

THE UGANDAN MILITARY CHALLENGE IN SOMALIA: HOW TO BE MORE
EFFECTIVE IN FIGHTING INSURGENCIES

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

THE UGANDAN MILITARY CHALLENGE IN SOMALIA: HOW TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN FIGHTING INSURGENCIES, by Major Henry Obbo, 179 pages.

Somalia's insurgency intensified when the country became stateless in 1991. Islamist extremists used the vacuum to worsen the conflict. Several interventions did not end the insurgency. The Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces' (UPDF) intervention in 2007 resulted in the expulsion of al-Shabaab insurgents from Mogadishu but the insurgents were not defeated. This research was conducted using the research question, "How can the UPDF be more effective in defeating the ongoing insurgency in Somalia?" Using the UPDF operation in Somalia and case studies of the Tamil Tigers and Lord's Resistance Army counterinsurgency operations, this research qualitatively analyzed intelligence, firepower, insurgent support, civil-military cooperation, and political control as important counterinsurgency precepts to arrive at conclusions for the need for the support of the international community, notably, to block insurgent support and enhance the UPDF's intelligence and firepower capabilities as a way to end Somalia's insurgency. There is also a need to rapidly develop Somalia's military to enable political control in the country so as to ease the UPDF operations.

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ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AO	Area of Operations
AU	African Union
COIN	Counterinsurgency
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Forces
EU	European Union
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFV	Infantry Fighting Vehicle
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
PSC	Peace and Security Council
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
UPDF	Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

This study examined the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces' (UPDF) challenges in Somalia and recommended practical strategies to enhance the force's effectiveness in the fight against al-Shabaab insurgents. The study compared Somalia's insurgency problem to other insurgent groups linked to terrorism. This comparative analysis identified critical relationships that enhanced the understanding of Somalia's insurgency problem. The clearer understanding of Somalia's problem provided a framework upon which the study developed recommended solutions to combat the insurgency. The research examined multiple variables prevalent in the Somali situation, including the UPDF's relationship with different partners, as well as earlier research findings on Somalia's insurgency. Identifying and examining the variables helped to derive holistic answers to cultivate a unity of effort in the fight against al-Shabaab. In effect, the outcome of the research provides the UPDF decision makers and their partners with broad workable approaches that can enhance the operational efficiency of the UPDF in Somalia's counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

A prominent issue in this study was the evolving security situation and inability to defeat al-Shabaab despite an 11 year-old African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), under which the UPDF had operated since 2007.¹ Moreover, in 2017, AMISOM announced its intentions to withdraw from Somalia by 31 December 2020.² The dilemma hinged on what the UPDF, as a central force for the Somalia COIN operations, can do, or be helped to do, to resolve the problem ahead of the 2020 AMISOM withdrawal date.

Somalia's indigenous security forces have not appeared ready to assume responsibility in the face of AMISOM's tentative withdrawal. The Somali security forces' lack of readiness appeared more pronounced as AMISOM began scaling down commitments by five percent in December 2017. Multiple factors influenced AMISOM's decision based on the premise that the Somali security forces will have developed the capacity to run the security of their country in the three-year period before the complete withdrawal of AMISOM.³ The country under study is located in East Africa. (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. Map Showing the Location of Somalia

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA World Fact Book Africa: Somalia," accessed 20 March 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>.

Somalia, like many other African countries, plunged into insurgency shortly after attaining independence in 1960. The cost of a lingering insurgency heavily affected the economic, political, and social conditions of the already least developed country in Africa. Somalia degenerated into a failed state in 1991 with the collapse of Said Barre's Regime. By 2016, it rated among one of the poorest countries in the world.⁴ In the same way that most African insurgencies had hinged on the struggle for resources, as well as social and political exploitation that bend towards the wide ethnic divides in the countries, Somalia's conflict initially started with a struggle for political power and later it firmed its roots on clan-based division.⁵ Foreign factors have only made the situation worse. The United States' (US) longstanding and, sometimes, misguided involvement in the affairs of Somalia have partially contributed to the country's unending insurgency.⁶

In recent decades, the character of insurgencies in Africa experienced a major twist when terrorist organizations from the Middle East made contact with African insurgent groups. Transnational terrorists groups, such as the al Qaida, took advantage of the conflict and chaos of the situation in Somalia for their own purposes, and complicated the already fragile security situation.⁷ The addition of foreign ideologies to the initial causes of Somalia's insurgency resulted in a complex situation that had already taken AMISOM, with the UPDF as a pioneer, a decade without resolving by March 2017.

Again, tribe and culture bond the African societies beyond international borders. In most cases, this bond extends insurgency or its effects well beyond recognized national borders. Spillover effects of insurgency beyond national borders often complicate solutions. Somalia's al-Shabaab used the cover of cross-border ethnic links to plan and conduct multiple high impact terrorist actions in Kenya. In 2011, Kenya deployed forces

in Somalia in response of several attacks on Kenyans by the Somalia's insurgents.⁸ In 2010, al-Shabaab killed 74 Ugandans who were watching a soccer match.⁹ Ethiopia has also been targeted.¹⁰

Over the years, al-Shabaab's operations have exhibited traits similar to other African insurgent groups, such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that was formed in Uganda but traversed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Central African Republic (CAR), covering over 1,000 kilometers from its origin.¹¹ Nigeria's Boko-Haram of Nigeria shares traits with al-Shabaab when attacking neighboring countries. Despite their similarities and international attention, African insurgencies appear to be quite enduring and difficult to defeat.

The presence of cross-border and trans-region insurgencies in Africa have resulted in regional and continental solutions, or attempted solutions. In the first decade of the twenty first century, the phrase "African solutions to African problems" gained prominence especially in respect to the African Union's (AU) involvement in Somalia. This came after an aborted United Nation (UN) mission in Somalia (1993-5) and a worsened security and humanitarian situation in the country. The AU sought a locally sourced approach to resolve the problem. That was how the UPDF deployed to Somalia in support of "UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1744, adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 20 February 2007, which authorized the establishment of AMISOM within six months. The mandate tasked AMISOM with protecting the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and enforcement of an arms embargo on Somalia."¹² UNSCR 1744 was a rejoinder to the decision of the Peace and Security Council of 8 January 2007 to deploy an AU mission in Somalia instead of a mission by

the Horn of Africa's trade bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which the 6 December 2006 UNSCR 1725 had authorized. UNSCR 1725 authorized the force in line with the resolution of 24th meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of African Union held on 7 February 2005.¹³

Nevertheless, the viability of the phrase "African solutions to African problems" generated debate, starting with the fact that some Somali citizens viewed this intervention as foreign interference. The reluctance by AU member states to deploy in Somalia introduced skepticism of the level of commitment and capability of African states to resolve insurgency on the continent. Despite the PSC resolution, only Uganda responded initially.¹⁴ Burundi followed later but with insufficient military capabilities to effect the mission.¹⁵ Therefore, the UPDF offered to handle the problem alone as the other 52 African countries looked on after making empty promises to deploy to Somalia.

It was only after Uganda, assisted by Burundi, made significant progress degrading al-Shabaab and restoring the government in Mogadishu when Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone responded to the AU call. The Commitment of the late comers is questionable. Sierra Leone has since withdrawn. Kenya and Ethiopia mainly responded in self-defense against al-Shabaab attacks on their countries. Critics argue that lack of commitment by AU member states partly explains the delayed solution to the Somali problem; however, many factors could have accounted for the decade-long COIN operations in Somalia. For example, the UN mandate and operational resourcing restricted the UPDF operations while al-Shabaab adopted new *modi operandi*. Al-Shabaab employed irregular warfare tactics enmeshing itself within communities to exploit limited UPDF special operations capabilities.¹⁶

The UPDF singlehandedly assumed the central role for Somalia COIN operations in 2007. Ten years later, it maintained the largest number of troops in Somalia and controlled the Banadir region, which was at the time of this studies publication, the most critical part of Somalia because it housed the nation’s capital Mogadishu. In 2012 and later in 2016, AMISOM and other missions in Somalia came to a near end with the threat of UPDF’s withdrawal from Somalia.¹⁷ As of 2018, the survival and future of the Somalia state was still heavily reliant on the enhanced UPDF operational proficiency and the ability to combat al-Shabaab from the center.

Problem

The problem statement used in this study is, “The al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia has far reaching effects on international security. The UPDF COIN intervention has, by April 2018, only been successful in defeating al-Shabaab control of major urban areas but not in eliminating the insurgent’s activities or existence in the Banadir and Shabelle regions. COIN approaches that can enhance UPDF operations to eliminate the al-Shabaab from Banadir and Lower Shabelle need to be identified.”

The Ugandan military deployed to Somalia, a failed state in conflict, on 6 March 2007 as part of the AMISOM to defeat al-Shabaab – an insurgent group that used methods such as terrorism for political ends. Somalia, a country faced with far reaching humanitarian crises caused by conflict, constituted a critical continental and global threat because it provided a safe haven for pirates and terrorists.¹⁸ Despite a number of critical successes by the UPDF over ten years, the Ugandan military did not achieve total success against the Somali Islamist insurgents that operated in its area of operations (AO).¹⁹ In an attempt to consolidate gains, the UN increased UPDF troop levels from the initial 1,605

to 6,223. Additionally, the UN also raised the AMISOM military force level to 17,400 with more troop contributing countries (TCC): Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.²⁰ Unfortunately, since 2016, Uganda and other TCCs in Somalia have suffered increasing single event combat losses at the hands of al-Shabaab than in earlier years.²¹ The degree of single event losses or violence on the civilians also rose to its highest levels in 2017.²²

The UPDF's operational methods such as offensive actions, long-range penetration operations, information operations, civil-military operations, and cordon and search did not fully yield the desired results.²³ Expectations held that a combination of these operations should have yielded positive results. The conflicting results raised questions concerning the effectiveness, application, and relevance of UPDF COIN approaches against al-Shabaab, even if evidence suggested that the Ugandan force was making progress. Several thoughts exist within UPDF leaderships circles about which COIN strategies could have led to the defeat of al-Shabaab; however, these opinions are not based on the analysis of how COIN has worked elsewhere. The research problem stated earlier led to the isolation, in the study, of possible contributory aspects to the prolonged UPDF COIN operations in Somalia with a view to analyzing the potential remedy to the problem, something that if emulated by other AMISOM TCCs could lead to total defeat of al-Shabaab in this Horn of Africa country.

Research Questions

The research question for this study was, "How can the UPDF be more effective in defeating the ongoing insurgency in Somalia?" In order to answer this question, the following secondary research questions were employed:

1. What are the intelligence gaps in UPDF COIN operations in Somalia?

2. How vulnerable has the UPDF been to the enemy firepower?
3. How can insurgent physical support affect the UPDF mission in Somalia?
4. How has the UPDF conducted its civil-military operations thus far in Somalia?
5. How can effective political control influence the UPDF performance in Somalia?

Assumptions

This research was based on the assumptions that:

1. The success of Somalia's COIN to date was heavily dependent on the UPDF.
2. New or adjusted approaches to the UPDF COIN operations would enhance its effectiveness in Somalia.
3. Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia would end when the insurgents have been defeated at their decisive points in the Banadir and Lower Shabelle regions.

Definitions

African Union Mission in Somalia. "An active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. The African Union's Peace and Security Council created it on 19 January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate."²⁴

Counterinsurgency. "A comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes."²⁵

Counterterrorism. “Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their networks in order to render them incapable of using unlawful violence to instil fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.”²⁶

Insurgency. “The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”²⁷

Operation. “A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. An operation may entail the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and manoeuvre needed to achieve the objective of any battle or campaign.”²⁸

Operational Approach. “A description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state.”²⁹

RAND. “A non-profit research organization that aims to develop solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier, and more prosperous.”³⁰

Support. “A command authority. A support relationship is established by a common superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.”³¹

Sustainment. “The provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion.”³²

Terrorism. “The use of unprecedented violence or threat of violence and intimidation on the public or government to push for political ends.”³³

Unconventional Warfare. “UW consists of operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow

a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”³⁴

Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces. Uganda’s national military that is made of four services: Land Forces, Air Force, Special Forces, and Reserve.

Unity of Effort. “Coordination and cooperation towards common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action.”³⁵

Limitations

Sourcing for information was difficult because there was little literature about Uganda’s COIN operations in Somalia and on Somalia in general. Available military sources were also limited because of the complexity of the African Union standard operating procedures and classification criteria of documents. Again, there were some known important ideas to inform the analysis but did not meet the academic documentation criteria. Despite these shortcomings, a professional approach to the research guaranteed affective results. There was quite a wide range of writing on COIN in general that informed a balanced discussion. Sources such as official reports, articles, research theses, and the internet filled the literature gap on Somalia to guarantee an objective and balanced thesis.

Delimitations

The analysis focused on only the UPDF and not AMISOM as a whole, thereby narrowing the research focus to a limited perspective of the multinational arrangement within which the UPDF conducted its COIN operations in Somalia. Nevertheless, the

UPDF was, by the time of this research, the central force in Somalia and constituted 36 percent of AMISOM's military component. The analysis in Chapter 4 covered only the years 2007-2018, leaving out the earlier years of the conflict that would have possibly influenced the outcome of the study. Furthermore, the analysis focused on only the Lower Shabelle and Banadir regions of Somalia where the UPDF operated by 2018, leaving out seven wider administrative regions of Somalia (Middle Shabelle, Hirran, Galgaduud, Bakool, Gedo, Upper Juba, and Lower Juba) (see Figure 2) whose influence could have possibly impacted on the UPDF COIN operations. It should be noted that during the period under review, the Lower Shabelle and Banadir regions were the focus of al-Shabaab activities and Banadir was the decisive point in the COIN fight. Key Somali government structures of al-Shabaab's interest were located in Banadir region.

The study employed a case study of an insurgent group from another continent: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. There could be possibilities that specific operational environmental factors influenced the success of the Sri Lankan COIN operation that might not apply in Somalia. In addition, the researcher worked for two years under the UPDF contingent in Somalia but he was ethical in his analysis to ensure that his personal experience and perceptions did not have a significant effect on the outcome of the research.




Figure 2. Map of Somalia Showing AMISOM Sectors

Source: Created by author using African Union Mission in Somalia, “AMISOM Sectors,” accessed April 27, 2018, <http://amisom-au.org/resources/amisom-sectors/>.

Significance of the Study

This research aimed at analyzing and presenting recommendations on how to enhance UPDF effectiveness in COIN operations against the Islamist insurgents, al-Shabaab, in Somalia. The outcome of the research adds value to both the military and nonmilitary actors operating in Somalia as well as academia. The study analyzed COIN operations against Islamist insurgents, a foreign phenomenon to Africans. COIN

operations against Islamic insurgents gained prominence in the last decade of the twentieth century. An African perspective gives this study high significance.

This research identified Somalia's conflict as a complicated and dynamic phenomenon that requires constant study to establish emerging trends. For close to four decades, scholars have analyzed the conflict and made recommendations that simply have not worked. Even lengthy international and regional interventions did not fully yield positive results in Somalia. Conducting this research was, therefore, part of a requirement for continuous study that adds value by bridging the missing links that are responsible for the prolonged conflict. The research linked the different scholarly perspectives and borrowed ideas from two other successful COIN operations with similar dynamics to enhance applicability of the outcomes in Somalia and similar environs. Therefore, the outcome of this comparative study of Somalia's prolonged and complex conflict, blended with terrorism, offered a rich avenue for lessons learned for successful conduct of COIN against extremist sponsored insurgency within the diverse African social, political and economic environment.

In addition, this study provided avenues for lessons on the viability of African countries' abilities to intervene in regional and continental security challenges and the rejoinders of the international community. The study further gave insights on the dynamics of a purely African multinational (MN) operation in the face of a large-scale protracted insurgency. It identifies lessons that could be applied to other COIN operations in Africa. It is also worth mentioning that when this research was conducted there was a near absence of literature about the AU operations in Somalia, especially about the UPDF operations under the umbrella of the continental body. Most of what was written about

the insurgency in Somalia focused on Siyaad Barre's regime, the US Army operations in Somalia during 1992-1993, the United Nations (UN) mission that followed, its withdrawal in 1995, terrorism, and the warring clans. Therefore, this study was significant in bridging previous literature to current and future operations.

Summary

Somalia, like many other African countries, plunged into insurgency shortly after the attainment of its independence in 1960. The struggle for resources as well as social and political exploitation drew Somalia into conflict. Clan divisions coupled with foreign interferences and Islamic extremism worsened the insurgency. The cost of the insurgency heavily affected the economic, political, and social conditions of the already least developed country of Africa. The effects of Somalia's insurgency extended beyond its borders into neighboring countries. It also impacted on the maritime safety on the Indian Ocean. To contain this situation, the African Union sought local solutions to the insurgency after a failed UN mission in 1993-5. After multiple attempts, the AU, through the UNSC, deployed AMISOM to Somalia in 2007 to end the insurgency.

The UPDF was the first AMISOM force to deploy to Somalia and by 2018 still played a pivotal role in the COIN operations in that Horn of Africa country. The UPDF restored a degree of security in Somalia but it has not fully achieved its objectives. Even after other TCCs joined the UPDF in Somalia, al-Shabaab continued to inflict damage on the forces and civilians. The unpredictable security pattern in Somalia has attracted a number of studies on the conflict to devise a solution to the problem. Nevertheless, these studies have contributed little to the end of the conflict. This thesis was an additional effort to derive solutions to Somalia's insurgency and identify potential techniques for

handling future insurgencies on the African continent. Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on the Somalia insurgency with a focus on the different actors in the conflict and the research questions in this chapter.

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose for conducting this study was to examine the UPDF's military challenges in Somalia to establish practical strategies to enhance the force's effectiveness in the fight against al-Shabaab insurgents. In order to achieve this purpose, the researcher applied the research question, "How can the UPDF be more effective in defeating the ongoing insurgency in Somalia?" In this chapter, the researcher explored what other writers have published regarding the subject. Books, government and other websites, research works, monographs, reports, journals, magazines, and newspaper articles supported this study. Other than the specific literature on Somalia, this study utilized a wide range of military doctrinal writings about COIN. This chapter explored the available literature in broad terms to cover the background of the conflict and other key areas that informed the analysis in this thesis: intellectual inheritance on insurgency and counterinsurgency; and the determinant factors to COIN success. The chapter ends with a summary of the most significant facts and issues.

Somalia and Insurgency

How it Started and Evolved

A noteworthy book for this research was *The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security* by Redie Bereketeab. The book analyzed the genesis of the conflict in Somalia with appreciation of related factors around the Horn of Africa. It covered Ethiopia's role in fueling the conflict and as well as other indirect and covert

actors.¹ Similarly, *Black Hawks Rising* by Opiyo Oloya discussed the Somalia conflict by chronologically linking the conflict back to 1960-69 with key events captured, although the book focused more from 2007-14. Oloya noted the significance of the disagreement over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, bordering with Somalia, as well as the USSR, US, and Italy's 1961- 77 role in shaping the insurgency in Somalia. The Cold War powers supported and armed the opposing sides in a zero-sum game. The US and Italy first armed Ethiopia while the USSR backed Somalia beginning in 1962 to secure access to the Horn of Africa's strategic location to the Middle East and key shipping lanes.²

The USSR sealed its relationship with Somalia in 1970 when Somalia became a socialist state. The USSR supplied Somalia with armored and aerial weapons. In exchange, the USSR received docking privileges in all the major ports of the second longest coastline on the African continent. After, Somalia and Ethiopia went to war in 1977 over the Ogaden Desert in Ethiopia, the USSR supplied arms to both rivals before later abandoning Somalia. Without its patron, Somalia suffered defeat in 1978. Shortly after its defeat, the US and Italy stepped in to fill the void. Both were motivated by Somalia's strategic location and the desire to counter communist advances. The trans-Atlantic allies soon took advantage of the privileges the Russians forfeited.³

Despite the US support of approximately \$120 million annually, the effects of the Ogaden War were irreversible.⁴ The Somali government's popularity was already damaged beyond repair, giving rise to an insurgency which was to last for decades without a solution. What followed from 1960-80 was an explosion of clan-based violence that wrecked Somalia for decades.⁵ The catalyst to the total breakdown of security in Somalia was the government itself that used the US support to finance its efforts to

suppress the people rather than developing the nation, brewing resentment and conflict. President Siyaad Barre, the leader of the Supreme Revolutionary Council that conducted a coup d'état on the 21 October 1969, resorted to dictatorship and unwarranted brutality against real and presumed critics of his government. Siyaad Barre reinforced his Special Forces with his Mareehaan clans-mates to suppress his opponents. This deepened the clan-based divisions in Somalia that readily transposed into the conflict.⁶

In October 1978, the execution of Colonel Usmaan Mahammad with sixteen others for alleged treason led to the formation of an insurgent group called the Somali Salvation Front (SSF).⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf Ahmed led the SSF comprised mainly of members of the Mojerteen clan from which the slain Col Usmaan Mahammad originated.⁸ In the years that followed, clan based insurgent groups were established. By 1989, four major insurgent groups challenged Siyaad Barre at his state house in Mogadishu.⁹ The Mojerteen's SSF was renamed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) after a merger with smaller anti-government groups. There was also the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF) that the Ogaden clan dominated. The United Somali Congress (USC) was dominated by the Hawiye clan, and the Somali National Movement (SNM) was composed of the Isaaq clan. They all applied military pressure on Siyaad Barre's government from different fronts.¹⁰

Confronted on so many fronts, Barre focused his wrath to the clans that constituted the rebel groups. One of Barre's worst retaliatory actions was against the marginalized Isaaq clan that formed the NMS. Barre's collective brutality included the poisoning of water wells and indiscriminate mass killing of tens of thousands of civilians.¹¹ After dealing with the NMS, Barre turned his attention towards the SNM that

had emerged as the main threat to his regime. Again, Barre's reprisals on civilians dented the government's international image and created more insurgents.¹²

As the insurgency picked steam, Barre increasingly relied on the US. Unfortunately for him, the US's attention shifted to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Additionally, the prospect of US support was tenuous because of the Somali government's human rights record. Rather, the US conducted noncombatant evacuation operations of its citizens in Somalia. On 27 January 1991, Barre could no longer cling to power. He fled the country.¹³ However, Barre's departure did not resolve Somalia's security problem. Somalia's national military disbanded soon after January 1991. The state's collapse resulted in open rivalry for national power by the different clan-based insurgent groups.

