Lincoln Administration as a trouble-shooter, he was appointed Judge Advocate General of the Army 3 Sep 1862 and served until 1 Dec 1875.

term in the House of Representatives, but had had little administrative experience; his military experience had consisted of a brief tour of duty as a Militia captain in the Black Hawk War. Lincoln's election was due to the division of the country into sectional minorities. As a direct result of his election, seven states had seceded from the Union by 4 March 1861.[5]

The Secretary of War in President Lincoln's cabinet was Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania. Cameron was a political chameleon whose versatility had kept him in a succession of political posts since Jackson's administration. His appointment as Secretary of War was in payment of a campaign promise made by Lincoln's presidential campaign manager.[6] The record was clear in 1861 that Cameron was not a qualified appointee; subsequent events were to prove him a most incompetent Secretary.[7]

The General in Chief of the Army was Brevet Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott who had held that position since 5 July 1841. He was a Virginian by birth, but he remained consistently loyal to the Union and to the Army of which he had been an officer since 1808. Scott was an able officer, and he had gained important field experience in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. He was, however, 74 years old and a semi-invalid in the spring of 1861. His long self-imposed exile in New York because of his differences with a succession of Secretaries of War had kept him out of close touch with military affairs until he returned to the Capital on 12 December 1860.[8]

Next in the War Department hierarchy were the semi-independent bureaus and departments which comprised the staff. [For a roster of the bureaus and their chiefs *see chart 1.*] Although there were several internal reorganizations in the various bureaus during the Civil War, the only major organizational change was the merger of the Corps of Engineers and the Corps of Topographical Engineers on 3 March 1863.

The high age of the bureau chiefs [See *chart 1.*] was due to the fact that there was no provision for retirement from the Army either

[5] South Carolina seceded 20 Dec 1860; Mississippi 9 Jan 1861; Florida 10 Jan; Alabama 11 Jan; Georgia 19 Jan; Louisiana 26 Jan; Texas 1 Feb. On 4 Feb 1861, the Provisional Congress met at Montgomery, Ala., to begin organizing the Confederate government. On 18 Feb 1861, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated Provisional President. Contrasted with Lincoln, Davis was a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point, had served as a colonel of a Volunteer regiment in the Mexican War, had had a long career in Congress, had served as Secretary of War 1853–57, and had been chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee 1857–61. Probably no other civilian was more familiar with the United States Army in 1861 than Davis. The four other states that later seceded were Virginia 17 Apr; Arkansas 6 May; North Carolina 21 May; and Tennessee 8 Jun 1861.

[6] Burton J. Hendrick, *Lincoln's War Cabinet* (Boston, 1946), p. 58.

[7] For Cameron's background see: Meneely, *op. cit.*, pp. 74–82. There is almost universal agreement about the character and abilities of Simon Cameron and the fact that they were a major reason for the confusion in 1861.

[8] Charles W. Elliott, *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man* (New York, 1937), p. 679.

*Chart 1. War Department, Staff Departments, Civil War.**

Department	Chiefs	Term of service	Home States	Age on 12 Apr 61	Misc
Adjutant General	Col. Samuel Cooper	15 Jul 52– 7 Mar 61	N. Y.	62	A. G., CSA.
	Brig. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas	7 Mar 61–22 Feb 67	Del.	56	
Quartermaster General	Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston	20 Jun 60–22 Apr 61	Va.	54	Gen., CSA.
	Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs	15 May 61– 6 Feb 82	Pa.	45	
Inspector General	Col. Sylvester Churchill	25 Jun 41–25 Sep 61	Vt.	77	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. Randolph B. Marcy	9 Aug 61– 2 Jan 81	Mass.	49	
Medical (Surgeon General)	Col. Thomas Lawson	30 Nov 36–15 May 61	Va.	79	Died.
	Col. Clement A. Finley	15 May 61–14 Apr 62	Ohio	64	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. William A. Hammond	25 Apr 62–18 Aug 64	Md.	32	Dismissed.
	Brig. Gen. Joseph K. Barnes	22 Aug 64–30 Jun 82	Pa.	43	
Judge Advocate General	Brevet Maj. John F. Lee	2 Mar 49– 4 Sep 62	Va.	48	Resigned.
	Brig. Gen. Joseph Holt	3 Sep 62– 1 Dec 75	Ky.	53	
Ordnance	Col. Henry K. Craig	10 Jul 51–23 Apr 61	Pa.	70	Transferred.
	Brig. Gen. James W. Ripley	23 Apr 61–15 Sep 63	Conn.	66	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. George D. Ramsay	15 Sep 63–12 Sep 64	Va.	59	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. Alexander B. Dyer	12 Sep 64–20 May 74	Mo.	46	
Subsistence (Commissary General)	Col. George Gibson	18 Apr 18–29 Sep 61	Pa.	78	Died.
	Col. Joseph P. Taylor	29 Sep 61–29 Jun 64	Ky.	65	Died.
	Brig. Gen. Amos B. Eaton	29 Jun 64– 1 May 74	N. Y.	55	
Paymaster General	Col. Benjamin F. Larned	20 Jul 54– 6 Sep 62	Mass.	67	Died.
	Col. Timothy P. Andrews	6 Sep 62–29 Nov 64	D. C.	67	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. Benjamin W. Brice	29 Nov 64– 1 Jan 72	Ohio	52	
Corps of Engineers**	Brig. Gen. Joseph G. Totten	7 Dec 38–22 Apr 64	Conn.	72	Died.
	Brig. Gen. Richard Delafield	23 Apr 64– 8 Aug 66	N. Y.	62	

Corps of Topographical Engineers**	Col. John J. Abert	14 Sep	34– 9 Sep	61	Va	72	Retired.
	Col. Stephen H. Long	9 Sep	61– 3 Mar	63	N. H	76	
Chief Signal Officer	Col. Albert J. Myer	27 Jun	60–21 Jul	64	N. Y	31	Transferred.
	Col. Benjamin F. Fisher	3 Dec	64–28 Jul	66	Pa	26	

Source: Compiled from Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army* (Washington 1903); George W. Cullum *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy* (Cambridge, 1891); and James G. Wilson and John Fiske, *Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography* (New York, 1898).

**The two Engineer Corps were merged 3 March 1863. Highest rank attained in bureau is given for each officer.

for age or for disability, until passage of the Act of August 3, 1861. This lack of retirement procedures had made senility and high rank almost synonomous throughout the Army and especially in the staff departments. The average age of the 11 bureau chiefs 12 April 1861 was 64, but 6 were over 70.

With but few exceptions, the War Department staff at the onset of the Civil War was an antiquated machine made up of independent parts headed by career soldiers both over age and physically and mentally incapable of meeting the mobilization demands.[9] The combination of elderly staff officers (unfamiliar with troops or with staff operations beyond those for a small peacetime army) and uncoordinated staff bureaus proved to be a serious handicap when the mobilization began.

The general officers of the line of the Army on 4 March 1861 were old men who had grown rusty and decrepit in the service. In addition to the General in Chief, General Scott (74), there were Brevet Maj. Gen. John E. Wool (77), Brevet Maj. Gen. David E. Twiggs (71), and Brig. Gen. William S. Harney (60). Wool and Twiggs were veterans of the War of 1812; Harney had entered the Army in 1818. None of the four general officers had attended the Military Academy at West Point.[10]

The Regular Army

The forces in being on 4 March 1861 consisted solely of the Regular Army. Although the Militia was still in existence, it was only a paper force. The strength of the Regular Army 1 January 1861 was 1,108 officers and 15,259 enlisted men organized into 19 regiments (10 Infantry, 4 Artillery, 2 Dragoons, 2 Cavalry, and 1 Mounted Riflemen).[11] Of the 198 companies (or similar-sized units) in these regiments, 183 were widely scattered at 79 posts along the frontiers from Texas to Minnesota and from Puget Sound to southern California. The other 15 companies manned posts along the Atlantic coast, the Canadian border, and the 23 arsenals. It was unusual for as much as a battalion of Regulars to be assembled in the period 1849–61. It was, indeed, more usual for the small companies to be split into smaller detachments to permit their being dispersed even more extensively.[12] Even after the firing on Fort Sumter it was impossible to concentrate all the Regular Army without stripping the frontier of its defenses against the Indians.

For administrative and tactical purposes the United States was divided geographically [13] into the following six departments:

---

[9] Meneely, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–26.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 22.
[12] Ganoe, *op. cit.*, pp. 244–45.
[13] *Official Army Register* (Washington, Jan 1861), p. 54.

Department	*Extent*	*Headquarters*
(1) Department of the East.	Country east of the Mississippi River.	Troy, N. Y.
(2) Department of the West.	Country west of the Mississippi River and east of the Rocky Mountains except Texas and New Mexico.	St. Louis, Mo.
(3) Department of Texas.	Texas	San Antonio, Tex.
(4) Department of New Mexico.	Territory of New Mexico less Fort Mojave.	Santa Fe, N. Mex.
(5) Department of Utah.	Territory of Utah less portion west of 117° west longitude.	Camp Floyd, Utah.
(6) Department of the Pacific.	Country west of the Rocky Mountains less the departments of Utah and New Mexico.	San Francisco, Calif.

The Regular Army was demoralized by the decision of 313 of its officers (29 per cent of the total 1,098) to either resign or accept dismissal to join the Confederacy. Even more serious than the number of officers who went over to the South was their high caliber. Such men as Robert E. Lee, Albert Sidney Johnston, Joseph E. Johnston, and Samuel Cooper resigned. Four of the five regimental commanders of mounted regiments left the Army. "But few, if any, enlisted men turned against the government." [14]

The small detachments of the Regular Army stationed in Southern states were in a precarious position because they could be easily swamped by any Southern forces which might be assembled. A crippling blow was dealt the Regular Army when General Twiggs surrendered the Department of Texas on 18 February 1861. All public property in the department except the personal arms of the troops was turned over to Texas. The 102 officers and 2,328 enlisted men (about 16 per cent of the entire Army) were to be allowed to withdraw from the state via the coast. Although Twiggs was a Southerner with Southern sympathies, he had tried vainly to get instructions from the War Department as to what disposition he should make of property and troops in Texas if it seceded. The vacillation of the War Department exasperated Twiggs into requesting relief from his command, but the relief order did not arrive until he was completing the surrender negotiations. Only about 1,200 of the Regulars had been withdrawn from the state before the firing on Fort Sumter, after which the rest became prisoners.[15] A sizable portion of the Regular Army was thus lost just as the mobilization was beginning.

---

[14] "Final Report made to the Secretary of War by the Provost Marshal General of the Operations of the Bureau of the Provost Marshal General of the United States from the Commencement of the Business of the Bureau, March 17, 1863 to March 17, 1866; the Bureau terminating by Law August 28, 1866," hereafter cited as "PMG Report," *Messages and Documents, War Department, 1865–1866, III* (Washington, 1866), I, pp. 6–7.

[15] *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. I, pp. 521–79. Twiggs was dismissed from the Army 1 Mar 1861 for the surrender of Texas.

The *actual* force in being on 12 April 1861, the Regular Army, was not capable of suppressing a rebellion of great magnitude or even of waging sustained warfare. It was small; dispersed over the wide area of the West (where roads were primitive and communication slow and difficult); untrained for large scale operations; and commanded by old men.

The Militia

The *theoretical* force in being in the spring of 1861 was still the Militia; and the Militia Act of 1792 was still the law of the land. Its failure during the War of 1812 and its disuse during the Mexican War had not destroyed paper existence of the Militia. [See *table 4* for summary of the *latest* available militia returns at The Adjutant General's Office in January 1861.]

Of the 3,163,711 Militia reported, 2,471,377 were from Union states and 692,334 from Confederate states. The totals were impressive but some of the returns dated back to 1827. The figures did not indicate how much the Militia, as a military force, had deteriorated. The Militia organization prescribed in the Act of 1792 had never been precisely complied with in all the states although they all had some kind of Militia-implementing laws on their statutes. Most of these state laws directed that all men in certain age groups were to be enrolled in the Militia. But long before the Civil War, the muster and drill day for the Militia had disappeared almost entirely. Where it still survived, it was an occasion for carnival merriment and not a military exercise.

When the Civil War began, the United States and the Confederate States, for all practical purposes, had no forces in being on which to base a mobilization. Both sides had to start from the bottom.

The War and Mobilization Begin Together

The war began on 12 April 1861 when Southern forces bombarded Fort Sumter, a United States installation off Charleston, S. C., commanded by Maj. Robert Anderson. The long-standing sectional differences were to be resolved by Civil War.

There were no plans immediately available in the North for the mobilization of military manpower or for the waging of war. However, General Scott, in spite of his infirmities, applied himself strenuously and almost singlehandedly in the preparation of such plans. He alone in Washington appeared to understand that the task was one of tremendous magnitude and one which required sound planning. The President consulted with his Cabinet, with Scott, other military men, and available political advisers; and although all had ideas, none had any considered plans except Scott. Scott's preliminary plan for the conduct of the war estimated that a Regular Army of 25,000 men and 60,000 Volunteers (for three years) would be neces-

*Table 4. Militia Force of the United States.**

State or Territory [a]	Year [b]	Total Militia	Officers	Enlisted men
Total [c]		3, 163, 711	50, 053	2, 144, 445
Maine	1856	73, 552	304	73, 248
New Hampshire	1854	33, 538	1, 227	32, 311
Massachusetts	1860	161, 192	580	160, 612
Vermont	1843	23, 915	1, 088	22, 827
Rhode Island	1859	17, 826	163	17, 663
Connecticut	1860	51, 630	200	51, 430
New York	1859	418, 846	1, 993	416, 853
New Jersey	1852	81; 984		
Pennsylvania	1858	350, 000		
Delaware	1827	9, 229	447	8, 782
Maryland	1838	46, 864	2, 397	44, 467
Virginia	1860	143, 155	5, 670	137, 485
North Carolina	1845	79, 448	4, 267	75, 181
South Carolina	1856	36, 072	2, 599	33, 473
Georgia	1850	78, 699	5, 050	73, 649
Florida	1845	12, 122	620	11, 502
Alabama	1851	76, 662	2, 832	73, 830
Louisiana	1859	91, 324	2, 792	88, 532
Mississippi	1838	36, 084	825	35, 259
Tennessee	1840	71, 252	3, 607	67, 645
Kentucky	1852	88, 979	4, 870	84, 109
Ohio	1858	279, 809		
Michigan	1858	109, 570	1, 018	108, 552
Indiana	1832	53, 913	2, 861	51, 052
Illinois	1855	257, 420		
Wisconsin	1855	51, 321	1, 142	50, 179
Missouri	1854	118, 047	88	117, 959
Arkansas	1859	47, 750	1, 139	46, 611
Texas	1847	19, 766	1, 248	18, 518
California	1857	207, 730	330	207, 400
Minnesota	1860	24, 990	185	24, 805
Territory of Utah	1853	2, 821	285	2, 536
District of Columbia	1852	8, 201	226	7, 975

[a] There is no record of any Militia in Iowa, Oregon, Washington Territory, Nebraska Territory, Kansas Territory, nor the Territory of New Mexico.

[b] Represents year of latest return received by The Adjutant General.

[c] All State totals are not broken down as to the number of officers and enlisted men.

**Source: Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 67–68.

sary to open the Mississippi River and conduct an enveloping land campaign in conjunction with a tight naval blockade to strangle the South into submission.[16] Although at the time Lincoln and his advisers were unwilling to accept Scott's "Anaconda plan" for a long and difficult struggle, it was the general strategy eventually employed. The major weakness in Scott's plan was the size of its manpower estimates.[17]

[16] Ltr, Scott to McClellan, 3 May 1861, in *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. II, pt. I, pp. 369–70.
[17] Elliott, *op. cit.*, pp. 721–23.

The only statutory basis for increasing the military forces was the Militia Act of 1792 which empowered the President to call out the Militia to suppress insurrection. After consultation with his advisers, President Lincoln issued a proclamation on 15 April 1861 calling out 75,000 Militia for three months and convening a special session of Congress 4 July 1861.[18] Both of these decisions have been questioned: first, why the call was only for 75,000 Militia; and, second, why the meeting of Congress was delayed for over 11 weeks. But Scott's "Anaconda plan" had called for only 85,000 men; and it may have been hoped by many in the Capital that one of the attempts at compromise and reconciliation might still succeed.

The apportioning to the states of their quotas under the call for 75,000 Militia was quickly accomplished. Messages dispatched to the governors over Secretary Cameron's name gave the places of rendezvous, set 20 May as muster day, and allotted quotas. [See *table 5*].

*Table 5. Quotas and Men Furnished Under Militia Call of 15 April 1861.**

States and Territories	Quota	Men furnished	States and Territories	Quota	Men furnished
Total	73, 391	93, 526	Ohio	10, 153	12, 357
			Indiana	4, 683	4, 686
Maine	780	771	Illinois	4, 683	4, 820
New Hampshire	780	779	Michigan	780	981
Vermont	780	782	Wisconsin	780	817
Massachusetts	1, 560	3, 736	Minnesota	780	930
Rhode Island	780	3, 147	Iowa	780	968
Connecticut	780	2, 402	Missouri	3, 123	10, 591
New York	13, 280	13, 906	Kentucky	3, 123	0
New Jersey	3, 123	3, 123	Kansas	0	650
Pennsylvania	12, 500	20, 175	Tennessee	1, 560	0
Delaware	780	775	Arkansas	780	0
Maryland	3, 123	0	North Carolina	1, 560	0
West Virginia	2, 340	900	Territory of New Mexico	0	1, 510
District of Columbia	0	4, 720			

**Source*: *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 66–77; "PMG Report," I, p. 161.

The replies of the governors followed sectional lines. The Governor of Kentucky telegraphed: "Your dispatch is received. In answer I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."[19] But John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts, replied cryptically to Cameron: "Dispatch received. By what route shall we send?"[20] The Governor of Delaware replied his state had no law under which he could call

[18] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 67–68.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 70.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

out the Militia. The regiment raised in that state was the result of work of private citizens.[21]

Preceding the President's proclamation of 15 April, there had been a call for 10 Militia companies from the District of Columbia on 9 April for the immediate defense of the Capital. After some haggling, about whether these companies could be employed outside the District, companies of District Militia were mobilized—35 under the restrictive condition and 3 without restrictions. Most of the companies served outside the District without protest once the war began.[22]

The war situation darkened during the two weeks following the call for 75,000 Militia. Virginia seceded from the Union on 17 April. A Massachusetts regiment passing through Baltimore on 19 April was attacked by a mob which later destroyed the bridges and telegraph lines to the North. The Capital was isolated and surrounded by hostile territory. Although Federal troops forcibly restored order in Baltimore some days later, the panic in Washington resulting from the severance of communications was so great that the Administration decided drastic action was necessary to prevent complete deterioration of the military situation.[23]

The Militia call of 15 April had been based on the Militia Act of 1792. The President now decided not to wait until Congress met before calling for Volunteers but to act and hope Congress would ratify his action after it convened 4 July. Therefore, on 3 May 1861 the President in a second proclamation increased the Regular Army by 22,714 men (an increase of eight regiments of Infantry, one of Artillery, and one of Cavalry), called for 42,034 Volunteers for three years, and 18,000 seamen for the Navy for one to three years.[24]

When Congress met it not only approved the President's action but in the Act of July 22, 1861, authorized him to call up to 500,000 Volunteers for from six months, to three years, service as the Prsident deemed necessary. Quotas were to be apportioned among the states according to population taking into consideration the number of men already in the service. The same act prescribed the organization for the Volunteer units (old Regular Army regiments and Volunteer regiments were to have ten companies whereas the new Regular Army regiments had three battalions of eight companies each); pay, pension, and other benefits were essentially the same for Volunteers as for the Regular Army; the President was given the right to appoint general officers, but the governors were to commission company and field officers. The President was given power through the medium of military boards to examine into the qualifications of all officers appointed by the governors and to remove those deemed not qualified.

[21] *Ibid.*, ser. IV, vol. IV, p. 1264.
[22] "PMG Report," I, p. 7.
[23] Meneely, *op. cit.*, pp. 116–19.
[24] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 145–46.

This excellent provision was vitiated to a degree by a provision that officer vacancies in Volunteer units in the company grade would be filled by vote of the enlisted men of the unit and in the field grade by vote of the officers in the regiment. Additional provisions gave all soldiers the privilege of free postage, provided some death benefits to next of kin, and directed establishment of a system of family allotments.[25]

Subsequent acts of Congress provided authority for calling additional Volunteers, and finally the Enrollment Act of 1863 removed statutory limits on the size of the Army. In addition to Regulars and Volunteers, the President was authorized to call out Militia units whose period of service was limited to 60 days after Congress convened unless specifically extended.[26] [See *Tables 6, 7,* and *8* for statistics of the manpower mobilization of the Civil War.]

*Table 6. Number of Men Called For, Periods of Service, Quotas, and Number Furnished Under Each Call During the Civil War.**

Date of call or proclamation	Number called for	Periods of service	Quotas assigned	Number obtained
Total [a]	2, 942, 748		2, 759, 049	[b] 2, 690, 401
15 April 1861	75, 000	3 months	73, 391	93, 326
3 May 1861, Volunteers	42, 034	3 years	611, 827	714, 231
3 May 1861, Regulars	22, 714	3 years		
3 May 1861, Seamen	18, 000	3 years		
22 and 25 July 1861	500, 000	3 years		
May and June 1862		3 months		15, 007
2 July 1862	300, 000	3 years	334, 835	431, 958
4 August 1862	300, 000	9 months	334, 835	87, 588
15 June 1863	100, 000	6 months		16, 361
17 October 1863	300, 000	3 years	467, 434	[c] 374, 807
1 February 1864	200, 000	3 years		
14 March 1864	200, 000	3 years	186, 981	284, 021
23 April 1864	85, 000	100 days	113, 000	83, 652
18 July 1864	500, 000	1, 2, and 3 years	346, 746	384, 882
18 December 1864	300, 000	1, 2, and 3 years	290, 000	204, 568

[a] The totals in the various tables do not always agree; Civil War statistics derived from different official records vary appreciably even when assembled in such a compilation as the *Report of the Provost Marshal General.* The fact that many short-term Militiamen frequently reenlisted for varying terms made accurate personnel accounting impossible. If all enlistments were reduced to a 3-year standard, the estimated total enrollment in the Union Army is approximately 2,325,000.

