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BASIC PLAN

JOINT ARMY AND NAVY EXERCISES, 1925.

PROBLEM NO. #3.

BLUE MARINE CORPS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

APPROVED BY THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT

JANUARY 8, 1925.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS
DIVISION OF OPERATIONS & TRAINING
JANUARY 8, 1925.

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BASIC PLAN

JOINT ARMY AND NAVY EXERCISES, 1925.

PROBLEM NO. #3.

BLUE MARINE CORPS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

GENERAL SITUATION:

The General Situation for Joint Army and Navy Problem No. 3 is stated as follows:

BLUE is at war with BLACK.

The HAWAIIAN ISLANDS belong to BLACK.

The occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to secure Pearl HARBOR and HONOLULU as naval operating bases is an essential element of the BLUE Strategic Plan.

The BLUE FLEET is assembled in SAN FRANCISCO.

A MARINE CORPS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE of two Divisions (about forty-two thousand men) with appropriate heavy artillery is assembled at SAN FRANCISCO.

Fourteen large transports are available at San Francisco for transportation of this MARINE CORPS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

The BLUE FLEET consists of:

BATTLE FLEET, less Submarine Divisions NINE and FOURTEEN	Approximate Total Strength.	(11 Battleships
SCOUTING FLEET		6 Light Cruisers
CONTROL FORCE		56 Destroyers
FLEET BASE FORCE, less Mine Squadron TWO.		1 Aircraft Carrier
		2 Aircraft Tenders
		Submarines
		Minelayers
		Train

The BLACK forces available for the defense of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS include the following:

Land Forces:

- (a) Regular Army Garrison of OAHU.
- (b) National Guard of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
- (c) Army Reserve Force, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

Naval Forces:

- (a) District Forces, Fourteenth Naval District, plus SUBMARINE DIVISIONS NINE AND FOURTEEN AND MINE SQUADRON TWO.

- (b) Naval Reserve Force, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

The Regular Army Garrison of OAHU consists of approximately 15,000 troops and contains considerable air strength. The Fourteenth Naval District Forces include considerable air strength. The Commanding General HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Commander-in-Chief, BLUE FLEET know that the strategical situation is such that the BLACK FORCES in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS cannot be reinforced and that no other BLACK forces are available for operations against the BLUE

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ASSUMPTIONS:

- (1) The occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS is being undertaken for the primary purpose of seizing PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU for use as naval operating bases.
- (2) As the Army is charged with the defense of naval stations in permanently garrisoned possessions, and as the BLACK naval force is not capable of offering effective resistance to the BLUE FLEET, the Army has the paramount interest in the operations of the BLACK FORCES.
- (3) For the purpose of this exercise the United States Fleet will represent the BLUE FLEET.
- (4) Fourteen large naval auxiliaries and tenders will represent transports. Hospital ships (painted white) will not be used to represent transports.
- (5) The transports constructively represented by naval auxiliaries and tenders are of sufficient capacity to carry the entire MARINE CORPS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. The assignment of constructive organization units to vessels will be arranged by the MARINE General commanding the Expeditionary Force after consultation with the Commander Fleet Base Force.
- (6) The landing troops from BLUE transports will be represented by the actual passage of the boats from the ships to the beach, and actual landing of units. Units landed, if representing units of greater strength will indicate such strength as follows:

Each boat carrying a large signal flag in the bow as it approaches the shore, will represent a tow of boats. The character of the troops actually or constructively carried, will be indicated by the flag as follows:

<u>Flag</u>	<u>Meaning (Character of Troops)</u>
I.....	Infantry
A.....	Artillery (75 mm or A.A.)
P.....	Artillery (G.P.F.)
T.....	Tanks
V.....	Signal
K.....	Aviation
G.....	Pioneers (Engineers)
L.....	Train
S.....	Service Troops and stores
Red Cross.....	Medical

Landing Forces, after arrival on shore, will designate their units and organization by flags as follows: -

<u>Flag</u>	<u>Meaning (Character of Troops)</u>
F.....	Force Headquarters
V.....	Signal Battalion
S.....	Service Battalion
O.....	Finance Companies Ammunition Maintenance and Heavy Maintenance.

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C.....Gas Battalion
A.....Artillery Brigade Head-
quarters
A.....Artillery Brigade
L.....Artillery Train
(Ammunition)

<u>Flag</u>	<u>Meaning (Character of Troops)</u>
L.....	Train
E.....	Observation Battalion (Artillery)
P.....	Regiment Artillery 155s
H.....	Anti-aircraft Artillery
G.....	Regiment Pioneers
K.....	Air Service
D.....	Division Headquarters
T.....	Tanks
J.....	Regiment Artillery 75s
M.....	Machine Gun Battalion
B.....	Brigade Headquarters
I.....	Regimental Headquarters Infantry
I.....	Regiment Infantry
Red Cross.....	Medical

Assumption (7)

Change to read as follows: -

(7) The boats of each transport will be considered capable of carrying on one trip -

Infantry - one battalion fully equipped; or,

Field Artillery - one battery, with animals or tractors and equipment; or,

G.P.F. - one gun, tractor and necessary equipment; or

Pioneers (Engineers) - two companies with material; or,

Tanks - four (whippet), with equipment and material for landing.

Other troops - at the discretion of the umpires.

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(8) The rate of landing of constructive troops will be determined by the time actually employed by a boat in making the trip to beach and back to ship, plus a loading and unloading interval to be determined by the umpire according to existing conditions.

(9) Local umpires with the naval forces will communicate to the shore umpires, through channels prescribed in Regulations for Joint Army and Navy Exercises, the number and composition of troops attempting to land.

(10) Local umpires on shore, giving due consideration to covering fire from ships, will decide and communicate to commanders concerned the losses sustained by various arms in landing and in subsequent operations.

SPECIAL SITUATION - BLUE:

The Commander-in-Chief BLUE FLEET has received the following instructions from the NAVY DEPARTMENT-

"HAWAIIAN ISLANDS defended by BLACK Army Garrison, augmented by National Guard and Army Reserve, total approximately twenty thousand troops of all arms; and by Fourteenth Naval District Forces which include two divisions submarines, considerable air strength, and BLACK Mine Squadron Two.

"Immediate occupation by BLUE of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS required by BLUE Strategic Plan. HONOLULU and PEARL HARBOR required for BLUE naval operating bases.

"Occupy OAHU and such other HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as may be found desirable. Destroy naval and shipping facilities at places not occupied. Proceed at discretion."

Chief of Naval Operations.

NOTE:- The operations of Joint Army and Navy Exercise No. 3 will be based upon the solution of this problem by the respective commanders. The Exercise will begin at 0500 Twenty-five April, 1925, at which time the BLUE transports will be not more than 1700 miles from San Francisco.

REQUIREMENTS:

(1) Estimate of the Situation by Commander-in-Chief BLUE FLEET and his orders issued for the attack on and occupation of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(2) Estimate of the Situation, plans for attack by landing forces, and orders issued by General Commanding BLUE MARINE CORPS Expeditionary Force.

(3) Estimates, plans, and orders of such subordinate commanders as may be designated by Commander-in-Chief BLUE FLEET and by Commanding General BLUE MARINE CORPS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDUCT OF PROBLEM:

Instructions covering preparation for and conduct of Joint Army and Navy Exercise No. 3.

1. (a) - The Grand Joint Exercise, predicated upon Joint Army and Navy Problem No. 3, will be held in the vicinity of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(b)- The Exercise shall commence at 0500 April 25, 1925.

In case of a change in this date and hour, those concerned will be notified accordingly.

(c) - The Exercise will terminate on or about May 1, 1925, the actual date and hour of its termination being at the discretion of the Chief Umpires, who will communicate this information by radio, telegraph, or telephone to all concerned.

2. The following Army and Navy forces shall participate in the Exercise:

(a) Blue Forces: (To be communicated in detail to Blue Forces only.)

Army Forces: None.

Navy Forces: To be designated "Blue Fleet":

The U. S. Fleet, under command of the Commander-in-Chief, Battle Fleet, composed of the available units of -
The Battle Fleet, less Submarine Divisions Nine and Fourteen;
The Scouting Fleet;
The Control Force;
The Fleet Base Force, less Mine Squadron Two.
Marine Corps Expeditionary Force of about fifteen hundred officers and men, representing a constructive Expeditionary Force of Two Divisions.

(b) Black Forces: (To be communicated in detail to Black Forces only.)

Army Forces: To be designated "Black Hawaiian Department".
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the troops, defenses, and installations of that Department.

Navy Forces: To be designated "Black 14th Naval District".
Commandant, 14th Naval District, and the Naval District Forces and facilities, plus Submarine Divisions Nine and Fourteen, and Mine Squadron Two.

3. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, shall be the commanders of the respective Black Army and Navy forces involved, and the Commander-in-Chief, Battle Fleet, shall be the commander of the Blue forces involved.

4. The object of the Grand Joint Exercise is to test out under conditions approximating those of war as closely as possible a joint Army and Navy operation against Oahu, and the defense project and plans provided for the defense of Oahu. Since close mutual cooperation between the Army and Navy forces participating in the exercise is essential to its success, commanders of respective Army and Navy forces will make every effort to secure such cooperation.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, are authorized and directed to communicate direct with each other to the end that the forces under their respective commands may participate and cooperate in the most effective manner in the exercise. In this connection, the attention of the commandant is directed to the fact that on the Blue side the interest of the Army are paramount, in accordance with Part I, paragraphs 17 and 18, Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense.

6. In order that supervision of the Grand Joint Exercise may be facilitated, it is desired that the following arrangements be made effective by April 24, 1925, by the Commanders indicated:

(a) By the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet:

- (1) For furnishing suitable accommodations for the Office of The Chief Umpires and for the officers acting jointly as The Chief Umpires, and for their two assistants, on the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet - the U.S.S. SEATTLE - either at HONOLULU or at PEARL HARBOR.
- (2) For furnishing the necessary clerical assistance for The Chief Umpires.

(b) By the Commander-in-Chief, Battle Fleet:

- (1) For furnishing suitable accommodations for the office of the Senior Umpire - Blue, for the Senior Umpire - Blue, and for two assistants to the Senior Umpire - Blue, on the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, Battle Fleet.
- (2) For furnishing suitable clerical assistance for the Senior Umpire - Blue; and
- (3) For providing radio communications for the use of the Senior Umpire - Blue with all Umpires of the Blue forces, with the commanders of the various elements of the Blue forces, and with the Chief Umpires.
- (4) For furnishing on board a vessel of the fleet, suitable accommodations and suitable office space, for the General Commanding Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, his staff, and enlisted staff personnel.
- (5) For furnishing suitable accommodations on board same vessel for one assistant to Senior Umpire - Blue.
- (6) For providing suitable accommodations on other auxiliaries attached to Fleet Base Force for such assistant umpires as may be assigned to various parts of the Expeditionary Force.

- (7) For providing radio communication for use of the General Commanding Marine Corps Expeditionary Force with Senior Umpire - Blue and with officers with whom communication is essential in the exercise of command.

(c) By the General Commanding Hawaiian Department:

- (1) For suitable room in Fort Shafter and a suitable room in Schofield Barracks for use as an office by the Senior Umpire - Black.
- (2) For separate telephone communication between the office of the Chief Umpires (whether the U.S.S. SEATTLE be at Honolulu or Pearl Harbor) and the office of the Senior Umpire-Black (whether he be at Fort Shafter or at Schofield Barracks).
- (3) For transmission of telephone communications between the office of the Senior Umpire - Black and umpires at Department Headquarters and other headquarters of the Hawaiian Department and the Headquarters, 14th Naval District, and from these umpires to the office of the Senior Umpire - Black.
- (4) For suitable motor and airplane transportation for the use of The Chief Umpires, and the Senior Umpire - Black, and their assistants.
- (5) For such stenographic and clerical assistance, typewriters, and office fixtures including a field safe, as the Senior Umpire - Black may require.
- (6) For suitable large scale maps of the Island of Oahu for use of The Chief Umpires and the Senior Umpire - Black.
- (7) For suitable accommodations for the Senior Umpire - Black and his assistants.

(d) By the Commandant, 14th Naval District:

For providing transmission of all radio communications between umpires and commanders concerned.

7. The following instructions in regard to vessels adjudged sunk or totally disabled during the Grand Joint Exercise, will govern all concerned: -

(a) No vessel will be adjudged sunk or totally disabled except by the Chief Umpires or Senior Umpire - Blue.

(b) In the event of any vessel being adjudged sunk or totally disabled such vessel shall proceed to rendezvous to be designated by the Commander-in-Chief, Battle Fleet, for Blue vessels, and by the Commandant, 14th Naval District, for Black vessels. Chief Umpires, Senior Umpires Blue and Black and their assistants,

shall be informed previous to the commencement of the Exercises, as to the location of these rendezvous.

(c) Vessels adjudged sunk or totally disabled shall during daylight hoist the S (sail) flag at the fore truck and wear it while proceeding to the rendezvous. At night such a vessel shall carry all usual lights.

8. The attention of the Commanding General, U.S. Fleet, Commanding General Hawaiian Islands, and Commandant, 14th Naval District is invited to the fact that as at the termination of this problem the U. S. Fleet will base on Pearl Harbor, there will be created automatically a new situation requiring co-operation and possible joint action between Army and Navy forces in the Hawaiian Islands.

DESIGNATION OF UMPIRES:-

1. In accordance with paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, "Regulations for Joint Army and Navy Exercises", The Joint Board recommends that the following officers be designated to serve as The Chief Umpires, Senior Umpires, and Assistants:

The Chief Umpires

Admiral Robert E. Coontz, U. S. Navy.
Major General John L. Hines, General Staff.

Assistants to The Chief Umpires

Captain Sinclair Gannon, U. S. Navy.
Lieut. Colonel W. Krueger, General Staff.

Senior Umpire - Black

Brigadier General LeRoy Eltinge, G. S.

Assistants to Senior Umpire - Black

An Officer to be designated by C-in-C, U.S. Fleet.
Major J. J. Bain, General Staff.

Senior Umpire - Blue

Captain Wm. H. Standley, U. S. Navy.

Assistants to Senior Umpire - Blue

Captain A. W. Marshall, U. S. Navy.
Colonel R. M. Cutts, U. S. M. C.
Major Stephen C. Reynolds, U. S. Army.

2. It is impracticable at this time to assign the number of officers that will be required for duty as Umpires, Black and Blue, and Assistants. It is believed that the number of officers required for these duties will be approximately as follows and will be selected and detailed as indicated, reporting to the Senior Umpires concerned at the time and place indicated in Departmental Instructions to the Commanders by whom they are to be designated:

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Umpires and Assistant Umpires - Black.

Twelve officers, U.S. Army.

Four officers, U.S. Navy, for umpires on shore,
and one officer on board each Black vessel, to be
designated by the Commandant, 14th Naval District.

Umpires and Assistant Umpires - Blue.

One officer on board each Blue vessel,
and one officer, U.S. Marine Corps, on
the staff of each Flag Officer, or General Officer of
Marine Corps, to be designated by the Commander-in-
Chief, Battle Fleet.

Additional Umpires or Assistant Umpires will be
designated by above named officers by direction of
the Chief Umpires.

REGULATIONS FOR JOINT ARMY AND NAVY EXERCISES:

The following Regulations for Joint Army and Navy Exercises,
prepared by the Joint Board, August 15, 1924, and subsequently
approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy,
are included herewith for the information and guidance of all
those taking part in the contemplated exercises:

General.

1. The object of joint exercises is to train Army and
Navy forces in joint operations and to test existing joint
operations plans, Army and Navy plans predicated thereon,
the sufficiency of means provided for the defense of various
localities, and the adequacy of plans for their employment
under conditions as closely approximating those of war as
possible.

2. Joint Army and Navy Exercises are divided into two
classes:

- (a) Grand joint exercises; and
- (b) Minor joint exercises.

3. Grand joint exercises are joint exercises that in-
volve the United States Fleet as a whole or one or more
of its major subdivisions and such land forces as are con-
sidered necessary and are available.

4. Minor joint exercises are joint exercises other
than grand joint exercises.

Problems For Joint Exercises.

5. The problem for a joint exercise shall habitually
consist of the following:

(a) The general situation, which shall embody
information assumed to be known to both sides.

(b) The special situation - Blue, which shall
embody full information in regard to the Blue forces,

and such information of the Black forces as might have been obtained in actual war and shall include a statement of requirements which shall indicate definitely what is required and of whom it is required.

(c) The special situation - Black, which shall embody full information in regard to the Black forces and such information of the Blue forces as might have been obtained in actual war and shall include a statement of requirements which shall indicate definitely what is required and of whom it is required.

6. (a) The problem for a grand joint exercise shall habitually be prepared by the Joint Board, which shall furnish a sufficient number of copies thereof to the War and Navy Departments for issue by them respectively, to the Army and Navy forces concerned. In case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone the Joint Board shall furnish a separate copy of the problem to the Secretary of War for transmission to the Governor, the Panama Canal.

(b) In case grand joint exercises are to be held in the Hawaiian Islands or in the Philippine Islands the Joint Board will prepare a letter for transmittal by the War Department through official channels to the respective governors, containing such information as may be necessary to inform them of the operations contemplated.

(c) The problem for a minor joint exercise shall be prepared jointly by the Army and Navy commanders who have agreed to hold such an exercise and shall be promulgated by them to those concerned in their respective commands.

Designation Of The Forces Engaged.

7. (a) The forces engaged in any joint exercise shall habitually be divided into--

- (1) Blue forces, representing those of the United States; and
- (2) Black forces, representing those of the enemy.

(b) The Army and Navy forces that are to participate as Blue and Black forces in a joint exercise shall be indicated either in the problem or in the instructions issued in connection therewith--

- (1) In general terms, in case of a grand joint exercise, by the Joint Board.
- (2) In case of a minor joint exercise, by the Army and Navy commanders who have agreed to hold such an exercise.

8. The forces engaged in any joint exercise shall, in so far as practicable, be actual forces. Constructive armament and means shall not be used, except that field works, shelter, obstacles, and other structures that could not be built except at considerable expense and labor may be used constructively, but must in every case be outlined clearly and indicated by markers or other contrivances, and material therefor must be actually available.

Instructions For Joint Exercises.

9. (a) Prior to the commencement of a grand joint exercise.--(1) The Joint Board shall formulate such general instructions as are necessary to assure adequate and properly coordinated action, both in preparing for and in conducting the grand joint exercise. Any question arising in connection with the foregoing instructions that requires interpretation, amplification, or modification shall be referred to the Joint Board for decision. Copies of these instructions sufficient in number for all agencies concerned shall be furnished to the War and Navy Departments for distribution for transmittal to the Governor, the Panama Canal, shall be furnished by the Joint Board to the Secretary of War in the case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone.

(2) The War and Navy Departments shall formulate and issue detailed instructions affecting the forces under their respective jurisdictions, to the end that the grand joint exercise shall be carried out in accordance with the problem and the general instructions formulated by the Joint Board. Copies of detailed instructions issued by one department that are of interest to the other department shall be furnished to the department thus affected for its information. In the case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone the Navy Department shall furnish the Secretary of War for transmittal to the Governor, the Panama Canal, so much of the instructions issued by the Navy Department as are of interest to the authorities of the Panama Canal.

(3) In case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone the Secretary of War will issue such instructions to the Governor, the Panama Canal, as he may deem necessary.

