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Lt. Col. C. E. Oglesby

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Civilian supply and rehabilitation, by
Lt Col C. E. Oglesby. CGSC. 1948-49.

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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Logistics Specialized Course
Regular Class, 1948-1949

CIVILIAN SUPPLY AND REHABILITATION

Charles E. Oglesby
Lt. Col. Infantry

Date Submitted, 24 May 1949

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Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
24 May 1949

File No. 6-5

Subject; Civilian Supply and Rehabilitation in Liberated
and occupied areas.

To: The Director Department of Logistics.

1. PROBLEM: To develop policies, principles and procedures for provision of minimum living conditions for civil populations in occupied areas and liberated areas.

2. ASSUMPTIONS: a. In future wars we will be faced with problems of occupying liberated and conquered countries.

b. Our country will continue to observe the rules of land warfare and international law.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM: a. A special staff section for Civil Affairs now exists on the GSUSA.

b. An International Aid Branch now exists in the logistical division, GSUSA.

4. DISCUSSION: a. The US has a legal and moral obligation for supply of liberated and conquered areas. (Tab A)

b. The US national policies determine policies on civilian supply and rehabilitation. (Tab B)

c. In World War 11 responsibility for civilian supply was divided between military and civilian agencies (Tab C)

d. Plans for civilian supply must be coordinated with Allies (Tab D)

e. Problems of civilian supply and rehabilitation may limit the total amount of destruction we will inflict on the enemy to win the war. (Tab E)

f. The determination of requirements for civilian supply during the initial phases of operations is a military function. (Tab F)

g. Sound methods of procurement, storage and distribution of civilian supplies were developed in World War 11.
(Tab G)

5. CONCLUSIONS: a. Policies for civilian supply and rehabilitation must be coordinated with national policies.

b. The Military should be responsible for civilian supply during the initial phases of liberation or occupation.

c. Strategic planners should consider that large scale destruction of enemy cities and economy will multiply the problems of civilian supply and rehabilitation.

d. Requirements for civilian supply cannot be exactly determined but can be estimated.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS: a. That the President clearly define the responsibility of the Military for civilian supply.

b. That one civil governmental agency under the National Security Council have responsibility and authority to coordinate all civilian agencies dealing with international supply and rehabilitation.

c. That civilian governmental agencies take from the Military the responsibility for civilian supply and rehabilitation when military security will permit.

d. That logistical support plans for all strategic plans include plans for civilian supply and rehabilitation.

e. That civilian supplies be procured, stored and distributed in the same manner as military supplies.

f. That the present staff organization in the Department of the Army for civil supply be retained and plans made for its expansion in event of emergency or war.

g. That this study be forwarded to the Director of Logistics for consideration.

ANNEXES:

1. Draft memorandum to the Commandant, C&GSC.
2. Draft letter of transmittal to Director of Logistics,
3. GSUSA.
3. Bibliography
4. Tabs A to G

Approved:

24 May 1949

F. A. Henning
Colonel, FA.
Director

TAB A

The United States has a legal and moral obligation to supply and rehabilitate liberated and conquered countries. Since the military occupation of enemy territory suspends the operation of the government of the occupied territory, the obligation arises under international law for the occupying force to exercise the function of civil government looking toward the restoration and maintenance of public order. If law and order is to be maintained, the civil populace must receive the minimum food ration and minimum housing required to prevent wide spread disease and unrest. The commander of the occupying forces has the legal responsibility of providing the minimum food and housing required. Aside from the pure legal responsibility, commanders of United States Forces in occupied territory must assume a moral responsibility for feeding and housing the civil populace of occupied countries. As a Christian nation our people would not support a policy that left the civilian population of an enemy country to die of starvation and disease, nor would they support a planned destruction of all civilians to avoid the problems of feeding and housing them.

What has been stated with reference to occupation of enemy territory applies to the liberation of allied or friendly territory with added political implications. During World War 11 both the United Kingdom and the United States adopted a policy of entering the continent of Europe as Liberators. We were liberating Europe and the world from Nazis oppression. President Roosevelt announced the four freedoms and publicly proclaimed that no one would go hungry in territory liberated by United States Forces. Such a policy obviously transcends the pure legal responsibilities for supplying minimum food and housing and enters into a moral and political field. The part played by civilian supply in Europe was not rooted in legal concepts but was compounded of political, military and economic considerations.

