



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Operation Enduring Freedom Battle
Reconstruction: Battle Site Survey
and Ground Force Data Reconciliation
(Revised)**

William M. Knarr, Jr.
John Frost

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Reconstruction: Battle Site Survey
and Ground Force Data Reconciliation
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William M. Knarr, Jr.
John Frost

PREFACE

This publication was prepared for the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) to support the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction by documenting the battle site survey trip to Afghanistan and presenting the results of the ground force data reconciliation.

The objective of the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction was to “reconstruct salient aspects of a major Afghanistan Campaign [Mazar-e Sharif] in virtual simulations to support historical analysis as well as further research and development.”¹ In December 2001, a team consisting of DARPA, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA) 595 visited Afghanistan. The purpose was to validate or reconcile on-hand data and collect additional information by conducting a battle site survey and interviews of key participants, such as GEN Dostum, his subcommanders, and former Taliban.

This document differs from its original, IDA Document D-2925, in that it does not include Appendices I, Photographic Gallery Thumbnails of Servicemember Photographs and Ak-Yasin photographs, and Appendix J. Appendix I is only available with explicit approval of DARPA/IXO. Appendix J, “Who’s Who”: ODA Organization and Capabilities for 5 November 2001, is restricted to US Government Agencies and their Contractors.

¹ Project Assignment Number DA-3-2150, “Enduring Freedom Reconstruction.”

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The battle site survey and ultimately overall project success depended on access and opportunity. Many thanks to GEN Franks, Combatant Commander, CENTCOM, his staff, and in particular the J8; the U.S. Special Operations Command; and the 5th Special Forces Group for their support during a time when they were working a multitude of priority actions.

The comments and suggestions of Mr. Rick Wright and Dr. Geoffrey Koretsky are gratefully acknowledged and improved the quality of the report.

The most difficult part of the project was “putting the picture together,” that is, reconciling the volumes of data—sometimes conflicting, almost never perfectly matching—into a coherent, faithful reconstruction of events. Many people helped, but the reconciliation could not have been accomplished without the expertise, dedication and enthusiasm of Dr. Geoffrey Koretsky, Ms. Abigail Winthrop, and Mr. Rick Wright.

Special thanks to the service members that contributed battlefield photographs to this publication.

DEDICATION

This publication is dedicated to the “quiet professionals” of Special Forces Operational Detachment A 595 and their Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps brethren who entered unknown territory in late October 2001 to meet and defeat an enemy that had terrorized the world. This mature, adaptable, innovative, and highly trained group of professionals defined the characteristics of “Transformation” as the rest of Department of Defense wrestled with the concept. Their courage and warrior ethos set and maintained a high standard for the United States’ initial engagements in the war on terrorism and solidified the country’s sense of pride as Americans.

IN MEMORY OF...

Maybe it was the smile and calm assurance that SFC Bill Bennett exuded when you were with him. You know, it’s the feeling you get that, no matter what happens, you’re with a professional and everything will be okay. You also feel secure knowing the nation has people of this quality defending its freedom. Unfortunately, freedom has its price. SFC Bill Bennett was killed in action on 12 September 2003, in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, of wounds received when his team raided an enemy force stronghold. Bill will be sorely missed, but his legacy of heroism and dedication will live on.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

At the request of GEN Tommy Franks, Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency/Institute for Defense Analyses (DARPA/IDA) team reconstructed “salient aspects of a major Afghanistan campaign (e.g., Mazar-e Sharif) in virtual simulation to support historical analysis as well as further research and development.” The reconstruction, and in particular the ground force data reconciliation, depended on quality and detailed data, some of which simply wasn’t available without “walking the ground,” that is, conducting a battle site survey and talking to key Afghan participants.

This publication supports the Operation Enduring Freedom battle reconstruction by documenting the battle site survey and presenting the results of the ground force data reconciliation. In addition, it documents the planning, preparation, and execution of the battle site survey for future ventures.

The Battle Site Survey Team included representatives from CENTCOM, DARPA, IDA, and the original Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA) that participated in the campaign. GEN Dostum, the Northern Alliance Commander of Afghan forces for the campaign; his subcommanders; and his security force escorted the Battle Site Survey Team through the major battle sites south of Mazar-e Sharif. The battle site survey validated and reconciled on-hand data and collected additional data on team movements, locations, times, engagement areas, battle damage, terrain, etc. To represent all perspectives, the Battle Site Survey Team interviewed the primary Northern Alliance commanders, subcommanders, and former Taliban.

FINDINGS

New sources of information resulting from the battle site survey include the following:

- Tiger 02C positions on 5 and 9 November 2001, at Charsu and the Kafer Qalah, respectively, both a major part of the re-creation, were new material.

- CDR Haji Chari's perspective on Tiger 02C events filled gaps by providing the "other side of the story."
- CDR Ezattullah's account of his part in the battle at Baluch from the 02B battle position and CPT Mark's and SFC Vince's descriptions were detailed and painted the picture and sequence of the battle for follow-on re-creation.
- GEN Habib Bullah, a former Taliban, provided a description of the enemy and its methods of operation, which contributed to an area virtually uncollected from other sources.
- GEN Dostum's and his subcommanders' accounts of the events provided insights not revealed through previous collection.

Voids include collection south of the Darya Suf such as GEN Dostum's mountain headquarters, the Boxer element, and Tiger 02A and 02D positions. However, "back shots" from battle areas (e.g., video and photographs from Chapchal and Baluch to those positions) helped minimize the impact of these voids.

CONCLUSIONS

The battle site survey and reconciliation led to a number of conclusions concerning the value of the battle site survey itself and variables that contributed to the U.S. success in Northern Afghanistan:

- The level of detail required to recreate the ground force battle could not have been accomplished without the battle site survey.
- Special Forces exercises conducted with Uzbekistan (today, these are done under the Joint Combined Exchange Training program) helped to develop that country as a base for Operation Enduring Freedom. Without basing arrangements to support a northern campaign, the capture of Mazar-e Sharif, Northern Afghanistan, and ultimately all of Afghanistan would not have happened as quickly as it did, and may not have happened at all.
- Unconventional Warfare set a new standard for warfare by
 Minimizing the U.S. presence;
 Capitalizing on small, agile teams adapting to battlefield conditions and supporting committed indigenous Afghan forces; and
 Allowing GEN Dostum to recruit local Taliban to fight against the Pakistani, Chechen, Saudi, and other "foreigners" that came to Afghanistan to fight their own Jihad.

- Fire and maneuver were both required to defeat an adaptive and committed enemy.
- Courage—the human dimension—served to build the trust and camaraderie that catalyzed the coalition’s advance to Mazar.

I. INTRODUCTION

At 0200 local on 20 October 2001 (2130 Zulu, 19 October 2001), Special Forces Operational Detachment A (SFODA) 595,¹ or simply ODA 595, landed at Helicopter Landing Zone (LZ) Albatross in Dehi, Afghanistan, 60 miles south of Mazar-e Sharif. Their mission:

ODA 595 conducts Unconventional Warfare (UW) in support of GEN Dostum in order to render UW operational area unsafe for Taliban and terrorist organizations.²

As CPT Mark's³ detachment stepped off the MH-47E Chinook Special Operations Helicopter, GEN Dostum's forces greeted them. This linkup would begin the 3-week ground and air operations to capture Mazar-e Sharif, which would lead to the fall of Northern Afghanistan and eventually all of Afghanistan.

A. PROJECT BACKGROUND

GEN Tommy Franks, Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), in a 28 December 2001 letter to Dr. Tony Tether, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), explained that he wanted a reconstruction of events in Afghanistan:

Today we are engaged in a new network-centric war. It needs to be recorded and broken down for further research, development, and historical analysis. Thus my request to you is to reconstruct a view of this war...recommend the right scenario or chain of events for my approval.⁴

In February 2002, the DARPA/IDA team recommended the fall of Mazar-e Sharif as the "right scenario." In March 2002 CENTCOM approved the recommendation, stat-

¹ ODA 595 is part of the 5th Special Forces Group, 9th company [with three line companies (A, B, C) in a battalion, and three battalions in the 5th SFG], 5th Detachment. This also reflects that it is an element of C Company, 3d Battalion, 5th SFG

² Presentation to the Army Resource Management Conference, Denver Colorado, "Special Forces – Operation Enduring Freedom."

³ Naming convention for this paper is rank and first name for SOF military.

⁴ 28 December 2001 letter by GEN Franks, USCENTCOM, to Dr. Tony Tether, DARPA.

ing that the Battle for Mazar-e-Sharif “provides us with a view of a transformational battle that incorporates the application of technology and 21st Century operational fires by Special Forces fully integrated with indigenous opposition forces employing less than modern tactics and logistical support concepts.”⁵

B. PURPOSE

The objective of the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction was to “reconstruct salient aspects of a major Afghanistan campaign (i.e., Mazar-e Sharif) in virtual simulation to support historical analysis as well as further research and development.”⁶ The reconstruction depends on quality and detailed data, some of which simply were not available without “walking the ground” and talking to some of the key participants.

The purpose of the visit to Mazar-e Sharif and the Darya Suf was to:

- Validate/reconcile on-hand data and collect additional data by conducting a battle site survey. An accurate and credible ground picture requires a battle site survey, in this case walking the ground with elements of the original ODA to validate team movements, times, engagement areas, battle damage assessments (BDA), and terrain data, using Global Positioning System (GPS), video, photos, artifacts/remains, and to reconcile ODA team member recollection for record.
- Interview some of the key participants such as GEN Dostum, his subcommanders, and Taliban/Al Qaida defectors and detainees, and record and present all perspectives.

This publication supports the Operation Enduring Freedom battle reconstruction by documenting the battle site survey trip and presenting the results of the ground-force data reconciliation. The purpose of this publication is to provide the reconstruction-ist/analyst relevant and accurate ground-force data for reconstruction purposes and to highlight the contributions of the battle site survey to the ground-force data-collection effort.⁷ In addition, the publication provides battle site survey planning and preparation information that may be useful for later similar ventures. Information in this publication is organized in accordance with the various phases of the Mazar-e Sharif campaign.

⁵ March 2002 letter by LTG Delong, DCINC, CENTCOM to Dr. Tony Tether.

⁶ Project Assignment Number DA-3-2150, “Enduring Freedom Reconstruction.”

⁷ Classified air and ground data are discussed and presented in the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction DVD classified SECRET.

C. BATTLE SITE SURVEY—REQUEST AND APPROVAL

In April 2002 and again in June/July 2002, the IDA/DARPA team requested approval to conduct a battle site survey in order to reconcile conflicting data, fill in the voids where no data could be obtained, and validate existing data and templates.

CENTCOM's initial reluctance to approve the request and subsequently schedule the trip was based on a number of relevant concerns:

- The military had a multitude of competing requirements that had priority over the battle site survey. As an example, ODA 595 had training requirements they needed to complete to maintain skill currency, and the 5th Special Force Group as a whole was preparing for action in Iraq. In addition, conditions within Afghanistan during the summer and fall were not conducive to a visit.
- In August 2002, *Newsweek* reported that “Death by [conex] container” had killed approximately 1,000 Taliban prisoners as they were being transported from the Mazar-e Sharif area to Sheberghan in November 2001.⁸ There was no indication that the U.S. forces were aware of the atrocities. However, CENTCOM was sensitive that the presence of any U.S. research team in the Mazar-e Sharif area could erroneously be interpreted as related to the incident, in particular since the initial request indicated that the Battle Site Survey Team wanted to talk to former and current Taliban. CENTCOM asked that the team exclude any research that included a visit to the prison or discussions with prisoners.
- Violence in Afghanistan, and in particular northern Afghanistan, was still a weekly occurrence:

On 27 September 2002, *New York Times* reported, “The fighting, which started on Wednesday and lasted more than 24 hours, occurred in the remote mountains of Dar-I-Suf, about 60 miles south of Masar-i-Sharif.”⁹

In late October 2002, Reuters reported clashes between “Dostum’s and Atta’s forces in the Shulgareh area, about 25 miles southwest of Mazar-I Sharif. Residents of the area said seven people had been killed...six people were killed in fighting the previous day...Western observers have expressed

⁸ Babak Dehghanpisheh, John Barry, Roy Gutman, *Newsweek*, “The Death Convoy of Afghanistan,” 26 August 2002.

⁹ Gall, Carlottra, “Afghan Rivals Clash, Killing 17,” *New York Times*, 28 September 2002.

concern that the situation in the north could degenerate into renewed civil war if not checked.”¹⁰

- In mid November 2002, the Associated Press reported, “Forces loyal to Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum battled those of rival commander Gen. Atta Mohammed late Monday and early Tuesday in Masqsood [near Samangan].”¹¹

Finally, in late November 2002, the mission was approved. CPT Mark, SFC Bill, and SFC Vince were released to support the project, and DARPA orders were issued for IDA and DARPA team members to travel to Afghanistan from 2–18 December 2002.

D. PEOPLE AND PLACES (APPENDIX A)

The following provides the protocol for spelling the names of people and places, and titles are also discussed. Appendix A lists the people and places covered in this report and provides some background where appropriate.

- Locations—There are a number of spellings for each location. First preference was the Afghanistan Country Handbook, which lists CENTCOM-preferred spellings.
- Afghan Names—Translators provided the majority of spellings for the names of the Afghan people.
- ODA names—In accordance with a U.S. SOCOM preferred convention to minimize team member exposure, only rank (so the reader would recognize the military from the civilians) and first name is used. Ranks reflected service convention. For example, Staff Sergeant Chad is SSG Chad, which indicates he is a staff sergeant in the Army, but Staff Sergeant Matt is SSgt Matt indicating he is a staff sergeant in the Air Force.

E. SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT ALPHA

Before starting this venture, it is important to understand the structure of an ODA. One of the themes underlying Operation Enduring Freedom is the success of these “small, agile teams,” and the ODA is basic to understanding strategies and events leading to fall of Mazar-e Sharif.

¹⁰ “Afghan Warlords Agree on Disarmament in the North,” Reuters.com, 28 October 2002.

¹¹ Associated Press, “Two Combatants Killed in Afghanistan,” 19 November 2002.

The SFODA, or simply ODA, doctrinally consists of 12 soldiers: the Detachment Commander (Captain); his Assistant (Warrant Officer); an Operations Sergeant (E-8); an Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant (E-7); and two Weapons, Engineer, Medical, and Communications Sergeants (E-5 to E-7), as depicted in Figure I-1.




Figure I-1. Composition of an SFODA. (Source: Field Manual 3-05.20.)

In addition to having expertise in a discipline (engineers, weapons, medical, or communications), the soldiers must complete Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS), the Special Forces Qualification Course (“Q”); language school; and the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Course. Depending on the military occupational specialty (MOS) training (communications, medical, weapons, or engineer), soldiers can spend 10 to 16 months in training.¹² They are also cross trained in the other disciplines. This adds up to extensive training by the time a soldier joins a detachment. At

¹² Winter 2002, *Special Warfare*, PB 80-02-1.

minimum, a soldier is a sergeant when he enters qualification training. After the “Q” course and language training, a soldier normally has a minimum of 5 to 6 years in the Army. In the case of ODA 595, the average time in service was 14 years; the average age was 32, and the rank structure was one captain, one warrant officer, one Master Sergeant (MSG), seven sergeants first class (SFC), and two staff sergeants (SSG).

The structure of two medics, etc. and the organizational equipment allow the detachment to be split into an A team and a B team.

Two Air Force experts in close air support supported the ODA. One was an Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller (ETAC), primarily trained in close air support, and the second was a combat controller. Combat controllers are trained in a variety of skills, conventional and SOF, including air traffic control, air field survey, and military free fall, and they can receive additional training in close air support.

F. PUBLICATION STRUCTURE

Figure I-2 shows the structure of this publication. The most important chapter for the reconstruction is Chapter V, for observations and lessons is Chapter VI, and for future travelers and battle site surveys are Chapters II through IV. Details follow.

Planning, Preparation, Travel, and Battle Site Survey

Chapter II addresses the planning, preparation and travel to Mazar-e Sharif, to include the first few days of interviews prior to the Battle Site Survey.

Chapter III covers the Battle Site Survey: The Darya Suf—Valley of the Caves. It provides a day-to-day detailed account of the travel and discussions to include waypoint marking for photos, video, transcripts, and events. It starts as the team departs Mazar-e Sharif at noon on 8 December and concludes as the team finishes on 11 December with the survey of Tiangi and the Kafer Qalah and the interviews of CDR Kamal and GEN Habib Bullah.

Chapter IV provides post-battle site survey collection interviews of GEN Atta and CDR Ahmed Khan, descriptions of the events at Qala Jangi (actually outside the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction objectives, but an opportunity to capture information that may be required should the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction expand), and return travel events.

Introduction	Planning, Preparation, Travel, and Battle Site Survey	Data Indexing and Analysis
I. Introduction	II. Planning, preparation, travel and initial data collection	V. Enduring Freedom Reconstruction: Battle site survey and ground force data re- conciliation
	III. Battle site survey	
	IV. Post-battle site survey collection and travel	VI. Conclusions

Figure I-2. Publication Structure

Data Indexing and Analysis

Chapter V links the battle site survey to the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction by categorizing the information by phase for use in the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction product, addressing the validation and reconciliation of information, and highlighting those areas that are new as a result of the battle site survey.¹³

Chapter VI provides conclusions.

Combat Photographs

Service members provided the on-site combat photographs in this publication, primarily located in Chapters II and V.

¹³ The reconciliation of information occurred during January and February 2003 in several meetings after the battle site survey.

II. PLANNING, PREPARATION, TRAVEL, AND INITIAL DATA COLLECTION

This chapter provides information on the team's preparation to visit Afghanistan and the various actions required to support the Battle Site Survey. It includes home station preparation, travel to Afghanistan, preparation at Mazar-e Sharif for travel into the Darya Suf, and a summary of initial interviews.

A. PREPARATION FOR DEPARTURE

Preparation for the trip started in April 2002, when the first request was submitted to CENTCOM. The 23 July 2002 version, with modifications (Appendix B), was approved in November 2002. The minimum number of US people required for the Battle Site Survey Team included the Ground Data Collector Team lead (also principal interviewer), a videographer/cameraman, and a knowledgeable member from ODA 595, preferably CPT Mark. Other critical people included guides, security forces, and translators. The Battle Site Survey Team planned on obtaining them in Mazar-e Sharif, hopefully through the U.S. ground elements at Mazar-e Sharif and GEN Dostum. Local guides knowledgeable of mines and booby traps in the area and local security forces familiar with the local area and various villages were also required. Preparation for travel included obtaining visas, immunizations, invitational travel orders, funds, and personal and professional equipment, and development of the collection plan with basic data and Battlesite Templates for validation. One area not detailed below is the tremendous amount of work that MAJ Dan Striedieck, Project Officer, J8, CENTCOM, performed coordinating the trip with CENTCOM headquarters, overseas with CJTF 180, and through USSOCOM with elements of USASOC. A number of people questioned the priority of the mission relative to other CENTCOM missions. Many suggested postponing the trip until the spring, citing better weather and a more stable Afghanistan. The spring, however, would have been too late because the project was to be completed by March, and CENTCOM would have other priorities, such as Iraq. MAJ Dan Striedieck worked hard to staff the request, obtain theater clearances, and coordinate military travel.

1. Passports and Visas

Fortunately, we had learned the procedures for obtaining “official passports” during coordination of a trip in September 2002 to Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, UAE, and Kuwait. The critical requirement was obtaining visas for Saudi Arabia. The team couldn’t get a visa for Saudi without an official passport. The Saudi Embassy also said the only person that could vouch for the team from the Pentagon was “Betty” at the Pentagon Passport Office (located in Rosslyn). Betty was invaluable in providing guidance and working the requests. As the sponsoring agent, DARPA provided the DD Form 1056s, “Authorization to Apply for a ‘No Fee’ Passport and/or Request for Visa.” Once provided the 1056s and visa requests for the various countries, Betty worked her magic, correcting the visas (only someone with her experience could correctly interpret the information requirements, which were different for each country) and completing the endorsements. After she provided the endorsement letters, the packets were hand carried to the various departments and embassies. It may seem trivial, but we mention the passport and visa process because it has been a showstopper for other contractors seeking official visit authorization to Asia. One caution on visas, there are countries that periodically state they will not issue a visa to a passport holder that contains an Israeli visa stamp. Syria has enforced this policy and Kuwait issued a prohibition (found on its Web pages, but if in doubt, the embassy can confirm) during trip planning.

2. Immunizations

The authority for immunizations is the Center for Disease Control (CDC) Web page and your doctor. For a contractor, there are no requirements for immunizations, only recommendations (which in most cases it is wise to follow). They included a Polio Booster, Hepatitis A and B shots, a Typhoid shot, and Mefloquine Pills for Malaria.

3. Invitational Travel Orders

Invitational travel orders are the sponsoring agency’s responsibility. This enabled the team to billet and eat in government facilities—that is important overseas. It also allowed the team to ride in government transport—that is also important since military air (MilAir) may be the only means of reaching some areas. However, there was a problem. Because the orders read, “at no expense to the government,” there was no government fund cite. Since our travel was at no expense to the government, the Air Mobility Terminal at Baltimore Washington International (BWI) did not know how to bill it; in addi-

tion, government credit cards were not accepted to cover the expenses. The travel orders were reworked at BWI under Air Mobility Command's guidance to reflect the fund cite. The original orders were acceptable at all other locations.

4. Funds

In addition to funds for individual needs and emergencies, CPT Mark recommended taking approximately \$20,000 in small bills (\$10s, \$20s, and \$50s) for security forces (for the trip and local security near the villages), guides for the entire trip and in the local areas (the local guides knew where the mines and booby traps were located), translators, vehicles, gas, *in-extremis* situations, etc. He also recommended that the \$20s portray "Mr. Bighead." It seems that Andrew Jackson on the older \$20 bill has a smaller head than on the newer \$20s, and some of the Afghans would not accept the older \$20s. The \$20,000 was split among the team members.

5. Equipment

Appendix C lists personal and professional equipment taken on the trip. Personal equipment included the obvious field equipment for winter in Afghanistan—boots, winter clothes, sleeping bag, water containers, etc. The items were distributed between an A bag (duffel or gym) that would remain in the vehicle until the evening when we stopped and a B Bag (back pack or day pack) for any day or short trips where we might have had to leave the vehicle. Since most camping gear comes in fluorescents colors, the only caution issued was to use subdued colors—that is, "no target colors"—as we moved on the ground during the various site surveys. Other personal gear included body armor and cold weather gear, which CENTCOM provided.

Professional items included survey, data collection, and camera equipment. The team obtained Certificates of Registration from U.S. Customs Service before departure to certify the origin of the equipment. The purpose was to facilitate the return of the equipment through customs at the end of the trip.

We chose the Garmin GPS because that is what the ODA used. The Battle Site Survey Team carried, in order of capability (low to high), the Garmin E-Trex Vista, the Garmin III plus, and the Garmin V. In hindsight, the preferable model would have been the E-Trex Vista because that was the model that the ODA team used during Operation Enduring Freedom. Simply, Battle Site Survey Team members would have been better prepared to answer questions on ODA team GPS capabilities (primarily targeting ques-

tions) had they worked with the E-Trex. To respond to those questions, the manual (downloaded from the Web) was used or CPT Mark was asked.

The laptop computer loaded with World Map Source and FalconView accepted and displayed various maps of Afghanistan. The two most used were the 1:100,000 and 1:250,000. This capability was extremely important in recreating the ODA's movements. Although those maps only contained some of the very basic road, water, and town features, that was better than nothing for basic situational awareness. The ODA used FalconView to plot the location of events and units.¹ FalconView also provides the capability to import GPS plots for routes and waypoints. FalconView was the JSOTF map/navigation software of choice to display operational/situation updates.

When it came to the video equipment, the two main concerns were portability and the potential for equipment failure due to the dust. The fine dust of Afghanistan wreaks havoc on professional computer and video equipment, and replacements were not common items at the market in Mazar-e Sharif.

The choice for professional video was the Sony DSR PD-150 camera. With 3 CCDs for better color and the ability to record in the higher quality DVCAM mode, it had everything needed in a camera, the exception being that it only accepts MiniDV tapes, which hold just 40 minutes of video in DVCAM mode. That aside, it was smaller and lighter than other professional cameras on the market, making it the ideal camera for the field. In preparation for the worst-case scenario, a second, identical professional camera was packed in a hard case as a backup. A soft cover was purchased for the main camera to help protect against dust and light rain.

The complete video kit included a tripod and lighting equipment, which was mainly for use in interviews. Peripherals, such as extension cords, a converter plug, a surge protector, and rechargeable batteries were packed.

In addition, Ward Page, DARPA PM for the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction, brought a couple of smaller Sony MiniDV Handcam type camcorders. They proved a good choice since they used the same type tape as the professional camera, they provided another camera angle, and, on more than one occasion, during those times the Battle Site

¹ ODA 595 did not take a computer with them into the Darya Suf, hence did not have that capability until later. But the JSOTF used FalconView to display ODA, Northern Alliance, and Northern Alliance disposition and activities. Chapter 6 will discuss maps available to the ODA.

Survey Team split to survey different sites, they provided video capability for the second site.

Still photos were shot using digital as primary and film as a backup. The main digital camera was the Nikon Coolpix 950 Digital Camera. Whenever possible, photos were loaded from the camera to the laptop PCs as an immediate backup to the digital file. The backup film camera was the Canon ELPH LT. The convenience of the drop-in Advanced Photo System film made it easy to change rolls quickly and keep dust and moisture out of the camera.

Probably the most interesting little gadget carried was the Phraselator. Designed around a handheld computer, the Phraselator is designed to help the user translate common phrases into foreign languages. Expecting to meet people who didn't speak any English, and not knowing the availability of translators, John Frost researched the options. While scouring the Web for an English-to-Dari translation dictionary (which apparently does not exist), he came across the Phraselator. Developed by Ace Sarich for DARPA, it is capable of translating predetermined phrases from English into any language module loaded on the handheld device. The model carried by the Battle Site Survey Team, which was already in use by troops on the ground in Afghanistan, was loaded with the standard Dari, Urdu, Pashto, and Arabic languages.

There were several ways to translate phrases. Using a stylus, simply scroll through the list of phrases and select one for the Phraselator to read aloud. The user can also speak the phrase into the microphone, wait for it to display (as it interpreted the phrase), and select it. As a third option the user can set the machine to repeat the phrase out loud immediately after he says it. The third option should be avoided by all but the most seasoned users as, in one experiment, after saying in English, "Do you understand this language?" the machine quickly blurted out in Dari, "Halt! Or I'll release my dog!" The stylus was the preferred approach.

As it turned out, the Battle Site Survey Team had access to three human translators. At least one was always available, so the Phraselator didn't get much use in country. It did, however, come in handy on the long flight over, as it provided an opportunity to learn some basic phrases and to become familiar with the overall sound of the language. Dari was the most common language spoken in the areas visited.

Additional items of professional gear included a magnetic compass,² cassette recorders for interviews and discussions not on video, Motorola Talk-about's that were valuable for communicating during convoy or split operations, and 1:250,000 and 1:100,000 paper maps of the various areas.

6. Public Affairs/Operations Security

There were reporters and others who asked why we were in Mazar-e Sharif. The Battle Site Survey Team's first preference was to say nothing, but if pressed, the story line was,

To recreate engagements that led up to the fall of Mazar-e Sharif. Mazar-e Sharif, in retrospect, was the linchpin to the north and eventually all of Afghanistan. The key to the fall of Mazar-e Sharif is the battles that took place in the Darya Suf during the period 20 Oct to 6 November, with the final engagements in the Tiangi Pass on 8/9 November.

The above statement was a simple, abbreviated truth. CPT Mark also cautioned us to stay away from discussions about the prisoners. In addition, he provided background for the trip (cultural sensitivities, information on the various factions operating in the area, rules of engagement, situational awareness, medical emergencies, etc.) and outlined other ground rules for the Battle Site Survey Team's activities in Afghanistan. These topics are discussed later.

7. Collection Plan

The Battle Site Survey collection plan, a mini version of the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction collection plan, focused on the ground aspects of the campaign, such as U.S., Northern Alliance, and Taliban force composition, disposition, movements, etc. The collection plan included the SOF/Ground Force Information Tracking Worksheet (see Figure II-1), questionnaires, a site-survey checklist to ensure consistency in collecting data at the various sites, GPS coordinates from the ODA, photographs, and battle site templates developed from interviews for reconciliation.

² The compass provided by some of the GPS receivers relied on movement. For example, it used tracking data from GPS to provide direction. As a result, if one was standing on an area and turned to face various directions, those directions might not be displayed accurately.

Site surveys, GPS coordinates, and photographs are discussed below; the Battle site templates are addressed in Chapter V. But the first topic for discussion is the Area of Operation.