(b) Prior to the commencement of a minor joint exercise.--(1) The Army and Navy commanders who have agreed to hold a minor joint exercise shall jointly formulate such general instructions as are necessary to assure adequate and properly coordinated action, both in preparing for and in conducting the exercise, and shall issue them to those concerned in their respective commands.

(2) The Army and Navy commanders referred to in the preceding subparagraph shall formulate and issue detailed instructions affecting the forces concerned in their respective commands, to the end that the minor joint exercise shall be carried out in accordance with the problem and the general instructions jointly formulated by them. Copies of detailed instructions issued by either commander that are of interest to the other commander shall be furnished to the commander thus affected for his information.

(c) Subsequent to the commencement of any joint exercise and until its termination all instructions in connection with the conduct of the exercise, including definite directions as to commencement and termination of a temporary general or local suspension of the exercise, shall be prepared and issued by the chief umpires.

10. The instructions issued in preparation for a joint exercise shall include the following:

(a) The date and hour when the exercise is to commence.

(b) The date and hour when the exercise is to terminate, or merely the approximate date when it is to terminate,

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when determination of the actual date and hour of its termination is to be left to the discretion of the chief umpires, in which case this fact will be stated.

(c) A description of the signal or an indication of the method by which the chief umpires will terminate the exercise in case its termination is left to their discretion.

Supervision Of The Conduct Of Joint Exercises.

11. The conduct of a joint exercise shall habitually be supervised by--

- (a) The chief umpires.
- (b) A senior umpire - Blue.
- (c) A senior umpire - Black, and
- (d) Such umpires and assistant umpires as may be necessary.

12. For a grand joint exercise, one Army and one Navy member of the Joint Board or one Army and one Navy officer of high rank, recommended by the Joint Board and detailed therefor by the War and Navy Departments, shall act jointly as the chief umpires, and one or more Army or Navy officers, preferably members of the Joint Planning Committee, similarly recommended and detailed, shall act as assistants to the chief umpires.

13. For a grand joint exercise, one Army or Navy officer, preferably a member of the Joint Planning Committee, recommended by the Joint Board and detailed therefor by the War and Navy Departments, shall act as senior umpire - Blue, and one as senior umpire - Black, and one or more Army or Navy officers, similarly recommended and detailed, shall act as assistants to each senior umpire. Such number of other Army and Navy officers as the Joint Board may recommend shall be detailed by the War and Navy Departments, or by their authority, to act as umpires for major subdivisions and as assistant umpires for important elements of such subdivisions, it being understood that if this number does not suffice additional umpires and assistant umpires shall be designated by the Army or Navy commander concerned upon call by the senior umpire concerned.

14. For a minor joint exercise the chief umpires, the senior umpire - Blue, the senior umpire - Black, such assistants to the foregoing as may be necessary, and such umpires and assistant umpires as may be required shall be designated by mutual agreement between the Army and Navy commanders who desire to hold such an exercise.

15. The offices of the chief umpires shall be so located as to permit easy communication with the senior umpires, and the office of each of the latter shall be so located as to permit easy communication with the Blue or Black umpires and the Blue or Black forces, as the case may be, and with the chief umpires.

Distinguishing Marks.

16. Blue forces shall have no special distinguishing marks other than those authorized and worn and displayed by United States land and Navy forces.

17. Black forces shall be distinguished as follows:

(a) Ships shall fly the international K flag (a square flag divided vertically into two equal parts, the half nearest the mast being yellow and the other half blue) at the port yardarm.

(b) Launches and boats shall fly the same flag (international K) at the stern.

(c) Planes shall have the following white stripes, each 12 inches wide, painted on the fuselage as indicated below:

Two vertical stripes, one on each side of the fuselage, about 3 feet in rear of the rear edge of the wings, and extending from top to bottom of the fuselage.

One horizontal stripe on each side of and about 5 feet from the center line of the upper surface of the upper wing and extending entirely across the width of the wing.

One horizontal stripe on each side of and about 5 feet from the center line of the under surface of the lower wing and extending entirely across the width of the wing.

(d) Personnel.--Each officer and enlisted man shall wear a white band at least 1-1/2 inches wide around his headress.

18. Umpires shall wear a red band 4 inches in width on the left arm above the elbow.

Simulation Of Fire.

19. The fire of small arms and light field artillery and of boat guns shall be simulated with blank cartridges.

20. The fire of all ships and of heavy artillery armament of the land defenses shall be simulated during daylight by turning a searchlight upon the target or targets, if visible, during such times as the target is being fired upon. Care must be taken that searchlights are not thus used when the force in question is unable to deliver an effective fire against the target so indicated.

Communication Between Umpires.

21. So far as practicable, separate telegraph, telephone, visual signal, radio, or other communication shall be provided for the use of the umpires.

22. All messages passing between umpires shall be preceded by the word "Umpire" in plain language. Such messages are to be given to the senior umpire at the station addressed, or to the nearest umpire. The information contained in such messages shall not be given to persons other than umpires. Neither side shall attempt to decode or decipher messages preceded by this prefix, nor shall radiocompass bearings be taken on any station transmitting an umpire's message. No attempt shall be made to jam the radio-frequency assigned for the transmission of umpires' messages. All stations are prohibited from shifting to the umpire's frequency for the purpose of avoiding radio interference on their own assigned frequencies.

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Conduct Of Joint Exercises.

23. Unless specifically directed otherwise in the problem or instructions issued in connection therewith, the commander of the Army forces and the commander of the Navy forces participating on each side in the exercise shall each furnish the chief umpires, prior to the commencement of the exercise, with a copy, in triplicate, of his estimate of the situation, a copy of his estimate thereof and initial orders. The chief umpires shall furnish a copy of each document and shall forward one to the senior umpire - Blue and one to the senior umpire - Black.

24. After a joint exercise begins any new estimates made and all orders issued shall be immediately communicated by the commanders indicated in paragraph 23 above to the senior umpire-- Blue or Black, as the case may be -- through the umpire assigned to their staffs, or directly in case there is no umpire so assigned.

25. Commanders other than those referred to in paragraphs 23 and 24 above shall similarly communicate their initial estimates and orders and all subsequent estimates and orders to the umpire or assistant umpire assigned to their staffs.

26. All reports and messages that would in an actual case be dispatched by commanders to the Blue War and Navy Departments, the Black War and Navy Departments, or to other forces that are not represented in the exercise, shall be sent to the senior umpire -- Blue or Black, as the case may be -- for transmission to the chief umpires, who will represent those agencies or forces.

27. All action taken by commanders and all events occurring within the realm of a command shall be promptly communicated by the assistant umpire, or umpire concerned, to his umpire or senior umpire, as the case may be, of the side (Blue or Black) to which he is assigned.

28. Senior umpires shall constantly keep the chief umpires informed of all that occurs on their side in order that an accurate picture may be had by the chief umpires of the progress of the exercise, this being essential to the making of intelligent decisions.

29. The chief umpires shall similarly keep each senior umpire informed of the situation on the opposing side, and each senior umpire shall similarly keep his umpires and assistant umpires informed of the progress of the exercise. A senior umpire, umpire, or assistant umpire, as the case may be, shall similarly give a commander or commanders concerned such information of the situation, of the effect produced by any action taken by them, and of the action of the enemy as those commanders would possess or be able to obtain in an actual case. Information that commanders should and would in an actual case obtain only through the medium of an agency represented in the exercise shall in no circumstances be furnished by an umpire to any commander.

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30. To illustrate: The commander, Black Fleet, decides to bombard the land defenses in the locality where the exercise is being held and informs the senior umpire, Black, of his decision and of the character of fire to be delivered and the time and period of delivery. The senior umpire, Black, communicates this information promptly to the chief umpires, who in turn inform the senior umpire, Blue, who communicates it to his umpires, in particular to the umpire assigned to the defenses in question. The reaction of the commander of those defenses is then reported by the umpire of those defenses to the senior umpire - Blue, who communicates it to the chief umpires. The latter then makes a decision in the premises and communicates it to both senior umpires, who in turn communicate it to the umpires concerned and to the interested commanders.

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Umpires' Decisions.

31. All umpires' decisions shall be made by the chief umpires directly, or by the chief umpires' authority, by either senior umpire or by an umpire or assistant umpire, such decisions being promptly communicated to those concerned. Local decisions that may have to be made by a senior umpire must be immediately communicated to the chief umpires; if made by an umpire or assistant umpire, they must be immediately communicated to the senior umpire concerned and by him to the chief umpires. Wherever it is feasible, as, for example, in the case of an attack made by a landing party against land troops or positions, the umpires or assistant umpires on opposite sides on the spot should, if practicable, confer on the situation before making a decision.

Journal Of Events.

32. The chief umpires shall keep a complete journal of events covering all occurrences of the joint exercise. Each senior umpire and each umpire and assistant umpire shall keep a similar journal of all events coming under his cognizance. The journals kept by umpires and assistant umpires shall be turned in to their senior umpire, and by him with his journal of events to the chief umpires, at the conclusion of the exercise.

Critique.

33. At the conclusion of the exercise the commanders and staffs of all units participating, or at least those of the major units, shall be assembled for a discussion of the exercise as a whole. This discussion shall be held under the direction of the chief umpires and shall consist essentially of a brief resume of the situation and progress of the exercise and of a critique thereof, and shall conclude with a statement of the lessons to be learned from the exercise.

Reports.

34. As soon as practicable after the termination of a joint exercise, the following reports thereon, embodying pertinent conclusions and recommendations shall be rendered:

In case of a ground exercise:

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(a) By the chief umpires, to the War and Navy Departments.

(b) By the commander of the Army forces and by the commander of the Navy forces participating on each side in the exercise, to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

c In case of a minor joint exercise

(c) By the chief umpires, to the Army and Navy commanders by whose authority the exercise was held.

(d) By the commander of the Army forces and by the commander of the Navy forces participating on each side in the exercise, to the Army and Navy commanders, respectively, by whose authority the exercise was held.

(e) By the Army and Navy commanders by whose authority the exercise was held, to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

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II. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

MISSION:- To effect a landing on Oahu and capture or destroy its defense.

The Commander-in-Chief of the BLUE FLEET has received the following instructions from the NAVY DEPARTMENT:-

"HAWAIIAN ISLANDS defended by BLACK army Garrison, augmented by National Guard and Army Reserve, total approximately twenty thousand troops of all arms; and by Fourteenth Naval District, which include two divisions submarines, and BLACK Mine Squadron Two.

"Immediate occupation by BLUE of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS required by BLUE Strategic Plan. HONOLULU and PEARL HARBOR required for BLUE operating bases.

"Occupy OAHU and such other HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as may be found desirable. Destroy naval and shipping facilities at places not occupied. Proceed at discretion."

(Signed) Chief of Naval Operations.

From the above quoted order the Mission of the BLUE FLEET is determined, as follows:-

"To occupy the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to secure PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU as naval operating bases."

The General Mission of the Marine Corps is:-

"To support the Fleet, or any part thereof, in the accomplishment of its mission."

From a consideration of the Mission of the BLUE FLEET in the contemplated operations and of the General Mission of the Marine Corps, the Mission of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force in these operations is derived as above stated.

The support to the BLUE FLEET required of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force accompanying that Fleet, under the Missions of the BLUE FLEET and of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, as above stated, is of such a nature that it can only be accomplished by a military force of all arms organized and trained to carry out the specific duties required under the Mission.

ENEMY FORCES:- Strength, Disposition, and Probable Intentions.

The BLACK forces available for the defense of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS include the following:-

Land Forces:-

(a) Regular Army Garrison of OAHU.

(b) National Guard of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(c) Army Reserve Force, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

Naval Forces:-

(a) District Forces, Fourteenth Naval District.

(b) Naval Reserve Force, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

The Regular Army Garrison of OAHU consists of approximately 15,000 troops of all arms and includes considerable air strength.

The National Guard of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS consists of two regiments of Infantry, and are permanently located on the Islands.

The Army Reserve Force, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, is very small and it is understood that little progress has been made in the organization of these reserves up to the present time.

The District Forces, Fourteenth Naval District, consist of:-

- 20 submarines, R-type.
- 6 minelayers.
- 1 submarine tender.
- 5 eagle boats.
- 7 mine sweepers.
- 3 tugs.
- 3 submarine chasers, and
- A Naval air force of about 20 airplanes of various types.

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The total Naval personnel, including 12 officers and 350 enlisted men of the Marine Corps, consists of 85 officers and 1142 enlisted men.

The strategical situation is such that the BLACK FORCES in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS can not be reinforced within the period of time required for the contemplated operations, and no other BLACK naval forces are available for operations against the BLUE FLEET.

All of the BLACK regular forces, Army and Navy, are permanently located on the Island of OAHU, and no other island of the HAWAIIAN group is provided with permanent fixed defenses.

Analysis of BLACK Forces:-

Land Forces:-

(a) Regular Army Garrison of OAHU.

The Hawaiian Department officially includes all of the islands belonging to the United States within the area between 150° west longitude and 160° east longitude and between 15° south latitude and 30° north latitude, and the Department Headquarters is at HONOLULU.

The Department is commanded by a Major General who is assisted by a complete executive and administrative Staff.

The Department consists of certain departmental troops and activities, of the Hawaiian Division, and of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery District. All of the troops in the Department are regularly stationed on the Island of OAHU.

Department Troops and Activities:- The following troops and activities, not assigned to the Hawaiian Division of Hawaiian Coast Artillery District, are directly under the Department Commander or his deputies:-

At Fort Armstrong, HONOLULU:

- Hq. Detachment, Co.A., 21st Infantry.
- Detachment of Medical Department.
- Air Service Depot.
- Engineer Depot.
- Medical Depot.
- Quartermaster Depot, Q.M. Depot detachment, Motor Transport Cos. No.41 and No.42, Detachment of Motorcycle Co., No.11, Motor Repair Sections No.90 and No.91.
- Signal Corps Depot.

At HONOLULU:-

Chemical Warfare Service

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Analysis of BLACK Forces:- (Continued)

At HONOLULU (Continued) :-

Ordnance Depot, Hq. 74th. Ordnance Co.

Tripler General Hospital, Medical Corps detachments.

At Luke Field, FORD'S Island, PEARL HARBOR:-

5th Composite Group, Air Service, consisting of Headquarters.

6th. Pursuit Squadron.

19th. Pursuit Squadron.

23rd. Bombardment Squadron.

72nd. Bombardment Squadron.

11th. Photo Section.

65th. Service Squadron.

41st. Air Intelligence Section.

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Hawaiian Division:- The following troops and organizations are attached to the Hawaiian Division, which is under the command of a Major General, with Headquarters and barracks for all troops at Schofield Barracks, Longitude 158° 5' west, latitude 21° 30' north, 25 miles by road northwest of HONOLULU:-

At Schofield Barracks:-

Special Troops:-

Headquarters.

Hq. and M.P. Company, H. Division.

11th. Ordnance Co.

Motorcycle Co. No. 11.

11th. Signal Co.

11th. Tank Co.

Infantry:-

21st. Infantry Brigade:-

Hq. and Hq. Co.

19th. Infantry Regt.

21st. Infantry Regt.

22nd. Infantry Brigade:-

Hq. and Hq. Co.

27th. Infantry.

35th. Infantry.

Field Artillery:-

11th. Field Artillery Brigade:-

Hq. and Hq. Battery.

8th. Field Artillery Regt., 75 mm. guns, motorized.

11th. Field Artillery Regt., 155 mm. howtz., motorized.

13th. Field Artillery Regt., 75 mm. guns, motorized.

11th. Ammunition Train, motorized.

3rd. Engineer Regt.

Co. G., Chemical Warfare Service.

Hawaiian Division Air Service, 4th Observation Squadron,
at Wheeler Field, Schofield Barracks.

11th. Medical Regt., motorized.

Regt. Hq.

Sanitary Co. No. 31.

Ambulance Co. No. 32.

Hospital Co. No. 31.

Medical Supply Section No. 11.

Medical Laboratory No. 11.

Veterinary Co. No. 11.

Hawaiian Division Train, motorized.

Hawaiian Coast Artillery District:- The following troops and organizations are attached to the Hawaiian Coast Artillery District, which is under the command of a Brigadier General, with Headquarters at Fort Shafter, at Kahalaiki, Kona District, about two miles west of HONOLULU. The command embraces the fixed harbor defenses, railway artillery, heavy coastal artillery, and anti-aircraft artillery of Oahu.

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Analysis of BLACK Forces:--(Continued)

At Fort Shafter:--

Hq. Hawaiian Coast Artillery District.
55th. C.A.C. Regt., Heavy Tractor, 1 Batl. 240 mm. Howtz.
64th. C.A.C. Regt., Anti-Aircraft, 1 Batl. 3-in.AA. guns.
Service Co. No. 9., Signal Corps.
Hq. Detachment, H.H.D.
M.P. Co. Det.
Medical Dept. Det.
Ordnance Dept. Det.
Q.M.C. Det.

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HONOLULU Coast Defenses:--

At Fort De Russy:-- Battery - 2 14-inch Dis., 2 6-inch Dis.

Hq. HONOLULU Coast Defenses.
16th. Coast Art. Regt. (less 2d. Batl.), Harbor Defenses.
Detachment 74th. Ordnance Co.
Detachment Service Co. No. 9., Signal Corps.
Medical Dept. Det.
Ordnance Dept. Det.
Q.M.C. Det.

At Fort Armstrong:-- Battery - 2 3-inch pedestal mount.

Not garrisoned by C.A.C. troops.

At Fort Ruger:-- Battery-12 12-inch mortars, 4 4.7-inch pedestal mount, 2 5-inch pedestal mount.

2d. Battalion, 16th C.A.C. Regt.
2d. Battalion, 55th C.A.C. Regt.
Detachment 74th. Ordnance Co.
Detachment Service Co. No. 9., Signal Corps.
Medical Dept. Det.
Ordnance Dept. Det.
Q.M.C. Det.

PEARL HARBOR Coast Defenses:--

At Fort Kamehameha:-- Battery - 2 12-inch Dis., 2 12-inch long range R.C., 2 6-inch Dis., 2 4.7-inch pedestal, 4 3-inch pedestal, 8 12-inch mortars, 2 16-inch latest type (not completely installed), 12 3-inch Anti-Aircraft.

Hq. PEARL HARBOR Coast Defenses.
15th. C.A.C. Regt., Harbor Defenses.
55th. C.A.C. Regt. (less 1st. and 2d. Batls.).
41st. C.A.C. Regt., 8 12-inch Railway mortars, 1 Batl.
Detachment Service co. No. 9., Signal Corps.
Medical Dept. Det.
Q.M.C. Det.
Overseas Casual Det.

At Fort Weaver:-- Battery - 4 6-inch pedestal mount.

Not garrisoned by C.A.C. troops.

Recapitulation - Personnel Strength:-- The personnel strength of troops attached to the Regular Army Garrison of OAHU, according to the latest official published information is as follows:--

Commissioned officers-----	808
Army Nurse Corps-----	31
Warrant officers-----	44
Army Field Clerks-----	10
Q.M.C. Clerks-----	4
Total-----	897

Enlisted Strength by Branch:--

Infantry-----	4,353
Cavalry-----	none
Field Artillery-----	2,444
Coast Artillery-----	3,167
Engineers-----	821
Air Service-----	1,

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Analysis of BLACK Forces:- (Continued)

Enlisted Strength by Branch:- (Continued)

Signal Corps-----	310	
Q.M. Corps-----	723	
Ordnance Department-----	230	
Finance Department-----	28	
Chemical Warfare Service-----	57	
Medical Department-----	431	
D.E.M.L.-----	13	
Total-----	13,619	13,619
Total Regular Army-----		14,536

(b) National Guard of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

The BLACK National Guard in the Hawaiian Islands consists of two regiments of Infantry, not all of which are permanently located on the Island of OAHU.

