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JOHN COFFEE HAYS:

AMERICAN PIONEER OF MANEUVER WARFARE

By

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ABSTRACT

JOHN COFFEE HAYS: AMERICAN PIONEER OF MANEUVER WARFARE by Major David G. Yuers, 140 pages.

Colonel John Coffee Hays was a leader in the Texas Rangers during the early Texas republic, the commander of the Texas Mounted Rifle Volunteers Regiment during the Mexican War and the commander of the Washoe Regiment during The Paiute Indian War of 1860. Hays fought against many enemies in many theaters both conventional and unconventional, yet every engagement and campaign Hays participated in was highlighted by his preference for maneuver warfare over static, fixed, and conventional attrition warfare. Thus the central research question is whether the maneuver warfare methods introduced by Hays on the early frontier resulted in uniquely influencing the American military's subsequent combat doctrine. The research approach taken explored the contributions of other American pioneers of maneuver warfare prior to Hays, many of whom were also rangers. This is followed by four key battles Hays fought in highlighting specific principles of maneuver warfare most visibly applied in each of the four battles. Finally, the paper takes into consideration what tenets Hays developed, if any, which continue to be followed today. The conclusion is that Hays was a pioneer in some aspects of maneuver warfare, yet has a mixed outcome when it came to counterinsurgency operations in Mexico, the upshot being Hays was a great counter-guerilla fighter but had some shortcomings applying some of the more sensitive elements of a successful counterinsurgency program. This paper discovered some aspects associated with maneuver warfare, such as Fourth Generation Warfare doctrine, might be anachronistic and inapplicable when applied to Hays and his circumstances, yet the OODA Loop theory developed by Colonel John Boyd is still very applicable. The conclusion is the maneuver warfare methods introduced by Hays on the

American frontier initially did influence the American military's combat doctrine but over time were forgotten and ignored. Yet many of the techniques and procedures used in maneuver warfare continue to currently remain relevant today to commanders inclined to study, learn, and re-apply these same techniques and procedures.

OVERVIEW

Research Question

Did the Maneuver Warfare methods and elements introduced by John Coffee Hays on the early Texas frontier result in uniquely influencing, shaping and developing the American military's subsequent combat doctrine?

Research Argument

In the early 19th century open territories of the West the combat doctrine of the American military remained in its embryonic stage. Yet some of the campaigns on the frontier which eventually shaped and developed into an emerging and unique pattern of distinctive and clear tactics were already forming into a model which later scholars would label Maneuver Warfare. Historically Maneuver Warfare has had a successful record when applied by American military forces.¹ One of the inaugural forerunners and champions of this method of warfare was the celebrated Colonel John Coffee Hays.

Problem Background and Significance

The innovative Maneuver Warfare tactics developed by Colonel John Coffee Hays on the early Texas frontier resulted in uniquely forming some of the American military's subsequent combat doctrine and shaped Hays into an early leading architect and practitioner of Counter-Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW).² Unlike state-aligned guerillas though, 4GW describes the non-state actor exclusively. The Comanche tribes of the 19th century American west – for example - would be characterized as non-state actors.

A further driving premise of 4GW and Counter-4GW is - it is highly decentralized in execution, a style which Hays absorbed from his days as a Texas Ranger patrolling the Texas interior looking for Comanche raiders.

Another part of the working theory of Maneuver Warfare is new technology is always welcomed, accepted and aggressively applied.³ When Samuel Colt invented the cylindrical repeating and revolving handgun nobody except Hays anticipated or understood the revolutionary dynamic such technology would bring. After the Battle of Walker's Creek, Hays sent one of his lieutenants, Samuel Hamilton Walker, to collaborate with Colt to improve Colt's firearm - resulting in the historic Walker Colt and the wake of transformative battle tactics the Walker Colt swept in. From at least the American Civil War - when the Americans used ironclad steamships and submarines, aerial surveillance, and instant communications via the telegraph – to the present, the American military has usually led the way in innovatively exploiting new technology.

Additionally, Maneuver Warfare is usually associated with light infantry which, in contrast to the rigidity of regular line infantry, is swift, nimble, and anticipates tactical adaptation to the environment and circumstances. The light cavalry innovations Hays adapted mirror and compliment the Counter-4GW theorist's emphasis on light infantry as well.

Hays had an amazing record of success in every combat action he engaged in – whether his opponent was the Comanche Indians of Texas, the outlaw bands who roamed through the early Texas Republic before it was annexed into statehood, regular Mexican Army forces, Mexican guerillas, or the Paiute Indians of northern Nevada – Hays prevailed over them all.

Counterinsurgency was a form of warfare Hays was both familiar with and a master of. “Revolutionary,” “Partisan,” “Rebel,” and “Bushwhacker” were all terms used to describe

paramilitary forces in the 19th century.⁴ However, Hays and his contemporaries never used these terms to describe the Comanches. “Violent Non-State Actors” would most likely be the term used by the present-day American military to describe the Comanche warrior of then - or “illegal combatant.”

The term “guerrilla” was an English word as early as 1809 - after the fighters in the Napoleonic Peninsular Wars of Spain - but guerilla fighting was used as a tactic long before then - simply under different labels.⁵ Hays may have characterized the resistance in conquered Mexico as “guerillas” as that term was frequently used in dispatches then. Whichever the categorization being applied though – the principles of fighting a counterinsurgency under the auspices of Counter-4GW doctrine remain unchanged.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) John Coffee Hays acquired from fighting the Comanche directly tied in to how he and his men fought against the Mexican Army and Mexican guerillas during the Mexican American War. Whereas Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott remained firmly entrenched in First Generation Warfare (1GW) doctrine, this was understandable as they came from and were shaped by the generation which fought in the War of 1812. The main features of this generation of warfare were state actors from two separate armies wearing their own distinct uniforms leveraging tactical column formations into distinct and opposing battle lines. This also continued into the American Civil War (the generals who fought it on both sides were Company Grade Officers in the Mexican American War), where the Union and Confederate armies continued to fight with 1GW doctrine.⁶ It was not until the American military’s entry into World War One that Second-Generation Warfare (2GW) methods were introduced and adopted.⁷

John Coffee Hays was the only combatant commander in Mexico who discernably fought a 1GW war using 4GW tactics against the Mexican guerillas.

A record of over 20 years of consistently winning every conflict engaged in might pique the interest of today's warfighter as such a record may perhaps impart some timeless realities which transcend time and place – and even service branch - thus being applicable even today. If Hays' operational doctrine is still useful and still applicable, then the timeless factors which contributed to his success may also remain in play as well.

Hays is among a long line of notable Americans from George Washington and Andrew Jackson - who successfully used Maneuver Warfare prior to Hays' era - to John Mosby, Smedley Butler, Carl Eifler, Peter Ortiz, and Russell W. Volkmann afterwards.⁸ When the American military finds itself in a 4GW conflict now or in the future it may be wise and certainly germane to examine the successes of past maneuver warfare operations and their current applicability to the 4GW problem-set rather than reinventing the wheel.

An example of reinvention of the wheel?

Counterinsurgency (COIN) practiced in the Philippines during the turn of the last century yet swiftly forgotten after World War One, World War Two, and Korea. The Army wrote a Field Manual for COIN during Vietnam.⁹ Then the Cold War and classic attrition warfare returned from Grenada to the First Gulf War. When the United States military found itself in another counterinsurgency after the textbook overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government - General David Petraeus found himself dusting off the old COIN Field Manual again and re-writing it.¹⁰

The effective tactics John Coffee Hays' practiced and developed on the Texas frontier, from orchestrating decentralized forays and strikes to the aggressive application of new technology to advancing the art of dexterous Counter-4GW to mastering COIN operations, echo down to the modern warfighter still interested in the proficient application of Maneuver Warfare today and tomorrow.

Research Methodology/Framework/Argument

This research paper will apply qualitative/constructivist methodology via case studies to answer the research question and attend to the hypothesis' claims. The paper will be based in historical record and precedence; thus, this is not a practical problem but a conceptual problem. If prior historical precedence has led to Maneuver Warfare doctrine as understood conceptually at present, then a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources and how historical case studies in those same sources apply to Maneuver Warfare doctrine today is demanded.

Introduction

The insurgents were surrounded.

While stationing his company around a dogwood grove the insurgents were hiding in, Captain John Coffee Hays and a few of his men followed the insurgents into their refuge to flush them out. The insurgents responded by attacking their pursuers – wounding two significantly. The young captain dragged one of his wounded out and returned with a double-barreled shotgun. Only one of his foes was armed with a rifle. Hays then heard two insurgents' approach and unloaded both barrels on them. He then traded his empty shotgun for a loaded rifle.

Hays then spent the next four hours systematically killing an insurgent each time he spotted one until only the adversary with the rifle remained.

Hays feigned a noisy fall; the insurgent assumed the pretense was genuine and opened fire. Now the insurgent's position was exposed, and Hays returned fire, seriously wounding the insurgent and leaving the insurgent with only one choice: death or surrender. The insurgent chose to surrender.

Killed on that day were a dozen insurgents - single-handedly - by John Coffee Hays.

The fight took place not in the Mesopotamian basin of modern-day Iraq or the Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan but on the plains of frontier Texas.

In the summer of 1841.

The insurgents were Comanche Indians.

And Captain Hays' troops were Texas Rangers.

Hays demonstrated respect for his enemy as he wrote in his After-Action Report,

“The Indians had but one gun, and the thicket too dense to admit using their arrows well, they fought under great disadvantage but continued to struggle to the last, keeping up their

warsongs until they were all hushed in death. Being surrounded by horsemen, ready to cut them down if they left the thicket, and unable to use their arrows with much effect in their situation their fate was inevitable – they saw it and met it like heroes.”¹¹

By effectively engaging the methods of Maneuver Warfare he himself had pioneered, John Coffee Hays was able to get inside his Comanche foes “OODA Loop.”

Hays **observed** the Comanches (with a Mexican scout); he **oriented** his men to surround the Comanches - driving them into the thicket. He **decided** to go in after them. Moreover, his **action** ultimately resulted in victory with zero lives lost on his side.

Hays got way inside the insurgents/Comanches OODA loop before they even knew what hit them! Without any field manual or formal training Hays had also just re-introduced the forgotten principles of what would later be christened as “Counter-4GW,” a significant element in Maneuver Warfare.

This paper asks the research question, “How did the Maneuver Warfare methods introduced by John Coffee Hays on the early Texas frontier result in uniquely influencing, shaping and developing the American military’s subsequent combat doctrine?”

In addition to continuing in the tradition of the long line of American military men who led in maneuver warfare, John Coffee Hays was one of the first American military men to use what is today labeled Counter-Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) in his style of maneuver warfare. 4GW warfare is non-state aligned actors fighting against state forces. Counter-4GW is the state aligned forces TTPs against 4GW. Although most of the advocates and promoters of Counter-4GW suggest the American way of war has always markedly embraced first and second generation warfare more so than Counter-4GW, John Coffee Hays was an early pioneer in Counter-4GW nonetheless.

The principles of maneuver warfare itself – centralized control and decentralized execution using a combination of mechanical innovation, speed, surprise, flexibility and other tactics - were used on the American frontier going back to the rangers of John Gorham and up to and including the rangers of John Coffee Hays. As opposed to attrition warfare, maneuver warfare methods have historically been shown to be more effective when fighting guerilla war, terrorism, low intensity conflict (LIC), Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), insurgency warfare or nontrinitarian war.¹²

These same methods are being successfully used today on the battlefields of Somalia, Nigeria, Mindanao, Syria, and Afghanistan.

Definition of Maneuver Warfare

Maneuver warfare contrasts with the standard concept of warfare – that is “killing people and breaking things” which is associated with attrition warfare – with maneuver warfare being one of several historically effective schools of thought since man organized armies to fight wars. Ancient sieges of cities, famous battles such as the Battle of Thermopylae where nearly every last man was annihilated by King Xerxes the First of Persia, and the eradication of Carthage by Scipio Africanus the Younger during the Third Punic War are the standard perceptions of warfare where nothing is left of the enemy’s order of battle and conquest is total – the standard result of attrition warfare. In comparison, although maneuver warfare also consists of killing people and breaking things, the point is to do this at a faster tempo, to keep the enemy constantly guessing, and without as much regard to effecting utter obliteration as to simply ensure victory. This method of fighting also stretches back into the beginning of war itself, as well being just as applicable today. As military historian and theorist Martin van Creveld writes, “Before the fight, maneuver warfare seeks ways to place the enemy’s forces within a limited area so as to obtain a

subsequent advantage over the force as a whole. Once the fight is over, it seeks to take maximum advantage of the outcome by pursuing the enemy, keeping him off balance, and striking into his vitals.”¹³

Removing specific Centers of Gravity (COG) such as leaders, support assets, logistical hubs, and lines of communication (LOC), isolating the enemy, and probing/taking advantage of weaknesses in the enemy’s actions can be more effective than a blunt assault on frontal lines. Historically this was even evident in wars of attrition such as World War Two. From the Wehrmacht bypassing the Maginot Line to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz skipping over Japanese bases in the Pacific. “Attrition warfare takes aim at the enemy’s strengths; maneuver warfare, at his weaknesses.”¹⁴

Martin van Creveld has categorized six key characteristics of maneuver warfare: tempo, *Schwerpunkt*, surprise, combined arms, flexibility, and finally – decentralized command.¹⁵

All these key characteristics define the fighting methods and style of John Coffee Hays.

For maneuver warfare to be put into practice, the first vital element is *tempo*. Tempo is not the same as speed; it has perhaps been defined best by Colonel John Boyd, USAF, Retired, as the observation-orientation-decisive-action cycle, sometimes called OODA Loop. Fighter pilots know the concept from air-to-air combat as energy maneuverability – a concept which was also initiated by then Captain Boyd at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada. The idea is to get ‘inside’ the loop by transitioning from one mode of action to another before the other party can react. As this happens, the opponent progressively loses coherence in his actions. His situation is comparable to that of a chess player who is allowed to make only one move for every two made by the opponent. In ground combat, too, the idea is to move faster than the other can react and to react faster than the other can move. All this is done while aiming at fault lines in the opposing army.¹⁶

The concept of maneuver warfare itself was mainly developed by the Prussian, and later German armies through over a century of trial and error beginning in 1809 and finishing in 1945.¹⁷

The principle of *Schwerpunkt* is a concept which has been used by German military forces since the era of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder. It means, “focal effort at the center of gravity. It is sometimes known as hitting at the right time and place with the most force.”¹⁸

The third integral element of maneuver warfare is surprise.

Surprise can only be based on deception. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, it is necessary to find out the enemy’s intentions while concealing one’s own. One must pretend to be at point A doing B while actually being at point C doing D; being at point C, one must pretend to be at point A doing B. The purpose of all this maneuvering – which can be very complicated, time-consuming, and expensive – is to confuse the opponent, throw him off balance, and introduce an element of uncertainty into his plans. Once that is achieved, it is a question – again paraphrasing Sun Tzu – of falling on him ‘like a thunderbolt’ with all the force one can muster.¹⁹

The fourth principal constituent of maneuver warfare is using combined arms. “Combined arms is the grouping of diverse arms so that the strength of each arm is brought to the fore so as to expose an enemy weakness to another arm.”²⁰

Today we see an armored division as the modern example of combined arms, with the blend of mechanized infantry, armor, artillery, and reconnaissance synchronized together and driven by a unified command.²¹ The United States Marine Corps took the lead in formalizing this concept of operations (CONOPS), combining Marine ground troops and Marine aviation for expeditionary taskers.²² And the Marines continue to push the doctrine of maneuver warfare today.

Yet again, this is nothing new. A historical example of the principle of combined arms in action would be medieval heavy cavalry. When heavy cavalry attacked independently, it was considered to be “the weakest of the arms.” Whereas “elusive light cavalry, relying on the bow for the long-distance work and on the sword or scimitar for the coup de grace, was the strongest.”²³

If the Crusaders remained with heavy cavalry they would continue to be defeated by light-armored, swift mounted Arabs. As the Comanche would later do – the Arabs would tease the Crusaders into attacking them, and then after they had been drained, worn out and utterly fatigued, they would flock around each knight and progressively obliterate them.

To counter such tactics, the Crusaders themselves were forced to adopt the combined arms system, originally adapted from the Byzantines. Infantry, armed with pikes, provided shelter for the other arms. Bow infantry caused the Arab bow cavalry to maintain a respectful distance, and the heavy cavalry waited for opportunities such as when the Arabs were pinned against terrain obstacles or tripped by concentrated bow firepower as they incautiously came too close to the Crusader formation. At that point, heavy cavalry would deliver an irresistible blow. Provided all the other components were kept well in hand, opposing light cavalry could not cope with this system, while one's own light cavalry was used as an auxiliary arm for foraging, for screening, and for filling gaps between the heavy cavalry and the main body so as to minimize the danger of being swarmed about.²⁴

John Coffee Hays would also use similar combined arms tactics during the siege of Monterrey, Mexico in the fall of 1846.

“After the medieval era, when cavalry (mounted knights) ruled the battlefield, the Spanish *tercios* of the 16th and 17th centuries signaled the return of the infantry's dominance. The development of light infantry followed in the 18th century. The French *Chasseurs*, the Prussian *Jägers*, and the Austrian *Grenzer* regiments followed the ancient Greek concept; in contrast to the rigid maneuvers of their line infantries, the light units were fast, agile, and expected to adapt their tactics to the terrain and situation.”²⁵

Throughout most of his military career, the principle opponent John Coffee Hays fought was light cavalry in the guise of either the Comanche horseman or Mexican lancers, and thus he met that opponent with his own light cavalry. However, the essential principles applied by the 18th century light infantry *jägers* and *grenzers* were fundamentally the same.

Airpower strategist General Giulio Douhet famously coined the phrase, “Flexibility is the key to airpower.”²⁶ It is also one of the key ingredients of maneuver warfare. “Because tempo, surprise, and combined arms all mean the rapid adaptation of available resources to a fleeting situation, the fifth cardinal element of maneuver warfare is *flexibility* (emphasis in original).”²⁷ Being able to improvise, adapt to, and overcome enemy movements is central to the operational art of war, and having a mindset free of entrenched nostrums and doctrines has been the hallmark of successful commanders throughout history.

In the succession of battles fought and won by John Coffee Hays his flexible approach to maneuver warfare may have been his starkest attribute regarding both his command as well as the performance and exploits of his Texans.