Request for Information -- Status as of Nov 02	Source	Rqst'd	Rcv'd	% cover	Op/CI	Interim Product	Action?
2. How was the ODA organized to support MeS?	Team Interviews;	Feb 02	Apr 02			Spread sheets:	Final
a. Team Composition	ODA Briefs;	*	*	100	Closed	"Who's Who"	"
(1) Cell breakdown	JSOTF Changeover	*	*	100	Closed	C3 matrix	"
(2) Callsigns	briefings; iMrchat;	*	*	100	Closed		"
b. Equipment	Photos	Apr 02	May 02	85	Closed		analysis
(1) Communications	"	*	*	80	Open	line/block	"
(2) Maps	"	*	*	100	Open	Battle Book	Final
(3) GPS/location aids & Targeting Equipment	"	*	*	100	Closed	updates	"
4. Team Locations/times	Garmin GPS, team	Apr 02	May 02	85	Open	Mapex	Battlesite
a. Insertions	reports, iMrchat	*	*	55	Open	"	Survey
b. Movement	ATOs, Misrchat	*	*	85	Open	"	"
8. Northern Alliance		Apr 02	*	40	Open	Mapex and Battle	Battle
a. Who were NA commanders in the area?	intsums; Sitrep	*	*	80	Open	Book	Site
What were their affiliations, backgrounds?	ODA, JSCF	*	*				Survey;
b. What type of forces did each command to include composition, disposition, strength, morale	CEM, COM staff and NA interviews	*	*	30	Open	"	interview
c. How were they equipped, what were their missions, how well did they perform those missions?	"	*	*	30	Open	"	NA Cdrs
9. Other:							
a. What transpired between GEN Franks and Dostum prior to the 4-6 November battle? Was it influential in the campaign?	Interview GEN Franks and GEN Dostum	Oct 02	*	30	Open	Battle Book	CbtCdr/Dostum
b. Were Joint operations an issue? Were inter-agency operations an issue? Describe.	Interviews: OGA, CCT's, ODA,	May 02	*	75	Open	"	OGA
c. CCT's vs OD's -- GFAC capability differences?	JSOTF, CbtCdr	Apr 02	Apr 02	85	Closed	"	Final

Figure II-1. SOF/Ground Force Information Tracking Worksheet (Extract)

a. Area of Operations

Figure II-2 provides the operational area of interest and the seven phases of the reconstruction—from the insertion at LZ Albatross, through the Darya Suf and Balkh River Valley, through the Tiangi to Mazar-e Sharif.

b. ODA 595 GPS Coordinates

The ODA's GPS coordinates, marked during their 20 October 2001 to 10 November 2001 movement through the Darya Suf to Mazar-e Sharif, were downloaded from the ODA's GPS receivers. Those GPS coordinates were used as a baseline for the battle site survey. Figure II-3 shows a screen capture of those waypoints on "MapSource—Worldmap." The coordinates were inserted into FalconView and provided the basis for site surveys. Those coordinates were also loaded into the GPS receivers before departure so they could be used for navigation. However, because the primary purpose was to validate ground locations and movements, the Battle Site Survey Team was sensitive to accuracies and could re-plot the coordinates if a more accurate location was found.





Figure II-2. Mazar-e Sharif—Area of Operations and Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Phases

c. Site Surveys

The following procedures were used for conducting the surveys:

Site Identification—At each location GPS coordinates were recorded with the site name (e.g., Cobaki OP, Tiangi, Kafer Qalah, etc.) Shorthand was used because some of the receivers were limited to recording eight characters. Hence Co for Cobaki, Ch for Chapchal, and any additional identifiers such as OP (observation post), WP (waypoint), etc.

Site Description—The site was then described for the record in operational terms. For example, “This is GEN Dostum’s command post on 8 November. This is where he briefed his commanders on his strategy for Tiangi.”



Interview—The basic interrogatives were covered during the interview or discussion. For example, What was the significance of the event at this location? What was its relationship to other events and locations? A video camera was preferred for recording the interview, if available. If not, a cassette recorder and still camera were used. If a video camera was used, the interview started with an identification of the interviewee and his or her image. In addition, the video camera was pointed in the direction the interviewee was pointing to or addressing.

Photographs/Imagery—A 360-degree camera sweep of the area with direction (magnetic compass) of terrain or manmade features was noted for the record. This was normally done at the end of the interview because the ending 360-degree sweep could incorporate comments by the interviewee. However, weather or quick movement through

areas sometimes required the 360-degree sweep to be done whenever possible. This was easy with the video camera, because the information could be recorded right on the tape: “We are located at Dostum’s headquarters, looking 030 degrees into the Tiangi Pass, as we move clockwise...” It was more problematic for photos, because the information had to be written or recorded on cassette and later matched with the appropriate photo. Perspectives, both to and from a location, were also important. For example, What did the position look like from the Taliban position, or from the higher ground, or from other friendly positions? Footage of the routes in and out of a position was also important. Recording the significant landmarks was critical for later reconstruction. For example, “At 067 degrees is the notch in the hills where Commander Lal’s forces came through during his attack, at 153 degrees is Oimatan where 02D was located, and at 224 degrees is Shammallak, where Fakir gathered troops for the movement to Baluch.”

Validation—Ground force positions, Battle Site Templates, and annotated maps and photos created before the trip required validation. Figure II-4 shows the annotated photograph of Burro DZ.

Investigative Leads—The survey should provide the reconstructionist investigative leads. For example, if a previous interview adds to understanding the events at a certain site, then reference the interview.

Although not part of the site survey checklist, the nightly protocol included changing batteries and charging the rechargeables when possible. Auto chargers were used for the GPS and camera equipment; surge protectors were used with house electricity to protect the equipment. Photos were downloaded at least every evening. With MiniDV tapes the standard protocol was to store the tapes (in their original wrappers) in Ziploc bags³ until ready for use and carry a second bag for storing used tapes. Any chance to switch out all of the used tapes with new tapes was a must. If someone got into a discussion or a critical area was approached while away from the vehicles, several tapes and multiple rolls of film could be consumed quickly. Depending on the video camera, each tape only lasted 40 minutes to an hour. Each roll of APS film only had 25 shots and, when a 360-degree panorama takes between 12 and 16 shots, the film is used at an amazing rate. Fortunately, both media types were small.

³ A must for most materials to protect against dust and precipitation.



Figure II-4. Drop Zone Burro

B. DEPARTURE AND TRAVEL TO AFGHANISTAN

The Battle Site Survey Team, with members (Appendix D) from MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (USCENTCOM), Fort Campbell, Kentucky (5th Special Forces Group/USASOC/USSOCOM), and the Northern Virginia area (DARPA and IDA), met at the Baltimore-Washington International (BWI) Airport on the afternoon of 2 December 2002 for a 2030 flight aboard an Air Mobility Command (AMC) charter. After resolving issues with invitational travel orders for the IDA members (discussed above) and with NATO Travel Orders for the military members, the Battle Site Survey Team was on its way to Incirlik, Turkey, via Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

At Incirlik, 4 December, the night before departure into Afghanistan, CPT Mark prepped the Battle Site Survey Team and set the ground rules for conduct in Afghanistan:

- Battle Site Survey Team activities would be coordinated with the various factions (Dostum, Uzbek; Mohaqiq, Hazara; and Atta, Tajik) through the

ODA on the ground (ODA 2014), because the Battle Site Survey Team was working in their area of responsibility. In addition, a balance of attention needed to be provided to each of the factions—with particular sensitivity to Atta.

- The survey would start in the Dehi area—Dehi was a friction point for all three factions.
- CPT Mark would check on humanitarian aid. There was probably no humanitarian aid delivered to the Darya Suf since the ODA was there in November 2001. It would be helpful to see if humanitarian aid could be delivered. A Los Angeles Times article, “Empty US Promises Linger in Afghan Minds,” cites interviews with residents of the “Dara-I Suf” who were complaining that they had fully supported U.S. and Northern Alliance forces in the area, but had received nothing in return. Locals claimed that their support included “translators, soldiers, guides, and cooks” and making sure that “‘Baba John’ and the other Special Forces had the best caves, along with rugs to line them.”⁴
- Before entry into the Darya Suf, the ODA would develop and brief plans for communications, medical evacuation, evasive plan of action and fire support.
- OPSEC procedures included naming conventions—first names only and no rank.
- Rules of engagement were to be briefed upon arrival in Mazar-e Sharif.
- Maintain situational awareness—

Stay together as a group, minimum two-man rule—keep “gun toters” with you.

Read the local populace—be friendly. Afghan custom is patience and “In’Shallah”—If Allah wills it, it will happen.

Build additional lead-time into interviews for “nothing talk” (conversational pleasantries) before interviews.

Watch where you’re walking—beware of surface mines. Painted rocks mark mined areas or unexploded ordnance, but not all areas are marked! The Battle Site Survey Team may not go into an area if there is snow and the ground is not visible.

Beware of celebratory fire. It is common in the area, especially during celebrations after Ramadan.

⁴ Jeffrey Gentleman, “Empty US Promises Linger in Afghan Minds,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 2002.

- Maintain perspective. Always be aware of “the threat and where the threat is coming from.” Large bands of Taliban live in the area, and the IMU, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, works in Northern Afghanistan.
- Take no high risks. Potential attack scenarios include
Drive-by shooting.
Planned ambush using mines and rocket propelled grenades (RPG).
Car bombs. Don’t just get into vehicles and drive away. The bombs are pretty crude, but they are effective; be sure to check your vehicle first.
- Do not refer to GEN Dostum as a Warlord—he would be offended. Dostum comes from Dost, which means “friend”; Dostum means “my friend.” Dushman (long u) means “enemy.”
- Avoid any war crimes discussions.

On 5 December, at the Incirlik Passenger Terminal preparing to depart, the Battle Site Survey Team had the opportunity to meet with Air Force Capt Black and LtCol Morrow (Gallery Photo G1422, Appendix G). Capt Black was a navigator with the AC 130H and assigned to the 16th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Lt Col Morrow was the Fire Support Officer with the AC 130H, also assigned to the 16th SOS at Hurlburt. Both had arrived at Karshi Khanabad, Uzbekistan on 25 November 2001 and immediately after crew rest received a mission (they were in separate AC 130s) to support ground teams—one of which was ODA 595—in Konduz. Capt Black said they had fired 100 rounds of 105 mm and 400 rounds of 40 mm during the engagements at Konduz.⁵ During GEN Dostum’s negotiations with Mullah Faizal and Noori, the Taliban Minister of Defense and Taliban Commander of Northern Forces respectively, for their surrender at Konduz, GEN Dostum heard Capt Black (a female) on the radio. He turned to Faizal and Noori and, referring to the female voice as the “Angel of Death,” said, “The Americans have sent their women to kill you.” Both Mullahs immediately surrendered, not wanting the embarrassment of being killed by a woman.

That evening the Battle Site Survey Team departed Incirlik for Bagram, Afghanistan, via Karshi Khanabad. At Karshi Khanabad there was a 2-hour delay to the flight plan, so the crew shut down the C-17 and the passengers moved to a warming tent. It was pitch black, the wind was blowing, and the outside air temperature was 2 degrees Fahrenheit. The tent was chilly but better than outside. It provided a momentary perspective on

⁵ See Appendix F, Notes 1.

what the troops might have endured in support of regional operations. Two hours later the passengers reboarded the C-17 for the next leg of the trip. The passengers were informed that they would have to stay seated during the hour-long flight to Bagram since it was considered a Combat Zone. Approximately 1/2 hour into the flight, the crew shut off all lights and switched to dim red lights, faintly illuminating the C-17's cargo bay. The crew put on night vision goggles and continued their routines as the plane occasionally pitched hard from side to side on its way in to Bagram.

After landing the lights remained a dim red. The cargo bay door opened and a man walked in carrying a green glow stick to escort the passengers to the terminal. When the Battle Site Survey Team stepped off the C-17, Bagram Air Base was in near complete darkness. There were a few glow sticks moving around the runway and the sky was cloudless with stars visible down to the mountainous horizon. After checking in and getting a brief lecture about life on the base and rules of engagement (see Appendix E) the Battle Site Survey Team collected their bags and spent the night of 5 December 2002 in the transient area at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.

C. AFGHANISTAN

The first few days in Afghanistan were devoted to checking in with the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180 at Bagram Air Base; traveling to Mazar-e Sharif; meeting the various players—battle site survey participants, support personnel, and Mazar-e Sharif veterans; and preparing for the trip into the Darya Suf.

1. Bagram Air Base

On 6 December the Battle Site Survey Team visited the JSOTF at Bagram for an update on events in the Mazar-e Sharif area and received cold-weather clothing and body armor from their supply section. Later, BG Mixon, Chief of Staff, CJTF 180, met the Battle Site Survey Team at the air-base transient area before departure for a quick “glad hand” and discussion on mission and support requirements. The C-130 departed Bagram (Figure II-5) at approximately 1300 for a 1-hour flight to the Mazar-e Sharif civilian airport.



Figure II-5. Departing Bagram Airbase

2. Mazar-e Sharif

At 1400, 6 December 2002, the Battle Site Survey Team arrived at Mazar-e Sharif, was greeted by ODA 2014 team members, and transported to the ODA house. The first order of business was the security briefing and instructions on what was expected of each person during an attack. MSG Woody then informed the Battle Site Survey Team that GEN Dostum fully supported the mission, would meet with the Battle Site Survey Team that night at his guest house in Sheberghan, and would accompany the battle site survey. This was much, much more than expected and solved the major issues of security forces, guides, and translators. In addition, GEN Dostum provided the food and fuel for the journey. After dropping equipment at the ODA house the Battle Site Survey Team drove to Sheberghan (a 1-hour drive west of Mazar-e Sharif) to meet GEN Dostum. His guest house (Figure II-6) was of great quality. Even with frozen pipes and little or no heat, the accommodations were much more than expected anywhere in Afghanistan. GEN Dostum hosted the evening meal, introduced some of the major participants in the battles for Mazar-e Sharif, and then ran a video (copy provided to the Battle Site Survey Team) portraying his battle through the Darya Suf.



Figure II-6. GEN Dostum's Guest House

3. Initial Interviews

On 7 and 8 December 2002 interviews were conducted at Sheberghan and on 9 December, before the Battle Site Survey Team's departure for the Darya Suf, interviews were conducted in Mazar-e Sharif. The following paragraphs summarize seven interviews. Transcripts for each of the interviews and discussions are indexed in Appendix F. The index is used to reference transcripts, video logs, and notes within this paper. Those transcripts, numbered 1 through 32, are located in a separate document.

The index for transcripts:

- Provides an audit to transcriber records and video and cassette tapes.
- Lists the interviewees.
- Briefly comments on the contents of the transcript.
- Rates the quality of the transcript, from 1 (poor) to 5 (very good) in two areas:

The first number rates the video and audio quality of the transcript.

The second number rates the contribution of the information to the reconstruction.

- Indicates which phase of the battle the transcript supports.

a. Commander Lal⁶

Commander Lal (Figure II-7) started fighting the Taliban in the Sar-I Pol area to the west. He primarily conducted guerilla warfare, ambushing the Taliban to sieze weapons and ammunition. In 1999 he fought in the Bamian region and later in the Balkhob area and then moved to the Darya Suf in the Summer of 2001 to link up with GEN Dostum.

When asked if he had received military training such as GEN Dostum had with the Soviets, CDR Lal was adamant, “Let me tell you that I’ve been fighting for 24 years so this I think a big school, maybe bigger than any military colleges in the world, so I know how to fight, I know the tactics of war very well!” He also mentioned that, while others may have fled to other countries during the Taliban reign, “I was the only one who stayed in country.” CDR Lal made the point several times that GEN Dostum fought alongside and led his men at war and was very good at briefing his commanders on the strategy and what to expect. When asked the difference between the Taliban and Al Qaida, he said, “There is no good enemy, they are all bad.” Ammunition was the critical supply item. CDR Lal bought it by the weight. The night before Mazar fell (9 November 2001) CDR Lal bought 5,000 rounds. Horses were another critical item. He said that 30 horses and many people died as they fought thru the Tiangi on 9 November 2001.⁷ CDR Lal also said that he could not confirm stories of taunting the Taliban into revealing their locations. The rumored example was of a Northern Alliance soldier’s taunt to Taliban, “Did the bombs kill you this time?” Taliban response, “No they missed me by 200 meters to the east!” But he added, “It was quite ob-



Figure II-7. CDR Lal

⁶ Transcript 1 (T1).

⁷ Tanscript 2, 2A, 3.

vious...where the enemy was situated.”

b. Commander Haji Chari⁸



Figure II-8. CDR Haji Chari

CDR Haji Chari (Figure II-8) spent the majority of his time with the Tiger 02C element, at Charsu on the 5th of November, and on the Kafer Qalah on 9 November. He described the initial fighting on 5 November 2001 from their initial positions near Charsu. After an hour they moved forward and found that “tens of hundreds of Taliban are approaching our position and surrounding us!” He contacted GEN Dostum and CDR Ahmed Khan, then opened up a corridor for the team to escape. The Taliban “didn’t care about the air strikes. Even though...some of them were killed by the air strikes, they didn’t care, they kept coming.”

Finally, he was able to carry the team’s equipment on horseback as they withdrew to a ditch. They then made it back to their original observation post. When asked about obtaining intelligence on the enemy, CDR Haji Chari said they “used many methods. The first one was finding out the enemy’s plans through radios...we had solved their passwords so we could understand if there was any attack...we [also] had some mobile people who were going alongside the battlefields and coming toward us and giving us their reports.” He repeated what the Battle Site Survey Team had heard from many of the interviewees—that it was frustrating that “Afghanistan had become a harbor of terrorists and outlaws, using the name of

Islam...what they were doing was contrary to Islam.”

c. Commander Fakir⁹

CDR Fakir (Figure II-9) referred to himself as GEN Dostum’s Deputy or Executive Officer (XO) because after the meetings, GEN Dostum would expect him to coordi-

⁸ Transcripts 2, 2A, 3. These provide good information on the 5 and 9 November engagements.

⁹ Transcript 4, 5, and 5A and Video Tape DV 6 and 7.

nate the operations. He was also responsible for reconnaissance of the objective and knowing the enemy forces' strength and disposition before the battles.

CDR Fakir talked of the strikes and described the precision before the ODA arrived as “throwing the bombs randomly...and there was no coordination from the ground...the targets were hit quite precisely after their arrival.”

He described his impressions the first time he saw an aerial refueling:

What I'm going to tell you is the most interesting I think. He has seen a big plane being chased by five small jets. And he calls Mr. Dostum and tell him that they are hijacking the big plane with five small jets, then Mr. Dostum calls Mark, and asks what's happening? And then he said no, the big plane is getting fuel to the jets.¹⁰

Concerning Taliban tactics, CDR Fakir said that the Taliban would leave their positions when the B-52s attacked and then after the attack run back to their positions. The Northern Alliance tactic was to attack the other position after the bombardment. CDR Fakir said he could hear the Taliban fear of the B-52s over the radios.

Due to GEN Dostum's successes, the Taliban moved forces from other areas to support their fight in the Darya Suf. The Northern Alliance exploited their successes by pursuing the enemy into the Keshendeh areas and up through the Shulgareh.

In the Tiangi, GEN Dostum was positioned at the top of the Kafer Qalah to organize the troops and spot the Taliban. He verified that there were “30, 35 soldiers lost” and said, “I can see BM-21s, they are not mines, these are 21s.”¹¹ The transcript provides good information on the Tiangi engagement.

¹⁰ Transcript 4, 5, 5A.

¹¹ A BM-21 is a Soviet-made multiple rocket launcher.

d. GEN Ak-yasin¹²

GEN Ak-yasin (Figure II-10) is currently the border Commander on the Afghanistan/Uzbekistan border. At the time of the Darya Suf battles, he was a subcommander of Lal and had 40 infantrymen and 60 horsemen. He provided pictures of the early days in Balkhob and the Darya Suf. Ak-yasin fought for 23 years and recalls extreme shortages of ammo. He needed ammo more than water or food, although there were shortages of both. He paid 300,000 Afghani for buckets of water and drank from the same buckets as the horses. He used to look for ammo on the ground and clean up the rounds for use. Ak-yasin traced the battle from the Safid Kotah area thru the Darya Suf. He recalls strong resistance at the Boybe Che and Tiangi areas. He asked that the Americans not leave and forget about them.



Figure II-10. CDR Ak-yasin

e. Commander Ali Sarwar¹³



Figure II-11. CDR Ali Sarwar

Commander Ali Sarwar (Figure II-11), currently the commander of Le Wa 114 (Division 114) was a subcommander of Lal's and had 40 horsemen and 20 dismounted soldiers during the battle of the Darya Suf. Ali Sarwar repeated what Ak-yasin said about ammo shortages and the basic flow of the battle from the Darya Suf through the Balkh River Valley to Mazar-e Sharif. Although CDR Fakir said that the losses in the Darya Suf were from BM 21s (per GEN Dostum it was the BM 21 and not landmines), both GEN Ak-yasin and CDR Ali Sarwa indicated there were a lot of mines in the Tiangi area.

¹² Transcript 5, 5A, 6, 6A and 7 and Video Tape DV 9.

¹³ Transcript 7 and Video Tape DV 9.

f. GEN Morta Sar¹⁴

GEN Morta Sar (Figure II-12) was GEN Mohaqiq's commander in the Darya Suf and is currently the commander of the 38th Division. The significance of GEN Morta Sar interviewing early and then accompanying us to the Darya Suf was that he represented the Hazara people, a minority in Afghanistan. GEN Dostum was very sensitive of the need to include GEN Mohaqiq's people on the discussions since part of his leadership challenge was to bring all the factions together. Morta Sar provided a good account of the abuses suffered by the Hazara Shia under the Taliban rule and said that over 2,000 homes had been destroyed in the Safid Kotah area during the 4 years before the November 2001 victories in the Darya Suf. He also provided information on the engagements at Beshcam and Chapchal. He said they had attacked Beshcam from several directions and had captured it from the top (north). GEN Dostum's forces then moved on Chapchal with approximately 1,000 men/horsemen from the back (southwest). He estimated that 1,000 Taliban—mostly Pakistani—were killed or captured.



Figure II-12. CDR Morta Sar

g. Commander Haji Muhammed Abdu¹⁵



Figure II-13. CDR Abdu

Commander Haji Muhammed Abul (Figure II-13), is currently Mazar-e Sharif Deputy Mayor for Mohaqiq, but he accompanied Mohaqiq during the war. Commander Abdu described the beginning of battles in the Darya Suf. Three anti-Taliban groups were assembled in the Darya Suf: the Jammiat with 1,000–1,500 horsemen, GEN Dostum with 800–900 horsemen, and the Wahdats (Hazara), the strongest, with 2,000 men. Commander Abdu said there were four things that made the missions successful: uniting the people of Afghanistan, taking out the Taliban Air Force, American air support/air attack, and putting U.S. forces on the ground. Commander Abdu related two very important events during the war—both re-

¹⁴ Transcript 7, 7A, and 8A and Video Tape DV 9, 10, and 11.

¹⁵ Transcript 8A.

lated to precision targeting. The first was the destruction of enemy artillery on a very rainy night before the next day's battle (he couldn't remember the day, but his description seems to be one of the close air support preparation days for Chapchal). They were impressed that the ground forces could relay the locations and the aircraft could precisely hit the target. The second was the targeting of the bridge at Pole Baraq. He said Taliban morale was very high before the bridge was taken out. The bridge was located in very difficult terrain and they thought it was impossible to take it out. The Taliban were amazed that "someone from the States could come to Afghanistan, not knowing the country or the landscape," and destroy that bridge with precision munitions. They couldn't believe it, and "Taliban morale went down, way, way down." The bridge was over the river on one of their main resupply routes. He added that was one of the reasons why the Taliban retreated. Figure II-14 shows a picture of the area and the rebuilt bridge.



Figure II-14. Bridge in the Vicinity of Pol-e Baraq

4. Afghan Sports, Memorials, Heroes, and Legends

While in Sheberghan, GEN Dostum provided Battle Site Survey Team members an opportunity to see Buzkashi and visit the memorial cemetery.



Figure II-15. Buzkashi Intermission—Camel Fights. Sequence clockwise from top left

Buzkashi is the Afghan National sport. It is like rugby on horseback, but instead of a ball they use a headless goat. The intermission entertainment was just as traditional—camel and dog fights. Photographs of a Buzkashi game are posted in Chapter III; photographs of the camel match are shown in Figure II-15.

After the Buzkashi match, GEN Dostum, at his guesthouse courtyard, provided an hour long brief using a large Russian 1:50,000 map (Figure II-16).

During the interviews at Sheberghan, CPT Mark and some of the Battle Site Survey Team members visited the memorial cemetery, recently dedicated to Afghan locals that lost their lives fighting the Taliban/Al Qaida (Figure II-17). GEN Dostum had promised that those Sheberghan residents that died during the war fighting the Taliban would be brought back to Sheberghan for burial.



Figure II-16. GEN Dostum's Mazar-e Sharif Strategy Brief



Figure II-17. Sheberghan Memorial Cemetery

At the site stood a 20-foot poster atop a 50-foot pair of poles depicting CPT Mark, Lieutenant Colonel Max, and GEN Dostum at a table strategizing the war (Figure II-18). These posters (in 8 × 10 size) were located throughout the town and displayed at Qala Jangi (a large one at the entrance to one of the courtyards and a multitude of smaller

ones) for the Michael Spann Memorial (see Chapter IV). CPT Mark and ODA 595 were truly heroes-to-become-legends in Mazar-e Sharif.



Figure II-18. CPT Mark Standing Next to Billboard Depicting Him, GEN Dostum, and LTC Max Planning the Campaign

On the evening of 7 December 2002, the Battle Site Survey Team drove back to the ODA house in Mazar-e Sharif, and at noon on 8 December the Battle Site Survey Team departed for the Darya Suf to conduct the battle site survey.

III. BATTLE SITE SURVEY: THE DARYA SUF— VALLEY OF THE CAVES

The battle site survey was conducted from 8 to 11 December 2002 with discussions at each of the major areas of conflict. This chapter provides information derived from the battle site survey as it occurred and is organized sequentially, from 8 to 11 December. An integral part of the chapter, for the reader and the reconstructionist, is the battle site survey “figure.”

Each segment of the battle site survey is reflected in a figure that incorporates a description, map, and matrix. Using Figure III-1 as an example, the title provides the date of the battle site survey, and the description summarizes events for the battle site survey period. The map provides the route and marked waypoints (WP) and reflects an annotated (waypoint numbers and route lines) screen capture of FalconView. FalconView, the software of choice by the SOF elements, provides various sized maps and imagery for mission planning and allows the user to import GPS waypoints and tracks. It also allows the user to annotate friendly or threat data. The matrix describes each waypoint in terms of the location name, GPS waypoint name to audit the mark to the GPS receiver, time in Zulu that the mark was made, waypoint coordinates, comments on the location, and the media link. The “media link” column of the matrix provides the link to various media, such as photos in the photo Gallery, with the number corresponding to the photograph (or the videotape, notebook, or transcript). The legend is at the bottom of the matrix.

Chapter V places this information in context with the various phases of the battle, addresses the implications, assesses the contribution of the information to the overall project, and identifies existing voids. The information supports re-creation and experimentation.

A. 8 DECEMBER 2002 (FIGURE III-1)

At 1200 hours, 8 December 2002, the Battle Site Survey Team departed Mazar-e Sharif for Dehi. The convoy included the Battle Site Survey Team in rented vehicles, MAJ Drew and MSG Woody from ODA 2014 in team vehicles, and GEN Dostum’s




Figure III-1. Battle Site Survey: 8 December 2002

people in an assortment of trucks and SUVs to transport himself, subcommanders, translators, the chow wagon, and security force. The first stop was south of the Tiangi¹, also known as the Kuh-e-al Pass, and Cashmeh, at map and matrix WP2, Figure III-1. This is where GEN Dostum gathered his commanders on 9 November 2001 to brief his plan for capturing the Tiangi and Mazar-e Sharif. The next stop was at the market place in Shulgareh to get a flat tire fixed. While the affected vehicle stopped, the rest proceeded to the Buzkashi field where the Afghans were playing in honor of GEN Dostum (Figure III-2).



Figure III-2. Buzkashi at Shulgareh in Honor of GEN Dostum

The team then proceeded to the bridge at Pole-e Baraq (WP6; Figure II-14). This is a rebuild of the bridge Commander Haji Muhammad Abdu referred to in his interview—the one that the Taliban thought was impossible to hit and were demoralized when it was taken out with one bomb.

¹ Tiangi means pass.



Figure III-3. GEN Dostum Briefs his Strategy

The convoy arrived south of Dehi (WP15) at approximately 1930, ate dinner (kabobs) in a mud hut, and remained the night (Figure III-3). Every day with GEN Dostum was an education on the war, its strategies and tactics, and an opportunity to meet and talk with people involved in the war. On this night GEN Dostum laid out his battle map and explained that the battle really started in Balkhob, to the south of Sar-i Pol; this is where he gathered his forces and later moved to the Darya Suf.

This night and the next day, GEN Morta Sar, GEN Mohaqiq's commander, accompanied us. GEN Mohaqiq is the Chairman, Political Committee, Wahda, and the Minister of Planning for the National Gov-

ernment. He is also ethnic Hazara, a Shiite faction and minority in Afghanistan. His people were brutalized (much more than any other minority) during the Taliban reign, with tens of thousands being killed. Although his soldiers were mostly on foot, they made major contributions to the early fights (September/October 2001) in the Darya Suf, primarily in the mountainous area of the Safid Kotah, located southeast of Mazar-e Sharif.

