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THESIS

**ANCHORING IN THE AMERICAN LAKE: U.S. MILITARY
GOVERNMENT ON GUAM, THE NORTHERN MARIANA
ISLANDS, AND OKINAWA FROM 1944 TO 1951**

by

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June 2020

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ON GUAM, THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, AND OKINAWA FROM
1944 TO 1951**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

As the United States achieved preeminence in the Pacific during World War II, political and military leaders faced a fundamental question about what to do with the islands of Guam, Okinawa, and the Northern Mariana Islands, which were seized by military force. As leaders deliberated long-term strategy, the U.S. military undertook a significant civil-military effort to govern liberated and occupied territories. While these initiatives initially facilitated immediate military objectives to further prosecute the war, they later served as a foundation upon which the United States built a new security order in the Pacific. These were not predetermined outcomes, however. U.S. policy underwent years of discourse to establish defense requirements, secure military bases, and maintain legitimacy in the international community. Though devastated during the war, the populations of these occupied areas still held political and social agency. How did the diverse civil-military interactions exemplified by these three cases shape the development of long-term basing agreements in the Pacific?

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¹ Isaac Newton, personal letter to Robert Hooke, February 5, 1675, HSP Digital Library, <https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Detail/objects/9792#>.

Navy and academics that began in World War II. I must especially thank Professor Daniel Moran and Professor Robert Weiner for shaping the development of this thesis.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

As the United States achieved preeminence in the Pacific during World War II, political and military leaders faced a fundamental question—What was to be done with the islands seized by military force? As leaders deliberated long-term strategy, the U.S. military undertook a significant civil-military effort to govern liberated and occupied territories. While these initiatives initially facilitated immediate military objectives to further prosecute the war, they later served as a foundation upon which the United States built a new security order in the Pacific. These efforts were received with varying measures of support from the local populations. In the former Japanese Mandated Islands of Micronesia, an ambivalent population initially welcomed U.S. forces, then incrementally sought autonomy after years of direct U.S. administration. In Guam, a pre-war U.S. territory, the population largely welcomed U.S. forces as liberators. In turn, the U.S. eventually granted citizenship and self-governance while retaining significant basing rights. In Okinawa, the local population initially met U.S. forces with skepticism, then welcomed reconstruction aid, but disagreed over issues of land use, sovereignty, and long-term basing of U.S. forces.

These were not predetermined outcomes, however. U.S. policy underwent years of discourse in order to establish defense requirements, secure military bases, and maintain legitimacy in the international community. Though devastated during the war, the populations of these occupied areas still held political and social agency. How did the diverse civil-military interactions exemplified by these three cases shape the development of long-term basing agreements in the Pacific?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The United States' post-World War II occupation of Japan and its former possessions is frequently heralded as an example of strategically capitalizing on the outcome of military conflict. Once-bitter adversaries became allies in mutual defense. Japan democratized and constitutionally embraced liberal American values. Meanwhile the

United States retained its influence and preeminence in the Western Pacific through a network of military bases in Japan and its former possessions. Yet, as time passes, this phenomenon is at risk of being taken for granted, dissociated from the motivations, mechanisms, and context that contributed to this outcome.

Within the Department of Defense, critical analysis of this era has ebbed. Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, dated 8 February 2001, described military government as “a last resort” for post-conflict governance.¹ The term “military government” only appeared twice in the 2001 edition, was completely eliminated from the 2008 update of the publication, and only reappeared in the glossary of the 2013 update. The 9 July 2018 update of Joint Publication 3-57 recently reintroduced military government as a doctrinal method to enable civil authorities.² Additionally, the 2018 version included a vignette on the importance of military government: “following the invasion of Iraq [in 2003], coalition forces did not completely occupy the territory of Iraq; thus coalition forces were unable to completely dominate the operational environment. Civilian factions resorted to violence in order to assert political dominance; chaos ensued.”³

The ways and means that contributed to post-war security have only recently regained prominence following contemporary U.S. military experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. In “Civil Order and Governance as Military Responsibilities,” Lieutenant Colonel David Mueller argued that the military must assume the onus for post-war stability and governance.⁴ In his paper, Mueller argued, “occupation duties are the inevitable result of most offensive operations. We need to recognize that a military unprepared for occupation

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001), I-19. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=3764>.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), II-11. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_57.pdf.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-13.

⁴ David A. Mueller, “Civil Order and Governance as Military Responsibilities,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 84 (2017), 43–50, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1038803/civil-order-and-governance-as-military-responsibilities/>.

is likewise unprepared for offensive operations.”⁵ This essay won the Strategic Research Paper category of the 2016 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. The accolades for this thesis and the revisions of Joint Publication 3-57, both emanating from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signal the importance of civil-military operations from the perspective of the military’s top leaders. As the United States military prepares for an era of great power competition, recounting the means and ways in which the United States translated military achievements into long-term strategic benefit may prove valuable.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The motivations for creating an American-based network of defense alliances in the Pacific are a point of debate among scholars. John Ikenberry argued that the United States elected to restrain its own military power after World War II through institutions and alliances in order to gain legitimacy, reduce fears of American hegemony, and entrench its long-term global influence.⁶ Ikenberry likened this approach as an up-front payment in United States’ power in order to gain long-term returns on investment. In the Pacific, Ikenberry’s model of institutions resulted in overseas military bases under the legal framework of bilateral or multilateral security agreements.

Victor Cha argued that the United States deliberately selected a “hub and spoke” model of bilateral alliances in the Pacific to both maximize its political, economic, and military influence in the region and to restrain otherwise-eager anti-Communist allies.⁷ Cha termed this as the “powerplay,” whereby the United States exerted significant influence in the Pacific due to its central position in the regional alliance network.⁸ As a result of these diplomatic maneuvers, the United States gained access to bases that supported this power dynamic.

⁵ Mueller.

⁶ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 17–20.

⁷ Victor Cha, *Powerplay: the Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 3.

⁸ Cha, 4.

The U.S. Navy's official account of its military government in Micronesia demurred on the policy battles that created the Trust Territory. While its author, Dorothy Richard, acknowledged the policy debates within the United States Government, and that Secretary of Navy Forrestal was "sincerely disturbed about the proposed trusteeship of the Pacific Islands," she summarized that "lack of immediate decision at the close of the war as to the status and disposition of the ex-Japanese Mandated Islands forced the extension of naval military government."⁹ This suggested that the Navy remained outside of policy deliberations regarding the future of occupied areas.

Many scholars, however, detailed the political maneuvers that the Department of the Navy, Department of War, Department of State, and the Department of Interior took to advance their organizations' interests. In his seminal work on civil-military relations, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington argued that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff rose to unparalleled preeminence in foreign policy creation during World War II. Huntington stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 1945 were "next to the President, the single most important force in the overall conduct of the war."¹⁰ Admiral William Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945, concurred with this sentiment when he stated, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the present time, are under no civilian control whatsoever."¹¹ John Dower continued this assertion and stated that, in occupied Japan, "MacArthur was the indisputable overlord of occupied Japan, and his underlings were mere viceroys."¹² Both Friedman and Nicholas Sarantakes also argued the United States military retained its prominence in creating foreign policy post-World War II.

Hal Friedman suggested that the network of military bases was driven primarily by the United States' urge to create a defensive perimeter across the Western Pacific, and

⁹ Dorothy E. Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Volume II: The Postwar Military Government Era 1945–1947* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operation, 1957), 62, 87.

¹⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 318.

¹¹ Huntington, 336.

¹² John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company / The New Press, 2000), 205.

thereby prevent another disastrous attack similar to that on Pearl Harbor.¹³ This defensive concern, Friedman argued, then drove the United States' foreign policy to obtain bases through a multitude of means. In the northern Mariana Islands, the United States pursued a strategy of trusteeship via the United Nations in order to retain exclusive control of the hard-won islands. In Guam, the United States resumed the prewar naval administration. In Okinawa, Sarantakes argued that the United States allowed Japan "residual sovereignty" over the island to secure bases while preserving legitimacy in the international community.¹⁴ This approach maintained American integrity within the international community and also allowed for uncontested control of the strategically vital islands. Only once American bases were guaranteed, could the United States and Japan formally sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Treaty for Mutual Security and Cooperation.¹⁵

Relatedly, but separate from the theories on alliances, Kent Calder created a framework to understand the political dynamics of U.S. military bases overseas. Calder's "Paradigm for Base Politics" classified interactions according to the presence of coercion and material benefit wielded in each case.¹⁶ Bazaar politics, fiat politics, compensation politics, and affective politics vary according to their combination of material benefits and coercion wielded by the host country. Affective politics occur when the host nation wields neither coercion nor material benefit, and instead relies on shared values, identities, or other social constructs to assure foreign bases. Fiat politics occur when the host nation wields coercion, but no material benefits, and most often occurs in dictatorships. In the paradigm of bazaar politics, the host nation wields material benefits and coercion to increase the palatability of bases. Calder specifically classified Japan in the paradigm of compensation politics, where the state wields material benefits, but no coercion, to maintain bases throughout the country.¹⁷ This research helps bridge the divide between alliance politics

¹³ Hal Friedman, *Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the Pacific Basin, 1945–1947* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 2000), 35–36.

¹⁴ Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 58–59.

¹⁵ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 59.

¹⁶ Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 127–153.

¹⁷ Calder, 130–136.

at the international level and basing rights at the national and local level. Thus, Calder's framework is applicable to Guam and the Trust Territories, who significantly interacted with the U.S. military governments and bases, but outside the scope of an alliance. While Calder's framework is instrumental in explaining the continuity of military bases overseas, his analysis leaves space to study the creation of the U.S. base network in the Pacific. His framework, though, opens the door to understanding how domestic factors at the regional and national level affect U.S. basing initiatives.

While the creation of U.S. foreign policy post–World War II is relatively well researched, fewer accounts exist that detail the domestic politics of Micronesia and Okinawa of the same era. Much of the predominant research conducted by U.S. government agencies understandably depicts U.S. rather than local perspectives in order to capture organizational lessons learned. This prevailing focus, however, risks oversimplifying the role of local actors in affecting the outcome of U.S. military bases. Richard's chronicle of Naval military government in Micronesia depicted local society as such: "There was no tradition or experience of areal unity and no desire for such unity on the part of the people. Years of subjugation to foreign administrators had stunted their political development and deadened their initiative."¹⁸ Arnold Fisch's *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950*, published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, recounted that Okinawa's political revitalization began with rudimentary organization in refugee camps, and then continued under military government guidance and assistance.¹⁹ Sarantakes also depicted the U.S. military government as the impetus for local political revival. Sarantakes pointed to the appointment of Shikiya Koshin as Okinawan governor on 25 April 1946 as the key event that led to Okinawan political participation.²⁰

Several scholars have depicted the political development of these occupied areas from the perspective of the local population, though. These accounts are most significant

¹⁸ Richard, *Volume II*, 280.

¹⁹ Arnold G. Fisch Jr., *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 102–107

²⁰ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 34.

for their description of pre-war governance that later affected post-war social and political development. In the former Japanese Mandated Islands, Mark Peattie described in detail the effects of the Japanese administration on the indigenous populations. Peattie described Japanese administration as “intensive and dominating,” which left indigenous rulers as “minor functionaries in a bureaucratic structure.”²¹ While this outwardly echoed Richard’s description, Peattie added important nuance to his description of Micronesian society. The peoples of the Japanese Mandated Islands were not only affected by the administration, but also participated in ways that affected their post-war bureaucratic capabilities. Peattie suggested that native political leaders were not simply underdeveloped; rather, they accepted accommodation for legitimizing a foreign administration.²² This transactional form of political participation would be a model for future interactions with the U.S. Naval Administration.

Guam, like its Micronesian neighbors, also existed under foreign administration before the war, but benefitted from being on the winning side. Timothy Maga argued that Guamanians parlayed their support for America during the war into political activism that led to increased accommodation from the United States.²³ Thus, Guam spent its political capital, acquired through more than fifty years of operating within the American system, to increase its returns after the war.

In Okinawa, Mikio Higa described how Okinawan political parties were consolidated to support the war and failed to develop competitive politics.²⁴ Postwar Okinawan political parties then developed independently from Japan, albeit inspired by political revival in mainland Japan.²⁵ These parties, such as the Okinawa Democratic

²¹ Mark R. Peattie, *Nanyo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 68, 76.

²² Peattie, 76.

²³ Timothy P. Maga, “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950,” *Pacific Historical Review* 53, no. 1 (February 1984): 59–77, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3639379>.

²⁴ Mikio Higa, *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa* (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia, 1963), 22–23.

²⁵ Higa, 27.

Alliance, Okinawa People's Party, and Okinawa Socialist Party, all espoused democratization, thought the implications of that term ranged from alliance with the United States to autonomy.²⁶ Though instructive, Okinawan political participation had its limits. Higa argued that the war reshuffled political elites that only slowly regrouped following the devastation.²⁷ Thus, political opposition to U.S. administration, or at least viable alternatives, had to overcome both the physical devastation of the war and their stunted political development prior to the war.

In the midst of this upheaval, military government teams landed on the former Mandated Islands, Guam, and Okinawa to establish U.S. control. Navy military government had three primary functions in Micronesia: "reduction of active and passive sabotage, implementation of policies," and "restoration of civilian living conditions to normal."²⁸ Similarly, military government in Okinawa sought to further national policies, fulfill obligations under international law, and assist military operations.²⁹ The "implementation of policies" implied military policies until political guidance was received. In the Pacific, this translated to exclusive, indefinite U.S. control. As Richard summarized the guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff towards the Japanese Mandated Islands, "no forces under their [military government] control would take any action, make any plans, agreements or statements which directly or by implication might serve as a basis for any nation other than the United States obtaining sovereignty or any other territorial rights therein."³⁰ Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), recognized, however, that local populations could affect the U.S. basing interest. As Richard recounted CINCPOA's perspective on military government, "successful implementation of the objectives depended to a great extent upon native attitudes. Accordingly, relations with the people of the islands were handled with great

²⁶ Higa, 27–28.

²⁷ Higa, 24.

²⁸ Richard, *Volume II*, 163.

²⁹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950*, 21.

³⁰ Richard, *Volume II*, 164.

care.”³¹ U.S. objectives, as outlined initially by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were not always congruent with native attitudes, however.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Several possible factors help explain how the United States translated military achievements into long-term political and military hegemony in the region. Research will examine the domestic factors in the U.S. and occupied areas that shaped base politics, how military governments affected these forces, and the creation of U.S. foreign policy in the Pacific after World War II.

First, years of foreign administration affected the societies and base politics of Guam, Japanese Mandated Islands, and Okinawa. On Guam, the U.S. naval administration that began in 1898 continued years of foreign administration under Spain and inhibited the development of indigenous administrators, bureaucracies, and identities. On Okinawa, years of political incorporation and social assimilation culminated in the devastation of World War II. On the Japanese Mandated Islands, direct colonial administration and mass immigration similarly affected indigenous political and social organization. In these areas, years of foreign administration inhibited resistance to military bases and facilitated the transition from Japanese to U.S. control.

In the wake of the war, U.S. military government units maintained order and filled the political void in occupied areas across the Pacific. Additionally, the military governments bought the United States time to deliberate, formulate, and apply national policies to the political vacuum created in these areas. As indigenous political and social movements reemerged after the war, military governments also played an important role in mitigating the tensions between U.S. and local interests. The ways in which military government teams informed, refined, and applied policies affected the outcomes on the northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and Okinawa. Military government teams bridged this divide between the reality created by previous administrations and U.S. policy ambitions.

³¹ Richard, *Volume II*, 165.

In doing so, Military government teams established a foundation of civil-military relations upon which long-term military bases were built.

During World War II, the United States military, and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rose to preeminence in foreign policy creation and fiercely advocated for a network of overseas bases to establish a forward line of defense. This influence resulted in a strong military voice in American diplomacy. As such, the plan to retain the areas occupied by military government gained hold in the highest levels of government.

Following World War II, the United States also exploited ambiguous claims to territorial interstices in order to secure military bases. Both the Japanese Mandated Islands and Okinawa were indirectly referenced in the Allies' Potsdam Declaration, which established the terms for Japanese surrender. This ambiguity created a sovereignty vacuum in which the United States exerted its force.

Later, the Cold War coalesced United States foreign policy into the broad objective of countering Communism worldwide, which unified disparate departments of the federal government to seek military establishments overseas. While the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff diverged in their approach to obtaining these bases, they concurred with the strategic impetus to secure overseas bases in the Pacific. These efforts, pursued through a variety of legal and diplomatic mechanisms, affirmed the precepts of the Atlantic Charter that the United States was committed to the self-determination of liberated peoples and opposed to territorial expansion. The United Nations granted the United States strategic trusteeship of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, which included exclusive military access. In Okinawa, United States bases continued within the framework of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed in 1951. These maneuvers fulfilled the United States' obligations under international law and reinforced United States legitimacy in the international community.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research will examine three case studies involving significant interaction between United States Navy military governments and civilian populations: the population of the northern Mariana Islands and the United States Navy military government between 1944

and 1951; Guamanians and the Navy Military Government between 1944 and 1951; and Okinawans and the United States Navy and Army military government between 1945 and 1951. These cases were occupied by Japan during World War II, seized by United States forces, administered by United States Navy military governments, and later transferred to U.S. civilian administration to facilitate long-term security interests. These cases will serve to intertwine the U.S. policy objectives with indigenous governance initiatives to illuminate the ways in which military governments resolved these forces.

Both Okinawa and the northern Mariana Islands circa 1944–1951 contained multiple similarities that make them interesting for comparison. Both areas were brought under Japanese control relatively recently before World War II, and both areas contained ethnicities and cultures that were distinct from their Japanese rulers. Through decades of Japanese rule, these two populations experienced heavy social assimilation and political incorporation.

Despite their similarities, the northern Marianas and Okinawa diverged in their security relationship with the United States. In the northern Marianas, direct U.S. military administration continued after the war and was transferred to civilian administration by the Department of the Interior via a United Nations Strategic Trusteeship. In Okinawa, direct U.S. military administration continued after the war. First administered by the Navy, then transferred to the Army, the U.S. maintained this security arrangement until 1972.

Guam, in contrast, was a U.S. possession prior to World War II and was administered by the U.S. Navy until Japan seized the island in the opening days of the war. Guamanians' identity as Americans, manifested through their resistance to Japanese occupation and the political institutions they developed under military government tenure, mobilized efforts to increase autonomy. As a result, the United States ceded concessions to the population in order to maintain access.

Eventually, Okinawa reverted to Japanese control and maintained U.S. bases under the umbrella of the Treaty for Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. Meanwhile, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands later gained independence through the Compact of Free Association, becoming several island nations that relied on

the United States for defense and federal services. Guamanians obtained citizenship and self-governance, but also accepted long-term basing of military forces. These cases seek to illuminate the diplomatic, bureaucratic, and operational approaches that linked the United States' unprecedented military achievements in World War II to a long-term security network in the western Pacific that endured through the Cold War and to present day.

These particular cases in civil military operations are still relevant today. The Compact of Free Association, which granted exclusive U.S. military access, is due for renegotiation in 2022. On Okinawa, protests against military bases are persistent, ongoing, and a factor that may affect the strategic disposition of U.S. forces. Guam is the potential destination for thousands of U.S. Marines relocated from Okinawa, but is strongly resisting aspects of the new bases. These cases require a historical understanding of American involvement in order to maintain U.S. interests in the long term.

II. PRE-WAR BASE POLITICS IN OKINAWA, THE MARIANA ISLANDS, AND GUAM

This chapter examines the environments and characteristics that shaped base politics on Okinawa, the Mariana Islands, and Guam before and during World War II. Environmentally, the chapter discusses the history, demography, and governance of these islands before and during the Pacific War. Characteristically, it discusses local levels of base protest and support, and assesses the levels of social and cultural assimilation demonstrated through institutions of education, language, and religion. Finally, the chapter applies Calder's paradigms of base politics to each location in order to contextualize historical civil-military interactions. Although these islands developed under separate pre-war administrations, the islands shared similar histories, characteristics, and environments that would shape their post-war outcomes. With this foundation established, later chapters will examine how each of these three cases changed as a result of the war, and how these changes affected long-term U.S. basing agreements.

A. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING BASE POLITICS

In *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism*, Kent E. Calder analyzed the politics surrounding overseas U.S. military bases circa 2007. Calder took a multi-disciplinary approach to base politics, and analyzed the individual, domestic, national, and international variables that determined outcomes. Accordingly, Calder categorized individual motives for participating in base politics, paradigms in which sub-national entities participate in base politics, and historical hypothesis that determine future prospects for base support.

Calder categorized three primary motives for individuals to participate in base politics: ideological, nationalistic, and pragmatic. Ideological participants engage with bases on philosophical grounds, while nationalistic participants support or defend bases for their effect on national sovereignty. Calder described pragmatic participants as those

concerned with the environmental, criminal, and material effects of bases.³² Calder also noted the importance of catalysts in base protests, and specifically correlated military mishaps and egregious crimes with an increase in base protests.³³

Calder then classified four paradigms in which national leaders engage in base politics. Bazaar politics, fiat politics, compensation politics, and affective politics vary according to their combination of material benefits and coercion wielded by the host country. Bazaar politics occur when a host nation trades compensation for cooperation. Fiat politics occur when a host nation wields coercion, but no material benefits, and most often occurs in dictatorships. Compensation politics occur when a host nation does not coerce its constituents, but rather compels support through material benefits. Affective politics occur when a host nation wields neither coercion nor material benefit, and instead relies on shared values, identities, or other social constructs to assure foreign bases.

At the environmental level, Calder introduced five hypotheses for predicting general outcome of base politics. Contact hypothesis predicted that civil-military tensions correspondingly increase with the frequency of contact between the military and population. Calder measured population densities on and surrounding military bases to gauge the frequency of civil-military contact. Calder called this the “first cut” in understanding tensions in base politics.³⁴ While additional variables, discussed below, may mitigate or inflame base tensions, greater contact between foreign militaries and local populations increases the likelihood of friction.

Colonization hypothesis predicts that former colonies will resist military bases of former colonizers. The stronger the colonial experience, the more forcefully will the former colony seek to reject or oust foreign military bases. Though Calder did not provide a scale to measure the strength of a colonial relationship, he noted that external factors may also affect the outcome of base politics in the context of this model.

³² Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 84.

³³ Calder, 86.

³⁴ Calder, 121.

Similar to colonization hypothesis, Calder's occupation hypothesis predicts that non-liberating military occupations will likely lead to broad popular opposition to foreign bases. Liberating occupations, conversely, can lead to broad popular support for foreign bases. Calder distinguished liberating from non-liberating occupations by their level of two main variables: legitimacy garnered during the occupation and the institutional reforms implemented during the occupation.³⁵

Regime-shift hypothesis correlates changes in host-nation regimes to the withdrawal of foreign military bases. These regime shifts complicate elite-driven decision processes in the host state, unleash the power of popular sentiments, and redefine the relationships between key actors in base politics.³⁶ One likely scenario that Calder predicted is the withdrawal of foreign bases as a country transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule.

Dictatorship hypothesis argues that the United States frequently supports dictatorial governments in order to maintain stability in base politics. Calder observed that dictatorships are a "superficially stabilizing refuge in the face of the uncertainties of regime change in a nation with significant foreign bases."³⁷ In the Cold War era, Calder further argued that the United States, and particularly the National Security Council, accommodated dictators in order to create strategic bulwarks against communism.³⁸

Calder's framework is applied in this thesis to the sub-national entities of Guam, the Northern Marianas, and Okinawa to analyze the foundations of their later base politics. Though Calder's framework did not assess instances of domestic military bases on sovereign territory, the framework is applied to Guam in this context due to its designation as a territory and not an incorporated state with direct representation in the U.S. government. Similarly, although the Northern Marianas would later become a U.S. territory, it began the war as a Japanese colony and subsequently entered a period of

³⁵ Calder, 111.

³⁶ Calder, 113.

³⁷ Calder, 115.

³⁸ Calder, 117.

sovereign ambiguity after the war. Finally, Okinawa entered the war incorporated into the Japanese Empire, but entered a period of sovereign ambiguity after the war. All three cases, in essence, experienced a type of regime shift when U.S. military governments established their authority over the war ravaged populations.

In all three cases, history's legacy proved to be as strong a factor as pragmatic motivators. As Calder himself noted, "historical origins, in short, are crucial to understanding the institutional environment in which base politics develops thereafter."³⁹ Accordingly, this chapter will analyze the history and institutional development of Okinawa, the Mariana Islands, and Guam preceding their occupation by U.S. forces during the war.

B. OKINAWA, A PREFECTURE OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE

Although the Japanese Empire annexed the Ryukyu islands by force, Okinawa developed many aspects of affective politics prior to World War II. The Japanese administration appealed to nationalism, ideology, and pragmatism to build Okinawan support for imperial aggrandizement. With increased political representation, cultural assimilation, and few military impositions prior to the war, Okinawans enjoyed the benefits of the Empire with acceptable costs. This support manifested itself not only in the Japanese military bases that the islands hosted, but also in the culture, language, and identity of Okinawans. As the war progressed, however, Japan resorted to coercion in order to maintain Okinawan subjectivity. The devastation of the war would define Okinawan history, unleash popular anti-military sentiments, and call into question Okinawa's very identity as Japanese. These resultant civil-military forces created during the Imperial Japanese era affected Okinawan base politics long after the war.

The Japanese Empire deposed the Ryukyu Kingdom in March 1879 and subsequently incorporated Okinawa as a prefecture on 5 April 1879.⁴⁰ Despite their

³⁹ Calder, 99.

⁴⁰ Tze May Loo, *Heritage Politics: Shuri Castle and Okinawa's Incorporation into Modern Japan, 1879–2000* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), 34.

forceful absorption into the state, Okinawans gained political representation and legal equality under the Japanese Empire. In 1909, a Prefectural Assembly convened for the first time with representatives chosen by elected local council members.⁴¹ Okinawans then gained their first two representatives in the Lower House of the Diet in 1912.⁴² On 1 April 1920, representation increased to five members in the 381-member body.⁴³ In that same enactment of 1920, Okinawans also gained equal protection under Japanese law.⁴⁴

To overcome the divisive issues of history and ethnicity, the government of Japan promoted an ethno-Japanese Okinawan identity.⁴⁵ These efforts focused on Okinawan education, language, religion, and patriotic duty to forge a united identity that would eventually support Japanese militarism. Years later, Yanagita Kunio, prominent Japanese scholar and ethnologist, asserted, “Okinawans are and were Japanese.”⁴⁶

Okinawan schools were the vanguard of Japan’s assimilation program. In 1916, the All-Okinawan Teachers Convention resolved to teach only Japanese and punish any use of the Ryukyuan language.⁴⁷ Military drill and traditional Japanese martial arts accompanied academic studies.⁴⁸ The level of government funding reflected Japan’s increased priority for assimilation through education. Between 1910 and 1935, annual education funds increased 25-fold, from 100,000 to 2,500,000 Yen.⁴⁹ This increase in funding also enabled

⁴¹ George Kerr, *Okinawa, The History of an Island People* (Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 2000) 427.

⁴² Kerr, 428.

⁴³ Kerr, 428.

⁴⁴ Kerr, 428.

⁴⁵ Loo, *Heritage Politics*, 37.

⁴⁶ Masamichi S. Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 75.

⁴⁷ Steve Rabson, “Assimilation Policy in Okinawa: Promotion, Resistance, and ‘Reconstruction,’” *Japan Policy Research Institute* no. 8, October 1996.

⁴⁸ Kerr, *Okinawa*, 446.

⁴⁹ Kerr, 441.

educational initiatives to reach more Okinawans. By 1937, 100,000 students were enrolled in Okinawan primary schools.⁵⁰

The Japanese government also promoted the religion of State Shinto to reinforce Japanese nationalism. State Shinto venerated the holiness of the Japanese Emperor and, by association, the Japanese Empire. Although initial attempts to introduce State Shinto in 1924 fell flat, subsequent efforts that merged Japanese spiritualism with Okinawan traditions proved more effective.⁵¹ After Japan provoked hostilities with China in 1931, the Japanese administration promoted State Shinto with renewed zeal, and pressured localities to build Shinto shrines.⁵² With savvy, these new shrines were prominently located with or in front of ancestral Okinawan places of worship.⁵³ As with language, culture, and identity, the Japanese administration increasingly promoted a vision of Okinawa that was inseparable from Japan.

The Okinawan population increased alongside political and social assimilation. In 1903, Okinawa's population was 480,000.⁵⁴ By 1940, approximately 750,000 people lived in Okinawa Prefecture.⁵⁵ This equated to a 56.2 percent increase over 38 years. This growth led to a population density of 588 Okinawans per square mile, compared to a ratio of 529 in mainland Japan.⁵⁶ Due to this high level of population density and the worldwide economic depression of the 1920s, more than 54,000 Okinawans had emigrated overseas for economic opportunities by 1930.⁵⁷ Overseas labor was also an important source of income for many Okinawans. In 1937 alone, 40,483 overseas Okinawans remitted an average of 88 Yen per person, in comparison with the average of 50 Yen per person for

⁵⁰ Kerr, 445.

⁵¹ Kerr, 452.

⁵² Kerr, 452.

⁵³ Kerr, 452.

⁵⁴ Kerr, 426.

⁵⁵ Kerr, 436.

⁵⁶ Kerr, 436.

⁵⁷ Kerr, 438.

overseas workers from all other Japanese prefectures.⁵⁸ Okinawan laborers immigrated to the Japanese Mandated Islands in large numbers and would constitute a significant part of the Japanese population.⁵⁹

Although the Japanese government significantly invested in assimilating Okinawa since 1879, segments of Okinawans identified themselves as a distinctly separate culture and ethnicity. The scholar Iha Furiyū, “father of Okinawan studies,” rose to prominence in 1911 after publishing *Ancient Ryukyu*, in which he defined Okinawa as a distinct nation related to the Japanese nation.⁶⁰ Iha’s work inspired subsequent intellectuals to consider the nature of Okinawan identity. In January 1940 Yanagi Soetsu, leader of the Mingei folk arts movement, declared that Okinawan clothing, arts, and language should be equally promoted alongside Japanese culture.⁶¹ This “language controversy” spread throughout the island via the local *Okinawa nippo* and *Ryukyu shinpo* newspapers.⁶² Officially, Okinawa Governor Fuchigami Fusataro denounced Yanagi’s Folk Art Association and declared that all traces of Okinawan identity must be forgotten.⁶³ Okinawans themselves divided over whether to embrace modern Japanese practices or to retain traditional Okinawan culture. Though the war sidelined the issue, the incident exemplified the tensions in the Okinawan-Japanese relationship even before 1945.⁶⁴

Due to these sensitivities regarding Okinawan inclusion and equality, the Japanese Empire did not demand much militarily from Okinawa. Japan began nationwide military conscription in 1873, but Okinawans were not conscripted until 1898 due to their perceived substandard aptitude.⁶⁵ Okinawans were similarly under-represented in the Japanese

⁵⁸ Kerr, 438.

⁵⁹ Kerr, 439.

⁶⁰ Richard Siddle, “Colonialism and Identity in Okinawa Before 1945,” *Japan Studies* 18 no. 2 (May 1998): 125.

⁶¹ Loo, *Heritage Politics*, 139.

⁶² Loo, 139.

⁶³ Kerr, *Okinawa*, 457.

⁶⁴ Loo, *Heritage Politics*, 129.

⁶⁵ Kerr, *Heritage Politics*, 459.

military officer corps. Between 1897 and 1937, only 16 Okinawan men attended Japanese military or naval academies.⁶⁶ And although Japan established its first military garrison on Okinawa in 1898, the archipelago was relatively free of military bases prior to the Pacific War.⁶⁷ As the Japanese military increased its control of the national government, however, Japan increasingly prepared Okinawa and its inhabitants for war.

Although historically underrepresented in the military, Japan attempted to prepare Okinawan citizens for the anticipated war effort. In 1934, the Japanese government established regulations for a National Spiritual Mobilization Training School that sought to imbue Okinawan youth with nationalistic militarism.⁶⁸ In 1935, however, the Japanese commander of the Okinawan Garrison Forces, General Ishii Torao, publicly disparaged the fighting potential of Okinawan youths.⁶⁹ While Okinawan youths were previously disqualified for military service at the highest rates in all of the prefectures, the Japanese army also had established minimum height and weight requirements slightly above Okinawan averages.⁷⁰ The Okinawan public decried General Torao's remarks as an affront to Okinawan pride, loyalty, and identity.⁷¹ Although officially proclaiming Okinawans to be Japanese, the Japanese military still differentiated between the two groups, even as military conflicts increased the demand for personnel.

Okinawan civil liberties and political representation also decreased as the prospect of wider war increased. In March 1938, Japan passed the National General Mobilization Law that abrogated many of the individual rights of the Meiji constitution.⁷² In October 1940, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was formed to promote "national

⁶⁶ Kerr, 441.

⁶⁷ Kerr, 461.

⁶⁸ Kerr, 461.

⁶⁹ Kerr, 462.

⁷⁰ Kerr, 460.

⁷¹ Kerr, 462.

⁷² Kerr, 462.

solidarity” for the war effort.⁷³ Practically, however, the organization enabled Japanese bureaucrats to dominate Okinawan political offices. In June 1943, Japan politically reorganized for an increasingly dire situation, and Okinawa Prefecture was amalgamated into a new Kyushu District.⁷⁴ Japanese political consolidation culminated in April 1944, when Japan declared martial law in Okinawa.⁷⁵ The remaining Okinawan bureaucrats and law enforcement personnel were transferred to the Japanese military administration.

In preparation for battle, the Japanese Empire not only controlled the political and legal bodies that once defined Okinawan assimilation, but also the mortal bodies of Okinawans. Concurrent with the declaration of martial law on 1 April 1944, the 32nd Imperial Japanese Army was established to defend Okinawa.⁷⁶ After assembling piecemeal reinforcements from across the Empire, the 32nd Army activated the first units of the Okinawan Home Guards, *Boetai*, in June 1944.⁷⁷ In January 1945, the Imperial Japanese Army mobilized approximately 17,000 additional Okinawans males between the age of 17 and 45.⁷⁸ Years of assimilation also proved helpful in mobilizing Okinawan youths. The 32nd Army organized and trained 750 middle school students, age 14 years and older, to conduct guerrilla warfare in the anticipated battle.⁷⁹ Additional drafts brought *Boetai* units to a total strength of approximately 20,000 by April 1945.⁸⁰ As battle neared, the 32nd Army also augmented regular Japanese units with individual Okinawan

⁷³ Kerr, 463.

⁷⁴ Kerr, 465.

⁷⁵ Kerr, 466.

⁷⁶ Roy Appleman, *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1948), 85.

⁷⁷ Appleman, 89.

⁷⁸ Appleman, 89.

⁷⁹ Appleman, 89.

⁸⁰ Appleman, 89.

draftees.⁸¹ By April 1945, a total Japanese force of 100,000 prepared for battle, of which Okinawans constituted a significant part.⁸²

These civil-military measures did not prepare Okinawans for the events of the following months, however. On 1 April 1945, U.S. forces landed on Okinawa and wrested the island from Japanese control after 82 days of vicious combat. The Pacific War killed approximately 122,000 Okinawans by its end. 28,000 were killed while serving as soldiers or civilians in the military, while an additional 94,000 civilians were killed in the battle of Okinawa.⁸³ As historian George Kerr observed, “no prefecture contributed so little to the preparation for war and its prosecution through the years, but none suffered as much in widespread misery, in loss of human lives and property, and in ultimate subservience to military occupation.”⁸⁴ The price for involuntary assimilation with Japan in 1879 proved costly for a generation of Okinawans years later.

C. THE MARIANA ISLANDS, A DISTRICT OF THE JAPANESE MANDATED ISLANDS

Unlike the peoples of the Ryukyu Islands, the people of the Mariana Islands were politically, legally, and ethnically distinct from the Japanese. Although acquiring these islands nearly 20 years later than Okinawa, Japan nonetheless sought to assimilate Micronesians of the mandate into the Empire. Instead of political and legal integration, however, the Japanese administration demographically dominated the northern Marianas, and in so doing, ensured later support for its militarization of the islands. Although these variables indicated a strong likelihood for fiat politics, the disproportionate Japanese influence in politics and population instead resembled affective politics. The remaining indigenous actors did not simply accept domination, however, but instead accepted accommodation in the new Japanese administration. These civil-military foundations would influence subsequent U.S. administrations long after the war.

⁸¹ Appleman, 91.

⁸² Appleman, 91.

⁸³ Furuki Toshiaki, “Considering Okinawa as a Frontier,” in *Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity*, ed. Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 29.

⁸⁴ Kerr, *Okinawa*, 463.

Japan seized the northern Mariana Islands from their previous imperial power, Germany, during World War I. Following the war, Japan maintained possession of the former German islands through a trusteeship governed by the League of Nations. The South Seas Mandate, also known as the Japanese Mandated Islands, included the Caroline Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Mariana Islands less Guam. The Mandate was initially organized into six administrative districts, with government offices on the most significant islands of each district: Saipan, Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit.

Japan administered the islands of Micronesia as a colony more than a trustee. This was in keeping with the mandate classification system, where Class A mandates were the most developed nations, while Class C mandates were the least developed. The League of Nations allowed Class C mandates such as Micronesia to be “administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions thereof” due to the “sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization.”⁸⁵ Japanese administration profoundly changed the Micronesian society, but not always in ways that upheld the “sacred trust of civilization” intended by the League of Nations.⁸⁶

The Japanese colonial bureaucracy in the Mandated Islands was as prohibitive to the local population as it was proficient. 950 Japanese bureaucrats administered the Mandated Islands, a striking comparison to the 25 German officials who managed the islands prior to World War I.⁸⁷ While this commitment in personnel reflected Japan’s high level of interest in the Mandated Islands, it also marginalized traditional indigenous political actors. After establishing civil administration in 1922, the colonial governor reported directly to the Japanese Prime Minister.⁸⁸ Furthermore, the colonial governor of the South Seas Mandate held jurisdiction over all legal matters pertaining to its inhabitants.

⁸⁵ Peattie, *Nanyo*, 54.

⁸⁶ Peattie, 81.

⁸⁷ Peattie, 74.

⁸⁸ Edward I-te Chen, “The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 264.

The Japanese constitution did not apply to Micronesia, as it was acquired through the League of Nations mandate and not considered sovereign territory.⁸⁹

Additionally, Japanese colonial administrators marginalized traditional sources of authority in Micronesia.⁹⁰ As historian Mark Peattie observed, “below the lowest Japanese functionary in the branch government of the Nan’yo-cho, below the stern eye of the resident Japanese policeman, was the traditional Micronesian leadership.”⁹¹ While hereditary chiefs retained prestige, Japanese-appointed officials exercised authority. Peattie described Japanese administration as “intensive and dominating,” which left indigenous rulers as “minor functionaries in a bureaucratic structure.”⁹² While it was possible for native chiefs to hold both offices, the threat of obsolescence persisted.

In the positions that indigenous peoples could hold, clear lines of subordination were established. While colonial policemen in Micronesia functioned in many more roles than traditional police, indigenous policemen were limited to assisting Japanese policemen.⁹³ Furthermore, these constables were limited to those who were “under forty, were in good health, and had completed the optimum five years of primary school.”⁹⁴ Only in 1929 were these indigenous policemen allowed to investigate cases involving Japanese nationals.⁹⁵ Even then, the government maintained a two to one ratio of Japanese police to indigenous police.⁹⁶ Still, this was relatively better than in other colonies of the Japanese Empire, where Japanese police maintained a four to one ratio over ethnic Chinese police.⁹⁷

⁸⁹ I-te Chen, “The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives,” 244.

⁹⁰ Peattie, *Nanyo*, 76.

⁹¹ Peattie, 75.

⁹² Peattie, 68, 76.

⁹³ Peattie, 74.

⁹⁴ Peattie, 74.

⁹⁵ Peattie, 74.

⁹⁶ Ching-chih Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 224.

⁹⁷ Ching-chih Chen, 224.

Though Micronesian participation in administration was limited, it reflected the Japanese belief that cooptation of the local populations was necessary for successful administration.

