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THE HIGH COST OF CHINA'S INVESTMENT IN AFRICAN COMMUNITIES: LOST LAND AND JOBS

by

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September 2020

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This thesis examines the economic and societal impacts of China's investments in African communities in relation to displaced communities and the loss of land and jobs, with a focus on Zambia. The thesis asks: what is the impact of China's investments on the ordinary African in terms of land ownership, business ownership, and employment opportunities? Case studies facilitate the examination of local population claims of lost land and jobs. This thesis finds that China's investments in Zambia, especially in the mining sector and multi-facility economic zones development, have led to large-scale land acquisition and displacement of indigenous Zambians from their ancestral lands, leaving most rural communities landless and with inadequate access to social services. Moreover, where resettlement of displaced persons is implemented, there are issues of food insecurity, marginalization, and psychological stress. Additionally, local Zambian unemployment is increasing dramatically as Chinese firms hire fellow Chinese rather than Zambians, and small and medium businesses are competing with local Zambian traders for market space and customers. Given these findings, it is recommended that Zambia's government improve implementation of the land-acquisition policy framework to regulate land acquisitions. Further, regulation of Chinese businesses should be strengthened, along with a revision of the immigration policy and issuance of immigrant work permits.

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THE HIGH COST OF CHINA'S INVESTMENT IN AFRICAN COMMUNITIES: LOST LAND AND JOBS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the economic and societal impacts of China's investments in African communities in relation to displaced communities and the loss of land and jobs, with a focus on Zambia. The thesis asks: what is the impact of China's investments on the ordinary African in terms of land ownership, business ownership, and employment opportunities? Case studies facilitate the examination of local population claims of lost land and jobs. This thesis finds that China's investments in Zambia, especially in the mining sector and multi-facility economic zones development, have led to large-scale land acquisition and displacement of indigenous Zambians from their ancestral lands, leaving most rural communities landless and with inadequate access to social services. Moreover, where resettlement of displaced persons is implemented, there are issues of food insecurity, marginalization, and psychological stress. Additionally, local Zambian unemployment is increasing dramatically as Chinese firms hire fellow Chinese rather than Zambians, and small and medium businesses are competing with local Zambian traders for market space and customers. Given these findings, it is recommended that Zambia's government improve implementation of the land-acquisition policy framework to regulate land acquisitions. Further, regulation of Chinese businesses should be strengthened, along with a revision of the immigration policy and issuance of immigrant work permits.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFDF	China-Africa Development Fund Co.
BOC	Bank of China
CNMC	China Nonferrous Metal Mining Corp
CSFAC	China-State Farms Agribusiness Corporation (Group) Co. Ltd.
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ETCZ	Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LE-MFEZ	Lusaka East Multi-Facility Economic Zone
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MFEZ	Multi-Facility Economic Zone
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce (People's Republic of China)
NFCA	Non-Ferrous Company Africa
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOF	Other Official Flows
PRC	People's Republic of China
TUFF	Tracking Underreported Financial Flows
UN	United Nations
VOF	Vague Official Finance
WITS	World Integrated Trade Solution
ZCCM-IH	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Investment Holdings
ZCCZ	Zambia China Economic and Trade Cooperation zone
ZDA	Zambia Development Agency

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I. INTRODUCTION

A recent report from Oxfam reveals that, in less than a decade, more than "227 million hectares of land in developing countries has been leased or sold to foreign investors."[1] Furthermore, Emma Li Johansson et al. note that at least "22 million hectares of land have been contracted to large-scale acquisitions leading to displacements and tenure insecurity, competition, increased pressures, and conflicts over freshwater resources,"[2] all of which pose risks to sustainable livelihood of the local communities.[3] Thus, land deals in Africa have drawn much attention from African governments and foreign investors, given that land is the basic resource for production and most African societies hold land as a valuable resource. Empirical studies on large-scale land acquisitions in Africa show that there is increasing discontent among local communities due to African governments' approaches and negotiations with foreign investors on matters of land for investment.[4]

Likewise, the scale of fast-growing investments between China and Africa has created a combination of optimism and concern. Optimism stems from the significant growth of Chinese foreign direct investments and official financing in Africa since the introduction of China's "Go Out"[5] (*Zouchuqu*) policy.[6] On the other hand, concerns have arisen about the Chinese land deals in Africa that are perceived to affect local people

[1] Oxfam International, "Land and Power," September 1, 2014, https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/land-and-power.

[2] Emma Li Johansson et al., "Green and Blue Water Demand from Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Africa," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 113, no. 41 (2016): 11471–11476.

[3] Sandra Evers, Caroline Seagle, and Froukje Krijtenburg, Africa for Sale?: Positioning the State, Land and Society in Foreign Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Africa (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013), 59, ProQuest.

[4] Honita Cowaloosur, "Land Grab in New Garb: Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa," *African Identities* 12, no. 1 (2014): 94–109, https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2013.868674.

[5] Thomas Vendryes, "The Going Outstrategy: Economic Moves with Political Consequences," *China Analysis*, 2012, www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_analysis_facing_the_risks_of_the_going_out_strategy.

[6] Peter J. Buckley et al., "Historic and Emergent Trends in Chinese Outward Direct Investment," *Management International Review* 48, no. 6 (2008): 715–748.

negatively.[7] Further, concern centers on the adverse impact of China's state and private investment and entrepreneurial activities, particularly on resulting local jobs losses.[8] As such, while some scholars argue that China's economic investments in Africa could be good for Africa's economic growth and development, other scholars hypothesize that the investment is not a genuine effort to lift Africa out of poverty, but rather an effort to exploit African resources and people to enrich China. Fabrizio Carmignani and Abdur Chowdhury argue that Africa's increasing dependence on natural resource exports has the potential to disrupt and suffocate Africa's local manufacturers and businesses.[9]

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

This debate has largely overlooked how China's economic activities affect local communities in Africa. Therefore, this thesis asks: what is the impact of China's investments on the ordinary African, especially in relation to lost land and jobs and the displacement of local populations due to Chinese mining, agriculture, and infrastructure projects? In answering the question, the thesis investigates how China's investments impact the livelihoods of local communities. It analyzes the impacts of such investments on land ownership and employment and trade opportunities in Zambian communities.

The study finds that Chinese activities in Zambia, in particular, have affected local communities in terms of the loss of land, businesses, and jobs. This study reveals that China's investments have led to large-scale land acquisition that has left many rural communities landless. Moreover, it has eroded community identity, and increased food insecurity due to reduced agricultural activities. Furthermore, once the displaced communities are resettled, they face reduced access to social services like education and hospitals, and they are offered inadequate compensation for their lost assets. Ultimately, such communities face marginalization and under involvement in policy and decision

[7] Saturnino M. Borras Jr and Jennifer C. Franco, "Global Land Grabbing and Political Reactions 'from Below,'" *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 9 (2013): 1723–1747.

[8] Jing Gu, "China's Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development," *The European Journal of Development Research* 21, no. 4 (2009): 570–587.

[9] Fabrizio Carmignani and Abdur Chowdhury, "The Geographical Dimension of the Development Effects of Natural Resources," *Environmental and Resource Economics* 52, no. 4 (2012): 479–98.

making on change of land ownership, which contributes to social disintegration resulting from lost networks of friends and such social gathering places as religious and cultural sites. Additionally, local traders have suffered losses or gone out of business due to Chinese traders who import and sell low-quality and low-priced products manufactured in China. My research found that China's investments in Africa have adversely affected the livelihoods of African communities in many of the ways just mentioned, but most notably, they have received minimal money as compensation in comparison to the size of property taken, struggle with increased food insecurity due to reduced farmlands and being resettled in infertile areas, and suffer from marginalization and conflicts arising from social disintegration and psychological stress.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

There is minimal study on the impact of Chinese imports and entrepreneur activities on local African traders and firms. However, research on land acquisitions in Africa have shown that practices of actors matter and have adverse effects on the local communities.[10] As such, this research will help to understand the effects of large-scale land acquisitions on the local communities in Zambia. It is evident that Chinese investments have the potential modify property ownership rights, alter social structures like collective communal or family ownership and use of property such as land, and lead to internal displacement of local people (IDPs).

An in-depth analysis of the drivers of IDPs may help to understand the broader problems of food insecurity, healthy insecurity, environmental degradation, and economic deterioration of Africa's displaced people. In the long run, the impact of displacements could cause a humanitarian crisis. As the United States is the largest contributor to humanitarian assistance in Africa, this research may help to generate and strengthen initiatives and interventions for proper land governance to protect the property "rights of

[10] Marie Widengaard, "Land Deals, and How Not All States React the Same: Zambia and the Chinese Request," *Review of African Political Economy*, 2019, 1–17.

communities and people, and their livelihoods”[11] and reduce vulnerabilities to humanitarian crisis.[12]

In addition, for many African governments, understanding the impacts of Chinese investments on the local community will help in interpreting Chinese actions through clearer agreements, better interpretation, more clarification, and improved negotiations between the African governments and Chinese investors. Moreover, involvement of local people will provide the proper foundation for crafting effective and efficient policies in response to Chinese investments. In Zambia specifically, this research will help the Zambian government to develop local interventions and legal framework to address the issues of customary tenure systems and provide documentation of customary land rights to protect and preserve the indigenous peoples’ land rights.

C. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA

In November 2006, during the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit, a “new type of strategic partnership”[13] between China and Africa was declared, which initiated the significant increase in Chinese investments in Africa.[14] Over the last decade, political and economic ties between African countries and China have grown, with trade investments increasing from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$175 billion in 2015.[15] The increase in trade investments made China Africa’s largest trade partner.[16] Matthias Busse et al. argue that China-Africa economic relations have increased international trade by

[11] Melissa Hall et al., “Zambia Customary Land Documentation Tenure Assessment” (Lusaka, Zambia: USAID, 2017), 1–29. https://land-links.org/document/tgcc-assessment-zambia-customary-land-documentation-tenure-assessment/.

[12] Hall et al., 1.

[13] Zhang Chun, “The Sino-Africa Relationship: Toward a New Strategic Partnership,” *Emerging Powers in Africa*, 2013, 10–18.

[14] Chun, 11–13.

[15] Antonio Martuscelli, “The Economics of China’s Engagement with Africa: What Is the Empirical Evidence?,” *Development Policy Review* 38, no. 3 (2020): 285–302.

[16] Wioletta Nowak, “China-Africa and India-Africa Trade in the Years 2000–2014,” *Procedia Economics and Finance* 39, January (2016): 140.

increasing demand for African products, mostly raw materials.[17] The composition of the trade volume indicates that China imports intermediate goods in the form of raw materials and exports finished products, especially machinery and electrical equipment and electronic devices.[18] Furthermore, Chinese aid to Africa rapidly increased from US$13.042 billion in 2010 to US$46.104 billion in 2018, making China the fifth biggest investor in the continent, behind the Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, and United States.[19]

Recently, sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed a rise in large- scale land acquisitions by Chinese investors that has led to several communities being displaced or expelled from their ancestral homes.[20] In the name of development, investors acquire large parcels of land, and the affected people are displaced and often resettled with or without compensation, and with even less attention given to the impacts of these transactions on their livelihood.[21]

The influx of Chinese investments in Africa is highly influenced by natural resources and trading opportunities, which has worsened employment opportunities for Africans. In addition to Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE), Chinese private firms have increased their activities in trading, agriculture, and manufacturing in Africa, and consequently, they are competing for resources and market share with ordinary African business owners.[22] Furthermore, Carmignani and Chowdhury argue that Africa's

[17] Matthias Busse, Ceren Erdogan, and Henning Mühlen, "China's Impact on Africa—The Role of Trade, FDI and Aid," *Kyklos* 69, no. 2 (2016): 228–262.

[18] Daouda Cisse, "FOCAC: Trade, Investments and Aid in China-Africa Relations," CCS Policy Briefing, 2012, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/FOCAC-%3A-trade%2C-investments-and-aid-in-China-Africa-Ciss%C3%A9/870c18dfad7f17e46a5111280e86897d8b701afd.

[19] UNCTAD, "World Investment Report 2019" (New York: United Nations, 2020), https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2460.

[20] Linda Kleemann and Rainer Thiele, "Rural Welfare Implications of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Africa: A Theoretical Framework," *Economic Modelling* 51 (2015): 269–279.

[21] Lorenzo Cotula and Sonja Vermeulen, "Contexts and Procedures for Farmland Acquisitions in Africa: What Outcomes for Local People?," *Development* 54, no. 1 (2011): 40–48.

[22] Gu, "China's Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development," 576–80.

increasing dependence on natural-resources exports has the potential to disrupt and perhaps to suffocate African local manufacturers and businesses.[23]

For example, Zambia has become the third largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa, largely in copper and nickel mining, manufacturing, and large-scale land agricultural farms.[24] In the 2000s the value of mining and manufacturing investments increased rapidly in Zambia, and export trade between China and Zambia grew 25-fold between 2003 and 2009.[25] In the same period, incidents of large-scale land acquisitions and expansions also increased and significantly contributed to a rise in food prices, loss of customary land rights, displacements, loss of agricultural and forest income, insufficient and mismanaged compensations payments, and job losses.[26] Zambia's deep financial and economic integration with China is worrisome, in the event of a serious economic or pollical destabilization in Zambia, its economic growth prospects will be frustrated, and ultimately increase the potential for financial and debt crisis, and eventual collapse. Moreover, the destabilization will cause disruption in the supply of basic goods and services, more specifically food to households.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review examines debates concerning Chinese economic activities in Africa, potential benefits and costs. First an overview of Chinese economic activities in Africa; second, potential benefits of these activities for African communities; and third, potential costs/negative impacts of these activities.

[23] Carmignani and Chowdhury, "The Geographical Dimension of the Development Effects of Natural Resources," 479–498.

[24] Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund, "State-Driven Chinese Investments in Zambia: Combining Strategic Interests and Profits," in *The New Presence of China in Africa*, ed. Meine Pieter van Dijk (The Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 117–140.

[25] Kragelund, 117–140.

[26] George Schoneveld, Laura German, and Davison Gumbo, The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations: A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia, vol. 133 (CIFOR, 2014), 1–37.

1. Chinese Economic Activities in Africa

China has a growing involvement in economic activities in Africa. There are five main types of activities: mining and energy, agriculture, trade, manufacturing, and infrastructure.

a. Mining/Energy

One of the principal motivations for Chinese investment projects in Africa is the extraction of natural resources such as minerals and oil for its domestic needs.[27] Axel Dreher et al. contend that China's high demand for raw materials together with Africa's high dependence on exporting raw materials is the reason China is increasingly investing in rich natural resource African countries.[28] Jason Z. Yin and Sofia Vaschetto state that, for China, the "current interests in Africa are largely energy-driven, and the makeup of its imports reflects this."[29] The authors claim that oil and gas contribute to more than 60 percent of Africa's exports to China, with an additional 13 percent being minerals and metals. They continue to say that China's imports are heavily concentrated in five resource-rich African countries: Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, and Sudan."[30]

b. Agriculture

Chinese have also invested heavily in the agricultural sector on the African continent at both small and large scale. Chinese enterprises dealing in Agriculture comprise of China state-sponsored commercial farms and individual business by Chinese migrants who came to Africa as business entrepreneurs or former employees of Chinese state owned

[27] Jean- Claude Berthelemy, *China's Engagement and Aid Effectiveness in Africa*, 129 (Tunis, Tunisia: African Development Bank, 2011), 25.

[28] Axel Dreher et al., "Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa.," *AidData Working Paper #15*, no. 15 (2015): 5–10.

[29] Jason Z. Yin and Sofia Vaschetto, "China's Business Engagement in Africa," *The Chinese Economy* 44, no. 2 (2011): 43–57, https://doi.org/10.2753/1097-1475440203.

[30] Yin and Vaschetto, 43–57.

enterprises.[31] Most State-owned enterprises expanded their activities in Africa to capture markets, for example the Hubei Lianfeng Overseas Agricultural Corporation was established in 2005 to expand its activities in Mozambique and Africa at large. Hubei Dadi Corporation for Economic and Technical Cooperation was created in the 1990s to promote rice production principally in Nigeria, Ghana and the DRC.[32] In Zambia both Chinese state-owned farms and private Chinese entrepreneurial farms are operational. For example, Chobe Agrivision farm is the largest China's state-owned farm in Zambia occupying approximately more than 4200ha of land.[33] Another China state-owned farm is Jonken Farm occupying more than 3000ha. These farms produce include livestock, cereals, vegetables, and fruits for both export and domestic consumption.

c. Trade

Trade between Africa and the rest of the world has significantly increased. Matthias Busse et al. suggest that economic linkages between China and Africa has already made China Africa's largest trading partner within a short time as compared to other developed countries.[34] Also, China's approach towards African countries in terms of trade structure and technology transfer through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is also different when compared to high-income, developed, and emerging economies such as the UK , the United States, India, and Brazil. Consequently, China's trading and investment links with Africa are much more intensive than those of other developing countries.[35] China-Africa bilateral trade is steadily increasing as evidenced by the trade value increase from $155bn in 2017 to $185bn in 2018.

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[31] Thomas Lum, Hannah Fischar Julissa Gomez-Granger, and Anne Leland, "China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.," *Russia, China and Eurasia - Social, Historical and Cultural Issues* 25, no. 2 (2009): 175–200.

[32] Elizabeth Gooch and Fred Gale, "Get Ready for Chinese Overseas Investment in Agriculture," *Choices* 30, no. 2 (2015): 1–5.

[33] "Chinese Agricultural Investments in Zambia," ECDPM, accessed March 19, 2020, https://ecdpm.org/great-insights/emerging-economies-and-africa/chinese-agricultural-investments-zambia/.

[34] Busse, Erdogan, and Muhlen, "China's Impact on Africa — The Role of Trade, FDI and Aid," 228–62.

[35] Busse, Erdogan, and Muhlen, 228.

d. Manufacturing

In the manufacturing sector, China has invested in textiles and clothing, steel, chemical, and electrical and electronics products. China has expanded and acquired ownership and control of former African state corporations. For example, in 2007, China state-owned Sino Steel Corporation bought 67% shares of Zimasco Holdings, which was one of Zimbabwe's largest Chrome producing company.[36] In Zambia, Chinese Quingdao Textile Corporation owns 66% shares of the Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles. Manufacturing joint ventures with Chinese firms has allowed integration of African companies into global and regional corporate structures and trade. In support of these ventures, the China-Africa Development Fund has invested a total of $10 billion since 2006 to finance Chinese companies in Africa engaged in manufacturing of products such as transformers, trucks, chemicals, air conditioners, refrigerators, television sets among others to raise Africa's exports.[37]

e. Infrastructure Projects

China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects in Africa. These projects include roads, dams, ports, bridges, railroads, etc. The TAZARA railway project, which linked Zambia to the sea through Tanzania was the first infrastructural project the Chinese undertook on the African continent in 1970.[38] Since that time, China has emerged as a major financier of transport infrastructural projects to expedite continental connectivity.[39] Most of the road and railway projects in most African countries are financed by China. Moreover, China has invested in other infrastructural projects such as dams in countries including Benin, DRC, Gabon, Ghana, Sudan, Ethiopia, etc.[40] China is releasing Capital inflows for infrastructure development projects, and has pledged its commitment to boost

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36 See Martyn Davies et al., *How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa.* (Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, 2008).