To be flexible, a military organization must be well-rounded, self-contained, and not too specialized. It must discourage excessive standardization of component parts and allow redundancy (which permits the organization to absorb hits without impairing its ability to function) and even allow some waste. Even when all these structural elements are in place, the only factor that can guarantee flexibility is training and still more training. While exercises designed to ensure that smooth cooperation of all the different elements are very important, they in themselves are not enough. Rather, it is necessary to pit oneself against an active, reactive opponent (i.e. to use war games of every sort).²⁸

Throughout the career of John Coffee Hays, he was afforded the luxury of having commanders who trusted his judgement. The presidents of the Republic of Texas, Samuel Houston and Mirabeau Lamar, as well as the two commanders of the Mexican American War, Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott, allowed Hays to have free reign after providing him with what we label today as “commander’s intent.” This free reign on the part of Hays reflects the sixth principle of maneuver warfare: centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution.

“Lower levels must be granted both the right and the means to exercise their own initiative, adapt themselves to the situation, and seize the opportune moment. In maneuver

warfare, units and commanders who merely follow orders – let alone wait for them – are useless. The whole point, on the contrary, is to make use of the ‘total independent commitment’ – as the Wehrmacht’s regulations used to put it – of the troops from the lowliest private up.”²⁹

When accounting for most conflicts in the present day (keeping in mind that any generation of war can happen at any time) another key element of maneuver warfare has been the re-introduction of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW).³⁰

Maneuver warfare can be adapted to other generations of war but it may be less successful or more effective based on the generation being fought.

In sequence, the generations of war begin at Zero Generation War (0GW) in which “the entire able population fights. As such there is no difference between civilians and soldiers.”³¹ Primitive tribes fall into this category when they engage in full-blown, unmitigated genocidal war. “Because 0GWs are total wars, Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) in 0GW typically involves ethnic cleansing in kind. Thus, the Great Sioux Uprising that temporarily removed all whites from what is now South Dakota.”³²

First Generation Warfare (1GW) is warfare characterized by order on the battlefield, where uniforms are distinct, and the enemy is known and open. In the past 1GW “was fought with line and column tactics. It lasted from the Peace of Westphalia until around the time of the American Civil War. Its importance for us today is that the First Generation battlefield was usually a battlefield of order, and the battlefield of order created a culture of order in state militaries. Most of the things that define the difference between ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ – saluting, uniforms, careful gradations of rank, etc. – are products of the First Generation and exist to reinforce a military culture of order.”³³

This is how it was when John Coffee Hays and his Texas volunteers went to fight with the United States Army during the Mexican War. The American and Mexican armies conformed to First Generation warfare principles. John Coffee Hays did not.

Just as most state militaries are still designed to fight other state militaries, so they also continue to embody the First Generation Culture of order. The problem is that, starting around the middle of the 19th century, the order of the battlefield began to break down. In the face of mass armies, nationalism that made soldiers want to fight, and technological developments such as the rifled musket, the breechloader, barbed wire, and machine guns, the old line-and-column tactics became suicidal. But as the battlefield became more and more disorderly, state militaries remained locked into a culture of order. The military culture that in the First Generation had been consistent with the battlefield became increasingly contradictory to it. That contradiction is one of the reasons state militaries have so much difficulty in Fourth Generation war, where not only is the battlefield disordered, so is the entire society in which the conflict is taking place.³⁴

Just as the late 19th century German military leadership were the prime engineers of maneuver warfare, French military leadership in the early 20th century were the leading architects of Second Generation Warfare (2GW). Characterized by a methodical grinding down of the adversary, 2GW is concentration of firepower and head-to-head, force-on-force battles.

2GW emerged in the artillery duels of World War One, which occurred everywhere from the plains of Gallipoli, the trenches of Flanders fields, and even the steel dreadnought battleships hammering each other in the North Sea close to the Jutland peninsula of Denmark. Later battles in World War Two such as the hundreds of tanks firing upon each other for weeks on end in the mud-drenched grasslands of Kursk, or the hundreds of aircraft dogfighting over the skies of the Philippine Sea (known to American naval aviators as “The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot”) would be characterized as 2GW. 2GW is mainly attrition warfare. 2GW relies upon “centrally controlled indirect artillery fire, carefully synchronized with infantry, cavalry and aviation, to destroy the enemy by killing his soldiers and blowing up his equipment. The French summarized

Second Generation War with the phrase, ‘The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.’”³⁵ Today many United States Air Force planners prefer this method of warfare, and label it as “Putting warheads on foreheads,” (with an emphasis on precision bombing as opposed to the carpet bombing advocated by airpower advocates of the past), while “The United States Army and the U.S. Marine Corps both learned Second Generation war from the French Army during the First World War, and it largely remains the ‘American way of war’ today.”³⁶

“While 0GW relies on wiping out the enemy, 1GW on defeating him with larger numbers, and 2GW on defeating him with better machines, victory in 3GW (Third Generation Warfare) comes from better minds.”³⁷ A stark example is the German Blitzkrieg of France in 1940. The French had the Maginot Line. The French had more personnel. The French had better tanks. The French believed they were going to fight another war of attrition as they had in World War One. Nevertheless, as former Secretary of Defense, General James “CHAOS” Mattis has often said, “The enemy gets a vote.” And France’s enemy voted to utilize the key elements of maneuver warfare – speed, surprise, combined arms (in this case armor, mechanized infantry, and aviation), flexibility and commander’s intent – to thwart the French forces’ operational plan and inhibiting the French military from carrying out a counter-attack of any consequence. “Third Generation militaries focus outward on the situation, the enemy, and the result the situation requires. Leaders at every level are expected to get that result, regardless of orders. Military education is designed to develop military judgment, not teach processes or methods, and most training is force-on-force free play because only free play approximates the disorder of combat. Third Generation military culture also values initiative over obedience, tolerating mistakes so long as they do not result from timidity, and it relies on self-discipline rather than imposed discipline, because only self-discipline is compatible with initiative.”³⁸ Needless to say, maneuver warfare goes hand in hand with 3GW as well.

“Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 4GW represents one of the largest changes in warfare because the state has lost its monopoly of war.”³⁹ Whereas state military forces have become accustomed to fighting against other state forces, in a 4GW fight the fighters do not concede the domain of conflict to be limited to state uniformed forces. To the 4GW fighter a uniformed state military (or even their law enforcement personnel) is just another tribe, cartel or faction and has no bearing either way - with regard to the legitimacy of legally sanctioned violence - as they refuse to acknowledge the law as the state demands it be acknowledged. In a failed state these actors emerge as groups that states characterize as brigands, insurgents, illegal combatants, pirates, terrorists, or guerillas. Additionally, when the state can no longer perform its primary function, securing the safety and security of its citizens and their property, “the people will look for an alternative and turn towards whatever group or organization can provide them with protection and security.”⁴⁰ Recent examples of this condition would include northern Iraq, where the Kurdish Peshmerga have undertaken the role of the Iraqi state forces, parts of the Philippines, most of Somalia, all of Libya, pockets of Afghanistan, and lately even Mexico.⁴¹

“Viewed in the context of military history, fourth-generation warfare is highly irregular. ‘Asymmetric’ operations — in which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and philosophies of the combatants, and in which the emphasis is on bypassing an opposing military force and striking directly at cultural, political, or population targets — are a defining characteristic of fourth-generation warfare.”⁴²

When the state has arbitrarily drawn borders - individuals will identify with their tribe, their ethnic identity, their religious tradition or other cultural distinctions rather than the state. Since 4GW is a war of non-state entities an effective Counter-4GW force must grasp the nature of asymmetric war where the opponent does not seek to define a frontline or a rear but instead

perceives his battlespace as everywhere. The 4GW fighter rarely makes the distinction between military and civilian opponents. To his mind women and children are combatants as well. Since the 4GW fighter has no legal prohibitions preventing him from financing his cause illicitly he in turn has no compunctions at all using weapons that might be considered outside the boundaries of the laws of armed conflict either. One of his strengths is he can use any weapon he chooses from chemical gases⁴³ to dirty bombs⁴⁴ to devices normally not associated with weapons such as box cutters and commercial airliners. Even conventional weapons may be used for purposes other than what they were designed for such as a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) initially designed to combat armored tanks being used to shoot down a helicopter, which was the case when a United States Army Black Hawk helicopter was shot down in Mogadishu, Somalia.⁴⁵

For Counter-4GW forces this innovation and adaptability presents challenges where there is no enemy order of battle weapons to count nor doctrinal considerations to anticipate as 4GW TTPs are marked by constant adaption and improvisation. However many military theorists see maneuver warfare as the most relevant response to 4GW, as Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Myers has stated, the “maneuverist approach in campaign design and execution remains relevant and effective as a counter-insurgency strategy at the operational level in contemporary operations.”⁴⁶

“This kind of fighting eschews heavy firepower, attrition, and long-range, high-altitude bombardment. It favors joint-service operations and close-quarters combat involving small, fast-moving units with lighter equipment.”⁴⁷ Hence Counter-4GW must intrinsically integrate maneuver warfare into any planned concept of operations.

Relation of early American warriors to Maneuver Warfare

Early colonists to North America swiftly encountered warfare practices to which they were not accustomed to in Europe. The North American Indian did not practice long, protracted

campaigns, line and column tactics, or attrition warfare. In many ways the North American Indian was the precursor to the 4GW fighter.

Millennia before the first European arrived in North America, the American Indian was already galvanized by his surroundings, terrain, and weather and hence used to traveling immense areas by foot, water, and later, by horse. Their method of warfare was akin to maneuver warfare – preferring to effect rapid and ravaging destruction as they raided their enemies before swiftly withdrawing – inflicting as much psychological and traumatic terror as possible upon those fortunate to survive their attacks. Colonial European counterattacks were at first nearly futile against the TTPs of American Indian tribes. In addition to the TTPs employed by these tribes, the Indians also took advantage of terrain which was still unfamiliar to the Europeans.

When it came to war, in order to encounter the Indian on his own terms and survive, the colonist had to develop TTPs which reflected those of the Indians. And part of that involved getting to know their terrain. In order to provide advance warning to settlers of an impending Indian raid the colonists deployed scouts on long-range patrols to search for signs. The range of these patrols depended on the season, supplies, manpower, and most importantly, terrain. The action itself, long distance scouting patrols, was known as ranging – a term which went back to 13th century England, when the label was used to designate a far-reaching borderer or forester used by the English crown to secure the border frontier between Scotland and England. Those who participated in ranging – from 13th century England to early colonial America – were known as rangers.

The designated rangers who journeyed through the frontier wilderness to reconnoiter, report, and warn the colonial settlements of the Commonwealth of Virginia were recognized as such with the “Ranger” appellation around the time of the Berkeley Plantation Massacre of 1622.⁴⁸

“As they went in search of the enemy, the words range, ranging and Ranger were frequently used.”⁴⁹

Later, during King Philip’s War, the Indian tribes who fought against the English colonists proved themselves extremely proficient at demonstrating their aptitude for effective ambushing techniques and in their lethal applications of such – gained a lasting reputation of brutality and cruelty. This in turn managed to further infuse the terror felt by the settlers in all the colonies even more intensely.

To combat this the colonists learned to employ the methods of maneuver warfare, particularly flexibility and decentralized command. The colonies raised small squads of pioneers who were proficient at living off the land, catching wild game, experts at terrain, and master horsemen. These men were then organized into groups of rangers who would fan out, screening and scouting - between the frontier and their settlements.

Later, in western and central Europe, hunters - translated into German as jäger – skirmishers and sharpshooters, were used by German armies as light infantrymen. These hunters, skirmishers and sharpshooters were allowed to fight at an independent level rather than as part of a larger military force. These were the maneuver warriors in 18th century Europe.

The ranger, the jäger, and the American Indian warrior all shared a virtuosity in maneuver warfare, and the limited fraternity of the ranger, jäger, and warrior as a group would remain a small yet effective military component in the centuries to come. Eventually they would be joined by the grenzers, the hussars, and the pandurs of Europe as well.

“In small unit operations, the essence of maneuver consists of ‘stealth and stalking.’ It is a question of exploiting the terrain, while maintaining cover, and jockeying for position, all the

while waiting for the opportune moment to arrive. In this respect, it is much like the hunter, or jäger. In fact, jäger units are the source of many of the tactics practiced in maneuver warfare.”⁵⁰

Early American Fighters: Colonial Maneuver Warfare – Benjamin Church to Francis Marion

One of the earliest practitioners of maneuver warfare in North America was the father of American ranging: Colonel Benjamin Church (circa 1639 – 1718). In 1676, during King Philip’s War, Church was commissioned by the governor of the Plymouth Colony (Josiah Winslow) as a company grade commander (captain) in charge of the first ranger company in North America. Church and his rangers also fought in King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War. Church patterned his rangers to model themselves after the TTPs of the American Indian tribes they fought with - and against. Church’s memoirs, *Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip’s War*, published in 1716, is considered by historians today to be the first American military manual ever written.⁵¹

Like other American leaders in maneuver warfare who followed him, Church was a quick study when it came to his enemy. Observing how the Indians successfully ambushed colonists when the colonists traveled in large groups – and the colonists’ reaction by closing ranks, rather than dispersing and making themselves a harder target, as well as depriving themselves of the ability to regroup and counterattack – thus giving the Indians a target-rich environment, Church turned the Indian’s tactics around. When Church’s Rangers advanced through enemy terrain they would do so in loose formations – depriving the Indians of a clustered together herd of easy targets and hence granting a maneuver element the opportunity to implement a counterattack after an enemy encounter, to the point where Church’s Rangers were soon turning the tables by consistently employing the field tactic of encirclement and precision shooting.

Other colonies soon imitated Colonel Church's successful program and soon other ranger-style military organizations were raised culminating (before the American War of Independence) with the Georgia Rangers who were initially formed in 1734 and fought not only Indians but against Spanish forces in Florida as well. The Georgia Rangers disbanded for the final time only four months before the American Declaration of Independence.

During the period between Church's Rangers and the Georgia Rangers other ranger leaders made their historical impact. Colonel Church had the father of John Lovewell in his command as well as the grandfather of John Gorham.⁵² Both Lovewell and Gorham participated in Massachusetts Bay Province's Governor William Dummer's war against a coalition of Indian tribes (The Wabanaki Confederacy who were allies with the French) later known as Dummer's War (1722 – 1725).

Lovewell became the most famous ranger of the 18th century after the Battle of Pequawket (1725), when he was later immortalized by authors such as Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Henry David Thoreau (who labeled the battle "Lovewell's Fight.")⁵³

During the third of the four French and Indian Wars known as King George's War (1744-1748), John Gorham formed a ranger company known as "Gorham's Rangers," which became so successful at effective maneuver warfare - Gorham became the first American ranger to receive a commission as a captain in the regular British Army in acknowledgement of his outstanding service to the crown. Captain John Gorham was the first of three rangers (followed by younger brother Joseph Gorham and Robert Rogers) to earn commissions in the British Army, an elusive prize for many colonial men who strove for but never achieved it (including George Washington).

Finally, the last celebrated ranger prior to American independence from the British crown was Major Robert Rogers who in 1751 established Rogers' Rangers: nine Ranger companies throughout the colonies of New England. A prodigal genius at maneuver warfare – Major

Robert's left to posterity the first set of standard orders for rangers in 1759. To this day *Robert Rogers' 28 "Rules of Ranging,"* is acknowledged as being one of the first modern military field manuals for asymmetric warfare and continues to be presented to all United States Army Rangers when they have earned their Ranger tabs.

Benjamin Church, John Lovewell, John Gorham, and Robert Rogers. All early American military leaders who implicitly understood maneuver warfare as rangers and irregular fighters in the very early American frontier. And then there was also a young colonial officer named George Washington.

By 1754 the western frontier of the British colonies was expanding into the Ohio River Valley, which was still occupied by independent Indian tribes and French colonists. The British empire perceived the French as infringing to the east.

"General Edward Braddock was sent with two regiments to secure the encroachment of French forces on England's claimed lands."⁵⁴

"Officers in the colonial militias generally aspired to receive a Royal Commission as a symbol of status; George Washington was among these officers."⁵⁵ And George Washington was with Braddock's army as a colonial militiaman. The only individual in the expedition who was familiar with maneuver warfare.

The perceived French advance into British colonial territory was met by General Braddock's forces marching to meet them – once they had forded the Monongahela River to surprise the French at Fort Duquesne, "Colours flying, Drums Beating, and Fifes playing,"⁵⁶ Braddock's men, including Washington, were now only a mile away from their objective.

General Braddock's forces consisted of his 44th and 48th regiments, the New York Independent Company, three companies of Virginia rangers, a company of Virginia

artificers/carpenters, Stewart's Virginia light horse,"⁵⁷ a detachment of sailor/marines and some gunners. More than 1200 in all British forces forging into present-day western Pennsylvania to meet 900 (254 French regulars and Canadian militiamen plus 650 Indians) opposing French forces.⁵⁸

The plan was to lay siege to the French fort.

The plan was a simple frontal assault.

"This siege would not occur because the French had a plan of their own."⁵⁹

The French were planning to defend their fort by engaging in offensive action against the British before the British had time to set up a perimeter around the fort and commence a siege.

The commander of Fort Duquesne, Captain Claude Pierre Pecaudy, Sieur de Contrecoeur, sent men out commanded by Captain Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie-Lienard de Beaujeu and Captain Jean-Daniel Dumas to meet the English and left a small vanguard behind to defend the fort.

The Battle of Monongahela started after the English forces had proceeded one mile in from the Monongahela River. The English forces had hoped to surprise the French forces at the fort and the French forces had hoped to ambush the English forces at the river, resulting in both forces being surprised. The English forces unleashed the first musket volley of fire, killing Captain de Beaujeu, leaving Dumas to continue the fight.

"French forces held the high ground, but English forces were advancing on the confused French forces. Dumas made the decision to attack the English flanks, which stymied the English advance and caused English forces to fire in all directions and greatly contributed to the large instances of fratricide by English forces. Dumas decisiveness in ordering a flank attack during the first ten minutes of the battle ensured French victory. The disarray among English forces turned into a complete rout as they disintegrated and fled for the safety of the Great Meadows."⁶⁰

George Washington attested to the disgraceful actions of the English regulars, writing in a letter to the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, Robert Dinwiddie about the collapse of their discipline under fire.⁶¹

*“In short the dastardly behavior of the English Soldier’s expos’d all those who were inclined to do their duty to almost certain Death; and at length, in despite of every effort to the contrary, broke and run as Sheep before the hounds, leav’g the Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, and every individual thing we had with us prey to the enemy.”*⁶²

The French and their Indian allies matched the English in their firepower, yet the French and Indian forces were able to outflank the English during their panic, subsequently creating the conditions for a disorganized retreat, abandonment of weapons and several cases of fratricide.