Though not legally considered sovereign Japanese subjects, the Japanese nevertheless dominated the indigenous population of Micronesia socially and numerically. Near the beginning of the Japanese administration in 1920, 3,671 Japanese nationals lived in the Mandated Islands with 48,505 indigenous Micronesians. In 1937, those statistics rose to 58,861 Japanese compared to 50,741 Micronesians.⁹⁸ By 1941, approximately 93,000 Japanese lived in the Mandated Islands.⁹⁹ The plurality of Japanese immigrants moved to the Mandated Islands to work in the expanding agriculture industry.¹⁰⁰ These Japanese immigrants reshaped the cultural, political, and linguistic composition of the Mandated Islands.

Saipan, the largest island in the northern Marianas, highlighted the effects of Japanese assimilation. In 1928, the Japanese administration owned 78 percent of land on Saipan and 88 percent of land on neighboring Rota.¹⁰¹ This state-owned land was apportioned to Japanese capitalist for development. In that same year, Japanese-owned enterprises produced 1,200 tons of sugar a day on Saipan.¹⁰² To fuel this agricultural boon, the Japanese administration imported labor from across the empire. In 1920, approximately 2,500 Japanese inhabited Saipan with 4,000 Micronesians. By 1938, however, approximately 45,000 Japanese inhabited Saipan with 4,000 Micronesians.¹⁰³ This equated to a 1,700 percent increase in the ethnic Japanese population over 29 years, compared to no increase in the indigenous Chamorro population.

⁹⁸ Felix Moos, Carl Lande, and Nobleza Asuncion-Lande, "An Historical Overview: Micronesia and Papua New Guinea," in *The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific: Micronesia and Papua New Guinea*, ed. Goodman, Grant K. and Felix Moos (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), 40.

⁹⁹ Peattie, *Nanyo*, 160.

¹⁰⁰ Moos, Lande, and Asuncion-Lande, "An Historical Overview," 41.

¹⁰¹ Moos, Lande, and Asuncion-Lande, 42.

¹⁰² Peattie, *Nanyo*, 130.

¹⁰³ Peattie, 161.

Social and linguistic changes accompanied this economic and demographic transformation. As Felix Moos, Carl Lande, and Nobleza Asunción-Lande described, “the Micronesian islands were well on their way to becoming ‘Japanese islands,’ not simply in the externals of administration but in the internal attitudes and sentiments of their people.”¹⁰⁴ Japanese-run schools in the mandate prioritized Japanese morals, the Japanese language, and basic math.¹⁰⁵ The limits of this socialization would be tested when the Empire of Japan waged the Pacific War with the United States and its allies.

As tensions rose in the Pacific, the Japanese military increased its military presence throughout the Mandated Islands and especially in the northern Mariana Islands. Between 1934 and November 1940, Japan allocated a total of nearly \$4,000,000 for general construction in the Mariana Islands.¹⁰⁶ During this period, Japan developed the strategic Asilto Airfield in Saipan and an airfield on neighboring Tinian, ostensibly for civil aviation.¹⁰⁷ From November 1940 to November 1941 alone, Japan allocated an additional \$3,658,000 for airfields and military installations in the Mariana Islands and nearly \$24,000,000 for military bases throughout the rest of the Mandated Islands.¹⁰⁸ In December 1940, 919 marines of the 5th Special Base Defense Force arrived on Saipan to “defend its assigned areas.”¹⁰⁹ These forces were the largest and primary combat units stationed in the Mandated Islands prior to the Pacific War.¹¹⁰ In June of that year, the unit’s mission was amended to include “planning and preparation for the Guam invasion

¹⁰⁴ Moos, Lande, and Asuncion-Lande, “An Historical Overview,” 44.

¹⁰⁵ Felix M. Keesing, “Education and Native Peoples: A Study in Objectives,” *Pacific Affairs* 5, no. 8, (August 1932): 679.

¹⁰⁶ Philip A. Crowl, *Campaign in the Marianas* (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1993), 53.

¹⁰⁷ Crowl, 54.

¹⁰⁸ Crowl, 54.

¹⁰⁹ Crowl, 55.

¹¹⁰ Crowl, 55.

operation.”¹¹¹ Thus, on the eve of war, Japanese troops on the strategically vital island of Saipan consisted of approximately 1.88 percent of the island’s total population.

As the Japanese empire mobilized for war, so did the peoples of the Mandated Islands. Prior to the Pacific War, the Japanese administration formed nationalistic youth leagues, *seinendan*, to organize and indoctrinate indigenous men and women.¹¹² In the strictest interpretation of the League of Nations mandate, Japan was prohibited from conducting “military training of the natives.”¹¹³ Accordingly, these leagues promoted “knowledge and virtue, physical training, and public service” throughout each of the main islands in the Japanese Mandate. Following a model successfully applied in other areas of the empire, however, Japan parlayed these youth organizations into paramilitary organizations when hostilities initiated. Micronesian men volunteered for labor battalions, *teishintei*, to support the Japanese military throughout the mandated islands and service battalions, *kesshitai*, for service overseas.¹¹⁴ In the battles throughout Micronesia during World War II, approximately 10 percent of the indigenous population died.¹¹⁵ Thus, political opposition to foreign administration, or at least viable alternatives, had to overcome both the physical devastation of the war and their stunted political development prior to the war.

The indigenous peoples of the Japanese Mandated Islands were not only affected by the foreign administration, but also participated in ways that affected their post-war governance capabilities. Participation in the Pacific War demonstrated that the peoples of these small islands were not just passive recipients of foreign rule. Native political leaders were not simply underdeveloped; rather, they accepted accommodation for legitimizing a foreign administration.¹¹⁶ This transactional form of political participation would be a model for future interactions with U.S. forces.

¹¹¹ Crowl, 55.

¹¹² Peattie, 108.

¹¹³ Moos, Lande, and Asuncion-Lande, “An Historical Overview,” 59.

¹¹⁴ Peattie, *Nanyo*, 108.

¹¹⁵ Moos, Lande, and Asuncion-Lande, “An Historical Overview,” 44.

¹¹⁶ Peattie, *Nanyo*, 76.

D. GUAM, A TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES

Guam, like its neighboring Mariana Islands and Okinawa, also existed under foreign rule prior to World War II. Unlike its neighboring islands, however, Guam became subject to explicit U.S. military control long before the upheavals of World War II. This civil-military foundation enabled fiat politics to dictate base outcomes. While living under U.S. Naval Civil Administration, though, Guamanians politically, linguistically, and religiously embraced America. In so doing, the pre-war U.S. military government sowed the seeds for social and political integration after the war. In the years to follow, this growing American identity would redirect the trajectory of base politics on Guam.

The United States Navy seized the island of Guam from Spain during the Spanish-American War in 1898. On 20 June, the USS Charleston arrived off the coast of Guam and fired 13 cannon shells at Fort Santa Cruz in Apra Harbor for four minutes.¹¹⁷ That night, Captain Henry Glass of the USS Charleston forced the Spanish Governor to surrender the island and submit to American authority.¹¹⁸ In one day, a U.S. naval officer captured an island for which the Spanish had fought a 28-year war that killed more than 90 percent of the native Chamorro population.¹¹⁹ President McKinley's inaugural instructions to the naval administration were to assure "the full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples."¹²⁰ The high hopes of the new administration, however, would only fitfully come to fruition.

The Naval Civil Government established an authoritarian system to govern the island's population. A U.S. Navy officer served as both the naval governor and the commandant of Naval Station Guam.¹²¹ Although the naval administration retained Spain's system of municipal government, the Naval Governor dismissed local elections

¹¹⁷ Stephen Kinzler, "The American Conquest of Guam," *World Policy Journal* 23, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 101.

¹¹⁸ Kinzler, 101–102.

¹¹⁹ Kinzler, 101.

¹²⁰ Laura Thompson, "Crisis on Guam," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 6, no. 1, (November 1946): 10.

¹²¹ Thompson, 9.

and instead appointed officials.¹²² The island's only elected body, a "people's congress," only could advise the Naval Civil Government.¹²³ Furthermore, the naval administration retained absolute legal authority over the civilian population. Guamanians had no rights to trial by jury or appeal to a higher court.¹²⁴ At the municipal level, the Marine Corps Insular Patrol supplanted local civil police to maintain law and order.¹²⁵ Thus the naval administration's early institutions failed to meet the executive branch's noble guidance.

Although transferring sovereignty from one colonial power to another, the people of Guam did not readily accept a loss of individual rights or representation. In 1901, 32 prominent Guamanian leaders petitioned the U.S. Congress to remove the "military government of occupation" and address the circumstances that led to "fewer permanent guarantees of liberty and property rights that exist now than under Spanish domain."¹²⁶ This Chamorro advocacy set a precedent for successive rights movements.

In the following years, Guamanians repeatedly petitioned the U.S. government for increased autonomy, equal representation, and citizenship. In 1927, Guamanians attempted to simultaneously gain citizenship with the people of the U.S. Virgin Islands, but were defeated in Congress.¹²⁷ A sympathetic naval governor, Captain Willis W. Bradley, unilaterally enacted a Guam Bill of Rights in December 1930 that established habeas corpus equal voting rights in local elections.¹²⁸ Buoyed by Captain Bradley's advocacy, 2,000 Guamanians again petitioned Congress for citizenship in 1933, but were again denied.¹²⁹ Baltazar J. Bordallo and Francisco B. Leon Guerrero, members of the Guam Congress, traveled to Washington, DC, in 1936 to advocate for Guamanian rights. Senator

¹²² Thompson, 9.

¹²³ Thompson, 9.

¹²⁴ Thompson, 9.

¹²⁵ Robert F. Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), 148.

¹²⁶ Kinzler, "The American Conquest of Guam," 103.

¹²⁷ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 139.

¹²⁸ Rogers, 139–140.

¹²⁹ Rogers, 142.

Millard Tydings, Chair of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs and a co-sponsor of the Tydings-McDuffy Act that established Filipino independence, subsequently proposed citizenship for Guamanians in 1937.¹³⁰ Again, however, the U.S. Navy trumped the citizenship movement.

Despite rejecting Guamanian calls for citizenship, the U.S. Naval Civil Government increasingly promoted an American identity for the island's inhabitants. Schools were the primary vessel to float this new identity. The administration prohibited the native Chamorro language from being taught or spoken in schools.¹³¹ By 1940, nearly 75 percent of Guamanians over the age of ten spoke English.¹³²

The U.S. also controlled religion in order to promote an American identity. Beginning in 1937, the naval administration replaced Catholic Spanish priests with American priests, and by 1941 only two of the island's 14 priests were Spanish.¹³³ In 1938, the U.S. Navy restricted all foreign vessels from entering Guam, which further isolated the island from economic development, international trade, and travel.¹³⁴

Although Guamanians yearned for autonomy under foreign rule, the U.S. naval administration also improved the lives of many residents. The U.S. Naval Civil Administration concentrated its efforts on improving public health and, as a result, the island's death rate decreased from 2.78 percent in 1905 to 1.17 percent in 1940.¹³⁵ Accordingly, the Chamorro population on Guam increased from 9,360 in 1901 to 21,502

¹³⁰ Rogers, 145.

¹³¹ Rogers, 149.

¹³² Rogers, 149.

¹³³ Rogers, 148.

¹³⁴ Rogers, 146.

¹³⁵ Rogers, 149.

in 1940.¹³⁶ This equated to a 129.7 percent increase in indigenous population over 40 years. By 1940, a total of 23,067 people inhabited the island.¹³⁷

As with its neighboring Pacific islands, Guam was the subject of debate over a pre-war buildup of military assets. The military increased its landholdings by 30 percent since 1899, and controlled nearly a third of Guam's total land by 1941.¹³⁸ Although Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan once declared that Guam ought to be the "Gibraltar of the Pacific," the United States did not resource the outpost to meet the theorist's ideals.¹³⁹ After Rear Admiral Arthur Hepburn advocated for a strengthened chain of naval bases around the world in 1938, the U.S. Navy sought \$5,000,000 from Congress to develop an air and submarine base on Guam.¹⁴⁰ U.S. war plans of 1939 – 1940 categorized Guam as an indefensible territory, the lowest priority for resources.¹⁴¹ Accordingly, Congress only appropriated \$4,700,000 in 1941 to improve Guam's defenses.¹⁴²

Unlike its Japanese neighbors, local conscription in the armed forces decreased in 1937 when the Guam Militia was disbanded due to budget cuts.¹⁴³ By April 1941 the island's entire garrison consisted of merely 698 personnel, of which only approximately 340 were combat forces.¹⁴⁴ This military force represented 3.02 percent of the island's population as counted in 1940. Of the five naval vessels based in Apra Harbor in 1941, only four were seaworthy, and only three were combat vessels.¹⁴⁵ The USS *Penguin*, a

¹³⁶ Mansel G. Blackford, "Guam, the Philippines, and American Samoa," in *Pathways to the Present* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 169.

¹³⁷ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 147.

¹³⁸ Rogers, 148.

¹³⁹ John Gunther, "Our Pacific Frontier," *Foreign Affairs* 18, no. 4 (July 1940): 598.

¹⁴⁰ Gunther, "Our Pacific Frontier," 597.

¹⁴¹ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 147.

¹⁴² Rogers, 150.

¹⁴³ Rogers, 150.

¹⁴⁴ Rogers, 150.

¹⁴⁵ Rogers, 150.

World War I minesweeper, was the largest of the combat vessels.¹⁴⁶ In December 1941 nearly seventy American contractors arrived on the island to construct new airfields and oil storage tanks, but their work would prove too late.¹⁴⁷

On 10 December 1941, Japan invaded Guam from their bases in neighboring Saipan and the Bonin Islands.¹⁴⁸ Approximately 5,900 Japanese troops quickly defeated the 153 U.S. Marines, 271 U.S. Sailors, and 308 Guamanians that defended the island.¹⁴⁹ After two and a half years of subsequent occupation, Japan constructed two airfields on Guam, had been constructing two more, and had reinforced the island to a total of 18,500 troops by June 1944.¹⁵⁰ On 21 July 1944, however, the first of 39,080 U.S. troops landed on Guam to retake the strategic outpost.¹⁵¹ 1,769 American service members died during the subsequent liberation alongside 11,000 Japanese.¹⁵² Between 1941 and 1944, 578 Guamanians died and another 258 were injured in the war.¹⁵³ Though numerically small in comparison with the wider war, these casualties represent 3.89 percent of the total Chamorro population counted in 1940.

E. CONCLUSION: BASE POLITICS REVISITED

Although Okinawa, the Mariana Islands, and Guam developed under separate pre-war administrations, the islands shared similar demographics, histories, and environments that would shape their post-war outcomes. Acquired in the waning days of imperialism, all three island chains existed as more than colonies, but less than fully equal parts of their nation. In the following years, authoritarian military governments governed all three locations and increasingly coerced support for an oncoming conflict. Japan solidified its

¹⁴⁶ Rogers, 150.

¹⁴⁷ Rogers, 150–151.

¹⁴⁸ Crowl, *Campaign in the Marianas*, 23.

¹⁴⁹ Crowl, 22.

¹⁵⁰ Crowl, 329.

¹⁵¹ Crowl, 36.

¹⁵² Blackford, “Guam, the Philippines, and American Samoa,” 169.

¹⁵³ Blackford, 169.

possession of Okinawa through political incorporation and cultural assimilation. Okinawans and ethnic Japanese subsequently dominated the indigenous populations of the Mariana Islands. The indigenous population of Guam increased in size under foreign administration, but consistently sought closer identification with the United States.

These islands contained both active base supporters and protestors, however, and did not passively accept foreign occupation. This analysis demonstrates that pre-war Guam, Okinawa, and the northern Mariana Islands contained strong elements of pragmatic and nationalistic base supporters. The governmental structures of these islands also indicated a high propensity for coercion and not compensation. Despite low levels of autonomy, though, each island also contained underlying elements of affective politics. In the case of Guam and Okinawa, years of assimilation through education, language, and religion created a shared identity that strengthened base support. On the northern Mariana Islands, an extreme disproportionate demographic of Japanese citizens marginalized local actors and effectively created a paradigm of affective politics.

Yet, following the war, each developed divergent base politics. What changed their outcomes? Along with so much else, the Pacific War altered the trajectory of Guam, the northern Mariana Islands, and Okinawa. More specifically, the manner in which U.S. forces administered these islands in the wake of the war proved to be a catalyst for their change in base politics. U.S. military governments supplanted Japanese administrations, revamped the institutions that governed base politics, and uncovered popular sentiments that would redefine the political trajectory of each population. The next chapter analyzes the development and implementation of U.S. military governments on the Marianas, Guam, and Okinawa.

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III. THE CATALYST: U.S. NAVY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE PACIFIC

The war was a catalyst that redefined the base politics of the northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and Okinawa. As Calder noted, these catalysts can be “political earthquakes” that unleash popular sentiments and affect the outcomes of base politics.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, Calder argued that local actors are often “the most visible and volatile element” in base politics.¹⁵⁵ With a population demographically weighted with Japanese citizens, the northern Mariana Islands of 1944 would seem to support Calder’s occupation hypothesis. As U.S. forces consolidated on the relatively small islands, occupation hypothesis suggests that these Japanese-assimilated populations would have resisted occupying forces. On Guam of 1944, Calder’s colonization hypothesis similarly suggests that decades of military government by the U.S. Navy would have turned the local population against returning U.S. forces. Given decades of assimilation with Japan, occupation hypothesis predicts that Okinawans would have opposed U.S. bases on the island. Furthermore, colonization hypothesis also suggests that Okinawans would have rejected any attempts to reintegrate with Japan.

In the wake of the assault forces, U.S. military governments occupied the political vacuum on the islands of the northern Marianas, Guam, and Okinawa. In all three locations, U.S. military governments centralized authority and controlled local populations in ways that were equally or more demanding than their pre-war counterparts. Given such conditions, how did U.S. military governments on the northern Marianas, Guam, and Okinawa affect local base politics to facilitate the long-term basing of U.S. forces?

First, the U.S. military governments on the northern Marianas, Guam, and Okinawa reaped widespread affection for their humanitarian relief efforts immediately following battle. The destructiveness of these battles increased the necessity and appreciation of this aid. Even amongst Japanese populations and former possessions, this relief effort led U.S.

¹⁵⁴ Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 113.

¹⁵⁵ Calder, 96.

forces to be perceived as liberators and not occupiers. These perceptions forestalled the resistance predicted by Calder's occupation hypothesis.

Second, military governments immediately established their authority as the legitimate governing, legal, and social body on the islands. While U.S. military governments strictly retained political authority on all three locations, these forces did not simply repress popular sentiments to control outcomes. Rather, U.S. military governments in the Pacific engineered political and social "legitimizing procedures" to generate support for bases.¹⁵⁶ By coopting existing political structures and controlling demographics, military governments deftly navigated historic grievances in base politics, even as population densities and military land use skyrocketed to unprecedented levels.

As military government continued in duration, however, historical grievances resurfaced. New pragmatic, ideological, and even nationalist tensions also developed. In responding to these tensions, military governments on the northern Marianas, Guam, and Okinawa established institutions and precedents that affected the long-term nature of base politics in each location. As Calder observed, "although it is ultimately individuals that really *act*, in both domestic and international politics, they act in institutional contexts."¹⁵⁷ Calder also noted that, "institutions, although they have multiple origins in the interplay of economic, political, and social forces, tend to be profoundly shaped by national historical-political forces."¹⁵⁸ While the previous chapter described the heritage of political and social forces on these islands, this chapter will examine how U.S. military governments, individuals, and institutions interacted to affect the local level of base politics.

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT

World War II marked the U.S. military's first attempt to educate dedicated civil affairs forces for military government.¹⁵⁹ Before analyzing how U.S. military government

¹⁵⁶ Calder, 109.

¹⁵⁷ Calder, 126.

¹⁵⁸ Calder, 126.

¹⁵⁹ Arnold G. Fisch Jr., *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1988), 7.

units affected base politics in the Pacific, however, we must first establish the intended purpose of these forces and the manner in which they were prepared for their duties. This section demonstrates that training and developing civil affairs personnel was a vast effort by the U.S. military. By mobilizing and enlisting academic expertise in the base politics of the post-war Pacific, the U.S. Navy consolidated the accomplishments of the war and established the foundation for long-term security agreements.