37 "State Council," Government of the People's Republic of China, accessed March 13, 2020, http://english.www.gov.cn/statecouncil/.

38 Howard W. French, *China's Second Continent*, 1st ed. (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 46–51.

39 Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 1368–85.

40 Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 1368–85.

Africa's economic growth by enhancing Africa's ability to produce through investments in infrastructure.[41] China's infrastructure development in Africa is seen as a principle of mutual benefit through combining the extension of financial assistance for infrastructure construction with the expansion of Chinese business interests.[42]

2. Potential Benefits of Chinese Investments in Africa

There is existing literature arguing that some of China's economic activities have the potential to bring about benefits to the continent in several areas, including economic growth, infrastructure, and trade. One potential benefit of Chinese investment is an increase in productivity, leading ultimately, to economic growth. For example, Isaac Doku, John Akuma et al., in a study of 20 African countries for the period 2003–2012, reported that "a 1% increase in China's FDI stock in Africa significantly increases Africa's GDP growth by 0.607%."[43] Likewise, Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana and Eric Opoku, when investigating technological progress and worker efficiency in Africa find that China-Africa economic relations contribute to economic growth through increased efficiency due to improved production technology.[44] Additionally, Kwasi Boakye-Gyasi and Yao Li studied China's FDI contribution to economic growth in Ghana between 2006 and 2010. The authors report that Chinese FDI flows have significantly contributed to an efficient workforce in the building and construction sector, which has benefited Ghana's economy from high productivity and subsequent economic growth.[45]

Also, Chinese economic projects continue to establish and improve critical infrastructure in some countries in Africa. Researchers contend that in poor countries,

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[41] "State Council."

[42] Ana Cristina Alves, "China's 'Win-Win'Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of Infrastructure-for-Resources Deals in Africa," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 20, no. 2 (2013): 207–26.

[43] Isaac Doku, John Akuma, and John Owusu-Afriyie, "Effect of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth in Africa," *Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies 10*, no.2 (August 2017): 162–171. https://doi.org/10.1108/JCEFTS-06-2017-0014

[44] Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana and Eric Evans Osei Opoku, "Technological Progress, Worker Efficiency, and Growth in Africa: Does China's Economy Matter?," *China Economic Review* 52 (2018): 151–164.

[45] Kwasi Boakye - Gyasi and Yao Li, "The Impact of Chinese FDI on Employment Generation in the Building and Construction Sector of Ghana Boakye – Gyasi, Kwasi ; Li, Yao," *Eurasian Journal of Social Sciences* 3, no. 2 (2015): 1–15.

undertaking capital intensive infrastructure projects is difficult due to domestic capital shortages.[46] They claim that Chinese loans have contributed to infrastructure development by filling the capital-investment gap. Chris Alden supports this claim when he asserts that "in countries such as Sudan, Angola, and Ethiopia which had been accustomed to crumbling transport infrastructure for decade, the Chinese built highways that connected the major urban centers with rural communities."[47] César Calderón and Luis Servén, who have studied the impact of physical infrastructure on economic growth, have observed that such physical infrastructure as roads, ports, and railways are essential to economic growth because new connectivity improves market access, hence generating higher and faster economic growth.[48]

In addition to infrastructure, there are also benefits associated with China's efforts to increase trade in Africa. Victoria Hnatkovska and Norman Loayza suggest that China's activities in Africa have positive effects, such as opening international trade for African countries.[49] International trade with China significantly boosts growth rates by increasing demand for such African products as raw materials and minerals. Overall, this increase of trade, FDI, and aid in Africa has potentially positive effects on economic growth. Moreover, according to Ali Zafar, "China's enormous demand for raw materials has led to higher world market prices for raw materials, improving the terms-of-trade of African exporters of natural resources."[50] In addition, African consumers benefit from imports of Chinese manufactured goods at lower costs or an increase in the variety of consumer goods available to them. He argues that equally, "African producers could take advantage of low-

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46 Paul Mosley, John Hudson, and Sara Horrell, "Aid, the Public Sector and the Market in Less Developed Countries," *The Economic Journal* 97, no. 387 (1987): 616–41.

47 Chris Alden, *China in Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 4.

48 César Calderón and Luis Servén, "Infrastructure and Economic Development in Subsaharan Africa.," *Journal of African Economies* 19 (2010): 113–87.

49 See Victoria Hnatkovska and Norman Loayza, *Volatility and Growth. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 3184 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003).

50 Ali Zafar, "The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, and Aid Links," *The World Bank Research Observer* 22, no. 1 (2007): 103–30.

cost Chinese inputs in their production process rather than importing goods and technologies from "Northern" countries that may be too expensive or advanced."[51]

3. Potential Costs of Chinese Investment in Africa

There are also many concerns that Chinese economic activities could also have some unwanted impacts on African countries. Carmignani and Chowdhury assert that China's engagement in Africa has negative consequences.[52] Specifically, the authors argue that China's aid projects lead to corruption and paralyze local industries.[53] There is also evidence that some Chinese activities are displacing African businesses and jobs.[54]

Although there is little evidence to suggest that China prefers to provide aid to countries with weak governance and tyrannical regimes more than democracies, Berger et al. claim that there is evidence that Chinese activities harm institutional quality and breed corruption.[55] Axel Dreher and Andreas Fuchs note that widespread corruption has been found around Chinese projects, suggesting that Chinese aid does not encourage local economic activity but fuels local corruption.[56] Thibaut Dort et al. further note that countries embroiled in "high corruption and with weak institutions may not be able to fully reap the benefits of investment."[57] Moreover, China claims to have a policy of non-interference in Africa's internal politics, but this policy ignores governance standards and regime types of

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[51] Yong He, "Does China's Trade Expansion Help African Development? —An Empirical Estimation," *China Economic Review.* 26 (2013): 28–38.

[52] Carmignani and Chowdhury, "The Geographical Dimension of the Development Effects of Natural Resources," 2012, 479–98.

[53] Carmignani and Chowdhury, 479–98.

[54] Samuel Adams, Philip Adom, and Isaac Kofi Mensah, "Africa's Economic Growth Convergence: The Story Of The China-Africa Trade" (1st Africa-Asia Dialogue Network (AADN) International Conference 2019, 2019), 25.

[55] Bernt Berger and Uwe Wissenbach, "EU-China-Africa Trilateral Development Cooperation: Common Challenges and New Directions" (Discussion Paper, German Development Institute, 2007), 4–18. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/199282.

[56] Axel Dreher and Andreas Fuchs, "Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China's Aid Allocation" (*IDEAS Working Paper 93*, Courant Research Centre PEG, 2011), 1–48.

[57] Thibaut Dort, Pierre-Guillaume Méon, and Khalid Sekkat, "Does Investment Spur Growth Everywhere? Not Where Institutions Are Weak," *KYKLOS* 67, no. 4 (2014): 482–505.

recipient countries, which may increase corruption and support repressive state survival.[58] According to Mushfiq us Swaleheen, corruption would then "lower the level of investment and the productivity of capital stock in an economy."[59] As a result, the projects may make no real contribution or may even hurt economic growth in Africa.

In addition, there is also concern that China's investment practices do not benefit African countries to the extent that they could. While most of the research investigating China's presence in Africa has focused on the implications for Africa's economic growth and development,[60] the literature has paid less attention to questions about the impact of China's investment on local communities, specifically on the social structures related to land and livelihoods.

E. HYPOTHESES

This thesis offers two hypotheses: First, China's land-intensive activities, such as agriculture, mining, and infrastructure projects, displace people from their lands and thus affect their livelihoods. Second, Chinese engagement in Africa, especially Chinese imports to Africa, leads to local people being displaced from jobs and fuels trade and market competition.

The first hypothesis relates to the claim that China's land-intensive activities – for example, agriculture, mining, and infrastructure projects – displace people from their lands. In these activities, both Chinese entities and African governments may seize lands previously controlled by communities. The Zambian Development Agency facilitates land acquisition for large scale foreign investment projects.[61] Studies show that there is high-

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[58] Joshua Kurlantzick, *Beijing's Safari: China's Move into Africa and Its Implications for Aid, Development, and Governance*, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 1–7.

[59] Mushfiq us Swaleheen, "Corruption and Investment Choices: A Panel Data Study," *KYKLOS* 60, no. 4 (2007): 601–16.

[60] Juliet U. Elu and Gregory N. Price, "Does China Transfer Productivity Enhancing Technology to Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Manufacturing Firms," *African Development Review* 22, no. S1 (2010): 587–98.

[61] "Chinese Agricultural Investments in Zambia," ECDPM, accessed March 19, 2020, https://ecdpm.org/great-insights/emerging-economies-and-africa/chinese-agricultural-investments-zambia/.

level, obscure political involvement in acquiring state land where investors obtain questionable land titles. As a result, there is large scale displacement of local communities and indigenous people. For example, when the copper mines were privatized, the Copperbelt land in areas of China was transferred to private corporations who claimed they had legal rights to the land and started forced evictions without considering the livelihood of communities which occupied the land.

Second, China's activities in Africa may cause the displacement of industries and of local people from their jobs, and contribute to unfair trade and market competition. The displacement of jobs is especially likely where China invests in trade and manufacturing activities. Researchers who have studied China's increasing investments reveal that these projects often do not take into consideration the livelihood of the ordinary African.[62] For example, Nadia Abdelghaffar et al. argue that Chinese manufacturing activities and goods may crowd out local manufacturing and dissuade African businesses from investing in their own production, thus removing jobs.

The thesis also examines how, if at all, Chinese actors and African governments are seeking to mitigate these problems for the affected populations. Population displacement associated with development projects poses the most visible risk of loss of land, with additional risks of joblessness, homelessness, food insecurity, and disruption of normal life. Governments should therefore sufficiently protect the displaced by fully compensating them, resettling them, or enacting laws that require companies to compensate landowners and replace lost basic public services.

F. RESEARCH DESIGN

These two hypotheses are tested by researching the impact of China's investments on land displacement and on employment in Zambia. The study explores Zambia because Zambia is China's leading emporter of copper and third-largest recipient of Chinese investments, and because of the availability of data for analysis. Of great importance, China is one of the world's largest consumers and the leading importer of copper from Zambia,

[62] Nadia Abdelghaffar et al., "Leveraging Chinese FDI for Diversified Growth in Zambia," In *The Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Policy Workshop* (Princeton University, 2016), 1–51.

which is one of the major Zambian export commodities. Zambia is also the third largest recipient of China’s investment.[63] Most Chinese investment in Zambia is in mining, especially mining in the Copperbelt province. China Non-Ferrous Mining Co. Ltd. owns both the Chambishi Copper Mine and Smelter. Additional Chinese mines are in Luanshya and Baluba.[64] Other Chinese investments are in agriculture and manufacturing; for example, Chinese corporations own a “multi-facility high tech manufacturing zone in the north of Zambia … and another one in Lusaka.”[65] This thesis investigates how and to what extent Chinese economic activities in Zambia have affected the local people in terms of job losses and land displacement; therefore, a case-study approach is used.

To study the displacement of the local people from their lands, I analyze government policy documents to illuminate the land tenure system, as well as ownership and transfer of land processes, and to understand and evaluate the claims of population displacement due to large-scale land acquisitions as Chinese investments. The analysis looks at different cases of land acquisitions and generates information on issues of concern to local communities in Zambia regarding the displacement of local people from their land and their resettlement, and how these conditions impact on the people’s livelihood.

To examine cases of lost industries and jobs among the local people of Zambia by Chinese firms, as well as the job and market displacement claims, the thesis considers case studies a to understand and evaluate whether Chinese traders are engaged in small and medium businesses that compete with locally owned businesses. The study also examines the effect of manufactured consumer goods from China.

The thesis uses a range of sources including Zambian news sources, government communiques, and reports by international organizations. Sources used were primarily government publications and expatriate sponsored reports, such as those produced by

63 Inyambo Mwanawina, *China-Africa Economic Relations the Case of Zambia* (African Economic Research Consortium, 2008), 1–45.

64 “Zambia Development Agency,” accessed March 19, 2020, http://www.zda.org.zm/.

65 Padraig Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa* (UK, USA: Polity Press, 2016), 201.

Brookings Press on Africa in Focus, the Oakland Institute reports examining land investment deals in Africa, as well as other expert analyses of the incidents.

G. THESIS CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is organized into four additional chapters. Chapter II examines Chinese FDI, official financing, and investments in Zambia. Chapter III discusses systems of land tenure, as well as acquisition and transfer of land to Chinese investors, and investigates cases of land displacement and the impact on local populations in Zambia. Chapter IV explores job displacement claims by Zambians who point to Chinese manufacturing and trade activities as the cause. Chapter V concludes with a discussion of the implications of land and job displacements and provides possible recommendations to improve cooperation between Chinese investors and their host communities.

II. CHINESE FDI, OFFICIAL FINANCING, AND INVESTMENTS IN ZAMBIA

This chapter examines the relationship between China and Zambia, including recent Chinese official financing and foreign direct investment stock. Financing and investment from China has meant significant economic growth for Zambia. This chapter further provides background information on the most important Chinese activities in Zambia mainly in mining, agriculture, manufacturing, and Zambia's exports to China, and imports from China.

A. CHINA-ZAMBIA RELATIONSHIP, 1960–2003

A brief review on the Zambia–China relationship is vital to understand the impacts of Chinese investment activities in Zambia. This section examines the diplomatic and economic relationships between the two countries. Historically, Zambia has had a long-established relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC), beginning on October 29, 1964, just a few days after Zambia's independence from Britain.[66] Prof. Zeng Qiang of the Institute of Asian and African Studies chronologically divides this relationship into three time periods: 1960–1979, 1979–1999, and 1999–2003.[67]

The first epoch from 1960 to 1979 was focused on support to Zambia's independence struggle in 1964, along with China's craving for international recognition and political allies,[68] and on the TAZARA railway line project. Zambia became the beneficiary of one of the biggest Chinese investment projects in Africa, the Tanzania-Zambia railway line built between 1970 and 1976 with an interest free loan worth $406 million.[69] In 1971, during the United Nations debate, Zambia among other African

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[66] Judith Van de Looy and Leo de Haan, "Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?," *Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. Strategic Analysis* 30, no. 3 (2006): 562–75.

[67] Zeng Qiang, *China-Africa Relations since the Introduction of FOCAC* (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, 2007), 1–5.

[68] Van de Looy and de Haan, "Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?," 562–75

[69] See Douglas G. Anglin, *Zambia and Southern Africa Liberation Movements* (Dalhousie University, 1973).

countries played an essential role for China to be admitted, and was in favor of Beijing's "One China" policy and co-sponsored the UN General Assembly ruling to reinstate Mainland China's seat on the Security Council.[70] Agnes Ngoma Leslie notes that during this period, the primary themes were "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence."[71]

The second epoch, from 1979 to 1999, marked the period of major changes in both Zambia and China. In Zambia, this period saw the International Monetary Fund and World Bank sponsor structural adjustment and liberalization programs, while China was emerging from the economic and social chaos from the great Cultural Revolution.[72] China adopted an "open door" policy and reforms prioritizing economic development strategies. In 1991, China initiated a "Going Out" policy targeting Africa, particularly focusing on economic cooperation evidenced by increased contract bidding for infrastructure and direct investments in Africa. The relationship continued on the traditional basis of friendship with a particular focus still on equality and mutual benefit, an emphasis on practical results, non-interference in domestic affairs, and economic development.[73]

The third epoch spanned 1999 to 2003. Before the new millennium, the main pre-occupation of Zambia, like any African country, was wealth creation, peace and stability, economic development, and achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG)—now Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). In the meantime, in October 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) under President Jiang Zemin was introduced.[74] The Secretary General of the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other heads of state from Zambia, Togo, Algeria, and Tanzania, attended. The forum signaled a new

70 Agnes Ngoma Leslie, "Zambia and China: Workers' Protest, Civil Society and the Role of Opposition Politics in Elevating State Engagement," *African Studies Quarterly* 16 (2016), 89–106.

71 Leslie, 89–109.

72 Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 67–90.

73 Van de Looy and de Haan, "Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?" 562–75.

74 Sven Grimm, "The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)-Political Rationale and Functioning," 2012, 1–4.

era of economic relations and China's investments in Zambia.[75] As Chris Alden states, "this regularized structure provides a public setting for celebrating the achievement of the relationship, an opportunity to formulate a raft of economic targets aimed at fostering mutual development interests and policies to match these, as well as a stage to endorse common perspectives on global issues."[76] Furthermore, FOCAC is, officially, a platform for collective consultation presented as a structure of "equal cooperation between China and the 'African friendly countries' that have suffered the ravages of colonialism"[77] and want to be a part of the continuing "spirit of Bandung."[78] In 1955, in Bandung, Indonesia, the first major conference of African and Asian heads of state was convened with an ambitious agenda of "Strengthening South-South cooperation to Promote World Peace and Prosperity."[79] In 2005, the new Asian-African strategic partnership was launched in Bandung to further economic cooperation initiatives by way of the Asian-African Business Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, therefore the Forum meets to "fight together Western hegemony and dominance and establish a new world order."[80] Notable aspects include: the continuing institutionalization of FOCAC and the effect of the institution on Sino-Zambia economic relations and political issues.

B. CHINESE INVESTMENTS SINCE 2003

In December 2003, Ethiopia hosted the second FOCAC ministerial conference. Ministerial conferences meet every three years alternating between China and Africa.[81]

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75 Grimm, 1–4.

76 Chris Alden, "China in Africa: From Engagement to Partnership," Perspectives for a European Security Strategy Towards Asia: Views from Asia, Europe and the U.S. 18 (2011): 149.

77 Mamoudou Gazibo and Olivier Mbabia, "Reordering International Affairs: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation," *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* 1, no. 1 (2012): 51–74.

78 "The Spirit of Bandung," Yale Global Online, accessed August 29, 2020, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/spirit-bandung.

79 CIGH Exeter, "The 'Spirit of Bandung' at Sixty," *Imperial & Global Forum* (blog), May 4, 2015, https://imperialglobalexeter.com/2015/05/04/the-spirit-of-bandung-at-sixty/.

80 Gazibo and Mbabia, "Reordering International Affairs: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation," 51–74.

81 Anshan Li et al., *FOCAC Twelve Years Later: Achievements, Challenges and the Way Forward* (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2012), 18.