B. 9 DECEMBER 2002 (FIGURE III-4)




Figure III-4. Battle Site Survey: 9 December 2002

On the morning of 9 December 2002 GEN Dostum took the team to the location of his initial meetings with other commanders (WP16). The next stop was Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ) Albatross (WP17; Figure III-5). HLZ Albatross was the ODA insertion point, their base camp from 20 to 31 October 2001, and a DZ for humanitarian airdrops. Figure III-6 depicts the ODA quarters at the compound. GEN Dostum gathered 5,000 men in the HLZ Albatross area to fight the Taliban. He recalled that during one of the Commanders' meetings, the Taliban had someone inside wearing a concealed radio that enabled them to hear his plans for placing forces and, in particular, where the commanders, such as Ahmad Khan, would locate.²



Figure III-5. Helicopter Landing Zone Albatross

CPT Mark then described the airdrops. They mostly used C130s because they were afraid the bigger and more dispersed drops from a C17 might hit houses. In addition, the locals swarmed the DZ's when they heard the planes. To alleviate confusion and provide better DZ control, the coalition set up another DZ west of Dehi to support the Humanitarian drops to the locals. DZ Albatross was used for lethal and nonlethal coalition supplies. The separation of the type drops (humanitarian, unit equipment and sup-

² Transcript 10.

plies, and lethal aid) made it easier for them to control the drops and DZs—that is, instead of separating the bundles on the same DZ, they simply separated the DZs.³ They also used different types of chemical lights for the various drops: infrared lights indicated ODA equipment and green lights indicated supplies for the Northern Alliance.

The Battle Site Survey Team proceeded through Dehi and the marketplace (Figure III-7). GEN Dostum had gathered several hundred horsemen at the Dehi Marketplace on 20 October 2001. His purpose was to recruit them for the upcoming battles.

The convoy then passed a house (WP21; Figure III-8) where GEN Dostum had held a number of meetings with his commanders, in particular, the big command meeting of 28 October 2001.



Figure III-6. ODA Quarters 20 October 2001

³ Ibid.



Figure III-7. Dehi Marketplace



Figure III-8. GEN Dostum's Command Post and 28 October Meeting Place

The convoy passed the trailhead to Cobaki, where the A Team called close air support into the Chapchal area on 21–23 October 2001. The Battle Site Survey Team stopped at the trailhead from the Darya Suf to Chapchal (WP22) to discuss the battles for Beshcam and Chapchal, in particular the difficulties GEN Dostum had moving 1,500

troops to the north ridge of the Darya Suf to fight the Taliban. Although a treacherous route, he surprised the Taliban and was victorious. It was so treacherous, increasingly so in the rain, that he told the Americans to get off their horses and walk. The trail was the only available Northern Alliance route to and from the battle area. At the same time they were moving soldiers, horses, and supplies up the trail, they were also trying to move the wounded down the trail on stretchers to the aid stations at HLZ Albatross. Figure III-9 depicts GEN Dostum at the bottom of the trail discussing the movement and subsequent battles. Figure III-10 shows the trail from the top of the canyon.



Figure III-9. GEN Dostum Describes Moving Soldiers from the Darya Suf up the Steep Trails to the Chapchal Battle Area

At this point GEN Dostum explained there were three battles that led to victory in the north:⁴

- Safeed Kotal (white steep snow; Safi Kotah on the map). These engagements took place before the Americans arrived. They involved fierce fighting between the Taliban and the Hazara in the area.

⁴ Notes 1.



Figure III-10. Top of the Trail Looking Down on the Darya Suf. This is the trail GEN Dostum moved 1,500 horsemen up to fight in the Chapchal battle area.

- Beshkam (Bescham)—Chapchal. These engagements took place from approximately 18 October to 25 October and were supported by American SOF and firepower.
- Baluch (the name of a minority in Afghanistan). The battle of 5 November 2001. He would discuss that in more detail later.

The next stop was DZ Burro (WP23; Figure III-11). On 31 October 2001, the ODA located their base station at DZ Burro. Then, ODC 53, the Boxer element, was inserted at 0200 hours on the morning of 3 November 2001, and Tiger 02, 02B, 02D, and Boxer moved from here to man battle positions for the 5 November 2001 Battle of Baluch.⁵ The trail to the south (see Figures II-4 and Figure III-11) was used to move people and supplies to Oimatan, Shamallak, and Omitak Mountain.⁶

⁵ CPT Mark broke his ODA down into four three-man teams and a command and control element, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter V.

⁶ Transcript 11 and Video Log DV13.



Figure III-11. Facing South to DZ Burro, Cave Entrance on North Side of DZ


CPT Mark said that it snowed and rained while they were there in October-November 2001. Home was a series of caves (Figure III-12). SFC Vince revisited the caves where the team lived and John captured good 360s of the area and the cave. Although there was an earlier description of the local Afghans providing rugs to line the caves, that is not exactly how some of the members remember them. Donkeys used the caves as refuge during inclement weather and some of the caves needed to be cleaned out before team members could move in.



Figure III-12. Cave on North Side of DZ Burro. Home to ODA members in November 2001.

The survey continued up highway 326 to the site CDR Kamal occupied on 5 November 2001, for the battle of Baluch (WP24, Kamal's command post). From the command post, CPT Mark provided an orientation, pointing out the Village of Cobaki, Dostum's mountain headquarters to the south; the village of Oimatan, also to the south; Omitak Mountain to the west-southwest; Baluch to the west; and Charsu to the north (Figure III-13).

The team moved to WP25, the top of the trail, discussed earlier, and then on to the Beshcam/Chapchal (WP26 and WP27) area to discuss those engagements.



**Figure III-13. CPT Mark Describes the Area from CDR Kamal's
5 November 2001 Command Post**

CPT Mark provided a good description of the Beshcam/Chapchal events in Transcript 13 in conjunction with Dave's video log for Tape 14. He provided an excellent orientation of the area, including the observation post at Cobaki, from which the ODA initially called close air support. In particular, he describes events on 21 through 26 October as the Northern Alliance fought the Taliban in the Beshcam/Chapchal areas and the evening he and SSG Chad accompanied GEN Dostum to the battlefield. GEN Dostum was concerned that the Taliban were mounting a counterattack and frustrated that his men had not taken the ridge line to the west from which a ZSU 23-2 was firing on the Northern Alliance. At GEN Dostum's command, the Northern Alliance mounted and charged the ZSU 23-2 from various positions. GEN Dostum, in an effort to rally his forces and maintain contact with the battle, ran down the hill and up the next ridge line. That evening the Northern Alliance took that ridge line and several others, losing a number of comrades in the conflict, including a good friend of GEN Dostum's. The fighting carried them through to the ridge lines to the west of Chapchal. Enemy casualties included 123 Pakistanis and 2 prisoners. CPT Mark relays the story of GEN Dostum and his soldiers engaged in the close fight—within 20 meters. They only had one grenade among them. One of the soldiers carried it into the enemy, and the Northern Alliance won.

Figure III-14 is a photo taken from Beshcam toward CDR Lal's command post further west. CDR Lal's 5 November 2001 command post (WP29) was the next stop. The site provided a view of Lal's OP to the west (Figure III-15), the Chapchal area to the east, the Cobaki area across the Darya Suf to the south, and Omitak Mountain to the west-southwest. This is the area where CPT Mark, SFC Vince and Tiger 02C stayed the night of the 31 October 2001 after departing DZ Burro. On 1 November 2001, 02C called close air support from Lal's command post into the Baluch area. CPT Mark also visited this area with LTC Max after the Boxer element arrival early that morning.



Figure III-14. View Looking West from Beshcam to CDR Lal's Command Post



Figure III-15. View from CDR Lal's Outpost West toward Baluch

The entire convoy then proceeded to the village of Baluch (WP31). We were surprised that Baluch, as the major engagement in the battle for Mazar-e Sharif, was never mentioned before this trip. Even CPT Mark was surprised. The area had been referred to as Boybe Che or Bai Becha, although neither name was reflected in that area on the maps (Bai Becha was located 4 kilometers to the west on the 1:100,000 map). It is also surprising that the first time so much emphasis was placed on Balkhob (the locational genesis of the insurgency) and Safid Kotah (fierce battles that preceded the battle of the Darya Suf) was during the trip. GEN Dostum accompanied us to the high ground south of Baluch to discuss the battle. It was getting dark, and GEN Dostum said that the heaviest fighting took place “at this [1700/1800] time of day.” He also described some of the coordination challenges between calling in air strikes and maneuvering for the attack. After the first strike, the infantry would attack the positions, but sometimes the B-52 would make a second strike and hit friendly troops. GEN Dostum explained how the Taliban went into the village when they heard the B-52s. The Northern Alliance would then capture their positions so the Taliban could not return to them.⁷

That evening, GEN Dostum related the radio conversation he had with Mullah (General) Guhaire, the Taliban commander in the area the evening prior to the 5 Novem-

⁷ Video Log DV15. But we often heard that the Northern Alliance would subsequently cede these positions at night.

ber 2001 battle. Mullah Guhaire told him that if he (GEN Dostum) defeated him at Baluch, then GEN Dostum would win the north.

C. THE MORNING OF 10 DECEMBER 2002 (FIGURE III-16)

On the morning of 10 December 2002, the Battle Site Survey Team split up. Team 1, with Dave, CPT Mark, SFC Vince, and Kamal (the interpreter) and Bill met with CDR Fakir at 0730 on the high ground overlooking Baluch Village from the south (WP33). Team 2, with George, John, Ward, and SFC Bill, departed Baluch with CDR Haji Chari to survey Tiger 02C's 5 November 2001 position (CDR Haji Chari was with Tiger 02C on that day).


1. Team 1, at Baluch

At the Baluch overlook with Battle Site Survey Team 1, Fakir reiterated GEN Dostum's comments about Mullah (General) Guhaire, the Taliban Commander in the area:

He [GEN Dostum] was communicating with the Taliban leaders and he was telling them, "Listen, Taliban, I'm gonna capture this area." And on the return the Taliban commanders [Mullah Guhaire] replied, "Listen,...if you capture this area that means you capture the whole north." And then GEN Dostum replied, "I will do that. When I capture it I will say it on the radio that I captured the north." And he captured this little village....GEN Dostum himself...showed up to capture the village.⁸

CDR Fakir said that the fighting of 5 November 2001 took place outside the town, mostly on the ridge lines and hilltops and that no fighting took place inside Baluch. He pointed to the southwest where he (Fakir) approached from Shamallak, and to the south/southeast where GEN Dostum's headquarters and Tiger 02D were located near Oimatan. CDR Kamal entered the area from Chapchal and approached from the southeast on the south side of the road.

⁸ Transcript 16, CDR Fakir relating the conversation between GEN Dostum and Mullah Guhaire, Taliban Commander.



BSS 10 December 2002, morning activities. On the morning of the 10th the BSS team split into two elements, one to cover 02 & 02B's area (Blue line) and the second to cover 02C's area (Green line). The Orange line reflects their link up at Baluch and route towards Keshendeh-ye Bala.

CPT Mark, SFC Vince, Dave, Bill and Kamal with a security team proceeded to the hilltop south of Baluch. Cdr Fakir outlined the battle of Baluch from that vantage point. They then proceeded to Tiger 02B's position where CPT Mark, SFC Vince, CDR Ezattullah discussed the battle.

SFC Bill B, Ward, George, John, Haji Chari, and Hafiz proceeded to Tiger 02C's position where Haji Chari discussed the battle from the 02C position.

At 1230 hours the teams linked up at Baluch and proceeded towards Mazar-e Sharif.

WP	Name	GPS WP Name/#	Time (Z)	Coordinates	Comments	Media Link*
42	BoyBega	BOYBEGA	08:20:58	N36.10085 E67.12024	Moved thru BoyBega to BDA ZSU2	
41	Path from 02B to Bal	045	07:48:18	N36.10173 E67.14145	movement to Baluch	DV17
40	Path from 02B to Bal	043	07:46:13	N36.10885 E67.14150	02B movement to Baluch on 6th	DV17
39	Path from 02B to Bal	042	07:39:13	N36.11353 E67.14882	02B movement to Baluch on 6th	DV17
38	Path from 02B to Bal	041	07:37:14	N36.10693 E67.15234	02B movement to Baluch on 6th	DV17
37	Path from 02B to Bal	040	07:33:10	N36.10341 E67.16335	CX-road to Baluch	DV17
36	02,02B,02C Linkup point	039	07:31:12	N36.09554 E67.16275	Mark & 02B link w/02C on the 6th and then move out to KB	DV17
35	Lal's OP	LAL OP 02B	05:45:36	N36.08035 E67.16229	Cdr Lal's & 02B's OP on 5 Nov	G1710,17,19,23,24;DV16,17;VV2;T13;T17
5G	Path from 02C	10	05:14	N36.12256 E67.16192	GL -- Blocking position	T20;JV7
4G	Path from 02C	9	05:03	N36.12600 E67.15825	Team leaves trail -- buttslide	T20;JV7
3G	Tiger 02C Forward	OIOQ2C	05:00	N36.12688 E67.15733	GL 02C Position 5 November	T20;JV6,7
34	Chumka Pass (Ph)	CHUMKA PASS	04:51:42	N36.06581 E67.15887	Fakir indicated that Kamals forces came thru Chumka Pass	
2G	Bunker near Charsu	BUNKER	04:15	N36.12411 E67.15994	GL	T20;JV6
		7	03:49:00	N36.11797 E67.16947	GL, not plotted, next to house	T20;JV6
	Farm	8	03:49:00	N36.11793 E67.16944	GL not plotted, same as house	T20;JV6
1G	House near Charsu	HOUSE	03:49	N36.11793 E67.16944	GL 8, same as house	T20;JV6
33	Overlook on Baluch	F2	03:36:26	N36.08184 E67.13227	Position is south of, and overlooks Baluch. Interviewed	G1691,2-6,1700;DV15,16;VV2;T14A, T15
31	Baluch	BELUCH2	0.5064583	N36.08730 E67.13289	Village of Baluch -- RON 9 Dec	G669,70,75,89
*1.Photos: Gallery Photo #, 2.Video: DV:Dave's Video [Tape #]; VV:Vince's Video; JV:John's Video, 3. Transcript #, 4. Notes, N#						
Color Code: GREEN -- Significant new locations, not plotted before the BSS						

Figure III-16. Battle Site Survey: 10 December 2001, Morning

CDR Lal, with approximately 600 to 700 horsemen, came from the east and through the notch in the ridge line approaching Baluch (Figure III-17; notch as seen from overlook south of Baluch facing northeast). CDR Ahmad Khan entered the area from the northeast from Charsu. CDR Fakir said that the attacks started at 0900 hours and that Dostum's forces captured the area twice but were driven out both times. Finally at approximately 1600 hours, GEN Dostum with approximately 1,500 horsemen attacked. It was chaos; with several thousand enemy forces in the area, it was hard to tell the enemy from the friendly. But most of the Taliban were "Pakistanis who had just arrived. Approximately 300 to 400 were captured. They didn't know what was going on. But the real Taliban and Al Qaeda...they...escaped." CDR Fakir pointed to a bunker/building to the north, off in the distance (Figure III-18) where the Taliban had retreated and set up another defensive position.⁹



Figure III-17. Village of Baluch

⁹ Transcript 14A.



Figure III-18. Taliban Retreated from Baluch to House on Hilltop (center of picture)

2. Team 1, at CDR Lal's Outpost and Tiger 02B Position (collocated)

At 0900 Team 1 traveled with Vince and CPT Mark to CDR Lal's OP (02B's position, WP35) east of Baluch. In addition to the 7-member Afghan security force, Commander Ezattullah, a Northern Alliance commander who commanded 10 horse soldiers and made the charges on the afternoon of 5 November 2001, accompanied the team.

a. 5 November 2001 Event Descriptions

SFC Vince described events of that day and explained that SFC Steve B was on the Special Operations Forces Laser and Marker (SOFLAM) and provided distance, SSG Will provided azimuth, and SFC Vince computed locations to be communicated to the aircraft. In addition, SOFLAM duties for laser designation were rotated between the team members, including CPT Mark. SFC Vince recalled several targeting events of the day. In particular, they dispelled any Taliban belief the U.S. forces could not place a second bomb in the crater of a previous bomb:

Most of the guys in the building I guess figured out that the bomb was coming at them next...So they came out and went into the bomb crater as Steve had the laser spot on the building. This is on the second pass. Actually it was the number two aircraft, 'cause I was flying twos. As he

finally let the bomb loose, Steve saw the people inside the bomb crater or running to the bomb crater. He slowly shifted the spot from the bunker in the building to the left of it where the crater was at and that's where the bomb impacted and took all those people out...that stopped the PKN fire from that direction.¹⁰

SFC Vince described how they targeted the various bunker locations (designated 1–4) from the Tiger 02B position and he provided details on the targets they struck during the day: a primary bunker, a second set of bunkers, troops in the open, and a building with a tent next to it. CPT Mark described the sequencing of laser-guided bombs and the excitement and concern they felt when CDR Lal commanded the charge before the bombs struck the target. SSG Will was on the radio, turned to CDR Lal, and said, “Thirty seconds.” CDR Lal misunderstood and ordered the charge. CDR Kamal's forces charged Taliban positions one and two, and CDR Lal's forces charged Taliban positions three and four. CDR Kamal's forces arrived at the target as bombs hit and rode through the smoke and shrapnel. CDR Lal's lead forces were literally thrown from their horses as they approached northern ridge.

CDR Ezattullah (Figure III-19) described how he charged the Taliban defenses, using bounding overwatch in coordination with other Northern Alliance forces. He said that his horsemen, equipped with AK 47s, PK Machine Guns, and RPGs, fired from the gallop. He rode a white horse; the horse colors of his soldiers were a mixture of browns and whites.¹¹ He made several attacks during the day, moving from one ridge line to the next; there were approximately six ridge lines with bunkers that they had to capture. Approximately 400 Taliban occupied trench and bunker systems in the area. The charges took place approximately 500 meters from the strikes. Although sometimes within 100 meters of some of the strikes, none of his men were injured or thrown from their horses. SFC Vince described a wave of 50–100 horsemen attacking, with 50 in reserve. MSgt Bart, from his vantage point south of the Darya Suf looking up the valleys and ridge lines, described the final charge on the Taliban positions as four waves of 100–200 horsemen each, moving toward the objectives near Baluch. CDR Ezattullah said that they captured approximately 70 Taliban as they moved toward Baluch. His team bypassed Baluch and moved further west toward Bai Becha.¹²

¹⁰ Transcript 16.

¹¹ This type of detail is important to the event reconstructionist.

¹² Transcript 17.



Figure III-19. CDR Ezattullah at Tiger 02B 5 November 2001 Position

Although the Taliban were broken in the Darya Suf, there were still targets for the next morning, some of which they had previously hit on 5 November 2001.

Unfortunately, the weather for the Battle Site Survey Team didn't cooperate, and the haze set in, limiting the range of the photography and videography.

b. Battle Site Survey Team 1 Movement to Baluch

Team 1 departed Lal's OP and drove west toward Baluch, collecting WPs 36-41 enroute, and arriving in Baluch at 1230 hours.

3. Team 2, at Charsu, Tiger 02C's Outpost

At 0900 hours, Battle Site Survey Team 2 left Baluch via the route shown in Figure III-16 and arrived in the Charsu area at approximately 1000 hours. They drove as far as the terrain would permit and parked at a house (WP1G)—the same house that was 02C's fallback position on 5 November 2001 (Figure III-20).



Figure III-20. Tiger 02C's Fallback Position on 5 November 2001

Battle Site Survey Team 2 moved on foot toward Tiger 02C's forward location. This was Haji Chari's horseback egress route (in reverse) on 5 November 2001.¹³ Battle Site Survey Team 2 proceeded to what was left of the bunkers at WP3G, Tiger 02C forward outpost. These bunkers were struck by air from 02C's 5 November 2001 original position (to the east). All that remained was a large pit with a rough outline of earthworks.¹⁴ From the outpost, CDR Haji Chari discussed the sequence of events. Their mission was to attack the Taliban bunkers in the area west of Boi-a nan Village in the Char Su Region.

CDR Haji Chari pointed (mostly west) to areas where the Taliban had moved on 5 November 2001, to the front of Tiger 02C's position, and another group of Taliban moved to the south-southwest to trap Tiger 02C. He related that when he realized they

¹³ Enroute, SFC Bill described the bunker configuration, marked WP2G and videoed at JV6. Although the bunker didn't seem to be part of the fight, SFC Bill's discussion, the video, and photos are good background information.

¹⁴ Standing approximately 40 feet north of the pit was a circular burial mound. It was roughly 4 feet tall and 12 feet in diameter. SFC Bill suggested that it was the burial site for the remains of the Taliban dead from the battle of 5 November 2001.

were being cut off he called GEN Dostum for assistance. GEN Dostum ordered CDR Ahmad Khan to clear the route (G1729). When the route was clear, GEN Dostum ordered CDR Haji Chari to retreat. With no translator present, Haji Chari was unable to communicate his orders to MSG Paul. CDR Haji Chari ordered CDR Rasheed to pull Tiger 02C team off the hilltop. CDR Haji Chari picked up 02C's equipment but, surprised by its weight, he fell off his horse. With help from one of his soldiers he managed to pick the equipment up and hang it from his horse as he rode back to the house.



Figure III-21. Tiger 02C's Emergency Route

CDR Haji Chari pointed out the area where, on 5 November 2001, the Tiger 02C team slid down the embankment (Figure III-21; WP4G) to the valley, as well as their route to the house. On 5 November 2001, CDR Haji Chari led the Tiger 02C team to that location (WP4G) and then continued on horseback to the house along the path Battle Site Survey Team 2 was traveling.

George used the tape cassette during the trip (T18); John used the video camera (JV6 and 7) and took photos (G1724–1729). Battle Site Survey Team 2 captured 360-degree pans at the OP, shots of the ingress/egress routes, the bunker, the house, and the area where 02C slid down the embankment. Battle Site Survey Team 2 arrived back at Baluch by 1200 hours.

D. THE AFTERNOON OF 10 DECEMBER 2002 (FIGURE III-22)

At 1300 GEN Dostum led the convoy toward Mazar-e Sharif. GEN Dostum had to be back in Mazar-e Sharif that night to greet the Spann family when they arrived to attend the 12 December 2002 memorial ceremony for Mike Spann.¹⁵ The Battle Site Survey Team's objective was to stop at Keshendeh-ye Bala, Keshendeh-ye Pain, and the Tiangi Pass.

1. Tiger 02A's Description of Events, 26 October–6 November 2001

At Keshendeh-ye Bala (WP45), the Battle Site Survey Team stood approximately 100 meters north of ruins, described as a Taliban command post, and south of a decaying Taliban T-55. Those were reminders of Tiger 02A's mission in the area. SFC Bill and CDR Haji Habib pointed to places on Omitak (see Figure III-23) where they fought for 2 weeks, 26 October to 6 November 2001, against Taliban forces in the Keshendeh areas. Their mission from Omitak was to execute the deep fight—interdict Taliban reinforcements to the Darya Suf area and destroy any Taliban forces that could threaten the Northern Alliance advance to Mazar-e Sharif. Tiger 02A, coupled with its air counterpart, devastated Taliban positions throughout the Keshendeh areas, reaching as far north as Pole Baraq and east to Bai Becha. Remnants included the T-55 tank and command post near the battle site survey position, BDA still located along the sides of the unimproved road running from Bai Becha to Shulgareh (see Figure III-22), and bunkered/entrenched areas both north and south of the Darya Suf. By 5 November 2001, their mission was complete. Their next task was to link up with the Northern Alliance forces as they made their way through Keshendeh-ye Bala and Keshendeh-ye Pain to the Balkh River Valley leading to Mazar-e Sharif. There was only one problem—a Taliban Bunker was in the way of their route down the mountain.

¹⁵ Mike Spann, CIA, the first American killed in Afghanistan, died during the Qala Jangi prisoner uprising, which is discussed in Chapter IV.




Figure III-22. Battle Site Survey: 10 December 2002, Afternoon



Figure III-23. Omitak Mountain—Tiger 02A Position

SFC Bill described the events of 5 November 2001 as they worked with a Predator, a B-52, and the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) to accurately target a bunker complex. Accuracy was important because a miss might have devastated the local village of Katch Gardan. A cavalry charge, immediately following the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) strike, finally took the bunker. But that evening as the Northern Alliance moved into the town, the Taliban, under the guise of surrendering, opened fire on the Northern Alliance and drove them out of the town. As Tiger 02A prepared to depart their position on 6 November 2001 and join the ODA, they had to re-strike the bunker complex and Taliban positions to open their path off the mountain.

Local townspeople volunteered to tell their story. The Commissioner of Keshendeh-ye Bala, Mullah Mohammad Haschim, explained how he had provided information on Taliban forces to the Northern Alliance. We departed Keshendeh-ye Bala to Keshendeh-ye Pain, marking and photographing T-55s, D-30s, ZSU 23-2s, and a BMP along the way (see Figure III-24). The decaying tank at WP46 fired on the Tiger 02A nightly until it was destroyed by a JDAM.



Figure III-24. Tank Destroyed by Tiger 02A Directing Close Air Support from Omitak

2. Battle Site Survey Team Movement through the Shulgareh to Tiangi

The battle site survey convoy moved quickly through WP54 where Tiger 02 swam the river on 7 November 2001; WP55, the site of GEN Dostum's meeting on 8 November 2001 as he moved through Shulgareh; and then the Tiangi. The Battle Site Survey Team arrived at the Kopa Kula (WP58), on the north side of the pass (Tiangi), at dusk.

3. GEN Dostum's Description of 8 and 9 November 2001 Events

GEN Dostum recalled that by the time his forces reached the pass, on 8 and 9 November 2001, they were exhausted; but fortunately the enemy forfeited the high ground: "The enemy did not know the strategy of war."¹⁶ GEN Dostum directed his forces to several objectives, some to the hills in the west, a contingent through the canyon, and others to the east to take Hill 732. He launched his attack at 0800, 9 November 2001, and gained control of the canyon, but later in the afternoon the Taliban launched a successful counter-attack. A salvo of 160 BM-21s hit the canyon and the adjacent hilltops, including the

¹⁶ Transcript 19, GEN Dostum north of Tiangi.

Kafer Qalah where GEN Dostum was positioned to lead the fight. The Northern Alliance was pushed back to their original positions—and demoralized. GEN Dostum redirected forces to the east to take Hill 732. In the meantime, U.S. airpower, directed by Tiger 02C, targeted Taliban positions on the north side of the pass. The enemy began to flee to the northwest toward Sheberghan, toward Mazar-e Sharif, and east to Konduz. Early the next morning, GEN Dostum rode down the east end of the Kafer Qalah and said he almost drowned crossing the river. He had come so far and fought so hard—he cannot swim—and as he saw his horse’s ears disappear under the water, he thought he was going to drown. Fortunately he, and his horse, made it across the river (see Figure III-25).



Figure III-25. GEN Dostum’s River Crossing Site. Center mountain is the location of the Juma Namangani fighting position.

GEN Dostum pointed out the various defensive positions on the far hills (Figure III-25) and talked about his enemy, the opposition leader Juma Namangani, an Uzbek, fighting for Al Qaida (he was injured during fighting and taken to a nearby hospital in Logar where he died). Although this area required a great deal of data collection, daylight was not on the Battle Site Survey Team’s side. It was agreed that the team would return on the 11th to gather additional GPS waypoints, photos, video, and interviews. GEN Dostum had to depart for Shulgareh to prepare for the arrival of the Spann family and would not be available on the 11th but he suggested that he would send horses for the climb up Kafer Qalah. The team continued on to the Mazar-e Sharif safe house for the night.

E. 11 DECEMBER 2002 (FIGURE III-26)

At 0930 hours, 11 December 2002, the Battle Site Survey Team departed the house to meet CDR Haji Habib at the foothills of the Kafer Qalah. From there, they planned to ride horses to the top and see Tiger 02C's 9 November 2001 OP.

The Battle Site Survey Team arrived at foothills of the Kafer Qalah at 1030 hours; CDR Haji Habib had not arrived with the horses, so CPT Mark, SFC Vince, Bill, and Dave went back to the gap to take pictures and listen to CPT Mark and SFC Vince's description of the battle at Tiangi.

The first stop was an area south of the bridge to photo-capture the terrain to the south (WP60 Photo 1 Tiangi). Marking the waypoint at the bridge (WP61) was difficult because of the steep terrain surrounding the pass. The next stop was the house where Dostum slept the night (8 November 2001) before he attacked the Tiangi (Figure III-27). This was also the location of the 9 November 2001 command meeting before Tiger 02A deployed to the east and Tigers 02 with 02D moved into the pass.

1. SFC Vince's Description of 9 November 2001 Events

To the northeast of the command post (WP62), SFC Vince described how he called in a drop late on the 9 November 2001/early morning of the 10 November 2001 and that it had landed several hundred meters to the northeast of the house in a field next to the river. The team was critically short of batteries, and this drop contained those batteries. The challenge was retrieving the supplies without activating any mines.




Figure III-26. Battle Site Survey: 11 December 2002



Figure III-27. Phraselator Use. At GEN Dostum's 9 November 2001 Command Post, John attempts to use Phraselator to talk to owner of the house (at left walking away as John searches for phrase).

2. CPT Mark Discusses 8 and 9 November 2001 Activities

CPT Mark traced his 9 November 2001 path to the Tiangi (WP62–64; Figures III-28 and 29). He described how the BM-21s had hit an area south of the pass, in the pass, and on the mountain that Tiger 02C occupied. At GEN Dostum's direction, Tiger 02C moved to the top of the Kafer Qalah (WP66) late 8 November/early morning 9 November 2001. Their mission was to coordinate close air support against Taliban positions north of the Tiangi. CPT Mark, upon reaching the mouth of the pass, retraced the high road the horses used. He described the scene, including the locations of the dead—men and horses—and said it was the most terrified he had ever been in his life. Pete was with him and said, "Mark, I don't know about this." CPT Mark said it was obvious that if he did not go, no one was going to go, so he proceeded into the pass. As he entered the Tiangi, Northern Alliance soldiers appeared from the rocks and caves, and horsemen from the south end of the pass fell in behind him. He proceeded to an open area to the north mouth

of the pass. After he led the way through, CDR Kamal's horsemen passed him to capture the slopes to the west of the pass.