In July 1940, the War Department published Field Manual (FM) 27-5, *Military Government*, which outlined the basic precepts of U.S. military governments.¹⁶⁰ As the first doctrinal publication to govern civil affairs in the U.S. military, the manual defined key terms, roles, and objectives. FM 27-5 defined “military government” itself as the authority exercised by military forces over occupied or liberated territories.¹⁶¹ The manual deemed “civil affairs control,” the supervision of civil activities by military forces, as an essential aspect of military government. Civil affairs control consisted of practical activities such as maintaining order, facilitating military operations, and employing local resources to further United States interests.¹⁶² To conduct these activities, the manual designated “civil affairs officers” in the armed forces to control civilians under the direction of the military governor.¹⁶³

In 1943, FM 27-5 was revised to govern both Army and Navy civil affairs forces. In so doing, the U.S. armed forces established its first joint doctrinal approach to the challenge of military government. *U.S. Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs* would serve as the doctrinal point of reference for all U.S. civil affairs forces on Okinawa. Using the manual as a doctrinal reference, the Army and the Navy successfully engaged American academic institutions to prepare for the challenges of military government in liberated and occupied areas.

¹⁶⁰ Fisch, 8.

¹⁶¹ War Department and Department of the Navy, *U.S. Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, FM 27-5/OpNav 50E-3 (Washington, DC: 1943), 1.

¹⁶² War Department and Department of the Navy, 1.

¹⁶³ War Department and Department of the Navy, 1.

The School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville on 11 May 1942 in order to train the Army's civil affairs officers. Curriculum for the new course consisted of an overview of the U.S. military, historical cases of military governance, and civil-military considerations.¹⁶⁴ Japanese language was not initially taught, as the War Department prioritized the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operation.¹⁶⁵ The first course at the School of Military Government consisted of 50 officers, the second of 115 officers, and the third of 133 officers.¹⁶⁶

The Department of the Navy also recognized the coming need for military governors and found willing instructors at Columbia University. In March 1942, faculty members formed a committee and petitioned Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, Dr. Joseph Barker, to teach a course in Asian and Pacific languages, cultures, and governance on behalf of the war effort. Dr. Barker, who was a former Columbia dean, favorably endorsed the proposal. On 9 June 1942, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frederick Horne directed the civil affairs course at Columbia University to proceed. On 17 August 1942, 10 days after the 1st Marine Division landed at Guadalcanal, the first course at Columbia University convened with 57 officers and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets.¹⁶⁷

In March 1943, the Army and Navy harnessed the power of American academia to address the projected shortfall in educated civil affairs officers. The military authorized three-month civil affairs courses to be taught at 10 civilian universities.¹⁶⁸ These institutions—Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, the University of Michigan, the University of Chicago, Boston University, the University of Wisconsin, Western Reserve College, and the University of Pittsburgh—constituted the Civil Affairs Training Schools

¹⁶⁴ Henry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1992), 12.

¹⁶⁵ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 10.

¹⁶⁶ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, 81.

¹⁶⁷ Coles and Weinberg, 14; Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 13

¹⁶⁸ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 11.

(CATS).¹⁶⁹ Unlike their counterparts in Columbia and Charlottesville, the CATS trained junior civil affairs personnel who were expected to be in regular contact with occupied populations.¹⁷⁰ Accordingly, instruction focused on practical matters such as language proficiency, local government organization, public health practices, and judicial systems to be employed in areas likely to be occupied.¹⁷¹ Like Columbia and Charlottesville, the CATS were slow to focus on the Pacific Theater of Operations, but five schools eventually instructed East Asian civil affairs courses. In a process that rivaled U.S. wartime assembly lines, the CATS educated 450 Army and Navy civil affairs personnel each month.¹⁷²

The Department of the Navy also recognized the unique capabilities of civilian academics early in the U.S. war effort. In April 1943, the Navy took ownership of an anthropological study of the Japanese mandated islands that was initiated at Yale University in July 1937.¹⁷³ Yale professors George Murdock, Clellan Ford, and John Whiting, who led the study, were subsequently commissioned as officers in the U.S. Navy Reserve and assigned to the military government school at Colombia.¹⁷⁴ These scholars produced, amongst others, the *Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands*, published 15 November 1944.¹⁷⁵ The handbook, “designed primarily for the use of Army and Navy commanders and their staffs and subordinates who may be concerned with military government and the control of civil affairs,” exhaustively detailed all dimensions of Okinawa: geography, natural resources, history, people, customs, organized groups, government, law and justice, public safety, public welfare, health and sanitation, education and propaganda, public utilities, transportation, food production, industry, labor, property

¹⁶⁹ Rebecca Patterson, “Revisiting a School of Military Government,” *Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Expeditionary Economics* no. 3 (June 2011), 9.

¹⁷⁰ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 11.

¹⁷¹ Fisch, 11.

¹⁷² Patterson, “Revisiting a School of Military Government,” 10.

¹⁷³ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 14.

¹⁷⁴ Fisch, 14.

¹⁷⁵ Department of the Navy, *Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands*, OpNav 13–31 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1944).

laws, and finance.¹⁷⁶ The Handbook was the most comprehensive U.S. study of Okinawa prior to 1945, and served as a reference for students of the Columbia military government school. The handbook, and similar editions specific to anticipated battlegrounds, informed and guided the actions of civil affairs officers engaged in local base politics around the world.

As civil affairs officers prepared in the United States, the U.S. Navy gained practical experience in military government across the Pacific. Throughout 1943 and 1944, military government teams landed on the former Mandated Islands to establish U.S. control of the population. Navy military government teams had three primary functions in Micronesia: “reduction of active and passive sabotage,” “implementation of policies,” and “restoration of civilian living conditions to normal.”¹⁷⁷ The “implementation of policies” implied military policies until political guidance was received. In the Pacific, this translated to exclusive, indefinite U.S. control.

As these battles were being fought, Navy and Marine Corps military government teams established authority and control over the indigenous population. Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) and Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), established command relationships for military government that would be employed largely unchanged throughout the rest of the war. Island and Atoll Commanders assumed control of the population after the assault phase and essentially served as mayors. In turn, these mayors reported directly to Admiral Nimitz in his capacity as Military Governor.¹⁷⁸

In a pattern that would be repeated in future operations, teams posted Proclamation Number One, which established Admiral Nimitz’s authority as military governor, and Proclamation Number Two, which established the rules of military government.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Department of the Navy, *Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands*, IV–XII.

¹⁷⁷ Dorothy Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Volume I* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957), 163.

¹⁷⁸ Richard, 324.

¹⁷⁹ Richard, 330.

Subsequent announcements followed, but wherever possible, military government teams located and coopted existing indigenous political and social structures to facilitate their wartime objectives.¹⁸⁰ These islands were subsequently developed into critical bases to support the continued offensive against the Japanese. Concurrently with the military development, military government teams developed public health, public safety, medical, and economic capabilities in the islands.¹⁸¹ These measures proved effective in establishing civilian control. At no time during the war did any Marshallese islander under U.S. military government commit a major crime against U.S. forces.¹⁸²

By 1944 both the Army and the Navy possessed the doctrine, organization, education, and experience to administer military governments abroad. Between September to December 1943 alone, the School of Military Government and CATS educated 2,000 civil affairs personnel.¹⁸³ By March 1945, the U.S. Navy educated 1,333 officers and nearly 300 U.S. Army officers at the civil affairs school at Columbia University and an additional school opened at Princeton University.¹⁸⁴ These civil affairs officers, and several scholars themselves, would serve as the planners, administrators, judges, economists, and civil engineers in the political battles across the Pacific.

B. U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON THE MARIANA ISLANDS

In the *Civil Affairs Handbook, Japanese Mandated Islands* of April 1944 assessed that “native political heads were shorn of much of their authority, and complete pacification was achieved.”¹⁸⁵ As discussed in the previous chapter, Imperial Japanese administration dominated the geographic, demographic, and political landscape of the Mariana Islands, but Chamorro and other indigenous leaders actively cooperated with their foreign rulers. Calder’s occupation hypothesis would have predicted that the local population, after years

¹⁸⁰ Richard, 330–343.

¹⁸¹ Richard, 394.

¹⁸² Richard, 374.

¹⁸³ Patterson, “Revisiting a School of Military Government,” 10.

¹⁸⁴ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 15.

¹⁸⁵ Department of the Navy, *Civil Affairs Handbook, Mandated Mariana Islands*, OpNav P22-8 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1944), 26.

of social and political assimilation with Japan, would have resisted U.S. military bases and forces. How then, did the war and subsequent military government change the population's interactions with foreign forces based on the island?

The U.S. Navy military government rapidly established authority and legitimacy on the northern Mariana Islands, then employed many similar methods to control the population as had the Japanese. U.S. military government altered the demographics of the island as dramatically as the Japanese administration and similarly controlled social institutions through education and religion. In doing so, the U.S. military government established a narrative of political and social separation from the Japanese administration that facilitated U.S. military basing interests. The main difference between American and Japanese rule, however, was the way in which the United States administered the island. These early military government initiatives shaped base politics on the northern Mariana Islands for years to follow.

After successive operations across Micronesia in 1943 and 1944, Navy military government teams encountered their most difficult civil-military challenge in the northern Mariana Islands. These islands were the most heavily populated of the Mandated Islands, and also contained the largest percentage of Japanese nationals anywhere in Micronesia.¹⁸⁶ The battles to capture the islands were costly, and also witnessed large number of Japanese suicides. An estimated 30,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were killed in the battle.¹⁸⁷ Into this environment, Navy military government teams landed to establish U.S. control and govern the population.

Military government established on Saipan on 19 June 1944, four days after the initial landings. The teams found more than 1,000 civilian refugees already under control of the assault divisions.¹⁸⁸ To control and care for these civilians, military government teams established Camp Susupe near the landing beaches. On neighboring Tinian, Marine

¹⁸⁶ Peattie, *Nanyo*, 161.

¹⁸⁷ Crowl, *Campaign in the Marianas*, 266.

¹⁸⁸ Richard, *Volume I*, 435.

Corps civil affairs teams established military government on 30 July 1944, six days after the initial landing.¹⁸⁹ By 31 August 1944, military government teams controlled 10,639 civilians in Camp Churo.¹⁹⁰ These high numbers of civilians were compounded by the fact that civilians in the Marianas were unable to evacuate to Japan due to the constricting allied war on merchant shipping.¹⁹¹ Against this problem, 25 officers and 130 enlisted men served in the military government section of Saipan, while 23 officers and 70 men served on Tinian in September 1944. The number of personnel under military government in the northern Mariana Islands exceeded anything the Navy had experienced up to that point in the war. Indeed, the size of the Navy military government operation in the Mariana Islands was only later overshadowed by the forthcoming operations on Okinawa and the main islands of Japan.

The challenges of military government continued long after the assault phase concluded. Furthermore, military government controlled and cared for Japanese nationals for the first time. In August 1945, 18,390 civilians still inhabited Camp Susupe on Saipan, of which 13,506 were Japanese, 1,386 Korean, 2,660 Chamorro, and 838 other indigenous islanders.¹⁹² That same month, 11,465 civilians inhabited Camp Churo on Tinian, of which 9,090 were Japanese and 2,371 Korean, and 4 Chinese.¹⁹³ There were no indigenous people on Tinian, as the Japanese administration had evacuated all ethnic Chamorro from the island to Saipan prior to the battles. As one U.S. Navy civil affairs officer observed of the internees, “the Japanese civilians are greatly relieved that the propaganda about the way we would treat them has proved to be entirely false,” but “this does not mean that any gratitude which they may feel towards us should be interpreted as affection.”¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁹ Richard, *Volume I*, 535.

¹⁹⁰ Richard, 537.

¹⁹¹ Peattie, *Nanyo*, 298.

¹⁹² John F. Embree, *Military Government in Saipan and Tinian* (Cambridge, MA: The Society for Applied Anthropology, 1946), 5.

¹⁹³ Embree, *Military Government in Saipan and Tinian*, 22.

¹⁹⁴ Richard, *Volume I*, 467.

To help control the civilian population, military government recruited police forces from within the camps. Organized along ethnic lines, these provisional forces only policed their respective ethnic communities. Proportionally, the local police also represented a larger segment of the indigenous population than under the Japanese administration. On Saipan, 103 Chamorro and Carolinian men constituted the “Camp Susupe Police” by August 1945.¹⁹⁵ A corresponding 76 Japanese and 19 Koreans policed their respective populations.¹⁹⁶ This nearly equal ratio of native to foreign police officers was quite the reversal from the mandate era, when ethnic Japanese outnumbered Chamorro by a 2:1 ratio in the police forces. The figure is even more striking when considering that the ratio of ethnic Japanese to the indigenous population on Saipan was 4:1 in August 1945. As in the Japanese mandate era, service in the police was an important gateway to participation in the foreign administration. In the U.S. military government, however, the gateway was much larger for indigenous persons.

The legitimacy and control established by the U.S. military government yielded immediate benefits. Saipan and Tinian became the site of some of the largest and most important U.S. military bases during the Pacific War. Two major airfields were developed on Tinian and housed approximately 200 B-29 bombers and 17,000 associated crew.¹⁹⁷ On Saipan, an additional airfield was improved and housed another wing of approximately 100 bombers and 8,500 crew members.¹⁹⁸ The U.S. airfields on Tinian were so secure that the U.S. Army Air Force chose that location to base the bombers that delivered the nuclear weapons to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No major acts of sabotage or subversion occurred in the northern Mariana Islands during the war.¹⁹⁹

As the prospect of long-term administration increased, the Navy military government proceeded with the comprehensive health, safety, political, financial, and

¹⁹⁵ Richard, *Volume I*, 468.

¹⁹⁶ Richard, 468.

¹⁹⁷ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 181.

¹⁹⁸ Rogers, 181.

¹⁹⁹ Richard, *Volume I*, 475.

economic initiatives that engendered U.S. support in other liberated areas of the Pacific. Admiral Raymond Spruance, succeeding Admiral Nimitz as CINCPAC, issued a new, more optimistic directive for the administration of former Japanese islands on 12 December 1945.²⁰⁰ This directive, which came to be known informally as the “Pacific Charter,” established new guidelines for the political, social, and economic development of the populations under U.S. Navy administration.²⁰¹ Admiral Spruance’s “Pacific Charter” would serve as the foundation for civil-military relations in the post-war Mariana Islands.

Admiral Spruance’s directive also facilitated the kind of social assimilation that U.S. Navy military government employed on Guam before the war. Although initially intended to altruistically develop future generations on the administered islands, education proved to be a primary means to Americanize the population. As Admiral Spruance decreed, “instruction in English language is a prime necessity but this is not to be construed as discouraging instruction in native languages or cultures.”²⁰² By May 1947, 1,193 students in the Saipan District, including 200 adults and 11 teachers in training, attended school for five hours a day, five days a week, for eight months of the year.²⁰³ The Navy also encouraged children to participate in the Boy Scouts of America after school.²⁰⁴ The students educated in the U.S. system would later serve as the medical professionals, police, bureaucrats, and politicians of an increasingly autonomous northern Mariana Islands.

Religion was another social institution that shaped the identities of the population of the northern Marianas. The majority of the indigenous pre-war population of Saipan and Tinian were Catholics, due to proselytization under Spanish rule.²⁰⁵ In June 1946, the U.S. naval administration facilitated the Catholic Church’s mission by allowing the first

²⁰⁰ Dorothy Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Volume II* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957), 280.

²⁰¹ Richard, *Volume II*, 281.

²⁰² Richard, 283.

²⁰³ Richard, 375, 382.

²⁰⁴ Richard, 375.

²⁰⁵ Richard, 401.

American priest to return to Saipan. By August 1946, 10 Catholic missionaries were either on or travelling to Saipan.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, the Marianas Vicariate was established on Guam in September 1946. The reinvigorated church oversaw the 4,222 Catholics of the post-war indigenous population on Saipan.²⁰⁷ The U.S. naval administration made no similar provisions to promote Shinto, other than local practices by internees in Camp Susupe and Camp Churo.

Most significantly, the “Pacific Charter” decreed that indigenous peoples should be “granted the highest degree of self-government that they are capable of assimilating,” and that administrative structures “should be patterned on the politico-social institutions which the inhabitants have evolved for themselves.”²⁰⁸ While this directive accommodated regional differences in history and development, it also implied that indigenous societies were not yet advanced enough to manage democratic governance. Local leaders, however, soon demonstrated their aptitude for such a government.

The indigenous population of Saipan developed a sophisticated system of representative government at the municipal level.²⁰⁹ Established by charter on 1 July 1947, all persons over the age of 18 directly elected a precinct-level representative to a one-year term and a chief commissioner to a four-year term.²¹⁰ Each of the eleven elected precinct representatives formed a high council, which convened weekly and advised the U.S. military government. With the concurrence of the high council, the chief commissioner appointed a treasurer, education officer, and health officer to advise the legislative body.²¹¹ The rest of the Saipan District, which encompassed the islands of Tinian, Rota, Alamagan and Agrihan, also adopted similar systems.²¹² Despite years of demographic domination

²⁰⁶ Richard, 491.

²⁰⁷ Richard, 401.

²⁰⁸ Richard, 282.

²⁰⁹ Dorothy Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Volume III* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957), 390.

²¹⁰ Richard, 390.

²¹¹ Richard, 390.

²¹² Richard, 390.

under the Japanese, indigenous leaders of the northern Mariana Islands demonstrated their capability for democratic governance.

A pendulum swing in demographics also reversed the trend of foreign domination experienced during the war. The low population density of Saipan, which at 39 people per square mile equaled that of Vermont, avoided tensions between U.S. forces and the local population.²¹³ Furthermore, the U.S. administration revoked Japan's claim to government-owned land on the islands, which provided a boon for prospective local landholders.²¹⁴ Thus, civil-military contact did not have a significant effect on base politics on the northern Mariana Islands.

The social and political initiatives implemented by the U.S. military government, combined with demographic shifts equal in magnitude to those in the Japanese era, revamped the civil-military dynamic and effectively nullified the effects of Calder's occupation hypothesis. Instead, military government created the conditions conducive to viewing U.S. forces as a liberating occupation. The decrease in the number and scope of U.S. military forces after the war also created opportunities for increased indigenous political participation. As years of socialization accumulated, inhabitants of the northern Mariana Islands internalized their American identity and sought closer ties to the United States. These social effects would define the civil-military relations of the northern Mariana Islands.

C. U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON GUAM

With more than four decades of experience governing Guam, the U.S. Navy felt relatively well prepared to administer the island after liberation. Civil affairs officers created no handbook to specifically describe Guam, but as the *Civil Affairs Handbook for the Mandated Mariana Islands* declared, "the United States Navy, which has been charged with the administration of Guam, is well apprised of the situation in that island."²¹⁵ In a

²¹³ Richard, 414.

²¹⁴ Richard, 505.

²¹⁵ Department of the Navy, *Civil Affairs Handbook, Mandated Mariana Islands*, iii.

sign of its confidence, the U.S. Navy largely reestablished the governing institutions that existed before the war. After years of U.S. Navy military government rule, however, Calder's occupation hypothesis predicts that the local population would have resisted U.S. military bases and forces. How did the returning military government actually affect the base politics of Guam?

Although initially gaining widespread support after the liberation of the island, the U.S. military allowed tensions to build amongst pragmatic and ideological actors in the island's base politics. The authoritarian nature of the military administration failed to reconcile with the Americanized population of Guam that embraced ideas of individual rights, legal representation, and self-governance. The governing structures re-imposed following the war failed to accommodate the power of these ideas that were generated under pre-war U.S. Navy administration. Meanwhile, the centralization of authority in the hands of the military governor facilitated control of the population, but also enabled significant institutional changes depending on the decisions of individual governors. In the post-war military government era, a confluence of individual actors, local institutions, and domestic politics created a new environment of Guamanian base politics.