[b] Includes 86,724 paid commutations, excluding 63,322 men furnished at various times for various periods of service.

[c] Includes 35,883 men raised and 52,288 paid commutations resulting from the draft of July 1863.

* *Source:* "PMG Report," I, p. 160.

[25] "An act to authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting public property," 22 Jul 1861, in Callan, *op. cit.,* pp. 466–71; "An Act to increase the present military establishment of the United States," 29 Jul 1861, in *ibid,* pp. 473–76.

[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 476–78.

*Table 7. Strength of the Army at Various Dates: 1860–1865.**

Date	Total			Present			Absent		
	Total	Regulars	Volunteers	Total	Regulars	Volunteers	Total	Regulars	Volunteers
1 January 1860	16, 435	16, 435	----------	14, 636	14, 636	----------	1, 799	1, 799	----------
1 January 1861	16, 367	16, 367	----------	14, 663	14, 663	----------	1, 704	1, 704	----------
1 July 1861	186, 751	16, 422	170, 329	183, 588	14, 108	169, 480	3, 163	2, 314	849
1 January 1862	575, 917	22, 425	553, 492	527, 204	19, 871	507, 333	48, 713	2, 554	46, 159
31 March 1862	637, 126	23, 308	613, 818	533, 984	19, 585	514, 399	103, 142	3, 723	99, 419
1 January 1863	918, 191	25, 463	892, 728	698, 802	19, 169	679, 633	219, 389	6, 294	213, 095
1 January 1864	860, 737	24, 636	836, 101	611, 250	17, 237	594, 013	249, 487	7, 399	242, 088
1 January 1865	959, 460	22, 019	937, 441	620, 924	14, 661	606, 263	338, 536	7, 358	331, 178
31 March 1865	980, 086	21, 669	958, 417	657, 747	13, 880	643, 867	322, 339	7, 789	314, 550
1 May 1865	1, 000, 516	----------	----------	797, 807	----------	----------	202, 709	----------	----------

*Source: "PMG Report," I, p. 102.

*Table 8. Men Mobliized for the Union Army by States During the Civil War.**

State or Territory	Quota	Men furnished	Paid commutation
Total	2, 759, 049	[a] 2, 666, 999	86, 724
Maine	73, 587	69, 738	2, 007
New Hampshire	35, 897	33, 913	692
Vermont	32, 074	33, 272	1, 974
Massachusetts	139, 095	146, 467	5, 318
Rhode Island	18, 898	23, 248	463
Connecticut	44, 797	55, 755	1, 515
New York	507, 148	445, 959	18, 197
New Jersey	92, 820	75, 315	4, 196
Pennsylvania	388, 515	338, 155	28, 171
Delaware	13, 935	12, 265	1, 386
Maryland	70, 965	46, 053	3, 678
West Virginia	34, 463	32, 003	----
District of Columbia	13, 973	16, 534	338
Ohio	306, 322	310, 654	6, 479
Indiana	199, 788	194, 363	784
Illinois	239, 379	258, 162	55
Michigan	95, 007	88, 111	2, 008
Wisconsin	109, 080	91, 021	5, 097
Minnesota	26, 326	24, 002	1, 032
Iowa	77, 459	75, 793	67
Missouri	122, 496	108, 773	----
Kentucky	100, 194	75, 275	3, 265
Kansas	12, 931	20, 095	2
Tennessee	1, 560	31, 092	----
Arkansas	780	8, 289	----
North Carolina	1, 560	3, 156	----
California	----	15, 725	----
Nevada	----	1, 080	----
Oregon	----	1, 810	----
Washington Territory	----	964	----
Nebraska Territory	----	3, 157	----
Colorado Territory	----	4, 903	----
Dakota Territory	----	206	----
New Mexico Territory	----	6, 661	----
Alabama	----	2, 576	----
Florida	----	1, 290	----
Louisiana	----	5, 224	----
Mississippi	----	545	----
Texas	----	1, 965	----
Indian Nations	----	3, 530	----

[a] Includes 63,322 men not included in table 6.

**Source:* "PMG Report," I, p. 163.

Although there were well over 2,000,000 men enrolled in the Union Army during the war, the total present and absent strength at any one time never reached half that number. This is attributable to four factors:

1. Short terms of enlistment and service.
2. Over 200,000 discharges during the war for disabilities arising either from wounds or disease.
3. Heavy casualties; there were 359,528 battle and nonbattle deaths in the Union Army.
4. Heavy desertion rate; some 16,365 men deserted from the Regular Army and 182,680 deserted from Volunteer units.[27]

As in 1846 a decision was made to keep the Regular Army intact rather than to utilize its officers and men as cadres for the huge Volunteer armies being mobilized. This departure from the "expansible army" concept which had been used by the Army since Calhoun originated the plan in 1820 was due to General Scott's insistent advice. Remembering the Mexican War, Scott was anxious to keep in tactical being the only force which he believed was completely dependable—the Regular Army. Although Scott showed farseeing wisdom in his strategic plan for the war, he sadly underestimated the ground forces which would be necessary for such a war of attrition. In an Army whose aggregate strength would be 85,000 men, as Scott initially estimated, a Regular Army of 25,000 would indeed have had a marked leavening effect. But in an Army which grew to over 1,000,000 men, the intact Regular force was too small to influence the mass, or to be employed independently on any large scale tactical mission. This decision to keep the Regular Army intact was to deprive the mobilizing armies of maximum use of the small reservoir of military leadership contained in the Regular Army.[28]

The ultimate number of troops mobilized by the United States during the Civil War was a fine achievement in military manpower procurement, but the methods by which those men were procured clearly demonstrated how *not* to raise armies.

Mobilization Procedures

There were no coordinated plans for implementing the early mobilization; the methods used followed the patterns of custom as they were remembered from the previous wars. The procedure, in general, was for the President to issue a proclamation calling for a specified number of troops for a given period of service. The Secretary of War

[27] Fox, *op. cit.*, pp. 531–32; "PMG Report," I, pp. 78–79.

[28] For the official policy on keeping the Regular Army intact see: Ltr, AG to Maj Gen Patterson, 30 Apr 1861, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 138. For further discussion of the results of keeping the Regular Army intact see section this chapter on officer procurement and n. 84. For Scott's plan see: *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. II, pt. I, pp. 369–70.

would then assign to the respective governors their quotas according to population. These messages usually also specified the branch of service for which men were wanted and named the rendezvous point for muster. The governors then issued state proclamations subdividing the quota within the state, specifying the local and state rendezvous points, and furnishing other pertinent information. Procedures varied somewhat between states in accordance with different state laws and customs. Mobilization within the states was usually by regiments.[29]

From the point of view of the individual soldier, enlistment followed a personal decision to volunteer. Usually there were several units from which he might make a selection recruiting simultaneously in any area. In a large city such as New York the choice was even greater. Once a man volunteered, he might help recruit the unit (company or regiment) up to strength. When the minimum prescribed strength was reached the unit proceeded to a mustering point where it was inspected before muster into Federal service by a Regular Army officer. Instructions to mustering officers were simply: ". . . to receive no men under the rank of commissioned officer who is in years apparently over forty-five or under eighteen, or who is not in physical strength and vigor." [30] By 3 August 1861 a thorough medical examination was required: ". . . volunteers . . . to be mustered into the service of the United States . . . will . . . be minutely examined by the surgeon . . . to ascertain whether they have the physical qualifications necessary for the military service." [31] There was, however, considerable disregard of the medical regulations in the rush to fill regiments to strength.[32]

Once the oath of allegiance had been taken the muster was completed and the unit (usually a regiment) was under Federal jurisdiction. If complete uniforms and equipment had not been furnished by the state, shortages were made up by the Federal government as quickly as possible.[33] Usually drill began even before muster; on 24 May 1861 the Secretary of War asked the governors to turn the rendezvous into camps of instruction for units not ordered to a concentration point.[34] If a unit were ordered to a concentration area such as Wash-

[29] For Secretary of War's letters to the governors for call of 15 Apr 1861 see: *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 68; for call of 3 May 1861 see: *ibid*, pp. 203–04.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 384.

[32] The physical examinations were not effective according to a letter from the Executive Committee of the United States Sanitary Commission to the President, 21 Jul 1862: "The careless and superficial medical inspection of recruits made at least 25 per cent of the volunteer army raised last year not only utterly useless, but a positive incumbrance and embarrassment, filling our hospitals with invalids and the whole country with exaggerated notions of the dangers of war that now so seriously retard the recruiting of the new levies we so urgently need." *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 237.

[33] *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 107.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

ington or Cairo, drilling and instructions were continued there. Units were moved by rail and boat with occasional marches when easier means of transportation were not available.

Potential officers frequently undertook recruiting for a unit which they hoped to command. Usually these men were given their commissions by the governors once the unit was filled. This was the beginning of the recruiting competition which led to practical anarchy in the early mobilization. Sometimes also at the beginning of the war volunteers would be called for at a patriotic meeting and then allowed to select their own officers. General Grant's first action in the war was to preside over such a meeting at Galena, Ill., in April 1861.[35]

In addition to the recruiting activities of the governors and of the Regular Army, certain private individuals were authorized by the War Department to raise regiments or brigades independently. This was not an attempt at Federal recruiting since the officers conducting the recruiting were practically independent until the unit was completed; it was rather an acceptance by the War Department of spontaneous efforts by private individuals. The governors resented the resulting competition for the available manpower in their states and complained bitterly to the War Department.

In the first enthusiasm in the North which followed the President's first two calls for Militia and Volunteers, states frequently organized more units than their quota. There was an amazing correspondence between the governors and Secretary of War Cameron in the late spring of 1861; the governors pleaded and urged the War Department to accept additional units; Cameron adamantly refused them; and on occasion the President would intervene to direct acceptance of an extra-quota unit.[36] The War Department's reluctance in the early part of the war to accept more men than called was due to the fact that the War Department was fully occupied trying to organize, equip, sustain, and utilize the men it already had. It was believed also that the first two calls would provide enough men to implement General Scott's plan. The War Department was probably also worried about justifying additional unauthorized expenditures to Congress.

The confusion, lethargy, and lack of a long-range mobilization plan by the War Department in 1861 failed to take advantage of the tremendous war enthusiasm which swept the North after Fort Sum-

[35] Grant, *op. cit.*, I, p. 231. For descriptions of early recruiting see: Josiah M. Favill, *The Diary of a Young Officer* (Chicago, 1909), p. 42 ff.; John G. B. Adams, "Sunshine and Shadows of Army Life," *Civil War Papers . . . Massachusetts Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the U. S.* (Boston, 1900), II, pp. 448–49, 451; Michael H. Fitch, *Echoes of the Civil War as I Hear Them* (New York, 1905), pp. 17–20; all quoted in Henry Steele Commager, *The Blue and the Gray* (New York, 1950), I, pp. 72–76.

[36] For examples of this correspondence see: *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 131, 203, 219, 229, 233, 274.

ter, but which slackened off by the late summer.[37] This abatement of fervor was accentuated by press accounts of poor clothing and food in the Army. The expanding war economy was utilizing more and more of the available manpower in the factory and on the farm at ever rising wages.[38] The disaster at the first Battle of Bull Run (21 July 1861) shocked the North and revived Volunteer enlistments, but the enthusiasm of April and May 1861 was never again equaled during the war.

The confusion which began with the mobilization of the 75,000 Militia called by the President 15 April was increased by his subsequent calls for 500,000 Volunteers in 1861. Militia quotas and three-year Volunteer quotas became inextricably confused. Many regiments mobilized under the Militia call later volunteered for three years thereby upsetting administrative accounting. The authority granted to private citizens to recruit their own regiments outside of state control added to the confusion and harassed the governors who had become the chief cogs in the mobilization machinery of 1861. The quota accounting had become so chaotic after the President's call of 3 May 1861 that the War Department for the rest of the year discontinued formal assignment of quotas to the states. With no long-range mobilization plan in 1861 requisitions were made on the governors for units as circumstances dictated. Sometimes the governors mobilized units without any Federal call for them, and private individuals also mobilized units without even state connections. The Army, like Topsy, just grew in 1861. When the quota system was reinstituted in 1862, exhaustive checks were made of the Adjutant General's records to determine the men from each state that were already in the service so that the state could receive proper credits in subsequent quota allocations.[39]

In September 1861 the War Department took the first step to bring some sort of order and system into the mobilization. By a series of orders all units being recruited independent of the governors were placed under state control.[40] This was a step toward eliminating recruiting competition, but control of competition within a state depended on the respective governors. As late as August 1862 there were 11 colonels in Philadelphia alone recruiting for their regiments.[41] Delegation of authority to the governors for raising troops was almost complete. Having established a general policy, the War Department proceeded to make an exception by authorizing Maj. Gen. Benjamin F.

[37] Ltr, Sen W. P. Fessenden to Sec of War, 8 May 1861, in *ibid.*, p. 191.

[38] Fred A. Shannon, *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861–1865* (Cleveland, 1928), I, pp. 259–60. Shannon's two volume work based mainly on the *Official Records* is one of the better secondary sources although frequently his conclusions are open to question.

[39] "PMG Report," I, p. 160.

[40] *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. I, p. 518.

[41] *Ibid.,* ser. III, v. II, p. 422.

Butler to raise troops in New England. Butler was a political general, a war Democrat who had been defeated for the governorship of Massachusetts. Conflict between the two political rivals was inevitable; from September to February a stalemate in recruiting existed in Massachusetts with Butler and Andrew bickering and arguing. In theory Butler expressed the correct view when he stated: "I . . . was informed by Governor Andrew, in substance, that the President of the United States had no right to recruit in Massachusetts men for the volunteer service of the United States without his leave. This doctrine of secession did not seem to me any more sound uttered by a Governor north of Mason and Dixon's line than if proclaimed . . . south." [42] However, if the War Department expected the governors to recruit Volunteer units effectively it should have refrained from authorizing independent recruiting parties such as General Butler's. The Butler-Andrew controversy was a major political blunder which demonstrated the ineptitude of the War Department under Cameron in 1861.[43] A general order of 21 February 1862 ended the confusion: "The Governors of States are legally the authorities for raising volunteer regiments and commissioning their officers. Accordingly, no independent organizations, as such, will be hereafter recognized in the U. S. service." [44]

Cameron's Replacement Plan

The second step in systematizing the mobilization was the plan to establish a replacement program. War Department General Orders No. 105, 3 December 1861, provided that:

1. After the units in the process of organization were completed, troops would be recruited only on requisition from the War Department.

2. War Department general superintendents of recruiting would take charge of the central recruit depots in each state on 1 January 1862. Each superintendent would have supervisory control over all regimental recruiting parties within his state.

3. Recruits would be assembled, equipped, and instructed at central depots before being forwarded to their assigned regiments.[45] This system placed recruiting activities directly under War Department control and supervision. The state governors whose job had been to raise new units were gracefully eased out of the mobilization picture by halting the creation of new units. The primary responsibility for manpower procurement thus passed to the Federal Government.

---

[42] *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 652–55.

[43] Material on the Butler-Andrew controversy is found in *ibid.*, pp. 810–66. A good summary is found in Hesseltine, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–91.

[44] WD GO 18, 21 Feb. 1862. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 898.

[45] WD GO 105, 3 Dec 1861. *Ibid*, pp. 722–23.

It was felt that the forces already mobilized were adequate to suppress the rebellion if this replacement system were effective. The total strength of the Army 1 December 1861 was 660,971 men apportioned by arm of service as follows: [46]

Arm of Service	*Number*
Total	660, 971
Infantry	568, 383
Cavalry	59, 398
Artillery	24, 688
Riflemen-Sharpshooters	8, 395
Engineers	107

The replacement plan, however, was never put to an adequate test. Cameron was replaced as Secretary of War on 15 January 1862 by Edwin M. Stanton. The new Secretary who was to prove so able, energetic, and honest an administrator committed a major blunder on 3 April 1862 by abolishing the new recruiting-replacement system set up under his predecessor.[47] The reasons for this action were simple enough. It appeared to Stanton in April 1862 that the Army was large enough to accomplish its mission for he grossly underestimated future casualty losses of the Army. Congress and the people were looking more and more aghast at the huge expenditures for the war. The discontinuance of the recruiting system was part of Stanton's campaign to economize and to eliminate waste in the War Department's operations.[48]

The heavy losses suffered by the Union Armies during the Peninsula Campaign (April-June 1862), at Shiloh (6 April 1862), and from disease and desertion greatly reduced the Army. Replacements in large numbers were going to be necessary very quickly. On 1 May 1862 the War Department directed Army commanders to requisition recruits from the governors to keep the regiments in the field up to strength.[49] This was only a temporary expedient. The Federal recruiting service was restored 6 June 1862.[50] Not only were individual replacements needed in far greater numbers than had been estimated but the lengthening lines of communications required new units to protect them.[51]

---

[46] "Report of the Secretary of War to the President," 1 Dec 1861. *Ibid.*, p. 699.

[47] WD GO 33, 3 Apr 1862. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 2–3. The order was all-inclusive: "The recruiting service for volunteers will be discontinued in every State from this date. The officers detached on volunteer recruit service will join their regiments without delay, taking with them the parties and recruits at their respective stations. The superintendents of volunteer recruiting service will disband their parties and close their offices, after having taken the necessary steps to carry out these orders." Shannon called the order "one of the colossal blunders of the war." Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 266.

[48] "PMG Report," I, p. 9.

[49] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 28–29.

[50] WD GO 60, 6 June 1862.

[51] For a complete discussion of replacements in the Civil War see: Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. II. The spring of 1862 was the low point in the replacement picture. There was a gradual

The governors were appealed to once again for manpower although for morale and propaganda purposes the impression was given that the governors spontaneously urged the President to accept 300,000 more Volunteers and that he graciously acceded to their request.[52] The President's call was issued 2 July 1862; quotas were assigned calling for 334,835 Volunteers for three years. At the beginning the War Department authorized prepayment of $25 of the $100 bounty which had heretofore been paid on discharge.[53] The immediate response to the call was slow, and the need for manpower was increasing daily.

The Draft Plan of 1862

The War Department had two alternatives available by which it could increase the response to the call of 2 July 1862: increase bounties or draft men. Two states, Iowa and Missouri, had used the threat of a draft in 1861 to speed up volunteering.[54] The Confederate Congress had passed a comprehensive draft act on 16 April 1862. There was no direct Federal statutory authority for a draft, but an obscure provision in the Militia Act of July 17, 1862, provided that for those states which did not have adequate laws governing the Militia "the President is authorized . . . to make all necessary rules and regulations." [55] Interpreting this provision broadly, the President on 4 August 1862 issued a call for a draft of 300,000 Militia for nine months. A proviso was added to that call that any state which by 15 August 1862 had not furnished its full quota of three-year Volunteers under the call of 2 July 1862 would make up the deficiency by a special draft from the Militia. The Secretary of War was instructed to establish the necessary rules for the draft.[56] This is the first instance of the Federal Government assuming military draft prerogatives in the United States. This Militia draft may well have been intended to spur the governors to greater recruiting speed.[57]

The draft machinery [58] was prescribed in General Orders No. 99, 9 August 1862:

1. State governors were responsible for the conduct of the draft within their respective states.

---

improvement after the establishment of the Provost Marshal General's Bureau in 1863 and the passage of the draft. Although the War Department never retained complete control of the Volunteer recruiting service, its possession of the power to conscript proved to be a weapon of coercion in forcing the governors to divert Volunteers from new organizations into the ranks of the old. By late 1864 a federally controlled replacement system was in operation which supplied a steady although insufficient and poorly distributed stream of replacements for the old regiments.

[52] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 180, 187–88.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 187. Eventually 431,958 men were furnished under the call of 2 Jul 1862. See also "PMG Report," I, p. 160.

[54] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 273–74.

[55] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 531.

[56] WD GO 94, 4 Aug 1862, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 291.

[57] Hesseltine, *op cit.*, p. 201.

[58] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 334.

2. All men between 18 and 45 were subject to the draft and were to be enrolled except the following exempted classes:

(a) those in military service; (b) telegraph employees; (c) railroad locomotive engineers; (d) employees of public arsenals and armories; (e) the Vice President, members of Congress, and judicial and executive officers of the Federal Government; (f) customs officials and clerks; (g) postal officials and clerks; (h) pilots and the merchant marine; (i) those exempted by state law; (k) those certified physically incapable of service by a state surgeon.

3. Substitution was authorized.

4. The county was to be the local unit of draft jurisdiction.

5. County or state appointed officials would conduct the draft.

These regulations were issued 9 August 1862. "Troubles quickly followed. The governors did not question the President's authority to order a draft—which was of dubious legality . . . Instead the governors protested at the time allowed, and . . . the proper quotas. The people protested, too. There were draft riots in Wisconsin, and threats of riots in Pennsylvania. Yielding to pressure, Stanton permitted the governors to postpone the draft—first for a month, and then indefinitely." [59] Although the draft of 1862 never went into effect, the threat of a draft and increased bounties helped to fill the calls of 2 July and 4 August 1862. Under Stanton's accounting system of allowing four nine-month Militia to equal one three-year Volunteer, the calls yielded 431,958 Volunteers and 87,558 Militia and were, therefore, considered successful.[60] The chief contribution of the executive draft of 1862 was that it affirmed without serious constitutional opposition the principle of a compulsive Federal draft of manpower for military purposes.

The 1863 Draft Act

The principle of a compulsory Federal draft of manpower was reaffirmed by the Congress when after two weeks of debate it passed by comfortable majorities "An Act for enrolling and calling out the National Forces, and for other purposes," 3 March 1863.[61] The functional provisions [62] of the Enrollment Act of 1863 were as follows:

1. Draft liability was imposed on all male citizens and declarant aliens between 20 and 45 years of age except the following exempted categories:

---

[59] Hesseltine, *op cit.*, pp. 201–02. At least three governors (Washburn of Maine, Morton of Indiana, and Yates of Illinois) had expressed approval of a draft in principle before the President's call. See *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 201, 212–13, 289. Gov. Andrew of Massachusetts opposed this draft on the very sound principle that it would produce ". . . a mere paper army, unorganized, ineffectual, discontented, valueless—flocks of green men, green officers, conscripts." *Ibid.*, p. 401.

[60] Hesseltine, *op cit.*, p. 202.

[61] Act of March 3, 1863. *Stat. L.*, XII, pp. 731–37.

