



Senior Officer Oral History U.S. Army Military History Institute



An Oral History of **GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN**

Edited by - COL John R. Dabrowski, PhD

FOREWORD

This oral history transcript has been produced from a tape-recorded interview with General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA, Retired, conducted by Colonel David Ellis, USA, as part of the US Army War College/US Army Military History Institute's Senior Officer Oral History Program.

Users of this transcript should note that the original verbatim transcription of the recorded interview has been edited to improve coherence, continuity, and accuracy of factual data. No statement of opinion or interpretation has been changed other than as cited above. The views expressed in the final transcript are solely those of the interviewee and interviewer. The US Army War College/US Army Military History Institute assumes no responsibility for the opinions expressed, or for the general historical accuracy of the contents of this transcript.

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

As the 32nd US Army Chief of Staff, GEN Gordon R. Sullivan can claim ownership to the many changes that occurred in the US Army during his tenure as Chief, from 1991-1995. GEN Sullivan assumed the Chief's post in the immediate aftermath of America's victory over Saddam Hussein in early 1991. The US Army had proved itself a master of conventional warfare, something that our Army had been training for in order to meet a Soviet-styled adversary. America's victory over Iraq in 1991 was a vindication of the US Army's training doctrine of the time, "train as you would fight."

During his illustrious 35 year military career, GEN Sullivan was instrumental in initiating change within the Army, particularly in modernizing the force. GEN Sullivan held key posts as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army and Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, before assuming the Chief's position. Having commanded at platoon through division level and being assigned key staff positions as a senior officer, he was the ideal candidate to become the US Army Chief of Staff in 1991.

This oral history transcript has been produced from a tape-recorded interview with GEN Sullivan and was conducted by numerous interviewers, mainly student-officers attending the US Army War College. The transcript was reviewed personally by GEN Sullivan for accuracy and changes made per his direction.

I believe the reader will find the transcript interesting as it gives insight to the Cold War Army as well as the Army that began to transform itself when the Cold War ended. It will be a step back into time for many of the readers who served in the Army during that time. His account captures a leader's response to the highs and lows faced by the Army during that period, particularly problems faced by the post-Vietnam Army.

Here then is GEN Gordon R. Sullivan in his own words.

John R. Dabrowski, Ph.D.
COL, USA
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

General GORDON RUSSELL SULLIVAN

Retired 31 July 1995

SOURCE AND YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTC, Over 35

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Armor School, Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

Norwich University - BA Degree - History
University of New Hampshire - MA Degree - Political Science

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

| | |
|-----|-----------|
| 2LT | 21 Nov 59 |
| 1LT | 21 May 61 |
| CPT | 6 Nov 63 |
| MAJ | 28 Sep 67 |
| LTC | 12 May 74 |
| COL | 1 Jul 80 |
| BG | 1 Oct 84 |
| MG | 1 Oct 87 |
| LTG | 21 Jul 89 |
| GEN | 4 Jun 90 |

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

| <u>FROM</u> | <u>TO</u> | <u>ASSIGNMENT</u> |
|-------------|-----------|---|
| Nov 59 | Feb 60 | Student, Armor Officer Basic Course, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky |
| Feb 60 | Jun 60 | Platoon Leader, Company B, 1st Medium Tank Battalion, 66th Armor, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas |
| Jul 60 | Sep 60 | Student, Armor Communication Class, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky |
| Oct 60 | Feb 61 | Communications Officer, 1st Medium Tank Battalion, 66th Armor, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas |
| Feb 61 | Jun 61 | Commander, Company A, 1st Medium Tank Battalion, 66th Armor, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas |
| Jun 61 | Jan 62 | Battalion Communications Officer, 3d Medium Tank Battalion (Patton), 40th Armor, United States Army Pacific, Korea |
| Jan 62 | Jul 62 | Platoon Leader, Company A, 3d Medium Tank Battalion (Patton), 40th Armor, United States Army Pacific, Korea |
| Sep 62 | May 63 | Assistant Civil Guard/Self Defense Corps Advisor, 21st Infantry Division, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam |

General GORDON RUSSELL SULLIVAN

| | | |
|--------|--------|---|
| May 63 | Jul 64 | Administrative Officer, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, and later Executive Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 Division, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam |
| Jul 64 | Jun 65 | Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky |
| Jul 65 | Jan 66 | S-4 (Logistics), 3d Battalion, 32d Armor, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany |
| Jan 66 | Oct 66 | Commander, Company A, 3d Battalion, 32d Armor, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany |
| Oct 66 | Jun 68 | Assignment Officer, later Staff Officer, Combat Arms Section, Military Personnel Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army Europe, Germany |
| Jun 68 | Jun 69 | Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas |
| Jun 69 | May 70 | Personnel Services Officer, Plans and Operations Division, G-1, Headquarters, I Field Force, Vietnam |
| May 70 | Jul 73 | Personnel Management Officer, Personnel Actions Section, Armor Branch, Office of Personnel Operations, United States Army, Washington, DC |
| Aug 73 | Dec 74 | Student, International Relations, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire |
| Jan 75 | Aug 76 | Commander, 4th Battalion, 73d Armor, 1st Infantry Division (Forward), United States Army Europe, Germany |
| Aug 76 | Jun 77 | Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division (Forward), United States Army Europe, Germany |
| Aug 77 | Jun 78 | Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania |
| Jun 78 | Dec 79 | Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations)/Director of Plans and Training, 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley, Fort Riley, Kansas |
| Jan 80 | May 81 | Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), VII Corps, United States Army Europe, Germany |
| May 81 | Jun 83 | Commander, 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany |
| Jun 83 | Oct 83 | Chief of Staff, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe, Germany |
| Nov 83 | Jul 85 | Assistant Commandant, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky |
| Jul 85 | Mar 87 | Deputy Chief of Staff for Support, Central Army Group, Allied Command Europe, Germany |
| Mar 87 | Jun 88 | Deputy Commandant, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas |
| Jun 88 | Jul 89 | Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas |
| Jul 89 | Jun 90 | Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army/Army Senior Member, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, Washington, DC |
| Jun 90 | Jun 91 | Vice Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC |
| Jun 91 | Jun 95 | Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC |

General GORDON RUSSELL SULLIVAN

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

| <u>Assignment</u> | <u>Dates</u> | <u>Grade</u> |
|---|------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Administrative Officer, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, and later Executive Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 Division, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam | May 63-Jul 64 (No joint credit) | Lieutenant/Captain |
| Deputy Chief of Staff for Support, Central Army Group, Allied Forces Central, Allied Command Europe | Jul 85-Mar 87 | Brigadier General |

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star Medal
Purple Heart
Meritorious Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Infantryman Badge
Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge

As of 31 July 1995

General Gordon R. Sullivan Interview

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SENIOR OFFICER ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

INTERVIEWER: Colonel Dave Ellis

INTERVIEWEE: General Gordan Russell Sullivan

FIRST INTERVIEW

[Begin Tape S-437, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: This is interview number one of an unclassified senior officer oral history interview with General Gordan Russell Sullivan, which is being conducted on 14 February 2002 at Arlington, Virginia. The interviewer is Lieutenant Colonel Dave Ellis. Sir, please discuss your childhood, family and friends.

GEN SULLIVAN: As I look back on my childhood, I take that all the way through high school, it seemed wonderful to me. Life was relatively simple and enjoyable. My home where we lived almost my whole life was a relatively quiet tree-lined street. We lived in a single home. A wood frame home, it is still there in Quincy. 29 Hilda Street, Quincy, Massachusetts. A place called Lakin Square. I can even remember my phone number. I walked to grammar school as a kid. That school is now a condominium.

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We walked in the morning and I walked home for lunch. Then I walked back again in the afternoon and back home again. I had some buddies who lived on the street with me. My mother and father were divorced. My buddies in those days had pretty much disappeared from my life. I really don't know what happened to them. I'll pick up on some other friends later. Probably one of the most important things in my childhood was my mother and father divorced in the forties. I think I was in the second or third grade. This was obviously a big event in my life and my sister's life. I have a younger sister, she is four years younger than me. From that point on, my mother raised us. But looking back on it, it seemed idealic to me. We never had much money. My mother worked at a number of jobs. She worked at a candy store at the end of a street. She worked as a bank teller. She was a secretary in Boston. She obviously, even in those days, the 1940s and 1950s, was unhappy that women were paid less than men for the same kind of work. Although I would not classify my mother was as hard over on an issue, but I remember it. She was a working mother and essentially my sister and I were latch key kids. But life was great! I went to junior

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high school. My wife and I, as a matter of fact, went to junior high school together. We didn't date or anything, we were just friends. In junior high school in those days you were just kids. I went to Quincy High School, I played football. The usual stuff, football, no great shakes, just played it. On the weekends when we weren't doing sports with the school, we would get on a bus or a street car and we would go to another part of the city and play guys in a pick up game. I was not a great student for reasons which I think were probably related to I was having such a great time doing other things. My mother and my father, who was still sort of a part of my life, decided I should go to Thayer Academy which was a country day school in Braintree. The irony is that this is the "West Point" Sylvanus Thayer. I always thought when I went to West Point and participated in the reunion at West Point where the oldest grad would lay a wreath at the base of the Thayer statue on the plain, how ironic it was that I was a graduate of Thayer Academy and responsible for the Military Academy and standing there while they were laying a wreath at the statue. But at any rate, I went to Thayer Academy. That was important for me because I

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then started to get my head screwed on properly and I met a number of people there. One of whom I talked to two nights ago, a fellow by the name of Tom Cramer. He is an attorney now in Massachusetts. He is still a close friend of mine. We had a wonderful time together as kids. He went on to Georgetown; I went to Norwich with a couple of my classmates, Jack Dings, who recently passed away; and Bob Hopkins, John Shehey. There were four of us out of the same class who went on to Norwich. Now back to my youth. Because my mother needed the money she rented out the two front rooms in the house. I was influenced greatly by the people who lived in the house because essentially it was room and board. They actually lived with us. A young fellow and his wife and son lived there. The wife passed away in child birth, which was my first real touch with death. She just died. The fellow's name was John Murphy.

INTERVIEWER: How old were you?

GEN SULLIVAN: 6th Grade I think. He stayed in the house. He served in the Coast Guard for a number of years. He was going to law school. He just became a

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part of our family. There were other people there also. But from him, I learned lots of things. This house, although we didn't have much money, for some reason we always had the *New York Magazine*, the *New York Times* on the weekends, books. My mother was a member of Great Books, or some kind of club. She was active in the church; my sister and I were active in the church. It was a very idealic life and it influenced me very greatly, even to today. As did John Murphy, who was a strong influence on me. He was a Chief petty officer in the Coast Guard. I think it is from him that I picked up lots of my love of being in the service. It is hard for me to even describe. But these memories are important to me. World War II, I was born in 1937. I can recall during the war a constant stream of friends of my mother and my father. My father was still there at the time, coming to the house. Friends of theirs, two WACs [Women's Army Corps]. One of their friends was a Marine. One of my uncles was a sailor. He came back from the Pacific and there were parties and all sorts of songs. I just remember all of that. Quincy Ship Yard. I would go down there with my next door neighbor to pick up her husband, who worked at the ship yard, seven days a

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week, 24 hours a day, building warships. All of that was a part of my life. Their academy was pretty much a prep school. We went to prep school although we didn't live there. Maureen McCarthy was my classmate. Her husband is John Scalia, the justice of the Supreme Court. As I said, my wife was my classmate. Her sister was the class behind me. My girlfriend at the time was her best friend. Jack Dings, who recently passed away, and I was the eulogist at his funeral. His wife and I. His wife was in that class with my wife's sister. I am still very close to all these people. It is almost like a family. My sister as I say, was four years younger than me. Four years is a wide gap, although I am very close to my sister. Because it was she and I and my mother essentially. Just the three of us. Although my father lived in the area with his second wife, we were never particularly close to her. It was not a problem for me. My sister, who was four, it was traumatic for her. Education was standard, blocking and tackling. Thayer was classical education. Shakespeare, psalms, the *Forsythe Saga*, it was a classical kind of education. History, Math, English composition and so forth. I played football at Thayer. Not very well, but I did.

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We had our girlfriends. The girls had their boyfriends in the class. It was great.

INTERVIEWER: Anything else on hobbies and interests from that time frame?

GEN SULLIVAN: I will touch on this later, but my grandfather was important to me. My mother's father. My grandmother also. I would spend a lot of time with them as a young boy. He was born in the 1800s. He worked at a factory for all his adult life. He would take me lots of places. To Boston, to the Old State House, to the Bunker Hill monument, to the Constitution, to the first railroad in America. But granite for the Bunker Hill monument was mined, what was quarried in Quincy. It was taken on a railroad built by Gridly Bryant. The school that I went to was taking on this railroad, over to the Charles River and then floated over to Charlestown to build the monument. Quincy had both Adams houses, the two little houses that John Adams and John Quincy Adams lived in. And then the Adams mansion is there. Both Adams are buried in Quincy. From as long as I can remember, history has been an important part of my

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life. My grandfather walked me around. We went to parades, the Memorial Day parades, Spanish-American War had parades and we would go to that. He would introduce me to his buddies who had fought in the Spanish-American war. This was the 1940s so these guys were 50 or 60 years old. I went to Cape Cod, Nantucket. There is a picture in my family stuff of me shaking hands with a guy in Nantucket who shook hands with Abraham Lincoln. They made a big deal out of that. And I remember to this day. I think my love of history went back to all of that. I read a lot. I think my mother gave me a book at some point, *Johnny Reb and Billy Yank*. And Bruce Catton. But books were always a part of my life. It was just a part of our house. You could probably tell from just looking around this office that they still are. They are a big part of my life. I was a Cub Scout and a Boy Scout. My mother was the den leader. How she found the time to do it, I don't know. How she found the money to do all that she did is beyond me. I think my father in those days gave her 35 dollars a month. Whatever it was, it wasn't much. But this was the 40s. I worked. It seems to me I always worked from junior high school on. I worked at a hardware store; I

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worked for the city of Quincy. Various jobs for the city of Quincy. I worked construction. My father was in the wool trade. I worked in a wool warehouse one summer. I always worked. I worked in a grocery market bagging groceries, cleaning chickens, whatever. I worked in a filling station. I don't know what the heck I made there. But when you are a teenager in those days hanging around a gas station, it seemed like the thing to do. I would pick up a couple of bucks there. So anyway, looking back on it, I have very fond memories of all of it. It was a happy home. We never seemed to want for anything. I was influenced greatly by my mother and her strength. And her endurance support of me. There were times, I am sure, when she wondered how all of this was going to turn out. Because I was a typical young guy. She even told one of my friends when I got promoted to the Vice Chief, that it still was amazing! The whole thing.

INTERVIEWER: Do you want to talk about Norwich first?

GEN SULLIVAN: Your second question, I think I told you all of that about reading. Model building. I did

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the usual model building type of stuff. I was a typical kid. Norwich was the extension of my life at Thayer Academy. Jack Dings and I were good friends. John Shehey, who became a tragic case, was another of my classmates. A guy named Bob Hopkins was my classmate there and at Norwich. I went up to Norwich in 1954 to see a friend of ours. Jack Dings and I drove up. I graduated from Thayer Academy in 1955.

INTERVIEWER: Was Thayer Academy a prep for only Norwich or just a prep school for any college?

GEN SULLIVAN: Just a prep school. And the students went everywhere. Mostly New England colleges. I think we had one kid go to Harvard. Anyway, we went up to see this guy in the fall. We drove up. We went up to see this fellow, his name was Dick Manosky, who later served in the Army with me. He was at Thayer Academy, the class ahead of me. He was a good guy and we went up to see him. We spent the weekend up there. We fell in love with it. Now admittedly it wasn't January and 48 below zero. It was the fall and there was a football game. We saw the cadets. And that was all very attractive to us. To me, and I think, my

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classmates. And we had fun. They were obviously putting the move on us to go there and we bit! The atmosphere, the program, and the location. Ski jumps, ski hills and all of this stuff we had done as kids. Skiing was big for me. So I was excited about going. Somehow my mother and father got together. I wouldn't want to give you the wrong opinion. They were never at each other's throats. This was not acrimonious. Obviously, we all would have preferred that it didn't happen, but it was not acrimonious. Although it was very unique at that time. I don't ever remember it being a burden to me. That is the way life was and I couldn't do anything about it so I just got on with my life. I was not the ideal cadet.

INTERVIEWER: You joined the corps as a freshman?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well, everybody did in those days. We all did and we all were in ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] and we all wore uniforms. I was not the ideal cadet. As time went on, I started to discount cadet life as not real. My academic performance improved and by the time I graduated, junior and senior year, I started being on the dean's

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list or just about on the dean's list. I wrote for the newspaper. I was starting to get into it. I was starting to get into the Army. I said, "I really like this," not cadet life. I never warmed up in cadet life because as I said, it seemed artificial. I liked the noncommissioned officers who were in the ROTC program. World War II war veterans, Korean War veterans, or both. They seemed very attractive to me because I had worked a lot, construction jobs and so forth. I was around men like that a lot. I was just attracted to them and what they stood for. Of course, General Harmon was a colorful World War II leader and had also served in World War I. He was a colorful presence. He was a colorful person. He had General Guy V. Henry up once for a review. Henry was an Indian fighter. The guy is in his 80s. This was in the 1950s. He was born on the Great Plains and he fought the Indians. He was a cavalryman. All of this was very influential on me. So anyway, I went to summer camp in the summer of 1958. That is where I really decided that I loved the Army. In those days the ROTC summer camps were a general military camp at Fort Devens and elsewhere in the United States. Then people who were branch oriented -- Norwich had three

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branches in those days, cavalry, armor, signal corps and engineers. I was an armor guy. So we went to Fort Knox. Essentially what we did was take a watered down version, about a six week version of the armor officer basic course. At that time during that summer camp, I really started to like the Army. I met cadets from VMI, the Citadel, Texas A&M, Virginia Tech, Clemson. I started meeting a wider mass of people, my whole world started opening up. It was all very exciting. Even driving to Fort Knox was exciting because I had never been out of Massachusetts. I had been to New York City and Pennsylvania, but you started to get on your own. So at any rate, did that and started to get it in my head that the Army was for me. I made life long friends at Norwich. I talked to one of them this morning, a guy named Tom Decker, who I am very close to. Dick Durgans, who unfortunately passed away while I was the Chief. I buried him in Germany. He was a brigadier general in the Army Reserve. He and I were very close. I officiated at his funeral. Jack Dings, Mark Troble, I was the godfather for one of his children. He was there with me and then at Norwich. I am very close to his wife. I see her periodically. I saw her over New Years and

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I will see her again down in Florida over Easter.

Teddy Kamilis, Eddie O'Brian. I could name hundreds.

A lot of guys that I am very close with. Norwich was important to me.

INTERVIEWER: Let me ask you a couple of questions about Norwich. Did you have to compete for a Regular Army commission?

GEN SULLIVAN: No. That is an important question. When I graduated -- well, I guess you did. I was not a DMG [Distinguished Military Graduate], but they called them RFAs [expand????]. Some of my classmates went into the Army for 90 days. I was an OBV2 (Obligated Volunteer for 2 years), I went in for two years. I was an obligated volunteer for two years and then I had a six year obligation. When I went to the basic course, because I wasn't a Regular Army officer, this whole thing is interesting. I went into the Active Army on the 21st of November 1959. I went to the basic course, AOB 5. Bill Stoft lived across the hall from me. He and I have been life long friends. I was a reserve officer. Because I was a reserve officer I was assigned duty to Fort Hood. Regulars

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were going overseas. Reserve officers did not go overseas. I said, and the correspondence is probably around somewhere, I remember writing to my mother and telling her that I was going to compete to become a Regular Army officer because I didn't want to be a second class citizen. That I really liked the Army and I wanted to become a part of it, not some guy off on the side. So I competed for it and I was interviewed. I remember being interviewed by a colonel and two or three lieutenant colonels. They looked at my academic stuff. They looked at my record at Fort Knox. But the basic course was a piece of cake for me because I had already essentially been through the basic course as a cadet. Instead of doing it in six weeks, let's say I did it in twelve weeks or whatever. But it was kind of like taking six weeks and making eight or twelve weeks. Then I went to Fort Hood. That was important for a number of reasons. I went to the Second Armored Division. I was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 66th Armor. The 1st Battalion, 66th Armor was a tank battalion in name only. We had all of the tanks, a couple of versions of M48s. We had all of our equipment. We had no soldiers. Our job was to train AIT [advanced individual training]

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soldiers at Hood. So the 2nd Armored Division was essentially a shell of a division. That influenced me greatly when I became the DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations], the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and particularly as the Chief of Staff of the Army. It was apparent to me that I would cut force structure but maintain readiness rather than conduct a charade on the soldiers in the Army. I reported to -- I don't know, let's say my first company was Bravo or Charlie -- the company commander was Robert Price. There were a couple of people at the battalion headquarters. The battalion XO [executive officer], the battalion commander, the adjutant who was a highly decorated Korean War veteran. The XO was a West Point graduate. The brigade commander later went on to command the 4th Infantry Division during the Vietnam War. General Jim Hollingsworth retired as a lieutenant general. He was the Chief of staff of the division. There was a lot of talent there. But down at the companies there wasn't a hell of a lot.

INTERVIEWER: So there was a talent gap between the experienced vets that were senior folks and the new folks coming out?

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GEN SULLIVAN: The rest of us were Christmas help. The rest of us were reserve officers. Most of them got out of the Army. Some of them didn't even want to be in the Army. Noncommissioned officers, some of them were very good. My first sergeant, First Sergeant Bonds. My first company had two outstanding first sergeants, one after the other, the second was First Sergeant Dillon.

[End Tape S-437, Side 1]

[Begin Tape S-437, Side 2]

INTERVIEWER: You were talking about Sergeant Dillon.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, Otis Dillon was my first sergeant. I think it was his second first sergeant job. Bond left and Dillon came. Dillon had been my first sergeant at summer camp, Regular Army, noncommissioned officer. He was very good. These men were really an influence on me, probably more than my company commander. He had his own problems. But all of that was learning. I then took over a company but it was a company that was charged with training soldiers,

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maintaining all of the tanks and all of the equipment so I learned a lot of blocking and tackling. How to teach classes, how to conduct classes. How to set classes up. Do rehearsals. Teach a broad number of subjects. Since I was the only commissioned officer of the company. Field hygiene, marksmanship, basic rifle marksmanship, on and on and on. Tank maintenance and so forth, all of which stood me in pretty good stead later. I also met a fellow by the name of Paul Schwartz. Paul retired as a major general. I talked to him just two days ago. He works for General Dynamics now. He and I have remained close friends. He and I were lieutenants together down there. He was in the 1st Armored Division. The 1st Armored Division and 2nd Armored division were there side by side. The 1st Armored Division it was actually only one brigade called a combat command [CCA]. Being a platoon leader vicariously, I lived through him. He went to the field, he became a Draper award winner. The Draper award is a very prestigious award for armor lieutenants, platoon leader of the year, kind of thing. He was that guy.

INTERVIEWER: An installation level award?

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GEN SULLIVAN: No, it is Army wide. It was a big deal. I learned a lot by listening to him and being with him about how to be a platoon leader, what platoon leaders did. Real units. I don't mean what I was doing. Another fellow, John Mason, he was another bachelor who lived in the BOQ. John had come back from Hawaii. He was in the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 25th Division. From that, I guess I was kind of in retrospect, it seemed to me I was sucking up this whole Army culture thing. I became the communications officer. I went to Fort Knox and went to Commo school. 0200 MOS. I met Tom Foley there. Tom and I remain close friends to this day. He retired as a major general. He is a good guy. He and I were classmates. While all this was going on, this was January or February of 1960 through the spring of 1961. At some point in there I became a Regular Army officer. This caused a whole number of things to happen. My name came up on the screen with Department of the Army. I was now something. I wasn't somebody, I was something. All of a sudden they had a Regular Army officer who hadn't been in a tank platoon or whatever, so they had to do something with me. All of

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the Regular Army people from West Point, the class of 1959, etc., Norwich, 1959, they had gone off to Europe. I was assigned to Korea. I went to the 1st Cavalry Division, the 3rd Battalion 40th Armor. We had five tank companies. This was when there were five battle groups in the division and the infantry battle groups. There were five tank companies in this tank battalion. Each battle group got a tank company. The best assignment I ever had. It was terrific! At first I was the communications officer so I got a chance to look at lots of stuff. I was able to learn a lot about the tank battalion, about Korea. I did lots of driving around--reconnaissance. You lived in the field. We lived in these straight wall butlers. There was a latrine in the middle. There was a long row of butlers and then a latrine. So you walked to the head. Sometimes we had water, sometimes we didn't have water. If the creek washed out the dam we didn't have water and we took showers out of 55 gallon drums.

INTERVIEWER: Where was this in Korea?

GEN SULLIVAN: Outside of Moonsani. On MSR one (Main Supply Route 1). Part of the Seoul corridor, in the

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Western corridor. Seoul was still bombed out. Power was all from generators that were from the United States. There was no sewer system at all. Kimpo Airfield was still bombed out. It was essentially a runway. You couldn't land at night there at all. Yoido, where the Korean General Assembly meets now, was a airfield, called K14, I think. It was in the middle of the Han River. It was truly much different. This was 1961. We were on curfew. When I arrived we couldn't go out because of the coups, or the threat of a coup. It was very unsettling. It was relatively primitive but it was great soldiering. We spent a lot of time in the field, we were with our soldiers all the time, with the noncommissioned officers and idle officers and other officers. I learned a ton. I loved it. I don't recall -- I talked to my mother once in the time I was there. That was sort of like, "Hey, Mom, how are you doing? What time is it there? It is whatever. All of this time line whatever." I didn't go home in the 14 months that I was there. I was extended. So I was commo platoon leader, platoon leader, and a company commander in Korea. A Company, 3rd Battalion, 40th Armor. I learned a lot in Korea. I had a company commander who later went on to get

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himself shot by a soldier in Germany. He later became my battalion XO in Germany when I wound up there in 1965. He was a hard-nosed guy. He was not very well received by lots of people. But having said that, he set and enforced standards at a time when the Army didn't necessarily have published standards. In other words, these are the standards in the barracks, clean is clean, straight is straight, this is the way the wall lockers are, and oh, by the way, all platoon leaders have to come and stand in front of my desk once a week and perform some soldier skill. Like what? Assemble and disassemble all the automatic weapons in the tank. Go to the motor pool. The 27 steps to set the range finder in operation. Track tension. Do it by the book, not by some black magic way. Clean is clean on the tanks. Things all lined up. Your tools are spotless. Everything was spotless. And to a standard that he set. Now if you didn't perform to standard, some of the tasks he assigned to the platoon leaders you didn't go out on the weekend. You couldn't go to Seoul. Obviously that was a big deal because we were all bachelors. I learned a lot. I also learned there are still some weird things. I recall -- I am not going to mention

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his name, but I went down to a friend of mine's room one day. We had a lot of venereal disease. We had about ten percent of the soldiers that had VD or gonorrhea at any one time. He had written the parents of one of the soldiers, the mother, to tell her. That floored me! I said, "What in the hell did you do that for?" I mean the dignity of soldiers. OK.

Obviously, it was not great. We did not encourage our soldiers to do that kind of stuff, but at any rate, I started to get a feel for what it was like to be with real soldiers in that kind of an environment. And the role of officers and the role of noncommissioned officers. And standards. Performance to standards, articulating standards. Leading people so that they could meet your standard in training them. As I said, we spent a lot of time in the field. It was dangerous although I don't recall, we didn't have many border incursions and I don't recall any real fire fights. There may have been some but I don't recall any. Certainly none that involved me. Seventh Division was there. Seventh Division is over in the Eastern corridor near Camp Casey in that area. There were some other camps, Camp Beavers. The ranges were icicle range. The usual ranges. Anyway, I went to

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Japan once for a week or so all by myself. I had a great time there. I had some time to travel around. I am not sure at my age now I would do it, but I did it then and I had a great time. I just got on a train and went somewhere. And I met some Japanese kids who were students at Michigan State, I think, and they took me under their wing. I had a wonderful time. I really liked the Orient. At some point during my tour, Maxwell Taylor came out, there was a message that had arrived, asking for volunteers for Vietnam. I volunteered to go. Everybody thought I was crazy. I probably was. But by that time I was convinced that I really wanted to be a soldier, but I figured, hey, this is what soldiers did. So I volunteered to go and went to Vietnam, from Korea.

INTERVIEWER: So it was all draftees at the time?

Quality?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well, there were Regular Army people, but quality was fine. They were what they were. That term right there, where my brain was at that moment, that was never. The soldiers were the soldiers and that is what we had. Hey, that was your platoon.

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Sergeant Kirk, my tank commander, I was a platoon leader. Sergeant Kirk, you could always count on him. You could count on these guys. I don't even remember. He was a good E5. A good tank gunner. We had M47s when I first arrived and then we got the M48A2C, which is a diesel version of the M48s. We also went down to the railhead in Moonsani, and we got them off the rail head. There was no net team or anything. We had to read the manual. The company commander was really rigorous on that. We offloaded the tanks. We drove them back. A soldier was killed by the way, bringing them back very shortly after we got them. There was something about the brakes and the accelerator that was reversed. The kid walked between two tanks. A driver got nervous and hit the accelerator and crushed him. Not in my company. But at any rate, we took the tanks, we took the boxes off the back where the OVM [On Vehicle Material] is. The ramming stacks, and all of that. The tools. We broke them down, read the manuals. This is how we used the tanks. We essentially taught ourselves how to use them. It was a great tank. Certainly better than the M-47. We were always having fires with the M-47 because it was a gas burner. We had the camouflage nets on the back.

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The nets always would catch fire, which always led to great excitement since we had the ammunition on board. Anyway, since we had to keep it clean, we dug a well. My platoon dug a well. The motor pool was not paved, it was dirt, but we had concrete paths for the tanks to sit on. So we dug a well. Somehow we got a pump and we actually made a well with a pump like in the old days. A hand pump. Then we buried 55 gallon drums in front of it and put immersion heaters in one of them so we had hot water and so forth. Well we were kind of the envy for the other platoons because we had figured out how to do something. So our tanks we could satisfy our company commander and everybody started digging wells. Since A Company was on the outside, we could actually dig them and have them up against the fence. These things were barbed wire compounds. Of course we have a lot of problems with thieves and stuff. I learned a lot. I learned a lot about myself and I learned a lot about the Army. I look upon it very fondly. So by that time it was the late summer of 1962. I went back to the United States and went to the MATA [Military Advisors Trainers and Assistance--getting ready to go to Vietnam] course at

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Fort Bragg. Then I went to the language school at Monterey, California.

INTERVIEWER: You studied Vietnamese for six months?

GEN SULLIVAN: No. It was from Thanksgiving, six weeks maybe. I should have arrived in January. I think I arrived in late January. You've got this interesting question about West Point, ROTC and favoritism. In my case it is kind of interesting because it never entered into because there were no West Point officers. Certainly there weren't any in the 2nd Armor Division that I knew of. There may have been majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels. But none of my peers were West Point people. My peers were all ROTC guys. Some of them were in the Army but two years. So that was not favoritism. I don't know. When I went to Korea there was one, Rocky Versace. He later was captured and they named a park after him in Alexandria. He was captured and killed in Vietnam. He was up in the 9th Cavalry. He was in the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, which was the cavalry squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division. I don't know how he got up there. There were a couple of West Pointers

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around. One of the company commanders in the tank battalion I was in, was one. He must have gone to graduate school or something to get there. He wasn't much senior to me. But at any rate, it was not something I thought of. I did what I did, I learned what I could where I was. I thought I was doing what the Army wanted me to do. That was like whatever. I thought a lot about your question. I guess what I would say was, I was out of phase. I was out of phase with the Regular Army guys. The Army was developing the Regular Army guys. That is, the ones who are commissioned in the Regular Army in a different way. They were sending them to Europe, not to Fort Hood where they knew, obviously what was going on. So they were drawing real distinctions between regular army officers and the other guys. Then they wound up with me as an outer phase kind of guy. I think they said we have to get this guy up to sync so we will send him to Korea then bring him back and send him to the career course. Well, I volunteered to go to Vietnam, so I went to Vietnam, and frankly, Vietnam was such at the time that if you were Regular Army, Reserve, whatever, you were just an officer down there. With some exceptions. Since I wasn't a Ranger, by the way,

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there are a lot of things I am not. I am not airborne qualified, I am not a Ranger because the Army didn't feel like they wanted to send me to those schools. But I integrated. So I wound up in Vietnam as an advisor. Which was fine. I just became an advisor down in the 21st ARVN. Now in retrospect and reflection, it seems to me that there was for the regular army guys and the West Pointers and maybe even some ROTC. There were some who went to units initially where they were asked to come to those units based on people who had been their mentors at West Point or Norwich or VMI. In other words, their cadet performance influenced where they went. So and so was a football player, get him. He is a good man. So they were known. I was an unknown quantity, which frankly, it never even dawned on me. None of this penetrated my skull.

INTERVIEWER: Did it ever play?

GEN SULLIVAN: No, I don't think it ever played.

INTERVIEWER: It was also unusual in that when you were a four star initially, almost all of your peers

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were Academy graduates with very few exceptions in the Army.

GEN SULLIVAN: I don't think it ever played. I think what I did was I tried to learn wherever I was, looking back on Fort Hood, I think Fort Hood was very important to me because it enabled me to get into the Army. To begin to get into the flow. To learn vicariously and to learn other things too, obviously. Then Korea was very important to me developmentally. I began to feel like I was making a contribution, that I really could lead soldiers, or at least I thought I could. The feedback from my officers, from my seniors, from my superiors, and my peers indicated that. So I started to gain confidence. But all of this other stuff was transparent. People talked about it. The WPPA [West Point Protective Association] that was meaningless because there were never any manifestations in my presence. Tom Carpenter was one of the company commanders in the 3rd Battalion, 40th Armor. He later retired as a brigadier general and went to work for USAA down in San Antonio. I don't know where he is now. He was in the battalion. I think he was the only West Point graduate junior

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officer. But he was a company commander. He was the S3. I still have some stuff around that he and I did, platoon tests. But I looked upon it as a learning experience. I didn't look upon him as a threat to me. I didn't think that at all. I may have been kidding myself. And I know it sounds banal. Sometimes when I say this in response to questions. People say, "What is your secret?" My answer always is, "Well, I try to do the best job I could with what I was given to do, and I tried to learn as much as I could and then apply it later." That is kind of how it all fell out with me.

INTERVIEWER: My intent there wasn't to convey that this bad fraternity is out there. It is just that the generation of officers that I was with saw you as breaking some ground.

GEN SULLIVAN: No, I don't think, and I don't imply it to be. I think it would be interesting for them to know. I never thought I couldn't succeed, although I must tell you in all honesty, none of these thoughts, there were no thoughts in my mind until after 1982 or 1983, as I was completing my brigade command that

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there was anything more in store for me in terms of general officer rank. Obviously, by that time I knew that I could perform, but that came later. So at any rate, there were lots of things that I wasn't, but there were some things that I was. I thought I was a pretty good officer, I thought I was a pretty good armor officer. I thought I understood the relationship between noncommissioned officers and their soldiers and noncommissioned officers and officers. I thought that I understood how the relationships worked between officers. I began to have confidence in my capabilities. I was growing up. I was maturing. I think that is probably what Korea did for me as much as anything. I was also learning cultures, Japanese, Korean culture, by being there. I didn't know, and I don't think any of us knew, what poverty and deprivation was until we arrived in Korea. About how resilient the Korean people are, or how tough humans can be. I really liked Korea. Even when I go over there now, I have some very evocative memories, being in the field. Spring in Korea when the rice paddies were all green. Going out with my tank platoon when we got snowed in on an icecicle range. We actually stayed up there in two hex tents.

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We carried hex tents with stoves on our tanks. I think we stayed in the tents essentially for two days because we couldn't get out of there. But we survived. Soldier skills served with the Koreans, the ROK [Republic of Korea] Army, platoon leader, those are really important.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have any KATUSA [Korean Augmentation to the United States Army] in your unit?

GEN SULLIVAN: No, we did not. There may have been some in battalion headquarters, but not on the company.

INTERVIEWER: Korea is still a place that the Army can go to and say, "We did that." That place wouldn't exist like it does if it hadn't been for what we did.

GEN SULLIVAN: Not Korea, but Germany maybe. I think Germany maybe would have come back, I guess, without the U.S. Army, although that is another place. That is another important part of my life. But at any rate I closed out the Korean phase and back to the United States and then went off to Vietnam.

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INTERVIEWER: Tomorrow we will take off on Vietnam.