Upon a nearby hill, where French and Indian forces were raining fire down upon Braddock’s troops, Washington suggested attacking the hill with his Virginia militiamen to *“engage the enemy in their own way; but the propriety of this was not seen into until it was too late for execution,”*⁶³ Washington later wrote. Clearly Braddock would not be a champion of maneuver warfare as it was later defined. But George Washington swiftly learned fighting a battle was an activity where propriety had no place and engaging the enemy by following the enemy’s rules was rarely effective.

While Braddock was attempting to rally his men he was mortally shot, joining most of his senior and junior officers – most of whom had been mortally wounded or dead as well. *“Scores of regimental officers lay dead or wounded along with hundreds of soldiers. The enemy’s shooting was clearly quite accurate and the British soldiers’ instinct to close ranks simply offered excellent targets even through the thick musket smoke.”*⁶⁴ Closing ranks for defense is one of the opposite principles of maneuver warfare. Ignoring most of the principles of maneuver warfare was fatal for many British officers and men that day.

Miraculously, Washington was the solitary officer not wounded or dead at this stage of the battle. “Four bullets had pierced his coat and two horses had been shot under him but he had escaped any injury.”⁶⁵

Washington attempted to rally the remaining British forces during the rout, but they were overwhelmed with panic and despair. General Braddock died of his wounds during the long retreat and in the end the tally of wounded and dead together was over 1000 with an estimated 450 British troops killed in action. “The leading officers had been killed or wounded including the commanding general. All the artillery and baggage had been lost. It ranked as one of the worst disasters in the annals of the British Army.”⁶⁶

One upshot of Braddock’s defeat was the resulting stature of George Washington. To the American colonists who heard of the battle he was a hero. And his experiences molded him into a maneuver warfare fighter. Later battles created other heroes such as Nathanael Green, Daniel Morgan and Robert Rogers of Rogers’ Rangers. All of them more interested in maneuver warfare than wars of attrition, siege, or frontal assault.

General Braddock’s replacement, John Campbell, the 4th Earl of Loudoun, listened to George Washington’s counsel. Lord Loudoun “encouraged the formation of rangers and light troops. More significantly he felt this should not be limited to American frontiersmen but should also be practiced by selected British regular soldiers grouped in light units.”⁶⁷ The Earl of Loudoun was succeeded by General Abercrombie who, after his disastrous frontal attack on Ticonderoga in July 1758, was in turn replaced by Sir Jeffrey Amherst as commander of the forces in North America. Amherst, who had just captured Fortress Louisbourg, used light troops in conjunction with his light battalions and proceeded cautiously, not wishing to replicate the fates of Braddock and Abercrombie.”⁶⁸

The upshot of all these actions correlates with lessons learned in both maneuver warfare and principally 4GW.

Events prior to and following Braddock's Defeat symbolized the nation state's loss of a monopoly on war. Native raids on frontier settlements precipitated the arrival of General Edward Braddock with two regiments of foot (infantry) to pacify the western settlements. Following the conclusion of hostilities with France, native unrest west of the Appalachian Mountains once again erupted in Pontiac's Rebellion. The Proclamation of 1763 brought the hostile actions of Pontiac's Rebellion to a close but left the door open to a whole new insurgency that was realized in the following decade.⁶⁹

“Ultimately, in the final third of the 18th century, the French developed their light infantry in line with experience acquired in Europe, while the British, and eventually the Americans, adapted theirs as a result of their experiences on campaign amid the North American wilderness.”⁷⁰

In a pattern which would repeat itself over and over, however, which required new “pioneers” to blaze a trail which had been summarily forgotten during peacetime – all the experiences gained by rangers and light infantry in maneuver warfare were swiftly forgotten.

In spite of the proven utility of light infantry units, they were not established as permanent formations in European militaries. Light infantry units only prospered during wartime, and they were usually dissolved when the conflict ended. The catastrophic defeat in 1755 in Pennsylvania of the British forces under General Edward Braddock by a small force of Indians and French light infantry that employed ambush tactics and took advantage of terrain, agility and loose formations convinced the British to create Roger's Rangers and the Royal American Regiment, both of which eventually became famous light infantry units during the French and Indian War. Typically, both units were dissolved when the war ended.⁷¹

At the start of the American War of Independence, George Washington recognized the utility and value of rangers and consequently appointed his first ranger leader, Thomas Knowlton, to engage in ranger TTPs. Knowlton, a veteran of Bunker Hill and the Siege of Boston, was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and ordered to select a group of men from the New England colonies (including Captain Nathan Hale) to be the United States' first official spies. “Knowlton's Rangers,”

as they came to be known, are also considered by many historians to be the first unit of elite troops in the United States military. At the Battle of Harlem Heights however Lieutenant Colonel Knowlton clashed with a force of British heavy infantry and was mortally wounded. Washington wrote in his general orders for September 17, 1776, "*The gallant and brave Col Knowlton, ... would have been an Honor to any Country, having fallen yesterday, while gloriously fighting ...for his country.*"⁷²

Other notable rangers who fought in the American War of Independence were Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys, who bloodlessly captured Fort Ticonderoga early in the conflict and earned distinction not only as a military leader but also as the "father" of the state of Vermont, George Rogers Clark, older brother of William Clark of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, known as the "Conqueror of the Old Northwest" after his successes using maneuver warfare and irregular tactics in the Illinois Campaign, and The Swamp Fox, Francis Marion, scourge of the Loyalist Tory troops of the United Kingdom, and ingenious master of the sudden surprise attack and equally abrupt and unexpected departure from the battle; one of - if not the - foremost masters of maneuver warfare during the American fight for independence.

The tie which bound men like Knowlton, Allen, Clark and Marion together was an avoidance of direct and sustained attacks. Their principles of tempo, surprise, flexibility and especially decentralized command were exercised with little deviation. Enveloping the enemy rather than focusing on frontal assaults was their signature tactic.

Career military men of that era, however, preferred the lessons in martial adeptness instilled in them by European professionals such as Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben and once American independence had been established, sought to learn from the actions occurring across the Atlantic Ocean in Europe, rather than the lessons they had learned in their own backyards.

Not everyone who participated in the American War of Independence forgot their lessons though. One of these individuals, a young courier who had been captured by British forces and bore the sabre scars of a British officer (as punishment for refusing to clean the officer's boots), was also a seasoned veteran of battles with and against North American Indians. This individual respected and appreciated the advantages of, and devoted his military career to the proficient application of, maneuver warfare. His subsequent experience and mastery of maneuver warfare would in due course contribute to a career path which would eventually elevate him into becoming the seventh President of the United States of America.

Early American Fighters: Post-Colonial Maneuver Warfare - Andrew Jackson

In the summer of 1813, a faction of Creek Indians known as The Red Sticks led by Chief Red Eagle (also known as Menawa) and aligned with the British crown, attacked a garrison of militia at Fort Sims, Alabama. The entire defending force and most of the women and children who didn't escape were wiped out, including numerous Creek Indians not belonging to the Red Stick faction. The massacre marked a transition from an internal civil war between various factions of the Creek tribe to a war between the United States and The Red Sticks, with most Creeks siding with the United States.

Major General Andrew Jackson led the Tennessee State Militia and was ready to fight the United Kingdom, which had formally been in a declared war with the United States beginning that same year. After the massacre at Fort Sims though, in an operation devised to avenge the atrocities committed by the United Kingdom's allies – The Red Sticks - Jackson marched his army into Alabama.

Jackson had spent most of his life in the backwoods of the American frontier and respected the martial capabilities and prowess of the American Indian - and so "considered with

care information on the enemy provided by friendly Creeks, Choctaws, and Cherokees.”⁷³ Jackson intuitively knew reliable intelligence would give him the fighting edge and “out of instinct rather than military training – of which he had little – Jackson understood that intelligence concerning his enemies’ forces would be invaluable.”⁷⁴

After learning of another Red Stick attack on allied Creeks at Talladega, Jackson rode to their aid and tapped into three reliable elements of maneuver warfare to ensure his force’s success prior to their first engagement: surprise, combined arms, and flexibility. Jackson’s forces surprised the Red Sticks by successfully feinting with a frontal attack of three mounted companies while he ordered his light infantry militia to the left flank and his light infantry volunteers to the right flank and the rest of his mounted troops out on the further flanks in a judicious application of combined arms. This flexibility was intrinsic to the means in which Jackson sought to outmaneuver and outflank his Red Stick opponents - and his gambit was a success. The Red Sticks took the bait, Jackson’s three mounted companies fell back and soon the enemy was encircled and ensnared in a lethal crossfire.

A young enlisted soldier named David Crockett later wrote the Red Sticks reacted “like a cloud of Egyptian locusts, screaming like all the red devils had been turned loose, with the old devil of all at their head.”⁷⁵ That old devil being their leader Chief Red Eagle. Somehow Red Eagle and his “locusts” swarmed through a gap in Jackson’s line and managed to escape. Yet, the final tally was 299 dead Red Sticks compared to the loss of 15 of Jackson’s troops. Added to this was a new name which Andrew Jackson acquired from his foe, “Sharp Knife.”⁷⁶

Early in 1814 Jackson gained an additional force of regular Army soldiers, the 39th United States Infantry Regiment, bringing the combined might of Jackson’s army to over 3500 troops (to include 500 Cherokee and 100 Creek collaborators). When Jackson received word of

Red Chief and a thousand of his warriors close by in a village near the Tallapoosa River, he made the determination to once again attack. *“This enemy posed a dual danger: they were a threat to frontier life, and they had chosen to ally themselves with the nation’s larger enemy, Great Britain.”*⁷⁷

The Red Sticks were camped at Horseshoe Bend, a U-shaped curve in the Tallapoosa River which provided a natural barrier on three sides. The one remaining avenue of attack was filled up with a breastwork of timber 8 feet high and 400 feet long.

On March 27, 1814 – at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend - Jackson sent mounted infantry to attack the bend in the river – convincing the Red Sticks this is where the main attack would come.

However, Jackson swiftly attacked the Red Stick breastwork fortifications – barraging them with two artillery pieces firing for two straight hours. Damage to the breastworks was minimal though and Jackson was quite impressed by how well the Red Sticks resisted the initial siege.

Jackson wrote, *“It is impossible to conceive a situation more eligible for defense than the one they had chosen and the skill which they manifested in their breastwork was really astonishing. It extended across the point in such a direction as that a force approaching would be exposed to a double fire, while they lay entirely safe behind it. It would have been impossible to have raked it with cannon to any advantage even if we had had possession of one extremity.”*⁷⁸

The artillery barrage was followed up by a bayonet charge and a full-frontal attack on the fortifications of the Red Stick encampment. And while the Red Sticks main force was engaged in repelling the frontal assault, the mounted troops coming in at the tip of the peninsula rode through the river, into the enemy camp, and surrounded them. However, the Red Sticks refused

to surrender and chose instead to continue fighting. After five hours of combat approximately 800 of the 1000 Red Stick warriors were dead with a loss of 43 of Jackson's soldiers and an initial loss of 23 of Jackson's Cherokee and Creek allies. The Battle of Horseshoe Bend was over.

Chief Red Eagle managed to slip out of the enemy's camp during the fighting though, despite being severely wounded, and retreated to Spanish Florida where he and his surviving warriors stayed with a Seminole tribe. Eventually he would personally surrender to Andrew Jackson with a promise to end his fighting and – due to the terms Jackson offered him – assisted Jackson in making peace with the other renegades.

General Jackson was the same man who early the next year (January 8, 1815) defended New Orleans, Louisiana from a force of British troops who were seasoned veterans of campaigns against Napoleon Bonaparte. Indeed, the British commander of the forces invading New Orleans was the brother-in-law of the Duke of Wellington, who would defeat the first Emperor of France at Waterloo six months later (June 18, 1815). Needless to say – Jackson did not play by the rules of infantry squares, line and column tactics, and close order drill – hence he handily defeated the thousands of professional European soldiers who fought against less than a thousand of his regular Army troops, less than two hundred Marines and Navy sailors, a little over a thousand each of Louisiana and Tennessee militia, a scattering of Kentucky and Mississippi militia, 52 Choctaw warriors and a band of pirates under the command of Jean Lafitte.⁷⁹ Although not formally developed by the German army until World War One, Jackson was in essence fighting a 3GW fight against a 1GW foe. “Instead of trying to hold a line in the defense, the object was to draw the enemy in, then cut him off, putting whole enemy units ‘in the bag.’”⁸⁰ This is something Jackson succeeded in doing and became The Hero of New Orleans.

Major General Andrew Jackson's most trusted and valued commander from the fight against the Red Sticks at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend to the fight against the British at the Battle of New Orleans was a Virginia-born gentleman named John Coffee. John Coffee commanded the Tennessee militiamen of the 2nd Regiment of Volunteer Mounted Riflemen, and later took command of the 1st Regiment of Volunteer Mounted Gunmen during The War of 1812. At the Battle of New Orleans, Coffee's troops were the first to engage with the invading British forces and defended their positions in the hard learned American manner acquired after centuries of experience gained on the frontier – by shooting at the invaders from the concealment of brush and trees.



Figure 1. Brigadier General John Coffee (1772 - 1833).
Courtesy of Tennessee State Library and Archives, Library Photograph Collection.

Five years after The Battle of New Orleans, a son was born to Harmon Atkins Hays of Cedar Lick Tennessee. Harmon Hays was a Second Lieutenant in the 2nd Light Dragoons and also fought at Horseshoe Creek and New Orleans under John Coffee's command. Harmon Hays named his son after his commander - John Coffee. There are some historians which claim Hays was related to Coffee via marriage but as yet there is no evidence of this.⁸¹ Identifying his son with the name of a nationally renowned American virtuoso of maneuver warfare was certainly an omen heralding the arrival of a new American pioneer of maneuver warfare.

Research Question

Texas Ranger: Captain John Coffee Hays

Harmon Hay's experience as an officer fighting under Andrew Jackson in The War of 1812 may have influenced young John Coffee Hays' thoughts on the most efficient means of fighting on the American frontier. Being raised by a seasoned veteran of hostile engagements with The Red Sticks and the British, it is entirely plausible young John Coffee Hays heard accounts of the actions of his father, as well as those of Andrew Jackson, Davy Crockett, and of course his namesake, John Coffee, from these same individuals personally "and profited by what was said."⁸²

John Coffee Hays may have also acquired some knowledge of the valiant exploits of Third Lieutenant (or Ensign) Samuel Houston who also fought at The Battle of Horseshoe Bend. Lieutenant Houston was grievously injured and nearly died of the numerous wounds received at Horseshoe Bend, yet after convalescence and leaving the Army four years later, Houston eventually moved to Texas and - after defeating Antonio López de Santa Anna's Mexican Army at The Battle of San Jacinto - led the former Mexican state of Texas to freedom as a sovereign independent republic. As a general, Sam Houston may have also applied the lessons he learned

as a young lieutenant at Horseshoe Bend for The Battle of San Jacinto. Many factors of Maneuver Warfare were demonstrated at San Jacinto: tempo, *Schwerpunkt*, surprise, and flexibility. Shortly afterwards Houston was elected the second president of the Republic of Texas (after David Gouverneur Burnet).




Figure 2. Ensign Samuel Houston (1793 - 1863).

Courtesy of Tennessee State Library and Archives, Library Photograph Collection.

John Coffee Hays grew up in Tennessee hearing of the legendary feats of men like Sam Houston. As a young man he spent a year at the Davidson Academy of Nashville (today's George Peabody College of Vanderbilt University) before spending a short period of time surveying the swamps of Mississippi. Soon after earning enough money to follow his fellow Tennesseans to Texas, John Coffee Hays arrived in the nascent republic sometime after The

Battle of San Jacinto and was introduced to then President of the Republic of Texas: Sam Houston.

Sam Houston appointed John Coffee Hays to the Texas Rangers as “one of the first recruits in a battalion of two hundred and eight mounted men.”⁸³ John Coffee Hays initial introduction to combat demonstrated he was an adept initiate into the art and science of maneuver warfare. Within a scant few months Hays went from being a private in that battalion to the commissioned captain of his own company – his capabilities recognized throughout the young republic – and came to be known by friend and foe simply as “Captain Jack.” Hays would harness the skills he steadily acquired through experience - and apply them with methodical determination to relentlessly and systematically developing the methods of maneuver warfare which he would introduce to the plains of Texas - and beyond.

These methods would go on to subsequently uniquely influence, shape, develop and contribute to a combat doctrine which astute future American military leaders would respect, study and further pursue, refine, advance and put into action themselves.



Figure 3. Early Texas Rangers.
Courtesy of The Illustrated London News. London: June 18, 1842.

Observational Assessment

Maneuver Warfare Precedents & Highlights

When legendary military theorist Colonel John Boyd began to study the operational art of war going back to antiquity, he observed the further back he went the same patterns continually emerged.

Doing it backward emphasized continuity, not change. He pondered what the essence of success was for those who won battles and wars across different times and continents. He began to focus on maneuverability, quickness, attacks in flank or rear, and rapid adaptation to tactical developments. These were the constants, and winning was often about getting inside the adversary's decision cycle, controlling the tempo of battle, being unpredictable, causing friction for the adversary, and taking advantage of the element of surprise. He noticed that the larger forces did not always win battles. Attacks from the flank or the rear, contrived misdirection, timing, and deception all played important parts in achieving victory.⁸⁴

And maneuver warfare successes ran through from the battles of antiquity to the medieval period to the post Westphalian era to the modern era up to and including the most recent actions and wars fought by the armed forces of the United States.

When going back to antiquity it can be said that, while not exclusive to Western culture, maneuver warfare has certainly been an element of Western warfare since at least Classical Greek civilization. With the subsequent emergence in Western culture's development of abstract theory, creativity, and innovation in art, science, and philosophy the principles of war have followed.

The result has been a constant increase in the technical ability of Western armies to kill their adversaries. Is it not odd that Greek hoplites, Roman legionaries, medieval knights, Byzantine fleets, Renaissance foot soldiers, Mediterranean galleys, and Western arquebusiers were usually equipped with greater destructive power than their adversaries? Even the capture or purchase of Western arms is no guarantee of technological parity – as the Ottomans, Indians, and Chinese learned – inasmuch as European weaponry is an evolving phenomenon, ensuring obsolescence almost simultaneously with the creation of new arms. Creativity has never been a European monopoly, much less intellectual brilliance. Rather, the West's willingness to craft superior weapons is just as often predicated on its unmatched

ability to borrow, adopt, and steal ideas without regard to the social, religious, or political changes that new technology often brings – as the incorporation of and improvement on the trireme, Roman gladius, astrolabe, and gunpowder attest.⁸⁵

Where no one else did, John Coffee Hays saw the potential of a handgun with a revolving cylinder capable of firing more than one round at a time. He also exploited the potential of light cavalry. And finally, when given the opportunity to work with combined arms as he did at the Battle of Monterrey, he immediately grasped the promise of the potential success of coordinated attacks and applied them. Hays intrinsically sensed his light cavalry would be the key to a successful strategy. And until the post-industrial age of mechanized warfare, light cavalry (and light infantry) were absolutely key.