[62] Duggan, *op. cit.*, p. 48. Duggan contains a succinct summary of the Enrollment Act of 1863. Most of the outline summary of that act is based on Duggan's analysis.

a. Physically or mentally unfit.
b. Vice President, Federal judges, heads of Federal executive departments, and governors.
c. Men with certain specified types of dependents.
d. Persons convicted of a felony.

2. Enrollees were divided into two classes: Class I, all persons between 20 and 35 and all unmarried persons between 35 and 45; Class II, all enrollees not in Class I.

3. No Class II enrollees could be drafted until the Class I pool was exhausted.

4. Enrollees were subject to draft for two years after enrollment; once drafted, they would remain in service for three years or the war, whichever ended first.

5. Administratively the country was divided into enrollment districts with at least one per congressional district. Enrollment boards could subdivide enrollment districts into conveniently small subdistricts.

6. Draft quotas from each district would be set by the President based on population and the number of men already in the service from each district.

7. The executive machinery to administer and enforce the Enrollment Act consisted of:
a. The Provost Marshal General as the operating executive under the President and Secretary of War.
b. A provost marshal with the rank of captain for each district appointed by the President to serve as president of the Enrollment Board and to act as principal administrative and enforcement official in the district.
c. Enrollment Board of three members including the district provost marshal and one practicing physician.
d. Each district or subdistrict was to have an enrolling officer to conduct the actual enrollment and transmit the list of enrollees to the Enrollment Board.

8. Procedure for drafting men was essentially as follows:
a. The President would assign a draft quota to an enrollment district.
b. The Enrollment Board would call from its roster of enrollees the requisite quota plus a 50 percent overstrength to report at a designated rendezvous.
c. The physician on the Board would examine all enrollees called and report the results to the full Board. Decision of the Board as to exemption for physical reasons was final.
d. As soon as the quota of able-bodied men was filled the remainder were released and those selected were mustered into the Army.

9. Substitution, whereby a drafted man could hire another to perform military service for him, and commutation, whereby a drafted man could purchase relief from obligation for that call by paying $300, were authorized.

The Enrollment Act of 1863 also had formidable defects:

1. The administration and enforcement of the draft were charged solely to military officers.

2. Under the enrollment procedure officers went from house to house enrolling men rather than making it a civic responsibility to register.

3. The substitution and commutation privileges were unsound and unjust.

4. Exemptions and commutations almost emptied the manpower pool before the draft began.

The Enrollment Act was, however, a Federal law providing for the raising of armies by Federal administrative machinery, and it ignored the state governments in the task of mobilizing manpower. A fundamental change in the theory of military mobilization had thus taken place.

The implementation of the Enrollment Act began with the first enrollment which started 25 May 1863. Drafting began the first week in July and continued into August. Sporadic resistance to the draft throughout the country culminated in riots in New York City. Police, Militia, and the Regular Army finally restored order after four days of rioting and an estimated 1,000 casualties and $1,500,000 damages.[63]

The statistics of the draft of July 1863 are a good indication of its relative effectiveness:[64]

Status	*Number*
Whole number drawn	292,441
Number not examined	39,875
Failed to report	39,415
Discharged, quota filled	447
Discharged per order	13
Number examined	252,566
Exempted	164,395
Held to service	88,171
Men raised	35,883
Held to personal service	9,881
Furnished substitutes	26,002
Paid commutation	52,288

[63] Rhodes, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 328.
[64] "PMG Report" I, p. 175.

The net results of 35,883 men and $15,686,400 were so meager as to justify the assertion that the Enrollment Act of 1863 was a failure as a direct medium for the procurement of manpower. Certainly the number of men secured by the draft in 1863 fell far short of meeting military manpower requirements for 1864. In addition to the heavy losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the desertion and disease rates were continuing high, and the three-year enlistment term of the 1861 Volunteers was drawing to an end. In frustration Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, General in Chief of the Army, wrote to General Sherman 1 October 1863 "Your ranks cannot be filled by the present draft. It is almost a failure, as nearly everybody is exempt. It takes more soldiers to enforce it than we get by it. A more complicated, defective, and impracticable law could scarcely have been framed." [65]

To fill the seemingly inexhaustible manpower demands of the war, the President resorted to additional calls for Volunteers. On 17 October 1863 he called for 300,000 three-year Volunteers with a warning that if Volunteers were not forthcoming deficiencies would be made up by draft to be held 5 January 1864. The draft was postponed, and on 1 February 1864 the President increased the call to 500,000 Volunteers with a draft to begin 10 March 1864 if volunteering did not produce the required number. This draft was also postponed to allow men to volunteer and take advantage of the increased bounties included in an act passed 24 February 1864 amending the Enrollment Act of 1863. The major changes in that act included: (1) a redefining of quota credits; (2) increasing the penalty for resisting the draft; (3) recognizing the validity of conscientious objectors; (4) subjecting Negroes to enrollment and service.[66]

On 14 March 1864 the President increased the pending calls for 500,000 Volunteers by another 200,000 and again directed a draft to fill vacancies to begin on 15 April 1864. Quotas assigned under these calls for 700,000 men came to 654,415, and 658,828 men were raised, a substantial achievement after three years of war. Although many communities produced enough Volunteers to fill their quotas, many other communities had to resort to the draft which this time had the following results: [67]

Status	*Number*
Held to service	45,005
Men raised	12,327
Held to personal service	3,416
Furnished substitutes	8,911
Paid commutation	32,678

[65] *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. III, pt. I, p. 718.
[66] Duggan, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
[67] "PMG Report", I, p. 185.

Again the major effect of the draft was not its direct procurement of manpower (which can be measured exactly), but its indirect effect by encouraging volunteering.

Two more major calls for men were made by the President. The call on 18 July 1864 was for 500,000 men to serve 1, 2, or 3 years, but the quotas assigned to the states came to only 346,746 men. Although 384,882 men were raised under this call, a draft was again necessary in many localities. Its results were as follows: [68]

Status	*Number*
Held to service	85,589
Men raised	84,291
Held to personal service	26,205
Substitutes furnished by enrollees before draft	29,584
Substitutes furnished by draftees	28,502
Paid commutation	1,298

The last call was made on 18 December 1864 for 300,000 men. Quotas were allocated for 290,000 and 204,568 had responded when the war ended. Draft results this time were: [69]

Status	*Number*
Held to service	30,494
Men raised	30,034
Held to personal service	6,845
Substitutes furnished by enrollees before draft	12,997
Substitutes furnished by draftees	10,192
Paid commutation	460

The net results of the four applications of the Enrollment Act of 1863 were as follows: [70]

Status	*Number*
Held to service	249,259
Men raised	162,535
Held to personal service	46,347
Substitutes furnished	116,188
Paid commutation	86,724

Of the 2,666,999 men raised by the North during the Civil War, only 6 percent can be attributed to the direct effect of the draft. The indirect effects of the draft in encouraging enlistments cannot be accurately assessed, but that those effects were important seems certain. The principal importance of the Enrollment Act of 1863, however, lies not in the direct or indirect effects it had on manpower procurement for the Civil War. It lies in the fact that this measure established firmly the principle that every citizen owes the Nation the obligation to defend it and that the Federal Government can impose

[68] "PMG Report," I, pp. 44, 199.

[69] "PMG Report, I, pp. 56, 212.

[70] The 86,724 commutations yielded $26,366,316.78, part of which was used for bounties and substitutes. "PMG Report," I, p. 95.

that obligation directly on the citizen without mediation of the states. Of almost equal importance were the lessons learned from the Civil War draft which served as the basis for the well-planned selective service laws of World Wars I and II.

The Bounties

As in previous wars, bounties were an integral part of the Volunteer system during the Civil War. Because the Civil War was on a larger scale the bounty payments came to staggering totals for that day. It is not possible to assign relative weights to the influence of bounties and the draft in spurring volunteering since both measures were used simultaneously. It is reasonably safe to assert that both the bounties and the draft had an appreciable effect on encouraging men to volunteer for service. [For complete estimates of the amounts expended by the Federal and state governments on bounties during the Civil War see *tables 9* and *10*.]

*Table 9. Bounties Paid by the Federal Government—Civil War.**

Periods	Class	Period of service	Number of men	Amount per man	Total amount paid
Total			1, 722, 690		$300, 223, 500
3 May 1861 to 17 Oct 1863.	Volunteers	3 years	905, 869	$100	90, 586, 900
17 Oct 1863 to 18 Jul 1864.					146, 417, 500
	Veteran Volunteers.	3 years	158, 507	400	63, 402, 800
	Recruits	3 years	257, 028	300	77, 108, 400
	Recruits	3 years	11, 025	100	1, 102, 500
	Drafted men and substitutes.	3 years	48, 038	100	4, 803, 800
18 Jul 1864 to end of war.					63, 219, 100
	Volunteers	1 year	191, 936	100	19, 193, 600
	Volunteers	2 years	10, 606	200	2, 121, 200
	Volunteers	3 years	139, 681	300	41, 904, 300

**Source:* "PMG Report," I, 213.

The cost of bounties was extraordinarily high. The $585,000,000 reported in *tables 9* and *10* is far from a complete total. Although Federal records are reasonably accurate, the total includes only a minimum estimate of the amount paid out by the state governments and entirely omits local bounties paid by towns, cities, and counties. It has been estimated that the total amount paid out in bounties exceeded $750,000,000. Bounties cost about as much as the pay for the

Army during the entire war; exceeded the quartermaster expenditures for the war; and were twice as great as the cost of subsistence and five times the ordnance costs.[71]

*Table 10. Estimate of the Minimum Amount of Bounties Paid by the State Governments—Civil War.**

State	Amount paid	State	Amount paid
Total	$285, 941, 036	District of Columbia	$134, 010
		West Virginia	864, 737
Maine	7, 837, 644	Kentucky	692, 577
New Hampshire	9, 636, 313	Ohio	23, 557, 373
Vermont	4, 528, 775	Indiana	9, 182, 354
Massachusetts	22, 965, 550	Illinois	17, 296, 205
Rhode Island	820, 769	Michigan	9, 664, 855
Connecticut	6, 887, 554	Wisconsin	5, 855, 356
New York	86, 629, 228	Iowa	1, 615, 171
New Jersey	23, 868, 967	Minnesota	2, 000, 464
Pennsylvania	43, 154, 987	Missouri	1, 282, 149
Delaware	1, 136, 599	Kansas	57, 407
Maryland	6, 271, 992		

**Source:* "PMG Report," I, pp. 214–23.

The basic evil of the bounty system was the local competition which developed in bounty payments; as communities vied with each other to get recruits, local bounties became progressively higher. The bounty became not a reward for volunteering but a price for mercenaries. The evils of bounty jumping and substitute brokers were the result. When bounties soared as high as $1,500, the substitute-bounty broker "racket" became big business. The high desertion rate was closely related to the bounty system, for men deserted time and time again in order to enlist elsewhere for additional bounties.[72]

Bounties were frequently considered, in part, as another form of pay. Pay increases for soldiers were necessary to bring their pay into a more equitable relationship with steadily increasing civilian wages. Bounties, however, were an inefficient method for bringing about such a readjustment. Pay in the Army for privates increased from $11 per month in April 1861 to $13 in August 1861 to $16 in June 1864. A clothing allowance of $3.50 was also authorized.[73] There were proportionate increases in pay for other ranks of the Army. Although the increases seemed appreciable on paper, "Actually the pay of the soldiers diminished throughout the war through the depre-

[71] Shannon, *op. cit.*, II, p. 80.
[72] "PMG Report," I, p. 86; Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 69–71.
[73] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 468, 489; *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 448.

Although there was no large scale organized Army draft until World War I, many measures were taken to recruit men for the service. Frank Leslie, the famous illustrator, has left this memento of the Civil War.

Figure 2. Civil War Recruiting.

ciation in the value of greenbacks with which after February, 1862, they were paid." [74]

However well the bounty program was conceived, in practice it was costly, inefficient, and sordid. Its manifest evils during the Civil War taught another lesson which was to be remembered in 1917 and 1940.

Substitution and Commutation

Substitution and commutation were closely related to bounties. The practice of furnishing substitutes had developed as an adjunct of Militia drafts in the colonial period. As long as there was only one call or draft of manpower the practice of furnishing substitutes did little damage. But when the need for manpower made necessary frequent uses of the draft in the Civil War, the immunity from service derived from furnishing a substitute reduced the available manpower

[74] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 246. General Sherman stated: "I believe it would have been more economical to have raised the pay of the soldier to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to have held out the promise of three hundred and even six hundred dollars in the form of bounty." See William T. Sherman, *Personal Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman* (3d ed.; New York, 1890), II, p. 387; "Conclusion—Military Lessons of the War," ch. XXV of General Sherman's memoirs, is a most valuable and interesting commentary.

pool. This contingency had never occurred before the Civil War, and therefore was not foreseen in 1862 when a substitution privilege was included in the executive draft.[75] Although there is a considerable difference of opinion over the caliber of substitutes, the mercenary factor motivated most of them in seeking that entrance into the service.[76]

The Enrollment Act of March 3, 1863, contained the following substitution-commutation provision: "That any person drafted and notified to appear as aforesaid may, on or before the day fixed for his appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his place in the draft; or he may pay to such person as the Secretary of War may authorize to receive it, such sum, not exceeding three hundred dollars, as the Secretary of War may determine, for the procuration of such substitute." [77]

A question of interpretation arose as to the length of exemption to be obtained by hiring a substitute or paying commutation. The amendments to the Enrollment Act passed 24 February 1864 clarified the substitute-commutation system by providing in general: (1) substitutes had to be men not liable to the draft themselves; (2) a principal's exemption lasted only as long as his substitute remained in service; (3) payment of commutation exempted the payee from service only for that specific draft call. These changes not only raised the hiring fee of substitutes but also confirmed the belief that the substitute-commutation system was a class privilege. To hire a substitute or pay $300 for exemption from each draft call was beyond the financial capacity of the average farmer and laborer in the 1860's. Public antipathy centered on the commutation fee and became so strong that Congress abolished commutation outright for all but conscientious objectors 4 July 1864. The substitution privilege remained, and the Act of July 4, 1864, specifically provided: "That nothing contained in this act shall be construed to alter or change the provisions of existing laws relative to permitting persons liable to military service to furnish substitutes."

In spite of the substitution privilege the Enrollment Act was in its best form during the period 4 July 1864 to 3 March 1865. The percentage of men brought into service out of the number examined was greatest during this period. An act passed 3 March 1865 contained several new amendments to the Enrollment Act including a repeal of the provision that substitutes must come from men not themselves subject to the draft.

A review of Civil War draft statistics indicates the extent to which the substitution and commutation privileges were utilized:

---

[75] *Ibid.*, II, p. 11; *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 334–35.

[76] For praise of substitutes in after-action reports see: *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXIX, pt. I, pp. 286, 288.

[77] Act of March 3, 1863. *Stat. L.*, XII, p. 733.

*Table 11. Draft Substitution and Commutation in the Civil War.**

Date of call	Held to personal service	Substitutes furnished by draftees	Substitutes furnished by enrollees	Paid commutation
Total	46, 347	73, 607	42, 581	86, 724
July 1863	9, 881	26, 002	0	52, 288
14 Mar 1864	3, 416	8, 911	0	32, 678
18 Jul 1864	26, 205	28, 502	29, 584	1, 298
19 Dec 1864	6, 845	10, 192	12, 997	460

**Source:* Summary of draft statistics in "PMG Report," I, compiled by the author.

The substitution-commutation concept was predicated on the faulty assumption that no draft for personal service was necessary if military manpower could be procured by other methods. Yet the very passage of the Enrollment Act of 1863 indicated the failure of the volunteer system. A curious effort was made to retain the fiction of volunteering by stimulating it with bounties and the threat of draft. Substitution and commutation were part of the camouflage used to make the draft more palatable.

Utilization of Negro Manpower

The question of whether Negroes should serve in the armed forces of the United States was settled affirmatively during the Civil War after more than a year of hot political arguments. At the beginning of the war the Regular Army limited enlistments to free white males. The first authorization for using Negroes in the Army was contained in an act passed 17 July 1862 authorizing the President to accept Negroes for labor and other military service. The Congress did not include Negroes in the draft until 24 February 1864.

The first recruiting of Negroes took place in captured areas of the South beginning in Louisiana in September 1862. With the exception of a few units organized by states, Negro units were formed and filled by the Federal Government. The Bureau for Colored Troops (created by General Orders No. 143, 22 May 1863) was charged with the organization and supervision of Negro units. The Adjutant General of the Army took personal charge of Negro recruiting in the Mississippi Valley in the spring of 1863; after that, recruiting was accelerated all over the country and continued until 29 April 1865.[78]

[78] "PMG Report," I, pp. 67–68. Even after issuance of WD GO 143, 22 May 1863, the Northern governors were allowed to recruit in the South and receive credit for Negroes enlisted on their state quotas. This composed a very small part of the Negro recruiting program, however. See *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 372, 383, 572, 576.

By the end of the war the following Negro units had been organized and mustered into Federal service:

120 Regiments of Infantry,
12 Regiments of Heavy Artillery,
1 Regiment of Light Artillery,
7 Regiments of Cavalry.[79]

Of the 186,017 Negroes in the Union Army, some 134,111 were from slave states and most of those were slaves or former slaves.[80] [See *table 12* for summary of Negro enlistments by states.]

*Table 12. Negroes Recruited or Drafted in the Civil War, by States**

State	Number	State	Number
Total	186,017	Border States	44,034
		District of Columbia	3,269
Northern States	35,699	Maryland	8,718
Colorado Territory	95	Kentucky	23,703
Connecticut	1,764	Missouri	8,344
Delaware	954		
Illinois	1,811	Seceded States	93,346
Indiana	1,537	Alabama	4,969
Iowa	440	Arkansas	5,526
Kansas	2,080	Florida	1,044
Maine	104	Georgia	3,486
Massachusetts	3,966	Louisiana	24,052
Michigan	1,387	Mississippi	17,869
Minnesota	104	North Carolina	5,035
New Hampshire	125	South Carolina	5,462
New Jersey	1,185	Tennessee	20,133
New York	4,125	Texas	47
Ohio	5,092	Virginia	5,723
Pennsylvania	8,612		
Rhode Island	1,837	At large	733
Vermont	120	Not assigned to States	5,083
West Virginia	196	Officers	7,122
Wisconsin	165		

**Source:* "PMG Report," I, p. 69. See also *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 1269–70.

Militarily the Negroes appear to have been amenable to discipline and army life in the Civil War. No effort was made to integrate Negroes into white units although an occasional Negro undoubtedly

[79] "PMG Report," I, pp. 68–69.

[80] The figure 134,111 includes Negroes from the seceded states plus Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. Another 5,052 credited to Northern states came from seceded areas and were presumably for the most part former slaves as were the 3,269 from the District of Columbia. See: Bell I. Wiley, *Southern Negroes 1861–1865* (New Haven, 1938), p. 311; *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 1270.

served in a white unit. Negro units were used principally as labor-service organizations and for garrisoning forts along the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, along lines of communication, and in coastal regions. The instances where Negro troops were employed in combat were so few as to preclude any appraisal of their overall value in combat.[81]

Limited Service Men

The pressing need for additional manpower in 1863 led to the establishment of a special corps to utilize the services of partially disabled veterans. General Orders No. 105, 28 April 1863, established the Invalid Corps which was to be composed entirely of officers and enlisted men no longer fit for frontline service but who volunteered for further duty. The Corps was organized into companies, battalions, and regiments of Infantry divided into two classes according to the physical capacity of the men: units available for any work except combat and units available for only very light work. The Corps performed valuable rear area services as prisoner guards, building guards, clerks, hospital orderlies, administrators, etc., thereby releasing physically fit men for combat. In 1864 the unpopular term "Invalid" was dropped and the Corps redesignated the "Veteran Reserve Corps." Although the Corps did not furnish an appreciable amount of manpower, the establishment of the principle of the utilization of limited service men was truly significant. Altogether over 60,000 men passed through the ranks of the Veteran Reserve Corps. The strength of the Corps at various times was as follows: [82]

Date	Total	Officers	Enlisted men
31 Oct 1863	18, 255	491	17, 764
1 Oct 1864	29, 502	764	28, 738
31 May 1865	30, 614	762	29, 852

Officer Procurement

The sources of trained officer material in the United States at the outset of the Civil War were meager indeed. The Military Academy which had been established at West Point in 1802 had graduated 1,966 men by June 1861 of which 684 were in the Regular Army at the outbreak of the war. Of the total of 1,098 officers in the Regular Army, 313 elected to serve with the Confederacy. The 785 Regular officers

[81] Wiley, *Southern Negroes 1861–1865*, pp. 340–41. In the reorganization of the Army under the Act of July 28, 1866, Negro Regular Army Regiments of both Infantry and Cavalry were authorized for the first time.

[82] "PMG Report," I, pp. 91–93, WD GO 105, 28 Apr 1863 in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 170–72; WD GO 111, 18 Mar 1864, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 188.

who remained loyal were for the most part kept in their Regular Army units during the early months of the war thus depriving the mobilizing armies of the men best qualified to lead, command, and instruct them. The same insistence on keeping the Regular Army units intact made it impossible to utilize qualified Regular Army enlisted men as officers. The war brought back into the service many graduates of the Military Academy who had resigned from the Army. Included in this group were such men as Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, Henry W. Halleck, and George B. McClellan. These officers proved to be invaluable, but there were far too few of them to meet the need for officers in an Army which would eventually number a million men. Altogether some 800 officers who had attended West Point served in the Union Army and another 296 in the Confederate forces. There had been an increase in private and state military schools since the Mexican War, but a great majority of these schools were in the south.[83] The most important private military school in the North was Norwich University in Vermont which furnished 523 men for Union service and 34 for Confederate.[84]

The call for 75,000 Militia 15 April 1861 included within the total 3,549 officers, all of whom were to be appointed by the state governors even including the 5 major generals and 17 brigadier generals. The call for Volunteers 3 May 1861 directed the governors to appoint com-

[83] Gen Sherman was head of a state-sponsored military school in Louisiana when the war began.