In *State and Stateless Violence in Somalia*, Linke and Raleigh explained that immediately after the Somali state collapse in 1991 the SNM declared independence for northern Somalia and named it Somaliland – unrecognized by the international community. In the south, multiple insurgents turned their guns on each other in the absence of a unifying enemy. The USC split into two groups significant in the Somali conflict: the United Somali Congress-Aideed (USC-A) and United Somali Congress-Mahdi (USC-M).¹⁴ The situation degenerated into ethnic rivalries that took a firm root in Somalia, transforming into untamed political climate led by warlords, supplanting traditional Somali leadership. Constant conflict led to a humanitarian crisis, prompting US intervention in 1992 and the UN in 1993.¹⁵

In their book, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Hirsch and Oakley explored the US humanitarian operation of 1992-93 in

Somalia and the aborted UN mission in 1995 that led to further escalation of the conflict. They, as well as multiple scholars, argued that the US and UN operations in Somalia deepened clan divisions, opening ground for sentiments to fight intervening forces.¹⁶ Othman O. Mahmood argued that the UN Special Representative failed to understand that Somalia's Darood clan, which was 20 percent of the population, was traditionally mistrusted by the remaining clans. But, ignorant of this historical factor, the leadership of the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) showed favoritism in dealing with the Darood clan over the other clans. The other clans perceived the well-intended UN policies directed towards the Somali reconciliation process as a backstabbing attempt and Darood-fostered conspiracy.¹⁷

Likewise, Linke and Raleigh also highlighted that UNOSOM disastrously consolidated the clan-based factions and antagonized warring factions, including that of Muhammad Farah Aideed and his Habr Gedir clan. The UN's attempt to disarm the clan militias was futile because of its piecemeal nature, leaving the disarmed groups vulnerable to attacks. The militia's disarmament rate was very low as compared to the traders and farmers who remained defenseless against the ambushes of the former. The UNSCR 794, transitioning the mission from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and authorizing use of force on provocation, resulted in the killing of 18 US troops and the downing of their Blackhawk attack helicopter by USC-A.¹⁸

In their book, *Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity*, Rainer Grote and Tilmann Röder theorize that interventions by the UN into the Somalia conflict did not yield much.¹⁹ After the failed UN mission, militant groups like Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) that had fought the Barre regime, took prominence.

Although AIAI disbanded in 1997 as a result of an Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) offensive when it attempted to assassinate the Ethiopian prime minister, warlords, too, had emerged and controlled Somalia in parts as the struggle for state power deepened.²⁰

Lawlessness befell the country even deeper and in October 2004, there was an attempt to bring back sanity through a US supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG first established its base in Nairobi, Kenya, but it later relocated to Baidoa through Ethiopian military support.²¹ When the TFG was formed, an informal governance system had taken root in Somalia-the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Because of chaos, Sheikh Ali Dheere, a.k.a Ali Mohamed Rage Dheere, initiated an Islamic court in Mogadishu in 1993 to solve petty crime, applying Sharia law. Dheere's idea later spread throughout the country.²² In 2000, the courts formed a nationwide Islamic Courts Union (ICU) with the aim of defeating the warlords who then controlled the country.²³

The ICU initially subscribed to a moderate Islamic ideology with an all-embracing nationalist philosophy aimed at uniting the country. On 3 July 2006, the ICU reopened Mogadishu Airport that had been closed for ten years and on 25 August, it opened the 11 year non-operational Mogadishu sea port.²⁴ Additionally, on 15 August, the ICU defeated the pirate's cells in Harandhere with an aim of promoting safer seas off Somalia's coast and beyond.²⁵ Unfortunately, by November 2006 the ICU adopted radical tendencies. It gave sanctuary and training ground to key terrorist groups. The group hosted foreign fighters from the Middle East. After establishing its own military wing, the ICU became a threat to the US supported TFG in Baidoa.²⁶

In the strategic context of the Global War on Terror, the actions of the ICU attracted US concern. The US returned to Somalia to support militias, the TFG, and Ethiopia in an offensive against the ICU after it was linked to al-Qaida. By 29 December 2006, the ENDF had marched for 240 km from Baidoa and captured Mogadishu.²⁷ By early January 2007, the Ethiopian offensive defeated the last stronghold of the ICU in Southern Somalia at Kismayo and the TFG was able to move from Baidoa to Mogadishu.²⁸ But, the ICU did not completely disintegrate.

The military wing of the ICU, al-Shabaab, together with other militias, took the fight to the TFG and Ethiopians in the streets of Mogadishu after the ICU collapsed. Lawlessness returned to Mogadishu. In March 2007, al-Shabaab changed its approach to incorporate Iraqi-inspired terrorism tactics such as suicide attacks.²⁹ The US sponsorship of militias and warlords to fight against the ICU did not yield the anticipated results. The recipients of the US money, such as a militia business man called “Muhammad Qanyare, openly boasted of receiving \$150,000 between January and February 2006.”³⁰ He and others rather considered this as doing business with the US and reporting what the “donor” wanted to hear than the reality on the ground. The US had rather created more confusion.³¹

Watching the massive suffering in Somalia, the AU stood against the US with a view of supporting reconciliation and a centralized government to resolve the insecurity problem in Somalia rather than funding criminals.³² Despite US resistance, the AU insisted and held to its position of seeking a continental approach to resolve the Somalia problem. With the dogma of “African solutions to African problems”, the AU initially adopted to use an Eastern Africa regional organization, the Intergovernmental Authority

on Development (IGAD) to deploy in Somalia. Later, the African body adopted AMISOM under which Uganda deployed to Somalia. By 2018, Uganda remained the major TCC by troop numbers and responsibilities.

What Could the UPDF Offer?

General skepticism of the UPDF's ability to succeed in Somalia attracted some scholarly interests in light of UN's previous withdrawal from the Horn of African country in 1995. Other concerns based on the history of Uganda as much as the UPDF's known capabilities. Like Somalia, Uganda also suffered post-independence instabilities. Between April 1979 and January 1986, Uganda had five heads of state, hyperinflation, and low economic development.³³

The UPDF is an offspring of the revolutionary force that overthrew the Ugandan autocratic government in 1986. By 2007, the UPDF was a relatively small and young military. Moreover, during the first 20 years after the revolution, the ill-equipped UPDF fought over 20 domestic insurgency groups. The UPDF finally ejected the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) out of Uganda's western borders in 2007.³⁴ Through those years, the Ugandan military also participated in major conflicts in the DRC, Sudan, and CAR. Therefore, from independence to UPDF's deployment to Somalia, Uganda had been in some sort of instability and the UPDF was in constant combat from 1986-2007. Despite its operational experience, the UPDF lacked a written doctrine by then. The numerous challenges gave scholars reservations of what the UPDF could do in Somalia. A Canadian based Ugandan writer, Dr. Opiyo Oloya, initially predicted that the UPDF mission in Somalia was "dead on arrival" only to revoke his statement nine years later in

his book, *Black Hawks Rising: The Story of AMISOM's Successful War Against Somali Insurgents, 2007-2014*.³⁵

On 7 March 2006, artillery fire greeted the UPDF's arrival at Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu. Incoming mortar shells of all calibers and constant close quarter engagement with the insurgents characterized the routine in the UPDF camps. The narrative of failure on arrival started to change when two months passed without a major loss inflicted on the UPDF troops in Somalia save for on 16 May 2007 when an improvised explosive device (IED) attack killed four UPDF soldiers and injured six others.³⁶ Since then, much of the narrative relating to the UPDF in Somalia focused on the reasons for the prolonged COIN operations, counterterrorism, success stories, and ethics in war.

The UPDF has since 2007 gained tactical successes. In 2011, the UPDF ejected al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu.³⁷ In 2012, the UPDF began to pursue al-Shabaab in the countryside as the insurgents engaged in a massive information operations as well as covert operations at the UPDF rear.³⁸ This research took into consideration the changing trends as well as the role of the international actors in the conflict.

The International Community and the UPDF

From 2007, several international actors supported the UPDF COIN operations in Somalia while others supported al-Shabaab. The term international community, as used in this study, meant "states, organizations of states, and grouping of people of the world with common interests."³⁹ Most literature on the military operations in Somalia since 2007 focused on the roles of the US, European Union (EU), AU, IGAD, individual European countries, the UN, League of Arab States, transnational extremist

organizations, and Somalia's neighbors. Little attention has been devoted to the individual actions or contributions of African nations.

American support to the UPDF operations in Somalia resulted from the Ethiopian threat of withdrawal from fighting the ICU in February 2007 before tactical gains were consolidated in a war that the US had interests and spent much time and resources.⁴⁰ The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, informed an eleven-person US diplomatic and military delegation at his office in Addis Ababa that the ENDF was overstretched in Somalia amidst rising resistance from the Somali. He announced a withdrawal of the ENDF in two weeks, considering the severity of the threat to the force and Ethiopia as a whole. This announcement, and especially the timeframe, presented the US with a big challenge of filling in the Ethiopian gap.⁴¹

As events unfolded in Somalia through 2006 and into 2007, the international community discussed possible solutions to the Somalia problem. By 2006, the IGAD, AU, and UN had almost reached a consensus of deploying an IGAD force to Somalia. The debate later replaced the IGAD with an AU force. In either case, the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, promised to deploy a battalion of the UPDF to protect the TFG government in Somalia, preferring an IGAD force to an Ethiopian force.⁴²

The UPDF leadership in Uganda made immediate preparations to support the Commander-in-Chief's promise. Earlier, on 26 November 2006, President Museveni revealed to the US that a UPDF Mechanized Battalion was ready and waiting for the deployment as long as a UN mandate was in place. Therefore, the Ugandan promise was the immediate solution to the US concerns over the ENDF withdrawal.⁴³ The remaining hurdle was to push for the implantation of the UNSCR 1725 so that the UPDF could

deploy to Somalia under the IGAD arrangement. A significant operational issue was overcoming the sustainment requirements for the troops. Nevertheless, a day after the Ethiopian announcement, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer, announced that the US government would provide \$40.5 million in renewable assistance to Somalia with another \$19 million, for an 8,000 strong peacekeeping mission in the country.⁴⁴ In addition, as the diplomatic cards changed from IGAD to AMISOM, the US was this time quick to support an AMISOM force that eventually was authorized by UNSCR 1744.⁴⁵

The US was one of the closest partners to Uganda on AMISOM matters and immediately joined Uganda in the final preparations for the troops with a plan for immediate deployment. Since the start of the mission in 2007, the US has continued to offer materiel and training support to Ugandan troops in Somalia. By 2018, under the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and Bancroft Global Development, the US still provided pre-mission training to the UPDF and mentorship in the mission area.⁴⁶ According to the *Africa Year Book 2015*, the US remained a major actor in supporting the UPDF COIN operations in Somalia.⁴⁷ While US donations were not sustainable due to shifting policy priorities, the contribution strengthened the UPDF's operations in Somalia.⁴⁸ The US has also supported the UPDF operations with intelligence sharing and physically degrading al-Shabaab especially in the Lower Shabelle region.⁴⁹

When on January 2007 the US offered to support Somalia and a peacekeeping mission financially, during a Nairobi, Kenya meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia, the EU also offered to fund the peacekeeping with an additional goal of

promoting consensus between the TFG and the subdivisions within Somalia.⁵⁰ The EU kept its pledge to provide the troop allowances as well as other requirements for running the mission where Uganda participated.⁵¹ Mostly, the EU played a key role in maintaining the mission through financial support; however, the support was not constant. In January 2016, the EU reduced troop allowances by 20 percent from \$1028 to \$828 per month. After the reduction, the EU paid to AMISOM 20 million Euros for soldiers' allowances per month of which over 30 percent went to the UPDF. In 2013, AMISOM required an annual funding of \$3.6 billion to run its operations.⁵²

Within the period under analysis, the EU also trained the UPDF and other AMISOM troops as well as built the capacity of Somali security forces. France, Belgium, and United Kingdom also provided training and other material support to the UPDF.⁵³ The UK and France specifically, as well, offered mentorship on the ground in Somalia. Initially, the EU funded training of the Somali forces was in Uganda. However, by 2011, the EU training mission in Somalia transferred the training to Somalia at the Jazeera Training Centre in Mogadishu.⁵⁴ Other individual actors, such as Uganda and Turkey, trained Somali cadets in their respective countries which helped to build local capacity to support the UPDF operations in Somalia. On 29 September 2017, Turkey opened its largest overseas military base collocated with the UPDF base in Mogadishu. The mission of the \$50 million base was established to train and mentor the Somali security forces.⁵⁵

The UN was an important player in Somalia as well. The UN's establishment of AMISOM in 2007 opened the door for the UPDF in Somalia. Over the years, the UN made changes in the face of the mission. Important among those were multiple renewals of the mission mandate as well as changing the mandate from peacekeeping to peace

enforcement in 2011. The UN has also since changed the mandate from six months to one year as well as increased the authorized troops from 8,000 to 22,000 in 2018, to include the police.

The UN passed 50 resolutions regarding different aspects on the Somalia operation between February 2007-2018. UNSCR 2372 (2017) was the latest change that directed the transition of security responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security forces.⁵⁶ The UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), later replaced by the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), provided the sustainment requirements of the UPDF and other AMISOM forces.⁵⁷ To ensure effective support, on 24 January 2012, the UN office shifted from Nairobi to Mogadishu after a 17-year hiatus.⁵⁸ Many other EU and Asian countries made several individual contributions to the UPDF and AMISOM operations.

All these efforts received an opposing force. The transnational extremist groups opposed international support to Somalia. Al-Shabaab received support from international terrorist organizations, such as the al-Qaida. In 2017, ISIS claimed links to Somalia's insurgent group. Since 2007, al-Shabaab received training and equipment support from mainly the Middle East based extremist groups. The foreign fighters (*Mujahideen*), especially snipers, played a significant role in delaying operations against the UPDF advance to control Mogadishu.⁵⁹

Intellectual Heritage on Insurgency

Characteristics of Insurgent Movements

There are many definitions of insurgency but all tend towards the US Department of Defense's definition that, "insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence

by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of the governing authority.”⁶⁰ Insurgent movements derive most of their characteristics from this definition. The book, *Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* further explained that insurgencies are always built on grievances in the society and that insurgent groups have identical characteristics.⁶¹

Many scholars share the view of Louise Stanton that insurgent movements have seven identical characteristics. To her, insurgent movements worldwide thrive from a cause and ideology, are indigenous of the country where they fight, their goals are destruction of existing order, and their aim are the seizure of state power. Other historical characteristics of insurgent groups are that they operate in an undefined battlefield with no definite period and they usually use terrorism and guerrilla warfare as important tools of operations.⁶² Whereas a veteran participant in insurgency, Vladimir Lenin, agreed that, by default, insurgents use a cause and ideology as an important strategy, he also brought in the element of organization. He explained that his Bolshevik Party took over power in Russia (1917-24) primarily because the insurgent group united behind a political party, supported by an ideology.⁶³ Mao Tse-Tung also suggested the significant role of ideology in the success of any revolution as well as popular support that he said must build from a cause.⁶⁴ He explained that all insurgent groups use a cause, an ideology, and revolutionary objectives to mobilize support so that the population can identify with them. The UPDF doctrine referred to insurgency as a war for men’s minds where terrain or weaponry in themselves are not that important than appealing to the aspirations of the people.⁶⁵

On another perspective, Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, suggested that in the twenty-first century, the quest for personal interests, other than the common cause of the society, characterized many insurgent movements. He noted that the ulterior desire to tap from the national treasury always drives the move and the manipulation of the grassroots people, usually the illiterates, serves as the tool to achieve this mission. The betrayal of the cause by master minders of insurgencies shortly after they get to power evidences this argument.⁶⁶ That was why Louis Stanton observed that “today’s insurgents are moving away from the rural areas to cities where money lies even though their leadership remain in hiding.”⁶⁷

Religious ideological indoctrination that are totally foreign to the indigenous community and not based on any grievances in the society, has become a common characteristic feature of many insurgent movements in the twenty first century.⁶⁸ In recent past, transnational organizations, motivated by ideologies based on extremist religious or ethnic beliefs, have exploited unstable conditions in failed and failing states to influence the insurgencies there.⁶⁹ They take advantage of conflict and chaos for their own purposes independent of societal grievances. The insurgents’ desperate desire for support has forged the relationship between insurgents and foreign actors who most often hijacked the insurgency. In fact, this factor marries modern insurgency to extremism that has bred terrorism across the globe. Terrorism has become part of any insurgency and should always be anticipated as such.⁷⁰

The UPDF COIN training manual presented a different argument on Paul’s assumption that no matter the reason for an insurgency, insurgents always tended to use violent means to overthrow the government.⁷¹ The training manual rather explained that

by characteristic, insurgents use both destructive and constructive methods to achieve their aim. Destructive methods attack the established order and its supporters. Constructive methods aim to build up the will to fight, the means of fighting, and establishing an alternative society or government.⁷²

Insurgent movements have been understood to be very fluid, especially their leadership. They have no defined locations, especially at the early stages of the insurgency, and most often, their biggest mass are in the rural areas whereas small units operate asymmetrically in the urban areas. Kenneth Watkins wrote that contemporary insurgents have increasingly become adept at operating in urban environments as demonstrated in Chechnya, Iraq, and Somalia. He also believed that the terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare that contemporary insurgents use have a relationship: “urban guerrilla warfare is terrorism in a new dress.”⁷³

Traditionally, the initial core of the insurgent movements used to be nationals of a given country. However, foreign influence and the complex nature of insurgency has led to cross-border membership and international memberships to insurgencies. Hence, insurgent support extends from local to foreign support, from both state and non-state actors. In so doing, insurgents build highly connected worldwide networks eased by globalization.⁷⁴ Scholars further noted that insurgents usually recruit the youth into their ranks. Many factors influence the youth to join insurgent groups, including unemployment and other forms of societal challenges. Mostly the illiterate communities form the source of the fighters for most insurgent groups. “The mass of the population of emerging nations is generally poorly educated and indifferent to problems outside its

daily environment. The individual does not always realize the main reason for his misery or poverty and is thus easy prey for a well-trained subversive organization.”⁷⁵

No matter the year or place, the multiple characteristics that insurgent groups often display are survival dynamics that all lead to the common agenda of facilitating the insurgent’s goal of the destruction of the existing order and the ultimate seizure of state power. These multiple characteristics equally present multiple challenges to the implementers of COIN operations.

Uniqueness of Conducting COIN

The Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies have been common throughout history, but especially since the beginning of the twentieth century.⁷⁶ The US Army field manual, FM 3-24, defined COIN as a “comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to address the root causes of an insurgency simultaneously, contain, and defeat it.”⁷⁷ Even if the same manual insinuated that many insurgencies follow a similar course of development, have similar characteristics, and that the tactics used to defeat them are similar in many situations, this has not always been the case. In some cases, insurgencies differ as determined by their locations and the ever-changing local and international factors at play in the field even if the motivating factors for insurgencies have commonalities.

COIN operations involves comprehensive strategies of multiple lines of operations and efforts. Hence, Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O’Connell argued that the ability to balance appropriately the lines of efforts and lines of operations, in the face of a dynamic operational environment, dictates the differences in the conduct of COIN operations in different situations and places.⁷⁸ The writers also had a view that successful

COIN strategies often involve “picking the right elements to follow, achieving synergy and balance among those elements, and continually assessing their impact on the enemy’s freedom to act and to exert influence.”⁷⁹

As earlier noted that COIN is a war of the mind, other military literature described COIN as a struggle to influence or win back the population so that they do not support the insurgents. It further defined COIN as a physical war with the insurgents as well as a psychological war within the population to address the reasons for the formation of the insurgency to win the hearts and minds of the population.⁸⁰ Other authors shared the idea that no amount of force can win an insurgency unless combined with non-military approaches aimed at winning hearts and minds, although some authors emphasized the use of force. Taking the 2003-06 Iraqi case, the Ba’athist regime imposed order primarily through force by the Iraqi Army.⁸¹ That kind of order would last only for a short term. Therefore, the use of force can be productive in COIN operations only when successfully blended with the application of non-civilian means to disconnect the people from the insurgents using interventions that address the conditions that gave rise to the insurgency.⁸²

Meanwhile, the Uganda military doctrine considers COIN to be a multi-stage complicated undertaking as described in Table 1 after this paragraph. The interpretation of the table indicates that insurgents use a wide range of approaches in each stage, which dictates the application of different ranges of COIN approaches that merge as parts of a continuous struggle.⁸³ Similarly, Kenneth Watkin observed that COIN operations often employ a number of unconventional warfare methods in response to the wide range of operational tactics that the insurgents apply. For example, in Somalia, al-Shabaab dug

tunnels to connect from building to building for miles.⁸⁴ This could not be resolved with conventional means.

Table 1. Three Stages Through Which Insurgency Grows		
Phases	Name of Phase	Characteristics
First	Preparatory	Insurgents set up an efficient party organization, infiltrate into key positions, recruit, and train active workers.
Second	Active resistance (Terrorism)	Characterized by terrorism to decrease the credibility of the government.
Third	Insurgency (Guerrilla Warfare)	Military action is concentrated upon attacking government security forces. Insurgents use hit and run tactics to compensate for their weakness.

Source: Compiled by author using data from Commandant, Junior Command and Staff College, UPDF Training Manual, *Counter Insurgency Basic Book* (Jinja, Uganda: Junior Command and Staff College Production Office, 2014), 1-7.

On another perspective, Dale Eikmeier noted that resolving of insurgencies that are bent on religious ideology call for the use of counter-ideological struggles or the war of ideas alongside wider political and economic interventions as the only means to win such insurgencies.⁸⁵ In summary, different COIN operations apply unique solutions. What worked in one place may not necessarily work in another case of insurgency. Even so, the determinant variables or approaches used for COIN operations in different insurgencies are always the same, save for the combination of how they are applied. The question of who has succeeded and who failed roots on whether they applied the right mix or wrong mix of the approaches.⁸⁶

The Determinant Variables to COIN Success

Background

Regardless of the location, time, and variant characteristics of an insurgency, intellectual inheritance specify the common historical principles and imperatives for the conduct of COIN operations that the sides that abide by or adapt to first often win the struggle. The US Army's field manual, FM 3-24 enumerated the principles of COIN as legitimacy, unity of effort, knowledge of the environment, intelligence driven actions, isolation of insurgents, a lead by the political, and long-term commitment. The book further listed the COIN imperatives as information and expectations management, mission command, use of appropriate force, and learning and adapting to the situation.⁸⁷

Other scholars suggested different variables they said universally lead to the success or failure of COIN operations. For example, Christopher Paul, Collin P. Clark, and Bethel Grill examined 30 cases of insurgencies using comparative parameters of *good* and *bad* COIN practices to determine where COIN succeeded and failed, respectively.⁸⁸ Many writings, including the US Army's field manual, FM 3-24, concurred with some of the variables they provided for the conduct of successful COIN operations. The variables include intelligence, tangible insurgent support, civil-military cooperation, restoration of services, and dominance of firepower, especially air power.⁸⁹ These factors, that also constitute the variables of analysis in Chapter 4 of this thesis, were justified and defined by their proponents as important COIN-winning factors and supported by literature as explained below.