[End Tape S-437, Side 2]

SECOND INTERVIEW, GENERAL GORDON SULLIVAN

15 February 2002

[Begin Tape S-439, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: This is the second interview being conducted with General Sullivan, which is being conducted on 15 February 2002 in Arlington, Virginia. The interviewer is Lieutenant Colonel Pat Donahue. Sir, the area we will start looking at will cover your Vietnam to graduate school period. The first question I would like to ask you is how were you prepared to execute the advisory job on arrival in Vietnam? Did you draw upon your training conducted at basic training at your unit at Fort Hood? Was there a special in-country school? How were you set up for success?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well, I would characterize it as I was prepared as best the Army could prepare anyone, I guess, for doing something that had never been done on

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such a massive scale before, at least in modern times. Obviously, at Fort Hood you know from yesterday's session that I was not in what was truly a tank battalion. It was a training organization. And interesting enough, I gave a talk this morning, today, and I said something about where I went in 1961 and I talked about that experience because it was fresh in my mind from yesterday. Some guy came up out of the audience and he told me that he took his initial entry training in the 2nd Armor Division in an infantry battalion which was adjacent to the tank battalion I was in. He is the only guy that I met from that time period. We talked about that. So at any rate, we did the Fort Hood thing. I went to the Communications Officers Course and I learned a lot of very specific communications skills which later stood me very well in Vietnam. So that was all, then I went to Korea and I was a commo officer in a tank battalion. I was a platoon leader. When I came out of Korea, I went to Fort Bragg. I went to this MATA [military advisor/training assistance] course. We learned all the basic things that we should know about weapons like the Mach 49. All of these weird weapons that we would come into. ????, O-mines, and all of the school

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of a soldier type of thing. And we did a little cultural stuff. Kind of "This is Vietnam," and "Don't point the bottom of the shoes at the people you are sitting with," etc. I went from there to the language school in Monterey. I drove, I am looking over there to a painting on the wall and I will tell you why I am looking over there in a minute. I drove from Fort Bragg to Monterey with a guy by the name of Chuck Titus. Chuck Titus was an officer whom I met at the MATA course at Fort Bragg. He and I drove cross country together. We went to Vietnam together. He went to the airborne regiment or brigade as an advisor and I went down to the 21st Armor. He was subsequently killed. On that impressionist painting on the wall, his name is on there. Bob Serio is another guy I met in Germany and I will talk about him in a minute. But Titus and Serio were two buddies of mine who were killed and are on that impressionistic rendition that an artist did of some of my time in the Army. So at any rate, we went to the language school together at Monterey. I went to Vietnam in January of 1963, processed through Saigon and went down to the unit. I had the basic small unit leadership skills. I knew the weapons and I had this time as a trainer in a

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basic training unit. But that is essentially all I really knew. It wasn't particularly clear. There were a lot of things in retrospect that aren't particularly clear that the Army really told me, or that we really understood what the hell was going on. The cultural challenges were enormous. I wasn't with a regular unit. Some of the guys I was advising were self-defense forces. That is like living in one of these hamlets, which was like a triangle fort with a tower and little fighting positions along a mud wall. So I was advising them and the civil guard which were really province units. We lived in a place called "Rach Gia, which was the province headquarters. We lived in an old French colonial house. We, being an advisory team. We had a couple of jeeps. There might have been six or seven of us as I remember. We would operate from there and we would go with our units out into the boondocks. We would either go by boat or walk. We didn't have helicopters. We weren't airmobile in any sense of the word. Or by jeep. We would drive by jeep. We might have had some trucks but trucks were of virtually no value because we were in the Delta and you couldn't get around and it was too dangerous. IV Corps, when I went there, was very

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dangerous. IV Corps was where a lot of the hard corps Viet Cong, it was old Viet Minh territory. We went out to villages a lot where they just didn't know there was such a thing as the Republic of Vietnam. There were VC flags, North Vietnamese stuff. The legitimate government, the Diem Government, was hardly recognized. Did some MEDCAPS, and I spent time doing that, going out and checking units, going with a Medic, Specialist Five. I remember he had a bunch of stuff and we would go out and distribute that and check units and so forth and so on. Combat was sporadic, periodically a mine would get detonated and blow up a truck. Casualties and terror were sporadic. But you could really get yourself in a serious fight if you went into certain areas. That happened periodically. There were normally regular units around if you probed. One time we did and we pushed real hard up against the U Minh Forest down in Kien Giang Province. That is really where the heat was. You asked the question about strategic hamlets. I don't think strategic hamlets were very successful. But I don't think in retrospect, I never got the feeling that the U.S. advisory effort was coherent and, Ok, guys, here is what we are trying to do, and

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everybody pay attention. I never had any exposure to the guys who were in the advisory teams in the other provinces where we would all sit down and say, "OK, here is what we are trying to do." The corps headquarters was a guy named -- this was his nickname -- "Poopie" Conners. "Coal Bin Willie" was the senior advisor of III Corps. These guys were World War II (WWII) vintage guys. There was this hierarchy but I never got the feeling I was part of the coherent plan. We landed at Saigon, went to a place called Five Oceans to the BOQ. That is where we stayed. We landed at Tan Son Nhut AB. I had been in Korea for 14 months so Asia was no particular surprise. The smells, sights and sounds of Asia were not unusual to me. I was somewhat unique in that regard amongst the guys I went with. But that was like I was coming home. Although the weather obviously was much different. Vietnam was more advanced. Saigon was more advanced than Seoul. It was obviously a step down from Tokyo, but it was idyllic in the early 1960s. The weather was great. There were trees. Tree-lined boulevards in Saigon. In the evenings Tu Do Street, there were lots of night clubs in those days. You didn't have the pervasive, hundreds of

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thousands of American GIs. It was still a mixture of an old French colony, of a sleepy, South Asian city, and a city at war. But the bomb screenings were not there. You could move freely. As a matter of fact, we had come to Saigon on weekends with our weapons with our harnesses and so forth, and actually would sleep in hotels, the Majestic and the Rex, and various places. There were bunks set up on saw horses with mattresses. We just threw our gear in the corner with the weapons and just left it there. I don't think we thought much about it in those days. Now it later changed. We got around by fixed wing Army aircraft, Beavers and Otters. And the Air Force was flying C-123s. You could go out to Tan Son Nhut on a weekend and fly to Bangkok if you had a passport and an ID. And you would come back on Sunday pretty loose, pretty loose! I was a part of the 21st ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Division. The senior advisor of the 21st ARVN was a fellow named Jonathan Ladd. When I arrived I processed through that outfit. That was in Bac Lieu. Bac Lieu Air Field was a dirt strip, landed there. They had a tower. I think I have a picture of them around someplace. One foot above sea level in the dry season, one foot below in the wet season, it

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set on the tower. It was just like a wooden tower with a little platform. We lived in a tent city like a little cantonment area. Tents, I was sleeping with a couple of guys who gave me an empty bunk. A couple of guys who were Ranger advisors, Jeff Tuton and a fellow named Jones. I was there the first day, they weren't there and then the next day they came back. They had come on a bus from Ca Mau or someplace, with their Rangers. Which, even then everybody was in an unbelieving mode that somebody would do that. They were good guys. So anyway, I went through all of that and then went Rach Gia. In late March, we were out pushing these guys for three or four days. We were in and out of combat. Nothing great. We were probed one night in the village. I don't remember where it was. But nothing real serious. Patrols, that kind of stuff. At the 26th or 27th of March we started getting real resistance, 10 o'clock in the morning and we just went through one canal line to another. It died down and we stopped for lunch to eat. We didn't have any food. We would eat once a day, principally rice or duck or whatever. There were lots of ducks. Some vegetables, although I don't remember too many of them. Essentially rice. We got some nutrition out of

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a duck. Somebody called me because I had the radio and said that some helicopters were coming in that wanted to see us. Which was not particularly unusual. What was unusual is that it was three Hueys that came. I popped smoke and brought them in. About the time the first one flared out a VC popped up out of a spider hole. We were in a pineapple field and the guy popped up, and with a BAR [Browning automatic rifle], cut down on the lead helicopter. He actually shot, the rounds went through the doors, the doors were open. Everybody "unassed" the bird and the pilots took off. The helicopter got hit. I later met that guy at the career course. We were in a bar or a club at Fort Knox and I was telling the story. This guy named Dick Constance said, "So you were the guy who did that?" I said, "Yes, but we didn't know they were there." We had our scouts out. We had a perimeter. We had a patrol out, but we didn't know that what we had essentially done was we went into this pineapple field and were eating pineapple. What we didn't realize is that we were right on top of them. Have you ever been in a pineapple field?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, I have.

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GEN SULLIVAN: So you know that you can get under pineapple plants. The field is broken up anyway. So a real fight evolved. In retrospect, we think that they thought that we were reinforcing. And they really hadn't had much experience with the Hueys. I think they thought that something big was going down. So anyway, we got in a fight, which ultimately cost them about 80 KIA. It was a big fight. The guys who came in to see us were General Stillwell, a guy named General Roland, who was a Air Force brigadier general, who I think was one of the senior Air Force guys in country at the time. Stilwell was the U.S. Army, Vietnam guy. I don't know who else was there. In the process of all of this, I got wounded. Ultimately, this was mid-day, I worked my way back because I was out. I had gone out with this outfit I was advising. At that time it was an element of a Vietnamese Ranger battalion that had somehow got in the area and we were all mixed up. My guys, civil guard, SDC (Self-Defense Corps), this Ranger outfit, and we probed out in one quadrant of this perimeter. I worked my way back to work where the mortars were and the CP [command post]. A VNAF (Vietnamese Air Force) H-37 came in. A VNAF is

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very strange. This whole thing is really weird. VNAF H-37 came in, they loaded me on it with a bunch of Vietnamese guys, all of whom died. They were either dead or in the process of dying. By the time we got to come out, they were all dead. They laid me out on the ramp in the corner of the air field. I could walk although it was getting obviously more difficult the longer time went, but I could walk. About the time I was getting myself sorted out they took off, a jeep came up, loaded me on it. They checked everybody else out, saw I was obviously alive. It wasn't like somebody discovered it. They took me into a Vietnamese hospital, an aid station. By this time I was getting nervous -- not so much nervous about the wound, which I had convinced myself was not serious. I had been wounded in the side and it didn't come out. I urinated and I said, "if I don't pass blood, I am ok." Well, I didn't, so I figured I was ok. Well, Ok, the battlefield surgeon. I got back, the Vietnamese guy, I couldn't talk to him. I was laying on this table at this place that was a real dump! About this time a priest comes in from I don't know where, and he had a Special Forces soldier. The priest asked me what I needed and I said, "The first

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thing I think I need is a real doctor, a real American." He said, "OK." So they took me down to the air field. There was an Otter there that had flown somebody down. They talked to the pilots. They put me in the Otter. There was a veterinarian colonel who was sitting in this plane. Don't ask me why. They took me to Tan Son Nhut. I got to Tan Son Nhut. A couple of weeks later I went back down to the Delta. I was going to be reassigned in May or June to a regular unit. Then somehow I wound up being assigned around June - July to the J2 of MACV (Military Advisory Command, Vietnam), not MAAG (Military Advisory Assistance Group). It was on Pasteur Street. A very small, kind of old hotel. I worked for the J2 (Intelligence Officer) as the executive officer to a Marine and an Air Force general. Then it was a Marine colonel and a Marine three-star who was the J2. So I had a very interesting perspective on the 1 November coup. You asked a question about the 1 November coup.

INTERVIEWER: I read about all the chaos that had ensued with the counter coups.

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GEN SULLIVAN: It was, in my view, and somewhere around I have a letter that I wrote to my mother. I felt from the outset that we acquiesced and that was really one of the major turning points, which people don't talk about very much. I think it was one of truly was when we acquiesced to the elimination of the Diem regime. We just started a series of events which we all know how it ended. But there was a series of coups. We never really knew who was doing what to whom anymore. I did a number of things that night during the coup. Went and found people. There were a whole bunch of CIA people around town. It was kind of an interesting perspective on all of this. But the civil disobedience really started about the time I arrived, maybe in July. Somewhere in there we had the monk immolate himself.

INTERVIEWER: It was May of 1963 when it started. Are you talking about the same time frame?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, May, June, July, in there.

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INTERVIEWER: It says here marshal law was decreed in 1963 and the Buddhists started being arrested at the same time.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. When I arrived in January, Saigon was one kind of place. Then it started deteriorating in the summer. The coup was 1 November. It kind of flattened out for awhile but it never really flattened out. It was constant deterioration. People started acting differently. It was dangerous. It started to get dangerous. Terrorist combat started shifting from the Delta into III Corps, which was west of Saigon, around of Saigon, West of Saigon up towards Tay Ninh And up into the Central Highlands which was Pleiku, that is off the water, up in the central islands. Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku. It started shifting up in there. In 1965, of course, you have the battle for the Ia Drang. But it was kind of moving up that way out of the Delta. Initially it was the Delta and then it moved from the Delta. You can still get in trouble at the Delta. When the 9th Division went down there, on the MeKong you could get in real fights, which they did. But down where I was, it never really played a

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dominant role. Initially it did. I think the 1 November coup was really an important thing. OK?

INTERVIEWER: A follow up on the combat action you mentioned, was General Stilwell on the ground during the fight?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. He was on the ground during the fight. They were at the CP. This was serious stuff. The U.S. helicopters could not come back in. They loaded me on the bird. They found a door some place, put me on it, and stuck me into the helicopter. They used that as a stretcher. They told me, "No morphine, no nothing." Nobody really knew what I knew, that I had a hole in my side. We all knew that. But we didn't know what was going on inside.

INTERVIEWER: You didn't know if there was any internal bleeding?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well, I knew because I took a leak. It wasn't red. Sort of ER kind of stuff. [laughter] But as simple as it may sound, I didn't go into shock, which was important. So at any rate, they stayed

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there. They got me out of there. I left -- I think it was actually their plane that I took to Tan Son Nhut. General Timmes, General Stilwell, they came to see me. Timmes was the MAAG guy. He was the two-star running the Military Advisory Group for Vietnam. They all came to see me in the hospital. At that time, in those days getting wounded was noteworthy because not that many people had been. So any way, they came by to see me. It was an Air Force hospital. It was a little Jamesway operating room. This was truly rudimentary stuff. There were duck boards that went down to what was the latrine. As I remember I didn't get out of bed for awhile, they wouldn't let me. As it turned out, everything was fine. I lost some intestine and other stuff. They cleaned me up but I healed. It never bothered me since although I did get hepatitis C somewhere in all of this. I did have some saline solution and some stuff like that. But the "Ranch Hand" C-123 aircraft, which were herbicide aircraft, were parked right next to this hospital. It was at Tan Son Nhut. The duck boards were to keep us up so that our feet wouldn't get in the herbicide. So essentially what we were doing, we had a hospital on top of that. Hey, it was just what you do.

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[End Tape S-439, Side 1]

[Begin Tape S-439, Side 2]

INTERVIEWER: Sir, the six or seven Americans who were with you there in that old French colonial house, would you operate as a pair of two Americans with a patrol? Or did you go out by yourself?

GEN SULLIVAN: No. We went out by ourselves. One of them was the team guy. He was a major. He worked with the province Chief. There was a weapons sergeant; there was a commo guy. No, we went out by ourselves. I went with the medic on a trip around to a whole bunch of villages. The strategic hamlets, with the Medcap. He and I went with a bunch of Vietnamese. No, this was not amateur sports night. You were out there. We were out there alone with these guys. There were on some operations there would be people like me, with other units. But we were with, I am advising you and you have a battalion, so I am it. Then over there there would be another American or two. The units where you would get more team work were like the airborne brigade and others. You would have a team of advisors with a battalion.

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But no, we didn't have teams. Not with the civil guard and SDC. We were alone.

INTERVIEWER: That is fascinating. One of my questions here is, how do you compare what you did with what the SF in Afghanistan are doing?

GEN SULLIVAN: It was completely different. There was a legitimate structure in Saigon. There were these divisions. There were the advisory detachments so we lived in advisory detachments. But then it kind of broke down from there. So one guy, you were out there with a battalion of civil guard, SDC people. You are not with a team of Americans who are trying to leverage all of the U.S. fire support? U.S. fire support? Maybe U T28 would show up. Maybe. I guess that day of the combat action, we did have the T-28 (Trojan), if I remember correctly. Sometimes I remember having a T-28 or two would show up to give us some close air. No, it was completely different. In a sense it was less structured. It is different in Afghanistan because of a lack of structure. We had structure at least down to the division, the 21st ARVN. We had structure in the province. But then after that

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it became very unstructured. In this Special Forces thing, these guys are very well equipped to do what they do. They are there as a team and you are able to leverage a whole number of systems. That is completely different. They had surrogates with the Northern Alliance and others who were warriors. That is not to say that the South Vietnamese and Viet Cong were not warriors or the South Vietnamese in some cases. Yes, it is different.

INTERVIEWER: What kind of advisory function did you provide them? In this book I mention here on *One Very Hot Day*¹ they did help call in artillery.

GEN SULLIVAN: We called in mortar fire. We tried to help them with tactical formations, with reaction to fire, with marksmanship, basic schools of the soldier. But they don't want to listen. I was a first lieutenant. It was challenging. It was no center of mass. They had a little training center down south of Rach Gia. There was a guy down there whose name escapes me. He lived all alone at this training

¹ David Halberstam, *One Very Hot Day* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968) is a novel about the war in Vietnam.

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center. Like this is ten miles outside of town, on the edge of the U Minh Forest. When you think of it, it is really scary. These guys would go down there to do their initial entry training, basic rifle marksmanship, get some items of equipment. That was about it. So he did that. He was an American. It was pretty loose. We were learning. It was not overly impressive.

INTERVIEWER: Let me follow up here with that. When you left Vietnam, sir, you went to your Armor Advanced Course. When you went there, did you find that the Army was staying doctrinally correct with your experiences you had just experienced in Korea and Vietnam? Was what they were teaching at your career course relevant for preparing officers for combat or the service they would see after the course was over?

GEN SULLIVAN: Absolutely not. We, a handful of us, Andy O'Meara, Bill Carpenter, a guy named Bob Dessler, and I don't think it was ten, we were looked upon as interesting, as people who had been on an adventure, but hardly germane to what the Army was doing. What the Army was doing was being in Europe. It was Euro-

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centric. If you hadn't been in Europe, if you didn't know about Ulm and the Fulda Gap, and so forth and so on, you weren't in the club. I don't even recall once having a class at Fort Knox that had said anything about Vietnam. Now that is not to say that they weren't interested in the war stories and stuff like that. They were. But remember now, this was 1964. I graduated in 1965 from Knox so U.S. units didn't start going in until 1965. Then it was the 173rd out of Okinawa. Then the 1st Cav and the Big Red One. All those guys in my advanced course, by the way, ultimately went.

INTERVIEWER: The guys in your class?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. All these guys. I went to Washington and asked to go to Germany, which apparently surprised them because I had already been in Korea and Vietnam. I had almost three years overseas. But I really wanted to go to Germany because of course that is where all these guys had been. Those were the stories. So I graduated, got married, and went off to Germany. I don't think any of us knew that Vietnam was going to do what it did so

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I wasn't running around, none of my classmates were running around, all ginned up about how screwed up the Army was over Vietnam. We weren't crusaders. But they did ask us. All of us had seen combat of one form or another. Some of us had been wounded. There were a couple of aviators. I got some kind of a Joint Service Commendation Medal of something. I have a picture of it. The guy next to me was awarded either an Air Medal or a Distinguished Flying Cross. We were standing on the stage when we were given them. We would get asked questions but we didn't have any doctrinal stuff about Vietnam, or Korea. Christ, Korea was like going to the moon. None of those guys ever thought about serving in Korea. That was nowhere land.

INTERVIEWER: That is still the case, sir.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, it is still the case. It is a backwater. It shouldn't be, but it is. I got married on June 20th, 1965 in Quincy. My wife and I kind of grew up together. We went to junior high school together. We knew each other in junior high school. Her father was a dentist. He actually went to high

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school with my father. I always knew her. We went to high school together at Thayer Academy. We didn't date or anything. I had a girlfriend and she had a boyfriend. Then while I was in Vietnam my mother and I would correspond. My mother said that she bumped into her one day at a sandwich shop. She worked for her father, she is a dental hygienist. My mother worked in Quincy. So anyway, my mother said that she had bumped into her, blah, blah, blah. I sent her a letter back and said, "Is she married?" "No, she isn't." So I was coming home and needed a date so I wrote her a letter and said, "What do you say?" One thing led to another and we got married. So I went to Europe on a boat. She flew over. I went to Europe, went to this tank battalion up in Freiberg, the Third Battalion, 32nd Armor. I promptly went to the field. Went to Hohenfels and she came over. As it worked out, we had come back after 30 days at Hohenfels and Grafenwohr. We came back and lived on the economy in Germany. It was great. We didn't have any children in 1965 and life was great. We really enjoyed Europe. That whole assignment was very important to me. I felt very confident about my own skills because of Korea, Vietnam, and what I had learned at Fort Hood,

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which I know in a traditional sense, it obviously had lots of shortcomings, but I felt that I learned a lot of stuff about myself, about how to do things the right way. Certainly troop leading in Korea, surviving in the field, being a tank platoon leader, doing all those things. Operating independently, and certainly in Vietnam operating independently. Getting shot at, and getting hit, and you can survive all of that. So at any rate, Europe was very important to me. I served first as the S4 in this tank battalion and then as the A Company commander. I think one of the most important things to me about that assignment was my battalion Commander. My battalion commander, the second one, the guy who was there when I arrived was a real nit wit. He left very quickly. A fellow by the name of Sidney Hack, he was Richard Hack's father. Richard is now a major general down at AMC. Sid Hack was a World War II veteran. He was older. He later went on to command the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Tom Montgomery was in that battalion. Tom retired as a lieutenant general.

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INTERVIEWER: I know him very well sir, he was my boss in DAMO-SS (Strategy & Plans Directorate of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, DCSOPS).

GEN SULLIVAN: Is that right? Tom and I are close friends. He was the adjutant and I was the S4. Tom and my wife, Gay, and I are very close personal friends. Things were still idyllic in Germany. The battalion was full up. All the captains, majors -- we had two majors, or a senior captain as the 3 and a major as the XO and a battalion commander. And by the way, we made calls, put on your blues. Went to the commanders' house. That was normal. General Dutch Kerwin was the division CG. The brigade commanders were WWII vets. Things were "Europe before Vietnam." So in October of 1966 I left there and I went down to Heidelberg to become the combat arms assignment officer in the DCSPER operation, working for a guy named Julian Wilson. Lo and behold, what happened was the bottom fell out. I later learned the reason I went down there was I had two short tours. Everybody else was slated to go. So what I did, from October 1967 until I left, was essentially take virtually every combat arms captain and lieutenant out of Europe

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and send them to Vietnam. It would go every night and I would take a phone call. I took them at home sometimes or at the office. And they would be filling up battalions. They would say, "OK, we are activating this artillery battalion, here." They would give me so many captains, boom boom, boom, and I would write the names down. We sent them home. I went back to the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Armor. I left in October. I think I went back in the spring for something. The battalion was made up of Colonel Hack, the battalion's commander, and all lieutenants. Now Colonel Hack was very important to me. He really was a mentor. A very strong mentor to me. For some reason we hit it off. We had a very nice relationship. My wife told Richard Hack and his wife the other night at a reception we had on the 6th of January this year, that we host every year, she told him that she wanted to grow up to be just like his mother. They had such an impact on us. I had never heard my wife say that about anyone. This was an important relationship! He called me in one day and said, "Look, you have a choice to make. You can be a great officer if you want to be, but you have to decide whether you are going to be or not." He also told me I had to learn how to write. You have to

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choose. A foot locker counselor. You have to decide. If you want to stick with this thing and really be a distance runner, then here is what you have to do. And oh, by the way, you have to learn how to write. So he would have me write. I wrote some stuff, he would critique me. Anyway, he and I have stayed in touch over the years. That whole experience was very important to me. You probably know from looking at my records now that I then, because of this DCSPER business, I went to Leavenworth and my Leavenworth class was filled up with a bunch of guys who later became famous. I didn't know them then, Schwarzkopf, and others. I think "Shali" (John Shalikashvili) was in that class. I left my wife in Hawaii and then went back to Vietnam. Was supposed to go in the 9th Division. I got a call while we were in Hawaii that 9th Division had been inactivated so I went into the great pool of "go to the Long Binh to the replacement whatever." I didn't know anybody so nobody was beating down the door to get Gordon Sullivan into The Big Red One or the 101st or whatever. I wound up, because somebody saw that I was in the personnel business in U.S. Army Europe, I wound up back in the personnel business up in First Field Forces. Which I

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didn't particularly like and I told the guy I worked for at the time, a guy named Herbie, who subsequently passed away. He was a colonel. I told Herbie, "Listen, you guys are telling me I can't get out of here. A hundred years from now I am not going to be very happy about all of this." So I got the usual look, "You got to bloom where you are planted bullshit." But at any rate, I was in the personnel business there and then I came back to armor branch and I was in the personnel business there, where I participated in the downsizing of the Army. Tom Tate, retired as a major general, a good guy, a good friend of mine, he was actually assessing people and I was releasing them through a series of mechanisms called Department of the Army Active Duty Boards. This was the device that was used and it was essentially wholesale, big muscle movement release of people. Lots of them. That combination of assignments, not Vietnam so much, the combination of sending them to Vietnam, that was pretty big muscle movement stuff. Sending them to Vietnam and then releasing everybody from the Army influenced me greatly when it came to downsizing the Army. It influenced General Vuono too because he was in DCSPER after the war. I didn't know

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him then but he was in DCSPER. We were all very unhappy with how it happened after Vietnam. Now admittedly a lot of those guys wanted out but we lost a lot of good guys who didn't want to go and it was wholesale. Shopping carts full of records would come down. We would look at them. Some guys were apparent that they had screwed up and they were gone. But after we did this for a couple of years we started getting into the meat. And there were actually some Regular Army officers who should have gone, but didn't because we had a restriction on Regular Army officers. Now some of those guys went under another category. But when we did it this last time, we did look at Regular Army officers.

INTERVIEWER: I remember from my dad's experience that there is a Regular Army promotion that you had to also make.

GEN SULLIVAN: That was a way of getting them too. If they didn't make their Regular Army promotion. So there were a couple of ways of working it. But there were lots of unhappiness. It wasn't a good time. The Army was kind of really, this was 1970 to 1973, it

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was a wholesale release. Readiness and discipline suffered greatly. I saw the impact of all of that when I wound up in Germany commanding a tank battalion in 1975.

INTERVIEWER: You have answered most of my questions. One of the things you haven't talked about was your graduate school education. How did that fit in and how did that help you as a professional?

GEN SULLIVAN: I had learned how to create a supporting structure for hypotheses. I had learned how to think. It was very important for me to learn how to ask what is the theory that is supporting what you are doing and what is your hypothesis? Critical thinking. Presentation. And it exposed me to the other views of Vietnam. The University of New Hampshire was not a hot bed of liberalism. It wasn't Berkeley or whatever, but there were other views. What the hell do you guys in the Army blah, blah, blah. So I was exposed to a little bit of that but I think it was important because it rounded out my education. I, for one, think that officers who progress should have a master's degree. It takes 36

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years to get 36 years worth of experience. Do you know.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir, I do.

GEN SULLIVAN: All of these events make you what you are. Time in the field is important but time relating to other people, being out in civilian institutions, is important. I got a lot out of it. I did my master's thesis on Japanese Self-Defense Forces. I think I ascribed more devious thoughts to the Japanese than were probably warranted. I felt bad that they were doing things like building equipment, building their own tanks, building their own aircraft, doing some things which were much more expensive than needed to be. They could have bought them from us more cheaply. But they wanted to develop their own so that they would have a defense industry, which I think is probably true in a sense. But clearly, this is 30 odd years later and we don't see much evidence that they are going to take on much of their own defense. So at any rate, that is what I did my master's thesis on. I had to write it, and defend it and research it. I liked to study. I liked being a student and I enjoyed

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it. I got to meet other people and learn about the world. And learn how to present myself in an academic setting. So by that time, by 1975 I had three children, two boys and a girl. My wife and I were off to Germany again, which excited us because we liked Germany. And I went to this tank battalion in Boeblingen.

INTERVIEWER: The next session, sir, will cover your battalion command up through when you were Chief of Staff for 3rd Armor Division. Is there anything else that you want to capture that I didn't bring up in the questions I sent down to you for this period that we already discussed?

GEN SULLIVAN: No. I think if I were to characterize it I would say it was important to me in a development sense, in a maturation sense. I think it was a pretty normal experience for a guy of my generation. Graduate school, time in Washington. A lot of time in the field, although my time in the field was much different. I didn't spend those three years in Cold War Germany like my counterparts did, the class of 1959. They went over and spent three or four years and

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they came back to the career course. Mine was a little different. I think I actually benefited from it. I always felt that way. One of my buddies, when I commanded the 4th Battalion, 73rd Armor that was in Boeblingen, it was one of two tank battalions in the 1st Infantry Division Forward, one in Boeblingen and one in Augsburg. This guy called me up. He was in the 3rd Infantry Division and he said, "What the hell are you doing down in Boeblingen? You ought to get up here in a real division in a real tank battalion." So I said, whatever. This is where they sent me and I want to do the best job I can. That was my approach to it. OK, this is where they sent me. It is the Army. You go do what you are told to do. Well, that is what I did.

[End Tape S-439, Side 2]

[Begin Tape S-440, Side 1]

GEN SULLIVAN: Bob Serio was a platoon leader in the 32nd Armor with me in Germany. We were good friends. He and his girlfriend -- he had a girlfriend from Switzerland or Austria -- and my wife, we used to go places together. He had a Corvette; we had a Porsche! We had a wonderful time. He was a great officer. He was a troop commander in the 3/4 Cav and was killed in

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Vietnam. He was a good guy and a good friend of mine. As a matter of fact, both of these guys from West Point were really good guys. Chuck Titus was killed in the 1st Cavalry Division, I think the 8th Cav. He was extracted. He started off as an artillery officer then became an infantryman. He was wounded and extracted in the harness that was pulling it up through the canopy. Apparently his head came out of the harness and it snapped his neck and he died. Anyway, he was a good guy and they were good friends of mine. I think in retrospect, this period for me was what people did in the Army. There was lots of uncertainty and then this whole business that we are going to talk about the next time, the rebuilding of the Army. I think we all knew what we wanted. I think we were all very anxious to get on with it. In 1972 or 1973 West Point was in flames. They had fired the superintendent, the Calley affair (My Lai incident), all of that business. Race. There was lots of uncertainty but lots of us stuck with it.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, I don't know if you covered this last time, but when did you get your Regular Army commission? Was there any mentorship that drove you

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to that? Or was that something that you did on your own?

GEN SULLIVAN: I wanted to do it myself. I didn't like the fact, I really knew by the time I came on active duty that the Army was for me. As I said yesterday, there are some letters around that I wrote to my mother. I told her that I didn't want to be second team, I didn't want to be part-time help. I wanted to be a Regular Army officer because I liked it. I just liked it. I don't even know how I did it. I guess you got a form and I filled out the form. It was a competitive kind of thing. But I don't know what the competition was now. I went before a board and they asked me some questions. I remember one question was something about the Republic. It was sort of a political science kind of question. I think it was at Fort Knox that I did that. But it may have been during the Commo Course. It may not have been, because when I became a Regular Army officer I think I had to go up and get sworn in as a Regular Army officer in the CG's office of the 2nd Armored Division. His name was Forran. I went up there and was sworn in. It was an old wooden building at Fort Hood. And

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I became a Regular Army officer. But no, I didn't receive any mentoring or anything. There were very few people in this battalion that I was in that I really talked about. The battalion commander was a nice man. His name was John Nickell. He was a 1st Infantry Division veteran. John Howland was the XO. A guy named Max Stulcup was the adjutant. A Korean War veteran who was highly decorated. He was a nice guy. But I don't remember getting a lot of mentoring from them. I wanted to do it myself. I wanted to be a Regular Army soldier. It bothered me that I wasn't in the 1st Armor Division in CCA. We talked about this yesterday. I learned vicariously from some of my buddies who were about ARCEPS???. One of them was an artillery man. A guy named Jack Batilla. He got out of the Army and went to work for Canon Camera. Jack was a good guy. Paul Schwartz, still a very dear friend of mine. He works for General Dynamics now. John Mason lives out near Fairfax. Michael Connell. Michael retired as a major general, I think. Mike now lives in Florida. He was the Delta Company commander of his battalion. Looking back on it, up until when I finished commanding my battalion, I was pretty much out there. I was learning how to be an officer and

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doing lots of things and raising my family and just soaking it up. I loved the Army. I still do. I just look at all of that very fondly. You didn't get lots of introspection from officers. It was kind of like, ok, this is the way it is. This is what you do and you just do it. That is not to say that there weren't some who were writing articles and energized about one thing or another, some of which the same things were energized about. OERs and that kind of stuff. I will say though by the time I finished Leavenworth, there was a lot of unhappiness with the war. There was unhappiness with the preparation for the war. Even at Leavenworth, I think we had to take an elective to talk about it. Some of these guys had really seen some stuff. It was very disappointing. That was very disappointing. Leavenworth had a center of mass that was not like Fort Knox. When I went to Fort Knox there was a handful of guys. Now by 1968 you had big numbers who had gone to Tet. They had gone through Tet, Ia Drang, all of the big stuff. To go to Leavenworth and not have the Army caught up, that was very influential on me as the Chief. The institution has a hard time catching up with what it is doing. It concerns me that for what might be political reasons

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we have not embraced and extolled the experience our officers are gaining in such faraway places as Kosovo, Bosnia, Korea, the Gulf, whatever. These are important developmental experiences. It will influence these young people, men and women, years ahead. All of these troop leading experiences and all of these experiences are important developmentally. To just say to ourselves, "Well, this is not really important and I can hardly wait to get out of here so that I can get back to real soldiering," that is bull shit. It is all real soldiering. That is what the Army is. I have never liked it because of my own developmental experiences when people say, "This is not important and we should not be doing it." We do what we do. We do what we are told to do and we do the best job we can. I note with interest that the U.S. Army is now back in the Southern Philippines and it is 2002 and we are fighting the same guys, or the same movement that we were fighting in 1902! It is ironic. So what goes around, comes around. I think when you get through the first phase of the next interview, that is the battalion command, which is where I would say, "Ok, that is a period, 1959 to 1977, is the education and development phase. That is

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not to say that there is not more education, there is. But I don't know what you would call it but it is an important period in my life.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, you have just been fascinating. Dave do you have anything?

OTHER INTERVIEWER: I do want to ask you, yesterday I asked you about the quality of soldiers and you said in those early days, they were just your soldiers. That is what you had. A perception is, at least for us looking back at it, that quality started to diminish during the Vietnam War.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, it did. The NCOs that influenced me, Sergeant First Class Allen in my platoon and 3rd Battalion, 40th Armor, First Sergeant Bond, First Sergeant Dillon in the 1st Battalion, 66th. Sergeant Kirk, my tank commander when I was a platoon leader. These guys - a guy named Muldinaldo that I met on our way to Vietnam - a lot of the NCOs were killed or they were wounded in Vietnam. Or they got out and they weren't replaced. By the time that I went to my battalion in 1975, the experience level was low. A

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guy by the name of Command Sergeant Major Parks, he just retired. He runs AUSA (Association of the US Army) in Europe now. Parks was an E5. He is 11 Charlie. He was in Combat Support Company of the 4th of the 73rd when I commanded it. He was a terrific soldier. He is now retired. That guy stood out. He stood out then, he stands out now. But he was a beacon. That guy was a beacon in 1975. He was an African-American soldier. He understood standards, he wanted to be a professional noncommissioned officer. But surrounding him, we had real problems. Oh yes, it had deteriorated in 1975. We were in bad shape. In this battalion that I went to, was made up of the discards. Because it was a created tank battalion out of the discards, I don't know what the organization was the Army had in Europe, but they created this battalion out of companies that had been eliminated by other battalions. Do you have any idea what they sent? Yes, the very best. Care enough to send the very best and that is what we wound up with. We were in bad shape. Sergeant Major Parks, I should remember his name. He lives in Las Vegas and he runs an AUSA chapter out there. By the time I commanded the brigade

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in 1981 things had started to get better. Things were picking up.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir. Almost within six months of platoon leader, I agree when I first got there it was unbelievable, but by the time I left my platoon

GEN SULLIVAN: Where were you?

INTERVIEWER: Korea, sir. I was in the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, Camp Hovey.