During the third FOCAC meeting held in Beijing in 2006, President Hu Jintao officially announced the establishment of economic and trade co-operation zones (ETCZ) that were approved by China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) on the African continent: two in Zambia, two in Nigeria, and one each in Ethiopia, Mauritius, Egypt, and Algeria.[82]

In addition, the policy on the establishment of ETCZs further encouraged more Chinese investors in Africa, leading to 1,217 private Chinese investors by 2013¾ up from only four private investors in 2002, as recorded by MOFCOM.[83] During this period stability, market size, and natural resources became the major concerns in China's policy towards Africa.[84] Nevertheless, in Zambia where economic zones have increased, the government tends to focus on wealth-generating projects and the problem of social dislocation of communities, which according to Leslie, is becoming "a nightmare."[85]

More recently, in 2009, relations between China and Zambia significantly shifted from strong ideological ties to a commercially based partnership.[86] The change in relations is evidenced in Beijing's restructured aid policy and restrictions, where interest-free loans became discounted (concessional) loans and grants were replaced by joint ventures.[87]

1. Official Financing

Official financing is aid from governments of donor countries to low developing countries, which is based on need of the recipient country.[88] The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)**,** categorizes official financing into

[82] Ana Cristina Alves, *Chinese Economic and Trade Co-Operation Zones in Africa: Facing the Challenges* (South African Institute of International Affairs, 2012): 1–4.

[83] Ping Deng, "Outward Investment by Chinese MNCs: Motivations and Implications," *Business Horizons* 47, no. 3 (2004): 8–16.

[84] Wenjie Chen, David Dollar, and Heiwai Tang, "Why Is China Investing in Africa? Evidence from the Firm Level," *The World Bank Economic Review* 32, no. 3 (2018): 610–32.

[85] Leslie, "Zambia and China: Workers' Protest, Civil Society and the Role of Opposition Politics in Elevating State Engagement," 89–106.

[86] Anne Welle-Strand and Kristian Kjøllesdal, "Foreign Aid Strategies: China Taking Over?," 2010: 3–5.

[87] Van de Looy and de Haan, "Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?, " 562–75.

[88] "AidData," TUFF Glossary, accessed September 5, 2020, https://www.aiddata.org/pages/tuff-glossary.

official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF).[89] OECD defines ODA as "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries."[90] OECD defines Other Official Flows (OOF) as "official sector transactions that do not meet ODA criteria. OOF include: grants to developing countries for representational or essentially commercial purposes, official bilateral transactions intended to promote development, but having a grant element of less than 25%; and, official bilateral transactions, whatever their grant element, that are primarily export-facilitating in purpose."[91]

As China is not a member of OECD, it does not conform to the definitions of aid and assistance established by the OECD. The AidData researchers in their efforts to track aid flows used the Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology to collect data for Chinese official finance from government agencies, which include ministries and Chinese embassies; provincial governments; the China Development Bank; and the China Export-Import Bank.[92] The researchers analyzed Chinese official finance projects from 2000 to 2014 and grouped them in accordance with the OECD definitions of ODA and OOF. Officially financed projects which lack sufficient information to definitively be classified as either ODA-like or OOF-like are tagged as vague official finance (VOF) projects.[93]

As shown in Figure 1, Chinese official financing to Zambia totaled approximately $3.97 billion across 95 projects between 2000 and 2014.

89 "Official Development Assistance (ODA) - OECD," accessed August 29, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm.

90 "Official Development Assistance (ODA) - OECD."

91 OECD, "Other Official Flows (OOF)," 2020, http://data.oecd.org/drf/other-official-flows-oof.htm.

92 Austin Strange et al., "Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) Methodology, Version 1.3," *Williamsburg, VA: AidData*, 2017: 6–8.

93 AidData Research and Evaluation Unit, "Geocoding Methodology, Version 2.0.2" (AidData at William & Mary, 2017), https://www.aiddata.org/geoquery-datasets/chinatotal-geocodedresearchrelease-level1-v1-1-0.



Figure 1. Percentage distribution of number of projects under Chinese official financing, 2000–2014.[94]

Across the country, 82 percent of Chinese official financing went to 78 ODA projects, which is significant given high interest rates and cost over time to Zambia. In addition, 8 percent went to eight OOF projects and 10 percent went to VOF projects, which is notable in that the specifics of this project data are not publicly available. By flow class, projects in Zambia made up 4.4 percent of China's total global official financing to sub-Saharan Africa with 2,169 projects. In addition, of the $3.97 billion in Chinese official financing to Zambia, approximately $3.34 billion facilitated ODA projects accounting for 84 percent, approximately $195 million facilitated OOF projects taking 5 percent of the total finance share and approximately $420 million facilitated VOF projects accounting for 11 percent of the vague finance share, as shown in Figure 2.[95]

94 Axel Dreher et al., "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset," 2017: 5–12.

95 Dreher et al., 5–12.



Figure 2. Aid share in categories of Chinese official financing in $millions, 2000–2014.[96]

Chinese official financing in Zambia from 2000 to 2004 was the only Chinese aid, which changed in 2005 when VOF took a larger share as compared to ODA when the country was in debt due to famine, instability, and drought. Hence, Zambia probably acquired more Chinese vague official finance to rectify these irregular cycles.[97]

In 2008, there was no type of Chinese official financing allotted to Zambia, in part due to the global financial crisis, yet in 2007 and 2010, Zambia received almost 80 percent of Chinese official financing in terms of other official finance that accrues a higher interest rate as compared to aid (ODA). The change in financing terms was due to the Chinese government launching an economic recovery plan that encouraged foreign investment and

96 Dreher et al., 5–12

97 Anandita Philipose, "Policy Implications of Droughts and Food Insecurity in Malawi and Zambia (7-3)," *Case Studies in Food Policy for Developing Countries: Domestic Policies for Markets, Production, and Environment* 2 (2018): 161.

Sino-Zambia mining cooperation agreements and deals setting up joint economic zones, respectively.[98] In contrast, during 2014, Chinese official financing was only ODA as shown in Figure 3, probably because of the uncertain political situation in Zambia due to the death of the Zambian president, which could have discouraged investors.[99]



Figure 3. Chinese official financing in Zambia, 2000–2014.[100]

2. Sector Breakdown

Chinese official financing is categorized across 17 separate sectors, as shown in Table 1.

98 Deborah Bräutigam and Tang Xiaoyang, "African Shenzhen: China's Special Economic Zones in Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 1 (2011): 27–54.

99 Sam Phiri, "Political Dis-Empowerment of Women by ICTs: The Case of the Zambian Elections," in *Overcoming Gender Inequalities through Technology Integration* (IGI Global, 2016), 54–67.

100 Dreher et al., "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset," 5–12.

Table 1. Chinese official financing in Zambia by sector, 2000–2014.[101]

Sector	# of projects	Total funding	% finance Share
Action relating to debt	3	$ 259,000,000.00	6.54
Agro business	3	$ 10,816,346.83	0.27
Communications	7	$ 56,128,736.04	1.42
Food security aid	1	$ 1,000,000.00	0.03
Education	7	$ 14,775,094.95	0.37
Emergency response	3	$ 650,000.00	0.02
Energy generation and supply	6	$ 1,907,450,000.00	48.16
General budget support	2	$ 26,677,589.10	0.67
Government and civil society	11	$ 43,391,644.16	1.10
Health	24	$ 213,382,016.57	5.39
Industry, mining, construction	1	$ 76,000,000.00	1.92
Other multi-sector	3	$ 68,431,138.54	1.73
Other social infrastructure and services	8	$ 129,125,428.03	3.26
Trade and tourism	1	$ 45,800,000.00	1.16
Transport and storage	10	$ 1,068,499,000.00	26.98
Unallocated / unspecified	3	$ 29,623,843.08	0.75
Water supply and sanitation	1	$ 10,033,312.69	0.25
Grand Total		**$ 3,960,784,149.98**	**100.00**

When distributed by percentage of total funds, the majority of China’s portfolio was allocated to energy generation and supply (48 percent), transport and storage (26 percent), action relation to debt (6.5 percent), and health (5.4 percent). On the other hand, this analysis shows that the health sector had the largest number of projects,[102] followed by government and civil society[103] and transport and storage.[104]

Differences in percentage distribution of total funding and the frequency of projects in each sector can be explained by the nature of each sector. The energy generation and supply sector and transport and storage sector consist mostly of OOF projects that include significant outlays for energy projects like the Kariba North Bank Extension project,[105]

[101] Dreher et al., 5–12.

[102] Deborah Brautigam and Jyhjong Hwang, *China-Africa Loan Database Research Guidebook* (Washington, DC: China Africa Research Initiative, Johns Hopkins University, 2016), 10–25.

[103] Ian Taylor, *China’s New Role in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 30–34.

[104] Chen, Dollar, and Tang, “Why Is China Investing in Africa? Evidence from the Firm Level.” 610–632.

[105] Deborah Brautigam and Jyhjong Hwang, “Great Walls over African Rivers: Chinese Engagement in African Hydropower Projects,” *Development Policy Review* 37, no. 3 (2019): 313–30.

which are massive construction contracts for resource deals.[106] The health sector, which has the largest number of projects in Zambia, receives ODA, which fits the traditional profile of aid.

3. Foreign Direct Investment

FDI is an investment made by a firm or individual in one country into business interests located in another country.[107] While official financing is concessional and non-concessional funding that developed countries provide to economically disadvantaged countries with development, commercial or representational intent.[108] The OECD reveals that official financing can improve investment environment and thus promote FDI.[109]

By the amount received, Zambia is among the African countries that attract a significant share of Chinese FDI, apart from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan.[110] Generally, FDI takes place when an investor establishes foreign business operations or acquires foreign business assets in a foreign company. Most Chinese companies are urged to invest in Zambia for quicker access to new markets, and FDI is one of the means to secure a supply of resources, get around import quotas, convey managerial and technological capabilities, and pursue and gain political goals.[111] Most FDI-related statistics are retrieved from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS-CARI) on Chinese Investments in Africa database.[112] By 2014, Zambia represented 13.27 percent of Chinese FDI because of its resource abundance and its political stability,

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106 Ana Cristina Alves, "China's 'Win-Win'Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of Infrastructure-for-Resources Deals in Africa," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 20, no. 2 (2013): 207–26.

107 OECD, "Foreign Direct Investment Statistics Explanatory Notes" (OECD, 2008), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI-statistics-explanatory-notes.pdf.

108 "AidData, TUFF Glossary."

109 "Foreign Direct Investment for Development" (OECD, 2002), https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf.

110 Peter J. Buckley, Jeremy Clegg, and Chengqi Wang, "The Impact of Inward FDI on the Performance of Chinese Manufacturing Firms," *Journal of International Business Studies* 33, no. 4 (2002): 637–655.

111 Buckley, Clegg, and Wang, 637–655.

112 Brautigam and Hwang, *China-Africa Loan Database Research Guidebook*, 10–25.

enabling China's strong influence in investment decisions by the SOEs.[113] Furthermore, the significant level of Chinese investment is strongly correlated with privatization of Zambian copper mines, which has allowed Chinese firms to get more involved in mining projects, manufacturing operations, and physical construction of Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ).[114]

According to the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University's SAIS-CARI data on China-Africa FDI, the stock of Chinese FDI in Zambia grew from $143.7 million in 2003 to $3523.02 million in 2018, as shown in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Chinese FDI stock in Zambia (US$million), 2003–2018.[115]

Chinese FDI stock in Zambia consistently increased over the period, an indication of an excellent market size, natural resources, and political stability. Notably, Chinese investors were not concerned about property rights in African countries apart from ensuring

[113] Roland Wall et al., "The State of African Cities 2018: The Geography of African Investment," *United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations*, 2018: 128–172.

[114] Stuart John Barton, "Sino-Substitution: Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Zambia," *Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies*, 2014, 90–109.

[115] Brautigam and Hwang, *China-Africa Loan Database Research Guidebook*, 5–35.

that the political regimes in which it invested remained in power in order to maximize Chinese returns.

On the other hand, Chinese FDI flow in Zambia did not consistently increase in from 2003 to 2018, with a few notable exceptions (see Figure 5).



Figure 5. Chinese FDI flow in Zambia (US$million), 2003–2018.[116]

The drop in Chinese FDI flow in 2009 and 2010 may have been as a result of the global financial crisis, implying Zambia felt the effects of the investment slow-down as China shifted her economic focus to responding to the crisis. Chinese FDI flow in Zambia drastically dropped in 2015 by 77.3 percent, probably due to a transition in political leadership brought about by the change of government. The flow recovered in subsequent years thanks to the pledge of an investment boost from the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation by President Xi Jinping in December 2015. In the event, the China-Africa Development Fund Co. (AFDF) and China Nonferrous Metal Mining Corp. (CNMC) special agreement was signed between Zambia and China on March 8, 2016. Additionally,

116 Brautigam and Hwang, 5–35.

the China-Zambia Agricultural Technical Demonstration Centre was established, among others.

Notably, most local professionals and firms are unable to compete with the Chinese and Indians, mainly because of inadequate resources and capacity, meaning they lost some contracts to foreign investors—for example, the Zambian army's uniforms, which are currently produced in China.[117]

4. Sector-Specific Projects and Investments

The main sectors in which China has investments are shown as follows:

a. Mining Investments

Mining investment is of economic and political value to both Zambia and China: Zambia produces almost 60 percent of Africa's copper, and copper exports amount to 40 percent of Zambia's total exports. By contrast, China leads in copper consumption and demand is rapidly increasing.[118] The privatization of the Zambian mining sector triggered massive Chinese FDI in that sector, providing Chinese companies better control over a considerable copper resource supply. According to Dominik Kopiński and Andrzej Polus, "Chambishi mine is China's largest and first overseas nonferrous metal mine, and since the acquisition of the shares, the Chinese group has invested more than US$150 million to put the mine back into production."[119] Other mining operations in the Konkola Copper Mines, Kanshanshi Copper Mining, and Mopani Copper Mines have increased the bulk of copper production in Zambia.

Furthermore, Chinese mining companies like Non-Ferrous Company Africa (NFCA), a producer of copper concentrates, are owned by Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines investment holdings (ZCCM-IH 15 percent and China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Group (CNMC 85 percent). Similarly, Chinese state-owned Jinchuan Group, a nickel

[117] Ina Eliassen, "Chinese Investors–Saving the Zambian Textile and Clothing Industry," 2012, 20–22.

[118] Dan Haglund, "In It for the Long Term? Governance and Learning among Chinese Investors in Zambia's Copper Sector," *The China Quarterly* 199 (2009): 627–46.

[119] Dominik Kopiński and Andrzej Polus, "Sino-Zambian Relations:'An All-Weather Friendship' Weathering the Storm," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29, no. 2 (2011): 181–92.

mining company and shareholder with Albidon's Minali Nickel Mine, taking a lion's share of 50.4 percent, and Collum Coal Mine[120] have undoubtedly encouraged financial inflows and increased mine production outputs leading to improvements in exports and earnings.[121]

b. Agricultural Investments

Chinese actors have also invested heavily in the agricultural sector on the African continent at both small and large scale.[122] Meine Pieter Van Dijk revealed that since China is looking for cheap food from Africa, China's state farms have invested heavily in the agricultural sector in Zambia. Chinese enterprises dealing in agriculture include state-sponsored commercial farms and individual businesses owned by Chinese migrants who came to Africa as business entrepreneurs or former employees of Chinese SOEs.[123] Most SOEs expanded their activities in Zambia to capture markets, for example Chobe Agrivision farm¾ the largest of China's state-owned farms¾ occupies approximately more than 4,200 hectares of land.[124] China's state-owned Agribusiness Corporation (Group) Co. Ltd. (CSFAC), which includes Jhonken Friendship Farm, occupies 667 hectares, Jhonken Estates Ltd occupies 3,573 hectares,[125] and China Zambia Friendship farm occupies more than 2,600 hectares, worth more than US$2.9 million.[126] These farms produce livestock, cereals, vegetables, and fruits for both export and domestic consumption.

[120] Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations: A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia, 15–20.

[121] John Sutton and Gillian Langmead, *An Enterprise Map of Zambia*, vol. 4 (International Growth Centre in association with the London Publishing, 2013): 184-87.

[122] Meine Pieter Van Dijk, *The New Presence of China in Africa* (Amsterdam University Press, 2009): 166–69.

[123] Van Dijk, 165–69.

[124] "Chinese Agricultural Investments in Zambia." 46–48.

[125] Xiaoyun Li, Qi Gubo, and Tang Lixia, Agricultural Development in China and Africa: A Comparative Analysis (Routledge, 2012), 316.

[126] Kragelund, "6 State-Driven Chinese Investments in Zambia," 2009, 130–136.

c. Manufacturing Investments

In the manufacturing sector, China has invested in textiles and clothing, steel, chemicals, and electrical and electronics products, and in doing so, has expanded and acquired ownership and control of former African state corporations. For example, in Zambia, Chinese Quingdao Textile Corporation owns 66 percent of the shares of Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles, and a large share of a group of companies that produces an assortment of building materials, chandeliers, and melamine kitchenware. In 2016, Marcopolo Tiles Chinese Company invested more than US$35 million to increase their tile production. Other manufacturing investments of note include China Henan International Cooperation Group Co. Ltd., the Mulungushi Cotton and Cooking Oil Co. Ltd., and Chipata China Cotton Company. Manufacturing joint ventures with Chinese firms has allowed integration of Zambian companies into global and regional corporate structures and trade. In support of these ventures, the China-Africa Development Fund has invested a total of US$10 billion since 2006 to finance Chinese companies in Africa engaged in manufacturing of products such as transformers, trucks, chemicals, air conditioners, refrigerators, and television sets, among others, to raise Africa's exports.[127]

d. Import of Chinese Products and Trade Investments

In addition to the aforementioned investments, trade between Zambia and China is increasing almost daily. Matthias Busse et al. suggest that economic linkages between China and Zambia have already made China Zambia's largest trading partner within a short time, as compared to other developed countries.[128] In 2018, according to World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), developed by the World Bank, exports to China accounted for 14.4 percent of Zambia's total exports (see Table 2) and amounted to US$1,308 million, compared to US$381 million in 2008, representing a 70.8 percent increase over a period of ten years.

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127 "State Council."