[84] West Point figures are from Callum, *op. cit.*, vol. I–II, and from Dupuy, *op. cit.* Norwich University figures are from Ellis, *op. cit.* See also: Reeves, *op. cit.* For the official policy on keeping the Regular Army intact see: Ltr, AG to Maj Gen Patterson, 20 Apr 1861, in *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. I, p. 138. An excellent example of the failure to make prompt use of Regular Army officers was Gen Philip H. Sheridan, who was serving as a captain as late as 25 May 1862. See Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan* (New York, 1888), I, p. 141. In his memoirs General Grant stated: "The North had a greater number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. In the Army of the Potomac there was what was known as the 'regular brigade,' in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. . . . This state of affairs gave me an idea . . . that the government ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the staff corps." See Grant, *op. cit.*, I, p. 283. General McClellan stated: ". . . it would have been wise to adopt a definite policy with regard to the regular army—viz., either virtually break it up, as a temporary measure, and distribute its members among the staff and regiments of the volunteer organization, thus giving the volunteers all possible benefits from the discipline and instruction of the regulars, or to fill the regular regiments to their full capacity and employ them as a reserve at critical junctures. I could not secure the adoption of either plan." See George B. McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story* (New York, 1887), p. 97. The Executive Committee of the United States Sanitary Commission in a letter to President Lincoln, 21 Jul 1862, stated: "If we have learned anything, it has been that it was a mistake to keep the Regular Army and the Voluntary Army separate. Had the regulars been from the first intermingled with the volunteers they would have leavened the whole lump with their experience of camp police, discipline, subordination, and the sanitary conditions of military life. We should have had no Bull Run panic to blush for. Our little Regular Army, diffused among the volunteers of last year, would within three months have brought them up to its own standard of discipline and efficiency." *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. II, p. 237. The Regular Army officers who went South were utilized to the fullest extent much earlier in the war.

pany and regimental officers but reserved to the President the appointment of general officers for the Volunteers.[85] On 22 May 1861 Secretary of War Cameron at the instigation of General Scott wrote the governors to urge them to use great care in officer selection and suggested maximum age limits for the various ranks as follows:

Lieutenant, 1st and 2d	22
Captain	30
Major	35
Lieutenant Colonel	40
Colonel	45

The governors were admonished "To commission no one of doubtful morals or patriotism and not of sound health" and ". . . that the higher the moral character and general intelligence of the officers . . . the greater the efficiency of the troops and the resulting glory of their respective States.[86]

The governors for the most part were able and loyal. When militarily experienced men were available, the governors gave them commissions. The scanty supply of trained soldiers which the governors might commission was accentuated by the decision to keep the Regular Army intact. An officer holding a Regular commission in the early days of the war had to resign to accept a higher commission in the Volunteers unless the War Department released him. Most Regulars were loathe to resign since there was considerable doubt that they could regain Regular status after the war. Once the supply of experienced officer material was exhausted the governors had to commission untrained civilians. The governors had a difficult time selecting men from the swarms of candidates for commissions. Inevitably political considerations and expediency influenced the governors in their choices.[87] Governor David Tod of Ohio, in a telegram to Secretary of War Stanton, frankly admitted commissioning unqualified men: "In my efforts to popularize volunteering I have been compelled to appoint many officers who I fear unfit for their positions. This difficulty can be cured only by an examining board. Please organize one . . . at as early day as possible." [88]

In many states company grade officers and even higher were elected by the men and then commissioned by the governors. The custom of electing officers was an inheritance from the Militia system and dated back to colonial times. A provision in the Act of July 22, 1861, specifically provided that officer vacancies occurring in Volunteer regiments should be filled by election. Company officers were to be elected

[85] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 69.

[86] *Ibid.*, pp. 227–28.

[87] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I pp. 158–59: Thomas W. Higginson, "Regular and Volunteer Officers," *Atlantic Monthly*, XIV (1864), p. 354.

[88] Telg, Tod to Stanton, 11 Sep 1862. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 538. Stanton replied: "I am pretty much of your opinion about some of your officers, and will try to do them justice by a board." *Ibid.*

by members of the company and field grade officers elected by the officers of the regiment. This provision of the act was never implemented, but was repealed by the Act of August 6, 1861, which provided: "That vacancies hereafter occurring among the commissioned officers of the volunteer regiments shall be filled by the governors of the states respectively, in the same manner as original appointments." [89] Any attempt at systematization of officer selection was abandoned by this restoration of gubernatorial control over Volunteer commissions.

A section of the Act of July 22, 1861 provided for the appointment of military boards (of three to five officers) to examine "the capacity qualifications, propriety of conduct, and efficiency of any commissioned officer of volunteers." [90] If the board made an adverse report against any officer and if the report was approved by the President, the officer's commission was vacated. This authorization for the first real efficiency boards in the United States Army was a soundly progressive measure aimed at raising the standards of the officer corps. There was, however, a curious inconsistency in coupling the authorization for the boards with the short-lived provision for filling vacancies by popular election.

The boards removed some of the Volunteer officers by direct action, others resigned rather than face a board, and indiscriminate appointments were discouraged.[91] General McClellan felt that many inefficient Volunteer officers ". . . were weeded out by courts-martial and boards of examination." [92] There were limitations of the effectiveness of the boards, however. The supply of good officer material was limited because of the absence of an officer training program, and the caliber of replacements was frequently little better than that of the original officers.[93] The various state systems used to select officer replacements in the first years of the war usually combined election and gubernatorial confirmation. In the early days popularity was frequently more important than ability in securing a commission through election. Finally the boards were more successful in weeding out incompetent junior grade officers than they were in removing senior grade officers.[94]

---

[89] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 470, 488–89.

[90] The military boards authorized by the Act of July 22, 1861, to determine officer fitness were established by WD GO 47, 25 July 1861.

[91] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 187.

[92] McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

[93] To assure a reserve pool of partially trained officers in future wars the Congress passed the Morrill Act of July 2, 1862. This act provided for a grant to each state of public lands which were to be sold and the money derived therefrom used to endow a state college where agriculture, the "mechanic arts," and "military tactics" would be taught. This, however, was a long-range program for training potential officers and was not implemented until after the Civil War. See: ch. V, "The Spanish-American War," this study, for an account of the implementation of the Morrill Act after the Civil War.

[94] Higginson, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

Probably the greatest waste of experienced officers during the Civil War resulted from raising new regiments rather than filling up the depleted veteran units. In his memoirs General Sherman stated:

> The greatest mistake in our civil war was in the mode of recruitment and promotion. When a regiment became reduced by the necessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up at the bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from the best noncommissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise new regiments, with new colonels, captains, and men, leaving the old and experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeleton organizations.[95]

Eventually the election of officers was supplanted by a system of appointment within the Army which materially improved the caliber of the company grade officers. By the end of the war the appointment of veterans directly from the ranks had become the chief method of obtaining officer replacements. The standards of the officer corps rose gradually if slowly throughout the war.[96]

The Act of August 3, 1861, established a retirement system for Army officers, authorizing retirement for physical disability or after 40 years of service with adequate pay and allowances. Although the retirement program was not intended as a direct mobilization measure, it materially assisted the mobilization effort by making possible the elimination of high ranking line and staff officers no longer physically able to do their work adequately.[97]

Training

Training and discipline in the forces mobilized in the spring of 1861 were rudimentary. Comparison of the straggling regiments on the road to Bull Run in July 1861 with the veteran troops who paraded in the Grand Review in Washington in May 1865 indicates, in part, the degree of improvement in the training and discipline of the Union Army. The War Department never developed a comprehensive training program. Whatever training was given in the Union Army was due to the foresight and initiative of individual officers.

General Scott, with discerning forethought, emphasized the importance of training in his plan for squeezing the South into submission, but his advice on training was no more heeded in 1861 than it had been by President Polk in 1846. In a letter to General McClellan, 3 May 1861, Scott advised: "Lose no time . . . in organizing, drilling, and disciplining your three-month's men, many of whom, it is

---

[95] Sherman, *op. cit.*, II, p. 387.

[96] See the list of appointments in *Annual Report of The Adjutant General to the Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year ending November 15, 1865* (Columbus, 1866) for an indication of the high number of appointments directly from the ranks. See also: Rpt, Hq, 25th Reg. Mass Vols., 16 Dec 1864. *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. XLII, pt. 1, pp. 809–10.

[97] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 484–86.

hoped, will be ultimately found enrolled under the call for three-years' volunteers. Should an urgent and immediate occasion arise meantime for their services, they will be more effective." [98]

The call of 15 April 1861 for 75,000 three-month Militia designated rendezvous points rather than training camps as the place for the assembly of the Militia.[99] The length of service of the Militia was so short that any thorough training was precluded. After the call for three-year Volunteers, 3 May 1861, Secretary Cameron at the instigation of General Scott suggested the desirability of training to the governors in a circular dated 24 May 1861:

> As soon as the regiments of three-years' volunteers comprising the quotas called for from your respective States are organized and equipped I will ask that those not otherwise ordered be assembled at rendezvous to become camps of instruction. These Your Excellencies best can choose.
>
> A rolling surface or porous soil should be chosen. Other conditions are proximity to wood, water, abundant subsistence for men and horses, and railroad or water transportation. Each camp should be the rendezvous of four or eight regiments.
>
> As some of these regiments may not be called into activity much before frost, they will have ample time to acquire discipline, habits of obedience, and tactical instruction, without which they would be unequal to the campaign for which they are intended.[100]

But the pressing necessity for assembling an army at Washington resulted in dropping this proposal. Troops were rushed to Washington, underwent perfunctory training and drill,[101] and marched to disaster at Bull Run on 21 July 1861. First Bull Run became a classic example of a battle fought by troops without adequate training or discipline.[102] The three-month Militia units which had not volunteered for three years were demobilized after Bull Run as their term of service expired.

The shock of Bull Run awakened the North to the seriousness of the war ahead. Trained and disciplined men were needed in large numbers. In July 1861 the President issued calls for 500,000 Volunteers for three years; the 714,231 men obtained under these calls formed the backbone of the mobilizing Army. Men recruited by the Federal Government for Regular service and Volunteers not entering the service in units were sent to "camps of rendezvous and instruction

---

[98] Ltr. Scott to McClellan, 3 May 1861. *Official Records,* ser. I, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 369–70.

[99] *Ibid.,* ser. III, vol. I, p. 69.

[100] *Ibid.,* pp. 229–30.

[101] An account by a member of a New York regiment described the training of this period as follows: ". . . after breakfast, come company drills, bayonet practice, battalion drills, and the heavy work of the day . . . In the afternoon comes target practice, skirmishing-drill, more company-or-recruit-drill, and at half past five our evening parade. Let me not forget tent-inspection, at four, by the officer of the day, when our band plays deliciously." Theodore Winthrop, *Life in the Open Air, and Other Papers* (Boston, 1863), pp. 271–76, as quoted in Commager, *The Blue and the Gray,* I, pp. 268–69.

[102] For a colorful account of the lack of training and discipline at Bull Run see: Shannon, *op. cit.,* I, p. 177.

. . . at or in the vicinity of New York; Elmira, N. Y.; Harrisburg, Pa.; Cincinnati, Ohio; and other convenient places."[103] Complete Volunteer regiments mobilized by the states (which constituted the major part of the troops raised in this period) were forwarded as soon as filled to the front or to army concentration areas such as Washington; Cairo, Ill.; or St. Louis, Mo.[104]

Four days after Bull Run, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan was placed in command of the forces around Washington which were to become the Army of the Potomac. General McClellan stated: ". . . the mass of troops placed under me were utterly demoralized and destitute of organization, instruction, discipline, artillery, cavalry, transportation."[105] During the winter of 1861–62, the Army of the Potomac was built and, after a fashion, trained under the able administration of General McClellan. Whatever his other foibles, General McClellan was a very competent military organizer and administrator whose creation of the Army of the Potomac was a masterful military accomplishment. But training consisted primarily of drill with little emphasis placed on such essentials as rifle and musket practice.[106]

Training and instructional materials were scarce throughout the war. The two most popular military texts were still General Scott's *Infantry Tactics* (in three volumes) and William J. Hardee's *Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics* (in two volumes). Congress twice appropriated $50,000 "For purchase of books of tactics and instructions for volunteers."[107] General Orders 45, 16 February 1863, provided that in the Artillery: "Each company should be supplied with three copies of the Tactics for Heavy Artillery and rigidly adhere to its directions."[108] The materials available were keyed not for the use of the individual soldier but for the trained officer, and their distribution does not appear to have been very effective or widespread.

Occasionally an especially competent commander set up a practical training program in his jurisdiction. General Sherman, in command of the XV Army Corps, on 30 August 1863 ordered:

> Besides the daily guard-mounting and parade, the rollcalls prescribed by Regulations, and drills, heretofore ordered, division commanders will give special attention to the arms, ammunition, and equipments of their commands, and see that all things material to the service are now procured. A system of book instruction should be instituted in all the brigades, that the officers and men now on duty may become qualified to impart proper instructions to all recruits and conscripts to which we are entitled to fill our ranks.[109]

---

[103] WD GO 58, 15 Aug in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 412.
[104] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 153.
[105] McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
[106] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 173.
[107] Act of July 5, 1862, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 214–17; Act of June 16, 1864, in *ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 455.
[108] WD GO 45, 16 Feb 1863, in *ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 48.
[109] Hq, XV Army Corps GO 69, 30 Aug 1863, in *ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXX, pt. III, p. 226.

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, in command of the Army of the Potomac, issued a circular 19 April 1864 (after three years of war) ordering that steps be taken to train the men in the use of their rifles:

> To familiarize the men in the use of their arms an additional expenditure of 10 rounds of small-arm ammunition per man is hereby authorized. Corps commanders will see that immediate measures are taken by subordinate officers to carry out the order. Each man should be made to load and fire his musket under the personal supervision of a company officer. It is believed that there are men in this army who have been in numerous actions without ever firing their guns, and it is known that muskets taken on the battle-fields have been found filled nearly to the muzzle with cartridges. The commanding general cannot impress too earnestly on all officers and men the necessity of preparing themselves for the contingencies of battle.[110]

The most thorough training program used during the Civil War was that of the Signal Corps. The training methods and procedures employed for officers and enlisted men at the Signal Corps camp at Georgetown, D. C., were thorough, intensive, and successful. Unfortunately the Signal Corps was such a small organization that its comprehensive training system had little overall effect.[111] Through the efforts of such officers as McClellan, Sherman, and Meade and through the Signal Corps program there was a gradual improvement in training throughout the Army. However, the most effective means of providing the men with functional training was combat itself.

When only a few new regiments were being formed an effort was made to provide some training for replacements before forwarding them to their units. But the training that recruits received before they joined their regiments was still primarily drill. Once a recruit reached his unit he received training from the combat veterans in the unit.[112]

The lack of comprehensive training was due to several simple factors:

1. The failure of the War Department to formulate a specific training program.
2. The scarcity of officers and noncommissioned officers capable of conducting training.
3. The absence of an adequate supply of usable training literature and materials.

Poor discipline was one of the results of inadequate training. The extremely high desertion and AWOL rates were an indication of the poor discipline. There were some 199,045 deserters from the Union Army. Statistics for AWOL's are highly inaccurate because of the

---

[110] Cir, Hq Army of Potomac, 19 Apr 1864, in *ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, pp. 907–08.

[111] For detailed information on the Signal Corps training program see: *Ibid.*, ser. I vol. V. pp. 69–73; ser. III, vol. I, pp. 694–95; ser. III, vol. II, p. 945; ser. III. vol. IV, pp. 819, 837–38.

[112] See Lerwill. *op. cit.*, ch. II.

failure to report short but unauthorized absences which indicate that men seem to have come and gone with considerable fluidity. The Provost Marshal General attributed the high desertion rate to the bounty system, the failure to deal harshly with offenders early in the war, and to poor officers.[113] A comprehensive and effective Army-wide training program would undoubtedly have done a great deal to correct the poor discipline in the Union Army.

Logistics Problems

No plans had been made before the firing on Fort Sumter to meet either the manpower or logistics problems of the impending war. Even then it was only after the calls for manpower had been made that some thought and attention were given to equipping, feeding, sheltering, and transporting the men called. As units mobilized and assembled at camps, according to War Department directions, food and clothing procurement became problems of great immediacy. The War Department had no reserves of clothing and equipment other than some obsolete rifles. The War Department had neither the staff nor the organization to undertake the vast task of initial supply and procurement. In the first press of the emergency the War Department delegated to the states the task of feeding and providing initial equipment for their own units with the assurance that the United States would eventually reimburse the states.[114]

The early period of procurement activities was so thoroughly disorganized as to constitute one of the sorriest examples of mobilization ever to occur in this country. Federal agents from different bureaus, state agents, and private individuals bid against each other in the domestic markets and competed with the Southerners in foreign markets. Haste, carelessness, collusion, and profiteering were so great that fantastically high prices were paid for the shoddiest commodities. When Simon Cameron was replaced as Secretary of War 15 January 1862 by Edwin M. Stanton a reformation of the procurement system gradually took place.[115]

Subsistence

Logistically the food supply presented few major problems in the Civil War. The rations were plain and simple, obtained from local areas for the most part, and easily moved to the camps. When the armies were in the field the problems of transporting rations in-

[113] "PMG Report," I, 89–90, 203–31.

[114] *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. I, p. 132.

[115] Shannon, *op cit.,* I, chs. II and III, contains a good documented account of the procurement system with details on the graft and speculation; Commager, *The Blue and the Gray,* II, pp. 725–28, contains two interesting accounts on this subject by Regis de Trobriand and Charles A. Dana.

creased proportionately with their distance from their bases. Railroads, wagon trains, and water transportation were all used to move rations to the front. Cattle for fresh beef usually traveled on the hoof.

Congress increased the food ration for the Army for the duration of the war by the Act of August 3, 1861. This act increased the bread or flour allowance outright; authorized the substitution of fresh meat for salt meat; added potatoes to the bean, rice, and hominy ration; and authorized the substitution of tea for coffee.[116] Standard Army rations, in spite of these increases, did not provide a proper diet. The possibility of scurvy alarmed the Sanitary Commission, but that disease was not widespread because the men supplemented their rations with packages from home, purchases from the sutlers' wagons, and foraging.

The latter, although usually discouraged, was a common part of Army life. Once food was consumed it was difficult to ascertain its source. During the later part of the war foraging was used on occasions as part of military policy. The best example of such foraging was Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea. Potable drinking water was often more of a supply problem than food; the principal source was shallow wells and reasonable clean streams.[117]

Clothing and Equipment

Clothing, equipment, and other military accoutrements were a severe problem in the early months of the mobilization. ". . . while effective arms were not an absolute necessity until the battlefield was reached, blankets and clothing were indispensable in rendezvous camps . . . And while it may be true . . . that an army travels on its stomach, nevertheless, stout shoes keep the feet from dragging." [118] Equipment had to be furnished the men immediately after enlistment. As has already been noted the War Department had no reserve supplies on hand in 1861. The initial supply of the Militia and Volunteers was left to the states with a promise of ultimate reimbursement.[119] This resulted in clothing and equipping the Army with whatever materials could be obtained on the local markets regardless of price. Consequently the Army was supplied with inferior and frequently impossible clothing and personal equipment. No pattern or prescribed color was designated for uniforms. Because the Southerners

---

[116] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 484.

[117] For further details and discussion of Army food during the Civil War see: Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 76–80, 208–13; Cyril B. Upham, "Arms and Equipment for the Iowa Troops in the Civil War," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics,* XVI (1918), pp. 46–48; John D. Billings, *Hardtack and Coffee, or, The Unwritten Story of Army Life* (Boston, 1887), pp. 110 ff., as quoted in Commager, *The Blue and the Gray,* I, pp. 290–95; Reports of the Commissary General of Subsistence for 1862 and 1863 in *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. II, pp. 738–39 and vol. III, p. 944.

[118] Upham, *Iowa Journal of History and Politics,* XVI (1918), p. 27.

[119] *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. I, p. 132.

were also attired in all types and colors of uniforms, mistakes in battle occurred in attempting to distinguish friend from foe. Early in 1862 steps were taken to standardize Union uniforms.[120]

The shortages of clothing and consequent troop hardship during the war may be attributed to four factors:

1. Shortage of supply.
2. Poor methods of distribution.
3. Inferior materials and workmanship.
4. Lack of supply discipline among the troops.[121]

Once the 1861 units were raised by the states, procurement of supplies became primarily a Federal function and most of the early abuses were eliminated. The Quartermaster General was the chief procurement officer of the Union Army. He decentralized his purchasing activities by establishing depots at the principal market sources. In addition to the main quartermaster depot at Philadelphia, new depots were established at Boston, New York, Cincinnati, Louisville, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Detroit, and Springfield, Ill.[122] Quartermaster officers drew their supplies from these depots and only rarely were authorized to make individual purchases after 1861.[123] Once the organization of new units tapered off, replacements were equipped with quartermaster supplies under the supervision of the provost marshal at recruit depots. As the Quartermaster General's Department gained experience in purchasing and distributing large quantities of clothing and equipment, the supply situation throughout the Union Army improved.[124]

Troop Housing

Troop housing throughout the war was primitive and improvised. At the beginning public buildings, halls, churches, warehouses, etc., were utilized whenever available. In Washington in April and May 1861 the Capitol building itself was used to house troops. Tentage at first was scarce, but later in the war, as production expanded, it became abundantly available. The shelter half, popularly known as the "pup tent," originated early in the Civil War and was the principal shelter for men in the field.

Barracks, constructed at concentration camps and for winter quarters, were of rough wood or log construction. There was no prescribed shape or capacity for these barracks, but most of them were of two general patterns.

---

[120] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 93–94.

[121] *Ibid.*, pp. 82–83.

[122] Rpt, QMG to Sec of War, 18 Nov 1862, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 803.

[123] Instructions to Army quartermasters from QMG, 8 Oct 1863, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 867.

[124] For more complete coverage of clothing and equipment in the Civil War see: Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 80–103, 213–16; Upham, *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XVI (1918), pp. 27–41, 48–51.