The authorized strength is as follows:-

Staff---- 8 officers--- 24 enlisted men.

Infantry-65 officers---1328 enlisted men.

Totals---73 officers---1352 enlisted men.

Total National Guard----- 1425.

It may be assumed that the National Guard Brigade of Infantry will be brought to full war strength of two regiments by additional enrollment of men available and fit for military service.

(c) Army Reserve Force, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

The BLACK Army Reserve Force in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS consists of 265 members of the Officer's Reserve Corps, 13 of whom are on duty with the National Guard of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, leaving 252 for assignment to levies from men available and fit for military duty.

Estimate of Total Land Forces available for defense by BLACK of OAHU.

The total of all ranks and branches in the three classes above enumerated is - 16,193. It is estimated that of the total civil population of 251,546 there are available and fit for military service 21,712.

It is further estimated that previous to the attack by the BLUE forces BLACK would be able to call enough men to the colors from those available and fit for military service who have had previous military training to bring the BLACK forces for the defense of OAHU up to a total of 20,000; but the main reliance of the defense would have to be based upon the Regular Army strength supplemented by the National Guard and Reserve Force, totalling, as above stated, 16,193 of all ranks and branches.

Fixed Defenses of OAHU:-

The fixed defenses of OAHU consist of well constructed emplacements consisting, in general, of three types; first, the type constructed between 1900 and 1914, consisting of a concrete emplacement including in one structure the guns and ammunition storage and fire control and personnel shelter installations; second, the type constructed about 1915, in which the guns are located on low gun blocks and all other portions of the battery are combined in one concrete structure directly in rear and third, the post-war type, in which all elements are dispersed irregularly, and have no overhead or horizontal protection.

All of the fixed defenses are located on the section of the southern coast of OAHU from DIAMOND HEAD to the entrance to PEARL HARBOR, both inclusive. They are divided into two general groups:-

Analysis of BLACK Forces (Continued):-
Fixed Defenses of OAHU (Continued):-

- (a) HONOLULU Coast Defenses.
- (b) PEARL HARBOR Coast Defenses.
- (a) HONOLULU Coast Defenses.

These defenses are designed to afford protection for the Harbor of HONOLULU and flank defense to the eastward for PEARL HARBOR, and are all contained in the six miles of coast line from KUPIKIPKIO POINT to the entrance to HONOLULU HARBOR. They consist of the following forts and batteries:-

Fort Ruger, vicinity of DIAMOND HEAD:-

Harlow Battery, eastern side of DIAMOND HEAD:- 8 12-inch mortars, all around fire.
Berkheimer Battery, eastern side of DIAMOND HEAD:- 4 12-inch mortars, all around fire.
Hulings Battery, eastern side of DIAMOND HEAD:- 2 4.7-inch pedestal mount.
Dodge Battery, eastern side of DIAMOND HEAD:- 2 4.7-inch pedestal mount.
S. C. Mills Battery, KUPIKIPKIO POINT, 2 5-inch pedestal mount.
Battery "A", west side of DIAMOND HEAD:- pounders.

Fort De Russy, WAIKIKI BEACH:-

Randolph Battery, 2 14-inch disappearing guns.

Dudley Battery, 2 6-inch disappearing guns.

Fort Armstrong, at eastern side of entrance to HONOLULU HARBOR:- 2 3-inch pedestal mount.

(b) PEARL HARBOR Coast Defenses:-

These defenses are designed to afford protection for PEARL HARBOR and the Naval Station, Naval Activities, and Air Activities located there, and are contained in the four miles of coast line from AHUA POINT to KEAHI POINT, inclusive, and within PEARL HARBOR. They consist of the following fort and batteries:-

Fort Kamekameha, vicinity of PEARL HARBOR:-

Battery one mile north of AHUA POINT:- 2 12-inch barbette mount, long range.
Selfridge Battery, one mile east of entrance to PEARL HARBOR:- 2 12-inch disappearing guns.
Jackson Battery, east side of entrance to PEARL HARBOR:- 2 6-inch disappearing guns.
Hawkins Battery, east side of entrance to PEARL HARBOR:- 2 3-inch pedestal mount.
Barri Battery, east side of entrance to PEARL HARBOR:- 2 4.7-inch pedestal mount.
Chandler Battery, east side of entrance to PEARL HARBOR:- 2 3-inch pedestal mount.
HEAHI POINT Battery, west side of entrance to PEARL HARBOR:- 2 16-inch post-war guns - battery not yet completed as to installation but can probably be worked by hand.
Boyd Battery, on FORD'S ISLAND:- 2 6-inch pedestal mount.
Adair Battery, on FORD'S ISLAND:- 2 6-inch pedestal mount.

Railway Batteries.

there are 8 12-inch Railway mortars, which can be moved to any point on the railway extending from HONOLULU westward, north of PEARL HARBOR, along the entire western and northern coasts of OAHU to KAHANA on the eastern coast, and on the railway line run-

Analysis of BLACK Forces:- (Continued)

Railway Batteries:- (Continued)

ning from WAIPAHU northward through the central plain to Schofield Barracks.

Field Emplacements:-

Two field emplacements have been constructed near the north ern end of WAIMANALO BAY for 240 mm. howitzers. Mobile, heavy tractor drawn guns of this type could be installed in these emplacements in a few hours. Guns of this type could also be placed north of Schofield Barracks to command the landing places in the vicinity of HALEIWAI on the north coast.

There are 8 of these 240 mm. howitzers, heavy tractor drawn, manned by one battalion of the 55th. C.A.C. Regiment.

There are also 24 155 mm. guns, tractor drawn, manned by the 11th. Field Artillery Regiment, which could be used to supplement the fixed batteries in opposing a landing at any of the available landing places on the Island of OAHU.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery:-

The plans for anti-aircraft defense include forty 3-inch anti-aircraft guns on fixed mounts with accompanying searchlights and machine gun auxiliary defense. Twelve (12) of these guns have been installed in the PEARL HARBOR district. These guns would probably be manned by personnel from the 64th. C.A.C. Regiment.

Air Service Materiel:-

The Air Service of the Hawaiian Department includes the 5th Composite Group, stationed at Luke Field, FORD'S ISLAND, (see page 3, hereof), and the 4th Observation Squadron, attached to the Hawaiian Division, at Wheeler Field, Schofield Barracks. The materiel of this Army Air Service consists of the following:-

At Luke Field:-

Pursuit Squadron No. 6. - 16 MB3a, Thomas Morse pursuit, gunnery planes.

Pursuit Squadron No.19. - 16MB3a, Thomas Morse pursuit, gunnery planes.

Bombardment Squadron No.23. and No. 72. - 9 NBS-1, bombing, gunnery and observation planes.

Personnel - 66 officers and 824 enlisted men.

At Wheeler Field:-

Observation Squadron No. 4. - 13 DH4-B, observation, gunnery and bombing planes.

Personnel - 18 officers and 154 enlisted men.

At Fort Armstrong:-

Air Service Depot, reserve materiel, personnel 3 officers and 34 enlisted men.

War Reserve Materiel and Supplies:-

Black is well supplied with equipment and war reserves at OAHU, and could probably continue the struggle from the logistic standpoint for a period of 6 months. War reserves include 150 75 mm. guns, 1200 machine guns, and 5000 automatic rifles, calibre .30, and a large quantity of regulation small arms.

Motor Trucks:- In addition to the trucks of the Hawaiian Division Train there are sufficient commercial motor trucks to meet all requirements of the BLACK defense forces for moving troops from point to point on the island of OAHU.

Analysis of BLACK Forces:- (Continued)

Naval Forces:-

(a) District Forces, Fourteenth Naval District:-

The Fourteenth Naval District comprises all of the naval ships, personnel and materiel regularly stationed in and allotted to the Hawaiian Islands. The Naval Operating Base is located on the eastern side of PEARL HARBOR about 4 miles north-east of the entrance to the harbor. At this Base there are the following naval activities:- Navy Yard, with dry dock capable of taking battleships and complete construction and repair shops; naval air station on FORD'S ISLAND; submarine base, naval hospital; Marine Barracks, naval ammunition depot at KUAHUA; naval fuel depot; and naval radio stations at PEARL HARBOR and at HILO, Island of HAWAII.

The Fourteenth Naval District and all of the naval activities in Hawaiian Islands are under the command of a Rear Admiral whose Headquarters is at Pearl Harbor.

Floating Forces:-

The floating forces of BLACK, based at PEARL HARBOR, consist of the following:-

20 Submarines; Division 9 (R-2 Flagship),- R-1 to R-10, incl. Division 14 (R-14 Flagship),- R-11 to R-20, inclusive.

1 Submarine Tender;- SEAGULL, AM class, 950 tons.

6 Minelayers, Light minelayer DM class, old destroyers, 1191 tons.

5 Eagle boats, PE class, 500 tons.

7 Mine sweepers, AM, 950 tons.

3 Tugs.

3 Submarine chasers, PC.

1 Station ship, HANCOCK, old transport, 8500 tons, moored at Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR.

Naval Air Force:-

The Naval Air Force bases at PEARL HARBOR consists of about 20 planes of various types. The following planes and personnel are known to be stationed at PEARL HARBOR:-

Patrol Squadron No. 5. - 3 HS seaplanes, observation, spotting and gunnery.

Torpedo and Bombing Squadron No.19.- 1 N-9 seaplane, training; 1 R-6-L seaplane, torpedoes; 4 DT seaplanes, torpedo, bombing and gunnery; 1 F5L seaplane, scout, bombing, gunnery, spotting and observation; 3 JN land planes, training.

Total personnel:- 21 officers and 181 enlisted men.

Marine Corps Force:-

The Marine Corps force stationed at the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR, consists of 12 commissioned officers, 3 warrant officers and 425 enlisted men; total 440. They will probably be organized for BLACK defense as a battalion of infantry.

Analysis of BLACK Forces:--(Continued)

The total regular Naval Personnel of BLACK stationed in the Hawaiian Islands, all of them being concentrated at PEARL HARBOR, is as follows:--

Navy-----	73 officers,	792 enlisted men.
Marine Corps-----	15 officers,	425 enlisted men.
Total-----	88 officers,	1217 enlisted men.

(b) Naval Reserve Force, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS:--

The Naval Reserve Force, Hawaiian Islands, consists of 13 officers and 152 enlisted men. These reserves are given drills and training aboard an Eagle boat stationed at HONOLULU.

It is probable that the officers and men of the Hawaiian Naval Reserves would be used to man vessels of the Fourteenth Naval District which have reduced crews. This will make the total BLACK naval force:-- 101 officers and 1369 enlisted men.

Civilian Population of the Hawaiian Islands:--

Following is an analysis of the civil population (soldiers and sailors deducted) of the Hawaiian Islands with reference to possible use which could be made of civilians by BLACK in the defense of OAHU.

Total civil population, Census of 1920,-----251,546
Consisting of;

Males, 58% classified as follows:

Available and fit for military service--	21,712
Partially fit for military service-----	3,412
Friendly and useful but not available for military service-----	24,728
Friendly but not of material usefulness--	34,284
Unfriendly but useful-----	41,369
Unfriendly and not of material use-----	21,275
	<hr/> 146,780

Females, 42% classified as follows:

Friendly and useful-----	32,192
Friendly but not of material use-----	25,944
Unfriendly but of possible usefulness--	26,527
Unfriendly and not of material use-----	20,103
	<hr/> 104,766
	<hr/> 251,546

The rate of increase may be taken at 2.5% per year.

The civil population is classified by race as follows:--

Japanese-----	43%
Caucasian-----	21%
Hawaiian and part Hawaiian-----	16%
Chinese-----	9%
Filipinos-----	8%
Korean-----	2%
Others-----	1%

The population is distributed among the principal islands as follows:--

Oahu-----	48%
Hawaii-----	25%
Maui-----	15%
Kauai-----	12%

From a military standpoint the civil population is below average in intelligence and deficient in occupational specialists. A seriously large percentage is unfriendly.

DISPOSITION, BLACK FORCES:-

The normal disposition of the BLACK land and naval forces is given in detail in the foregoing Analysis of BLACK Forces. In general, all of the BLACK Forces are concentrated in the Island of OAHU.

Land Forces:- The BLACK land forces (with the exception of the Coast Defense Forces) are principally concentrated in the Hawaiian Division, which is normally stationed at Schofield Barracks, in the central plain about midway between PEARL HARBOR on the south coast and WAIALUA BAY on the north coast.

The Coast Defense Forces are divided into two groups, one for the defense of HONOLULU manning the coast defenses from DIAMOND HEAD to HONOLULU HARBOR, and the other for the defense of PEARL HARBOR manning the coast defenses in the vicinity of the entrance to PEARL HARBOR.

The land air forces are mainly concentrated at Ford Island on FORD'S ISLAND, with the 4th Observation Air Squadron at Wheeler Field, Schofield Barracks.

Naval Forces:- The BLACK Naval Forces, sea, air and land, are concentrated at PEARL HARBOR as a base, but of course may be employed in any part of the islands.

There is but one outlying station, the Naval Radio Station at HILO, on the Island of HAWAII.

PROBABLE INTENTIONS, BLACK:-

The general mission of the BLACK land and sea forces stationed in the HAWAIIAN Islands is to defend these islands, and especially the Island of OAHU with its naval activities at PEARL HARBOR, as a naval base for the BLACK FLEET.

It is assumed that the BLACK forces have given careful study to the defense of OAHU by all means available to them and that they have complete plans for such defense, and that they are entirely familiar with the topographical and physical characteristics of the island and the sea approaches thereto.

It is believed that this plan of defense embraces the following employment of the elements of the defense:-

(a) The employment of the BLACK Naval vessels as scouts to give timely advice of the approach of BLUE ships. The BLACK submarines would be very useful for such scouting to seaward during the night, as when running in the awash condition they are not readily discovered and at the same time can pick up the larger BLUE ships as they appear in silhouette above the water.

(b) The employment of the BLACK airplanes for scouting to seaward during the daylight to such a distance that before nightfall they may obtain information of the approach of BLUE ships within one night's steaming distance of the land.

(c) The employment of the BLACK coast defense batteries to prevent BLUE ships from closely approaching OAHU by day or night.

(d) The employment of BLACK submarines to sink BLUE ships, especially transports carrying troops for a landing attack.

(e) The employment of the BLACK land forces (other than those manning the Coast Defense Batteries) to combat any attempt of BLUE to land a force of troops upon OAHU. It is considered that the BLACK defense will be concentrated at OAHU, as the BLACK Commanding General knows the approximate strength of the BLUE attacking force and would not violate the principle of concentration of forces by detaching troops to any other island; and in addition, BLUE must capture OAHU to accomplish his mission, therefore, if BLACK succeeds in holding OAHU, BLUE must fail of accomplishing his mission.

PROBABLE INTENTIONS, BLACK:- (Continued)

(f) The weakness of an island as a defensive position lies in the fact that the attacking force may choose any part of the surrounding coastline for his point of attack; and conversely, the strength of an island position lies in the fact that the defense will always have the interior lines of communication. These considerations will probably lead BLACK to decide upon a system of defense for OAHU which will include an initial position for the main land defense forces in a central position from which it may be moved by radial routes toward any part of the coastline where a landing in force is effected by the BLUE troops, together with a system of observation posts covering all possible landing places on the coastline of the island, and a system of outpost or cordon lines of defense back of all probable landing places for the BLUE troops landing from transports. These cordons would consist of infantry and auxiliary weapons, light howitzers and mortars and machine guns, with supporting artillery batteries, 75 mm. guns.

(g) The time when a landing force is most vulnerable is when the boats approach close to the shore and the troops are disembarking therefrom and gaining a foothold. If BLUE can meet them at this time it is probable that BLACK will establish masked dagger batteries of 75 mm. guns, supported by nests of machine guns to enfilade the most probable landing places of BLUE forces.

(h) Considering the overwhelming naval preponderance of BLUE it appears probable that a landing of BLUE troops can be effected upon any selected section of the coastline of OAHU, with the exception of the southern coast from KOKO HEAD westward to a point 7 miles west of the entrance to PEARL HARBOR (2 miles east of BARBER'S POINT). With the coast defense batteries still in action and not subdued by BLUE ships' gunfire this section of the southern coast would probably be interdicted by the fire of the coast defense batteries. However, BLACK would have to consider the possibility of the ships' gunfire silencing the coast defense batteries long enough for BLUE troops to get ashore on this southern coast, hence his observation posts and defensive cordons would also include this coastline.

(i) Strong outposts of infantry supported by field guns and auxiliary weapons would probably be stationed back of the mountain passes through the KOOLAU Mountain Range to hold them against a BLUE force effecting a landing on the east coast until the reserves of the defense could be brought up to meet them. The same provision would probably be made to meet an attack by BLUE from the southwest coast and over the WAIANAE Mountain Range.

(j) The defense of the naval activities centered at PEARL HARBOR being a main requirement of the mission of the BLACK troops, it appears probable that insistence on the part of the BLACK naval authorities would cause the BLACK commanding general to station a strong cordon defense from WEST LOCH westward to the WAIANAE Range, with the object of delaying a BLUE force landed on the coast to the eastward and northward from BARBER'S POINT until reserves could be brought up to meet such an attack.

(k) It appears probable that the area selected for the general BLACK reserve force would be in the general vicinity of Schofield Barracks, and that this reserve would be held intact until the BLUE landing attack is so well developed as to convince BLACK that it is a main attack in force; viz:- until BLUE is actually committed to an attack in force at a determined point on the coastline. The BLACK reserve force would then be moved forward to meet the general BLUE attack. The method employed by BLACK to meet such a landing attack by BLUE would probably be for the defense cordon to fight a delaying action with the BLUE landing force, falling back upon the main reserve position until the time should come when the BLUE force

PROBABLE INTENTIONS, BLACK (Continued):-

attack by the main BLACK reserve force.

(l) It is probable that the BLACK fixed defense batteries will be employed against BLUE heavy ships, but after the BLUE landing attack has developed to the point where the exact landing place may be determined it is probable that some of these guns will be used against the succeeding waves of the BLUE attack while the boats are moving from the transports to the shore. The BLACK heavy mobile artillery will probably be used against the BLUE landing forces during their disembarkation from the boats and their initial advance inland, in order to delay their advance and reduce the numbers that will later have to be met by the main BLACK reserves in the counter-attack.

(m) During the landing of the BLUE force the BLACK air force will probably be used against the BLUE landing force while it is disembarking from the boats and gaining a foothold on the beach. In this it will have to meet the BLUE air force which is supporting the BLUE landing operations.

(n) The available BLACK main reserve force will probably be concentrated at a position to meet the BLUE landing force.

(o) BLACK will probably replace in so far as possible all regular army personnel normally engaged in non-military work by levies from the available civil population, and send men thus relieved to join the combatant troops. He will also increase his available force by the addition of all national guard and reserves, thus bringing his total combat force up to approximately 20,000 strength. Of this strength about 4,000 will probably be assigned to the fixed defenses and will not be available for other defense employment. Approximately 1,000 personnel are assigned to the Air Service. This will leave about 15,000 of all arms for assignment to the observation posts, cordon lines, and main reserve force. It is estimated that it will take 3,500 BLACK troops to establish the observation posts and cordon lines to cover all probable landing places for BLUE. This will leave about 11,500 for the main reserve force located in the central area.