128 Busse, Erdogan, and Muhlen, "China's Impact on Africa – The Role of Trade, FDI and Aid." 6–10.

Table 2. Zambia's exports to China[129]

Product Description	**Export (US$ Thousand)**		**% of world**
	China	**World**	
Capital goods	1767.74	182670.68	0.97
Consumer goods	20265.78	794224.69	2.55
Intermediate goods	1232123.97	7694232.89	16.01
Raw materials	51255.63	372405.9	13.76
Animal	162.38	26401.51	0.62
Chemicals	1088.4	365139.05	0.30
Food products	26497.57	434805.94	6.09
Footwear	0	1841.24	0
Fuels	0	92664.4	0
Hides and skins	733.04	6093.36	12.03
Mach. and elec.	1737.98	167340.05	1.04
Metals	1239187.96	7065971.63	17.54
Minerals	20541.51	223138.89	9.21
Miscellaneous	667.34	12214.29	5.46
Plastic or rubber	38.02	26831.72	0.14
Stone and glass	2040.5	220262.51	0.93
Textiles and clothing	1461.81	55733.12	2.62
Transportation	54.68	35922.78	0.15
Vegetables	3197.28	110060.16	2.91
Wood	10401.11	207744.14	5.01
Total	1307809.58	9052164.77	14.45

Total exports for Zambia stood at US$9.05 billion in 2018. The five main contributors to export growth include metals consisting of refined copper and cobalt, intermediate goods like cotton, raw materials, hides and skins, and minerals. Zambia's imports from China are smaller compared to its exports to China (see Table 3), which amounted to US$1,291 million as of 2018, though there has been a rapid growth to US$92 million in 2006 from US$6 million in 1998.[130]

[129] Source: WITS, "Zambia - Product Exports and Imports by World, 2018," WITS Data, accessed June 29, 2020, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZMB/Year/2018/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/WLD/Product/all-groups#.

[130] Inyambo Mwanawina, "China-Africa Economic Relations: The Case of Zambia," 2008: 16–20.

Table 3. Zambia's imports from China[131]

Product Description	Import (US$ Thousand)		% of world
	China	world	
Capital goods	706749.37	2647473.05	26.70
Consumer goods	249897.8	2555712.26	9.78
Intermediate goods	312135.04	2146379.41	14.54
Raw materials	11415.91	2087261.97	0.55
Animal	9571.99	165285.95	5.79
Chemicals	62954.37	1421877.81	4.43
Food products	2565.6	191172.66	1.34
Footwear	13640.55	33893.06	40.25
Fuels	3433.27	1339757.36	0.26
Hides and skins	1824.34	4321.44	42.21
Machinery and Electrical	575482.65	1974868.5	29.14
Metals	232416.98	688568.77	33.75
Minerals	688.03	1464589.45	0.047
Miscellaneous	55703.15	256395.1	21.73
Plastic or rubber	62863.28	472583.44	13.30
Stone and glass	28415.11	108962.69	26.08
Textiles and clothing	28308.05	136173.84	20.79
Transportation	203590.7	868426.62	23.44
Vegetable	890.78	164646.08	0.54
Wood	8333.81	170216.33	4.90
Total	1290682.66	9461739.09	13.64

Imports from China mainly include: footwear, hides and skins, machinery and electrical products, and stone and glass.

C. CONCLUSION

Over the past two decades, the depth and breadth of the China-Zambia relationship has signaled a new era of economic relations. After the introduction of Forum on China-

[131] Source: WITS, "Zambia - Product Exports and Imports by World, 2018."

Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000, the growing trade relationship was evident given the increase in Chinese FDI, trade and official financing in Zambia. Specifically, from 2000 to 2014 Chinese official financing to Zambia totaled approximately $3.97_billion across 95 projects, mainly in energy generation and supply, transportation and storage, and health.[132] In addition, Chinese investments mainly in mining, agriculture, infrastructure, manufacturing, and trade have drastically increased FDI stock in Zambia.[133] The flow of Chinese FDI in Zambia grew from $ 143.7 million in 2003 to $3.523 billion in 2018.[134] In 2007, China announced more than $15 billion investment in trade financing and infrastructure to Africa, which led to an increase in the number of Chinese business people and technical expertise in Zambia.[135] According to empirical research on Chinese investments in Africa, Zambia is the third largest Chinese FDI recipient in Africa,[136] and the Zambian government describes the influx of Chinese investors as a manifestation of a favorable investment climate. As such, the Zambian government tends to focus more on aid generation, trade, and official financing than on the economic and societal impact of Chinese investments on the African communities.[137]

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132 Bastholm and Kragelund, “6 State-Driven Chinese Investments in Zambia: Combining Strategic Interests and Profits,” 62–67.

133 Olayiwola Abegunrin and Charity Manyeruke, “Zambia’s Bilateral Relations with China,” in *China’s Power in Africa* (Springer, 2020), 115–130.

134 Deborah Bräutigam, “Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How Much?,” in *Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Jane Golley and Ligang Song (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2011), 203–23.

135 Laura German, Davison Gumbo, and George Schoneveld, “Large-Scale Investments in Chitemene Farmland: Exploring the Marginal Lands Narrative in Zambia’s Northern Province,” *QA-Rivista Dell’Associazione Rossi-Doria* 2, no. 2013 (2013): 27.

136 Kragelund, “6 State-Driven Chinese Investments in Zambia,” 2009, 130–136.

137 Jessica M. Chu, “Creating a Zambian Breadbasket:’ Land Grabs’ and Foreign Investments in Agriculture in Mkushi District, Zambia,” 2013, 8–12.

III. ISSUES OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN ZAMBIA

This chapter examines the dynamics surrounding the Zambian people being displaced from their land due to Chinese activities in Zambia. The loss of land to Chinese investors deprives the local people of their vital activities, livelihoods, and productive assets, leaving them impoverished and vulnerable to exploitation..[138] For the majority of rural Zambians, land is the primary resource from which they obtain water and food, and from which they derive shelter and social identity.[139]

To clarify how China is linked with large-scale land acquisitions, this chapter first provides a brief overview of land issues in Zambia. The chapter then discusses systems of land tenure and administration in Zambia, including acquisition and procedures for transfer of land to foreign investors. Finally, this chapter describes large-scale land utilization projects and their associated displacements of populations due to the development of Chinese Multi-facility Economic Zones and mining activities, and their impacts on local livelihoods in Zambia.

A. OVERVIEW OF LAND ISSUES IN ZAMBIA

Land issues in Zambia stem from the government's lack of a clear and comprehensive policy framework for properly regulating land transactions, particularly land on customary tenure where there is no legal document in the form of a title deed to prove ownership. Historically, Zambia has experienced the displacement of people from their land since the 1950s, for example during the construction of the Kariba Dam where more than 57,000 people were displaced.[140] In recent years, the government of Zambia's push to boost economic growth through foreign investments has increased investments in industrial development, mining, agriculture, and the tourism sector. Thus, demand for land

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[138] Bogumil Terminski, "Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social Problem and Human Rights Issue (a Global Perspective)," *SSRN* 2028490 (2012): 1–45.

[139] See Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[140] Jessica Chu, Kathleen Young, and Dimuna Phiri, "Large-Scale Land Acquisitions, Displacement and Resettlement in Zambia," 2015, 2. http://hdl.handle.net/10566/4296.

has grown and is resulting in further displacement of people, especially in rural areas where most of the large-scale land investments such as mining take place.

In 1995, the government of Zambia enacted the Lands Act of 1995 to change the land tenure system to make it more responsive to the new liberal economic policies.[141] The Act allowed approved foreign investors to acquire and own land on leasehold rights. In 1991, Zambia liberalized its economy with an emphasis on improving industrial and agricultural production, with a focus on increasing foreign investments as a source of economic growth.[142] To achieve this objective, key policy and structural reforms were undertaken to further promote and enable foreign investment in the country. The reforms included the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) Act of 2006, which created the ZDA as a one-stop center for investment promotion and facilitation.[143] Since that time, there has been persistent and overwhelming demand for land by both local and foreign investors.[144]

The political and economic reforms coincided with China's "Go out" policy, which actively promotes Chinese investment abroad.[145] As such, Chinese investors, mostly state-owned companies, seized these opportunities very quickly and took advantage of the favorable investment conditions that had been created by the liberalization reforms. Musibau Babatunde has noted that in 1998, China Non-Ferrous Company Africa (NFCA), a subsidiary of state-owned CNMC, purchased Chambishi Copper Mines, "making it China's first overseas non-ferrous mine."[146] Furthermore, in 2006 CNMC expanded its

141 "Lands Act," Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1995, http://www.parliament.gov.zm/node/945.

142 "National Report Zambia," The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development – (Rio+20), Brazil: The Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2012, 39 sustainabledevelopment.un.org/.../988zambia.pdf.

143 "Zambia Development Agency Act," Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2006, http://www.zda.org.zm/?q=content/publications.

144 "Zambia : Government Selling Rural Prime Land to Foreign Nationals in the Name of Farming Blocks.," *LusakaTimes*, sec. Economy, accessed June 24, 2020, https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/09/01/government-selling-rural-prime-land-foreign-nationals-name-farming-blocks/.

145 Stuart John Barton, "Sino-Substitution: Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Zambia," *Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies* 7, no.2 (May 2014): 90–109.

146 Musibau Adetunji Babatunde, "Sino-Africa Investment Relations: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly," *Asia Pacific and Globalization Review* 3, no. 1 (December 2013), 1–23: https://journals.macewan.ca/apgr/article/view/103.

operations and established Chambishi Copper Smelter. In the same period, CNMC undertook to develop MFEZs¾ Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) and Lusaka East-MFEZ near Lusaka international airport.[147]

Many of these activities by corporate actors have been shaped by political considerations, and therefore, in their pursuit of land for investments, Chinese investors prefer to form close working relationships with state institutions rather than direct links with local traditional chiefs.[148] It is in this context that the Chinese became significant competitors with other foreign interests, especially in the mining, manufacturing, and trading sectors¾ and in which Chinese interests in Zambian land became prominent, as their investments require a vast mass of land for greater and effective production.[149]

Because most land in Zambia falls under the customary tenure system, in most cases, Chinese state-owned companies acquire land in customary areas, and land acquisition is facilitated by the ZDA in accordance with the ZDA Act.[150] On behalf of the investors, the government of Zambia, through the ZDA, engages and facilitates all negotiations with traditional chiefs and people living on the considered land to persuade them to relinquish their customary land to the foreign investor.[151] Vlado Vivoda et al. refer to this type of displacement as development induced displacement, "where people are forced to leave their homes due to development projects."[152] Thus, displacements, compensation, and resettlement are organized and executed by the government on behalf of the investor.

[147] Deborah Bräutigam and Xiaoyang Tang, "'Going Global in Groups': Structural Transformation and China's Special Economic Zones Overseas," *World Development*, Economic Transformation in Africa, 63 (November 1, 2014): 78–91, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.10.010.

[148] Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations: A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia, 20–23.

[149] Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, 1–30.

[150] "Zambia's Investor Guide," Government of the Republic of Zambia, Zambia Development Agency, 2016, http://www.zda.org.zm/?q=content/investment-guide-zambia.

[151] "Zambia Development Agency Act."

[152] V. Vivoda, J. Owen, and D. Kemp, Workbook: Applying the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model to Involuntary Resettlement in the Global Mining Sector (South Africa: University of Queensland, Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, Sustainable Minerals Institute, 2017), 1–21.

This phenomenon is not new: in Zambia, development-induced displacements have been taking place since the 1950s. For example, during the British colonial administration, 57,000 people were displaced from their ancestral land to pave the way for the construction of Kariba Dam.[153] According to the Zambia Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development, over 70,000 people in Kabwe and the Copperbelt province in the areas of Luanshya, Kitwe, Mafulira, Kalulushi, Chingola were to be displaced due to mining activities in 2016. Additionally, in 2015, the Zambian government reported that, during the development of the Greenfield mining project in Solwezi district, 570 households were displaced.[154] Moreover, in 2008, during the construction of Lusaka East MFEZ, 247 households were displaced. Overall, from 2010 to 2015, more than 1,000 households were displaced without resettlement due to development projects.[155] As foreign investors need more land for investment, more incidences of displacement will continue to occur, and more communities will be affected if challenges that lead to displacements are not addresses.

B. LAND ADMINISTRATION AND TENURE SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA

Currently, Zambia has two land tenure systems: leasehold tenure, and customary tenure. The Ministry of Lands of the Government of the Republic of Zambia defines leasehold tenure as a system of land holding usually held on land that is known as state land and is regulated by statutes.[156] It is a legal holding of land in Zambia where the occupant is guaranteed right of ownership and security of tenure through a title deed, which is the officially signed document that the Registrar of Lands and Deeds issues to a person as evidence of ownership of the surveyed and demarcated piece of land.

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153 Thayer Scudder, "The Kariba Case Study," no. 1227 (June 2005), https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-151727675.

154 Government of Zambia, "Zambia: National Resettlement Policy" (Office of The Vice President Government of Zambia, 2015), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a8436554.html.

155 Government of Zambia.

156 Ministry of Lands, "Draft Land Administration and Management Policy," Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2006, https://www.mlnr.gov.zm/.

Also, the Ministry of Lands defines customary tenure as “an indigenous form of land holding which is generally communal in character.”[157] The customary tenure system does not guarantee the occupant right of ownership and security of tenure. There is no title deed issued to occupants. Currently while the Zambian constitution recognizes the customary land tenure system, there is no legal provision for the documentation of land in customary areas for adequate protection and assurance of rights of ownership of the individual or community occupying the land. The dual land tenure system – leasehold tenure and customary tenure – presents inequality of land rights among Zambian citizens. Specifically, customary land occupants do not possess title deeds to ascertain land rights and ownership; thus, they are often at risk of losing their land and livelihoods when the government allocates and transfers the land to foreign investors. Under these circumstances, displacement of people from land they have occupied for many generations is seen as violating their rights of land ownership and is considered unfair and unjust.

To illustrate the genesis of the current land tenure system in Zambia, this section first elaborates on the historical context of land administration in Zambia. For centuries, Zambia, like many African countries, had a persistent colonial inheritance of land tenure rights rooted in British law.[158] The Crown Land and Native Reserves Law, Council-in-Order 1928, first introduced the dual land tenure system that is still in place to this day. The order categorized land into Crown land and Native Reserves. Crown land was vested in the British King and was for white settlers’ perpetual occupancy only; acquisition of freeholds or leasehold land rights occupancy was administered by common law.[159] Native Reserves were vested in the British Secretary for territories and were lands for exclusive occupation by the indigenous African people; obtaining individual land rights was prohibited because it was for communal use only. The British used African chiefs to administer Native Reserves, and African customary law applied.[160]

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[157] Ministry of Lands.

[158] Bastiaan Van Loenen, *Land Tenure in Zambia* (Orono, University of Maine, 1999), 1–9.

[159] Van Loenen, 3–8.

[160] Van Loenen, 3–8.

Later the Native Reserves became overcrowded due to more displacements of indigenous people from Crown land. Consequently, in 1947, the British colonial government passed a new law, Trust Land Council-in-Order 1947, which allowed the creation of a third category of land tenure, Trust land.[161] According to Bastiaan Van Loenen, "Trust land was carved out of Crown land"[162] and made available for indigenous people to use, although non-indigenous people could still be granted rights of occupancy on Trust land for a period of 99 years.[163] He goes on to write: "The difference between Trust land and Native Reserves is that the duration of a non-native on Trust land was 99 years … and non-natives could be granted land if this was seen to be in the interest of both races."[164]

In 1964, when Zambia gained independence, the land tenure system was retained, but Crown land was renamed state land and vested in the president rather than the British crown, and its administration and regulation continued under statutory law. Native Reserves and Trust land remained, and the independent Zambian government recognized the role of chiefs in its administration under customary law. The chiefs had the authority to allocate and regulate use of land in their respective chiefdoms and territories. Thus, the new government under President Kaunda "maintained the distinction between state land, and Native Reserves and Trust land."[165]

According to Leonen, in 1975, the Zambian government made constitutional and land policy amendments, and nationalized all land to promote socialist economic policies.[166] The new laws restated that all land in Zambia is vested in the president on behalf of the Zambian people. The vesting of Zambian land in the president meant that all decisions over land had been centralized, and all land transactions required the approval of

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161 Taylor Brown, "Contestation, Confusion and Corruption: Market-Based Land Reform in Zambia," *Competing Jurisdictions: Settling Land Claims in Africa*, 2005, 79–102.

162 Van Loenen, "Land Tenure in Zambia."

163 Van Loenen, 3–8.

164 Van Loenen, 3–8.

165 Brown, "Contestation, Confusion and Corruption: Market-Based Land Reform in Zambia," 83.

166 Van Loenen, "Land Tenure in Zambia," 3–8.

the president. Additionally, the law abolished freehold land, which was converted into leasehold land for a period not exceeding 99 years. Furthermore, Native Reserves and Trust land were merged into one category¾customary land. Moreover, the 1975 land policy abolished and prohibited private land ownership and sale, which fundamentally undermined its marketability. As such land was declared valueless and undesirable because it could not be used as collateral in business transactions.[167] In 1985, another law was enacted to restrict alienation of land to foreign investors, except for charity organizations and presidentially approved investors.[168] Since that time, the dual land tenure system—leasehold and customary—has persisted.

In 1995, the Zambian government enacted the Lands Act to provide better land governance and processes of land allocation to stimulate foreign investments for development because earlier policies on land could not fit the new political and economic environment.[169] The Act provides for the recognition of two categories of land tenure: leasehold, and customary. According to the Zambia Draft Land Policy, 2017, "Leasehold tenure refers to a system where land belonging to one entity (the state) is, by contractual agreement, leased to another entity for a fixed period of time."[170] In Zambia, leasehold provides rights guaranteed by the state, right of ownership, and security of tenure.[171] It permits occupants to invest without fear of being dispossessed if they comply with lease conditions. Leasehold runs for 99 years, and further renewal for another 99 years is possible if there is no breach of conditions in the existing agreement. The leasehold tenure system applies to state land, and it comprises only 6 percent of the land in Zambia. It is the land where major urban areas, economic activities, industries, and commercial farms are located, and is zoned out for use by District Council authorities in their jurisdictions.

167 Van Loenen, 3–8.

168 Brown, "Contestation, Confusion and Corruption: Market-Based Land Reform in Zambia," 84.

169 "Lands Act."

170 Government of Zambia, "Draft National Land Policy" (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, December 2017), 7.

171 "Zambia's Investor Guide," 22–23.

On the other hand, customary tenure refers to the indigenous form of land ownership, and section 7 of the Lands Act of 1995 explicitly provides for the recognition and perpetuation of customary land holdings, stating:

> (1) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of section thirty-two but subject to section nine, every piece of land in a customary area which immediately before the commencement of this Act was vested in or held by any person under customary tenure shall continue to be so held and recognized and any provision of this Act or any other law shall not be so construed as to infringe any customary right enjoyed by that person before the commencement of this Act.
>
> (2) Notwithstanding section thirty-two, the rights and privileges of any person to hold land under customary tenure shall be recognized and any such holding under the customary law applicable to the area in which a person has settled or intends to settle shall not be construed as an infringement of any provision of this Act or any other law except for a right or obligation which may arise under any other law.[172]

The two sections clearly show that the Lands Act recognizes customary land rights; just like the rights that are applicable to leasehold land, they can only be lost to create way for investments that are in harmony with the property acquisition legal obligations for national development. According to the Zambia's Ministry of Lands, customary land comprises approximately 90 percent of all land in Zambia and consists of protected forest areas, wildlife areas, national parks, and game reserves.[173]

Additionally, the 1995 Lands Act made the conversion of customary land to leasehold land possible, by providing for the legal conversion of customary land into leasehold tenure.[174] The act stipulates that land in the customary jurisdiction can be converted to leasehold, and once converted, it cannot revert back to customary tenure.[175] Converting customary land to leasehold land requires the consent of the president in

[172] "Lands Act."