GEN SULLIVAN: You would see it in Korea in a hurry because of their rotation. Yes, it happened in a hurry once it started happening. An NCOES came in, MQS testing, things started to move. Women came in the Army in the 70s. I know when I was Chief of Staff of the 1st Division Forward they were coming in. We really had socialization problems. First of all the Army was having trouble with behavior in 1976, still 1975/1976, 1977, then you added women to that mixture, some of the behavior truly was bizarre. We spent hours, toilet facilities, showers, we spent hours on things that are now just routine. We had to learn.

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It was great. My family liked living in Europe. We developed lots of friends, people who are still our friends today. Life was ok. General Kerwin is still alive, I see him a lot. He was my CG of the 3rd Armored Division. I recall being out on Range 42, which is Table 8 in the big tank gunnery course. The mortar platoon was having trouble registering the rounds. So anyway, he crawled up on my tank. I didn't know it was him. He said, "What is going on?" I said, "Well, they are having trouble getting the rounds in, and they won't let me go down range until they get the rounds in. So you get down off the tank." He got in the jeep. He went back and laid the rounds. He put the rounds in, laid the mortars, got everything sorted out, came back and said, "OK, try that." So he fought with the 3rd Infantry Division in WWII. He is a wonderful man. He later became Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Just a wonderful guy. He was a great division commander. General Jimmy Polk was the CG at Fifth Corps. All of these little experiences fire away in your head. He wasn't necessarily a mentor to me, but it was apparent to me that the division commander knew how to be an officer and knew how to do things.

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INTERVIEWER: Right. He could have reacted completely differently.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. I can't think of anything else. I have all my notes, by the way, and when we are done with this, I will make them a part of the record too.

INTERVIEWER: Very good sir.

[End Tape S-440, Side 1]

Interview 3 - General Gordon Sullivan

[Begin Tape S-444, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: This is tape one, side one, of interview number three of an unclassified senior officer oral history program interview with General Gordon Sullivan, which is being conducted on 5 April 2002 at Alexandria, Virginia. The interviewer is Colonel David Ellis.

GEN SULLIVAN: When I look at my career, when I look back at it, I think things started to get in a groove about the time I finished my battalion command, 1976.

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I moved into that position as Chief of Staff of the 1st Infantry Division Forward, when really I was a lieutenant colonel. It was a lieutenant colonel's position. I was working for a brigadier general. That started to expose me to the complexities of staffs and so forth. From 1976 until the end, I was doing almost related activities so certainly from 1976 until 1983 it was all related. It was all in the same venue, which is the combat divisions and combat corps. It was all the same subject. Probably the best time for me. The most enjoyable. The most productive was as a brigade commander. I loved it. And I think those who served in that brigade enjoyed it. They got a lot out of it. I bump into a lot of them all the time. I hardly ever go anywhere anymore where I don't bump into somebody who was there. The present DCSOPS of the Army was in that brigade. For instance, he was an officer in that brigade. A captain. That was a nice period of my life and I learned a lot. I think your questions are stimulating and I will be anxious to pursue them.

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INTERVIEWER: Sir, the pre-command training that you attended before battalion and brigade commands, did it meet your expectations and needs?

GEN SULLIVAN: The pre-command training before I took my battalion is very dim, in my mind. I don't know what it was frankly. I went to Fort Knox. This was 1974 now; or maybe I went in 1975. I was a graduate student at the University of New Hampshire and I went down to Fort Knox. As I recall it was technical. It was actually refresher training on the equipment, on the tank: M-60A3, the M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier, a little bit of maintenance stuff. The usual stuff that I had been exposed to all my life. Just kind of bringing myself back up to speed on that. Some doctrinal discussions. Field Manual 100-5 [Operations], General DePuy was coming out with the new 100-5. TRADOC was in turmoil. It didn't get sorted out until later when General Starry came in. But there was all of this intellectual foment. So we were exposed to all of that during the precommand course. I remember there were lots of discussions. Since I hadn't been in command since really since my company, to tell you the truth, there were a lot of

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gaps in my own knowledge of the doctrine. But the Army had gaps too because its focus was then towards Vietnam. The real energy in the pre-command course though was on the legal aspects of command because at that time the drug culture had taken over and we had a lot of discussion on searches and seizures and that kind of thing. As I remember, most of it was at Knox.

INTERVIEWER: Was there a Leavenworth phase?

GEN SULLIVAN: I don't think so. I don't remember that there was. There may have been, but I don't remember. It was very early in the development of all of that and I just don't think so. Now the brigade pre-command course was different. Things had started to sort themselves out by then and we pretty much knew where we were going. That was 1981. You had a number of years of people really working on the pre-command course. It was much more specific. Although there was some technical stuff. There was a lot of work with the initial vestiges of computer based kind of stuff, simulations. But we were exposed to doctrine and there was more certainty in TRADOC that we had the doctrine right. But I was coming to the pre-command

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course, having been a G3 in a division, having been the G3 in a Corps, having been in divisions and corps working the war plans, making the doctrine come to life in the war plans. It was like this was a refresher, bringing me up to speed. I looked at that pre-command course as just a "tooth-check" to make sure I knew what the institution was saying. It certainly met my expectations. Though I was deeply into the game. I was almost -- I wasn't on the inside, I was on the outside, but because I had had those two G3 jobs, G3 of the Big Red One, and G3 of VII Corps, I knew what TRADOC was thinking. We were responding to their stimuli in those positions. How did we feel about the new doctrinal treatments? And tactics, techniques and procedures and so forth. So the pre-command course was OK. I don't recall that it was the biggest thing in my life that I ever did. It is certainly not as specific as it is now as it has evolved. It has been under constant evolution and development.

INTERVIEWER: And you mentioned in your book about how important it is to the Army.

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GEN SULLIVAN: Pre-command course?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir. You talked about your book, *Hope is not a Method*.²

GEN SULLIVAN: Absolutely. It is where the Army leadership gets to talk to the commanders, the people who will be touching the Army for the next two years. The senior leaders in the Army get to talk to them about what they are doing about the future and how these young commanders will relate to the evolution of the Army. Also it is an opportunity for senior people to exchange their views about leadership, about the development of young people, young soldiers and any number of things. It is kind of like being a village elder and exchanging information and telling stories. I think that is where the Army gets its strength, from listening to guys like the DCSPER of the Army, the DCSOPS of the Army, the senior people, including the Sergeant Major of the Army. General Vuono and I just spent two days together at Fort Leavenworth. He was inducted into the Leavenworth Hall of Fame which is

² Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, *Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army* (NY: Times Business, 1996).

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just recognition of his massive contributions to the Army and to Fort Leavenworth. But at any rate, he and I and General "Butch" Saint and Ron Griffith were out there for a couple of days and the subject of pre-command course came up. He said that he, like me, went to every pre-command course. He went when he was the Chief, I went when I was the Chief, to every pre-command course at Fort Leavenworth. I think General Reimer did and I think General Shinseki is. That is a pretty good indication that this is critical. I don't recall that the Chief of Staff of the Army came to any of mine. Back in 1981 or 1975. I know he didn't in 1975. I don't believe he did in 1981. But yes, it is critical. If you are a battalion commander or a brigade commander, you have to know what the Chief of Staff of the Army looks like, what he really looks like. I don't mean what he looks like on a picture on a flat photograph on a bulletin board, I think you have to know what he looks like, how does he think, what is he thinking about? What is he wrestling with? How does he handle speaking to groups? All of those contacts you have with him form it. How does he respond to questions? How does he answer them? Then when the young officer goes to his or her unit they

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are then capable of responding in a positive way and in an informed way to questions. They can shape their programs. Yes, it met my expectations at the time. I don't think looking back at it, that my expectations were any different than any other officer in the Army. We expected to be exposed to the technical aspects of our job to be updated on new equipment, whatever that equipment might be. Then the doctrine. We in 1974 and 1975 didn't have any wild expectations about simulations because the simulation explosion had not yet happened. Later when I took over as the Assistant Commandant of Fort Knox, and then the Deputy Commandant at Leavenworth, I had more input into the pre-command world and worked on the simulation side of things to make it more practical and to expose the commanders to the dimensions of battle command as best we could and to start getting into their heads the complexity of the execution of the doctrine and the complexity of the tasks. Training, what was the training doctrine? What was the relationship for the mission essential task list to the scientific method of training? But all of this TRADOC stuff was pouring out in this enormous stream, products were coming out. And we had to synthesize that and give it to these new

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battalion commanders so that they could in fact, execute the Army's doctrine.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, the phrase *Hope is Not a Method*, is the title of your recent book and appears in some of your correspondence from the 1980s. Where did it come from?

GEN SULLIVAN: I don't know when I started it, 1975 or 1976, but I started using it in there somewhere. I don't know where it came from. I either saw it in a magazine, in an ad or something. It just came from somewhere and I started using it. It seemed to fit me. I still believe it. If you don't prepare yourself for what you are going to do, and you can see around here all these little notes, and you know it because you have gone through my papers, you have to think about what you are going to do. And then you have to train to do it. A lot of what went on in the brigade, a lot I just believe it is true. Now the older I get, the more I am aware of the fact that I should tell people that hope is not a method that relates to a leadership environment. It relates to very specific things in your life like making good

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things happen and keeping bad things from happening. You have to do something about the accomplishment of tasks. But I understand that hope plays a big role in our psyche and just our soul. Without getting too cute about it, the Bible does tell us that hope is the auger of our soul. Hope is important to humans. I understand that. It is not only the work side of life or whatever, you have the spiritual side too. I understand that. I try to make sure people understand that I know that. But you know there is a paper up there at Carlisle.

INTERVIEWER: I couldn't find it yet. The MHI folks are looking for it.

GEN SULLIVAN: I thought it was there. Anyway, the title of that is *Hope is not a Method*. It actually is in the management book that was put together. It is a compilation of readings. It was probably 1978, when I graduated from the War College. Try in those books. It is an anthology of papers. 1978 or 1979 somewhere in there. That was about building up POMCUS [Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured to Unit Sets] and preparing ourselves if we had to fight the

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Russians. We couldn't just hope that it was going to happen, that we were going to get all this equipment from the United States over there.

INTERVIEWER: It was 1978.

GEN SULLIVAN: So that was where it came from. I have used it ever since and it works. It worked for me.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, when you were in the 1st ID forward, it was one of the two forward divisions the United States Army Europe during the Cold War. Can you talk about how it was organized and structured and what challenges it had for you? And if it was different from having a full division here?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well, I am not sure of all the evolution of it. The 24th was there. There was something about the 24th Division being over there. The 24th disappeared. The 1st came back from Vietnam and there was a brigade. The initial structure of the 1st Infantry Division forward was an ADC with a staff. Then a brigadier general. So you had a brigadier general with a staff, then a colonel with a brigade

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staff, and a small support battalion. That was the initial structure. When I got there, it had evolved to a brigadier general with a staff, for special staff. The colonel was a colonel with a very small installation staff. He was known as the brigade commander but he really wasn't. He didn't have any staff to do that. Then there were four battalions. Actually there were five. Fourth Battalion, 73rd Armor; Fourth Battalion 73rd Armor, the one I commanded was in Boeblingen. There was a tank battalion in Oxborg. There was an artillery battalion in Neu Ulm. The 16th Infantry was in Boeblingen so in Boeblingen you had the 4th Battalion 73rd Armor, the battalion I commanded; Charlie Troop with the Quarter Horse, L-4 Cav was attached to me. I was responsible for it. The 16th Infantry was there in Goepingen, which was where the general was. We had the Blue Spaders, the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry and the support structure for the division. Down at Neu Ulm the 233rd Field Artillery, 2nd Battalion, 33rd FA was there. And then the 63rd Armor was down in Augsburg. So I commanded the battalion in 1975 and 1976. At that time it was an 18 month command in the Army. That was how long I stayed.

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INTERVIEWER: That was standard battalion command tour length, sir?

GEN SULLIVAN: That was standard. Then I went to Goepingen to be the Chief of Staff of this thing called the 1st Division Forward. I don't think the rest of the guys in Europe thought much of that. In fact I know it. One of my buddies called down to me and said, "What the hell are you doing down there? Why don't you come up and get yourself in a real division?" At that time it was the 3rd Armored, the 8th Infantry, the 3rd Infantry, and the 1st Armored. We were back. We were in our reserve position, way down, actually southwest of Stuttgart. So we were pretty much out of the main stream. We had this rather ambiguous mission. It is hard for me to keep track because it later evolved into something else. But we were in a reserve posture, the division came over from Fort Riley. Then we were part of a division. General Fuller was the division commander at Fort Riley when that happened at REFORGERS. Then the ADC became the ADC-S. My boss, the division forward commander, became the ADC-M of the division. That is essentially

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what happened. We just fell in under the division. It was idyllic. Nobody bothered us much. We trained like everybody else in Europe. We had our war plan. We did our partnership work. We did all of the things that everybody else in Europe did. We had some nice relationships with the Canadians, with the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. I had life long friends that I made there. Guys that I am still friendly with that I see now in retirement, who are working for Canadian companies or for U.S. companies. We had a relationship with both the Germans and the French. The French were down in Tübingen. They had a regiment there. I still see some of those people in Paris or elsewhere. Then we had a partnership relationship with German/Italians. And we had a relationship with II Corps. So anyway, it was great. It was at the height of the Cold War. We had lots to do. We didn't have a lot of resources. Things were not fully sorted out on the discipline side. The soldiers presented lots of challenges. Discipline, drug use, my battalion did not have any dramatic events like murders or big drug busts, although we were always finding pot. That was common in those days. We didn't have urinalysis. It was before urinalysis. It

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was not easy to track people down all the time. Discipline, we would just have challenges all of the time. I had a very good sergeant major in the battalion. He was a good role model. He was an African-American, which was important because race relations weren't up to what we wanted them to be. We knew what we wanted to do. We spent a lot of time working on it. I spent a lot of time on physical training, running, athletics, because I felt that we had to build a winning environment. We had to create the atmosphere that people felt as if they could win and succeed. Training was like it had always been. The training revolution had not occurred yet. Training was pretty much as General Depuy describes it in his book, *To Change an Army*. In those days, the Army, especially the armor community, was convinced that if you could hit the target on Table 8, if tank gunners and tank crews could succeed and could qualify individual tanks, then everything else would fall into place. We were just beginning to see the vestiges of movement into platoon runs, into live fires, into platoon combat exercises so that you got the team into it. The team larger than the tank itself, the tank crew itself. But that was a promise on the horizon.

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It was not there yet. At Graf (Grafoenwehr) it wasn't set up. The ranges weren't set up to accommodate it. I think we all knew that we had to move to that level, but it just was slow in coming.

INTERVIEWER: Well, doctrinally I think the armor community was looking back at the Arab/Israeli War of 1967, maybe. Armor having armored victory. Not a combined arms operation like that which occurred in the Yom Kippur War. Is that possible?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well, there was a lot of talk about that if you read the early doctrine, you can see the Arab/Israeli wars they played a big role in all of that. Although as you know, as we learn more about it, we found that the tank without the infantry or the artillery was exposed. So all of that was happening. But there was ferment, there was stuff just pouring out of TRADOC. It was very exciting. It was a very exciting time to be in the Army. I am not sure we always saw it as exciting in the battalions because it just kept pouring on us. New doctrine and new 100-5, the first version of 100-5. Drafts, new drafts all of the time. "How to Fight" manuals. You name it. So

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we tried to accommodate all of that. The emphasis was on discipline. Our own little program. PT, improvements. There wasn't much money though. This battalion that I commanded was created in 1973 from the Delta companies. The Army reorganized them. They took the Delta companies out of a bunch of other battalions and created this battalion. Well you could imagine the kinds of people that we had. I was the second commander of it. A guy named Oscar Meyer was the first and then me. We lived in barracks that were not great. I don't know who had occupied them before we got there, but things were not good. So we did the best we could.

[End Tape S-444, side 1]

[Begin Tape S-444, Side 2]

INTERVIEWER: Sir, you made some life long friends during your tour in the 1st Infantry Division forward.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. You asked about General Vuono. General Vuono didn't come into my life until after I graduated from Carlisle. George Joulwan, who later became the SACEUR was the commander of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, while I had the 4th of the

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73rd. We did a lot of things together, those two battalions, while I was a battalion commander. Then when I went down to Boeblingen, I was his next door neighbor. George and I later went to Carlisle together. He commanded the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division when I was the Corps G3. So we saw each other then a lot. Then for the rest of our careers as we progressed, we were together or not together, but we talked all the time because we were generals together. He was the SACEUR when I was the Chief of Staff of the Army. Before that, he was in Panama and I was the DCSOPS or the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army or whatever I was. Our families know each other and we vacation together and so forth. It was a close relationship with George. Charlie Bauman was the S-3 of the 60th Infantry at Boeblingen. He is a Norwich graduate. I didn't know him when he was at Norwich, he is younger than I am. He retired as a brigadier general. He and his wife Joan are very good friends of my wife and I. He retired and lives in Atlanta. He spent a lot of time overseas. He became a special operations guy. He retired at Graf where he commanded the Center for Army Training. He and I became very close. He is a good guy and a very good

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friend of mine. General Jack Faith was my boss at the division forward. He lives up in Carlisle. He retired as a major general. He commanded the 1st Armor Division. I was very close to him and I still correspond with him and talk with him periodically. So you meet a lot of people along the way and you learn from them. Some of it is vicarious learning. You learn by watching them. One of the things I liked about my relationship with George Joulwan was that he and I would talk. It is probably like a lot of people. On weekends you just exchange views about what you are doing about this and you feed off each other. You learn. And you watch how they do things. In turn, I presumed they watched how I did things and one thing leads to another. That is an important part of being an officer in an Army where the competition is not so much with each other as against the standard and what you are trying to do is be a team player and a member of a team. That relationship was very important. Of course there was a whole group of guys in Europe that I knew that I was really a part of, a larger team, which for some reason or another, kept going back. General Glynn C. Mallory. Glynn was in the other forward brigade. There was another brigade

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up in Mainz. You had the 1st Infantry Division Forward. You had the one up in Garlstadt in the 2nd AD Forward. Bill Streeter later commanded it. General Gene Anderson was up there who later became my boss in the 3rd Armored Division. He was the CG of the 3rd Armored Division when I commanded my brigade. Dick Barrenhouse was Chief of Staff of the 3rd Infantry Division. General Jack Galvin was up in the 3rd Infantry Division. Bob Wagner was Chief of Staff of the 8th Infantry Division. Tom Tate was over there. Freddy Franks, Dave Maddox, I could go on and on. Tom Foley. All of these guys were a part of my life. Most of them were European guys. They spent a lot of time in Europe. At that time you had people who were spending time at Fort Bragg but the bulk of the guys were all in Europe. That was where I was.

INTERVIEWER: In those days more than 40 percent of the Army was in Europe.

GEN SULLIVAN: That is right. I kept going back and going back. I didn't meet General Vuono until I became the G3 of the Big Red One. Probably one of the best times of my life, and this is really when things

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started to spin up, and I loved this period of the Army. I went to Carlisle. I just enjoyed the heck out of that. Obviously, I had my family there. We were all together at Carlisle in one of those funny little houses. The five of us, my oldest boy who is now Chief petty officer in the Navy, caught his first fish in the Letort Creek. Elizabeth, my daughter, was very young. She was born in 1972 so she was about six or seven. They all learned how to play soccer there. Mark my other boy, played sports. Ward LaHardy, who retired as a brigadier general, was the soccer coach. Our classmates were the soccer coaches and the football coaches. We did things together. We had fun as a class as young adults. It was great fun. Happy hours, block parties, just get togethers. Sports and the studying. I really like to study. I like to research. I enjoyed that aspect of my life. I was exposed to the wider Army and to other services for the first time. I had known John Shalikashvili. Before I had known him over the years because, like me, he had spent time in Europe, so I knew who he was. Gary Luck was my next door neighbor. He and I were in Vietnam together although we didn't know it, way back in 1963. George Joulwan, it was like George and I

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went from Germany to Carlisle and that is the way it went. Binnie Peay, I had known him. He was a VMI graduate. We had bumped into each other a couple of times. A lot of these guys I had heard their names. You knew who the guys were from various methods, maybe through the grapevine, etc. Dave Maddox, I knew from Europe. Dave was one of the bright guys in the Army. He always was. Cal Waller and I were together. He was an armor officer. I don't know where we had been together but we knew each other. Lee Salomon was not at Carlisle; he was down here, but he came to Carlisle. Paul Schwartz and I had been together at Fort Hood in 1960. He was a classmate. Bill Streeter, he and I were classmates at Norwich. Tex Turner lived across the street from me. Tex Turner was an infantry officer, a West Point guy. He and I had gone to Fort Knox together, the career course. We later went to Leavenworth together and Carlisle. Andy O'Mara was there. He was the son of General Andy O'Mara, was up at Carlisle. I had a lot of friends, a lot of people I knew. I met a lot of other people, guys who I am still friendly with. It was there, I actually thought I was going to leave there to come to the DCSPER of the Army as an action officer. I had

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received a couple of calls about going to Fort Benning to do something called the Army Training Board. This had attracted me. Things were up in the air as it is there right now. You get these phone calls from guys. But the Army was going to send me to the DCSPER and then one day I received a call from a guy named Herb Kernigsbauer. Herb had commanded a squadron in the 2nd Cavalry and he was in Armor Branch. He asked me if I would like to compete to be the G3 of the Big Red One. I said yes right away. General Cal Benedict, who now runs Norwood, which is the retirement home that the Army had, this was not for profit, but just for widows. He was the CG. He came to Carlisle and he interviewed me. One thing led to another. I didn't know General Vuono, although I knew of him. I had heard about him a lot from Bill Streeter who had worked with him in Seventh Army, which was down in Stuttgart. About all I knew was that I wanted to go be a G3 of a division. I knew that much. I wanted to go to the Big Red One because I loved the Big Red One. So one thing led to another and I became the G3 of the division. It was terrific. It was probably one of the best things that ever happened to me. People have asked me about serendipity. "Geesh, you went there

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and General Vuono was there." Yeah, that is right. I didn't know him. I know him now. He and I are very close. I think what I would say about that, luck, serendipity plays a big part in anybody's life. But you have to be able to produce. If you can't produce, the door may be open, but you have to produce. I was challenged. It was fast. It was a fast track. The CG was Major General Phil Kaplan. A nice guy. He lives up in Palm Springs. Carl Vuono was a dynamo. He was an energy source. He was very aware of where the Army was going with training. He was one of the drivers even as a brigadier general, with the people at TRADOC. He was deeply into what they were doing. We were into quarterly training briefs in the division. He was instituting all of that into the division. So I was exposed to that and I was kind of his action guy on that. General John Mitchell retired as the commandant in Berlin. He lives out in Colorado Springs. He was the Chief of staff. He, the Chief, worked with the CG on things and I essentially worked with General Vuono. I was the inside guy. He would go out in the morning and he and I would meet in the afternoon and we would make things happen for him. We had a REFORGER. We all went on that. It was a big

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deal. We learned a lot. It wasn't completely successful. There are lots of reasons for it. We all learn. As a result of that, I put together a thing called MANHATTAN. It was a training exercise designed to bring everybody together, sitting around the table. It was a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) as essential elements. From that evolved lots of other things. This was in the summer and fall of 1979. I had been there about a year and a half. I ended up in December over in Germany. I became the VII Corps G3. This guy, Major General Jack Faith, who is up at Carlisle, became involved with that. He had retired and he was a contractor. They started putting some exercises together that really were based on what we were doing at Fort Riley where you would sit around. You would bring everybody involved together and you would be assigned a role and then you would solve problems. So it was the beginning of some of these more sophisticated exercises. Like the crisis action thing you guys did. So at any rate, Operation MANHATTAN was the exercise. That was about the last thing I did in the 1st Division as the G3. I got this call, General Becton wanted me to be the G3 of VII Corps, which was fine with me.

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INTERVIEWER: You had worked for him twice by that time?

GEN SULLIVAN: Once. I worked for him in armor branch in 1973. We moved from the old temporary buildings over at Fort McNair, down to where everybody is now on Eisenhower Avenue. That happened in 1973. He was the VII Corps commander during the winter exercise. He was the VII Corps commander when I was the G3 of the division so I saw him. I didn't really work directly for him.

INTERVIEWER: I thought you worked for him when you did the officer downsizing exercise when you were a captain in Europe?

GEN SULLIVAN: No. I was in armor branch when I worked for him. Anyway, he saw me there. I think I had seen him, I stayed in touch with him, but I hadn't worked for him. So he asked me to be the G3 of VII Corps. What was unique about that, then I don't think it was apparent to me, it really is apparent to me now though, I was not a lieutenant colonel promotable. I

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had not commanded a brigade. The profile to be a corps G3 was post brigade command. Hell, I wasn't even on the list. So I went and became the Corps G3 as a straight lieutenant colonel without a brigade command. I wasn't even on the brigade command list. Likewise, that was a very important developmental job. In that job I was exposed to all sorts of things. Bob Wagner was the 2nd Regimental Cavalry, he was the commander. He was one of the real innovators. He had been Paul Gorman's Chief of staff in the 8th Division. Wagner was a very imaginative guy. A very charismatic guy. And a very good trainer and warfighter. And he had a strong personality. Within the Army unit he was flamboyant. He was a good guy, lots of fun. But guys like that cause ripples. I was exposed to him. George Joulwan was the brigade commander. George is very innovative, a very good trainer. A strong personality. You have lots of good people in Europe by this time. Things had really sorted themselves out. Guys were very experienced. Battalion commanders, the brigade commanders they have all grown up in Europe. All of them had Vietnam. That was not a separation. Everybody had Vietnam, which was no news there. But they were now disciples of this new

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training system and they saw all kinds of stuff out there. One of the things we created in VII Corps was an exercise called COLD REASON. The code word was COLD REASON. It was designed to expose the corps leaders to the "what ifs" of the world so that the corps commander could talk and conceptualize while they were in a crisis, what if the enemy came down through the Coburg Gap? What if they shifted over and came into the 12th Panzer Division sector? What if they did this? What would you do? It was one of those things. Then people would make a decision and give the decision to the computer guys. Guys such as Ben Anderson, Dallas Long, and A.J. Foyt. They would take the decisions, put them into computers and run the computers and get an answer. And OK, if you had made that decision, here was the outcome. That exercise, by the way, evolved into lots of very sophisticated things that the Army was using today. From MANHATTAN, Fort Riley to that, I was beginning to become deeply involved in the collective training of large formations. We had a real push in VII Corps on war plans and the specifics of training to those plans. We did a lot of work. I did a lot of traveling around, talking to people, briefing them

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about what the corps commander's war plan was. How we were going to pull it together, what we were going to do. Very specifically do. Sort of in the "hope is not a method" thing. Just because you write it in a war plan, doesn't mean that you can do it. Especially if you don't train to do it. If you train to fight your war plan you are going to find that there are some things that you probably can't do. If you can't do it in peacetime, you sure as hell are not going to do it in wartime. Those were very exciting times. My children were getting older. One of them was in the Boy Scouts. John was the oldest, he was in the Boy Scouts. He started to travel with the Boy Scouts. Did you serve in Europe?

INTERVIEWER: Three times, sir.

GEN SULLIVAN: Well, then you know. As the kids get older they go on these trips. They go on school trips. They were beginning to do that and they were exposed to lots of interesting things. I will be in conversations with each of them now and things will come up that they did. As a matter of fact, there is a picture of Gay and I and Mark and Elizabeth when I

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got promoted to Colonel. It was just the four of us. John was away on a trip when I got promoted so he missed it. When I looked at it, I would think he was off doing his things with the Boy Scouts or school or whatever. General Becton was the corps commander. It was fun. Roger Thompson, who works for me now, was in the corps then. General Jimmy Ross, who later became the AMC commander, was the DISCOM commander. George Patton, Jr. was the assistant corps commander for a while. Lieutenant General Lenny Wishard retired as the CAC [Combined Arms Center] commander out at Leavenworth. He commanded the 1st Division. He was the Chief of staff of the corps. He later told me that when I was nominated -- when General Becton told him that he wanted Sullivan as the Corps G3 he couldn't believe it. He had never heard of me, and he didn't have a clue, who the hell I was! So he started calling around and talked to Carl Vuono, because they were classmates. But I was going to be the Corps G3, because General Becton wanted me to be the Corps G3. In my career, those two jobs, division G3 of the Big Red One, and Corps G3, that were essentially within five years -- if you put Carlisle in there -- that five years was so important to me. I learned so much

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about moving large organizations. About the role of the leader in large organizations. And the role of the leader, playing the part that they were given. That is, making their way. Everybody doing what they are supposed to do in each of the functional areas and then trying to bring it all together. The reason I bring that up is, without going into personalities because some of us get a little sensitive, you cannot have in the senior leadership group, someone, a key person not playing their part. If they don't play their part, if they are asking another actor or subordinate actor to fill in for them, it doesn't work. Everybody has to play their role. The leadership situation in the Big Red One when I was the G3 gave a number of people in the command group an opportunity to take initiative, sometimes to an inappropriate degree. But the system doesn't react to that well. So everybody has to do what they are supposed to do. The division commander can't be a brigade commander; he can't be the ADC; he can't be the G3, he has to be the division commander. He is the guy who sets the tone. Or the Chief of Staff of the Army or whatever. The commander has certain functions to play. You have to play them. These were

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very important positions. Now before I leave General Becton let me say one thing. There are five people in my life who have been very critical to me. My mother, my wife -- my wife is enormously important to me. Truly one of the most important people in my life for any number of reasons. Sydney Hack. . .

[End Tape S-444, Side 2]

[Begin Tape S-445, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: Sir you mentioned there were five people who were really important to you.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, my mother, who instilled in me values, love, respect for others, and a recognition that no matter how tough things are, you've got to stay the course and be true to yourself and your children. There is much more I can say, but let's just leave it at that. My wife, who has been my wife since 1965. I couldn't say enough. I couldn't even think of all the things that she is to me and has been. She has been critical to my development as a person and to everything that I have accomplished. Three people that I met in the Army and each of them in their own way could be looked at as a surrogate.

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There is something about them that maybe filled the void of not having a father in my life. I had a father, obviously, but he wasn't much involved. Colonel Sydney Hack, my commander in the 4th Battalion, 73rd Armor. General Carl Vuono, my friend, mentor, buddy, confidant, and of course, General Julius Becton. General Becton still is big in my life, as is Carl Vuono. These guys had faith in me. They were willing to put up with whatever shortcomings I had. They would help me over the rough spots and they let me be myself and grow. We have a great relationship. But I would say all of this about the three of them. That is Hack, Vuono and Becton, as good of friends as they are, I always knew with them that I had to produce. They weren't going to tolerate substandard performance, goofy behavior or screwball ideas. They expected production and they expected results. I remember one day at Fort Riley, General Vuono had come in from the field and he was changing out of his field boots into some shined boots, he was going to something down town, that he was doing with the Boy Scouts or whatever. I was banging on about something, some idea I had about solving some problem and he said to me, "Oh, ok, Sully. What do you want

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me to do? What decision do you want me to make to help you move this along?" That was an important lesson. It is easy to come up with the ideas. That is not the hard part. You have lots of ideas guys around. Being able to go from theory to practice. Being able to take all these good ideas and make something out of them, that is the hard part. And actually do it and cause other people to do it, that gets to be enormously difficult. So I only used that example because these guys wouldn't have put up with me for a minute if I couldn't produce. It wasn't that they were, "OK, Sully is my buddy. He can't perform." I would have just been gone and I knew it. So those are the five. They have a special place in my life.

INTERVIEWER: What about brigade command, sir?

GEN SULLIVAN: Oh yes, the brigade command.

INTERVIEWER: You commanded the biggest brigade in the Army at that time, correct?

GEN SULLIVAN: The biggest brigade in the Army. Everybody knew it. Everybody knew it was a good

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outfit; it was clearly the brigade to have. Now there were Armored Cavalry Regiments. The regiments in the armor community were big deals too. The 2nd and the 11th were there in Germany. The 3rd was back at Fort Bliss. So being a regimental commander was a big deal. Obviously commanding any brigade was a big deal. Commanding the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Armored Division was really huge. I was really excited about that. It was a big brigade, it had five maneuver battalions and a field artillery battalion, plus all the support for the stuff. One of three brigades in the 3rd Armored Division, I had commanded a company in Friedberg so I was very familiar with the 3rd Armored Division, sort of familiar with the ground. We lived in Butgbach. The brigade itself was outside of Kirtchgoens, a place called Ayers Kaserne, "The Rock." Jammed in there in post-World War II barracks. It was not a garden spot to be sure, although it wasn't bad. Motor pools were paved for the most part. I think I had one that was wasn't. Not much training area, south of Giessen. The local training area was tiny. But we didn't wring our hands about that. I had very good battalion commanders. My brigade staff, Ron Davis was my XO when I arrived. I replaced a guy

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named Dick Crouchou, whom I had replaced in Vietnam in 1963. He had been wounded severely and I came in and took his place. I took his place again. Ron Davis was the XO of the brigade. A guy named Bert Maggart was the three. Bob Rogers was the four. Pat Cavanaugh was the Signal Officer. Hally Bachman, had the Pickles- 3-33 Armor. He is now running an orphanage up in Pennsylvania. Bill Cheserak had 2-33 Armor. He is a big force development guy in Europe, USAREUR. He is now coming back to work for Dave McKiernan, who was in that battalion. Dave McKiernan, now the G3 of the Army. Norm Corson, at 3-36 Infantry, he is a retired colonel living down in the Tidewater. Don Saury at 2-32 Armor, he is a retired colonel living here in Northern Virginia. Jay Johnson at 2-36 Infantry, Jay retired as a brigadier general. I don't know where he lives. He was in the DC school system. So at any rate, we were a very close knit group, wives, officers. We had enormous confidence. We spent a lot of time out on the field. GDP [the General Defense Plan area], we walked and we lived it; we talked it. We truly wanted to demonstrate that we knew how to fight and that we were ready to fight. I think that when I got there I really had a head of

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steam up. I essentially had lived in Europe since 1975. I had been in command positions or G3. I knew how good guys did things and I felt like, hey, I can do this. General Walt Ulmer was the CG of the division. General Ulmer was a very strong commander. He had lots of ideas about how to command people. He did surveys. He was a big people guy. I was there for about a month and I said to myself, "There are two ways to handling this, one is just sort of lay back and let him tell me how everything is going to be, or the other way is, tell him OK, this is how we are going to run things up here. This is how I am going to make your programs come to life. Which is what I did. And it worked. He just let me go. Periodically he might say something to me about something he would like me to do. But we had a great relationship. He is a good man. Things worked out. I come towards the end of that time in the brigade that things were really working, and as things wound down, Major General Gene Anderson was the CG. Ulmer left and he selected me to be Chief of staff of the division. I got selected for promotion in August of 1983. I left there in 1983 and went to Fort Knox. I was doing a lot of work with General Vuono. He was the CG of the

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8th Division. Colonel Burt Maggart and I would go over to see him. We were collaborating on some training stuff. He was reading my training notes, one of which you have. This is the first one. I also had some things called "Be A Shooter." You have a lot of stuff in there that shows what we were trying to do. Train to standard and so forth. A lot of that stuff found its way into 25-100. Some of it goes back to Bob Wagner. Some of it came out of Wagner and it came out of Paul Gorman in the 8th Infantry Division. A lot of this stuff was swirling around in the Army that General Vuono was able to package up as DCSOPS. Now General Vuono, in the 8th Division, -- and Gary Luck, Denny Reimer, we had a lot of guys in this group who later went on to very senior positions in the Army. We were collaborating and exchanging views, seeing each other and talking about it. I went over to see General Vuono a couple of times when I was at 3rd AD. But the 3rd Armored had this great competition with the 8th Division on REFORGERS and so on.

INTERVIEWER: I was at his change of command when you left command.

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GEN SULLIVAN: Is that right?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir.

GEN SULLIVAN: So at any rate, I think by the time I finished up my brigade command, I really felt like I had something to offer the Army. I didn't know what was going to happen next.

INTERVIEWER: What were the differences between when you had the battalion in USAREUR and the brigade in USAREUR? I think one of them might be soldier quality.

GEN SULLIVAN: Oh, soldier quality wasn't the same at all.

INTERVIEWER: We took a leap in the early eighties.