Dynamic Intelligence by COIN Force

Writers examined this variable in different perspectives but most of their arguments were based on the premise that insurgents are fluid, which requires timely and accurate intelligence to deal with them. Insurgents use destructive approaches aimed at eroding government support that is characteristically the key in COIN struggles. This necessitates the COIN force to be ahead of the insurgents in information collection to facilitate the decision-making process and action to deter their moves.⁹⁰ A RAND study in 2010 of 30 resolved insurgencies established the criticality of actionable intelligence in COIN operations. Intelligence-focused strategies led to disintegration of the insurgent groups such as Sendero of Peru.⁹¹ Intelligence per se was not sufficient to win the wars in the 30 studies. Rather it supported the other approaches to win the wars. The lesson drawn from the study show that in order to win a COIN operation, the intelligence capabilities of the COIN force must be able to support the effective engagements and disruption of the insurgent activities.⁹²

The need for internal and external networking of intelligence was observed as critical for either a COIN or insurgent group to win in an insurgency. For example, in the Chechnya insurgency (1994-96) the insurgents had a more extensive network than COIN forces, hence a COIN loss.⁹³ In Sri Lanka, the government established a wide national and external intelligence network that led to sinking of Tamil Tigers' ships and international blockage of support to the rebels that was critical to their survival, hence a COIN win. The Sri Lankan experience manifested the need for superiority in both technical and human intelligence for a COIN force in order to succeed in its operations.⁹⁴ Writers also suggested airpower as an important intelligence capability required in

enhancing surveillance and reconnaissance, more so that COIN operations are joint by nature. This capability works together with signal intelligence.⁹⁵ Another important contributor to intelligence in all insurgencies was noted to be popular support. This enhances information collection and building trust through familiarity.⁹⁶

In Somalia's context, the UPDF has since 2007 been at a disadvantaged position in intelligence collection because al-Shabaab killed civilians who acted as their informers. For example, in 2014, at least 27 were victims of al-Shabaab execution over allegations of spying for the UPDF.⁹⁷ Al-Shabaab enjoyed home advantage in information collection as compared to UPDF.⁹⁸ The UPDF received equipment support from the US and other actors to bolster its intelligence capabilities such as on 27 February 2018 when the Charge Affairs of the U.S. Mission to Somalia, Martin Dale, delivered aerial surveillance systems at one of UPDF bases, but the Special Representative of the African Union Commission Chairperson (SRCC) for Somalia Ambassador Francisco Madeira pointed out the continued capability shortfalls of what he called assets of "critical importance" that AMISOM sought for a long time to no avail.⁹⁹ In the UPDF's 2012 major operations, US aid of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) played an important role in determining actions in the battlefield.¹⁰⁰

Dominance of Firepower by COIN Force

Most western military doctrinal literature used in this study indicate that firepower, especially airpower gives the COIN force a marked advantage over the insurgents through "strikes on the insurgents and supporting friendly forces by transportation and conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions."¹⁰¹ When supported by actionable intelligence, airpower is the most viable means for convoy

security as well as the speedy destruction of insurgents if they group for a combat mission, taking into note that insurgents operate in splinter groups in difficult terrain areas.¹⁰² The US Army publication reiterated the significance of airpower as:

Airpower provides considerable asymmetric advantages to counterinsurgents. If insurgents assemble a conventional force, air assets can respond quickly with precision fires . . . In numerous COIN operations, airpower has demonstrated a vital supporting role. In Malaya (1948 through 1960) and El Salvador (1980 through 1992), as well as more recently in Colombia and Afghanistan, airpower contributed significantly to successful COIN operations.¹⁰³

Airpower has proved to be important in the destruction of the enemy's command nodes and convoys. In Somalia, the US intelligence guided airstrikes killed many al-Shabaab leaders and fighters. Strikes on convoys and command nodes were specifically fruitful. For example, in 2014, the US surprise airstrikes promptly killed 288 al-Shabaab personnel, including their head of intelligence, Abdishakur Tahlil.¹⁰⁴ The US also conducted multiple airstrikes against al-Shabaab especially in December 2017 and January 2018 where it killed over 100 militants. Mohamed Abu Abdalla, al-Shabaab's deputy commander for Lower Shabelle region, died in one of the strikes at Awdheghe.¹⁰⁵

Airpower also has its own shortfalls because it is prone to inflicting civilian casualties and not viable to use where insurgents operate in splinter groups. Reports of three children killed in US airstrikes in Somalia featured in 2014.¹⁰⁶ Civilian casualties can degrade the popular support a COIN force has among the population. For example, during the Vietnam War (1955-75), the insurgents melted into the population to pull the battles to populated areas. The US force, obsessed by its reliance on airpower, fell prey to the Vietnamese trap when it massively bombed civilians especially during the Tet offensive of 1968. This raised domestic pressures for a withdrawal from the mission.¹⁰⁷

No wonder, the US Army Field Manual FM 3-24 called on commanders to apply

extraordinary caution when using airstrikes because of the unintended civilian casualties it usually inflicts regardless of the level of precision of the weaponry used.”¹⁰⁸

The COIN force must also have adequate and applicable artillery and other force multiplier capabilities for firepower delivery with a marked advantage over the enemy. A Naval War College thesis, by Povlock Paul, *A Guerilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War*, concurred that dominance of firepower is important in winning COIN operations. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka presented to their foes a unique challenge that prolonged the war because even if they did not have many sophisticated vessels, they locally constructed vessels with maximum stealthy characteristics and mounted on them multiple modified weapons that offered better range and lethality.¹⁰⁹

On the ground in Somalia, the firepower that the UPDF used since 2007 to conduct COIN operations has been criticized for being inadequate to handle the threat at hand. During a 2012 media interview, the UPDF contingent commander in Somalia, Brig Paul Lokech, appealed for enhancement of force multipliers as a means to defeat al-Shabaab. The provision of air assets and more infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and engineer assets, including explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) equipment have specifically featured as a major recommendation by UPDF commanders as requirements to increase UPDF effectiveness in Somalia.¹¹⁰

Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen reiterated that the UPDF suffered from resource and logistical supply shortages. The perennial funding shortages and the lack of required combat force enablers remained an area to improve upon in order to enhance UPDF operations in Somalia.¹¹¹ Kristen and Lovelace pointed out another area to change to enhance UPDF effectiveness in Somalia. They highlighted that the UPDF contingent

owned equipment (COE) such as tanks and IFVs suffered from wear and tear but donor restrictions hampered their replacement. Many donors placed caveats preventing any expenditure towards the military component of AMISOM, whereas the UN funds for reimbursement of COE were always insufficient and delayed.¹¹² This significantly reduced UPDF capacity to respond to enemy attacks with maximum firepower.

The dominance of fire power was noted as not an end to itself. By default, insurgents operate in splinter groups, which significantly hampers the effective use of long-range precision fires capabilities or robust conventional ground maneuver to bolster the effects of firepower. A good example where the dominance of firepower failed was during the Vietnam War. Revolutionary ideology motivated the North Vietnamese and no amount of losses that they incurred due to the massive US firepower, such as in the summer of 1964 against North Vietnam navy, rolling thunder of 1965, and the 1967 free fire zones bombardments, would stop them from fighting.¹¹³

In a broader sense, the Vietnam War demonstrated the failure of the dominance of firepower when applied against the human spirit.¹¹⁴ As earlier noted in this thesis, resolving an insurgency bent on some sort of ideology, such as the Somalia case, calls for an ideological struggle or the war of ideas rather than massive use of firepower.¹¹⁵ However, other scholars rebutted that view based on the evidence that lethal means degraded al-Shabaab after the change of the UN mandate from chapter VI to VII. Besides, al-Shabaab always massed efforts to increase on their firepower before attacking the UPDF, hence the need for a lethal response.¹¹⁶

Physical Support to Insurgents is Blocked

Characteristics of insurgencies show that insurgent forces survive from internal and external support as seen earlier in this chapter. Most insurgent organizations in the poor countries such as in Africa receive support from mainly western state actors in a bid to overthrow governments that do not serve their interests or to sort out barriers to their peculiar interests. Somalia's situation was no exception because of the involvement of the US in support of militias to overrun the ICU.¹¹⁷ In the same way that states such as the US supported such groups, the Islamic extremist from the Middle East saw Somalia as a good ground to fulfill their interests, hence their infiltration into the ICU and later al-Shabaab systems, with support, as discussed earlier in this thesis. Confronted by the desire for sustenance, insurgent groups such as al-Shabaab sought for support at all costs, even if it meant inhaling the ideologies of their sponsors. Such desperate attitude only confirms the significance of insurgent support to the lifeline of insurgency. Internal and external supports extend the insurgent's lifeline and fuel their operations.¹¹⁸

In real life, no organization can survive without a source of sustenance, be it civil or military organization. The level of sustenance often determines the effectiveness of an organization. A RAND study confirmed that insurgent support of 30 insurgencies it analyzed came in the form of recruits, funding, intelligence, equipment, sanctuary, and tolerance, among other factors. In fact, the study underpinned that an effective COIN must be able to break off the sources of insurgent support.¹¹⁹ Insurgent support and their sources normally constitute the center of gravity for all insurgencies and the COIN force must destroy these to end the insurgency.¹²⁰ This line of argument was refuted by those who believe every COIN has its own center of gravity.¹²¹ But, Yaya J. Fanusie and Alex

Entz concluded that the more a COIN force has the capacity to constrict the insurgent's access to resources, the easier it will be for it to defeat the insurgents.¹²²

Civil-Military Cooperation

As reflected earlier in this thesis, COIN was seen as a war for men's minds.¹²³ Non-lethal means such as civil-military cooperation was also recommended to be the best way to fight an insurgency. The US Army definition of civil-military operations explains the significance of good relations in an operational setting.

Civil-military operations are those activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area of operations in order to facilitate military operations.¹²⁴

Civil-military cooperation encompasses a wide range of activities depending on the doctrine of application. The activities could mean the provision of a wide range of basic services to include health, education, and general welfare, infrastructure support, and support to the rule of law, governance, and economic stability.¹²⁵ In Somalia's UPDF operational context since 2007, enforcement of rules of engagement and taking responsibility for collateral damage constituted another important part of civil-military cooperation.¹²⁶

The Cold War COIN experiences indicated that the COIN force that applied proportionate force and reduced the impact of military operations upon the civilian population won popular support. The mass voluntary insurgent support offered by the population to the US' opponents during the Second Indochina War was one illustration that the use of arbitrary force against civilians erodes popular support.¹²⁷ In the Somali context, the failure to abide by the rules of engagement by the COIN force gave the

insurgents an upper hand during the reign of Siyaad Barre. Even today, the effective use of restrictive fires policy to protect civilians entangled in war is considered to be a good COIN practice that results in winning the hearts and minds of the population in favor of the force practicing it.¹²⁸

Experiences from major insurgencies confirm the assertion that the failure to negate the insurgent's goodwill to the people constitutes a risk of failure to COIN operations. An analysis of Sadr city near Baghdad correlated the vigor of insurgent activities to the government's ineffective delivery of power and sanitation services.¹²⁹ These facts collectively drive the argument back to the assertion that winning the people's support is necessary in managing contemporary COIN operations. This argument agrees with the general view by intellectual inheritance that appealing to the aspirations of the people is primary to the success of any COIN operations.¹³⁰

On the Somalia operation, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, said that the UPDF successes in Somalia resulted from the force's good civil-military cooperation.¹³¹ Official communication from Gen Andrew Gutti and Maj Gen Nakibus Lakara, while they served as AMISOM Force Commanders, also identified the need for a closer coordination between commanders and the local leaders as an easier way to success.¹³² Therefore, the ultimate success of civil-military cooperation in any COIN operation is measurable by the level of popular support that is attained from cooperation with the people, provision of services, and respect for their human rights, among other factors.

Effective Political Structures in Controlled Areas

The historical primary goal of all insurgencies have been ultimately to achieve political control. In the same thinking, Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen suggested that forces that conducted COIN operations in the absence of any meaningful political process or structure wasted their efforts. The authors used the example of Somalia to suggest that the AMISOM forces could have won the COIN operation if the Horn of Africa country had an effective political framework.¹³³ Thus they wrote:

AMISOM . . . operations have not been adequately linked to effective political efforts . . . Indeed, for many years AMISOM operated in the absence of any meaningful political process . . . The use of military operations should be anchored in a clearly articulate political strategy and process for resolving the conflict or the crisis that led to the deployment of the peace operations.¹³⁴

In that line of reasoning, COIN operations are a wide range of activities that are anchored on a political system to achieve a unity of effort. Hence, military efforts must be in support of a visible political scheme.¹³⁵ Spencer reiterated that the purpose of any military effort in the conduct of COIN operations must be to set the conditions for a long-term political solution to the reason that led the opposing factions to an insurgency. Therefore, as a function of a political system and part of the struggle to win the hearts and minds of the people, in an insurgency situation, the government must restore services in areas under government control. Some of the reasons for joining an insurgency are disgruntled minds due to the lack of such services.¹³⁶

Summary

This chapter reviewed the literature relating to the Somalia insurgency and the intellectual heritage on insurgency and COIN, including the suggested approaches to winning a COIN operation. Somalia's insurgency has evolved over the last 40 years. Like

a common characteristic of other insurgents elsewhere, the insurgents in Somalia started their activities with the desire to capture state power. As fate had it, an unstable Somalia provided a safe haven for terrorists who hijacked the insurgency and created a complex security situation in Somalia. Despite several international interventions, some of which worked negatively in the conflict, the Somalia conflict dragged on. Nevertheless, academics suggested that the only way to resolve any insurgency is to remove the conditions that led to the insurgency. They also listed intelligence, firepower, insurgent support, civil-military cooperation, and political control to be significant determinants of COIN success as will be analyzed in Chapter 4 of this research paper. Chapter 3 will elaborate the methodology that the researcher used to analyze these five variables in relation to the UPDF operations in Somalia.

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² Oloya, *Black Hawks Rising*, 22-22.

³ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁴ Abdullah A. Mohamoud, *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia (1960-2001)* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006), 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Andrew Linke and Clionadh Raleigh, "State and Stateless Violence in Somalia," *African Geographical Review* 30, no. 1 (June 2011): 49, accessed January 6, 2018, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

⁷ Oloya, *Black Hawks Rising*, 25.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Tyler Stiem, "In Somalia's Shadow," *Virginia Quarterly Review* 88, no. 1 (2012): 72, accessed January 6, 2018, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Oloya, *Black Hawks Rising*, 25.

¹⁴ Linke and Raleigh, *State and Stateless Violence in Somalia*, 49-50.

¹⁵ Catherine Besteman, *Unraveling Somalia: Race, Class, and the Legacy of Slavery* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 17-19.

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¹⁷ Othman O. Mahmood, *The Root Causes of the United Nations' Failure in Somalia: The Role of Neighboring Countries in the Somalia Crisis* (Bloomington, IN: iuniverse, 2011), 53.

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²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 32-3.

²⁸ Oloya, *Black Hawks Rising*, 61.

²⁹ Rubin, *Guide to Islamist Movements*, 33.

³⁰ Oloya, *Black Hawks Rising*, 39.

³¹ Ibid.

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- ³⁵ Oloya, *Black Hawks Rising*, i, 28.
- ³⁶ Ibid., 85.
- ³⁷ Griffith, *US Security Cooperation with Africa*, 45.
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- ⁴⁰ Oloya, *Black Hawks Rising*, 62-3.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., 58, 62-3.
- ⁴² Ibid., 63.
- ⁴³ Ibid., 58, 62-3.
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¹²⁷ Hammond, *The Tet Offensive and the News Media*, 241-249.

¹²⁸ Kuwali and Viljoen, *By all Means Necessary*, 413.

¹²⁹ Ganesh Sitaraman, *The Counterinsurgent’s Constitution: Law in the Age of Small Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 38.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of conducting this research was to analyze the UPDF's COIN operations in Somalia with a view to finding workable recommendations to enhance UPDF operational effectiveness to defeat the insurgents in that African country. The research question employed to achieve this purpose was, "How can the UPDF be more effective in defeating the ongoing insurgency in Somalia?" This chapter presents answers to the "how", "why", and "with what" questions of the research process that the researcher employed. The chapter also explains the choice of the tools that the researcher utilized to draw conclusions to the research question. The chapter is structured into an introduction, research process, research method, selection of case studies, data analysis, evaluation criteria, and summary.

Research Process

In general, this research employed the *five steps research process* by William Wiersma. The first step was identifying and isolating the problem of the study that was comprehensively covered in the first chapter of this thesis. Second was a review of the relevant information to the research as explicitly covered in the previous chapter. Third was collecting and classifying data to the respective chapters and sections that enabled the logical flow of this thesis. Fourth was data analysis whose criteria appears in this chapter and constitutes Chapter 4 of this thesis. The fifth and final step was drawing conclusions and recommendations as deduced from data analysis.¹

Research Method

The research employed a qualitative method of analysis because the area of study required understanding a complex phenomenon at a deeper level, and the research question had the “how” to be answered that could not be adequately answered by a quantitative research. “A qualitative research is the systematic process of learning that ethically applies tools to ensure trustworthiness and practical usefulness.”² The process searched for relevant information to the research problem from both primary and secondary sources. Therefore, books, government and official sites, research works, monographs, a wide range of reports, journals, magazines, and newspapers were the sources for the study.

To answer the research question adequately, the research employed a qualitative method using comparative case studies to extract lessons learned from other COIN operations with a view to finding workable recommendations to enhance UPDF effectiveness in its COIN operations in Somalia. A case study entails an in-depth examination of one or more contemporary phenomena that the researcher bounds “with justification from existing literature and theoretical perspectives.”³ The use of case studies was appropriate in this analysis because the research dealt with a practicable problem.⁴ Meanwhile, a comparative analysis entails the comparison of similar factors or events. The researcher employed it because the case study method would only yield value after comparison of the cases.

Selection of Case Studies

To answer the research question adequately, the researcher used the two case studies of insurgencies that related most to the Somalia situation. The research analyzed

the COIN operations against the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka and Uganda's LRA vis-a-vis the UPDF COIN operation in Somalia. The selected case studies were examples of where COIN operations succeeded so that the research could draw lessons learned that are in line with the research question. However, the degree of success and circumstances varied thereby giving a variety of areas to the analysis. The other selection criteria that informed the choices of the case studies were:

1. These insurgent groups shared with al-Shabaab the commonality of terrorism that was the most significant trait of al-Shabaab.
2. These insurgencies were conducted in relatively poor countries to allow for similar social, political, and economic settings as in Somalia, which provided the most possible balanced analysis.
3. These insurgencies lasted for over a decade, which allowed all factors in play ample time to manifest their full patterns.

Data Analysis

The analysis in this research focused on understanding the shortfalls in the UPDF COIN operations in Somalia, from 2007 to 2018, with a view to making recommendations that can enhance the force's effectiveness in ending the instability in the country. The two case studies in this research provided a testing ground for the concepts of counterinsurgency that several authors recommend as the parameters for success of COIN operations. The researcher conducted an in-depth understanding of the case studies focusing on the comparative variables used in the research (see Table 2). A narrative of the case studies was thus derived to guide interpretation at a later stage in Chapter 5. A comparison of selected COIN approaches then followed in respect to the

case studies. The comparison helped to draw the differences, general commonalities, and peculiar traits in COIN operations against the insurgent groups under analysis.

In this way, the researcher established a foundation to test the successful COIN approaches in view of the Somalia case. The researcher then assessed the outcome of the analysis to draw conclusions to the research problem from which the recommendations were made. The assessment procedure was in-depth and multi-step. As the researcher examined each of the case studies, he first identified a set of prime precepts of every variable or COIN line of effort. Based on these precepts, he then isolated sets of distinct, assessable aspects to stand for each variable, and acknowledged them to be present, neutral, or not present in each case. The researcher evaluated the factors assigning them a plus (+) value for presence of the precepts of assessment, zero (0) for neutral presence, or minus (-) values for absence of the factor resulting in a negative effect (see Table 2).

Table 2. Method of Analysis to Establish COIN Force's Performance during Sri Lankan, LRA, and Somalia Insurgencies				
Variables		Insurgencies		
		Sri Lanka 1976-2009	Uganda 1987-2004	Somalia 2007-2018
Military	Dynamic intelligence	+/0/-	+/0/-	+/0/-
	Dominance of firepower			
	Physical support to insurgents blocked			
	Civil-military cooperation			
Civil	Effective political structures in controlled areas			

Source: Created by author.

The research employed five variables in the analysis. Different scholars and militaries suggest different approaches to defeat insurgency but the choice of the variables in this research was based on the historical COIN approaches identified in Chapter 2. The variables were divided into the categories of military intervention and civil intervention as depicted in Table 2 above.

Evaluation Criteria

The Use of Dynamic Intelligence by the COIN Force

The analysis sought for evidence of the presence or absence of intelligence capabilities and their effective or ineffective application by the COIN force to gain advantage over the insurgents. The prime precepts of analysis used were:

1. Presence (+) meant that the COIN force had adequate human and technical intelligence capabilities that surpassed the insurgent's capabilities and it effectively applied them to COIN advantage as evidenced by the general trends of operations.
2. Neutral (0) meant that the COIN force either had adequate human and technical intelligence capabilities but did not effectively apply them, or it had partial capabilities that it applied but they were not sufficient in the operations as evidenced by occasional outwitting by the insurgents although the COIN force was still at an overall operational advantage.
3. Absence (-) meant that the COIN force lacked or had inferior human and technical intelligence as compared to the insurgents as evidenced by always being outwitted by the insurgents and the insurgents having overall advantage in operations.

Dominance of Firepower by COIN Force

The study analyzed the dominance of firepower based on the use of IFVs, air assets, and artillery in the defeat of the insurgents. The prime precepts for the analysis were:

1. Presence (+) meant that the COIN force had sufficient IFVs, air assets, and artillery in relation to the prevailing threat that it effectively applied to deliver unmatched firepower against the insurgents.
2. Neutral (0) meant that the COIN force had sufficient IFVs, air assets, and artillery in relation to the prevailing threat but it did not effectively apply them to deliver unmatched firepower against the insurgents.
3. Absence (-) meant that the COIN force had no, partial, or restricted IFVs, air assets, and artillery that bogged down the COIN operations.

Physical Support to Insurgents is Blocked

The criteria that the researcher employed to analyze physical insurgent support was based on the presence and effectiveness of mechanisms to constrict external and internal funding, recruiting, and equipping as described below:

1. Presence (+) meant that the COIN force had effective mechanisms that constricted the external and internal funding, recruiting, and equipping of the insurgents. This significantly blocked support to the insurgents.
2. Neutral (0) meant that the COIN force had ineffective mechanisms to constrict the external and internal funding, recruiting, and equipping of the insurgents. The insurgents continued to receive minimal support, but with difficulty and sometimes the support was impounded by the COIN force.

3. Absence (-) meant that the COIN force had no established mechanisms to constrict the external and internal funding, recruiting, and equipping of the insurgents. The insurgents received support with no difficulty and the COIN force did not intercept the support.

Civil-Military Cooperation

The analysis of civil-military as a variable was based on the premise that COIN is a war for the people's minds.⁵ This analysis was conducted in two steps. First, the study analyzed four set precepts of civil-military conditions. The analysis determined the complete, partial, or non-fulfillment of the precepts. Values of 1, 0.5, and 0 were used to determine complete, partial, or non-fulfillment, respectively, of the conditions. The four precepts were:

1. The COIN force avoided collateral damage on civilian property and lives as opposed to the insurgents.
2. The population was compelled to cooperate with the insurgents in fear of being harmed but would have preferred working with the COIN force.
3. On overall, the COIN force appealed to the aspiration of the people better than the insurgents did because they related to the population in a respectable and friendly way.
4. The COIN force negated the insurgent's goodwill to the people.

