ADAPTIVE SUPPORT: A QUALITATIVE STUDY ON SUPPORTING THE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE



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This study investigates the creation of the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) and analyzes how the Army can provide effective support to the unit's mission. This is significant due to the absence of current academic research pertaining to the SFAB. The intent of this research is to identify the sustainment challenges that the SFAB may encounter and present possible solutions for the Army to overcome them. In order to understand how to provide effective support, this study explains the SFAB mission, force structure, and the operational environments where SFA forces will doctrinally be employed. A qualitative research methodology is used to analyze this data through a collective case study design. The two case studies selected for this research represent the two types of operational environments where the SFAB will be employed and uses an embedded analysis to identify the sustainment challenges in each. The end result is a comprehensive understanding of the SFAB, the sustainment challenges that the unit will encounter, and possible solutions for overcoming them.				
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ADAPTIVE SUPPORT: A QUALITATIVE STUDY ON SUPPORTING THE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE (SFAB), by Major Ricky J. McArthur, 74 pages.

This study investigates the creation of the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) and analyzes how the Army can provide effective support to the unit's mission. This is significant due to the absence of current academic research pertaining to the SFAB. The intent of this research is to identify the sustainment challenges that the SFAB may encounter and present possible solutions for the Army to overcome them. In order to understand how to provide effective support, this study explains the SFAB mission, force structure, and the operational environments where SFA forces will doctrinally be employed. A qualitative research methodology is used to analyze this data through a collective case study design. The two case studies selected for this research represent the two types of operational environments where the SFAB will be employed and uses an embedded analysis to identify the sustainment challenges in each. The end result is a comprehensive understanding of the SFAB, the sustainment challenges that the unit will encounter, and possible solutions for overcoming them.

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ACRONYMS

ASCC	Army Service Component Command		
ATP	Army Techniques Publication		
ASL	Authorized Stockage List		
BCT	Brigade Combat Team		
BSB	Brigade Support Battalion		
CATC	Combat Advisor Training Course		
CF	Conventional Forces		
CREL	Cultural, Regional Expertise and Language		
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency		
DoD	Department of Defense		
DOS	Days of Supply		
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities		
DTO	Division Transportation Officer		
FMTV	Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles		
FSF	Foreign Security Forces		
FM	Field Manual		
GCC	Geographical Combatant Command		
GSO	General Services Officer		
HEMTT	Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck		
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle		
HSC	Headquarters Support Company		
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System		

JLEnt	Joint Logistics Enterprise
JP	Joint Publication
LNO	Liaisons Officer
MATA	Military Advisor Training Academy
MBU	Modular Burner Unit
MFS	Modular Fuel System
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization & Equipment
MTRCS	Multi-Temperature Refrigerated Containerized System
MWO	Mobility Warrant Officer
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCS	Operational Contract Support
OPFUND	Operational Funds
OTERA-A	Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build, Advise/Assist, and Assess
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPO	Support Operations
SSA	Supply Support Activity
ТСМ	TRADOC Capabilities Manager
TOE	Table of Organization & Equipment
TRADOC	Training & Doctrine Command

TSC	Theater Sustainment Command		
UJTL	Universal Joint Task Lis		
USAID	United States Agency for International Development		
USARAF	United States Army Africa		
USAREUR	United States Army Europe		
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command		
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command		

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Our ad hoc approach [to SFA] had vary mix results, some good, some not so good. Most critically, by sourcing the SFA mission from the leadership of our conventional brigade combat teams . . . We removed the brigade from the ready pool for worldwide contingencies. With the world as it is today, increasingly unstable, and potentially violent, an ad hoc approach to this core mission is something that we cannot afford to do.