Since the actual age of industrial warfare coordinated mechanized attacks – whether from the combined arms of Stukas, Panzers, and armored personnel carriers used in the Blitzkriegs of Western Europe in 1940, to Sir Archibald David Stirling’s raid on Sidi Haneish Airfield in 1942, to the helicopter air assault “cavalry” deployed in The Battle of Ia Drang – all designed to make an end-round against a direct frontal assault on the enemy, have replaced the light infantry and cavalry of generations past. Nonetheless – although the weapons systems may have changed the lessons learned from their use have not. Principles of Maneuver Warfare such as asymmetric fighting, counterinsurgency warfare, getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle, what Colonel John Boyd referred to as the OODA loop, and countering 4GW remain just as fundamental to know and execute as they have ever been.

Maneuver Warfare Principles

Asymmetric warfare

Asymmetric warfare is warfare between forces which are not equal, even or matched. Asymmetric warfare is warfare that attacks an enemy in a way that is not expected - often avoiding

their strongest defenses. A classic asymmetric fight occurs between an occupying professional, uniformed military and a local resistance or insurgency who do not engage in conventional warfare, prefer guerilla tactics and sometimes even engage in terrorism to achieve their ends. Over the last century historical examples of this type of fighting would include Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence (commonly known as Lawrence of Arabia) leading the Arab revolt during the Sinai and Palestine campaign against the Ottoman Empire, the Provisional Irish Republican Army fighting in the Northern Campaign against the British Empire, and the Kurdish Peshmerga groups fighting in northern Iraq and Syria today. Usually, but not always, the insurgents are not state-aligned actors. Not all asymmetric fights are between state-aligned and non-state aligned actors either. Sometimes an asymmetric fight is merely a battle between forces which are simply not equal. In September 1842 a Mexican Army of 1400 men, commanded by General Adrian Woll, invaded the Republic of Texas and occupied the city of San Antonio. “The Mexicans held it for nine days until a force of 600 Texas Rangers headed by Jack Hays decoyed them out of the city and into ambush on Saledo Creek. Woll lost 60 men to the Texans’ one and retreated toward the Rio Grande.”⁸⁶ Hays attacked Woll in ways which were not expected and thus the 1400 against 600 advantage Woll had in standard terms of orders of battle, was lost in asymmetric combat.

No matter who has participated, what type of weapons were used, or when or where the conflict occurred, the principle of asymmetric warfare remains: it is a war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly.

Counterinsurgency warfare (COIN)

The United States Department of State defines counterinsurgency (COIN) as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”⁸⁷ Hence of the four elements of the DIME (Diplomacy, Information,

Military, Economics) model, information and economics are equally as important as the military element and consequently COIN operations by their nature transform into more of a political than military contest. Nonetheless using military means to more effectively utilize the informational and economic elements by providing security, fortifying governmental legitimacy, and reducing the sway any insurgency may have over the local population, continues to be an integral part of any COIN strategy. A large amount of COIN strategy also entails marginalizing insurgents via different means including not recognizing them as a legitimate force but instead treating them as mere common criminals, not recognizing any political wing or front the insurgent's operate to convey their political messages and demands, and denying all of their economic resources - from the eradication of contraband to sanctioning all economic means of trade.

The American military has a history of COIN operations going back over the centuries but being codified in its final campaign directly after the Spanish American War in its newly acquired possession of the Philippines. "The tactics used in the war demonstrated a clear leaning toward the guerrilla style of war that emphasized ambushes, raids, and the separation of the populous from insurgents. A review of the backgrounds of the significant players demonstrated the presence of American political, economic, military, and psychological (PEMP) interests and Philippine interests of religion and independence."⁸⁸ General John Joseph "Black Jack" Pershing served as a captain in the Philippines during this era at the rank of a brevet major and later brevet lieutenant colonel and he wrote of witnessing one psychological aspect of COIN operations: burying Islamic (the label used at that time was "Muhhamadan") insurgents killed in action with pork to disincentive their jihadist attacks.⁸⁹ With large force-on-force attrition warfare battles later being fought in World War One and World War Two, followed by another conventional war on the Korean peninsula any lessons learned in COIN operations were swiftly forgotten only to have to be reinvented again when

the American military found itself in Vietnam. And the Field Manual for COIN had to be written from scratch.⁹⁰ General William Westmoreland, the commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was a graduate of West Point, led men into battle during World War Two and was already a Brigadier General at the age of 38 during the Korean War. Thus, his training and experience called for a war of attrition and he rejected using COIN operations as simply “pacification.” General James Mattis had a better grasp of COIN operations. When Mattis was in charge of the counterinsurgency in Iraq, he famously said, “every time you wave at an Iraqi civilian, al-Qaeda rolls over in its grave.”⁹¹ And General David Petraeus ended up writing the COIN Field Manual all over again when he was in command of the American forces in Afghanistan.⁹²

Maintaining accessible and unrestricted lines of communication (LOC), free waterways and roads, and ensuring open access to terrain – while denying this to insurgents - is another essential element of maneuver warfare exploited by COIN strategists to block insurgents as well.

Going back to the Roman Empire and their penchant for building roads to project their military force, this force multiplier then, as now, was the subsequent promoter of economic growth, extension of their governance, and other benefits to local communities. Keeping LOCs open also gives the advantage to COIN forces by “channeling and restricting insurgent movement and compartmenting terrain,”⁹³ which insurgents may otherwise be free to maneuver in. As always, “The general concepts of being more flexible, agile, and unpredictable are essential whenever and wherever you are operating.”⁹⁴

The OODA Loop

The noted British military theorist, Colin Gray, praised the OODA loop theory of Colonel John Boyd by stating, it “may appear too humble to merit categorization as grand theory, but that is what it is. It has an elegant simplicity, an extensive domain of applicability,

and contains a high quality of insight about strategic essentials, such that its author well merits honorable mention as an outstanding general theorist of strategy.”⁹⁵ In a nutshell, Colonel Boyd’s extensive study of military history, maneuver warfare, and the elements of a campaign which contribute to victory manifested themselves by one opponent getting inside the other opponent’s decision cycle. Observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) - before the opponent - and the victory goes to the first element to decide and act, hence the phrase: getting inside the other’s decision cycle.

Colonel Boyd understood maneuver warfare was effective due its psychological advantages primarily. Tempo, *Schwerpunkt*, surprise, and flexibility in particular are all maneuver warfare principles which do not rely on equipment, funding, technology or other advantages one force has over another in a typical order of battle. Instead, these principles rely primarily on the human element. One of Colonel Boyd’s dictums was, “Terrain does not fight wars. Machines do not fight wars. People fight wars. It is in the minds of men that war must be fought.”⁹⁶ Just as in asymmetric warfare and COIN operations, a mindset which transcends the characteristic military response of blunt force applied to the enemy as the only requirement for victory, is required to effectively apply the OODA decision loop.

Colonel Boyd’s experiences as a fighter pilot, his research into history, and grasp of the psychological aspect of warfare all led him to conclude mastery of maneuver warfare was the key to successfully defeating an enemy, consequently he became the latest in a long line of American pioneers of maneuver warfare whose tenets, unlike those who came before him such as Benjamin Church, John Lovewell, John Gorham, Robert Rogers, Thomas Knowlton, Ethan Allen and even George Washington and Andrew Jackson, and even later still, John Coffee Hays, are now respected, valued and most importantly of all – remembered, taught, studied, and absorbed.

All of Boyd's accumulated and combined wisdom resulted not only in his OODA loop theory but in his advocacy of not only appreciating the value of maneuver warfare but "learning how to do it quickly and well."⁹⁷

"This was an expansion on his experience of air-to-air combat in Korea: commander's intent, good TTP, and understanding where and when advantage could be had leads to achieving a successful kill. One should seek out the disposition of the enemy, much as Napoleon's skirmishers had done, then infiltrate and penetrate, as the Germans had learned in World War I and World War II, to exploit the surfaces and gaps, the strong and weak points, of opposing forces. Maneuver warfare was the way to do so and learning how to do it quickly and well was the key to victory."⁹⁸

Circumstances in the past where the OODA principle was in action at sea would include the Battle of Trafalgar (1805), the Battle of Tsushima (1905) and the Battle off Samar (1944). In the air domain the OODA cycle put in practice may certainly be seen in the early campaign of Claire Chennault's American Volunteer Group: The Flying Tigers, as well as the Doolittle Tokyo Raid, and Operation Bolo during the war in Vietnam. On the land Colonel Boyd mentions one of the first significant maneuver warfare battles as being the Battle of Gaugamela (331 B.C.) between King Darius' Persians and Alexander the Great's Greeks.⁹⁹ Robert E. Lee was a master of maneuver warfare beating George B. McClellan at the Seven Days Battles and Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville. And yet. Martin van Creveld writes, "armies historically have tended to eschew maneuver warfare for the 'safe,' prosaic frontal assault. That was much of General U.S. Grant's great insight and led to his prescription for victory in the American Civil War; General Lee never got the chance to outmaneuver him."¹⁰⁰ But Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse didn't cooperate with Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer's frontal assault at the Little Big

Horn and got inside his OODA Loop instead. The results of that noteworthy and unique engagement continue to be studied today - yet if examined in the light of Boyd's decision cycle many of the factors which ensured a Lakota, Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho victory can be clearly observed.

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

The Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) fighter starts out with some advantages over the Counter-4GW fighter. The 4GW side "will usually know the terrain better. It is likely to start out with stronger support among the local population, especially if the state forces on the other side are foreign."¹⁰¹

Nonetheless, an effective Counter-4GW effort will "have more resources for training, better equipment, better logistics, and sometimes in combat they can employ supporting arms, which they use when they can although they don't depend on them."¹⁰²

There have been successful Counter-4GW efforts in multiple domains, from sea to air to land, but the most notable success stories have occurred on the land domain from the Second Boer War which ended in 1902, the Herero Wars which ended in 1908 up and until the present day with the recent international military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which finished with the effective annihilation of ISIS.

A key element of maneuver warfare, combined arms, is also a force-multiplier to the Counter-4GW fight. And finally - reconnaissance, intelligence, communications, and flexibility – are critical resources to be made the most of in any successful Counter-4GW commander's operational design. The modern challenges faced by a Counter-4GW force though are exacerbated by the temptation to tie them down to and hence defend fixed positions ("Force

Protection”), burden them with overelaborate orders, or restraining them into narrow network centric nodes which require incessant inputs, and other conventional military practices.

As William S. Lind has stated, “Requiring cats to hunt like dogs will benefit only the mice.”¹⁰³




Figure 4. Texas Rangers in Pursuit.
Courtesy of Everett Historical.

Case Studies and Analysis

The Battle of Walker's Creek

The historical significance of the Battle of Walker's Creek in military terms was not due to it being an account of an outnumbered party defeating a greater party in an asymmetric running fight - which it nevertheless was – nor was it the first time an opponent's Center of Gravity (COG) was removed, although that happened as well. The significance of the Battle of Walker's Creek lay in the fact it was the first military engagement in history in which a repeating firearm (the Paterson Five Shooter - designed and manufactured by Samuel Colt) was used in combat. At this stage of his career, June 1844, Hays had already acquired a reputation as the most celebrated Texas Ranger on the frontier. He was a Captain with his own company in charge of defending San Antonio and the lands around it down to the border with Mexico, and he had the foresight to obtain Paterson Colts after the Texas Navy which previously owned them was disbanded. "Captain Jack" recognized and understood the practical utility of this new firearm and drilled his men in its use.

How "Captain Jack" drilled his men was in and of itself innovative and a gauge of his instinctual knack for the martial science and art of armed combat: instead of drilling his men to shoot their firearms while dismounted as every mounted horseman, dragoon and cavalryman had done since the invention of firearms (rendering them into nothing less than mounted infantry), he drilled them in shooting their weapons while still in the saddle. If the Comanche could shoot their arrows while mounted, and if some of his better rangers could shoot their rifles and shotguns while mounted, then Hays concluded his men could and should do the same with the recently obtained handgun.

There were some problems in the early Colt design though; the cylinders were already pre-loaded, tough to swap-out and replace, and after all the rounds had been discharged, they could not be reloaded in the field. With all these weaknesses and more the firearm still had a revolving chamber and Hays and his men were determined to test its combat capabilities.

“That test came to be known as the Battle of Walker’s Creek, a minor military engagement that became one of the defining moments in the history of Texas and the American West. Indeed, it can be argued that before Jack Hays arrived in San Antonio, Americans in the West went about largely on foot and carried Kentucky rifles. By the time he left (Texas) in 1849, anybody going west was mounted and carrying a holstered six-shooter. Walker’s Creek was the beginning of that change.”¹⁰⁴

Asymmetric warfare

“The engagement began when a party of seventy Comanche identified the Rangers on a patrol route. After refusing to pursue a decoy into a likely ambush, Hays maneuvered his sixteen men through masking terrain to flank the Indian position. The frontiersmen then achieved overwhelming victory when they employed repeating revolvers for the first time in coordinated volleys at close range. They fired the pistols while mounted, reflecting a distinct shift towards doctrinal cavalry techniques instead of traditional mounted infantry tactics.”¹⁰⁵




Figure 5. Comanches of West Texas in war regalia.
Courtesy of the Smithsonian American Art Museum.

Sixteen Rangers versus seventy Comanche from the standpoint of numerical superiority alone would appear to give the advantage at Walker Creek to the Comanche. Yet this battle demonstrated Hays' innovation on several levels – not simply taking advantage of new technology but exploiting the very same asymmetric warfare practices and TTPs of the Comanche and turning them around to Hays' advantage. “A typical Comanche tactic was to send scouts ahead to taunt their enemy, then fall back and lure their opponents into a trap where they would be showered by arrows. Another was simply to provoke an initial volley of fire and then rush their opponents before they had time to reload. Before this day, when the Texas Rangers were mainly stuck with single-shot, slow reloading pistols and rifles, those tactics were deadly

effective. In the time it took to reload, a Comanche could serve up a half-dozen arrows, launch a spear, or pick a prime spot of flesh to test the weight and edge of his tomahawk.”¹⁰⁶ The seasoned Indian fighter Hays was already aware of all this through hard earned experience.

There was also the element of surprise. As William S. Lind wrote in the *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, “One side had presented the other with a sudden, unexpected change or a series of such changes to which it could not adjust in a timely manner. As a result, it was defeated, and it was generally defeated at small cost to the victor. Often the losing side had been physically stronger than the winner.”¹⁰⁷ An objective observer would certainly assess the Comanche as being physically stronger in terms of a conventional order of battle, but Hays asymmetric tactics systematically rendered that strength asunder. “Hays report on the battle, which emphasized the transition between long-range and short-range weaponry, rapid mounted charges, and dogged pursuit, narrated the contest.”¹⁰⁸



Figure 6. “Crowd them! Powder-burn them boys!”
The Battle of Walker’s Creek by Bruce Marshall (1929 - 2015).
Courtesy of University of Texas Institute of Texan Cultures

*“After discharging our rifles, (we) closed in with them, hand to hand, with my five-shooting pistols, which did good execution. Had it not been for them I doubt what the consequences would have been. I cannot recommend these arms too highly. The fight, which was a moving one, continued to the distance of about three miles – being desperately contested by both parties. After the third round from the five-shooters, the Indians gave way; but, whenever pressed severely, making the most desperate charges and efforts to defeat me. I however, charged their ranks; and, with a courage that is rarely displayed my men succeeded in routing and putting them to flight – killing twenty on the ground, and wounding, at the lowest estimate, twenty or thirty more.”*¹⁰⁹

The Comanche losses were devastating but the minimal losses racked-up by Hays’ company of Texas Rangers remains extraordinary as well, *“My loss was, one killed (Peter Fohr) and three badly wounded, but not mortally, and one slightly. Two were wounded with lances and two with arrows.”*¹¹⁰

Another chronicle of the battle, written by Major John Caperton after a firsthand discussion with Hays, relates how maneuver was also utilized to defeat the asymmetric challenge by exploiting not only the element of surprise but also increasing the tempo and keeping the Comanche continually guessing – again, not to annihilate the enemy - but purely to defeat him. Relying on perpetual and persistent motion to disrupt Comanche unity of command while maintaining control of the battle rhythm, Hays’ rangers “broke the Indians’ line, and prevented them from reforming again, by keeping them on the move, never allowing them time to come to order again, and when the Indians charged on them they shot them down with their pistols.”¹¹¹ As Hays turned the asymmetric course of the battle around he also turned his attention beyond the immediate first order effects his Colts were inflicting and concentrated on his opponent’s

Center of Gravity (COG). His reason for doing this was prosaic enough: his men had run out of ammunition for their Colts and the Comanche's war chief, Yellow Wolf, was mounting a counterattack.

Removing the Center of Gravity (COG) or Schwerpunkt

“In the wild action of the Comanches that suddenly surrounded them, the Texans fought bravely.”¹¹² There were still twenty Comanches able to fight – twice the number of operative rangers. Hays noticed Yellow Wolf rallying his warriors and immediately understood he needed to quickly apply *Schwerpunkt* and focus his efforts on the COG: Chief Yellow Wolf.

Hays “coolly called out to see if anyone had any bullets left.”¹¹³ Private Robert Addison “Ad” Gillespie, “was shot through with an arrow that knocked him from his horse.”¹¹⁴ And yet Ad Gillespie ignored his severe wound and signaled he did by resting his Jäger rifle atop a boulder to aim. Hays yelled out, “shoot that damned chief!”¹¹⁵ Aiming carefully, Ad Gillespie squeezed the rifle's trigger. “Already advancing at the head of his braves and preparing to signal a charge, the chief, with shield in front of his chest, faced Gillespie who was only thirty yards away. Gillespie shot him through the head. Before the valorous Indian fell, his horse had sprung forward several bounds.”¹¹⁶ As soon as Yellow Wolf plummeted from his mount, the demoralized and defeated remaining Comanche braves ran. For a short time, Hays' Rangers pursued and even killed a few more of the enemy but with all of the extra cylinders for their revolvers empty, his men and horses both exhausted, and with his own wounded men to attend - Hays called off their pursuit.