The more primitive type was wedge shaped, built of rough boards standing on end and leaning against a ridge pole, to which they were nailed. The ends were closed by gables containing doors, which, in addition to unintentional interstices, were the sole source of ventilation and light. The whole bore a striking resemblance to an elongated hog-house or a detached clapboarded roof of a "shot-gun" dwelling house. Elevate such a shed as this upon four walls and you have the other type.[125]

Transportation and Communications

The Civil War was the first war in which railroads played an important part. As early as 2 August 1861 General McClellan wrote President Lincoln: ". . . the construction of railroads has introduced a new and very important element into war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular positions large masses of troops from remote sections, and by creating new strategic points and lines of operations." [126]

On 11 February 1862 the supervision and management of railroads in the war areas was centralized and a director and general manager for military railroads appointed with complete power. Secretary Stanton selected Col. Daniel C. McCallum, a Volunteer officer with extensive railroad experience, for the position which he held throughout the war.[127] The director and general manager had control of maintenance, repair, building, and management of all railroads in the theaters of operations. Railroads proved of inestimable value in concentrating and supplying the armies from the very beginning. In the winter of 1864 Colonel McCallum was sent west to reorganize the railroads there in preparation for General Sherman's advance into Georgia. General Sherman subsequently wrote in his memoirs: "The value of railways is also fully recognized in war as much as, if not more so than, in peace. The Atlanta campaign would simply have been impossible without the use of railroads." [128]

The railroads revolutionized warfare, but water transportation was also an important factor in the Civil War. Steamboats, which had played an important part in the Mexican War, were used extensively. Wagon and pack transport were also used in areas without railroads or waterways and were still an integral part of Army transportation.

The invention of the telegraph began the revolution in military communications. The newly established Signal Corps was responsible

---

[125] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I p. 203. Troop housing is discussed in more detail in Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 198–208, and Upham, *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XVI (1918), pp. 44–46.

[126] McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

[127] "Report of the Director and General Manager of the Military Railroads of the United States" hereafter cited as "McCallum Report" in *Messages and Documents, War Department, 1865–1866* (Washington, 1866), I, p. 5. This final report of the director to the Secretary of War, 26 May 1866, gives a brief but complete coverage of the use of railroads during the Civil War.

[128] Sherman, *op. cit.*, II, p. 398, and Grant, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–48, discuss the use of railroads in the campaigns in the West. For a complete account on Northern railroads see: Thomas Weber, *The Northern Railroads in the Civil War: 1861–1865* (New York, 1952).

for the operation of military telegraph lines which were used with ever increasing frequency throughout the war. General Sherman was one of the officers who appreciated the importance of the telegraph: "For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering a large space of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best." [129]

Ordnance Problems

Munitions constituted a separate logistical problem of considerable magnitude during the Civil War. The Chief of Ordnance on 21 January 1861 had reported that there were on hand 617,881 small arms (477,087 in the North and 140,794 in the South) and 163 field guns (122 North and 41 South).[130] The condition of this supply of arms varied from serviceable to useless. There were three methods employed to augment the ordnance supplies:

1. Importation from abroad.
2. Contracts with domestic manufacturers.
3. Increasing the manufacturing capacity of Government arsenals.[131]

Importation was the first method used to augment ordnance supplies. Europe was deluged with Federal and State purchasing agents from both the North and the South and also with private speculators purchasing arms for resale in the United States. There was a surplus of arms on the European market because many of the countries were changing from muzzle to breech-loading guns.[132] But because of the demand created by all the competing purchasers, prices skyrocketed and quality decreased. In October 1861 the Federal Government withdrew its agents from Europe, and in late November Secretary Cameron asked the States to recall their agents. Thereafter the North entrusted its foreign ordnance purchasing to resident diplomatic officials.[133] An investigation and review of contracts to purchase foreign arms early in 1862 led to a cancellation or modification of many of the contracts.[134] Foreign purchases were but an expedient to bridge the initial crisis. Every effort was made to increase the production of rifles at the Government arsenal at Springfield, and private manufacturing of both arms and ammunition was encouraged.[135]

---

[129] Sherman, *op. cit.*, II, p. 398.

[130] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol, I, p. 43.

[131] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 113–14. Shannon's chapter entitled "The Problem of Munitions," I, pp. 107–48, based in great part on the *Official Records*, gives an excellent coverage of ordnance problems.

[132] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 118.

[133] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 575, 675–76.

[134] For the report of the commission which handled the investigation of ordnance procurement, 1 Jul 1863, see: *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 188–95.

[135] "Report of the Secretary of War to the President", 1 Dec 1861. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 702. The arsenal at Harper's Ferry had been destroyed early in the war. See also "Report of the Chief of Ordnance to the Secretary of War," 21 Nov 1862. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 852.

Since artillery was not employed in mass, its procurement was not a serious mobilization problem. Government and private arsenals were able to produce enough to meet most of the requirements. Only 7,892 field pieces were issued to the Union armies from 1861 to 1866 while over 4,000,000 small arms were issued during the same period.[136]

The reluctance of the Ordnance Department to accept improved weapons during the war has led to severe criticism. The breech-loading seven shot repeater rifle was rejected by the Chief of Ordnance 9 December 1861.[137] The Ordnance Department also rejected the Gatling type guns, a precursor of the machine gun. After a new and younger Chief of Ordnance took over the department in September 1863 there was a gradual change in attitude. By the end of the war steps had been taken to use both the breech-loading repeater rifle and the Gatling guns. The chief criticism of the Ordnance Department during the Civil War was its failure to set up effective procedures for examining and testing new armaments.[138]

This brief coverage of logistical problems in the Civil War indicates that the economic mobilization was uncoordinated and piecemeal. Industry in the North was able to expand its production enough to produce both guns and consumer products. The halting, uneven progress of the North's logistical achievements, due to the failure to coordinate manpower and materiel procurement, should have served as a warning that better coordination and more cohesive planning would be necessary in future wars. In the Civil War no one had the time, the vision, or the experience to be the architect of an orderly mobilization.

Reform and Reorganization in the War Department

In 1861 the War Department bogged down in handling the vast mobilization program and soon became the subject of severe criticism.[139] Cameron's resignation 13 January 1862 was ". . . hailed as equivalent to a great Union victory."[140] His successor, Edwin M. Stanton, was a man of fearless honesty and an effective administrator. Using the same machinery which had faltered under Cameron, Stanton soon had the War Department on a more efficient basis.

There were few major organizational changes in the War Department during the Civil War, but there was continuous experimentation to create a workable relationship between the War Department and the armies in the field. The system which finally evolved in 1864,[141]

---

[136] *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. V, p. 1042.
[137] *Ibid.*, ser III, vol. I, pp. 733–34.
[138] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 147.
[139] Hendrick, *op. cit.*, p. 221, and Meneely, *op. cit.*, contain a more complete coverage of the War Department under Cameron.
[140] Meneely, *op. cit.*, p. 371.
[141] WD GO 98, 12 March 1864.

was the most satisfactory arrangement up to that time. Secretary Stanton ran the War Department bureau activities which meant manpower and supply procurement. General Grant commanded the actual operations of all the field armies from a headquarters with the Army of the Potomac. General Halleck served as Chief of Staff of the Army in Washington and was the main channel of communication and coordination between the Secretary of War and General Grant. [The evolution of this system can be traced in *charts 2, 3, 4* and *5.*]

The Judge Advocate's Office was given bureau status by an act passed 17 July 1862, and its chief became The Judge Advocate General. A similar act passed on 3 March 1863 gave the Signal Corps definite bureau status also. The Corps of Topographical Engineers was merged with the Corps of Engineers by the same law. The only new bureau created was The Provost Marshal General's Department which managed the draft. Substantial increases were authorized in both military and civilian personnel in the bureaus.[142] The increases in the Engineer and Medical Departments were particularly large reflecting the increased importance of those fields. The Act of August 3, 1861, authorized the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of War; later the number of Assistant Secretaries was increased to three by administrative action.[143]

The cumbersome, slow internal staff procedures did not change a great deal during the war. The bureaus competed bitterly with each other at times, but nevertheless presented a united front against any attempt to streamline their procedures. The staff functioned as a collection of independent bureaus without real coordination throughout the war. Any convulsive changes in organization were avoided, but the gradual replacement of the bureau chiefs by younger men improved the functioning of the respective bureaus. [See *chart 1.*] Although this process of reform was slow, in the end a reasonably efficient machine was developed.

Mobilization in the Confederacy

The problems of mobilization were essentially the same in the South as in the North except that they were appreciably more difficult. The South, with a considerably smaller manpower pool and without an extensive industrial economy, was compelled to resort to measures to conserve that manpower and to utilize its economic resources fully much earlier and more stringently than the North. Although mobilization in the Confederacy would not nominally be included in this

[142] Act of August 3, 1861, in Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 480–86.

[143] The men who served as Assistant Secretaries of War were: Thomas A. Scott—3 Aug 1861 to 1 Jun 1862 (Scott fulfilled duties from Mar 1861), Peter H. Watson—24 Jan 1862 to 31 Jul 1864, John Tucker—29 Jan 1862 to 21 Jan 1863, Christopher P. Wolcott—12 Jun 1862 to 23 Jan 1863, Charles A. Dana—28 Jan 1864 to 31 Jul 1865.

Chart 2. Organization of the War Department, April 1861–11 March 1862.



Chart 3. Organization of the War Department, 11 March 1862–23 July 1862.



Chart 4. Organization of the War Department, 23, July 1862–12 March 1864.



Chart 5. Organization of the War Department, 12 March 1864–April 1865.



study, the solutions which the South improvised for these two major mobilization problems had particular significance and influenced mobilization in the North during the Civil War and in later periods.

Confederate Manpower Mobilization

No complete compilation of the size of the Confederate Army has ever been made. According to the 1860 census the South's military manpower pool totaled 1,064,193 men as contrasted with 4,559,872 men in the North's pool.[144] Estimates of the aggregate total of the Confederate armies throughout the war range from 600,000 to 1,650,000 men but probably about 1,000,000 is the most accurate and generally accepted estimate.[145]

As soon as they seceded most of the Southern states took steps to place themselves in a position of partial military preparedness. Alabama seceded 11 January 1861, and the governor recommended to the legislature three days later ". . . that the State of Alabama be placed, at as early a period as practicable, upon the most efficient war footing. The first requisites of this condition are money, men, and arms." [146] Several of the Southern states mobilized portions of their Militia or special Volunteer organizations.[147]

The provisional Confederate Government was organized 4 February 1861; Jefferson Davis was elected provisional president 9 February; and on 28 February the Provisional Congress passed an act authorizing Davis to take charge of military operations, to receive property confiscated from the United States, and to receive into service any or all units tendered by the states for a period of 12 months' service.[148] On 6 March 1861 the Provisional Congress passed two major military laws. The first authorized the President to call out the Militia for 6 months and to accept 100,000 Volunteers for one year. Volunteers were to furnish their own clothing and, if mounted, their horses and horse equipment; arms were to be provided by the states from which the men came or by the Confederacy itself. The second act authorized establishment of a Regular Army of some 10,600 men for the Confederacy.[149] Thus the Provisional Congress provided for the extensive use of manpower even before the war began. After the firing on

---

[144] Fox, *op. cit.*, p. 552. The pool included white males between 18 and 45. A somewhat larger proportion of Southerners were available for service because the slaves could tend the crops.

[145] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 107; Fox, *op. cit.*, p. 552.

[146] *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, p. 50.

[147] "PMG Report," I, pp. 115–16.

[148] *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, p. 117.

[149] *Ibid.*, pp. 126–31. The Confederate Regular Army was never much more than a paper organization because the war began so soon. The Provisional Army fought the war. See E. Merton Coulter, *The Confederate States of America 1861–1865* (Louisiana State University Press, 1950), p. 308.

Fort Sumter, 12 April 1861, the size of the forces authorized was increased and the term of service lengthened.[150]

The implementation of the military legislation passed by the Provisional Congress did not keep pace with its passage. The first call for manpower was made 9 March 1861 for 7,700 men to garrison Southern forts. A second call for 19,500 Volunteers was made 8 April 1861 which brought the total forces requested before Sumter up to 27,200. The Southern states probably had larger forces under arms than did the Confederate government. On 16 April 1861 Davis called for 32,000 more Volunteers.[151] The calls were met enthusiastically; feeling in the South was optimistic that it would be a short, victorious war. The South's victory at First Bull Run (Manassas) sustained morale and enthusiasm at high levels. Men continued to respond to the President's calls in numbers beyond what he requested.[152]

Although the manpower situation in the Confederacy was favorable at the outset of the war, uneasy doubts about logistical sufficiency arose in the minds of Southern leaders. Gen. Robert E. Lee on 15 June 1861 reported to the Governor of Virginia that ". . . assembling the men . . . was not the most difficult operation. Provision for their instruction, subsistence, equipment, clothing, shelter, and transportation in the field, required more time and labor." [153]

Enthusiasm in the South began to wane as it did in the North when it became apparent that the war was likely to be long and difficult. On 8 August 1861 the Provisional Congress authorized the President to call up to 400,000 Volunteers for up to three years of service.[154] In the winter of 1861–62 the Confederate Congress became concerned with the approaching expiration of the enlistments of the 12-month men which comprised the major part of the Confederate armies. Ef-

[150] Coulter, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–09. For Acts of May 8, May 11, and May 16, 1861, see: *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, pp. 302, 310, 326-27.

[151] "PMG Report," I, pp. 118–19. Quotas were as follows:

State	9 Mar 1861	8 Apr 1861	16 Apr 1861
Total	7,700	19,500	32,000
South Carolina	0	3,000	5,000
Florida	500	1,500	2,000
Georgia	2,000	3,000	5,000
Louisiana	1,700	3,000	5,000
Texas	0	3,000	5,000
Alabama	2,000	3,000	5,000
Mississippi	1,500	3,000	5,000

[152] Albert B. Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy* (New York, 1924), pp. 4–6.

[153] Ltr, Lee to Gov of Virginia, 15 Jun 1861 in "PMG Report," I, p. 116. "The training and equipping of men, particularly the latter, constituted the really difficult military problem." See Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[154] *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, p. 537.

forts were made by an act passed 11 December 1861 to induce these men to reenlist by authorizing reenlistment bounties and reenlistment furloughs and by guaranteeing them the right to reorganize themselves into companies, battalions, and regiments and to elect their officers.[155] Several others acts were passed to stimulate reenlistment and volunteering before the expiration of the Provisional Congress 18 February 1862. "Every conceivable means of securing men was adopted, save that of compulsion.[156]

By the spring of 1862 things were going badly for the Confederacy. Forts Henry and Donelson had fallen; New Orleans was on the verge of capture; at the terrible drawn battle of Shiloh, 6 April 1862, the Southern forces had suffered heavy casualties; McClellan in preparation for his Peninsula Campaign against Richmond was besieging Yorktown. The one-year Volunteers were not reenlisting in appreciable numbers.

The Confederate Congress abandoned its adherence to states rights in this crisis, and on 16 April 1862 passed a Conscription Act which provided that:

1. The President was authorized to draft into service for three years all white males between 18 and 35.
2. The terms of service of all men in the army were extended to three years (thus retaining the 12-month Volunteers).
3. Enrollment and draft would be administered by state officials under Confederate supervision.
4. Drafted men would be assigned to units from their own states.
5. Election of company, battalion, and regimental officers was guaranteed.
6. Persons not liable for service could substitute for those who were.[157]

Thus the first major military draft law in the United States was passed by the Confederate government to retain its 12-month men and to force other men into service. It was passed over ten months before the Enrollment Act in the North. There was no provision for exemption in the Act of April 16, 1862, but this omission was corrected by the Act of April 21, which provided exemption for Confederate and state legislative, executive, and judicial officials and their clerks and employees; ferrymen, pilots, and all actually engaged in river and railroad transportation work; employees in iron mines, foundries, and furnaces; telegraph operators; ministers; printers; educators, hospital employees, and druggists (with qualifications); and certain employees in wool and cotton mills.[158] This series of ex-

[155] *Ibid.*, pp. 825–26.
[156] Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[157] *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, pp. 1095–97.
[158] *Ibid.*, p. 1081.

emptions made the Confederate conscription system in actuality a selective service system. Other groups were exempted by subsequent legislation which seriously reduced the manpower pool. Finally the entire system of exemptions was overhauled and the final decision on exemptions made a matter of executive discretion by the Act of February 17, 1864.

Amendments to the Conscription Act of April 16, 1862, increased the draft age from 35 to 45 on 27 September 1862 [159] and on 17 February 1864 included 17-year-olds and men 45 to 50 for state defense.[160]

Another Act of February 17, 1864, authorized the use of both free Negroes and slaves in labor units.[161] Finally an Act of March 30, 1865, just at the end of the war, authorized the use of slaves as soldiers.[162] The unpopular substitution provision was repealed outright by an Act of December 28, 1863.[163] These and other amendments improved the Conscription Act. The absence of records makes it difficult to assess the proper direct and indirect value of the law. Many difficulties developed because of the use of state officials to administer the act, besides which there was a great deal of popular opposition to the conscription.

Confederate Economic Mobilization [164]

The South had within its borders practically all of the materials necessary for waging war. The problem was to transform those materials into munitions and supplies for the Army. The South's greatest weakness was its lack of an industrial economy to accomplish this transformation of raw materials into finished products.[165]

Economic controls were necessary if the Confederacy were to equip and supply its Army. Controls of varying types and effectiveness were instituted during the war. On 17 April 1862 the Confederate Congress passed an act to assist businesses with war contracts in building new factories and enlarging existing facilities by loaning without interest one-half the cost of such undertakings.[166] Profits were limited first to 75 per cent and then to 33⅓ per cent, and factories which received government assistance were required to sell two-thirds of their production to the government. These regulations were enforced by denying labor and transportation facilities to recalcitrant

---

[159] Act of September 27, 1862. *Ibid.*, ser., IV, vol. II, p. 160.

[160] Act of February 17, 1864. *Ibid.*, ser. IV, vol. III, p. 178.

[161] Act of February 17, 1864. *Ibid.*, pp. 208–09.

[162] "PMG Report," I, p. 120.

[163] Act of December 28, 1863. *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. III, p. 11.

[164] The material in this section is based almost entirely on comprehensive accounts in Coulter, *op. cit.*, ch. X, "War Supplies and Manufactories," pp. 199–218; ch. XI, "Prices, Profits, and Labor," pp. 219–38; ch. XII, "Agriculture, Subsistence, and Negroes," pp. 239–68; ch. XIII, "Transportation and Communication," pp. 269–84.

[165] Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 202. Coal, iron, lead, and most other war materials were available except mercury and niter.

[166] *Official Records*, ser. IV., vol. I, pp. 1070–71.

manufacturers under powers derived from the Conscription Act of April 16, 1862, and the wartime railroad laws. Cost plus contracts were experimented with by the Confederacy as well as fixed fee contracts, but neither was very satisfactory. Eventually a fixed fee contract with a provision for subsequent arbitration of prices was developed.

An oversupply of paper money and speculation began an inflationary spiral which undermined the Confederate economy. Even the government could not afford to pay market prices. Impressment of supplies because of military needs began in 1861. On 26 March 1863 the Confederate Congress passed "An Act to regulate impressments." [167] This was a complicated law regulating in great detail the methods of impressment and the fixing of prices for impressed articles. The President of the Confederacy and the governor of each state each appointed a commissioner to fix prices. These two men were supposed to publish price schedules at two-month intervals to guide impressing officers.

Railway transportation was one of the most difficult problems which the Confederacy faced. Its railroad system was not highly developed at the beginning of the war. An extensive construction program was beyond the South's economic capacity in wartime. Even small construction projects of highest priority bogged down. Early attempts at voluntary coordination of railways were abandoned in May 1863 when control of almost all railroad equipment was turned over to The Quartermaster General.[168] Government control of the deteriorating system came too late and was no more successful than private control had been. Control of telegraph lines was given to the President in May 1861, and he delegated supervision to the Postmaster General.[169]

The industrial expansion of the South was remarkable considering its lack of manufactories at the beginning of the war. This was the first attempted economic mobilization of a nation for war. The controls which the South imposed over its economic life were improvised and not always too effective. The South had no precedents to guide it and was forced to use the trial and error method of experimentation while fighting for its life. The South failed because it was unable to produce manpower and munitions in quantities and at speeds necessary to match the North. That the Confederacy was able to survive for four years was due in great part to her superior mobilization effort.

---

[167] *Ibid.*, ser. IV., vol. II, 469–71. For examples of price schedules see: *Ibid.*, pp. 836–38, 842–45.

[168] Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 280. For a complete account of the Confederate railroad system see: Robert C. Black, III, *The Railroads of the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill, 1952).

[169] Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

The Lessons of the War

There was no precedent for a war of the magnitude of the American Civil War. It was necessary to improvise solutions as problems arose. Many contemporaries were aware of the errors and inadequacies of the mobilization, but in the press of events little more than improvisation was possible. The mistakes of past wars were repeated to a great extent. The outstanding mobilization lessons of the Civil War were as follows:

1. Planning in advance of a mobilization is necessary to avoid waste and inefficiency. Such planning should be the responsibility of a special staff group.

2. Centralized, coordinated, supervisory control of the war effort at the War Department level is a prerequisite of an orderly mobilization. The activities of staff bureaus and agencies must be integrated into the overall program.

3. Manpower for a major mobilization can not be procured by a Volunteer system whether under state or Federal control.

4. The Militia as organized could not provide a reservoir of military manpower.

5. Conscription based on principles of selective service is the most efficient and fair method of obtaining military manpower. Such a system should include utilization of manpower regardless of color and should include limited service men. It should preclude use of bounties, substitution, or commutation. The term of service should be for the duration of the war.

6. After the initial organization of the Army, units should be kept at full strength by a replacement system; additional units should be raised only if actually needed as organizations.

7. The officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army with their experience and training must be used as the cadre for the wartime Army. Keeping the Regular Army intact deprived the Volunteer Army of leaders and instructors during the crucial months of the initial mobilization.

8. Some sort of an officer training program for company grade officers is necessary in any large-scale mobilization. Officer candidates should be selected on the basis of prospective ability. A retirement system is necessary to allow older officers to step aside. Promotion should be based on efficiency and not strict seniority.

9. Training programs should be carefully planned and organized at the War Department level in peacetime so that an adequate uniform training program can be instituted at the beginning of a mobilization.

10. Coordination of manpower mobilization and logistics is essential. Economic factors influence manpower mobilization both directly and indirectly.

a. Reserves of supplies should be kept on hand for at least the first increment of manpower in a mobilization.

b. Procurement must be based on a sound assessment of the nation's economic and industrial capacity.

c. Necessary controls over the nation's economic life must be instituted including an arbitrary allocation of manpower and resources to ensure a flow of supplies for the war effort.

d. Critical shortages in national resources must be met by careful stockpiling.

e. Adequate testing procedures must be developed to take full advantage of technological developments.