(p) As BLUE, to capture OAHU, must effect a landing in force and then decisively defeat the BLACK land forces, the plans of BLACK will doubtless include, first, an effort to prevent such BLUE landing in force, and, second, the defeat of such BLUE force if it should succeed in effecting a landing. The first of these requirements will have to be met by action of the BLACK naval forces against BLUE ships, especially the troops transports, and by heavy gunfire from shore batteries; while the second requirement will have to be met by tactical dispositions of BLACK land forces to effect the defeat of the BLUE landing forces in engagements on land. It is believed that the plans of BLACK for such defense of OAHU would be practically as above outlined.

(q) From a consideration of the coastline of OAHU with reference to possible landing places for BLUE forces, an estimate may be formed of the general locations of the defensive cordons which BLACK will establish to contest BLUE landings. EAST COAST:- At WAIMANALO BAY, KAILUA BAY, and KANEOHE BAY there are possible landing places, but during the northeast trades this is a weather shore, and BLUE forces effecting a landing here would have to effect the difficult passage over the KOOLAU Mountain Range in the face of strong BLACK opposition before being in position to meet the BLACK main force. Judging from the fact that BLACK has heavy guns at the northern end of the island, it is estimated that a BLACK cordon will be established in this section of the coastline, with heavy outposts guarding the mountain passes.

PROBABLE INTENTIONS, BLACK (Continued):-

South Coast:- From KOKO HEAD westward to BARBER'S POINT the possible landing places are completely covered by the fire of the heavy coast defense batteries. However, it is known to be the policy of BLACK to protect such coast defenses by detachments of mobile troops to prevent raids by small enemy detachments, and on this account it is estimated that cordons of BLACK mobile troops will be found in this section of coastline.

From BARBER'S POINT northward to KAHE POINT landing is practicable in good weather (but not when Kona winds are blowing). A landing of BLUE on this section of coastline would seriously threaten PEARL HARBOR naval activities and to meet such a BLUE landing it is estimated that BLACK would establish a rather heavy cordon of mobile troops on the line from WEST LOCH to the southern slopes of the WAINAE Mountain Range.

West Coast:- From KAHE POINT to KAENA POINT there are a number of good landing places sheltered from prevailing winds, with terrain available to deploy a considerable force back of such landing places, but the WAINAE District is enclosed by the WAINAE Mountain Range with but few poor roads and trails crossing the range, and on this account it is estimated that BLACK would establish light cordons of mobile troops to dispute these landing places with BLUE.

North Coast:- From KAIKA BAY to WAIMEA BAY there are a number of landing places where BLUE could land a large force in ordinary weather, sheltered from the prevailing winds, and the terrain back of the landing places is excellent for deploying and advancing a large force. Excellent roads lead from these landing places through the great central plain directly to PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU. These considerations would probably lead BLACK to establish a strong cordon of mobile troops back of the available landing places on this north coast, supported by machine guns and artillery.

(r) It is estimated that BLACK will place obstructions at the most available landing places where the cordons of mobile troops are established with a view to delaying the BLUE landing forces under the fire of the defensive cordons and supporting guns.

(s) Treaty obligations do not prohibit the use of non-lethal gases and it is probable that BLACK will make provision for the employment of such gases, especially at landing places where the prevailing winds will tend to carry such gases from the land toward the beaches upon which BLUE troops would have to effect a landing.

(t) It is thought that BLACK will use mines at the entrance to PEARL HARBOR, HONOLULU, WAIMANALO BAY, KAILUA BAY, and KANEOHE BAY to prevent the passage of BLUE ships or boats through the available channels. It is also probable that ground mines will be planted by BLACK near the shore at the most probable landing places for BLUE.

SUMMARY:- BLACK Probable Intentions:-

(1) Scouting to seaward by naval vessels and aircraft to give timely advice of BLUE approach.

(2) Submarine attack by BLACK on BLUE ships, especially transports.

(3) Employment of coast defense batteries against BLUE ships approaching within range.

(4) Holding BLACK main land force in reserve in central area in vicinity of Schofield Barracks.

(5) Establishment of observation posts to cover all possible landing places for BLUE.

PROBABLE INTENTIONS, BLACK (Continued):-

(6) Establishment of cordons of mobile troops to contest BLUE landings at all probable landing places, strengths of such cordons depending upon the importance of such landing places in the BLACK scheme of defense and upon the probability of the use of such landing places by BLUE.

(7) Employment of the main BLACK reserve to engage BLUE main landing force after it has been committed to an attack in force.

(8) The use of gas to delay BLUE advance from landing places and to force BLUE troops to use gas masks thus decreasing their mobility and speed of advance.

(9) The emplacement of obstructions and ground mines at the most probable landing places for BLUE troops.

(10) The use of motor trucks to move elements of the main reserves to the front lines to meet well developed landing attacks of BLUE.

OUR FORCES:-

Strength of Forces of Action
Open

DECLASSIFIED

The BLUE forces available for operations against the BLACK forces in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS include the following:-

Land Forces:-

(a) Army Forces - None.

(b) Marine Forces - Marine Corps Expeditionary Force of about fifteen hundred officers and men, representing a constructive Expeditionary Force of Two Divisions, total about forty-two thousand officers and men. (These are Naval forces under the Commander-in-Chief of the BLUE Fleet).

Naval Forces:-

(a) The BLUE Fleet, consisting of:-

Battle Fleet (less Submarine Divisions Nine and Fourteen);

The Scouting Fleet;

The Control Force;

The Fleet Base Force (less Mine Squadron Two).

The entire BLUE Force will be assembled at SAN FRANCISCO by April 15, 1925.

Fourteen large transports (represented by fourteen large auxiliaries and tenders) will be available at SAN FRANCISCO before April 15, 1925, to transport the entire Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, and the assignment of constructive and actual organizations to these transports will be arranged by the Commanding General, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, after consultation with the Fleet Base Force.

DECLASSIFIED

The Commanding General, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, with his Executive Staff and the necessary enlisted Staff personnel, will be embarked in the Flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the BLUE Fleet.

Analysis of BLUE Forces:-

Land Forces:-

(b) Marine Forces - Marine Corps Expeditionary Force.

The Marine Corps Expeditionary Force consists of a constructive force of about 42,000 officers and enlisted men, represented by an actual strength of 1500 officers and men. The organization of the force is as follows:-

Force Headquarters----- 40 officers, 90 men.

Special Troops----- 43 officers, 1267 men.

1 Headquarters Company-----	6 officers,	100 men.
1 Signal Battalion-----	12 "	350 "
1 Service Battalion (Q.M.)-----	10 "	437 "
1 Ordnance Company (Ammunition)-----	4 "	100 "
1 Ordnance Co. (Heavy Maintenance)-----	3 "	100 "
1 Gas Battalion-----	8 "	180 "
Total-----	43 "	1267 "

Force Artillery----- 63 officers, 6338 men.

1 Headquarters and Signal Battalion-----	11 officers,	75 men.
1 Ammunition Train-----	"	1000 "
1 Observation (Flash) Battalion-----	17 "	204 "
2 Regiments 155 mm. Howitzer, 48 guns-----	148 "	3322 "
1 Regiment 155 mm. guns, 24 guns-----	70 "	1737 "

1 Regt. AntiAircraft Artillery----- 63 officers, 1450 men.

1 Regiment Pioneers----- 38 " 806 "

Force Air Service----- 135 " 1000 "

Force Medical Service----- 50 " 600 "

Force Train----- 15 " 500 "

Attached Medical Personnel and
Chaplains----- 60 " 300 "

2 Marine Divisions----- 1660 " 31326 "

Grand total in Force 2384 " 43677 "

Each of the Marine Divisions in the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force consists of the following organizations and strengths:-

Division Headquarters----- 40 officers, 87 men.

Special Troops----- 35 " 623 "

1 Headquarters Company----- 11 " 111 "

1 Signal Company----- 6 " 150 "

1 Light Tank Company----- 3 " 145 "

1 Ordnance Company (Maintenance)----- 1 " 105 "

1 Service Company (Q.M.)----- 2 " 100 "

Attached Medical Personnel----- 3 " 12 "

2 Marine Brigades----- 460 " 9746 "

Analysis of BLUE Forces (Continued):-

1 Artillery Brigade, 48 75mm. guns-	169 officers,	3227 men.
1 Pioneer Battalion-----	15 "	410 "
Division Air Service-----	38 "	190 "
1 Machine Gun Battalion (2 Cos.)--	8 "	215 "
1 Medical Regiment, 1/3 Marines, and 2/3 Naval Medical personnel-	50 "	700 "
Division Train-----	15 "	465 "
Total Strength, Marine Division		830 " 15663 "

Each of the Marine Brigades in a Marine Division consists of the following organizations and strengths:-

1 Headquarters and Hq. Company-----	12 officers,	88 men.
1 Machine Gun Battalion (2 Cos)-----	8 "	215 "
16 guns.		
2 Marine Regiments-----	210 "	4570 "
Total Strength, Marine Brigade-----	230 "	4873 "

Each of the Marine Brigades consists of the following organizations and strengths:-

1 Headquarters and Hq. Company-----	12 officers	100 men.
1 Service Company-----	6 "	140 "
3 Marine Battalions-----	78 "	1995 "
Attached Medical Personnel (Navy)---	9 "	50 "
Total Strength, Marine Regiment-		105 " 2285 "

Each of the Marine Battalions in a Marine Regiment consists of the following organizations and strengths:-

1 Headquarters and Hq. Company-----	11 officers	165 men.
Battalion Headquarters-----	3 "	4 "
Company Headquarters-----	1 "	11 "
Intelligence Section-----	1 "	13 "
Communication Platoon-----	1 "	35 "
Pioneer Platoon-----	1 "	27 "
Service Platoon-----	1 "	11 "
Howitzer Platoon-----	3 "	64 "
1 Machine Gun Company-----	3 "	100 "
4 Marine Companies-----	12 "	400 "
Total Strength, Marine Battalion		26 " 665 "

The strength of 1 Marine Company----- 100 "

The assignment of troops to the units should be made with a view to keeping organizations together in far as it is practicable to do so.

Analysis of BLUE Forces (Continued):-

Equipment of BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force:-

The equipment to be carried with the BLUE landing forces is, by organizations, as follows (the equipment and the personnel to operate it should be embarked together in ships):-

Infantry Machine Guns and Auxiliary Weapons:- Each Infantry Battalion has 8 machine guns, 2 37mm. guns, and 2 3-inch mortars. This gives each Infantry Regiment three times these numbers. Each Marine Brigade has in addition to the above 1 Machine Gun Battalion with 16 machine guns.

	Machine Guns	37mm. Guns.	3-inch mortars
Total in 1 Regiment Inft.-----	24-----	6-----	6
Total in 1 Brigade Inft.-----	64-----	12-----	12
Total in 1 Marine Division-----	128-----	24-----	24

Light Field Artillery:- Each of the two Marine Divisions of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force has one Artillery Brigade composed of 2 Artillery Regiments of 75mm. guns, tractor drawn.

Total in 1 Regiment Artillery-----	24 75mm. guns.
Total in 1 Brigade Artillery-----	48 75mm. guns.
Total in 1 Marine Division -----	48 75mm. guns.
Total in Marine Corps Expeditionary Force---	96 75mm. guns.

Heavy Field Artillery - Force Artillery:- The Marine Corps Expeditionary Force has one Force Artillery Brigade, composed of 2 Regiments of 155mm. Howitzers and 1 Regiment of 155mm. guns, tractor drawn.

Total in 1 Regiment, Howitzer,-----	24 155mm.Howitzers.
Total in 1 Regiment, G.P.F.-----	24 155mm.Guns.
Total in Force Artillery Brigade--	48 155mm.Howtz. 24 155mm. Guns.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery:- The Marine Corps Expeditionary Force has attached to it 1 Regiment of Anti-Aircraft Artillery with the following equipment:-

12 3-inch Anti-Aircraft guns, tractor drawn.
48 Heavy Machine Guns, Anti-Aircraft, 50 calibre.

Tanks:- In the Special Troops assigned to each of the 2 Marine Divisions there is 1 Light Tank Company equipped with 24 light fighting tanks and 1 light signal tank, with 9 trucks, 1 tractor and 2 trailers.

	Tanks fighting	Tanks signal	Trucks,	Tractor,	Trailers.
Total in Marine Division--	24 -----	1 -----	9 -----	1 -----	2 --
Total in Marine Force-----	48 -----	2 -----	18 -----	2 -----	4

Division Air Service:- The Division Air Service attached to each of the two Marine Divisions in the Force is as follows:-

1 Observation Squadron

	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Men	No.Planes	Type
Operation -----	35 -----	1 -----	160-----	13 -----	VO
Maintenance -----	2 -----	0 -----	30 -----	2 -----	VO
Total-----	37 -----	1 -----	190 -----	15 -----	VO
(1 Division)					
Total-----				30 -----	VO.
(For the Force having 2 Divisions)					

Analysis of BLUE Forces (Continued):-

Force Air Service:- The Force Air Service consists of the following organizations, strengths, and equipment:-

Organizations.	Officers	Enlisted	Planes	Type
1 Pursuit Squadron -----	32	260	25	VF.
1 Observation Sqdn.-----	35	190	13	VO.
1 Bombardment Sqdn.-----	56	285	13	VB.
1 Air Park (Main- tenance)-----	8	250	2	VO.
Wing Headquarters.-----	4	15	1	VO.
Total-----	135	1000	54	

Signal and Radio Equipment:- The Signal Battalion forming part of the Force Special Troops consists of 12 officers and 350 enlisted men. The equipment of this battalion for the operations under consideration consists of the following:-

3 5-passenger motor cars, 1 trailer, radio.
16 motorcycles, 1 truck, radio.
20 trucks, general service, 2 radio sets,
Telephone equipment, 2 radio receiving sets,
on reels, and switchboards.

The general purpose of this battalion is to maintain the necessary communication between Force Headquarters and Division Headquarters and naval vessels engaged in supporting the attack.

The Signal Company forming a part of the Special Troops of each Marine Division consists of 6 officers and 150 enlisted men, and it has the following equipment for the contemplated operations:-

1 5-passenger motor car, 1 trailer, storage batteries.
9 motorcycles, side car, 2 trucks, radio
14 trucks, general service 4 radio sets,
Telephone equipment, wire 1 radio receiving set
on reels, and switchboards.

The general purpose of these companies is to maintain communication between Division Headquarters and the elements of the Division.

Force Train Equipment:- The Force Train has 15 officers and 500 enlisted men and, for the operations contemplated, should have the following equipment:-

3 5-passenger motor cars, 3 motorcycles, side car,
1 tractor, 5-ton, 2 trailers,
25 trucks, cargo, 2 light trucks,
2 trucks, tank,

Division Train Equipment:- The Division Train of each of the two Marine Divisions in the Force has 15 officers and 465 enlisted men and, for the operations contemplated, should have the following equipment:-

4 5-passenger motor cars, 4 motorcycles, side car,
2 tractors, 5-ton, 3 trailers,
54 trucks, cargo, 4 light trucks,
4 trucks, tank.

The above equipment pertains to the Constructive BLUE Force and will all be constructive except such signal equipment as will be required for necessary communication service by the Representative Force.

DECLASSIFIED

Analysis of BLUE Forces (Continued):-

Naval Forces:-

(a) The BLUE Fleet.

The BLUE Fleet consists of:-

BATTLE FLEET (less Submarine Divisions Nine and Fourteen).

SCOUTING FLEET.

CONTROL FORCE.

FLEET BASE FORCE (less Mine Squadron Two).

The approximate total strength in ships of various classes in the BLUE FLEET taking part in the operations is as follows:-

- 11 BB. - Battleships, First Line.
- 6 CL. - Light Cruisers.
- 56 DD. - Destroyers, First Line.
- 1 OCV. - Aircraft Carrier.
- 2 - Aircraft Tender.
- DM. - Minelayers.
- 14 AP. - Transports (1 actual - HENDERSON, and 13 auxiliaries acting as transports).
- Train - Fuel ships, Supply ships, Ammunition ships, and Hospital ships.

DISPOSITION - BLUE FORCES:-

On April 15, 1925, the entire BLUE Force is assembled at SAN FRANCISCO, the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force personnel and equipment and materiel, as above enumerated, being embarked in the transports accompanying the Fleet.

The operations of the BLUE Forces against the BLACK Forces in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS will begin at 0500 Twenty-five April, 1925, at which time the BLUE transports will be not more than 1700 miles from SAN FRANCISCO.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE:-

The Mission of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force in the contemplated operations being, "To effect a landing on OAHU and capture or destroy its defenses", a decision must be reached as to the definite plan of campaign which will accomplish this mission in the most expeditious and efficient manner with the minimum loss to the BLUE forces, utilising to the best advantage all of the available land and sea forces at the disposal of BLUE.

OAHU is one of the eight principal islands which comprise the Hawaiian Group. The BLACK land and sea forces are all concentrated at OAHU, with but one outlying post, the Naval Radio Station at HILO on the island of HAWAII.

The operations of BLUE against the BLACK defenses of OAHU will begin at 0500 Twenty-five April, 1925, when the transports carrying the BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force will be not more than 1700 miles from SAN FRANCISCO. If the BLUE Fleet proceeds by the direct route this point will be 391 miles from HONOLULU.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

At the time when the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force (in transports) is at the point approximately 400 miles from OAHU, it is assumed that the BLUE Scouts will be much nearer to OAHU and that the BLACK naval scouting vessels and BLACK aircraft patrols will be in touch with them, and that the information thus gained will lead BLACK to conclude that an attack in force against OAHU is imminent.

If this assumption is correct, the line of action indicated for BLUE is a rapid descent upon OAHU by the whole BLUE land and sea force, an engagement of the BLACK coast defense batteries by the heavy BLUE ships, an expeditious landing of the BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force at a selected section of the coastline of OAHU supported by gunfire from the BLUE ships, and an advance of the BLUE landing forces with the object of effecting a decisive defeat of the BLACK land forces. Such a decisive defeat of the BLACK land forces would result in the capture of BLUE fixed defense batteries and of the facilities located at PEARL HARBOR, thus accomplishing the mission of the BLUE Fleet.

Two general courses of action are open to BLUE; first, the capture and occupation of some roadstead suitable for a rendezvous for the BLUE Fleet as a preliminary move to an attack upon the defenses of OAHU; second, a direct descent upon OAHU.

The first mentioned course of action would give the enemy more time for preparation, subject the BLUE ships, both fighting ships and transports, to a longer period in which BLACK might deliver harassing attacks by submarines and aircraft, lessen the possibility of the element of surprise in the BLUE attack, and would present no commensurate advantages to BLUE. The BLACK forces are concentrated in OAHU, and should this course of action be adopted the BLUE forces would still have to move to OAHU and make the landing and attack there in order to accomplish its mission.

The second course of action would give the enemy the least time for preparation, subject the BLUE ships to enemy attack for the shortest period of time, increase the possibility of surprise, and have the advantage of being the most direct method of attack.