-General Mark A. Milley, 1st SFAB Activation Ceremony

The American people expect the military to be ready to respond to future challenges while being stewards of the resources given to them. Because of this, military leaders are constantly balancing "what they want to do" with "what they must do." The Budget Control Act of 2011 significantly reduced the force structure of the Army (U.S. Congress 2011). Leaders have to think critically in order to ensure that the Army is effectively and efficiently using its limited resources. According to the Atlantic Council, a U.S. policy think tank, "an adverse effect [of using Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) for Security Force Assistance (SFA), is that] it creates temporary makeshift organization with limited skills for this vital and complex long-term missions, and it destroys the readiness of the entire BCT by breaking it apart, making it unavailable for other combat operations" (Barno 2016, 12). In order to save resources, the Army is creating the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) to assume the responsibilities of conducting SFA operations around the globe. The SFAB is an emerging force structure model that creates a brigade specializing in training and equipping foreign security forces. The SFAB concept is one of the top priorities for the Chief of Staff of the Army (Lopez

2017). This new force structure has the potential to be a resource-saving capability for the military; however, leaders must ensure that this new organization is properly resourced to succeed at accomplishing the SFA mission.

The military continually trains to operate in uncertain environments with complex problems. One of the major challenges of creating a new organization is ensuring that it has the resources to succeed. The Army must balance each unit's resource requirements with its capabilities in order to create an effective unit capable of accomplishing its mission. The challenge is finding the balance. The unit must be able to adapt and overcome any shortfalls without hindering the mission.

The significance of this problem is immense because the military routinely operates in high risks environments with lethal consequences for guessing wrong. By properly resourcing units, military leaders can employ resources that lower the operational risks and mitigate capability shortfalls. The nature of the SFAB mission routinely puts soldiers in high-risk and isolated environments. The SFAB must be able to safely sustain operations in these types of environments.

The purpose of this study is to pinpoint the sustainment challenges that the SFAB must overcome, considering the operational environment, and identify possible solutions. In past decades, the military conducted SFA operations as ad hoc military transition teams (MiTT), and the Army is now looking for a permanent solution. This study will analyze the SFA mission, the force structure of the SFAB, and the two types of operational environments that they will operate in.

Research Question

The primary thesis question is address the sustainability of the SFAB. "How can the Army effectively support the SFAB mission?" The two subordinate questions for this thesis are: "What are the best practices for providing logistics support to the SFAB with the current force structure?" and "Is the SFAB force structure appropriate for the two types of operational environments that the SFAB will be operating in?"

Assumptions

Since the SFABs are regionally aligned forces (RAF), a major assumption is that the SFAB will eventually deploy to an immature theater that is not fully set by conventional sustainment forces (Budhias 2017). The SFAB must also be able to operate and sustain itself in this type of theater. Furthermore, the SFAB must be capable of leveraging conventional sustainment forces in a set theater of operations. This assumption is based on the operational environments that joint doctrine plans for SFA operations.

Definitions

The following is a list of terms that must be understood in order to comprehend the concepts and theoretical framework presented in this thesis:

<u>Common-User Logistics</u>. "Material or service support shared with or provided by two or more Services, Department of Defense agencies, or multinational partners to another Service, Department of Defense agency, non-Department of Defense agency, and/or multinational partner in an operation" (JCS 2013b, I-2).

<u>Conventional Forces</u>. "Forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons or forces other than designated special operations forces" (JCS 2014a, GL-7). This term is also commonly referred to as "General Purpose Forces" (GPF).

<u>Force Structure</u>. "The manpower and materiel composition, by number and type of organization, of the current, planned, or programmed Total Army tasked to perform mission in peace and war" (AWC 2015).

<u>Foreign Security Forces</u>. "All organizations and their personnel that are under governmental control with the mission of protecting a government, an organization or people from internal and/or external threats" (JCS 2013a, GL-3).

<u>Home Station Mission Command</u>. "A standardized distribution of mission command at a headquarters that enables reach-back and allow commanders to forwarddeploy capabilities into theater while others provide distant support at home station" (AUSA 2015, 4).

Integrated Logistics Support. "A composite of all the support considerations necessary to assure the effective and economic support of a system for its life cycle" (JCS 2015b, GL-8).