Figure III-28. Facing Tiangi from the South—As Tiger 02 and the Northern Alliance Approached it on 9 November 2001



Figure III-29. CPT Mark's Approach through the Tiangi

CPT Mark then led us to the area where approximately six horses and their riders were killed (WP64) in the BM-21 attack. The BM-21 attack had a devastating effect on the Northern Alliance morale.¹⁷

3. Tiger 02A 9 November 2001 Events

SFC Bill, a member of Tiger 02A, described events on 9 November 2001 from the Tiger 02A perspective.¹⁸ At the conclusion of GEN Dostum's 9 November 2001 morning/noon meeting, Tiger 02A's mission was to mount up and ride to a location several kilometers east of the Kafer Qalah and link up with Haji Rakasara. Their mission was to strike the enemy as they fled their defensive positions on the north side of the pass toward the east (Konduz). This was similar to the mission the team executed in the Darya Suf where they were also set up to strike deep. As they traversed the south side of the Kafer Qalah, the enemy unleashed a barrage of rockets that knocked SFC Andy off his horse. Fortunately no one was hurt and they regathered and proceeded east. Haji Rakasara was a no-show. The team spent the night in the mountains and awaited daylight before moving toward Mazar-e Sharif.¹⁹ In an area known to be mined, they were reluctant to move around at night without a local guide or Haji Rakasara.

4. CDR Haji Chari Described 9 November 2001 Activities from the Kafer Qalah

At approximately 1230 hours the Battle Site Survey Team started walking up the mountain, led by CDR Haji Chari (Figure III-30). Haji had been with Tiger 02C and GEN Dostum on the mountain on 9 November 2001. As noted, the Tiger 02C mission was to coordinate close air support against Taliban positions north of the Tiangi (Figure III-31). Haji showed us where he had dug the trenches, where GEN Dostum had stayed (Figure III-32), and where they had called close air support. As he discussed the battle, the weather started coming in and Haji said that this was like the weather on the 9 November 2001. Haji said (as GEN Dostum had the previous night) that the Northern Alliance attacked, but their first assaults were repelled. The Taliban fired BM-21 rockets into the pass and on the Kafer Qalah. GEN Dostum ordered a re-attack to include an assault on Hill 732 to the northeast of Kafer Qalah (see Figure III-26).

¹⁷ Transcript 21.

¹⁸ Transcript 19, 21.

¹⁹ Interview Notes 2.



Figure III-30. Interviewing CDR Haji Chari as the Battle Site Survey Team Climbed to the Kafer Qalah



Figure III-31. Looking North from the Kafer Qalah toward Taliban Positions



Figure III-32. Bunker at the Top of the Kafer Qalah

In addition to the BM-21 rocket attack, the Taliban had left mines at the north mouth of the pass. CDR Lal's horsemen hit several mines; and the troops were demoralized. It was from this vantage point that GEN Dostum listened to the Taliban radio traffic. Although the Taliban radio chatter spoke of a meeting, GEN Dostum knew that it was an escape plan and he alerted the SOF to look for targets.²⁰

The Battle Site Survey Team departed the mountain at approximately 1430 hours. CDR Haji Habib had finally arrived with the horses (Figure III-33), and some team members had an opportunity to ride horses down the mountain. On the drive back, the Battle Site Survey Team met CDR Kamal at a cave at the center of the pass (Figure III-34)—the same cave where CPT Mark had met CDR Kamal on 9 November 2001. Both CDR Kamal and GEN Habib Bullah were interviewed. The interviews were continued that evening at the ODA house. CDR Kamal, now the commander of the 82d Division, provided background information and described events in the Darya Suf on 5 November and later at Tiangi.



Figure III-33. Horsemen Arrive atop the Kafer Qalah

5. Interviews

a. CDR Kamal

CDR Kamal was from the Omitak area; his older brother had fought with GEN Dostum and died in 1999. CDR Kamal had fought with GEN Dostum when Dostum was a battalion commander and rejoined his fight in the Safid Kotah area. CDR Kamal had 240 horsemen during the engagement at Tiangi.

²⁰ Transcript 23.

CPT Mark and CDR Kamal discussed the engagements of 5 November, in particular the coordination of the bombing and Northern Alliance cavalry charges. CDR Kamal said that each entrenchment/bunker contained 20 to 30 Taliban with PK machine guns, RPGs, and AK-47s. The trenches were deep, and the Taliban could stay and fight from the trenches all day. They also had tanks, ZSUs, and artillery, but the American air attacks could take out most of them. On the first strike, the Taliban fled and the bombs struck about 15 meters away from the horsemen. CDR Kamal recalled that he was already past the bunkers when the bombs hit on the afternoon of 5 November 2001.²¹



Figure III-34. CDR Kamal

At Tiangi he had 240 horsemen. The enemy consisted of approximately 1,000 Chechens and Pakistanis. The Northern Alliance's first assault on 9 November was repelled. The Northern Alliance had to contend with landmines, BM-21 rocket fire, and ZSU 23-2s employed in a direct-fire mode against his forces. He lost several men and horses to the mines. But later, after the airstrikes, "they [the Taliban] lost their morale, and we were able to take Mazar."²² CDR Kamal directed 50 horsemen to move through the mountains to the west of Tiangi, and he led the rest of his horsemen through the Tiangi to overrun or capture Taliban positions on the northwest side of the pass.²³

b. GEN Habib Bullah

GEN Habib Bullah was a general in the Afghan Army, but when the Taliban took power, he was put in prison. Later, at the insistence of his family, he was made a commander in the Taliban forces. He had approximately 40 soldiers under his command and fought against GEN Dostum's forces in the Darya Suf (before the Americans arrived), manning defensive positions in the area. He said that he became a Dostum/Kamal supporter while in the Darya Suf (he made an agreement with GEN Dostum) and somehow was reassigned to Mazar-e Sharif. From there he provided, via radio/radio relay, GEN Dostum with intelligence on the conditions in Mazar-e Sharif, Taliban troop situations in the area, and, in particular, the status of Taliban reinforcements and movements. He overtly

²¹ Video Log DV22.

²² Video Log DV20.

²³ Transcript T19.

defected to Dostum's forces on the eve of the fall of Mazar-e Sharif by meeting up with Kamal in the mountains west of the Tiangi Pass. He helped create an organizational chart of the Taliban forces in the area before their defeat (see Chapter V).

IV. POST BATTLE SITE SURVEY COLLECTION AND TRAVEL

This chapter discusses the remainder of the collection for the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction and the Battle Site Survey Team's return to CONUS. Although the battle site survey was completed as the Battle Site Survey Team surveyed the north end of the Shulgareh, the Tiangi, and the Kafer Qalah, there were still a number of interviews to conduct, among them interviews with CDR Ahmad Khan and Generals Atta and Moha-qiq. In addition, the Battle Site Survey Team visited Qala Jangi Fortress, the Sultan Razia School, and the Civil Affairs office, and it attended the memorial service for Mike Spann, CIA, and the first American casualty in Operation Enduring Freedom. Departure was scheduled for 1000 hours, 13 December 2002, but the schedule, as well as the route home, changed, as transportation out of Afghanistan became a challenge.

A. AFTER THE FALL OF MAZAR

Over the next several days, after the fall of Mazar-e Sharif on 10 November 2001, the Northern Alliance secured the Mazar Airport and the Heiratan Freedom Bridge, allowing ground and air access to the northern provinces.

The fight then turned east toward Konduz, where there were reports of over 10,000 Taliban consolidating. After several days and nights of negotiations, Mullah Faisal, the Taliban Deputy Minister of Defense, continued to stall the surrender. In the meantime, on 24 November 2001, the Taliban were executing a deception plan with the feigned surrender of approximately 600 non-Afghan Taliban southeast of Mazar. It was their intention to surrender in the city and then take the city. But their plan was short-lived as they were led to Qala Jangi and imprisoned in an underground basement/bunker. However, the captured Taliban were poorly searched and managed to retain hand grenades and other small, easily concealed weapons. On 25 November 2001, as they were led out of the basement into the courtyard where Mike Spann and a fellow agent were interrogating prisoners—one of whom was John Walker Lindh—they managed to overwhelm the 100 guards and take over the armory containing small arms, RPGs, and mortars. Several days later the insurrection was contained.

B. QALA JANGI

On 12 December 2002, the Battle Site Survey Team toured Qala Jangi (Figures IV-1 and IV-2) and attended the Mike Spann memorial service.



Figure IV-1. Qala Jangi Fortress. Clockwise from top left: entrance to the South Fort, gate to South Fort, basement where prisoners were located, and stairwell to basement

Entering from the north gate, CPT Mark and SFC Vince took the Battle Site Survey Team through the compound (south Fort) where the prison riot occurred and Mike Spann was killed.

The Battle Site Survey Team then toured the old hospital area where the prisoners took refuge, fought from, and were flooded (literally) out. Next was the west fort area and northwestern wall where U.S. and Northern Alliance forces were wounded or killed by a JDAM. SSgt Mike, a CCT member with the Boxer element, was wounded; a tank with Northern Alliance fighters was hit, and the turret was thrown near the top of the wall; and U.S. Forces were thrown into the ditch on the other side of the wall.

The Spann Memorial service began at approximately 1100 hours and lasted about 2 hours. It was conducted in the rain with approximately 100 horsemen lined up as a backdrop. The Ambassador, a USMC representative, and Mike's father, mother, wife, and daughter attended the service.



Figure IV-2. Qala Jangi Area. Clockwise from top left: remnants of tank hit during 25 Nov 01 friendly fire incident, horsemen arriving at the Spann Memorial, U.S. Ambassador speaking at memorial, and Spann family arriving.

The Battle Site Survey Team departed at 1400 hours and met at the Mazar Hotel for lunch with GEN Dostum, the Spann family, the Ambassador, and others. GEN Dostum invited the Battle Site Survey Team to attend a dinner for the Spanns at his house later that evening. However, interviews with GEN Atta and CDR Ahmad Khan precluded Battle Site Survey Team member attendance.

At 1650 hours GEN Atta called to say that he was available for an interview (he had been contacted several times before but was unavailable). In the meantime the Ahmad Khan interview was being conducted at the ODA house.

The interview with GEN Atta lasted from approx 1700 to 1900 hours, and then he offered the team fruit and tea while he talked on the cell phone. He was very intelligent, knew how to read the map, and could understand some English. He wanted to explain his strategy first and then allow questions.

C. INTERVIEW SUMMARIES

1. GEN Atta¹



Figure IV-3. GEN Atta

General Atta (Figure IV-3) was the 7th Corps Commander and the 1st Deputy Operating Group in the North at the time of the interview. During the summer of 2001, he had been the General Commander of Resistance against the Taliban in the North. For 2 years he had resisted the Taliban and was in charge of both the military and political aspects of the resistance. According to him, all forces in the Darya Suf, Aq Koprak, and Bazarak areas were under his control. He had approximately 2,000 horsemen (various areas).

He talked about his failed attempt to take Mazar-e Sharif from the Marmul area in mid-October. “However, the first attack in the Marmul district, I had no cooperation or consultation with my American friends.” (There were rumors that he had asked for U.S. air support for the attack, but it did not come.) In addition, the United States bombed for “almost 15 days but you have not captured any significant areas.” He said that the bombing, which accomplished nothing in terms of defeating the Taliban, was having a “negative impact on the soul, the morale of my soldiers...I then stopped the war.” To promote a coordinated effort, he ceded command of the Darya Suf forces and campaign up the Darya Suf through Shulgareh to General Dostum. But he also insisted on keeping the front open in the Marmul area where the bulk of his forces were located.

GEN Atta discussed his operation in Aq Koprak. He faced approximately 1,500–2,000 Taliban with artillery, ZSU, BMPs, and BM-21s but no tanks. “They were worried that the tanks would be seized by [Northern Alliance] forces and used on them.” The commander of Taliban forces in the area was Mullah Dadullah, but in Shulgareh it was Mullah Razzak.

¹ Transcript 29.

The OGA provided the logistics. The most important items were ammunition and clothes “since it was winter.” Food was found in the areas in which they operated.

After capturing Aq Koprak he met with GEN Dostum south of Tiangi. At that time GEN Atta decided to split his forces. Part of his forces attacked through Tiangi with GEN Dostum’s forces, and the other part attacked from the Marmul area through the airport into Mazar. He indicated there was very little resistance at Tiangi.

GEN Atta was extremely frustrated over the bombing of the Sultan Razia School that was seized by “600 Pakistani Taliban.” He said that his forces on the ground in the area had negotiated a surrender—“almost 200 weapons were confiscated and the Taliban were preparing to surrender.” Although informed of the plan to bomb, he said that he had not been consulted, and “eight of my men were killed.”

This concluded the interview. There was not much detail on his advance through Aq Koprak to Mazar, but he provided good background on his relationship with GEN Dostum, and the operation in general, throughout the entire period.

In the meantime, the 13 December scheduled departure for 1000 hours was postponed until 1100 hours, then 1400 hours, and eventually was canceled. The Air Force either could not get out of Karshi Khanabad or had maintenance problems; irrelevant but frustrating was the great weather at Mazar. This delay provided an opportunity to interview GEN Mohaqiq.

2. GEN Mohaqiq²

Mr. Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq (Figure IV-4), Chairman, Political Committee, Wahdat, was interviewed at his compound at 1900 hours, 13 December 2002. The translator was Dr. Abdul Wahid Yasa, who was in charge of International Relations, Wahdat. Also present was Engineer Tahir, Deputy Commander, 38th Infantry Division.

GEN Mohaqiq was impressive, not in stature but in his apparent concern for improving the plight of the Afghan people. He wanted to start his story in 1998 because that is when he was forced into the Darya Suf.

In August 1998 “tragedies struck with arrival of Osama Bin Laden, the development of the religious schools, and the aggressive infiltration of the Taliban and the Arabs in the north.” GEN Mohaqiq resisted. But Mullah Omar and the Taliban won and decreed

² Transcripts 29–32A and Interview Notes 2.

that they would “kill anyone [opposition] in a three day period.” During that period 10,000 people were killed, of which 90 percent belonged to the Hazara. They killed Hazaras because they were a religious minority; but they also killed Uzbeks.

On 8 August 1998 GEN Mohaqiq left the city by helicopter and went to the mountains in the Darya Suf. There he organized a force of 2,000 soldiers and set up a front, but he was asked by the community elders to leave because of the danger to the people. He moved from the Darya Suf and set up two fronts, one in Balkhob and the other in the Bamian Province. Later he was able to migrate into the Darya Suf along with GEN Dostum’s forces.

GEN Mohaqiq provided background on events in Bamian Province, including the Taliban human rights violations against the people of Yaqolan (500 killed and 5,000 houses destroyed) and the destruction of the Buddhist statues.

GEN Mohaqiq said that the hardest fought battle was in the Sofid Kotah area because they had to fight uphill against an entrenched Taliban that had artillery and tanks. Although the U.S. bombardment helped them move forward, it was a hard fight in Beshcam, Chapchal, and Baluch. “After Baluch, they did not resist.”³

After discussing the fall of Mazar, GEN Mohaqiq discussed the bombing of Sultan Razia School, the Taliban negotiations and surrender at Konduz, and the uprising at Qala Jangi. As the deception plan of the feigned Taliban surrender near Mazar-e Sharif unfolded, GEN Mohaqiq heard Mullah Omar on BBC say that he was going to recapture a northern city. GEN Mohaqiq knew that it was the prisoners who had requested transport to Mazar, so they were diverted to Qala Jangi.



Figure IV-4. GEN Mohaqiq

³ Transcript 29.

D. FINAL VISITS

On 14 December, CPT Mark and Battle Site Survey Team members visited the Sultan Razia Girls' High School and spoke with Saiforah Neyuzi, Director. The school has approximately 5,000 students and 150 teachers. The school was almost completely destroyed during the fight against the Pakistanis who used it for refuge. It was rebuilt by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). She said that a lot of people indicated that they would help but have not. She needs more rooms and teachers to teach. Before the war they only had about 30 students.

The next visit was with LTC Bob Jones, MAJ Reed, and SGT Brooks at the Civil Affairs office in Mazar-e Sharif. LTC Bob Jones provided information on his role as the USASOC Historian Office representative. CPT Mark coordinated with MAJ Reed for civil affairs support to CDR Kamal in Sar-I Pol and also coordinated with SGT Brooks for a partnership between high schools (e.g., CPT Mark's old high school in Kansas and the Sultan Razia High School). In response to the Battle Site Survey Team's transportation dilemma, LTC Jones suggested the UN Air for the World Food Program as an option. It made several stops throughout Afghanistan, stopped in Mazar on Monday, and cost approx \$100.

CPT Mark then stopped by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to pick up an Afghan flag and make a quick visit with Sayed Noor Ullah, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The last visit was with CDR Ak-yasin, Commander of the Border. CDR Ak-yasin provided several pictures, including one of several hundred horseman gathered together by GEN Dostum before their march from Balkhob to the Darya Suf (Figure V-1) and another that showed his movement from the Darya Suf to Chapchal (Figure V-7).

E. DEPARTURE

Finally on 15 December at 1300 hours, the Battle Site Survey Team departed Mazar-e Sharif to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on a U.S. Government aircraft. After several more Air Force cancellations and no scheduled flight in sight, the Battle Site Survey Team took the best (and only) offer from a U.S. Government agency. Figure IV-5 depicts the Battle Site Survey Team at the Mazar Airport before departure.



Figure IV-5. Battle Site Survey Team at Mazar-e Sharif Airport before Departure (Source: Photograph by Ward Page.)

The flight from Mazar-e Sharif to Tashkent was uneventful, except for the out-the-window scenery (Figure IV-6), which was beautiful from 20,000 feet but also a reminder of the ruggedness of the terrain U.S. forces contended with. As the Battle Site Survey Team entered the Tashkent Airport, issues about visas and the transport of weapons back to the U.S. needed to be reconciled through the embassy before continuing the journey. Visas and weapons were not an issue during ingress because the Battle Site Survey Team traveled through U.S. facilities at Karshi Khanabad. Although visas were obtained for Turkey, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan, the ones for Uzbekistan for two of the Battle Site Survey Team members had expired on 14 December. The visas, however, did not seem to present a problem as the embassy worked the arrival and departure paperwork. The weapons took the time. The Uzbeks were very strict when it came to moving weapons and ammunition through their country.

On 16 December, Sunday, three Battle Site Survey Team members scheduled flights via Turkish Air to Germany and United Airlines to Dulles Airport, Virginia. As they entered the Tashkent Airport early on 17 December to purchase tickets, they were surprised that credit cards and U.S. currency were unacceptable. Awakened at 4 AM by a phone call from the airport, George Lukes managed to have the hotel bank open and exchanged \$3,000 (U.S.) for approximately 3,090,000 Sums. The exchange ratio foretells the volume of the Uzbeks—two trash bags. George quickly caught a taxi to the airport in

hopes of buying tickets for MAJ Dan, David, and John. In the meantime, John managed to produce \$700 (U.S.), which he had stashed in various compartments in his backpack. In an extraordinary example of multitasking, the woman working the ticket counter closed the office, led John to the far end of the terminal and outside across a plaza to the currency exchange office. She told John to wait at the exchange window while she unlocked and opened the office. She took his money through the window and exchanged it for a medium sized, plastic bag filled with approximately 500,000 Sums. She then closed the Currency Exchange office and led him back through the airport to the ticket office where he had to pass the bricks of Uzbeks through the ticket window to acquire one one-way ticket to Germany. George made it in time to purchase David's ticket. MAJ Dan was concerned about the rest of the Battle Site Survey Team's return to CONUS. He decided to hold off until the rest of the Battle Site Survey Team was ready to depart. The lesson: ensure you have your tickets purchased before arriving at the airport (or at least know how you will pay for them).



Figure IV-6. Mountainous Terrain between Mazar-e Sharif and Tashkent (Source: Photograph by Ward Page.)

Finally, 3 days after arriving in Tashkent (Figure IV-7), the weapons were cleared and the rest of the Battle Site Survey Team prepared to depart Tashkent. The Embassy did a great job processing clearances for individuals and weapons and allowing the Battle Site Survey Team to work within their facilities to coordinate travel back to the States. A

plus was ODA 595's previous visit to Uzbekistan in 2000 to train Uzbek forces. In fact, a plaque to "The Regulators" was on the wall of the U.S. Embassy. CPT Mark's contacts at the U.S. Embassy and in the Uzbek military helped obtain the necessary clearances. An interesting concept that made clearance through the Tashkent International Airport easier was the use of "helpers." At a small price of \$30 per person the U.S. Embassy provided "helpers" to assist travelers in processing through the airport customs and other various lines—it was well worth the money. The rest of the Battle Site Survey Team finally departed Tashkent, and they arrived at Dulles Airport on 18 December 2002. It was good to be back in the United States.



Figure IV-7. Tashkent Park at Night

V. ENDURING FREEDOM RECONSTRUCTION: BATTLE SITE SURVEY AND GROUND FORCE DATA RECONCILIATION

This chapter has two purposes: (1) to describe how and where (phases of the battle) the information obtained during the battle site survey supports the reconstruction of the campaign for Mazar-e Sharif and (2) to provide the results of the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction ground data reconciliation/validation conducted at the conclusion of the battle site survey.¹

The purpose of the battle site survey was to validate and reconcile information received before the battle site survey; add new material to the database in various media forms (video, audio, still photos, maps, drawings, etc), gather records, if available; and conduct interviews of key players such as Generals Dostum, Atta Mohammed, and Mohammad Mohaqiq; subcommanders; and former Taliban.

To support the reconstruction, this chapter is structured in accordance with the original seven phases of the campaign, from insertion through the battles of the Darya Suf and Tiangi, to the fall of Mazar-e Sharif. Additions to the original seven include Phase 0 and VIII. Phase 0 was added to provide background information and Phase VIII was added to address events after the fall of Mazar, officially 10 November 2001.² These phases are listed below:

- Phase 0—Background
- Phase I—Mission Preparation, Insertion, and Initial Operations (15–20 October 2001)
- Phase II—Building Coalition Confidence and Strategy (21–28 October 2001)
- Phase III—Battlefield: Preparation and Positioning (29 October–4 November 2001)

¹ This reconciliation took place through a series of meetings in January and February 2003. The Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Reconciliation Team team included Dr. Geoffrey Koretsky, Ms. Abigail Winthrop, Mr. Rick Wright, Dr. John Gray, Mr. George Lukes, and Dr. Robert Richbourg.

² Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Phase VII ends with GEN Dostum's forces assembling at Qala Jangi and entering Mazar-e Sharif. Events after the fall of Mazar-e Sharif, such as Sultan Razia School, Konduz, and Qala Jangi, are also documented here as Phase VIII because the team had an opportunity to look at those critical events, and they may support future reconstruction or research requirements.

- Phase IV—Battle for the Darya Suf (5 November 2001)
- Phase V—Exploitation & Pursuit (6–8 November 2001)
- Phase VI—Tiangi (9–10 November 2001)
- Phase VII—The Fall of Mazar-e Sharif (10 November 2001)
- Phase VIII—After the Fall of Mazar-e Sharif

Previous analysis determined that the major engagements of interest for the reconstruction were, in order of priority, the Darya Suf on 5 November 2001 and the Tiangi on 9 November 2001.

Each section of this chapter begins with a phase summary and then includes a table; a discussion of the material obtained (did the material validate or correct existing material, was the material new or unique, i.e., had not been collected before?); and an index of material to support the phase reconstruction. Each section also identifies information voids, the extent of those voids, and their implications for the reconstruction.

Each section's table identifies the relevant Enduring Freedom Reconstruction phase, the location, waypoint, and waypoint name to trace back to the battle site survey (Chapter III), and the associated media (photos, videos, and transcripts). The consolidated table is in Appendix H. Thumbnails photographs for the galleries associated with this chapter are in Appendix I.³

A. PHASE 0: BACKGROUND

At approximately 12:30 p.m. (EDT) on October 7, 2001, on my order, U.S. Armed Forces began combat action in Afghanistan against Al Qaida terrorists and their Taliban supporters. This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism and is designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations.⁴

—George W. Bush

The tragedies of September 11, 2001, spawned the Global War on Terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom. Although the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction captures

³ Photographs provided by service members are provided in the gallery marked Servicemember photographs and those provided by CDR Ak-yasin are titled Ak-yasin.

⁴ George W. Bush, President, 9 October 2001 letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive...I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep Congress informed, consistent with the War Powers resolution and Public Law 107-40."

the time frame 15 October 2001 to 10 November 2001, and focuses on 5 and 9 November events, a number of significant events occurred before the insertion of ODA 595 on 19/20 October 2001, such as the deployments of US forces to the various staging areas and the beginning of the air campaign on 7 October 2001. In addition, the Northern Alliance fought the Taliban long before Operation Enduring Freedom. As indicated by GEN Dostum, the genesis of his insurgency was located in the Balkhob area (Figure V-1). Events before the insertion provide the setting and allow us to compare conditions before and during Operation Enduring Freedom. Material in this section shows the disposition of GEN Dostum's Northern Alliance forces before U.S. forces arrived and gives an overview of the Taliban force structure facing the Northern Alliance, thereby setting the stage for the ODA insertion.



Figure V-1. Balkhob Area—GEN Dostum Speaks to his Northern Alliance Horsemen
(Source: Photo courtesy of CDR Ak-yasin.)

1. Battle Site Survey Support to Phase 0 (Table V-1)

GEN Dostum's coordination of the three major factions in the Darya Suf area contributed to the success of the campaign. The Uzbeks under GEN Dostum, Tajiks under GEN Atta Mohammad, and the Shia, Hizb-e-Whadat Islami (Islamic Unity Party) under GEN Mohammad Mohaqiq joined forces to defeat the Taliban. Before 20 October 2001, GEN Atta mounted a failed campaign against the Mazar-e Sharif civilian airfield

from the Marmul area 30 kilometers southeast of Mazar-e Sharif. According to him, he called for a halt to Northern Alliance operations in the area until the major factions started cooperating.⁵ Of significance are the continued (as of this writing) rifts between GEN Dostum's and GEN Atta's forces.⁶

Table V-1. Phase 0: Background/Battle Site Survey Media Index

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/other
0 Background	Balkhob					A-Balkhob		DV1,2,10;T1,2,8,9,30A
	Safid Kotah							DV11;T3,6,8,30D,31D
	Darya Suf				3 battles led to victory in the DS: Safid Kotah; Beshcam/Chapchal;Baluch			N1p31
	OGA Meeting	16	Command Meeting 1st	N35.90774 E67.28063		GP1587	DV13	DV13;T8A,29
					Order of Battle from GEN Habib Bullah			T27,27D;N5
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#								

New information, a result of the battle site survey, included the disposition of Northern Alliance forces in the area before U.S. force deployment. During the summer of 2001, GEN Dostum located his forces in the Balkhob area, approximately 120 kilometers south-southwest of Mazar-e Sharif in the Balkh River Valley. This is the area that GEN Dostum considered to be the birthplace of his insurgency. But there is more to the story. The Taliban had devastated the Darya Suf area in the late 1990s as they persecuted the Shia in the Safid Kotah area. There was initial reluctance to GEN Dostum basing his forces in the area because the Hazara did not want to give the Taliban an excuse to return to the valley and restart the devastation (see Figure V-2). Once GEN Dostum moved his forces into the Darya Suf, with the support of the Shia, Balkhob provided a second front.

Additional data collected included GEN Dostum's initial meetings with the United States (Gallery Photo 1587, photograph of the location) before the insertion of ODA 595, discussed in the gists⁷ for DV11 (Dave's Video #11) and Transcript 3. Table V-1 gives descriptions and other media associated with those locations and the time frame.

⁵ Transcripts 28 and 29.

⁶ Associated Press, "At Least Four Killed, three Wounded In Afghan Skirmishes," 6 July 2003.

⁷ A gist is more descriptive than a log of events, but less descriptive than a transcript.



Figure V-2. Remnants of a Hazara Village in the Darya Suf

Most of the media for Phase 0 was obtained from GEN Dostum through his sub-commanders. For example, Ak-yasin provided photographs and Mak Dume provided video from the Afghan cameraman that traveled with GEN Dostum. The transcripts⁸ were of conversations with the various Afghans such as Generals Dostum, Mohaqiq, and Atta and GEN Dostum's subcommanders. The table provides the reconstruction team a list and location of information for Phase 0 and the various topical areas. The waypoints correspond to battle site survey waypoints identified in Chapter III.

Finally, interviews with GEN Habib Bullah provided an overview of the Taliban order of battle in the Mazar-e Sharif area (Figure V-3). Accounts place Taliban forces ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 in the Mazar-e Sharif/Darya Suf areas with reinforcements flowing in from Pakistan via Konduz.

2. Information Voids and Follow-up Requirements. None

⁸ There are various transcripts. Dave provided a good gist/summary of his video, coded as DV for Dave's Video; a transcription service transcribed entire tapes, coded as T for the transcript, which includes both the audio portion of the videotapes and cassette tapes; N represents notes or notebook entries.