“When the contest ended, the Indians had suffered twenty-three dead and over thirty wounded while the Anglos lost only one. The Texas Ranger ideal of superior mobility, firepower, and frontier adaptation – the tactical cornerstone of the Texan way of war – had

attained full maturation.”¹¹⁷ Applying the principles of maneuver warfare in an asymmetric battle, seizing the element of surprise, maintaining a high tempo battle rhythm, remaining flexible in execution, and applying the *Schwerpunkt* principle while initiating further innovations in rapid movement and firepower during the Battle of Walker’s Creek highlighted a consistent set of patterns demonstrated over the course of John Coffee Hays military career; all qualifications admitting him to the early ranks of American pioneers of maneuver warfare.

Fighting for Zachary Taylor: The Battle of Monterrey

Combined arms

The sovereign and independent Republic of Texas became the 28th state to be annexed and admitted to the United States of America on December 29, 1845. The Mexican government immediately broke diplomatic relations with the United States and on April 23, 1846 the president of Mexico issued a declaration of war against the United States. Two days later, on April 25, 1846 American forces were attacked by Mexican forces north of the Rio Grande in what has come to be called the Thornton Affair. The American Congress formally declared war on Mexico on May 13, 1846, and the Mexican Congress formally declared war on the United States on July 7, 1846.

The commander of the American forces, Major General Zachary Taylor, supplemented the regular army with numerous volunteer regiments from throughout the United States and placed regular army Brevet Major General William Jenkins Worth in command of the First Regiment of Texas Mounted Rifle Volunteers from West Texas and the Second Regiment of Texas Mounted Rifle Volunteers from East Texas. These two regiments together made up a single division (The Second Division) which, in addition to General Worth, was also commanded by

Texas Volunteer Major General James Pinckney Henderson.¹¹⁸ At the Battle of Monterrey Henderson would command the East Texans and Worth would command the West Texans.

General Henderson and General Worth had as their immediate subordinates Colonel George Thomas Wood, commander of the East Texas Second Regiment (also known as the Eastern Regiment) and Colonel John Coffee Hays, commander of the West Texas First Regiment (also known as the Western Regiment) popularly known as “Hays’ Rangers.”



Figure 7. A Texas Ranger.

Courtesy of The Pictorial History of Mexico and the Mexican War by John Frost, 1848.

Many of Hays’ subordinates were veterans of the Battle of Walker’s Creek including Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Hamilton Walker. Walker contributed to the design of the upgraded six-shot revolver which had been labeled in his honor as “The Walker Colt,” and which been taken into combat by Hays’ Rangers the following year. Robert Addison “Ad” Gillespie, the then

private who had taken out Chief Yellow Wolf at the Battle of Walker's Creek, was also now one of Hays' reliable captains.

Unlike the regular army, the irregulars in Hays' unit did not render typical military customs and courtesies such as coming to attention when being addressed by a superior, saluting each other or formally addressing each other by rank. They did not carry military issued weapons but their own instead, usually a Bowie knife, a rifle, and two or more Colt repeating revolvers. Sometimes a shotgun and tomahawk were part of their personal arsenal as well. Occasionally they also carried swords. None of Hays' men followed any customary grooming standards and most of them wore beards. None of them wore any type of recognizable uniform or rank either. Artillery officer Roswell Ripley expressed the attitude of many regular military men when he wrote, "*One species of mounted force, peculiar to the western frontier of the United States is, however, efficient. The inhabitants of that frontier, from their vicinity to hostile Indians, are well practiced in partisan warfare, and although they will not easily submit to discipline, yet take the field in rough, uncouth habiliments, and, following some leader chosen for his talent and bravery, perform partisan duties in a manner hardly to be surpassed.*"¹¹⁹ And the artist-soldier Samuel Chamberlain also shared this impression, albeit with more reservations, when he stated, "*with their uncouth costumes, bearded faces, lean and brawny forms, fierce wild eyes and swaggering manners, they were fit representatives of the outlaws which make up the population of the Lone Star State.*"¹²⁰ Yet, one of Zachary Taylor's staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock, was more amiable in his judgment, "*Not any sort of uniforms, but well-mounted and doubly well armed: each man has one or two Colt revolvers besides ordinary pistols, a sword, and every man a rifle.*"¹²¹




Figure 8. Texas Ranger Caricature.
Courtesy of The Library of Congress.

Just as the regular Army had to get used to Hays' Rangers so too did Hays' Rangers need to also adapt to the regular Army. Hays' and his men were no longer freely executing commander's intent but actually receiving on a frequent basis verbal and written commands. They were also for the first time working with infantry regiments, dragoons, and a new type of artillery.

In the past most artillery was fixed in place and fired from fixed positions. But Major Samuel Ringgold and, after Ringgold's death at the Battle of Palo Alto, Lieutenant Braxton Bragg were early developers of the tactic of using light horse-drawn artillery to shoot and then swiftly move to another site and then shoot again which came to be known as "flying artillery."

All these approaches and means of fighting were alien to Hays and his Texas Mounted Rifles yet they rapidly acclimated themselves to fighting in an environment of combined arms and learned how to take advantage of this principle of maneuver warfare as well.

By the fall of 1846, Zachary Taylor's American army was camped at Cerralvo, ready to attack the strategic northern Mexican city of Monterrey.

Monterrey was 250 years old, protected by mountains and the Santa Catarina River on the south and to the west two steep-sided hills known as Loma de Federacion (Federation Hill) and Loma de Independencia (Independence Hill) – both garrisoned and buttressed with soldiers and artillery.

“To the north – the direction from which the Americans would approach – was a formidable bastion, an unfinished cathedral containing eight cannon and 400 men, surrounded by a wall and moat. The Mexicans called it The Citadel, and the Americans soon dubbed it The Black Fort because of its dark stone walls. To the east was a four-gun redoubt named La Teneria because of a nearby tannery. Near Le Teneria was another fort called El Rincon del Diablo, or The Devil's Corner, and still a third bastion that defended the bridge over a canal flowing through the city. Even the interior of the city was fortified. Loopholes for sharpshooters had been cut in the stone walls of the houses and their flat roofs were equipped with sandbag parapets from which Mexican infantry could enfilade the streets. The American Army would have to pierce all of these obstacles manned by a well-armed force twice its size.”¹²²

From the first days of the war until this point Hays' Rangers had made their reputation with the American army via their indispensable ability to “range” ahead of the core elements of the army and screen in advance of the main columns. “The whole army knew rangers could scout; soon they would realize Texans could also fight.”¹²³

On the morning of September 21st General Taylor launched his initial assault against Monterrey.

Colonel Percifer Frazier Smith led an attack with six companies of the 5th Infantry and an extra company of Louisiana volunteers. “Hays, Walker, and the ranger companies of Early,

Gillespie, and Acklin joined the latter Smith's detachment."¹²⁴ Mexican lancers counter-attacked and Rangers riding ahead of the main assault, dismounted, took cover – and using their Colts and shotguns – drove the lancers back.¹²⁵ Before the Mexican lancers could recover, a battery of American flying artillery wheeled up, unlimbered their 6 pounders, and began to lay down extremely well-aimed rounds of canister on the massed horsemen, forcing them to retreat with substantial losses.

General Worth was in overall command of the assault and decided his first objective would be Federation Hill. Worth ordered Hays' Rangers to lead an unmounted charge on Federation Hill – which he later reinforced with the 5th Infantry Regiment. “Despite the facts that Texans were cavalymen and Worth possessed two professional and several voluntary infantry regiments, he ordered the rangers to dismount and lead the assault against the heights. Accepting their new role, the volunteers set their horses aside and deployed with the 5th U.S. Infantry Regiment in support.”¹²⁶

Federation Hill's west side cliffs were sheer and provided little shelter from the muskets and artillery barrages being rained down upon the Texans from the 500 Mexican fighters dug in at the top. Knowing forward movement was their only option for survival, the Rangers climbed directly into the kill zone – startling the Mexican soldiers to such a degree they concentrated all of their fire on the Rangers, thus neglecting the 5th Infantry troops advancing up the north side - until the 5th Infantry crested the top and bayonet charged the Mexican defenders, pushing the Mexican line to collapse and withdraw to Fort Soldado. Captain Ad Gillespie “was the first man inside the walls, followed by the color sergeant of the 5th with the regimental colors. Sergeant Updegrass rammed the staff into the earth on some breastworks, while cheers echoed across the valley.”¹²⁷ While the Texans pursued the retreating Mexicans, the regular army foot-soldiers of

the 5th Infantry, astounded by the valor of the seasoned Texans, and admiring the Texan's wherewithal under heavy fire, were inspired to seize the abandoned Mexican nine pounders and turn them on their former owners. One of the first officers in the fort, Lieutenant Thomas G. Pitcher of the 5th Infantry, strolled up to a captured cannon and said to some of the Rangers ready to pursue the retreating Mexicans, "Well, boys, we liked to have beaten you."¹²⁸ And then grabbing a piece of chalk wrote on one of the barrels, "Texas Rangers" and "5th Infantry."¹²⁹

Ad Gillespie's company closed in on the heels of the fleeing Mexican defenders and followed them over the walls of Fort Soldado – while the Mexicans kept running, abandoning the fort and crossing over the Santa Catarina River to go straight to Independence Hill and the refuge of the abandoned bishop's palace: the Obispado.

All of these successes on the southwestern side of Monterrey were unfortunately not being matched on the northeastern side where Zachary Taylor's other divisions stalled out in their repeated frontal assaults to divert the enemy from concentrating too much on his western attack. The diversionary regiments finally bogged down along the northern outskirts of Monterrey after repeated and devastating counterattacks from the Mexican forces.




Figure 9. The Battle of Monterrey.
 Chart Courtesy of The Warfare History Network © 2020 Sovereign Media.

Although Taylor and Worth’s attack on the western side of the city was also characterized by the typical conventional frontal assault favored by most military commanders and strategists then and now, the key difference was in how Hays’ Texans assaulted the ramparts of Federation Hill and the approaches to Fort Soldado, taking advantage of their allies in the flying artillery batteries and in the 5th Infantry in a well-coordinated strike against the entrenched

Mexican defenders. As Martin van Creveld has stated, “The value of combined arms is obtained from the coordination of their diversity, not in the sum of their firepower scores.”¹³⁰

“This combined arms assault against a massively fortified bastion illustrated the Texan volunteers’ second specialized ability: close combat as both shock cavalry and infantry. While reconnaissance and screening had required mobility, endurance, navigation competency, and timely reporting, defeating massed formations while mounted afoot required lethality, audacity, and aggression. Hays of the 1st Texas confirmed this proficiency when he assessed rangers ‘as well calculated for street fighting as any body of troops could be.’”¹³¹

Since Taylor’s only success that day occurred on the western front of the city, he focused on it again the following day and directed Worth to take Independence Hill. The previous night was spent with artillery duels between the American guns on Federation Hill and the Mexican guns on Independence Hill. Besides the Obispado, or the Bishop’s Palace, there was also Fort Libertad which needed to be taken as well. Once more the attack would be coordinated by two separate columns. This time each column would be led by a Ranger company. The first, led by Captain Ad Gillespie, approached the southwest face of Independence Hill, an approach even more sheer and even steeper than the climb up Federation Hill the previous day. Gillespie’s company was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Hamilton Walker. The other company, led by another legendary Texas Ranger, recently promoted to Major by Zachary Taylor – and Chief of Scouts for the entire army, Benjamin McCullough, embarked upon the even more daunting northwest face. McCullough’s company was under the command of Colonel Jack Hays. The plan was for both companies to merge just as they reached the summit and coordinate the final strike jointly. The attack commenced in the pre-dawn hours of the day while the Mexicans slept. By the time they had discovered they were

under attack it was too late for them to organize an effective counterattack and the Rangers led the way in the ensuing onslaught. The weak opposition of the defenders collapsed, and the panicked Mexicans retreated to the safe haven of the Bishop's Palace. Once again, the Texans were able to deliver General Worth a victory with light American casualties, and one significant cost: fatally stabbed by a Mexican bayonet, Captain Ad Gillespie succumbed to his wounds and died the next day. "With his captain dead, William A.A. 'Bigfoot' Wallace took over command of the company."¹³²

Encouraged by Colonel Hays, General Worth's next stratagem was to advance a Louisiana dragoon company towards the Bishop's Palace. The dragoons halted within range, fired one volley at the Palace, and then feigned a hurried withdrawal. The deception succeeded in luring the Mexicans out of the Palace to give chase to the retreating dragoons up a slope only to reach the summit and find themselves facing the 5th and 7th Infantry regiments. The American troops fired a volley and then advanced with fixed bayonets; the Rangers contributed their part by firing upon the unprotected flanks of the Mexican troops from hidden positions on both sides, decimating both lancers and infantrymen in a lethal crossfire. Hays reported the Mexicans were "so vigorously pursued by our men that they were unable to regain the Castle (Obispado) and continued this retreat to the town, leaving us in possession of the works with four pieces of artillery and a large quantity of ammunition."¹³³

In another example of the successful application of combined arms the infantry regiments and the Rangers, working together once again, transformed the Mexican retreat into a complete rout. The rest of the day was spent with Worth's American forces securing their positions on the outermost western neighborhoods of Monterrey to prepare for the final attack scheduled for the next day.



Figure 10. Battle of Monterrey.
Illustration from Henry Montgomery's *The Life of Major General Zachary Taylor*, 1847.
Courtesy of Illinois State University.

On that next September morning – coordinated attacks from the west and east commenced again. Listening to the experienced Texans - the American forces applied new urban warfare procedures which the Texans had themselves learned at great personal cost from the siege of San Antonio de Bexar in 1835, to the intense urban combat which they experienced during the notorious and bitterly fought engagement at Mier in 1842. Both San Antonio and the border town of Mier were similarly constructed in the same manner as Monterrey. Each city had narrow streets, thick walled buildings, parapets upon their flat roofs and a central square or plaza. “Soon each column began conducting combined arms type attacks with infantry forces penetrating houses and fighting through them, snipers firing from rooftops to suppress enemy marksmen, and the artillery sweeping the streets with charges of canister.”¹³⁴

“As the American forces relentlessly continued their coordinated attacks throughout the streets, block by block, building by building, the Mexican soldiers gradually withdrew to the central plaza and cathedral in the center of the city.”¹³⁵

“From the bloody street fighting in San Antonio and Mier, the Texans had learned to ‘mouse hole’ from house-to-house by using battering rams, picks, sledgehammers, and occasionally explosives, to smash through shared walls and bypass enemy strong-points. Once inside a building, they would systematically work their way to the roof and clear it before continuing their advance to the next building. The process was tedious and time consuming, but it resulted in far fewer casualties. The Texans had also learned not to approach street barricades head-on, especially if they were fortified with artillery. Instead, once cleared, they would place their own snipers on the rooftops to kill any artillerymen foolish enough to approach the guns.”¹³⁶

The Mexican forces felt the noose tightening around them to the point where the enemy commander acknowledged the inevitable. “Mexican General Pedro de Ampudia then realized he had no escape route and began proposing terms for a surrender.”¹³⁷

To the surprise of his Commander-in-Chief, President James K. Polk, Zachary Taylor agreed and granted generous terms: for an eight week armistice - the city of Monterrey was to be handed over to the Americans, and the Mexican army could withdraw and even keep their sidearms.

“As the Mexicans evacuated the city, Ampudia rode out under a heavy escort of United States regular officers that he had requested so as not to fall into the hands of the *Tejanos sangrientes* (bloody Texans).”¹³⁸

General Worth – who commanded the divisions on the western portions of the attack during the four days of intense combat where his regular American troops learned much from Hays and his Texans, - everything from the successful use of combined arms to effective urban fighting - praised, “the distinguished gallantry of Colonel Hays and his noble band of volunteers. Hereafter they and we are brothers, and we can desire no better security of success than by their association.”¹³⁹



Figure 11. Major General William J. Worth (1794 - 1849).
Lithographic portrait titled *Genl. William J. Worth at the Storming of the Bishop's Palace*.
Courtesy of Nathaniel Currier published 1847

Indeed, the Chief Historian of the National Park Service, Robert M. Utley, declared, “In the battle of Monterrey, the regiments of Hays and Wood proved first-rate combat soldiers, unsurpassed by any of the regular army formations.”¹⁴⁰

Maneuver warfare is defined by flanking and enveloping. Keeping the enemy off balance and staying flexible at every stage of the fight are also defining principles of maneuver warfare. The unconventional Texans fought a conventional battle at Monterrey using various unconventional means and succeeded reliably and without fail. “Despite the advantages of being on the defensive and enjoying interior lines, the Mexicans were unable to withstand the multi-

pronged, three-dimensional attack of the Texas Rangers and continually gave ground.”¹⁴¹ At every stage of the Battle of Monterrey Hay’s Rangers applied the then unwritten principles of maneuver warfare. Surprise, tempo and unorthodox solutions to the standard established responses – and managed to impart a few lessons to the regular army as well.

“Texan actions in support of Taylor’s assault on Monterrey perfectly illustrates the strengths of their society’s way of war. The rangers’ contributions during the culminating battle, learned in the brutal academy of frontier conflict, rested upon three factors: audacity, tactics, and technology. While adept maneuvering certainly facilitated rapid advancement under enemy fire, repeating revolvers and precision rifles allowed an irresistible advantage over the Mexican Army’s dated musketry and blades. Memories of mass executions at the Alamo and Goliad in 1836 and Mier in 1842 then galvanized the aggressive use of these technologies.”¹⁴²

Superior technology was certainly a contributing factor to Hay’s Rangers influencing the victory at Monterrey – as was the simple fact that, unlike their fellow Americans, the fight for them was personal. Yet even with those salient aspects impacting the battle the most significant contribution at Monterrey was the ability of the regular military units and Hay’s irregulars to combine their respective strengths together to defeat the adversary Mexican forces. Compound Warfare (CW) is a concept the United States Army’s Combat Studies Institute defines as “that in which one side has a regular (conventional) force and irregular (unconventional) forces fighting under unified direction. In this situation, the full complementary effects of compound warfare can be realized, as each type of force conducts operations that give full expression to its own capabilities.”¹⁴³ Whether the principle of maneuver warfare known as combined arms or the concept of CW characterized this battle, the result was the same, “Without the benefit of the Rangers’ experience, Taylor’s army may not have succeeded in capturing Monterrey, and if it had, the cost in lives certainly would have been much higher. The tactical contributions of the Texas Rangers in the urban fight for Monterrey made the difference between compelling a quick Mexican surrender and a long and bloody stalemate that might have changed the course of the war.”¹⁴⁴

After the Battle of Monterrey, President James Knox Polk would shift his focus from Zachary Taylor's campaign in northern Mexico to Major General Winfield Scott's southern campaign the following year. Scott assumed command of the Army of Mexico and commenced the American army's first amphibious invasion at Vera Cruz. And it was under the command of Scott that Colonel John Coffee Hays and his Texans would once again perform a central role. This time in the ultimate defeat of the Mexican Army.