Second, using a set weighting system, the outcome of the first step was summed to determine the overall presence, neutrality, or absence of civil-military cooperation as follows (see Table 3):

1. Presence (+) was the result of a score of 3 or greater.

2. Neutral (0) was a score below 3 but above 1.
3. Absence (-) was a score of 1 and below.

Table 3. Method of Analysis to Establish the State of Civil-Military Cooperation during Sri Lankan, LRA, and Somalia Insurgencies		
Variables	COIN Force	Insurgent group
Avoidance of collateral damage	1/0.5/0	1/0.5/0
Involuntary cooperation with insurgents		
Appealing to the aspiration of the people		
Negation of the opposing force's goodwill		
TOTAL		
	+/0/-	+/0/-

Source: Created by author.

Effective Political Structures in Controlled Areas

The analysis sought for evidence of the presence or absence of effective political structures in areas under the control of the COIN force. The prime precepts of analysis here were:

1. Presence (+) meant that there were government structures that actively restored or provided services to the people in conflict areas and those regained from the insurgents.
2. Neutral (0) meant that there were government structures that partially or unresponsively addressed service delivery challenges in conflict areas or those regained from the insurgents.
3. Absence (-) meant that there were no viable government structures to address service delivery challenges in conflict areas or those regained from the

insurgents. Either the insurgents or other actors overshadowed the government in the provision of service delivery to the people in conflict area.

Summary

This chapter presented answers to the “how,” “why,” and “with what” questions of the research process that the researcher employed. It explained the choice of the tools that the researcher utilized in analysis to draw the conclusions to the research question. It further explained the qualitative method of analysis applied to conduct this research and the reasons for its application. To answer the research question adequately, the researcher selected two case studies that related most to the al-Shabaab situation in order to guarantee the most valid conclusions. The chapter also highlighted the research process applied in the study and evaluation criteria used to analyze five comparative variables to ensure an in-depth assessment. Therefore, Chapter 3 explained the analytical approach used in Chapter 4.

¹ William Wiersma, *Research Methods in Education: An Introduction* (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1991), 8.

² Gretchen B. Rossman and Sharron F. Rallis, *An Introduction to Qualitative Research: Learning in the field*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2017), 2.

³ Kakali Bhattacharya, *Fundamentals of Qualitative Research: A practical Guide* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 110.

⁴ Rossman, *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*, 2.

⁵ Commandant, Junior Command and Staff College, UPDF Training Manual, 1-4.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The analysis in this research focused on understanding the shortfalls in the UPDF COIN operations in Somalia, from 2007 to 2018, with a view to making recommendations that can enhance the force's effectiveness in ending the instability in the country. The question that informed this research was, "How can the UPDF be more effective in defeating the ongoing insurgency in Somalia?" In an attempt to answer this question, this chapter explored five variables in a comparative analysis of two successful COINs, Sri Lanka (1976-2009) and Uganda (1987-2004), that were used as the evaluating models against how the UPDF conducted its COIN in Somalia from 2007 to 2018. Notwithstanding the fact that many COIN approaches could have been used to defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and LRA insurgencies, this study focused on determining if dynamic intelligence, dominance of firepower, blocked physical support to the insurgents, civil-military cooperation, and effective political control contributed to the success of the two COIN operations. These are then compared to the UPDF operation in Somalia.

Case Study 1: Sri Lanka (1976-2009)

Background

The Sri Lankan insurgent group, the LTTE, was formed in 1976 although it started its hostilities against the government in 1983.¹ Under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE evolved from a youth group called the Tamil New Tigers and

members from gangs.² The LTTE was initially a political group for a defensive reaction against marginalization and suppressive political, economic, and social policies by a numerically superior Sinhalese. The group emerged from the minority Ceylon Tamil people that sought for an independent state, *Tamil Ealam*, of 25,000 square miles after they failed to agree with policies of the Sinhalese dominated government.³

The LTTE turned into a violent insurgent group, with internal, diaspora, and some nation state support. It was later defeated in 2009 after it had evolved into a rich and powerful terrorist group.⁴ They conducted a protracted *tit for tat* revenge attacks strategy and master minded the use of murderous vest suicide bombings using, a tactic that has claimed almost universal acceptance by insurgent terrorists throughout the world.⁵ Before the LTTE was defeated, the Sri Lankan government made four failed peace negotiations with the group in 1985, 1987, 1994, and 2002. The LTTE continued to conduct protracted military offensives against the government forces, using guerrilla warfare, even after the government met many of the insurgent's demands, including granting them a semiautonomous rule over the Jaffna peninsula.⁶

This preceded a massive military offensive against the group that saw its defeat in May 2009.⁷ During its existence, the LTTE applied multiple methods of operation. Guerrilla warfare of hit and run on government military targets dominated their mode of operations as well as assassinations and attacks of key government officials, and killing of government sympathizers.⁸ In later years, the LTTE used suicide attacks as its tactic of choice on both land and sea. In general, the Sri Lankan situation was an ethnic civil war as well as “an insurgency fought in a mix of classic guerrilla tactics plus semi-conventional mobile war and also terror campaign.”⁹ The government may have used a

combination of COIN efforts to end the LTTE insurgency but this case study examines five possible areas for a successful conduct of COIN: dynamic intelligence, dominance of firepower, blocked physical support to the insurgents, civil-military cooperation, and effective political structures.

Dynamic Intelligence

The LTTE and Sri Lankan security forces both had intelligence capabilities that overlapped each other at certain periods as evidenced by the seasonal changes in the trends of operational successes on both sides. Nevertheless, looking at the intelligence capabilities from the perspective of the COIN force during the final stages of the conflict, there was a rich discussion on the presence and effectiveness of actionable intelligence to gain advantage over the insurgents.

The ultimate foundation of the Sri Lankan COIN intelligence that the force or government applied in the final stages of the LTTE insurgency traced its roots to the 2006 national intelligence structures that were run in an interlinked manner from the national strategic level through operational and down to the tactical operations. It was also coordinated with other international intelligence networks. Sri Lankan intelligence network comprised of effective satellite intelligence, local intelligence to include military and police intelligence, and foreign intelligence covering mainly America, Europe, and Asia. The nation's permanent secretary of the ministry of defense, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, headed the network and the chief of military intelligence, Major General Kapila Hendawitharana was the coordinator. Aside from its close intelligence ties with Israel, Sri Lanka maintained a well-coordinated strategic intelligence sharing with the British and Indian Intelligence, as well as the US' well-funded Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).¹⁰

The outcome of the strategic intelligence sharing with the CIA was specifically helpful in secondary intelligence sharing between CIA and its friendly Israel intelligence. Moreover, Israel was nearer to the theatre of operations. As a whole, following the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terror attack on the US and the naming of the LTTE as a terrorist group, international intelligence sharing focused on defeating the LTTE. Specifically, the intelligence sharing helped in monitoring and outwitting the LTTE intelligence that resulted in blockading its arms flow, sinking of its several ships, and a crackdown on their funding channels from the west.¹¹ Sri Lanka's intelligence sharing with Indian intelligence specifically facilitated the most in the international naval blockades against the LTTE's arms replenishment. There could be no better examples of the results of the effectiveness of the international intelligence sharing with the US and India than the Sri Lankan Navy's sinking of the LTTE's eight pigeon ships that acted as its floating warehouse and preventing the escape of the LTTE's top leadership.¹² In this way, the Sri Lankan intelligence had outmatched the LTTE's electronic warfare monitoring units that were initially effective in monitoring Sri Lankan Navy operations to facilitate their Exclusive Economic Zone-Marine Logistics Support Team (EEZ-MLST), which used to facilitate the transportation of the insurgent's armaments and supplies.¹³

At the tactical level, Israeli Mossad training of the Sri Lankan intelligence squads yielded results on the battlefield.¹⁴ Israeli-trained Sri Lankan Special Forces intelligence squads were highly flexible and surreptitious.¹⁵ The flexible eight-man squads performed multiple roles, to include reconnaissance and surveillance, establishing forward supply, as well as stealthy operations in the enemy rear. They also acted as excellent spotters for artillery strikes.¹⁶ They were able to operate surreptitiously as far as 40-50 kilometers

into the LTTE's rear for as long as a month and if detected, they often escaped by themselves by the support of their Air Force helicopters.¹⁷ They also choked the LTTE's attempt to operate in their rear. Not even the large presence of the usually effective female covert HUMINT operatives within LTTE's ranks was able to surpass the Sri Lankan military intelligence capabilities towards the end of the insurgency. The LTTE could not match the capabilities of the jungle squads that became arguably the best Special Forces, at the time, on earth.¹⁸

The LTTE mainly established clandestine cells countrywide that focused only on select killings, suicide attacks, and planning tactical assaults without a wider strategic or international bearing. It is no wonder that scholars attributed to poor intelligence the misguided decision by the LTTE to resort to an open war against a then highly equipped and staffed Sri Lankan military, which partly led to the insurgent's total destruction in 2009.¹⁹

Again, in the later years of the insurgency, Sri Lankan COIN force developed high-tech satellite-supported, as well as locally made intelligence surveillance capabilities that the LTTE failed to match at a time when the insurgent's foreign support had dwindled. One of the notable Sri Lankan intelligence strengths was its live feeds capability that enhanced its intelligence gathering and fires adjustment. This also helped the COIN force in battle damage assessments and battlefield surveillance and control. Aside from its satellite capabilities, the Sri Lankan military used high-tech unmanned aerial vehicles to enable its live feeds to the army and lower headquarters. By the last two years of the insurgency, Sri Lankan forces had two well-fledged surveillance squadrons equipped with Israeli-made IAI Searcher Mark II and EMIT Blue Horizons as part of the

army operations, independent of other surveillance capabilities the Air Force would provide.²⁰ Whereas Searcher Mk II was adverse weather capable, Blue Horizon had:

a fully integrated weapon system capable of capturing and reporting intelligence data in real-time and day/night operation over a pre-determined target zone. Characteristic missions included intelligence gathering, close support operations, target acquisition and weapon guidance, and battle damage assessment. The Blue Horizon contained the necessary elements to achieve relevant UAV missions, either as a stand-alone system or as an integral part of a total intelligence and weapon delivery system.²¹

The army also had one American made Cessna Golden Eagle aircraft and two twin-turboprop light aircraft of the Beechcraft family that enhanced its surveillance. In contrast, the LTTE had only two UAVs and a few aircraft that lacked freedom of operations due to Sri Lankan enhanced air defense systems.²²

Again, the Sri Lankan army also utilized its signals department to boost its intelligence operations in a way that the LTTE could not. They provided a secure communications system that allowed a simultaneous transmission for rapid action and eluding the LTTE electronic warfare monitors. It did not only have the capability of intercepting the enemy communication but also jamming or disrupting the enemy networks. This kind of technology, specifically the locally made manpacks, detected and defused or jammed LTTE's IEDs.²³

Analyzing the above capabilities, by 2009 when the LTTE was finally defeated after three decades of insurgency, the Sri Lankan COIN force had a series of dynamic international, national, and local intelligence networks and capabilities that outmatched the LTTE. The COIN force had both human and technical intelligence capabilities that surpassed the insurgent's capabilities and effectively applied them to COIN advantages as evidenced by the general trends of operations, which was manifested in the ultimate

defeat of the insurgents. Therefore, there was presence (+) of dynamic intelligence in favor of the COIN force.

Dominance of Firepower

The Sri Lankan insurgency ended mainly using military means. Despite several peace negotiations, the opposing parties did not reach an agreement. Forests covered 28.7% of Sri Lanka by 2008. This terrain heavily dictated the tactics and type of fires used throughout the insurgency.²⁴ The forest facilitated guerrilla tactics and limited infantry fighting vehicles but when the insurgents opted for an open warfare, the type of fires and assets used in the war changed and it was recorded as one of the reasons for the immediate end to the war as discussed in the previous section. Other factors, however, determined the use of firepower. The entanglement of the LTTE within the civilian population and their use of civilians as human shields, coupled with the laws of war, also influenced the use of fires.²⁵ Similarly, the availability of the fires assets to both groups, among other factors also determined the use of fires.

The LTTE insurgents initially enjoyed the advantage of firepower due especially to their mode of operations of hit and run on soft targets as well as the inappropriately equipped national military, among other factors. The LTTE were unique insurgents in the world history because they had an air wing and a navy “with a table of organization not dissimilar to any modern naval force.”²⁶ Indeed, although they had inferior weaponry to the COIN force, the LTTE insurgents constituted a military threat to the national force using their fabricated vessels that they mounted with modified weapons that were more lethal and offered them better range than that of the COIN force.²⁷ Generally, 290 pieces of combat maritime assets were the LTTE’s naval capabilities. They were in the

categories of fast-attack crafts, mounted fiberglass dinghies and boats, locally made submarines, diving scooters, and suicide boats.²⁸ Meanwhile, due to lack of political will to end the insurgency by the country's leadership prior to 2006, the military received little attention that affected its armament. Besides, the economy was poor, affected by the war, making it difficult to afford expensive assets. Arms embargos imposed on it, by states such as the US, due to its human rights record worsened this. Sometimes the country resorted to the black market to arm its military.²⁹

Still, even when countries like Pakistan, Britain, and Israel offered to arm Sri Lanka, corruption in the Asian country marred the deals.³⁰ Meanwhile, the opponent, the LTTE, sought weapon support from several sources. In the way that guerrillas do, initially, the LTTE had a diverse arms procurement strategy. Moreover, India armed the LTTE insurgents extensively before the insurgents killed the Indian prime minister.³¹ Even the Sri Lankan government ironically armed the insurgents with variants of AK-47 and M-16 rifles to fight off the Indian peacekeepers that had outlived the reason for their deployment to keep peace in Sri Lanka in 1987-90. The peacekeepers engaged instead in fierce battles with the locals they were supposed to protect. The death toll of this was over 400.³²

Generally, by 2009, the LTTE land forces possessed rifles of different brands alongside 1,050 pieces of artillery weapons in ten different calibers. Some of the artillery pieces included howitzers, rocket artillery, mortars, rocket launchers, missiles and missile launchers. They also had one T-55 tank, two helicopters, two microlights, and five Zlin aircraft. The LTTE used the Zlin aircraft to psychologically torture and rain IEDs on the population as well as the COIN force. Apparently, the light aircraft stealthily flew very

low to evade the air defense systems. They operated both day and night.³³ Probably, one of LTTE's most disturbing assets was the handheld stinger surface-to-air missiles that kept the Sri Lankan Air Force grounded. The LTTE acquired these missiles from Afghan insurgents despite the \$400,000 reward that the US had tagged for whoever handed over each. The LTTE offered more cash for it.³⁴

However, following a defeat of the COIN force at the Elephant Pass in 2001, Israel equipped the Sri Lankan military with a wide range of weaponry. Again, after the 9/11 attack on the US, western nations launched a war on terror. In 1997, the US named the LTTE as a terrorist group rather than freedom fighters. The UK, Canada, EU and other nations, such as India, also followed suit. The Sri Lankan government was then enabled to look for international support to fight the LTTE terrorists. It sought to raise the force strength, train, and acquire equipment. The UK, India, China, and the US joined Israel to transform the Sri Lankan military to fight the LTTE terrorists. The country also received support that raised its defense budget to \$1 billion.³⁵ The post 2006 Sri Lankan government was a bonus to the military because it had the will to end the insurgency. The government gave the COIN force a new face against the LTTE whose support was dwindling. The newly restructured Sri Lankan force was comprised of 230,000 personnel. Not only the infantry but also the Navy and Air Force saw massive improvements. The commando, armor, field artillery, and rocket artillery regiments received a near overhaul. Engineer and signal regiments also improved.³⁶ Table 4 highlights selected capabilities that the Sri Lankan military had by 2009.

Table 4. Key Capabilities of the Sri Lankan Military by 2009	
Land Component	
Category	Type
Hand guns	US Bretta M9 and Glock 17
Rifles	Russian AK-47, German G3, FN, US M-16.
Machine guns	British Starling, German MP5, Russian 56 LMG, Israel Uzi.
Grenade	M-203, RPG, and launchers from south Africa and Germany.
Anti-tank	Anti-tank Missiles from Pakistan.
Others	106 recoilless rifles, 60 mm and 80 mm mortars, sniper rifles, night vision.
IFVs	Chinese Type 85 AFV, Russian BTR-80 APC (45 pieces), South Africa Buffalos, Sri Lankan fabricated Buffalos (300 pieces), Soviet BMP Variant (300 pieces),
Tanks	T-55 medium battle tanks (80 pieces, Czech support), T-59s (80 pieces, Chinese support), Type 63 Amphibious tanks, 62 MBTs.
Artillery	Calibers 122 mm, 130 mm, and 152 mm howitzers. 122 mm Katyusha rocket launchers and several BM-21s from Russia. 120 mm mortar towed version. Five artillery locating radars.
Navy	
Maritime assets	05 Home built offshore patrol vessels. 02 Fast-missile crafts armed with Gabriel-11 missile & other capabilities. 10 Fast-attack crafts from China. 06 Fast-attack Dvora from Israel 14 Mark II super Dvora from Israel. Home built Israeli Shaldag-class design (heavily armed with multiple all-weather weapons and locating systems). US's Courageous transferred and named Samudura (up-date systems). Sayura formerly Indian vessel (up-to-date system)
Air Force	
Fighter aircraft	Multiple Mi-24 Attack helicopter. 22 combat fixed wing aircraft (11 were the Israeli Kfir). 08 Chengdu F-7 (interceptors). 07 Mikoyan MiG-27. Multiple Mikoyan MiG-29.

Source: Created by author using data from Paul Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers: The Rare Victory of Sri Lanka's Long War* (South Yorkshire, England: Pen and Sword, 2012), 51, 56, 65.

With a wide difference at hand in the armaments between the insurgents and the COIN force, reforms within the military that included selection based on merit of the best commanders to enhance mission command, the LTTE encountered a different type of force. The COIN force had undergone a physical and conceptual evolution and was at its best capacity to break its opponent's will to fight than even the ability to fight. Moreover, the government had turned the media atmosphere to its favor to enable recruitment and training of 5,000 personnel per month from 2008-09. Sri Lanka also fielded arguably the best Special Forces at the time on earth and a good intelligence network as discussed in the previous section.³⁷ All was not well for the LTTE, especially since it was at these very moments that it performed the worst in terms of armament, foreign support, and it had lost the media war to win recruits due to its internationally recognized terrorist attributes as discussed earlier.

All the multiple factors above fielded a force that presented to the LTTE unmatched firepower. The basic approach that the LTTE used to inflict losses on the COIN force was a combined use of guerrilla tactics, positional defense, and IEDs. The guerrillas lured the COIN force to their positional defensive positions where they used IEDs to slow down the government forces before inflicting on them heavy casualties by indirect fires. The LTTE was armed with 654 mortars of calibers ranging from 81 mm to 140 mm, 350 rocket launchers, 21 missiles, two 107 mm rocket launchers, and 23 guns of 122-152 mm calibers.³⁸ These enemy artillery used constituted a great challenge to the COIN land component. However, the COIN force found solutions to this threat.

The acquisition of five artillery locating radars by the Sri Lankan military was one of its greatest achievements. Assets, such as the AN/TPQ-36 fire finders from the US,

and more advanced ones from China helped in locating and neutralizing the LTTE fires as well as locating Sri Lankan friendly forces. The several 122 mm Katyusha rocket launchers and BM-21s from Russia served as a will-to-fight breaker to the LTTE due to the “devastating physical and moral effects that rocket artillery inflicted on the receiving end.”³⁹ The series of fires that were at the disposal of the COIN force provided opportunity to apply interlocking fires to tear down the LTTE completely.⁴⁰

The LTTE had made a serious mistake of opting for open warfare. The now large COIN force, that could deliver massive firepower tactically, accepted the open war challenge but also fought conventional war unconventionally. It copied and mastered the asymmetric tactics of the insurgents so as to deliver maximum dilemmas to the enemy while maintaining a high tempo to deny him the chance to reorganize.⁴¹ An open war, away from the jungles, allowed the use of all the COIN force’s armored and infantry fighting vehicles to enable maximum firepower while the Special Forces intelligence squads’ operations in the enemy’s rear limited the freedom of action of the enemy and its ability to retreat to the forests for reorganization. The Sri Lankan airpower even multiplied the overall firepower meted on the LTTE while, to ensure that was the last breath for the insurgents, the government opted for a deaf ear to the international community over the massive force that its forces employed on the insurgents. The hand held surface-to-air missile that the LTTE boasted over was no longer effective with the introduction of anti-missile technology that Israel provided to the COIN force.⁴²

The impact of the rockets from close air support that the Mi-24 provided was specifically felt by the enemy since the helicopter flew low and always surprised the insurgents. Only the LTTE survivors of the Mi-24 strikes and witnesses of the air strikes

on all sorts of remaining LTTE assets, including non-military ones, could testify to the superior firepower that the Sri Lankan COIN force possessed and the COIN force's resolve to eliminate the LTTE using superior firepower. Besides, the enemy light aircraft did not survive the last two years of the insurgency. Even worse for the insurgents, was the introduction in the theater of the lethal MiG-29 bombers that provided uncompromising conditions to the LTTE. The bottom line was that, unlike infantry, the Air Force maintained air superiority throughout the insurgency although they only used them most effectively at the last moments of the war.⁴³

The Sri Lankan Navy also played its active role to destroy most of the LTTE fighter capabilities and neutralize its homemade technologies. The fabrication of heavily armed patrol vessels with all-weather equipment, as well as the donation of the two up-to-date vessels by US and India, alongside the acquisition of the fast-attack and fast-missile crafts reflected in Table 2, guaranteed a more superior firepower and capabilities against the LTTE's Sea Semisubmersible, human torpedoes, and clandestine diver attackers.⁴⁴ Besides, the fast-attack Dvoras flotilla subdued the LTTE asymmetrical naval warfare of using swarming tactics and mixing suicide and attack boats. With better firepower, endurance and reach, the fast-attack crafts swarmed from different directions to mass their fires effects on the LTTE. Indeed, the combined superior firepower from all the modern assets of the COIN force enabled the sinking of eight pigeon ships that had acted as floating LTTE warehouses.⁴⁵

In summary, many analysts rightly described the COIN efforts that ended the Sri Lankan insurgency as being mainly military focused as illustrated above by the firepower effects and disparities between the Sri Lankan COIN force and the LTTE, especially

during the last three years of the insurgency.⁴⁶ Tactical flexibility, numerical superiority, as well as air superiority, and IFV and artillery support allowed the COIN force to dominate and overwhelm the LTTE. The LTTE's misguided choice of open warfare against a transformed heavily armed COIN force that finally used a combination of conventional and counter guerrilla warfare inserted a high operational tempo accompanied by unmatched firepower that denied the LTTE a comparative advantage and a chance to regroup.⁴⁷ The firepower that the COIN force used totally surpassed the enemy firepower. Therefore, there was presence (+) of the dominance of firepower in favor of the COIN force that had IFVs, air assets, artillery, and even surprising maritime capabilities that it effectively applied to deliver unmatched challenge to the insurgents.