CHAPTER V

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The Post-Civil War Period

When the Civil War ended in the spring of 1865 the Union Army was the most powerful military force in the world, but its strength was soon dissipated in a rapid demobilization.[1] The Congress passed an act on 28 July 1866 which fixed the military peace establishment at 45 infantry, 10 cavalry, and 5 artillery regiments with a total strength of 54,302 men.[2] This strength was subsequently reduced to 37,313 in 1869 and to 27,472 in 1876.[3] During this period, characterized as the Army's "dark ages," the Army engaged in Indian campaigns and routine garrison life.[4] Replacements were the major manpower problem. Mobilization planning was unknown except for the rare efforts of individual farsighted officers.[5] Among the more important events of the period were the proposals for the reorganization of the War Department and the developments in military education.

Proposals for Reorganization of the War Department

When the Army had been reorganized and reduced in size in 1821, the senior officer of the Army was given the title of Commanding

[1] DA Pam No 20-210, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army* (July 52) pp. 5-8. This study covers personnel demobilization through World War I briefly and the World War II period in detail.

[2] Act of July 28, 1866, 39th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States"; *Stat. L.*, XIV, pp. 332-38.

[3] Otto Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington, 1946), p. 11. The following table compiled from the War Department annual reports for the indicated years summarized the actual strength of the Army in the period between the Civil War and the Spanish-Amercian War:

Date	Total	Officers	Enlisted
1871 [a]	28,953	2,105	26,848
1875 [a]	24,864	2,068	22,796
1880 (30 June)	26,411	2,152	24,259
1885 [a]	26,859	2,154	24,705
1890 (30 June)	27,089	2,168	24,921
1896 (30 June)	27,038	2,169	24,869

[a] For these years the strengths are from the latest returns received, but the dates of the returns are not indicated.

[4] Ganoe, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

[5] Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. III, deals with the replacement problems of this period in detail. For an example of individual mobilization planning see: Ltr, Col John Gibbon to General in Chief, 15 March 1877, in H Misc Doc 56, 45th Cong., 2d sess., "Reorganization of the Army," pp. 124-28.

General of the Army.[6] Before 1821 the Secretary of War under the supervision of the President had exercised nominal command of the Army through various geographical departments.[7] The position of Commanding General of the Army was never specifically recognized by statute; its powers and duties developed from Army regulations and customs and were never clearly prescribed. Theoretically, the Secretary of War was responsible for the administrative and technical services; he controlled the financial affairs of the Army; and the bureau heads reported directly to him. The Commanding General was responsible for the efficiency, discipline, and conduct of the troops. The staff of the Commanding General was usually limited to his personal aides and secretaries.[8] The control of expenditures by the Secretary of War meant that no Commanding General in time of peace could exercise any substantial power unless he conformed to the policies and views of the Secretary of War. Conflict and disagreement were almost inevitable with such organizational confusion.

Another complicating factor was the relative position of the Secretary of War and the Commanding General in relation to the President who under the Constitution of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. The Secretary of War was appointed by the President and served at his pleasure; he was the President's *alter ego* in the control of the War Department. The Commanding General was assigned to the command of the Army by the President, but once assigned he could not be removed except by court-martial until he was eligible for retirement.[9] Usually a Commanding General served under a series of Presidents and Secretaries of War with varying relationships. The extent of his ability to command the Army and perform his duties was dependent on the support and confidence he received from the President and Secretary of War. Throughout this entire period the Commanding General was always faced with three alternatives: he could move his headquarters to some location away from Washington; he could stay in Washington and subordinate his views to those of the Secretary of War; or he could stay in Wash-

[6] Jerome Thomases, "Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the Headquarters of the Army 1825–1903," Aug 1946. PC49 (47–5). National Archives. The title of the office varied from time to time with Commanding General and General in Chief most commonly used.

[7] The Congress provided for the appointment of a commanding general 28 May 1798. George Washington was commissioned first as a lieutenant general and then under the Act of March 3, 1799, as General of the Armies of the United States. General Washington never actually assumed command of the Army. The office of Commanding General was discontinued with Washington's death, 14 Dec 1799.

[8] When General Grant was Commanding General during the last year of the Civil War he had a personal staff in the field with him including a chief of staff with the rank of brigadier general.

[9] Harold D. Cater, "Evolution of the American General Staff," p. 17ff. MS in Gen Ref Office, OCMH.

ington and bicker with the Secretary, thereby causing a virtual stalemate in Army business.

The danger of the absence of clearly defined lines of command in the War Department had become apparent with Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott's disagreements with the Secretaries of War during and after the Mexican War. Under the pressure of the Civil War and after a great deal of experimentation, a workable organizational arrangement was evolved when General Grant became Commanding General 12 March 1864. From his headquarters in the field General Grant exercised command of all military operations, but he maintained close liaison with the Secretary of War and the President through Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck who served as Chief of Staff of the Army in Washington and who had previously been Commanding General. This was only a temporary wartime solution and was recognized as such by General Grant. [See charts for departmental organizational during Civil War.]

After the Civil War, General Grant outlined his proposals for the organization of the War Department command in a letter to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton dated 29 January 1866:

> The entire adjutant-general's office should be under the entire control of the general-in-chief of the army. No orders should go to the army, or the adjutant-general, except through the general-in-chief. Such as require the action of the President would be laid before the Secretary of War, whose actions would be regarded as those of the President. In short, in my opinion, the general-in-chief stands between the President and the army in all official matters, and the Secretary of War is between the army (through the general-in-chief) and the President.[10]

No immediate action was taken, but General Grant kept the proposal in mind and discussed the subject with General Sherman in the winter 1868–69. General Grant became President 4 March 1869, and the following day Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, Secretary of War, issued the following order:

> By direction of the President, General William T. Sherman will assume command of the Army of the United States.
>
> The chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus will report to and act under the immediate orders of the general commanding the army.
>
> Any official business which by law or regulation requires the action of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted by the General of the Army to the Secretary of War, and in general all orders from the President or Secretary of War to any portion of the army line or staff, will be transmitted through the General of the Army.[11]

Thus, by the too simple device of issuing a general order, General Grant clearly delineated the lines of authority within the War Depart-

---

[10] William T. Sherman, *Personal Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman* (3d ed., New York, 1890), II, pp. 449–50.

[11] WD GO 11, 8 Mar 1869.

ment and the Army. The similarity between this system and the system which developed out of the General Staff Act of 1903 is striking. The order, however, conflicted with the statutes creating the individual staff bureaus and stirred up so much opposition that it was revoked 26 March 1869 and the Commanding General reverted to his previously undefined status. Although in "command" of the Army his staff was limited to his personal aides and he was deprived of any effective means of command. This situation resulted in a series of disagreements between General Sherman and the Secretary of War, William W. Belknap, and in October 1874 General Sherman moved his headquarters to St. Louis. In his memoirs General Sherman stated: "The only staff I brought with me were the aides allowed by law, and, though we went through the forms of 'command,' I realized it was a farce, and it did not need a prophet to foretell it would end in a tragedy." [12]

Secretary of War Belknap resigned in March 1876 following charges of corruption. The new Secretary of War, Alphonso Taft of Ohio, asked General Sherman to return to Washington. General orders issued 6 April 1876 were designed to avoid some of the previous conflicts between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army:

> The headquarters of the army are hereby reestablished at Washington City, and all orders and instructions relative to military operations or affecting the military control and discipline of the army issued by the President through the Secretary of War, shall be promulgated through the General of the Army, and the departments of the Adjutant-General and Inspector-General shall report to him, and be under his control in all matters relating thereto.[13]

In 1876 the bureau chiefs still were directly responsible to the Secretary of War in all matters except those reserved to the Commanding General. As long as the Commanding General's staff was limited to his personal aides, he had no effective means of either actually commanding the Army or of planning for possible military campaigns.

In the period 1865–98 the Congress investigated and studied the problems of War Department organization over and over again. In a questionnaire sent to a select list of officers in 1872 the question was asked as to whether the staff departments should be under the Secretary of War or the Commanding General. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade replied: "The staff corps, being constituent parts of the Army, should in all purely military matters, be under the orders of the general commanding the Army, this officer being himself under the orders of the Secretary of War, as representing the President." [14] Special studies of staff organizations in other armies were made for the War

[12] Sherman, *op. cit.*, II, p. 454.
[13] WD GO 28, 6 Apr 1876.
[14] H Rpt 74, 42d Cong., 3d sess., "Army-Staff Organization," 2 Feb 1873.

Department by officers on special detail; among the studies which were published were Emory Upton's *The Armies of Asia and Europe* and Theodore Schwan's *Report on the Organization of the German Army.*[15] No action was taken on the various proposals to reorganize the War Department before the Spanish-American War began.

Military Training in Civil Educational Institutes

The Civil War found the United States, and the North in particular, without adequate sources from which to draw sufficiently trained officers. To remedy this situation in future emergencies, the Congress passed a bill introduced by Rep. (later Sen.) Justin S. Morrill of Vermont which was signed on 2 July 1862 by President Lincoln. The Morrill Act provided for a grant to each state of public lands which were to be sold, and the money thus derived—

> . . . to constitute a perpetual fund, the capital of which shall remain forever undiminished, . . . and the interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated, by each State which may take and claim the benefit of this act, to the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading subject shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, *and including military* tactics [italics author's] to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life.[16]

The phrase "and including military tactics" became the foundation for military education in the new land-grant colleges. The land-grant colleges had a dual function: they were to provide higher education along practical lines as well as military training.

At the time the Morrill Act was passed the country was in the midst of the Civil War; military education in the new schools had to wait until the Rebellion was over. The Act of July 28, 1866, which prescribed the peacetime establishment of the Army, contained a provision empowering the President to detail up to 20 officers to schools having more than 150 male students "for the purpose of promoting knowledge of military science among the young men of the United States," but the land-grant colleges had no priority on the detail of these officers. A joint resolution of Congress on 4 May 1870 authorized the Secretary of War to issue small arms and artillery not needed by the Army to schools with instructors detailed under the Act of July 28, 1866. A further act of Congress, 5 July 1876, authorized an increase from 20 to 30 in the number of officers the President might detail as military instructors. Subsequent increases followed until

---

[15] Emory Upton, *The Armies of Asia and Europe* (New York, 1878); Theodore Schwan, *Report on the Organization of the German Army* (Washington, 1894).

[16] Act of July 2, 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess., "An Act Donating Public Lands to the several States and Territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts" [Popularly referred to as the Morrill Act]. *Stat. L.*, XII, p. 504.

100 officers were authorized for assignment to school details under the Act of November 3, 1893. This latter act also provided that retired Army officers detailed for duty within the quota would receive the full pay of their rank.[17]

In the period 1866–98 the War Department failed to utilize the program of military instruction in civil educational institutions to create a reserve of trained officers. Not even a record of those who had received instruction was maintained. Officers were generally assigned only to the land-grant colleges and to essentially military schools of which there was an increase after the Civil War. There was very little standardization in the training. Its usefulness depended on the initiative and program of the individual officers assigned as instructors and on the attitude of the school authorities. Among the officers who later distinguished themselves after serving as professors of military science and tactics in the 1880's and 1890's were 1st Lt. John J. Pershing (Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces in World War I and General of the Armies) and 1st Lt. Enoch H. Crowder (Judge Advocate General, 1911–23, and simultaneously Provost Marshal General in World War I).[18] The President of the University of Tennessee summarized the status of the program in 1898: "The land-grant colleges have by no means failed in the past of their duty in respect to military education. Had they been helped more and been encouraged more . . . they would doubtless have done much more." [19]

Although the program of military training in civil educational institutions had not been fully developed by 1898, the fact that thousands of college graduates had received basic military instruction meant that a potential supply of partially trained prospective officers had been created. These men would be available for Volunteer service in an emergency.[20] The Regular officers detailed as professors of military science and tactics were ordered to their regiments in April 1898, and military instruction in the schools just about ceased for the duration of the war.

---

[17] Act of July 28, 1866, 39th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States." *Stat. L.*, XIV, p. 336; Act of May 4, 1870, 41st Cong., 2d sess., "Joint Resolution authorizing the supply of arms, for instruction and practice, to certain colleges and universities." *Stat. L.*, XVI, p. 373; Act of July 5, 1876, 44th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to amend section twelve hundred and twenty-five of the Revised Statutes of the United States." *Stat. L.*, XIX, p. 74; Act of November 3, 1893, 53d Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to increase the number of officers of the Army to be detailed to colleges." *Stat. L.*, XXVIII, p. 7.

[18] General Pershing was PMST at the University of Nebraska, 1891–95 and General Crowder was PMST at the University of Missouri 1885–89. Both men also earned law degrees while at the respective schools.

[19] Charles W. Dabney, *The Colleges and National Defense* (U. S. Dept of Agriculture, Office of Experiment Stations, Circular No. 40 [Washington, 1898]).

[20] For further information and list of schools, number enrolled, etc., in 1897 see "Report of The Inspector General," pp. 256–65, and "Report of The Adjutant General," pp. 226–33, in *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1897.*

The Army School System Established

In the post-Civil War period steps were taken to establish a system of Army schools to give small Regular units concentrated training, to train officers appointed to the Army from civil life, and to give advanced training to graduates of the Military Academy. The Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Va., which had been founded in 1824, served as a model. The first post-Civil War school was the School of Instruction for Light Artillery at Fort Riley, Kans., authorized 18 February 1869 and discontinued 4 March 1871. This school of instruction was designed to train light artillery batteries and not just officers.[21] "The instruction at this first school at Riley was purely of a practical nature. There were no regular classes as we now know them and theoretical instruction probably was in the form of critiques delivered during, or following, the exercise." [22]

A School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry was ordered established 7 May 1881 at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., by General Sherman on the recommendations of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan and Maj. Gen. John Pope. One lieutenant from each regiment of Infantry and Cavalry was assigned to the school; the course of instruction was for two years. The "practical instruction" prescribed included ". . . everything which pertains to Army organization, tactics, discipline, equipment, drill, care of men, care of horses, public property, accountability, &c., and generally of everything which is provided for in Army Regulations." "Theoretical instruction" included "reading, writing, grammar, arithmetic, geography, algebra, geometry, and trigonometry sufficient for the measurement and delineation of ground, and such history as every young gentleman should be presumed to know." The final field of study was to be "the 'science and practice of war,' so far as they can be acquired from books." [23] A list of prescribed books was included in the order. The School was designated "The United States Infantry and Cavalry School" in 1886; it was gradually expanded and perfected in the period before 1898.[24]

Following recommendations made by General Sheridan, the Congress passed an act 29 January 1887 authorizing the establishment of ". . . a permanent school of instruction for *drill and practice* [italics author's] for the Cavalry and Light Artillery service of the Army of the United States" at Fort Riley, Kans. The actual organization and opening of the school was delayed until 9 January 1893 while facilities were constructed. The instruction was given to units as a

[21] WD GO 6, 18 Feb 1869; WD GO 17, 4 Mar 1871.
[22] Woodbury, F. Pride, *The History of Fort Riley,* (Fort Riley, 1926), p. 165.
[23] WD GO 42, 7 May 1861; WD GO 8, 26 Jan 1882.
[24] WD GO 39, 22 Jun 1886. See: Reeves, *op. cit.,* pp. 204–08 for background; and "Regulations of the United States Infantry and Cavalry School" in WD GO 49, 7 Aug 1897.

whole and was chiefly practical concentrated training; the average course was a year in length.[25]

Two other service schools were established before the Spanish-American War. The first was the United States Engineer School at Willets Point, N. Y., established in 1890 as an outgrowth of a series of schools for application conducted by the Engineers.[26] The United States Army Medical School was established at Washington, D. C., 24 June 1893 to instruct candidates for admission to the Medical Corps in army procedures and medical practice.[27] All the service schools were discontinued when the Spanish-American War began and the personnel ordered to their units. But in the period before 1898 the foundations for an Army service school system had been laid.

War Declared Against Spain

The sinking of the USS *Maine* in Havana Harbor the night of 15 February 1898 brought already declining Spanish-American relations to a new low. For two years, the situation in Cuba had led to a widening gulf between the United States and Spain. War fervor, kept alive by journalistic activities,[28] boiled over in the United States when the *Maine* was so mysteriously blown up. The Congress unanimously voted $50,000,000 for national defense on 9 March 1898. When a Naval court of inquiry concluded 28 March that the *Maine* had been sunk by a submarine mine, inflamed popular opinion in the United States was convinced that the mine had been touched off by the Spanish. Although the Spanish government agreed to adjust the Cuban problem, President McKinley finally yielded to popular opinion and asked Congress for authority to intervene in Cuba on 11 April. The Congress, swept by the same emotions as the people, passed a joint resolution 19 April which was tantamount to a declaration of war. The President signed the resolution the next day, and on 25 April the Congress declared that a state of war had existed between the United States and Spain since 21 April 1898.[29]

The Military Establishment, 1 April 1898

On 1 April 1898 Russell A. Alger was Secretary of War. A lawyer by profession, he had served as a Volunteer colonel and brevet major general during the Civil War. He had been elected governor of Michigan in 1884 and became Secretary of War under President McKinley 5 March 1897; he was 62 years old when the Spanish-American

---

[25] Act of January 29, 1887, in WD GO 9, 9 Feb 1887; WD GO 17, 14 Mar 1892 authorized the establishment of the school; "Regulations for the Cavalry and Light Artillery school, 1896" in WD GO 6, 28 Feb 1896; Pride, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

[26] Reeves, *op. cit.*, pp. 256–61.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] For a discussion of journalistic activities see: Marcus M. Wilkerson, *Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War* (Baton Rouge, 1932).

[29] Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (4th ed.; New York, 1950), pp. 501–10.

War began. The office of Assistant Secretary of War, which had been discontinued after the Civil War and then reestablished by the Congress 5 March 1890, was held by George D. Meiklejohn.

The Commanding General of the Army was Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles. General Miles, who was 58 years old, had entered the Army as a Volunteer officer from Massachusetts in 1861; he rose from first lieutenant to major general in the Volunteers and commanded a corps at 25; he remained in the Regular Army after the Civil War as a colonel of Infantry; and he became a major general in the Regular Army in 1890 after successful Indian campaigns. Upon Lt. Gen. John Schofield's retirement General Miles became Commanding General of the Army 2 October 1895. General Schofield had served both as Secretary of War (1 Jun 1868–13 Mar 1869) and as Commanding General (14 Aug 1888–29 Sep 1895). As Secretary of War on 5 March 1869 he had issued the general orders (rescinded by his successor) giving General Sherman control over the staff bureaus. Realizing that the actual power of the Commanding General depended on a close relationship with the Secretary of War, General Schofield served more as a military adviser to the Secretary than as a Commanding General. General Miles did not appreciate the delicate balance struck by General Schofield between the office of the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, and the old struggle for power was resumed, straining personal relations between Alger and Miles.

The staff of the Army consisted of 10 War Department bureaus: Adjutant General's Department, Inspector General's Department, Quartermaster General's Department, Subsistence Department, Medical Department, Pay Department, Engineer Department, Ordnance Department, Signal Department, and Judge Advocate General's Department. There had been few changes in staff work or precedures since pre-Civil War days.

*Table 13. Strength of the Regular Army: 1 April 1898.**

Organization	Strength			Number of regiments
	Total	Officers	Enlisted men	
Total	28, 183	2, 143	26, 040	42
General Officers and Staff Corps	2, 558	532	2, 026	0
Cavalry	6, 484	437	6, 047	10
Artillery	4, 774	288	4, 486	7
Infantry	13, 714	886	12, 828	25
Miscellaneous	653	0	653	0

*Source: "Report of The Adjutant General," *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1898*, vol. I, pt. I, p. 253.

The strength of the Regular Army on 1 April 1898 was 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, a total of 28,183. [For distribution by services see *table 13.*] The regular Army was scattered at some 80 posts across the country with the largest portion of the troops at small posts in the West.[30] The 1890's were the end of a military era. From the close of the Civil War until the Battle of Wounded Knee Creek, 29 December 1890, the Army had been almost continuously absorbed with the pacification of the Western Indians. At the beginning of the Spanish-American crisis the Army was still distributed in the West pretty much as it had been during the Indian campaigns. For Army administrative purposes the country in 1898 was divided into eight geographical military departments.[31] [See *chart 6.*]

The only means of augmenting the Regular Army was by voluntary enlistment. Recruiting was carried on under the supervision of The Adjutant General at general recruiting stations in the larger population centers and at all military posts. In 1897 there were 15 general recruiting stations and 3 special stations in operation. The number of general recruiting stations was increased in April 1898 to 22, which operated during the war. The recruiting activities at the military posts and recruiting stations were designed to maintain the strength of the peacetime Regular Army at about 25,000 and were not meant to obtain the manpower for a major mobilization.[32]

In addition to the Regular Army the only organized military force was the organized Militia or National Guard. On paper the Militia contained 9,376 officers and 106,251 enlisted men, or a total of 115,627. Equipment for the Militia was scarce and outmoded; units were below strength and had only meager training; and it appeared that it would take almost as long to place the Militia on a war footing as to organize new units.[33]

Mobilization "Planning"

During the two years of steadily mounting tensions between the United States and Spain, no practical plans were prepared for a possible mobilization. As a matter of fact there was no organization within the War Department specifically responsible for mobilization

[30] S Doc 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., "Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War With Spain," hereafter cited as "Report on Conduct of the War," (Washington, 1900), I, p. 113. The commission, sometimes referred to as the Dodge Commission after its president, Maj Gen Grenville M. Dodge, met from 24 Sep 1898 to 9 Feb 1899. The report consists of eight volumes of reports and testimony. See vol. I, pp. 107–233, for an account of the mobilization for the Spanish-American War.

[31] WD GO 7, 11 Mar 1898.

[32] "Report of the Adjutant General," *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1897,* pp. 216–18.

[33] *Official Army Register for 1898,* p. 354; Ruby W. Waldeck, "Missouri in the Spanish American War," *The Missouri Historical Review,* XXX (1935–36) p. 377.

*Chart 6. Geographical Military Departments, 1898.**



O Department Headquarters.

**Source:* WD GO 7, 11 Mar 1898.

planning. There was also considerable antipathy to planning for offensive operations on the part of the McKinley administration. As late as 9 March 1898 the President had given positive instructions that the $50,000,000 appropriated by Congress for defense would be expended within the strictest, most literal interpretation of defense.