During World War II the sharp ideological division between Nazism and democracy caused our political leaders to adopt this policy of enlisting the support of the masses of Europe by entering the continent of Europe as Liberators. The sharper ideological division between communism and democracy would force us to adopt a similar policy should we have to again enter Western Europe to drive out any power that might seek to dominate that continent.

TAB B

Civilian supply and rehabilitation is just another means of pursuing our national war aims and our national policies. In the last analysis we go to war because a power or combination of powers insists on forcibly opposing our national policies. War is the extreme means we take to pursue our national policies, and civilian supply and rehabilitation is part of war or a logical step we must take as a result of war. We are faced with problems of civilian supply and rehabilitation only after we have had success of arms. Civilian supply and rehabilitation can therefore be said to be the first step toward winning the peace.

Since civilian supply and rehabilitation is so closely tied to national policy it falls to the lot of the Department of State to determine its broad policies. In determining these policies the Department of State must look beyond the immediate need to win the war and visualize the post war world. To supply and rehabilitate any country that will oppose our national policies in the post war period is wasteful of time, materials and effort. During and after World War II our country sent supplies and equipment to countries that did subsequently oppose our national policies. Such a waste of materials and effort would not have occurred had civilian supply and rehabilitation plans been closely tied to our National Policies.

The National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board are two civilian agencies that should assist the Department of State in the formulation of the broad policies of civilian supply and rehabilitation. The inclusion of these two agencies will insure that the policies developed are consistent with our war aims, national policy, and economic capabilities.

TAB C

Once the Department of State with the assistance of the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board has formulated the broad policies of civilian supply and rehabilitation, agencies must be designated to execute these policies. At the beginning of World War II it was felt that civilian supply should be a function of civilian governmental agencies. President Roosevelt felt that military commanders would not be responsive enough to civilian needs. When landings were made in North Africa, no agency existed in the War Department for coordination of civil affairs much less civilian supply. This failure of organization stemmed from the Army's reluctance to step into a field in which the operational importance was not yet apparent, and from the reluctance of the Government to trust the army to be sympathetic to civilian needs.

In the reorganization of the Army in March of 1942 there was created an International Division in SOS. From this small beginning developed the Army organization that eventually delivered 13,000,000 tons of civilian supply from September 1943 to September 1945. This International Division gradually assumed the job of coordinating all matters with reference to civil affairs and became the War Department liaison with all civilian agencies concerned with civilian supply.

In December of 1942 the North African Economic Board (NAEB) was set up with civilian and military sections with the civilian element in control. The civil section was further divided into five different government agencies without a clear delination of their responsibilities or functions. The military section had to deal with each of these five subsections. Since these civilian agencies were not ready to function in the field, and since all shipping was consigned to the theater commander, the army of necessity

assumed limited responsibility for civilian supply of essential food in North Africa.

In February 1943, with full knowledge of the combined committee for North African Civil Affairs, the War Department informed General Eisenhower that he was responsible for civilian supply. In the meantime President Roosevelt had attempted to reduce the number of civilian governmental agencies concerned with civil supply by organizing the OFRRO (Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Organization) with Governor Lehman as its head. It had the mission of coordinating all civilian governmental agencies dealing with civilian supply. The OFRRO was unable to effect the coordination and the International Division found itself dealing with an increasing number of civilian agencies. Finally in June of 1943 the OFEC (The Office of Foreign Economic Coordination) succeeded in coordinating the activities of all civilian agencies dealing with civilian supply and rehabilitation and gave the International Division of SOS a single point of contact for coordination with civilian agencies.

The plans for the invasion of Sicily brought about the military procurement of civilian supplies when OFRRO's plans went far beyond immediate military objectives and invaded the field of rehabilitation. The army took the view that initially civilian supply should be restricted to that essential to prevent the civil populace from interfering with military operations. Since OFRRO could not implement their plans without the support of the army, the army plan prevailed and we had the situation of the State Department responsible for civilian supply but the army was procuring civilian supplies, moving them to the theater of operations and making distribution of these supplies.

The operations in North Africa, Sicily and Italy demonstrated that essential civilian supply of food and housing

was necessary for the continued operation of the field armies. Unruly civilian populations in the army's rear was a threat to successful military operations.

The eventual recognition of the military interest in adequate civilian supply plus the fact that the army was actually performing the functions of civilian supply caused the President in the early part of 1943 to formally charge the army with responsibility for civilian supply during the initial stages of military operations.