GEN SULLIVAN: Soldier quality and soldier discipline was much higher. You were beginning to see the first indications of the all volunteer Army and Recruiting Command, General Thurman's, all of that stuff started to come out. SQT [Skill Qualification Testing], MOSQ

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[Military Occupational Skills Qualification]. Now we still had education. We still had some of those education programs that were big for you where you had guys who couldn't read or write, we had them go on to school, BSEP [Basic Skills Education Program]. I spent a lot of time on the education center. I am a big guy for management by walking around. I was out all the time into the education center. People saw me a lot. That is the way I commanded. The other difference between brigade and battalion was I had a staff. In the brigade you have an experienced staff. Maggart, Rogers, I had a very good staff. They were very cohesive. They were thinking all the time. They were doing stuff. They were competent and they were confident, and they were experienced. They were able to back me up. That wasn't like the battalion. In a battalion you have a staff but it is not as robust. Nor is it as experienced. Captains, and in some cases lieutenants. We didn't have CAS3 then. So it was inexperienced. But not so in the brigade. All Leavenworth graduates. All experienced combat guys. All people that had commanded companies, stuff like that. They were branch qualified. Plus they were experienced. Maggart, for instance, and then in the

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"Boathouse Gang," down at Fort Monroe, and he had been at Leavenworth working through the initial phases of all of the new doctrines.

INTERVIEWER: For the future, sir, what is the "Boathouse Gang?"

GEN SULLIVAN: The "Boathouse Gang" was a group that worked for General DePuy and General Starry. They actually had an office in a boat house down there at Fort Monroe. They were the thinkers. They were the guys that were pulling all of this stuff, task condition standards, competency base training. They were the guys who were there when I got there. They were very powerful. Mike Harper, the guy who I wrote the book with, who was my initiatives group guy, was the S3 of the 3rd Brigade of the 3rd Armored Division. I had known Mike before that, somehow, but anyway he was down there. Jerry Rutherford took the 3rd Brigade. He later retired as the V Corps commander. I just had lunch with Jerry. Bob Rosencrantz was the DIVARTY commander. Gene Anderson was the CG of the division with Walt Ulmer. Tony French. Bob Diorio had the 2nd Brigade. Tony French and Bob Rosencrantz commanded

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DIVARTY. Chuck Berry had the DISCOM. Jim Ball passed away tragically of cancer. He was DISCOM commander too. We had a very good division. 3rd Armored was a good division. I had no way of knowing this, but I did feel at the time that the 1st Brigade was the best brigade in the division. You would expect me to say that. I don't know whether it was or it wasn't. I think it was. I thought we were on top of our game. We trained our people. We took care of them. There is a little logo that you might run across in some of those files up there. It is a little sticky logo. It has people in it. It has the German flag, the American flag. They are on a shield. There are three people. Two people, a man and a woman, and some children, helmet up in the corner. The people are in gold and the expression was people are golden. So we tried to balance training to fight, the family stuff. John Altenburg, who retired as the number two JAG in the Army was one of my guys. He was my legal counsel. Sam ???, he retired as a colonel chaplain. He was a wonderful guy, a wonderful chaplain. A real character. The troops loved him. Those were great days. Really when I left of November of 1983 to go to Fort Knox, that was the closing of a chapter of my

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life that began in 1975 in Boeblingen. I feel a great sense of accomplishment in that whole period. Growth accomplishment and personal accomplishment. Personal developments through it. I know I was a hell of a lot better when I finished it because of all the experience of it. That was truly eight years of living with battalions, brigades, corps, just immersed in my profession.

INTERVIEWER: And there was something about the Warsaw Pact that gave that a special energy.

GEN SULLIVAN: Oh, sure, it was a focus. One of the things that I did was I had a map that I carried in my pocket. It was a GDP map. I would ask people to unfold the map, and I would ask them, "Where is your position?" "Platoon leader or platoon sergeant, show me where your platoon goes." Well, the first time I did it, you can imagine what happened. I got all kinds of answers. I can tell you, the word spread that I was serious about training to fight and fighting. So that rippled around and there were all sorts of gimmicks. They were gimmicks, but they worked because they got people focused on what it was

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we were supposed to do. Training to fight, if you can't do it in peacetime, you probably can't do it in wartime. We had to have everybody believe in themselves, their ability to be a member of this team, and the team. We couldn't rely on killer tanks. Although every company usually has a killer tank, one that clearly exceeds everyone else's production rate, but you can't rely on that. You have to try to make everybody a killer tank. So that was important. Now to your last one. Burt Maggart, Bob Rogers - I am going to the ball game with Bob Rogers tonight; he retired as a colonel. He was the Chief of staff for 3rd Armored Division later. Anyway, Bob Rogers now works for Bose-Allen and Burt Maggart is down at North Carolina at RTI. Burt went on to command the 1st Brigade of the Big Red One in the Gulf War. He retired as a major general out of Fort Knox. Those guys are important in my life. I learned a lot from each of them. I think they learned some stuff from me. It was a good relationship. They are good guys. Bob Lindsay was my sergeant major. A hell of a good man. A real soldier; an old style soldier. There were lots of friends. I don't know mentors so much. Walt Ulmer was. I learned a lot from General Ulmer.

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Not as much as from the other guys. I think there are some things about me that are different from General Ulmer, about how he does things. But there are similarities.

INTERVIEWER: We will probably talk more about him again when we talk about general officer training. Anything else sir?

GEN SULLIVAN: No.

[End Tape S-445, Side 1]

[Tape S-446, Side 2, blank]

FOURTH INTERVIEW, 15 APRIL 2002

[Begin Tape S-452, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: This is tape 1, side 1 of interview number four of an unclassified Senior Officer Oral History Program interview with General Gordon Russell Sullivan which is being conducted on 15 April 2002 at Arlington, Virginia. The interviewer is Colonel Dave Ellis. Sir how were you notified of your selection to Brigadier General?

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GEN SULLIVAN: It was a Sunday morning and the division commanding general and his wife, I was the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Armored Division. General Landis and General Gene Anderson was the CG. He and his wife came over to our quarters they had some champagne with them and they notified us and we had a great celebration. It was announced then on Monday from U.S. Army Europe following the Army's lead. That night we had a celebration in our quarters there in Frankfurt. A lot of the people from the brigade came down from the brigade that I commanded, the 1st Brigade and the division headquarters and it was a great celebration. Memorable, memorable for us, for Gay and myself and our family it was a big deal. Needless to say our immediate family was very pleased. I'm not sure that they understood the full dimensions of it, that is our family, because of course they were in the United States. None of them had been military people. Gay's father had, but they were very pleased because we were pleased and they understood enough about it to know it was important. So at any rate that was in August, I think when it was announced and then in November I knew I was going to Fort Knox and I can't remember when I was told that, but I knew I was going

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to Knox and then there was a lot of toing and froing about whether I'd get frocked or not. At that time we were still frocking people. I was going to a brigadier general's job but it was unclear as to how it would all happen. On a Friday there was a lot of scurrying around. My wife had gone shopping some place with Mrs. Anderson and there was a lot of scurrying around to find them for some reason I didn't know why. Then I was told that I'd get promoted or frocked that day in a ceremony there in the kaserne in Frankfurt. I wore General Tom Griffin's belt, general officer belt which I didn't have. They found some stars, I think somebody ran over to the PX and bought some stars and I was promoted there in a ceremony with the 3rd Armored Division and all my friends and so forth - people I had worked with in Germany there. It was special and a big deal for me obviously and it was special. I guess the thing that sticks in my mind is the family nature of it all and the fact that it happened in Germany which was a country very special to both Gay and I and our family. Really, my children grew up in Germany when you think about it. First child born in Germany and the other two all of them raised there. So anyway after I got promoted we left.

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General Tom Raine, colonel at that time, Colonel Tom Raine who later became the CG of the Big Red One and is now working here in AUSA replaced me as the Chief of staff of the division. Tom came up from the 3rd Infantry Division and he replaced me as the Chief and I went on to Fort Knox.

INTERVIEWER: What special training did you receive as a brigadier general select or as a new GO?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well first of all it was there was the generals "charm course," what they called the "charm course." It was much different than it is now. It was a few days, maybe three days I can't remember how long. Number of speakers came, some spouses came, not all. I don't remember anything remarkable about it frankly it's pretty straight forward. The one that I do remember is the CAPSTONE course. The CAPSTONE course was new; all officers from other services; it was joint. This was the first vestiges of jointness. I believe it was in the spring of 1984 that I went to it. It started over at Fort McNair at the National Defense University. Admiral Harry Train, General Bill Knowlton, Admiral Ike Kidd, I can't remember who the

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Marine was for some reason; I don't think we had a Marine. The Air Force general's name escapes me at the moment, but at any rate we had senior mentors and that was an important course - went to the Pacific. Because I hadn't spent much time in the Pacific so I had a gay week. The group I was with went to the Pacific and got a perspective on the Pacific, Korea, Hawaii, mainly Japan. It was very good and I made some good friends there and I got good perspective on the other services and what they did. So that was pretty much what I had as a BG select and then I was able to use some of that when I moved to Central Army Group which was joint and combined; more combined than joint probably. It was important. But I truly do not remember anything noteworthy about the Brigadier General Officer's "Charm Course" which may in a sense of influenced me to do more with it than was done with us.

INTERVIEWER: What parts of that training, the early GO training did you change later as the DCSOPS or the Vice or the Chief?

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GEN SULLIVAN: Well we started getting more specific. We started to expose the brigadier generals to more specific stuff. Involving them more and their spouses and what we were doing getting feedback from them. Certainly the force integration piece, that while I was the OPS I think began west of here in a farm out towards the Shenandoah Valley. I forget what the name of the place was. It moved to the Xerox Center and then it ultimately evolved down to this thing that General Dick Trefrey runs down at Fort Belvoir. The brigadier generals also where exposed to this, not all of them while I was the Chief. But a good number of them went down at General Ulmer's; he was active in it at the time, the Center for Creative Leadership. So we had a number of them go down there. I forgot that I went to Harvard for two weeks to a senior executive course there and that was a good course. Unfortunately they are still sending me contribution notices, but, Harvard has a way of roping you in once they get a hold of you. The brigadier generals while I was the Chief had the CAPSTONE, "Charm Course," also sat in the back of the room and were involved in the pre-command courses. If they hadn't been in the divisions, they hadn't been in the field for a while

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we sent them to Leavenworth so that they could participate in the pre-command course and that involved them in the evolving, in the growth in the evolutionary growth of simulations and the war gaming there and ultimately the digital battlefield or the beginning of the digital battlefield. So let's see Center for Creative Leadership, Brigadier General Course, CAPSTONE, Force Integration and the Pre-Command Course and it was not unusual to see brigadier generals in the back of the room. And we sent aviators, any general officer who was an aviator had to go back to Rucker to get himself tuned up on the aircraft and a lot of them asked to go back to the Armor School and the Infantry School and the Artillery School to spin themselves up on the latest thinking regarding doctrine and equipment, the latest innovations and equipment and we were pretty forthcoming on that. By the time I was a BG though I had been in divisions/corps pretty much since 1975. I got promoted in 1983 so I was pretty comfortable with the equipment.

INTERVIEWER: Ready to move to Fort Knox? The 19 months you spent as Assistant Commandant of the Armor

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School at Knox--what were some of your biggest challenges and successes?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well one of the biggest challenges was the integration of the Abrams into the force. General Rick Brown, retired Lieutenant General, at the time he was a major general, was the Commandant. I was the Deputy Commandant I guess Deputy Assistant, whatever we called it at the time. We had in the armor community a well-defined and long history of devoting a lot of energy to our gunnery program. It's a well-defined program. It was based on standards related to the technology, the equipment, and the soldier. When the Abrams came in we were at a watershed between a relatively, unsophisticated system, the M60 series and some very sophisticated systems which would in fact take us to new levels of performance. Well, the real challenge was to stretch the Army so we published new gunnery standards. Unfortunately, some of the Army was still in the M60 series tanks, some of it was in the Abrams and there was lots of gagging on the step-up in performance that the Armor School set forth. So like any transition there were lots of opponents and there were some proponents. This put a burden on me

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because I was the guy in the school house. I learned a lot during the relatively emotional, I say emotional. I don't know whether it was emotional, but it was not easy to convince everybody that this was the way to go. So I had to spend a lot of time traveling around trying to convince everybody that the new standards could be met and that we were trying to screw things up. Now as they became more and more comfortable with the equipment, with the Abrams and got rid of the M60 series then it was _____ bar the door. They saw that the equipment could do it and they could do it. We modified too, I don't want it to sound as if we really knew what every answer was when we started. About six or seven months of transition and it was sort of into the force. As I say I learned a lot about change in large organizations and the role of the senior guys getting out and talking to people and you have to convince people and you have to be willing to change yourself and change some of your preconceived notions about what you had originally put out based on human factors and so forth. Looking back on it I think it went relatively smoothly, so that was one of them--the change in equipment, major change in equipment. The other was that the Army in those days

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in spite of what some people think we didn't have a hell of a lot of money and school houses never seem to have much money. We couldn't run the tanks and the vehicles as much as we wanted to and Fort Knox didn't have a lot of land anyway, so we were trying to come up with some innovative approaches to platoon leader training. We had things called tankers night rides-- various devices that the armor community and cavalry community had used over the years. We exposed lieutenants to map reading, field craft, and we started experimenting with all-terrain vehicles. Get away from using the tanks, we didn't have the money to run the tanks and buy the spare parts. So we were coming up with innovative approaches to learning. Faculty development was and still is a challenge. Getting people in who have not taught in the school house and you have to develop them. We went to small unit instruction where we had one instructor or at the most, two instructors with small groups and we started evolving to that. The Army likes that I believe they still like it. That was a lift from CAS3 back into the school house. The relationship of the Armor School with Fort Benning was very strong in those days. General Ed Burba retired as a general, four

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star, retired as the CG of Forces Command was the Assistant Commandant down at Benning, I was the AC at Fort Knox, General Jim Livsey was the CG at Benning, Rick Brown at Knox. We did a lot of work together on doctrine and the evolution of doctrine to include training doctrine as well as tactical doctrine, 100-5. Ed and I have a good relationship. We had a good relationship then. He is a good man and a good friend of mine. Probably the biggest thing that, at least I think the biggest thing that I worked on while I was there, is the armor force of the future, and I started getting into the micro processor, horizontal integration, and the relationship of maneuver training with gunnery. I was convinced by the time I got to Fort Knox that while gunnery was important there were things that were just as important. That is the integration of maneuver with fires and the need to train our people. To train and educate them to be doing both and to enable them to synchronize fires and maneuver we had to do more with the command and control instruments. So you can find in my papers the beginning of the comments about the micro processor and all of it's manifestation whether it be SINNET. SINNET came on in those days. I was exposed to SINNET

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which was netted lap tops essentially at the time and from that developed this big SINNET facility down there at Fort Knox. So you see bringing together the simulators to train large organizations. Okay, so anyway that was all going on. In the armor conference of 1984 or 1985, I talked about all of that. We began to talk about it in the open and there may be some papers around on that from the period. But I was really starting to get into the simulations and command and control stuff by the time I left Knox. I had a good time at Knox. General Brown was a task master probably one of the more innovative guys in the Army, still is. Real innovator into training, taught me a lot. I was exposed to combat developments there and the challenge of the school house. I liked the school house, I liked TRADOC. General Phil Richardson was the TRADOC commander at the time. General Carl Vuono was a CAC at Leavenworth and I had lots of interface in the TRADOC community and learned a lot about the importance of TRADOC. I don't know what successes I had there you'd have to ask others that. I think that, I felt that one of the biggest ones was, probably the only one was related to this armor conference of 1985 where I tried to articulate the

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relationship of simulators and simulation of the armor force and how through the use of smart tanks. We didn't have smart munitions, but smart tanks, very bright tanks, very bright soldiers, doctrine and simulators and simulations we would elevate the level of performance of the armor force so that in conjunction with our combined arms comrades we could dominate the Soviet Union. I thought it would do it, would provide us the edge on the battlefield. He who accommodates change quickest wins and that was a big part of what was in my brain and I thought the micro processor only quality soldiers would do it.

INTERVIEWER: There is a note that says the micro processor would enable us to get inside the Soviet decisions cycle.

GEN SULLIVAN: That is where it all started.

INTERVIEWER: Something on the birth of digitization?

GEN SULLIVAN: Perhaps. It really wasn't in the Army as you know but my interest in it. Yes, my interest in it. I really saw it at Knox. See this first

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quote? This is an interesting quote. What is taught and how it is taught. What I was getting at here is there is lots of. The important thing is for me to be able to sit down with you and explain to you. Okay, look here is really what we are trying to do here. If you understand all that we were telling you in the class room that is one thing, but you have to go from all of that theory to practical application on the battlefield. My view was we were agonizing over all of these laundry lists and we failed to understand that we had to put it into someone's head so that they could use it when the chips were down and that's not easy. That's not easy to go from being one of the guys standing on a platform to enabling them to do something on battlefields around the world. So anyway that is what I was getting at there. And you can see here people, TDA cuts, repeating demands for quality people. It's the same problem today as it was then. Given the declining manpower pool and given the escalating demands for manpower I'm afraid it's not solvable unless the Chief were to cut force structure and be able to keep it. The challenge the Army has always had is that if it cuts force structure all of that manpower is liable to be cut, taken right off the

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table because there is no one in the analytical community in the Pentagon who sees value in the institution - in the institution of the Army. You can see it at Carlisle. You can see it at TRADOC. And I'm probably a part of it when it comes to quality people. You will find highly competitive colonels they are out in other positions. It takes a very dedicated person to go into TRADOC or to the War College because a colonel is about where you are going to be which is fine. There are some people that don't want to do it. Where did you find this, this is an original?

INTERVIEWER: Sir, in one of your boxes of files. Of course there is very limited access on those documents.

GEN SULLIVAN: These?

INTERVIEWER: Yes sir.

GEN SULLIVAN: How come?

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INTERVIEWER: Well MHI has control over who goes in there. Then there are your items in the vault that are pretty much closed off. People just can't wonder into these stacks to pull these out.

GEN SULLIVAN: So I feel pretty good about my time at Knox. I enjoyed it.

INTERVIEWER: You participated in a mentoring study and I believe lead an officer leader development study?

GEN SULLIVAN: I didn't do the leader development study until I went to Leavenworth. I didn't do it there. I did some work on my own on mentoring. There is probably some letters around from guys.

INTERVIEWER: There was a project going about general officer mentors at the time.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. I don't recall that it was an Army program. I recall that I was trying to get myself up to speed to contribute something. I don't know who I was doing it for other than for myself. I

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was influenced greatly as I told you by five people. The five most influential people in my life; my mother, my wife, Colonel Sideny Hack who was my battalion commander in the 3rd of the 32nd, General Carl Vuono and Lieutenant General Julius Becton. Each of them in their own way was a mentor. Now my relationship with each of them is profoundly different obviously, given the nature of who they all are but it was life long, it has been life long. Unfortunately my mother passed away almost four years ago now, but it was life long in her case and it was legitimate. My first exposure to mentoring in a more formal way was in the 3rd Armored Division. General Ulmer had a program called foot locker counseling. It was a part of sergeant's time. General Ulmer expected to see sergeant's actually sitting on foot lockers.

[End Tape S-452, Side 1]

[Begin Tape S-452, Side 2]

GEN SULLIVAN: So it was very formal and he expected to see it. Well as the case in almost every incident when you are trying to institute a program like that there were lots of people who didn't get it. It was very formal and the people were very busy and there

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was a general feeling that some of the NCOs that were trying to do this mentoring didn't have a clue as to what they were supposed to be doing. Remember now this is the early 1980s and we were still sorting things out although the Army was getting better it was not where it is today. NCOES (non-commissioned officer education system), the whole development of the non-commissioned officer corps, was at that point problematic. It was the beginning of what later became a very robust system. So the program had fits and starts. Now having said all of that I was clearly an advocate of mentoring because I was the result of good mentoring even at that point. So whatever is in the files I think is a reflection of me writing to some people, Burt Maggart and others to see how they felt about it. There is some letters around, I think I wrote out and asked guys where were they on the subject of mentoring. There is lots of pretty good stuff in there. So some of what I was gathering was for my own education. I think a better word for mentoring, which sounds like foot locker counseling and all, might be improvement. Improving your unit, improving the people who make up your unit. Some of them you mentor almost from a distance. Some of them

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you are very close to for any number of reasons, but all of them you are trying to impart to them knowledge and advice that you think might, number one, improve them in their performance of duty and improve your unit. And that is really what it's all about. I don't recall that I participated. I may have, but I don't recall it. The mentoring study or whatever my personal study was later fueled a lot of this stuff I was doing at Knox, it later came back when I did the Leader Development Study for General Vuono.

INTERVIEWER: Well after Knox you went back to Germany to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff for Support in Central Army Group, Europe or CENTAG. What were your duties in that position?

GEN SULLIVAN: I was the deputy Chief of staff for support. There were two brigadier generals working in the Central Army Group. We had a major general his name was Odendahl, he was a German. The DCAS OPS was a Canadian. A guy named Kent Foster who later became the Chief of their Army as a lieutenant general. And myself, I was the DCAS of support. As such the personal logistics sustainment at least at an Army

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group level which was pretty much policy. I was surprised that I wound up in CENTAG. I knew I needed a joint assignment. CENTAG had always been some distant thing while I was in Europe. It was not very visible to me down in the divisions and even the corps which is surprising but that is the case. I went to Heidelberg which is where it was. It was in Mannheim for years and by the time I got there it was in Campbell Barracks with 2 ATAF [Allied Tactical Air Force]. So you had Central Army Group and 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force right side by side along with ACE (Allied Command, Europe) Mobile Force and Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe. Everything was there in Campbell Barracks. Now I guess they thought I was going to be quiet. When I got there I felt that we weren't moving into the evolving world of simulations and the ability to war game at a higher level. Most of the exercises that we went on were scripted and they were all CPXs (Command Post Exercises) without a heck of a lot of value in my view. Procedural value and there was a lot of work that had been done on decision making cycles which were 48-96 hour procedural cycles related to the employment of nuclear weapons. Central Army Group had a big nuke weapons

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role in the employment of nuclear weapon. So there were a lot of procedural things that had to take place. I felt we could use the Warrior Prep Center and put in to place some of the things that had worked down in VII Corps when I was the G3 down there - COLD REASON. A lot of that stuff had evolved and we did have an exercise while I was in Central Army Group that brought the whole Army group into the world as it was evolving with simulators and simulation. There was not the universal acclaim, by the way, because the Germans never warmed up to simulations. They felt you could not simulate battle or simulate the conditions surrounding battle so they were pretty much opposed to it although they went along. My assessment at the end of that time is that in some small way I contributed it wasn't only me General Glenn Otis was the CINCUSAREUR at the time. He was for it. He being for it moved the ball along too. Other than that I don't remember much about that other than one thing. I did begin to do a lot of work with Miter and Rand on command and control. There were a lot of people running around doing studies on command and control some of which was related to the control of nuclear weapons. Remember now this is 1985-1986 pretty much

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the height of the war, the Cold War, Pershing II. How do you command and control all of that? How do you command and control large formations? The development of doctrinal concepts. Now one day I was in General Otis's office and we were talking about command and control and simulation. He said to me, he asked me a question and the question was this, "What do you think my biggest problem is as COMCENTAG?" I believe my answer was communications, equipment or communications ability, the ability to communicate. He said, "No." His biggest challenge was to create a common perception of the battlefield and his concept. That to me was very profound and it was like a missing piece in a lot of what I had been fooling around with. As I step back and think of it and you will see after that starting to creep in to some of my work. A common perception between the Germans, the French, the Americans, Canadians of the commander's intent and of the battlefield as it is being portrayed, that is a real challenge. And the only way you are going to get to that is with very good command and control systems and very good reconnaissance systems. The quest to get to that point was what fueled a lot of what came out of that for me. So you know life is a journey and

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you start piecing all of this stuff together. I can look back and see what little pieces of information and experiences you know personal study. I am a humanist, however and whatever it is that I was trying to do over the years it all related for the soldier. How do we put this into the heads of the people who are going to have to do it? I became at this time also deeply involved with staff rides. As I showed you the other day this book, *The Seeds of Disaster*. I should say this now on the tape. I know there are people who say how you have to detach yourself and yes, you do. You have to rest and you have to reflect and all of that. But looking back on my Army career I think I can say now that from 1975 to 1995 when I retired that whole 20 year period I was deeply involved in the development of myself, the development of ideas, most of which were related to the improvement of the units I was in and in some way the improvement of myself and figuring out how I could contribute to the growth of the United States Army. You can see--it there is a thread throughout all of this and it was in my brain all the time. It's just I lived it for 20 years, for the last 20 years and there is a consistency of thought, I think in all of that.

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Now you know there are sometimes when I launched off on some screw ball idea, but there was a consistency to it.

INTERVIEWER: Well one of the things from our first discussion I think will come back out when we talk about your Chief years. When you are trying to stay that course and you have all these other outside influences. When they are pulling and pushing you in so many directions.

GEN SULLIVAN: Defeat the enemy the way you find them - you got to fight the fight you are given, okay? Team work planning is five percent of the battle, plan your fight, fight your plan. Listen, what I was looking for when I became the Chief, what I was looking for in the summer of 1991, is a way to coalesce my thoughts so that I could lead the Army through some tough times. I found it in Louisiana Maneuvers in the book by Chris Gable on Marshall and Louisiana Maneuvers because it brought me back to all of this stuff *To Lose a Battle, The Seeds of Disaster*. Because I didn't want that to happen. I didn't want to have happen to the American Army what has happened

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in the past no more Task Force Smiths, and I felt that if I could explain that to the people in the Army we would have something to coalesce around. So I viewed it, I viewed my challenge then in these kind of terms; battle, conflict. I didn't create an enemy, I mean I couldn't create an enemy because there was no enemy. The enemy was ourselves. Central Army Group was good because I had time to think I had time to spend with my family. I enjoyed Europe, we had a great time. My son enjoyed Heidelberg High School, our oldest boy, John enlisted in the Navy in Heidelberg. I guess the recruiter was in Heidelberg. Any rate he is now a Chief Petty Officer in the Navy and he is in Bahrain. We just got a letter from his commanding officer yesterday. He was decorated for his service in the Gulf a couple days ago. So anyway we are very proud of him and what he has done. We left there and went off to somewhere, Leavenworth I guess.

INTERVIEWER: You are assigned as the Deputy Commandant of the Command and General Staff College. It was your second assignment as a general officer in TRADOC what did you think about that?

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GEN SULLIVAN: I loved it. I thought we were going to the desert. I thought we were going to Fort Irwin where I would take over the National Training Center from General Ed Leland. That didn't happen and we went to Leavenworth and I loved it. I love TRADOC. I really enjoy TRADOC. I enjoyed my time at Fort Knox. I told General Vuono while I was there as the deputy commandant he would come all the time and I saw him a lot and one day in the parking lot as he was getting in his van to go back to the airport down at Sherman Field I told him he could leave me there at Leavenworth forever. That I just enjoyed what I was doing. I enjoyed the college, the students the whole atmosphere. Anyway, I was very pleased to go there. That is where I did the leader development study for General Vuono. That was, I think, an important study for the Army. It was a compilation of lots of work that had gone on since the 1970s. What we tried to do was synthesize all that and give him, the Chief of Staff of the Army an action plan, things he could do to legitimize a lot of the work that had been done by others on various other general officer study groups on the subject of officer education. So we did that, that took about a year, that took a lot of my time,

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but I got a pretty good look at the Army and was able to put some of my own thoughts down. Some of which would come as no surprise to anybody who had seen some of the previous stuff that had gone on. It's 1987, focusing and my view on war fighting, the relationship of doctrine to what was taught in the school house, what was done in the units and warfighting. Preparing the Army officer corps to fight wars which is our principal mission. Now I know and rightfully so that that shifted a little bit over time. It's now 2002, not 1986, we are not in this bipolar relationship with the Russians. And the fact that the Soviet Union was going to collapse in 1989 was not apparent in 1986 and 1987, I can tell you that. It may have been apparent to someone, but nobody was telling me and nobody was talking much about it if it was apparent. So at any rate train to fight, develop officers, noncommissioned officers warrants and soldiers to do their wartime mission. I'm a big supporter of TRADOC and always have been. I replaced General Freddie Franks as the deputy commandant. Before him we had guys like Dave Palmer, "Butch" Saint, Bob RisCassi. Binnie Peay came immediately after me, Mike Steele, Dave Ohle, lots of good men have been involved at Leavenworth. You got

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good men there now. The Armor School and the Infantry School have always had very solid people, John Lemoine who is now the DCSPER in the Army, John Foust, Jim Lindsay - very good people. Division Command, the school house, the Army staff, you started to get a perspective on jobs that make a difference. The major challenge while I was at Fort Leavenworth is to find the time to be at Fort Leavenworth and I think that has been the challenge forever for the deputy commandant. There is a lot going on especially the leader development study. I think Bob Wood had the same problem when he was there. The present Dave Hontoon is the present deputy commandant he has got the same problems because he is doing lots of studies on leader development and the evolution of the officer corps. So number one challenge is to find time to be there to influence the action. Number two is faculty development, the curriculum. Keep your hand on the throttle of the curriculum, try to improve the student body in some way by your presence, by your physical presence and whatever knowledge you may have and talk to them and be with them and help the Army grow into the future. All of those are big challenges. I don't know what contributions I made while I was there other

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than the leader development study and I tried to create an advance war fight course which I think is still there in some form and bring back large scale war gaming. Used to be called JAY HAWK, it's now called PRARIE WARRIOR.

INTERVIEWER: That began when you were there?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. It certainly began while I was the Chief. I think I started it. It's in the after action report. I talked about it in the after action report. The thing I sent to General Peay when he took over, the letter I left him.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, I could not find that.

GEN SULLIVAN: Well it's out there. It's around somewhere. I talked about Louisiana Maneuver-like exercises in that and the use of simulators in the class room to expose the students to command and control instruments they would see in the field. That has all evolved since then, but I was in for that as a carry on to what I did at Fort Knox, as a follow on to what I did. I don't mean to imply by any of this, by the way, that I was the only guy in there. It just so

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happens I had the job for a while and tried to move the ball. General Vuono was a real mover and shaker and a lot of this obviously because he was very strong. General Max Thurman came in as the TRADOC commander. Lieutenant General Jerry Bartlett was the CG all the time I was there. It was a great assignment. Then you know I was selected to go and command the Big Red One at Fort Riley.

[End Tape S-452, Side 2]

[Begin Tape S-453, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: This begins tape 2, side 1 interview number four with General Gordon Russell Sullivan conducted on 15 April 2002 in Arlington, Virginia. Okay sir, 1st Infantry Division.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, I assumed command of the 1st Infantry Division in July. I think it was July 6, 1988. The division was getting ready to go on REFORGER. We were doing a REFORGER that fall, return of forces to Germany. This was not a new challenge to me since I had been the G3 of a division that went on REFORGER from Fort Riley, so it was getting into the

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game and getting on with it. Lieutenant Colonel Bob Rodgers was the G3 of the division, Burt Maggart was the Chief. We put it together. They had been with me in the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Armored Division so I had a group of guys that I was very comfortable with and we got on with it. We had a pretty good REFORGER. It was the last big REFORGER that was ever fought. It was really exciting, it was great fun a lot of learning went on. General "Butch" Saint was the CINCUSAREUR. Freddie Franks I think was the umpire. Everybody I had grown up with was involved in this thing. George Joulwan commanded the 3rd Armored Division, Cal Waller I think was the division commander of the 8th Infantry Division, untimely death with Cal died as a young man - way too young. It was great and I enjoyed every minute of it. We finished that up and came back to Fort Riley and we started really paying attention to the post. Where the post was going, what the post would look like, what the division would look like, what we wanted the ranges to look like, quality of life for the troops, how would we train the troops. And I took sort of a follow-on to the thing we started in the 3rd Armored Division called "Spearhead Country" and created Republican Flats. It was a document to

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coalesce, it was a plan to coalesce everything that was going on. How would we take our resources and move this organization, Fort Riley and the 1st Infantry Division as a part of Fort Riley into the future. Could we legitimately plan training facilities the master plan for where the commissary would go, PX, housing improvements? Republican Flats was that planning document. In one form or another that thing is actually still around. There is a guy named Gary Lagrange who goes around talking about it. He was my 4 at the time and he later became a civilian and he does work in the Department of Defense and he talks about this plan and how it's a tool for planning. Now it's evolved a lot and I wouldn't want anybody to think that it's the same thing. It's evolved from rather modest beginnings. The Republican as I told you the other day that is a river that flows through Riley right on the edge of Riley. That is why Junction City is the junction of the Republican River and the Kansas River. That is why Fort Riley was put where it is in 1846 because rivers were an important part of moving West. It was an important period, but I didn't stay there long. In February of 1989 General Vuono and Mrs. Vuono came on a visit and we had a good

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visit; he looked around the division and then he and our wives went back to the airport. The women were in another car. He and I were in a van. We got to the airfield and he asked the driver to leave us alone. We sat in the van and he told me at that point that he wanted to bring me back to Washington to be the DCSOPS of the Army. I was really blown over by all of that. I had never served in the Pentagon. It was completely the furthest thing from my mind. I was having a great time commanding the division. I had just come off what I thought was a very successful exercise. We had troops doing a lot of exciting things and I was having a great time. I think Gay was enjoying herself and our kids were moving on and getting on with their lives and everything was great. So anyway he hit me with that I had no idea he was going to do that. He and I were laughing about this the other day. I just blurted out I said, "God you don't want to do that." I said, "I don't know anything about the building [Pentagon]." So he left me bang on for a couple of minutes and then he said, "Thanks a lot Sully, thanks for your input, but this is what we are going to do." So at any rate the rest of the story is that I finished up command of the division, left on the 6th of

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July 1989. Couple of guys Ray Dankie and Tom Burnett, Tom later retired as a lieutenant general, Ray retired as a colonel. They came out to Fort Riley with stacks of books, stacks of stuff I mean it was like things I had never imagined. They piled all of these things up and they talked me through what the DCSOPS did. This was probably in May and they got my head into the game. Probably overwhelmed me now in retrospect. At any rate I started getting in the game in May and June and we departed in July. Came East went to work as the DCSOPS in July replaced General John Foss as the DCSOPS - get on with it. I loved it. I loved being at Riley. It wasn't probably as enjoyable as brigade command because there is a certain distance between the division commander and the troops. The real close relationship is down, obviously, I know it sounds stupid to say, but the closer you are to the troops then the closer you are to the troops. You had brigade commanders who had solid relationships. Colonel Jack Wood was the 1st Brigade Commander. A guy named Bruce Clark had the 2nd Brigade. Had a good staff, good relations with the post, lots of fun things with the post and the two towns of Junction City and Manhattan, very good relations. That is an

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interesting story, this whole relationship with the civilian community. You had a lot of big supporters, men and women, people who had grown up around the fort and they had been long-term supporters. Many of them were on in years and they had been there during World War II, Vietnam, and Korea so they really had close relationships with the post. They understood the value of the post to the community. Some of the young people had a lot of difficulty getting close to the post because they were burdened down in some cases with Vietnam kind of stuff, 1960s and 1970s. They had trouble getting as close as their parents did so that was a challenge but local communities were very supportive. And some of my fondest memories are going dove hunting, bird hunting, dove in the summer and bird hunting in the winter with the local community. Through AUSA activities, doing things socially, golf tournaments, etc.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, that division command time and your experiences—did they have any influence that has on your thoughts on the current debate that is going on now about doing away with division structure or more

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independent brigades that is going on in the Army right now?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well we have to be careful as a nation that we don't presume to think the colonels are generals and that someone with 23 years of experience has 26 or 27 years of experience and leadership positions and in the ability to coalesce the staff and to gather the resources the colonels need to fight. Somebody has to help the colonels. Somebody has to coalesce the material and the weaponry needed to pursue the fight. You can see that with General Haganback in Afghanistan. He doesn't have the whole 10th Mountain there. He is using troops from the 101st, from his own division. He is using Special Forces people, but it takes an experienced war fighter and experienced tactical commander to handle the operational tasks. I think a two-star and obviously in some cases a three-star, but somebody who has been experienced, who is experienced in the art of command and leadership to do all of that. Now whether or not you need all of the structure that is in the division is problematic and I think that is a part debate. But

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I think you do need experienced two-stars with a staff around them to do that. I for one think the division is important although I am well aware of the fact that in no case since DESERT STORM has any U.S. Army division fought as it was over. All of those divisions in the Gulf War had different brigades in them. They were mixed and matched. And since then the division headquarters, the two star has operated as a synthesizing force as a coalesce of the four. Now you asked me some questions about nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons were still in the division so I had to get spun up on that when I took over command of the division. Although I was pretty well in the loop because of my time as the G3 of both corps and CENTAG so I was pretty much in the loop on it. Tactical nuclear weapons were not a big part of our lives though in Europe on REFORGER. We certainly were very well aware of the fact that corps was deeply into it with their weaponry to include the Perishing. It was a part of the exercise but we were more or less recipients of nuclear weapons fired by somebody else. That is probably one reason why when it came time to make a decision about tactical nuclear weapons that it was not very emotional in the Army. When I was the

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Chief we did away with tactical nuclear weapons. They were not very visible anymore at the division level. I don't think we were overly enthusiastic about the use of them. Now that is controversial once again in the Army. Okay, it wasn't readily apparent. You got a question down here on 12 on Republican Flats. How was Republican Flats related to the others? It was related specifically to all of the others - they evolved. It was an evolution. There is a neck tie. I got a catalog at home Saturday from Hermes, the French neck tie people. They do other things too. They make men's neck ties. So I was looking at this neck tie and it looked kind of funny. It looked like it had little sticks and I was reading, they were telling you what the design was on each of these neck ties. This is related here to these special programs - Spearhead Country, COLD REGION, MANHATTAN. Well what the sticks are, are pick up sticks. Pick up sticks is an ancient game and the point of pick up sticks when you read it you understand it. It's that it is a game that replicates life and interactions one to the other. You are trying to pick them all up, but you understand the relationship of each stick to the other because you can move one and move the other and

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win. So you have to very carefully structure how you are going to go at this universe. That is what is behind all of this. That everything in some way is related to the other and how can you put it all together so that you can move this organization forward in a functional way and that is what is behind all of these programs. You got to be careful and I may have failed in some cases, but you have to be careful that you don't get so overly bureaucratic that the things falls on its own weight. Yes, it was the last big REFORGER and it was terrific. I don't know over time we had these lessons learned and I've always been some what skeptical about what we did with some of the lessons we learned about large formation. Seems to me we kept learning some of the same things over and over again. One of them is large attacks, large counter-attacks - too big, too tough to mount, too hard to set up. One of the things I learned from the Battle of France in 1940 is you got to beat the enemy where it is, when it's there. You can't be standing around waiting for two days to counter-attack them. If you wait two days there is no telling what's going to happen. It was not apparent to me when I was the CG of the Big Red One that the Soviet Union was

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collapsing, it truly was not. We had battle books which were very specific about what we were going to do in Germany. We had pictures of the towns we were carrying maps around in our pockets. We knew where we were going to go. We knew what we were going to do. We were confident we could kick their butts. We were very confident of our own capability. All of us were very experienced guys in armored divisions, mechanized infantry divisions, we'd been in Europe a lot. It was our second home we could sort of speak German and we just were very confident in our abilities to train the troops, to motivate the troops and to move them around. Now I believe that many in the future we associate only with the demise. When I got to Washington in the summer of 1989 the wheels were turning.