Physical Support to Insurgents is Blocked

The LTTE insurgency in Sri Lanka was a unique one considering the extent of international involvement in support or disfavor of the opposing parties in the conflict. The presence and effectiveness of COIN mechanisms to constrict external and internal insurgent funding, recruiting, and equipping determined the definition of physical insurgent support as used in this thesis. The history of physical insurgent support in Sri Lanka ties to the cause of the insurgency. Marginalization and mistreatment of the Tamils attracted international sympathies and forced many Tamils out of the country that formed the basis of physical support to the LTTE. India's initial involvement in support of the insurgents was mainly because of its fears that the Tamil Nadu in India might buy into the discontents of their Sri Lankan Tamil counterparts or use their native links to export the insurgency into India.⁴⁸ The activities of the LTTE triggered a huge refugee influx into India that further firmed India's worries. Consequently, in 1983, the Indian

intelligence services in the south engaged in training of the Sri Lankan insurgents. India also had connections to militant groups around the globe that smuggled arms into Sri Lanka using small boats with Indian complicity.⁴⁹

Norway also offered support to the LTTE.⁵⁰ Aside from those two widely documented nation states that provided support to the Sri Lankan terrorist group, the insurgents received other support in various ways. The LTTE acquired handheld surface-to-air missiles from their Afghan terrorist counterparts, as they were able to pay more than the \$400,000 that the US had offered to buy up the weapons as discussed earlier. These missiles proved a nightmare to the COIN Air Force until Israel provided an anti-missile solution to the problem.⁵¹

There was also evidence of the LTTE connections with international arms companies. The insurgents imported arms into Sri Lanka using its Sea Pigeon ships. The LTTE invested much in keeping a secure sea line of communication to support its combat units on land. In fact, the LTTE even raised revenue from transporting legal cargo using its Sea Pigeons in addition to illicit activities that included the transport of contraband and human trafficking.⁵² Nevertheless, this support was not enough for the LTTE.

Therefore, the LTTE needed support from the diaspora:

While necessary, these sources were not sufficient to meet the LTTE's expansive concept of operations. The Tamil diaspora, made up of Tamils that had fled the island at the commencement of hostilities in the early 1980s and settled in western nations, became responsible in large part for providing the funds to buy other armaments and keep Prabhakaran's cadres in operation.⁵³

The LTTE ran a number of organizations that it registered as charities, especially in Canada and the UK, from where the diaspora made their voluntary and forceful contributions. Forceful financial contributions resulted from threats that the LTTE would

kill both those who refused to pay monthly taxes and their relatives. An estimate of 90 percent of the LTTE's funds came from the diaspora. Sri Lankan intelligence estimated that the LTTE raised approximately \$300 million annually but it only spent 26 percent in its operations and the administration of the area under their control.⁵⁴ The LTTE also taxed the population in areas where they operated. The insurgents recruited from the Tamil population where each family initially contributed one fighter but later, the LTTE forced all able-bodied Tamils into their ranks, including minors and women.⁵⁵

The immediate outcome of listing the LTTE as terrorist group was a crackdown on LTTE fundraising and information operations in the US, UK, EU, Canada, and India, among other countries. The Sri Lankan government started a massive media and diplomatic information operations program to influence the respective governments to destroy the LTTE structures in their countries. An embarrassed and frightened Tamil diaspora started to distance themselves from the LTTE and stopped their financial support to the Tigers.⁵⁶ Moreover, the Tamil diaspora used to contribute about 90 percent of LTTE's annual income.⁵⁷ Worse still for the LTTE, the Sri Lankan security forces captured the insurgent's financial coordinator, Kumaran Pathmanathan, who ran secret bank accounts on behalf of the organization, hence, leaving the group bankrupt.⁵⁸

Countries that engaged in anti-terror campaigns lent support to the Sri Lankan military to block all other source of external support to the insurgents. In this way, the US, India, Israel, EU nations, among other countries, started a crackdown on the LTTE's second source of income and channel of supply - the LTTE ships. At the same time, the Sri Lankan external intelligence network and navy received support to blockade the LTTE's arms flow and sink their ships.⁵⁹ Moreover, India stopped supporting the LTTE

after they assassinated the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.⁶⁰ Up to that point, India's intelligence contributed the most towards the international naval blockade of LTTE's arms supply. The Sri Lankan Navy's sinking of the LTTE's eight pigeon ships, that had acted as the insurgent's floating warehouse, was a way to destroy the enemy's economic base and cripple his armament channels.⁶¹ In 2009, the LTTE started a forceful recruitment policy that the people detested. Yet at that same period, the government engaged in a media war to discourage recruits from joining the now terrorist group but rather have them join the national army. This worked well for the government. This came along with a dislike for the payment of taxes to the LTTE causing the people to go to the government controlled areas.⁶²

In summary, the Sri Lankan government set up effective measures, internal and external, that restricted major physical support to the LTTE insurgents. Funding, equipping, and recruiting channels of the LTTE was curtailed by the COIN force and Sri Lankan government network as illustrated by the international action against remittances to the LTTE, and the capture of the group's financial controller. Other illustrations were the sinking of LTTE's ships, blockades on their arms supply, and turning around of the insurgent's taxation and recruitment ground, among other factors. Therefore, there was presence (+) that the COIN force and government had effective mechanisms that constricted the external and internal funding, recruiting, and equipping of the insurgents towards the end of the insurgency.

Civil-Military Cooperation

Many COIN experts assume COIN to be a war for the aspirations of the people.⁶³ For purpose of this research, civil-military cooperation was determined by the COIN

force's avoidance of collateral damage, the civilian involuntary cooperation with insurgents, negation of the opposing force's goodwill, and how COIN forces generally appealed to the aspiration of the people. The case of the Sri Lankan insurgency presented a complicated situation to analyze its civil-military cooperation because of the wide usage of propaganda and the ever-changing dynamics where the population changed sides back and forth. Nevertheless, a deeper look reveals that some of the twists were involuntary or due to unavoidable circumstances.⁶⁴

The LTTE was a terrorist group that indiscriminately killed people, both Tamils and other citizens, and destroyed infrastructure. Their destruction of the infrastructure such as the airport and a Buddhist temple where 11 people were killed, degraded their civil-military cooperation to the advantage of the COIN force that preserved such facilities.⁶⁵ Destruction of the infrastructure affected the economy. The below record was the population's general reaction to LTTE's collateral damage and its resultant effects.

The population got discontented with Tamil Tigers. As much of domestic savings was diverted to the war, Sri Lanka roads and infrastructure were pathetic. No wonder the business community led/brokered the peace deal that saw peace in last two years after Tamil blew up Colombo's airport in July 2001 and sent the country in an economic tailspin. The business community finally said, 'Enough is Enough'.⁶⁶

The LTTE also became the world's number one proponent of suicide bombing and it made history for its invention of the suicide vests that alone claimed over 1,500 people.⁶⁷ Many more civilians died due to LTTE's overall terrorist attacks. An example was at the Dharmapuram displaced peoples' camp where the LTTE killed 23 Tamil civilians in early 2009. The group also used children and other civilians as human shields. Such was in Sampur where the LTTE used 30,000 people, many of who were children, as its shield to allow its withdrawal and possibly lure the COIN force into committing war

crimes to attract international concerns. Other places that the LTTE used civilians as human shields were in Jeffna in 1995, Vanni, and Mannar. These were all needless incidents of collateral damage.⁶⁸

Towards the end of the insurgency, people involuntarily dealt with the LTTE. The insurgents often held the civilians as hostages to push for a cease fire, let alone forcefully recruiting them, including children and women, into their ranks, and making the non-payment of taxes as a death sentence, including the Tamil diaspora. However, most often the hostages escaped to the government controlled areas, although under risk of execution if found escaping. On the night of 20 April 2009, at least 33,000 civilians were lucky to escape unharmed to government-controlled areas.⁶⁹ However, that does not mean the government was treating them much better, although the civilians would rather have worked with the government because once in its hands, they were safer.

The COIN force, backed by a government that turned a deaf ear to international pressures, was blamed for the use of excessive force that resulted in the death of numerous civilians. Even if deaf to the international community, at least the government listened to its main helper, India, that forced it to establish no-fire zones as a measure to limit civilian collateral damage.⁷⁰ However, this was not a voluntary measure, just as the civilians involuntarily enrolled into the LTTE ranks and fought for the terrorist group. This affects the COIN force's full score on observance of collateral damage although it limited it preserved the infrastructure and later on protected only the civilians who were on its side. Nevertheless, it did not care much for the civilians still on the enemy side as illustrated by India's concern and demand for fire-free zones. Therefore, the analysis revealed a partial fulfillment (0.5) for the government on limiting collateral damage. The

insurgents did not limit collateral damage whatsoever and therefore scored 0 (non-fulfillment). On the other hand, the people only cooperated with the LTTE involuntarily due to the fear for their lives, hence a score of 0 (non-fulfillment) for the insurgents as opposed to a score of 1 (complete) in favor of the COIN force that the people willingly worked with and fled to for sanctuary.

In that regard, the government ensured several measures to safeguard the civilians that were detached from the enemy, including the provision of navy assets to sail them to safer areas and the establishment of internally displaced people's camps where the people received dignified treatment. Hence, the government forces generally appealed to the aspiration of the people as opposed to the terrorist group. That gave it a score of 1 (complete) as opposed to the LTTE's 0 score (non-fulfillment) who bombed civilians, held them hostage, or executed the escapees. The population detested LTTE's inhumane treatment of the people, to include forced labor, use of child soldiers, and extortion.⁷¹

In terms of negating the goodwill of the opposing force, the LTTE overshadowed the COIN force for the greater part of the conflict as backed by its international networks of charities. When the Tsunami struck Sri Lanka on 26 December 2004, killing over 30,000 people, the LTTE capitalized on the situation to outdo the government in responding to the needs of the people.⁷² Being more effective in the use of propaganda, the LTTE gained local and international respect for being better handlers of the situation even if the opposing forces had laid down their arms to unite and help the people during this disaster. Other than the use of funds from its international network of charities to buy itself a better image, the LTTE used its structures, like the Planning and Development Secretariat (PDS), to outcompete the government. Even bodies like the World Bank

thought the PDS was in a better position to act as the lead to coordinate the relief operations during the 2004 Tsunami.⁷³ The government used its High Court to block the possibilities of the LTTE taking this lead role and instead pushed for a less effective organization called Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure, to handle the situation although the LTTE was part of it.⁷⁴

The competition between the government and the LTTE over showing goodwill to the people again manifested itself when the government struggled to win the population on its side while the LTTE equally wanted the population on its territory so much that it took them as hostages. Each of the opposing sides wanted to show the world that they were more concerned about the people. Meanwhile, the government ensured rapid resettlement of the displaced people and provided for their needs, but that was not until 2009. In the previous thirty years, the Sri Lankan government left almost all the credit to the LTTE in providing for the people in the war torn areas. The government seldom provided many of the administrative needs of the people even when Rajapaksa Mahinda became president in 2006 yet the world generally saw him as the better leader.⁷⁵

To conclude, the government goodwill to the people, as well as its involvement in countering the insurgent's goodwill to the people, was apparent but it was more of too-little too-late effort. Prior to this government intervention, the LTTE had provided for the people in the war torn areas for three decades, despite its terrorist attributes. The Sinhalese-dominated government even made no efforts to negate this goodwill or even show the same to the Tamils that they had marginalized. Moreover, the LTTE conducted a more effective propaganda campaign against the government as it internationally sold its own image. The insurgents countered the goodwill of the government to the extent

that the international community saw it as the better actor even if government used its own legal structures to block this impression.⁷⁶ Considering the long period of service delivery to the population by the LTTE and a last resort change of attitude towards the government, the government partially met the requirement to negate the insurgent's goodwill, and thus scored 0.5 (partial). The LTTE also scored 0.5 (partial) because, despite its three decades of excellence, it lost it all during the last battles. In general, there was presence of civil-military cooperation in favor of the COIN force because it met the 3.0 and above score criteria of this analysis as reflected in Table 5.

Table 5. The State of Civil-Military Cooperation during the Sri Lankan Insurgency		
Variables	COIN Force	LTTE
Avoidance of collateral damage	0.5	0
Involuntary cooperation with insurgents	1	0
Appealing to the aspiration of the people	1	0
Negation of the opposing force's goodwill	0.5	0.5
TOTAL	3.0	0.5
	Presence (+)	

Source: Created by author.

Effective Political Structures in Controlled Areas

Disparities in service delivery between Sinhalese-dominated areas and Tamil regions were part of the reasons for the Sri Lankan war. The LTTE started as a pressure group to demand for an independent state called *Tamil Ealam* as a way to end marginalisation and suppressive political, economic, and social policies by a numerically superior Sinhalese.⁷⁷ Even a decade after the war ended, there were still grievances by the Tamils over marginalization in government service delivery. It is obvious that the

government opted for a military approach to resolve the conflict because it failed in this sector. Indeed, through the thirty-year war period, rarely did the Sri Lankan government consider to provide important services, such as food and medical care, to the Tamil people in war areas.⁷⁸ Despite the fact that the government maintained only basic government service structures in the insurgent controlled areas, service delivery was scanty and taken over by organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Not even during the cease-fire periods did the government take advantage of the calm to deliver services. Rather, the COIN force occupied social service facilities, such as schools and hospitals, as their bases or targeted hospitals if they suspected that the wounded rebels were receiving treatment in there.⁷⁹

As a result, the LTTE took advantage of the situation to provide the much-needed services to the people in a bid to gain popular support. However, this support was short lived due to the insurgent's terrorist mentality and abuse of the people's human rights although it did not change the fact that the LTTE provided services to the people. The LTTE had utilized its wide network to get support for the population through the charities it established in the western countries.⁸⁰ The insurgent group established a semi-autonomous system of governance where it dominated the area where they occupied, even if scanty government structures ran concurrently. The LTTE set up structures to coordinate all NGO activities in the war zones through its PDS that gave it an international reputation for excellence.⁸¹

In view of this, there were no effective government political structures in the war zones of Sri Lanka. Instead, the LTTE played the role of government. There was lack of political will from the Sinhalese-dominated government to address the service

requirements of the oppressed Tamils, even when faced by a rebellion, despite the shortfall of resources due to the negative impact of LTTE's activities on the economy.⁸² Moreover, foreign support to Sri Lanka was episodic due its poor human rights record. Therefore, there was absence of effective political control (-) as the insurgents overshadowed the government in service delivery in the contested areas.

To conclude on all the five variables of analysis, a look on the Sri Lankan insurgency reveals the presence of dynamic intelligence in favor of the COIN force and government. The Sri Lankan COIN force had a series of dynamic international, national, and local intelligence networks and capabilities that outmatched the LTTE. Likewise, there was presence of the dominance of firepower in favor of the COIN force that had superior IFVs, air assets, artillery, and maritime capabilities that it effectively applied to deliver unmatched challenge against the insurgents, especially when the insurgents engaged in open war. The Sri Lankan government also set up effective measures, internal and external, that restricted major physical support to the LTTE insurgents in the form of funding, equipping, and recruitment. Furthermore, there was an overall presence of civil-military cooperation in favor of the COIN force and government although there were aspects of civil-military cooperation where the government performance not very effective. Nevertheless, the insurgents performed better in political control as the government and COIN forces made no efforts to offer service delivery in contested areas, but rather preferred to solve the problem using military might. See Table 6 for a summary.

Table 6. The COIN Force's Performance during the Sri Lankan Insurgency				
Variables		Insurgencies		
		Sri Lanka 1976-2009	Uganda 1987-2004	UPDF in Somalia 2007-2018
Military	Dynamic intelligence	+		
	Dominance of firepower	+		
	Physical support to insurgents is blocked	+		
	Civil-military cooperation	+		
Civil	Effective political structures in controlled areas	-		

Source: Created by author.

Case Study 2: Uganda (1987-2004)

Background

The LRA was Uganda's longest insurgency led by the infamous Joseph Kony. The insurgency lasted from 1987 to 2004 in northern Uganda and later on it extended to the east in 2003-4 where the insurgents were defeated before they fled to the DRC, via Sudan, and to the CAR, where they were based by 2018. Kony carried on the rebellion from his paternal aunt, Alice Lakwena who had led the Holy Spirit Movement that was another rebel group, which the Ugandan military defeated in 1987.⁸³ The LRA was founded on spiritualism and the desire to overthrow the Ugandan government and establish a theocracy based on the biblical Ten Commandments. However, the group violated the commandments by wantonly killing people. Their activities were synonymous with cult movements.⁸⁴ Joseph Kony later claimed that his rebel group fought for freedom and equal political and economic opportunities for all Ugandans.⁸⁵

However, his group was comprised of only one tribe: the Acholi, one of the 65 Ugandan indigenous communities.⁸⁶ He also claimed to fight against the *no party system* that the Ugandan revolutionary government had just implemented as a transitional measure shortly after its 1981-86 revolutionary war that toppled a government that had divided Ugandans on political parties based on tribes and religion.⁸⁷

Despite the absence of a concrete political agenda, the LRA activities resulted in one of the worst humanitarian crises Uganda has experienced since independence.⁸⁸ Uganda, and other countries such as the US, included the group in the list of terrorists. In 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for its top commanders over war crimes and crimes against humanity.⁸⁹ They included Joseph Kony the rebel leader; Dominic Ongwen who was later arrested; Raska Rukwiya; and Okot Odiambo who was confirmed killed by the UPDF.⁹⁰ The UPDF could have applied several COIN approaches to eject the LRA from Uganda in 2004 but this study is focused on establishing how dynamic intelligence, dominance of firepower, blocking of physical support to the insurgents, civil-military cooperation, and effective political control could have contributed to the UPDF COIN success against the LRA insurgents.

Dynamic Intelligence

The UPDF relied partly on intelligence to combat the LRA. Uganda's defense minister, Amama Mbabazi reiterated how the defeat of the LRA partly hinged on an effective intelligence network that formed the background to the strategic courses of action that led to the eventual expulsion of the LRA from Uganda.⁹¹ The COIN force had a well-coordinated network of both military and civil intelligence. The Internal Security Organization (ISO) and police formed part of the civil network. ISO covered the national

to regional levels and down through the district to sub-county levels. Police intelligence had the same structure. These were all coordinated with military intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels through Joint Intelligence Committees (JIC) coordinated by the Overall Intelligence Coordinator (OIC) for Northern Uganda.⁹² Moreover, there was also the district security committees headed by a civilian political appointee, called the Resident District Commissioner (RDC). The district security committee gave a more civil flavor to the intelligence operations as it incorporated JIC members and multiple civil leaders. This security committee extended down to village level being chaired by the Local Council 1 (LC 1) chairperson, the lowest political office in Ugandan system.⁹³

Despite these structures, intelligence collection was difficult because the insurgents lived a jungle life with limited connection to the outside world. Some scholars said the LRA challenged what humanity really meant by living a bush life rather than a home one.⁹⁴ They only came out when going to loot basic needs, abduct children, and conduct acts of terrorism against the population.⁹⁵ Therefore, HUMINT that usually inform COIN operations was relatively absent in the LRA case. Even so, using the intelligence network discussed above, the COIN force established a wide network of informers in different IDP camps to track down the rebel collaborators in order to safeguard the civilians in IDP camps from invasions. In the same network, the COIN force extended its covert operations to the business community although the LRA had a thin connection with towns which was a secondary source of rare supplies like drugs.⁹⁶

Furthermore, the abductees who escaped or were rescued by the UPDF during battles provided intelligence to the COIN Force. They were an important source of

information of where the LRA buried its weapons.⁹⁷ Another valuable source of intelligence to the COIN force were the fighters who were captured in battle or defected. They provided the best intelligence on the routines of the rebels, locations, immediate intentions, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses, among other factors. Such defectors were Sunday Otto, Brigadier Sam Kolo, Colonel Onon Kamudulu, and Opiyo Makas who was the LRA's Director of Operations.⁹⁸ By mid-2004, 5,000 LRA had defected to benefit from an amnesty pronouncement by the government.⁹⁹

Technical intelligence was another means the COIN force used to inform its operations. Using its signal intelligence, the COIN force intercepted the enemy communication and established its location for artillery and other action.¹⁰⁰ In the later years when the LRA left Uganda, they learned from their mistake and stopped using means of communication that are traceable and rather relied on messengers.¹⁰¹ The COIN force also had light aircraft that it used for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance although the insurgents often used the vegetation cover to evade detection. On the other hand, the LRA did not have advanced technology to conduct technical intelligence but heavily relied on its thin HUMINT network and the use of superstition. The LRA believed in ten spirits that acted through Kony to give the insurgents actionable intelligence. One of the spirits was Jim Brickey, a foreign spirit from the US, sent from the supernatural world to guide the LRA intelligence operations. All the insurgent operations were sanctioned from an altar where Jim Brickery briefed Kony.¹⁰² The HUMINT base for the insurgents was due to their disconnectedness from the society that it aggressed.¹⁰³ Little information that they could rely on was from their abductees who were only children with limited knowledge. Even so, they relied on geographic

intelligence. Mastery of the terrain gave the insurgents cover for over a decade as the military pursued them in rotating unending cycles within the jungles as the insurgents lived a survivalist life.¹⁰⁴

In summary, therefore, the COIN force relied heavily on intelligence to combat the LRA insurgency. Intelligence formed the background to the strategic courses of action that led to the eventual expulsion of the LRA from Ugandan borders. The COIN force had both human and technical intelligence capabilities that surpassed the insurgent's capabilities and effectively applied them to COIN advantages as evidenced by the general trend of operations. The insurgents only relied on geographic intelligence and limited HUMINT due to their delinked nature to the society. Therefore, there was presence (+) of intelligence in favor of the COIN force.

Dominance of Firepower

The LRA insurgency depicted a true character of irregular warfare, where a weaker force uses a combination of insurgency tactics to challenge their stronger foes. They mastered how to elude the UPDF fires. The insurgents broke into small groups to limit the use of massed fires against them, remained invisible to the COIN force, and ensured their fights were deep in the jungles where the COIN force could not use its abundant assets such as IFVs. When the COIN force organized a main offensive against the insurgents, they either sought fake peace talks or temporarily relocated to Sudan where international laws restricted the COIN force from operating.¹⁰⁵ Initially, the LRA used the remnants of Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement but from 1997, the government of Sudan armed the insurgents in retaliation of Uganda's support for Sudan's rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army.¹⁰⁶

Despite Sudan’s support, the LRA only had small arms that it used selectively due to lack of ammunition¹⁰⁷ (see Table 7).

Table 7. LRA Weapon Inventory		
Frequently used	Less frequently used	Rarely used due to ammunition shortage
Kalashnikov derivatives (particularly Chinese Type 56/56-2 rifle)	B-10 (82 mm recoilless gun)	FN-FAL/SLR
Type 81/RPK light machine gun	Rocket propelled grenade (RPG)	G3
PKM light machine gun	60 mm mortar	81 mm mortar
		12.7 mm anti-aircraft gun
		SPG-9 mm recoilless guns
		SA-7 man-portable air defense systems

Source: Created by author using data from Graduate Institute of International Studies, *Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business* (Geneva: Oxford University Press, 2006), 283.