The first official planning conjecture that there was going to be a war which would require offensive action came in a letter from General Miles to Secretary of War Alger, 9 April 1898. The general in this letter recommended the immediate mobilization of all available Regular Army troops: specifically, the assembling of 22 regiments of Infantry, 5 of Cavalry, and the Light Field Artillery in one large camp where they could be ". . . carefully and thoroughly inspected, fully equipped, drilled, disciplined, and instructed in brigades and divisions, and prepared for war service." To back up this Regular Army force of some 30,000 men, General Miles further recommended that the President call 50,000 Volunteers. These measures, Miles summed up, would provide an army capable of launching an offensive against the Spaniards in Cuba, estimated to number 80,000 effectives. In addition, state troops in the coastal areas would be available for emergencies or threatened attacks on exposed cities and towns "or for construction of the large force that may be required in the future." [34]

This was the first concrete step toward estimating the manpower which might be needed for a possible war with Spain. In all, General Miles estimated that a combined Regular and Volunteer force of at least 80,000, not including state troops for coastal defense, would be needed. These broad suggestions of General Miles were still under consideration by Secretary of War Alger on 15 April 1898 when the general again wrote to the Secretary reiterating and elaborating his recommendations of 9 April. Miles advised that the site for the mobilization of the Regular Army should be ". . . in the best and most available healthful position in the Department of the Gulf." He suggested Chickamauga Park, near Chattanooga, Tenn., because ". . . of its altitude and advantages for preparing a command for the serious requirements of actual warfare." Miles believed that the number of state troops needed to man coastal defenses would be 40,000.[35] This time the Secretary of War, presumably after approval by the President, immediately directed the Regular Army concentration recommended by General Miles. Secretary Alger wrote three years later that "Fortunately there was no law forbidding immediate mobilization." [36]

---

[34] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army to the Secretary of War, 1898*, p. 5.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

[36] Russell A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War* (New York, 1901), p. 15.

Regular Army Concentration

Orders were dispatched by The Adjutant General on 15 April to the commanding generals of seven departments ordering all the light batteries of five artillery regiments, six cavalry regiments, and twenty-two infantry regiments to one of four stations in the South. Contrary to General Miles' recommendation for concentrating the Regular Army at a single camp but following the recommendations of a Joint Military and Naval Board, the Cavalry and Light Artillery were ordered to Chickamauga and the Infantry scattered, with eight regiments ordered to New Orleans and seven each to Mobile and Tampa.[37] Ostensibly, these units would be ready for an immediate descent upon Cuba, but they were placed beyond any possibility of the combined training with the other arms which they so badly needed.[38] This original order was later amended to permit some of the Infantry to proceed with the Artillery and Cavalry to Chickamauga.[39]

Another order from The Adjutant General 15 April assigned commanding generals to each of the four chosen camp sites and directed those men to send their chief quartermasters to those places to select ground for the camps. The same order directed that all officers on duty at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth and the Cavalry and Light Artillery School at Fort Riley who belonged to any of those units under orders rejoin their commands.[40]

The Regular Army troops who began their trek toward these four camps from over 80 garrisons scattered all over the Nation were, individually, at a fair standard of efficiency as the result of years of Indian campaigning. Tactically they were almost totally devoid of any but minor maneuver experience. Field maneuvers by regiments were almost unknown. Only the Civil War veterans had ever seen a force much larger than a regiment.

The joint resolution passed by the Congress 19 April 1898 had demanded that Spain relinquish its authority over Cuba and withdraw its military and naval forces. The President was given authority to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry this resolution into effect. It was evident that more than a concentration of the Regular Army and Naval forces were going to be necessary to implement this resolution.

Wartime Legislation

In his original recommendations of 9 April General Miles had proposed the raising of a "volunteer force" of 50,000 men. The only

---

[37] AGO, *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain . . .*, I, p. 7; Arthur L. Wagner, *Report of the Santiago Campaign 1898* (Kansas City, 1908), p. 25.

[38] Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit* (Cambridge, 1931), p. 154.

[39] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, p. 9.

[40] *Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain. . . .* I, pp. 7–8.

reserve forces from which even partially trained military personnel could be drawn were the state Militia or National Guard units. The term "National Guard" had come into general use in most of the states in the post-Civil War period. It was synonomous with the older term "Organized Militia" and should not be confused with the National Guard organized by the National Defense Act of 1916. These state units were too influential politically to be ignored by recruiting a completely new Federal Volunteer force. The War Department struggled to find some formula whereby the National Guard of the states could be federalized without reintroducing the Militia problems of Civil War days.[41]

A hurriedly drafted bill creating an independent Federal force with all officers to be commissioned directly by the President was drawn up by the War Department. In order to get around the desire of the governors to appoint the officers for regiments raised within their states, the argument was advanced that since this force was to be used outside state boundaries and probably outside the United States the President should retain the authority to appoint the officers. There was even thought of omitting the term "Volunteer" to assuage National Guard pride; the National Guard felt that it should have a priority on serving and resented the formation of Volunteer units unless they were composed of Guardsmen. But the War Department's efforts were in vain. Before the bill even reached the Congress, the Army was forced to yield to political pressure and agree that any National Guard unit up to full strength would be integrally taken into the mobilizing Army, if the state governor so desired, and that none of these units would be staffed with Regular Army officers. The bill was then turned over to the House Military Affairs Committee with a companion measure for increasing the Regular Army just as war was declared.[42]

The Congress passed "An Act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war" on 22 April 1898. This act provided:

1. In time of war the Army would be composed of the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army which would include the Militia of the states when in Federal service.

2. The President with Congressional permission could call for Volunteers between the ages of 18 and 45 for two years of service with quotas to be apportioned among the states according to population.

3. If any Militia organization volunteered in a body it, with its officers, would be integrally accepted as a unit into the Voluntary army.

---

[41] Millis, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–56.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 156–57.

4. Other organizations would be raised by the states and the officers appointed by the governors.

5. The Secretary of War was authorized to organize units "possessing special qualifications, from the Nation at large not to exceed three thousand men" with officers Federally appointed.

6. All units accepted were to be recruited to maximum strength and provision was made for the organization of both Regular and Volunteer units into brigades, divisions, and army corps.

7. Not more than one Regular officer could be appointed to any Volunteer regiment.

8. Efficiency boards composed of Volunteers were authorized to review "the capacity, qualifications, conduct, and efficiency" of Volunteer officers.[43]

This was not an ideal Volunteer law; it repeated many of the mistakes of the Civil War. Units were to be raised by the states and the officers appointed by the governors. The period of service was to be for two years. But the Act of April 22, 1898, had made possible the reinforcement of the Army and that reinforcement, when it came, was to be under Federal control.[44]

The Congress passed an act on 26 April 1898 providing for "the better organization of the line of the Army of the United States." This act authorized the President to expand the Regular Army by adding a battalion to each of the infantry regiments (making a total of three) and by bringing the companies up to maximum strength. The actual increases were wisely left to the discretion of the President enabling him to adjust the mobilization to meet changing conditions. The maximum authorized strength of the Regular Army was thus increased to 64,719 men. At the same time enlisted pay was increased 20 per cent in time of war.[45]

Under an act passed 11 May 1898 the Congress authorized the Secretary of War to raise two additional Federal Volunteer forces: (1) a brigade of Volunteer Engineers of 3,500 men; (2) a force of 10,000 enlisted men "possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates.[46] Other legislation authorized minor increases in the staff departments, the raising of a Volunteer Signal Corps of 65 officers and men, and provided for the filling of Volunteer officer vacancies by the governors.[47] Thus the Congress had authorized a Regular Army of some 64,700, federally raised and officered Volunteer forces of 16,500 (3,000 "Special qualifications," 3,500 Volunteer Engineers,

[43] Act of April 22, 1898, in WD GO 30, 30 Apr 1898.

[44] Millis, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[45] Act of April 26, 1898, in WD GO 29, 29 Apr 1898; Ganoe, *op. cit.*, p. 373; WD GO 27, 27 Apr 1898.

[46] Act of May 11, 1898, in WD GO 44, 13 May 1898.

[47] Act of May 12, 1898, and May 18, 1898, in WD GO 52, 24 May 1898; Act of May 28, 1898, in WD GO 62, 3 Jun 1898.

10,000 "Immunes"), and such state-raised Volunteer forces as the President deemed necessary.

Manpower Mobilization and Procedures

Volunteer Army

President McKinley issued a proclamation on 23 April 1898 calling for 125,000 Volunteers under the authority given him by the joint resolution of 19 April and the Act of April 22, 1898.[48] The number of men was to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the states, territories, and the District of Columbia, according to population. The length of service was to be two years unless sooner discharged. The men gained through this call were to be organized into the following types of units:

Cavalry	5 Regiments, 17 Troops.
Light Artillery	16 Batteries.
Heavy Artillery	1 Regiment, 7 Batteries.
Infantry	119 Regiments, 10 Battalions.[49]

On 26 April General Miles communicated to the Secretary of War his views on processing the Volunteers called under the President's proclamation. He recommended that these troops remain in state camps selected by the governors for a period of approximately two months while they were equipped, organized, and disciplined for field service.[50] General Miles acknowledged that "many of the States have made no provision for their State militia, and not one is fully equipped for field service." [51] Because the states themselves were not prepared to process their men in state camps and because the Army did not have an adequate number of qualified quartermaster, commissary, ordnance, and medical officers to staff the state camps, it was decided to concentrate the mobilizing Army in a few large camps. General Miles later claimed that this decision was a serious error. However, supplies and equipment for any camps were almost nonexistent, and the use of large Federal concentration camps undoubtedly simplified the mobilization process. The Quartermaster Corps later reported that it had had only enough clothing and camp and garrison equipment on hand to provide for the existing Regular Army and perhaps 10,000 more men.[52]

The Adjutant General's Office had issued its "carefully prepared regulations" for the guidance of mustering officers on 22 April 1898. These regulations specified that only officers of the Regular Army,

[48] Proclamation is published in WD GO 30, 30 Apr 1898.
[49] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, p. 489.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[52] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, pp. 127, 436–37.

except in case of necessity, would be detailed to muster duty. A few of the more pertinent provisions of these regulations were as follows:

1. The organization of the units to be mustered was to follow statutes and War Department regulations.

2. During the organization of a Volunteer regiment, the adjutant, quartermaster, and, when necessary, medical officers could be mustered in to aid in recruiting the regiment. The noncommissioned staff was not to be mustered in until the regiment was complete.

3. After a regiment had been mustered into service no commissioned officer was to be mustered in before he produced a commission from the governor of his state, and then only if a vacancy existed.

4. All Volunteers had to be between 18 and 45 years of age and were to be "minutely examined" by a medical officer of the Army or a contract physician.

5. Mustering officers were to be careful that one company or detachment did not borrow men from another to swell its ranks for muster.

6. As in the days of the Civil War every officer and man in a mounted organization should be the owner of the horse in his use.

7. No officer of the general staff of the Militia force was to be mustered in without special authority from the War Department.[53] The Federal Government assumed responsibility for financing the mobilization of Volunteers in General Orders No. 26 issued 27 April 1898:

> All absolutely necessary expenses for the subsistence, transportation, sheltering and generally the maintenance of volunteers during the interval between their enrollment (enlistment) and their muster (or being sworn) into the service of the United States; also all incidental expenses connected therewith, such as the hire of offices, clerks, messengers, etc., for mustering officers, will be met by the Government of the United States from the proper appropriation at the disposal of the several staff departments of the Army.[54]

The men to comprise the 125,000 called under the 23 April proclamation came primarily from men already in the Militia units of the states. However, these men had to volunteer as individuals since under the Federal Constitution, National Guard or Militia units could be ordered into Federal service only to repel invasion, to execute the laws of the Union, and to suppress insurrection. To circumvent the constitutional limitation and still give the National Guard priority, the Act of April 22, 1898, provided that National Guard units would be taken first if the governors so desired, if the men volunteered as a unit, and if the unit was up to strength. The telegrams to the governors assigning state quotas included a sentence which stated: "It is the wish of the President that the regiments of the National Guard or State militia shall be used as far as their numbers will permit, for

[53] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898, pp. 507–10.*
[54] WD GO 26, 27 Apr 1898.

the reason that they are armed, equipped and drilled." The governors were asked what additional supplies and equipment would be required and when the troops would be ready for muster into Federal service.[55]

Response to this call was immediate and varied.[56] In some states the governors refused to permit their National Guard units to go, and formed new units for the call. The units which volunteered and were chosen by the governors were then ordered to camps within their state where organization was completed. Units discharged personnel who failed to volunteer to go with the unit and conducted recruiting campaigns to bring their strength up to that required for muster into Federal service. Units then accepted had their organizational designation changed from that of National Guard or Militia to Volunteer, i. e., 1st Regiment, New York National Guard became the 1st Regiment, Infantry, New York Volunteers. The mobilization of the Volunteer Army units began with their muster into Federal service at state camps. In most cases, the mobilization was conducted with great rapidity.[57]

Before the Volunteers requested under the call of 23 April had been mobilized, strategic manpower requirements had been greatly increased by Rear Adm. George Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, 1 May 1898. Up to that time all plans had contemplated campaigns in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The question of sending a force to the Philippines was first raised by General Miles in a letter to Secretary Alger 3 May.[58] Admiral Dewey estimated 13 May that it would take 5,000 men to hold Manila;[59] the same day Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, who had been selected by the War Department to lead the Philippine expedition, estimated a force of at least 14,400 (6,350 Regulars and 8,050 Volunteers) would be needed.[60] With considerable foresight General Merritt in a letter to the President 15 May pointed out: "It seems more than probable that we will have the so-called insurgents to fight as well as the Spaniards, and upon the work to be accomplished will depend the ultimate strength and composition of the force."[61]

To meet the increased manpower needs President McKinley issued a second proclamation on 25 May calling for 75,000 Volunteers, thereby increasing the total number of Volunteers called to 200,000.[62] The act of April 22 contained a provision that no new organization would be

[55] Telg, SW to Gov of N Y, 25 Apr 1898, sub: Mobilization of Volunteers. Incl 2, AG 247144 filed with AG 253334 (Correspondence Relating to the Muster of Troops in the War with Spain). National Archives.

[56] For account of N Y National Guard units, see: Millis, *op. cit.*, p. 158–59.

[57] See: copies of telegrams and messages Apr-May 1898, sub: Mobilization of Volunteers. AG 253334. National Archives.

[58] *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain.* . . . II, p. 635.

[59] Richard H. Titherington, *A History of the Spanish-American War of 1898* (New York 1900) p. 352.

[60] *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain,* . . . II, p. 644.

[61] *Ibid.,* II, p. 646.

[62] Proclamation of 25 May 1898 in WD GO 83, 28 Jun 1898.

accepted into the service from any state unless the organizations already in service from that state were as near their maximum strength as the President thought necessary. Therefore, a part of the men obtained under this second call were used to fill up below-strength units. This was done by sending recruiting parties from the various Volunteer organizations to the localities where the troops had originally been raised. When a state had a surplus remaining, it was applied toward organizing new units. Some 40,000 men had been obtained under the second call when instructions were given to suspend Volunteer recruiting following the signing of the protocol for an armistice and peace negotiations 12 August 1898.[63] [The growth of the Volunteer Army is shown in *table 14*.]

Regular Army

The strength of the Regular Army on 1 April 1898 had been 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men. The monthly rate of enlistment prior to March 1898 was from 700 to 1,000, but under the stimulus of the war the number jumped to over 9,000 for May and June, over 6,500 for July, and over 3,000 for August. Although the Regular Army expanded appreciably [See *table 15*] its strength never quite reached the maximum authorization of approximately 64,700 men.[64] The strength of the Regular Army was maintained and augmented solely by means of recruitment. In the period prior to the outbreak of war recruits enlisted at the various stations were dispatched as quickly as possible to regiments and posts. The Army continued this practice during the war insofar as it was possible.[65]

When it became necessary to collect recruits for those regiments on foreign service, Fort McPherson, Ga., was selected as the rendezvous point for Cuba and Puerto Rico, and the Presidio of San Francisco for the Philippines. The base at Fort McPherson was soon turned over to the Medical Corps and the recruits there distributed elsewhere. The end of active operations came before this Regular Army replacement depot system really got under way.

Immediately after the declaration of war orders were sent to regimental commanders to recruit their regiments to their authorized war strength. To assist in this intensified recruiting program, commanders were authorized to send out regimental recruiting parties. However, because of the scarcity of officers, the transfer of the Regular Army regiments to concentration camps and the early departure of these regiments overseas, it was not always possible to send out or

---

[63] Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 515.

[64] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, p. 485; "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 118.

[65] This section on Army recruiting is based on material in the "Report of The Adjutant General to the Commanding General," *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, pp. 485–506.

*Table 14. Strength of the Volunteer Army: May-August 1898.**

Organization	May		June		July		August	
	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted
Total	6, 224	118, 580	7, 169	153, 355	8, 633	203, 461	8, 785	207, 244
Major Generals	11		12		18		21	
Brigadier Generals	25		70		70		71	
Adjutant Gen's Dept	54		98		100		99	
Inspector's Gen Dept	19		30		27		25	
Judge Advocate Gen's Dept	6		7		8		8	
Quartermaster Gen's Dept	34		82		114		121	
Subsistence Dept	25		87		106		108	
Medical Dept	19		84		99		113	
Pay Dept	12		65		80		86	
Corps of Engineers	10		24		28		28	
Ordnance Dept					20		24	
Signal Corps	10		101	897	112	1, 089	111	1, 173
Engineers			81	704	108	2, 458	150	3, 286
Cavalry	285	5, 972	292	6, 920	292	7, 221	289	7, 003
Heavy Artillery	83	1, 836	83	2, 010	93	2, 540	92	2, 570
Light Artillery	69	1, 706	84	2, 979	120	4, 405	120	4, 265
Infantry	5, 562	109, 066	5, 969	139, 845	7, 238	185, 748	7, 319	188, 947

* *Source:* "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 254.

*Table 15. Strength of the Regular Army: May–August 1898.**

Month	Total	General officers and staff corps	Cavalry	Artillery	Infantry	Miscellaneous
May	44, 125	3, 209	8, 270	7, 865	16, 212	8, 569
Officers	2, 191	535	435	305	916	0
Enlisted [a]	41, 934	2, 674	7, 835	7, 560	15, 296	8, 569
June	51, 711	5, 547	10, 342	9, 382	18, 249	8, 191
Officers	2, 198	535	430	317	916	0
Enlisted [a]	49, 513	5, 012	9, 912	9, 065	17, 333	8, 191
July	56, 258	7, 103	11, 010	11, 677	19, 872	6, 496
Officers	2, 327	550	419	369	989	0
Enlisted [a]	[b]53, 931	6, 553	10, 591	11, 308	18, 883	6, 496
August	58, 688	8, 528	12, 013	12, 823	23, 445	1, 879
Officers	2, 323	548	419	369	987	0
Enlisted [a]	56, 365	7, 980	11, 594	12, 454	22, 458	1, 879

[a] Monthly data include the men of the Hospital Corps which are exclusive of authorized strength. Regular Army enlistments were as follows: May—9,569, June—9,311, July—6,586, August—3,400.

[b] Includes 100 persons not shown in succeeding columns.

*Source: *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, p. 486.

maintain regimental recruiting parties. The number of enlistments made by the regimental parties was therefore greatly reduced. General service recruiting officers at posts and city stations were instructed to assign general service recruits to regiments when requested to do so by their regimental commander. There was but one special regimental recruiting station in operation in April; in May the number was 126; in June 120; in July 85; and in August the number dropped off to 58. Lack of officer personnel prevented any considerable increase in the number of general service recruiting stations in cities. In October 1897 there were 15; the maximum during the war months was only 22.

During the period May–July 1898, 25,500 recruits were enlisted, notwithstanding the fact that Regular Army recruiting parties had to compete with recruiting for the Volunteer army and for the various special Federal Volunteer units. By the end of August the enlisted strength of the Regular Army, exclusive of the Hospital Corps, was approximately 52,000 men. Although the Regular Army doubled in size during the war, over 75 per cent of the applicants for enlistments

were rejected "as lacking in legal, mental, moral, or physical qualifications." [66]

The Regular Army officer corps, small to begin with, was placed under a severe strain. Some 387 officers of the Regular Army were nominated and appointed to commissions in the Volunteer Army; many others were placed on staff or mustering duty with the Volunteers.[67] The absence of these officers interfered with the regimental recruiting programs. This was even more evident when the units departed for foreign service. Generally speaking, those units which were able to detail a number of recruiting officers soon had their commands filled to maximum strength. Unfortunately, artillery officers were so scarce that few officers of that branch were released for recruiting; the strength of the artillery units suffered as a result.

Special Federal Volunteer Units

In addition to the Regular Army units and those obtained from the states for the Volunteer Army, Congress provided for the organization of some 16 special units to be recruited by the Federal Government from the nation at large. [See *table 16.*] The Act of April 22 authorized the Secretary of War to form units of men with special qualifications and appoint their officers for a total number not exceeding 3,000. Under this authorization three regiments of United States Volunteer Cavalry were raised. The 1st Regiment, United States Volunteer Cavalry, popularly known as the Rough Riders, was organized by Col. Leonard Wood (later Chief of Staff of the United States Army) and Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt (at that time Assistant Secretary of the Navy).

The Secretary of War was authorized under the Act of May 11 to organize a Volunteer brigade of Engineers. This brigade was to be composed of not more than three regiments or more than 3,500 men. The regiments were to be armed and equipped as infantry, the officers to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. This same act also authorized the Secretary of War to organize an additional Volunteer force of not more than 10,000 men or 10 infantry regiments to be recruited from men possessing immunity to tropical diseases. The officers for these units were likewise to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. Each regiment organized under these provisions was to be known as the ———— Regiment of United States Volunteer Infantry, and was to have a maximum strength of 46 officers and 992 men. At least five of these units were to be composed of white troops; as it worked out, four were colored units and six were white. These units soon became known throughout the Army as Immunes.[68]

---

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 505.

[67] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 255.

[68] Act of May 11, 1898, in WD GO 44, 13 May 1898. For regulations governing the organization of these forces see WD GO 55, 26 May 1898.