The U.S. military returned to Guam on 21 July 1944 and liberated the islands in a costly three-week battle. Landing with the assault forces, military government teams on Guam soon uncovered pockets of Chamorro civilians sheltered from the battle. Prior to the battle, the commander of the Japanese garrison evacuated all Chamorro civilians to the relatively unoccupied southern half of the island.²¹⁶ As combat units discovered civilians, they directed them rearwards to civil affairs personnel and eventually to two temporary camps established at Asan and Finile, near Agat.²¹⁷ Civil affairs personnel then triaged and addressed the most immediate health and sustenance needs. While these acts undoubtedly saved many civilian lives during the battle, they also dissociated many Guamanians from their lands. By the time the island was declared secure on 10 August

²¹⁶ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 167

²¹⁷ Rogers, 177.

1944, U.S. military government was caring for approximately 18,000 Chamorro civilians.²¹⁸

The U.S. military quickly developed Guam, along with neighboring Tinian and Saipan, to fulfill its role as a base of operations. Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, Commander Marianas Area, reclaimed Apra Harbor, adjacent Orote Peninsula, and the neighboring village of Sumay for use as a naval base and airfield.²¹⁹ In February 1945, Admiral Nimitz established his forward headquarters on Guam, overlooking the assault beaches of Asan.²²⁰ Like recently captured Saipan and Tinian, naval construction battalions also developed Guam for B-29 operations. The first bombers began flying from Northwest Field by February 1945, and North Field was operational by June 1945.²²¹ In total, the United States planned to base 500 bombers and 45,000 personnel of the Twentieth Air Force on Guam, Tinian, and Saipan during the war.²²² Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, chief of naval operations, declared that the Mariana Islands were the “key to the Pacific War.”²²³

The Military Government of Guam, established in October 1944, thus had the responsibility of administering the population in order to control the “key to the Pacific.”²²⁴ The newly established administration, led by Marine Major General Henry L. Larsen, first tackled the problem of housing and land usage. The war destroyed approximately 80 percent of the 3,286 pre-war domiciles on Guam.²²⁵ To rectify this shortage, and to ease the burden on the administration, the military government constructed more than 1,400 homes by September 1945.²²⁶ Local Chamorro also built an additional

²¹⁸ Rogers, 177.

²¹⁹ Rogers, 181–183.

²²⁰ Rogers, 183.

²²¹ Rogers, 184.

²²² Rogers, 181.

²²³ Rogers, 189.

²²⁴ Rogers, 185.

²²⁵ Rogers, 186.

²²⁶ Rogers, 186.

1,500 houses.²²⁷ The Military Government of Guam still housed approximately 5,000 Chamorro by middle of 1945, though, as the Navy forbade resettlement of Sumay and Agana, two of the largest population centers of pre-war Guam.²²⁸ This amounted to nearly a quarter of the pre-war Chamorro population.

Applying Calder's contact hypothesis, the sheer number of people on Guam in the early postwar years would suggest increased civil-military tensions. By the end of the war, 201,718 U.S. service members occupied Guam.²²⁹ Combined with an estimated civilian population of 21,838, the total population density of Guam was 1,045 people per square mile in August 1945.²³⁰ Although the total military population on Guam declined to approximately 29,000 by the end of 1946, Guam's population density remained relatively high for the Pacific islands.²³¹ With 203 square miles of land, the total population density of Guam at the end of 1946 equated to 250 people per square mile.

To fulfill the obligations incurred by military demands during the war, the Military Government of Guam implemented an array of social initiatives. As in the northern Mariana Islands, the administration employed education and religion to occupy the population. In 1945, 167 Chamorro teachers instructed more than 7,000 students daily in 21 schools across the island.²³² The administration also rebuilt 17 churches on Guam, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, accommodated the Catholic Marianas Vicariate in September 1946.²³³ Through these early humanitarian and social initiatives, the military government established legitimacy and earned the good will of the population.

In May 1946, however, the military government took a new course. Along with a broader reorganization of forces in the Pacific, Rear Admiral Charles Pownall, commander

²²⁷ Rogers, 186.

²²⁸ Rogers, 186.

²²⁹ Rogers, 190.

²³⁰ Rogers, 190.

²³¹ Rogers, 190.

²³² Rogers, 187.

²³³ Richard, *Volume II*, 491.

Navy Forces Marianas, relieved the Military Government of Guam and established the Navy Island Government.²³⁴ Rear Admiral Pownall commanded Naval Air Forces, Pacific during the war, and senior Navy leadership viewed Admiral Pownall as an ideal candidate to develop Guam into a strategic air base in the post-war Western Pacific.²³⁵ Under the authority of Admiral Pownall, Guam and its inhabitants would undertake some of the most significant civil-military developments in its history.

As the administration continued, the initial goodwill that was engendered by the liberation and social programs faded. Under Admiral Pownall, the U.S. military government established the City Planning Commission and the Land and Claims Commission to appropriate and develop land on Guam for military purposes.²³⁶ Commander A. L. O'Bannon, head of the Land and Claims Commission, made clear to Guamanians that the Navy would determine “who goes back where, how they go back, how fast they go, and on what lots they go back.”²³⁷ To facilitate new base construction, the Navy administration also enacted a new “off-limits policy” to prevent locals from accessing lands to be developed.²³⁸ This policy led to Guamanian families losing an additional 1,350 homes by 1947.²³⁹

Land ownership became an increasing source of tension between the local population and the military government. By 1948 the U.S. military controlled 56,500 acres, or approximately 88.3 square miles, of land on Guam.²⁴⁰ This accounted for nearly 42 percent of all land on Guam.²⁴¹ Compounding the land problem, Guamanians were

²³⁴ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 93.

²³⁵ Blackford, “Guam, the Philippines, and American Samoa,” 171.

²³⁶ Timothy P. Maga, “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950,” *Pacific Historical Review* 53, no. 1 (February 1984), 68.

²³⁷ Maga, 69.

²³⁸ Maga, 69.

²³⁹ Maga, 71.

²⁴⁰ Blackford, “Guam, the Philippines, and American Samoa,” 171.

²⁴¹ Blackford, 171.

initially not legally entitled to contest the acquisition of their lands.²⁴² And as families, not individuals, historically owned land on Guam, this lack of due process affected Guamanians exponentially.²⁴³ The lack of legitimating legal procedures to contest land claims led Guamanians to increasingly view the Navy Island Government as a non-liberating occupation.

Legal mechanisms to compensate Guamanians were equally lackluster. Although the U.S. Congress enacted the Guam Meritorious Claims Act of 1945 to compensate locals affected by the war, the Navy Island Government depressed payments to a maximum of \$5,000 per lost property in order to reduce administrative budgets.²⁴⁴ This policy had the unintended consequence of disproportionately affecting large landholders on Guam, which included many political elites such as the Bordallo family.²⁴⁵ Exacerbating these limitations, the U.S. Navy paid only 190 of 1,519 Guamanian rent claims by June 1947.²⁴⁶ Even then, the military government calculated these rates at 1941 levels of property value, despite land increasing in value by an estimated 100 percent after the war.²⁴⁷ These pragmatic grievances reinforced Guamanians' ideological desire for increased political participation.

The limits on political participation imposed by the reinstated Navy Island Government accelerated ideological base protests. Although the Guam Congress reconvened in the same format as before the war, military government still granted the island's sole representative body no legislative authority.²⁴⁸ Legally, Guamanians had no recourse to appeal military government decrees beyond the military governor.²⁴⁹ And

²⁴² Blackford, 171.

²⁴³ Blackford, 172.

²⁴⁴ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 198.

²⁴⁵ Rogers, 198.

²⁴⁶ Rogers, 199.

²⁴⁷ Rogers, 198.

²⁴⁸ Maga, "The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950," 69.

²⁴⁹ Thompson, "Crisis on Guam," 9.

while Guamanians lived in an unincorporated territory, they were not foreign citizens eligible for U.S. citizenship. Thus they were caught in a citizenship loophole. Guamanians could only obtain U.S. citizenship through military service, as established in the Nationality Act of 1940. Approximately 600 Guamanians earned their U.S. citizenship in this manner.²⁵⁰ With increased military demands and few corresponding avenues for recourse, pragmatic and ideological actors appealed to the Navy Island Government. Guamanian Congressmen Baltazar Bordallo and Francisco Leon Guerrero resumed their pre-war citizenship movement and also demanded territorial status for the island.²⁵¹

To address these concerns, the Secretary of the Navy granted legislative powers to the Guam Congress on 7 August 1947.²⁵² Under the new system the Guam Congress established budgets, and its legislation carried the force of law; but Admiral Pownall retained veto authority subject to overrule by a two-thirds majority in the Guam Congress.²⁵³ In the case of an overruled veto, the Secretary of the Navy would determine the final resolution of the bill.²⁵⁴ In practice, however, the Secretary of the Navy aligned with Admiral Pownall on most decisions.²⁵⁵ Guamanians remained unsatisfied, and between 1947 and 1949 their advocacy produced 11 additional bills and resolutions for citizenship and representation in the Congress.²⁵⁶ Despite local outcry, this system continued on Guam until another catalyst changed the national and international environment in 1949.

On Guam, U.S. military government forces initially enjoyed the latitude afforded from being perceived as a liberating occupation by the local population. After recapturing Guam, the United States Navy resumed administration in a manner similar to the pre-war era. As military government continued and demand for land increased, however, the

²⁵⁰ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 196.

²⁵¹ Maga, "The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950," 69.

²⁵² Maga, 72.

²⁵³ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 197.

²⁵⁴ Maga, "The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950," 72.

²⁵⁵ Blackford, "Guam, the Philippines, and American Samoa," 171.

²⁵⁶ Maga, "The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950," 72.

population increasingly came into conflict with the naval administration. Pragmatic base protestors advocated for land rights and compensation, while ideological base protestors advocated for increased participation in base politics and representation in the federal government. Although pragmatic disputes over land continued, Guamanians increasingly protested the political status quo on ideological grounds. This dynamic threatened to return Guam to an environment of a non-liberating occupation. Only national-level intervention would resolve these tensions.

D. U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON OKINAWA

As in the former Mandated Islands, Calder's occupation hypothesis would have predicted that years of social and political assimilation with Japan would result in resistance to U.S. military bases. Additionally, the political repression and the devastation of the war suggest that Okinawans would have viewed association with Japan as a vestige of their colonial occupation. How did the post-war military government promote base supporters to ensure U.S. bases?

In the 1944 edition of the *Civil Affairs Handbook: Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands*, the U.S. Navy ascertained that "the Ryukyu islanders have not become wholly assimilated to the culture of the Japanese, by whom they are generally regarded as somewhat uncouth rustics."²⁵⁷ Written by Yale anthropologists George P. Murdock, John M. W. Whiting, and Clellan S. Ford, the *Civil Affairs Handbook* reflected the dual narratives with which Americans governed Okinawa.²⁵⁸ While acknowledging significant historical and cultural ties to Japan, these civil affairs officers distinguished Okinawans as distinct from the Japanese and advocated for their full rights as liberated peoples. Accordingly, the U.S. military government ceded social life back to the Okinawan people. Politically, however, the military government retained absolute authority to protect U.S. military bases. This bifurcated strategy resulted in an occupied population with a distinct heritage that initially remained uninfluential in national and international base politics. The nuanced policies

²⁵⁷ Department of the Navy, *Civil Affairs Handbook: Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands*, 69.

²⁵⁸ Masamichi S. Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 79.

implemented by the U.S. military government would affect base politics on Okinawa for generations to come.

Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa, provided a new challenge to the U.S. military in the Pacific War. With an estimated population of 448,859 as of 1940, Okinawa was the largest Japanese population center encountered by the Americans in the Pacific War.²⁵⁹ The island was also devastated as a result of the battle between Japanese and Allied forces from April to June 1945. In addition to the mass suffering of the population, the island's government, institutions, and infrastructure were destroyed. In the midst of the largest amphibious operation of the Pacific War, the U.S. Navy undertook its largest military government effort of the war to secure Okinawa as a base for future operations against Japan.

Recognizing that Okinawa would exceed the capacity of each service, Army and Navy civil affairs graduates were assigned to the Military Government Section, Tenth Army Headquarters for the planning and execution of Operation Iceberg. Developing Okinawa into an airbase, anchorage, and staging area would require monumental cooperation between the Army and Navy along all lines of effort. The Tenth Army Military Government Section was led by veterans of the Allied Military Government in Italy and comprised of school-educated Army and Navy civil affairs officers.²⁶⁰ Former Yale Professor George Murdock, co-author of the Civil Affairs Handbook, served as a naval officer in the Tenth Army Military Government Section. Accordingly, the CINCPAC and Tenth Army staffs adhered to the precepts of military government as outlined in *Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs* and the *Handbook for Civil Affairs*. Tenth Army directed civil affairs officers to employ local law enforcement agencies, adhere to local governmental structures, and cooperate with local political leaders to the greatest extent possible.²⁶¹ This policy established a basis for interactions between the U.S. military and Okinawans that would last for decades to come.

²⁵⁹ Department of the Navy, 51.

²⁶⁰ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 18–22.

²⁶¹ Fisch, 21.

U.S. military government detachments initially gained legitimacy with the Okinawan population through their humanitarian efforts. Humanitarian aid accounted for 2,599.9 measurement tons of cargo loaded across the 430 transportation ships of the assault wave, with an additional 10,000 measurement tons that arrived each month for the next six months.²⁶² These supplies reached Okinawa after a 6,250 nautical mile journey from the West Coast of the United States that took nearly 120 days for requisitioning, loading, shipping, and unloading.²⁶³ By the end of the battle in July, the Tenth Army Logistics Section estimated that U.S. forces cared for 295,000 of the island's population.²⁶⁴ To do so, the U.S. Navy imported 59 percent of all foodstuffs consumed by the civilian population.²⁶⁵ The entirety of this effort was coordinated by the military government, which comprised of 2,879 sailors, soldiers, and Marines in July 1945.²⁶⁶

As in Guam, however, the increased size of the military population and increased demands for land challenged the U.S. military government. The U.S. military government relocated approximately 250,000 Okinawans between 1 April and 31 August 1945 in order to safeguard them during the battle and subsequently render aid.²⁶⁷ By August 1945, the U.S. military also controlled approximately 85 percent of all land on Okinawa.²⁶⁸ Exacerbating the land problem, 259,000 U.S. troops occupied Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands by the end of the war.²⁶⁹ With 463 square miles of land on Okinawa, the total civilian and military population equated to a density of 1,207 people per square mile. Excluding military-controlled land, the 320,000 Okinawans under military government control in September 1945 had roughly 69 square miles of available land to resettle. If

²⁶² Roy E. Appleman, *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1948), 36; Fisch, 65.

²⁶³ Appleman, 36.

²⁶⁴ Appleman, 417.

²⁶⁵ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 47.

²⁶⁶ Fisch, 73.

²⁶⁷ Fisch, 57.

²⁶⁸ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 31.

²⁶⁹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 74.

evenly distributed, this would equate to a civilian population density of 4,638 Okinawans per square mile. This represented a significant increase from the 1940 population density of 901 Okinawans per square mile.²⁷⁰ Thus, the military government faced significant challenges when it began resettling Okinawans in October 1945.²⁷¹

To help manage these administrative challenges, the military government coopted local Okinawan leaders. At the direction of Lieutenant Commander George Murdock, former Yale professor and Tenth Army military government planner, an Okinawan delegation elected a 15-member Okinawan Advisory Council in August 1945 to assist the U.S. administration.²⁷² This Advisory Council, led by the prominent educator Shikiya Koshin, assisted the military government in administering cities, towns, and villages as Okinawans resettled the island.²⁷³ The Advisory Council subsequently established a five-person land claims committee to document ownership at the village, or *mura*, level. The Council similarly established 10-person committees at the village section, or *aza*, level.²⁷⁴ These were the first institutions to re-establish the pre-war Japanese system of land ownership on Okinawa.²⁷⁵

Social developments paralleled political developments. The U.S. military government implemented educational initiatives out of necessity rather than in search of assimilation. Rampant school-aged children in civilian camps created a discipline problem for military government units across the island.²⁷⁶ Thus, in August 1945, military government established an Education Section that brought 40,000 Okinawan children into school by October 1945.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁰ Daniel D. Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (May 1948): 254.

²⁷¹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 90.

²⁷² Fisch, 105.

²⁷³ Fisch, 105.

²⁷⁴ Fisch, 172.

²⁷⁵ M. D. Morris, *Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail* (New York, NY: Hawthorne Books, 1968), 55.

²⁷⁶ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 98.

²⁷⁷ Fisch, 98.

The education initiative was also an inadvertent step towards Okinawan self-administration. Although Admiral Spruance's "Pacific Charter" prohibited the teaching of the Japanese language in schools, the military government diverged from this policy for practical and ideological reasons. Due to a lack of dual-language teachers and conscious of Okinawa's political uncertainty, military government allowed all Okinawan schools to teach in Japanese.²⁷⁸ Furthermore, military government established the Okinawan Department of Education on 2 January 1946, to oversee the growing number of schools across the island. This was the first Okinawan-led department with full administrative authority under the military government. By July 1946 Okinawa returned to pre-war levels of education with 133,536 students enrolled in 224 schools.²⁷⁹

Another significant development followed the creation of the Okinawan Department of Education. On 21 September 1945, the U.S. Navy assumed responsibilities for military government on Okinawa.²⁸⁰ Rear Admiral John D. Price assumed command of Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, and also duties as the Chief Military Government Officer. His Deputy Commander for Military Government, Marine Colonel Charles I. Murray, administered the island in practice.²⁸¹ Under Colonel Murray, who served as the Deputy Military Government Officer in Guam prior to his assignment on Okinawa, the U.S. Navy implemented some of the most significant reforms in Okinawan base politics.²⁸²

Under the direction of Colonel Murray, the U.S. Navy continued the ambitious civil affairs initiatives started at Columbia University in 1942. Civil affairs officer Lieutenant John Caldwell, formerly a professor at Vanderbilt University, devised a bold plan to build autonomous Okinawan institutions in order to drive economic development and thus ease

²⁷⁸ Fisch, 99–101.

²⁷⁹ Fisch, 98; Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," 266.

²⁸⁰ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 74.

²⁸¹ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 30.

²⁸² Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 104.

the burden on military government.²⁸³ The key aspect of this plan was creating self-administering political bodies that reinforced U.S. governing authority. Lieutenant Caldwell's plan began in September 1945 with direct elections by Okinawans, 25 years or older, for councilmen and mayors.²⁸⁴ This was also the first election in Okinawan history in which women voted.²⁸⁵ These elections coincided with a restructuring of military government that empowered political participation at the village, *mura*, level, and centralized military government oversight.²⁸⁶ These elected councilmen and mayors then nominated three individuals to advise the military governor on behalf of all Okinawans.²⁸⁷ On 24 April 1946, Colonel Murray appointed Koshin Shikiya to serve as the governor, or *chiji*, of Okinawa.²⁸⁸

Koshin Shikiya's appointment coincided with a larger restructuring of Okinawan political bodies. In his new position, Shikiya reported directly to Colonel Murray as the Deputy Commander for Military Government.²⁸⁹ The newly appointed governor headed the Central Okinawan Administration, which was created from the recently dissolved Okinawan Advisory Council.²⁹⁰ Military government also reconstituted the pre-war Prefectural Assembly to advise the *chiji* and renamed the body the Okinawan Assembly.²⁹¹ The Assembly reinstated officials from the last wartime election of 1942, and military government appointed individuals to fill the remaining vacancies.²⁹² The 25 members of the Okinawan Assembly first convened on 23 May 1946.²⁹³ Thus, with a foreign-

²⁸³ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 33.

²⁸⁴ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 108.

²⁸⁵ Mikio Higa, *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa* (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia, 1963), 25.

²⁸⁶ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 108.

²⁸⁷ Fisch, 109.

²⁸⁸ Fisch, 109.

²⁸⁹ Fisch, 110.

²⁹⁰ Higa, *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa*, 25.

²⁹¹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 110.

²⁹² Fisch, 110.

²⁹³ Fisch, 111.

appointed governor and the recently reestablished island-wide assembly, Okinawa's political structure returned to its pre-war form less than one year after the battle for the island ended. These structures continued mostly unaltered throughout the remaining years of U.S. military government.