The International Division construed the President's directive to give the army responsibility for civilian supply only during the actual military operations phase. As soon as the military situation would permit the army was to turn the supply operations over to designated civil governmental agencies. It was hoped that this transfer would be accomplished within ninety days but events proved that it would take much longer. The International Division also construed the directive to mean that the army was to supply the civilians with the minimum quantity of supplies necessary to prevent rioting and disease-conditions that would be unfavorable to our military operations. The army supply activities were usually confined to essential food and rehabilitation and to essential transport and utilities.

Governor Lehman was made the head of UNRRA which was the civil organization that finally coordinated all other civilian agencies dealing with civilian supply. He recognized the army's predominate role in the initial phases of operations and attached his personnel to the army and they actually functioned as agents of the military until civil supply was formally turned over to them.

A policy was finally evolved between UNRRA and the army where-by the army supplied the minimum food and rehabilitation necessary during the early phases of operations and UNRRA took the responsibility of providing clothing and

supplies designed to restore the economy of the liberated or conquered country.

By the end of World War II the Department of State and the President had the Military Establishment and a civil agency (UNRRA) working together to execute the broad policies of civil supply and rehabilitation. The system was formed by trial and error. It was some time before all concerned realized the role that had to be played by the Military Establishment. It was even longer before the many civil governmental agencies involved were properly integrated and given authority commensurate with their responsibility.

TAB D

In a war fought with allies, civilian supply will of necessity be a combined operation. Since civil supply and national policies are so closely linked together, the allied powers will have different concepts on civil supply unless their national policies are identical - a most unlikely situation. Such differences rooted in policy may never be satisfactorily resolved. However, early combined planning can establish procedures for procurement, shipping and distribution of civil supplies. During World War 11 the British Army did not handle civilian supply. The British had civilian procurement and distribution and the Americans had military procurement and distribution of civilian supplies. This caused confusion on the many civilian combined committees that met on supply problems. Our representatives on these committees could not commit our government on matters of civilian supply because most of that supply was procured and distributed by our military establishment. Thus while the British members of these civilian committees could speak with authority, our members had to be sure that our military establishment would back up their commitments. This difference in procuring and distributing civilian supply was particularly disturbing because the Allies had more or less pooled all supplies and equipment. In any future war we should early in the war reach an understanding with our allies as to the purpose and procedures for civilian supply and rehabilitation.

TAB E

In World War II our strategy for winning the war was definitely made without consideration for civil supply and rehabilitation. By resorting to all out strategic bombing of Germany's cities, we adopted a policy of destruction of the enemy's economy in order to reduce his war potential regardless of the ultimate direct and indirect cost to the world economy and hence our own national economy. Nor did we consider how Germany was to fit into our post war national policies when we adopted this policy of all out destruction of her principal cities.

At least one prominent military writer, General Fuller, has attacked this principle of maximum destruction of the enemy to force his surrender as militarily and politically unsound. General Fuller states, "Civilized peoples have seldom imitated the disgusting mongols in making slaughter and destruction ends in themselves. In western civilization the few military excesses deliberately planned by governments have originated in religious or quasi-religious hatred", ---"Hitler's lightning wars, notwithstanding the moral vile-ness of their accompaniments, were at least rationally planned in that he sought to conquer without undue loss and destruction to either side. In France the Germans conspicuously refrained from bombing cities, national monuments, or economic resources such as factories", ---"War is no more than a lethal argument and to be worth fighting, it demands a sane and profitable end."

To justify his statement that strategic bombing was a military failure not worth its cost in man power and materials, General Fuller quotes the U.S. strategic bombing survey to show that despite the great combined bomber offensive, German output of combat munitions continued to rise steeply until October 1944 by which time the German Armies had been pushed back nearly to their 1939 frontiers both in the East

and the West. General Fuller maintains that had the effort necessary to make the bomber offensive possible gone into tactical aircraft, troop carrier aircraft, landing ships and landing craft that the war would have been won quicker with less destruction.

In support of his contention that the strategic bombing was a political and economic failure, General Fuller points to the cold war in Europe today and to the situation where the United States and Great Britain are pouring money and materials into Germany to build up the economy they so systematically destroyed during the war. As General Fuller states it, "While the first and second fronts were winning the war, the third front, strategic bombing, was blowing the bottom out of the peace."

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey so frequently quoted by General Fuller shows some interesting facts about strategic bombing in Germany and Japan. Of the sixty-one large German cities most frequently bombed 3,600,000 thousand homes were destroyed (20% of Germany's total residential units), 7,500,000 people out of a population of 25,000,000 were made homeless, 780,000 civilians were injured and 300,000 killed. Great stretches of countryside and many small and medium cities had suffered no physical damage from the allied bombing offensive but forty-nine of the larger cities, those of industrial importance, had 39% of their dwelling units destroyed or seriously damaged. The number of people deprived of essential services such as gas, water and electricity was estimated at 18-20 million. The city of Berlin was 60-7- percent destroyed.