[173] Government of Zambia, "Draft National Land Policy," 17.

[174] "Lands Act."

[175] "Lands Act."

consultation with the local chiefs and district local authorities in the area where the land to be alienated is located.[176] The Lands Act of 1995 states that the president:

> Shall not alienate any land situated in a district or an area where land is held under customary tenure without taking into consideration the local customary law on land tenure ... and without consulting the chief and the local authority in the area in which the land to be alienated is situated.[177]

This statutory framework creates an attractive private land ownership capability favorable to local and foreign investors who wish to have assurance of land rights over land they occupy.[178]

Nevertheless, some studies have contended that the land reforms only benefited foreign investors and elites who have good connections with government.[179] Taylor Brown has argued that few rural-based and poor communities have knowledge of legal land transactions and procedures of conversion of customary land to leasehold as stated in the Lands Act.[180] He noted that the primary purpose of land reforms was to facilitate foreign investment for economic diversification and eventual growth. As such, the Lands Act of 1995 repealed the Lands Act of 1975, which restricted foreigners from owning land, making it easier for foreigners to "acquire land than it had been under the Kaunda regime."[181] Accordingly, both foreign investors and Zambian nationals have to follow the same rules and procedures that govern acquisition and registration of land. For example, the procedures for access to and conversion of customary land to leasehold status are the same for Zambian nationals who are already occupants and for foreigners.

Likewise, the study that Brown conducted between 2002 and 2003 showed that only foreign investors and wealthy elite Zambians had made conversions of customary to

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176 "Lands Act."

177 "Lands Act."

178 "Lands Act."

179 Mweembe Muleya Mudenda, "The Challenges of Customary Land Tenure in Zambia," Shaping the Change, XXIII FIG Congress, Munich, Germany, October 8–13, 2006, 1–11. http://www.fig.net/pub/fig2006/papers/ts50/ts50_03_mudenda_0740.pdf.

180 Brown, "Contestation, Confusion and Corruption: Market-Based Land Reform in Zambia," 88.

181 Brown, 85.

leasehold land.[182] He noted that in many areas, for example, Mwemba and Sinazongwe along Lake Kariba, and chiefdoms like Chief Shankumbila's area, which is west of Lusaka, "foreign investors, successful local shopkeepers, retired civil servants, district-level officials, and chief's relatives"[183] had acquired leasehold title deeds.[184] Brown further explained that foreign investors and elites were able to obtain title deeds because they have the financial means and are knowledgeable of the conversion procedures compared to the rural poor or even average income households who might be willing to gain legal ownership rights to their land but have no financial ability to meet the costs involved in land tenure conversion from customary land tenure to leasehold tenure.[185]

Brown argued that foreign investors have exploited the investment aspect to be granted customary land expeditiously. He contended that the entire normal process is too cumbersome, complicated, and slow for ordinary Zambians. Also, the process involves substantial amounts of money and requires the applicant to make repeated travels to the district headquarters and to the Ministry of Lands in Lusaka, making it very costly for the ordinary Zambian.[186] For example, the process begins with the applicant obtaining consent from the local chief where the land is located. While ordinary Zambians receive land from the chief at no cost, obtaining consent is difficult because the chiefs are unwilling to give consent for free. On the other hand, foreigners and urban elites induce unscrupulous district council officials and chiefs with "gifts" to speed up the process. After the incentives, the tribal chief gives his consent to relinquish the plot of customary land, and the local district council handles the following procedures, including drawing cadastral diagrams and demarcation of the customary land plot appropriate for titling. In a district council meeting, which sits every three months, the council members review the application and give recommendations, before the application is submitted to the Commissioner of Lands in Lusaka to issue a certificate of title for the requested land after

182 Brown, 86–90.

183 Brown, 87–91.

184 Brown, 87–91.

185 Brown, 88–89.

186 Brown, 89.

the applicant has paid the stipulated charges.[187] Although under Zambian law, all land is vested in the president, usually it is the Commissioner of Lands in the Ministry of Lands, who on behalf of the president, makes and executes the issuance of certificate of title for the land.[188] The centralized system of issuing the certificate of title and the lack of mechanisms to discourage agents and officials at the district headquarters and the Ministry of Lands from abuse of office makes it far less likely that a typical Zambian can purchase land.

The ease and speed with which foreign investors are granted land, compared to the difficulties ordinary Zambians encounter, has raised concerns that this excessive foreign land ownership could lead to marginalization of natives and eventually leave them landless.[189] President Edgar Lungu when he was addressing the Zambian nation on the application of Constitutional Values and Principles at the National Assembly of Zambia echoed the same concerns.[190] He directed the revision of the Lands Act and policy to ensure that land ownership is regulated to "avoid foreigners from indiscriminately and illegally buying land."[191]

C. ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF LAND PROCEDURES RELATED TO FOREIGN INVESTORS IN ZAMBIA

Foreign investors can acquire either state land or land in customary areas and hold it under the leasehold tenure system. The Lands Act permits foreigners to acquire land in the following ways:[192]

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187 Government of Zambia, "Draft National Land Policy," 29–31.

188 Government of Zambia, "Draft National Land Policy," 29–31.

189 Government of Zambia, "Draft National Land Policy," 20.

190 "Zambia : Government to Revise Land Act and Land Policy- President Lungu," *LusakaTimes* (blog), accessed July 3, 2020, https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/03/17/government-revise-land-act-land-policy-president-lungu/.

191 "Zambia."

192 "Lands Act."

1. Acquisition of State Land

The government of Zambia has established processes and procedures through which foreign investors can acquire or are allocated land for investment. First, a foreign investor can acquire land through private land market transactions with an already existing leasehold title holder.[193] In this case, when the transaction is completed, the Commissioner of Lands issues a new certificate of title to the investor.[194] The second procedure is where the ZDA Act permits the ZDA to facilitate acquisition and transfer of state land to foreign investors.[195] With this procedure, the investor approaches the ZDA for assistance to identify a suitable area for the proposed investment project. If the ZDA confirms availability of already established state land, the investor submits application forms for land acquisition to the relevant district council to obtain 'State Consent' issued by the Commissioner of Lands. After 45 days of non-response, the application is automatically granted consent. If consent is refused, the reasons for refusal are furnished to the applicant within 30 days. In exceptional cases, to expedite the process the president intervenes by issuing a presidential consent in writing, but in normal situations, a foreign investor registers a company under the Companies Act, with no less than 75 percent of the company shares held by Zambians. After the whole process is successfully completed, and "upon payment, by the investor, of the prescribed fees, charges, or rates,"[196] land is allocated to the investor and a certificate of title is issued to the investor in the name of the registered company with respect to that land.[197]

2. Acquisition of Customary Land

The procedures for foreign investors to acquire land in customary areas start with the process of converting customary to leasehold land. The conversion process requires the potential investor to consult with the local communities, the traditional chiefs, and the district council of the area where the land is located before the Commissioner of Lands

193 "Zambia's Investor Guide," 22–23.

194 "Zambia's Investor Guide," 22–23.

195 "Zambia Development Agency Act."

196 "Zambia Development Agency Act."

197 "Zambia's Investor Guide," 22–23.

allocates and issues a certificate of title to the investor.[198] As mentioned earlier, although the ZDA does not secure land to investors, it is authorized under the ZDA Act to facilitate the process of land identification and conversion.[199] In this case, the investor approaches the ZDA to assist in the search and identification of land for the proposed investment project. When land cannot be found on state land, the land search agents at ZDA conduct a search in customary areas on behalf of the investor. If the foreign investor is satisfied with the ZDA recommended land for the proposed investment project, the ZDA facilitates the conversion process.[200] Some foreign investors, however, prefer to identify the land privately without ZDA help because foreign investors perceive that chiefs could give them land at a lower cost than following ZDA approved process.[201] If the foreign investor relies on the ZDA for help in obtaining land, the ZDA facilitates the conversion process, which requires meeting and negotiating with local people, traditional chiefs, and local district leaders in the areas where the identified land is located.[202]

Notably, the Lands Act of 1995 provides the chiefs with the power to manage the administration of customary land. To acquire customary land, the interested investor must first obtain approval of the area chief.[203] When the chief, in consultation with his community members, agrees to the proposed investment and conversion of customary land to state land, he writes and addresses a letter of consent to the district council. In the letter he specifies the location and size of the land requested for conversion and confirms that the community members have been consulted.[204] After the chief's consent is obtained, the investor submits the application, together with the chief's letter, to the district council land and planning committee. The committee interviews the investor on the proposed

198 "Zambia's Investor Guide," 23.

199 "Zambia Development Agency Act," 31.

200 "Zambia Development Agency Act," 31.

201 Frederic Mousseau and Anuradha Mittal, "Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Zambia," Country Case Study Project Report (Oakland, CA: The Oakland Institute, 2011), 33. https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/understanding-land-investment-deals-africa-zambia.

202 "Zambia Development Agency Act," 31.

203 "Lands Act," 8, 9 ,23.

204 "Lands Act," 8, 9 ,23.

investment and visits the proposed investment project site to survey and draw up plans of the prospective plot or block of land, at the investor's cost.

Upon completion of the district council land and planning committee's necessary procedures and deliberations, the full district council convenes to discuss and approve or reject the request. In case of approval, the district council confirms that alienation of land to the foreign investor does not contravene customary law in the area and recommends conversion of the land to the commissioner of lands, who is responsible for the issuance of certificate of title. After the whole process is successfully completed, and the foreign investors completes payment of charges, and prescribed fees, the land is allocated to the investor and a certificate of title is issued to the investor in the name of the registered company with respect to that land.[205] The piece of land changes from customary to state land (leasehold tenure), and there is no statutory provision that land that has been converted to state land can be reconverted to customary.

In addition, because original state land is almost used up, customary land is increasingly being converted to state land to meet large-scale land-based investment requirements.[206] As such, foreign investors are purchasing large tracts of land in the customary area and converting it to leasehold land with ease. For these reasons, local people fear losing their land, especially because there are no transparent and effective systems in customary land allocation, displacement, and resettlement.[207] Brown has argued that despite the legal provision in the Land Acquisition Act for customary land acquisition, in most cases investors contravene them.[208] He noted that while the Land Acquisition Act prohibits acquisition of customary land without the consent of the people living on the land and the chief's approval, in practice there are several instances of villagers complaining that most of the land deals are done in secrecy without their knowledge. As such, Brown noted that in many cases "long-term occupants of converted

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205 "Zambia's Investor Guide," 22–23.

206 Augustine Mulolwa, "Plan of Action for Strengthening Land Administration in Zambia" (PASLA_Zambia, May 2006): 21.

207 Mudenda, "The Challenges of Customary Land Tenure in Zambia" 4–9.

208 Brown, "Contestation, Confusion and Corruption: Market-Based Land Reform in Zambia," 98.

land have been forced to resettle or have found themselves transformed into 'squatters' overnight."[209]

As a result, these unrepresented rural residents end up surrendering their fertile and resource rich land, becoming landless and facing serious negative impacts. When villagers voice their grievances for lack of consultation, they are often threatened with eviction by powerful and influential political cadres, government land agents from the Ministry of Lands, and sometimes traditional chiefs.[210] Political and economic interests that political cadres and government officials in charge of land administration have in a potential investor determine the government's response to the local people's concerns.[211] These interests range from the politician's desire to retain political supremacy in his constituency to positioning of development projects in specific regions.

D. LARGE-SCALE LAND UTILIZATION AND DISPLACEMENT OF LOCAL POPULATIONS

This section discusses two cases of large-scale land acquisitions and their outcomes in relation to communal displacements and government responses. First, the section elaborates on involuntary displacements caused by MFEZs. The ZDA defines MFEZs as "special industrial zones for both export-oriented and domestic-oriented industries."[212] Second, this section expounds on mining activities in customary areas that have resulted in involuntary displacements of households lacking legal rights to land they have occupied for generations.

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[209] Brown, 90.

[210] Kerstin Nolte, "Large-Scale Agricultural Investments under Poor Land Governance Systems: Actors and Institutions in the Case of Zambia" (GIGA Working Papers, 2013): 20–24.

[211] Brown, "Contestation, Confusion and Corruption: Market-Based Land Reform in Zambia," 94–100.

[212] Zambia Development Agency. "Multi-Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ)." accessed June 24, 2020, http://www.zda.org.zm/?q=content/multi-facility-economic-zone-mfez.

1. MFEZs

There are two Chinese developed MFEZs in Zambia: the Chambishi MFEZ and the Lusaka East Multi-facility Economic Zone (LE-MFEZ).[213] Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone Development Ltd, a subsidiary of CNMC, developed and controls the two zones. Both are known to have contributed to population displacement.[214] The displacement of people to pave way for the development of the MFEZs led to substantial loss of farmland, disrupted food production, and discontinued sufficient food supply for households. Moreover, the displacement caused economic deprivation through loss of sources of income such as sand excavation, small-scale trading, and charcoal production.

In 2009, the government of Zambia commissioned the first MFEZ, Chambishi MFEZ, which is in "Chambishi, Kalulushi, Copperbelt Province, and covers an area of 41 km^2 with 11.58 km^2 planned."[215] Chambishi MFEZ is situated on 1,158 hectares of land with a lease of 99 years in the Chambishi mine area controlled by NFCA, a subsidiary of CNMC. Many people migrated from rural and other urban areas to take jobs in the Copperbelt before the collapse of the mining industry, which started in the mid-1970s.[216] At that time, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines controlled and managed the Copperbelt land, permitting former workers to settle and farm on the land for alternative livelihood activities.[217] During the sale and privatization of the mines in 1998, the prospective investors demanded that the land be handed over to them unencumbered.[218] Prior to the NFCA takeover, ZCCM had offered free education and health services to the local

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213 CNMC. "Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone Development Ltd.," accessed July 24, 2020. http://www.cnmc.com.cn/zccz/detailentem.jsp?column_no=071005&article_millseconds =1355729162671.

214 Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations: A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia, 20–23.

215 CNMC, "Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone Development Ltd," accessed July 6, 2020, http://zccz.cnmc.com.cn/detailentem.jsp?column_no=071005&article_millseconds =1355729162671.

216 Austine Ng'ombe, The Role of Grassroots Organisations in Fostering Local Communities' Access to Land, Lessons from the Copperbelt and North Western Provinces of Zambia (Oxford, UK: Oxford Brookers University, 2008), 4–9.

217 Ng'ombe, 4–9.

218 Robin Palmer, "Land Tenure Insecurity on the Zambian Copperbelt, 1998: Anyone Going Back to the Land?," *Social Dynamics* 26, no. 2 (2000): 154–70.

communities, constructed roads, provided accommodations, and many other development-related benefits, including houses to former miners for permanent settlement.[219] Under the NFCA, however, the mining communities have not been provided the same welfare services, and most of them have resorted to farming on former ZCCM land to bolster their incomes and sustain their livelihoods.[220] Yet when the government considered evictions without compensation or resettlement of the population, it became a politically sensitive issue, and evictions were temporarily halted.[221] In 2011, however, NFCA again asked farmers and settlers to vacate the land, but was not willing to compensate or resettle them. According to a study done by Schoneveld et al., NFCA evicted an entire village without resettlement, and the Kalulushi district administration carried the burden of resettling the displaced community.[222]

In addition, NFCA bought the adjoining Mukulumpe estate, a large defunct commercial farm that had many residents, but the company was not prepared to resettle or compensate displaced communities.[223] The researchers interviewed Kalulushi District Council leaders who alleged that NFCA insisted it was not responsible for the resettlement of displaced communities. As a result, the district leadership took responsibility to resettle its people in Luano forest reserve.[224] According to Zambian analyst Paul Shalala, 2,000 people were settled in Ichimpe forest and are now demanding the Kalulushi Municipal Council issue them permanent residential plot permits to prevent further eviction by

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219 Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, “For Whom the Windfalls,” *Winners & Losers in the Privatisation of Zambia’s Copper Mines*, (Lusaka, Zambia: Research Report, 2007), 29. https://sarpn.org/documents/d0002403/Zambia_copper-mines_Lungu_Fraser.pdf.

220 John Lungu, “Copper Mining Agreements in Zambia: Renegotiation or Law Reform?,” *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 117 (2008): 403–15.

221 Palmer, “Land Tenure Insecurity on the Zambian Copperbelt, 1998: Anyone Going Back to the Land?” 162–170

222 Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations: A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia, 22.

223 Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, 22.

224 Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, 22.

Chinese investors.[225] Moreover, 67 farmers from Lukoshi area in Chambishi accused NFCA of destroying their farms and crops, which affected the continued supply of food for the households, adversely impacting their livelihoods and food security.[226]

The second MFEZ is Lusaka East Multi-facility Economic Zone (LE-MFEZ), located near Lusaka International Airport; it covers an area of 5.70 square kilometers.[227] It is also operated and controlled by ZCCZ. The zones are managed and developed by CNMC, a Chinese SOE.[228] According to the Office of the Vice President of Zambia, during the development of the LE-MFEZ, 247 households were displaced.[229] This development project deprived the households of food and water supplies, and caused their loss of income. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) conducted a study for the government of Zambia on the establishment of MFEZs in Lusaka, and issued the subsequent MFEZ Master Plan Development Study Report, which showed that the social and economic situations of the local population living on the proposed sites would be affected. According to the report, "The survey found that all persons would lose their structures or croplands. The majority of the population engaged in agriculture for self-consumption and partly sales as well as charcoal production, petty trading, and livestock raising."[230]

Therefore, JICA's report recommended that the developer of the MFEZ, in collaboration with the local people, either find an alternative resettlement area and prepare it for resettling the affected displaced people or compensate them in cash for housing and

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225 Paul Shalala, "The Zambian Analyst: Over 2,000 Ichimpe Forest Settlers Sue Kalulushi Council over Land," *The Zambian Analyst* (blog), October 1, 2015, https://paulshalala.blogspot.com/2015/10/over-2000-ichimpe-forest-settlers-sue.html.

226 Angel Mondoloka, "Approaches to Supporting Local and Community Development," *Extractive Industries*, 2017, 611.

227 CNMC, "Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone Development Ltd."

228 CNMC.

229 Government of Zambia, "Zambia: National Resettlement Policy," 2015, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a8436554.html.