By the time the U.S. Army resumed military government responsibilities on 1 July 1946, the U.S. Navy significantly reconstructed the political and social landscape of Okinawa. Through early and intense humanitarian aid, the military government earned legitimacy and respect from the Okinawan population. These efforts shaped Okinawan's initial perception of U.S. forces as liberators rather than occupiers. The U.S. military government reinforced these perceptions by avoiding cultural assimilation and implementing social initiatives that reinforced Japanese identity. By rehabilitating the island's pre-war political structures, the Americans also encouraged Okinawan prospects for political participation. In doing so, military government initially marginalized ideological and nationalist base protestors. This left only pragmatic protestors, which Calder argued are the "most amenable to policy suasion."²⁹⁴ These initiatives by the U.S. Navy military government set Okinawa on a course for political and social rehabilitation, encouraged continued civil-military cooperation, and propagated the U.S. military's strategically advantageous position in local base politics.

Still, significant challenges remained for Okinawa in summer 1946. Relief, relocation, and repatriation efforts brought the total population in the Ryukyu Islands to 690,160 by June 1946.²⁹⁵ At the same time, the new military government refused to consider compensation for the use of Okinawan land.²⁹⁶ As one military government officer observed, "housing, the agrarian problem, and the growing population problem certainly seem important issues that will have to be dealt with if the United States is going to permanently establish itself in the Ryukyus."²⁹⁷ Indeed, these forces increased tensions

²⁹⁴ Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 84.

²⁹⁵ Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," 265.

²⁹⁶ Higa, *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa*, 42.

²⁹⁷ Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," 267.

in base politics during the years to follow. As strategic indecision regarding Okinawa's future lingered into the 1950s, the problems associated with prolonged occupation exceeded military government's capabilities to resolve them. Thus, national and international arrangements would be needed to stabilize base politics on Okinawa.

E. CONCLUSION

The Navy's military government teams were the catalyst that implemented policy, connected military objectives to strategic goals, and built the civil-military structures that governed long-term base politics. Military governments on Saipan, Guam, and Okinawa quickly established legitimacy and control through their humanitarian relief efforts in the immediate aftermath of battle. The successful execution of this effort resulted from years of education, training, and planning by some of the country's leading experts in their fields. For a modest investment in personnel, education, and resources, the Navy military governments perpetuated the hard-won victories across the Pacific.

After the immediate cataclysm passed, military government initiatives redefined base politics in each location. On Saipan and Tinian, massive population redistribution, social assimilation, and increased political participation changed the environment of base politics from that of a non-liberating occupation to a liberating occupation. On Guam, the brutality of the Japanese administration and their subsequent expulsion also initially created the dynamic of a liberating occupation. Increased competition for land and dashed hopes for increased political participation, however, threatened to return base politics to an environment of a non-liberating occupation. Okinawa experienced a similar dynamic in base politics, although on a delayed timeline compared to Guam. In both Guam and Okinawa, local leaders emerged as influential actors in base politics. Tensions over land, citizenship, and self-governance remained unresolved at the local level, however. In all three locations, these tensions eventually required arbitration at the national and international level in order to continue U.S. military basing arrangements.

To understand the evolution of base politics on the northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and Okinawa, we must also understand the national and international context surrounding these civil-military relationships. National and international actors not only

shaped the base politics of these islands, but local populations and military governments similarly affected international outcomes. Understanding the civil-military interactions of the military governments only partially explains these outcomes. Thus, the next chapter will analyze the outcomes of base politics on the national and international level.

IV. COLD WAR BASE POLITICS: A NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The United States held unparalleled power in the Pacific at the end of World War II. This power, however, exposed fundamental tensions between American policy makers. Military and political leaders disagreed over the disposition of the vast network of military bases on islands seized from Japan during the war. One camp, primarily led by military leaders, advocated for the annexation of territories seized during the Pacific war and permanently establishing military forces as a bulwark against future aggression. Another camp, primarily led by diplomats and politicians, advocated for the restrained use of power and to uphold the anti-expansionist values championed during the war. These debates often occurred in the context of competing foreign policy strategies and larger ideological battles.²⁹⁸ Between 1944 and 1951, the United States subsequently established a long-term military presence in the Western Pacific in order to prevent a resurgent Japan and to contain the spread of communism. How did these competing American visions of the postwar world affect the outcomes of base politics on Guam, the Mariana Islands, and Okinawa?

Of the many factors that shaped American postwar foreign policy, three significantly affected U.S. policy towards its military possessions in the Western Pacific. First, simplistic American perceptions about the peoples inhabiting these islands enabled American leaders to initially act relatively unencumbered by domestic dissent. As American media informed the public on local issues surrounding these overseas bases, however, domestic pressure compelled policy makers to respond. Second, strategic security concerns arising from the Pacific War motivated the United States military to entrench bases in the Western Pacific. Third, the developing Cold War unified political and military desires to maintain regional hegemony in East Asia.

²⁹⁸ Michael Green, *By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017), 247.

Local and subnational forces, however, shaped outcome of these national and international forces. Limited means forced American policy makers to pursue only the most critical locations to base military forces. Unresolved tensions in local base politics precipitated action at the national and international level. Ideologies and prominent political theories swayed U.S. foreign policy. Finally, the desire for international legitimacy shaped the ways in which the United States pursued these aims. Guam, the Mariana Islands, and Okinawa, in particular, were chosen for their strategic value, vague claims to ownership, and diplomatic expediency.

A. AMERICAN IMAGES OF THE PACIFIC

As Thomas Bailey, Associate Professor of History at Stanford University, wrote about America's Oceanic possessions in April 1940, "overnight these tiny islets sprang from obscurity to the headlines." Indeed, the outcropping of atolls and islands strewn across the Pacific, once only of interest to whalers and guano harvesters, gained a new purpose in the 20th century. In the preface to *Uncle Sam's Pacific Islets*, Bailey wrote, "with aircraft assuming an increasingly vital place in naval and military strategy, these hitherto scorned land dots have before them an exciting – perhaps terrifying – future."²⁹⁹ The outbreak of war in the Pacific brought the terrifying version of the future to these islands.

The war also brought an urgent, renewed interest in these Pacific islands to Americans from all walks of life. Writing of Micronesia in 1942, Helen Follett described "signs on some of the islands – ancient earthworks, walls, and canals – of an old race of keen intellect of which today's people are a poor remnant."³⁰⁰ On Guam, Follett recounted that the "natives have always called themselves 'Chamorros' in spite of the fact that the pure 'Chamorro' really disappeared a long time ago."³⁰¹ Instead, Follett depicted school children who "saluted the American flag and sang a patriotic song in a confused kind of

²⁹⁹ David N. Leff, *Uncle Sam's Pacific Islets* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940), vii.

³⁰⁰ Helen Follett, *Ocean Outposts* (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), 6.

³⁰¹ Follett, 44.

English,” buoyed by “the marine barracks and the naval hospital that has always taken care of the natives.”³⁰²

In 1943, the Smithsonian Institution published a 21-volume series describing the history, geography, and society of locations sprung from obscurity to the headlines by the war. The series was so popular that its print run was increased from 3500 to 8000 copies, with the Army and Navy purchasing a significant amount for its service members.³⁰³ Volume 16, written by Herbert Krieger, the U.S. National Museum Curator for the Division of Ethnography, described the peoples of the Western Pacific.³⁰⁴ In pre-war Guam, Krieger depicted a society where “a pleasing form of native Chamorro-Filipino-American civilization came into being, with Americanisms in the ascendancy.”³⁰⁵

Americans knew even less about Saipan, Okinawa, or any of the other outlying islands under Japanese control. With Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, Japan closed these island possessions to foreigners. Walter Harris, one of the last Americans to visit the Japanese Mandated Islands in 1932, wrote in *Foreign Affairs* that “the natives of the islands vary in character as they vary in appearance, but as a general statement they may be described as docile, law-abiding, thriftless, and idle.”³⁰⁶ Harris concluded that “the natives have no past and will have no future.”³⁰⁷ Only through invasion and occupation would Americans learn of the peoples inhabiting these former Japanese outposts.

The war not only transformed these islands themselves, but American perceptions of the islands. As Follett asked, “Islands – what does that word mean in 1942? Romance,

³⁰² Follett, 44.

³⁰³ “Smithsonian Institution War Background Studies,” Smithsonian Libraries, <https://library.si.edu/digital-library/collection/war-background-series>

³⁰⁴ Herbert Krieger, *Island Peoples of the Western Pacific, Micronesia and Melanesia no. 16* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1943), 4. <https://library.si.edu/digital-library/book/islandpeoplesofw16krie>

³⁰⁵ Krieger, 33.

³⁰⁶ Walter B. Harris, “The South Sea Islands,” *Foreign Affairs* 10, no. 4 (Jul 1932): 693.

³⁰⁷ Harris, 697.

adventure, an escape for world-weary people? Can an island anywhere ever again feel safe in its isolation?" Follett concluded, "sentries on guard – that is what islands are today...today when the farthest outposts of the United States have become so vital these small stepping-stone islands have taken on an heroic importance of their own."³⁰⁸ Krieger lamented in 1943, "it is to be regretted now that all 17 of the Marianas as well as the Carolines were not taken by the United States in 1898."³⁰⁹ These perceptions of the Pacific islands as romantic yet remote, simple yet strategic, shaped U.S. foreign policy in the years to come.

While these accounts by no means comprehensively capture American public opinion, they indicate Americans' growing concern for these Pacific islands. By May 1944, 69 percent of Americans supported some sort of permanent U.S. control over the islands seized in the war, while only 17 percent opposed.³¹⁰ Writing for *Far Eastern Survey* in November 1945, Eleanor Lattimore asked if U.S. military bases in the Marianas, Ryukyus and elsewhere would result in a "Pacific Ocean or American Lake?"³¹¹ "The means by which the bases are acquired and held," Lattimore declared, "is the legitimate concern of the average citizen, because here not only naval and military but political questions are involved – questions of precedent and our relations with other nations and with the United Nations Organization."³¹² In the years between 1945 and 1951, the American military, government, and citizenry would increasingly grapple with this thorny issue in local, national, and international arenas.

³⁰⁸ Follett, *Ocean Outposts*, 14.

³⁰⁹ Krieger, *Island Peoples*, 35.

³¹⁰ Kimie Hara, "Micronesia and the Postwar Remaking of the Asia Pacific: 'An American Lake'" *The Asia-Pacific Journal, Japan Focus* 5, no. 8 (August 2007).

³¹¹ Eleanor Lattimore, "Pacific Ocean or American Lake?" *Far Eastern Survey* 14 no. 22 Nov 1945), 313.

³¹² Lattimore, 314.

B. MANDATES TURNED STRATEGIC TRUSTS

In a speech on 27 October 1945 commemorating Navy Day, President Truman declared his commitment to maintain the “greatest naval power on earth” while simultaneously “laying up ships” and “breaking up aircraft squadrons.”³¹³ The postwar U.S. military’s purpose would be to “fulfill the military obligations which we are undertaking as a member of the United Nations Organization – to support a lasting peace, by force, if necessary.”³¹⁴ President Truman also described the fundamentals of his foreign policy: “we seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage...we believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government...this is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, and in the Western Hemisphere.”³¹⁵ In this speech, President Truman announced three tenets that would define his administration’s foreign policy: aspirations of world peace through international organizations; upholding the tenets of the Atlantic Charter through self-determination and rejecting territorial aggrandizement; and striving to achieve these aims with reduced military capabilities.

President Truman’s tenets, as outlined in his Navy Day speech, were creatively applied to ensure long-term U.S. security objectives in the Western Pacific. The islands formerly mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, including the Mariana Islands in Micronesia, provided an early opportunity for such diplomatic ingenuity. Long after the military battles to gain control of these islands, the United States would fight diplomatic battles to maintain control of these strategically-located bases.

The first policy battle, however, occurred within the U.S. government itself. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for U.S. annexation of these strategic outposts. Annexation, however, would directly contradict the terms of the Atlantic Charter and the subsequent Declaration of the United Nations signed in 1942, which renounced “territorial

³¹³ Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, ed., *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History* (New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966), 193.

³¹⁴ Bernstein and Matusow, *The Truman Administration*, 194.

³¹⁵ Bernstein and Matusow, 194.

aggrandizement” as an aim of the Allied war effort.³¹⁶ Thus, the Department of State faced the dilemma of achieving “absolute control” of Micronesia for the military while upholding President Roosevelt’s “wartime assurances that the United States would not indulge in territorial acquisitions.”³¹⁷

The Department of State, and specifically its newly-formed delegation to the United Nations, became the central negotiator that sought international and intra-governmental consensus on the disposition of the former Japanese possessions in the Pacific. John Foster Dulles, as the U.S. representative to the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, was crucial in these negotiations.³¹⁸ To allay military concerns and uphold its international image, the U.S. delegation proposed the concept of a “strategic trust,” whereby the United Nations would grant the United States legal authority to exclusively administer the islands seized in the Pacific war.³¹⁹ The U.S. delegation envisioned this proposal would govern the “minor islands” of Micronesia and the Ryukyus left ambiguous in the Potsdam Declaration. Unlike the 11 other trusts adopted at the United Nations founding conference on 26 April 1945, the strategic trust system would enable the United States to fortify positions in the trust territory and deny access to any part of the area for security reasons.³²⁰ Additionally, the United Nations Security Council, vice the General Assembly, would oversee the strategic trusteeship.³²¹ The United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, could thus veto any detrimental action against the strategic trust territories once established. Finally, only “states directly concerned” with the strategic trusteeship could amend its status.³²² In the Pacific, the United States argued their costly war against Japan merited their exclusive right to be the state “directly

³¹⁶ Hara, “Micronesia and the Postwar Remaking of the Asia Pacific,” 17.

³¹⁷ Friedman, *Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the Pacific Basin, 1945–1947* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 2000), 117.

³¹⁸ Hara, “Micronesia and the Postwar Remaking of the Asia Pacific,” 13.

³¹⁹ Hara, 1, 9.

³²⁰ Hara, 4–9.

³²¹ Hara, 4.

³²² Hara, 9.

concerned.”³²³ This approach savvily employed institutional mechanisms to achieve the United States’ security interests while adhering to the tenets of the United Nations.

Through rounds of negotiations between October to December 1946 at the U.N. General Assembly in New York, the U.S. obtained the international acquiescence it desired. The first challenge was to convince allies who held trusteeships themselves. The United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Belgium all placed their former mandates under the new trust system during the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in January 1946, and expected the United States to follow suit.³²⁴ Eventually the key Allied stakeholders in the Pacific, Great Britain and Australia, acquiesced to the U.S. strategic trusteeship proposal.³²⁵

A more challenging task, however, was convincing the Soviet Union to accept strategic trusteeship. The Soviet Union decried the U.S. proposal as a “flagrant violation” of the U.N. Charter.³²⁶ As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the Soviet Union held veto power over the proposal and argued that they should be a “state directly concerned” with the strategic trusteeship.³²⁷ In response, the U.S. delegation noted the hypocrisy of Soviet opposition to the strategic trusteeship in Micronesia while simultaneously seeking to annex the Kurile Islands from Japan.³²⁸ Just as the Kuriles were vital to the Soviet Union, the United States argued Micronesia was vital to its national security.³²⁹ In compromise, the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. strategic trusteeship in return for U.S. acquiescence over the Kurile Islands. Furthermore, the U.S. excluded Okinawa and the Bonin Islands from the strategic trusteeship, thereby limiting their authority to the former Japanese Mandated Islands. With support from the permanent

³²³ Friedman, *Creating an American Lake*, 126.

³²⁴ Hara, “Micronesia and the Postwar Remaking of the Asia Pacific,” 11.

³²⁵ Friedman, *Creating an American Lake*, 151.

³²⁶ Friedman, 142.

³²⁷ Friedman, 145.

³²⁸ Friedman, 146.

³²⁹ Friedman, 147.

members of the Security Council, the United States submitted its strategic trusteeship proposal to the U.N. on 26 February 1946.³³⁰

On 12 April 1947, the United Nations established the strategic Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, with the United States as the sole administrator.³³¹ President Truman signed a joint resolution of Congress to accept the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands on 18 July 1947.³³² The strategic trusteeship satisfied American defense, diplomatic, and domestic concerns about the former Japanese mandated islands.

Civil administration of the Trust Territory was easier to declare than to enact. Although Department of Interior Secretary Julius Krug successfully advocated in May 1947 to assume administrative responsibilities from military government, the department could not field sufficient personnel to accomplish this undertaking.³³³ In the interim, the U.S. Navy continued to administer the Northern Mariana Islands and Micronesia. To reflect its new status, the U.S. Navy Military Government renamed itself as the U.S. Civil Administration. On 1 July 1951, 280 civil servants from the Department of the Interior assumed administrative responsibilities for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.³³⁴ The disposition of America's remaining wartime acquisitions in the Pacific, however, proved even more difficult.

C. CONTAINMENT

While the U.S. delegation to the U.N. was in the final stages of securing the Trust Territory, President Truman announced a new approach in U.S. foreign policy. In an appeal to Congress on 12 March 1947, President Truman outlined what would become known as the Truman Doctrine. With the British unable to support anti-communists in Greece and

³³⁰ Hara, "Micronesia and the Postwar Remaking of the Asia Pacific," 19.

³³¹ Hara, 1.

³³² Grant K. Goodman and Felix Moos, *The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific: Micronesia and Papua New Guinea* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 71.

³³³ Friedman, *Creating an American Lake*, 200.

³³⁴ Richard, *Volume III*, 1109.

Turkey, President Truman announced, “it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”³³⁵ Contrary to the President’s sweeping rhetoric, Gaddis recounted that “the Truman Doctrine implied an open-ended commitment to resist Soviet expansionism, therefore, at a time when the means to do so had almost entirely disappeared.”³³⁶ It was “shock therapy,” according to Gaddis, “a last-ditch effort by the Administration to prod Congress and the American people into accepting the responsibilities of world leadership.”³³⁷

The same month that President Truman took ownership of the Trust Territory, an anonymous author “X” published “Sources of Soviet Conduct” in *Foreign Affairs* magazine. The author, later revealed to be George Kennan, advocated “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”³³⁸ Kennan, who had risen to prominence after his “Long Telegram” described Soviet aims in February 1946, had become the State Department’s director of the newly created Policy Planning Staff (PPS) in May 1946. The “X” article formed the foundations of containment policy, which sought to apply “counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points” to prevent Communist expansion.³³⁹ Although Kennan later claimed that containment in application differed from his policy recommendations, the approach became popularly linked to the Truman Doctrine announced several months earlier.

Between 1947 and 1949, the Truman administration prioritized economic aid over military expenditures in order to safeguard vital industrial centers from communist influence. As Gaddis observed, “the blunt reality of limited means had once again, as

³³⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941–1947* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972), 351.

³³⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 23.

³³⁷ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 351.

³³⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2011), 260.

³³⁹ Gaddis, 260.

during World War II, forced the making of distinctions between vital and peripheral interests.”³⁴⁰ This trade-off was a “calculated risk” recommended by Kennan to asymmetrically counter Soviet influence in Europe and Asia.³⁴¹ Recently promoted Secretary of Defense Forrestal stated in December 1947 that foreign policy objectives were “economic stability, political stability and military stability...in about that order.”³⁴² To align resources with these aims, the Truman administration increased foreign aid at the expense of defense spending.³⁴³

In East Asia, this approach justified ongoing initiatives to revitalize strategic economies. In 1946 the United States supplied Japan with \$188 million in food and raw materials, and this amount increased to \$300 million in 1947.³⁴⁴ Between September 1945 and February 1948, the United States contributed \$1.43 billion to aid Nationalist China in its struggle against the Chinese Communist Party.³⁴⁵ The Foreign Assistance Act of April 1948 allocated an additional \$463 million to China, of which \$338 million was economic aid.³⁴⁶ A better-known aspect of the Foreign Assistance Act, commonly known as the Marshall Plan, initially contributed \$5 billion to aid Western Europe.

In accordance with the “calculated risk,” defense spending decreased from \$81.6 billion in fiscal year 1945 to \$44.7 billion in 1946, then to \$13.1 billion in 1947.³⁴⁷ For the Department of the Navy, these budget reductions corresponded to a \$31 billion budget in fiscal year 1945, a \$24 billion budget in 1946, and a \$5 billion budget in 1947.³⁴⁸ In fiscal

³⁴⁰ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 23.