Whichever one of the above mentioned courses of action is adopted, it will be necessary to land the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, supported by fire from the BLUE ships, at some selected section or sections of the coastline of OAHU, after a preparatory bombardment of the BLACK fixed defenses by the ships' gunfire of the BLUE Fleet, and after effecting such landing to deploy the landing force and consolidate it in a position from which it can attack the BLACK land forces in OAHU.

During this landing of the BLUE forces it will be necessary for the BLUE air force of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force to gain and maintain supremacy in the air, the BLUE naval air forces being employed at the same time in the protection of the ships of the Fleet, and especially the transports which can not be underway during the disembarkation of the troops. To accomplish this it will be necessary for the Air Forces of the BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force to have a shore base of operations for their land planes. To secure such a base in OAHU before the Expeditionary Force is landed and deployed in OAHU would be impossible, and the alternative presented would be for BLUE to first seize a site for such an aircraft base in some other place within air striking distance of OAHU.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

The problem presented to the Commanding General of the BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force in order to enable him to reach a decision under his estimate of the situation is the course of action to be followed on land in OAHU which will insure the decisive defeat of the BLACK land forces, in other words a plan of campaign for BLUE on land in OAHU.

Such a plan of campaign requires a consideration of the terrain over which the operations would have to be conducted and consideration of the availability and practicability of the possible landing places which give access to such terrain.

Terrain of OAHU:- The island of OAHU is a rough quadrilateral in shape, area about 600 square miles, the sides having air-line lengths as follows:-

East side-----36 miles,

South side-----31 miles,

112 miles. The total perimeter, air-line, is 107 miles. The island is paralleled by mountain ranges the crests of which lie from 3 to 5 miles from the coastline. These mountain ranges are practically impassable for organized troops due to their rugged character and to natural obstacles, steep sides ravines and semi-tropical growths of thorny underbrush.

On the east side in the KOOLAULOA District, from KAHUKU POINT to KUALOA POINT, 17 miles, the mountains come down close to the coastline and the terrain is unsuitable for the deployment and maneuvering of large forces. In the KOOLAUPOKO District, from KUALOA POINT to MAKAPUU POINT, 19 miles, there is a coast plain from 2 to 7 miles wide between the mountains and the coastline, but the sea face of the mountains is very precipitous and the only practicable crossings are by two roads, both first class macadam roads, one leading through the pass known as the NUUANU PALI, thence directly southeast through NUUANU VALLEY, 5 miles to HONOLULU, the other skirting the coastline northward around the northern end of the island, KAHUKU POINT, and along the north coast to WAINEA BAY and WAIALUA BAY. From the latter place roads lead southeast through the Central Valley to PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU.

In the KOOLAUPOKO District the coast plain affords opportunity for the deployment of a large force but the mountain range encloses it and makes of it a veritable cul-de-sac from which it would be wellnigh impossible to advance into the Central Valley, and such an advance would be necessary to defeat the BLACK defensive force of OAHU.

On the south side, from KOKO HEAD to DIAMOND HEAD, along the shores of MAUNALUA BAY, the mountains approach close to the coastline, and there is an excellent macadam road skirting the shore into HONOLULU. In this section of coastline a large force could not be landed and deployed.

From DIAMOND HEAD to AHUA POINT, the HONOLULU District, there is a narrow coast plain with numerous swamps and lagoons. From the coast plain the land slopes gradually back to the KOOLAU mountain range and numerous valleys trend southwest from the mountains to the coast. This section is covered by the fire of the heavy guns of the coast defenses of BLACK.

About the middle of the south coast is the PEARL HARBOR District, containing the large harbor of PEARL HARBOR where the naval activities and facilities of BLACK are concentrated. The coast plain is comparatively low forming the southern end of the great central mass of OAHU. West of PEARL HARBOR to BARBER'S POINT is a wide coast plain with room to deploy a large force.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

This section of the southern coast is commanded by the heavy guns of the Coast Defense District of PEARL HARBOR.

There are excellent roads leading from HONOLULU to the Navy Yard on the eastern side of PEARL HARBOR, and south to the batteries at the eastern side of the entrance to the harbor, and around the northern side of PEARL HARBOR to WAIPAHI, from whence excellent roads lead northwest through the Central Valley and west through the southwestern coast plain to KAHE POINT.

A force landed between the entrance to PEARL HARBOR and KAHE POINT would have ample area for deployment and good terrain for an advance northward to PEARL HARBOR and the Central Valley.

On the west side, from BARBERS POINT to KAENA POINT, there is a coastal plain between the WAIANAE mountain range and the coast. The BLUE forces could be landed on this coast and there is room for deployment of a large force, but the WAIANAE mountain range is rugged and impassable for organized troops, there are no roads crossing it into the Central Valley, and a force landed and deployed here could not advance to meet the BLACK forces holding the Central Valley. This coast plain would, therefore, form a cul-de-sac for a BLUE force landed and deployed there.

On the north side, from KAENA POINT to WAIMEA BAY, there is a coastline of 17 miles. For the first 6 miles, from KAENA POINT to KAWAIHAPAI, the mountains approach close to the shore and there are no good landing places nor any room for deployment back of the coastline.

From KAWAIHAPAI to WAIMEA BAY, 11 miles, there is good terrain back of the coastline for the deployment of a large force and practicable landing places for the BLUE forces. From this section of the coast it would be practicable for the BLUE forces to advance in a southeasterly direction through the Central Valley to the attack of the BLACK forces concentrated in their central position in the vicinity of Schofield Barracks. From KAWAIHAPAI to KAIKA BAY, 5 miles, the mountains command the coastline at a distance of from 1 to 3 miles.

To the eastward of the section of coastline occupied by KAIKA BAY and WAIALUA BAY, with a width of 3 miles, there are four small streams flowing in a general westerly direction through deep ravines or gulches which form a serious obstacle to the movement of large bodies of organized troops in a north and south direction or vice versa, but in the areas between these gulches the BLUE forces could move in organized formation from the coastline in an easterly direction toward the area surrounding Schofield Barracks, which it is estimated, would be the area of concentration for BLACK'S main force or reserve.

From KAENA POINT to KAWAIHAPAI a fair road skirts the coastline and from the latter place an excellent road leads via PUNIKI to WAIALUA. From the KAIKA BAY - WAIALUA BAY section of the coastline excellent roads lead inland to the Schofield Barracks - WAHIAWA district, and thence to PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU.

For the first four miles inland to the southeastward from the KAIKA BAY - WAIALUA BAY coastline the available width of the terrain between impassable gulches is about three miles, and beyond the WAIANAE mountain range the valley gradually widens until it reaches a width of 7 miles at the Schofield Barracks - WAHIAWA line, which is the divide across the Central Valley. Northwest of this divide the Central Valley slopes gradually down to the coastline at KAIKA BAY - WAIALUA BAY, and southeast of the divide it slopes gradually down to the low

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

land surrounding PEARL HARBOR.

Railroad Facilities:- The OAHU R.R. line runs from HONOLULU westward to PEARL HARBOR at the head of SOUTHEAST LOCH, then skirts the shore of PEARL HARBOR to WAIPAHA JUNCTION, from where a branch line runs north through the Central Valley to WAHAIWA and Schofield Barracks. The main line runs from WAIPAHA JUNCTION south along the shore of WEST LOCH to within 2 miles of the southern seacoast, thence westward across the coast plain to the western seacoast at BROWN CAMP, from where it closely follows the west coast north to KAENA POINT, and along the north coastline to KAHUKA POINT, and then runs along the east coast to its terminus at KAHANA BAY.

There are eight 12-inch railway mortars mounted on cars which can be taken over any of the railway lines and which can be set up and fired from any of the railway lines.

There are many other points on the R.R. lines which could be demolished by raiding demolition parties or by well directed fire from ships' guns, thus precluding the further transportation of the R.R. mortars. The branch line of R.R. from WAIPAHA JUNCTION to WAHAIWA and Schofield Barracks could not be readily reached by raiding parties or by fire from ships' guns.

BLACK Positions in General:- It has been estimated (under the heading of PROBABLE INTENTIONS, BLACK) that the general plan of defense of BLACK will include the following provisions:-

- (1) To deny the close approach of BLUE ships by gunfire from the coast defense batteries.
- (2) To attack BLUE ships, and especially BLUE transports, with submarines and bombing aircraft.
- (3) To interdict a BLUE landing of troops on the south coast of OAHU by gunfire from the coast defense batteries as long as possible.
- (4) To hold a large main reserve of mobile troops at some central area until the BLUE land attack is developed in force at some point or points on the coastline of OAHU, probably in the area around Schofield Barracks and WAHAIWA.
- (5) To establish observation posts covering all possible landing places for BLUE.
- (6) To establish cordons of mobile troops to command all probable landing places for BLUE with the object of delaying the BLUE landing and deployment long enough to enable the BLACK main force to be disposed to best meet the main BLUE land attack after it has developed in force.

It has been estimated that BLACK will station a cordon of troops to contest a BLUE landing on the east coast at WAIMANALO BAY and KAILUA BAY and support such cordon by heavy mobile tractor-drawn guns near the northern end of WAIMANALO BAY, and that BLACK will also post sufficient force at the PALI to hold the mountains; that BLACK will have support from the coast defense batteries on the south shore from DIAMOND HEAD to PEARL HARBOR; that BLACK will have a strong cordon of mobile troops in the area between WEST LOCH and the southern slopes of the WAIANEA mountains to meet a BLUE force landing at the southwestern coast section; that BLACK will have detachments of mobile troops to meet possible BLUE landing forces on the west coast at NANA-KULI, MAILI, WAIANAE, and MAKAHA, where there are excellent beaches for BLUE landings; and that BLACK will have a strong cordon supported by field artillery and machine-guns to command the possible landing places for BLUE at the KAIKA BAY -

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-
WAIALUA BAY section of the north coast of OAHU.

Assuming that BLACK will hold his main force as a reserve in the central area in the vicinity of Schofield Barracks - WAHAIWA; that he will interdict a landing of BLUE on the south coast east of a point four miles west of the entrance to PEARL HARBOR; that landings of BLUE forces on the east coast at WAIMANALO BAY or KAILUA BAY, or on the west coast from NANAKULI north to MAKAHA, would only result in placing them in a position from which they could not advance against the BLACK main force in the Central Valley; the plan of campaign promising the maximum chances for BLUE success appears to be for BLUE to force a landing on the north coast at the northern end of the Central Valley. BLUE is considerably superior in strength to the BLACK forces in the area, and attack in column formation echeloned in depth in the direction of the Schofield Barracks, WAHAIWA line, with the BLACK main force as the objective; and simultaneously to force a landing with a smaller BLUE force on the west coast between KAHE POINT and BARBER'S POINT, and advance with this force in the general direction of WAIPAHI, with the object of threatening the naval activities located at PEARL HARBOR and thus drawing strength from the BLACK main force in the central area.

Preceding the BLUE landing attacks the BLUE air forces should make a reconnaissance of the BLACK positions in OAHU. To effect this it will be necessary for BLUE to seize an air base for land aircraft on another island of the HAWAIIAN Group within striking distance of OAHU. The available places for such an air base for BLUE are the eastern end of MOLOKAI, distant by airline 35 miles from HONOLULU, 40 miles from PEARL HARBOR, 50 miles from Schofield Barracks, and 57 miles from WAIALUA BAY; and LANAI, approximately 20 miles farther distant from the BLACK positions.


The BLUE air forces belonging to the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force should be employed during the landing and attack by the BLUE forces for observation of BLACK forces and positions, for overcoming the BLACK air forces operating against the BLUE landing forces, and for bombing and machine gun attacks upon the BLACK land forces, and for laying gas clouds.

As soon as possible after BLUE has gained a foothold on OAHU and deployed sufficiently to cover an area between its front lines and the coastline where the landing is effected, a base for BLUE aircraft should be established in OAHU in rear of the BLUE line.

BLUE Landing Places:- The above outlined plan of campaign for the BLUE landing forces would require the selection of BLUE landing places on the north coast in the general vicinity of KAIKA BAY and WAIALUA BAY, for the main force.

After the first waves of BLUE troops have gained a foothold on the shore and driven back the BLACK cordon troops from the close vicinity of the coastline, following elements of the BLUE landing force will be landed at available landing places northeast of KAIKA BAY, in order to effect the landing of the main force as rapidly as possible by utilising the landing places in a wider front of coastline.

This plan would also require the selection of a suitable landing place for BLUE landing forces on the south coast to the northwest of BARBER'S POINT.



COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

Climate:- The climate is semi-tropical and equable; during the month of April the average temperature is 72.7° (F), mean maximum 77.6°, and mean minimum 67.7°; and the average humidity is 68%. Fogs are unknown and except for rain squalls and occasional mist and haze, there is no thick weather.

Rainfall:- The average rainfall for the month of April is 2.11 inches; the average amount of clouds for the month of April (0 to 10) scale is 5.4. The average annual rainfall is 28.6 inches. The rainfall varies greatly owing to local conditions in the different islands and there is usually more rain on the windward side of the islands.

Winds:- The prevailing winds prevail throughout the year. During the summer months, from May to September, they are almost continuous and usually from the north of the average direction. During the winter months, October to April, the trades are likely to be interrupted by variable winds, or by "Konas", the local name for strong southerly or southwesterly winds. These konas last from a few hours to two or three days and are attended by rain squalls. During the konas all anchorages on the lee side of the islands are unsafe and landings on the south and west sides of OAHU are impracticable.

Observations twice per day, at 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., during the month of April throughout a number of years give the following number of times the wind blows from the different directions in April:-

N.--- 2	E.---22	S.--- 1	W.--- 1	Calm--- 1
N.E.-29	S.E.- 2	S.W.- 1	S.W.- 1	

The average number of days with gales of 40 miles per hour or over during the month of April has been -----0.1 days.

During the prevalence of the northeast trades landings on the east side of the island of OAHU is difficult and dangerous and the sea continually breaks on the numerous reefs and shoals that skirt the shore.

Tides:- The periodic tides in the Hawaiian Islands are usually small, the average rise and fall being from 1 to 2 feet. The high water intervals vary from 2 to 3-3/4 hours and the tides occur from 1 to 1-1/2 hours earlier along the northern coasts than they do along the southern coasts of the islands.

Sun:- The Hawaiian Islands are in the Plus 11 Time Zone. Honolulu is in Lat. 21° 20' N., Long. 157° 50' W.

DATE	SUN RISES	SUN SETS
April 25, 1925	5:36 a.m.	6:22 p.m.
" 26 "	5:35 a.m.	6:23 p.m.
" 27 "	5:35 a.m.	6:23 p.m.
" 28 "	5:34 a.m.	6:23 p.m.
" 29 "	5:33 a.m.	6:23 p.m.
" 30 "	5:33 a.m.	6:24 p.m.
May 1 "	5:32 a.m.	6:24 p.m.

Moon:- The moon will be new April 23, 1925, first quarter May 1, 1925.

DATE	MOON RISES	MOON SETS
April 25, 1925	7:23 a.m.	8:37 p.m.
" 26 "	8:6 a.m.	9:29 p.m.
" 27 "	8:58 a.m.	10:19 p.m.
" 28 "	9:5 a.m.	11:8 p.m.
" 29 "	10:23 a.m.	11:54 p.m.
" 30 "	11:11 a.m.	12:41 p.m.
May 1 "	12:8 p.m.	1:28 a.m.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

Landing Places - Coast of OAHU:- To determine the available landing places on the coast of OAHU a consideration of all of them is included, as follows:

(a) East Coast, from MAKAPUU POINT to KAHUKU POINT:- This is the least practicable coast for a BLUE landing, as it is the weather coast during the prevailing northeast trades and there are no possible landing places where BLUE forces could land on a wide front; and, after landing there, BLUE forces would still have to face a very difficult passage of the KOOLAU mountains before reaching the BLACK main land forces. The only landing places on the east coast are at WAIMANALO BAY, KAILUA BAY, MOKAPU PENINSULA, KANEOHE BAY, KAHANA BAY, LAIE BAY, and at several points on the coast between KAHANA BAY and KAHUKU POINT.

WAIMANALO BAY:- The bay affords shelter in all weather behind the barrier reef which parallels the coast. The principal entrance is at the northern end of the bay, width about 750 yards, least depth 12 feet over the bar, but during strong trades this entrance is closed by breakers. Landing of a large force is not considered practicable here during north east trades of usual strength.

KAILUA BAY:- The only possible landing place in this bay for ships' boats is on a partially protected sand beach south of ULUPAU HEAD, but this landing is not practicable during strong trades and the advance inland would have to be across a very narrow neck of land.

MOKAPU PENINSULA:- There is a practicable landing place on the north side on a good sand beach, but it is not possible except in smooth weather.

KANEOHE BAY:- The bay is separated from the open sea by small islands and coral reefs having two entrance channels. The southeastern entrance, 1-1/2 miles west of PYRAMID ROCK, has a depth of 8 feet but it is difficult and requires local knowledge. The northwestern entrance is 1/2 mile southeast of MOKOLII ISLAND and has a depth of 12 feet, but requires local knowledge for entrance. In strong trades the sea breaks over both entrances. The northern and southern portions of the bay are separated by a cross reef.

KAHANA BAY:- There is an entrance about 350 yards wide with sufficient depth for ships' boats to a good landing beach at the head of the bay. Ships' boats could land here in any weather that would allow ships' boats to lie alongside transports lying off the bay. The landing is commanded at short range by heights on both sides and there is very little room for deployment of troops after landing.

LAIE BAY:- There is an entrance for small craft 1 mile north of LAIE POINT between two islets and a fair sand beach along the shores of the bay, but there is little room for deploying a force after landing and no roads except north and south along the coast.

Coast from KAHANA BAY to KAHUKU POINT:- The coast is skirted by reefs but there are small breaks in the reef at PUNALUU and HAUULA where small boats can pass inside the reef in smooth weather only. These landings would be practicable for small forces only, and as the mountains command the coast, there is no room for deployment of troops.

(b) South Coast, from MAKAPUU POINT to BARBER'S POINT:- From KOKO HEAD to BARBER'S POINT there is a coral reef along this coast, usually with small openings. There are large openings in this reef at HONOLULU, KAILUA, and PEARL HARBOR, and small breaks at other points. This section of the coast is commanded by the Coast DEFENSE batteries and until

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

these batteries are reduced or silenced landing of a large force on this coast is not considered practicable, except at the western portion near BARBER'S POINT.

HANAUMA BAY:- This is a small inlet with entrance practicable for small craft in fairly smooth weather and a beach at the head of the bay about 300 yards wide where boats could land, but the land back of the beach is abrupt and impracticable for movements of any large force. East of KOKO crater there are two small sand beaches where landing of small detachments would be practicable except in strong northeast trades.

MAUNALUA BAY:- This is an open bight between KOKO HEAD and DIAMOND HEAD, free from obstructions and sheltered from the prevailing northeast trades. A coral reef fringes the shore of the bay but there are a number of small breaks through which ships' boats could enter. The possible entrances and beaches are commanded by the guns of Fort Ruger and the mountains come down close to the shore precluding deployment of any considerable force that could be landed here.

WAIKIKI BEACH:- There are two breaks in the barrier reef here but the approaches are commanded by the guns of Fort De Russy and DIAMOND HEAD batteries. There is room for deployment of the force which could be landed here if these batteries were reduced or silenced.

HONOLULU HARBOR:- The entrance is narrow but deep enough for large ships; it is commanded by the shore batteries.