Even with LRA’s low firepower capabilities, the COIN force was initially ill equipped for the LRA irregular warfare. Prior to 2002, the Ugandan defense budget was low and the UPDF had limited assets or did not put to maximum use what was available. Assets like Mi-24 attack helicopters and BM-21 were absent from the war theatre. The President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, said the LRA War had lasted long partly because of an ill-equipped COIN force. In 2002, the defense budget was raised by 20 percent for this purpose.¹⁰⁸ The UPDF used a variety weapons against the LRA (see Table 8).

Table 8. UPDF's Selected Weapons Used against the LRA		
Infantry	Armored Assets	Artillery
SMG 56	T-55 Tanks	BM-21s
LMG 56	BMP-2	Katyusha rocket launchers
Type 81/RPK light machine gun	Buffalo	107 mm Rocket Launchers
PKM light machine gun	Mamba	120 mm mortars
G2 Machine Gun	APCs	
40 mm Automatic Grenade Launchers		
RPG 7V		
60-82 mm Mortars		
82 mm recoilless gun		
14.5 mm AA gun		

Source: Created by author using data from UPDF 4 Infantry Division Headquarters, "Arms Returns," UPDF 4 Division, 2002.

The budget rise that would see the acquisition of capabilities that would improve the UPDF's firepower coincided with a Nairobi agreement between Uganda and Sudan. The US Carter Center brokered talks between the two countries and 1999 they signed a Nairobi Agreement that stopped the support to rebel factions against the conflicting governments. In 2001, further talks led to signing of an agreement that allowed the UPDF to pursue the LRA inside Sudan. Sudan also stopped its support to the LRA. The LRA was left vulnerable to the UPDF. With an increased budget, better equipment, and permission to operate in Sudan, the UPDF prepared for a massive offensive, *Operation Iron Fist*, against the LRA. All the UPDF firepower capabilities were at excellent combat

readiness levels. The LRA could not withstand the UPDF firepower during Operation Iron Fist and turned into a fugitive group that roamed as far as eastern Uganda. However, the rush could not permit them to carry their arms supplies forcing them to bury their weapons stocks.¹⁰⁹

In the same way as the Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers made a mistake to opt for an open war, the LRA's relocation to eastern Uganda, which could not avail it the ample cover that they enjoyed in the north, was a mistake. Now on open terrain, the COIN force delivered uncompromising firepower from IFVs, artillery, Air Force, and infantry, that saw the end of the LRA in Ugandan soil. Moreover, the COIN force amassed forces from another operation in north-eastern Uganda and also recruited a 12,000 strong militia group, *Arrow Boys*, in order to ensure increased strength that could guarantee a delivery of unmatched firepower to the LRA.¹¹⁰ Overwhelmed in 2004, the LRA ran to the DRC, via Sudan, where it was again pursued and by 2018 it was still running, then in CAR, some 1,200 kilometers away from the Ugandan borders where by 2013 it had displaced over 350,000 people.¹¹¹

In summary, the LRA's lack of IFVs, artillery, air assets, and many infantry weapons together with insufficient munitions was an evidence of its inferior firepower as compared to the COIN force. The LRA's constant running was another manifestation of its lack of capacity to withstand the COIN force's firepower. *Operation Iron Fist* and open warfare victories against the LRA in eastern Uganda illustrated the effective application of the COIN force's capabilities to deliver unmatched firepower against the insurgents. In that case, this research established that during the LRA War in Uganda, there was presence (+) of dominance of firepower in favor of the COIN force.

Physical Support to Insurgents

The LRA received significant support from Sudan and minimal physical support from collaborators and virtually nothing from the people from where they operated save for what they acquired using force.¹¹² Regarding local support, the LRA had poor relations with the people and controlled no territory from where it would perhaps tax the population. Besides, funds would mean little to the LRA since they were virtually in the jungles all of the time.¹¹³ The support the LRA got forcefully from the population was basic needs such as food and recruits. The group failed to attract adults into its ranks due to its dented ideology, lack of political agenda, and extreme cruelty against the civilian population. Therefore, the rebel group relied mainly on the abduction of children to fill its ranks. The terrorist group abducted over 38,000 children from northern Uganda alone.¹¹⁴

In a bid to block this source of recruits, the government settled over 1,600,000 people into IDP camps where the COIN force provided security to avoid abduction of children as well as deny the rebels basic requirements although some people were still being abducted from gardens.¹¹⁵ In situations where the insurgents abducted children, the COIN force made efforts to rescue the children. However, the rescue efforts were effective in returning only about 50 percent of the abducted children. Between June and December 2005, the UPDF rescued 2,227 of 5,000 children that the insurgents abducted.¹¹⁶ The UPDF seemed slow in the rescues because it exercised minimum force to ensure it safely rescued the children as per the training and pre-mission briefings they received prior to each attack.¹¹⁷ However, when the LRA was defeated in *Operation Iron Fist*, it could not run with the children so the UPDF rescued most of the children, significantly reducing LRA's strength.¹¹⁸

Meanwhile, realizing that the LRA activities were escalating between 1992-94, due to Sudan's supporting role to the insurgents, the Ugandan government took measures to end the support from Sudan. The government initiated bilateral talks with Sudan, and other third party arrangements, to block support to the insurgents. When western countries launched a war on terror after the 9/11 incident in the US, the Ugandan government successfully pushed the LRA into the list of the terrorist groups on the western target list, considering LRA's atrocities against the population. The western governments then started to pressure Sudan's government to cease support to the LRA. Uganda played a covert role to justify why the western governments needed to push even more. The government of Sudan already had a bad record of crimes against humanity and was desperate to regain its image. It succumbed to the pressure, especially from the US, knowing very well what the US could do to it for non-compliance.¹¹⁹

Moreover, in 2006, Uganda had also taken the diplomatic line using talks with Sudan that the US Carter Center brokered. Therefore, in 2009 they signed the Nairobi Agreement that aimed at improving relations between the two countries. This arrangement, supplemented by the international pressure, forced the Sudan to withdraw its support to the LRA and allowed the UPDF to pursue the LRA in Sudanese territory. In 2000-2001, the government of Sudan officially stopped supporting the LRA, although reports indicated that it gave the LRA a huge stock of arms as a farewell package. This package was an insurance policy by Sudan to avoid the LRA's wrath on Sudanese people because as part of the Nairobi agreement, Sudan allowed the UPDF to pursue the LRA into its territory. So, it was aware that the UPDF pressure would not allow the LRA to

take along with them this final package. Indeed, the LRA buried the arms and later, the UPDF unearthed them and returned them to the Sudan government.¹²⁰

In summary, the Ugandan government and COIN force employed diplomatic and military means to constrict external and internal support to the LRA in the form of funding, recruiting, and equipping although it did not fully address the issue of recruiting. The LRA continued to sneak in and abduct children. Nevertheless, a combination of other means, such as degrading their military capability, limited their ability to access civilian areas to abduct child recruits. The diplomatic approach was successful and considered by scholars as one of the key reasons that led to the expulsion of the LRA from Uganda. With no safe haven in Sudan and support from the Khartoum government, the LRA fled to the DRC, where there was no stable government, and it started trading in gold and ivory in order to support its operations.¹²¹ In essence, there was presence (+) of COIN measures that significantly blocked support to the LRA insurgents.

Civil-Military Cooperation

Over a decade after the UPDF expelled the LRA from Uganda, the trauma of the insurgent group's activities lingered amidst the population. The LRA had one of the worst civil-military cooperation programs in African insurgency history. However, this thesis did not immediately assume that the LRA's poor civil-military cooperation automatically represented good civil-military cooperation by the COIN force because in some cases COIN forces have been worse than the insurgent forces. Nevertheless, the UPDF case was a pro-people experience in accordance to its name as a peoples' force or both related well to the population. Unlike the LRA that used children as human shields, the COIN force always tried to avoid collateral damage to civilians even when in the

jungles. Most encounters by the UPDF with the LRA turned out to be rescue missions of abductees.¹²² The UPDF also protected the population in IDP camps and provided escorts to civilian convoys, as opposed to the LRA that burnt houses, shops, vehicles, and schools, among other atrocities.¹²³ An example of such attack was at Barlonyo where the insurgents killed over 300 civilians and burned hundreds of houses.¹²⁴ There were several other incidents of LRA massacres. (see Figure 3). In that case, there was evidence of a limitation of collateral damage by the COIN force and hence a score 1 (complete) in favor of the COIN force and 0 (non-fulfillment) for the insurgents.



Figure 3. A Monument to Commemorate Victims of LRA Massacre in Northern Uganda

Source: Photo by author.

Regarding voluntary or involuntary cooperation with the insurgents, the populace was afraid of getting anywhere close to the LRA and they only made unavoidable contact under circumstances of abduction by the LRA.¹²⁵ Kony was too deadly to cooperate with as he killed even his own top commanders, such as his deputy, Vincent Otti.¹²⁶ The people could not work with the LRA because of the insurgent's record of atrocities as summarized in Table 9.

Table 9. Major Crimes Committed by the LRA against the Civilians	
Crimes	Comment
Abduction	Both children and adults abducted for multiple use by the rebels.
Child Soldiers	LRA failed to convince adults to join. Indoctrinated children into fighters.
Human shields	Children used as human shields to escape the UPDF's wrath
Child wives/ defilement	Girls abducted made Kony's wives and the balance, distributed to commanders.
Murder	By execution (of abductees trying to escape). Mass shooting during raids. Use of sticks to clobber civilians to death. Slaughtering. Children exhausted by carrying luggage.
Maiming	Cutting ears, nose, lips, fingers, and limbs.
Looting	Foodstuff, clothing, money, households.
Arson	Burning down IDP camps
Road Ambushes	The LRA ambushed and destroyed vehicles on the roads and made transportation unbearable.

Source: Compiled by author using data from Human Rights Watch Africa, *The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997).

This led, in 2005, to the ICC issuing arrest warrants to the LRA top commanders for crimes against humanity.¹²⁷ Therefore, the populace hated the LRA whereas the COIN force was generally a preferable force for them to work with. The population even

volunteered to help the army fight the LRA. On the President's approval, the able-bodied youth in the affected areas formed two militia groups to fight alongside the UPDF to defeat the LRA. These militias included 8,000 *Amuka* in northern Uganda and the *Arrow Boys* that rapidly formed in weeks to build 12,000 fighters.¹²⁸ Therefore, the score was 1 (complete) in favor of the COIN force.

The UPDF appealed to the aspiration of the people for the very reason the population hated and refused to work with the insurgents – human rights abuses. The LRA was considered a group of social misfits and was not concerned about the human rights abuses by its own members. Even three years after the insurgency ended, the COIN force's military court carried on with the trial of its soldiers who were involved in human rights violations during the war.¹²⁹ The COIN force also conducted several training for its members on human rights observance, child protection, and the law of armed conflict to promote dignified treatment of civilians in combat and fostering civil-military cooperation.¹³⁰ All these were the opposite of the LRA brutal acts (see Table 9).

The UPDF established civil-military operation centers (CMOC) to receive complaints about the army's operations or individuals within the army who conducted themselves improperly. The government also granted amnesty to rebel defectors and offered them rehabilitation and building materials to help them in resettlement.¹³¹ The ex-insurgents also had the opportunity to serve in the national military if they so wished, with even some retaining their insurgent ranks.¹³²

A conglomerate of all the above civil-military measures by the COIN force mentioned under this section, made the COIN force appeal to the people more than the insurgents who terrorized the civilians. Therefore, the COIN force scored 1 (complete)

for appealing to the aspirations of the people, whereas the LRA scored a 0 (non-fulfillment) due to its inhumane actions. Moreover, even if the insurgents presented no goodwill to the people that the COIN force would perhaps negate, the UPDF conducted several acts of goodwill to the people as already discussed in this section. Examples of these were protecting the people in the IDP camps, escorting them to their gardens, and providing escorts to civilian convoys to avert the LRA’s road ambushes, among other measures. Such acts not only gave a complete score of 1 to the COIN force but also added to the overall good civil-military cooperation that the COIN force had as opposed to the LRA. Therefore, there was presence (+) of civil-military cooperation in favor of the COIN force because it scored above the 3.0 points required for presence (see Table 10).

Table 10. The State of Civil-Military Cooperation during the LRA Insurgency		
Variables	COIN Force	LRA
Avoidance of collateral damage	1	0
Involuntary cooperation with insurgents	1	0
Appealing to the aspiration of the people	1	0
Negation of the opposing force’s goodwill	1	0
TOTAL	4	0
	Presence (+)	

Source: Created by author.

Effective Political Structures in Controlled Areas

The LRA did not have control over any territory while in Uganda. It operated mainly in the jungles of northern Uganda, in the Acholi and Lango sub-regions, although the rebels were predominantly Acholi.¹³³ As the LRA moved to the east, Teso was also affected for about a year. In all areas where the LRA operated, government structures

remained operational although limited in some areas. Despite the conflict and constant abduction of schoolchildren, the government maintained the education process for the children at all levels. However, as the population moved away from the villages to the protected camps, the schools in the villages were left vacant but the children continued their education in the camps, although now over crowded. In 1996, Gulu district alone had about 60,000 school-aged children moved away from their villages to protected IDP camps rendering 68% of the village schools non-functional. Nevertheless, the remaining schools operated even though under significant difficulty.¹³⁴

Similarly, the government maintained at least 50 percent of the grassroots health centers and all the main hospitals operational although the population pressure and vulnerabilities, due to poor hygiene in the makeshift camps, overwhelmed the few centers.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, other organizations, such as ICRC, supplemented the government services with ad hoc medical supplies and equipment.¹³⁶ Another basic service was water. The government also drilled boreholes in the IDP camps to provide for safe water and coordinated with NGOs to supplement its efforts.¹³⁷ Meanwhile, all the political processes that went on in the other parts of the country continued in the conflict area. The elections of national and local leaders continued and members of parliament from the affected areas represented the interests of their constituents at parliament.¹³⁸ The office of the prime minister coordinated all the government's relief requirements as well as NGO operations in the area. The government created a special cabinet ministry, State for Northern Uganda and Teso Affairs, to coordinate with the office of the prime minister in reducing the suffering of people in the conflict area.¹³⁹

Therefore, there was general presence of effective governance in the conflict area. The government provided political direction and services in the conflict area, despite the shortages led by the relocation to IDP camps. Even so, the government coordinated with other agencies to supplement its efforts. Schools, health centers, government offices, political processes, relief interventions, and trade existed. Therefore, there was presence (+) of ‘effective, political structure in controlled areas’.

In summary, the overall analysis of the LRA insurgency in Uganda indicates the presence of dynamic intelligence, dominance of firepower, blocked physical support to the insurgents, civil-military cooperation, and effective political structures as contributing factors to the success of the two COIN operations (see Table 11).

Table 11. The COIN Force’s Performance during the LRA Insurgency				
Variables		Insurgencies		
		Sri Lanka 1976-2009	Uganda 1987-2004	UPDF in Somalia 2007-2018
Military	Dynamic intelligence		+	
	Dominance of firepower		+	
	Physical support to insurgents is blocked		+	
	Civil-military cooperation		+	
Civil	Effective political structures in controlled areas		+	

Source: Created by author.

Precisely, intelligence formed the background to the strategic courses of action that partially led to the eventual expulsion of the LRA from Ugandan borders. The COIN force had both human and technical intelligence capabilities that surpassed the

insurgent's capabilities and effectively applied them to COIN advantages as evidenced by the general trends of operation.

The LRA's lack of IFVs, artillery, air assets, and many infantry weapons together with insufficient ammunitions was evidence of its inferior firepower as compared to the COIN force. The government used local and diplomatic approaches to alienate the LRA from receiving support. The local approach isolated the LRA from the population. The diplomatic approach was through bilateral agreements with Sudan and the use of third parties, such as the US and EU, to influence Sudan to stop supporting the LRA. The COIN force used a combination of measures to enhance positive civil-military cooperation. The COIN force put in place measures to avoid collateral damage, promote harmony with the population, and provide goodwill to the people. All the civil-military measures were possible because the government ensured constant presence and active political structures in the conflict areas. So, the results of analysis of the five variables were all in favor of the COIN force.

Case Study 3: Somalia 2007-2018

Background

Somalia's insurgency passed through different stages as influenced by multiple factors. (see sub-heading *Somalia and Insurgency* in Chapter 2). The insurgent group in Somalia, al-Shabaab, was initially the military wing of the ICU but supplanted the ICU. Al-Shabaab gained prominence and support immediately after the collapse of the ICU because the Somalis believed that the group fought against the west's intention to use the predominantly Christian Ethiopians to fight Islam in Somalia. Al-Shabaab's aim was to

fight a jihad against the west, capture state power, and establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law.¹⁴⁰

The name al-Shabaab means the youth in Arabic, which is Somalia's second national language following the country's early contact with Arab traders. Al-Shabaab was initially comprised of the youth who resisted the US sponsored Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006.¹⁴¹ Due to their violent activities against the population, the US listed Al-Shabaab as a terrorist group in 2008. Australia did the same in 2009, and the UK and EU listed it in 2010. In the same vein, the UNSCR 1844 named al-Shabaab as an international terrorist group.¹⁴²

Despite its international interaction, the operational method of Islamic insurgents remained focused on local warfare with an asymmetrical operational strategy based on its hit-and-run guerrilla experience that it developed in 2006 when it fought the ENDF.¹⁴³ Through the years, al-Shabaab conducted assassinations, used IEDs, and bombed civilian as well as military targets.¹⁴⁴ Al-Shabaab has not been predictable, changing its tactics regularly. In early 2000, scholars named al-Shabaab as "one of Africa's most fearsome militant Islamist groups."¹⁴⁵ Al-Shabaab killed 74 civilians in Uganda and conducted multiple heinous attacks on civilians in Kenya.¹⁴⁶

The UPDF was the main challenger to al-Shabaab during the period under study because it controlled al-Shabaab's decisive point, Mogadishu. The Ugandan force employed operational methods, such as strikes and other small-scale offensive actions, information operations, civil-military operations, to win hearts and minds, cordon and search, patrols, and long-range penetration operations as well as major offensives to capture new territories.¹⁴⁷ The post August 2011 COIN operations within Mogadishu was

against the insurgent's covert operations following al-Shabaab's announcement of a withdrawal from the city yet it maintained its undercover cells.¹⁴⁸ Prior to that, al-Shabaab controlled the greater part of Mogadishu and engaged the UPDF in urban warfare at close combat.¹⁴⁹

In May 2012, the UPDF started *Operation Free Shebelle* that aimed at moving out of the Bandir region and gaining more territory from al-Shabaab. *Operation Free Shebelle* was a phased operation. A year later, al-Shabaab had lost to the UPDF all the major towns in Banadir, Lower Shabelle, and Middle Shabelle.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, al-Shabaab started covert operations in UPDF's rear that led to several civilian losses.¹⁵¹

Dynamic Intelligence

When the UPDF deployed to Somalia in March 2007, al-Shabaab enjoyed HUMINT because the population viewed the fighters as freedom fighters that resisted the Ethiopian invasion.¹⁵² The UPDF deployment had come only two months after the last sections of the ICU were defeated and al-Shabaab became the lead insurgency. The US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia united the Somalis more than any other event. There was popular resentment for the ENDF. Forming a coalition with ENDF that was still in Mogadishu was a setback for the UPDF intelligence operations although on the opposing end the UPDF required the ENDF's firepower.¹⁵³ However, the UPDF civil-military operations later improved the population's popular perception of the UPDF.¹⁵⁴

The UPDF received support from the Somali national security agency to compensate partially for its lack of geographic intelligence and home advantage.¹⁵⁵ The COIN force had limited technical intelligence capabilities, such as UAVs donated by the US. These were shared with the Burundi contingent. Even so, the RQ-11 Raven UAV

helped the troops monitor al-Shabaab's movements and in adjusting battlefield plans.¹⁵⁶ Still, that capability was most applicable in 2012-13 operations when the enemy still had bases. By 2018, the enemy had melted into the population and operated in small squads that were easy to track mostly by HUMINT assets, which al-Shabaab enjoyed more than the COIN force due to its home advantage.¹⁵⁷ In Mogadishu, the insurgents ran an effective intelligence network covered within the population that led to several successful suicide attacks in the city. The UPDF intelligence was rather reactive to the proactive insurgent cells called *Amyats*. Besides, the larger force of al-Shabaab had relocated deep in villages where the Raven RQ-11s are inapplicable due to distance. The insurgents also enjoyed the local geographic intelligence more than the UPDF, other than just HUMINT.¹⁵⁸ "Geographic intelligence is one of the oldest forms of military intelligence, and one of the most important."¹⁵⁹ Moreover, al-Shabaab targeted and executed people thought to be giving the UPDF HUMINT, such as 27 civilians it killed in 2014. Such intimidation by al-Shabaab affected the opportunities of information collection.¹⁶⁰

Even when al-Shabaab provided the UPDF with targets of opportunity, such as the enemy force driving in long convoys, the UPDF had no technical intelligence capability to monitor their movements. It was the US CJTF-HOA, located far away in Djibouti, which had air surveillance and reconnaissance capability and often engaged those targets using drones.¹⁶¹ Even with the February 2018 donation of more UAVs to the UPDF, the SRCC said the critical capabilities were still insufficient.¹⁶² Whereas several factors could have led to the 1 September 2016 incident where al-Shabaab inflicted heavy losses on a UPDF unit in Lower Shabelle, deficiencies in intelligence capabilities could have been one of the major ones. Al-Shabaab amassed over 100

fighters from the community and still surprised the COIN force without any HUMINT warning or detection by use of technical intelligence means.¹⁶³

Therefore, due to its home advantage, intimidation of the population by use of terror, and knowledge of the geography, al-Shabaab surpassed the COIN force in information collection. Moreover, the AU's rules of engagement (ROE) restricted the COIN force on how far they could move off their bases and what mode of transport they used while al-Shabaab had freedom of movement, as individuals or in groups, by any transport means, everywhere. Worse still, the natural skin complexion and facial appearance of Ugandans was unique from Somalis. This limited their freedom to conduct covert operations. Sadly, explosives still reached Mogadishu without intelligence detecting and intercepting the sources for now over a decade even if claims were that the non-selective weapons entered Africa through Puntland.¹⁶⁴

In summary, al-Shabaab used its advantages of HUMINT and geographic intelligence to exploit the lack of technical intelligence by the UPDF to conduct attrition on the AU force. Through HUMINT, al-Shabaab also created ample distance between its mobile positions and the UPDF to cultivate from the UPDF's lack of technical intelligence capabilities. Nevertheless, the UPDF had an upper hand in overall operations due to its other strengths as evidenced by the ejection of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other major towns. The COIN force lacked the most critical long-range intelligence capabilities although it had partial capabilities that it applied in unison with other lines of efforts to achieve overall operational advantage. Its assets were also not effective enough to support the operations as evidenced by the occasional insurgent's surprises on the COIN force's positions. Therefore, the score for dynamic intelligence was neutral (0).