³⁴¹ Gaddis, 62.

³⁴² Gaddis, 61.

³⁴³ Gaddis, 61.

³⁴⁴ John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs 1945–47* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1948), 268.

³⁴⁵ John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs 1947–48* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1949), 190.

³⁴⁶ Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs 1947–48*, 201.

³⁴⁷ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 23.

³⁴⁸ Friedman, *Creating an American Lake*, 103.

year 1948, President Truman proposed a \$11.2 billion budget for the Army and Navy, then directed an additional \$650 million cut in Navy expenditures.³⁴⁹ Congress also ended the Selective Service on 31 March 1947, which continued a manpower drawdown that began shortly after the war.³⁵⁰ The size of the U.S. military decreased from 12 million personnel in 1945 to 1.6 million by July 1947.³⁵¹ Available means no longer supported the Navy's base strategy for the Pacific.

These reduced means forced military leaders to prioritize the vast network of bases in the Pacific by strategic value and economic feasibility. In September 1945, the U.S. Navy proposed maintaining 12 active bases in the Pacific, with an additional 15 in a reduced status.³⁵² By September 1946, Admiral Towers, Commander-in-Chief Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas, recommended to Admiral Nimitz that active bases in the Pacific be reduced to Pearl Harbor, Guam, Saipan, Kwajalein, Okinawa, and Adak in order to avoid "foolish" expenditures.³⁵³ The Navy proposed reinvesting these savings into maintaining a mobile carrier fleet that would be able to counter threats and deter aggression. This approach differentiated the Navy's position from the Army and Air Force, which was crucial to gaining an upper hand with Congress amidst increasing inter-service budgetary competition.³⁵⁴

While Admiral Towers did not foresee the need for active bases in the former Japanese mandated islands, he argued that the U.S. should maintain exclusive access to these islands to prevent repeating the Pacific war.³⁵⁵ In 1947 the Far Eastern Commission proposed retaining the Bonin, Volcano, and Ryukyu Islands under long-term U.S. control. From these offshore bases, the United States could minimize its occupation effort in

³⁴⁹ Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs 1945–47*, 458–459.

³⁵⁰ Campbell, 457.

³⁵¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 23.

³⁵² Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs 1945–47*, 43.

³⁵³ Friedman, *Governing the American Lake, The U.S. Defense and Administration of the Pacific, 1945–1947* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2007), 105.

³⁵⁴ Friedman, 114.

³⁵⁵ Friedman, 106.

mainland Japan while providing a security backstop against a resurgent Japan.³⁵⁶ By 1948, however, the Navy pared down its base requirements to the bare minimum: primary bases in Hawaii and the Marianas, with secondary bases in the Marshall and Aleutian Islands.³⁵⁷

This strategic vacillation and decrease in military spending also adversely impacted the base politics of Guam and Okinawa. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Navy Civil Administration on Guam was already encountering difficulties in compensating Guamanians for land by 1947. The military government's land compensation initiatives on Guam, however, were years ahead of their counterparts on the Ryukyu Islands.

To drive down occupation costs, the U.S. military government took the policy position that no compensation would be paid for Okinawan land used for bases.³⁵⁸ Under the American military's interpretation of the Rules of Land Warfare, military necessity removed the legal obligation to compensate Okinawans for their land.³⁵⁹ Although the military government cooperated with the Okinawan Advisory Council to establish land ownership records after the war, "these early claims were for the mere recognition of ownership."³⁶⁰ Successive campaigns also sought to reduce the military's overall use of Okinawan land, but did not attempt to compensate Okinawan land owners. Disputes over compensation and land use surfaced slowly, but surely by the late 1940s.

The loss of Okinawan land was exacerbated by underdevelopment. Due to the U.S. policy of directing occupation costs to the Japanese Government, fewer economic and development initiatives were funded outside of U.S. bases. With Okinawa an "occupied area," Under Secretary of the Army William Draper, Jr. summarized the U.S. position that "appropriated funds could not be used to pay for indigenous Japanese materials and labor utilized for the benefit of the Ryukyu Islands."³⁶¹ With every dollar increasingly valuable

³⁵⁶ Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs 1947–48*, 166.

³⁵⁷ Campbell, 459.

³⁵⁸ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 173.

³⁵⁹ Fisch, 174.

³⁶⁰ Fisch, 173.

³⁶¹ Fisch, 156.

in the new Pacific strategy, military government budgets were stretched as far as possible. As military leaders deferred payments for Okinawan land, however, overall costs to maintain U.S. bases only increased with interest.

As the military revised its Pacific requirements, Kennan traveled to Japan in February 1948 to confer with General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Both Kennan and MacArthur favored limiting the duration and quantity of occupation forces in Japan. As early as March 1947, General MacArthur declared that the military occupation of Japan was “approaching such completion as is possible” and that the remaining problems in Japan were primarily economic.³⁶² Kennan argued that an ongoing occupation of Japan risked creating anti-American sentiments and alienating an important potential ally against Communism.³⁶³ In the context of these considerations, offshore military bases in Okinawa and the Marianas gained appeal. General MacArthur related to Kennan that “Okinawa was the most advanced and vital point in this structure” which could “easily control every one of the ports of northern Asia from which an amphibious operation could conceivably be launched.”³⁶⁴

Kennan accepted the General’s military assessment, and in March 1948 he subsequently proposed an offshore defensive perimeter of military bases to secure American interest in East Asia:

Okinawa would be made the center of our offensive striking power in the western Pacific area. It would constitute the central and most advanced point of a U-shaped U.S. security zone embracing the Aleutians, Ryukus [sic], the former Japanese mandated islands, and of course Guam. We would then rely on Okinawa-based air power, plus our advanced naval power, to prevent the assembling and launching of any amphibious force from any mainland port in the east-central or northeast Asia.³⁶⁵

³⁶² Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs 1945–47*, 272.

³⁶³ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 78.

³⁶⁴ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 43.

³⁶⁵ Green, *By More Than Providence*, 273.

Kennan argued that China, though a wartime ally, was not a vital center of power, and thus not worth the vast resources necessary to indefinitely defend it from communist forces.³⁶⁶ Kennan's maritime defense perimeter gained consensus support in the Department of Defense and Department of State as the best way to employ limited means to achieve American interests in East Asia. On 7 October 1948, Kennan's proposal was adopted in National Security Council memorandum 13/2 (NSC 13/2).³⁶⁷

D. THE SHOCKS OF 1949

1949 brought unexpected changes to the domestic and international base politics of Guam and Okinawa. Domestically, President Truman surprisingly won the 1948 presidential election and began another term in 1949. In this new administration, President Truman replaced an ailing Secretary Marshall with Republican foreign policy expert Dean Acheson. Acheson subsequently replaced George Kennan with Paul Nitze as the Director of the Policy Planning Staff. Louis Johnson also replaced a disgraced James Forrestal as Secretary of Defense to "accelerate already deep cuts in defense spending that Forrestal had resisted."³⁶⁸ Together, the new administration would affect some of the most important changes in base politics in the Western Pacific.

On the island of Guam, 1949 catalyzed the citizenship movement at the local and national level of base politics. After reelection, President Truman declared that the naval administration would be an interim government, and on 15 January 1949 the Guam Congress resumed its demands for citizenship.³⁶⁹ In February 1949, the Guam Congress subpoenaed a Navy civil service employee suspected of dishonest business dealings on the island.³⁷⁰ The employee, Abe Goldstein, refused to testify on the grounds that the Guam

³⁶⁶ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 85.

³⁶⁷ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 44.

³⁶⁸ Green, *By More Than Providence*, 274.

³⁶⁹ Maga, "The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950," 74.

³⁷⁰ Maga, 74.

Congress had no jurisdiction over him, an American citizen.³⁷¹ Admiral Pownall, still leading the Navy Civil Administration, sided with Goldstein and prevented the military police from detaining him.³⁷² In protest, Antonio B. Won Pat, Speaker of the House of Assembly, dissolved the Guam Congress on 5 March 1949.³⁷³ Admiral Pownall attempted to hold a special election to replace the emboldened members of the Guam Congress, but Guamanian districts refused to nominate any candidates other than their current representatives.³⁷⁴ This domestic political row soon rose to the level of national politics.

The U.S. news media overwhelmingly sided with the Guam Congress and pressured the U.S. Navy and President Truman to intervene. On 6 March 1949, the *New York Times* reported “Guam Assembly Quits,” and the next day that “Congress Walks Out.”³⁷⁵ In an article entitled “Guam Rebels at New Navy Rule,” printed on 3 April 1949, *The Washington Post* declared that disharmony was inevitable given the structures of the administration.³⁷⁶ Even the *Honolulu Advertiser* reported “Guam Congress Revolt Grows.”³⁷⁷ After heated criticism, Admiral Pownall reconvened the dismissed members of the Guam Congress in May 1949.³⁷⁸ The issue of Guamanian citizenship, however, had gained traction with the American public and at the highest levels of the government.

President Truman sought to resolve the discord on Guam that affected the United States’ international reputation. The Department of State advised the President that, although loyal to the United States, Guamanians could become increasingly antagonistic unless granted further rights. After receiving recommendations from the State Department in May 1949, President Truman directed the Navy to transfer governing responsibilities to

³⁷¹ Maga, 74.

³⁷² Maga, 74.

³⁷³ Maga, 74.

³⁷⁴ Maga, 74.

³⁷⁵ Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 202.

³⁷⁶ Maga, “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950,” 75.

³⁷⁷ Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 202.

³⁷⁸ Rogers, 202.

the Department of the Interior.³⁷⁹ On 7 September 1949, President Truman signed Executive Order 10077 and formally transferred administration responsibilities, effective 1 July 1950.

In the intervening year, Guamanians resumed their drive for citizenship and recognition. In April 1950, a delegation led by Antonio Won Pat and Francisco Leon Guerrero delivered a petition signed by 1,700 Guamanians that supported the organic act.³⁸⁰ Between May and July, the organic act steadily progressed through Congress. On 1 August 1950, President Truman signed the Organic Act of Guam, officially conferring citizenship and territorial status to Guam.³⁸¹ In a nod to Guam's shared hardships during the war, the Organic Act was made retroactive to 21 July, the anniversary of Liberation Day.³⁸² Thus, the era of Navy military government on Guam ended with the population more closely linked to the United States than ever before.

As the citizenship movement redefined Guam's political status, the Truman administration also charted a new course for Okinawa and Japan. NSC 13/3, adopted by President Truman on 6 May 1949, indicated the United States' intention to "retain on a long-term basis the facilities at Okinawa."³⁸³ Implicitly, NSC 13/3 politically separated Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands from the remainder of Japan. The directive also broke the diplomatic stalemate that had hindered Okinawa's economic recovery. With NSC 13/3 establishing long-term American military interests on Okinawa, the U.S. Government now agreed to partially fund Okinawa's social and economic recovery.³⁸⁴

In 1949 natural disasters uncovered man-made structural failures on Okinawa. Between October 1948 and June 1949, Typhoon Libby, Typhoon Della, and Typhoon

³⁷⁹ Rogers, 203.

³⁸⁰ Rogers, 205.

³⁸¹ Maga, "The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946–1950," 76.

³⁸² Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 205.

³⁸³ Department of State, *Report by the National Security Council on Recommendations With Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan, NSC 13/3* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1949) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v07p2/d70>.

³⁸⁴ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 156.

Gloria sank approximately half of all Okinawan fishing vessels, damaged nearly half of all buildings on the island, killed 50 military personnel, and seriously injured an additional 200.³⁸⁵ Visiting the ravaged island in November 1949, journalist Frank Gibney wrote “Okinawa: Forgotten Island” for *Time* magazine, in which he described Okinawa as “the end of the Army’s logistics line” and “as a major American base...no credit to America.”³⁸⁶ The December 1949 edition of *Life* magazine ran a similar pictorial entitled “The Okinawa Junk Heap: After Four Years of Neglect U.S. Tries to Clean Up A Shameful Mess.”³⁸⁷ The article reported that “life on Okinawa is still hard and squalid.”³⁸⁸ The typhoons exposed the consequences of years of underfunding and political inattention. Unsurprisingly, military leadership did not favorably endorse these reports.

Public outcry over the conditions in Okinawa spurred an American response. Additionally, with the approval of NSC 13/3 and the deteriorating military situation for Nationalist China, Okinawa gained strategic value for the U.S. With Okinawa still under U.S. Army military government, the Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees toured the island, soon followed by Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins.³⁸⁹ As Army historian Arnold Fisch observed years later, “even the rubble generated by the typhoons could not mask the effects of some three years of Washington’s relative bureaucratic neglect.”³⁹⁰ General Collins consequently appointed General Josef Sheetz to take command of the island and improve conditions. These structural reorganizations would eventually lead to a new era in Okinawan base politics.

³⁸⁵ Fisch, 88.

³⁸⁶ Fisch, 81.

³⁸⁷ Carl Mydens, “The Okinawa Junk Heap: After Four Years of Neglect U.S. Tries to Clean Up A Shameful Mess.” *Life*, December 19, 1949, https://books.google.com/books?id=UkEEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=Okinawa+Junk+Heap+Life&source=bl&ots=X_MmjDgIYP&sig=ACfU3U1YN3TcdK38I4CbgFTvQXD8Q_ojJQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiC1MKtjJbpAhW8CjQIHxWhBdwQ6AEwA3oECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Okinawa%20Junk%20Heap%20Life&f=false.

³⁸⁸ Mydens, 21.

³⁸⁹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 158.

³⁹⁰ Fisch, 158.

E. FORMING A DEFENSE PERIMETER IN THE PACIFIC

The “shocks of 1949,” as Gaddis coined them, set the Truman administration in search of a new foreign policy approach.³⁹¹ Internationally, the loss of China and the Soviet Union’s detonation of an atomic bomb led political leaders to recalculate the communist threat. In January 1950, Secretary Acheson outlined an approach that embraced many of the points Kennan earlier articulated.

In a speech to the National Press Club entitled, “Crisis in China – An Examination of United States Policy,” Acheson reassured Americans that a “defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyu Islands. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold.”³⁹² While Acheson’s “defense perimeter” speech is often remembered for excluding South Korea and implicitly inviting North Korean aggression, it also reflected the influence of Kennan’s argument, even after his departure from the Policy Planning Staff.

The same month as the “defense perimeter” speech, President Truman commissioned a study to develop policy recommendations for this new geopolitical environment. A task-organized team of officials from the State and Defense Department, led by Paul Nitze, sent their recommendations to the President on 14 April 1950.³⁹³ In a policy paper known as National Security Council 68 (NSC-68), the study group recommended a major military buildup to oppose communist expansion universally and equally in every contested area.³⁹⁴ NSC-68 deliberately did not attempt to quantify, however, the means necessary to implement such a policy.

Although President Truman initially did not endorse the recommendations of NSC-68, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 brought Nitze’s argument to the forefront of policy debates. NSC-68 hardened U.S. foreign policy against communism and

³⁹¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 90.

³⁹² Cha, *Powerplay*, 44.

³⁹³ Gaddis, *George F. Kennan*, 390.

³⁹⁴ Gaddis, 391.

entrenched the network of military installations in the Western Pacific. In the context where “a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere,” the concept of a rigid perimeter defense in the western Pacific regained prominence.³⁹⁵ After 25 June 1950, the United States expanded that defensive perimeter to include South Korea. By October 1950, the United States would unsuccessfully attempt to “rollback” North Korean communists.

Even before the North Korean invasion, Acheson concluded that the occupation of Japan must come to an end, and a peace treaty between Japan and the United States should be signed.³⁹⁶ The cost of the occupation, concerns of rising anti-American sentiments in Japan, and pressure from allies led Acheson to prepare for negotiations.³⁹⁷ Acheson, under immense domestic pressure due to the “loss” of China, enlisted John Foster Dulles in May 1950 to explore terms of a peace treaty with Japan.³⁹⁸ After months of discourse with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dulles and the State Department reached consensus in September 1950. Under the terms of the interagency agreement, the United States would pursue a peace treaty with Japan under three main conditions: retaining U.S. military bases in Japan after the occupation, implementing the terms of the treaty only after the Korean War concluded, and securing “exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands.”³⁹⁹ Thus, the resolution of the Okinawa issue was tied to the signing of the peace treaty with Japan.

On 14 September 1950, President Truman charged Dulles with the dual tasks of negotiating a peace treaty with Japan and also a collective security arrangement to maintain long-term stability in the region.⁴⁰⁰ Multiple obstacles faced Dulles and his negotiating team, however. First, allies who had fought alongside the United States through the Pacific war were understandably concerned about a resurgent Japan. Second, Japan was eager for a peace settlement and an end to the occupation, but wary of the terms imposed by the

³⁹⁵ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 91.

³⁹⁶ Gaddis, 77.

³⁹⁷ Gaddis, 77.

³⁹⁸ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 49–50.

³⁹⁹ Sarantakes, 52.

⁴⁰⁰ Sarantakes, 52.

United States. Primarily, Japan did not want to cede control of Okinawa, which it incorporated peacefully before the war. To accomplish his objectives, Dulles employed legalistic devices and bilateral consultation, tactics he successfully used to obtain strategic trusteeship over Micronesia in 1947.

As with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in 1947, the State Department assumed the responsibility of devising a politically palatable solution to the United States' strategic security problem. To solve this conundrum, Dulles proposed the legalistic concept of Japanese "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa.⁴⁰¹ In Dulles' proposal, Japan would retain long-term ownership of Okinawa, but the United States would retain military control over the strategic island into the undetermined future. This solution avoided the pugilistic negotiations required to secure strategic trusteeship in the U.N., preempted Russian charges of colonialism, and reassured Japanese that their country would not be dismembered.

As at the U.N. General Assembly in 1946, the United States had to reassure its allies before continuing this diplomatic maneuver. Australia and New Zealand opposed a collective security pact with the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines due to the concern of being committed to another war.⁴⁰² In turn, the United States rejected Australia and New Zealand's counteroffer of including Great Britain in the Pacific security alliance.⁴⁰³ Retaining U.S. troops in Okinawa, however, reassured Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines that the U.S. would not allow a resurgent Japan to threaten its neighbors.⁴⁰⁴ Though the multilateral security organization that President Truman envisioned did not materialize, the United States would become the center of new bilateral alliances with Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. By implementing this "hub and spoke" model of bilateral security alliances in the Pacific, the United States inadvertently increased the importance of its position on Okinawa and the Marianas.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰¹ Sarantakes, 58.

⁴⁰² Sarantakes, 54.

⁴⁰³ Sarantakes, 55.

⁴⁰⁴ Sarantakes, 52.

⁴⁰⁵ Sarantakes, 55.

To ensure Okinawa's long-term viability as a base in the defensive perimeter, the U.S. military conceded to financially compensating Okinawans for their land. On 5 December 1950, General MacArthur directed the U.S. commander of the Ryukyu Islands to ensure due process in land acquisitions, clarify ownership of disputed lands, and pay rent for acquired land.⁴⁰⁶ The recently-reorganized Real Estate Division of the military government undertook the task of accomplishing General MacArthur's guidance, and appraised 39,000 acres of land valued at approximately \$10 million.⁴⁰⁷ For fiscal year 1951, the Real Estate Division proposed leasing Okinawan-owned land for 20 years at six percent of their appraised value.⁴⁰⁸ This policy not only reflected the long-term intentions of the U.S., but also established a fundamental legitimating mechanism that would define Okinawan base politics for decades to come.

Yet despite these belated steps towards addressing land usage, contentious issues remained on Okinawa. The same directive from General MacArthur that agreed to compensation for land also established the U.S. Civil Administration for the Ryukyu Islands. While this formally ended the U.S. military government on 15 December 1950, it also heralded long-term occupation to the Okinawan people.⁴⁰⁹ Between May and August 1951, 71.1 percent of all eligible Okinawan voters, 199,000 people in total, signed a petition to revert to Japanese administration.⁴¹⁰ This was the first major political movement in postwar Okinawa and would portend protest movements by an increasingly active and aggrieved island population.

The signing of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951 officially ended the war with Japan and entrenched the United States military's position in the Western Pacific. Surrounding the 8 September signing ceremony, the United States separately cemented its bilateral

⁴⁰⁶ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 174.

⁴⁰⁷ Fisch, 175.