Fighting for Winfield Scott: General Order Number 20 and the Action of Sequalteplan *Counterinsurgency warfare (COIN)*

A principle which runs through the theories of maneuver warfare, COIN, and 4GW is the moral level of war.¹⁴⁵ "At the most powerful level of war, the moral level, the key to victory is to convince the local people to identify with the state, or at least to acquiesce to it, rather than identify with non-state entities. Meeting this challenge will depend to a significant degree not on what state forces do, but what on they do not do. They cannot insult and brutalize the local population and simultaneously convince them to identify with the state. They cannot represent a threat to the local culture, religion, or way of life. They cannot come across as Goliath because no one identifies with Goliath."¹⁴⁶ Many historians have criticized Hays and his Texas volunteers for the brutal acts committed in the Mexican War on the local population, guerillas, and soldiers - and while there is a surfeit of documented evidence to support the numerous allegations against the Texans - Hays himself, as well as his chief lieutenants such as Samuel Hamilton Walker, innately understood the need to maintain the moral high ground.

MORAL LEVELS OF WAR

	PHYSICAL	MENTAL	MORAL
TACTICAL			
OPERATIONAL			
STRATEGIC			

Figure 12. Moral Levels of War.

As suggested by William S. Lind in *The Fourth Generation Warfare Handbook*.

Chart created by the author: Major David Yuers

An early example demonstrates Hays' understanding. A few days after the end of the Battle of Monterrey a Mexican lancer was murdered as he rode through the streets. Hays was close enough to hear the shot and investigated the cause. "He rushed into a building opposite where the lancer had fallen and found a single occupant, a Ranger."¹⁴⁷ Hays asked the Texan if the gunfire had come from the building he was in, with the individual being challenged responding he was unaware of any shooting. Hays inspected the soldier's revolver and it was clear it had just been fired. Hays arrested the shooter, charging him as guilty, or knowing who was, and turned him over to the military authorities.¹⁴⁸

Even with this action Major General Taylor's impression of the military professionalism of his Texan volunteers was negligible. And they were aware of it as some claimed to overhear the general once say to an officer, "On the day of battle, I am glad to have Texas soldiers with me, for they are brave and gallant; but I never want to see them before or afterwards, for they are too hard to control."¹⁴⁹




Figure 13. Major General Zachary Taylor (1784 - 1850).
Half-Plate Daguerreotype of Zachary Taylor, Maguire of New Orleans circa 1845.
Courtesy of Library of Congress

On February 23, 1847 Major General Zachary Taylor was fighting another battle at Buena Vista and an American mule train coming to resupply Taylor's troops was captured by a combined Mexican force of bandits and lancers. "The Mexicans executed and mutilated the fifty teamsters, took the infantry escort prisoner and burned what they could not carry away with them." Maintaining open and unobstructed LOCs then – as today, with the issues faced by present day American forces from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) highlighting one of the problems in present day COIN warfare – was a vital element of maneuver warfare, which tested the restraint and tolerance of any commander. In order to block insurgents and keep a LOC open

the most effective strategy for the occupier then and now was to have the resident community see the same advantage also, rather than taking out reprisals and punitive measures against the local population. This was and is a strategic mindset many tactical thinkers have failed to grasp, accounting for why many COIN operations have failed.

Taylor still entrusted the securing of his LOCs and all counter-guerilla operations to the seasoned and combat-hardened Texans. At this stage of the Mexican War there was much rumor and innuendo, some of it undoubtedly used as an instrument of terror to psychologically project upon the enemy the reputation of the *los diablos Tejanos* (“Texas Devils”) but little recorded evidence. “The decentralized nature of counter-guerilla operations made them particularly difficult to document. The Rangers kept few records, and as few non-Rangers accompanied them on their missions there were very few observer accounts either.”¹⁵⁰ However – on the evidence which is available these “men showed admirable restraint, discipline, and appreciation for orders seldom credited to the Rangers. Second, Taylor continued to blame units rather than individuals” which has contributed to further obscure the historical record.¹⁵¹ There were historically documented cases of reprisals and even atrocities being carried out by certain Texan individuals and even in one case an entire mounted company, but beyond the company level no evidence can be found.¹⁵² Also, Colonel John Coffee Hays himself left Mexico after the Battle of Monterrey in October 1846 and would not return to the field until the summer of 1847 to fight again, this time for Lieutenant General Winfield Scott. Taylor’s phase of the war in northern Mexico was “costly for both sides; it cost the combatants much blood shed – Mexican guerilla and Texas Ranger; it costs the inhabitants lives and property lost, and it cost Taylor and the Rangers an indelible mark on their reputations. Overall, the Ranger’s contribution in this phase must be assessed as mixed.”¹⁵³ Colonel John Coffee Hays though, emerged with his own honor and reputation intact during this phase.

Lieutenant General Winfield Scott took over all of the American forces in the Mexican theater as they made their first amphibious landing at Vera Cruz and fought their way through the Mexican interior to an ultimate victory at Mexico City. Soon their logistic lines were stretched thin though, and as a consequence, vulnerable to guerilla and military attack. As Robert Utley wrote, “The surrender of Mexico City did not end the affliction, for Santa Anna took his army to the countryside to join with the guerillas and continue the war.”¹⁵⁴



Figure 14. Commander in Chief of the Mexican Armed Forces Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794 - 1876).

Woodblock by Homer Thrall.
Courtesy of The Library of Congress.

A close ally of Santa Anna, Brigadier General Jose Mariano Salas, recruited volunteers into units which he hailed as “Guerrillas of Vengeance,” and vowed he would strike the American invaders by every possible means under the motto, “war without pity, unto death.”¹⁵⁵

The Guerillas of Vengeance “were designed to target supply and replacement convoys, small parties of American troops, and stragglers.”¹⁵⁶ The Mexican resistance was in actuality, “a haphazard endeavor that included both state-sanctioned cavalry and opportunistic brigands, often blurring the lines between patriotic raiding and blatant criminality.”¹⁵⁷ Applying a full range of tactics these units succeeded in harassing and wreaking havoc on Scott’s quartermaster corps, disrupting his LOCs, and creating havoc with his supply chain. The favored tactic by the larger cavalry units was “hit and run,” seeking “to engage quickly, to inflict maximum casualties, and then to disappear rapidly. The smaller units made extensive use of sharpshooters who concealed themselves in the trees and chaparral that lined the Mexican National Highway, which Scott’s forces would use extensively. Imposing terrain features along most of the route’s length (also) worked to the advantage of the partisans.”¹⁵⁸



Figure 15. “A Guerilla Group”.
Mariano Arista, Santa Anna, and a Lancer.
Courtesy of The Illustrated London News. London: November 18, 1843.

Scott put the Rangers in charge of guarding his supply trains and the roads they traveled on but was wary of the Ranger’s reputation. Zachary Taylor had complained about their conduct between battles destroying strategic gains with the local population and not carrying out his commander’s intent. Scott was also aware of the strategic consequences of his volunteers or even his regular soldiers engaging in brutal acts.

Scott owned an extensive personal library including works on the history of Napoleon’s occupation of Spain from 1808 to 1814. In particular, Sir William Francis Patrick Napier’s three-volume *History of the Peninsular War* guided his planning for his future campaign. Mining French experience for insights, he was struck by the rancorous conduct of the French troops toward the Spanish population and the failure of harsh French occupational measures to quash the growing uprising there. As provocations multiplied on both sides, the fighting

escalated out of control. The French responded by setting fire to entire villages, shooting civilians en masse, destroying churches, and even executing priests. The locals retaliated in kind. Although the Spanish irregulars operated without any centralized command and control structure, individual bands of guerrillas managed to isolate various French commands and wreaked havoc on their lines of communications. By the time an allied force under Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, compelled the French to withdraw from Spain in 1813, Napoleon's force had seen some 300,000 men killed and wounded, compared with Napoleon's preoccupation estimate of approximately 12,000 casualties. In fact, Scott saw Wellesley's stress on strict discipline -- insisting his soldiers respect personal property and meet the basic needs of Spanish civilians -- as the proper model for operating in a potentially hostile land.¹⁵⁹

In short, Scott came to understand and apply the concept of the moral level of war. And General Order Number 20, also known as the Martial Law Order, was Scott's attempt to seize the moral high ground. The American military was to treat civilians with respect, cultural institutions such as the Catholic Church would be acknowledged, and drunkenness, raping, looting and murder would not be tolerated in the conquered villages, towns, and cities of Mexico. Anyone caught violating orders would be court-martialed. Furthermore, everybody was under the jurisdiction of General Order Number 20: United States Army regular soldiers and volunteers, American civilians, and even Mexican civilians. When Scott's Army oversaw the Mexican occupation it "had the authority to determine innocence or guilt and to levy punishment, which included the lash, hard labor in ball and chain, imprisonment, branding, and even death. The commanding general -- and sometimes the War Department -- had to approve the most severe sentences."¹⁶⁰ This was all done due to Scott's acknowledgment of the moral level of war and because Scott "recognized the Mexican population as a strategic asset to be courted and mollified."¹⁶¹

Lieutenant General Winfield Scott was the rare commander who was gifted with the ability to comprehend what later generations referred to as pacification and COIN operations. General Order Number 20 also included lines of effort protecting "unoffending inhabitants and

their property,' partnership with 'military police' in occupied towns, and direction to purchase supplies on the march with gold instead of relying on confiscation."¹⁶²



Figure 16. Lieutenant General Winfield Scott (1786 - 1866).
Portrait done at West Point, New York, 1862.
Courtesy of The United States Military Academy.

The United States Government says, “COIN is a complex effort that integrates the full range of civilian and military agencies. It is often more population-centric (focused on securing and controlling a given population or populations) than enemy-centric (focused on defeating a particular enemy group). Note that this does not mean that COIN is less violent than any other conflict: on the contrary, like any other form of warfare it always involves loss of life. It is an

extremely difficult undertaking, is often highly controversial politically, involves a series of ambiguous events that are extremely difficult to interpret, and often requires vastly more resources and time than initially anticipated.”¹⁶³ This has always been true for -- despite his efforts -- partisan guerilla attacks continued to remain a thorn in Scott’s side.

In addition to killing American troops via rifles, shotguns (escopetas), and swords many of the guerillas – who were also called rancheros – would also ride down isolated American soldiers, lasso ropes around their necks, and then drag them across the ground - spearing their mutilated bodies with their lances to finish them off. Naturally this invited the urge to retaliate.



Figure 17. Captain Samuel Hamilton Walker (1817 - 1847).
Mathew Brady portrait circa 1846.

Courtesy of the United States Library of Congress’ Prints and Photographs Division.

“Scott responded with Capt. Samuel Walker’s mounted Texas Rangers, ruthless fighters outfitted with Colt six-shot revolvers. Walker’s men engaged the guerrillas outside of La Hoya and Las Vigas, two towns about seventy miles northwest of Veracruz, killing some fifty Mexican irregulars.”¹⁶⁴ And yet later, Captain Walker was killed just outside the town of Huamantla with his own “Walker Colts blazing,” and this sole incident -- the death of a by now nationally acclaimed American hero -- unleashed a wave of retaliation no military protocol, propriety or orders could hold back.¹⁶⁵ Peasants were slaughtered. Women old and young were stripped of their clothes, raped, and murdered. Homes were burned. Brigadier General Joseph “Jo” Lane – who had been placed in command of a counter-insurgency brigade created by Scott himself – attempted to stop the carnage, and yet the loss of Walker prevented even a man of flag rank from maintaining discipline. “For the only time, Scott’s troops lost all control. Lane escaped punishment in part because news that Santa Anna had stepped down as commander of the Mexican Army after the engagement at Huamantla overshadowed the American rampage.”¹⁶⁶



Figure 18. Captain Walker’s Death (Walker was killed by a Mexican bullet and not a lance). Lithograph printed and published by Thomas W. Strong after James S. Baillie circa 1847. *Courtesy of the Library of Congress.*

When Colonel John Coffee Hays returned to the field a year after the Battle of Monterrey in October 1847, “Hays drew 394 Model 1847 Colt revolvers – the Walker Colt six-shooter,” so named after the late Samuel Hamilton Walker. “Many of the Rangers already had the Paterson five-shooter, and the issue of Walkers probably equipped everyone with at least one revolver. Men accustomed to the light Paterson had difficulty adjusting to the heavy Walker. In a painful irony, most of the Walkers were stamped for the U.S. Mounted Rifles, Captain Walker’s outfit.”¹⁶⁷ Instead, the Walker Colts went to Colonel Hays’ rangers, who soon became proficient with the capabilities of the Walker Colt. “First, Hays spent several days training his men and honing their skills: conducting target practice with the new pistols, operating as a unit, and conducting local

patrols.”¹⁶⁸ When Colonel Hays arrived in Mexico City the population was terrified of the *los diablos Tejanos*. But the professional criminal element of any city could not resist the temptation of new prey and so within a week of the Texans arrival two Mexicans who attempted petty theft and assault and battery were promptly answered “with the business end of a Walker Colt.”¹⁶⁹



Figure 19. Walker Colt Six Shooter .44 Caliber Percussion Revolver circa 1847.
Photograph Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Not amused by the Texans’ conduct, Winfield Scott called Hays to report. “Hays promptly stood before his commanding general and, saluting, stated, ‘I, sir, am Colonel Hays, commander of the Texas Rangers and report myself to you in accordance with an order just received.’”¹⁷⁰

Scott frostily asserted, “I have been informed, sir, since the arrival of your command in this city, two Mexicans have been killed. I hold you, sir, responsible for the acts of your men. I will not be disgraced, nor shall the army of my country be, by such outrages. I require you, sir, to say whether my information is correct, and if so, you will render me a satisfactory explanation.”¹⁷¹

Colonel Hays responded, “Your information is correct. General, the Texas Rangers are not accustomed to being insulted without resenting it. They did kill two Mexicans as I entered the city, and I, sir, am willing to be held responsible for it.”¹⁷²

“The colonel’s respectful manner and forthright bearing persuaded Scott that Hays believed his men to have been justified. The general invited the ranger to sit and give a full account of the matter. Hays went on to briefly inform Scott of the numerous reasons Texans felt such enmity for Mexico and Mexicans alike. Once the interview was completed, Hays was courteously dismissed and the episode was not discussed further. Throughout their stay in the Halls of the Montezumas, the rangers would well earn the sobriquet of *los diablos Tejanos*.”¹⁷³



Figure 20. Colonel John Coffee Hays (1817 - 1883).
Courtesy of Library of Congress.

The situation was not improved when one of Hays’ men, Adam Alsans, wandered alone into the worst part of Mexico City – known as ‘Cutthroat’ – and was nearly hacked to death in a brutal assault. After lingering for eight hours in agony Alsans died and was buried with full military honors. “The eerily quiet mood in the Texan camp following the funeral foretold ominous events ahead.”¹⁷⁴

That night screams were heard throughout the city.

Colonel Hays was in his headquarters that evening speaking with Captain Parry W. Humphreys of the U.S. Army and the rangers Adjutant John Salmon “Rip” Ford, when around ten o’clock all three of them heard a continual salvo of gunfire. Hays maintained the shots were due to U.S. Marines engaged in target practice outside of the city limits. “According to Ford, all three men knew the true nature of the shooting, but maintained the polite fiction. Around midnight, Humphreys looked outside and abruptly asked, ‘I wonder what the commanding general’s orderly is coming for?’ Desiring to remain officially unaware of what was occurring that night, Hays quickly absented himself from the room and disappeared until daybreak. Obviously, the captain had not seen the orderly, but merely wanted to test the colonel’s stated opinion. Once Hays had vanished, the two remaining officers listened to the gunfire until after one o’clock.”¹⁷⁵

The next morning over 80 bodies lay strewn through the streets of Cutthroat. Knowing Hays was an influential friend of President Polk, Scott soon found pressing duties outside of Mexico City to assign Hays’ Rangers. Events like this demonstrate when it came to COIN operations Hays certainly knew commander’s intent and why, yet also empathized to a great degree with those who were reluctant to execute that intent.

When it came to a centralized vision of the threat of guerilla partisans though, Hays remained the best at decentralized execution and Winfield Scott understood the Mexican guerillas “had to be countered through reciprocal violence. This was where the Texas Rangers balanced the strategic equation: he (Scott) would utilize his regular forces to stabilize urban centers along the Vera Cruz Road, while the Texan irregulars countered irreconcilable elements with specialized lethality in more rural settings.”¹⁷⁶



Figure 21. Texas Rangers.
Courtesy of The Culver Pictures Collection (circa 1845).

Hays main opponent throughout the remaining months of the Mexican War was the infamous *Presbyterio* Celedonio Domeca de Jarauta, a radical priest originally from Spain who carried a government *patente* for guerilla operations and remained an elusive nemesis for Hays as Hays chased Padre Jarauta and his band from city to city, town to town, and village to village throughout central Mexico – always evading Hays and his Rangers at the last moment. “The militant padre’s reputation grew the longer he fought as a patriot against foreign occupation.”¹⁷⁷ The closest they came to targeting the elusive priest was at the Battle of San Juan Teotihuacan, but in the aftermath of the battle the “priest-general escaped with recoverable wounds.”¹⁷⁸ Hays doggedly pursued Padre Jarauta through other cities – always narrowly missing him until the Action at Sequalteplan (Zacualtipán), where Hays fought 450 of Padre Jarauta’s guerillas with a “force of 250 rangers and 130 Dragoons.”¹⁷⁹

When Hays approached the outskirts of Sequalteplan he brought his men into a column. Then, with General Joseph “Jo” Lane – the commander of the counter-guerilla unit Hays’ Rangers had been an indispensable part of – the entire column charged. After entering the city, Lane’s men rode into the plaza while Hays fought at the first barracks encountered. Soon “fighting became general all over town, and the Rangers and the Dragoons went wherever they heard firing.”¹⁸⁰ The Action at Sequalteplan became a series of fights scattered throughout the city and suburbs, with the guerillas taking over a hundred losses compared to the Rangers and Dragoons less than ten. By the time it was over fifty prisoners had been taken, three of which had been American deserters, and among the dead were Padre Jarauta’s lieutenant, Padre Martinez. “The guerilla losses were severe enough, but the most damaging thing was the knowledge that there was no place that was safe.”¹⁸¹ Jo Lane and Jack Hays turned the city upside down searching for the “general priest” as Adjutant Rip Ford had labeled him, yet “like before, the wily Jarauta escaped.”¹⁸²

“This battle ended as the last significant fight for the federalized Texas Rangers in Central Mexico. Like the rest of their contests, tactical victory had rested upon superior firepower and mobility. While the rangers had failed to capture many of their high value targets, the sheer relentlessness of their pursuit deprived the insurgency leadership of initiative during a critical phase in the occupation, thus preventing intensification of the resistance.”¹⁸³

The Action at Sequalteplan was the last battle of the Mexican War. Hostilities with regular forces had ceased three weeks earlier with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and so “the Texas Rangers ended the Mexican War with the twin legacy of combat excellence and vengeful excess.”¹⁸⁴ Although the latter may be due more to legend than reality as

on balance, considering the enmity which existed between Texans and the Mexican government going back over a dozen years prior to the war, their restraint – particularly at the leadership level – was greater than to be expected.