Dominance of Firepower

By October 2017, the UPDF's strength was 6,223 soldiers.¹⁶⁵ It was comprised of seven battalions broken down into a contingent headquarter, commanded by a Brigadier General, and three battle groups under the command of Colonels. (see Figure 4). The units had a mix of one T-55 tank battalion shared among the seven battalions, a few mounted boats that patrolled a short distance off Mogadishu's shores, and a mechanized element comprising of at least six different brands of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), APCs, and BMP-IIIs, that the UPDF used to bolster its infantry firepower.¹⁶⁶




Figure 4. UPDF Command Relationships in Somalia

Source: Created by author using data from Uganda Contingent Headquarters in AMISOM, “Organization Chart,” Uganda Contingent, 2013.

Each of the mechanized assets were mounted with not less than three weapons systems such as a 12.7 mm anti-aircraft gun and 40 mm automatic grenade launchers. The infantry had a wide range of weaponry but the SMG-56, PKM, automatic grenade launchers, 60 mm to 120 mm mortars, 82 mm recoilless guns, M-16s, and RPG-7s dominated the inventory.¹⁶⁷ The contingent also had a versatile and light Special Forces that conducted successful long-range operations in 2012, such as at Albao where it overran al-Shabaab base and captured assortment of military equipment.¹⁶⁸ Other assets capabilities were light artillery with weapons such as 120 mm mortar, and light air defense with 12.7 mm guns, 14.5 mm guns, and 37 mm guns.¹⁶⁹ A combination of all the UPDF capability produced far higher firepower than al-Shabaab possessed especially during major offensives.¹⁷⁰ Al-Shabaab mainly used 12.7 mm anti-aircraft weapons mounted on pickup trucks, PKMs, 82 mm recoilless guns, RPGs, automatic grenade launchers, sniper rifles, and variants of the AK-47.¹⁷¹ However, even with the inferior weapon inventory, al-Shabaab occasionally challenged the UPDF because the UPDF's force capabilities were as low as 40 percent combat power.¹⁷² The UPDF deployed the assets thinly amongst a huge AOR in such a way that they could not support each other. No wonder in 2006 al-Shabaab adopted an approach of massed attacks on the AU forces resulting in bigger losses incurred by small detachments than it used to be when al-Shabaab was better armed and equipped.¹⁷³

In 2012, the AU's PSC endorsed the acquisition of necessary air assets and maritime capabilities to enhance UPDF firepower and rapid response to the enemy threats but it did not materialize.¹⁷⁴ Following this, the UPDF deployed one Russian made M-17 utility helicopter and three Mi-24 attack helicopters (AH) to Somalia. To UPDF's

misfortune, on 12 August 2012, all the three AHs crashed on Mt. Kenya, while en route to Somalia, because of bad weather.¹⁷⁵ Even in the face of a growing AO, the UPDF in Somalia was mainly a land component without close air support (CAS).¹⁷⁶ On 1 September 2015, al-Shabaab attacked and inflicted losses on a UPDF company at Janaale but the insurgents were not promptly repulsed.¹⁷⁷ There was no air asset to destroy the attackers. As noted in Chapter 2, the US Army publication reiterated what airpower could have done under such a situation:

Airpower provides considerable asymmetric advantages to counterinsurgents. If insurgents assemble a conventional force, air assets can respond quickly with precision fires. In a sudden crisis, air mobility can immediately move land forces where they are needed. In numerous COIN operations, airpower has demonstrated a vital supporting role.¹⁷⁸

The success of air strikes in Somalia by the US's Djibouti headquartered Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) confirms the UPDF claims of the need for air assets. Air strikes by the CJTF-HOA were responsible for the death of most of the al-Shabaab senior commanders killed since 2007. In late December 2017 alone, CJTF-HOA conducted multiple air strikes on al-Shabaab that killed with ease over 100 fighters.¹⁷⁹ That justified the analysis of Somalia's prime minister that the security structure in Somalia lacked capabilities and it required more US support in the form of air strikes as the most accurate means to cripple al-Shabaab leadership nodes.¹⁸⁰

Still on the Janaale attack, the UPDF force multipliers were too dispersed to give responsive support. For example, one tank battalion could not adequately cover all the UPDF's positions in support of seven battalions. Moreover, tanks must operate in a minimum of groups of threes. Even with artillery capabilities, the AU's 2011 indirect fire policy restrained the UPDF's use of fires as one way to reduce the impact of military

operations upon the civilian population.¹⁸¹ “Disproportionate or indiscriminate response under fire was punishable under AMISOM rules of engagement.”¹⁸²

To summarize, the firepower assets were limited in number against such a vast AOR, during the period under study, even though the UPDF had the capabilities to deliver superior firepower. The COIN force operated at a rate lower than 50 percent combat power. The insurgents operated in small groups to avoid the effects of the use of massed fires against them. In addition, the insurgents used massed attack tactics on smaller UPDF detachments to ensure the use of maximum firepower against the UPDF. The UPDF even had no air assets to compensate for the wide AOR. The ROE also restricted UPDF’s use of fires. This bogged down the COIN operations. So, the dominance of firepower was absent (-) in the UPDF’s COIN operations in Somalia.

Physical Support to Insurgents

Meaningful support in the form of recruits joining al-Shabaab started in 2006 when the group resisted the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and the population saw the insurgents as freedom fighters.¹⁸³ Other than the US factor, al-Shabaab got recruits as the only feasible group then to resist Ethiopian aggression based on the deep-seated Ogaden 1978 War hatred between Somalia and Ethiopia. Later, in 2008, the group started international recruitment before introducing forceful recruitment, including taking minors into their ranks.¹⁸⁴ The group used the internet to connect to the world terrorist groups and individuals with Islamist extremist tendencies. Through properly packaged videos, the group used their al Kata’ib Foundation to reach out to the world with recruitment messages that framed the Somalia insurgency to an anti-western world war.¹⁸⁵ “One testimonial from a foreign fighter published on the internet sites that British, Swedish,

African, American, Saudi, Yemeni, and other Arab volunteers, some with experience in Afghanistan, as being among al-Shabaab ranks.”¹⁸⁶

Through its international network, the group not only got foreign fighters, known as *Mujahideen*, but also bomb experts who introduced in Somalia the kind of suicide bombing conducted in the Middle East.¹⁸⁷ Al-Shabaab’s official link with al-Qaeda in 2012 gained it more prominence that earned it different forms of international support, especially since the Somali insurgent group was the only group in al-Qaeda’s network that actually controlled a territory.¹⁸⁸ Funding was also important to al-Shabaab’s lifeline. Through the years, the group built a big financial network, internal and external.

One funding source for al-Shabaab was kidnapping. In 2013, al-Shabaab received a ransom of \$5.1 million from the kidnap of two Spaniards. The group also received foreign funding from the Somali diaspora, organisations, and sympathizers.¹⁸⁹ Evidence to this claim was in 2012 when the group received \$250,000 from a Qatari national called Abd al-Rahman bin Umayr al-Nu’aymi. Al-Shabaab received its external funds mainly through mobile money transfers.¹⁹⁰

Since funding, recruitment, and equipping of the insurgents, as featured in chapter 2, are important aspects in the lifeline of the insurgents, it was imperative in this study to analyze the mechanism that the UPDF and its networks established to constrict this support. Due to strength and asset shortfalls, the UPDF was not in full control of all its AO by 2018, especially in the expanse of space west of the Shabelle river. (see Figure 5). Even if al-Shabaab had lost a level of popularity, due to its brutality towards the population, large ungoverned spaces in several parts of Somalia, such as this one, allowed the insurgents unrestrained recruitment, training, and operations.¹⁹¹

However, by the control of Mogadishu and Barawe seaports, Bakara market, and key towns in its AO, the UPDF and its network denied al-Shabaab major sources of internal income it used to get from taxes. Al-Shabaab lost approximately forty percent of their 2011 budget due to the 2011 capture of Bakara and Suuq markets alone. Even if the other AMISOM contingents also captured key towns and ports, such as Kismayo, from where al-Shabaab used to collect money to fund its efforts to take over the UPDF's OA in Mogadishu, the group continued to earn over \$100,000 per annum from the previous high tens of millions it got prior to 2011.¹⁹² In 2016, the Islamist group benefited most from sugar and livestock taxes even when the UN put a ban of the charcoal exported from Somalia as a measure to cut off the large sums of income the insurgents used to get from the charcoal trade. The group taxed traders who smuggled sugar into Kenya to raise huge sums of money due to lack of governance in many parts of Somalia and weak border controls in Kenya.¹⁹³ This acted as alternative sources of money to fund the activities of al-Shabaab in Mogadishu and beyond.

Even with the UN ban on charcoal trade, Kenyan AMISOM forces in Kismayo became a thorn in the implementation of the charcoal trade ban through connivance with traders.¹⁹⁴ Even though the force denied involvement in this activity, in 2017 the African Union carved off Kismayo into a separate sector and deployed the ENDF to operate alongside the KDF for closer monitoring of the controversial sector and as a control measure to block al-Shabaab internal funding, among other reasons.¹⁹⁵ (see Figure 2). Unfortunately, for the UPDF in Mogadishu, there were no effective measures to block foreign funding to al-Shabaab.

Despite the US government's implementation of its anti-terrorism measures in 2014, where it put pressure on money-transfer companies to cease business with Somalia, all institutions and other countries did not implement this measure. Big companies that valued their credibility, such as the US Wells Fargo & Co. and US Bancorp, had responsibly blocked the money wires to Somalia a decade earlier, Western Union and Moneygram did not operate in Somalia. However, companies like Merchants Bank of California only announced the closure of its services to Somalia on the first week of February 2015, months after other companies had ceased money-transfers to Somalia.¹⁹⁶ The World Bank named WorldRemit, Tawakal Express, Amal Express, Iftin Express, and Dahabhiil as major UK based firms that still made money transfers to Somalia by the end of 2017.¹⁹⁷ In December 2017, Dahabhiil Company alone had 107 registered agents in London alone.¹⁹⁸

During the period under study, the UPDF Air Force offered ground support at Somalia's only international airport in Mogadishu. Part of the support included aviation security to constrict possible terrorist entry through Mogadishu's airport. However, there were no credible patrols along its coast even when AMISOM took over its major ports. The coastline remained unprotected and Somalia's coastline is long with sandy landings that can act as entry points for insurgent support.¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, al-Shabaab showed no interest in developing maritime capabilities but still enjoyed proceeds from the pirates.²⁰⁰

There was evidence of foreign mujahedeen in Somalia.²⁰¹ The presence of materials for making bombs evidenced continued external insurgent support since Somalia does not manufacture such material. The insurgents even made higher impact bombs as years passed by. The October 2017 explosion in Somalia were the worst in the

country's history, claiming over 300 lives in one attack.²⁰² Yet, it was not clear how the explosives were smuggled into the country although open source intelligence indicated that the bombs that al-Shabaab used in Kenya and Somalia since 2013 found their way into Africa via Puntland, eventually being transported to Somalia. The paradox remained how the insurgents transported the bombs unnoticed in a stretch of over 1,500km road distance characterized by numerous roadblocks.²⁰³

It was clear that not only the ungoverned expanse of land enabled the terrorists to hold hostages for ransom but also other factors were a barrier to the COIN force in constricting insurgent physical support by April 2018. The insurgents still had undisclosed or unchecked source of armament, especially the acquisition of bombs. Evidence to this observation were the numerous and deadlier explosions in Mogadishu. There was either ineffective or absent mechanisms to constrict the insurgents' sources of funding. Moreover, al-Shabaab also recruited at will in the ungoverned areas. The insurgents received support with little difficulty and the COIN force did not intercept the support. Therefore, there was absence (-) of effective mechanisms to constrict the insurgents' physical support.

Civil-Military Cooperation

The UPDF engaged in a war for people's minds in Somalia and its strategic leadership recognized that the secret behind the success it had registered in ten years was a good civil-military cooperation programs.²⁰⁴ Indeed, being a young poorly equipped force from a poor country that was still recovering from instabilities since its independence, it was unexpected by many that the 1,605 strong force would hold ground for a day in a place where a well-equipped 16,000 strong UN force was forced to exit.²⁰⁵

The handling of collateral damage, civilian involuntary cooperation with the insurgents, the COIN force's ability to appeal to the aspiration of the people, and its ability to negate the insurgent's goodwill were the important aspects that determined the extent of the UPDF's civil-military cooperation in this study.

Applying the AU's 2011 indirect fire policy that forbade the indiscriminate response under fire, the UPDF restrained its use of indirect fires and had only light artillery as a measure to avoid collateral damage on civilians.²⁰⁶ Even in the case of civilian losses, the COIN force had measures, under AMISOM arrangement, to compensate for civilian losses that resulted from AMISOM action and to treat those injured in crossfire or al-Shabaab attacks. This was a way to foster its civil-military cooperation with the population.²⁰⁷ On the contrary, al-Shabaab conducted indiscriminate use of fires, killing even civilians in its attacks on the COIN force and it conducted multiple terrorist attacks that killed several civilians and destroyed property.²⁰⁸

Al-Shabaab did not spare the infrastructure either. The insurgents dug tunnels across the roads to act as tank ditches.²⁰⁹ They also destroyed bridges and culverts as a way to block the UPDF's advance, such as in Marka on August 2012.²¹⁰ Meanwhile, al-Shabaab lost its initial popularity due to its terroristic activities and hence lost the cooperation of the population. It resorted to forceful recruitment.²¹¹ On the other hand, the population was more willing to work with the UPDF. The multitude of civilians that always welcomed the UPDF in areas it liberated from al-Shabaab was evidence of the people's cooperation. (see Figure 6). Even certain sections of al-Shabaab defected in large numbers to work with the UPDF. For example, on 22 September 2012, 218 al-

Shabaab fighters, under the command of Segu Abdu Yusuf, surrendered to the UPDF's 342 Battalion at Garsale.²¹²



Figure 5. Somali Civilians Welcome the UPDF in the Port Town of Marka

Source: Photo by author.

As part of goodwill to the people, the UPDF provided more medical care to the civilians in its AO than any other institution in Somalia, as summarized here:

At first, senior UN officials in Nairobi nosily disapproved the decision to treat civilians alongside soldiers . . . But the (UPDF) commanders had taken the view that since their mission was to help the people of Somalia, it would be absurd to deny them medical assistance . . . Winning the hearts and minds is a cornerstone of modern counter-insurgency theory—and what better way was there to achieve

this when fist-class trauma clinics were practically non-existent anywhere else. Nairobi had grudgingly conceded this point, since UPDF had taken the principle further, and dug into their own budgets to open a civilian outpatient department (OPD) nearby. The OPD was an instant success. On three mornings each week, about eight GPs treated as many as six hundred patients who came not just from Mogadishu but some cases from as far as the Ethiopian border, a dangerous 500-Kilometer journey . . . Although the clinics did not open until nine, a long queue had always formed before dawn at the entrance in the camp perimeter.²¹³

Al-Shabaab tried to stop the population from seeking medical help, but people turned a deaf ear on the insurgents even when the terrorist group threatened to conduct a door-to-door inspection with the intention to kill whoever possessed a UPDF medical form or medicines.²¹⁴ Al-Shabaab had for long collected taxes but never provided any such services. The insurgents had no goodwill for the UPDF to negate. The COIN force took advantage of the gap in service delivery to improve its own civil-military cooperation.

In summary, there was generally a friendly relationship between the COIN force and the people while the populace turned away from al-Shabaab.²¹⁵ The people shunned al-Shabaab because it violated their human rights. (see Table 12).

Table 12. A Summary of Major Crimes Committed by Al-Shabaab against Civilians as Reflected in Case Study 3	
Crimes	Comment
Murder	Suicide attacks IEDs Assassinations Execution
Kidnaps/Hostage	For ransom
Extortion	Over taxation
Abuse of labor rights	Forced recruitment
Child soldiers	Indoctrination of children into fighters

Source: Compiled by author using data from Case Study 3 of this thesis.

Meanwhile, the population found the UPDF more appealing because the people received dignified treatment from the COIN force when al-Shabaab mistreated or executed them under the Sharia law for petty accusations or lack of support to the terrorist group. The UPDF observed the rules of engagement and had a mechanism for the compensation for civilian losses. The population was also not only friendly to the COIN force but also generally preferred to work with them than al-Shabaab. The goodwill that the UPDF built with the people of Somalia remained a cementing factor for the good relations between the people and the COIN force. Therefore, the UPDF scored 1 (complete) in all the four precepts of analysis. There was presence (+) of civil-military cooperation in favor of the COIN force because it scored above the 3.0 points required for presence. (see Table 13).

Table 13. The State of Civil-Military Cooperation in Somalia's COIN Operations		
Variables	COIN Force	Al-Shabaab
Avoidance of collateral damage	1	0
Involuntary cooperation with insurgents	1	0
Appealing to the aspiration of the people	1	0
Negation of the opposing force's goodwill	1	0
TOTAL	4	0
	Presence (+)	

Source: Created by author.

Effective Political Structures in Controlled Areas

Several decades of instability destroyed Somalia's political and administrative structures. By 2007, when the UPDF deployed to the war-torn country, Somalia was a failed state, characterized by a total breakdown in all service delivery systems. By April 2018, little had changed in the greater part of Somalia despite the presence of a central

government structure and two presidential elections conducted.²¹⁶ Scanty service delivery was within Mogadishu with foreign actors or organizations taking the greater role whereas the shaky government structures were still threatened by the covert operation of al-Shabaab and the scarce government resources were allocated in the fight against the insurgents.

The government appointed regional and local administrators in 2012 after the UPDF and other AMISOM forces captured most towns in the country but the several years of collapse left no viable physical infrastructure that could support service delivery. The human resources were lacking. Therefore, the governors and other government appointees out of Mogadishu remained more of ceremonial figures than were administrative actors. Additionally, al-Shabaab assassinated a number of Somali government leaders and private service providers, such as the Banadir University graduation bombing that killed four Somali ministers together with many teaching staff, including the founder of the University, Dr. Shahid.²¹⁷ Aside from political leaders and journalists, teachers comprised a large number of individuals killed by al-Shabaab assassins.²¹⁸

In fact, education could have been one of the worst affected service delivery sectors in Somalia with a 30 percent enrollment rate for primary school-aged children in 2016. Secondary education was at 26 percent. This was one of the lowest enrollment rates in the world. In the same year, the number of children below 18 years who were out of school had doubled to three million from previous data. The majority of the children out of school were in the UPDF controlled area in Banadir that had the largest IDP concentration. There was both a lack of teachers and government support. This left many

actors offering education but the government had no control over their activities.”²¹⁹

There was therefore no effective political control.

Moreover, the many years of a failed Somali state affected the health sector so badly that it will require much time to recover from the breakdown it faced. When the situation should have started to improve, with the expulsion of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in 2011, al-Shabaab looted and expelled a number of critical organizations that could have helped the government restore its health and other service delivery structures. Preventable diseases kept rising in Somalia.²²⁰ Even in 2018 some areas had not received any form of viable medical services from the government in over three decades and they only relied on the UPDF’s basic medical care in the OPDs that was constrained by the lack of enough drugs and UN restrictions, in the face of an overwhelmingly growing number of patients and medical complications.²²¹

Therefore, as illustrated in Table 14, there was absence (-) of effective political structures in the COIN force controlled-areas in Somalia from 2007-17. There were no viable government structures to address the service delivery challenges outside Mogadishu. Other actors overshadowed the government in the provision of service with little or no government control. Equally, there was absence (-) of effective mechanisms to constrict the external and internal funding, recruiting, and equipping of the insurgents. There was also absence (-) of the dominance of firepower in the UPDF COIN operations in Somalia because, despite its numerical advantage of firepower assets, the assets were too dispersed to achieve maximum effect. Moreover, the COIN force had ROE limitations on the use of its fires, no air assets, and it operated a readiness rate of lower than 50 percent with partial IFVs and tanks. This bogged down the COIN operations.

Table 14. The COIN Force's Performance in Somalia				
Variables		Insurgencies		
		Sri Lanka 1976-2009	Uganda 1987-2004	UPDF in Somalia 2007-2018
Military	Dynamic intelligence			0
	Dominance of firepower			-
	Physical support to insurgents is blocked			-
	Civil-military cooperation			+
Civil	Effective political structures in controlled areas			-

Source: Created by author.

Nevertheless, the COIN force had dynamic intelligence capabilities although the enemy outwitted it on HUMINT, and it lacked important intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. This left a gap and neutral (0) presence of dynamic intelligence for the COIN force as evidenced by the occasional outwitting of the COIN force by the insurgents even if the COIN force still had the overall operational advantage. One area where the COIN force performed best (+) was in civil-military cooperation, which only confirms the UPDF Commander-In-Chief's comment that the force's success in Somalia was mainly rooted on civil-military cooperation.

The Synthesis of Case Analysis

Despite the different settings and different approaches used by COIN force in the three case studies, there is a higher semblance of the overall outcome of the LTTE and LRA insurgencies save for the variation in the political structures in controlled areas. In both, there was presence (+) of dynamic intelligence, dominance of firepower, blockage

of physical support to the insurgents, and civil-military cooperation in favor of the COIN force. In both cases, the COIN force succeeded in ending the insurgency. However, the outcomes of the COIN efforts against the al-Shabaab insurgency, which was still running by the time of this research, widely differed from the LRA and LTTE COIN operations with only one out of the five variables showing presence (+), three showed absence (-), and one gave a neutral (0) result. Whereas there was semblance in the overall outcome of civil-military cooperation in all the three cases, the LRA and al-Shabaab cases had more semblances as compared to the LTTE insurgency that faced some challenges. Even if in both the LRA and al-Shabaab insurgencies the UPDF was the COIN force used for the analysis, the outcomes are not identical. Nevertheless, the overall outcome for al-Shabaab and the LRA’s civil-military cooperation was similar. Table 15 summarizes the overall outcome of the analysis of the three case studies.

Table 15. A Synthesis of the COIN Forces’ Performance in the Sri Lankan, LRA, and Somalia’s Insurgencies				
Variables		Insurgencies		
		Sri Lanka 1976-2009	Uganda 1987-2004	UPDF in Somalia 2007-2018
Military	Dynamic intelligence	+	+	0
	Dominance of firepower	+	+	-
	Physical support to insurgents is blocked	+	+	-
	Civil-military cooperation	+	+	+
Civil	Effective political structures in controlled areas	-	+	-

Source: Created by author.

Summary of Findings

A primary research question and five secondary questions guided this analysis (see Chapter 1). The overall findings in relation to the research questions were:

Intelligence Gaps

1. On HUMINT, as opposed to the LRA and LTTE cases that had home advantage and freedom of action and movement, the distinct physical appearance of the UPDF intelligence staff from the Somali people amidst a volatile environment, language barrier, and the AU standing operating procedures (SOP) limited the UPDF HUMINT and information collection in the field.
2. In the LRA and LTTE COIN cases, the COIN force controlled and co-existed with the civilians in IDP camps and villages that gave them access to HUMINT. However, the lack of control of the population, due to confinement in the AU bases, left al-Shabaab freedom of action to intimidate civilians to deter UPDF information gathering.
3. The UPDF in Somalia had a limited size of Special Forces and lacked fighter-intelligence squads to operate in the enemy rear as opposed to the LTTE that specifically performed well in that regard. The Special Forces gave Sri Lankan COIN force a marked advantage.
4. Concerning geographical intelligence, unlike in the LRA and LTTE COIN operations where the COIN forces were permanent to the operational environment and natives of the country of operations, the UPDF COIN force in Somalia had poor geographical intelligence as compared to the enemy

because the force rotated out annually, were foreign to the environment, and their movement was limited by AU SOP.