Figure V-3. Taliban Order of Battle

B. PHASE I: MISSION PREPARATION, INSERTION, AND INITIAL OPERATIONS (SEPTEMBER 2001–20 OCTOBER 2001)

Only a week after the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, SF ODA 595, “The Regulators,” was given notice to deploy to Central Asia. By 7 October 2001, they were in Karshi Khanabad, Uzbekistan. The initial mission was to support combat search-and-rescue operations. A week later, they were given 48 hours to prepare to be inserted into northern Afghanistan for a new mission—help GEN Dostum’s Opposition Forces capture Mazar-e Sharif. Their mission statement:

ODA 595 conducts Unconventional Warfare (UW) in support of General Dostum in order to render UW operational area unsafe for Taliban and terrorist organizations.⁹

At 0200 hours local time on 20 October 2001, ODA 595, callsign Tiger 02, landed at HLZ Albatross and within 6 hours made contact with GEN Rashid Dostum (see Figure V-4). Tiger 02 then split into two teams of six men each (A Team and B Team), with A Team accompanying GEN Dostum to his headquarters and B Team remaining at HLZ Albatross. Once at GEN Dostum’s Mountain Headquarters, the A Team immediate-

⁹ Presentation to the Army Resource Management Conference, Denver Colorado, “Special Forces—Operation Enduring Freedom.”

ly demonstrated U.S. firepower and military capability, calling in close air support to targets in the Beshcam area, approximately 8–10 km from GEN Dostum’s headquarters.



Figure V-4. The ODA’s First Meeting with GEN Dostum at HLZ Albatross

1. Battle Site Survey Support to Phase I Reconstruction (Table V-2)

GEN Dostum escorted the Battle Site Survey Team to HLZ Albatross, through Dehi and past the trailhead from the Darya Suf to Cobaki. Validation included GPS coordinates for those locations. Collection included service members’ photographs of the initial meetings (Figure V-4), living at HLZ Albatross, and media of Albatross and GEN Dostum’s mountain headquarters (See Figure V-5).

Table V-2. Phase I: Insertion/Battle Site Survey Media Index

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/other
I Insertion 19-20 October	Albatross	17	Albatross LZ Overlook	N35.94116 E67.29064		GP1597, 160	VV1;DV13	DV13;T10
		18	Albatross LZ Compound	N35.94409 E67.28859	ODA's 1st night	GP1602-5; S120, 21	VV1;DV13	T10
	Dehi	19	WP before Dehi	N35.95312 E67.27396		GP1606.7	VV1;DV13	DV13;T10
		20	Dehi Market	N35.95712 E67.27014		GP1606 Qua	VV1	T10
	Trail to Cobaki	14	Trail Head to Cobaki	N36.0049 E67.2225	Manually marked; reconciled previous coordinates			N1p27
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV.3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#								



Figure V-5. GEN Dostum's Mountain Headquarters—Communications

2. Information Voids and Follow-up Requirements

Since the team was not able to venture up the south ridge of the Darya Suf, voids include any validation of team or Northern Alliance locations in that area and additional media for the area. For Phase I this precluded surveys of GEN Dostum's Mountain Headquarters and the Cobaki outpost.

C. PHASE II: BUILDING THE COALITION CONFIDENCE AND STRATEGY (21–28 OCTOBER 2001)

As they linked up and trained with anti-Taliban forces, they learned from their new allies about the realities of war on Afghan soil, and they assisted the Afghans with weapons, with supplies, with food, with tactics and training. And they helped plan the attack on Mazar.¹⁰

The success of the first air strike impressed GEN Dostum. However, CPT Mark wasn't satisfied. He was too far away to adequately spot the targets and requested that his team be allowed to move closer to the Taliban positions. GEN Dostum, concerned with the safety of the Americans, reluctantly approved. CPT Mark moved forward to the Cobaki area (Figure V-6) and called in additional air strikes on tanks, artillery, and a Taliban command post in the Chapchal area as GEN Dostum moved forces there (Figure V-7).

¹⁰ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, NDU speech, 31 January 2002.

GEN Dostum, capitalizing on the damage and chaos resulting from the air strike, ordered a cavalry charge of several hundred horsemen to take the Taliban positions. By 25 October 2001 GEN Dostum's forces had pushed through Chapchal, and the enemy had withdrawn to positions near Baluch.



Figure V-6. Fire Mission at Cobaki



Figure V-7. CDR Ak-yasin Leads Soldiers up Trail from the Darya Suf to the Chapchal Battle Area

Realizing they needed to start targeting Taliban reserves and potential counterattack forces, CPT Mark dispatched Tiger 02A, now a three-man team, to Omitak Moun-

tain on 26 October 2001. Their mission was to interdict Taliban forces moving south in the Balkh River toward the Darya Suf and to destroy Taliban forces in the Keshendeh-ye Bala and Keshendeh-ye Pain areas. These forces were in defensive positions along GEN Dostum's axis of advance and were capable of reinforcing the Taliban in the Baluch area.

On 28 October 2001 GEN Dostum convened a commanders' meeting at his command post near Dehi (Figure III-8) to strategize the next major action—the Battle for the Darya Suf. That night an Air Force Combat Controller (CCT) and Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller (ETAC), with radios and targeting equipment, arrived by MH-47. Their arrival provided CPT Mark with the additional manpower and equipment needed to complete the breakdown of the ODA into four three-man cells: 02A, 02B, 02C, and 02D, and one two-man C2 element made up of CPT Mark and his radioman, callsign Tiger 02 (see Appendix J for the list of cells and capabilities). As GEN Dostum's forces continued to push the Taliban back, CPT Mark repositioned teams to remain within spotting range of the Taliban for close air support.

1. Battle Site Survey Support to Phase II Reconstruction (Table V-3)

Table V-3. Phase II: Building The Coalition/Battle Site Survey Media Index

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/other
II Building the Coalition	Dehi Meeting	21	Command Meet -- Dehi	N35.96330 E67.26348		GP1608	VV1:DV13	DV13;T10
	Chapchal Trail	22	Trail to Chapchal	N36.00558 E67.20733		GP1614	VV2:DV13	DV13;T10
21-28 October		25	Trail top Chapchal	N36.00849 E67.20501		GP16471,2,8	DV14;VV2	T13
	Beshcam	27	Beshcam	N36.03170 E67.21053		GP16611-4	DV14	DV10,14;T7,7A,9,10,1
	Chapchal	26	Chapchal/Beshcam	N36.02352 E67.19537		GP1659-61	DV14;VV@	DV10,14;T1,9,10,13
	Omitak/02A				See Phase III			
	Oimatan					S270-273		
	Cobaki				DV14 fm WP24	S25,26	DV14	
	Dostum's HQs					S221,224,2241		
1.Photos:Gallery G#, Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#, Vince-VV, John-JV,3.Transcript:T#,Video gist:V#, Notes#								

Battle site survey 9 December 2002 data provided coordinates and media from the house in Dehi, the trail head to Cobaki and Chapchal, and the Beshcam and Chapchal areas to support Phase II of the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction. New collection consisted of coordinates for the Cobaki trail head; Ak-yasin photos, such as Figure V-7; service member photos of Cobaki; and the Afghan video showing the trail up to Chapchal. Validation included Northern Alliance and team locations/movements in the Beshcam/Chapchal area. Discussions on the evening of 8 December 2002 (T10), the day of 9 December 2002 (T13), and CPT Mark's description of the areas (DV13 and DV14) provide excellent coverage of Phase II activities.

2. Information Voids and Follow-up Requirements

Voids include a lack of battle site survey media from south of the Darya Suf and validation of SOF team and Northern Alliance positions. However, the Battle Site Survey Team was able to take “back shots” from the Beshcam and Chapchal areas to Cobaki. Enduring Freedom Reconstruction will have to depend on previous photos and GPS locations provided by CPT Mark, the SOF teams, and JSOTF reports.

D. PHASE III: BATTLEFIELD POSITIONING AND PREPARATION (29 OCTOBER–4 NOVEMBER 2001)

During this period, the coalition prepared for a major engagement in the Baluch area. These preparations included the repositioning and resupply of coalition forces, the insertion of ODA 534 east of Aq Koprak to support GEN Atta, and the arrival of the Boxer element, an ODC to support the ODAs. In addition, the bombardment of Taliban forces continued in the Baluch area and to the west along the Darya Suf.

The Tiger three-man elements were deployed as follows:

- Tiger 02A, deployed with CDR Haji Habib on Omitak during Phase II, was attriting Taliban forces in the Keshenda-ye Bala and Keshendeh-ye Pain areas west of Baluch (BDA documented in Figure III-22).
- On 31 October the rest of ODA 595 moved their base camp from HLZ Albatross to DZ Burro (Figure V-8), closer to the impending battlefield. From 31 October to 4 November:

02B remained at DZ Burro, a short move to their battle positions on the north ridge of the Darya Suf.

Tiger 02C repositioned through CDR Lal’s area (Figure V-9). They spent 31 October–1 November 2001 at CDR Lal’s and directed close air support to the north near Charsu to support Ahmad Khan’s forces and to prevent Taliban forces from counterattacking or reinforcing from the west down the Darreh ye Dadel or from Dallan in the north.

Tiger 02D moved to Oimatan, south of the Darya Suf, but in position to target Taliban forces near the vicinity of Baluch.



Figure V-8. Cave on North side of DZ Burro, Home to ODA Members in November 2001



**Figure V-9. Tiger 02C Sets up SOFLAM and Scope at
CDR Lal's Command Post, 31 October 2001**

By 4 November 2001, all elements were either in position or within a short ride (Figure V-10) to their 5 November battle positions.



Figure V-10. GEN Dostum, Northern Alliance Forces, and ODA Members Traverse the North Ridge, 3 November 2001

1. Battle Site Survey Support to Phase III Reconstruction (Table V-4)

Table V-4. Phase III: Positioning and Preparation/Battle Site Survey Media Index

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/other
III Positioning & Preparation	Burro	23	Burro DZ Aid Station	N36.01919 E67.17902		GP1624-30;S320-323,331-333,3341-3349,3351,3358,3410,3412,342	DV13;VV2;JV5	T12
	Omitak/O2A				DV14 fm WP24	S350-351	DV12 fm PB	T21
29 Oct - 4 Nov	Keshendeh-ye Bala	44	Photo 1 Keshendeh-ye Bala	N36.12144 E67.01494	Grouped under		DV18;VV2	
		45	Photo 2 Keshendeh-ye Bala	N36.12066 E66.97733	O2A because the	GP1735-9;	VV2 DV18	T19,21
		46	Tank BDA Keshendeh-ye Bala	N36.12897 E66.97291	BDA and most	GP1745	DV18	
	Keshendeh-ye Pain	47	D30 BDA Keshendeh-ye Pain	N36.14200 E66.94284	discussions at	GP1750		
		48	BMP BDA Keshendeh-ye Pain	N36.14627 E66.93806	these locations	GP1752	DV18	
		50	Tank BDA	N36.14597 E66.93629	result from O2A's	GP1757	DV18	
		52	ZSU BDA	N36.16493 E66.92204	work			
	Oimatan/O2D				DV14 fm WP24		DV14	T13
	Shamallak/O2D				See Phase IV	S3431-3438		
	Charsu/O2C				See Phase IV			
	CDR Kamal's CP	24	Kamal's CP	N36.04639 E67.17382		GP1646,16460,1,1647	VV2;DV14	DV14;T13
	CDR Lal's CP	29	Lal's CP	N36.06947 E67.17899		GP1662-8	VV2;DV14	DV14;T13
	North Ridge					S3350,3352-3356		
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#								

The 9 December 2003 battle site survey data provided coordinates and media, including DZ Burro, Kamal's command post, and Lal's command post. Figure V-11 reflects initial Northern Alliance and Tiger 02 locations for the 5 November 2001 engagements and Taliban locations from the battle site survey BDA and interviews.




Figure V-11. Force Disposition

The 10 December battle site survey data supporting Phase III reconstruction include data from Keshdendeh-ye Bala and Pain. Taliban in those areas were targeted by Tiger 02A from the Omitak area (see Figure III-22). As indicated earlier, Tiger 02A struck those targets before 5 November 2001.

Collection included service member photos during that phase (e.g., Figures V-8 through V-10), BDA photos and GPS marks, interviews with villagers in Keshdendeh-ye Bala about the air strikes and Taliban movements, and BDA during this phase. Video and discussions from the Baluch overlook of Oimatan and Shamallak (Tiger 02D's positions) support reconstruction of activities south of the Darya Suf. It also included interviews with the Northern Alliance commanders, specifically, GEN Dostum and Commanders Lal and Fakir, on the ground where they fought during Phase III of the campaign.

2. Information Voids and Follow-up Requirements

Voids included lack of validation on Tiger 02A positions and their immediate enemy locations. The impact: Although 02A's coordinates and the enemy they targeted by close air support were available through interviews and GPS downloads, precise loca-

tions on Tiger 02A's forward OPs or enemy locations that were not struck by close air support were not. In addition, any photos the Battle Site Survey Team received taken from the top of Omitak (Tiger 02A's position) were poor quality.

E. PHASE IV: BATTLE FOR THE DARYA SUF—VALLEY OF THE CAVES (5 NOVEMBER 2001)

When the moment came, they signaled their targets to the coalition aircraft and looked at their watches. Two minutes and 15 seconds, 10 seconds—and then, out of nowhere, precision-guided bombs began to land on Taliban and al-Qaeda positions. The explosions were deafening...¹¹

By the early morning hours of 5 November 2001, the conditions for a coalition success were set: aggressive Northern Alliance forces cooperating under a single Northern Alliance commander, U.S. ground forces; the building of the coalition strategy and confidence, accurate and responsive air support, and the delivery of lethal aid (at 0200 hours to GEN Dostum's forces into DZ Burro).

The general sequence of events for 5 November 2001 is provided below and in Figure V-12. The Synchronization Matrix, reflecting events for Tiger and Northern Alliance elements, is in Appendix K. The general sequence will be followed by a description of actions at the various Tiger 02 locations.

At 0500 two MC-130s dropped BLU 82s, one near Aq Koprak and the other west of Shulgareh, to signal the beginning of the offensive. CPT Mark saw a faint flash on the horizon, then moved to CDR Lal's OP, Tiger 02 and 02B's battle position.

In the north, Tiger 02C's primary mission was to protect the coalition's northern flank; by 1330 the Taliban were closing to within 1,000 meters of their positions, and the Tiger 02C Northern Alliance security force was out of ammunition and withdrawing.

¹¹ Ibid.




Figure V-12. 5 November 2001, Battle for the Darya Suf (Source: Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Working Group reconciliation, February 2003.)

To the south, Tiger 02D targeted what was rumored to be the bunker of Mullah Razzak, the commander of the Taliban forces in the area (Figure V-13).

Atop Omitak mountain in the west, Tiger 02A faced an unexpected obstacle—an enemy command bunker was between them and GEN Dostum's main forces. Their targeting needed to be extremely accurate because of a nearby village. A Predator UAV in the area helped coordinate the targeting.

At 1630 hours GEN Dostum received word that Mullah Razzak was killed in the earlier strike. He then ordered CDR Lal to charge the bunker complex. In preparation for the attack, Tiger 02B readied the SOFLAM and coordinated with a flight of F18s to strike four targets in succession. SSG Will turned to CDR Lal and said, "30 seconds to impact." Commander Lal ordered the attack. Near simultaneously, the bomb and cavalry struck the target:



Figure V-13. Photo Taken from Tiger 02D Position South of the Darya Suf North to Baluch

The timing is so precise that hundreds of Afghan horsemen literally came riding out of the smoke, coming down on the enemy in clouds of dust and flying shrapnel...it was the first cavalry attack of the 21st century.¹²

At 1730 hours a B-52 that was provided precise coordinates by the Predator UAV liaison at the CAOC struck the bunker for Tiger 02A. Simultaneously, CDR Haji Habib ordered his horsemen to charge the bunker.

It was a long, but productive day for the coalition.

1. Battle Site Survey Support to Phase IV Reconstruction (Table V-5)

Activities by the various Tiger teams include Tiger 02A, fighting the deep fight; Tiger 02D, responsible for the striking the Taliban rear areas in the vicinity of Baluch; Tiger 02 and Tiger 02B, fighting the main battle; and Tiger 02C, guarding the Northern Alliance flank to the north near Charsu. The sequence of activities will be discussed from west to east (02A, 02D, Baluch, 02/02B, 02C) to north, a “lazy L” shape, as the teams were positioned on the battle field to fight the deep, rear, main, and flank battles.

¹² Ibid.

Table V-5. Phase IV: Battle for the Darya Suf/Battle Site Survey Media Index

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/other
IV Battle for the Darya Suf	Burro	23	Burro DZ Aid Station	N36.01919 E67.17902		GP1624-30	DV13;VV2;JV5	T12
	Omitak/02A					S350-352	DV12,18	T21
	Oimatan						DV14,15,16	DV14;TT7,7A
	Shamallak					S451,452,45 21-4522,	DV16	DV16, T15
	Dolstum's HQ's					S4531,4532, 4541,4542,4 551-		
	CDR Kamal's CP	24	Kamal's CP	N36.04639 E67.17382			VV2;DV14	DV14,22;T13
	CDR Lal's CP	29	Lal's CP	N36.06947 E67.17899			DV14	T13
	CDR Lal's OP/02B	35	Lal's OP	N36.08035 E67.16229	Cdr Lal's & 02B's OP on 5 Nov	GP1710,17, 19,23,24	DV16,17;VV2	DV16,17;T13,16,17
	Path from 02B to Baluch	41		N36.10173 E67.14145	02B movement to Baluch on 6th		DV17	
		40		N36.10885 E67.14150				
		39		N36.11353 E67.14882				
		38		N36.10693 E67.15234				
		37		N36.10341 E67.16335	X-road to Baluch			
	02,02B,02C Linkup point	36		N36.09554 E67.16275	02,02B,02C link on 6th; move to KB		DV17	
	Baluch/Baluch Overlook	31	Baluch	N36.08730 E67.13289	Village of Baluch	GP1691,2- 6,1669,70,7	VV2; DV15; DV16	DV6,7,15,16,22;T14, 14A, 15,16
	Chumka Pass (Ph)	34		N36.06581 E67.15887	Kamals forces came thru Chumka		DV15,16	T14,14A,15,16
	Charsu/02C	3G	Tiger 02C Forward OP	N36.12688 E67.15733	02C Position 5 Nov		JV6	DV3,4;T2A,20
	Path from 02C	5G		N36.12256 E67.16192	Blocking position		JV6	T20
		4G		N36.12600 E67.15825	Team leaves trail -- buttslide		JV6	
	Bunker/Charsu	2G	Bunker	N36.12411 E67.15994			JV6	
	House/Charsu	1G		N36.11793 E67.16944			JV6	

1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#

a. Tiger 02A Activities—5 November 2001

Tiger 02A's challenges were different than the other teams for 5 November. Most of their work—attriting Taliban positions in the Darya Suf and reinforcements in the Keshendeh-ye Bala and Pain areas—was completed by that day. Their challenge was getting off the mountain to link up with GEN Dostum's forces as the Northern Alliance advanced through the Darya Suf and up the Balkh River Valley. Battle site survey interviews with SFC Bill and CDR Haji Habib (T21, DV12, 18), previous interviews with SFC Andy (Tiger 02A team lead), Team GPS coordinates, and IDA experts¹³ were used to construct the schematic in Figure V-14. Unique data collection included the opportunity to interview CDR Haji Habib, who was with Tiger 02A, talk to the townspeople in the Keshendeh areas, and document the remaining BDA as a result of Tiger 02A's work prior 5 November 2001.

b. Shamallak—Tiger 02D

Tiger 02D's mission was to strike the Taliban rear in the Baluch/main battle position area. They remained in the Oimatan area for the night of 4 November 2001 and proceeded to the Shamallak area the next morning. This placed them closer to their objec-

¹³ Terrain profiles by Dr. Robert Richbourg and air support discussions with Dr. Geoff Koretsky.

tive. Although they were last for priority of fires, they made some significant contributions to the battle. They directed close air support that struck Mullah Razzak's bunker on the afternoon of the 5 November 2001 and contacted the F14 for the strafing runs in the Baluch area and north in the Charsu area that aided Tiger 02C's escape. Figure V-15 gives the sequence of events for Tiger 02D's activities.




Figure V-14. Omitak—Tiger 02A Sequence of Events, 5 November 2001 (Source: Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Working Group reconciliation, February 2003.)

c. Baluch

CDR Fakir escorted Battle Site Survey Team 1 to the Baluch overlook. Data collection included Fakir's and CPT Mark's description of the area, including the approaches from the various Northern Alliance positions. As an example, CDR Fakir described CDR Kamal's approach through the Chumka Pass (DV15), CDR Lal's attack through the notch (Figure III-18; also on DV15 and G1693) and the mixing of enemy and friendly forces at dusk/darkness: "We had three or four thousand enemy forces and they [Northern

Alliance] had fifteen hundred of their own forces. Going in, they could not recognize who was the enemy and who was their own forces.”¹⁴




Figure V-15. Shamallak—Tiger 02D Sequence of Events, 5 November 2001 (Source: Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Working Group reconciliation, February 2003.)

The Taliban eventually retreated from Baluch to a far off house and bunker system atop a distant hilltop. CDR Fakir described the Taliban technique of abandoning the bunker system during the strikes—and the Northern Alliance technique of capturing those entrenchments before the Taliban could return.

GEN Dostum described some of the drawbacks to the seemingly synchronous attacks immediately following the bomber strikes—during the second pass of the bomber, Northern Alliance troops had already taken the objective and some were killed.

CDR Fakir described the “foreigners” as “mostly Pakistanis who had just arrived. They didn’t know what was going on. You know, their motivation was that they were

¹⁴ Transcript 14.

fighting for Islam. But we knew, the real Taliban and Al-Qaida who could feel the danger they had all escaped.”¹⁵

In addition, the local Taliban who had been forced into Taliban service were switching to GEN Dostum’s side. The “foreigners” had two choices—die or surrender.

Taliban Commander Mullah Guhaire’s challenge to GEN Dostum, that the winner of the day’s battle would control the north, was powerful and foretelling of the days ahead. GEN Dostum personally met that challenge and led forces on the final attacks of the day. These are all reflected in Transcripts T14–T16; videos DV15, DV16, and VV2; and photographs GP1691, 2-6, 1669, 70, 77. This is all unique material; the significance of the “foreigners” is discussed in more detail later.

d. Tiger 02 and Tiger 02B Activities

Battle Site Survey Team 1 then proceeded to CDR Lal’s OP/Tiger 02 and 02B’s 5 November 2001 position. The central figures in this re-creation of events were SFC Vince, CDR Ezattullah, and CPT Mark. A summary of their comments and sequence of events are in Chapter III and Figure V-16. This part of the survey allowed the team to validate enemy and friendly positions and document target azimuths from the team’s location. Figure V-16, reconciled with previous information, provides detail to the sequence given in Chapter III.

Reconciliation of the information includes the various perspectives: MSgt Bart’s perspective from south of the Darya Suf near GEN Dostum’s headquarters, where he could see up the valleys and ridge lines from his vantage point south of Baluch; Tiger 02D’s description of the battle area from Shamallak, southwest of Baluch; Fakir’s description from the Baluch overlook; and SFC Vince’s, CPT Mark’s, and CDR Ezattullah’s description from the east along the Northern Alliance main avenue of approach into Baluch. The coalition’s actions, planned and unplanned, communicated and miscommunicated, all heroic, followed GEN Dostum’s receipt of information on the reported death of Mullah Razzak and subsequent order to charge, and led to the day’s victory.

¹⁵ Ibid.




Figure V-16. Tiger 02 and 02B Sequence of Events—5 November 2001 (Source: Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Working Group reconciliation, February 2003.)

e. Tiger 02C Activities

In the north, Tiger 02C's primary mission was to protect the alliance's northern flank and to prevent the Taliban from attacking or reinforcing from the Dallan and Dare-a Dadel areas. Figure V-17 gives a general sequence of events for 02C.

Data collection included video of the area and discussions with CDR Haji Chari and later with CDR Ahmad Khan to get the Northern Alliance perspective. In addition, because 5 November locations data for any of the Tiger 02C were not on file, survey locations of the various activities and waypoints, such as the house, the Taliban blocking position, the location where the team departed the path to escape down the ravine, etc., were all unique.




Figure V-17. Charsu—Tiger 02 Sequence of Events, 5 November 2001 (Source Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Working Group Reconciliation. SSgt Matt's quotes are taken from Wils Hylton, "Masar-e Sharif," *Esquire*, August 2002.)

2. Information Voids and Follow-up Requirements

As in previous sections, the major information voids existed in imagery and validation of locations south of the Darya Suf. Although battle site survey data sought to minimize the impact of those voids by taking "reverse shots"—video and photographs from the Darya Suf and positions north of the Darya Suf to areas of interest to the south, such as SOF team locations—that information simply isn't an adequate replacement for "point of origin" imagery. Also, the only photographs taken were by the team members. Follow-up requirements included reconciliation of data with other experts and the SOF teams.

F. PHASE V: PURSUIT AND EXPLOITATION (6–8 NOVEMBER 2001)

The Northern Alliance fought the Taliban during the night of 5 November 2001. By the next morning most Taliban/Al Qaida had fled; those that remained were restruct by air and ground assault. Taliban casualty estimates ranged from 500 to 1,000. Many were Pakistanis, Chechens, Uzbeks, and others who had come to fight their own self-proclaimed Jihad. GEN Dostum initiated his own psychological operation by calling

those forces “foreigners” fighting on Afghan soil, and he urged the Afghan Taliban to switch sides and join him in his fight against the “foreigners.”

After 5 November 2001, SOF on Omitak prepared to depart to link up with GEN Dostum’s forces (Figure V-18). On the afternoon of 6 November, Tigers 02 and 02B met with Tiger 02C at a bunker northeast of Baluch and then headed toward Keshendeh-ye Bala. Tiger 02A thought they had cleared their way down the mountain, but as the Northern Alliance soldiers moved into the town near the previously captured bunker, the Taliban feigned surrender, then ambushed the Northern Alliance soldiers and reoccupied the bunker systems. Restrikes that evening again cleared the route.

On 7 November, Tigers 02, 02B, 02C; Commanders Lal, Kamal, Ahmad Khan, Fakir; and GEN Morta Sar’s forces assembled at the Keshendeh-ye Bala Bazaar with an estimated strength of over 2,500 fighters. GEN Dostum directed the commanders to meet him at Omitak and requested that CPT Mark move forward toward Shulgareh. That afternoon, Tiger 02A and Tiger 02D departed Omitak and remained overnight in Keshendeh-ye Bala.

On 8 November Tiger 02 and 02B met GEN Dostum in Shulgareh. Commanders Lal and Kamal were forward near the gap, and Ahmad Khan was south near Keshedeh-ye Bala. Tiger 02A moved forward from Keshendeh-ye Bala on foot. They lost their pack mules and loaded their equipment onto horses. They walked for 25 miles before linking up with Tiger 02, north of Shulgareh, that evening. Tiger 04 was with GEN Atta’s forces pushing north from Aq Koprak toward Shulgareh.

At 1600 hours, Tiger 02C was with CDR Ahmad Khan in the compound at Pole Baraq. GEN Dostum entered with Generals Mohaqiq and Atta and developed the strategy to take Mazar. At dark, Generals Atta and Mohaqiq left to rejoin their forces while GEN Dostum proceeded to his forward command post, several kilometers south of Tiangi.



Figure V-18. Team Load Outs and Movements after 5 November 2001

From his forward command post, GEN Dostum called back over radio to CDR Haji Chari, who was with Tiger 02C. GEN Dostum needed Tiger 02C to meet him at his command post. Upon arrival at the command post, GEN Dostum briefed them on their mission, which was to set up a forward observation post on the Kafer Qalah, the high peak on the east side of the Tiangi. By 2200 they were mounted and at 0300 they were in position. The Kafer Qalah had a commanding view of the north side of Tiangi—a perfect spot to direct air support against the Taliban who had forfeited the high ground for a reverse-slope defense.

On the night of 8 November 2001, ODA 595, except for 02C, rendezvoused at a site between Shulgareh and Tiangi (Figure V-19). The next day would be the final battle for Mazar.

This was one of the most difficult phases to reconcile because of the number of moving parts, locations, and times. For example, there were five teams, some split and some combined, five plus Northern Alliance commanders and the Boxer element moving each day at different times to different locations. In addition, locations of meetings, names of people, and times weren't as seemingly significant during this period, hence not always recorded or remembered as well as the 5 November and 9 November events. The above phase summary was primarily reconciled as a result of the battle site survey.



Figure V-19. ODA 595 (minus 02C) Rendezvoused on 8 November 2001

1. Battle Site Survey Support to Phase V Reconstruction (Table V-6)

Table V-6. Phase V: Pursuit and Exploitation/Battle Site Survey Media Index

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/other
V Pursuit & Exploitation	Keshendeh ye Bala	45	Photo 2 Keshendeh-ye Bala	N36.12066 E66.97733	Photo shot & interview from sth of KB facing south	GP1735-9	VV2;DV18	T19,21
	Keshendeh ye Pain	50	Tank BDA	N36.14597 E66.93629	BDA Tank,	GP1757	VV1;VV2;DV18	DV18;T19
	Keshendeh-ye Pain				BDA BMP	S5730,5731		
	Pole Baraq	6	Bridge			GP1575-6	VV1,2;DV12,18	T8
		54	River Crossing site	N36.23162 E66.90064		GP1758	VV2	
		55	Meeting Place 8 Nov	N36.28252 E66.90570	Dostum's meeting with 02C & Atta	GP1762		
	Tashkanda							T22
	Shulgareh	4	Shulgareh Market	N36.32516 E66.87980		GP1559156 8,1570-2	DV12, VV1	
		5	Shulgareh CP	N36.31697 E66.88555	2-story house where Dostum held his meeting on 8th	S5820	DV12	T22
			Shulgareh Plains			S5811,5811 1,58112,581 2,5813,5813 1,5814,5815		
		3	H20Resupply	N36.46275 E66.91161	Tm obtained water on 9 Nov			
	South of Tiangi	2	Dostum's 9 Nov CP	N36.52209 E66.94438		GP1557-8	DV12,VV1	
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#								

Validation included GPS waypoints of the market in Keshendeh-ye Bala where the 2,500 soldiers met after the victory in the Darya Suf and the 8 November meeting place. Unique data collection included the GPS waypoints of the Shulgareh command post, the river crossing site and imagery of Keshendeh-ye Bala and Pain, and the Shulga-

reh command post. GEN Dostum's 9 November 2001 headquarters is addressed in the next section.