Figure 22. Padre Celedonio Domeca de Jarauta (1814 - 1848).
Print courtesy of Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain).

As for the general priest?

“Padre Jarauta still lived, but not to fight Americans. He joined in a revolt against the government that had signed the peace treaty with the United States. In July 1848 government forces achieved what Americans could not. They captured Jarauta. Convicted of treason, he fell before a firing squad.”¹⁸⁵




Figure 23. Colonel John Coffee Hays and his Texas Mounted Volunteers patrol the Mexican interior. Hays' Regiment Mounted Texas Volunteers, Mexican War, 1847 by Don Troiani.
Courtesy of the kind written permission of the artist: Don Troiani

The Second Battle of Pyramid Lake

The OODA Loop

After the Mexican War, John Coffee Hays resigned his commission with the Texas Mounted Volunteers, spent a brief stint as an Indian agent in the New Mexico territory, followed the Gold Rush to California, discovered the Tucson Cutoff as he emigrated with his family along the Southern Emigrant Trail, and shortly after arriving in northern California,

was elected the first Sheriff of San Francisco.¹⁸⁶ After his time spent serving as a sheriff, Hays was appointed as the first Surveyor General of California by his fellow Mexican War veteran, President Franklin Pierce. Purchasing vast tracts of land from the Californio Vicente Peralta in an area then known as Encinar (“Oak Grove”), surveying it, and selling it off to developers, the land eventually became known as Oakland and Hays’ financial investments in the city made him a rich man by the 1850s.

After the silver Comstock Lode was discovered in Virginia City, Nevada, Hays found himself there on business in the spring of 1860. Prior to his arrival a series of events took place which would force him to answer the call of duty again.

“On May 8, 1860, Paiute Indians in Nevada, once friendly to white settlers, killed five men at Williams Station (Pony Express transfer center) on the Carson River, and set the trading post on fire. Lost in the subsequent furor over the ‘massacre’ was the fact one or all of the men slain at Williams Station had earlier kidnapped and raped two young Paiute girls. Ignorant of the reasons for the killings, the grim news alarmed residents of Virginia City, Silver City, Carson City, and Genoa, and a force of 105 miners was organized to punish the Paiutes.”¹⁸⁷

Unfortunately for the miners, they were led by William Matthew Ormsby, a man who gave himself the title of “Major” despite having little military background other than a stint as a volunteer militiaman for a few months.¹⁸⁸ The miners themselves, with the exception of a few veterans, had no military background either and thus had no discipline, were badly equipped, had no chain of command, and were utterly unschooled on any type of tactical doctrine. On May 12, 1860, at the First Battle of Pyramid Lake, the entire “miner’s militia” were effortlessly lured into an ambush by a force of 300 Paiute warriors – who then showered them with cascades of arrows

and bullets. Quickly overwhelmed and routed, the amateur soldiers were soon simply fleeing for their lives.




Figure 24. First Battle of Pyramid Lake.

*Courtesy of the kind permission of the editor of WILD WEST Magazine: Gregory Lelire.
Special thanks to the artist, Joan Pennington, for her kind written permission.*

“The chase stretched out for miles. Whites with weak, wounded, tired, or overloaded mounts fell behind. They were dragged down and killed as their animals foundered. Others threw

away their arms and begged for quarter. Indians spitted them on arrows, knives and spears.”¹⁸⁹
The Paiutes followed stragglers for thirty miles, either massacring them or capturing them to take back to their camps for later torture. Seventy-six were killed and all the survivors were wounded to various degrees. Among the dead was William Ormsby.¹⁹⁰




Figure 25. William Matthew Ormsby (1814 - 1860).
Life Among the Paiutes: Their Wrongs and Claims (1883) by Sarah Winnemucca Hopkins.
Courtesy of Yosemite Online Library.

“The First Battle of Pyramid Lake was the worst loss of white life in an Indian fight since the Dade Massacre in central Florida escalated the Second Seminole War in 1835. No battle

would significantly exceed its toll until General Custer's disaster on the banks of the Little Bighorn sixteen years later."¹⁹¹ The total Paiute losses were two horses killed and three braves wounded.

Now the citizens of the Comstock Lode begged Colonel Hays to lead another militia, "The Washoe Regiment," and he took command on May 22.¹⁹² Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Sanders and Major Daniel Elihu Hungerford were Hays' chief aides.¹⁹³ The Washoe Regiment was manned with 550 volunteers and "supported by 144 detached regulars from the First Dragoons, Sixth Infantry, and Third Artillery – the latter fielding two 12 pound mountain howitzers – under the overall command of Captain Joseph "Jasper" Stewart."¹⁹⁴ Captain Stewart's regulars had arrived from Fort Alcatraz, California and marched to the Comstock Lode labeling their excursion the "Carson Valley Expedition."

Once again "Captain Jack" would apply the principles of maneuver warfare to his adversary as his regiment approached and made camp at Williams Station on May 28.

First, Hays sent out scouts to screen The Washoe Regiment's march and at Big Meadows, about two miles from Williams Station, Hays' scouts encountered 150 Paiute warriors. Undoubtedly believing they had run across more reckless whites, the Paiutes opened fire on the scouts and pursued what they likely believed to be a small unit back to Williams Station. At what history has labeled the Battle of Williams Station, Hays' Washoe Regiment made its first stand.

In stark contrast to William Ormsby stumbling directly into the trap set for him and his militia by the Paiute Chief Numaga, Hays had turned the circumstances and conditions around and made his adversary fight on his terms. Hays was able to get inside the Paiutes

decision cycle and consequently outmaneuvered their forces by surprising them with his scouts.



Figure 26. Paiute Chief Numaga (1830 - 1871).
Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Whereas William Ormsby was predictable and acted precisely in the manner the Paiutes expected he would – marching with a large force en masse and bumbling into what he imagined would be a frontal assault on the Paiute camp – Hays had instinctively known via years of experience “the most important lesson is that to defeat guerillas, state-armed forces have to

become better at their own game than they are. When U.S. Army Colonel David Hackworth commanded a battalion in the Vietnam War, he called this “out-guerilla’ing the guerilla,” or “out G’ing the G.”¹⁹⁵

Hays was a seasoned campaigner and so assessed the situation immediately. As the scouts rode back, Hays and thirty of his best men rode to reinforce the scouts -- surprising the Paiute braves and engaging them in a running fight which lasted nearly forty-five minutes. The warriors eventually abandoned the field -- recognizing the futility of future combat -- and left seven of their dead behind.

Major Hungerford recognized and acknowledged this, and his biographer later wrote,

As the lesson of this engagement, Col. Hayes, perceiving the loose and unsatisfactory character of the organization, and seeing that discipline, if not so necessary in guerilla warfare or Indian encounters, was absolutely essential to the success of operations on a large scale, separated the command into two divisions, Lieut-Col. Saunders commanding the mounted force, and Major Hungerford the infantry, composed of three companies of Regulars, the Sierra Battalions, and companies of hastily-formed volunteers from the mining camps, Col. Hayes being Commander-in-chief. The next day, the now reorganized forces marched to the Truckee River and succeeded in turning the position held by the Indians.¹⁹⁶

Under the direction of Chief Numaga, the Paiutes sent their women and children into the Black Rock Desert to protect them from the next battle they anticipated to once more overwhelmingly prevail in – despite the temporary setback at Williams Station.

On June 2, 1860, Hays scouts located between eight hundred to one thousand Paiutes on the Truckee River close to the to where the First Battle of Pyramid Lake had occurred. Colonel Hays and Lieutenant Colonel Saunders left behind the regulars and Major Hungerford’s infantry to fortify a potential line of retreat and dismounted his cavalry to deploy them in a skirmish order. “A large gathering of Indians formed to his left and, predicting they would attempt to turn his flank, Hays led a portion of his command to engage them.”¹⁹⁷

Knowing how to take advantage of terrain, Hays eventually positioned his command in a mile wide canyon, naturally defended on the east by the Truckee River and protected and secured on his western flank by the mountains of western Nevada's Virginia Range. Some of the Paiute's managed to scale a portion of the range called The Rocky Butte and "directed enfilade fire on the right flank of Hays's troops," but the terrain nonetheless thwarted any attempt by the Paiute's to outflank him.¹⁹⁸ Captain Stewart's howitzers were brought up to remove the Indian's position but were never able to range them. Eventually a combination of regulars and volunteers ascended the summit despite encountering lethal fusillades of rifle fire -- and drove the Paiutes off the butte.

Textbook maneuver and flank, and flank and maneuver continued for three hours. Captain Stewart's forces drove the Indians back from the mountains in the west while Colonel Hays forces focused on the river on the east. Colonel Hays knew the strategic goal was not to destroy the Paiute but simply to drive them away. "In 4GW, the goal is to collapse the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him."¹⁹⁹ This was Colonel Hays' Counter-4GW goal as well.

"The Indians gradually gave ground through the long spring afternoon, almost certainly covering the evacuation of their villages near Pyramid Lake. As evening fell, the Indian force withdrew onto slopes above the battlefield, daring the whites to pursue them into a moonless evening. Colonel Hays held his force in check, and the Indians on the slope above, safe beyond rifle range, rained defiant yells and 'the most insulting gestures and abusive language, in both good and bad English' upon the heads of the astonished soldiers."²⁰⁰

Colonel John Boyd, the architect of the OODA Loop, emphasized the "orient" portion as the most important of the four elements because it was via the orientation aspect that a warrior would maneuver inside the decision cycle of his adversary. Hays strategy at the Battle of

Pyramid Lake was to force the Paiute to cease hostilities, and he was constantly orienting to decide and act ahead of the Paiute leadership. “Boyd’s method to produce paralysis and collapse of the enemy’s will to fight is getting inside the adversary’s OODA-Loop.”²⁰¹ At this battle Hays succeeded in persuading the Paiute to abandon their “will to fight,” with losses on his side of 3 killed and 5 wounded and losses on the Paiute side considerably higher.




Figure 27. Colonel John Boyd, USAF: The OODA Loop.

From "A Discourse on Winning and Losing" Edited and compiled by Grant T. Hammond.

Courtesy of Air University Press.

Body counts are irrelevant though. According to Boyd attrition and/or annihilation is not the goal, “Operate inside adversary’s observation, orientation, decision, action loops to enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic chaos ... and/or fold adversary back inside himself so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.”²⁰² Once again, Hays succeeded.

“The tribesmen vanished into the mountainous deserts of the north.”²⁰³

Several days later Major Hungerford took a party of his men to reconnoiter any sign of any remaining living Paiutes (none were found) and to surveil the aftermath of the battle. “Here

he found the bodies of one hundred and thirty-three dead Indians, slain by the avenging settlers in the battle at that place.”²⁰⁴ Other accounts state an estimated 25 Paiutes were killed with an additional tally of 20 wounded.²⁰⁵ In the end the actual numbers are truly immaterial to the strategic goal Hays set out for himself and The Washoe Regiment: to thwart, contain, and discourage any further Paiute actions. Mission accomplished.

Although the concept of the OODA Loop would not be formulated for more than a century afterwards, in his last battle John Coffee Hays once again implemented an essential element of maneuver warfare which many military theorists and historians even today have missed in their conventionally rendered judgment of the Second Battle of Pyramid Lake as nondecisive or inconclusive. Hays – an unheralded expert in maneuver warfare – would likely have disagreed with these latter-day assessments. Because the actual result of the battle was -- regardless of the true amount of their casualties -- the Indians sustained enough damage, in addition to losing their will to fight, to damage Chief Numaga’s loosely coordinated command structure and force them to leave their area of operations. This then allowed Colonel Hays in the end to return with his Washoe Regiment to Virginia City where he was able to disband them, and then return to a life of lasting peace at his home in Oakland, California.

Interview with noted Military Theorist William S. Lind, Author of *The Maneuver Warfare Handbook* and *The Fourth Generation Warfare Handbook*.

The following is from a telephone interview conducted on October 13, 2019.

Q: Was John Coffee Hays fighting 4GW entities?

A: “In order to answer this I refer you to Barbara Tuchman’s *A Distant Mirror* and Martin Van Creveld’s *The Rise and Fall of The State* which is a prequel to his *The*

Transformation of War. 4GW entities are non-state aligned. The Mexican raiders and bandits Colonel Hays fought in Texas had the unofficial consent of the Mexican government to harass and raid Texas ranches and farms. The only 4GW entity Hays fought in Texas was the Comanche Indian. Again, the banditos and brigands Hays fought in Texas were still state aligned, and against the Mexican guerillas Hays was actually fighting a classic counterinsurgency, not to be confused with 4GW. 4GW is outside of the state framework which is the Clausewitzian trinity of government, army and people. Counterinsurgency is a fight against actors who are striving to become a state (insurgents). What changes is not how they fight – it’s who and what they fight for. Again: refer to Martin Van Creveld’s *The Transformation of War.*”

Q: Did John Coffee Hays set any precedents or examples the modern warfighter may continue to derive lessons from?

A: “Absolutely! Leadership, focus on knowing language and terrain, taking advantage of technical superiority, and -- this is central to maneuver warfare -- envelopment. John Coffee Hays excelled in all these methods. Hays cognitively understood maneuver warfare is not a pushing contest. The goal is envelopment, not attrition. What Hays was able to consistently accomplish reminds me of the phrase of the late Colonel David Hackworth, ‘outGing the Guerilla.’ Hays was able to regularly out-g the guerilla!”

Q: In your opinion: Was John Coffee Hays a leader in counterinsurgency?

A: “Yes – very much so. During the Mexican War, Hays was optimally chosen to defend General Winfield Scott’s supply lines.”

Q: Was John Coffee Hays a leader in counter-guerilla operations?

A: “Yes – again, with the Mexican War example. His fight against the guerilla leader Padre Celedonio Dómeco de Jarauta, is illustrative of how Hays was able to break the

resistance's will to fight. The last stand of Jarauta's guerillas in Sequalteplan was inevitable due to their envelopment."

Q: Was John Coffee Hays a leader in Counter-4GW?

A: "Against the tribes he fought - Hays was quite an effective leader, particularly against the Comanche tribe. However, I would not characterize him as a leader in Counter-4GW per se."

Q: Do you believe the tactics introduced by John Coffee Hays on the early Texas frontier make a suitable example of early American Counter-Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) then?

A: "Yes, again - against the Comanche, Hays's tactics are a solid example, especially in meeting the Comanche adeptness in mounted warfare with trained and experienced horsemen of his own. Early American Counter-4GW was effectively applied by Benjamin Church, Anthony Wayne, Lewis Wetzel, and other early Americans but Hays is a very good example of a solid tactician, particularly how he adapted the enemy's TTPs regarding mounted fighting. Hays was astute. He appears to have acclimated from the start of his career all of the factors which made him a success: tempo, decisiveness, and flexibility - and when fighting 4GW - you have to envelop - not push!"

Q: Do you see John Coffee Hays as being one of the inaugural antecedents of the Counter-4GW fighter?

A: "Hays certainly managed to diverge from the groupthink of his era. From the armies which fought during the era which led to Westphalia, to the American Civil War, most military leaders in those days would rather lose than move away the ground plan which had been drilled into them. Hays adapted to his opponents -- he was constantly going for the enveloping movement, counter-guerilla tactics, counter-insurgent, counter-4GW-- within the context of light infantry or light cavalry irregular forces. But I don't see his legacy influencing those who are writing doctrine today."

Q: One of the markers of 4GW include decentralized decision making referencing a centralized vision; to what extent (if any) was John Coffee Hays an example of this type of Counter-4GW fighter both during his days as a Texas Ranger and as the commander of the Texas Mounted Volunteers in the Mexican American War?

A: “Colonel Hays was a fine example of being able to carry out decentralized execution. In Hays’ era the communications were too poor, events moved too quickly – so men like Hays were needed to carry out ‘commander’s intent.’ The Germans have a name for this: ‘Absicht.’ It roughly translates into ‘intent,’ which Prussian officers in the past were expected to carry out regardless of formal orders. ‘Centralized vision, decentralized decision making’ maneuver warfare ‘not just executing – but deciding,’ is the essence of Absicht. Sam Houston actually told Hays part of the execution of this intent was to negotiate with Indians when possible and to avoid unnecessary fighting. Houston also understood the moral ground or moral level as well. Hays’ record appears to be fairly consistent here. Major General Mike Hyatt, USMC (ret) was one of the first proponents of this in the modern era.”

Q: Another part of maneuver doctrine (and Counter-4GW) is taking advantage of technological innovation. Hays alone among his contemporaries seemed to truly grasp the technical importance of the repeater revolver.

A: “Hays had tremendous superiority over both Indian and Mexican armament, and he exploited that advantage. You might ask why the Indians also did not take advantage of the Rangers’ Kentucky rifles and use them prior to the introduction of the Colt, yet if you were to examine the two starkly different weapons you will see the bow and arrow had a much higher rate of fire. Nevertheless, on the subject of technological innovation and 4GW, in the past non-state forces have never been able to innovate as uniformly as state forces could – state forces learned

and adapted faster. This was also an advantage for the Counter-4GW leader. This is changing now though, from terrorist groups employing the war of IEDs to transnational drug cartels getting their product to meet demand – the state has steadily declined in its ability to meet the 4GW challenge.”

Q: Maneuver warfare is often associated with 4GW. Do you see the innovations Hays adapted to light cavalry operations as a compliment or extension to Counter-4GW methods?

A: “It is a compliment. The maneuver warfare Hays is celebrated for was effective against the 4GW Comanche fighters but just as effective against state forces. State forces including classic light troops, locally recruited, with loose state control, which shade into gangs and bandits, sometimes there’s no difference. The Confederate raiders of William Quantrill are an example. The Mexican bandits – who were working for their government at the same time and very familiar with territory – technically remained state forces as well. Grenzers – light infantry who emerged from the frontier borderlands between Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire during the Hapsburg monarchy are a textbook example of state forces carrying out decentralized execution of Absicht. When you get to light cavalry, the Hussars are another perfect example of state force who travel light, know local terrain, and are under very loose centralized control. Hays’ Texans fit this same pattern on the American plains and later in the Mexican interior.”