230 JICA, "Master Plan Development Study on Establishment of Multi Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ)," accessed May 23, 2020. https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/archive/pro_asia/zambia_3.html.

other developmental structures that would be destroyed.[231] According to the Office of the Vice President, Government of Zambia, the displaced people were neither resettled nor compensated.[232] The Office of the Vice President reports that the resettlement process was hampered due to lack of a comprehensive policy and legal framework to guide the resettlement of displaced persons affected by development projects.[233] As a result, the local people felt that they had been disregarded and had lost control over their source of livelihood and wellbeing, and the resources they owned. Vivoda et al. have witten that the loss of land and subsequent marginalization put the people at a disadvantage in contributing to decisions that impact the development of their community.[234]

2. Mining Licenses

Mining activities require large tracts of land and may lead to the displacement of many people. The displaced people risk losing productive land, employment opportunities, social services, social networks, sources of income, and exposure to vector-borne and parasitic diseases.[235] George Schoneveld et al. have reported that Chinese mineral prospecting in Zambia is rapidly expanding.[236] In the Zambian mining sector, there are seven Chinese companies with active large-scale mining licenses, and more than 14 others with active large-scale mining exploration licenses,[237] which have resulted in population displacement, inadequate resettlements, and little or no compensation for their lost land.[238] The exploration area covers a total of 2,282,039 hectares of land, and active large-scale

[231] JICA.

[232] Government of Zambia, "Refworld | Zambia."

[233] Government of Zambia, "Refworld - Zambia."

[234] Vivoda, Owen, and Kemp, "Applying the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model to Involuntary Resettlement in the Global Mining Sector," 6–8.

[235] Vivoda, Owen, and Kemp, 6–8.

[236] Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations: A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia, 23–25.

[237] Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, 6–8.

[238] M. B. Rapanyane, "An Afrocentric Analysis of the Successes and Failures of Chinese Companies in the Application of Corporate Social Responsibility in Zambia's Mining Sector," *African Renaissance* 17, no. 1 (2020): 55–73.

mining covers a total area of 78,606 hectares, as shown in Table 4, most of which is customary land, which means that the people living on the land had to be displaced.

Table 4. Active large-scale mining licenses allocated to Chinese companies[239]

Company	**location**	**Area (in ha)**
Albidon Zambia	Copperbelt, Luanshya	24,806.3
Albidon Zambia	Copperbelt, Kalulushi, Kitwe	24,056.6
Chambishi Copper Smelter	Copperbelt, Luanshya	6.7
Jin Ding Mining	Copperbelt, Kitwe	2,870.4
Luanshya Copper Mines	Copperbelt, Kitwe	6,020.7
Luanshya Copper Mines	Copperbelt, Kalulushi, Kitwe	4,294.6
Luanshya Copper Mines	Copperbelt, Chingola, Kalulushi, Kitwe, Mufulira	163.3
Luanshya Copper Mines	Southern, Sinazongwe	116.6
Luanshya Copper Mines	Southern, Siavonga	86.6
Luanshya Copper Mines	Copperbelt, Chingola	60.0
Luanshya Copper Mines	Copperbelt, Luanshya	53.3
NFC Africa Mining		10,703.4
NFC Africa Mining	Central, Mumbwa	5,193.8
NFC Africa Mining		96.8
Sino-Metals Leach Zambia	North-Western, Solwezi	23.4
Zhonghui Mining Industry Zambia	Central, Mumbwa, Matala	53.4

The underlying gaps in the land tenure and administration system, and several flaws in the legal framework exacerbate the displacement situation. For example, in a study conducted by Jessica Chu and Phiri Dimuna, in Zambia, it was established that the legal provisions to protect local communities' tenure rights are inadequate.[240] Chu and Dimuna also noted that there is insufficient community participation in displacement and resettlement decisions.[241] In addition, the quality of life of the local people after resettlement is appalling, as they are moved to areas with no infrastructure. The transfer of locals to places without adequate public services occurs because Zambia generally lacks adequate compensation and resettlement policies and has a weak legal framework for

[239] Adapted from Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations: A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia, 17.

[240] Jessica, Chu, and Phiri, Dimuna. *Large-scale land acquisitions in Zambia: Evidence to inform policy*. Research Report 50 (Cape Town, South Africa: University of the Western Cape,2015), 1–5.

[241] Chu and Dimuna, 1–5.

helping locals obtain legal redress.[242] Similarly, Laura German et al. have noted that although most land transactions and acquisitions in Zambia are not illegal, they often bypass the local administration for consultation and participation, presenting a number of governance issues through the lack of adequate legal frameworks.[243] As such, there have been disputes between Chinese investors and local communities in several areas, and numerous households have been displaced from their lands without any redress; details of several cases are provided in the following paragraphs.

3. Jinchuan Nickel Mine

The displacement of Zambians' from their land is increasing due to growing foreign investor interest in the land for mining projects. Mining prospects require large tracts of land, and most of it is in customary areas.[244] In 2007 a nickel mining company owned and run by China's state-owned Jinchuan and Australia-listed Albidon in Mazabuka district collided with the local population over relocation.[245] The mine required 500 hectares of land in addition to 1,600 hectares that had already been allotted by the district council. Local people bitterly complained that they were not consulted and "forced" to sign documents to relocate. The land deal resulted in the displacement of at least 57 families, affecting their access to water, firewood, and agricultural land for their crops and causing them to be resettled in a water logged area not fit for farming.[246] In addition, an influential resident was bribed (with the gift of a cow and 20 kilograms of maize seed) to leave his farms and the area's councilor and chiefs were corrupted.[247] Joshua Ng'andu, a resident, said that "he was surprised when their councilor, who they had a meeting with where they

[242] Jessica Chu and Dimuna Phiri, "Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Zambia: Evidence to Inform Policy," 2015.

[243] German, Gumbo, and Schoneveld, "Large-Scale Investments in Chitemene Farmland: Exploring the Marginal Lands Narrative in Zambia's Northern Province," 27.

[244] Schoneveld, German, and Gumbo, The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations: A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia, 23–26.

[245] Neo Simutanyi, "Copper Mining in Zambia: The Developmental Legacy of Privatisation," *Institute for Security Studies Papers* 2008, no. 165 (2008): 5–10.

[246] Simutanyi, 5–10.

[247] Simutanyi, 5–10.

had refused to leave, turned around saying they had agreed to move".[248] As a result, the local chief, Chief Naluama confronted Robbie Chizhyuka, the chairperson of the indigenous people's rights association, over resistance to moving.[249] Furthermore, in 2008 Albidon Munali Nickel Mine acquired an additional 5,100 hectares of land, displacing another 125 families.[250] The displaced local population was denied access to the basic natural resource which they depend on for their livelihood.[251]

Likewise, in a study by Lewis Tumbama of displaced and resettled families affected by the nickel mine project, some of the local people revealed that they were resettled far from the main tarred road, which affected their business opportunities to trade with motorists who use the paved road, leading to a reduction in the sale of various agricultural products such as maize, pumpkins, and vegetables.[252] His findings revealed that residents complained of moving long distances and spending more time than needed previously to access markets. For example, one resident reported that "to go to the tarred road to buy something you need to cycle for a long period of time and people wake up as early as 5:00 am just to go and get groceries; many people here miss our old place which was nearer to the road."[253] Another respondent further complained that "this new place is infertile, hilly, and lifeless as a widow, I could not imagine staying in a place like this; it is hard for me to access roads, market shelters, and water points."[254] Consequently, the majority of people who lost land had no alternative site where they could continue growing their own food for consumption. They resorted to non-food related business activities like carpentry and

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248 Simutanyi, 5–10.

249 Simutanyi, 5–10.

250 J. Makupa, "Government Led Resettlement: Experiences in Zambia–Challenges and Lessons Learned," in *Resettlement and Livelihoods Symposium in Kruger National Park, South Africa*, 2014, 20–24.

251 Robby Kapesa, Jacob Mwitwa, and Donald C. Chikumbi, "Social Conflict in the Context of the Development of New Mining Concessions in Zambia," *Southern African Peace and Security Studies* 4, no. 2 (2015): 41–62.

252 Lewis Tumbama, "An Exploration of Lived Experiences of 11 Resettled Families in Mazabuka District, Zambia, by a Nickel Mine Project" (master's thesis, University of Cape Town, South Africa, 2019), 38–39. https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/31302.

253 Tumbama, 38–39.

254 Tumbama, 38–39.

crafts, charcoal burning and selling, hairdressing, and operating as money lenders as a source of income.[255] The impact of the expansion of the mining activities resulted in lost access to social services, food and water insecurity, and social disintegration.

a. Loss of Access to Social Services

Communal displacement results in loss of basic social services such as schools, hospitals, and recreation centers. As they relocate to new places, people find there are no educational and medical centers or such centers are far away, which makes the prospect of children going to school uncertain and compromised. The disruption in children's education occurs because resettlement areas are mostly in forest reserves with no basic social infrastructure. A study by Tumbama showed that there were two schools, Naluama and Mugoto Basic schools, which most children attended before displacement.[256] After displacement in 2008, the Jinchuan Nickle Mine promised to construct new schools, which were completed in 2015. In the interim, the lack of school facilities in the resettlement area greatly affected the children's future prospects and career development as they had no school to attend. Furthermore, the old site had three medical facilities, but by 2015 at most two centers had been constructed in the resettlement area. During the construction of new medical centers, local people complained of increasing cases of illness and disease such as malaria, diarrhea, and cholera that affected their economic productivity. They became most at risk due to poor sanitary facilities and inadequate waste management at the new site, and so they became more vulnerable to diseases and illnesses than they had been before the displacement.[257]

b. Food and Water Insecurity

When local communities are displaced, there is degradation in development activities, which affects food and water availability and supply. Compensation is not enough to rebuild and improve livelihoods of displaced people in relocated areas. A study

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[255] Tumbama, 38–39.

[256] Tumbama, 25.

[257] Tumbama, 58.

by Mwape Mungu showed that because less land was being allocated to displaced people, the number of annual crop harvests has dropped.[258] In addition, the land where the people were relocated is hilly and infertile, which adversely affects food production. In one of the interviews that Mungu conducted, one respondent stated:

> From the time we came here I can never point to any year when I was satisfied with farming. We are even buying maize here. There I used to have 50 bags and when I have not done well it would drop to 40 50-kg bags. But here when you have done well it is 20 bags.[259]

Furthermore, the residents complained about the difficulties of accessing sufficient water for their livestock because the dam that was constructed in the resettlement area is seasonal and contaminated the water which animals cannot drink.[260] This resettlement risk affects the food and water security for the local people, and a reduction in food and animal products results in reduced incomes since there is less surplus for sale, heightening the risk of impoverishment.[261]

c. Social Disintegration

Overall, social and community networks positively correlate with resilience, and help in forming a supportive environment.[262] For example, voluntary associations, kinship groups, interpersonal ties, self-organized mutual service community groups form social capital, which is beneficial and accelerates development of areas.[263] In Zambia, land is a vital factor in the creation of social identity for Zambians; thus, when local people are

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[258] Mwape Mungu, "The Relationship between Mining and Local Community Development" (PhD diss., University of Pretoria, 2017), 113–116. https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/67829.

[259] Mungu, 114.

[260] Mungu, 113–115.

[261] Vivoda, Owen, and Kemp, "Applying the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model to Involuntary Resettlement in the Global Mining Sector," 6–9.

[262] Jennifer G. Cooke, The State of African Resilience: Understanding Dimensions of Vulnerability and Adaptation (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 26.

[263] Vivoda, Owen, and Kemp, "Applying the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model to Involuntary Resettlement in the Global Mining Sector," 6–9.

displaced, social disintegration arises as well as loss of culture.[264] Zambia is mostly a subsistence-based society, so relationships play a big role in enabling people to cope with stress through religious activities, and via a network of friends, neighbors, and relatives who participate during community and family celebrations, like harvest festivals, weddings, and baptisms, as well as intervene to resolve conflicts.[265] Tumbama's study revealed that although the mine authorities resettled residents and provided them access to newly constructed schools, a health center and water supply, the people's relocation was not voluntary, and there are still instances of lost opportunities for social support and evidence of psychological stress.[266] The effects of displacement are reflected through fear and anxiety, fracturing of community, uncertainty, and deficiencies in solutions to common problems. According to Thayer Scudder, social identity losses that displaced and resettled people suffer become a lived experience that impacts their health in the long run;[267] yet, health-impact monitoring, assessments, and evaluation studies are not common in Zambia. Thus, displacement and resettlement procedures should be properly designed and managed to mitigate the risk of fragmenting communities, weakening their community cohesion, and breaking their interpersonal ties.

E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In sum, land in Zambia is an important resource for the local population's sustainable livelihood, and most local Zambian communities depend on land for food production, a sense of belonging, and social security. The findings of this chapter reveal that China's investments in Zambia have affected the livelihoods of the Zambian people who are displaced from their land to make way for Chinese investment projects. The study shows that Chinese investments have led to large scale-land acquisition that has left some

[264] African Union, "Land Policy in Africa: A Framework to Strengthen Land Rights, Enhance Productivity and Secure Livelihoods," *Addis Ababa: African Union and Economic Commission for Africa,* 2009, 8–22.

[265] African Union, 8.

[266] Tumbama, "An Exploration of Lived Experiences of 11 Resettled Families in Mazabuka District, Zambia, by a Nickel Mine Project," 46–51.

[267] Thayer Scudder, "Development-Induced Relocation and Refugee Studies: 37 Years of Change and Continuity among Zambia's Gwembe Tonga," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 6, no. 2 (1993): 123–52.

rural communities landless. As such, most of the people lose their community identity and become vulnerable to increased food insecurity due to reduced agricultural activities. Additionally, the displaced people have inadequate access to social services like education and medical care in resettlement areas. Furthermore, displaced populations are seldom consulted before these displacements occur; thus, they are compensated for less than the actual value of the assets and land they are surrendering. They also fall victim to marginalization as they are less involved in influencing policy and decisions on change of land ownership, which throws new landowners and those that remain in rural communities into potential conflict, since the latter are perceived as squatters.

IV. JOB LOSSES IN ZAMBIA

China's commercial activities in Africa have persistently generated debates and concerns of job losses among local workers. As this chapter will discuss, Chinese corporations prefer to hire Chinese workers instead of hiring local personnel. Furthermore, Chinese traders who import cheap merchandise such as clothing, cookware, footwear, and electrical goods and electronics from China further displace local Zambian traders, who cannot favorably compete with their Chinese counterparts who set up similar and diverse businesses.[268] Moreover, the financial boost many Chinese businesses in Zambia obtain from the Bank of China places them in a better competitive position compared to Zambians, who struggle to obtain financing to start and boost their own businesses.[269] In particular, the experience of NFCA, a Chinese state-owned mining company, and China Hainan Zambia Ltd., raise a host of concerns about the ways that Chinese activities in Africa impact employment opportunities for local populations.

While media interest and scholarly research regarding large-scale Chinese projects in Zambia are increasing, less is documented about the impact of Chinese business activities on job losses among the local Zambian population. To better understand issues related to potential job losses in Zambia, this chapter first provides a summary of Zambian policies on foreign industry, trade, and investment. It then discusses Chinese activities in Zambia in these areas. Furthermore, the chapter examines the impacts of Chinese business activities on local populations, using the NFCA and China Hainan Zambia Ltd.'s purchase and ownership of the Kamwala market as case studies. This analysis finds that there are cases of displaced workers in Zambia mainly due to persistent layoffs, rising rents for traders, the forced relocation of Zambian traders into less desirable stalls, and stiff competition from Chinese workers. Moreover, there is a surplus of traders, Chinese and

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[268] Giacomo Macola, One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2008), 175–177.

[269] Peter Kragelund, "Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure? Chinese Investments in the Zambian Mining and Construction Sectors," *The European Journal of Development Research* 21, no. 4 (2009): 644–661.

Zambian, who compete for the same jobs in the labor market and competition from Chinese entrepreneurs who run businesses almost identical to those of locals.

A. INDUSTRIAL, TRADING, AND INVESTMENT POLICIES IN ZAMBIA

In 1991, Zambia's economic liberalization and privatization processes introduced different policies such as the National Industrial and Trade Policy (NITP) and the Zambia Development Agency Act that were enacted to attract and facilitate trade and investment, and increase employment opportunities in Zambia. The NITP supports industrial and trade development by assuring a conducive investment environment, providing guidance on government's approach to regional and international trade, and urging the use of domestic raw materials in production. The NITP, due to its principles of inclusivity and equity, facilitates the creation of new employment opportunities for Zambians mainly in the manufacturing subsectors of processed foods, wood and wood products, and textiles and garments.[270] Nevertheless, James Sumberg et al. have argued that most foreign firms employ skilled labor from their home countries, and only employ Zambians for casual work such as cooks and drivers¾ jobs with no social security entitlement.[271]

In 2006, the ZDA Act was enacted to promote investment and increase business competitiveness and employment opportunities in the country.[272] As such, under the act, there are strict regulations and conditions that an investor must fulfill before investment permits, licenses, and certificate of registration are issued. These include a minimum investment of US$250,000 and the guarantee of at least 200 jobs to Zambian citizens.[273] As Peter Kragelund notes, however, by 2009, the ZDA had approved most Chinese investments in Zambia, most of which did not conform with ZDA-stipulated guidelines.[274] In accordance with the ZDA minimum investment requirements at that time, according to

[270] Government of Zambia, "National Industrial and Trade Policy," 2018.

[271] James Sumberg et al., "Formal-Sector Employment and Africa's Youth Employment Crisis: Irrelevance or Policy Priority?," *Development Policy Review* 38, no. 4 (2020): 428–440.

[272] "Zambia Development Agency Act."

[273] "Zambia Development Agency Act."

[274] Kragelund, "Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure?," 651.

Kragelund, most Chinese investments did not provide sufficient funds or create enough new jobs, and therefore could have been rejected, but were instead approved.[275] Overall, the ZDA's weak enforcement of the regulations resulted in many unqualified foreign investors obtaining permits, licenses, and certificates of registration, and consequently, in crowding out the local traders.[276]

B. CHINESE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AND CHINESE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

Zambia's favorable foreign investment policy environment has paved the way for an influx of Chinese traders and investors into the country. Chinese investment in Zambia has increased copper production, Zambia's lead export to China, specifically via the NFCA's Chambishi Copper Mines.[277] Other major investments are in agriculture, for instance, the Jhonken Friendship Farm that deals in livestock, cereals, vegetables, and fruits; in manufacturing like the Zambia-China Mulungushi firm that produces an assortment of building materials, chandeliers, and melamine kitchenware; and in assorted trade investments.[278] In line with WITS' assessment, China accounted for 14.4 percent of Zambia's total exports in 2018, which amounted to US$1.308 million, and that same year Zambia's imports from China were worth US$1.291 million.[279]

To support and increase investment flows, the government of China established institutions in Zambia to facilitate access to finances and investment advice, in part to facilitate money transfers to and from China.[280] According to Kragelund, in 1997, "by political decree of then Chinese vice-premier Zhu Rongji,"[281] China opened a state-owned

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[275] Kragelund, 651.