⁴⁰⁸ Fisch, 175.

⁴⁰⁹ Fisch, 183–184.

⁴¹⁰ Richard Siddle, "Return to Uchina: the Politics of Identity in Contemporary Okinawa," in *Japan and Okinawa; Structure and Subjectivity*, ed. Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 135.

security agreements with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. In these accompanying events, John Foster Dulles also publicly debuted the concept of Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa.⁴¹¹ While the signing of the San Francisco Treaty began the long procession towards ending U.S. control of Okinawa, it also propagated base politics begun under U.S. military government. The dynamics of land usage, redressing grievances, and compensation would continue to affect Okinawa for decades more. By confining these forces to the Prefecture, however, American leaders sought to stabilize the wider Western Pacific.

F. CONCLUSION

At the end of World War II, the United States held unprecedented power in the Pacific. Following the war, however, American foreign policy makers judiciously weighed ways and means against ends. The means and ways Americans considered were not only material, however. Ideologies played an important role in constructing the U.S. foreign policy between 1945 and 1951. Although the American public initially stereotyped the populations of the Marianas and Okinawa, civil society challenged preconceived narratives and humanized these peoples. With their grievances framed in the context of American values, Chamorro and Okinawan issues gained traction at the highest levels of U.S. government. Accordingly, the United States went to great lengths to obtain its security objectives while simultaneously preserving its legitimacy and restraining its power through multilateral institutions.

Foresighted scholars and diplomats, such as Kennan and Dulles, reconciled competing ideologies and advanced a more pragmatic approach to U.S. foreign policy. The strategic value and vague sovereignties of the Mariana Islands and Okinawa made them ideal objectives for this pragmatism. The United States did not outright annex these strategic outposts in order to support the fledgling United Nations' legitimacy – and its own. Similarly, the United States did not demand sovereignty of Okinawa in order to

⁴¹¹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 156.

embrace an important future ally. This pragmatism contributed to the new order created by the San Francisco Treaty.

Ideologies also hindered American foreign policy, however. Just as Americans initially simplified their understanding of peoples on the Marianas and Okinawa, American policy makers reduced complex military and geopolitical calculations into domestically-digestible solutions. These ideologies and their supporting rhetoric restricted the options U.S. policy makers deemed politically feasible. As Gaddis mourned, “Washington officials encouraged a simplistic view of the Cold War which was, in time, to imprison American diplomacy in an ideological straightjacket.”⁴¹² Dissociated from means, ways, and justifications to citizens, American ideologies later advocated ends that would prove unachievable. Only after bearing the costs incurred by exceeding available means, however, can one truly appreciate the pragmatism with which American policy makers created a new security order in the Western Pacific between 1945 and 1951.

⁴¹² Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 352.

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V. CONCLUSION

This thesis attempts to analyze how the diverse civil-military interactions on Guam, the Northern Marianas, and Okinawa shaped the development of long-term basing agreements in the Pacific. In the formative years between 1944 and 1951, the United States created a new security apparatus that spanned across oceans, connected nations, and extended down to military bases across the Pacific. The populations of these strategic outposts also redefined their position in the world after the cataclysm of World War II upheaved decades of existing political and social structures. Between these two forces, U.S. military governments implemented national policies, mediated local tensions, and created unique outcomes through their methods in each location.

The Northern Mariana Islands are a case study in base politics that perpetuates the wisdom of George Kennan's defensive perimeter concept. Heavily populated by Japanese citizens and autocratically controlled by the Japanese Empire for nearly 30 years, the populations of Saipan and Tinian were on a trajectory towards closer ties with Japan. Yet, after the war, the U.S. military government ruled the islands relatively easily. With the massive repatriation of Japanese citizens, Navy civil affairs officers achieved nearly total cooperation with the indigenous population. For a relatively minimal cost and with few personnel, Navy military government ensured access to a key strategic link in the Pacific defensive perimeter. Though imperfect and subject to variances in governors, the Navy created the foundations for social, political, and economic integration with the United States. Eventually, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands gained autonomy through the Compact of Free Association, becoming several island states that relied on the United States for defense and federal services. These trends towards affective politics reached a crescendo when the population decided to join the United States as the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

Guam presents a more complex case study in base politics with deeper historical influences. The war indelibly linked the identity of many Guamanians to America, and these effects persisted well into the future. Amidst discussion of reorganizing U.S. forces

in 2009, 71 percent of Guamanians supported an increased military presence.⁴¹³ With more than 40 years of shared history before the war, however, not all Guamanian perceptions of Navy military government were not favorably altered by the liberation of the island from the Japanese military. Influential actors continued to oppose the terms of military government until the status quo changed.

The citizenship movement on Guam also adds nuance to Calder's ideal type base supporters. Calder classified national-level politicians and conservative business leaders as some of the most influential supporters of foreign bases.⁴¹⁴ Furthermore, Calder argued that "more likely than not, base backers are pragmatic and nationalistic, but not ideological."⁴¹⁵ While the citizenship movement on Guam was rooted in pragmatic grievances, it was also intimately tied to ideological aspirations for political recognition and equality before law. Neither was the citizenship movement explicitly for or against U.S. military bases. Indeed, many Guamanians joined the U.S. military to obtain citizenship before the Organic Act was signed, and many Guamanians still serve in the U.S. military. In fact, Guam has a higher enlistment rate than any U.S. state, and suffered four times the national average of casualties in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴¹⁶ The greatest grievances in base politics on Guam were not necessarily American military imposition, but rather that the populations under military administration were not governed equally as Americans. This dichotomy between ideals and practice will continue to affect base politics as long as it exists.

Okinawa proved to be one of the United States' longest and most challenging cases in foreign administration. Civil-military issues regarding land use, compensation, and reconstruction originated under military government rule. The institutional responses to those issues would be repeatedly redeployed under successive administrations. Although

⁴¹³ Jeffrey W. Hornung, *The U.S. Military Laydown on Guam: Progress and Challenges* (Washington, D.C.: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2017), 68.

⁴¹⁴ Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 92.

⁴¹⁵ Calder, 92.

⁴¹⁶ Neil Weare and Rodney Cruz, "Guam, America's Forgotten Front Line," *New York Times*, August 14, 2017 <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/opinion/guam-north-korea-american-ally-.html>.

military government officially ended in 1950, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands effectively continued American rule on Okinawa until 1972. The functions of the Real Estate Division lived on through the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and the Japanese government assumed the corresponding compensation payments for land.⁴¹⁷ In this period, Okinawa hosted increasingly important American military bases in the Western Pacific.

It is also worth assessing the overall effectiveness of U.S. military governments on Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Okinawa. While budgets and personnel are common targets of fiscal constraints, it is important to justify the ways and means with end results. Both subjectively and objectively, the Navy's military governments enabled the postwar security order that turned the Pacific Ocean into the American Lake.

Navy military governments contributed to the legitimacy of the United States, an intangible but consequential factor in military occupations. The vast humanitarian relief efforts that followed battles across the Pacific engendered mutual affection that facilitated cooperation in the early days of military government. Control and security derived from cooperation, and in this way, military government directly enabled the prosecution of further military objectives. These effects contributed to what Calder observed as “the stabilizing heritage of liberating occupations.”⁴¹⁸

This legitimacy enabled American diplomats to rebuff charges of neocolonialism on the international stage, and facilitated diplomatic arrangements such as the strategic trust system that authorized American rule of the former Japanese Mandated Islands. Furthermore, it is unlikely that American diplomats could have defended military bases in Micronesia and on Okinawa without credible and legitimate forces upholding widely – accepted responsibilities under international law. This legitimacy was even more important as the United States nurtured a new system of international alliances and institutions to stabilize the postwar world.

⁴¹⁷ Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 136.

⁴¹⁸ Calder, 103.

Practically, it is doubtful that any governmental organization other than the U.S. military could have planned, coordinated, and executed operations of this scale. While civilian administration earlier in the postwar period would likely have increased positive perceptions of the U.S., the military mobilized and deployed civil affairs forces with uncanny speed and efficiency. The Department of the Interior was the only other organization vying for administration of liberated and occupied territories, but no training or education infrastructure existed to compete with the military. The Department of Interior's delayed assumption of administrative responsibilities for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands suggest that the military's wartime mobilization of academics and civilian affairs officers was not only effective, but irreplaceable.

Objectively, military governments yielded disproportionate returns on investment. With 243 civil affairs personnel on Saipan and Tinian in July 1945, the United States retained critical terrain that directly contributed to the defeat of Japan.⁴¹⁹ For \$275 million in base development, military government, and civilian reconstruction, by 1945 the U.S. military gained Naval Base Guam, the future Andersen Air Force Base, and headquarters for the Pacific Fleet and 20th Air Force.⁴²⁰ By the end of the war, 201,718 U.S. service members occupied Guam in preparation for future operations.⁴²¹ At the height of its effort in July 1945, 2,600 U.S. Navy civil affairs personnel on Okinawa facilitated the garrison of 259,000 U.S. troops that were preparing to invade Japan.⁴²² Military government enabled the U.S. to occupy nearly 394 square miles of the island in the same period.⁴²³

Though the exact figures fluctuated in the subsequent years, the relative value of these strategic outposts only increased after the war. Forces based on Okinawa, Guam, and the Northern Marianas were critical in defending American interests in Korea, Vietnam, and beyond. Their persistence demonstrates the potential outcomes when academic

⁴¹⁹ Richard, *Volume I*, 545.

⁴²⁰ Hal Friedman, *Creating an American Lake*, 4.

⁴²¹ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 190.

⁴²² Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 73–74.

⁴²³ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 31.

expertise and military preparations create an understanding of base politics at the local, national, and international level.

These cases were studied historically to understand the origins of base politics on Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Okinawa. As Calder observed in *Embattled Garrisons*, “the crucial imperative, historical experience suggests, is thus for occupiers to be perceived in host nations as liberators, not imperialists.”⁴²⁴ The period between 1944 and 1951 largely established the United States’ perception, for better or worse on these islands. These civil-military interactions were dependent on the actions of local leaders, individual bureaucrats, and civil affairs officers through more than six years of administration. “The individual decision maker,” Calder remarked, is “the level at which actual real-world decisions are made.”⁴²⁵ Navy military government in the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and Okinawa, not only established many of the institutions that defined future paradigms of base politics, but also influenced individual actors in base politics.

A. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

This study aimed to contextualize the role of heritage in base politics of the Pacific. Calder stated that “historical origins, in short, are crucial to understanding the institutional environment in which base politics develops thereafter.”⁴²⁶ Base politics are not static, however, and many developments occurred in the years since military government concluded its mission on Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Okinawa. As such, there is great opportunity to further study contemporary developments in the base politics of these particular locations. Furthermore, there is ample opportunity to analyze additional case studies to test Calder’s theories of base politics.

While *Embattled Garrisons* thoroughly described base politics of contemporary Okinawa, few commensurate examinations have been conducted into the contemporary

⁴²⁴ Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 98.

⁴²⁵ Calder, 80.

⁴²⁶ Calder, 99.

base politics of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. As discussed earlier, Calder's framework for understanding base politics did not originally intend to address U.S. military bases on domestic soil. As this work detailed, however, Guam and the Northern Marianas Islands do not fit neatly into any one category. Geographically linked in the same island chain, these two locations shared a common history and developmental trajectory until first being colonized by the Spanish, then further diverged politically after the Spanish–American War in 1898. Successive world wars piqued this divergence, and only slowly after World War II did these islands politically and socially reconcile.

As the Northern Mariana Islands moved towards association with the United States, however, collective memories of Japanese collaboration during the Pacific War led Guamanians to reject union with their neighbors in the former Mandated Islands. Even with both locations incorporated into the United States, historical grievances separate the two largest population centers of Guam and Saipan, despite their geographic separation of only 136 miles. History, memory, and identity clearly still affect local politics to this day, and it is logical to reason that these forces affect base politics as well. The specific ways in which these forces act, however, are worthy of further study.

This study also contains a relatively small sample size and only aimed to explain the historical affect on outcomes at these three locations. Larger sample sizes with relevant cases could yield theoretical instead of simply explanatory results. American Samoa circa 1941–1951 and Hawaii circa 194–1959 are case studies that would illuminate the United States' wider employment of military government to secure overseas bases. These cases may also help develop theories in subnational base politics and contextualize the American practice of assimilating overseas possessions. Diego Garcia circa 1968–present and Souda Bay circa 1969–present are potential case studies to provide international context and alternative strategies to overseas basing. All these suggested cases are inherently naval in nature and reflect the great power competitions of their era. Additionally, these locations were primarily selected for their strategic and military value rather than economic or material value.

B. APPLICABILITY TO CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

The National Security Strategy of 2017 declared that, “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned.”⁴²⁷ The National Defense Strategy subsequently observed that “the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the *reemergence of long-term, strategic competition*.”⁴²⁸ As the United States military again prepares for strategic competition, it is worth understanding how military forces translated operational success to enduring strategic advantage.

World War II marked the U.S. military’s first attempt to educate dedicated civil affairs forces for military government.⁴²⁹ Amidst the greatest power competition in history, the U.S. military government on the Northern Marianas, Guam, and Okinawa solidified the U.S. Navy’s maritime superiority that was achieved at great cost during the war. The civil affairs personnel who achieved these aims were the product of a years-long investment that required the manpower, education, and institutions of a nation fully mobilized for war. While these World War II-era academic institutions exist in contemporary forms, their success still requires foresighted application.

Insightful leaders forecasted the need for post-war governance and formulated appropriate doctrine, organizations, and training early in the war. Americans widely mobilized for the war and brought to the services a wealth of experience and education that directly applied to civil affairs. Academics from across the country volunteered their expertise and applied their knowledge to the U.S. military government effort. Their efforts solidified the U.S. military’s position on what General Douglas MacArthur declared as, “the most advanced and vital point” that could “easily control every one of the ports of northern Asia from which an amphibious operation could conceivably be launched.”⁴³⁰

⁴²⁷ White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2017) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

⁴²⁸ Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018) <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

⁴²⁹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 7.

⁴³⁰ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 43.

As U.S. military bases endured on these small Pacific Islands, however, historical, pragmatic, and ideological tensions surfaced. The peoples of Guam, the Northern Marianas, and Okinawa recovered from the cataclysmic Pacific War and hoped for a more prosperous, more equal future. Ironically, U.S. Navy military governments implemented the social initiatives that instilled this distinctly American vision for the future in the population, yet did not always fulfill expectations. As time progressed, reconciling these ideals with practical limitations proved to be the greatest challenge to the longevity of American military bases.

These aspirations for agency were not confined to U.S. military bases in the Western Pacific, however. American experiences in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, indicate that local civil-military grievances will continue to affect the viability and efficacy of U.S. military forces overseas. Writing of Long An Province in Vietnam circa 1967, Jeffrey Race observed that “man is moved by the need for spiritual values: a sense of power over his own destiny, a sense of respect from his fellow man.”⁴³¹ Although diagnosing the causes of revolutionary conflict, Race’s findings also apply to larger issues of instability in civil-military interactions. Race noted that “a decade and a half of killing and destruction in Long An provides evidence of the superhuman sacrifices which some men, deprived of these values, will endure to redress their deprivation.”⁴³² In Long An, individual agency and domestic discord upended the best laid plans guided by foreign policy theories.

Having served as a junior Army officer in Vietnam, Race recalled “my fellow officers and I frequently had to make decisions affecting people’s lives with an insufficient understanding both of actual conditions and of the nature of the conflict itself which we were a part.”⁴³³ Misdiagnosing drivers of instability at the local level directly affected national and international responses. “This widespread failure of understanding,” Race later reflected, “permitted a belief at higher levels of government in possibilities that did

⁴³¹ Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), 276.

⁴³² Race, 276.

⁴³³ Race, ix.

not actually exist, in turn leading to increased intervention and to the high costs which the failure of that intervention has subsequently entailed.”⁴³⁴

To gain understanding and remedy this shortcoming, Race embarked on an ambitious personal and academic venture. “When I began, my effort was focused on such issues as force deployment, allocations among types of forces, weaponry, and training,” Race recalled.⁴³⁵ “In other words, the issues which I had been led to believe were important during my army training.”⁴³⁶ In Race’s perspective, military studies commissioned during the war analyzed the wrong aspects of society to adequately resolve local grievances. Similarly, academics and journalists similarly lacked historical and social context to challenge established narratives of the conflict, and merely served as a “transmission belt for statistics and reports of military engagements.”⁴³⁷ “Consequently,” Race recalled, “I gradually redirected my inquiry into the areas of social and economic policies and power relationships which now appeared more fundamental.”⁴³⁸

Years later, Carter Malkasian observed a similar effect in the Afghan village of Garmser in Helmand Province. Land disputes, local political divisions, and a misunderstanding of the situation by national and international political leaders allowed for a “missed opportunity” to stabilize the region.⁴³⁹ “Land has often driven people to rebel,” Malkasian observed, and “land has been causing conflict in Garmser since the canals had been completed in the early 1970s.”⁴⁴⁰ “The Afghan government had no land reform policy,” however, and even nullified land claims granted under previous administrations.⁴⁴¹ Malkasian decried that “condoning this policy was one of America’s

⁴³⁴ Race, ix-x.

⁴³⁵ Race, xvi

⁴³⁶ Race, xvi.

⁴³⁷ Race, x.

⁴³⁸ Race, xvi.

⁴³⁹ Carter Malkasian, *War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2013), 74–80.

⁴⁴⁰ Malkasian, 81.

⁴⁴¹ Malkasian, 80.

greatest mis-steps in Afghanistan.”⁴⁴² These factors, according to Malkasian, are why “the United States and Great Britain fought so long in Afghanistan for so little gain.”⁴⁴³

As Jeffrey Race and Carter Malkasian detailed in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively, stabilizing local politics through military actions and national policy are easier said than done. Lack of political recognition and disputes over compensation for land, sources of instability on Guam and Okinawa, also increased volatility and violence in Long An and Garmser. These cases do not indicate that future conflicts will avoid such difficult civil-military entanglements either.

Contemporary American conflicts have suffered from the U.S. military’s aversion to long-term governing responsibilities. As journalist Thomas Ricks reported in 2006, “because the Pentagon assumed that U.S. troops would be greeted as liberators and that an Iraqi government would be stood up quickly, it didn’t plan seriously for less rosy scenarios.”⁴⁴⁴ Consequently, “there was no guidance for restoring order in Baghdad, creating an interim government, hiring government and essential services employees, and ensuring that the judicial system was operational.”⁴⁴⁵ Kent Calder himself noted, “in a post-9/11 world, in which interventionism and ‘nation-building’ are once again in vogue, the early post-World War II cases may provide insights into what occupations contribute to making a foreign military presence enduring.”⁴⁴⁶

In the context of these contemporary challenges, the era of military government in the Pacific provides an example of relatively successful civil-military interactions. As these cases in the Pacific demonstrated, effective civil-military relations were essential to entrenching long-term security arrangements. Recognizing this dynamic, U.S. military leaders of the World War II era resourced, developed, and fielded capabilities to perpetuate American control of overseas bases. A return to great power competition, then, should not

⁴⁴² Malkasian, 80.

⁴⁴³ Malkasian, 102.

⁴⁴⁴ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2006), 111.

⁴⁴⁵ Ricks, 150–151.

⁴⁴⁶ Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 104.

be equated with a decreased importance of civil-military interactions. Highly educated civil affairs forces proved to be one of the only tools readily available to stabilize post – conflict territory, transform operational objectives to strategic advantage, and create time for diplomatic maneuvering.

The ways in which military governments accomplished their mission were as important as their means. As Race asserted, “a humane society provides wide satisfaction for these spiritual needs, reaping domestic peace as its reward.”⁴⁴⁷ On Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Okinawa, Navy military government nurtured societies in ways that were remarkably humane in contrast to the destruction that preceded them. Academics, journalists, and civil servants informed and improved military government policies, to the betterment of local, national, and international base politics. Pragmatic diplomats lessened the constraining effects of ideology to achieve strategic security concerns through compromise and not coercion. In conclusion, the Navy’s foray into military government was a complex effort that incorporated expertise and accommodated dissent from all levels of interaction. As a result, its participants were rewarded with calm waters in the American Lake.

⁴⁴⁷ Race, *War Comes to Long An*, 276.

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