2. Information Voids and Follow-up Requirements

Reconciliation of this phase indicated that the battle site survey collected enough information to fill voids. Unless a requirement develops for more detailed Phase V information, there are no immediate or known voids.

G. PHASE VI: TIANGI (9–10 NOVEMBER 2001) (FIGURE V-20)




Figure V-20. Phase VI: Tiangi, 9 November 2001 (Source: Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Working Group Reconciliation, February 2003.)

In the early morning hours of 9 November, the coalition forces began their push through the Tiangi Pass. The Taliban had forfeited the high ground and were on the low ground on the far side of the pass. Their goal, according to GEN Dostum, was to delay the movement of his forces into Mazar-e Sharif, but "they did not know the strategy of

war.”¹⁶ As the fog lifted in the morning Tiger 02C, atop the Kafer Qalah, called close air support on the Taliban positions, hitting five or six targets.

In the early afternoon, Tiger 02A began their deployment from GEN Dostum’s command post to the east of the Kafer Qalah. They were to link up with a Northern Alliance subcommander and serve as a ground FAC against Taliban fleeing east from Mazar-e Sharif toward the Konduz area. As they traversed the southern slope of the Kafer Qalah, the Taliban employed BM-21 multiple rocket launched artillery in three separate salvos. One of the Tiger 02A team members was thrown from his horse as the others scrambled for cover.¹⁷ The Taliban target was likely the Northern Alliance force in the pass and Tiger 02C on top of the Kafer Qalah.

The Taliban counterattack halted the Northern Alliance advance at the pass. Losses resulting from mines and the BM-21 attacks started to demoralize the Northern Alliance forces. CDR Kamal estimated that he lost six horsemen.

GEN Dostum regrouped his forces and directed the assault on Hill 732 to the northeast of the Kafer Qalah. They again started their push through the pass. However, they sustained a number of casualties from landmines, which stopped their advance (Figure V-21).

CPT Mark, witnessing the rocket attack and concerned about his soldiers, headed into the pass on horseback. As he cautiously made his way through the pass, Northern Alliance fighters began moving off the mountainside and out of the caves to fall in behind him. As he passed destroyed equipment, dead horses and people, more Northern Alliance Forces joined him. Upon breaking through the pass, the Northern Alliance fighters started charging after the Taliban to the northwest and then west.

¹⁶ Transcript 19.

¹⁷ Notes 2.



Figure V-21. Landmine Casualty

CPT Mark and TSgt Steve, an Air Force Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller (ETAC), called close air support on the far side of the pass and then moved to cover and set up a defensive position in the event the Taliban decided to mount another counterattack.

It was getting dark and the fighting continued along side the north canyon walls, but GEN Dostum's forces had penetrated in Mazar and he overheard the enemy's radio traffic:

The enemy lost its [morale]...particularly when we captured one of the more key...positions [we were standing at the Kopa Kula, north side of the Tiangi and he was pointing toward Hill 732]. So they were demoralized and I could hear them through the radios...they were trying to make a plan for escape...in the late night I remember that hundreds and hundreds of vehicles were escaping toward [Konduz].¹⁸

¹⁸ Transcript 19.

1. Battle Site Survey Support to Phase VI Reconstruction (Table V-7)

Table V-7. Phase VI: Tiangi/Battle Site Survey Media Index

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/other
VI Tiangi	CP South of Tiangi	2	Dostum's 9 Nov CP	N36.52209 E66.94438		GP1557-8	DV11,12,VV1,	T21
	Tiangi	61	Tiangi Bridge	N36.54488 E66.96488		GP1784,5	DV19VV3	
		63	Photo 3 Tiangi	N36.54137 E66.96255	NA gathered behind Mark	GP1781	DV19;VV3	T5A,6A,21,24
		64	Photo 4 Tiangi	N36.54803 E66.96910	Fm WP Mark saw dead horses	GP1784,5	DV19;VV3	T21
		58	Kopa Kula	N36.54874 E66.96960	Near loc Dostum x'd river	GP1784,5	DV19	T19,23,23A
	Kafer Qalah	66	T02C OP 9 Nov	N36.54052 E66.96862	Tiger 02C CAS OP	GP1790-98	DV20;VV3	T24
	North of Tiangi	67	T02 RON 9 Nov	N36.56646 E66.96627				
		68	ZSU BDA	N36.57142 E66.96304				
					Tiger 02			T21
					02A			N2
					02B			T21
					02C			DV3,4;T02A,24
					02D			T21

1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#

Except for initial interviews before the battle site survey trip, almost all the data collection for Phase VI was unique (i.e., new). Data included the GPS locations for Tiger 02C's close air support OP and Tiger 02's movement to the gap; descriptions by Northern Alliance commanders and team members on the ground, particularly retracing locations and events at each waypoint by Tiger 02, 02A, 02B, GEN Dostum, and CDR Haji Chari; and the opportunity to capture those locations on film with narrations by the principals. Table V-7 summarizes the media available to reconstruct Phase VI events.

2. Information Voids and Follow-Up Requirements

Other than the remaining signs of BDA, locational data on enemy forces was difficult to capture because there wasn't enough time and because of concerns about unexploded ordnance—its locations were unknown. GEN Dostum warned the team several times to stay near the main paths and roads and with the guides. A follow-up requirement that became quite evident after conducting the surveys at both Charsu and the Kafer Qalah (Tiger 02C's positions) was the tactical need for a terrain profile/line-of-sight display to survey candidate observation posts. In both cases, initial positions did not have the best line-of-sight profiles to meet the stated missions.

H. PHASE VII: THE FALL OF MAZAR (10 NOVEMBER 2001)

It was 0001 on 10 November. Tiger 02 and 02D were north of the pass in defensive positions for the night. Tiger 02C was on top of the Kafer Qalah with GEN Dostum, CDR Haji Chari, LTC Max, and elements of Boxer. Tiger 02A was east of the Tiangi Pass. They were unable to link up with CDR Haji Rakasara and spent the night near Hill

1730. Tiger 02B was located at GEN Dostum's command post south of the Tiangi, awaiting an aerial resupply.

At 0250 hours, the MC-130H resupply drop landed approximately 1 kilometer to the northeast of the drop zone. Part of drop was on the river edge and embankment, in a suspected mined area. They spent several hours searching and were able to transport 95 percent of the items back to the house (Figure V-22).



Figure V-22. Resupply Drop

Prior to sunrise, GEN Dostum moved off the Kafer Qalah on horseback. He moved northeast toward Hill 732 and then west toward the main road. Obstacles included mined areas and the river:

And this is the location, the place where I came down off this mountain. So I came this way and...I tried to cross the river...but once I got in the river I was about to drown...and I thought to myself, you are not killed in these fightings but you are going to die in this water!

Obviously, GEN Dostum survived to survey the battle site and then move to his command post south of the Tiangi to link up with CPT Mark and LTC Max.

GEN Dostum's and GEN Atta's forces were now on the outskirts of the city. GEN Dostum moved with elements of Tiger 02 and Boxer north through the pass to Qala Jangi. At the bridge over the Balkh River, they encountered Afghan civilians lining the streets, cheering GEN Dostum and the Americans (Figure V-23).



Figure V-23. Coalition Forces Entering the Outskirts of Mazar-e Sharif

At 1100 hours they rallied inside Qala Jangi (Figure V-24). Qala Jangi, meaning “The House of War,” was a medieval fortress, previously GEN Dostum’s headquarters before the Taliban takeover and then headquarters to the 18th Taliban Division. GEN Dostum convened a meeting with primary commanders and the local political and civilian leadership.

At 1200 Tiger 02A arrived by horseback at Qala Jangi. Not since infiltration day on 10 November 2001 had all members of the ODA been in the same location. Although Mazar-e Sharif quickly came under Northern Alliance control, there were pockets of Taliban resistance. In particular, some 400–450 Pakistani Taliban were barricaded inside the Sultan Razia Girl’s School in central Mazar and refused to surrender. That afternoon, CPT Mark dispatched four team members to assess the situation. When negotiations failed, GEN Dostum asked for air strikes. After an extended “talk on” under small arms fire, a flight of F-18s destroyed the target. More than 300 Taliban were killed; the rest fled the building only to be shot or beaten by the locals. There were no civilian casualties or collateral damage. USAID did a great job rebuilding the school (Figure V-25).



Figure V-24. Qala Jangi Fortress



Figure V-25. Sultan Razia School on 10 November 2001 and Reopened October 2002

1. Battle Site Survey Support to Phase VII Reconstruction (Table V-8)

Table V-8. Phase VII: The Fall of Mazar-e Sharif/Battle Site Survey Media Index

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/other
VII Mazar-e Sharif	Qala Jangi		QJ CTR	N36.66691 E66.98447		G1799-1860;S8211-82924	DV24,25	DV26, 29;T32A
	Sultan Razia		R SCH	N36.70736 E67.12121		S71030-71036;G1875-1909	DV30	DV29; T29
	Konduz			N36.65622 E68.65415		S8251-82616		
	Heiratan Bridge			N37.22632 E67.42881		S81210,812101		

1.Photos:Gallery G#; Ak-yasin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#

The period covered by the Enduring Freedom Reconstruction concluded when the ODA and Northern Alliance assembled at Qala Jangi Fortress. Unique information included the interviews of the Northern Alliance commanders, Generals Dostum and Atta; a former Taliban Commander; video; and photos of the route into and out of Qala Jangi. Other events were documented because the Battle Site Survey Team had the opportunity to collect information on an historic event and “to provide the rest of the story” beyond the fall of Mazar-e Sharif.

2. Information Voids and Follow-up Requirements. None

I. AFTER THE FALL OF MAZAR

Over the next several days after the fall of Mazar-e Sharif, the Northern Alliance secured the Mazar Airport and the Heiratan Freedom Bridge (Figure V-26), allowing ground and air access to the northern provinces.



Figure V-26. Discussions between the Uzbeks and GEN Dostum at the Heiratan Freedom Bridge

The fight then turned east toward Konduz, where reports indicated that over 10,000 Taliban were consolidating. After several days and nights of negotiations, Mullah Faisal, the Minister of Defense, continued to stall. The introduction of the AC-130 gunships and B-52s flying overhead provided incentive, and he, along with 3,500 Taliban and Al Qaida forces, finally surrendered.

The prisoners were transported west of Mazar to the prison in Sheberghan by truck. At Sheberghan the ODA advised and assisted GEN Dostum on prison security, human rights, and health and welfare issues. The ODA began assisting the local doctors in providing medical treatment. The next challenge was separating the known Al Qaida members from the general Taliban populace (Figure V-27). After several days, GEN Dostum handed Mullah Faisal over to ODA-592 for questioning by CENTCOM interrogators. ODA-592 escorted Mullahs Faisal and Noori, the Taliban Minister of Defense and Chief of Armed Forces for the north, respectively, to the aircraft for transport to Guantamo.

In the meantime, Taliban prisoners at Qala Jangi had rioted and killed Mike Spann, a CIA agent, the first American death of the war. On 1 December 2001 at Sheberghan, John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban, was discovered (Figure V-27). ODA 595 secured Mr. Lindh, provided medical support and personal security, and turned him over to higher headquarters.



Figure V-27. Sheberghan Prison and John Walker Lindh, One of the Prisoners

The ODA shifted focus and began conducting area assessments, building relations with the Afghans and talking with the local factions to determine the ground truth. They continued to advise GEN Dostum and other Afghan leaders about working together to rebuild the northern infrastructure.

In the next several days Kabul and Kandahar would fall. This was truly a remarkable feat because the administration had cautioned the American people that this could take until spring 2002. Two months after September 11th, and less than a month after insertion, the north was captured and all ODA objectives were met with no loss of ODA

personnel. On the other hand, several thousand Taliban were killed with an equal amount captured, and thousands quietly moved into the countryside or returned to their homes.

Admiral Calland, the Coalition Special Operations Component Commander, and the various ODAs (595, 592, and 533) continued to work with the various factions in the Mazar area. As of this writing, there continues to be an ODA working in Mazar with all three factions to maintain the peace.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

What won the battle for Mazar and set in motion the Taliban's fall from power was a combination of ingenuity of the Special Forces, the most advanced precision-guided munitions in the U.S. arsenal delivered by U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marine crews, and the courage of the Afghan fighters...

—*Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld*¹

A. ENDURING FREEDOM RECONSTRUCTION—MAZAR-E SHARIF

The following conclusions were developed from or amplified by information received during the battle site survey trip.

1. Alliances

ODA 595 trained an Uzbek airborne brigade and Uzbek Spetsnaz during Centrazbat 2000 (Figure VI-1). These Special Forces exercises are conducted today under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, and they are extremely useful in developing the experience of our forces in other countries, as well as developing the foreign country as a potential base for future operations. This relationship proved valuable as the United States later developed basing rights and other tactical, operational, and strategic support arrangements with Uzbekistan. Without basing arrangements to support a northern campaign, the capture of Mazar-e Sharif, Northern Afghanistan, and ultimately all of Afghanistan would not have happened as quickly as it did, and may not have happened at all.²

The Battle Site Survey Team saw evidence, and reaped the benefits, of this relationship, albeit on a much smaller scale, as CPT Mark coordinated with the Defense Attache Office and others within the embassy to obtain team, equipment, and weapons clearance out of Uzbekistan.

¹ Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's presentation to the National Defense University, 31 January 2002.

² Afghanistan is a landlocked country. Access to the northern provinces required a base of operations that could support a ground operation. Uzbekistan, albeit difficult to negotiate, was the best option.



Figure VI-1. ODA Training Uzbek Spetsnatz

2. Ground Forces

The United States couldn't move to the next phase of the campaign without "boots on the ground." This was validated through interviews with Generals Atta, Moha-qiq, and Dostum. In fact, GEN Atta indicated that the bombing campaign, before ground forces were introduced, was counterproductive. That is, it adversely affected the morale of the Northern Alliance as well as the Afghan people because the bombing was not hitting anything significant. CDR Haji Muhammed Abdu noted that U.S. forces were able to coordinate air attacks:

The...U.S. forces being on the ground was big thing. It had a lot of effect on the war, so they could coordinate the targets and tell the aircraft what to do. If they were not on the ground, it would have been impossible.³

3. Unconventional Warfare

Small, agile, and adaptive U.S. ground force teams worked with committed indigenous forces to train, equip, plan, and subsequently synchronize precision fires and

³ Transcript 8.

ground force maneuver to defeat the Taliban/Al Qaida. Those ground forces, each with unique capabilities and contributions, consisted of the following:

- The ODA, a 12-soldier team of experts in various combat disciplines, cross-trained to enhance independent operations, language qualified and culturally focused, worked, trained and fought with the indigenous forces.
- An Air Force CCT and an ETAC enhanced and expanded the ODA's close air support capability.

4. Jointness/Coalition Warfare

Mazar-e Sharif demonstrated jointness/coalition warfare at the basic tactical level—young Army Special Forces officers, Army and Air Force NCOs, Air Force and Navy pilots, other government agency personnel, and Northern Alliance forces.

Without any one of the following elements, the mission would not have succeeded: other government agencies, SOF, Northern Alliance, tankers, fighters/bombers, and logistics. A battlefield condition was interdependence; a prerequisite for success was the development of trust among the various forces:

- Intra- (three man) and inter-team trust was critical—it meant survival.
- SOF trust in the Northern Alliance—ODA members were told during mission preparation that they could die during insertion. Initial reports on GEN Dostum painted the picture of a thug who couldn't be trusted. Later, ODA members found that the opposite was true: GEN Dostum was very supportive of the U.S. presence. The ODAs need better intelligence on coalition forces before linking up ODAs with coalition elements.
- Northern Alliance trust in the United States—the ODAs had to build that trust and confidence.
- Trust by the Northern Alliance that lethal aid would be there to support continuing operations—CDR Ahmad Khan's forces charged on 5 November with only 10 rounds of small arms ammunition per man. Aid had been received early that morning but had not reached his forces.
- Trust in precision (timing and locational accuracy) munitions—although there were some exceptional events of friendly fire and errant bombs, all interviewed expressed “awe” when discussing precision weapons.
- Trust in logistics—almost-too-late logistics (later than “just-in-time logistics”) represented an absolute minimum to operate. Included were cold-weather gear for ODA, lethal aid for GEN Dostum on 5 November, batteries

for radios, and food—in 3 weeks the ODA members lost an average of 20 lbs.

5. All-Weather Precision Fires

All-weather precision fires are irrelevant without an all-weather targeting system. That is, under positive identification rules of engagement, U.S. personnel on the ground needed to identify and locate the targets before fires could be executed. Because ground forces did not have an all-weather targeting capability, the system was not all-weather.

6. Precision Fires and Maneuver⁴

Both precision fires and maneuver were required to defeat an adaptive and committed enemy.

a. Fires/Targeting Comments

- The Predator system requires better targeting resolution. During the Tiger 02A linkage with Predator, AWACS, a B-52, and the CAOC to destroy a command bunker, the location from the Predator video required mensuration at the Joint Intelligence Center before the B-52 could drop precision munitions.
- Target locational data should be standardized to avoid confusion and extra work during the targeting sequence. The Navy required degrees, minutes, decimal minutes, the Air Force required degrees, minutes, and seconds; and the Army operates off the Military Grid Reference Systems.
- The process by which the ground forward air controller provides coordinates to aircraft should be automated. That is, from the ground laze, coordinates should be automatically provided to the aircraft rather than read to the aircraft.
- No-Fire Areas need to be updated to reflect friendly force positions, other government agencies/ODA, as well as coalition forces. For example, conversations between the headquarters elements on 5 November 2001 reflected conflicting No-Fire Areas for a neighboring ODA.
- Special engagement zones should be doctrinally formalized if they are value added to the FSCM. The comparison of Free Fire Area (a doctrinal term) to

⁴ Stephen Biddle, *Afganistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*, November 2002, Strategic Studies Institute.

special engagement zone (a nondoctrinal term) was confusing to some of the forces.

- A Joint close air support course, joint standards, and joint currency requirements should be developed to support all services.
- Maps were inadequate for Mazar-e Sharif. A variety of maps were used, but primarily the Escape and Evasion and 1:250,000 Joint Operations Graphic were employed. Later, the 1:100,000 tactical map became available. After Mazar-e Sharif, some SOF received the Russian 1:50,000 map sheet. The 1:250,000 maps presented some obvious problems when trying to estimate ranges and elevations for precision strikes.
- Static versus mobile enemy—in many cases the Taliban were static. The problem set becomes much harder when the enemy is mobile.
- Ingenuity and experience—ground forward air controllers employed various resources and techniques for close air support: maps, talk-ons, flash-to-bang (the ground forward air controller observes the flash, counts the seconds until the bang, and then computes the distance), SOF laser and marker, Garmin ETREX, Vista GPS receiver, etc.

b. Maneuver

At Beshcam, Chapchal and Baluch, fires, in and of themselves, were not sufficient to defeat the enemy—maneuver and close combat were required.

7. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Battlefield situational awareness was provided almost solely by ODA/other government agencies.

General Dostum's network provided the intelligence and early warning on enemy movements and disposition with little to no input from theater or national systems.

8. Command, Control, and Communications

JSOTF and ODA—doctrinally, the ODA is resourced to split into an A and B Team. CPT Mark took advantage of the additional manpower and equipment provided by the ETAC and CCT to better support the battle plan by splitting the ODA into four three-man cells and a two-man command and control element. This flattened organization, although commanded and controlled by him, used the same AC1 (command) net to call for fires. On 5 November 2001 this arrangement caused the Special Operation Liaison Ele-

ment and Predator liaison officer time sensitive targeting operator to resort to a SIPRNET chat link to coordinate fires. This arrangement had pros and cons:

- The chat link allowed them to coordinate the mission and reduce the AC1 traffic.
- This also provided historical audit for the re-creation.
- The overall complaint with the chat link, although not in this example, was a lack of discipline and hence, a lack of dependability and credibility.

Rules of Engagement—positive target identification was required by U.S. personnel. There was some frustration in trying to interdict Taliban reinforcements through the Balkh River Valley to the Darya Suf based on GEN Dostum's intelligence sources. Although there is no estimate, some of those Taliban made it through to reinforce TF Razzak in the Darya Suf. On the other hand, given warlord feuds in the area, CENTCOM was very reluctant to fire based on third-party positive target identification.

9. Cultural Aspects of METT–TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops—Time, Civil Considerations)

One of the team members described the meeting of U.S. high-technology and Afghan low technology civilizations as the “Jetsons meet the Flintstones.” Although that description had a lot of truth, when the focus was on technologies, there was commonality in the fighting spirit. ODA 595 cited a multitude of examples of the courageous Afghans attacking armor from horseback. Likewise, there are a multitude of examples citing U.S. courage throughout the period. These heroics, recognized by both sides, served to build the trust and comaraderie that catalyzed the coalition's advance to Mazar. Two interesting aspects of the Northern Alliance relationship to the Taliban are provided below.

a. Northern Alliance/Taliban Relationships

The relationship between General Dostum and his Afghan Taliban enemy seemed closer than the relationship between the Afghan Taliban and foreign Taliban in that area.

b. Foreigners

Ironically, the “foreigners” on the battlefield became the thousands of Pakistanis, Chechens, Saudis, and others that came to Afghanistan to fight their “Jihad.” In some cases, these volunteers became more of a burden than help to the Taliban. In particular, with winter approaching, the Al Qaida/Taliban couldn't feed, clothe, or equip them.

There were also cases where Afghan Taliban military leaders simply abandoned their foreign Taliban counterparts on the battlefield as they retreated north through the Balkh River Valley towards Mazar-e Sharif. Information operations were a CENTCOM “line-of-operations” that seemed to work quite well for GEN Dostum as he prodded the local Taliban to join his forces against the “foreigners.”

B. BENEFITS OF THE BATTLE SITE SURVEY

The battle site survey contributed to a 35- to 40-percent increase in usable data for the re-creation effort, bringing the total to 90–95 percent.

Original estimates, prior to the battle site survey, indicated ground force data at 60 percent. The 60 percent was computed by looking at the available locational data and information, versus what was needed, to recreate activities for each of the teams, particularly for 5 and 9 November 2001. Original data came from ODA team member GPS downloads, interviews, and reports. Although the information was abundant and credible for most lessons learned purposes, it did not provide the detail required for re-creation. As an example, there was no locational data on the movement of Tiger 02C on 5 November 2001 and inaccurate data for their location on 9 November 2001. Hindsight indicates that 60 percent was high; 50–55 percent is a better estimate.

The 35–40 percent increase in usable data was computed in several ways. First, locational data from the ODA GPS recordings was listed for major events and movements. The battle site survey attempted to validate each of those locations and provide additional locations not otherwise documented. This in itself reflected a 38-percent increase in significant (major locations and routes) locational data (See Appendix L).

Second, a list of key players provided a checklist for interviews and discussions. The Enduring Freedom Reconstruction Team had access to, and interviewed, the majority of ODA team members plus members of the Battalion and Group Staff prior to the battle site survey (a total of 16 personnel). Those interviews provided the structure and core information for the ground re-creation. During the battle site survey, the Battle Site Survey Team interviewed 16 Afghans representing the Northern Alliance commanders, ODA team member counterparts, GEN Dostum, and former Taliban. Although this reflected a 100-percent increase in interviews (or 50 percent of the total), the increase in information towards the re-creation was adjusted to 35–40 percent, because the original CONUS interviews provided the majority of core information. Having said that, team member and Afghan accounts “on the ground” during the battle site survey provided the most credible

and accurate reports and allowed the Battle Site Survey Team to mark and videotape or photograph at each location, enhancing the accuracy of the account.

Third, service members provided a wealth of photographs depicting events during the October and November 2001 time frame. The battle site survey imagery addition to the collection included Battle Site Survey Team video and photographs and original footage of the era. This was obtained from GEN Dostum's archives and CDR Ak-yasin. While the numbers indicate a increase in imagery by several factors, the increased percentage was adjusted to reflect a conservative 30–35 percent. Although the original photos (and video from GEN Dostum's' archive) are more valuable for historic purposes, the battle site survey imagery supported the accuracy of the re-creation and background for the simulation.

Fourth, the battle site survey had second- and third-order effects on the collection effort. As an example, notebooks that were not available during CONUS interviews surfaced during the battle site survey. In particular, coordinates for the major targets around Baluch, some not available through other sources, contributed significantly to the re-creation. Another example is the ability of the analyst to see relationships among activities that may have been unrecognizable outside of the battle site survey environment.

Revised Enduring Freedom Reconstruction collection status before the battle site survey was estimated to be at 50–55 percent (quality and quantity). The battle site survey contributed another 35–40 percent to the quality and quantity of data collection for the ground picture. Although these estimates are soft, they're believed to be conservative when considering second- and third-order effects created by the battle site survey opportunity and its impact on the credibility of the project.

GLOSSARY

AAR	After Action Review
AB	Air Base
AC	Aircraft
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
AGL	Above ground level
AK-47	Small arms – rifle, 7.62 mm
AO	Area of Operations
ATO	Air Tasking Order
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
B-52	U.S. Bomber
BM-21	122 millimeter Rocket Launcher
BMP	Armored Vehicle
BSS	Battle Site Survey
C2	Command and Control
CAOC	Combined Air Operations Center
CAS	Close Air Support
CATK	Counterattack
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CCT	Combat Control Team
CDE	Collateral Damage Estimate
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CFF	Call for fire
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CP	Command Post
DMSO	Defense Modeling and Simulation Office
D-30	Artillery, towed, 122 millimeter
DMT	Distributed Mission Trainer
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DSB	Defense Science Board
EO	Executive Order
EFR	Enduring Freedom Reconstruction

ETAC	Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FFA	Free Fire Area
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FSCL	Fire Support Coordination Line
FSCM	Fire Support Coordination Measure
FSCOORD	Fire Support Coordinator
FY	Fiscal Year
GCS	Ground Control Station
GFAC	Ground Forward Air Controller
GPS	Global Positioning System
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JCAS	Joint Close Air Support
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training Program
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munitions
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTF	Joint Task Force
K2	Karshi Khanabad
LIT	Likely and identifiable threat
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOS	Line of Sight
M&S	Modeling and Simulation
M4	Short barrel M16 Rifle
MeS	Mazar-e Sharif
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOUT	Military Operations on Urban Terrain
NA	Northern Alliance
NCA	National Command Authority
NGO	Non Government Organization

NLOS	Non Line of Sight
ODA	Special Forces Operational Detachment A (SFODA)
ODB	Special Forces Operational Detachment B (SFODB)
ODC	Special Forces Operational Detachment C (SFODC)
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA	Other Government Agency
OP	Observation Post
OPORD	Operations Order
ORD	Operational Requirements Document
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSW	Operation Southern Watch
PGM	Precision Guided Munitions
PID	Positive Identification
POTUS	President of the United States
RFA	Restricted Fire Area
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
SA	Situational Awareness
SAT	Satellite
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SEZ	Special engagement zone
SFODA	Special Forces Operational Detachment A
SIGINT	Signals intelligence
SITREP	Situation Report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOFLAM	Special Operations Forces Laser and Marker
SPINS	Special Instructions
SROE	Standing Rules of Engagement
STX	Situational Training Exercise
T-55	Tank
TCT	Time Critical Target
TF	Task Force
TST	Time Sensitive Targeting
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

USCENTCOM

USSOCCENT

UXO

ZSU 23-2

U.S. Central Command

U.S. Special Operations Command Central Command

Unexploded Ordnance

Air Defense Artillery

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APPENDIX A—SPELLING: PEOPLE AND PLACES

APPENDIX A—SPELLING: PEOPLE AND PLACES

The following provides the protocol for spelling the names of people and places. Titles are also discussed.

Locations—There are a number of spellings for each location. First preference was the Afghanistan Country Handbook that lists CENTCOM preferred spellings—an asterisk precedes those. The next spelling in parenthesis shows alternatives, if an asterisk precedes that, then it too is from the handbook. Subsequent spellings were taken from other common publications, such as the 1:250,000 Joint Operations Graphic—Air (JOG-A) or the translator that provided the spelling.

Afghan Names—Translators provided the majority of spellings for the names of the Afghan people.

ODA names—In country CPT Mark requested use of first names only. In accordance with a USSOCOM preferred convention to minimize team member exposure, ranks (so the reader would recognize the military from the civilians) and first names. Ranks were reflected according to service convention. As an example, Staff Sergeant Chad is SSG Chad, which indicates he is a staff sergeant in the Army, but Staff Sergeant Matt is SSgt Matt indicating he is a staff sergeant in the Air Force.

Abdul Wahid Yasa, Dr. In charge of International Relations, Wahdat translated for General Mohaqq.

Ahmad Khan. Commander, 19th Division, subcommander for General Dostum.