INTERVIEWER: For the downsizing?

GEN SULLIVAN: Absolutely. The wheels started turning on that around Thanksgiving of 1988 I didn't know it,

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but they did. Conventional Forces, Europe, ANTEUS,³ a study that was being done by John Foss. Mike Harper later worked with me. Mike Harper was a part of that, Tom Burnette, it was a close hold group, Dan Christman, later the superintendent of the Military Academy, Dan Gerstein. Dan Gerstein is an Army colonel commanding down at Fort Gordon now. A hell of a guy later became my assistant while I was the OPS - really a good man. He is commanding a signal brigade. He was a captain and he was the Army's expert on Conventional Forces, Europe - the expert. A perfect example of how in the Army in-spite of what some people think, in the Army the man or the woman who has the knowledge is valued. He was a captain living in a world of four-stars and three-stars. He had the information, he could present the information, he knew how to think, how to think and he was able to convey his thoughts to the senior leadership of the Army and the senior leadership of the Department of Defense. He is a great officer and the fact that he was a captain was, frankly, immaterial. Knowledge, capability that is what wins. The ability to perform

³ ANTEUS was a study undertaken by the US Army to possibly reduce the number of personnel in US Army Europe, to include Berlin.

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is what succeeds in the Army. Okay so at any rate all of this stuff was going on in 1988-1989 and I discovered that when I gotten through to Washington. But as far as I was concerned in the division in 1989 we were going to fight the route to the Soviet Union and we were ready to do it - ready to do it. July 6, 1989 that was when I left the Army that I had grown up in. It was really watershed because I never went back to it and I immediately became in the eyes of a lot of people a Washington guy. It's interesting to me how quickly people forget that I had spent the bulk of my career at the tactical or operational level. By 1989 I had been in Germany; everything I did was related to Europe for the most part other than my time in Korea.

[End Tape S-453, side 1]

Interview Five with General Gordon Sullivan

19 April 2002

[Begin Tape S-454, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: This is Lieutenant Colonel Pat Donahue I'm interviewing General Sullivan for the Senior Officer Oral History Program. This is 19 April 2002.

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Today we are going to talk about General Sullivan's Headquarters Department of the Army DCSOPS and Vice Chief of Staff assignments. Sir, first of all I'd like to ask you some scene setting questions about your selection to DCSOPS. Where you surprised to be selected as Army DCSOPS and then later on as the vice? Any special memories, reactions from friends, contemporaries, superiors? How did you find out and how did you prepare for this job coming out of the CG, 1st ID after just one year in the job?

GEN SULLIVAN: Let me just note that today is Patriot's Day, the 19th of April. The 19th of April was important to the Army, is important to the Army because of course that is the battle of Lexington and Concord so forth and so on. Now was I surprised to be selected as the DCSOPS? Yes! I was completely overwhelmed with it. General Carl Vuono, who was the Chief of Staff of the Army came to Fort Riley to see me or to see the 1st Infantry Division. It must have been February or March 1989. We had a good visit. He came out with his wife, stayed with us. We had been together there at Riley, he as a brigadier general, me as a lieutenant colonel. I was the G3, he was the

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ADC, so we had lots of fond memories together of all four of us at Fort Riley. We had a good visit. General Vuono was able to see training, see a number of people that he had known because the brigade commanders and the officers in the division were people that he had known in the past and we set up a social activity and he was able to see many of his old friends from Junction City and Manhattan. On the morning he departed, he and I rode together over to Manhattan airfield where his plane was. The ladies rode in my car and he and I rode in a van. He asked the driver to get out of the van and we parked there on the ramp by his Gulf Stream. He at that point told me he was planning to bring me back to Washington to make me the DCSOPS. You could have knocked me over with a feather and I told him so in words to this effect. He and I just laughed about this recently. I said, "Chief you don't want to do that. I have no experience in the building. I've never served in the building" so forth and so on. About two minutes into that soliloquy, I recognized that I was way off-base and I said, "Well I guess I ought to keep my mouth shut." He said, "Right, and come to Washington when I tell you to be the DCSOPS." Then he said something to

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the effect I'd do fine at the job and not to worry about any of the stuff I was banging on about. So he and I talked a little bit about some stuff and then he left. It was a month and I didn't say anything to anybody, I told Gay obviously, and like me, she hardly knew what the hell it meant other than it was in Washington. That is about what I knew. I also knew that it was obviously a big job, an enormous job and that I needed to do some work. But there wasn't anything I could do until it was announced and then I knew some things would happen. It was not until about April, early April, I was out on the range observing training when I received a call from my headquarters that I should go to find a phone, a hard phone, because Colonel Smith of the GOMO (General Officer Management Office) wanted to talk to me. So I went to range control, which had the closest Class A phone. Brigadier General Jerry Rutherford was around me at the time. He was the ADC and heard me say that I was going to range control, so anyway he followed me not really knowing why I was rushing off to range control. I knew it wasn't the Chief of Staff on the phone. I knew it was going to be somebody from GOMO, I believe it was a Colonel Smith. He told me that orders were

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being published on me as the DCSOPS of the Army and that I could tell people. I told Jerry Rutherford who was outside the room when I took the call. Then the word spread like wildfire and there was lots of excitement so forth and so on. Some of the guys, you know, said, "hmmm, but you are going to leave?" And I said, "Yep, I'm going to leave and I'm going to leave in a hurry." I was out of there by 6 July. July 6 was the change of command. So I stayed one year in the Big Red One. I was ambivalent about leaving because I loved command of the division and I liked the people who were there. I liked Fort Riley, I liked Kansas. There was lots I liked about my life and what I was doing, but needless to say I was excited about being the DCSOPS. Soon Colonel Ray Dehnke and Colonel Tom Burnette, arrived at Fort Riley with a number of briefing books. These were very savvy experienced officers who had worked in the Pentagon for a number of years. They came to Fort Riley to sit down with me and they just loaded me up with stuff. I mean they talked me through all the issues currently in play. They were there for about a week. We set up in the conference room where I would leave to do other things, I spent most of the time

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with them, but they helped me to see the big picture and many of the details. I think, I traveled to Washington to see General John Foss who was the DCSOPS at the time to get his perspective. I had a couple of months to prepare myself and looking back on this is a blur. It's hard to prepare yourself for a job of this magnitude. It's so big, so vast that all you can do is just get a feel for what the Army is up to; it was just enormous and there were a lot of things no one told me which are only apparent when you are in the chair.

My family was excited because, of course, as far as they were concerned, getting promoted was a great, but that was superficial; they didn't see the job aspects of it -- the burdens of the job, my wife did, but the other members of my family were pleased because of course I was getting promoted. I knew the reality of it as did Gay. We came to Washington, moved into Fort Meyer and started working right away. I mean it was work, hard work, long hours of important, challenging and rewarding work.

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INTERVIEWER: What was your biggest frustration as DCSOPS? As VCSA? What was your greatest accomplishment?

GEN SULLIVAN: One of my biggest frustrations as the DCSOPS was my own learning curve. I can be my own worse critic and I just had to live with the fact that there were lots of things I didn't know, lots of nuances about the job that I didn't know. General Vuono was a big help because he had been in the Pentagon, he had been the DCSOPS and he had been around now. Also, this was his last two years as the Chief and he knew what he wanted. I knew generally what he wanted, because I had worked for him a lot. He told me to focus my attention on certain things and not to worry about the requirements and acquisition. We had some very good guys such as Jerry Granrud, Jay Garner, Gus Cianciolo, and Tony Coroalles. Those guys knew all of the "ins and outs" of that business. The big issues in the summer of 1989 were Conventional Forces Europe. We had an officer named Dan Gerstein, Dan Gerstein is now a colonel. Dan is a wonderful guy. He was at that time a senior captain, I forget. I think when I first met him he was a captain. Dan

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Gerstein was the living expert on Conventional Forces Europe (CFE). He knew the numbers, he just was the living expert, so he handled that. Brigadier General Dan Christman was there, Brigadier General Barry McCaffrey⁴ in DAMO-SS which is the strategy and plans operation of the DCSOPS. These were very good people and I was very comfortable with these men working their piece of the action, as I'm not the kind of guy who has to get in and know every detail. They were very good about bringing me up to speed on the big muscle movements so that I could be a player as the Army representative in the Joint world.

INTERVIEWER: How did the Army respond to the end of the Cold War? Did we respond to the changed strategic environment and start planning post-Cold War force reduction soon enough? What was the QUICK SILVER initiative?

GEN SULLIVAN: Now the thing that I really got into was ANTAEUS. In 1988, not apparent to anybody in the field, responding to the indicators the DOD and Army

⁴ GEN Barry McCaffrey would later be assigned at the CINCSOUTH and upon retirement from the Army, appointed the nation's "Drug Czar" by President Clinton. LTG Dan Christman went on to become the Superintendent at the USMA, West Point.

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leaders were receiving from the intelligence people, and their own observations, that the Soviet Union was changing dramatically and there might be some implications for the Army. In 1988 General Vuono initiated a code word project known as ANTAEUS. It was a very close hold program managed by then Lieutenant General John Foss who was the DCSOPS. What this sequestered group were looking at was reduction of the Army in Europe to two divisions and leaving Berlin. The first time General Vuono saw it, I believe he told them he didn't want to talk about it. That happened about two or three times and they finally were able to sit down around the table. I believe he said he didn't want to talk about it because he wanted plausible denial on the subject as it was extremely sensitive. He was well briefed on the subject although he did not direct me to get into this project. By the summer of 1989, it was coming back to the forefront. The plans were being laid for the resizing of the Army and ANTAEUS was to become the basis for major changes put into motion in the summer of 1991. Most people are not aware of that whole episode and the important role of ANTAEUS after the end of the Gulf War. As Chief of Staff, I took

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advantage of the fact that many of the European units which had been deployed to the Gulf War, which had been identified for reduction. Now admittedly we updated them and I worked on QUICK SILVER which was the reduction of the Army Staff. It was the beginning of the reduction of the Army Staff. Although the facts are that there was a general feeling, and I agreed with it that the last thing we needed to do as the start of a very dramatic shift in the Army, reduction in size, the challenge of keeping it pulled together, was to make the Army staff smaller because somebody thought it would be a good idea to send a political signal that we were ten guys sitting around with one pencil making it all work. What we needed was a strong staff which could plan and oversee execution of our plans. We made a decision to do that. The other decision we made and it was really General Vuono who made it was how to draw down the Army to reflect changes brought on by the end of the Cold War. Around the table in his office, Bob RisCassi, the Vice, I was the DCSOPS, Bill Reno was the PA&E about to become the DCSPER and a note taker. We knew we were going down to an active duty strength of approximately 560,000. LTG Reno put forth two

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alternatives; take the Army down to 560,000 on a gradual ramp. The other alternative that nobody even had thought about except Reno was a quick reduction to 560,000. That would have been a reduction of 200,000 plus out in one year. The Chief listened to all of this. But he looked at me and he asked me how I felt about it. I was opposed to the major one phase reduction because of my experiences after Vietnam as an officer in Armor Branch responsible for reductions. I didn't think that we could stand that kind of trauma. It was traumatic after Vietnam and Bob RisCassi said the same thing. He like all of us, actually the four of us had gone through all of that in the early '70s. He was opposed to it. This meeting didn't last long, it was an easy decision, frankly or at least I think it was for him, General Vuono. It was an easy one in my mind that we shouldn't do it, that we would do the gradual ramp. Now General Vuono's words for that was pace: ". . .we had to have a pace that the Army could handle." His pace was, to reduce no more than 60,000 a year. Looking back on it, if we could have done it, it would have been terrific, but it just was not going to

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happen, frankly, because manpower reductions are a quick source of worry.

INTERVIEWER: What was driving us to go, what caused General Reno to say okay, we have to do 200,000 right away? Was it a political factor, was it money? Was it the changed strategy?

GEN SULLIVAN: We didn't know how much we were going to lose but GEN Vuono had serious discussions with the SECDEF and felt the Army would be manned at about 500,000 by 1995. We thought the size would be more than 500,000 but not over 550,000.

INTERVIEWER: So what made you think 200,000 was the right number right away?

GEN SULLIVAN: We were predicting based on what we saw as the trends and we had reasons to believe we would retain 12 divisions. Army leaders were way out in front with our planning for the future. This is one of the reasons I have such frustrations with what I'm reading in the press suggestive of our Army caught flatfooted. There is ample evidence to support my

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argument, a paper Carl Vuono wrote, published in *Council of Foreign Affairs* in 1991, entitled "DESERT STORM and Conventional Forces". He writes about the use of forces in the future. "While the aggregate force levels will reduce throughout the decade partly budget while carefully managed to ensure the characteristics the result will be a force of 535,000 soldiers in the active, 550,000 in the reserve. Combat structures will be a 20 division total force. That was 12 and 8 with a mix of armor, mechanized, etc. An Army that while maintaining lean Army heavily dependent on reserves mobilization in order to execute large protracted or simultaneous contingencies." The Army was not standing around waiting for instructions. This prediction is not entirely correct but close. We understood all of that. Then when I became Chief, what I said was, and you can see the evolution of my thinking in this, we will maintain continuity with the past, but we will change - change and continuity. Continuity was important because I couldn't see us divorcing ourselves from our planning or our traditions and our culture. Now as time went on I felt that change and continuity standing alone were constraining and I added a proactive verb. So the

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buzz words became "Change, Continuity, and Growth," "No more Task Force Smiths," "Smaller is not better, better is better." What is better? Well, better was an Army that was horizontally linked, that was deployable, the fast sealift ships, support for the C-17. We were the biggest supporters for the C-17. We were the guys who drove for the fast sealift ships. We were the guys who did that. The Navy didn't want to do it. John Dalton came into my office one day; I was the acting Secretary of the Army. Dalton had to come see me as the Secretary of the Navy. He tried to talk me out of it. I said to him words to this effect, "Fast sea-lift or sealift to lift the Army has been a problem since the Spanish-American War. It was the major finding out of the Spanish-American War. We have needed them for a 100 years and I'm not coming off the requirement. I'm not coming off the requirement to have gray ships at berth in ports in the United States." What the Navy wanted to do was to lease ships. These lease ships would be carrying rutabagas in Singapore when we needed to get the 24th Division or the 1st Cav out of the United States. So at any rate, change, continuity, and growth and these thoughts were what I used to drive me. I can tell you

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no Service nor the Department of Defense was as far out in front as we were on this subject. I get somewhat energized on the subject when I read what people are saying today in 2002 about the Army because it's not true.

INTERVIEWER: In retrospect, was OPERATION JUST CAUSE important? Why?

GEN SULLIVAN: Now behind all of this, going on behind all of this was, a hurricane hit South Carolina, Hugo or something blasted into South Carolina and then we had a Special Forces A-team policed up, they were holed up in a hotel in San Salvador and that is where I first saw and I think others began to see the intrusiveness of TV. You might remember this team was surrounded in a hotel by some guerilla extremists. CNN was there actually filming the Special Forces guys behind sand bags in the hall and the stairways. So that was defused and they made it out of there without much trouble. Then in December 1989 JUST CAUSE went down. Now the guys had done some planning and some work and some training down at Bragg as you know with the classified guys. Carl Stiner was the XVIII

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Airborne Commander and Gary Luck was the JSOC guy. General Max Thurman was down in Panama as the SOUTHCOM commander and this had bubbled throughout the period I was the DCSOPS and in October, I think it was October, Gary and Carl Stiner came in to see me as a part of a round-robin they were doing with the Chiefs and the OPSDEPS. They came in to see me, laid out all the maps. They had the maps on fold-out boards and they told me about the plan and what they had done to train. I told them that I thought my view was that it was just so complicated I just couldn't comprehend that they could pull it off. There were so many moving parts; I mean it was truly a very complex operation. Well that shows how much I knew. Then we went down to brief General Vuono. Because he had been down at Bragg and was pretty familiar with their capabilities, he was not that skeptical. He drilled them a little bit about training which was normal because that's where General Vuono's head was a lot.

INTERVIEWER: You talking about the joint training, the special Air Force/Army?

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GEN SULLIVAN: Yes the joint training, what kind of rehearsals they had done. The classified guys and the conventional force interface -- that was about it, nothing major. Went down to the tank. None of the other Service Chiefs had much to say about it in the tank and the plan was put on the shelf. The guys kept doing their training at Bragg and elsewhere. Then things really started getting bad down there in Panama in early December. We had a person killed. Noreiga was generally out of control by that time. Then on the 20th, I think there was a reception, General Vuono, I think he had a Christmas reception, but he had been with the President. I know he had gone to the Chairman's quarters and it was decided that we were going to go. So he told me and I think it was on a Monday night I left the house I told Gay I was going to work and walked across the street and General Vuono and I drove to the Pentagon and went down into the AOC.

[End Tape S-454, Side 1]

[Begin Tape S-454, Side 2]

GEN SULLIVAN: JUST CAUSE was executed as it was planned. Oh, there was some workarounds but it went

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essentially as it was planned. The rescue out of the Madello prison was a classic in commando-type operations. It was really very well executed. The whole thing was well executed. There were some things we learned that we didn't like and we changed. Some of them were training deficiencies or whatever, but generally it was flawless. I think what we saw was 21st Century warfare for the first time. Simultaneous applications of complementary capabilities and we literally shut a country down. Now admittedly we were dealing with a Third World threat so forth and so on. But the biggest threat to that operation was not the enemy and the enemy was lethal, it was just being able to do it. Do what? Put that many aircraft over in one space. It's like putting 300 airplanes all the way from little bird helicopters to F-117s over Washington, DC in the middle of the night. I mean it was truly a very sophisticated operation with lots of moving parts. Paratroopers and light infantry moving from strategic distances from the United States East and West Coasts and special operating forces staging on the ground. There were some on the ground and then there were some who came in. The Marines were on the ground. There were Navy SEALS in the operation. Not

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much Navy in the actual operation although the Navy was represented. Literally shut the country down in every respect and I think that and I have always felt that it was early look at 21st Century warfare and it is the ideal. I don't think DESERT STORM, I think it was a great operation, but it wasn't 21st Century warfare. Whatever it was, it wasn't simultaneous it was sequential. It was very sequential. I'm not criticizing anybody because the realities over there may well have precluded all of that. At any rate that is not the question on the table. JUST CAUSE, it was truly a great operation. The Army talked good about it and justifiably so, but we didn't have time to be standing around congratulating ourselves on that. The morning after didn't go so well and Max Thurman admitted to that because we didn't do much planning for the morning after and we had to hustle hard to pull all of that off because people expected that the Army was going to do certain things on post conflict reconstruction, help the Panamanians get back on their feet. So that went fine and then we kind of pulled ourselves together after that.

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INTERVIEWER: What did you think when the Berlin Wall came down both personally and as it impacted on the Army?

GEN SULLIVAN: The Berlin Wall came down in the middle of all of that, not to lose sight of that. Ironically I was in Boston at a symposium that Tufts University was putting on. It's an Army annual Fletcher Conference. It was in Boston at the Sonesta Hotel. I was up there giving a speech about doctrine at the noon luncheon remarks and somebody slipped me a note and said oh, by the way, the Berlin Wall just was open. So any way I finished my talk and the first question was to me about that and a guy said, "Well what do you think?" Well, you know, what did I think; I just gave the answer that came to my head. That while I was pleased, obviously, I said and it was reported in the *Boston Globe*, "I don't know what we don't know." Historians can do with this comment what they wish, but to the best of my recollection and I have thought a lot about that remark, I was not euphoric. I didn't necessarily see any of the catastrophes that have taken place since in detail, but there was something about it that suggested to me

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that before I personally and the institution launched off on some euphoric view about what it all meant, we had to be very careful to see how things turned out. But that was what was in my head when I said that. So at any rate, we had our plans. Those things kind of kicked up now. Because we knew, we were very well aware that the American people would really start demanding a peace dividend because the European armies would and so forth. Things were pretty routine, I mean this QUICK SILVER thing, the reduction of the Army staff, and you know there was lots of just day to day stuff going on. I can't recall that anything big happened after that. The Chief told me he was going to make me the Vice. That was another big surprise to me. I never really thought of myself as a Pentagon person. I thought of myself as a TRADOC guy or a field guy and I saw a relationship between TRADOC and the field because that's the way I had grown up. That is if you are not in school you are in tactical or operational units. And in school meant to me being in charge of the school or at least one piece of the school or a student and I loved being a student. I loved that life and I loved TRADOC. So at any rate I never thought of myself as a Pentagon guy. Because I

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had never served there and I thought if I was promoted to senior rank that it might be as a corps commander or something like that. So anyway he said I was the Vice. I don't know when he told me, but it happened in June or July. It must have been June because I didn't have an Army staff badge when I first became the Vice. I have a lovely picture of my mother and I. I got promoted down at the Hall of Hero's. My mother has subsequently passed away and she was there. That was a special day for my family and for me. So I became the Vice and was just getting my, I think the first thing we wound up doing was getting all sucked into some casualties down in Panama. There were some activists who claimed war crimes or whatever. It later proved to be false, but I think that was my first.

INTERVIEWER: Isn't it a road block or something?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, that was my first day. That was the kind of stuff the Vice did. You know bring the DAS (Director of Army Staff) and the PAO and the SJA and the CID guys and get everybody in there and the General Counsel, the Army General Counsel, and figure

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out what the hell is going on and so forth. About that time General Vuono whose hip was bothering him, went to the hospital to get his hip replaced. This was in July 1990. He was up at Walter Reed and he was in a considerable amount of pain which most people didn't know. Got back and he was in convalescent status which for him meant he was working at home. That is really what that meant because it was hard for him to get around the Pentagon. Then Kuwait was invaded. We had been doing some work on that whole thing. There was a war game going on, I can't recall. There was a war game going on or one had just finished and we on the Army Staff were tuning up based on what we had learned from that wargame. I think it was an ARCENT war game and there were some issues raised in the war game and we were in the Pershing Conference Room and we were drilling how we would respond to that kind of an approach. What you need to know about the Army Staff is that the Army Staff at that time had already been through JUST CAUSE and some hurricanes and the after-math of JUST CAUSE. My inclination as the OPS and as the Vice was to revert to my originally trained self -- that is as an S3 or a G3, a staff officer, an Ops officer, helping the subordinate

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formations. And that is what I thought my job was as the DCSOPS and as the Vice was to help facilitate and bring the staff together so that the staff could enable the commanders in the field do their jobs. One manifestation of that was my calling down to the formations in Panama or I talked to Bill Hartzog who was the J3 down there and others and let them know that if they needed anything they should call me as the DCSOPS and I would help facilitate that on the Army staff whatever kind of resources they needed. Papers we get into this whole business of G5, you know post conflict reconstruction whatever. Okay, but in any rate, the Army Staff was robust enough then that we were able to live in two worlds. The world of the Pentagon which doesn't even recognize the world is going up in flames. It's still plodding along worrying about five years from now while you got troops fighting a war. So we were able to live in both worlds and we really did live in both worlds. That made it a little tricky for me because they are in the Gulf War then the same day I would be living it five years into the future and at the same time trying to find lo-boys and heavy equipment movers all over

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the United States to support the war effort, but we were able to do it because we had good people.

INTERVIEWER: I was on the Army staff then sir. It was a very impressive group of officers I served with. I did see how we did everything we could for the guys in the field. I know like Colonel Harper, the team you set up to look six months a head of where we were. Very impressive how we really pretty much got ahead of the game on that.

GEN SULLIVAN: We had a very good group. We had a lot of talented people. I think what has happened to some of them is Goldwater-Nichols and the joint requirements and the mathematical requirement that is rigidly enforced of meeting the Chairman's requirement, and I'm not quivering about the Chairman's requirement. The Chairman has to have like or better quality personnel than that of the Service Chief. Well if you give the Chairman like or better quality and you measure it then he is going to get very good quality officers. And the services have in fact created for the country a very, very talented staff in the joint staff. And the Service Chief is

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admittedly they have smaller staffs, but they do not have the depth of bench that we had back then.

INTERVIEWER: I would have to agree sir. It's not an assignment that people seek anymore. Army Staff is like the last place that people want to go out of the War College.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, absolutely they want to go to the Joint Staff.

INTERVIEWER: Right, if they haven't been already they want to go to Joint Staff.

GEN SULLIVAN: So that is a fact, but it wasn't a fact then. It was not a fact then. It's a thread, that one little thread is a part of a larger issue in my view which is the diminution of the role of the Service Chief in peacetime and it's the strengthening -- I need to be careful how I say this because I'm not sure I really agree with that. I'm not sure the Chairman hasn't become like the Deputy Assistant or Principal Assistant of the Secretary of Defense. I think there is something we have to look at here as a

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country because I think we are drifting into a world in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is so like a potted palm. He is kind of there, but whatever that isn't the way it was then. We had very talented, very deep staffs in the Army and the other Services and that is the way we went into the Gulf War. General Vuono very quickly sublimated whatever discomfort he might have had because of his operation and he as back into the building. He did permit me the first weekend of the deployment since he couldn't do it, I went around, took the plane, took a team of officers. I went around, I went down to Fort Stewart, and I went to Fort Bragg, Fort Campbell, Fort Bliss, Fort Hood. I went to all of those places on a weekend and talked to the troops, talked to the commanders in the motor pools; Lieutenant General Gary Luck on the Green Ramp at Fort Bragg. Talked to him on the Green Ramp as he was loading the troops to go. A couple of things obviously come out is the spirit of the troops, but their ability to get themselves mustered and ready to go. Gary was shipping the time I was there we were at the marshalling yard for the Green Ramp. There was a _____; we had some Apaches and some other equipment in the queue. Very early on he was putting some very

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sophisticated equipment on the ground. There have been some things said about speed bumps and all of that. That was a "wise ass" comment that came out after the war. None of us felt, rightly or wrongly, that we were putting those guys from the 82nd in jeopardy. We had full confidence in their ability and we were giving them the best we had. The air was there. We were giving them Apaches.

INTERVIEWER: I agree with you sir. I don't think the guys that went there ever considered themselves speed bumps.

GEN SULLIVAN: Now the armored gun system when we looked at it--one reason that I was pushing the development and the acquisition of the armored gun system was to overcome what we knew was a short-coming. We did have the Sheridan, but the Sheridan was not capable and that is why I went after the armored gun system. So that was the outcome of it. The Javelin was another one.

INTERVIEWER: That is a war winner sir. That is a great system.

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GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. All of these things were an offshoot of that whole experience -- among others, but certainly the armored gun system, the Javelin. My role during the Gulf War was to be the go between, between the guys and gals in the field and the sustaining base. And that is essentially what I tried to do. Denny Reimer was the DCSOPS, I was the Vice, Glynn Mallory was down there in DAMO-OA, later commanded the 2nd Armored Division, and John Abrams was his assistant. Tom Fields was in DCSOPS, later retired as a lieutenant general. Tom and John Abrams really worked the mobilization piece a lot. They would work all night on mobilization which was the major challenge.

INTERVIEWER: In the Gulf War's mobilization, what happened to the three National Guard maneuver brigades? Why? What was the impact?

GEN SULLIVAN: We mobilized the three National Guard maneuver brigades; put them into a training cycle which later became very controversial for reasons which did not escape me. I understood the reasons

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that it became controversial, but I didn't appreciate the legs that would have. I think, in fact I know, General Vuono was right in his decision. He demonstrated great strength of character and the bottom line was he was not going to send those three brigades to war until he felt they were ready to go to war. And he would not countenance anyone speeding that process up. Now I know there are all kinds of dilatants around who felt that we should have just sent them and they could have guarded the ammo dumps back in whatever. But nobody, certainly not him who was the decision maker, was willing to do that. All of the great smart guys in Washington, DC and around the United States, all of these learned journalists who write all of this stuff can write until the cows come home. The fact of the matter was those units when they finished their training cycle at the National Training Center were ready to at least do some basic tasks of combat brigades, combined arms brigades. And they were not ready when they were mobilized. I don't say that to stick a stick in anybody's eye. I'm not denigrating anyone, but those were the facts as I saw them and I know as General Vuono saw them and General Reimer saw them and General

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Burba and serious members of Congress who went out to look like Sonny Montgomery. It was apparent, but the politics of it were important and they are still out there.

INTERVIEWER: Did that create a rift or did it just identify a rift between the Active and the Reserve Component?

GEN SULLIVAN: Oh it didn't create it the rift has been there seen the Revolutionary War. Oh, it probably brought it home. We were caught in a trap of our own rhetoric. It was the Cold War rhetoric where 10 and 10-10 divisions in 10 days. We were just going to mobilize these guys, get them mobilized and send them on to war. When we really put an eye dropper on it what we found was that when we mobilized them we found that the units, even people we thought would be capable, weren't because of health problems, because of dental problems, very sophisticated problems that nobody ever wanted to talk about that are still stumbling blocks. I mean this dental thing is not a trivial problem. You can't provide the guardsmen and reservists dental health care if they are just M-day

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guardsmen, so you get people who just are not healthy enough to go. I'm not criticizing anyone for this, it's just a fact. You got weight problems. You got family problems. You got any number of issues that have to be resolved. Okay, so we worked our way through all of that, we got the 48th Brigade into the queue. They went to the National Training Center. The 156th was doing their stuff and they were moving through the queue. The 48th was actually coming out the other end was about ready to go and the war ended. Then the politics of it were "the regulars screwed the Guard" and that's about how all that ended. There is lots to be said about it. Why don't you just give me a hook? We got it here and I can think about some other stuff. You know and I'll just write it. We might want to come back to it because of course that is colored. That is colored a lot that happened. There is a new book that was just written by a guy named Michael Doubler on the National Guard.⁵ He puts me in the history books and I don't care because I'm there anyway on this point. In testimony over on Capital Hill, I was asked how long it would take me,

⁵ Michael Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2001).

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because I was the Chief by the time I was asked this question, how long it would take me to get a division ready to go to war and I said I could not do it in less than 12 months.

INTERVIEWER: A Guard division?

GEN SULLIVAN: Guard division. Couldn't do it in less than 12. I frankly think that it would take longer. They don't like that. The Guard doesn't like that. That is the way I saw it. We worked hard to even make that happen, but it was just a hot button issue. I later did some stuff when I was the Chief on it to try and defuse it. Both General Peay, General Reimer, we worked hard on the issue, but it was an issue. It was not a new issue it was an old issue - historical issue.

INTERVIEWER: Any implications now sir based on that assessment and the NORTHCOM developing maybe apportioned forces will that have an impact on the force structure of the Guard? Any linkages back to DESERT STORM and their inability to mobilize a division, within 12 months, using your assessment.

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GEN SULLIVAN: I don't think it goes back to that. The whole subject of NORTHCOM is another subject entirely. Homeland defense highlights the fact that the Guard has a role to play in that. The Guard itself is ambivalent about that role and I'm sure you've heard it at the War College. The buzz words go something like this, and Herb Temple, who I will just use as a manifestation of the older members of the Guard: Homeland security is "a mission," it's not "the mission". Well, what that means is that the mission is war as we know it. Well what do you mean as we know it? Well the Korean War, World War II it's war as we know it with divisions. I'm not going to ascribe, I'm just going to leave it at that. So in other words, if we have these formations then we can do all of this lesser included stuff. Well yes, but there is lots of money involved in that and so forth and so on. It's complicated; it's very complicated to get into all of this stuff. But you can't get by square one because it's become a manhood issue. It's become very political on that stumbling point. I don't think this command; NORTHCOM that has been created is even remotely capable of getting into that.

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I think there is a lot of people saying a lot of things about homeland security who don't have the remotest clue what they are talking about. The role of the National Guard and our national experience. . .

[End Tape, S-454, Side 2]

[Begin Tape, S-455, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: Tape 2 of the 19 April interview of General Sullivan on his DCSOPS and Vice days. I think we were finishing talking about the impact of mobilizing the three National Guard maneuver brigades during DESERT STORM.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, we still feel that impact okay -- that's out there. Unfortunately, I think the energy associated with that overshadow the performance, overshadow in kind of a dark cloud sort of a way the excellence performance of the artillery brigades and everybody else. It just consumed it--it was the tomato that consumed Chicago because some guys down in Georgia or whatever were unhappy and that was a tragedy. But it did fuel a whole bunch of stuff. They didn't want to be taken down. The Department of Defense has some numbers that they wanted to go to.

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We all knew. When I told General Powell and Carl Vuono told them that we couldn't get to those numbers, but it became a major issue. It was a major stumbling block. We just couldn't get the Guard to those numbers. The Guard belongs to the governor until it's federalized. The Federal Government supports it and the Federal Government supports it with lots of money. Okay, in small states, it's an important part of the state program. You can't just avoid those realities and it's America.

INTERVIEWER: An armory in every small town.

GEN SULLIVAN: And a armory in every small town, they touch every small town and we have to love them and we have to figure out how to get as much as we can out of these people who are willing to serve their country and stop trying to beat them up for any number of reasons. For any number of reasons I think we, I, personally found myself in a confrontation with these guys that I didn't want to be in but I was in it. That was a fact and it was sort of there. It was the elephant in the living room kind of thing.

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INTERVIEWER: Sir, you mentioned Secretary Cheney and General Powell. What was the Army as an institution relationship with the other services and with the Secretary and the Chairman during the war? And did that change after the war?

GEN SULLIVAN: No, it was great. It was great after the war. If I wanted to see Mr. Cheney I could. I didn't have much occasion to go up there, but I did see him. He was as he is today. He was pretty taciturn, straight forward. I mean he was friendly and we do our business. And of course I saw the Chairman a lot. The relationship was good. And the relationship with the other Service Chiefs was good. Colin Powell set the tone right after the Gulf War. It was well known that he expected team work and he didn't expect a lot of freelancing and he didn't permit it. It wasn't until John Shalikashvili was the Chairman that the Air Force launched off on its quest to shorten the battle space, take all deep firers and MLRS, ATACMS and whatever and even the PATRIOT, I think. That was an irritant, okay. We ultimately succeeded in the Roles and Missions Review because frankly none of that made sense. It didn't make

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sense. My approach was to convince the members of the Roles and Missions Commission and there were others that today we have the ability to simulate through the use of simulations and simulators the virtual and constructive world. We could simulate some of these great ideas and we can do experiments. And if we did experiments we would find out that some of these great ideas people were talking about just didn't work. I don't think that ultimately paid the dividends that chance and the way people played their cards.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, besides DESERT STORM I know life was going on as you were saying. The Pentagon was still looking five, ten years out. As the vice what else besides DESERT STORM really stands out as an accomplishment during that time frame?