KALIHI ENTRANCE:- This entrance is narrow and about 2 miles in length and is commanded by shore batteries. It is not considered practicable for landing a BLUE force.

PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE:- The deep water channel through the reef is very narrow and about 1 mile in length, it is commanded by shore batteries, and is considered impracticable for a landing force while the defenses are intact.

PEARL HARBOR to BARBER'S POINT:- There are but few small breaks in the barrier reef along this coast; one small break 1 mile west of the entrance to PEARL HARBOR is passable for small boats in good weather and another small break at KUALAKAI of the same nature. This section of coast is not considered practicable for landing any considerable BLUE force in ordinary weather.

(c) West Coast:- This coast is protected from the prevailing northeast trades and there are many excellent beaches where landing in ships' boats would be practicable in ordinary weather to be expected in April. A force landed on this coast at any points between NANAKULI to KEPUHI POINT would find ample terrain suitable for deployment in the coast plain, but the WAIANAE mountains enclose this region and they would form an impassable barrier for a large organized force.

BARBER'S POINT to KAHE POINT:- Landings here are practicable in ordinary weather in April and the terrain to the eastward is a low coast plain suitable for deployment of a large force. A BLUE force landed here could deploy and advance over good terrain eastward toward PEARL HARBOR and WAIPAHU, with the object of threatening the naval activities at PEARL HARBOR or to create a diversion from the main BLACK force concentrated in the Schofield Barracks - WAHAIWA area.

KAHE POINT to KAENA POINT:- For two miles north from KAHE POINT the WAIANAE mountains come down close to the sea. From NANAKULI north to PUUO HULU there is an excellent sand beach landing, and also a landing of the same nature on a mile front at MAILI. At WAIANEA there are excellent landings on sandy beaches, and at KAAHAU there is a landing on a mile front of coast line. At MAKUA there is an excellent landing on a mile front of coast line.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

(d) North Coast, from KAENA POINT to KAHUKU POINT:- This coast trends east and west from KAENA POINT to KAIKA BAY, thence northeast to KAHUKU POINT. It contains a number of good landing places in ordinary northeast trades, with several bays or inlets suitable for landing large forces from ships' boats. The section of this coast from MOKULEIA to WAIMEA BAY is at the northwestern end of the Central Valley which extends across OAHU from PEARL HARBOR to the north coast. Landing the main BLUE force in this locality would best suit the BLUE plan of campaign on shore.

KAENA POINT to KAIKA BAY:- This coast is skirted by reefs making landings difficult. Breaks off KAWAIHAPAI and MOKULEIA are suitable for ships' boats in good weather.

KAIKA BAY:- The channel through the reef here is about 175 yards wide and leads around behind the reef with an excellent landing at the mouth of a small stream. It is about 1 mile south of WAIALUA BAY and, next after that bay, is the best landing place on the north shore. To the eastward of this landing place the terrain is good for deployment of a large force.

WAIALUA BAY:- The entrance to this bay is through a break in the reef 700 yards wide, the 5-fathom curve is about 800 yards and the 30-fathom curve about 2400 yards off shore, thus giving excellent anchorage in good weather and prevailing winds for transports and supply ships off the bay. The shores of the bay afford excellent landing places for ships' boats entering the bay. The coast between WAIALUA and KAIKA BAYS is also good for landing ships' boats, and a strip of coastline directly west of KAIKA BAY also affords a good landing place. WAIALUA and KAIKA BAY and the adjacent beaches offer the best landing places for a large force on the whole coast of OAHU (except in the harbors of HONOLULU and PEARL HARBOR). There is ample terrain for deploying a large force.

WAIALUA BAY to WAIMEA BAY:- This coastline is rocky with an outlying reef but there are several passages through the reef affording passages to practicable landing places in ordinary weather.

WAIMEA BAY:- This is a small bay with a 150 yard channel through the reef and a good beach for landing.

WAIMEA BAY to KAHUKU POINT:- This coast is bordered by a broad reef or ledge, which is apparently rocky formation and not coral, and there is no barrier reef enclosing deeper water inside as at other sections of the coast of OAHU. The mountains come down close to the coast, except from WAIKALEE to KAHUKU POINT, where there is a coast plain. There are several places in this section of coastline where small boats could pass through the reef and effect a landing, but no considerable force could be landed in this manner.

Conclusions as to Landing Places for BLUE:-

The place of landing for the BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force which will insure to the utmost the plan of campaign of the Commanding General of that force for operations on shore against the BLACK land forces is, for the main BLUE landing force, the section of the north coast at the northern end of the Central Valley of OAHU. The best and most practicable landing places in this section of coast are in the vicinity of KAIKA BAY and WAIALUA BAY with possible additional landing places for some elements at WAIMEA BAY and between WAIMEA BAY and WAIKALEE.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

The only available landing place for a secondary BLUE force landed with the object of threatening the BLACK naval activities at PEARL HARBOR and creating a diversion of some of the BLACK force concentrated in the Schofield Barracks - WAHAIWA area is on the southwestern coast between BARBER'S POINT and KAHE POINT; and if such a secondary attack by BLUE is made, the landing of the force allotted to such attack would have to be at this place.

Length of Time Required to Land BLUE Forces:- The length of time required to land the BLUE main landing force at a selected landing place or places will depend upon the following considerations:-

- DECLASSIFIED**
- (a) The number and classes of transports employed to transport the force from ship to shore.
 - (b) The length of time required to disembark the force from the transports into the boats to transport them to the selected landing places.
 - (c) The number of available landing places and the total frontage of beach afforded at these landing places.
 - (d) The length of time required to disembark the forces landed from the boats and to deploy them on shore and advance inland from the beaches a sufficient distance to gain the depth in formation necessary to conduct a well ordered advance in attack against the BLACK defense forces.
 - (e) The nature and extent of the defense offered by the BLACK forces at the selected landing places, and the strength of the BLACK opposition to the advance of the BLUE forces inland to a sufficient distance to gain the necessary deployment in depth of the BLUE forces to enable them to launch a sustained attack in force against the main BLACK defense forces.

It is estimated that the nature of the landing places is such that artillery and heavy material could not be satisfactorily landed at night, but that the first waves of infantry with their auxiliary weapons could be landed at night, and that it will require at least 18 hours to land the main BLUE landing force with its artillery and the heavy material necessary to make a sustained attack against the BLACK land forces.

On April 27, 1925, the approximate date of the landing, the sun rises at 5:35 a.m. and sets at 6:23 p.m. To accomplish the landing of the BLUE force within the estimated period of time, the first wave should reach the beach selected for its landing at 4:00 a.m., and the landing of the force proceed as rapidly as practicable from then on. The first operation undertaken by the BLUE landing forces would be to drive back the BLACK cordon troops stationed back of the beach to contest the landing. As rapidly as the first waves of BLUE troops can be reenforced by the successive waves, the advance of the BLUE attack should proceed inland from the landing places to gain room for the necessary deployment in depth and to enable artillery and heavy material to be landed. It is estimated that the landing of all classes of BLUE troops could proceed into the night of the day of the landing as the experience gained during the daylight concerning the nature of the landing places would enable this to be done.

Date of BLUE Landing:- In accordance with the conditions of the problem presented to the BLUE forces, the BLUE transports would be at 0500, April twenty, at a point about 1700 miles from SAN FRANCISCO and place them about 400

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE (Continued):-

miles from OAHU. With a speed of 12 knots, allowing time for reconnaissance and for landing the BLUE Force Air Service at the western end of MQLOKAI, the transports could be off the north coast of OAHU in time to land the first waves of the BLUE landing forces on the north coast at the selected landing places at 4:00 a.m., April 27, 1925.

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR TO THE PROBLEM PRESENTED:-

Before reaching a Decision upon the course of action to be pursued by BLUE for the solution of the problem presented under the Mission it appears necessary to apply the fundamental Principles of War to the problem.

(a) The Principle of the Objective:- The objective in war should be the main enemy force, as only by the decisive defeat of that force can the Mission be accomplished.

(b) The Principle of the Offensive:- The primary objective being the destruction of the enemy main force, the principle of the offensive demands that the strategical and tactical offensive be taken at the outset and maintained until a decision is reached.

(c) The Principle of Superiority:- This principle demands that superiority be brought to bear against the enemy upon the field of battle, and is opposed to the detachment of elements of the force from the main attack for secondary attacks at a distance from the main force.

(d) The Principle of Economy of Forces:- This requires the conservation of personnel and material in order that superiority in fighting power may be available at the decisive place and time. It is also opposed to detachments for secondary attacks at a distance from the main force.

(e) The Principle of Fire and Movement:- This requires that the troops be so maneuvered as to bring the fire to bear upon the enemy in such a manner as to overcome his fire and accomplish his defeat.


(f) The Principle of Surprise:- This principle demands, in so far as it is possible of accomplishment, secrecy in preparation for attack, concealment of real intentions, and certainty and rapidity in fire and movement from the time the attack is actually begun.

(g) The Principle of Security:- This requires that every possible means be provided and used to protect the flanks and rear of an advancing force from enemy observation, espionage, and attack, in order to secure lines of communication and prevent surprise attacks on the flanks and rear, thus leaving the force free to continue its operations against the enemy.

(h) The Principle of Simplicity:- This principle demands that plans and their method of execution be the simplest and most direct for the accomplishment of an offensive campaign with the enemy main force as the objective.

(i) The Principle of Cooperation:- Efficient cooperation demands that there shall be unity of command, that all elements of the attacking force (both ashore and afloat in this case) cooperate with but one end in view, the decisive defeat of the enemy main force (in this case the BLACK main land force).

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DECISION:-

Consideration of the MISSION of the BLUE forces; the strength, disposition, and probable intentions of the BLACK forces in OAHU; the strength, disposition, and courses of action open to the BLUE forces; and the application of the Principles of War to the problem presented; leads to the following Decision as to the Plan of Campaign for BLUE.

Plan of Campaign:- To make the BLACK main force the objective and to accomplish the decisive defeat and destruction of the BLACK land forces by employing the superior BLUE forces in a direct and sustained attack over the terrain best suited to an aggressive offensive, attempting to gain from the element a surprise by effecting the first landing during darkness, securing the flanks and rear of the advancing BLUE landing forces by well directed ship gunfire and using to the utmost the cooperation of the ship in the support of the BLUE land operations

Minor Decisions:- Pursuant to the above outlined Plan of Campaign, the following Minor Decisions are reached:-

(a) To launch the advance of the BLUE main landing force from the section of the North Coast of OAHU at the north-western end of the Central Valley of OAHU.

(b) The objective of this main BLUE attack will be the BLACK main force concentrated in the Schofield Barracks - WAHAIWA area.

(c) To occupy, previous to the landing attack at OAHU; an Air Service Base for BLUE land planes near the western end of MOLOKAI and from this base to employ the BLUE land planes in supporting the landing and advance of the BLUE main landing force.

(d) To make, simultaneously with the BLUE main land attack, an attack by a BLUE secondary minor force from the vicinity of BARBER'S POINT - KAHE POINT, with the BLACK naval activities at PEARL HARBOR and the railroad junction at WAIPAHAU as the objectives, with a view to effecting a diversion of some of the BLACK main forces.

(e) The best landing places on the north coast of OAHU, and on the whole coastline of OAHU, are contained in the section of the coast from MOKULEIA to WAIMEA BAY, and the BLUE main force will have to be landed there to enable the BLUE main force to carry out the decided plan of campaign.

(f) The only practicable landing place for the secondary BLUE attack (see paragraph "d" above) is on the west coast between BARBER'S POINT and KAHE POINT, and this secondary BLUE force will have to be landed there to carry out the decided Plan of Campaign.

(g) To secure by consultation with the BLUE Naval Commander-in-Chief the cooperation of the BLUE naval vessels in support of the BLUE landing and advance against the BLACK main force.

(h) To secure to the utmost the cooperation of the BLUE naval and land forces in the attack as planned the Commanding General must be embarked in the Flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the BLUE naval ships assigned to the support of the BLUE landing force, and must remain there until the land attack

DECISION (Continued):-

has developed and advanced inland sufficiently to enable him to establish his Headquarters on shore at the proper distance from the front lines of the attacking BLUE force.

(i) The BLUE land attack, once launched, must be aggressively prosecuted by action of fire and movement until a decision is reached, as a stabilization of BLUE in any position on land in OAHU before such a decision is reached would result in a defeat for BLUE since BLUE reinforcements could not be brought to OAHU from the homeland in time to be of any assistance.

APPROVAL OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BLUE FLEET:-

Under date of January 5, 1925, the Commander-in-Chief, BLUE FLEET, approved the foregoing Estimate of the Situation in the following letter:-

File
S E C R E T
57

UNITED STATES FLEET
BATTLE FLEET
U.S.S. CALIFORNIA, FLAGSHIP

San Pedro, California,
Jan. 5, 1925.

From: Commander-in-Chief, Battle Fleet.
To: Major-General Commandant, Marine Corps.

Subject: Joint Army and Navy Problem No. 3 -
Estimate of Situation.

Reference:(a) Major-General Commandant's SECRET FILE
#604 of 22 December 1924.

1. The plan of campaign and the landing places in the Hawaiian Islands proposed in the Estimate forwarded with reference (a) are approved.

S.S. ROBISON.

III. STAFF ORGANIZATION.

The organization of the Force Staff of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force will be as follows:-

- Chief of Staff.
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Chief of First or Personnel Division, F-1.
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Chief of Second or Intelligence Division, F-2.
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Chief of Third or Operations Division, F-3.
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, Chief of Fourth or Supply Division, F-4.

The organization of the Division Staff of the Marine Division will be the same as that of the Force Staff, except that the abbreviations for the several divisions of the Division Staff will be D-1, D-2, D-3, and D-4.

SPECIFIC DUTIES OF STAFF DIVISIONS:- The following specific duties of the Staff Divisions are given for the Force Staff Divisions. For the Division Staff the duties will be the same, but the abbreviations for the several divisions will be D-1, D-2, D-3, and D-4.

F-1, the Personnel Division, is charged with the duties of the Force Staff which relate to the personnel of the Force as individuals, and is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning:-

- (1) The procurement, classification, assignment, promotion, transfer, retirement, and discharge, in peace and war of all personnel of the Force.
- (2) The necessary measures for the conservation of manpower in the Force.
- (3) Replacements of personnel in the Force; the priorities and schedules for such replacements to be formulated by F-3, Operations & Training.
- (4) Preparation of all orders and regulations within the Force as especially concern individuals of the Force or apply to matters of routine within the Force not especially assigned to other Divisions of the Force Staff.
- (5) Citations and decorations to members of the Force.
- (6) Religious, athletic, and morale work, including all entertainments, within the Force; the assignment of time for such activities to be arranged in consultation with F-3, Operations & Training.
- (7) Welfare organizations operating within the Force (such as the American Red Cross or Y.M.C.A.), with the exception of such agencies as may be entirely devoted to hospital and medical relief work.
- (8) Courts and Boards.
- (9) Military Postal Service.
- (10) Payment of troops.
- (11) Prisoners of war held or taken by the Force during operations, including Provost Court prisoners and enemy allies and our own men held as prisoners by the enemy.
- (12) Military Government of occupied territory.

F-2, the Intelligence Division, is charged with those duties of the Force Staff which relates to the collection, evacuation, collation, and dissemination of all military information which may be of value to the Commanding General of the Force and to the Organization Commanders of the Force; and is also specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and supervision of all activities within the force concerning:-

(1) Military Surveys and maps, including their preparation, reproduction, and distribution within the Force.

(2) The collection, classification, file, and custody of all maps and photographs pertaining to the Force and its operations.

(3) Relations with military and Naval attaches and observers accompanied or visiting the Force during the maneuvers or active operations.

(4) The Intelligence personnel of all organizations forming a part of the Force.

(5) Liaison with the intelligence agencies of the Navy, Army, or other Departments of the Government and with the Naval and military Attaches of foreign Governments accompanying the Force during maneuvers or active operations

(6) Codes and Cyphers used in the operations of the Force including the use of code books and the coding and decoding of all orders and messages received or sent in code or cypher form.

(7) Translations to or from foreign language of letters and papers received or sent by the Force, including supervision of official interpreters employed by the Force.

(8) Publicity features in connection with the operations of the Force in training, maneuvers, or active operations, including relations with representatives of the Press, the preparation of articles for publication releases, and the collection and filing of printed articles referring to the activities of the Force.

(9) Censorship of the Press and of private correspondence of members of the Force during war or warlike activities.

F-3, the Operations Division, is charged with the duties of the Force Staff which relate to the organization, training, and operations of the Force in maneuvers or active warfare; and is specifically charged with preparation of plans and policies.

(1) Tables of Organization (in conformity with order from higher authority) for all organizations and branches of the Force.

(2) Assignment of units to higher organizations of the Force.

(3) Tables of Equipment (in conjunction with F-4, Supply) with reference to the distribution of items of equipment to the units of the Force as may be required by the nature of operations contemplated or being carried out.

(4) Training of the Force as a whole and of the units thereof in conformity with the requirements of the mission of the Force, including such educational and vocational and specialist training as may be requisite thereunder.

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- (5) Elaboration and explanation of Drill and Service Regulations in their application to the special requirements of the different arms and branches of the Force.
- (6) Determination of the Principles in the assignment of personnel and equipment, including reinforcements within the Force.
- (7) Consultation with F-4 as to types of arms and equipment required by the organizations of the Force.
- (8) Troop movements in accordance with approved plans and the decision of the Commanding General of the Force.
- (9) Assignment of technical and labor troops (Not employed as combat units) upon the request of F-4, after consultation as may be necessary with F-4.
- (10) Military Police.

F-4, the Supply Division, is charged with those duties which relates to the supply of the Force, in whole or in part; and is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and of the supervision of the activities concerning:-

- (1) The distribution, storage, and issue of all supplies required by the Force.
- (2) Transportation by land or water, and the necessary ports and ports of embarkation and the necessary facilities of such ports.
- (3) Traffic control on lines of supply transportation; the military police of roads and routes to be arranged for by F-3 to meet the traffic control plans formulated by F-4.
- (4) Tables of Equipment for all branches of the Force (to be decided in consultation with F-3).
- (5) Hospitalization and evacuation of men and animals, including the transportation and other facilities employed therefor.
- (6) Distribution and movements of supply, technical, and labor troops as are not employed as combat units (in consultation with F-3).
- (7) Property responsibility and accountability in consultation with the accountable officers in charge thereof.
- (8) The procurement by lease or otherwise of all real estate required for the training, housing, or hospitalization of personnel, or for the storage, distribution and issue of supplies, as may be required during exercises or active operations.
- (9) The procurement by lease or otherwise, and the construction, repair and maintenance of all buildings or other utilities required for the housing or hospitalization of the personnel or for the storage and distribution of supplies required by the Force.
- (10) The organization and movements of the Force Trains.

The Chief of Staff, acting directly under the Commanding General of the Force, shall have general supervision of the activities of the several Divisions of the Staff as above enumerated.

The Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force (Constructive) taking part in the operations covered by this plan will consist of the Force Troops and two Marine Divisions organized as enumerated in Section II. of this Basic Plan under the heading of "Analysis of Blue Forces".

The number of officers which will actually be present.

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to represent the total number which would be required by the Constructive Force will not be sufficient to allow a complete representation in all of the Staff organizations, but the Force Staff will have as full a representation as practicable, while the Division Staffs will have smaller representations.

CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE STAFF ORGANIZATION:-

The following is the complete Staff (Constructive) of the Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force of about 42,000 constructive strength.

Commanding General, Blue M.C.E.F.
2 Aides de Camp.
Chief of Staff.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, F-1.
 1 Assistant F-1.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, F-2.
 2 Assistants F-2.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, F-3.
 3 Assistants F-3.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, F-4.
 4 Assistants F-4.
Force Artillery Officer.
 1 Assistant.
Force Engineer Officer.
 1 Assistant.
Force Signal Officer.
 2 Assistants.
Force Air Service Officer.
 1 Assistant.
Force Gas Officer.
Force Surgeon.
 1 Assistant.
Navy Liaison Officer, Naval Officer.
Force Air Service Liaison Officer.
Navy Air Service Liaison Officer, Naval Officer.
Navy Communications Service Liaison Officer, Naval Officer.
Navy Supply Service Liaison Officer, Naval Officer.
Navy Transport Service Liaison Officer, Naval Officer.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, F-1, would have supervision over the following:-

Force Adjutant.
Force Inspector.
Force Judge Advocate.
Force Provost Marshal.
Force Military Police Officer.
Force Paymaster.
Force Chaplain.
Force Morale and Athletic Officer.
Force Billeting Officer.
Force Sanitary Inspector, with such assistants as these activities may require.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, F-4, would have supervision over the following:-

Force Quartermaster.
Force Depot Quartermaster.
Force Transportation Officer.
Force Ordnance Officer.
Force Commissary Officer.
Force Train Commander.
Force Remount Officer.

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Marine Division Staff:- The following is the complete Staff (Constructive) of a Marine Division of about 16,500 constructive strength.

Commanding General, Marine Division.
2 Aides de Camp.
Chief of Staff.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, D-1.
1 Assistant D-1.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, D-2.
1 Assistant D-2.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, D-3.
2 Assistants D-3.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, D-4.
2 Assistants D-4.
Division Artillery Officer.
Division Engineer Officer.
Division Signal Officer, and 1 assistant.
Division Air Service Officer.
Division Gas Officer.
Division Surgeon.
Navy Liaison Officer, Naval Officer.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, D-1, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, D-4, would have supervision over the Administrative Staff Department activities of the Division in accordance with the system above prescribed in the case of the Force Staff.

ACTUAL STAFF ORGANIZATION:-

The actual Staff organization of the Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force which will take part in the contemplated operations, representing the full Constructive Staff organization, will be as follows:-

Commanding General, Blue M.C.E.F.
2 Aides de Camp.
Chief of Staff.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel and Intelligence,
F-1 and F-2 - duties combined under one officer.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, F-3.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, F-4.
Force Artillery Officer.
Force Engineer Officer.
Force Signal Officer.
Force Air Service Officer.
Force Gas Officer.
Force Surgeon.
Navy Liaison Officer (To be designated by C-in-C, Fleet).

Marine Division Staff:- The actual Staff organization for each of the two Marine Divisions of the Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, representing the full Constructive Division Staff organization, will be as follows:

Commanding General, Marine Division.

1 Aide de Camp.

Chief of Staff.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel and Operations,
D-1 and D-3 - duties combined under one officer.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Supply,
D-2 and D-4 - duties combined under one officer.

Division Artillery Officer - duty to be performed by
Commander of Artillery Brigade in Division.

Division Signal Officer - duty to be performed by
Commander of Signal Company in Division Special
Troops.

Division Air Service Officer - duty to be performed by
Commander of Division Air Service.

Division Surgeon - duty to be performed by Medical
Officer who will also be the Organizing Officer of
Medical Regiment in Division.

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Brigade Staff:- The Brigade Commander and Brigade Staff
(Constructive) of each of the four Infantry Brigades and
three Artillery Brigades in the Force will be represented
as shown in the tables to be found in Section IV. of this
Basic Plan.

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IV. ACTUAL MARINE FORCE AND REPRESENTATION OF
CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE.

The Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force consists of a constructive force of about 42,000 represented by an actual Marine force of 127 officers and 1500 enlisted men, 120 Marine officers and 7 Medical officers of the Navy, and 1460 enlisted Marines and 40 enlisted men of the Navy Medical Corps.

This Constructive Force is constituted as follows:-

<u>Force Headquarters</u> -----	40 officers,	90 men.	
<u>Special Troops</u> -----	43	"	1267 "
1 Headquarters Company-----	6	"	100 "
1 Signal Battalion-----	12	"	350 "
1 Service Battalion, Q.M.-----	10	"	437 "
1 Ordnance Company, Ammunition-----			100 "
1 Ord. Co., Heavy Machine-----			100 "
1 Gas Battalion-----			180 "
Total-----			1267 "
<u>Force Artillery Brigade</u> -----	280	"	6338 "
1 Headquarters & Hq. Co.-----	12	"	75 "
1 Ammunition Train-----	33	"	1000 "
1 Observation (Flash) Batl.-----	17	"	204 "
2 Regiments 155 mm. Howitz			
48 guns-----	148	"	3322 "
1 Regt. 155 mm. Guns, 24 guns---	70	"	1737 "
<u>1 Regt. Antiaircraft Artillery</u> ----	63	"	1450 "
<u>1 Regiment Pioneers</u> -----	38	"	806 "
<u>Force Air Service</u> -----	135	"	1000 "
<u>Force Medical Service</u> -----	50	"	600 "
<u>Force Train</u> -----	15	"	500 "
<u>Attached Medical Personnel</u> <u>and Chaplains</u> -----	60	"	300 "
<u>2 Marine Divisions</u> -----	1660	"	31326 "
<u>GRAND TOTAL IN FORCE</u> -----	2384	"	43677 "

An enumeration of the elements composing this Force will be found in Section II. of this Basic Plan under the heading of "Analysis of Blue Forces".

The full Constructive Force will be represented by groups of the actual Marine Force present and these groups will carry distinctive flags to show what organization they represent.

One battalion of the 4th Regiment of Marines will be kept intact and the other two battalions of this regiment will be represented by groups.

The following tables show the method of representation of the Constructive Force by the personnel actually present.

M. C. E. F.				Represented by:										
2	ORGANIZATION	OFFICERS	MEN	GENERAL OFF'S	COLONELS	LIEUT-COLS.	MAJORS	CAPTAINS	1st LIEUTS.	2nd LIEUTS.	WARRANT OFF'S.	TOTAL	ENLISTED MEN	SIGNAL FLAG
35	Brigade Hdqrs.	12	88	1			1	1				3	31	B
	Medical Personnel												1	h
36	M. G. Battalion	8	215					(1)				(1)	4	M
37				1			1	1				3	36	
38	For 4 Brigades			4			4	4				(12)	144	
39	Regt'l. Hdqrs.	12	100			1		1	2			4	18	I
40	Service Company	6	140										(2)	S
41	Med. Per. (Att.)	9	50										1	h
42								1	2			4	19	
43	For 8 Regiments											(32)	152	
44	Battalion	26	665										8	I
45	For 2 Battalions												16	
46	1st Bn. 4th Regt.	26	665			1	1	6	8	10		(26)	665	I
47	TOTALS			3	5	13	30	39	26	10	3	(129)	1500	
48	NAVY						3	3			1	7	40	
49	MARINE			3	5	13	27	36	26	10	0	(122)	1460	

- a. Commander or Lieutenant-Commander (M.C.) U.S.N.
b. 2 Lieutenants, Medical Corps; 1 Lieutenant (D.C.) U.S.N.
c. 1 Pharmacist, Medical Corps, U.S.N.
d. 2 Phar. Mates for each Medical Regiment,
1 Phar. Mates for each Hospital,
1 " " " " Artillery Brigade,
3 " " " " Regiment of 155's,
1 " " " " A. A. Regiment,
1 " " " " Pioneer Regiment,
Totals: 18 Enlisted.
e. Lieutenant-Commander (M.C.) U.S.N., for each Medical Regiment.
f. 2 Phar. Mates, U.S.N., for each Medical Regiment.
g. 1 Phar. Mate, U.S.N., for each Artillery Brigade.
1 Phar. Mate, U.S.N., for each Regiment of 75's.
h. 1 Phar. Mate, U.S.N., for each Brigade.
i. 1 Phar. Mate, U.S.N., for each Regiment.
j. To represent Machine Gun Battalion, if needed.
k. 1 Quartermaster and 1 Paymaster.
2 A. D. C.,
1 Captain, Assistant to Force Artillery Officer.
2 Officers of detachment from San Diego to be detailed as
Quartermaster and Paymaster.
m. Commanding Officer, Force Headquarters Company.
(1 Warrant Officer from Quantico.
(1 Warrant Officer from the West Coast.

V. OPERATIONS CONTEMPLATED.

The operations of the Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force in Problem No. 3, Joint Army and Navy Exercises, 1925, are covered in the statement of the Problem and the estimate of the situation, Sections I. and II. of this Basic Plan, as to the general requirements.

An actual Marine force of 227 officers (including 7 Medical officers of the Navy) and 1500 enlisted men (including 40 enlisted men of the Navy Medical Corps) will be employed during the operations incident to the solution of the problem to represent a Constructive Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force of about 42,000, divided among the various arms and services as stated in the Analysis of the Blue Land Forces.

Approximately 90 of the actual officers will come from the East Coast and 30 from the West Coast; while approximately 800 enlisted men will come from the East Coast (Quantico) and 700 from the West Coast (San Diego).

The officers and enlisted men from the East Coast will be embarked in the U.S.S. HENDERSON, which is expected to sail from Quantico, Va., on March 7, 1925, in accordance with the following tentative schedule.

SAILING SCHEDULE - U.S.S. HENDERSON.

Sail from Quantico, Va.	13 March 1925
Arrive Hampton Roads, Va.	14 March "
Sail from Hampton Roads, Va.	15 March "
Arrive Canal Zone	16 March "
Sail from Canal Zone	17 March "
Arrive San Diego, Calif.	2 April "
Sail from San Diego, Calif.	10 April "
Arrive San Francisco, Calif.	12 April "
Sail from San Francisco, Calif.	15 April "
Sail from Honolulu T.H.	30 April "
Arrive San Diego, Calif.	8 May "
Sail from San Diego, Calif.	8 May "
Arrive Canal Zone	18 May "
Sail from Canal Zone	19 May "
Arrive Quantico, Va.	27 May "

It is intended that the HENDERSON will report to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet for special temporary duty in connection with the maneuvers on her arrival at San Diego about 2 April. Her movements from that time until the completion of the maneuvers will, of course, be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. The date of departure from Honolulu after the completion of maneuvers is contingent upon the date of completion. It is desired that the HENDERSON remain at Honolulu long enough to grant liberty to the men composing the Marine Expedition.

ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE PERSONNEL TO SHIPS:

The U.S.S. HENDERSON will accommodate comfortably 84 officers and 1300 enlisted men, and before she sails from San Diego, Calif., for San Francisco, Calif., additional personnel will be embarked from there to fill her to capacity.

The Commanding General, Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force and such of his Staff as can be accommodated will be embarked at San Francisco, Calif., on the U.S.S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, Battle Fleet, who will be Commander-in-Chief of the BLUE Fleet during the contemplated operations. In addition to the above mentioned officers such enlisted Marine personnel as may be required by the Commanding General will also be embarked on the U.S.S. CALIFORNIA.

As stated in the Statement of the General Situation, Section I. hereof, "fourteen large naval auxiliaries and tenders will represent transports" to carry the Constructive Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, and the personnel representing this Constructive Force will be apportioned to these ships. The U.S.S. HENDERSON will be one of the fourteen transports and she will carry approximately 84 officers and 1300 enlisted men of the actual Marine Force.

The officers and enlisted men of the actual Marine Force which cannot be accommodated in the U.S.S. HENDERSON and U.S.S. CALIFORNIA will be distributed to the other thirteen (13) naval vessels used to represent transports.

The assignment of these officers and enlisted men to the vessels representing transports will be arranged by the Commanding General, Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, Battle Fleet and the Commander of the Fleet Base Force, and the details thereof will be included in the F-3 Annex to this Basic Plan.

According to the Statement of the General Situation, Section I. hereof, the fourteen (14) large auxiliaries and tenders representing transports for the Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force; that is, they represent a Constructive fleet of transports sufficient to carry the entire Force and all of its necessary material. The Operations Annex to the Basic Plan should contain a detailed statement of the number of troop transports and freighters that would be required to carry the entire personnel and material of the Force and should indicate the method for the representation of this Constructive Transport Fleet by the fourteen (14) auxiliaries and tenders employed for this purpose. Care should be taken in the constructive distribution of the Force (personnel and material) to the Constructive ships so that in case of the sinking or loss of any one ship the operations of the Force would not be crippled.

Ships' Boats for Landing the Force:- In the Statement of the General Situation, Section I. hereof, it is provided that the boats of each transport (Constructive) will carry on one trip certain organizations of personnel and certain guns and material. As any Force of the strength contemplated (total of about 42,000) would be provided in time of war with the best classes of boats to successfully conduct a landing of the personnel and material of the Force against determined opposition, it may be assumed that the Constructive Transports are provided with such boats; beetle boats or other classes of landing boats that could reasonably be carried by transports of the size contemplated. The Operations Annex to the Basic Plan should contain the details for the provision and use of such classes of boats.

Constructive Beaching of Small Transports:- In the landing of a large Force against determined opposition on a hostile coast it is probable that certain small transports capable of being beached at suitable points on the hostile coast would accompany the expedition. Provisions for such Constructive Transports suitable for this service should be made in detail in the Operations Annex, together with the details of the plan for effecting the beaching of such transports and the disembarkation of the troops and guns and material therefrom.

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Flags for Designation of Organizations of Landing Forces:-

In the representation of the Constructive Blue Landing Force by the Marine personnel actually present certain signal flags will be used. Some of these flags are enumerated in the Statement of the General Situation; and the additional flags necessary to represent all of the important organizations of the Landing Force are given in the tables in Section IV. of this Basic Plan.

The Operations Annex to the Basic Plan should contain such descriptions and explanations of this system of flag representation of the organizations of the Landing Force as will enable all concerned (officers of the Landing Forces and Umpires) to have a complete understanding of the system of representation.

Communications Service:- It will be necessary to actually provide a communications service to connect the various command posts and elements of the Landing Forces during the operations, and also to provide means for communication between the Commanding General of the Force and the principal organizations thereof (Divisions and any separate Brigades or other elements).

Owing to the limited number of personnel provided in the actual Marine Force employed for the representation of the Constructive Force, this communications system should be as simple as possible and should require a minimum of personnel and signal material consistent with the efficient conduct of the actual operations.

The Operations Annex should contain complete details of this communications service and plans for its landing and employment.

Loading Schedules of Transports:- Schedules showing the Distribution of the personnel and material of the actual Force of Marines taking part in the operations should be included in the appropriate annexes to the Basic Plan; and also, complete loading schedules should be provided showing the distribution of the Constructive Force represented by the actual Force.

REQUIREMENTS - SPECIAL SITUATION - BLUE:

In the Statement of the Special Situation - BLUE - three general requirements are given and these must be met in the preparations of the Commanding General and Staff of the BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, and of the Commanding General and Staffs of the two (2) Marine Divisions of the Force.

Requirement One:- This is the Estimate of the Situation of the Commander-in-Chief, BLUE FLEET, and his orders for the necessary operations required in the solution of the problem presented.

The Commander-in-Chief, BLUE FLEET, has decided that this requirement includes the selection of the actual landing places for the Force, to be made by him after the Commanding General, BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, has submitted his Estimate of the Situation and arguments for the selection of such landing places as would meet his plan of campaign. The order of landing is not included in this requirement, as it will be decided by the Commanding General, BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, in his solution of the problem under Requirement Two.

NOTE:- The Estimate of the Situation by the Commanding

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General, BLUE M.C.E.F., has been submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, BLUE FLEET, and is included in this Basic Plan, Section II.

Requirement Two:- This requirement includes the Estimate of the Situation, plans for attack by Landing Force, and orders issued by the Commanding General, BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force.

The Estimate of the Situation demanded by this requirement has been made and submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, BLUE FLEET, and is contained in this Basic Plan, Section II.

The plans for the attack by the Landing Force and the orders issued by the Commanding General BLUE M.C.E.F., will include the orders for the embarkation of the Constructive Force with the distribution of the actual force in representation of the Constructive Force (both for personnel and material), the orders to determine the order in which the troops and material are to be landed for the operations as planned (Order of Landing), and the disposition of the various elements of the Landing Force in the lines of attack (Order of Battle); and the first operations order (for the landing and deployment of the Landing Force). It should be noted that this first operations order may have to be revised on account of the dispositions and operations of the enemy.

In order to meet the demands of Requirement Two, the Operations Annex to the Basic Plan should contain the additional plans and orders above referred to, and the several plans and orders should be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, BATTLE FLEET, as soon as practicable as they may have a bearing upon the plans and orders which he will publish to the forces under his command.

Requirement Three:- This requirement includes the estimates, plans and orders of such subordinate commanders as may be designated by the Commander-in-Chief, BLUE FLEET, and by the Commanding General, BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force. For the BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force this requirement will include the estimates, plans and orders of the Commanding Generals of each of the two Marine Divisions.

Such Estimates of the Situation, plans and orders as may be found necessary will be drawn up by each of the Commanding Generals of Divisions and submitted by them to the Commanding General of the BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, and in this work they will be assisted by the officers of the Division Staffs.

Operations Orders and Field Orders:- The Operations Annex to the Basic Plan will include the description of the system of operations and field orders to be employed within the BLUE Marine Corps Expeditionary Force during the preparation for the Joint Exercises and in the execution of the operations incident thereto.

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VI. SUPPLY, EVACUATION, AND HOSPITALISATION.

(Pertains to F-4, Supply).

The coordination, supervision and control of supply, transportation, and evacuation, within the theatre of operations of the Military Force, to meet the field requirements of such a Force in the accomplishment of its mission, are functions of F-4, the Supply Division of the Force Staff.

All matters effecting the hospitalisation of the personnel and animals also come under the supervision of F-4.

F-4 is the medium through which the order of the Commanding General concerning the general and specific supply needs of the Force in the Field are communicated to the several supply services and agencies.

These needs include the provision of all supplies at the points of distribution to the units of the field Forces, the movements by all means of transportation of all supplies within the theatre of operations, and their distribution to the units of the Forces. They also include the movements of troops within the theatre of operations by rail, mechanical transport, and water transport; and the evacuation from the front of all personnel, animals and supplies.

The general supervision of all traffic lines and routes within the theatre of operations is a function of F-4.

SUPPLY:

Supplies for a military Force in the field may be divided into four general classes; viz:-

Class I.- (Automatic), Fuel, forage, and food, the three F's; all articles which can be handled on a basis of daily automatic supply depending upon the strength in men and animals of the Force to be supplied.

Class II.- (Personnel). Authorized articles of equipment, which though consumed at an approximately uniform rate, are for the personal use of the individual and necessitates special arrangements to meet individual requirements; such as shoes, clothing, gas masks, helmets, blankets.

Class III.- (Provisional Allowance). Authorized articles of equipment allowance of which are established by Tables of Organization and Equipment or by schedules of allowances established in published orders; such as arms, engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, medical, and signal equipment, including motor and animal drawn vehicles.