5. Regarding technical intelligence, the LRA and LTTE operations benefitted from the wider national technical intelligence capabilities and had a wide range of satellite, SIGINT, and aerial intelligence capabilities that enhanced their performance. The UPDF in Somalia lacked the relevant technical intelligence capabilities and depended on irregular donations, whereas the Ugandan parliament's 'zero funding' approval of the Somalia mission and the donor caveats limited the capacity to develop the COIN force's technical intelligence capabilities. Somali intelligence, that the UPDF supported, also did not have these capabilities.
6. On networking, the LRA and LTTE COIN forces had a wide range of intelligence networks. They benefitted from a well-coordinated national intelligence network that the UPDF lacked in Somalia.
7. The LTTE specifically had a well-coordinated and highly sophisticated international intelligence network which the UPDF COIN force in Somalia lacked because of AU structures and the disadvantage of operating outside of Uganda.

Vulnerability of the UPDF to Enemy Firepower

1. In the LTTE and LRA insurgencies, the governments massed all efforts across the country to form a formidable firepower base that the insurgents could not challenge. The UPDF case in Somalia was different. The force had a wide AO with few assets that it had to spread very thinly over the AO, contrary to most

military doctrine. For example, one tank battalion could not appropriately cover positions of seven infantry battalions. The enemy took advantage of this to mass efforts on isolated detachments with the aim of overrunning the COIN force.

2. Donor caveats did not allow the expenditure of donor country funds on the military section of AMISOM, unlike the LTTE case where donors specifically armed the military. The UPDF relied on the US as a major donor for assets that came in piecemeal and was inadequate to cover the gaps on the ground, unlike the LTTE and LRA cases where assets were raised specifically for major final offensives.
3. The LRA and LTTE COIN operations were national operations where all available means were applicable. But for the UPDF in Somalia, even its few assets raised human rights and UN concerns when applied because of a fires policy that limited their use. Capabilities, like rockets, were significant in the LRA and LTTE COIN operations due to their demoralizing and degrading effects on the enemy but the UPDF in Somalia either lacked them or could not use the little it had.
4. The UPDF in Somalia lacked the much-needed airpower for reconnaissance and surveillance, convoy protection, quick response force capability, and to strike targets of opportunity, such as when the enemy massed for an attack. Insurgents move in splinter groups and once they converge, that is the time to strike. The UPDF in Somalia could not do this due to lack of air assets. Airpower played critical roles in the LTTE and LRA COIN operations. The

psychological effects of airstrikes and rockets broke the will of the enemy.

This was lacking in the Somalia operation.

Effects of Insurgent Physical Support to the UPDF Mission in Somalia

1. The UPDF did not constrict physical support to al-Shabaab insurgents because of a number of issues. Some of the issues were beyond its direct control but within the confines of its partners. The gaps included the failure to stop insurgent funding, recruitment, and the acquisition of weapons.
2. The three cases prove that constricting the source of funding constitutes an important ingredient towards winning COIN operations. The disruption of funding to the LTTE by the US and EU, as well as sinking the LTTE ships, had a direct impact on its failure. The insurgents could no longer fund the services in its controlled areas or run its operations. Likewise, when al-Shabaab lost Mogadishu and the key towns where it used to get funds, its military strength declined quickly and it turned into more of a fugitive organization than the former organized groups that had bases.
3. In the LRA and LTTE cases, the governments blocked the internal sources of insurgent support, unlike in Somalia. In the two cases, the governments got control of the IDPs and controlled the population physically and psychologically to cut off the internal funding. Somalia's case was different. The failure to control the internal sources of funding to al-Shabaab, that mainly came from the illegal sugar trade between Somali businesspersons and Kenya, was a major factor responsible for the financing of al-Shabaab atrocities in Mogadishu.

4. There was no international mechanism to constrict external funding to al-Shabaab, unlike in the LRA and LTTE cases. In the LTTE case, the key members of the international community operated under one voice to block funding to the insurgents, unlike in the Somalia case where only the US tried, yet the funds from the US could still pass, via other countries, to Somalia. Lack of access to international funding had little or no impact on the LRA operations because they were in the bush and living off the land.
5. In the LRA and LTTE cases, the recruits came from inside their borders and the governments put in the population control methods to deny the enemy access to recruits. In Somalia, the government had no control over the main source of recruits in the ungoverned rural places. Again, al-Shabaab had access to foreign fighters, a problem that has still not been resolved. That unique feature further complicated the Somalia insurgency as compared to the LRA and LTTE insurgencies.
6. The UPDF and its partners had no knowledge of the source of IEDs and bomb materials that came into Mogadishu. The IED and bomb threat was increasing as gauged by the degree of single event damages and number of incidents. In the LRA and LTTE cases, the government identified the sources of arms and mainly used diplomacy to blockade arms flow to the insurgents, which partly led to the defeat of the insurgents.
7. Donor caveats did not allow for the expenditure on the military section of AMISOM unlike the LTTE case where donors specifically armed the military. The UPDF in Somalia relied on the US as a major donor for assets that came

in piecemeal and was inadequate to cover the gaps on the ground unlike the LRA and LTTE cases where assets were raised once for final major offensives.

Impact of Civil-Military Cooperation on the UPDF COIN Operation in Somalia

1. The UPDF in Somalia derived part of its advantage from civil-military operations although it did not perform to its full capacity due to lack of resources caused by lack of funding, which ultimately affected the UPDF civil-military operations. The outpatient medical service was the most significant civil-military operation the UPDF conducted in Somalia that earned it popular support and HUMINT.
2. The UPDF under AMISOM lacked control of the population for a better civil-military impact. The COIN force in the LRA insurgency benefited from control of the population and so was the case in Sri Lanka where the COIN force gained control of the population in the final year of the insurgency. Lack of control of the population allowed al-Shabaab to issue threats to civilians for embracing the UPDF and thereby limiting the number of sources of intelligence for the UPDF. Somalia's case proved that, in an insurgency, popular support without the control of the population is counterproductive.

The Influence of Political Control on UPDF Performance

1. There was no viable political control outside Mogadishu city and no government services offered to the people. Even in Mogadishu, which the government regained control of seven years earlier, there were minimal basic

government services. The government even had no control of the services offered by NGOs whose motives were usually unclear.

2. The Somalia case was similar to the Sri Lanka case where the government offered no basic services to the people. Sri Lankan COIN forces used military force to suppress the rebellion because it provided no services to the people, something that was one of the reasons for the cause of the insurgency. By 2018, the grievances of marginalization still existed in Sri Lanka and in future the conflict may reoccur. Borrowing from this, no matter how well the COIN force performs in Somalia, there will be grievances in the society that will compromise the peace-building process unless the government addresses the service delivery gap in the society.
3. Borrowing from the COIN force in Uganda and the impact of the small scale OPD in Somalia, it is easier to have control of the population, gain HUMINT, and overall popular support during an insurgency if a government or COIN force ensures a well-established and functional system of service delivery.

Considering the comparison of the two case studies with the UPDF COIN operations in Somalia, the UPDF was on the negative side of the situation. If the UPDF COIN force in Somalia was to handle the LTTE or LRA insurgency in the state in which it was in 2007-2018, it would have most likely failed due to challenges in its intelligence systems, firepower capabilities, and uncontrolled physical support to the insurgents. Others challenges that would lead to its failure are irregularities within its civil-military cooperation operations, which is one of its greatest strength, and a lack of governance in

controlled areas. A combination of the strengths from the LRA and LTTE COIN operations provide good lessons learned in trying to solve Somalia's insurgency.

Summary

Chapter 4 examined how the COIN force and government responded to the LTTE, LRA, and al-Shabaab insurgencies. The analysis employed five variables against the three case studies within the unique contexts of each of the different insurgencies. Many scholars consider dynamic intelligence, dominance of firepower, constricting insurgent support, good civil-military cooperation, and an effective political control as key determinants, which are the variables used for this analysis, as key for a successful conduct of COIN operations. The UPDF COIN force in Somalia performed least of the three using these indicators as the basis of analysis. Except for civil-military cooperation that could only help the force as an enabling factor, the UPDF performance, in regards to the other four variables, faced many challenges, some of which were beyond the COIN force's control. The overall outcome of the analysis that appears in Table 15 is further subjected to interpretation that guides the recommendations on how to enhance the UPDF COIN operations in Somalia as will be discussed in Chapter 5.

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⁶ Connable and Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 32.

⁷ Ahmed S. Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 1-2.

⁸ Rashmi Raghav, "Why and how the Tamil Tiger lost the Battle: LTTE Case Study," *International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research* 4, no. 3 (2016): 55.

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¹⁰ Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers*, 76, 82, 83.

¹¹ Vinoth Ramachandra, *Subverting Global Myths: Theology and the Public Issues Shaping Our World* (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2008), 40.

¹² Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers*, 49, 59.

¹³ Povlock, *A Guerilla War at Sea*, 18.

¹⁴ Ramachandra, *Subverting Global Myths*, 39.

¹⁵ Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers*, 54.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 53, 68.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁹ David Kilcullen, "Overview of Counterterrorism," *Business Today*, July 2011, accessed June 5, 2018, http://www.businesstoday.lk/cover_page.php?article=3491&issue=22141-3.

²⁰ Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers*, 52, 65-66, 82.

²¹ Israeli Weapons Ltd., "Blue Horizon 2," accessed March 30, 2018, http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/aircraft/uav/blue_horizon_2/Blue_Horizon_2.htm.

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- ²³ Ibid., 52.
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- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers*, 96.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 75-6.
- ³⁰ Ramachandra, *Subverting Global Myths*, 39.
- ³¹ Povlock, *A Guerilla War at Sea*, 24.
- ³² Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya, *Ethnic Unrest in Modern Sri Lanka: An Account of Tamil-Sinhalese Race Relations* (New Delhi: MD Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1994), 122.
- ³³ Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers*, 93, 97-98.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 69-70.
- ³⁵ Cedric H. Grant and Mark R. Kirton, eds., *Governance, Conflict Analysis and Conflict Resolution* (Kingstone: Ian Randle Publishers, 2007), 276.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This research aimed at analyzing and presenting recommendations on how to enhance UPDF effectiveness in its COIN operation against the Islamist insurgents, al-Shabaab, in Somalia. This thesis examined dynamic intelligence, dominance of firepower, constricting insurgent support, good civil-military cooperation, and effective political control as significant variables to successful COIN operations. The analysis compared Somalia's COIN to the LRA and LTTE insurgencies. The five variables were the lines of efforts that most scholars recommended as the most suitable approaches which COIN forces elsewhere used to resolve insurgencies.

The analysis of the LRA and LTTE insurgencies confirmed the significance of the dynamic intelligence, dominance of firepower, constricting insurgent support, good civil-military cooperation, and effective political control as necessary tools in successful COIN operations. One exception was the lack of political control when addressing the LTTE insurgency. Nevertheless, the other four variables significantly compensated for the lack of political control during the Sri Lankan COIN operations. On the contrary, the Somalia case, which is an unresolved COIN case, showed the partial presence or absence of most of the variables.

Low access to HUMINT, poor geographical intelligence, inadequate or absent technical intelligence capabilities, and networking problems featured in the UPDF intelligence system. Inadequate assets that could not cover the wide AO, lack of air assets and a policy that limited effective fires affected the UPDF firepower. The insurgents

continued to bring in bomb-making materials unnoticed and got funds from external financiers and taxation of illegal trade to Kenya. They also conducted unchecked recruitment in ungoverned territories. Finally, al-Shabaab maintained a link with transnational extremist groups, like al-Qaeda, from where they received ideological and other external support.

The UPDF's positive civil-military cooperation set the ground for potential success, but resource constraints and poor governance in controlled areas affected the force's performance. A long period of a stateless Somalia left no service delivery infrastructures for the UPDF to tap into to enhance its civil-military operations. The Somali government lacked viable political and administrative systems as well as resources to support service delivery to the people in controlled areas. The UPDF operated in most places without an immediate political structure to support the populace. The following discussion focuses on interpretations of the previous findings and recommendations for action, as well as further studies.

Conclusions

Interpretation of Findings

The UPDF COIN operations in Somalia were relatively successful during the first eight years; however, the force reached its political-military limits as the UPDF's AO continued to expand through tactical successes. Even so, the force can still enhance its operations if its challenges are addressed. Before 2006, the Sri Lankan COIN force faced similar operational problems to that of the UPDF in Somalia; but upon increased defense spending and multiple interventions, the LTTE was defeated. The LRA dilemma

persisted in Uganda until the government raised the defense budget to acquire sufficient assets and undertook diplomatic efforts to delink the insurgents from Sudanese support.

Dynamic Intelligence

A COIN force without freedom of action and substantial control of the population and its AO cannot attain adequate HUMINT and will only register success to the extent of the intelligence it has. The UPDF will continue to operate at a disadvantage of low HUMINT and geographical intelligence because it lacks full control of the population and territory, and it lacks sufficient technical intelligence capability to cover its large geographic area. The use of aerial platforms provided COIN forces with greater acquisition and surveillance capabilities to bring firepower to bear, but limitations in Somalia resulted in a shortfall in the UPDF aerial reconnaissance. Only the US has maintained UAV coverage in Somalia, but the intelligence gathered has not benefited smaller UPDF outposts.

The low HUMINT and technical intelligence capabilities, especially night reconnaissance and aerial surveillance systems, allowed the enemy to conduct massed attacks on the UPDF positions by total surprise and cause avoidable losses. The insurgent groups will also continue to manipulate the UPDF's inadequate intelligence network to secure sophisticated explosives to use on AU bases. All the recent attacks on AU positions were initiated by vehicle bound IEDs to enable penetration into the base. The cross case study analysis indicates that the UPDF will require multiple intelligence capabilities (see Recommendations) to be successful in its COIN operations in Somalia.

Dominance of Fire Power

Extended deployments are the weakest points to the UPDF's application of firepower using its current available assets. The UPDF's dispersed fire assets make no significant effects upon the enemy. Besides, the enemy further rendered the UPDF's possible fires overmatch irrelevant by dispersing into noncontiguous areas of operations and massing force at opportune moments. Massed attacks constitute the biggest threats to the UPDF. Given the current UPDF deployment patterns and available fires assets, al-Shabaab will continue to enhance its ability to employ attrition warfare, using massed attack, to maximise effects to prolong the insurgency even if the insurgent group has no significant fires assets.

Conventional ground forces without Special Forces and air support are insufficient for COIN operations, no matter the amount of firepower they possess. From the Sri Lankan experience and the 2012 successful long-range operations of the UPDF Special Forces, the COIN force can conduct special operations to significantly disrupt and destroy al-Shabaab in the noncontiguous area of operations. However, inadequate strength of the UPDF Special Forces inhibited the tempo of the operations. Meanwhile, the timely response by airpower would nullify the dynamically dispersed enemy, provide CAS, and perform convoy escort duties but the UPDF remained nonresponsive to targets of opportunity and vulnerable to enemy ambushes because it was solely a land component. The US capabilities in Djibouti has only neutralized strategic targets and not directly supported the UPDF tactical operations.

Capabilities like rockets are significant for their demoralizing and degrading effects on insurgents. These would bridge the UPDF fires shortfalls but the COIN force either lacked them or could not use the little it had due to the limitations of a fires policy. Dependence on donations rather than a deliberate arming program for specific threats does not favor robust and deliberate response to defuse the wide range of insurgent tactics. Unfortunately, the UPDF was not able to acquire any weapons due to donor caveats. The cross case study analysis of firepower indicates that the UPDF will require a deliberate fires upgrade and acquisitions (see Recommendations) to be successful in its COIN operations in Somalia.

Constricting Insurgent Support

The cross case study analysis indicates that the most critical requirement for successful COIN operations is constricting insurgent support. The decisive points to target for the defeat of al-Shabaab are its sources of finance, recruits, and arms, such as explosives. IEDs and bombs are the weapons of choice of most terrorist groups. Unless the bomb and IED threats are neutralized, al-Shabaab will continue to use more destructive explosives in Mogadishu to show its relevance despite its degraded status. Unfortunately, on its own, the UPDF has no capacity to neutralize the threat.

Other than arms support, insurgent groups with links to other extremist groups also continue to survive because of financial support even without popular support. They can acquire civilian support, including recruits, by coercion. The UPDF had no capacity to target al-Shabaab's financial network. Only the international community and Somali government would do this. Unfortunately, international attempts to constrict money

transfers to Somalia were ineffective due to lack of nations' will, unlike the case of Sri Lanka.

Constricting the main source of al-Shabaab's internal revenue is heavily dependent on the commitment and ability of the Kenyan government to implement border control measures to restrict illegal trade from Somalia. The impact of the funds that the insurgents raise from illegal trade translates into civilian attacks in Mogadishu. Left alone, the UPDF will be unable to end al-Shabaab threat in its AOR due to its inability to constrict insurgent support. The cross case study analysis confirms the viability of concerted efforts (see Recommendations) to constrict insurgent support in order to end al-Shabaab threat in Somalia.

Civil-Military Cooperation

The cross case study analysis indicates that civil-military cooperation means little to many of the insurgents linked to terrorism. Their survival is not hinged on popular support. Therefore, winning the hearts and minds of the people is not enough for the COIN force to succeed in an extremist insurgency. However, the cases studies indicate that effective civil-military cooperation is necessary to support information collection for the COIN forces. It also establishes a foundation for future lasting peace. Nevertheless, the impact of civil-military cooperation is better felt where the COIN force has control over the population unlike in the Somali situation where al-Shabaab enmeshed into the population and intimidated the people.

Political Control

Political control is important to maintain trust in the government but it holds little weight when the population is afraid of the insurgents. Under a situation of terrorist insurgents like al-Shabaab, victory by other means over the insurgents holds first priority and political control can follow to consolidate the gains. The LTTE case was a testimony to this. The LRA also persisted despite political control until the government employed other means.

The cross case study analysis indicates that political control starts with political will and commitment by the government to prioritize building of its security forces to exert control over territory to enable other political interventions. It also shows that a local force can best resolve an insurgency due to its numerous home advantages. The challenges the Indian peacekeepers faced in Sri Lanka and the home advantage al-Shabaab enjoyed over the UPDF is evidence to this claim. A weak Somali security force will continue to exert extra pressure on the UPDF to protect its formations than it being a foundation for political control by the government.

Implications

The enhancement of the UPDF performance in Somalia will require resources; however, the Ugandan parliament endorsed the force's operation in the Horn of Africa country on a zero-budget basis. The international community remains the primary source of resourcing. Donor caveats on military expenditures continue to blunt hopes of any meaningful changes on the AU force's performance. Nevertheless, the acquisition of air assets would be possible since the 2012 AU PSC endorsed it.

The UNSC set December 2020 as the withdrawal date for AMISOM. It is not likely that the UN will invest more on AMISOM operations but rather focus on building the Somali security force. Effective 31 December 2017, AMISOM started scaling down its forces, by five percent, ahead of the official withdrawal date. This drawdown will aggravate operational disadvantages the UPDF was already facing in a wide AOR.

Recommendations for Action

1. The international community should support rapid development of the Somali security forces to bridge the challenges associated with ungoverned territories in Somalia and other home advantages that al-Shabaab has enjoyed for decades. The force is also needed to assume control of AU held territory and fill the looming security vacuum, created by the downsizing of AMISOM troop levels.

2. AU, UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), and donors should provide the COIN force with more material support to increase tactical flexibility and lethality. Needed equipment include IFVs, tanks, and artillery. Additional capabilities such as counterbattery radars, would help to further degrade al-Shabaab's capability.

3. UNSOS and donors should provide long-range day and night technical intelligence capabilities to mitigate the HUMINT and geographical intelligence gap al-Shabaab enjoys. Increased technical collection ability would enhance the UPDF's control of its close battlespace and act as early warnings to massed attacks by al-Shabaab.

4. Using the provisions of the 2012 AU PSC that endorsed the acquisition of force multipliers for the AU forces in Somalia, UNSOS and donors should provide the UPDF with air capabilities to narrow the gap of the COIN force's dispersed formations, deter massed attacks, destroy the enemy command nodes, and conduct convoy security.

5. The UPDF should substitute some of its regular force with a larger contingent of Special Forces to deny al-Shabaab freedom of action within Mogadishu and the rural territory.

6. The AU and government of Somalia should initiate a deliberate internationally coordinated intelligence operation to block external support to al-Shabaab, particularly the entry of IEDs and bomb-making materials into Somalia in order to render al-Shabaab irrelevant in the city, ensure safety of UPDF convoys, and reduce the impact of al-Shabaab attacks on AU positions.

7. The AU and government of Somalia should also initiate a deliberate internationally coordinated intelligence and diplomatic efforts to restrict money transfers to Somalia in order to narrow al-Shabaab's funding base.

8. The government of Somalia should constitute and implement a stringent monetary policy, including money-laundering measures, to limit al-Shabaab's access to foreign funding.

9. The AU, Somali government, and international community should compel Kenya to implement anti-smuggling measures in order to narrow al-Shabaab's financial base.

10. The AU, UNSOS, and donors should support the UPDF civil-military cooperation, especially the medical programs, to enable information collection to the COIN force and promote the good relationship with the local Somalis to sustain the COIN force in this foreign country.

11. The government of Somalia should initiate a deliberate move to seek international support to restore government services in AU controlled areas in order to gain popular support.

Recommendations for Further Study

The UPDF in Somalia deployed under the umbrella of AMISOM to support the Somali security forces. This research revealed that the UPDF contribution had degraded al-Shabaab, but, in 2016, it reached its limit due to shortfalls in its operational requirements when its close battlespace expanded. The UPDF's decade long performance in Somalia was partly dependent on the other AMISOM forces that it operated with and the Somali security forces that it supported. There is a necessity to conduct further research on the role of the other AMISOM contingents and the Somali security forces in enhancing the UPDF COIN operations. Another area of future study is the viability of the UNSCR 2372 in the context of the prevailing security challenges in Somalia.

Summary

This research focused on identifying measures to enhance UPDF COIN operations in Somalia. The study identified multiple factors beyond UPDF control that prevented the COIN force from defeating al-Shabaab. The interpretation of the research findings indicates potential areas of improvement in intelligence, firepower, ability to restrict physical insurgent support, civil-military cooperation, and political control.

The effects of these shortcomings became more prominent as the AMISOM force gained territory. The growing challenges resulted in renewed threats from the initially degraded al-Shabaab; however, it appears that the UPDF can still overcome these

challenges and launch further operations to defeat al-Shabaab. It should be noted that some recommendations are beyond the UPDF control. The decisive points to defeat al-Shabaab are measures that block insurgent physical support, to include arms and funds. Additional recommendations attempt to enhance the UPDF's firepower, increasing intelligence capabilities, and developing the Somali security forces. Improving civil-military cooperation and establishing political control are other secondary efforts required to create favorable conditions for operations and build a base for enduring peace in Somalia.

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