GEN SULLIVAN: No, everything was pretty well consumed. We were pretty well consumed with the war. Although certain elements of the staff were looking at what we would do if we went below 500,000. We were beginning to look at that. We were trying to figure out how to inactivate units, how to get the numbers down. So we were beginning to get into that. I'd

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have to go back and look at all my papers, but we were doing some pretty specific work on what we would do. It was not only that, but I guess I would characterize it as the execution of the plans in each functional area that we had initiated back in the 1989 timeframe. That is essentially what we are up to.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, one of the things, it comes up still in our War College class this year we talked about it in some depth, but did we end do you think DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD at the right time? A lot of people are saying we finished short of the mark, we didn't complete the task. Given what had happened when it was happening, was it the right call?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, I think it was. We could have gone to Baghdad. We could have gone all the way to Turkey, that was not the problem. I don't know what we would have done when we did it. What were we going to do the morning after? What about Iran? What about the Syrians? What about the Saudi's? What about the rest of the alliance? Okay, I don't think any of us, in fact I know none of us could quite comprehend and that was the prevailing sense. Now in the operational

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sense should we have pounded the Republican Guards more, maybe? But you have to remember these guys were sitting ducks. I don't want to get too cute here but is that really the American way to go in and just annihilate guys that what we knew was going to be the end anyway. I mean, okay, those were parts of the President said, we want you to take Kuwait, we take Kuwait restore the borders, we did that. My opinion today was that was the right thing to do. Now that has been controversial since it happened, not immediately, but shortly thereafter and certainly now when people are talking about going back it is.

INTERVIEWER: Well, we all gave you a vote of concurrence at the War College. All the students agree it was the right thing to do at the time. The negative effects of us just massacring them like you were saying basically would have played heavy on us and then have we gone to Baghdad we would be an occupying force and it would be a totally different situation.

GEN SULLIVAN: We'd still be there.

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INTERVIEWER: Right in large numbers.

GEN SULLIVAN: So at any rate that's how I felt about it then and that's how I feel about it now.

INTERVIEWER: The last two questions I had actually probably came up when you were the Chief.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes they were. Peacetime engagement was PFP [Partnership for Peace] all of that was while I was the Chief. We weren't thinking about any of that. Remember the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, I don't know when the formal disillusion was.⁶ There was a lot going on behind the scenes, lots of papers being written but we didn't start seeing a new national strategy until I was the Chief.

INTERVIEWER: Those were pretty heady times sir.

GEN SULLIVAN: They were very heady times. Everybody was very excited about what the Army had done. I think we on the Army Staff, though, understood the realities of what was about to happen. I was in a

⁶ December 25, 1991.

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very unique position when I became the Chief of having been there 1989, 1990, half of 1991 so my head had been in the game for about two years on the challenges of change.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, anything you want to add? Any themes or features of your time as the Vice that we haven't talked about do you want to add.

GEN SULLIVAN: I think the one lesson I would like people to know is that the Vice and the Army Staff at some point must revert to being warfighters and professional Army officers in the headquarters enabling the commanders in the field at all levels to execute their responsibilities. They have some responsibility in either the victory or the failure of the Army in the field. It's not something that they can just avoid. They must have that ingrained in their heads.

INTERVIEWER: You say that as just as a lesson learned or are you worried that they are losing that focus there?

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GEN SULLIVAN: No I'm just saying it as a lesson learned.

INTERVIEWER: Clearly this was their focus during the war when we were there.

GEN SULLIVAN: I think it was the focus during the war. I think actually it has been the focus here in Afghanistan. I think the Army Staff has been in the game and they have to be in the game. If they are not in the game then something doesn't work right and it doesn't work right.

INTERVIEWER: Any other comments? It's been another good session.

GEN SULLIVAN: No, no. I think what I'd like to see at this is the transcript so that I can leverage off; getting my head in it and then write you guys some.

**INTERVIEW 6
General Sullivan by Colonel Ellis
2 Jun 2002**

[Begin Tape S-456, Side 1]

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INTERVIEWER: This is tape 1, side 1 of interview number six of an unclassified Senior Officer Oral History Program interview with General Gordon Russell Sullivan which is being conducted on 2 June at Arlington, Virginia. The interviewer is Colonel David Ellis. Sir, how did your post-Vietnam experience influence your methods in the Army drawdown of the 1990s?

GEN SULLIVAN: The essence of the question is how did my post-Vietnam experiences influence me? I think critically in this context, but not only me. General Carl Vuono, who was the Chief and then General Bob RisCassi, who was the Vice Chief and myself were all, as were the other actors, but the three of us in particular were influenced profoundly by those experiences. In particular how people were handled was critical to us. None of us felt that people were handled very well after Vietnam and it was a wholesale bloodletting, people were just let go. Many of them probably deserved to go, some didn't. It wasn't very well handled in the early 1970s. I guess I would say that our experience was the catalyst for the theory upon which the concept of the physical downsizing of

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the Army was put together. The theory was that we would treat everybody with dignity and respect and that included those who were staying and those who were leaving. That we would do our very best to minimize forced releases and rely on normal attrition, early outs, and various other devices that we used. Also its worth noting that in late 1989, General Vuono and his people were writing a paper which subsequently was published, it was a White Paper. In this White Paper he posited that the way the Army rebuilt itself after Vietnam was found in what he called the six imperatives: high quality people, leader development programs, training programs, get the best equipment that the Congress would support the American people, the Big Five really, force mix, that was heavy forces, light forces, special operations forces, and doctrine. These six imperatives were the reason that Army leaders were able to rebuild the Army. When you combine those two that is the six imperatives and a drive to take care of people, both those who go and those that stay -- you see the essence of what ultimately what I put together as the Chief. In my lexicon, which will come out later in this, it was continuity with the past, change, change the

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equipment, change the doctrine, and growth. And so it all started to come together in my head.

INTERVIEWER: Did you agree at the time with the approach to force reductions that General Powell was taking as the CJCS?

GEN SULLIVAN: There was no disconnect between what the Army was doing and what he was doing or what he wanted to do. We knew in 1989 the strength of the Army on active duty was about 780,000. We hypothesized that we would be a little bit less than 550,000. The number that we were shooting for was 535,000. Remember now, when I became the Chief though, the active duty strength was over 900,000 because we had activated the Guard and Reserve for the Gulf War. We had no disconnect with General Powell, the Chairman. Everybody was in sync in 1989, certainly all through 1989 and into 1990 until the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, everybody was in sync. Now, where there was a disconnect over the Guard and the Reserve. Mr. Cheney and General Powell felt that the Guard and Reserve should be reduced considerably. I think all of us felt that they were probably right but

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the numbers that we were told to reach, in my view -- you'll have to ask General Vuono how he felt about it -- the numbers we were forced to reach were way too low and the ramp was way to fast.

INTERVIEWER: The Army's drawdown was praised for its compassionate dealings with soldiers and families; who came up with the plan for VSI, SSB, ACAP, etc., or how did they evolve?

GEN SULLIVAN: If we were praised for taking care of the troops, well that is fine. I never had much negative heat on the subject because of what's brought out here. Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI), there is any number of initials. Essentially what happened was the Congress stood up and said, "OK, we will facilitate the early release of people and we'll facilitate it with dollars and enhance the retirement benefits in the sense that you can retire early." So we were given a 15 year retirement, 2 ½ percent for every year of service, 15 years, so you got 40 percent of your base pay at 15 years. That enabled people to leave early. One of the programs enabled young people to leave with a nice piece of change in their pocket.

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Dual military couples took advantage of that, you know married to each other and one or the other got out and had a nice check in their pocket from the Government. So I think the Congress of the United States, the Department of Defense, the administration, recognized that these people for the most part had all signed up to be Regular Army people for a career as a soldier and that we were breaking that "contract" with them. They helped us get people out.

INTERVIEWER: Were there any important leaders in the Army or in Congress that thought we should have gone about it differently?

GEN SULLIVAN: There was one. The DCSPER of the Army at the time, this was 1989, I guess he was the DCSPER. He might have been the PA, the programmer, General Bill Reno, a good man, a good officer. His view was when we were putting the plan together was that rather than do a gradual ramp to 550,000, his recommendation is that we would do it all in one whack. In other words you go from 780,000 to 550,000. You just let 200,000 people out as quickly as you can get them out the door. That didn't fly because -- I'll speak for

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myself, let the others speak for themselves -- my view was and I stated it, that that would be impossible. We could not hold the Army together if we did that. It was just too many people and the fabric of the Army would just collapse. We had to do it on a gradual ramp. General Vuono's ramp was actually about 35,000 a year. So 780,000 to 550,000 you can figure the numbers out. You wouldn't have got that by 1995 but I think he was willing to or he felt he could stretch it out. There was only one really, everybody pretty much signed up for what we wanted to do. Now that is not exactly how it worked out in practice by the way, but the plan was that we would do a gradual ramp. I think the number -- actually 760,000 was probably the strength of the Army to let's say 535,000. You know, you figure it out; a little over 250,000 people had to be released in five years. So we were going to take a considerable number of people out. One year we actually did take over 100,000 out. The number when I left active duty was just around 500,000. So we went from 930,000 on active duty -- some of those were Guardsmen and Reservists we demobilized, but we got rid of a lot of people and remarkably, we held it together.

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INTERVIEWER: How were those disagreements resolved?

GEN SULLIVAN: Now the disagreements, there was only one. It was resolved very quickly and very decisively and it was resolved around the table. We are not going to do that, boom! That's it. There were not a lot of staff studies done. We knew exactly what we wanted to do and this is how we are going to do it. I never second-guessed that and I never second-guessed the execution of it while I was the Chief. We put the plan together. I executed the plan. Now, I will tell you that obviously it didn't go in execution quite as the plan was written, but that is life.

INTERVIEWER: It's no different from any other plan, General.

GEN SULLIVAN: No different than any other plan and I think it worked.

INTERVIEWER: How about the OER - did you consider changing it?

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GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, I did and I decided very quickly. I didn't ask a lot of people. I just decided that it would be foolish for me to try to change the OER in the midst of a downsizing in which I was being accused anyway, in some circles, of using the OER to eliminate people on the selective early retirement. And in a sense that was true since that's really what the boards went by. Well, they went by the total officer, but the bulk of what they had to go by other than decorations and stuff like that and performance in schools and jobs was manner of performance and potential. Well that comes off the officer efficiency report. I felt that if we had changed it, and by the way, the change in OER takes a couple or three years. The whole thing would have been over with and I just would have fueled the feeling that I was looking for devices to get rid of people. Because the normal reaction when a new efficiency report comes in is that the inflation is dampened, which is one reason you put a new efficiency report out there and if you were to graph out the performance of the total officer corps over time you'd see that the curve would come down, so performance would be down. And those that were released and their buddies would say, "Hey he is using

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this as a device." So I decided not to do it, but what I did was in 1994 probably late 1993, may have even been earlier. But I began the process of setting the Army up to redo the efficiency report. General Ted Stroup, who became the DCSPER, started doing some work in 1994. General Reimer then picked it up in 1995 and put the new efficiency report on the street. When I left there wasn't a heck of a lot done. It wasn't high priority with me.

INTERVIEWER: Please talk about the influence that the book, *To Lose a Battle*,⁷ had on you during the drawdown.

GEN SULLIVAN: Well, in addition to my own experience coming out of Vietnam, and we talked about that in one of the earlier interviews, I worked at Armor branch in those years. A strong influence on me was my reading in the history of the United States Army and other armies. One book that was very influential was Colonel Bob Doughty's book, *Seeds of Disaster*.⁸ It's about the French Army interwar years, World War I to

⁷ Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle, France, 1940* (Boston: Little, Brown, Inc., 1969).

⁸ Robert A. Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939* (Hampden, CONN: Archon Books, 1985).

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the outbreak of World War II. *To Lose a Battle* was about that same period. T.R.Fehrenbach's book was *This Kind of War*⁹, and Charles Heller's *America's First Battles*.¹⁰ Also, a relatively obscure book written by a guy named Hal Winton, an Army Colonel who's now down at the Air War College about a Brit trying to change the British Army in the interwar years.¹¹ Those books were pretty important to me because they talked about the same thing. They talked about Army's losing sight in periods of peace -- losing sight of what they were all about. I wanted to ensure that when we brought the Army down we were able at any point along the continuum 1991 to 1995 to do whatever the America people ask us to do and to succeed to the best of our ability in carrying those missions out. I had some graphics which I know you guys have which were critical to me and I would run whatever I was doing through those graphics to ensure that I did my best to maintain the equilibrium. Balance is another way of looking at it. That is keeping everything in line. That is bringing quality recruits, training them,

⁹ T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness* (NY: Macmillan Publishers, 1963).

¹⁰ Charles E. Heller, *America's First Battles, 1776-1965* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986).

¹¹ Harold R. Winton, *To Change An Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1988).

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developing them as leaders so forth and so on and writing a doctrine. Training was the glue that would hold it together and doctrine was the engine of change. This is the kind of an Army we were trying to build. An Army which could compel an enemy to do something. An Army which could prevent war, that is deter war. One that could support the American people -- the hurricanes and other things we did, earthquakes, riots and stuff like that, and lastly, reassure our allies. It was through all of these devices you know I tried to guide myself during the period I was the Chief, but the books were a big part of it. And certainly Fehrenbach's book was a big part of it. Because, of course, the primary case for me was Task Force Smith. Task Force Smith was not a failure of the soldiers; it was a failure of the leadership in the Army and in the country. I believe General MacArthur was responsible for some of it. The Army just took its eye off the ball and I don't think we appreciated what was going on in the world and we got trapped and the soldiers paid the price. I was going to do my best to ensure that that didn't happen. There is a lot to be learned by history from history and I think there is a lot to be learned today. And I

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think we have to be careful as we are going through this major transformation that we are apparently going through. Certainly in the Army I understand what we are trying to do. It's a little vague to me at the moment what the Department of Defense transformation is, where they are going, but I was driven by these books or the thoughts in these books and I didn't want to lose the first battle. And I didn't want to set my successors up to lose one either.

INTERVIEWER: Looking back do you feel that we've "broken the mold?" Have we escaped our historical paradigm of always fighting the last war and losing the first battle of the new one?

GEN SULLIVAN: I don't know the answer to that question. The mold I was trying to break --actually there were a couple of molds and one was losing the first battle, that's obvious. I don't think we lost the first battle while I was the Chief. I know I would get varying opinions on that subject with Somalia. We certainly didn't lose the tactical fight. If anything, we lost the strategic fight, but that doesn't have anything to do with the soldiers, nor

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does it really have anything to do with the Army. We won that particular fight. We were actually doing a pretty good job up there in the other part of Somalia. Performance in Somalia has been overshadowed by the 3rd and 4th of October. Refugees were coming back, the crops were being harvested. We broke the back of the famine. So in general, I think Somalia was a success. Now when I say that people tell me I sound like a Vietnam-era guy. That's at the tactical level, maybe at the operational level, obviously at the strategic level we lost it and I'm very well aware of that. Haiti was a success the country walked a way from it. The Army played a big role in that. Special operating forces, light infantry, support troops, I think Haiti was a success. So we have broken that mold. Now whether we broke the mold on the acquisition and modernization of equipment remains to be seen. I don't think we have. I think we may even be strengthening the role of the Acquisition Corps. There doesn't seem to be much flexibility in how we are doing business, but that is another subject that isn't what you're asking me.

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INTERVIEWER: Do you believe that the recent success of the Army in Afghanistan and other places is a direct result of your vision?

GEN SULLIVAN: I don't know. I was a part of a long line of Chiefs. I think I played a role in it, but I wouldn't -- you know I'll have to let others decide. Tried to change it, tried to change the Army. Tried to do it without unsettling the troops. My thought was, and I stated it a lot, was that we would change, but would maintain continuity with the past, which is why the training centers stayed there. The training centers were driven by doctrine or some of the forward thinking that we were doing in the 5-25 pamphlets. That would fuel a scenario in the training centers so the troops would have a feeling of change, but the change would be legitimized in the training centers. Like what? Like training with nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, primarily down at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC, Fort Polk, Louisiana) and we did a lot of that after Somalia in 1993 before and after October. Of course, growth came in the digital piece of our transformation information. Digits was the only way

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we could talk about information and knowledge. If you didn't go digital we wouldn't have had all the information and knowledge we needed. So I guess my answer to question four is, yes, somewhat. I'll leave it at that.

INTERVIEWER: At the time you were most immersed in crafting the Army of the future, the leadership of our country changed hands. Was that a tough time for you personally and professionally?

GEN SULLIVAN: Oh, yes, and no. We really got along well with the Bush administration, the first Bush administration, Mr. Cheney, Colin Powell. We were all very comfortable with that and we knew how to act in that administration. They went away and it was challenging, but I don't think it was tough -- it was challenging.

INTERVIEWER: What were your thoughts now when you look back on those months when the debate over the President's campaign promise to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military consumed so much energy?

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GEN SULLIVAN: Now, obviously, we would have preferred not to get so swept up in that homosexual thing like the second day President Clinton was in office, but that's the way it worked. What evolved from that -- and I don't think the President himself had a feel for it was the politics of it. That is the press, the conservatives; there were all sorts of views out there in America on this very controversial subject. Should homosexuals, gays, and lesbians, should they be legitimized by the Federal Government? We in the armed forces felt, and I should only speak for myself, so I will. I felt that the gay and lesbian community was taking advantage of the military in this process and using us with the President. I mean obviously, the President signed up for it and members of his administration and other well-meaning people signed up for the concept which would open up the military to homosexuals to serve, just to serve. We were in a tough spot because everything we said on the subject took on political overtones. I didn't like that, but I understood it. I understood this is America. This is not somebody else's country, this is America, and I understood what was going on. Advocates were writing about and trying to stylize it as it's going to be

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easy and these guys are living in the Stone Age. Certainly they used the Army as an example of an institution which had changed when Harry Truman signed the Executive Order in 1948. It wasn't quite as simple as they would make it out to be, but they used us as the example. There is a positive example and that was certainly somewhat satisfying. But the fact of the matter is it was a tough issue. I don't know whether you've asked me this question or not before, but the way it went down was the President-elect told the Chairman, Colin Powell on one of Powell's trips to Little Rock when he became the President, that he would meet with us, the Chiefs and discuss the issue to get our views. That was relayed to us by General Powell. We "rogered that" and that is essentially how we answered all of the questions before he became the President. People would ask us how we felt about it and we said, "Well it's probably more appropriate for us to wait until the President is inaugurated and then we'll discuss it with him." In fact, what happened was he was inaugurated and the next day or the day after Representative Barney Frank announced from the Hill and then it was reported in *USA Today*, among other papers. I recall the one I saw first was *USA*

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Today. The President would sign an Executive Order permitting gays to serve, gays and lesbians to serve. That caused a number of phone calls to be made between the Chiefs. We set up a meeting with the Secretary of Defense that afternoon, Mr. Aspin. Told him how we felt about it and essentially what we said was -- I know what I said and I'll tell you what I said. What I said was, "Look, the President's got us in a real box here because he told everybody he had talked to us. He obviously hasn't. When we are asked by the press and our constituents my answer will be an honest answer. No, I have not talked to the President. He didn't talk to me, he didn't ask me." I think for us to be in some kind of an ascendant position, a morally ascendant position with our constituents, that is the soldiers of the Army and the leaders of the Army, that the President should at least listen to us. The others said essentially the same thing. The next thing that happened is we had a meeting.

[End Tape S-456, Side 1]

[Begin Tape S-456, Side 2]

INTERVIEWER: The meeting, sir.

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GEN SULLIVAN: So, there was a meeting in the White House and all the Chiefs, the Chairman, and the Vice Chairman went to it. President of the United States was there. Vice President was there, George Stephanopolus, various other people. I think Tony Lake might have been there. Anyway, everybody was there, DeeDee Myers. All the personalities were present for duty. We stated our position. There was some give and take. At that time General Powell actually threw the compromise position on the table. I signed up for it and said this may be a pretty good way. As reported in somebody's book, Stephanopolus's book or someone's book, but that's pretty much the way the meeting ended. Then in July the policy was legitimized. Now there was lots of toing and froing. Okay, Sam Nunn and others over on the Hill. I recall only once where I really, I wasn't confronted, it wasn't a confrontation but one of the big deals was during the middle of all of this was some remarks I made out at Fort Leonard Wood. I went out to the Engineer Conference at Fort Leonard Wood in the Spring and somebody asked me if I were to resign and I said, "No, I would not. I would not leave the Army in a hot landing zone." I thought about it, but not for long.

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Is this the one that I hang it up over? And I decided that it wasn't, because I didn't think -- and I don't think I'm unique in this. I think Chiefs before me have come to a rationalization like this. If I did resign then they'd have to come up with another officer to do it and I felt that when that happened he would be seen by the Army as having compromised on the way in and he wouldn't have the flexibility. Rightly or wrongly, I felt that he'd have to say since they were going to interview him and he'd get all embroiled and it wouldn't be good for the Army, any number of things would happen so I just said, this is it, I'm in the fight and I'm going to stay in the fight. I figured that I was just as good as anybody else in uniform to try to make it happen if we were told that we had to make it happen, which I didn't want to do because this is the bottom line. I didn't know how the hell to make it happen if we were told to do it. We would have figured something out because I guess you always do, but it just hurt my brain to figure out how to make this thing happen in an effective way, which was essentially my position and that is what I stated throughout. I will tell you I did not get into a bunch of esoteric or theoretical or mental stuff.

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All of the things that many people have talked about with gays and homosexuals, because I'm not an authority on the subject. The only thing I'm an authority on is soldiers in the United States Army and I felt that it would be very difficult to say, "Okay, PFC so and so, you have just told me you are a homosexual. Now you go live with PFC so and so and Specialist so and so and everything is going to be alright." I didn't think it was logical then. I don't think it's logical now. It's too open. There is an openness about that that just to me wouldn't work. Disregard the moral issues and all of the religious connotations of it and all of that. I didn't get into any of that. I just didn't think it could be done and so stated. I think the compromise is appropriate and I think it's worked out okay.

INTERVIEWER: Yes sir, it has worked.

GEN SULLIVAN: I think we'll probably have problems with execution. I know that down at the "rubber meets the road" level there are some units and the companies and the battalions and the squadrons and batteries and troops who feel that people who say, "Hey, I am

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homosexual," that they get out too quickly, but that is the price we are going to pay for this policy and I think it's worth the price.

INTERVIEWER: Can I throw in a couple of follow-ups?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: Does it ever bother you, have you ever seen these accounts that still later on, if you will, accuse you and General Powell of disobeying the President's orders? Who disregard the facts of the way the meetings occurred?

GEN SULLIVAN: In what?

INTERVIEWER: I've seen where people looking back at this argument ignore the facts of how the meeting took place and the fact that the administration didn't really get back with you, but then later announced the policy. Accused some of the service Chiefs of being insubordinate, disobeying orders.

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GEN SULLIVAN: Oh yes, well, that doesn't bother me. That doesn't bother me at all. I know what I did and I know how it worked and I know the role that Rudy de Leon played and Jamie Garelick and I know the whole back and forth with the Service Chiefs. We were actively involved in it throughout. There was no order, there was nothing ever written. The President didn't give us an order so that we could disobey the order. It was a dialogue between us and the President. Some of this criticism -- I don't think it's well founded. I guess where I come down on all of this is H.R. McMaster wrote a book, *Dereliction of Duty*.¹² Essentially what he said was that the Chiefs at the time, this is prior to Vietnam, this is in the 1960s. The Chiefs at the time did not stand up to the President, to the National Command Authority and say we should not do this. Therefore, they were derelict in their duties. Okay, so you have that piece of scholarship on the ground and there is a lot of people in America who believe that. So I stood up and did my duty as I saw fit, that is I stated my position. I also told the President, which I didn't say in this

¹² Herbert R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997).

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thing because I presume everybody knows it, that if he decided, if he decided that the best course of action was to permit gays and lesbians to serve openly that I would do my best to execute his policy. I don't think you could ask anymore of any man or any woman than that. I don't think I was disloyal, dishonest, or whatever you want to call it. Now there is a third piece that is in this which just came out recently and I'll give you a copy of it. One of the people who has been involved in this is a guy named Richard Kohn.¹³ I was just interviewed by Tom Gjelten on National Public Radio (NPR) back in May. The interview was driven by the thesis that Gjelten has that the present administration is discounting the views of the senior military people and publicly denigrating these officers. It's essentially the Department of Defense and especially Mr. Rumsfeld. In the piece he uses General Buck Kernan and Admiral Denny Blair as examples of how the Secretary of Defense is sort of brushing them aside and criticizing them for stating their personal views and essentially trying to

¹³ Dr. Richard H. Kohn is the former Chief of the USAF History Program. Dr. Kohn has written extensively over the last 33 years on civil/military relations in the United States. His works include *Eagle and the Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802* (NY: Free Press, 1975) and *The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today* (Colorado: USAF Academy, 1999).

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diminish them as not being aware of what's really going on. Kohn, who is involved in this previous case, the one we are talking about here, the homosexuals with President Clinton and the Chiefs, makes the point on this NPR interview that we have to be very careful in civil/military relations that we don't go back to the McNamara era where we just brush the senior military people aside. Because in Kohn's view, and he has studied it now for a number of years, it's taken us almost 30 years to rebuild the trust that should exist between military people and civilian the leadership. If this administration is not careful that trust is going to be fractured again. People, senior people must treat each other with dignity and respect. If that dignity and respect bonds, those bonds don't exist if one is getting discounted or the other is getting discounted because of ideological views, whatever, then the thing, this whole system of ours starts breaking down. I must say I am concerned about it, but that is another subject. That was really not the case in early 1993. I don't have the strong feeling that any of the other Chiefs, however we felt about President Clinton, I can only speak about myself, however I felt about him later with the

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Monica Lewinsky case and all of that. That did not color my view during this homosexual thing. It didn't make any difference to me that he hadn't served. Mr. Cheney hadn't served. A lot of people who were my bosses never really served. You know people that I respected did not have a long distinguished career.

INTERVIEWER: I looked at your notes from the period. You are very positive about him (Clinton) at the time. Your question is handlers, because many of his handlers had their own agendas.

GEN SULLIVAN: Right. Everybody had an agenda.

INTERVIEWER: Last piece of this and I don't want to dwell on this issue too much, but one thing that is possibly positive out of that whole debate. You know one time the gay community was claiming to have 10 percent of the population, and in that whole airing of that debate centered on Department of Defense -- some other things came out and it wasn't seen as this great body that they claim to be.

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GEN SULLIVAN: No, they weren't. It's less than two percent, I think. It may even be less than that in the military. You've got some interesting thoughts in here about MAJ Melissa Wells-Petry and LTC Robert McGinnis. They were big players in it, they were there. Both of them had strong views, very strong views, and very conservative views about it. They were important too. Tom Carney was important, Mike Nardotti was important. There were lots of important people in the whole discussion phase of it, but ultimately it came down to, I hate to say this, ultimately it came down to how the Chiefs -- me personally how I was relating with Rudy de Leon and Jamie Garelick and the other Chiefs and the Chairman and the President. That is essentially what it came down to. Although these guys and gals helped me a lot because there was a lot of give and take behind the scenes. But I don't know about some of the counseling de Leon did as well as Wells-Petry at least I don't recall. I think she went off the deep end once and I wouldn't be a bit surprised. I'm not surprised that he said it, I just don't remember the details.

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INTERVIEWER: Did you ever get any White House or Congressional pressure to advance certain general officers?

GEN SULLIVAN: I never got any White House pressure to advance General Officers. My approach was to work with the Secretary of the Army and then go see the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry. Mr. Aspin, I think I went to see him once, and Dick Cheney and I had a matrix. I'd use a matrix and I had the commands across the top, you know, "Forces Command," "Europe," etc., and then I would line up under the people I was trying to develop to go into those positions. And it wasn't pressure, it was sort of give and take. Have you thought about so and so going into that position? But it wasn't pressure. I never got any pressure at all.

INTERVIEWER: What was the National Guard and Reserve "off-site" agreement? What roles were played by GEN Peay and COL Dubik?

GEN SULLIVAN: National Guard and Reserve was a problem. Was a real challenge because the numbers

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were big. Guard and Reserve didn't want to come down. The Guard in particular was unhappy with us, maybe with me in particular, since I was the Vice during the time of the Gulf War. They were very unhappy about the Gulf War and 48th Brigade out of Georgia and how that whole thing played out. Correctly, Carl Vuono said he was not going to send those three brigades, 48th was one of them, the 151st from Louisiana, and there was another one. He wasn't going to send them right away. He wanted to certify them at the training center so he put them through a session at the training center. Then we were about to send them and the war ended. Well, they were very unhappy about that. In my view, unjustifiably so. The perception was not good. Unfortunately that flap overshadowed the good performance of the bulk of the Guardsmen or Reservists and, by the way, the good performance of those brigades that we were getting ready to go. But it became a real political football. We needed to bring everybody back to common grounds so I sent Binnie Peay, Jim Dubick and others into an offsite to come up with an agreed approach to taking the forces down and the creation of "America's Army," Active, Guard, and Reserve and that was the expression. It's

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probably been around for a long while, but we used America's Army, which General Shinseki probably correctly so, now calls "The Army" and that means everybody. What I was trying to do was be inclusive. The offsite agreement was okay, here is what the numbers are, and here is how we are going to get there. Everybody agreed to it. They came to see me. They signed up for it, I signed up for it, and then we went to the Department of Defense. They made a political deal out of it -- you know, this is a big agreement, which, by the way, was done on a number of things. But whatever the case, it was political and anybody who thinks touching the Guard and Reserve, Guard in particular was not political, doesn't understand the National Guard, doesn't understand America.

INTERVIEWER: How about the sexual harassment and women in combat issues? How did you remain "steady" when all those emotional debates were raging? Did some good for the Army come from all of that?

GEN SULLIVAN: This whole business of women in combat and sexual harassment, you've got some good questions

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here. All of this is like water, it's like the ocean. You've got currents running through all of this. In 1991 the war ended, so we have the physical reduction of the Army. Then we have this whole male/female stuff going on. There was very little actually in the Gulf War -- sexual harassment. There was one sort of marquee case from West Texas that later was resolved in court. There were a lot of male/female issues in the Congress and we get swept up in it because of this case. It played out even, of course, more loudly during the Clinton Administration when the feminists and others felt that obviously sexual harassment was the problem. Sexual harassment was derivative as a discriminatory policy which said women couldn't serve in various positions -- women in combat. So it was, it was a fact of life, it was there. We had the Navy's Tailhook scandal, which was male/female. We had homosexuals, gays, and lesbians and all of this is swirling at the same time. I spent a lot of time on sexual issues. That is not what I wanted to do obviously, but that's the way things worked out. The way I remained steady was that I stated my position which was that I felt and I still do, that women should not serve in combat battalions, in battalions

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organized for direct combat. That is armor, infantry, and field artillery, which includes Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) because MLRS goes way forward because we don't out range the enemy. We are about to continue that because we killed the Crusader. So now they don't serve in cavalry squadrons either, but they can fly helicopters, so they are in Apaches (AH-64). That was only because I couldn't figure out how not, frankly. We couldn't figure out how not to do that and as it turns out that has worked out fairly well. First of all, not many women want to fly Apaches anyway, so we opened that. Everything else we were willing to work with. We worked our way through it, seems to have died down. We also did gender-integrated training, which is a matter of continuing interest to everybody. I thought it was the right decision then. I think it's the right decision now. Women serve in all branches in the Army except armor, infantry, and field artillery. They go everywhere. They are into Afghanistan right now. They are in Haiti. They were in Somalia, Rwanda and they are sleeping in tents with men. They are doing everything with men with the exception of showering. They go into a tent with a bucket of water or somebody stands

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outside and they take a shower inside--so males and females are together all of the time. They do in many cases the same jobs as men do in a lot of the branches, most of the branches in the Army. So I felt after a year of study on the subject that the best course of action was to train them from the minute they came in the Army to put them together in a sense, integrated in their initial entry training phases. Now, in retrospect I think the Army did not do a very good job of executing that policy. We had very spotty execution. The Cassabaum Study showed that. I think that has been sorted out now and I think to walk it back would not be very good. We have a lot of very good women in the Army. Most of them are dedicated soldiers, very competent and I think we did the right thing. Now how did I remain steady? That is a question that I could actually say throughout all of this and the way I did it was first of all, I have a very supportive wife whose only agenda was -- and she is not submissive in any sense of the word. She has never been submissive to me, but her agenda is to ensure that I can do the best job or the best at whatever job I'm given and she has been very supportive of me. She wasn't pressuring me all the

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time to be doing stuff she knew that I couldn't do anyway. Although she would tell me to lighten up every once in a while and stuff like that. Okay, that is number one. Number two, my aides were very good. I'll go from latest to earliest. The last one was now Brigadier General Leo Brooks who is going off to be the commandant at West Point. Then Colonel Carl Horst who's now with the 82nd as Chief of Staff. And before that Colonel John Grier who I believe is still at the National Training Center in a senior leadership position there. These men were all light infantrymen. The reason I selected light infantrymen is I am an armor officer and spent most of my time in heavy divisions and I wanted to have light infantrymen as my aide. They traveled with me all the time. They were with me all the time and they could tell if I was getting overloaded, sensory overload, too many people talking to me, too much going on, and this is particularly true on trips where people had access to me on planes or whatever. Since they had no agenda other than being with me and making sure I got to the place where I was supposed to be on time and making things easier for me, they were able to keep people away from me just to give me time to get my head

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sorted out. They were able to read the situation and do that. I also developed a very close friendship with Brigadier General Hal Nelson who was the Chief of Army History. He and I would go off together onto Civil War battlefields or World War II battlefields or just somewhere and reflect on the history of the Army. He'd help me wrestle my way through some problems. Like what? Well, during the American Civil War there was a radical Republican committee known as the Committee for the Prosecution of the War. They set themselves up after the Battle of Balls Bluff out here in Leesburg to determine how the battles went and who did what to whom and who was the good guy and who was the bad guy in all of this. What failures were there, who was weak on the Confederacy, etc. It was helpful for me to know that. It was also helpful for me to know that Pearl Harbor was investigated throughout the war and it's still being investigated and the Kimmel and Short families are still trying to get the ranks back of Admiral and General Kimmel and Short, who were the leaders found at fault and they lost their ability to serve at the three star rank. So when I was feeling sorry for myself over the fact that I had to go off to Capitol Hill to answer a lot

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of questions I didn't particularly want to answer, it was helpful for me to know all of that. That is a result of my own reading and my time with Hal Nelson and so forth and so on. And I also had my jazz, one of my interests, American jazz. Europeans play American jazz, but essentially American jazz, and I would listen to my music to relax when I was on trips and I'd also listen to it in the office and I still do. I also had to imagine what I was trying to do and, as you probably know from looking at my scribbles, you can tell, if you were to look at the dates on the scribbles and go find a newspaper you could correlate a crisis. . .

[End Tape S-456, Side 2]

[Begin Tape S-457, Side 1]

GEN SULLIVAN: Can't live in another time, you got to deal with the cards you have been given. God has dealt us these cards, this is it and we have to live in these times. Of course, Grant was sort of a muse for me because he was living in an Army that was coming out of the Agrarian Age. He was actually fighting an Army that was living in the Agrarian Age. The Union Army was beginning to get into the

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Industrial Age. He was the only who recognized that or one of the only ones who recognized that. The earlier generals did not and they couldn't turn their advantages into accomplishments on the battlefield and Grant did. I felt that in my case, in our case, we were going from the post-Industrial Age into the Information Age. Information knowledge was going to be the coin of the realm for us and that's what was driving me. We were writing the theories. We were experimenting and we were trying to figure out how we will use all of this. It pained me, it didn't pain me like somebody was sticking a pencil in my eye or something, but it bothered me that people didn't see that. They were trying to keep us back or they treated some of the press and even some members of the Army thought that life was a test and that there was an answer written on a tablet. There is no answer written on a tablet. We were trying to invent something. But Grant was helpful to me in thinking my way through all of this.