[276] Kragelund, 651.

[277] Abdelghaffar et al., "Leveraging Chinese FDI for Diversified Growth in Zambia," 22.

[278] Abdelghaffar et al., 24

[279] "Zambia - Product Exports and Imports by China, 2018," WITS Data, accessed August 3, 2020, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZMB/Year/2018/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/CHN/Product/all-groups.

[280] Abdelghaffar et al., "Leveraging Chinese FDI for Diversified Growth in Zambia," 37.

[281] Kragelund, "Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure?," 649.

commercial bank, a branch of the Bank of China (BOC), in Lusaka, Zambia to facilitate financial activities of both state-owned and privately-held Chinese companies.[282] Moreover, Abdelghaffar et al. observe that to a large extent the support the Chinese government provides to Chinese businessmen in the form of investment advice, finance, and business interactions with the Zambian government, enabled more Chinese to launch businesses in Zambia, consequently exacerbating the competition and displacement problem.[283] Further, Abdelghaffar et al. state that:

> Zambian traders are at a further disadvantage to Chinese enterprises due to constrained access to finance…. Chinese private investors are able to access loans at below-market rates through the Bank of China. While the bank does not explicitly give preferential rates to Chinese nationals, they consider collateral from overseas, which lowers a borrower's risk profile. Many local small players do not have collateral and thus are unable to borrow at low rates. This exacerbates the risk of Zambian SMEs being crowded out since the lower cost structure for Chinese enterprises, along with better technology, could enable them to sell products at lower prices than their Zambian counterparts.[284]

Additionally, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce created a center for Chinese investments and trade in Lusaka to promote and facilitate Chinese investments and trade in Zambia.[285] The center provides Chinese prospective investors and traders information and investment advice and assists them in their interactions with the ZDA and the Zambian government's Ministry of Commerce.[286] Adding to these issues, Chinese traders often set up business activities similar to those of Zambians at Kamwala market, which renders local traders jobless due to unfair competition. According to Laurence Marfaing and Alena Thiel, the Chinese engage in such varied business activities as manufacturing, food processing, wholesale and retail trade, pharmaceutical and medical services, beauty salons,

282 Kragelund, 649.

283 Abdelghaffar et al., "Leveraging Chinese FDI for Diversified Growth in Zambia," 37.

284 Abdelghaffar et al., 37.

285 Kragelund, "Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure?," 649.

286 Kragelund, "Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure?," 649.

and restaurants.[287] Laura Spilsbury has agreed with Marfaing and Thiel's findings, and mentioned that the influx of Chinese wholesalers and traders in Zambia provoked former Zambian Minister of Commerce, Dipak Patel, to comment on the massive amount of Chinese traders in Zambia. He asked, "Does Zambia need Chinese investors who sell shoes, clothes, food, chickens and eggs in our markets when the indigenous people can?"[288]

C. JOB LOSSES DUE TO CHINESE INVESTMENTS

Given the level of Chinese investment and the number of Chinese-owned businesses being established in Zambia, there is a growing concern over the increasing number of Chinese workers and traders who are displacing local Zambians from their jobs. In a 2017 study Hannah Postel conducted on Chinese workers in Zambia, she observed that across the board, Chinese companies are hiring workers from China or Chinese migrants in Zambia instead of local Zambians.[289] Her findings revealed that by 2017, more than 25,000 Chinese workers had valid work permits and resident status in Zambia.[290] The study also showed that when a foreigner obtains a working permit, his or her family members can use the same permit, and they are counted as the initial permit holder (there is no separate permit for each family member) when doing business.[291] Postel also observed that many Chinese have exploited this loophole to bring in other Chinese to work

[287] Laurence Marfaing and Alena Thiel, "Chinese Commodity Imports in Ghana and Senegal: Demystifying Chinese Business Strength in Urban West Africa," GIGA Working Paper No 180, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2011.

[288] Laura Spilsbury, "Can Michael Sata Tame the Dragon and Channel Chinese Investment towards Development for Zambians," *Journal of Politics & International Studies* 8 (2012): 238–278.

[289] Hannah Postel, "Following the Money: Chinese Labor Migration to Zambia," 1–12. migrationpolicy.org, February 19, 2015, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/following-money-chinese-labor-migration-zambia.

[290] Hannah Postel, "Moving beyond 'China in Africa': Insights from Zambian Immigration Data," *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 46, no. 2 (2017): 155–174.

[291] Postel, 155–74.

in Chinese companies or establish additional private businesses.[292] As such, it is clear there are more Chinese in Zambia than the official recorded figure of 25,000.[293]

Additionally, Aleksandra Gadzala has labeled this activity as "forming ethnic enclaves" and has explained that the Chinese co-ethnic employment culture is a consistent characteristic of overseas Chinese firms, both state-owned companies and privately-owned businesses.[294] She further explained that these enclaves are an overseas Chinese entrepreneur strategy built on the notion of family social networks and interpersonal trust for Chinese traders to facilitate the acquisition of business financing, material supplies, and labor.[295] As such, the ethnic enclave serves the needs of the Chinese community, facilitating travel and entry, the startup of businesses, and the hiring of Chinese workers on Chinese projects in Zambia.[296]

1. NFCA Case Study

Since the NFCA was established in 1998, there have been persistent complaints against the company over unfair hiring practices, specifically where Chinese are hired to replace Zambians.[297] Gadzala noted that in the years that followed NFCA's establishment, "the indigenous workforce at the mine was cut … and total employment dropped from 31,000 in 1998 to 19,145 in 2001."[298] In 2007, Alastair Fraser and John Lungu also reported that of all employed Zambian workers at NFCA, only 52 were on permanent contracts; 687 were on temporary contracts, which varied from one to five years in duration, and the remaining 100 were casual workers.[299] In comparison, the authors noted that NFCA extensively used Chinese subcontracting firms to hire workers, and by 2007,

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[292] Postel, 161–172.

[293] Postel, 161–172.

[294] Aleksandra W. Gadzala, "From Formal-to Informal-Sector Employment: Examining the Chinese Presence in Zambia," *Review of African Political Economy* 37, no. 123 (2010): 41–59.

[295] Gadzala, 47.

[296] Postel, "Moving beyond 'China in Africa," 161–172

[297] Gadzala, "From Formal-to Informal-Sector Employment," 41.

[298] Gadzala, 52.

[299] Fraser and Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls, 49.

there were 180 Chinese workers on permanent contracts, and another 1,093 workers who were hired through two Chinese subcontracting firms.[300]

In 2006, then President Sata accused Chinese businesses of purposefully not employing Zambians, stating, “Our Chinese don’t create any sensible employment. In fact, to every Zambian in a Chinese company, there are about 15 Chinese.”[301] Likewise, Abdelghaffar et al. have observed that most Chinese investors prefer hiring Chinese workers; hence, Zambians are laid off and must resort to working in the informal sector, particularly the retail trade.[302] The persistent Chinese co-ethnic recruiting behavior impedes the Zambian government’s goal of providing employment to its citizens, and the act has left increasing numbers of Zambians frustrated and unable to secure sustainable livelihoods.[303] Moreover, some Chinese who come to Zambia for employment in SOEs eventually wind up as small and medium traders, further exacerbating competition for local small and medium traders, who are frequently forced out of work.[304]

2. Kamwala Market Case Study

The case of Kamwala Market provides further insight into the impacts of Chinese commercial activities on Zambian populations in terms of increasing rents and Zambian traders being pushed into less desirable stalls. Kamwala Market in Zambia’s capital of Lusaka was formerly known as Luburma Market, which started in the 1950s during the colonial era. After Zambia’s independence, the market continued to grow and has since developed into Lusaka’s largest shopping area. By the 1990s it had grown to full capacity and required expansion to accommodate the growing number of local traders who were dealing in hardware, local *Chitenge* (colorful printed African wear) fabric, and *salaula* (second-hand clothes), and groceries.[305]

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[300] Fraser and Lungu, 49.

[301] “Zambians Wary of ‘Exploitative’ Chinese Employers,” The New Humanitarian, November 23, 2006, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2006/11/23.

[302] Abdelghaffar et al., “Leveraging Chinese FDI for Diversified Growth in Zambia,” 42.

[303] Gadzala, “From Formal-to Informal-Sector Employment,” 42.

[304] Abdelghaffar et al., “Leveraging Chinese FDI for Diversified Growth in Zambia,” 42.

[305] Macola, One Zambia, Many Histories, 175–177.

In 2001, the Lusaka City Council (LCC) leased out Kamwala Market to China Hainan (Z) Ltd. for a period of 65 years. LCC contracted China Hainan (Z) Ltd. to refurbish dilapidated buildings of the old market and expand the shopping area into a modern shopping complex, with shops, stalls and kiosks, and ample parking space in the new market area.[306] According to Giacomo Macola et al., the contract between China Hainan (Z) Ltd. and the LCC allows the Chinese firm to have exclusive rights of running the market for 65 years to recover capital investments before the market reverts to the LCC.[307] The change of ownership and management of the market from the LCC to the Chinese firm led to an upsurge in rent, and to rent being charged in U.S. dollars. The new management prioritized allocation of shops to foreign traders, especially Lebanese, Indians, and Chinese, in order to gain a quick return on its investments.[308] By 2010, it was estimated that there were more than 100 Chinese shops in Kamwala Market.[309] Currently, it is challenging to obtain authentic sources that show the exact number of Chinese and Zambians working in Kamwala Market due to their tendency to move. Nonetheless, there are many Chinese traders, selling competitive products side by side with Zambian traders in Kamwala Market.[310]

The entry of Chinese-owned enterprises and their business activities in Zambian markets risks crowding out local Zambian businesses by continually raising rents on traders. Allowing the Chinese firm to control and manage Kamwala Market led to a rapid increase in rental fees, which are difficult for local Zambians to pay, and the company charges rental fees in U.S. dollars, as previously mentioned, as well as Chinese Yuan, but not Zambian Kwacha.[311] The inability to pay the high rental fees has consequently pushed

306 Macola, 175–177.

307 Macola, 175–177.

308 Macola, 175–177.

309 Gadzala, “From Formal-to Informal-Sector Employment,” 53.

310 Kari Mjaavatn Stien, “Kamwala Shopping World: Competition and Cooperation among Zambian and Chinese Traders in Lusaka” (master’s thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway, 2013), 67.

311 Zambia Daily Mail, “Plight of Traders at Town Centre, Luburma Markets,” accessed July 30, 2020, http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/plight-traders-town-centre-luburma-markets/.

out many less-capitalized Zambian traders, hence, threatening their livelihoods. Additionally, Zambian traders, even those who can afford to pay the high rental fees, have complained of unfair competitive behavior by China Hainan (Z) Ltd., which gives Chinese traders priority in the allocation of better and strategically located shops and stalls, while pushing local Zambians into less desirable stalls that potential customers cannot easily access or locate.[312] These poor locations adversely affect sales and subsequent income, eventually pushing the local Zambian traders out of business.

These dynamics have also increased tensions between Zambians and Chinese immigrants. As a result, tensions and attacks on Chinese businesses have intensified. In 2015, Kabwe Chombe, the chairperson for Kamwala Market tenants, described the “situation at the market as a time bomb as tenants are agitated with the challenges they are facing.”[313] Kari Stien has described the relationship between Zambians and Chinese at Kamwala Market as ambivalent in general, whereas “both compete and cooperate, they are interdependent most times, but there are many conflicts and misunderstandings because of Chinese market saturation and intense competition for physical, economic and social space.”[314]

Furthermore, the influx of low-cost Chinese finished consumer goods on the Zambian market has made it difficult for local Zambian traders to continue doing business. Traders have voiced concerns that the cost of production for locally made goods is high, which consequently makes locally manufactured goods expensive compared to Chinese imported commodities. This reality has led to Chinese businessmen using their ethnic enclaves to send Zambian product samples for low-cost production in China, and these knock-offs have flooded the Zambian market. Since most Zambians are low income earners, imported Chinese products are generally more affordable than those locally produced; most are sold at less than a third of the local price.[315] The problem was large

[312] Zambia Daily Mail, “Plight of Traders at Town Centre, Luburma Markets.”

[313] Zambia Daily Mail.

[314] Stien, “Kamwala Shopping World,” 67.

[315] Gadzala, “From Formal-to Informal-Sector Employment” 53.

enough in 2007 that, as Gadzala has noted, to compete with Chinese traders, Zambian traders in Kamwala Market contemplated manufacturing cheap low-quality products or cease production altogether.[316] In 2017, Asia Abdul Simwaya conducted a study in Zambia, in which he quoted a Zambian trader involved in the tailoring business who stated:

> The main challenges we tailors face are Chinese products. The Chinese sell their products cheaply and most of their clothes are already finished products. It is so difficult because the order price for our input materials is a bit high. For example, one metre of a cloth material is equivalent to the price of a manufactured Chinese product. This makes people go to the Chinese and buy directly something they can wear immediately, instead of buying material and have their measurements taken then wait for the cloth to be finished. People do not realise that most of those Chinese products are of low quality. You wear and wash it twice, before you know it, it is torn. But people do not understand that aspect.[317]

The effects of the imitation products and importation of low-cost Chinese products have caused many Zambian traders, especially women who were trading in clothes, to be left jobless after finding it hard to compete with dealers of cheaper clothes from China.[318] With the growth of cheap imported goods from China, coupled with locals' lack of access to loans from financial organizations, the share of locally produced goods among aggregate goods on the Zambian market has actually declined.[319] As a result, local Zambian merchants dealing in locally produced goods and secondhand clothes were left jobless.[320]

Although most Zambian traders consider the Chinese competition unfair, some Zambians consider it a valuable employment opportunity, which they perceive as better than other jobs.[321] Nevertheless, the majority of the Zambians with stalls at the market

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316 Gadzala, 54.

317 Asia Abdul Simwaya, "Income Generating Activities in Zambia: A Case Study of Entrepreneurs and SMEs in Masala Market, Ndola" (master's thesis, NTNU, 2017), 86.

318 Pádraig Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa,* 2nd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2017): 195–214.

319 Karen Tranberg Hansen, "The City, Clothing Consumption, and the Search for 'the Latest' in Colonial and Postcolonial Zambia," *The Force of Fashion in Politics and Society: Global Perspectives from Modern to Contemporary Times*, 2010, 215–234.

320 Hansen, 215–234.

321 Stien, "Kamwala Shopping World," 77.

have lost incomes and businesses due to selling only few items per day each week due to stiff competition and contested spaces.[322] The increasing struggle between the traders in the market has led to increasing poverty for many Zambian traders who have started moving to neighboring countries, or among several markets, while swapping between different types of goods and categories of customers.[323]

D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed the impact of Chinese business activities on local Zambians in relation to job loss. The two cases of NFCA and the Kamwala Market show that the main impacts of Chinese business activities on Zambian workers and traders include job layoffs, high rental fees, allocation of undesirable shop space and stalls to Zambian traders, and unfavorable competition from Chinese traders, who set up diverse but similar businesses to those of Zambians in the market.

While the industrial and trade policies in Zambia present opportunities for foreign investment in Zambia aimed to boost economic growth and augment Zambian government efforts to create employment for its population, the Chinese hiring practices and business behavior undermines these efforts. Chinese companies' hiring practices, in which they prefer hiring fellow Chinese rather than Zambians, has resulted in Zambians being laid off and replaced by Chinese, as illustrated in the case at NFCA.

The ZDA policy prohibits entry of foreign businesses into Zambia unless they offer capital investment of a minimum of UD$250,000.00, and capacity to create employment opportunities¾ at least 200 jobs for local Zambians. Yet, the Zambian government's failure to effectively implement these policies to protect domestic firms and businesses has undesirably impacted domestic firms and traders as they are subject to foreign direct competition, which frequently pushes them out of business, as illustrated in the Kamwala Market case.

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322 Bernard Chileshe, "Contested Space: Controversies Surrounding Informal Street Vending in Zambia," April 2020, doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30171.11048.

323 Stien, "Kamwala Shopping World," 19.

In addition, the presence of the Bank of China further exacerbates the problem of struggling businesses owned by local Zambian merchants and the loss of jobs by local Zambian workers. Chinese traders can access bank loans at a lower market rate through the BOC, which makes the cost of doing business much lower for them, resulting in the Chinese selling their merchandise at a lower cost compared to Zambian traders. On the other hand, Zambian traders are financially constrained because most of them do not have access to bank loans, and even those who have access can only obtain loans at a very high interest rate, which makes the cost of doing business too high to be profitable for small traders. Since access to credit is critical for business continuity and expansion, Chinese traders are able to outcompete their Zambian counterparts, and eventually displace them.

V. CONCLUSION

In Africa land is the basic resource and means of livelihood, and unemployment is widespread; therefore, the objective of the thesis was to examine the impact of Chinese investments in land on African communities that are often displaced and Chinese business investments on employment opportunities for the local populations. Chinese investments have attracted worldwide attention to Africa in recent years, and land deals, trade, and labor patterns have attracted much scholarly attention to Africa. Yet, less attention has been paid to the impact of these investments and labor practices on local populations. In assessing the concerns about displaced communities and job losses among local populations due to Chinese investments, this research worked to obtain a better, deeper, and clearer understanding of the persistent, emerging issues related to large-scale land acquisitions, unfair trade and labor practices, and their impact on local communities in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly, Zambia.

The preceding chapters examined two hypotheses. First, I investigated whether China's land-intensive investment activities displace ordinary people from their land and impact their livelihoods, and if so, how this impact is facilitated. To investigate, I examined case studies from Zambia, as it is as the leading exporter of copper and the third largest recipient of Chinese investment. Specifically, government policy documents, press releases, and reports were assessed to understand the land tenure system and land transfer processes that facilitate foreign investment and large-scale land acquisition. In addition, specific cases of involving the displacement of local communities arising from large-scale land acquisitions in Zambia were also explored. The second hypothesis was to establish whether and to what extent Chinese business investment impacts job opportunities for local populations, and trade and market competition with local merchants. Specifically, I examined claims of job losses by local workers and unfair business practices and competition local traders face from Chinese traders, the majority of whom initially came as workers on Chinese state-owned projects in Zambia.

A. REVIEW OF FINDINGS

The findings of this thesis reveal that Chinese investments in Zambia have led to large-scale land acquisition and the displacement of people who had resided on and worked those lands for generations, leaving many ordinary people in dire straits. They are often left landless, with inadequate access to fertile agricultural land which affects sufficient food supply, thus causing food insecurity. Additionally, the displaced people receive minimal compensation for lost assets and are face limited access to social services like medical care and education in undesirable resettlement areas. Moreover, the displacements cause psychological stress stemming from social disintegration and marginalization.