Class IV.- (Munitions and materials). Ammunition, construction material of all classes, and all articles the consumption of which varies sharply with operations, season or terrain; such as road and bridge material, barbed wire, lumber, road and railway construction material and water supply equipment material. In this class are also included articles of an exceptional nature required for specific purposes arising under extraordinary circumstances during operations.

This classification of supplies for Forces in the field furnishes a convenient basis of procurement and distribution, and while it may be unnecessary to employ it during exercises of the nature contemplated in the present Basic Plan, it would be necessary in actual operations which the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force might be called upon to undertake under the mission assigned, and for this reason it should be used as far as practicable during all exercises to accustom the supply service to its use.

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The whole system of supply should be planned as to provide the supplies that the Force will require at the time and place required and in sufficient quantities to meet actual needs. The accumulation of supplies beyond actual or foreseen needs should be avoided as it places a burden upon the field Forces to care for the surplus, and in case of large accumulations tends to produce a condition of stabilization which should always be avoided in time of war of movement required by our doctrine.

TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES:-

The transportation of all classes of supplies for the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force in an overseas expedition from the concentration ports in the United States to the distant theatre of operations overseas will be by naval vessels; including the transports carrying the personnel, up to their cargo carrying capacity, and by freighters of the Fleet Train for the additional supplies required in the operations of the Force.

After the disembarkation of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force in the theatre of operations the land transportation of the supplies pertaining to the Force will be by motor trucks, tractor drawn trailers, animal-drawn transportation, pack animals, and by the Cole carts supplied to certain organizations of the Force.

It should be noted that it will not be practicable or even possible for the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, operating as a part of the Fleet, to carry with it the quantity of motor transport of various classes prescribed for a force of like size from the Army. The quantities of all classes of transportation for the Force must therefore be reduced to the minimum which will meet the requirements of operations which may be required of the Force, acting as a part of the Fleet under its mission, and considering that the area over which operations will extend will naturally be much more restricted than would be the case in an Army campaign which would require long distance land transportation in enemy territory occupied by the advancing Army forces.

ORGANIZATION OF THE TRAIN:-

In the F-4 Annex to this Basic Plan the details of the organization of the Force and Division Trains must be worked out for the Constructive Force and included in the Annex; and in addition the actual provisions to be made for the actual Marine Force taking part in the operations incident to the Problem must be determined and stated in detail.

Provision should be made for the supplies of all classes which must be landed with the troops in their initial operations; for the supplies of all classes which will have to be landed to supply the forces as the operations against the enemy proceed; and finally for the replacements of supplies of all classes which will be required by the Force during its occupation of the territory captured from the enemy during the contemplated operations and held as a base for the future operations of the FLEET, as indicated in the Statement of the Situation, Section I. hereof.

For the actual Marine Force which will be present to represent the Constructive Force, the minimum of transportation consistent with the probable operations should be provided.

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Considering the problem of landing on the beach without wharves or docks, it is considered that the actual problem of supply transportation for the actual force could best be met by light tractors and trailers and Cole carts.

EVACUATION:-

The problem of evacuation presents the problem of supply in reverse.

Evacuation is divided into two general classes, personnel and material, treating animals as material.

Personnel to be evacuated from the front includes wounded, sick, disabled, and prisoners.

Material to be evacuated from the front includes articles of equipment or portions thereof which are of no further use at the front, salvaged material which while of no use at the front in its present shape may be repaired and made serviceable at the bases in the rear, surplus articles in Class I which would be an unnecessary burden at the front, and sick or disabled animals which are of no use at the front.

The General route of evacuation is by motor truck transportation to establish refilling points and thence by rail or sea to the bases in the rear. As the personnel and material to be evacuated from the front is always less than the supplies carried to the front, the motor transportation employed to carry supplies from refilling points to the front will always be sufficient to carry the evacuations of personnel and material to the bases in the rear.

The details of evacuation of personnel and material will be included in the F-4 Supply, Annex to this Basic Plan.

RECLAMATION:-

During all operations including exercises, all articles and portions of articles which can by repairs be made fit for further service or use should be reclaimed and salvaged.

The collection of such material and its evacuation from the front to the bases in rear is a function of F-4 and the details thereof will be included in the F-4, Supply Annex.

HOSPITALIZATION:-

The hospitalization of the personnel of the Expeditionary Force, the organization thereof, and the facilities therefor, are under the supervision of F-4, the Supply Division of the Force Staff; and in so far as may be necessary for the Divisions, these details are under the supervision of D-4, the Supply Division of the Division Staff.

All of the details pertaining to hospitalization should be decided by the agencies of F-4 in coordination with the Force Surgeon for the Force, and by the agencies of D-4 in coordination with the Division Surgeon for the Division.

In the organization of the Hospital and Medical Service for the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force provision should be made in the detail plans for detached or isolated posts or detachments and for the evacuation of sick and wounded from such posts to Field Hospitals.

The details of all plans for hospitalization and treatment of sick and wounded during the operations should be included in the Hospitalization Section of the F-4 Annex.

The plans should include the provisions to be made for evacuation of such personnel by means of Navy Hospital ships.

The detail hospitalization plans should include the necessary provisions for the Constructive Force, and also for the actual force which will be present during the exercises.

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Complete details of Hospitalization of personnel and animals will be included in the F-4, Supply Annex, to this Basic Plan.

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VII. INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE.

INTELLIGENCE:-

The F-2, Intelligence Annex, to this Basic Plan should contain all of the information concerning the territory included in the theatre of operations and its resources, inhabitants, defenses, and characteristics which should properly be in the possession of the BLUE forces under the conditions of the problem as stated in the Statement of the Situation, general and special.

This intelligence information should be in the form of a monograph, completely indexed for ready reference; and should contain detailed information as to the topographical and hydrographic features of the Hawaiian Islands, with especial reference to OAHU.

Considerable information of this nature will be found in the Estimate of the Situation, Section II. of this Basic Plan.

The following BLUE Intelligence Report is furnished as a part of the statement of the General Situation.

September 15, 1924.

BLUE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

DEFENSES OF OAHU

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Reference - Topographic Map, Island of Oahu, 1:62,500.

1. Physical and Strategical Characteristics.

The Island of Oahu is a rough quadrilateral in shape. Its four sides have air line lengths approximately as follows:

East side, 36 miles
South side, 31 miles
West side, 23 miles
North side, 22 miles,

a total air line perimeter of 112 miles. The east and west shores are paralleled by mountain ranges, the crests of which lie in general from 3 to 5 miles from the shore line. These mountain ranges are practically impassable for organized troops, due both to their ruggedness and the character of the soil which crumbles under foot, preventing a foothold, and to natural obstacles caused by ravines filled with thick mesh of semi-tropical undergrowth.

At present there are two practicable routes through the eastern or Koolau Range. Both are first class, paved highways, one passing through the gap known as the Pali, directly back (N.E.) of the City of Honolulu, and the other the Beach Road which passes around the extreme northern end of the mountain range. The eastern range extends the full length of the eastern side while the western range extends from the northern end of the western side to a point about two-thirds of the way down to the southern end. A fairly good road passes around the southern end of this range and there is a practicable pass, the Kole Kole Pass, about the middle of the length of the range. The highway has been graded from the center of the Island almost to the top of this pass but no surfacing has been placed thereon, and there is no road at all down the western slope.

The center of the Island, extending from the middle of the northern side to the western half of the southern side is rolling rather than mountainous and is practicable for all kinds of military operations.

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The two real harbors of the Island are Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor. Both are on the south side. The north side is, in general, concave, from the ocean side, and thus presents a wide, extended harbor protected from the winds blowing from the east, from the south and from the southwest. In addition, there are many indentations in the shore line which would be suitable for landing operations, in fact, it may be stated that hostile landings could be made, if unopposed, or unless prevented by sea conditions, at practically every point of the sea line. Most of such landings, however, would be made with difficulty on account of the reef of live coral which surrounds the Island. This reef is close to the shore, on the north and farther out on the south coast. Many breaks exist on the reef and breaks are always found opposite the mouths of fresh water streams.

The most formidable of the coast defenses are located on the southern end of the Island covering approaches to Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. The most vulnerable points are the northern end of the Island and the south east end in the vicinity of Barber's Point. In the latter region there is presented an angle about 9 miles on one side and 4 miles the other which incloses territory of almost perfectly flat wooded country devoid of communications and difficult to defend. Other favorable landing points are as follows:

East Coast- Waimanalo Bay has 5-1/2 miles of beach suitable for landing; Kaneohe Bay has 5-1/2 miles; Kahana has 1/2 mile; making a total of 11-1/2 miles. Waimanalo Bay may be entered through breaks in the coral reef and by the channel to the northward and by another to the southward. Kaneohe Bay also has two openings. Kahana is reached from the open sea and is well sheltered. At Waimanalo and Kaneohe a large force could be deployed on landing.

Northern Coast - There are 5-1/2 miles of favorable landing beach extending from Waimea to Kawaihapai. The shore is fringed with coral reefs with breaks at Waimea, Wailua and Kauaka Bays. Landing practicable in rough weather. There is a sand beach 1/2 mile in length between Waiialua and Kaiaka. There are two beaches at Mokuleia and Kawaihapi where there are breaks in the reef. Stretches between can be used in high water and calm weather for small boats. Landing can be made on a broad front and the terrain permits the deployment of a large force. The distance from the northern coast to Pearl Harbor is 20 miles - good roads and railroads.

Northeast Coast - It would be practicable to beach light draft transports equipped with rafts on the northeast coast between the Waimea River and Kahuku. From a foothold secured in the Pupukea Area a large detachment might be organized to drive southward into the central plain.

West Coast - There is deep water close in on the western shore, and beaches for landing. The best landing place is at Pokai Bay at Waianae. Others lie farther to the north and there is a good beach in the pocket north of Kahe Point. In all there are five miles of practicable landing beach. There is no drinking water on this coast. Mobile artillery stationed in the mountains can reach the shore line with fire.

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South Coast - The south coast is protected by a broad coral reef. There are a number of small breaks in the reef which fringes Waialalae, Diamond Head, and Koko Head. Hanauma Bay, east of Koko Head, is an opening 300 yards wide. East of Koko crater are two small sand beaches. These landing places are small, are exposed to prevailing winds and are under the guns of Diamond Head. Advance after landing would be very difficult.

The vital points on the Island are Pearl Harbor, which contains a naval base, and the City of Honolulu, in which are located the supply installations of the Black Garrison and all the principal terminal facilities for water transportation with the outside world.

In the vicinity of Oahu the northeast trade winds blow for three-fourths of the time. These and ocean currents moderate the temperature to about ten degrees less than that of other places in the same latitude. The east coast is subject to heavy surf, caused by the northeast trade winds. Cyclones and typhoons are unknown. There are no fogs and no intense heat. The annual mean temperature at sea level is 74 degrees, and lower as we ascend to higher altitudes. Military operations are practicable during all seasons of the year day or night. There is no regular rainy season, but scarcely a day passes without a shower. At almost any point except on the west coast it is practicable to sink a well and get an abundant supply of water.

II. Defending Forces:

Black Forces defending Oahu consist of Regular National Guard, and Organized Reserves.

Regular Army in time of peace consists of -

- 2 Infantry brigades
- 1 Light Tank Co.
- 1 Field Artillery Brigade, consisting of 75 m/m and 155 m/m howitzers, all motorized.
- Coast Artillery troops manning Coast Defenses
- 1 Regiment of 155 G.P.F.'s
- 1 Anti-aircraft regiment
- 1 Battalion manning 12-inch R.R. Mortars
- 1 Battalion manning 240 m/m howitzers
- 1 Air Service, including Pursuit, Bombardment, and Observation.
- 1 Regiment Engineers, combat
- Small detachment of Gas Troops
- Special Troops

Total, 806 officers and 13,930 enlisted men.

The Black National Guard consists of the regiments of Infantry, not all of which, however, are permanently located on the Island of Oahu. It is contemplated that the Regular Army and National Guard will be brought to war strength by the utilization of Organized Reserve officers and troops and that a few additional units will be formed entirely of reserves. It is understood that little progress has been made in the organization of these reserves up to the present time.

The Black Naval Force operating in the 14th Naval District consists of:-

- 20 submarines, R-type,
- 6 minelayers,
- 1 submarine tender,
- 5 eagle boats,
- 7 mine sweepers,
- 3 tugs,
- 3 submarine chasers, and

A Naval air force of about 20 airplanes of various types.

The total Naval personnel, including 12 officers and 350 enlisted men of the Marines, totals 85 officers and 1142 enlisted men.

The civilian population, shown in the census of 1920, consists as follows:

"Total civil population (soldiers and sailors deducted.....251,546

Consisting of:

Males, 58%, classified as follows:

Available and fit for military service....	21,712
Partially fit for military service.....	3,412
Friendly and useful, but not available....	
for military service.....	24,728
Friendly, but not of material usefulness..	34,284
Unfriendly, but useful.....	41,369
Unfriendly, and not of material usefulness	21,275
	<u>146,780</u>

Females, 42%, classified as follows:

Friendly and useful.....	32,192
Friendly, but not of material usefulness..	25,944
Unfriendly, but of possible usefulness....	26,527
Unfriendly and not of material useful-	
ness.....	20,103
	<u>104,766</u>

"Until the census of 1930 is available, the rate of increase may be taken as 2.5% per year.

"The civil population is composed of an unusual number of racial elements. The following table is based on the census of 1920:

"Japanese.....	43%
Caucasian.....	21%
Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian..	16%
Chinese.....	9%
Filipinos.....	8%
Korean.....	2%
Others.....	1%

"The civil population is distributed among the principal islands approximately as follows:

Oahu.....	48%
Hawaii.....	25%
Maui.....	15%
Kauai.....	12%

"From a military viewpoint, the civil population in general is below average in intelligence and is materially deficient in usable occupational specialists. There is a seriously large proportion which is unfriendly."

It is known that the Black forces have given careful study to the defense of Oahu and that detailed plans and projects are in existence. In general, it is believed that the plans include an aggressive defense, the general scheme of which is to observe the entire coast-line, to defend probable landing places with small cordons, and to hold out a large central reserve with which to reinforce any threatening point and to counter-attack any successful penetration with a con-

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centration of coast defense fire on any naval attacking force.

III. Armament.

The fixed defenses of Oahu consist of well-constructed emplacements consisting, in general, of three types:-

The type constructed between 1900 and 1914, consisting of a concrete emplacement, including in one structure the guns and all ammunition storage, fire control, and personnel shelter installations;

The type constructed about 1915, in which the guns are located on low gun blocks and all other portions of the battery are combined in one concrete structure directly in rear;

The third, or post-war type, is the one in which all elements are dispersed irregularly, and constructed without overhead or horizontal protection; in other words, in the open.

Pearl Harbor is defended by two 16" guns in the latest, or post-war, type of emplacement located on the West side of the entrance; four 12" guns, two of which are in the semi-modern 1915 emplacements and eight 12" mortars located to eastward of entrance, and about a dozen fixed guns of smaller caliber. The battery of 16" guns is now and it is probable that all electrical devices for fire control and for movement of the guns themselves are not yet perfected. It is probable, however, that the guns can be hand operated in their present condition.

In the vicinity of the City of Honolulu and Diamond Head are two 14" guns and twelve 12" mortars, in the older type of emplacement, with about a dozen guns of 3", 4.7" and 6" calibers.

Plans are known to include the installation of 16" guns, to be located in the vicinity of Schofield Barracks, near the center of the Island, for fire all around the Island. Latest advices indicate that the construction of emplacements for these guns has not yet started.

Two 240" howitzer field emplacements have been constructed near the northern end of Waimanalo Bay. Portable motor-drawn howitzers could be installed in these emplacements in a few hours.

There are eight 12" railway mortars on hand for general defense of the Island, and there is, for the transportation of these guns, the railroad extending from Honolulu westward, north of Pearl Harbor, along the entire western and northern sides to Kahana on the eastern side, as well as the line penetrating the central plain northward from Waipahu. Coast defenses may also be supplemented by use of the armament of the 155 G.P.F. gun regiment.

Anti-aircraft defense includes fixed guns, machine guns, and searchlights. Completed plans are understood to include forty 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, the bulk of which will be installed at Pearl Harbor. Only about one-third of these have been erected at the present time.

IV. War Supplies.

Oahu is well supplied with equipment and war

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reserves of all kinds, and could probably continue the struggle from the logistic standpoint for at least 6 months. War reserves include 150 75 m/m guns, 1200 machine guns, and 5,000 automatic rifles, caliber .30.

A thorough description of the hydrographic features of the Hawaiian Islands will be found in the United States Coast Pilot, The Hawaiian Islands, Serial No. 227, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, which should be included with the F-2 Annex to this Basic Plan.

CHARTS AND MAPS:-

Complete sets of the hydrographic charts of the Hawaiian Islands should be furnished for the use of the Commanding General of the Force and the Force Staff, and for the Commanding Generals of Divisions and the Division Staffs.

The map for general use in the operations incident to the solution of the problem presented in Joint Exercise No. 3 will be the U.S. Geological Survey map, ISLAND OF OAHU, 1917, scale 1 : 62500. A limited number of the map of the ISLAND OF OAHU in thirteen (13) sheets, scale 1:20000, will be available for the use of the Commanding General and Staff of the Force and the Commanding Generals and Staffs of the Divisions.

If practicable photographic mosaic maps of the territory covered by the probable operations will be procured for the use of the commanders and staffs of the Expeditionary Force.

RECONNAISSANCE:-

The F-2 Annex should include plans for preliminary reconnaissance of possible landing places for the Expeditionary Force and the territory of the Island of OAHU prior to the landing of the Force, to determine the positions occupied by enemy forces and the dispositions of his troops and guns. Airplane reconnaissance should be employed both before the landing of the Force and during the deployment and advance of the Force after it has landed.

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VIII. ANNEXES TO BASIC PLAN.

This Basic Plan contains the statement of the problem presented for solution in the Army and Navy Joint Exercises of 1925, the first estimate of the situation by the Commanding General of the Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, an outline of the Staff organization, actual and constructive, a general statement of the actual personnel taking part and the method of representation of the Constructive Force, and outline of the operations contemplated, and sections on supply, evacuation and hospitalisation, and on intelligence and reconnaissance.

The details of the application of this Basic Plan to the solution of the problem presented will be contained in four Annexes to the Basic Plan, one for each of the Force Staff Divisions.

These Annexes will be prepared by the Force Staff as soon as practicable and will be based upon the specific duties of each Staff Division as stated in Section III., Staff Organization.

The F-1, Personnel Annex, will contain the details of all activities under the supervision and cognisance of the F-1 Division of the Force Staff. The Organization Tables to be included therein will be furnished by the Division of Operations and Training, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

The F-2, Intelligence Annex, will contain the details of all activities under the supervision and cognisance of the F-2 Division of the Force Staff. All information of the territory to be covered by the contemplated operations will be included in this annex, and the maps and charts required should be collected and issued by the F-2 Division.

The F-3, Operations Annex, will contain the details of all activities under the supervision and cognisance of the F-3 Division of the Force Staff. This includes the preparation of detail plans and orders for all troop movements in accordance with the plans and orders of the Commanding General of the Force.

The F-4, Supply Division, will contain the details of all activities under the supervision and cognisance of the F-4 Division of the Force Staff. This includes the procurement, distribution, storage and issue of supplies; transportation of personnel and material by land and water; tables of equipment; and details of hospitalisation and evacuation. In the present plan both actual and constructive requirements should be covered in the F-4 Annex.

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