INTERVIEWER: And I remember your Larry King interview that we showed at the BG conference where you said, "We've been through tough times before and we are

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America's enduring institution." Two things you used a lot.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. I'm writing a speech for the Army's birthday. I'm giving the Army birthday speech in Korea and I'm using that theme a lot. I got off the web yesterday the President's remarks at West Point. This could be a watershed for the Army and it's unclear to me how some of this will be operationalized. Deterrence and containment are out, which is obvious to everyone. Although deterrence and containment in Korea is still in and he acknowledges that, and in a sense deterrence in Kuwait is in too. The Army has been through all of this before and miraculously held it together. Okay, did any good come out of all of this sexual harassment, women in combat? Yes I think so, yes, I do. I think something good came out of the Aberdeen case. It's hard at the time to see it, but I think it did for the country and the Army.

INTERVIEWER: On the previous issues and the "Roles and Missions" debate, did the services mutually

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support each other during this period of crisis or was it everyone for themselves?

GEN SULLIVAN: No, certainly not the Air Force. I got along good with Carl Mundy. I actually got along good with Frank Kelso and the Navy. Mike Boorda, a tragic case, but I got along okay with him. The Air Force was odd man out in all of this. The Air Force, General Tony McPeak, clearly was a student of the air power advocates of the 1940s and believed very strongly that air power could do lots of things and the Army should pretty much stick to it's own knitting and occupy the battlefield as defined by the range of the 155, about 18 miles, 30 kilometers. That is the depth and everything else would be provided by the Air Force. I didn't agree with that. Colin Powell didn't agree with it. Although I think what Colin really didn't agree with was -- and he so stated -- that we should go it alone. Each service should go it alone and Colin's view as told to us and I agreed with it, was that we should be a team. If we weren't a team, we were going to be defeated in detail. During 1993-1994, somewhere in there, Tony McPeak was able to break out and start banging on about taking over

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ATACMS, taking over air defense and so fourth and so on. It became a constant battle between the Army and the Air Force. It still goes on. It still is very troublesome. I believe and so stated, and I still believe the use of the complementary capabilities of each service is what is needed. We need a strong Air Force, strong Army, strong Navy, and a strong Marine Corps and they have to be interoperable one with the other because each is designed to do certain things and their must be redundancy. There has to be redundancy, there has to be overlap. The use of precision weapons while good, is not the only challenge on the battlefield. One only has to look at Israel or the Palestinians to see that okay, I can fly a whatever through a window, through the third window from the left and blow up some guy's office and kill him, but that has not solved the problems with the Palestinians -- hasn't solved it. I believe when the record is clear, which it may never be, and by the way the perception in Washington may count more than the record, but I believe the record in all of the wars, to include the one in Afghanistan, is that the Air Force is not there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week providing the close support that the guys on the

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ground need and I think that is being proven once again. Okay, so at any rate it wasn't easy. Tony didn't make it very easy and that's a fact. I'm not criticizing him for it, I'm just stating a fact. He was an advocate. We are all advocates of our own services and I'll leave it at that. I really don't know that he was trying to be selected as the next Chairman. I never thought he would be. I thought it was very well known what he was doing. I never thought he would be, but he might have been jockeying for position.

INTERVIEWER: How was your relationship with the two Secretaries of the Army for whom you served. What was your reaction when Mr. Shannon had to resign?

GEN SULLIVAN: My relationship with Mr. Stone and Mr. West was very good with both of them. I felt that they respected me and I respected them. Mr. Stone was a wonderful man, died too young, very nice man. We did have a good relationship. When Mr. Shannon had to resign, that was a tragic case. I was sorry to see him go because he was a supporter, but he had to go and he did.

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INTERVIEWER: Describe the period when you were "dual-hatted" as Acting Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff.

GEN SULLIVAN: When I was dual-hatted as the Secretary and the Army Chief of Staff, I think I was the first one since, believe it or not, ironically, since U.S. Grant did it. There may have been other cases. I think I was the only other one, somebody told me that.

INTERVIEWER: I went back. It was Grant or Sherman that had.

GEN SULLIVAN: Needless to say, life was very easy because I didn't have a Secretary of the Army between me and the Secretary of Defense. That was at a time when we were working the homosexual, gays, and lesbian deal. I had a direct line to Dr. Perry, who was the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Mr. Aspin. The other actors, Rudy de Leon and Jamie Garelick and there was another one, sort of an emissary that was there, whose name I forget. I actually saw him a couple weeks ago at something I was at. When Mr. Shannon left, Mr.

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Perry arranged, and this was by design, for me to talk to him every day that he was in town and I was in town so that it would never be said, could never be said that I was out of control, out of civilian control. So every day I'd go down to see him for an hour, half an hour whatever. Tell him what I was doing and he and I would talk. I built up a personal relationship with him, which was very important to me, and, I think, to the Army and is important in my thinking regarding how senior military people have to operate in the Pentagon. It's a system of mutual trust, respect, and personal relationships. And you have to develop those personal relationships. You know, he went from being Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of Defense. I always felt that I could go see him that his door was open and I felt very comfortable talking with him as I did with Mr. Cheney and Les Aspin. I went to talk to Mr. Aspin. He called me one Saturday morning--I was in Levis and a shirt and I said, "Well, I need to cleaned up." And they said, "No, don't bother doing that. Come on over right now. He wants to see you." So I went over, we sat down in his office, had a couple of donuts, cup of coffee, and we talked about, I forget what it was.

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Women in the artillery or who knows, or gays and lesbians or something. Mr. Shannon went and I was the Secretary and established this relationship with Dr. Perry. Now, when Mr. West came in, he really didn't get on the ground until late 1993, November/December. I had an opportunity then to take him around the United States. One of the covers of *Army* magazine shows he and I and Sergeant Major Kidd down at Fort Bliss, at either Bragg or Benning with a bunch of soldiers. That trip was designed to show him the Army, to give him a feel for the Army and to give him a feel for what I was trying to do, had been trying to do. He then became the Secretary and he and I worked together. Now that is not to say that in that whole administration that there weren't some challenges. Clearly there were a lot of things going on about changing and so forth. But our relationship was good and I always felt that I had the last voice with him in spite of everything else that went on. Now, I don't know what you want to do with this but you need to know there was an incident in June of 1994 and the subject was women in the artillery. When I left to go to Rome for the 50th Anniversary (Liberation of Rome, 4 June 1944) it had been decided that women would not

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serve in the artillery. So I got on the plane and I went to Rome. Mr. West was coming on the plane with the President of the United States and I was going to see him in Nettuno, which is south of Rome at the cemetery where most of the people from Anzio were buried. Well during the night my aide came in and woke me up and told me that contrary to what I thought that a new decision had been made, and that new decision was that women could serve in the artillery.

INTERVIEWER: This was by the Secretary?

GEN SULLIVAN: By the Secretary. Well, needless to say I was not very happy. So I went out and I ran that morning with the aide. We were staying in a hotel by the Spanish Steps and it was a nice day, early June in Rome. We ran on the high ground up by this hotel and it looked over the Vatican and Eternal City and Rome. I was able to reflect on what I was gonna do. We got on the bus and went down to Nettuno and I saw Mr. West. First person I sought out was Mr. West. He probably wasn't the first person I saw but. . . . Because the two parties merged there before the ceremony. He and I had a discussion about this whole

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issue. Essentially the discussion was that when I left the United States we had an agreement and now we didn't and I was very unhappy about that. And I felt that if we were going to work together that we have to have trust each other on these issues. So there was no real resolution of the conversation but I knew that the Secretary of Defense -- Dr. Perry was the Secretary by that time knew -- about it. I was able to inform him of my position on the issue. Nothing much happened and they, being the President's party, went off to London. I stayed in Italy to be the senior representative on the ground for the commemorative activities of the liberation of Rome, which took place on the 4th of June. So at any rate, I did Rome and then I went on to France to be there again when they came from England for the 6th of June (50th anniversary of D-Day celebration) activities. They were terrific and it really was an honor for me to participate in all of that and it was fine. I then went on to London. Everybody went back to the United States. I went to London for a counterpart visit with my British counterpart. Monday night I was at the Savoy for a dinner. I had gone to a play with my counterpart and his wife and another guest and then we

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were having a late dinner at the Savoy in London. The matri'd came over and said that I had a phone call. I went and I took the phone call and essentially what Mr. West told me at that time was women would not serve in the artillery and that when I came back he and I would talk to Dr. Perry and that was the end of that. Actually, I never told anybody that. It's common knowledge now in some circles because Dr. Perry mentioned, and then Mr. West himself has talked about it. I never told anybody that. I never felt it was appropriate to do it. I mean I stated my case. I stated my case to Mr. West. Certainly he knew how I felt about it. Then by law, I have the legal right to go to the Secretary of Defense or I can actually go to the President. The Chief can go to the President. All he has to do is tell the Secretary of Defense that he is doing it. In that case I went to the Secretary of Defense and told him how I felt about it. As it turned out, women don't serve in the artillery. My relationship was okay with Togo West after that. I'm sure many people were surprised at that, but it was because I stated my case. Sometimes I'd state my case and wouldn't be "win-win" but life at the top is not always a zero sum gain. Well, a perfect case in point

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is gays and lesbians. I mean, some of the criticism is how come you didn't win it. Well, what is your definition of winning? With regards to women in the artillery, I think that was an issue that needed to be "won" and we did pretty good in it.

INTERVIEWER: How important was COL Harper and the Staff Group during your tenure as CSA?

GEN SULLIVAN: Mike Harper and the Staff Group were very important to me during my tenure. They were sort of always there through all of these issues. When you go back to study they were always there. They gave me stuff to read. They helped me think. They weren't working agendas, they weren't working the staff papers. What they were doing is helping me think putting speeches together any number of things and helping me think out into the future. Mike was very important to me. When I got back and I wrote down the guys here on one of these papers I did of who provided personal/professional support day to day; Dave Ohle, Greer, Carl Horst, Leo Brooks, Rose Walker, Gina Farisi, Lil Powell, my secretary, Al Blensol, you know. Okay, Al was an important part of my life

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because I could talk about personalities with him, the general officers, and we could dialogue about that.

Mike Harper was always there. He always traveled with me. He and I went through this four years together, so he occupies a special place in all of this.

Obviously, my wife, some of my civilian buddies, Tom Decker, Dick Durgens, who tragically died way too early. Dick was a Reservist, a brigadier general. He was in Europe, passed away and I buried him in Europe. Hal Nelson, and my Norwich buddies.

INTERVIEWER: In a commencement address you gave at Norwich, you cautioned the cadets not to emulate your record for punishment. What was that about?

GEN SULLIVAN: I guess what I was saying to the Norwich Cadets, I was not a great cadet. I was an okay student at Norwich. I mean all of this is a matter of record. I viewed cadet life as sort of not real. I was taken with the Army but not in the Army as it was portrayed to me in cadet life. It seemed unreal. The sergeants up there were very important to me. They were good mentors. They were good role models. The discipline, I mean all of that stuff was

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okay. Now in retrospect, they all know this because, you know, to the 18 and 19 year olds who look ahead and they see, well, this guy now became the Chief of Staff of the Army and he was not much of a cadet, so that is a justification for me to do that. I don't think anybody should emulate me in that regard and I just wanted them to know that. I don't think it hurt me any way that anybody could quantify. I think if I were more disciplined as a young man, if I were more mature, I might have been able to do whatever, but what the hell kind of thing is that to say. I mean, I've had a great life and I can't complain about anything. I mean, I'm enjoying my life. I have a good family. That is not to say life has always been great -- there have been challenges, but I don't think I'm unique in all of that. It has been terrific and I don't think anything I did at Norwich hurt my adult life. But, having said that, I don't want them to think that it's just funny or humorous, yeah, I'm going to do what this guy did because that's inappropriate. That's all I meant to say. Okay?

[End Tape S-457, Side 1]

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INTERVIEW 7, GENERAL GORDON SULLIVAN

[Begin Tape S-458, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: This is tape one, interview number 7 with General Sullivan. The date is 5 June 2002. Sir, how did you articulate your vision to the Army as an institution? Did your vision evolve? How well was this vision received by your MACOM commanders and other key Army leaders? How did you win them over?

GEN SULLIVAN: A key MACOM commander providing input was Carl Stiner. In his view, we had to embrace as a group--in our doctrine and in our deeds and words-- what later came to be called full spectrum operations in high, low, and mid-intensity and we had to structure ourselves accordingly. All the way from the classified forces at one end to the guys and gals who would fight in high intensity conflict. His statement was very supportive. What he said was very supportive of where I wanted to go. He was an important actor. There were others in there who chimed in. Nobody was really opposed to it, they just all needed to be brought along and educate ourselves. Apropos that, I felt, and still do feel that intellectually it is

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physical. And the doctrine was the intellectual piece of this. Until we got the doctrine right and sought it through all of the doctrinal implications of what we were talking about, not being involved actively in deterrence and containment, that we might have to do a lot of other things. But until we got the doctrine right we couldn't structure our forces and we couldn't buy the equipment. Now there is a whole number of papers that were published and pamphlets that I know you guys have and they were all part of it. *America's Army* was one of the pamphlets. *War in the Information Age, Leadership and all that Jazz*. The author for *Leadership and all that Jazz* was Dan Bolger. Dan Bolger was really important to the writing that paper. Jim Dubik, Tony Coroalles, Mike Harper, that is what those guys did. They helped me put all that together. Intellectually and physical. Freddy Franks, TRADOC, 525 series. Where will we be in the future? The Army after next was an intellectual time struck. It later became something else, but for us it was okay, what is next? Where do we want to go? Where do we want to be in ten years? I don't know whether I want them all over or not. I honestly don't know that. Only they would know and be able to tell you. I think generally

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they understood what I wanted to do. They knew I was going to do it. One of the things that I did to make us a power projection Army was take the funding, which for years, the Army had given to the USAREUR commander, to maintain the Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS). I took that money away from him and gave it to AMC (Army Materiel Command), and gave the responsibility for the maintenance of that equipment to the AMC commander. The reason I did that was two-fold. First of all, the USAREUR was out-prioritizing me. He would get a considerable amount of money and if he had higher priorities, he was able to move that money around. I felt that equipment, given my experience with the Gulf War, that equipment was really the Army's equipment and we could send it anywhere in the world whenever we wanted to. For that reason, I wanted it maintained to a standard that I felt was appropriate for the Army. Not U.S. Army, Europe, for the Army. That was one of the things that we did, and we gave some of that to Korea. We started moving it around because the world was different. I think today, frankly, people tend to forget that we really did make major shifts.

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INTERVIEWER: I hope I wasn't set up with that question sir, but I was told this was a really good one to ask you. I have no idea what the answer is on this one because they wouldn't tell me. What is the "Allegory of the Eye?"

GEN SULLIVAN: I think what they are talking about is going out and looking back. If I want to go ten years out, how do I get there? It is in my book. I can go from here to that water tower, right? That is ten years from now. I would line all the numbers up. I would make everything perfect. I have a plan, all the numbers, every Program Objective Memorandum (POM), and all of that. That really is not how life is. By the way, you can try to make yesterday perfect because if I make yesterday perfect, clearly if I am able to make all of that perfect, I will get to the future. I think the way to do it is you go out there and you picture yourself out there looking back at yourself here and then you bring yourself forward. In other words, you bring the command forward. As you run into problems you are interpreting for them. You are translating for them, OK, we lost this much money today. The Congress did this, like the Crusader. Ok,

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the Crusader is gone, here is what we are going to do about it. It is a mental game that you are playing with yourself. You are out there, you are a long distance runner and you have gone to the finish line before you even start the marathon. Then you turn around and you think of yourself as you are running at the finish line and it is easier to do it. It is in the book.

INTERVIEWER: What was your vision for "America's Army?" How did you see change, continuity, and growth as being the pillars of your vision for transforming the Army?

GEN SULLIVAN: In 2010 I wanted to have the six imperatives in some form of balance, some form of equilibrium and we kept them there all the way down, and we were able to organize around information knowledge. In some scenarios the measure of effectiveness is lethality. In some scenarios the management of effectiveness is stability. What the Army didn't have enough people of, what it doesn't have enough people of now, is people. So if I can get more lethality with information enhanced systems, like

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the Crusader, then, because I am doing with three people what it takes five or more to do. Actually it is not that, I am doing with 9 people what it takes 15 to do. What do I do with the 6 people? Well, I make infantrymen out of them. That is what I wanted to do. The problem is they kept sweeping them off the table. MPs, infantrymen, engineers, the things you need in the Kosovos of the world, you make special ops guys out of them. I made a conscious decision and proposed Special Forces, not while I didn't touch the Ranger regiment and I didn't touch Special Forces. Actually I crossed them up.

INTERVIEWER: That is useful sir. Useful for me going into brigade command and think through a problem. Sir, the next question is, issues turned up in the last couple of weeks, and I imagine there were issues with you as well during your tenure as Chief, but how would you describe the Army's relationship with Congress during your tenure as Chief of Staff? And how did you personally work to cultivate good Army-Congressional relations?

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GEN SULLIVAN: Congress is 535 people. It is hard to talk about it as Congress. There were some members with whom I had a lot of contact. There are some particular pieces that the Chief of Staff of the Army has a lot of contact with. Some parts of it, you don't. Obviously, the women, we talked about this at length on Sunday, there were a lot of very powerful women in Congress, both in the House and the Senate. They became very important to us because they were women and because they were working female issues. But that was episodic. Some of them like Kay Bailey Hutchinson, in addition to being a woman, she would participate. Although the Senate was less aggressive on some of the issues than the house was. But Pat Schroeder did have Denver and she was into Rocky Mountain Arsenal, but that really wasn't her issue. Kay Bailey Hutchinson was Fort Hood and Texas. So we would work it. I saw her any number of times. Your relations with Congress are problematic as always. It is a constant challenge. You have to be visible up on the Hill. The Army has to be visible and we were because we had a very good Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL) staff, Jerry Harrison, Chuck Dominy. They were very good at it. I had good

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people. I would try to go up to Congress when there wasn't a crisis and visit people. Norm Sassiski, Herb Bateman, both of whom happen to be dead. Norm died recently. Sonny Montgomery with the National Guard. Ike Skelton from the state of Missouri; Danny Inouye, a senator from Hawaii, Ted Stevens, senator from Alaska. Inouye and Stevens were appropriations people. Jack Murtha was an appropriations guy in the House. Norm Dix was appropriations. Senate Armed Services Committee, Arnold Prinaro was the permanent staff member. He was the senior staff guy in the Senate Armed Services Committee. I had to work him a lot. Sam Nunn, John Warner, it was constant. I didn't have anything like the Crusader. The issues were end strength, members of Congress felt that the Army should be bigger than it was. I would call Ike Skelton. Ike has always felt that way. He had a group of retired generals go over there--Carl Vuono, Jack Vessey, Bob RisCassi, and they essentially said, "Well, the Army ought to be 560,000." I didn't have any problem with that. My only problem was nobody was going to give me the money to maintain an Army of 560,000. So I went over there with the President's budget. The President's budget was seeking to support

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a smaller number because we were bringing it down for the particular year. This is all knowable by going into the records. But let's say I was defending an Army of 520,000. I was defending it because that was all the money I had, that was all the manpower I could buy to keep the thing in some kind of equilibrium. You are really constrained on manpower dollars. Skelton came back and said that the retired generals stated it should be 560,000. My answer to that was, "Yeah, OK, I don't have any problem with that except nobody has given me the money to do that. If somebody gives me the money and the authority, 560,000 would be fine. But the money is not forthcoming. Therefore, I am here to defend the program I have put together which keeps the Army in some form of balance. That was the way that went and that is the way the game is played. I think I got myself in trouble every once in a while with John Hamre who was the comptroller, because I didn't agree with what they were saying. I think I was probably in more trouble with the Department of Defense than I was with the Congress. I don't recall ever having a real confrontation over that.

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INTERVIEWER: Sir, one of the things I knew you supported early in your tenure was a concept called peacetime engagement. Did this concept face any resistance within the Army and DOD? Do you think this vision proved correct?

GEN SULLIVAN: I think it is correct; I think it was correct; and it is the way we are going to go into the future. I was and am a conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction guy. I think it is circular, it is not linear. I think there are in Europe, in Korea, and in Japan, after World War II, we were in post conflict reconstruction, but it was also conflict prevention. I worry that we have left Somalia and we left a petri dish open. There have been bugs crawling in that petri dish since we left and they are not good bugs. There was no post-conflict reconstruction. I understand that some people view that as nation building, which to some, has become a very derogative term. I think the military, the Army, has a role to play. I think the rest of the government has a role to play, which the rest of the government hasn't stood up to. But we have to play our role and the rest of the Federal Government has to play its role, the

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Department of Agriculture, the Department of Energy. Peacetime engagement, shaping--I happened to be a proponent of shaping. I guess some, George Joulwan, probably for one, would say that there was resistance to this in the Army. I have never agreed with that. George views everything as a mission and I am not sure I don't view it that way too, rather than low intensity conflict. I was and am a conflict prevention and a post conflict reconstruction guy. Peacetime engagement, being involved with our allies, being involved in winning the peace, are important concepts.

INTERVIEWER: In setting the conditions for us to execute conflict, if it becomes necessary, like the engagement we had in Kazakhstan spent a lot to have the bases there.

GENERAL SULLIVAN: Did you jump?

INTERVIEWER: I was the guy in charge of that operation for US Atlantic Command. I put it together but they wouldn't let me jump.

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GENERAL SULLIVAN: Those were important. The Special Forces, look at what they are doing now in the Philippines and elsewhere. They were unable to do what they are doing now because of what they did in peacetime.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, looking back now it may not seem a radical new change. But being an action officer working it up, I think it was a transformation how I looked at the world and we saw the Army's role. At least from looking back way back in 1991. It was a different way of doing business.

GEN SULLIVAN: There were a lot of differences. Whoever thought we would be in Rwanda. Rwanda, Haiti. Mexico. I have some stuff in that coffee table over there. Just right here was given to me up in the Sierras, out of an opium field. This was what young children in Mexico used to cut the bulb and then their parents come along and scrape off the residue. When it turns black they scrape it off. Who would have thought that the Chief of Staff of the Army was going to get down to Mexico to talk about that kind of stuff? Now Rwanda was a good mission. Rwanda was an

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appropriate mission for us and for the Army. Rwanda became a big deal about did we go in early enough and so forth. Frankly, it wasn't even visible within the department. When it became visible we were told to go and we went. USAREUR sent troops. I think we did the right thing. Somalia was an interesting case. We did fine tactically. Probably operationally. Strategically because what happened in Mogadishu, it wasn't clearly a loss. And we left, which we probably shouldn't have done, but we did. But out in the countryside we made great progress. We both go back in the famine before coming back. We talked about this the other day. The Balkans. I never had any trouble with the Balkans. I don't really have any problem with what the President said about pre-empting because when I looked at what he said on Saturday up at West Point, say to myself, well ok, what if we had pre-empted Adolph Hitler? Thirty million people might not have died. There are lots of other cases in point.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, along the same lines, I read the book on your "Louisiana Maneuvers," but how did you

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use the concept of the Louisiana Maneuvers¹⁴ and the lessons you gained from General Marshall to transform the Army?

GEN SULLIVAN: That is what I said earlier in this interview that it was in about October/November the thing started to become clear. I was always looking for a device to use to gain the imagination of the senior people in the Army to enable them to see the process that we would use to move ourselves forward. Louisiana Maneuvers was what I came up with. I read Gabel's book¹⁵ and said, that is it. This is how I am going to do it. We will do some experiments. We will put the Army in the field and wargames, then we will experiment. By the way, unlike what Marshall and McNair did with the tank destroyer, because we have the simulations to do it, if we get some gee whiz, big uh huh, we can replicate the "uh huh" to see whether it really is an "uh huh" or a disaster. So at any

¹⁴ James L. Yarrison, *The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers* (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1999). The Louisiana Maneuvers were the expression of GEN Sullivan's vision of a systematic way to assess and improve the Army's ability to carry out its mission. He envisioned the new Louisiana Maneuvers as using a variety of means including rapid feedback from experimentation and exercises and extensive use of computer-based simulations to shape the post-Cold War Army. From this point on, the Louisiana Maneuvers guided institutional change within the US Army. See also Linda Borie Dugan, *A Qualitative Study of General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan, Former Army Chief of Staff* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 2006), pp. 139-140.

¹⁵ Christopher R. Gabel, *The US Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1992).

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rate, one thing led to another. I started talking about Louisiana Maneuvers, this is how we are going to move ourselves forward. We will experiment, we will war game and we will drive ourselves into this new world, like Marshall did in 1939 and '40 when they got ready to fight a war that the American people hadn't yet agreed or determined that they would fight. That simply stated what it was all about. I thought I would get energetic support from the generals. I am not sure they all saw it. I am not sure the Army saw it, which is neither here nor there because I kept pushing it, pushing it and pushing it. Somewhere there is an answer to the question I gave, which sort of summed it up. I said, "Hey, look, we need a way to think about the future. This is my device." If I didn't have it, I would have to invent something. I have to have a way institutionally to think about the future. This is it. You will note that I took very few briefings on the downsizing of the Army, on bringing the Army back from Europe. Although I knew a lot about it, that I would get in my office, I never had big, public sessions on it. The reason I didn't was that I wanted people to focus on growing the Army, on changing the Army intellectually as opposed to

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making it smaller. Smaller was not better; better was better. What is the definition of "better" is found in the doctrine. I knew that if I took a lot of briefings related to bringing the families home from Europe to all of the physical dimensions of this, we would go right into our own navel. We would have nothing but hour and hour long, day long briefings on it. So I tried to focus my energy on the Louisiana Maneuvers, on experiments.

INTERVIEWER: Along this line, sir, how did you see the digital battlefield evolving as a result of these maneuvers?

GEN SULLIVAN: I must say, and I hate to say this, I saw it evolving the way it has, and I am really worried that the Crusader has been killed. I worry about that because the Crusader really is a network centric weapon. It really is more than it is. It transcends what it is. It is like the Comanche which has taken entirely too long to do. Total situational awareness, battlefield awareness, common operating pictures, all of this is doable. I think the real question is, I didn't see the objective force. I guess

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I saw some of it, but I wasn't that far along in my thinking, in a sense it enhanced crusaders, M1A1 tanks, Comanche's, a very lethal Army which can fight it across the spectrum. Probably more infantry and all of what we are talking about. That is what I saw. Joint by the way. The combined piece I wasn't worried about because I knew we could use the liaison officers.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, reading your speeches, many of them have references to General Grant in them. In particular, his relationship with Sherman. How did General Grant, his experiences, help you as the Chief of Staff of the Army?

GEN SULLIVAN: They helped me a lot. Grant was of use to me. In a historical sense. Grant understood. He was living with people who were in the early stages of the Industrial Age. Most of the armies of those days were agricultural armies, forces. They were foraging armies. Certainly his enemy was a foraging army. The Union generals were unable to turn their advantages into accomplishments on the battlefield. Their advantages were mass production and the North,

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processed food, munitions, standardized artillery, you name it. The railroad had waterborne transportation. Grant was the first one who was able to look at all of that and turn all of those advantages into accomplishments on the battlefield. He was able to run large scale operations. He essentially was writing the book on going from the Agricultural Age to the Industrial Age. He and his generals in his Army. I thought, and I still do, that we were beginning the journey from the Industrial Age into the Information Age. There was a lot that Grant did which was exemplary of the kind of work that we did. I used some of the examples. Frankly, we were being criticized for this and criticized for that. Every day was not great. He took some hits. Cold Harbor was one of them. He took a lot of hits. There is one piece that I wrote, I think it was in November of 1994. It was a letter to the generals. It was written on a Saturday night after Hal and I had been to Chancellorsville.¹⁶

[End Tape S-458, Side 1]

[Begin Tape S-459, Side 1]

¹⁶ See Gordon R Sullivan, "Letter to the Army's General Officers, Chancellorsville, 26 November 1994" in *The Collected Works, 1991-1995*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995), pp. 437-439 and "Civil War Roundtable talk, 11 March 1994: General Grant and America's Army Today," in *The Collected Works, 1991-1995*, pp. 241-247.

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GEN SULLIVAN: "We must have been in a big fight over money if I remember correctly. Our tasks do the very best given the resources we are given to protect and defend this Republic. We, like those who come before us, must do all we can to accomplish mission and play our part in the defense of our Republic. The defense of America is a shared responsibility. We will do our part. I do not intend to stop our movement nor retreat. I need your support." I was obviously in a fight here over money. That is not Grant, it is Lee. But there is a whole bunch of Grant stuff here. Now Sherman to Grant, that has been around for a long time with me. I think that is the essence of being a soldier. What Sherman said in that letter, the piece that relates to their personal relationship. That is why Shughart and Gordon¹⁷ did what they did. That is why the United States of America, ultimately why we go to places, to do things to help other people. Because they are in trouble. We have a strong orientation to help others. That is why you guys do what you do and it is why I did what I did. It is up to us to inculcate that into our subordinates. I don't think

¹⁷ MSG Gary I. Gordon and SFC Randall D. Shugart were killed in a firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia on 3 October 1993. Both were posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for their actions. See Gordon R. Sullivan, "The Hall of Heroes Ceremony, 23 May 1994, Selfless Service to Nation: The Ultimate Sacrifice" in *The Collected Works, 1991-1995*, p. 263.

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that happens by mistake. I think you have to talk about it. I think they have to know it. I think you have to live it. When you are making a decision or you are about to cut somebody off at the knees, you have to be very well aware how that will play given this Sherman-Grant letter.¹⁸ Are you being loyal to your subordinates? Will they in turn be loyal to you?

INTERVIEWER: I am a big fan of Grant sir. That letter from Sherman is full of other great lines. I will ask you about what you thought about Brad Smith's Army and George Crook's Army?

GEN SULLIVAN: I think about Brad Smith's Army. But the leadership of the Army, that is, Eisenhower, Bradley, J. Lawton Collins. They bore some responsibility for what happened to Brad Smith's Army as well as MacArthur, Truman and the political leadership. We let the Army atrophy. We said we were going to do it all with strategic bombers and atomic weapons. Now admittedly the Cold War was getting cracked up. I understand all of that. I think we let

¹⁸ W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1957), pp. 399-400. Letter in question is from Sherman to Grant, dated 10 March 1864.

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Brad Smith down. Brad Smith did the best job he could with what he had, which wasn't much. I tell you, I wasn't going to sign up for that nor was Carl Vuono before me. I don't think Denny Reimer and Rick Shinseki were either.

[Begin Tape S-458, Side 2]

INTERVIEWER: Your first question, sir, going from the Vice to the Chief, your prospective change?

GEN SULLIVAN: Vuono told me the day before, he and I sat in his office. I was sitting at the left hand corner of his desk. He was sitting behind the desk, tears rolling down his cheeks. He looked at me and he said, "Sully, it is different on this side of the desk, sitting in this seat, than it is where you are sitting." Indeed, that was true. It is profoundly true. It is easy to say. He knew that it wasn't. It wasn't even easy to say which is one reason that the tears were coming down his face, because he was retiring after 30 odd years of service. So at any rate, he was 100 percent right. The whole view, your whole prospective changed. First of all, you are responsible for the Army all the way from the

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uniformed people, in many senses I was to be the acting Secretary of the Army so I was responsible for everything that the Army represented, both physically, intellectually, and substantively, the Army in America. My perspective just got larger and larger and larger as time went on. As the Vice, my perspective was frankly, the Gulf War. A lot of it was the Gulf War because the Gulf War started relatively short. Not relatively, it was short. I took over as the Vice in June and in the first part of August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. So of course, that was 50 to 60 percent of my time as the Vice was that. But as the Vice you are also into other things. Paradoxically I would be sending stuff to the Gulf War, mobilizing people - this was during the DESERT SHIELD phase - for that, and at the same time working the plans to take the Army down. There was never any doubt that we were going to win it. That was always a given. We didn't know how quickly, but we were generally looking at the Spring of 1991 that it was going to be over. We were already planning to take units out. When I became the Chief I awoke up on the 21st of June 1991 and I was in charge. It really took me till some time in the late fall to

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begin to feel I was capable of seeing it all and that I generally knew where I wanted to go, and how I was going to articulate it.

INTERVIEWER: In that job, sir, I know you had key people to help you in your day to day execution of the position of the Chief. Can you tell us who these people were and how they supported you in your day to day routine?

GEN SULLIVAN: There were the principal people. General Reimer was the Vice Chief. General Peay was the DCSOPS. The director of the Army Staff was initially Don Parker and then it became Chuck Dominy. Mike Harper at the Staff Group. My first exec didn't work out for some reasons. My execs were Dave Ohle, Evan Gaddis, and J.B. Burns. It really went only J.B. Burns, Gaddis, and of course, my aides John Greer, Carl Horst, and Leo Brooks. My assistant execs were Rose Walker, and Gina Farrasey. Gina will soon get promoted to brigadier general if she is not already promoted. I don't think she has been promoted yet. Leo Brooks is going to be the Commandant of West Point. Carl Horst is the Chief of Staff of the 82nd

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and John Greer is out at USARPAC as the G3. Dave Ohle retired as a lieutenant general. Evan Gaddis retired as a major general. He got Recruiting Command. Dave Ohle was the DCSPER of the Army. J.B. Burns is the DCSOPS down at Forces Command. The key members of the staff, there is a picture of them right there, at one point that is when Binnie Peay was the Vice Chief. Chuck Dominy was the DAS. Sergeant Major Kidd was the Sergeant Major of the Army. He was the Sergeant Major of the Army for my four years. Lee Salomon was the DCSLOG at that time. He later went on to become the AMC commander. Chuck Owens was the J2, the DCSINT. Tom Carney was the DCSPER in those days. Tom Carney, Bill Reno, Ted Stroup were the DCSPERS of my tenure. John Tilelli at that time was the DCSOPS. John Tilelli later became the Vice and then he became Forces Command commander and then he went to CINCUNC in Korea. These men were all experienced people. They had access to me whenever they wanted. I saw the Vice probably three, four, or five times a day. The DAS I would see as many times. Sometimes I wouldn't because I would be traveling, but I would talk to them a lot. I would always check in with them and my XO [executive assistant]. And Lil. Lil Powell was my secretary for

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4 years. She is a national asset. The Protocol Officer was Liz Williamson. She was very important to me too because a lot of what the Chief does in Washington involves contact with the Army staff, promoting people, doing various kind of protocol things. But she did all that kind of stuff. And it was always very efficiently done so that I didn't have to worry about anything. She would come in and tell me, "Here is boom, boom, boom." She knew how I liked to do things and eased the burden. Apropos that, there was a staff of four noncommissioned officers in the quarters. Jerry Pietry was the cook. These sergeants kept the house going. One of them was up at 5 o'clock every morning. One of them was there with me at 5 o'clock in the morning. I would go out to run with the aides. The papers were there. Any newspapers, the *Early Bird*, papers that the XO wanted me to read before I came in. I would have a cup of coffee, read that stuff, get into the day. We would go out for a run, come back. I would generally be in the office by 0730, sometimes earlier. Mike Harper was critical. Mike and the guys and gals who worked for him were very critical. They were not charged with the day-to-day operations. They didn't have anything to do with

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staff. The staff didn't run papers through them. It was all things to help me think. Give me things to read that they had picked up in journals and other magazines. "Here, read this." It would be stimulating to me because they knew what I was wrestling with. So at any rate, in addition to all that they would write speeches, articles, Jim Dubik, Dan Bolger, Scott Feil, Doug Lute. There are so many of these guys. A lot of them are two star generals. Bob Dale. Bob is now the director of the US Army Transportation School. He was the DISCOM commander. Doug Lute is in Kosovo. He is an ADC in the Big Red One. He commands a brigade in the 1st Cavalry Division. Terry Juscobiac. At any rate this was a 24 hour a day, 7 day a week job. These people were there for me 24/7. They were feeding me and I was feeding them. If I was on a trip they were keeping me tied in with Washington. In turn I was feeding them stuff back. So it was a loop and it was constant. There were obviously other people. When we were working the homosexual issue, the social issue, gays and lesbians and all of that, Tom Carney, who was the DCSPER, was particularly involved. Mike Nardotti who was the Judge Advocate then, he was the number two guy at the

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time but he later became the Judge Advocate. There were other people who were involved in that operation. It would depend on what the issue was and how intense it was, whether some of them came to the forefront, which they did in that particular case. But these people were wonderful people and they were very supportive. I learned a lot from them. By the way, one thing I learned on the Army staff is what I wanted was knowledge and the ability of the staff officer to synthesize information for me and give me a recommendation or help me come to a conclusion. Whether they were generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels or captains was immaterial.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, I have been that guy in your office. You pointed your finger at me as a general sitting next to me, and you asked me what my opinion was. I was the action officer. I appreciated that.