Furthermore, in Zambia, there are rampant cases of joblessness, which negatively impact the livelihoods of the Zambian people. In part, job losses are due to intense competition between Chinese entrepreneurs and traders and their Zambian counterparts. The competition is multifaceted and emanates from the following: first, Chinese ownership of market spaces, such as shops and stalls, where local Zambians compete with Chinese for strategic locations to establish businesses, and the high rental fees for the spaces, which most ordinary Zambians cannot afford. Second, the competition stems from low-cost products imported from China, especially garments, kitchenware, electric powered lamps, wall clocks, shoes, and handbags, which Chinese traders deal in and use to easily outcompete Zambian traders in the same business.

Additionally, Africa's rich mineral resources and favorable investment policy have paved way for the influx of Chinese traders and investors. The investment climate attracted Chinese multi-national and state-owned corporations to invest heavily in mining, infrastructure, and manufacturing projects, and to a lesser degree in small and medium scale business. As discussed in Chapter III, China opened its first commercial bank in Africa, in Lusaka, Zambia to facilitate financial activities of both state-owned and privately-owned Chinese companies in Zambia. To a large extent the support the Chinese government provides to Chinese companies, entrepreneurs, and traders in the form of investment advice, financing, and business interactions has enabled a significant number of Chinese people to establish a strong foothold on the African continent. This has allowed the Chinese investors to acquire large-scale swaths of land for investment, thus displacing local people. It has also allowed Chinese entrepreneurs and traders to access credit; set up small, medium, and large enterprises in Africa; and import Chinese manufactured products and services to Africa, leading to unfair trade and market competition.

The case studies in Chapters III and IV provided further evidence of population displacement and lost jobs and their impact on African populations. The nickel mining company cases highlighted land disputes between Chinese investors and the local district council authorities and people in Mugoto, Mazabuka district in Zambia. The Albidon Munali Nickel Mine case showed that more than 200 families were displaced and resettled in marshy and infertile hilly area, affecting their agricultural farmland production and access to clean water, hospitals, clinics, and the main tarred road. Farmers and settlers displaced from the land revealed not only that the displacement affected their livelihoods and food security, but left them inadequately compensated in comparison to the losses they suffered. This evidence supports the first hypothesis: that China's land-intensive activities, such as mining projects, displace people from their lands and have an adverse impact on their livelihoods.

In addition, the influx of Chinese small-scale traders and laborers in Zambia has exacerbated the unemployment problem and left average Zambians struggling to sustain their livelihoods. The Kamwala Market in Lusaka city, Zambia highlights job losses, and unfair trade and market competitions between Zambian traders and Chinese entrepreneurs. Evidence from this case reveals that the arrival of Chinese traders in this market led to rapid increases in rent, which is hard for most local Zambians to pay, and those who could afford to pay found they were allotted less desirable trading places compared to their Chinese competitors. Furthermore, increasing competition in local products, restaurants, salons, and pharmacies, plus increased importation of manufactured consumer goods from China, has left the majority of Zambian traders jobless or forced them to move among several markets while swapping between different types of goods and categories of customers, costing them their usual network of suppliers and customers. This evidence supports the second hypothesis that Chinese activities in Africa have had negative impacts on the local businesses and the industrial sector, and has not only failed to provide the required employment opportunities but often cost the local population their jobs.

B. EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT BEYOND ZAMBIA

There is evidence that similar impacts are occurring elsewhere in Africa. Notably, local populations' loss of land and jobs can be seen in other African countries, such as Nigeria, Mauritius, Ethiopia, and Egypt, where there has also been an increase in large-scale land acquisitions by Chinese investors, especially for mining activities, and the establishment of Chinese economic trade zones.

The evidence shows that while China's input to the Special Economic Zones in sub-Saharan Africa is mainly financial, African countries provide the land to develop MFEZs. As such, local people in host countries find difficulties in favorably negotiating with the investors due to government involvement in the investment projects and agreements that are not openly available to the local people or their representatives.

1. Chinese Special Economic Zones

China's rapid economic rise in Africa has become of deep concern not only to the Western world but also to the impacted African communities. During the third meeting of the FOCAC in Beijing late in 2006, then Chinese president, Hu Jintao, committed to strengthen existing economic zones and establish more zones for better economic trade relations and cooperation with Africa.[324] As these zones are based on China's model, they are referred to as Chinese special economic zones (SEZ) in Africa. Descriptions of the larger zones are as follows:

a. Lekki and Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zones in Nigeria

The Lekki and Ogun Guangdong Zones (LFTZ and OGFTZ), which started in 2004, occupy 16,500 and 10,000 hectares of land, respectively, on a lease period of 99 years.[325] The zones have direct access to the Atlantic Ocean, airports, and the Gulf of Guinea, and have invested mainly in manufacturing of home appliance technologies,

[324] Ian Taylor, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Routledge, 2010): 39–40.

[325] Douglas Zhihua Zeng, "An Overview of Six Economic Zones in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities," *World Bank Policy Note*, 2012.

textiles and light industry, communication technologies, warehousing, and export processing.[326]

b. Mauritius Jinfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone

The Mauritius Jinfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (JFET) is located in Riche Terre, which is five kilometers from the harbor and the capital city of Port-Louis; it occupies 211 hectares of land for a lease period of 99 years.[327] The zone is home to Chinese manufacturing investments owned by Tianli Spinning Co. Ltd., Shanxi Coking Coal Group, and Taiyu¾an iron and steel company. In addition, the companies invest in manufacturing of textiles, light industrial goods, medicine, and electrical products.[328]

c. Ethiopia Eastern Industrial Zone

The Ethiopia Eastern Industrial Zone (EIZ), developed by Qiyuan Group and Huajian enterprise, occupies 500 hectares without a specified lease period.[329] The zone is located 32 kilometers from the capital city of Addis Ababa and borders Djibouti port. These Chinese firms invest in manufacturing mainly in sectors like textiles, building materials, shoes, food, electric assembly, and garments.[330]

d. Egypt TEDA SUEZ Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone

This zone encompasses 703.2 hectares of land for an unknown lease period and is funded by Tianjin TEDA Holding and China-Africa Fund.[331] Geographically, the zone is strategically located at the mouth of the Suez Canal, on the west bank of the Red Sea, near

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[326] Omoh Gabriel, “Lekki Free Trade Zone Attracts N170bn Investment,” Vanguard, 2012, 1–3.

[327] Cowaloosur, “Land Grab in New Garb,” 94–109.

[328] Douglas Zhihua Zeng, Global Experiences with Special Economic Zones: Focus on China and Africa (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2015).

[329] Cowaloosur, “Land Grab in New Garb,” 94–109.

[330] Emelie Rohne, “Chinese-Initiated Special Economic Zones in Africa: A Case Study of Ethiopia’s Eastern Industrial Zone” (master’s thesis, Lund University, Sweden, 2013), http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/38667092013.

[331] Cowaloosur, “Land Grab in New Garb,” 94–109.

Inhahane Harbor and the provincial capital of Suez, just 120 kilometers from Cairo.[332] Companies in this zone include Jiangsu Shepherd Group, which invests in manufacturing of machinery and electrical appliances, and Sichuan Honghua, an oil and gas equipment industry producing energy.[333]

According to Deborah Bräutigam and Tang Xiaoyang, firms in the zones benefit from an up to US$44 million grant and another up to US$294 million from China's MOFCOM, regardless of whether the firms are state-owned or privately owned.[334] Furthermore, they are reimbursed for half of their moving expenses, enjoy reduced taxes on export and import materials sent for construction, have access to foreign exchange, and are eligible to apply to MOFCOM's unique fund for Technological and Economic Cooperation, which is a 100 percent interest-free loan from a Chinese bank for five years.[335] Moreover, Honita Cowaloosur has observed that while China's major input in the development of the MFEZs is financial, it is Africa's land on which the investments are established.[336] Thus, most developers face land-related difficulties in terms of compensating villagers and relocating populations, as local African communities are victim to unfair negotiations and agreements within the development projects.[337]

2. Land Displacements and Resettlement of African Communities

Land in most African countries is owned by the state and traditional local customary communities, wherein the state, through land tenure regimes, regulates and distributes land rights to local and foreign investors. Catherine Boone has explained that colonial powers

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332 Li Jun, "Teda Suez, a Cooperation Model under the Belt and Road Initiative," *China Today*, no. 7 (2019): 23.

333 Emma Scott, "China Goes Global in Egypt: A Special Economic Zone in Suez," Discussion Paper, Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University, South Africa, 2013. https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/86133.

334 Deborah Bräutigam and Tang Xiaoyang, "African Shenzhen: China's Special Economic Zones in Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 1 (2011): 27–54.

335 Gabriel, "Lekki Free Trade Zone Attracts N170bn Investment," 1–3.

336 Cowaloosur, "Land Grab in New Garb," 94–109.

337 Cowaloosur, 94–109.

used land rights to exercise social control over rural communities.[338] She noted that postcolonial state authorities in Africa continue this same practice, by possessing the sole power of allocating rights to land and natural resources. A parallel can be drawn between Chinese developments in Africa and those of white colonialists, as states allocate land rights to individuals and groups with the aim of supporting developmental programs. Theodore E. Downing has argued that as land becomes scarcer, this practice creates room for evictions, which eventually results in loss of community and loss of livelihood.[339] Evictions cause severe consequences and potential upheavals. Downing argued:

> Involuntary settlement, if unmitigated, often gives rise to severe economic, social and environmental risks: productive systems are dismantled; people face impoverishment when their productive assets or income sources are lost; people are relocated to environments where their productive skills may be less applicable and the competition for resources greater; community institutions and social networks are weakened; kin groups are dispersed; and cultural identity, traditional authority, and the potential for mutual help are diminished or lost.[340]

Major land acquisitions have resulted in displacing local populations and impacted the local communities. Some of these acquisitions and their impacts are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The LFTZ and OGFTZ in Nigeria, where settlers and farmers were displaced, raised many grievances about dispossession of ancestral land and jeopardizing their only means of livelihood.[341] Other grievances included boundary expansions into other people's land, for example, where Hujian, a Chinese footwear company forcefully acquired more tracts of land outside the demarcated area.[342] Additionally, the local people complained of inadequate compensation and Chinese investors reselling land, which was

338 Catherine Boone, Property and Political Order in Africa. Land Rights and the Structure of Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 27–44.

339 Theodore E. Downing, "Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement," Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (Report Commissioned by the International Institute for Environment and Development) 58 (2002): 13–18.

340 Downing, 5–6.

341 Omolade Adunbi, "(Re) Inventing Development: China, Infrastructure, Sustainability and Special Economic Zones in Nigeria," *Africa* 89, no. 4 (2019): 662–679.

342 Cowaloosur, "Land Grab in New Garb," 94–109.

acquired for purposeful investments, to private Chinese agents who instead built private homes on that land.[343]

The JFET zone in Mauritius led the local community to complain bitterly about displacement and crop damages. According to Cowaloosur, sugarcane farmers under the Terre Rouge Land Settlement were displaced and their crops destroyed; they missed future usage of their agricultural land and were never compensated for their lost crops, irrigation networks, and fencing materials.[344] Furthermore, the Riche Terre vegetable planters missed an extra two annual harvests, but more importantly, they suffered psychological damage and loss of morale due to their lost investments, which led them to stage hunger strikes.[345]

In Ethiopia, a majority of local people have no legal right to their land, which makes it easy for the government to hand over large tracts of land to Chinese companies without much consultation with the local inhabitants.[346] Major displacements were realized in Oromia during the giveaway of more than 500 hectares of land to the Eastern Industry Chinese Zone. Settlers and farmers were displaced, threatening the social and cultural systems of local groups and fueling food insecurity, foreign economic dependency, and concerns from habitual residents about large-scale leases.[347]

According to Michael Richards, there are also many cases of people being displaced from their land in other African countries like Ghana, Cameroon, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, Tanzania, Senegal, and Mozambique.[348] He further revealed in his study that among the major impacts to African communities are the continuous conversions of land rights from

[343] Olayinka Akanle, "The Intersectionalities of Land Grabs in Nigeria Engaging the New Scramble for African Lands," *Africa Insight* 46, no. 4 (2017): 41–53.

[344] Cowaloosur, "Land Grab in New Garb" 94–109.

[345] Cowaloosur, 94–109.

[346] Jon Abbink, "'Land to the Foreigners': Economic, Legal, and Socio-Cultural Aspects of New Land Acquisition Schemes in Ethiopia," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29, no. 4 (2011): 513–535.

[347] Abbink, 513–35.

[348] Michael Richards, *Social and Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Africa—With a Focus on West and Central Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Rights and Resources Initiative, 2013), 57–59.

customary to state for quicker leasehold agreements with large-scale land transaction investors and an inconsistent process of consultation that marginalizes customary right holders. Such activities are often accompanied by deceit, political pressure, and coercion. Moreover, prominent chiefs tend to prioritize their own personal interests over those of the community, leading to inadequate compensation for the displaced community members.

Many scholars have acknowledged the increased risk of negative social, economic, and livelihood impacts on displaced communities, due to the disruption of social systems and networks, neglect of sacred sites, food insecurity, reduced access to educational and health services, home conflicts associated with competition for remaining land, severe effects on wetlands and forests, and adverse effects on marginalized groups, especially women and children, who mostly depend on communities.[349]

3. Chinese Entrepreneurial Activities and Local Workers' Job Losses

Another impact of Chinese investments on ordinary Africans is lost jobs, as Chinese migrants or those who leave the state-owned projects compete with locals for available job opportunities. Other Chinese entrepreneurs engage in small and medium scale enterprises where they disrupt local businesses, which are forced to close due to unfair competition. According to Robert Rotberg, cheap Chinese products flood African markets, putting "hundreds of thousands of Africans out of work."[350] Local manufacturers fail to compete on price with low-priced Chinese imports. Larry Hanauer and Lyle J. Morris have contended that

> local manufacturers could not compete on price with less-expensive Chinese imports; the import of inexpensive Chinese fabrics alone forced the closure of hundreds of textile factories, and the loss of thousands of jobs, in

[349] W. Courtland Robinson, "Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Development-Induced Displacement," Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution – SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, 2003. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.552.9873&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

[350] Robert I. Rotberg, *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 11.

Nigeria, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mauritius, and other countries.[351]

In 1999, the first Chinese migrants arrived in Oshikango town in Namibia, and as of today, there are more than 100 "China shops" constituting small and medium enterprises, which have created stiff competition for local traders in terms of higher rents and costs of trading.[352] Gregor Dobler has further noted that "Varied as cities on the African continent are, a new common feature has emerged over the last ten years: in every large or small African town, there is at least one shop owned by a Chinese migrant.[353] Moreover, the Chinese perceive Africa "as not only a boundless font of natural resources but a business opportunity¾ a near billion-person market for low-cost Chinese manufactured goods."[354]

C. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA

For China, these findings have several implications for its current and future investments in sub-Saharan Africa. First, with rampant displacement of local populations and their resettlement, the Chinese have faced a great deal of resentment from the local population in the host countries over loss of land and lack of or inadequate compensation. Thus, the Chinese have been confronted with riots, strikes, and even death, which consequently affects production and erodes the cordial relationship with the host communities. In particular, Chinese mining companies have lost the trust of the local people, who perceive them as hostile and uncaring, and even the media and scholars sometimes refer to these investors as land grabbers and violators of human rights. The exasperation is due to the way Chinese investors acquire land for their investments and the environmental degradation resulting from mining activities, which adversely affects the livelihoods of the local people who dwell close to the mining areas. This prevalent attitude

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[351] Larry Hanauer and Lyle J. Morris, *Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2014), 70.

[352] Gregor Dobler, "Chinese Shops and the Formation of a Chinese Expatriate Community in Namibia," *The China Quarterly* 199 (2009): 707–727.

[353] Dobler, 707–27.

[354] Terence McNamee et al., "Africa in Their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola," *The Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper* 3 (2012), 8–10.

among locals has the potential to escalate into conflicts and destruction of Chinese investments, which poses a high risk to Chinese firms operating in sub-Saharan Africa.

Second, findings show that financially strained indigenous Zambians are being displaced from their businesses as an increasing number of small and medium-scale Chinese traders, who come as migrants, join the ethnic enclave and benefit from credit from the Bank of China in Lusaka to launch businesses in Zambia. If any institution in Zambia were to offer financial support to the local traders or develop their native methodologies and capabilities, the continued success of Chinese traders could be seriously challenged. Additionally, by operating in ethnic enclaves, the Chinese miss out not only on benefits of communal integration with host communities, but on learning about their cultures, which would help the Chinese build their businesses, especially in terms of trust and facilitating communication. Specifically, in Kamwala Market, where they have full administration and control, the Chinese take the strategically located shops and stalls to do business, but if the Zambian government would intervene and demand equal opportunities for all traders on space allocation, the Chinese would be out of business.

Third, the findings indicate that poor quality products, manufactured in and imported from China, are flooding into many African countries. Consequently, the reputation of Chinese investors operating in Africa has been negatively affected, as African people perceive that the Chinese intentionally produce low quality products for the African consumer, to exploit the African market. This largely held opinion affects Chinese investments in Africa, translating into huge losses and reduced market from the local population and around the globe. The world equates “made in China” with low quality, which affects the value of their imports and thus potential customers shunning their products.

D. CONCLUSION

Land and trade struggles between foreign investors and local people in Africa have the potential to cultivate social resistance and culminate into organized violence. African governments are enthusiastic for economic growth and fostering industrialization founded on foreign investments, but they have neglected to protect legal land ownership rights of the people they govern. Due to overreliance on Chinese investments for economic growth, African governments frequently fail to exercise proper oversight and enforcement of land and trade policy requirements to protect the local people, resulting in the natives facing severe suffering due to loss of land and jobs, which adversely impacts their livelihoods. With widespread resentment of Chinese social and predatory trade practices, African governments risk plunging their countries into chaos as local people have the potential to rise up and challenge the logic of governments' acceptance of Chinese imposition and domination.

China has penetrated and established itself in the economies of most African countries. As such, tensions between locals and investors will continue to build. In Zambia, physical confrontations sometimes resulting in death have been witnessed. In June 2020 in Lusaka, three Chinese were murdered and burnt in a warehouse because of disagreements with some locals.[355] Thus, the locals' potential to "construct identities of resistance through claims that simultaneously challenge the logic of competitive global capitalism is much deeper."[356] The displaced people begin to resist both the effects of displacement on their livelihoods and the state, which represents foreign business interests rather than broad national interests. As a result, locally established, and radical movements have the potential to emerge to opportunistically challenge the state in order to sustain daily life. In this way, Chinese investments have the potential to cause conflicts in Africa.

355 Jenni Marsh and Chiwoyu Sinyangwe CNN, "Bashed and Burned, 3 Chinese Are Murdered in Zambia as Racial Tensions Run High," CNN Analysis, accessed August 20, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/china/china-zambia-murder-intl-hnk/index.html.

356 Grace-Edward Galabuzi, "Land Resistance in Zambia: A Case Study of the Luana Farmers' Cooperative," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 32, no. 3 (2014): 367–377.

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