<u>Joint Logistics Enterprise</u>. "A multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers cooperatively engaged or structured to achieve a common purpose without jeopardizing the integrity of their own organizational mission and goals" (JCS 2013b, GL-7).

<u>Logistics Support</u>. "Support that encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support continental United States-based and worldwide deployed forces" (JCS 2013b, GL-7).

<u>Operational Environment</u>. "A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decision of the commander" (JCS 2017b, GL-13).

<u>Partner Nation</u>. "A nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation activities [including security force assistance]" (JCS 2017c, GL-5).

<u>Reach-back</u>. "The ability of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed" (JCS 2014b, GL-7). Specifically, the ability to leverage strategic level assets from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Geographical Combatant Command (GCC), or the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in order to obtain logistics support.

<u>Regionally Aligned Forces</u>. "Units assigned or allocated to combatant commands and those service-retained, combatant command-aligned forces prepared by the Army for regional missions" (Miller 2015, 1).

Security Assistance. "Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services; by grant, loan, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives" (JCS 2010, GL-11).

Security Cooperation. "All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote U.S. security interest, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nation" (JCS 2010, GL-11).

Security Force Assistance. "A Department of Defense activity that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions" (JCS 2010, GL-11).

<u>Special Operations</u>. "Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or high degree of risk" (JCS 2014a, GL-11).

<u>Special Operation Forces (SOF)</u>. "Active and Reserve Component forces of the Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations" (JCS 2014a, GL-11).

<u>Sustainment</u>. "The provision of logistics and personnel support required for maintaining and prolonging operations until successful mission accomplishment" (JCS 2017b, GL-15).

Limitations

Since the Army is rapidly developing the SFAB concept, organizational information is limited and very fluid. In addition to limited information available, the force structure is still being modified as lessons are learned from the 1st SFAB. Both the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of the Army (DA) have accessible doctrine and theory for conducting SFA operations; however, organizational doctrine specific to the SFAB is still under development.

Scope and Delimitations

This study will assess the feasibility and suitability of the SFAB to conduct its mission in two different operational environments with its current force structure. The first operational environment involves a host nation that is willing to accept a limited overt U.S. presence. The second operational environment involves a host nation that is willing to accept a large-scale U.S. presence. This study will look at resource challenges and solutions for each operational environment without discussing any tactics, techniques, or procedures (TTPs) not compatible with the SFAB mission.

Significance of the Study

This research will address possible challenges that the SFAB must overcome in order to sustain SFA operations. By analyzing the unit's force structure with historical operations, this paper will identify effective processes for supporting the SFAB in the operational environments that it will be employed in. Since the organization is still being established, this research can be used to assist future researchers in understanding the sustainment challenges that the SFAB must overcome and identify possible solutions for these challenges based on the current force structure.

Conclusion

The SFAB is a new unit designed to be a resource-saving capability. As the Army continues to develop this unit, military leaders must ensure that it is fully resourced and capable of accomplishing the SFA mission. This thesis will address how the Army can effectively support the SFAB. This will be accomplished by assessing the SFAB mission

with the unit's resource requirements and sustainment capability in the two types of operational environments that it will be will employed in.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

We must ensure the ability to deter potential enemies by denial, convincing them that they cannot accomplish objectives through the use of force or other forms of aggression. We need our allies to do the same—to modernize, acquire necessary capabilities, improve readiness, expand the size of their force, and affirm the political will to win.

> -U.S. President, 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017

The purpose of this research is to identify how the Army can effectively support the SFAB mission. The focus is on the unit's ability to be interoperable with other military units and its ability to be self-sustaining. By examining the SFAB force structure, the intent of this paper is to understand the unit's sustainment capabilities and how the Army can overcome sustainment shortfalls.

In order to understand how to support the SFAB, the theoretical framework for this chapter is divided into three different elements. These elements comprise of the SFAB mission, the force structure, and the operational environment. By evaluating the SFAB mission first, this chapter will look at the purpose of the SFAB. Next, this chapter will analyze what is known about the SFAB force structure using the Department of Defense (DoD) DOTMLPF domains (JCS 2015a, D-H). Lastly, this chapter will consider two different types of operational environments that the SFAB will be operating in. At the conclusion of this chapter, there will be enough information to conduct an analysis on how to effectively support the SFAB mission.