*Table 16. Special Federal Volunteer Units Mobilized During the Spanish-American War.**

Unit	Date muster in completed	Strength at completion of muster in		
		Total	Officers	Enlisted
Total		16, 452	729	15, 723
U. S. Volunteer Cavalry		3, 056	133	2, 923
1st (Rough Riders)	21 May 1898	1, 041	47	994
2d	30 May 1898	1, 009	41	968
3d	23 May 1898	1, 006	45	961
U. S. Volunteer Engineers		3, 431	152	3, 279
1st	16 Jul 1898	1, 148	50	1, 098
2d	12 Jul 1898	1, 136	49	1, 087
3d	20 Aug 1898	1, 147	53	1, 094
U. S. Volunteer Infantry		9, 965	444	9, 521
1st	4 Jun 1898	1, 017	46	971
2d	26 Jun 1898	995	45	950
3d	9 Jul 1898	1, 027	43	984
4th	25 Jun 1898	1, 008	46	962
5th	13 Jul 1898	1, 027	46	981
6th	15 Jul 1898	950	46	904
7th	23 Jul 1898	995	42	953
8th	24 Jul 1898	908	40	868
9th	16 Jul 1898	1, 030	46	984
10th	22 Jul 1898	1, 008	44	964

**Source:* AGO, *Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer Forces Called Into Service During the War With Spain . . .*, pp. 18–21.

Summary of Manpower Program

The paper mobilization program called for raising approximately 281,200 men as follows:

Item	*Total*
Total	281, 200
Regular Army	64, 700
23 April call for Volunteers	125, 000
25 May call for Volunteers	75, 000
3 Regiment U. S. Vol Cavalry	3, 000
1 Brigade U. S. Vol Engineers	3, 500
10 Regiments of Immunes	10, 000

Manpower procurement was never a problem during the mobilization for the Spanish-American War, which lasted less than four months. There were 102,000 applicants for the Regular Army during the months of May, June, and July, of whom only 25,000 were found acceptable. In response to the President's call for Volunteers on 23 April nearly 125,000 men had been mustered into service by the end of May. The muster of the three regiments of Cavalry ("men with

special qualifications") was completed by 30 May, the ten Immune Infantry regiments by 30 July, and a special Engineer brigade by 24 August. The grand total of the Army reached its high point in August 1898, when 11,108 officers and 263,609 enlisted men appeared on its rolls.[69] [See *table 17.*]

*Table 17. Strength of the Army: May-August 1898**

Month	Total	Volunteer Army	Regular Army
May	168, 929	124, 804	44, 125
Officers	8, 415	6, 224	2, 191
Enlisted	160, 514	118, 580	41, 934
June	212, 235	160, 524	51, 711
Officers	9, 367	7, 169	2, 198
Enlisted	202, 868	153, 355	49, 513
July	268, 352	212, 094	56, 258
Officers	10, 960	8, 633	2, 327
Enlisted	257, 392	203, 461	53, 931
August	274, 717	216, 029	58, 688
Officers	11, 108	8, 785	2, 323
Enlisted	263, 609	207, 244	56, 365

**Source:* "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 254.

Army Corps Organization

The Act of April 22, 1898, provided that units should be organized into brigades of not more than three regiments per brigade, and that the brigades should be formed into divisions, each division to have no more than three brigades. Furthermore, the President was authorized to organize three divisions into an army corps. On the following day the Regular Army troops at Chickamauga were formed into a provisional army corps under Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke.[70]

Some two weeks later General Order No. 36, 7 May 1898, was published providing the ultimate framework under which the Army was to be organized and employed. It provided for the creation of seven army corps to be composed of Regulars and Volunteers, these corps to be numbered consecutively from one to seven. Actually the Sixth Army Corps was not activated; and an Eighth Army Corps was

[69] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898,* pp. 491–92.
[70] WD GO 25, 23 Apr 1898.

formed to provide for those forces comprising the Philippine expedition. Seven corps in all were activated.

Some attempt at uniformity is evidenced by this order. Coupled with the mustering instructions of 22 April regarding the necessity of units being organized according to prevailing regulations, a fairly equal distribution of strength among the several corps might have been effected, but such was not the case. The combined enlisted strengths of the First and Third Corps at Chickamauga ranged from 6,000 in April to 56,644 in June, and 12,725 in August. [See *table 18* for a comparison of corps enlisted strengths.]

*Table 18. Comparison of Corps Enlisted Strength: May–August 1898**

Corps	31 May	30 June	31 July	31 August
First and Third Corps [a]	42, 036	56, 544	42, 260	12, 725
Second Corps	17, 406	22, 624	21, 373	20, 686
Fourth Corps	7, 456	20, 053	13, 485	9, 933
Fifth Corps	15, 657	14, 945	18, 619	14, 347
Seventh Corps	8, 847	18, 375	23, 193	27, 817
Eighth Corps	10, 793	11, 660	7, 478	5, 988

[a] Enlisted strength on 30 April 1898 was 6,328.

**Source: Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898,* pp. 497–500.

The Selection of Camp Sites

Some 15 camp sites in the United States were utilized by the War Department for the mobilization, training, and demobilization of the troops. The first camp to be chosen was that of Camp Thomas at Chickamauga Park, Georgia. This was the site selected by General Miles for the concentration of all the available regular Army units. The order of 15 April designated three other areas in addition to Chickamauga for the concentration of the Regular Army—Mobile, Alabama; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Tampa, Florida. The camps established at Mobile and New Orleans were temporary ones and used only during the first few weeks of the war. Regular Army units were dispatched to port areas to be readily available for quick loading in the event a hurried invasion of Cuba became necessary, but the troops assembled at these points were shortly transferred to other more permanent installations for incorporation into brigades and corps. Like Mobile and New Orleans, Tampa was never intended as a permanent camp; troops were sent there only to stage, but gradually it became a permanent installation.[71]

The reason for the selection of Tampa as a base of operations was questioned during the investigation by the Dodge Commission of the

[71] "Report on Conduct of the War", I, p. 266.

conduct of the War Department during the war. The Secretary of War informed the commission that Tampa was selected "On account of the shipping facilities at that point and its comparative short distance from Cuba, rendering any movement of the troops possible on short notice." [72] Tampa was, however, completely inadequate in port or railroad facilities. Its selection was a major error and contrary to previous recommendations.[73]

The majority of sites chosen for camps were in the South. The reason for this seems to have been their proximity to the prospective scene of action and for acclimatization of the troops to a semitropical region. A number of camps over and above those originally planned were set up primarily as a result of outbreaks of yellow fever, malaria, and smallpox. Efforts were then made to scatter the troops to more healthful locations. The Dodge Commission investigated all of the camps occupied by the Army in view of charges of unhealthy locations, poor water supply, poor camp discipline, and of political influence in their selection. The commission found these charges to be exaggerated and largely baseless, but felt that the camp commanders at Camp Thomas had not been as attentive to sanitary conditions as they might have been.[74]

Most of the charges relating to conditions in the camps were aimed at the Secretary of War. In his history of the war, Secretary Alger listed five reasons why the War Department assembled troops in large camps:

1. The supply bureaus could not set up depots in each of the 45 states to supply Volunteers in small state camps because the shortage of personnel and supplies had already overtaxed the bureaus. There were not enough Regular Army officers in the supply and medical branches to detail one of each branch to so many scattered state camps, and only Regular Army officers were qualified for such assignments.

2. It was desirable to place the Volunteers in camps with the Regulars in order that they might benefit from the example and instruction of seasoned troops.

3. The War Department wanted to get the Volunteer units away from home as soon as possible "in that home influences tended to retard military discipline."

4. Immediate training in brigades, division, and corps maneuvers was of great importance, and only large camps would permit this.

5. "Considerations of national moment, which subsequent events prove wise, suggested the brigading of regiments, not from the same state, but from the four great geographical divisions—North, South, East, and West. In this way clannishness and provincialism were obliterated, and the result was a homogeneous army." [75]

---

[72] *Ibid.*, I, p. 245.
[73] See: Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[74] "Report on the Conduct of the War", I, pp. 202–22.
[75] Alger, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–27.

Supply Problems Harass Mobilization

Stockpiles of equipment were virtually nonexistent at the outbreak of the war. "The situation found the country unprepared with any large stock of arms, ammunition, clothing, supplies, and equipments." [76] The Quartermaster Department, with only 57 officers assigned to it, had sufficient clothing and garrison and camp equipage on hand for three months' supply for the Regular Army as then constituted (25,000) and perhaps 10,000 additional troops.[77] In less than one month that Department was called upon to equip over 250,000 men. What surplus clothing the Quartermaster Department had on hand was unsuitable for issue to troops expected to train and serve in tropical climates.

State units ran the gamut from those with virtually no uniforms or equipment to a few fairly well-outfitted organizations.[78] Sometimes the earlier units from a state were better equipped than those which followed, "but the worst from some States are better equipped than the best from others." [79] In late May, Maj. Gen. Joseph Breckenridge, The Inspector General of the Army, reported that at Camp Thomas the lack of uniforms, especially underclothing, was everywhere noted. In some companies there was a mixed uniform, in others wholly civilian attire prevailed. The fit of the clothes that were issued was often poor.[80] Some Volunteer units arrived in uniforms which had been furnished by their state and were in very poor condition. On 4 June 1898 General Miles wrote the Secretary of War from Tampa where he had been ordered to expedite the departure of the Santiago expedition: "Several of the volunteer regiments came here without uniforms; several came without arms, and some without blankets, tents, or camp equipage." [81]

In early March, The Quartermaster General had instructed government manufacturing depots to speed up production of certain items and authorized the purchase of additional tentage material—the shortage of this last item was later to plague the Army. In mid-April some sketchy inquiries were sent to manufacturers for estimates of prices, quantities, and delivery dates for certain essential items, but no implementing plans were prepared based on those tentative procurement studies.[82]

Following the declaration of war, Congress made adequate funds available for the purchase of supplies and equipment. But again

---

[76] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 113.
[77] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 126–27.
[78] For examples, see: *Ibid.*, I, pp. 293, 307–09.
[79] *Ibid.*, I, p. 277.
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, . . .* I, p. 24.
[82] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, pp. 128–29.

money was not enough: it could not buy time. For example, cotton twill or duck for summer uniforms could not be obtained; these materials did not become available until after the Santiago Campaign had been completed. The War Department pressed manufacturers and let contracts at a furious rate. Efforts were made to relieve the conditions at state camps by authorizing local purchases of items, but these were not always obtainable.[83]

The supply of ordnance materiel—the tools of the soldier—was about as bad as quartermaster. The Infantry and Cavalry of the Regular Army were equipped with the .30 caliber Krag-Jorgensen type, bolt-action rifles or carbines. This weapon had a box magazine with a five-round capacity, and fired a smokeless cartridge. Unfortunately the Ordnance Department had on hand at the outbreak of the war only 53,508 of these rifles and 14,875 of the carbines.

The standard weapon of the National Guard was still the .45 caliber Springfield breech-loading rifle usually Model 1873 or Model 1884. This was a long, unwieldy, single-shot weapon modified over its original .50 caliber version of late Civil War vintage but certainly not suitable for modern warfare. Inspections often revealed these weapons to be in a poor state of repair, rusty, and hardly capable of lasting a campaign. The ammunition on hand for these weapons was all black powder; efforts made to obtain cartridges with smokeless powder were not successful until after the end of the fighting. The use of this weapon with its revealing black powder ammunition caused the withdrawal from action in the Santiago Campaign of the two Volunteer units equipped with Springfields.[84]

There were numerous incidents of units arriving in camps without even outmoded weapons. General Breckenridge discovered, in his May inspection of Camp Thomas, that two complete regiments of one division were without arms and that some others had none for 30 to 40 per cent of their men. Sentinels were often observed walking posts with clubs or sticks.[85] The situation began to show improvement by 1 September after 53,571 Krag rifles and 11,715 Krag carbines had been issued to the troops; but had the war progressed and hard fighting ensued the Army would still have been hard-pressed for enough modern small arms for the additional men mobilized.[86]

The Medical Department was unprepared in either men or materials to meet the needs of the mobilizing Army. Economy in the prewar Medical Department had prevented the accumulation of any reserve supplies. If such contracts had been made, some of the later

[83] *Ibid.*

[84] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 196–98; Philip B. Sharpe, *The Rifle in America* (New York, 1938), pp. 96–98.

[85] Report on Conduct of the War", I, p. 277.

[86] *Ibid.*, I, p. 197.

shortages might have been avoided. The Dodge Commission found that there was too much red tape in issuing medical supplies and that the table of supply was too restricted. It condemned the serious mismanagement of medical supplies.[87]

The supply situation, critical enough in itself, became further complicated. In the early stages of mobilization, as articles of supply and equipment became available, they were shipped forward in bulk without bills of lading. The result was that railroad cars arrived in Tampa and Chickamauga with their contents unknown to anyone. A great deal of delay resulted while officers broke open boxes to discover their contents while searching for badly needed articles. Materials of different classes belonging to different departments were frequently loaded in the same car making it necessary to remove large crates of quartermaster or commissary supplies in order to obtain a small package of medical supplies. Inadequate loading and unloading facilities at camps, particularly at Tampa, coupled with the inexperience of those in authority caused terrific backlogging, sidetracking, and jamming of rail traffic. At one time supplies for 70,000 men for 90 days were ordered into Tampa, and the confusion became so great that 1,000 railroad cars were sidetracked, some as far back as Columbia, S. C.[88]

In the face of these supply difficulties it seems miraculous that the United States was able to field any sort of an army while a well-equipped army was out of the question. The salvation of the war effort was the nature of the enemy and the effectiveness of the native Cuban Rebellion. Eventually, the procurement efforts of the supply bureaus caught up with the demand, and later the log jam of distribution was also broken. Manpower, supplies, and equipment were nearly in balance by the end of the war, an achievement considering the magnitude of the task, the inadequacy of the staff tools, and the shortness of the war.

Training

The Regular Army was small, but the individual standard of training of its personnel was comparatively high. The great deficiency was in large unit tactical maneuvers. The Indian Wars had been largely fought by small units or detachments, and as a result small unit tactics were excellent. There had been no brigade or division formations since the end of the Civil War. The Regular Army units that assembled in the camps at Mobile, Tampa, New Orleans, and Chickamauga were individually well-trained, fairly well equipped, their discipline was good, and their morale high.

In the case of the Volunteers the situation was quite different. Ostensibly, the units were to be made up from National Guard personnel

[87] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 172–74.

[88] For an account of the railroad chaos at Tampa see: *Ibid.*, I, pp. 132–33; *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain . . .* I, pp. 24–25.

insofar as it was possible since the Guard had some equipment and drill. There was no other source of manpower with any semblance of a military organization. The degree of training of Volunteer army units, like their equipment, varied considerably. Even those units at the top of the training scale had seldom progressed beyond proficiency in close order drill. The training level, high or low, of many National Guard units mustered into Federal service was decreased by the absorption of raw recruits needed to meet the minimum strength requirements for muster into the Volunteer Army. Many of the officers in the Volunteer units raised by the states had had some training in the Militia, in military programs in schools or colleges, or had had Civil War experience, but as a body they were not comparable to the Regular Army officers. Some of the states still permitted the election of officers in Militia or National Guard units.[89] The Inspector General of the Army summarized his observations on the caliber of Volunteer officers: "They are, as a rule, zealous and fairly competent—some noticeably promising—as far as the limited instruction and experience of the National Guard can carry them; but when all is said, they are as much in need of instruction and experience as the men under them." [90]

He also noted that the First Corps appeared to be a fine body of men but were "not yet well in hand nor instructed in the first practical requirements of campaign and battle, such as marksmanship or extended order." In some units the manual of arms was not being taught in conformity with drill regulations. In the 1st Division over 30 per cent of the men were raw recruits, and over 20 per cent had had less than one year's service in the Militia; over 50 per cent had received no target practice of any description. Furthermore, differences in regimental strength ran as high as 300, and all were 200 or more below their authorized complement.[91]

General Breckinridge's inspection of Camp Thomas resulted in remedial action. Division and brigade maneuvers and mass reviews were held for the first time. As a result of this visit The Inspector General concluded that prior to an offensive campaign Volunteer units needed constant drill for at least two months, during which time they should be fully clothed and equipped. He also concluded that there was a great need for extended order drill, a training subject which the National Guard seemed to have neglected, and also for target practice.[92]

On 5 June 1898 General Miles reported to the Secretary of War from Tampa concerning the training status of the Santiago expedition: "This expedition has been delayed through no fault of anyone

[89] Waldeck, *The Missouri Historical Review*, XXX (1936), pp. 388–89.
[90] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 282.
[91] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 276; 278.
[92] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 280–84.

connected with it. It contains the principal part of the [Regular] Army, which for intelligence and efficiency is not exceeded by any body of troops on earth. It contains 14 of the best-conditioned regiments of volunteers, the last of which arrived this morning. Yet these have never been under fire. Between 30 and 40 per cent are undrilled, and in one regiment over 300 men had never fired a gun." [93]

Records of inspection of units in mid-July indicate that some progress had been made, but at least one Volunteer unit with a Regular Army officer as its lieutenant colonel was still in a deplorable state of discipline and training after two months of Federal service.[94] Others had made fine progress in small unit training. Adequate training in large-scale maneuvers suffered from the traditional American insistence on an immediate campaign.[95]

Troop Movements Overseas

The Spanish-American War was the first major war that the United States fought against an overseas power without territory contiguous to the United States itself. Troops had been moved comparatively short distances in coastal waters in both the Mexican and Civil Wars, but the Spanish-American War set the stage for the great overseas wars of the 20th century. The Spanish-American War was principally a naval war. The Army's campaigns around Santiago and Manila on opposite sides of the world were undertaken to supplement and aid naval campaigns.

In the prewar period no long-range plans or preparations had been made to move a sizable body of troops by water. The United States did not possess a single troopship. In the latter part of March 1898, The Quartermaster General had a canvass made of vessels that could be chartered in New York and learned that the Navy had options on most of the serviceable ships.[96] As soon as the war began the Quartermaster's Department was called upon to furnish ships to transport 5,000 men to Cuba; this number was subsequently increased to 25,000. A fleet of 38 ships was collected at Tampa, but ". . . upon loading these vessels it was found that their capacity had been largely overrated, and it was impossible to carry upon them . . . more than 16,000 men." [97] As soon as the ships reached Tampa, it was necessary to fit them with bunks and other accommodations for service as transports. "Thus, owing to our lack of military preparation, it became necessary to go through the labor and delay of altering all manner of steamers into troop ships, at a time when celerity of movement was of impera-

[93] *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain.* . . . I, p. 26.
[94] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, pp. 343–44.
[95] For reports of inspections see: *Ibid.*, I, pp. 343–46.
[96] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 133–134.
[97] *Ibid.*, I, p. 134.

tive importance and delay was both dangerous and costly." [98] The Dodge Commission reported: "In spite of the efforts of the Quartermaster's Department many of these vessels were poorly equipped with sleeping accommodations; the sinks in many instances were inconvenient and insufficient, and some of the vessels were badly ventilated and filled with disagreeable odors. . . . The Quartermaster's Department ought to have been able to more thoroughly equip these vessels, and surely it should have been more certain of their carrying capacity." [99]

The embarkation and debarkation of the Santiago expedition was one of the poorest managed phases of the war.[100] There was no system in loading the ships; units were split up and placed on different ships and their equipment and supplies on other ships. After superhuman efforts the expedition was finally loaded and ready to sail on 8 June, when a report of Spanish naval vessels outside of Santiago delayed the departure of the loaded transports until the 13th and 14th of June.[101] The expedition began an unopposed landing at Daiquiri near Santiago on 22 June. "The landing was made in small boats belonging to the transports, supplemented with a number borrowed from the Navy. . . . The landing . . . could have been greatly expedited had there been lighters provided beforehand for this purpose." [102] "The disembarkation was attended with serious difficulties. The high surf dashed several of the strong naval boats to pieces. The mules, artillery, and private horses of the officers were pushed overboard, several being drowned in attempting to swim to the shore." [103] Fortunately, transportation for the expeditions to Puerto Rico and the Philippines was better managed than for the Santiago campaign.[104]

The Lessons of the War

The brief Spanish-American War (21 April–12 August 1898) publicized the inadequacies of our prewar military establishment and concepts. Although combat casualties were comparatively low—22 officers and 244 enlisted men were killed, 7 officers and 96 enlisted men died of wounds, and 115 officers and 1,479 enlisted men were wounded but not mortally—public opinion was aroused. Most of the old mobilization errors were repeated again, and several were particularly pointed up.

---

[98] Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[99] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, pp. 134–35.
[100] Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[101] Titherington, *op. cit.*, pp. 209–11.
[102] Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[103] Joseph Wheeler, *The Santiago Campaign 1898* (Boston, 1898), p. 14.
[104] For a running account of embarkation of Santiago expedition see: Millis, *op. cit.*, pp. 246–49; and for debarkation see: *Ibid.*, pp. 263–68.

The principal error as in the War with Mexico was in the failure to coordinate foreign policy with military policy. Although following an aggressive foreign policy, ". . . there was no plan of mobilization, no higher organization, no training in combined operations, no provision for the assembling or transporting of an overseas expedition, or for the handling of any large body of troops whatever." [105]

Supply shortages again had an adverse effect on the mobilization. The Dodge Commission pointed out the future necessity for stockpiling critical supplies: "One of the lessons taught by the war is that the country should hereafter be in a better state of preparation for war. . . . Especially should this be the case with such supplies, equipment, and ordnance stores as are not in general use in the United States and which can not be rapidly obtained in the open market." [106]

The inefficiency in the embarkation of the Santiago expedition taught the need for careful logistical preparations for overseas expeditions, the need for a careful selection of ports of embarkation, and the need for either a more adequate merchant marine or a fleet of transports.

The division of authority in the War Department between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army which resulted in friction, squabbling, and indecision during this war as in earlier periods was clearly pointed up. The Dodge Commission felt ". . . a remedy, if possible, should be applied." [107]

The lack of preparedness and the hasty mobilization might have resulted in disastrous consequences if it had not been for the even greater weakness of the enemy, the effectiveness of the Cuban Rebellion, and the naval victories at Manila and Santiago. The Dodge Commission concluded that ". . . there was lacking in the general administration of the War Department during the continuance of the war with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was essential to the highest efficiency and discipline of the Army." [108] The hue and cry raised by what was felt in the public mind to be the mismanagement of the war gave impetus to the movement to reorganize the military establishment and particularly the War Department.[109]

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 152.
[106] "Report on Conduct of the War," p. 114.
[107] *Ibid.*, I, p. 115.
[108] *Ibid.*, I, p. 116.
[109] For a discussion of manpower procurement for the Philippine Insurrection see: Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. III. This was primarily a replacement problem and not a military mobilization of any sizable proportions.