Ak-yasin. Currently commander of troops along AFG-UZ border, he was a subcommander under Lal.

Ali Sarwar. Le Wa 114 (division 114) had 40 horseman and 20 dismounted (subcommander of Lal).

Aq Koprak. 1:250K map.

*Balkh.

*Balkhab (*Balkhab and JOG-A, 1:250K map). Area where General Dostum started in April 2001.

Baluch Village (name of a minority in AFG)—spelling by Esam. The battle for the Darya Suf took place around Baluch Village.

Beshcam, Beshkam, Bishqab—1:100K map.

Buzkashi. Afghanistan's National Sport. Like Rugby on horseback, but instead of a ball they use a headless goat.

*Chapchal.

Cobaki. Name of a town in the Darya Suf, one of the first locations the team used to call CAS. Pronounced Chobaki (long o soft a, I pronounced as a long e).

Darya Suf, *Dar-I Suf (*Darreh-ye Suf, Dar-e Suf) Darya Suf (JOG-A, 1:250K map). Darya Suf was used because it was the prevalent form in writing.

*Dehi.

Eid al-Fita or Eid, Feast of.

Esam—General Dostum's interpreter.

Ezattullah (spelling by Kamal). A Northern Alliance commander, he commanded 10 horse soldiers and made the charges on the 5th of November.

Fakir (Faqir, Fakeer—ph).

Habib Bullah. General, former Taliban.

Hafis. ODA Team's interpreter.

Haji Chari. Commander with 02C.

Haji Muhammed Abdu. Mazar-e Sharif Deputy Mayor for Mohaqiq.

Juma Namangani. Uzbekistan opposition leader fighting for Al Qaida, died from wound received during battle of Tiangi.

Kamal. Commander.

Kamal. ODA's contract interpreter.

Kafer Qalah (ph Coffe Kalay soft a/long a). Kafir Qala means the mountain east of the pass that Dostum went to on 9 November.

Karshi Khanabad (ONC) aka K2.

Kode Barq (heard pronounced Kodee Ba-rak), Area of the fertilizer plant, power electric plant, and Dostum's other house.

Lal, Commander. Subcommander for General Dostum.

*Mazar-e Sharif (*Mazar-E Sharif, Mazar-i Sharif).

Mohaqiq, Haji Mohammad. Chairman, Political Committee, Wahdat; Minister of Planning (also spelled Mohaqqueq).

Morta Sar, GEN. Commander 38th Division (Mohaqiq's General).

Mullah Gausidine. 18th Div Commander.

Mullah Gihaire. Taliban general that General Dostum spoke to over the radio at Baluch. Mullah Gihaire told General Dostum that the winner of the Battle of Baluch would take the Mazar and the north.

Pol-e Baraq (1:250,000 JOG-A).

Ramadan.

Razzak, Mullah. In charge of Taliban forces in the Darya Suf and Balkh River Valley.

*Safid Kotah (Safedkotal, JOG-A 1:250K map; Safeed Kotal sp by Esam, white, steep—snow).

Saiforah Neyuzi. Director of Sultan Razia Girl's High School, she is also in charge of the women's organization.

*Sar-i Pol (Sar-e-pol JOG-A).

Sayed Noor Ullah. The Minister of Foreign Affairs.

*Sheberghan (*Shebergan).

*Shulgareh (Sholgerah, JOG-A, 1:250K map).

Tahir. Engineer, Deputy Commander, 38th Infantry Division, was present at Mohaqiq's compound.

Tiangi (translation of Tiangi means pass). AKA Kuh-E-Al Borz Pass, also called Cashmeh Pass.

APPENDIX B—IDA/DARPA BATTLE SITE SURVEY REQUEST

TEAM TWO VISIT TO CENTCOM AOR—AFGHANISTAN

1. PURPOSE

To support a Mazar-e Sharif (MeS) battle recreation through validation/reconciliation of on-hand data and additional data collection, Team two will visit the MeS area. An accurate and credible ground picture requires a battle site survey (walk the ground with elements of the original ODA) to validate team movement(s), times, engagement areas, BDA, and terrain data, via GPS, video, photos, artifacts/remains, and to reconcile ODA team member recollection for record. Time in country also provides an opportunity to interview some of the key players such as GEN Dostum, his subcommanders, and Taliban/Al Qaida (defector or detainees) to record and present all perspectives.

2. RATIONALE

The ground picture currently consists of team GPS locational data (primarily from the Detachment Commander), team member interviews and pictures, overhead imagery, BDA reports, and team and JSOTF Situation Reports, updates, briefs, and Intelligence Summaries. However, we're having a hard time reconciling the air and ground pictures due to conflicting and missing information. Additionally, gaps/flaws in our DTED 1 and 2 data have reflected incorrect terrain features and non-existent land bridges in our simulations.¹ An accurate and credible ground picture requires a battle site survey (walk the ground) to validate team movement(s), times, engagement areas, BDA, and terrain data, via GPS, video, photos, artifacts/remains, and to reconcile team member recollection for record. We have heard about the distance and geometry relations between observation points, targets and enemy forces, but being there would introduce a ground truth perspective that would otherwise be missed. This will also give us an opportunity to capture the complexity of the terrain, determine exactly where munitions fell, and the

¹ Had the DTED material been accurate we would still request an onsite survey.

exact locations of the engagement areas and detailed structure of the strong points, trench lines, and bunkers.

In addition to completing our work on the ground picture, an in-country visit provides an opportunity to interview GEN Dostum (now the Deputy Minister of Defense), subcommanders, and Taliban/Al Qaida (defectors or detainees), to record and present all perspectives. This validation (and interviews) will greatly increase the accuracy of reconstruction and will enhance the credibility of the reconstruction and of the team.

3. ITINERARY/LOCATIONS

In order to retrace the route of ODA 595 with emphasis on 4-6 November and to interview GEN Dostum, his subcommanders, and Taliban/Al Qaida (defectors or detainees) the following itinerary is proposed.

a. Masar-e Sharif

Several days for the interviews indicated above and to allow the ODA element to complete coordination. If GEN Dostum is not in MeS, then we will need transport to his location for the interview.

b. Darya Suf

An hour at the primary LZs and initial base camps in the vicinity, an hour at each team location, and several hours at BDA sites (locations, at a minimum are displayed in Geodetic, though in some cases may be displayed in both MGRS and Geodetic).

LZ Albatross

LZ Burro

Cobaki

Tiger 02 5 November locations:

Tiger 02A

Tiger 02B

Tiger 02C

Tiger 02D

BDA sites:

Chap Chal

Boybe Che
Char Su
Katch Garden
Keshendeh-ye Bala
Keshendeh-ye Pain

c. Balkh River Valley (flyover/video)

Include Sholgerah area:

Pol-e Baraq
Aq Kopruk

d. Sholgerah Gap and Adjacent Ridgelines (On the ground several hours).

4. METHOD

- Record via video, still frame, audio (team member descriptions) and GPS, ground battlefield locational data to include Taliban positions.
- Collect data, relevant to MeS (and in particular, the Darya ye Suf during 4-6 November) from various Joint/component/operation centers to include video, feeds, imagery, ROE, CONOPS/TTP, and command architectures.
- Interview (on tape) Dostam and, if possible, subcommanders. Interview Taliban leadership that fought in the area or were responsible for the fighting (those in MeS or Sholgerah that supervised, supported, or reinforced Darya-ye Suf). Both prisoners and Hoi Chans.

5. TIME FRAME

Informal coordination with the ODA indicates mid to late September as best dates to accommodate planning/coordination requirements and other commitments during August/early September. Propose an advanced party of three personnel depart mid September (approximately 15 September) to coordinate the visit in and around MeS and the other members arrive approximately 22 September and return approximately 3 October.

6. PERSONNEL

It's imperative that at a minimum CPT Nutsch accompany the team and representatives from each of his subteams that were at the locations. Although I have unofficially contacted the unit for comments and best dates, recommend that CENTCOM officially make contact. The Afghan Team consists of the following personnel:

William Knarr—IDA/DARPA Team Lead

Dave Potaszniak—Videographer

George Lukes—IDA Project Manager

Ward Page—DARPA Program Manager

Captain Mark Nutsch—ODA Team leader* and overall incountry lead.²

ODA team members—at minimum representatives from 02A, B, C, D (preferably team leads).

John Frost—backup videographer (for processing only), he will deploy only if Dave Potaszniak is unavailable.

7. FUNDING

IDA PM will fund IDA personnel/expenses.

8. POCS

POC at CENTCOM is COL Ed Cardenas, 813-827-4326

POC in Afghanistan is MAJ Philip H. Karns, 49th Military History Det, Bagram Afghanistan.

9. ENCLOSURES

Passports for DARPA/IDA team members

List of original members of ODA 595

² Request CPT Nutsch and elements of his ODA that worked the area accompany the team (CENTCOM may consider putting them in charge of the planning, coordination and execution). COL Mulholland, 5th SFG Commander, agreed that a walk of the site was important to the reconstruction. He provided his conditional support for the proposal contingent upon activities in Afghanistan and unit commitments (didn't know if elements of the original ODA would be available due to mission requirements).

Prepared by:

Dr. William (Bill) M. Knarr, Jr.
Research Staff Member
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
703-845-6819
wknarr@ida.org

APPENDIX C—EQUIPMENT LIST

APPENDIX C—EQUIPMENT LIST

PROFESSIONAL GEAR

1. GPS w/
 - a. 20 AA batteries
 - b. DC adapter for auto lighter
 - c. USB/Serial port connector to laptop
 - d. World map
 - e. Waypoints loaded w/conventions for: Cobaki/Chapchal 21-25 Oct; Boybeche/Keshendah 4-6 Nov; Tiangi Pass, 7-9 Nov [*need to be able to pass WP from Laptop to GPS]
 - f. Manuals
2. Laptop w/
 - a. AC power adapter
 - b. Zip drive w/250 Zip disks for photos
 - c. Check WP passing from laptop to GPS
 - d. International electric plug adapters
 - e. FalconView 1:250,000, 1:100,000 maps loaded
3. Maps, 1:250K and 1:100K
4. Tape recorder w/5 90 min tapes
5. Passports—official and tourist w/visas
6. Invitational Travel Orders
7. International Driver's License
8. Certificates of Registration for Professional equipment




PERSONAL GEAR—IN COUNTRY

(We asked if we could drop off items in Karshi Khanabad and pick them up on the way out.)

1. In-country wear

- a. Columbia jacket w/Swiss knife, Gerber multi tool, Mag Light, lensatic compass, emergency bandage
 - b. Baseball cap/or watch cap, ear/head band and gloves (nomex) in pockets.
2. Duffel bag and day pack for in-country
 - 2 pair cargo pants
 - underwear
 - long tops
 - 1 long bottom
 - 3 pair boot socks
 - Gerber Multi tool
 - 1 vest
 - Nylon cord
 - Swiss knife
 - Flashlight (Maglite with extra batteries)
 - Lensatic compass
 - Glove shells
 - Toilet kit including toilet paper, chapstick, amoxicilin, imodium, water purification tablets, motrin, sewing kit, malaria tablets
 - Watch cap
 - Neck scarf
 - Alarm Clock
 - Matches/lighter
 - Duct tape
4. 2 Water bottles and carrier.
5. Sleeping bag
6. Towel
7. Power Bars
8. Handkerchiefs
9. Headlamp (in addition to flash light as a hands free light source), Sunglasses, Sun block, Mini disposable pocket warmers (last 7-hrs. or more), baby wipes

10. Body Armor/cold weather gear request to CENTCOM

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Simulation Center

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>BARCODE</u>	<u>SERIAL #</u>
Sony DSRPD150 Digital Camcorder	GP081371	1028249
w/battery pack and accessories (SEE ATTACHMENT FOR SPECIFICS).		
Sony DSRPD150 Digital Camcorder	GP081247	1027549
w/battery pack and accessories (SEE ATTACHMENT FOR SPECIFICS).		
Sony MSA-32A Memory Stick		
3 Sony NP-F960 Battery Pack, 7.2V, 38.8Wh		
Portabrace RS-PD150 Rain Slicker		
Century Optics DS65CV-SB Wide Angle Lens Adapter		
Century Optics DS-20TC-58 Telephoto Lens Adapter		
Century Optics DS-FA00 Lens Shade		
Century Optics Series 9 drop in clear lens filter		
Sony MDR75066 Headphone		
Marshall VLCD5.6 LCD Monitor Kit	GP081255	7656
Century Optics 65-070113 Filter		
Lectro UCR100 Wireless Receiver		2250
Lectro UM100 Wireless Transmitter		2088
Voice Technologies VT500 Microphone		
Bogen 3445-503 Tripod Kit	GP081374	
Sony MLCPD 150TH Hard Case		
Sony Headcleaning Cassette DVM12CLD		
Sony MiniDV Cassettes (sixty each) DVM60PR2		
Sony Memory Stick, 64MB, MSA64A		
Sony Battery Charger, BC-V500		
EWA-Marine Rain Cape for DSRPD150 Camera, VC-PD150		
Varizoom Camera Brace for DSRPD150, VZ-LSP		
Tiffen UV Series 9 Filter, UV Haze 1A		
Tiffen 58mm UV Filter Haze 1 A		
PortaBrace Hiker Pro Camera Case, HKP-3		
Nikon CoolPix 950 Digital Camera	GP081319	740697
w/battery pack and three 128MB Memory Cards		
Garmin GPS V	GP081375	93037856
Garmin GPS III	GP080787	40130850
Sony VAIO Notebook Computer Model PCG-6122	IDA035587	28321730 3300560
Sony VAIO Notebook Computer Model PCG-6122	IDA035588	28321730 3300569
Anton Bauer Ultra-Light Kit		
w/cable, extra bulbs, filters		
Anton Bauer two 12-volt battery belts		
1 AC battery charger for battery belts		
1 Mach 1 speed charger for camera batteries		
1 Sony HVL-20DWZ Camera Light		
1 Radio Shack 220 Watt Power Inverter		
1 Light Kit w/2 Mole Mini-Fresnels;		
2 Lowell Tota-Lights,		
Stands, Cords, & Filters		

Sennheiser MKH416 Microphone w/Foam Windscreen ID429148
Power Supply for Microphone
4 XLR-XLR Audio Cables
1 LTM 614-92 Mic. Pole & Microphone Mount
1 A/C Power Strip
1 TRAM Lavalier Microphone
1 Vinten Tripod Tube
2 Firewire Cables

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ARLINGTON, VA 22203-1714

<u>Name</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>
IBM Thinkpad T-22 Computer	S/N 78-7BAPZ
DARPA Audio Signal Processor	02322-002
DARPA Audio Signal Processor	02322-004
Motorola T-6220 Talkabout	182TBNXM95
Motorola T-6220 Talkabout	182ABND088
Motorola T-6220 Talkabout	182ABNBQ58
Motorola T-6220 Talkabout	182ABND092
Motorola T-6220 Talkabout	182ABND109
Motorola T-6220 Talkabout	182ABND077
Motorola T-6220 Talkabout	182TBNWY78
Motorola T-6220 Talkabout	182TBNWZ28



APPENDIX D—BATTLE SITE SURVEY TEAM MEMBERS

APPENDIX D—BATTLE SITE SURVEY TEAM MEMBERS

Major Dan Striedieck, J8, CENTCOM EFR POC and Trip Coordinator

CPT Mark, ODA Team leader and overall incountry lead

SFC Bill, ODA 595 Team Member

SFC Vince, ODA 595 Team member

William Knarr, IDA/DARPA Trip Coordinator and EFR Data Collection Team Lead

Dave Potasznik, Videographer

Ward Page, DARPA EFR Program Manager

George Lukes, IDA EFR Project Lead

John Frost, IDA Backup/assistant Videographer and still photos

APPENDIX E—RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

APPENDIX E—RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The following is the ROE brief we received when we arrived the reception station at Bagram. Titled “Staff Judge Advocate ROE,” it was read from a TV screen by a specialist to the new arrivals:

You always have the right to self-defense.

Use of force is authorized against individuals committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent:

- Hostile acts: An attack against U.S. forces a/o coalition forces or a use of force intended to impede Enduring Freedom operations.
- Hostile Intent: An indication of imminent use of force. Anything that tells you a person/force is preparing to attack you. Do not wait to take the first hit.
- Force must be necessary and proportional

Sound judgment will be required by all in determining the degree of force necessary for mission accomplishment.

Defend yourself, your fellow soldiers and other U.S. coalition personnel against hostile acts of demonstrated hostile intent.

Detention and search is permitted.

ROE don'ts:

- Don't shoot someone surrendering.
- Don't damage civilian property.
- Don't harm innocent civilians.

**APPENDIX F—AFGHANISTAN INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS,
VIDEO LOGS, AND NOTES**

APPENDIX F—AFGHANISTAN INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS, VIDEO LOGS, AND NOTES

The attached tables provide an index of interview transcripts, video logs and notes. Within the publication they are referred to as T# for transcript number; DV#, JV#, and VV# to reflect the primary videographer (Dave, John, or Vince) and videotape number for the logs; and N# to reflect the notes or notebook number.

The quality of the transcripts and video logs are rated and categorized by MeS battle phase to assist the researcher in determining which source would be most beneficial to his work.

The full transcripts and logs are provided in a separate document.

*Transcript #	Interviewee	Remarks	**Quality	***Phase
1	GEN Dostum and CDR Lal	7 Dec, at GEN Dostum's house in Sheberghan for dinner	3/3	0,2,6
2	CDR Haji Chari	7 Dec at Sheberghan	4/3	0,4,6
2A	CDR Haji Chari	Retranslation of T2	5/4	0,4,6
3	CDR Haji Chari	7 Dec, CDR Chari cont'd	3/2	0
4	CDR Fakir	7 Dec, at Sheberghan	2/2	0
5	CDR Fakir	7 Dec, Sheberghan with CDR Fakir -- discussion on Tiangi and Sultan Razia School	3/4	0
5A/6A	CDR Fakir and CDR Ak-yasin	Corrections and retranslations of 5 & 6	5/5	0,6,7
6	GEN Ak-yasin		3/3	0
7	GEN Ak-yasin, CDR Ali Sarwar, GEN Morta Sar	8 Dec in MeS	4/4	0,2,4,5,6
7A	GEN Ak-yasin and GEN Morta Sar		5/5	0,2,4,5,6
8	CDR Abdu	Background on Balkhob & OGA	3/3	0
8A	GEN Morta Sar and CDR Abdu	Duplicate of T8 with CDR Abdou	5/3	0
9	GEN Dostum	Tape of dinner discussion on 8 Dec -- GEN Dostum with map - cassette 002 side A	2/2	0,2
10	GEN Dostum	GEN Dostum speaking from Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ) Albatross to Burro. Kamal is interpreter. Mark addresses supply drops at HLZ Albatross	3/4	1,2,3
11	GEN Dostum and GEN Morta Sar	Duplicate of small portion of Cassette 002B -- taken at base of trail to Chapchal	4/4	2
12	CPT Mark	9 Dec Burro DZ with Mark	4/4	3
13	CPT Mark	9 Dec, Mark at Kamal's CP to Lal's CP	5/5+	2,3,4
14	CDR Fakir	9 Dec US Mil and 10 Dec Fakir at Baluch	4/4	3,4
14A	CDR Fakir	Tape 15, w/Fakir, overlooking Baluch on the 10 th . This is a duplicate of T14	3/3	3,4
15	003 (Baluch) Side A	Baluch with CDR Fakir -- Cassette 003 side A	2/3	4

*Transcript #	Interviewee	Remarks	**Quality	***Phase
16	CDR Fakir, SFC Vince, and CDR Ezattullah	10 Dec Fakir at Baluch, Vince & Ezattullah at 02B	4/4	4
17	SFC Vince and CDR Ezattullah	Tiger 02B 5 Nov position Cassette 003 side B	4/5	4
18	Team B at Charsu for 02C	10 Dec at Charsu with CDR Hajo Chari - Cass Side A		
18A	Team B at Charsu for 02C	10 Dec Team B at Charsu for 02C--includes reconciliation from video's JV6 & JV7	4/4	4
19	SFC Bill and GEN Dostum	10 Dec with SFC Bill at Keshendeh-ye Bala (KB) and GEN Dostum at Tiangi	3/3	3,5,6
20	CPT Mark	10 Dec with CPT Mark at KB Bazaar, GL recording, Cass side B	3/3	5
21	SFC Bill and CPT Mark	11 Dec, Bill at KB and Mark at Tiangi - Cass 004 Side A		
22	GEN Dostum	New material w/Dostum at Tashkenda - CDR Fakir appears to be retranslation of earlier interview	5/5	5,6,7
23	GEN Dostum	10 Dec Dostum at Tiangi - cassette titled Bouzkashi	3/3	6
23A	GEN Dostum at Tiangi	Kerri's transcript of Tiangi w/Dostum - Cass side B	3/3	6
24	CDR Kamal	Part 1 Haji Chari at Kafar Qala; Pasrt 2 Kamal at Tiangi	3/3	6
25	CDR Khamal and GEN Habib Bullah	11 Dec with CDR Kamal at Tiangi	1/1	
26	GEN Habib Bullah	11 Dec, See 26A	4/4	
26A	CDR Khamal and GEN Habib Bullah	Dup of T26 - Use this one	5/5	0,2,4
27	GEN Habib Bullah	Discussions on Sultan Rozia, Konduz, Qala Jangi	4/4	
27A	GEN Habib Bullah	Alternate to T27	5/5	0,4,6,7
28	GEN Atta	Not much material	1/1	0

*Transcript #	Interviewee	Remarks	**Quality	***Phase
29	GEN Atta		5/5	0,3,5,6,7
30	GEN Mohaqiq	Use alternate 30A		
30A/31A	GEN Mohaqiq		4/3	0
31	GEN Mohaqiq	Use alternate 31A		
32	GEN Mohaqiq	Use alternate 32A		
32A	GEN Mohaqiq		5/4	1,7

Notes:

*Transcript #. The "A" indicates that this is an another translation or transcription. The "quality" column will reflect which is best to read first. Both are listed because each is different enough to warrant mentioning and each may be of value to the researcher.

**Quality of the material is rated in two areas. The ratings range from 1 (as poor) to 5 (very good). The first number rates the quality of the transcript itself, i.e., is it coherent? The second number rates the information, i.e., how well does the information contribute to the reconstruction?

***This column indicates which phases (0-8) of the battle for MeS the transcript supports.

*Dave's Video Tape #			
1	Simctr; Bagram; Sheberghan w/GEN Dostum; Interview w/CDR Lal [Transcript 1]	M	0,2,6
2	Cont'd Interview w/CDR Lal	M	0,2,6
3	Interview w/Haji Chari, Sheberghan [2A]	M	0,4,6
4	Cont'd Interview w/Haji Chari, Sheberghan [T2A]; Buzkashi		
5	Cont'd Buzkashi; Dostum at Sheberghan w/map in courtyard	L	0
6	Interview w/Fakir, Sheberghan [T4&5A]	H	0,6,7
7	Cont'd Interview w/Fakir, Sheberghan [T4&5A]	H	0,6,7
8	Interview w/CDR Ak-yasin, Sheberghan, [T5A & T6A]	H	0,6,7
9	Cont'd, Interview w/CDR Ak-yasin, MeS, and GEN Morta Sar [T7A]	H	0,2,4,5,6
10	Interview w/Morta Sar and GEN Abdu at ODA house in MeS [T8A]	H	0
11	Cont'd Interview w/GEN Abdu, MeS [T8A]; start trip at 1230, down thru Tiangi, stop at Dostum's CP, Villager provides watermelon	H	0,6
12	BSS thru Shulgareh; Buzkashi; Pole Barak bridge; Omitak Mountain; Keshendeh; Dinner in mud hut, Dostum talks strategy w/map by lamplight [T9]	L	0,2
13	View of camp; depart to area where Dostum 1st met OGA and CDR's; Albatross [T10]; trail from DS to Chapchal [T10, 11]; DZ Burro [T12]	M	0,1,2
14	CDR Kamal's CP; top of trail from DS; Chapchal; Beshcam; Lal's CP [T13]	M	2,3
15	Hilltop SW of Baluch w/Dostum and Fakir evening of 9th and morning of 10th [T14&15]	M	4
16	Start SW of Baluch w/Fakir and then moves to Tiger 02B position w/Vince, Mark, & Ezattullah [T15,16,17]	H	4
17	Cont'd w/Vince at CDR Lal's OP (Tiger 02B) and Ezattullah T16,17]	H	4
18	At Keshendeh-ye Bala (KB) w/SFC Bill and Haji Habib [T20,21]; ends with GEN Dostum at Tahkenda speaking about Turkisdh friend in Embassy [T22]	M	3,4,5
19	North of Tiangi w/GEN Dostum [T23, 23A]	H	6
20	11 Dec, video of Tiangi, retrace Tiangi w/Mark & Vince [T21]; interview Haji Chari on Kafar Qalah [T24] and ends w/interview of CDR Kamal and GEN Habib Bullah at cave in Pass [T25]		
21	Interview Kamal and GEN Habib Bullah at ODA house in MeS [T26A]	H	0,2,3,4,5,6
22	"		
23	"		
24	Cont'd interview with GEN Habib Bullah [T27A]	H	0,2,3,4,5,6

25	12 Dec Qala Jangi Fortress, Mike Spann memorial; interview w/GEN Atta [T28,29]	H	0,2,3,5,7
26	Cont'd w/Atta [T28,29]; 13 Dec Interview w/GEN Mohaqiq [T29]	H	0,7
27	Cont'd interview with GEN Mohaqiq [T29, 30A, 31A, 32A]	H	0,2,5,6,7
28	"		
29	"		
30	14 Dec, video of militay equipment, i.e., weapons, tanks, artillery pieces; Sultan Razia School	L	0
30	"		

***John's**

Video Tape #			
1	Driving shots fromn MeS to Sheberghan; GEN Dostum's Guest House; segments of CDR Lal interviews; guesthouse courtyard and meeting of local leaders; Buzkashi	L	0
2	Buzkashi; GEN Dostum in courtyard w/Map	L	0
3	Sheberghan memorial; Drving shots MeS to Tiangi; Driving shots in dark from Dehi south	L	8
4	Driving thru DS	L	
5	Burro DZ; Vince's cave; drive switchbacks out of DZ; Kamal's CP; Chapchal; Trail top from DS to Chapchal	L	2,3
6	Lal's CP; interview w/Lal, Haji Habib, Haji Chari; Baluch; Charsu interview w/Hai Chari	L	3,4
7	Cont'd interview w/Haji Chari; Tiangi; Top of Kafer Qalah	L	4, 6,7
8	Ahmed Khan itnview in MeS	L	

***Vince's**

Video Tape #			
1	Drive thru MeS toi Sheberghan, memorail in Sheberghan	M	1,2
	8 Dec -- CP/house south of Tiangi, Shulgareh market, Buzkashi,Keshendeh-ye Pain	M	
	9 Dec -- Drive towards location where Dostum had first meet w/OGA, then to HLZ Albatross, good views of Albatross and compound, southern outskirts of Dehi, thru Dehi Market area.	M	0,1
2	9 Dec -- Bottom of trail from DS to Chapchal; Burro DZ, cave, switchbacks; Kamal's CP; view from top of path from DS to Chapchal;Chapchal; UXO; night shot at Baluch; night shot thru night vision scope.	M	2,3

10 Dec -- Hill overlooking Baluch, good shots of surrounding areas of Shamallak, Oimatan. Lal's OP, interview w/ Ezattullah; Keshendeh-ye Bala; Mak Dume. Keshendeh-ye Pain; Pole Baraq; Shulgareh market; South of Tiangi, supply drop

11 Dec -- Starts in Tiangi Pass, south of Bridge, Dostum's CP, then start retracing Mark's steps on the 9th of November; locationmet Kamal at cave; top of Kafer Qalah

Notes:

*Each video tape is referenced as DV, JV, VV and the number to reflect Dave's, John's, or Vince's video respectively

**The rating of Low, Medium, and High is applied to each of the tapes to reflect the quality of the log/gist

***This column indicates which phases (0-8) of the battle for MeS the transcript supports

*Interview Notes #	Subject	Remarks
1	**Interview Notes -- Capt Black & LtCol Morrow	5 Dec interview. "Angel of Death" -- Capt Black & LtCol Morrow are AC130H crewmembers and flew missions in Konduz and Qala Jangi 25-27 November 2001.
2	Interview Notes -- SFC Bill B, 11 Dec	SFC Bill discusses Tiger 02A's movement from 8 November to linkup w/CPT Mark, meeting w/ GEN Dostum, movement to the Kafer Qalah, the BM21 strike, and movement east.
3	Interview Notes -- GEN Mohaqiq	GEN Mohaqiq discusses varios fronts and DS elders were concerned w/the fight moving into the DS area because of #Shia killed previously -- see transcript
4	**Notebook 1	Starts w/ discussions w/Capt Black ref "Angel of Death" in Turkey, ends with Gen Dostum [Esam translating] north of Tiangi. Provides various spellings, diagrams, and coordinates.
5	**Notebook 2	Starts w/ discussions w/CDR Kamal and GEN Habib Bullah at ODA; includes interviews w/Atta and Mohaqiq. Most significant entry is OB for Taliban.

Notes:

*Interview Notes are referenced within the publication as N#, e.g., N1, N2, etc.