SFAB Mission

On order, 1st SFAB deploys in support of a Combatant Commander, integrates with foreign partner forces, assists and advises local security operations to build partner security capacity and capability, and achieve regional security in support of U.S. National interest.

-1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, Mission Statement

The SFAB provides an increase in capabilities that enhance the military's ability to respond to emerging threats. These capabilities can be narrowed down into two mission sets. The primary mission of the SFAB is to provide a conventional force able to conduct SFA operations globally. The secondary mission of the SFAB is to be able to rapidly expand into a Brigade Combat Team in times of a national crisis. Both of these mission sets affect how the unit is organized and how it conducts operations.

The primary mission of the SFAB is to conduct SFA operations. The importance of this mission is highlighted in the National Security Strategy that calls for the U.S. Government to build the capabilities of its allies in order to deter and defeat enemy threats (U.S. President 2017). The Army defines SFA as the development of the capacity and capability of a Foreign Security Force (FSF) of a host nation (HQDA 2013d, 1-10). There are six tasks associated with SFA. Those tasks are to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, advise/assist, and assess (OTERA-A) (4-3). The Army further arranges these tasks into three simple SFA building blocks (see figure 1): "Do it for them," "Do it together," and "They do it" (4-4). These building blocks summarize the process for developing FSF. To accomplish these tasks, the military must select advisors that are subject matter experts and specially trained to conduct SFA operations (JCS 2017c, II-8). Additionally, military advisors have to possess the sociocultural understanding, language skills, and the maturity to relate effectively to their FSF partners (II-8). The SFAB is the Army's solution for creating professional force permanently dedicated and proficient at conducting SFA operations.



Figure 1. Building Blocks of Security Force Assistance

Source: HQDA 2013.

The secondary mission of the SFAB is to rapidly expand into a brigade combat team during a time of national crisis. According to the Atlantic Council, U.S. Policies create future challenges that may require the rapid reconstitution of BCTs in times of war (Barno 2016, 24). It is the Army's Title 10 responsibility to be prepared to meet this challenge and grow as required. During the Activation Ceremony of the 1st SFAB, General Milley acknowledged that the SFAB is designed to rapidly transform into a BCT during times of national crisis (Milley 2018). It is projected to take approximately 30 months to build and train BCT (Pitts 2017, 97). The Atlantic Counsel suggests that an SFAB should be able to produce fully trained infantry battalions within 12 months if the unit is properly manned with experienced cadre (Barno 2016, 21). As of November 2017, all SFAB volunteers must be branch qualified in their current pay grade (TRADOC Capabilities Manager SFAB 2018). This requirement ensures that the SFAB is manned by an experienced cadre. Although the rapid expansion of the SFAB into a BCT is a secondary mission, it's important to understand this mission because of the constraints that it will have on the brigade's force structure.

The SFAB provides enhanced capabilities to the military. For the first time, the U.S. Army has a permanent force dedicated to conducting SFA operations. Additionally, the SFAB provides a unique capability for the military to rapidly build BCTs during times of national crisis. Both of these missions affect how the SFAB is designed and how the unit is employed.

Force Structure

As the Army builds SFABs, it must analyze the manpower and materials required to provide these new capabilities. The DoD has a complex Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) used for identifying capability gaps and finding efficient resource solutions (JCS 2015a, 1). By understanding current military doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) of the SFAB, the DoD can identify the requirements needed to fill these gaps (JCS 2015a, C-3-5). This is important to understand in order to determine how to effectively support the SFAB.

Doctrine

The U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is in the process of

creating a draft Army Techniques Publication (ATP) on how to employ the SFAB. Current Army and Joint Doctrine do not include the SFAB capabilities or force structure into their planning considerations. However, current doctrine does provide guidelines on how SFA qualified forces should be employed. Additionally, current doctrine provides planning guidance and methods for supporting SFA operations.