The Strategic Bombing Survey shows that the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed 46,000, injured 45,000, destroyed 62,000 houses and partially destroyed 6,000 houses. Approximately 90% of the city was totally destroyed.

The total percentage destruction of Hiroshima was only 20% greater than the destruction of Berlin. The comparison of total destruction in the two cities does not mean much but when it is considered that it took more than two years to destroy 70% of Berlin and but two hours to destroy 90% of Hiroshima, the comparison becomes quite dramatic and the implication quite plain. Our ability to destroy the enemy's industrial economy has increased many fold with the development of atomic weapons.

The use of biological warfare to destroy enemy populations and to make his land barren and unable to produce food is a weapon as yet untried but one that may have a tremendous affect on civilian supply and rehabilitation. If only 50% of an enemy's normal food production was destroyed for only one year the burden of providing sufficient food to maintain life for the civil population in an occupied country would be tremendous.

If in future wars we should use atomic weapons to destroy the enemy's industrial cities, biological warfare to destroy the life and productivity of his land, we will have when the enemy surrenders, a proverbial "white elephant" on our hands. It is not logical to use absolute weapons to effect the almost total destruction of a country and then because of the rules of land warfare and international law, supply the remaining people of that country with the food and shelter necessary to maintain life.

It would seem that the unlimited use of absolute weapons to force a surrender of the enemy is incompatible with the moral obligation of providing the enemy populace with minimum food and shelter once the enemy has surrendered. However, the resolution of this paradox is beyond the scope of this study. It is, however, within the scope of this study to state that the means used to force a decision in war must be related to the policy for civilian supply and rehabilitation once the war is won. The strategy to win the war and the strategy to win the peace cannot be developed separately.

TAB F

The determination of requirements for civilian supply and rehabilitation is dependent on many variable factors such as our national policy in relation to the country concerned, character of our own military operations, degree of destruction effected by the enemy, organization of enemy civilians for disaster relief, and indigenous supply.

If the country in question is a liberated ally that we hope to restore as an effective fighting ally, our supply and rehabilitation program will be much greater than if the country is a liberated ally from which we have no hope of receiving assistance in prosecution of the war. Even in the case of conquered countries the scope of the supply and rehabilitation program will vary. For example, in Italy we made an effort to restore Italy to the extent that we could receive limited aid from her to continue the war against Germany.

The character of our own military operations will have a marked influence on the quantity of supply required for civilians. Should our strategy envision the destruction of the enemy's land fertility by biological means, we naturally will require huge quantities of food. If our atomic weapons destroy a large percent of the enemy's industrial production, we will upset his economy to the extent that trade between his rural food providing areas and his industrial areas is non-existent. We will then be unable to effect a distribution of the indigenous food produced.

The degree and type of destruction effected by the enemy will have a decided effect on the type and quantity of supply required. A thorough scorched earth program in either a liberated or conquered country will place a tremendous burden of supply on the occupying power. When the Germans evacuated Paris during World War II they destroyed all communications with the rest of France. All rail, telephone,

telegraph and road transportation was cut. The city was completely without coal or gasoline. It was politically important that the French National Government installed in Paris establish communications with the rest of the country as rapidly as possible and it was of course necessary to bring food and fuel into the city as soon as possible. Yet, it took the army four months to restore a semblance of normality in Paris. Had Paris been partially destroyed and had not food and fuel been available in France the problem of restoring any semblance of normality would have been many months in solution.

The degree of organization of the enemy's civil government for disaster relief will have some effect on the requirements for supplies and equipment. Most large industrial cities will be bombed weeks ahead of the time our forces will actually occupy them (exceptions will be defended cities) and consequently civil governments will have restored some order to the normal activities of a large city. Efficient city government officials will be able to promptly give the occupying troops information on location of local supplies, conditions of transportation facilities, supply requirements, condition of utilities and equipment necessary to put them into operation again. If the civil government is unorganized and does not have the situation under control, much time will be lost in ferreting out local hoards of supply and in determination of requirements.