**A summary of each notebook is provided. The notebooks are on file in the IDA Simulation Center.

APPENDIX G—BSS PHOTOGRAPH GALLERY THUMBNAILS

APPENDIX G—BSS PHOTOGRAPH GALLERY THUMBNAILS

The thumbnails that follow are cited in Chapter III and Appendix H. Table G-1 indexes the gallery photographs according to which Mazar-e Sharif battle phase they support. Photographs in the gallery are identified by number. For example, G1626¹ refers to the photograph in this gallery that shows the cave where the ODA lived at Burro DZ. Electronic, full-size versions of the gallery are distributed separately.

Table G-1. EFR Photographs Indexed by MeS Phase

Mazar-e Sharif Battle Phase		Photographs
0.	Background	GP1587
I.	Mission preparation, insertion and initial operations—15–20 October 2001	GP1597, 1600, 1602-7
II.	Building Coalition Confidence and Strategy—21–28 October 2001	GP1608, 1614, 16471, 16472, 16478, 16611-16614, 1659-1661
III.	Battlefield Preparation and Positioning—29 October–4 November 2001	GP1624-30; S320-323, 331-333, 3341-3349, 3351, 3358, 3410-3412, 342; GP1735-9, GP1745, GP1750, GP1752, GP1757; GP1646, 16460, 1, 1647; GP1662-8
IV.	Battle for the Darya Suf—5 November 2001	GP1624-30; GP1710, 17, 19, 23, 24; GP1691, 2-6, 1669, 70, 75, 89
V.	Exploitation and Pursuit—6–8 November 2001	GP1735-9, GP1757, GP1575-6, GP1758, GP1762; GP1559-68, 1570-2; GP1557-8
VI.	Tiangi—9–10 November 2001	GP1557-8; GP1784, 5; GP1781; GP1784, 5; GP1784, 5; GP1790-98
VII.	The Fall of Mazar-e Sharif—10 November 2001	GP1875-1909
VIII.	Activities after the Fall of Mazar-e Sharif	GP1799-1860

¹ Disregard the “DSCN” preceding the thumbnails; it is an anomaly of this gallery. Each of the thumbnails in this gallery will be referred to with a “G” replacing the “DSCN” portion of the name.



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
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
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
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APPENDIX H—BSS MEDIA INDEX TO EFR PHASES

APPENDIX H—BSS MEDIA INDEX TO EFR PHASES

The BSS Media Index to EFR Phases provides an index of media to support the various phases of the campaign. For example, the media available to support Phase II of the EFR consists of photographs from the BSS and Service members, various transcripts, video, and notes. The index also provides the waypoint names, numbers and locations to assist the reconstructionist in locating the data on a map or auditing the information to the original BSS document.

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/Other
0 Background	Balkhob					A-Balkhob		DV1,2,10;T1,2,8,9,30 A, 31A
	Safid Kotah							DV11;T3,6,8,30A,31A
	Darya Suf							N1p31
	OGA Meeting	16	Command Meeting 1st	N35.90774 E67.28063		GP1587	DV13	DV13;T8A,29 T27,27A;N5
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#								
I Insertion 19-20 October	Albatross	17	Albatross LZ Overlook	N35.94116 E67.29064		GP1597, 1601	VV1;DV13	DV13;T10
		18	Albatross LZ Compound	N35.94409 E67.28859	ODA's 1st night	GP1602-5; S120, 21	VV1;DV13	T10
	Dehi	19	WP before Dehi	N35.95312 E67.27396		GP1606,7	VV1;DV13	DV13;T10
		20	Dehi Market	N35.95712 E67.27014		GP1606 Quad	VV1	T10
	Trail to Cobaki	14	Trail Head to Cobaki	N36.0049 E67.2225	Manually marked; reconciled previous coordinates			N1p27
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#								
II Building the Coalition 21-28 October	Dehi Meeting	21	Command Meet -- Dehi	N35.96330 E67.26348		GP1608	VV1;DV13	DV13;T10
	Chapchal Trail	22	Trail to Chapchal	N36.00558 E67.20733		GP1614	VV2;DV13	DV13;T10
		25	Trail top Chapchal	N36.00849 E67.20501		GP16471,2,8	DV14;VV2	T13
	Beshcam	27	Beshcam	N36.03170 E67.21053		GP16611-4	DV14	DV10,14;T7,7A,9,10,1 3
	Chapchal	26	Chapchal/Beshcam	N36.02352 E67.19537		GP1659-61	DV14;VV@	DV10,14;T1,9,10,13
	Omitak/02A				See Phase III			
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#								
	Oimatan					S270-273		
	Cobaki				DV14 fm WP24	S25,26	DV14	
	Dostum's HQs					S221,224,2241		

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/Other
III Positioning & Preparation	Burro	23	Burro DZ Aid Station	N36.01919 E67.17902		GP1624-30;S320-323,331-333,3341-3349,3351,3358,3410-3412,342	DV13;VV2;JV5	T12
	Omitak/02A				DV14 fm WP24	S350-351	DV12 fm PB	T21
	Keshendeh-ye Bala	44	Photo 1 Keshendeh-ye Bala	N36.12144 E67.01494	Grouped under 02A because the BDA and most discussions at these locations result from 02A's work		DV18;VV2	
		45	Photo 2 Keshendeh-ye Bala	N36.12066 E66.97733		GP1735-9;	VV2 DV18	T19,21
		46	Tank BDA Keshendeh-ye Bala	N36.12897 E66.97291		GP1745	DV18	
	Keshendeh-ye Pain	47	D30 BDA Keshendeh-ye Pain	N36.14200 E66.94284		GP1750		
		48	BMP BDA Keshendeh-ye Pain	N36.14627 E66.93806		GP1752	DV18	
		50	Tank BDA	N36.14597 E66.93629		GP1757	DV18	
		52	ZSU BDA	N36.16493 E66.92204				
	Oimatan/02D				DV14 fm WP24		DV14	T13
	Shamallak/02D				See Phase IV	S3431-3438		
	Charsu/02C				See Phase IV			
	CDR Kamal's CP	24	Kamal's CP	N36.04639 E67.17382		GP1646,16460,1,1 647	VV2;DV14	DV14;T13
	CDR Lal's CP	29	Lal's CP	N36.06947 E67.17899		GP1662-8	VV2;DV14	DV14;T13
	North Ridge					S3350,3352-3356		

1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/Other
IV Battle for the Darya Suf	Burro	23	Burro DZ Aid Station	N36.01919 E67.17902		GP1624-30	DV13;VV2;JV5	T12
	Omitak/02A					S350-352	DV12,18	T21
	Oimatan						DV14,15,16	DV14;TT7,7A
	Shamallak					S451,452,4521-4522,	DV16	DV16, T15
	Dolstum's HQ's					S4531,4532,4541,4542,4551-4554,4560		
	CDR Kamal's CP	24	Kamal's CP	N36.04639 E67.17382			VV2;DV14	DV14,22;T13
	CDR Lal's CP	29	Lal's CP	N36.06947 E67.17899			DV14	T13
	CDR Lal's OP/02B	35	Lal's OP	N36.08035 E67.16229	Cdr Lal's & 02B's OP on 5 Nov	GP1710,17,19,23,24	DV16,17;VV2	DV16,17;T13,16,17
	Path from 02B to Baluch	41		N36.10173 E67.14145	02B movement to Baluch on 6th		DV17	
		40		N36.10885 E67.14150				
		39		N36.11353 E67.14882				
		38		N36.10693 E67.15234				
		37		N36.10341 E67.16335	X-road to Baluch			
	02,02B,02C Linkup point	36		N36.09554 E67.16275	02,02B,02C link on 6th; move to KB		DV17	
	Baluch/Baluch Overlook	31	Baluch	N36.08730 E67.13289	Village of Baluch	GP1691,2-6,1669,70,75,89	VV2; DV15; DV16	DV6,7,15,16,22;T14,14A, 15,16
	Chumka Pass (Ph)	34		N36.06581 E67.15887	Kamals forces came thru Chumka		DV15,16	T14,14A,15,16
	Charsu/02C	3G	Tiger 02C Forward OP	N36.12688 E67.15733	02C Position 5 Nov		JV6	DV3,4;T2A,20
	Path from 02C	5G		N36.12256 E67.16192	Blocking position		JV6	T20

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/Other
		4G		N36.12600 E67.15825	Team leaves trail -- buttslide		JV6	
	Bunker/Charsu	2G	Bunker	N36.12411 E67.15994			JV6	
	House/Charsu	1G		N36.11793 E67.16944			JV6	
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#								
V Pursuit & Exploitation	Keshendeh ye Bala	45	Photo 2 Keshendeh-ye Bala	N36.12066 E66.97733	Photo shot & interview from sth of KB facing south	GP1735-9	VV2;DV18	T19,21
	Keshendeh ye Pain	50	Tank BDA	N36.14597 E66.93629	BDA Tank,	GP1757	VV1;VV2;DV18	DV18;T19
	Keshendeh-ye Pain				BDA BMP	S5730;5731		
	Pole Baraq	6	Bridge			GP1575-6	VV1,2;DV12,18	T8
		54	River Crossing site	N36.23162 E66.90064		GP1758	VV2	
		55	Meeting Place 8 Nov	N36.28252 E66.90570	Dostum's meeting with O2C & Atta	GP1762		T22
	Tashkanda							
	Shulgareh	4	Shulgareh Market	N36.32516 E66.87980		GP15591568,1570 -2	DV12, VV1	
		5	Shulgareh CP	N36.31697 E66.88555	2-story house where Dostum held his meeting on 8th	S5820	DV12	T22
	Shulgareh Plains					S5811,58111,58112,5812,5813,58131,5814,5815,5817		
		3	H20Resupply	N36.46275 E66.91161	Tm obtained water on 9 Nov			
	South of Tiangi	2	Dostum's 9 Nov CP	N36.52209 E66.94438		GP1557-8	DV12,VV1	
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#;Vince-VV;John-JV,3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#								

Phase	Location	WP	WP Name	Coordinates	Comment	1.Photo	2.Video	3.Transcript/Other
VI Tiangi	CP South of Tiangi	2	Dostum's 9 Nov CP	N36.52209 E66.94438		GP1557-8	DV11,12,VV1,3	T21
	Tiangi	61	Tiangi Bridge	N36.54488 E66.96488		GP1784,5	DV19VV3	
		63	Photo 3 Tiangi	N36.54137 E66.96255	NA gathered behind Mark	GP1781	DV19,VV3	T5A,6A,21,24
		64	Photo 4 Tiangi	N36.54803 E66.96910	Fm WP Mark saw dead horses	GP1784,5	DV19,VV3	T21
		58	Kopa Kula	N36.54874 E66.96960	Near loc Dostum x'd river	GP1784,5	DV19	T19,23,23A
	Kafer Qalah	66	T02C OP 9 Nov	N36.54052 E66.96862	Tiger 02C CAS OP	GP1790-98	DV20,VV3	T24
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#; Vince-VV; John-JV, 3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#	North of Tiangi	67	T02 RON 9 Nov	N36.56646 E66.96627				
		68	ZSU BDA	N36.57142 E66.96304				
					Tiger 02			T21
					02A			N2
					02B			T21
					02C			DV3,4;T02A,24
VII Mazar-e Sharif	Qala Jangi				02D			T21
1.Photos:Gallery G#; Aka Ya Sin-A, Servicemember-S 2.Video: Dave-DV#; Vince-VV; John-JV, 3.Transcript:T#;Video gist:V#, Notes#	Qala Jangi		QJ CTR	N36.66691 E66.98447		G1799-1860;S8211-82924	DV24,25	DV26, 29;T32A
	Sultan Razia		R SCH	N36.70736 E67.12121		S71030-71036;G1875-1909	DV30	DV29; T29
	Konduz			N36.65622 E68.65415		S8251-82616		
	Heiratan Bridge			N37.22632 E67.42881		S81210,812101		

**APPENDIX I—PHOTOGRAPH GALLERY THUMBNAILS FOR
SERVICE MEMBER PHOTOGRAPHS AND AK-YASIN
PHOTOGRAPHS**

Available only with the explicit approval of DARPA/IXO.

APPENDIX J—“WHO’S WHO”: ODA ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES FOR 5 NOVEMBER 2001

Available to US Government Agencies and their contractors.

**APPENDIX K—SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX: 5 NOVEMBER
2001, THE BATTLE FOR MAZAR-E SHARIF**

APPENDIX K—SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX: 5 NOVEMBER 2001, THE BATTLE FOR MAZAR-E SHARIF

During the reconstruction it was noted that a multitude of overlapping, sometimes-simultaneous events occurred. The attached matrix synchronizes the various events of 5 November 2001. That is, it reflects the relationship of events in time across the battlefield among the various ODA 595 cells, ODA 534 teams, ODC 53, and the Northern Alliance. This matrix was developed during Operation Enduring Freedom ground force data reconciliation meetings in January and February 2003.

Unit	Time and Event			
Tm 02A				
Tm 02B/2	0200 Bundle resupply	0445-0455 Travel to ridge	0500-0510 Bomber BLU-82	0715 Arrive at OP; set-up SOFLAM
Tm 02C			0600-0700 Wake-up to radio; rush to OP	*0730 Target ridgeline
Tm 02D				0900 Lal arrive at 02B psn
				*0830-1030 CAS
				0915 Arrive at psn; SOFLAM setup
Tm 04A				0800-0900 Travel from Oimatan 1 to Shamallak
Boxer	0200 Resupply			0800 Depart Burro
NA				1000 Arrive at Oimatan 1
General			0500-0510 Bomber BLU-82	0659 Sunrise
Tm 02A				1330-1430 02A(-) tvl to 02AAA; receive fire
Tm 02B/2		*1300 Tgts to east; buddy laze		
Tm 02C	1100-1200 Move to ridgeline	1300 Observe Taliban movement	1315 fire from TB; HH upset	1330 begin lazing for strikes fights TB at BP
			1320-1335 Khan's cavalry travels from Charsu to blocking psn	1335-1345 KK
Tm 02D				1400 KK links up with HC
				1405 orders withdrawal; 1415 complete lazing
Tm 04A	1130-1230 directing strikes			1345 Tgts Mullah R. bunker
Boxer				

Unit	Time and Event			
NA				1400 Stalled assault
General				
Tm 02A		1500 02A(-) Predator & B-52 contact	1530 02A(-) sees gun run to NW for B-52 strike; bomb lands 2km S	1630 Predator sees trps in strike on bunker bnkr; CAOC begin mens. coord
Tm 02B/2				1645 Lal contacts Kamal and prepares to charge
Tm 02C	1430-1435 JDAMs	1445-1455 Gun run	1530 HC links up w/ 02C in ravine	1700 laze strikes on targets 1-4
Tm 02D		1445-1455 Gun run	1530 Pete dprts for Oimatan(1) then 02A	1700 Orders JDAM strike on fwd OP & nearby loc
Tm 04A			1540 Lazes bunker	
Boxer				
NA				
General				Charge TB defenses
Tm 02A	1730 Pred. receives coord and passes to B-52	1800 B-52 drops bombs; NA charge bunker after drop	1820 02A(-) returns to base	
Tm 02B/2			1830 Observe firefight bet. TB ZSU & NA ZSU; NA horsemen charge & capture	

Unit	Time and Event	
Tm 02C	1710 Restrike fwd OP w/ 2 JDAM	1745(est) 02C retires to Charsu
Tm 02D		1900-2000 02D(-) returns to Oimatan(1); links up w/ Boxer
Tm 04A		
Boxer		
NA		
General		1734 Sunset

**APPENDIX L—ENDURING FREEDOM RECONSTRUCTION
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM MATRIX**

APPENDIX L—ENDURING FREEDOM RECONSTRUCTION GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM MATRIX

The attached matrix provides Global Positioning System (GPS) locational data for the ground force re-creation. Those locations were obtained from original ODA team member GPS system downloads and the battle site survey. The battle site survey validated some of those data points and, in many cases, added to the database.

Phase	Waypoints Derived During BSS			Original ODA 595 Waypoints		Location Description and Remarks
	*BSS Doc WP#/Source	BSS GPS Waypoint Name	BSS Coordinates	ODA Nov 2001 WP Name	ODA 595 Coordinates	
Phase I	**16	CMD Meet 1	N35.90774 E67.28063			First Cmd Meeting -- Taken from GPS Track 223
	17	ALBAT LZ	N35.94116 E67.29064			Albatross LZ Overlook - Photos as entering LZ
	18	DZ ALB HOUSE	N35.94409 E67.28859	LZ ALBTROS	N35.93833 E67.28583	Albatross LZ Compound - Tm's first night
	20	DEHI	N35.95712 E67.27014			Dehi Market - TM B met w/ NA horsemen
	SFC Bill		N35.96672 E67.22242	DOSMHQ	N35.96663 E67.22290	Dostam Base - w/radio
				TOC OP	N35.96697 E67.22262	CAS position north of TOC. On 21 Oct 02 struck Tb CP on nth side of gorge
Phase II				TOC	N35.96663 E67.22290	Dostum's hq's 20-26 Oct
				COBAKI	N35.99153 E67.21638	Cobaki -- 22/23 called CAS fm here, tgts vic ChapChal & tanks
	27	BISHCAM	N36.03170 E67.21053	BISHCAM	N36.03170 E67.21053	Beshcam
				BESCAM	N36.03165 E67.21120	Beshcam -- TB CP struck on 21/22d. On 23d CPT N /Chad rode to AO
		T55KIA	N36.02032 E67.20382			
	21	CMD MEETIG	N35.96330 E67.26348	DOST HOUSE	N35.96359 E67.26431	28 Oct 01 Command Meet -- Dehi
	14		N36.0049 E67.22250	DOSDHS	N35.96358 E67.26431	Trail Head to Cobaki. Provided by Mark enroute
	22	TRAIL CHOP-BESH	N36.00558 E67.20733			Trail from DS to Chapchal
				CHAPCL	N36.01993 E67.19781	Chapchal

Phase	Waypoints Derived During BSS			Original ODA 595 Waypoints		
	*BSS Doc WP#/Source	BSS GPS Waypoint Name	BSS Coordinates	ODA Nov 2001 WP Name	ODA 595 Coordinates	Location Description and Remarks
Phase III	25	TRAIL TOP CHAP	N36.00849 E67.20501			Chapchal Trail Top
	26	CHAP BIS HI GND	N36.02352 E67.19537			Chapchal/Beshcam
	23	DZ BURRO AID ST	N36.01919 E67.17902	AID STAT	N36.01979 E67.17916	Burro DZ Aid Station
				BURRO	N36.02031 E67.17928	DZ Burro
				BURROT - AIDTRL TOP	N36.03646 E67.17581	
Phase IV				AID TRL MID	N36.02814 E67.17597	
				CHAPDZ	N36.02889 E67.20556	DZ Chapchal
				WPT008	N36.10226 E67.18513	These WP's mark the trail CPT
				WPT009	N36.08687 E67.18496	Mark used to move from the DS to
				WPT010	N36.08265 E67.18345	T02C near Charsu
				WPT011	N36.07910 E67.18544	
				DIRTY DZ	N36.04497 E066.96953	DZ near T02A position - SFC Bill's
				Oimatan	N36.01706 E067.13164	Garmin
				OPSBOYBCHE	N36.01711 E67.13167	From SFC Bill's Garmin. Matches D&B location fm Mark's notes
						25-26 02/02A call CAS to spt NA attks. Destroy 50 vehicles; hit POL dump
				BOXER CP	N36.02034 E67.17924	Boxer dptd 05066 & moved vic T02D , same as Burro Aid Sta
				02 LOC	N36.11375 E 67.16186	T02
				T02A - 02A CAS OP	N36.04417 E66.97917	T02A
				02A G - Bunker	N36.08972 E066.93861	Mapped w/SFC Bill

Phase	Waypoints Derived During BSS			Original ODA 595 Waypoints		Location Description and Remarks
	*BSS Doc WP#/Source	BSS GPS Waypoint Name	BSS Coordinates	ODA Nov 2001 WP Name	ODA 595 Coordinates	
				2AA	N36.05310 E066.97200	Mapped w/SFC Bill
				02A G- Fire	N36.06503 E066.97325	Mapped w/SFC Bill
				2AAA	N 6.05747 E066.96032	Mapped w/SFC Bill
				T04A	N36.05135 E066.92151	ODA
	24	KAMAL CP	N36.04639 E67.17382	KAM CP	N36.04675 E67.17357	CDR Kamal's CP
	29	LAL CPK	N36.06947 E67.17899	LAL CP	N36.06917 E67.17976	CDR Lal's CP
	35	LAL OP 02B	N36.08035 E67.16229	02 LAL OP	N36.07977 E 67.16241	CDR Lal's & 02B's 5 Nov OP
	SFC Vince	02B	N36.08056 E067.16250	02B	N36.08056 E067.16250	
	SFC Vince	Target 1 Cmd Bunker	N36.08462 E067.14188			
	SFC Vince	Target 2 Bunker	N36.08633 E067.14137			
	SFC Vince	Target 3 First Bunker	N36.09370 E067.14423			
	SFC Vince	Target 4 Bunker w/tent	N36.10093 E067.13435			No LOS from 02B to target coordinates; imagery used to verify bunker at N 36.09857° E 067.13791°
	37	040	N36.10341 E67.16335			CX-road to Baluch. Path from 02B locations to Baluch
	38	041	N36.10693 E67.15234			02B movement from OP to Baluch on 6 Nov
	39	042	N36.11353 E67.14882			02B movement to Baluch on 6th.
	40	043	N36.10885 E67.14150			02B movement to Baluch on 6th
41	045	N36.10173 E67.14145			Path from 02B to Baluch	
				AMATCP	N36.11887 E67.17797	CDR Ahmed Khan's CP
				T02C	N36.11374 E67.16185	T02C. Located SW of house - maybe a WP for the 6th
				CHARSU	N36.12361 E67.16056	
1G	HOUSE	N36.11793 E67.16944			House near Charsu	

Phase	Waypoints Derived During BSS			Original ODA 595 Waypoints		Location Description and Remarks
	*BSS Doc WP#/Source	BSS GPS Waypoint Name	BSS Coordinates	ODA Nov 2001 WP Name	ODA 595 Coordinates	
	2G	BUNKER	N36.12411 E67.15994			Bunker near Charsu
	3G	OQ2C	N36.12688 E67.15733			Tiger 02C Forward OP -- T02C position 5 Nov 01
	4G	9	N36.12600 E67.15825			Path from 02C. Team leaves trail -- buttslide
	5G	10	N36.12256 E67.16192			Path from 02C. GL -- Blocking position
	ODA			T02D-02D CAS OP	N36.05833 E67.10834	T02D CAS on 5th
	36	039	N36.06939 E67.10819			T02D from Mark's notes
	34	CHUMKA PASS	N36.09554 E67.16275			02.02B,02C Linkup pt on the 6th and the move to KB
	31	BELUCH2	N36.06581 E67.15887			Chumka Pass (ph). Fakir said Kamal's forces came thru Chumka Pass
	32	B	N36.08730 E67.13289			Village of Baluch
	33	F2	N36.08029 E67.13300			Baluch Overlook, looking from south
Phase V			N36.08184 E67.13227			Overlook on Baluch. Position is south of, and overlooks Baluch. Interviewed Fakir from here
						Mullah Razzak: N 36.09722° E 067.13612°
	8	TANKS DEST	N36.14680 E66.93058			Bunker and Entrenched TB: N36.11111° E067.00694°;
	10	TANK BDA	N36.13174 E66.96259			N36.10944 E067.01722. located in DS near KB
						Tanks BDA
						Tanks BDA

Phase	Waypoints Derived During BSS			Original ODA 595 Waypoints		Location Description and Remarks
	*BSS Doc WP#/Source	BSS GPS Waypoint Name	BSS Coordinates	ODA Nov 2001 WP Name	ODA 595 Coordinates	
	11	KESH B MEET	N36.13174 E66.96259			Keshendeh-ye Bala Meet. Where 02, 02B, 02C linked up on 7 Nov
	12	BDAZSU	N36.13118 E67.04420			ZSU 23-2 BDA
	46	BDA TKKB	N36.12897 E66.97291			Tank BDA Keshendeh-ye Bala
	47	D30 KP	N36.14200 E66.94284			D30 BDA Keshendeh-ye Pain
	48	BMP1 KP	N36.14627 E66.93806			BMP BDA Keshendeh-ye Pain
	49	KESHPA	N36.14619 E66.93806			Keshendeh-ye Pain
	50	DA TK	N36.14597 E66.93629			Tank BDA
	52	BDA ZSU	N36.16493 E66.92204			ZSU BDA
	53	BDA TOYO PU+S	N36.19257 E66.90927			SUV BDA
	7	P OMITAK	N36.15658 E66.92646			Photo of Omitak from this location
	54	BRIDGE-SWIM	N36.23162 E66.90064			RiverCrossing Site. Next to location Mark x'ed river
	SFC Bill		N36.22222 E066.90278			Minefield at stream crossing
	6	POLE BARAQBRIDD	N36.21875 E66.90480			Pole Baraq Bridge
	55	MEETING	N36.28252 E66.90570			Meeting Place 8 Nov. Dostum's meeting with 02C & Atta
	5	SHOLCP	N36.31697 E66.88555			Shulgareh CP. 2-story house where Dostum held his meeting on 8th
	4	MARKETSHOLERAH	N36.32516 E66.87980			Shulgareh Market
	56	TANKS	N36.49652 E66.92013			Tanks BDA
	3	H20RESSUPPLY9N	N36.46275 E66.91161			Team obtained water on 9 Nov
	Map Tiangi		N36.41689 E066.89364			RON 11-8. Mark spent the night here on 8 Nov

Waypoints Derived During BSS							Original ODA 595 Waypoints		Location Description and Remarks
Phase	*BSS Doc WP#/Source	BSS GPS Waypoint Name	BSS Coordinates		ODA Nov 2001 WP Name	ODA 595 Coordinates			
Phase VI Tiangi	2	9NOVPASSCP	N36.52209	E66.94438	DOSTPASSOP	N36.52203 E66.94456	Dostum's 9 Nov CP		
	61	TIANGI PASS BRG	N36.54488	E66.96488			Tiangi Bridge		
	62	TIANGI PH2 STH	N36.53440	E66.95413			Photo 2 Tiangi - Photo taken from this location		
	63	TIAPASS PH3	N36.54137	E66.96255			Photo 3 Tiangi		
	64	TIANGI PS P4	N36.54803	E66.96910			Photo 4 Tiangi		
	65	CAS 9NO 2C	N36.54429	E66.96961			Steerage - don't use		
	66	F TT02C	N36.54052	E66.96862			T02C OP 9 Nov. Haji Chari, Dostum & 02C atop Kafer Qalah		
	58	KOPA KULA	N36.54874	E66.96960			Kopa Kula. See BSS 11 Dec map		
	67	PM LAG	N36.56646	E66.96627	RON 9NOV	N36.58294 E66.95454	Dostum's explanation of battle from north side of Tiangi.		
	68	ZSU PM	N36.57142	E66.96304	02C CAS OP	N36.54047 E66.96840	T02 spent the night of 9 Nov 01		
Phase VII	Map		N36.53603	E66.95887			ZSU BDA		
	Map Tiangi		N36.52476	E66.94651			SFC Bill mapped river xing for 9th		
	Map Tiangi		N36.52396	E66.94222			DZ Actual DZ for 10 Nov		
		ZSUKIA	N36.56153	E66.90819			DZ Planned for 10 Nov		
							BDA located mtns 2K west of Tiangi		
					QUALAJANGE	N36.66808 E66.98347	Qala Jangi Fortress		
							Sultan Rozia School		
	1	MeS	N36.61580	E67.40907			Mazar-e Sharif (MeS). WP located to west of city		

* All of the Waypoints in this column were developed during the BSS. The numbered Waypoints were derived from the Garmin GPS and correspond to the numbers in the IDA Document D-2925. Some of the sources surfaced during the BSS. As an example, SFC Vince and SFC Bill provided coordinates from notes or logs, or the map was used to develop locations (although the map recons were not used to compute BSS contributions.

** Color codes represent the following:

Significant	Matches/Validations	Erroneous	WPs Entered by CPT Mark on Trip over to Support BSS
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BSS "Location" Contributions to EFR

Phase	Total	New	Significant	Validation
I	9	3	2	2
II	13	5	3	2
III	13	0	0	1
IV	40	20	18	4
V	20	19	16	1
VI	14	8	3	2
VII	4	3	1	1
Total	113	58	43	13

Stats: of the 113 total coordinates, 58 or 51% were new; 43 or 38% of total were significant; 13 or 12% were validations. Map recons were not counted. "New" includes "significant" but not "validations".

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14. ABSTRACT <p>At the request of GEN Franks, Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the DARPA/IDA team reconstructed “salient aspects of a major Afghanistan campaign (e.g., Mazar-e Sharif) in virtual simulation to support historical analysis as well as further research and development.” The reconstruction, and in particular the ground force data reconciliation, required (1) a battle site survey (i.e., “walking the ground”) to provide quality and detailed data and (2) discussions with key Afghan participants, to include Northern Alliance Commanders and former Taliban. This publication supports the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM battle reconstruction by documenting the battle site survey and presenting the results of the ground force data reconciliation. In addition, it documents the planning, preparation, and execution of the battle site survey for future ventures. The Battle Site Survey Team included representatives from CENTCOM, DARPA, IDA, and the original Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha that participated in the campaign. GEN Dostum, the Northern Alliance Commander of Afghan forces for the campaign, his subcommanders, and security force escorted the Team through the major battle sites south of Mazar-e Sharif. The Team validated or reconciled on-hand data and collected additional data on friendly and enemy unit movements, locations, times, engagement areas, battle damage, terrain, etc.</p>					
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