Q: The bedrock foundational principles of fighting a counterinsurgency campaign going back to the Assyrians fighting the Babylonians and the Medes appear to have been unchanged – even the moral law was invoked by Herodotus when he characterized the eventual Assyrian defeat as an example of shaking ‘off the yoke of servitude, and to become a free people.’ Would you agree or disagree that throughout his career fighting Comanches as a Texas Ranger, fighting Mexicans in the Mexican American War and fighting Paiute Indians – John Coffee Hays

continued the foundational principles of Counter-4GW – meaning 4GW doctrine remained unchanged during his career?

A: “4GW is not applicable to Hays. In Hays’ era the state prevailed against non-state opponents. Fighting in Hays’ time culminated in state military supremacy over all other entities whether non-state 4GW fighters or state-aligned insurgent guerillas. If you’re the state against non-state, you’re Goliath. You’ve got everything. Who identifies with Goliath though? The natural inclination in the court of public opinion goes with David. So, the moral high ground usually goes to the underdog. Hays and his Rangers rarely applied the moral high ground. To reiterate: John Coffee Hays was more of a counterinsurgent fighter, and occasionally a counter-4GW fighter, than a 4GW fighter himself. 4GW is the rise of non-state forces that can defeat state armed forces. That did not exist in Hays time. What may be more applicable is Hays 3GW emphasis on the unexpected and his emphasis on encirclement. Maneuver warfare is certainly applicable to Hays.”

Q: For over 20 years John Coffee Hays won each of the conflicts and campaigns he engaged in. Would this record have any applicability or lessons for the warfighter today?

A: Hays emphasizes time and speed. He never cared about seizing ground; he enveloped, delegated and delegated some more – he’s closer to the 3rd Generation context of leaders like Patton in that respect. You can also find this in history. Mao’s classic maneuver warfare is an example, Israel in 1967 and 1973 is another. However, the warfighter today continues to favor attrition warfare. When the initial plan of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was briefed to then Vice President Dick Cheney – the plan was a head-on clash. General Tommy Franks, the architect of the “Left Hook,” was a cautious by-the-book leader. Maneuver warfare is effective, but the American military has demonstrated many times over the decades we won’t do it.”

Q: From the historical record it appears John Coffee Hays quickly and instinctively learned to Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) quicker than his adversaries – or – as Colonel John Boyd stated, “He was able to get inside their OODA loop.” Whether it was Comanche raiders, Mexican guerillas or Paiute Indians; John Coffee Hays appeared to have a knack for getting inside the OODA Loop of his adversaries. If you agree with this characterization is there any means you believe Hays may have acquired this knack other than possessing a simple and natural ability?

A: “John Coffee Hays is a classic case of natural ability.”

Q: Do you have any specific examples of John Coffee Hays utilizing the principles of maneuver warfare? For example: would the asymmetric Battle of Walker Creek - which Hays ended by ordering Robert Addison Gillespie to shoot the Center of Gravity (Comanche Chief Yellow Wolf) be an acceptable example? If not – are there any you might characterize from John Coffee Hays career?

A: “Walker Creek is actually an effective example; a rapid charge when the enemy doesn’t expect it. The TTPs in this battle reflects classic maneuver warfare characteristics.”

Q: Do you have any other thoughts on John Coffee Hays and his historical connection to maneuver warfare especially when it is aligned to Counter-4GW?

A: “When we’re speaking of Hays regarding maneuver warfare there is a historical connection which may be applicable today. However, when we’re engaged in 4GW today we’re allied with irregular light forces, and we’re providing them advice and guidance, attempting to turn them into a little American military. This is why we always lose now – you can see this going back to the army of South Vietnam to the Iraqi and Afghan armies of today. The way John Coffee Hays fought then as compared to now has no relevance and it is frankly anachronistic to

say he had any role reflecting modern 4GW. But his example may or could have some relevance when we're training allied irregular forces, such as the Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq. When it came to a centralized vision and decentralized decision-making it is hard to see if Hays shared Sam Houston's vision and it is clear Hays did not share Winfield Scott's vision – he could not grasp Scott's strategy. In fact, Hays's actions, or inaction, undercut Scott's strategic vision. I say inaction because although Hays may have been the de jure leader of the Texas Mounted Volunteers, he was still their elected leader. Irregular forces are difficult to control. I will say John Coffee Hays' combat record can be applicable to the study of maneuver warfare and the OODA Loop, and Counter-4GW is the closest description today of what Hays was doing then but it still doesn't fit the modern context of 4GW. Influence? There is no influence on modern American combat doctrine, we continue to copy the French and their Second Generation Warfare methods today. In the Mexican American War, the regular military leadership looked at John Coffee Hays with a very skeptical eye then and they would look at him with a very skeptical eye today.”

Current Doctrine

Attrition Warfare. Fighting a Fourth Generation War with Second Generation Doctrine

Since Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in the spring of 2003, the last conventional military battle fought by the American military, the threats faced by the American military from the Iraqi insurgency to the various jihadist groups (Al Qaeda, The Taliban, Al Shabaab, ISIS) to Central American and Latin American Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have been Fourth Generation threats which the American military has responded to in a Second Generation fashion. As a consequence, just as in previous campaigns against insurgent forces, the American military has been pulled down into quagmires and endless occupations with no clear exit strategy. The United States armed forces have always excelled at attrition warfare. This was successfully demonstrated for over a hundred years from campaigns in the Spanish-American War, World War One, World War Two, Korea, Iraq during Operation DESERT STORM and then again in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. For a century before that – with the notable exception of the American Civil War – the American military was also capable of fighting successful maneuver warfare engagements. The United States cavalry forces, first developed in the Southern states beginning with the Texas Rangers and culminating in such celebrated Southern horsemen as John Singleton Mosby, Nathan Bedford Forrest, and James Ewell Brown (J.E.B.) Stuart were soon eclipsed by the cavalry from the Northern states, particularly after the Battle of Brandy Station, and the lessons learned here were applied in the American West.

“In the succeeding years of continuous fighting with the Indians in the West and in guarding the southern frontier, the characteristics of mobility, fire power and shock, as well as the adaptability to all types of fighting, were further developed.”²⁰⁶ This was written by the Cavalry School of the United States Army in 1937, several years before the demise of horse cavalry so the

principle of maneuver warfare has been in the institutionalized American military for a while, although lip service continues to be rendered to the concept more than the actual application of it in the field. The historical record has been mixed at best, yet each branch apparently leans more towards fighting the attrition fight where metrics can be counted, enemy orders of battle can be reduced, and physical objects on a chart can be labeled as disabled and destroyed. Even in the war against drug cartels success is measured more in how many kilograms of contraband are interdicted, how many air and maritime vessels are destroyed or sunk, and how many indictments and convictions can be racked up against smugglers and cartel bosses rather than focusing on root causes. And this enemy is “technologically advanced, operationally sophisticated, well equipped and have proven themselves to be highly adaptable to law enforcement measures marshaled against them.”²⁰⁷ Yet we continue to fight the Fourth Generation TCO threat with the same Second Generation doctrine. As William S. Lind has written, “Second Generation militaries fight by putting firepower on targets, and Fourth Generation fighters are very good at making themselves untargetable.”²⁰⁸

Maneuver Warfare. Recent successes

Fortunately, there have been several examples of successful maneuver warfare engagements as well. The state of Israel, like the United States, has had a mixed record here but one prominent example has been the loss of Lebanese Hezbollah’s moral level with its alliance with the government of Syria in its recent civil war. “By siding with the Assad regime, the regime’s Alawite supporters, and Iran, and taking up arms against Sunni rebels, Hezbollah has placed itself at the epicenter of a sectarian conflict that has nothing to do with the group’s purported *raison d’être*: ‘resistance’ to Israeli occupation.”²⁰⁹ This loss of Hezbollah’s legitimacy has been to Israel’s great gain.

Piracy on the Horn of Africa, an international scourge a decade ago, is nearly non-existent today thanks to military leadership familiar with surprise, combined arms, flexibility and other principles of maneuver warfare.

And the combined arms used to defeat ISIS (including an alliance with the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Syria and Iraq), merged with a high operational tempo, and leadership determined to get inside ISIS' OODA Loop has also paid lasting dividends as well. Whether or not ISIS was a state-aligned entity as they claimed, or a non-state aligned entity as was demonstrated by their status as international pariahs is immaterial. At the moral level of war, the most important level, ISIS was an utter failure.

The bottom line is when maneuver warfare is properly applied it is successful. It worked in the era of John Coffee Hays, it worked for other American military leaders since his day, and it can work today and in the future if all of the American military branches do more than acknowledge maneuver warfare in the same way some American politicians acknowledge the importance of a balanced budget or profess to prioritize veteran healthcare while simultaneously cutting their benefits. As always, lip service and pretense is cheap and easy. Fortunately, in the air domain at least, the former pretense of airpower advocates appears to have grown more sincere over the last couple of decades and most air strategists today would agree that the "measure of merit is no longer the number of enemy killed and vehicles destroyed but *operational* results obtained by all force elements synergistically combined. A condition of maximum kills is obtained by efficient allocation of sorties, whereas 'results obtained' seeks military effectiveness. Thus, efficiency and effectiveness are *not* synonymous in attrition and maneuver warfare."²¹⁰

Recommendations

Maneuver warfare remains a vital element in American military doctrine today. And as United States Army Colonel Ian Lyles writes, an “analysis of the Mexican War and the role of the Texas Rangers offers many hard-won lessons for the commanders of today regarding the integration, control and utilization of coalition and irregular forces.”²¹¹ One of the recurrent themes which run throughout history is the short-term forgetfulness of hard won lessons. Even a decade after John Coffee Hays had left Texas and ceased fighting roaming bands of Comanche Indians many of the lessons the Texas Rangers learned had been lost. A protégé of John Coffee Hays, Rip Ford, had to re-apply those lessons when the United States Army and the Bureau of Indian Affairs temporarily took over from the duties of the Texas Ranger. At the Battle of Antelope Hills in 1858 the Rangers once again “reasserted the superiority of Texans over Comanches and underscored the incompetence of the army and Indian office. It sealed Rip Ford’s fame and, most important, proved the lesson that Jack Hays had learned but that had somehow gotten lost over the years. ‘The Comanches,’ Ford later wrote, ‘can be followed, overtaken, and beaten, provided the pursuers will be laborious, vigilant, and are willing to undergo privations.’ Willing, in short, to behave and fight like the Rangers of the late 1830s and early 1840s.”²¹² This calls to mind the lessons learned and forgotten with regard to COIN operations and the resulting field manuals being rewritten from the experience in the Philippine occupation to the Vietnam era to the recent counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. A firm grasp of historical trends and the study of the elements which have shaped successful commanders in the past is always warranted.

Emerging technological trends is also a factor all commanders should pay attention to. “The most challenging aspect of counterinsurgency will not be so plain to see. The ability of

insurgents to attack digitally and to confuse the populace with disinformation is a greater threat. Such ‘gray zone’ conflict is a murky mix of political and digital influence campaigns, backed by cyber, electronic warfare, and other nonkinetic means. It does not quite rise to outright armed combat, but it can be even more disruptive.”²¹³ Just as John Coffee Hays understood the utility of the repeating revolver in his day so should commanders today grasp the technological potential of the cyber-domain, even in the world of COIN operations, and learn to counteract their negative effects.

While technological progress has and always will remain relevant though, the human element is always the most important aspect of maneuver warfare. United States Army Colonel David Hackworth wrote when it came to counterinsurgency, “men, not helicopters or mechanical gimmicks, won battles, and the only way to defeat the present enemy in the present war (Vietnam) at a low cost in friendly casualties was through adopting the enemy’s own tactics, i.e., ‘out G-ing the G’ through surprise, deception, cunning, mobility ... imagination, and familiarity with the terrain ...”²¹⁴ These basic factors, and the principles of maneuver warfare laid out by Doctor Martin van Creveld, as well as the basic tenets put forth by Colonel John Boyd in his *Discourse On Winning and Losing* would likely all be agreeable to and recognized by John Coffee Hays due to the timeless results and solutions they have always offered – so long as they are studied, considered, and applied.

That is the lesson for today’s military and the military of tomorrow as well – know where and how successful doctrine has been shaped, developed and executed in the past – and look beyond the technological limitations of history towards the creativity, innovation, and imagination of past commanders. Throughout history the same patterns emerge, notably from the pioneers in warfare.

Conclusion

Today the American military is once more looking at the potential of maneuver warfare to combat non-state actors engaged in 4GW operations against the United States and its allies. Part of this includes participating in COIN operations once again. This is not new. General Winfield Scott recognized the same merit in applying effective COIN principles in his era as well. “Scott knew that successful guerrilla campaigns, like those in Spain against the French, required an environment hostile to the occupiers. He used discipline, good public relations, and an understanding of the local culture to keep that from happening.”²¹⁵ On many occasions military planners, theorists, and leaders appear to forget the United States military has a rich tradition of being able to successfully engage and defeat the asymmetric enemy we find ourselves facing. While there is certainly great merit to having operational plans to defeat a peer-competitor enemy and to also systematically eliminate those adversaries’ various orders of battle – maneuver warfare has also been a proven success for a long period of history as well. Today’s military leaders may be surprised to see what long forgotten lessons we can learn from individuals such as John Coffee Hays if we only take the time to examine his successes and apply his timeless examples in the easily observed present day. An examination of Captain Jack’s contributions to maneuver warfare would certainly result in many examples of success, yet even his failures may impart some lessons. The starkest example of where Hays appears to have failed in this domain was his failure to appreciate Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott’s strategy behind their commander’s intent – particularly Winfield Scott’s General Order Number 20. Even here though the consensus on this from history is mixed, with the consensus sometimes even leaning slightly in Hays’ favor. “Ranging from larger task force offensives to precision

targeted raids, Texans generally complimented, with some notable exceptions exemplified by their atrocities in Mexico City, the larger pacification effort.”²¹⁶

When it comes to the majority of the principles of maneuver warfare, as a leader and combatant in that discipline, John Coffee Hays sustains the appellation of “pioneer.” The answer to the research question as to whether or not Hays was a pioneer in Counter Fourth Generation Warfare would be negative though. As the writer of *The Fourth Generation Handbook*, William S. Lind, explained, “When it came to a centralized vision and decentralized decision-making it is hard to see if Hays shared Sam Houston’s vision and it is clear Hays did not share Winfield Scott’s vision – he could not grasp Scott’s strategy. In fact, Hays’s actions, or inaction, undercut Scott’s strategic vision.”²¹⁷

At an intellectual level there is no doubt Hays likely did understand leadership’s (Houston, Taylor, Scott) centralized vision yet at an emotional level there may have certainly been a conflict given his experiences over the prior dozen years fighting Mexicans in Texas. At a personal level Hays did lean forward as illustrated by the incident after the Battle of Monterrey when he charged one of his own men with murdering a Mexican lancer and turned him over to the authorities. At worst, particularly when his men went on a rampage after the death of Adam Alsans, Hays sin would be that of omission. Yet the historical record is nonetheless crystal clear with regard to the conduct of some of his men and as every military officer knows – as a leader – you are ultimately responsible for the conduct of your troops.

With that said though most of the lessons Hays imparts regarding surprise, tempo, flexibility, and maneuver - “Hays emphasizes time and speed. He never cared about seizing ground; he enveloped,”²¹⁸ continue to be valid and applicable.

John Coffee Hays may never have been aware of Colonel John Boyd's OODA Loop, Martin van Creveld's principles of maneuver warfare or even read Carl von Clausewitz or Antoine-Henri Jomini in his own era. Yet his title still stands. John Coffee Hays was an American pioneer of maneuver warfare.




Figure 28. Colonel John Coffee Hays (1817 - 1883).
Photograph by Mathew Brady circa 1857.
Courtesy of Peter Force Collection, Library of Congress.

SOURCES

Research on historical personages, military doctrine, and the comparison and contrast of said doctrine to the efficacy of its use then, now, and in the future frequently concentrate on past successes. Doctor Daniel H. Abbott's short 2008 treatise, *Revolutionary Strategies in Early Christianity* is both an original yet germane work which examines how Fourth Generation Warfare theory can be applicable to even extraordinary events such as the transformation of the Roman Empire from paganism to Christianity. Historical biographies are a necessary source for research, and I have found many – from the H.H. Bancroft Collection at the University of California at Berkeley manuscript detailing the life and adventures of John Coffee Hays to the after action reports found in the papers of Texas President Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar. Various works by noted historians, scholars and military men (Darren L. Ivey, Stephen L. Moore, Robert M. Utley, Major Ian B. Lyles, Major Nathan A. Jennings, Brigadier General John S.D. Eisenhower) on John Coffee Hays, the Texas Rangers, and the Mexican American War compliment other works written by noted and recognized Maneuver Warfare and Fourth Generation Warfare scholars (Martin Van Creveld and William S. Lind) as well as recent papers written by military men from across the service branches (Lieutenant Commander Scott A. Davis, United States Navy, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory A. Thiel, United States Marine Corps, and the above-mentioned Majors Ian B. Lyles and Nathan A. Jennings, United States Army). A thorough immersion in American military history, a concentration in joint warfare studies, and the emergence of a military operational art and science concept categorized today as Maneuver Warfare all require primary and secondary sources which are informed, credible, and conversant with the subjects raised in the research question. The following sources meet that requirement.

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³ Studer, Major Juerg. *Are There Five Rings or a Loop in Fourth Generation Warfare? A Study on the Application of Warden’s or Boyd’s Theories in 4GW*. Master of Military Operational Art and Science degree thesis, Joint Warfare Concentration, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 2005, 12. “*The actors in 4GW use conventional arms in traditional, but also in non-traditional ways to achieve their effects.*”

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source of most firepower, but otherwise, (and despite the Marine's formal doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare) the American military today is as French as white wine and brie. At the Marine Corps' desert warfare training center at 29 Palms, California, the only thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is true at the Army's Armor School at Fort Knox, where one instructor recently began his class by saying, "I don't know why I have to teach you all this old French crap, but I do."

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²¹ Combined Arms Breach (video). *OEC G&V. c. 2015. This visualization was developed for the Maneuver Center of Excellence and is closely based upon the National Training Center Breach and Assault exercise executed circa 1990. This visualization demonstrates viable TTPs as discussed in ATTP 3-90-4 for the conduct of the combined arms breach against a hypothetical enemy.*

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²¹⁶ Jennings, Major Nathan A. "Fighting Fire with Fire: Texas Rangers and Counterinsurgency in the 1847 Mexico City Campaign," *Small Wars Journal*, 01 June 2014. <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fighting-fire-with-fire>

²¹⁷ Personal interview with William S. Lind, October 13, 2019.

²¹⁸ Personal interview with William S. Lind, October 13, 2019.