GEN SULLIVAN: That to me, was the deal. Guys like you, Dan Gerstein. Dan Gerstein was the guy. He was the guy on Conventional Forces, Europe. If you get hung up on rank, well I knew this stuff. I knew him before so I have to have him around me, you are

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missing a lot as a CG. Because you are missing people of talent. You are missing the availability of your opportunity to know young people and to have young people who have lots of thoughts and lots of ideas.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, from an action officer's view, we did consider that if you could do the work, it didn't matter what rank you were, you were given the job.

GEN SULLIVAN: That is the way, I am glad to hear that because that was important.

INTERVIEWER: A follow up on that sir, your transition team, who led that? You came on like gang busters.

GEN SULLIVAN: Dan Christman. I think if I did come on like gang busters, that was a function of a very good transition team. You guys need that. Do you know about all these books by the way?

INTERVIEWER: They have a good number of those binders in MHI sir. Initial Studies Group, Volume One, 14 June 1991.

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GEN SULLIVAN: That is the study. This was put together to support, this is the work they did. You can go through it. What we did was I sent these guys and gals down to Fort Belvoir. They were down there in March, April and May of 1991. They went around and looked at the Army and I gave them some guidance. Essentially they knew that I thought maintaining the six imperatives, continuity with that, flattening the sine curve, and take the Army down; I had all of that in my head. All of this was in my head before they started their work. What we came out was, change and continuity, and they, then, started piecing everything together. So I knew that and no more Task Force Smiths. That was in my head also. What wasn't in my head at the time was growth. Growth was implied. If you had asked me back then, how do you feel about that? I would have said, "Yeah we are going to grow because I can't flatten the sine curve unless you grow." But because I didn't say it, it seemed to me that this was too passive. We were going to change, yeah. But change in what regard? I wanted to get growth in there. So the three buzz words were continuity, change and growth. No more Task Force Smiths. Training is a glue. Doctrine is the end to

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the change. When I came on I started talking about no more Task Force Smiths'. America's Army was my way of saying Active, Guard, and Reserve because I knew I had a problem with the Guard. I knew that. I wanted to demonstrate that I knew that the Guard was very important and I thought America's Army was the way to talk about it.

INTERVIEWER: So your vision did change in the first six months? I notice that it included a line, home and abroad. Is that also part of bringing in the Guard and this America's Army?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, but the vision was decisive victory at home and abroad. Yes, to get the Guard in it, but also to recognize that we were a strategic force and we had to get to the fight. That is what I would leverage to go after the C-17, the 19 large medium speed ro-ro's (roll-on, roll-off ships), prepositioning, shifting the stuff around, all of that was a part of the vision.

INTERVIEWER: I have a question that talks about that in particular. We went from a Cold War, forward

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station Army to a power projection army. The means that you just mentioned were key to making that strategy viable. How did you work with the other services in DOD and Congress to make your strategy a viable strategy? Get us the assets we needed to actually do and be a power projection Army?

GEN SULLIVAN: Well, I worked with the Air Force a lot on the C-17. I was very well aware of the fact that the leadership of the Air Force, while I was the Chief, was not completely convinced that strategic lift was the way to go. They were more tactical aircraft people. I understood that so we just started talking about C-17s a lot. I was, the Army was, probably the biggest proponent of this C-17, along with some strategic lift people in the Air Force. But the senior leadership of the Air Force was not convinced. So we talked about that a lot. In that regard, I pushed the armored gun system, which was a C-130 transportable direct fire weapon. And in fact, by the time I retired I think there were five of them. One of them got shot up in live fire testing so it was essentially destroyed. But there were four of them that had been type classified. That was a piece of it

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that had to be deployable in C-130s. A second piece of this endeavor was making each post a power projection platform, a world class power projection platform. If you go through the United States now and look at the installations all the way from Fort Hood to Fort Campbell to Fort Benning to Fort Bragg, Fort Drum, Riley, you will see all new rail heads. Multiple battalions, outloaded simultaneously. Airfields were extended like up at Drum and elsewhere. Manhattan and Kansas right outside Fort Riley, you will see a lot of investment, on rail. The investment on rail deployment from these posts to the ports was enormous! We have two ammunition ports now, one on the East Coast, one on the West Coast. Modernized. All kinds of cargo handling capability that wasn't there during the Gulf War. And prepositioning, we shipped the prepositioning out of Europe and we put it in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, with prepositioned sites. Then, of course, we have stuff in mobile ships. Linebacker ships which are ships loaded with rations, lumber, all classes of supplies. That was all a part of the Army being strategic. It was a major effort. The Navy, like the Air Force, was not interested in putting money into ships, although the Congress was.

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We were able to leverage the Congressional interest in building prepositioned ships fast deployment ships to cause the Navy to support the program. Mr. John Dalton was the Secretary of the Navy. I was the acting Secretary of the Army. It came down ultimately to a meeting between he and I. He wanted me to agree to leasing ships. Essentially these would be co leased. In other words, the ships would be off commercially deployed, carrying cars or whatever products. Then they would come back, like craft, to the government when we had to deploy to far away places. My response to his request was that I was going to hold firm because the Army had come out of the Spanish-American War knowing that our deficiency in that war was strategic lift. We couldn't get from Tampa to Cuba specifically. That the Army had always had this problem. We had it once again and I felt that now was the time to strike. He was supportive of that once we had the discussion. We now have the ships. He very graciously permitted us to name -- we gave him the names of some Medal of Honor recipients and the first five ships were named for Army Medal of Honor recipients. It is the Bob Hope class and the first ships *USNS Shughart* and *USNS Gordon* as well as

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two or three other Army people. My articulation of the vision was a multi-faceted campaign; I went all over the Army. I talked about it constantly. America's Army, trained and ready, training is the glue that will hold an Army together. We kept sending them to the training centers as we changed the doctrine. Doctrine is the engine of change. Well, as we changed the doctrine, the scenarios and the training centers changed. My theory was that it could be painless to the soldiers if they saw themselves training in the training centers to different scenarios. I think this was probably more the case in the light divisions because of the Joint Readiness Training Center than it was in the heavy divisions. But at any rate, that was the theory behind it if I talk hundreds or thousands of times about the Army. How well was it accepted? Who knows? I don't think there were any who thought the vision itself was off base although the Army hadn't really had a vision up until that time. The vision of the Army was trained and ready. It was the Cold War so that was fine; but I felt that we really needed a vision because we were going to go through some profound changes. The generals, I assembled all of them in about September

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of 1991. I had actually been with them before but the first time we really got together was in September of 1991 down at Fort Belvoir. Freddy Franks by that time was the TRADOC commander. Carl Stiner was still on active duty; Bob RisCassi, Butch Saint, so we had a pretty senior team. Ed Burba was down at Forces Command; Jimmy Ross was at AMC. Anyway we had this meeting down there and it was to talk about the new doctrine and the world as I saw it. We talked about what we were going to do to move things along. Carl Stiner made a point. Remember now he had been the commander of XVIII Corps in Just Cause and had done a lot of Special Operations work. He was pretty astute about where the world was going. As you can imagine a lot of those men had fought in the Gulf War and they were rightfully convinced that we had demonstrated that we were a world class Army. That was never a doubt in my mind; I didn't have any problem with that. The real issue was how would we maintain our status as the best Army in the world? That was the real issue. But given that we were going to go through all this physical change and get smaller.

[End tape S-458, Side 2]

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INTERVIEWER: How important was the strength of your personal relationships with other key leaders within the Army and DOD? In particular, how important were your relationships with GEN Jimmy Ross (AMC), GEN Freddy Franks (TRADOC), GEN George Joulwan (SACEUR), Admiral Frank Kelso (CNO), GEN Carl Mundy (Marine Commandant), and GEN Tony McPeak (CSAF)?

GEN SULLIVAN: My relationships with other people are critical to me. This is a human endeavor we are all involved in. I still have good relationships with all these people. The Chief, Naval Operations (CNO). I had lunch, spent time with Frank Kelso when he was going through the Tailhook scandal. I think we had good personal relationships. We both tried to ensure that we would because that is the kind of man he is. Carl Mundy, the same way. I think there were some people in the Army who were unhappy with that, so be it. My relationships with Tony McPeak were not great. And I think everybody knew that. I tried. Tony wanted to do some things that frankly, in my view, I felt were wrong. Tony is a bright guy and he did some things that were important for the Air Force. But they were wrong. They would have been wrong for the

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Nation and I so stated. Ultimately on roles and missions I think we prevailed. But personal relationships are very important. Freddy Franks - I was just with him this afternoon, he was the TRADOC commander. Bill Hartzog after him. I talked to those guys two, three or four times a week. I was on the phone with them all the time. The USAREUR commanders. The commander in Korea, developing a personal relationship so they knew how I thought and I knew how they thought. I think that was critical.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, you mentioned on Sunday that you wanted to talk a little bit more about your relationship with Dr. Perry.

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. Dr. Perry was the Deputy Secretary of Defense when I was the Chief and the acting Secretary of the Army. I became very close to him because I saw him a lot. I still am close to him. Because of our relationship I was able to go to him. When all else failed I could go to him and get a hearing with him. I wrote him a couple of handwritten letters. I don't know where they are. They may be around, buried somewhere. They were on yellow lined

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paper, and one of them was on women in the artillery. I felt that it was wrong to put women in the field artillery for any number of reasons. The Army wasn't ready for it. I didn't think it was appropriate. As I said the other day, the decision was made to not permit women to enter the field artillery. I left the country and while I was gone somehow that decision was changed. So anyway I talked to Dr. Perry, I talked to the Secretary of the Army, and I stated my case to Dr. Perry personally and then in writing, which was handwritten. I would probably tell you to lock this story up if Dr. Perry and Togo West themselves hadn't released it. Anyway, as I commented, you have the stuff off the other tape. I was told in London, called in London by Secretary West, "OK, women will not serve in the field artillery. If you do any press conferences or anything, you know what to say." I said, "sure." Nobody asked me actually. But the point is, he would listen. He would listen. He later worked with me just before I retired. I had an opportunity to get two billion dollars for the Army. To do that, we had to give up some manpower, some end strength. I brought General Reimer up -- this was in May of 1995 - to work with Mr. Deutch on it. Mr.

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Deutch was the deputy secretary of defense. I just told General Reimer, I didn't ask him how he felt about it, I just told him since I was the Chief, "I can't afford to give up two billion dollars so I will agree to give up 20,000 end strength but I want to do it in 1999, not in 1998. If I did it in 1998, it would have come out. General Reimer would have had to cut the Army about the first year he was in office and I didn't want to put him in that position. Dr. Deutch couldn't do anything with that. He didn't agree with it so I said, "OK." But he did agree to give me the two billion dollars. I went to Dr. Perry and told Dr. Perry the case. He said, "OK, do it." I only tell those two anecdotes because I think the only reason it happened was because we had a personal relationship and trust. He trusted me and I trusted him. I told him we could do it, but I didn't think it was right, it was appropriate because it would have been a very steep ramp and the Army needed stability. Young officers need to understand two things. One, it is not black and white. You can't win every fight. They are not compromises but it is give and take. You have to live to fight again another day. Frankly, at the time, I thought that between 1995 and 1999 when

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General Reimer had to give up that 20,000 that he might be able to do something. There might be money. Hell, look at where the budget is now! It is at 83 billion dollars. Then it was 62 billion. I can tell you, 2 billion dollars is a hell of a lot of money. So at any rate, live to fight again another day. Dr. Perry helped me do that.

INTERVIEWER: What were the key lessons learned and impact of the October 1993 TF Ranger firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia? What was the impact on you personally?

GEN SULLIVAN: Key lessons learned in Somalia, first of all, trained and ready troops. That is obvious. Trained and ready troops. Unity of command. There was not unity of command there and it is important. When there are plans like this, like what was, became operative in Mogadishu. Political activities, political governmental activities, closely linked everybody involved must be in the game 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The United States of America was talking to the United Nations about coming out. People forget that when they talk about tanks to

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Somalia. Disregard the tanks. We were negotiating to come out of Somalia when the operation went down. The question I ask myself a lot is I wonder if everybody really was paying attention to the fact that there were orders and authority which was operative in the theater, which were carried out. So at any rate, you needed command in the game. Everybody has to be in the game all the time. Now how did it impact on me personally? Obviously I was, and am, very saddened by the loss of those men, as I am the 44 who are on the parachute silk over there. Those are all the guys from Mogadishu. It just so happens they are all men; there could have been some women, who were lost in combat while I was the Chief. At any rate, there is a picture of me, Tony Lake, and Les Aspin in the summer time. That is the day we buried Ranger Sgt James C. Joyce.¹⁹

INTERVIEWER: What are your thoughts about then-MG Thomas Montgomery's denied request for tanks and AC-130s (USAF gunships)? What led to his selection as Commander, US Forces Somalia while serving as the

¹⁹ US Army Ranger Sergeant James C. Joyce, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, was killed on 3 October 1993 in a firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. He is one of the 44 US soldiers killed in Somalia.

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Director of Management on the Army Staff? How was his staff in Somalia selected?

GEN SULLIVAN: My thoughts on the Tom Montgomery tanks business. He probably should have been given the tanks and he certainly should have been given the AC-130s. I understand why he wasn't. But even if he had been given the tanks, if something hadn't had been done to get the tanks into the war plan, into that plan for the raid, I don't know that we would have been in any better shape because those tanks had to come up the alleys and the alleys, in spite of what you saw in the movies, those alleys were North African alleys, they weren't East African. You will probably talk to some of the Rangers who did it. The buildings were higher wherever they did it. Morocco or someplace. The streets were wider and the buildings were higher. I selected Tom Montgomery to go to Somalia because I knew Tom could be very good at coalition building and he is a very good team builder. That is really what the initial mission was. He was able to select his staff. That mission evolved to where he was the number two guy in the UN. He had been there. I think everybody was very comfortable

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with that. He was able to work with CENTCOM. I knew Tom. I had known Tom for a long while. He is a very competent officer. He was very good at team building.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir. He was my boss in DMO-SS.

GEN SULLIVAN: Was he? He was a smart guy. No, there wasn't a question of who all Diamond saw. It is unity command. Was it CENTCOM or SOUTHCOM? Or Special Operations Command? That, by the way, is the issue. It is not an issue, it has never really become an issue, although it was raised once in Afghanistan. It is the same thing. You didn't have that problem in Panama. You didn't have it in the Gulf War. Unity of command.

INTERVIEWER: During the conflict in Somalia, was there a question about who owned SOF? In particular, when CWO Michael Durant was captured, why was the CSA the media target and not USSOCOM or CENTCOM?

GEN SULLIVAN: Because the American people, I believe, do not see all of these acronyms, all of these headquarters, CENTCOM, Special Operations Command,

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CINCPAC. When they think of the Navy, if it is a ship, they think of the CNO. If it is a soldier, they think of the Chief of Staff of the Army. For better or worse, it is the service Chief who is the institution. I am the one in the cemetery. I am the one who buries Ranger Joyce. Now I am not saying that others don't feel a sense of responsibility. But I am saying that the Chief of staff of the army is the one who is the institution. That question is very insightful. The American people don't see all of that other stuff.

INTERVIEWER: What are your thoughts about Mike and Lori Durant; TF 160 Nightstalkers—Night Stalkers Don't Quit, the wounded engineer PFC you pinned the Purple Heart on at Andrews AFB coming back from Somalia? Was there any irony with this soldier being a wounded Vietnamese-American "sapper?"

GEN SULLIVAN: My thoughts on Mike and Laurie Durant? You know that they are divorced now?

INTERVIEWER: No, I didn't know that.

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GEN SULLIVAN: My thoughts on them, they are not giving 100 speeches where I have talked about them. First of all, Mike Durant is a very competent and very courageous guy. And very bright. I first met him in late October 1993 out at Andrews Air Force Base. There is a picture around somewhere. Putting a Purple Heart on him on a C-141. We took him from the C-141, carried him across the tarmac. Guys were carrying him. I was walking behind with Laura Durant. I said to her, "We are all proud of you. Proud of him. You were a source of great strength to me and to the American people." She had been on TV as you probably recall. So anyway, she pointed to her husband and she said, "Look, I love him. He loves what he does and I have no other choice but to be strong." Disregard however things worked out. At the moment that was offered and I think that was important for everybody to hear so I kept telling that story to the Army. A lot of these stories that I told were to reinforce values. Do you remember -- you may have heard me say the senior leader is the story teller, the interpreter. These were important stories. Certainly Specialist Ly. Ly's a Vietnamese kid, a Vietnamese-American from the 10th Mountain. What attracted me to

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him was obviously I was taken with his story. If a Vietnamese-American is laying there on a stretcher he probably weighs all of 96 pounds. The wound tags stated that he was from the 41st Engineer. You know the story. I said, "I see you are an engineer. Engineers are always out in front." In true soldier fashion he wanted me to know that he was better than an engineer, he was a sapper. I was standing there with my suit of lights on. I had my four stars, eight stars and all of this stuff. He wasn't cowed by any of that. It is the American spirit and he embodied that. It was not lost on me that he was a Vietnamese-American. I later saw him and I promoted him to E5 on the railhead up at Fort Drum, New York, when we deployed to Haiti. He is out of the Army now and I think he is doing fine. My role in the Haiti operation was that - obviously we sent troops, the 82nd and 10th Mountain and Special Ops and all of that. I had been involved in the Haiti operation since November. I was up at Fort Drum, New York, I guess it was Columbus Day, I really was annoyed because at that time we were fiddling around with the LST (Landing Ship, Tank). We couldn't get in. We had some special

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ops guys in this LST, *The Harlen County*. The Haitians kept the LST out.

INTERVIEWER: I remember that. A big disgrace for the Navy.

GEN SULLIVAN: A big disgrace for the Navy, a big disgrace for the Nation. So I was out on this holiday up at the Fort Drum trying to keep everybody under control up there because there was a lot of unhappiness. People were very nervous about what was going on. I was angry about the way we were handling this so I called down to LANTCOM (US Atlantic Command) or whatever we called it at the time. Called David Miller and flew down there. I said, "I am coming down and I want to talk to you." So I flew down and I said, "Hey, look. I am going to support you anyway, but what in the hell do you guys have up your sleeve? What are you really doing?" So I was actively personally involved in Haiti from that point on. I think the Haiti operation was very successful. I am sorry we left the way that we did. The rest of this country could not get behind Haiti, the other elements of power could not get behind it. Frankly, we had a

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win and I think we walked away from it. But the military did its part but we just couldn't mobilize the rest of the country.

INTERVIEWER: What was your role in the Haiti operations? Had we applied lessons learned from Somalia? What did Dave Brubeck, the great jazz artist have to do with the Army's experience in Haiti and Somalia?

GEN SULLIVAN: With regards to Dave Brubeck and this whole article; the basis of the article is improvisation.²⁰ I think what commanders do on the ground, adaptive, creative, commanders on the ground are improvising from a known theme. They are not playing concert music but they have to understand concert music. They have to understand the fundamentals. They have to understand all about the Army, Navy, the Air Force and the Marines and then they have to piece it together on the ground like the Special Forces guys did in Afghanistan. They never

²⁰ Gordon R. Sullivan, "Leadership, Versatility, and All That Jazz," in *The Collected Works, 1991-1995*, pp. 379-385 The same article is also printed in *Military Review* (Aug 1994, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 8), pp. 5-13. The premise of the article is that the skill and talent required of military leaders are in many ways akin to the virtuosity of the best jazz musicians. GEN Sullivan, being an aficionado of American jazz, cites jazz musician David Brubeck as an example of this talent.

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rode horses before. They never did a lot of the stuff they were doing. But fine, they got on the ground and they did it. Buster Higgenback did the same thing. Improvisers. Play jazz. I think the Army did a lot of that and it has all the time.

INTERVIEWER: Was there ever a time when you contemplated putting your stars on the table over issues you could not tolerate?

GEN SULLIVAN: I contemplated resigning, retiring, with the homosexuals and the lesbian issues that we had, but I quickly put it out of my mind. I just decided it would have been bad for the institution if I did it, because I thought that -- well first of all, I thought that if I went, nobody would care two wits if I went. But it would be a signal that the Chief of Staff of the Army didn't have the courage to fight the issue. It wasn't me personally, I didn't think that was a good idea. I felt I was as good as anybody to fight it out, and then if I was told to do it, to execute it. Secondly and probably more importantly, I felt that if I went they would obviously find another man and the institution that is the people in it,

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might think, some would think, that he compromised in his way in, and he would be seen as flawed on the way in. I didn't want to send him up to do that, or set the institution up. So I quickly discounted that. In the Spring of 1993 at Fort Leonard Wood, I told the engineers, they had a big conference and somebody asked me a question. I told them in my language that I wasn't going to leave the Army then in a hot LZ. That was pretty much the end of it.

INTERVIEWER: In your opinion, what is your legacy and greatest contribution to the Army?

GEN SULLIVAN: I don't know what my legacy is for the Army. I would just say that I have led the Army through a tough period. I believe in some sense retained the essence of the Army or I tried to. Created a base from which others could evolve the Army in that time. I never thought I could do much more than that to make it smaller. I knew I had to make it smaller and obviously, I did that. I kept it pulled together and I think in some small way some of what happened after that in combat actions and of the things that pretty good manifestation that happened.

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And provided the base, the leverage of digits. I feel pretty good about it. I don't know what my greatest contribution was. Like every Chief, you do the best you can with what you got.

INTERVIEWER: You are being very modest, sir. Aside from what I learned from doing this project, sir, the value of the ability to tell a story. And in conveying a message. It is very impressive reading your works and then talking to you. Your ability to tell a story really serves you well.

GEN SULLIVAN: If you think of yourself way out there, turn around so you are standing there but you are here with your guys. OK, guys, gals, here is where we are going. Here is how the Viet Cong is hitting us or the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) or whatever our enemy is. Here is what we are going to do to get to that point and you keep shaping them. You are interpreting that in ways that they can use. In real language they can use. They are not going to see ten years out there. You're visualizing that. You are interpreting the days in that context. In my view, that is art. That is what you guys get paid for.

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INTERVIEWER: Any other comments?

GEN SULLIVAN: What are we going to do now?

INTERVIEWER: They are going to give us the rest of the transcripts. You have three now.

GEN SULLIVAN: I need to go through the ones you gave me, which I have over here. That, and the ability to keep that as the lens through which everything else was focused as we went. And the digits weren't in here.

INTERVIEWER: When you sat down with General Nelson and myself the first time, and you opened up the book on the Sedan, you said one of your goals is when somebody looks at this 50 years from now, and looks at our interwar period, that you knew that we didn't just stumble into this?

GEN SULLIVAN: I want everybody to know that guys like us, and you were both in the building, we weren't standing around waiting for other people to tell us

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what to do. We knew generally what to do. We knew that the American people expected us to win. Whenever we were called out, they expected us to succeed at whatever we were asked to do. I want, I want, succeeding generations to know that the group of men and women who were leading the Army and soldiers in the Army

[End Tape S-459, Side 1]

[Begin Tape S-459, Side 2]

GEN SULLIVAN: And this is what we did. Someone may critique it. Somebody may say, "Gee, why didn't they go faster? Why didn't they go slower? How come they didn't do this? How come they didn't do that?" Look at the context. Look at everything that was going on and step back and try to put yourself in our shoes. Physical, intellectual, social, technological, fiscal, international, political. And just remember that we had to keep all of those balls in the air. And we came out in the other end in 1995. I was able to give General Reimer, in a sense, when I gave him whatever, when he took it, there was something that he could build on. By the way, it was not preordained that the United States Army could do as well as it is doing in

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Afghanistan or in any other place, the Balkans or you name it. It is not preordained that we would get to these successful points where you could lay it all out. It has never happened in the past in our history. I think that is a major accomplishment. The soldiers of the Army, the men like yourself, and the women, your colleagues up at Carlisle and all of that, you are the ones that shouldered the load.

INTERVIEWER: I think this last discussion will be less of a scriptive interview of the questions and you, just with thoughts you want to get down. Is that how you see it right now?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes, that is fine. I will have some thoughts.

[End Tape S-459, Side 2]

INTERVIEW 8

[Begin Tape S-460, Side 1]

INTERVIEWER: Today is 21 June 2002, this is the interview with General Gordon Sullivan.

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GEN SULLIVAN: I am going to reiterate a little bit on some matters I don't think I covered specifically in the interviews. When I took over as the Chief on the 20th of June 1991, I had a notion that this was my "war". In other words, I had to execute the plans that had been written and update them accordingly. The plans regarding the physical changes that we would undergo. At that time we thought we would downsize the Army to about 536,000 on active duty and around that number split between the Guard and the Reserve. So the physical change would be enormous. It wasn't completely clear what the civilian cut would be, but we knew it would be large. In addition to the physical change we had the intellectual change. Or at least some of us were beginning to talk and write about the intellectual changes, the doctrinal changes that would come about. Because of some work that I had done at the end of the Gulf War regarding fratricide, and the prevention of fratricide, it was becoming apparent that information technology and digital processing communications, microprocessor, was going to have a real impact on how the Army was organized and equipped. So I would sum it up saying I was well aware the physical change would be enormous.

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The intellectual change was being forced upon us even if we didn't want a change. I don't think it was as strong as some people suggest although the desire for the status quo was still fairly strong. Information technology, the beginning of the Information Age, those three thrust lines were apparent. Wrapped up into that is the dollar aspect of it, the fiscal challenges. I don't think any of us knew how precipitous that drop would be. But at any rate, I knew that my job was to keep hope alive and to keep the morale of the Army up as we went through it. As we went through all this and kept the Army trained and ready. I felt that was going to be my biggest task, just to keep their morale up. And to build a base, that is, units that were trained and ready, and build some momentum for change. I would then hand that off to my successor. Obviously, I didn't know who my successor would be, but I had it in my head, that there was going to be one and I would do my best to give him an operating army. I felt well prepared and somewhat confident although I doubt anybody is fully prepared for the scope of the Chief position. I think in retrospect it took me until late October or November to feel comfortable. Although comfortable is

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not a feeling I ever really had in the job because it is just so big. I don't mean to say I was uncomfortable in it, but there is an element of chance in any command job because there are some things you can't control. Being where I was in the Army at the time, there is a certain randomness, which has to be appreciated and accepted as a reality. Now those realities force you to come to grips with some aspects of senior level command. I think the individual, that is you, feel initially that people think you are omnipotent. In other words, that you know everything, you are on top of everything, or if you are not, you should be. And that you are in complete control. That is what you think. But it is not true. They don't really feel that way at all. I think they are very well aware of the fact, but nobody can be omnipotent. They don't expect you to be. What they expect is you will assess the situation and make a decision and move out, or cause them to move out using a combat metaphor. But you will move on. They just expect you to be a human being with all of the characteristics of human beings but that you acknowledge reality and you can make decisions. So at any rate I think I had pretty much worked my way

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through all of that by October or November. That is when I started to come up with what I thought was a pretty good way ahead for the Army. I think began to talk about growth. Winning or losing this war implies that life as a senior leader is a zero sum game. I don't think that is realistic. I was having to make adjustments each and every day as I went through my duties over the four years. Sometimes I had to compromise to get what I wanted. Sometimes I just had to give things up to get something else. I had to balance those risks and rewards. Sometimes I wouldn't compromise. I feel I made the right decision on holding the line on combat infantry, tank and artillery battalions and not permitting women to serve in those organizations. I still think I did the right thing with that. On the other hand, I did integrate initial entry training and appropriate MOSs because I felt that not to do so would not be either appropriate or beneficial to the Army. I still feel that those were proper decisions. Now there are people who disagree with that and I understand that. But the point is that you have to approach each situation separately and make decisions accordingly. And sometimes you have to live to fight again another day

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as it were. And tradeoffs. You have to make tradeoffs and you have to balance risks. I thought of myself and I think most senior leaders are, as the interpreter, the story teller, whose principal task was to hold the Army together and to balance the demands of today against the promises of tomorrow. When I would find someone who was sacrificing or whatever, or doing something particularly important, in a normative sense, where the story would travel. Not in a specific sense like somebody working in a motor pool doing something. But in a normative sense, that this person was demonstrating selflessness or courage. Soldierly values that my job was to interpret that or to tell that story to as many people as I could. My scheme was to use that device to keep the Army pulled together and to keep them focused on the values of the Army. And also to talk about the future. How what this young person did, this young soldier, officer, noncommissioned officer did related to the future we were trying to create. It also was one of my tasks to relate those individual accomplishments to the four missions of the Army, compelling someone to do something, such as Saddam Hussein. Deterring war in Korea, Japan, Germany. At

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the time, that was becoming less and less apparent, Germany. We weren't deterring war, but we had. Supporting civil authorities and we did a lot of that. Hurricanes, forest fires, floods, reassuring our allies. We kept going back and forth to the Gulf. And I sent some Patriots and Apaches to Korea. By the way those units are still there. All of that was done to reassure our allies. I thought of myself as an interpreter and a story teller. It won't come as any surprise to anybody who is listening to these tapes or read anything on the transcript of these tapes that I think about Mogadishu a lot. I ask myself if I could have done anything to prevent the events of 3-4 October 1993. I expect I will continue to do so for the rest of my life. Although for painful obvious reasons, certainly to me and anybody who knows anything about life, which I presume is anybody who listens to this tape, that it is too late. Frankly, realistically speaking, very few of the events or the intercedence to the events were really under my control or even in my power. But having said all of that, the great unknown to me was whether I could have taken a more assertive stance, which would have been viable and changed events before they happened. So I

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struggle with that and move on. I guess my advice to my successors in the job is to seek and demand as much knowledge about all activities as you can get. That is not always possible and it may not always be feasible. In this system we are operating under now, Goldwater-Nichols, everything is not available. Everything being every piece of information.

INTERVIEWER: How do you mean that, sir?

GEN SULLIVAN: The Chairman is the senior advisor to the President of the United States, not all the Chiefs. You have a CINC. You have a CINCSOCOM and you have a CINCCENTCOM who report to the Secretary of Defense. They may not necessarily bring it into the tank.

INTERVIEWER: You are talking about the relationships to the CINCs going right to the SECDEF?

GEN SULLIVAN: Yes. You have the CINCs going to the Secretary of the Defense who signs the orders. That is what I was talking about. What is important for me to get on the record is number one, I have real doubts

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about the intended or unintended consequences of Goldwater-Nichols. I don't think we as a nation are truly getting the expertise, all that we can, from the most senior military people. I think we have structured it so that now you have one, the Chairman, who was the senior advisor. Then you have the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs of Service. The Chiefs of Service can be cut out of the pack and the chairman can be politicized and can be dominated. I don't think that is good. The second point I would make is no matter how modern we think we are and how we tinker with it to make it better, the fact of the matter is the American people, when the chips are down, tend to look and see the Services, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. They don't quite understand the combatant commanders, the CINCs, all of the titles we have. It is the Service Chiefs that are standing in Arlington or meeting the Plains of Dover. That is who the American people see. Lastly, I would like to note that in spite of what all the sociologists and psychologists and management experts and people think about senior people refreshing themselves, the fact of the matter is that senior people, certainly someone who is Chief of service, in

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the world in which we are living today, has a very difficult time disengaging themselves from the duties of the office or the burdens of the office during the four years. It is almost impossible. The Army is actively engaged 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in operations around the world. That is becoming more and more apparent. You always have this constant pull to see the soldiers, to be with them when they are in far away places. Any time you have the slightest bit of flexibility on your calendar your inclination is to go see them. That is a blessing and a burden. It is a blessing because being with them refreshes you. Certainly it did me. But it is a burden because you continue to consume the hours in the day or the days in the week or the month. Those are precious. But more importantly than all of that, during my time, and I think Denny Reimer's and now Rick Shinseki's, the pressures of Washington never let up. You are always jockeying for position. You are always trying to do something to garner more resources or to change the way Congress is thinking or to change somebody's mind up in the Department of Defense. So it is a constant chess game. I used chess because it is a strategy. How can I position myself? What is happening? What is

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not happening and how can we influence the action? Wrestling with those three questions is a reality that never leaves you. All of which combines to make for a very busy life for four years. You need very good people around you. You need people who can support you to enable you to be able to do the things that you have to do. I was fortunate in having that. People who would give me an opportunity relaxing when it was appropriate. Not ha ha relax, but just relax, that is very important in my view. The senior leader has to find some activities which enable them to recharge their batteries. West Point was one of those places for me as were my visits to the troops. Wherever they were, Sinai, Saudi or wherever. Those visits were important. Combat soldiers or soldiers who spend a lot of time in the field with tactical battalions, combat battalions, combat support battalions, tend not to look out the car window or the HMMWV window and see scenery. What they see is terrain. Your mind is always working on how would I defend that piece of ground? How would I attack up this valley? How would I attack this town? How would I defend the town? How would I cross this river? Where would I put my artillery? Where would I put my tank companies? How

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would I task organize? All of those things are always going through your mind. I think that is the mark of a professional. Well, when you are in a very senior position in Washington, your terrain is the *Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, the *Chicago Tribune*, *The Early Bird*, the *Congressional Quarterly* as well as Presidential speeches, and speeches from senior leaders in the Pentagon. You are always doing radio things. National Public Radio or whatever, TV, what is going on around you is stimuli for your approaches and for your decisionmaking. For your planning, for your modification of your plans. If you are not prepared to do all of that. If you are not prepared to immerse yourself in all of that, then in my view, you are going to have a hard time living and operating in Washington or living and operating as an effective senior leader. Lastly, I would say you have to have confidence in yourself and you have to have a strong ego to go with it. You can't be overconfident. And you have to get along with people. You have to like people and you have to be willing to get knocked down and pick yourself up and go back into the fight. That is not easy because everybody has an ego despite of what people would like you to think. I am egoless,

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whatever! It is not whatever, it is tough to get beat up and to go back into the fight. But that is what you get paid for. That is what people expect of you, just to keep fighting, be human, acknowledge your own failings and the fact that you are not omnipotent. That is what I wanted to say.

INTERVIEWER: This concludes the interview with General Gordon Sullivan.

[End Tape S-460, Side 1]

APPENDIX A

ACCESS AGREEMENT – GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN, USA Retired

ACCESS AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

For use of this form see AR 870-5; the proponent agency is U.S. Army Center of Military History

| | |
|--|---|
| FROM General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Retired President Association of the United States Army 2425 Wilson Blvd Arlington, VA 22201 | TO (Include title of agency head) DIRECTOR U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE U.S. ARMY HERITAGE AND EDUCATION CENTER 950 SOLDIERS DRIVE CARLISLE, PA 17013-5021 |
|--|---|

1. I, Gen Gordon R. Sullivan participated in an oral history conducted by

Colonel David Ellis of the

(Name of interviewer)

United States Army War College

(Name of agency)


on the following date(s) : 14 Feb 02, 15 Feb 02, 5 Apr 02, 15 Apr 02, 19 Apr 02, 2 Jun 02, 5 Jun 02, 21 Jun 02 and 4 Nov 08

2. I understand that the tape(s) and the transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the U.S. Army, as determined by the Chief of Military History or his representative. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be given an opportunity to edit the resulting transcript in order to clarify and expand my original thoughts. The Army will provide me with a copy of the edited transcript for my own use subject to classification restrictions.


3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the tape (s) and transcript to the U.S. Army with only the following caveat: *(Please initial one)*

NONE OTHER

I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

NAME OF INTERVIEWEE

 GORDON R. SULLIVAN, General, US Army Retired

DATE
 4 Nov 08

ACCEPTED ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. ARMY BY

 DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

DATE
 4 Nov 08

APPENDIX B

BIOSKETCH – COLONEL JOHN R. DABROWSKI, Ph.D., Editor

COLONEL JOHN R. DABROWSKI, Ph.D.

Colonel John R. Dabrowski, US Army, is a Civil Affairs officer and military historian assigned to the US Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. During his career he has held numerous command and staff positions both on active duty and in the reserve components to include duty as an Assistant Professor of Military Science at Dickinson College and as a faculty instructor for the US Army War College's Department of Distance Education. He holds a Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees in History from East Stroudsburg University, East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania and a doctorate in History from Kent State University, Kent, Ohio. He is a 2002 graduate from the US Army War College and also holds a Masters of Strategic Studies Degree from the War College. Additionally, he is a 2000 graduate of the Air War College Seminar program. Colonel Dabrowski retired from the US Army Reserve on 1 September 2007 after 30 years of service only to be recalled back to active duty on 30 December 2007 to assist with the Senior Officer Oral History Program at AHEC. His area of expertise and research is the Second World War, specifically the Third Reich and the wartime operations undertaken by the German *Wehrmacht* and *Waffen SS*.



The USAWC Senior Officer Oral History Program was established in 1970 by then Chief of Staff, Army, General William C. Westmoreland to provide insights into command and management techniques utilized by senior officers in key positions and to further scholarly research in U.S. Army history. Interview transcripts are placed in the USAMHI archives for use by scholars in accordance with interviewee access agreements.