The main factor in determination of requirements will be the availability of indigenous supply. It is a cardinal principle of civil supply and rehabilitation that indigenous supply be exploited to the maximum, and that the occupying power furnish the difference between requirements and indigenous supply. In the invasion of France in the summer of 1944, the critical transportation situation caused the army

to place emphasis on exploitation of crops then in the ground. By bringing in a few agricultural experts and some machinery it was possible to harvest the French crops and reduce materially the food that had to be imported. In fact, except for fats, meats, and oil, the French were self sufficient with respect to food, although there was some difficulty in effecting its distribution.

In the determination of requirements we find, "the need for a general economic approach on the part of the military to problems of civilian supply as opposed to a purely relief approach. Such need arises because problems of internal distribution and availability of indigenous resources are intimately bound up with anti-inflationary measures, rationing, local transportation, and the use of local consumers goods production as a basic means of exchange between urban and rural areas. A supply program limited to items of immediate relief and implemented in a way not related to other areas of the economy generates nothing in the long run but greater demand for more relief supplies and more shipping. Imports can never be more than a mere fraction of indigenous resources. Thus a ten percent reduction in expectations from local supplies would call for more than two hundred percent increase in imports to make up the deficit in supply necessary to maintain approved scales."

Unlike the determination of requirements for the army, the determination of requirements for civilian supply has no constant factors. Planners will have to make reasonable estimates based on the factors discussed above. It is to be expected that these estimates may exceed the demands as was the case in France or be short of the demands as was the case in Italy. It is impossible to determine a year ahead of time the supplies and equipment necessary to restore essen-

tial services in a large city. The degree of destruction that might befall that city may vary from slight to complete destruction. Similarly medical supplies necessary may have a wide range in quantity and type. The quantity of food needed can be fairly accurately forecast but the amount locally available can only be estimated.

TAB G

Like the entire civil affairs set-up in the last war, the policies for procurement, storage and distribution of civilian supplies were evolved by the methods of trial and error. During the early part of the war when it was thought that the military had no responsibility for civilian supply, procurement was not the responsibility of the technical services but of the civil affairs division. When the President formally charged the Army with initial responsibility for civilian supply, the Chief of Army Service Forces made each Technical Service responsible for procuring the civilian supplies for which it had supply responsibility. Within the theater procurement was effected by requisition on the overseas supply division of the port of embarkation.

In the theater considerable difficulty was experienced in the transportation and storage of civilian supply. When transportation was short the technical services would move military supplies in lieu of vitally needed civilian supply. When civilian supplies were stored with military supplies excessive quantities were lost into the flow of military supplies.

The report of the General Board, USF, ETO is summarized below. The board recommended that civilian supply be handled in one of two ways: (1) the establishment of a separate or parallel civil affairs supply service such as the Quartermaster which would permit (a) more accurate accounting, (b) complete regulation of stocks, (c) handling by specialists of special items such as farm machinery, (d) the formation of an organization prepared to meet sudden emergencies. (e) the determination of priorities on the general staff level, (2) or by placing responsibility squarely on the technical services which would involve, (a) using same standard


of accountability for civil affairs as for other items, (b) determination of requirements as much in advance as for other items, (c) prescribing a basis for issue. The board also recommended the establishment of some tangible basis for determination of priority for the movement of civilian supplies. When not needed these supplies were given a low priority with the result that when they were urgently needed, no priority could get them there in time.

It would seem that the boards recommendation for a basis of priority harks back to the difficulty of forecasting requirements for civilian supply. If the need for civilian supply can be fairly accurately estimated, the supplies will flow to the needed place at the right time.

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

SUBJECT: Civilian Supply and Rehabilitation
(IDENTIFY THIS MEMORANDUM SLIP WITH PAPERS TO WHICH ATTACHED.)

TO	SUBJECT MATTER	FROM DATE AND INITIAL
Commandant C&GSC	1. I concur in the recommendations of the attached research study. 2. Request that this study be transmitted to the Director of Logistics, GSUSA, by means of a letter (annex 2) which has been prepared for your signature.	24 May 49 F.A. Henning Col. FA Director Dept. Log.



D R A F T

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Subject: Civilian Supply and Rehabilitation in occupied
and liberated countries.

To: The Director
Logistics Division, GSUSA
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The attached staff study entitled "Civilian
Supply and Rehabilitation in Occupied and Liberated
Countries" is transmitted to you for consideration and
appropriate action.

2. The research study was prepared by a student in
this college and concurred in by the Director, Department
of Logistics. The recommendations made for the standardizing
of civilian supply procedures appear to have considerable
merit.

M. S. Eddy
Lt. General, USA
Commandant

ANNEX 111

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