When employing SFA forces, there are three types of operational environments that must be considered. The first is a politically sensitive environment where a visible U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host nation government (JCS 2017c, B-12). The employment of SFA forces in this environment is typically tasked to Special Operation Forces (SOF) due to their specialized training (B-12). The second is an environment where the host nation government is willing to accept a limited overt U.S. presence (B-12). The employment of SFA forces in this environment can be Conventional Forces (CF), Special Operations Forces (SOF), or a combination of the two (B-12). The third is an environment where the host nation government accepts a large-scale US presence if necessary (B-12). Since the SFAB is a CF, it can be expected that the unit will be employed in an environment with either a limited or large-scale U.S. presence.

Supporting SFA operations will vary, depending on the operational environment of the host nation. Commanders have to balance personnel limitations in the host nation with the mission and the residual risk associated with relying on external support (JCS 2017c, B-13).Army Doctrine provides three methods for leveraging support: host nation, multinational, and reach-back. Host Nation Support relies on formal agreements with the host nation and is limited to the sustainment capabilities of that nation (HQDA 2013d, 3-16). The benefit of the leveraging host nation support is that it reduces the strategic lift required to support an operation. Multi-National Support relies on one or more partner nations to provide common-user logistic support or limited support (3-17). This method is limited to the partner nations' capacity to provide external support and their interoperability with the supported nations. Strategic Reach-back utilizes strategic sustainment capabilities and global distribution systems to extend operational reach (3-17). Additionally, this method requires the military to set the theater by establishing a formal reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) processes (3-17). The availability of logistic personnel and strategic assets may reduce the feasibility of this support method.

The Army is not limited to using only one of these methods. Multiple methods can be used to support an operation. However, logistics planners must consider that the military tends to rely on support contracts when there is not a large-scale US presence (HQDA 2013d, 3-18). Since the SFAB will operate in a variety of operational environments, it must be capable of leveraging each of these support methods as needed.

It is important to understand current Army and Joint doctrine in order to understand how the military plans to support the SFA mission. According to doctrine, the SFAB must be able to operate in a limited overt or large-scale military presence operational environment. Additionally, the unit must also be capable of leveraging host nation, multi-national and strategic reach-back support as required.

Organization

Understanding the capabilities and relations of each component assigned to the SFAB is key to understanding how to support the SFAB. There are three key components that have to be understood. Those components are the SFAB command structure from the brigade to company level, the types of advisor teams, and the structure of the brigade support battalion (BSB).

The SFAB is designed to provide mission command while simultaneously performing advisory roles at each level of the command. According to the January 2018 MTOE, the SFAB command structure is similar to a BCT with major changes at the company level and below (HQDA 2018). The unit is divided into six battalions and one brigade headquarters company (see figure 2). In addition to commanding the battalions, the brigade headquarters is capable of providing two senior-level advisor teams. Distinctive from a BCT, the SFAB headquarters is authorized a permanent rear detachment that can provide continuous home station mission command for the entire brigade. Each battalion commands between one to five companies and is capable of producing a senior level advisor team. The companies assigned to the SFAB can be categorized into three types: headquarters, advisors, and direct support companies (HQDA 2018). Headquarters and direct support companies facilitate mission command and support operations. The advisor companies are designed to advise FSF while commanding two to three subordinate advisor teams. Under this structure, the SFAB is organized similarly to a BCT and capable of simultaneously advising FSF at each level.



Figure 2. Security Force Assistance Brigade

Source: Analysis of the SFAB MTOE 2018.

At the company level and below, there are three types of advisor teams. Those teams are *Maneuver Teams*, *Maneuver Support Teams*, and *Fires Teams* (see figure 3). The first, second, and third SFAB battalions are capable of providing 12 maneuver teams each (HQDA 2018). These teams are made up of 12 advisors that provide a diverse advisory capability (HQDA 2018). The teams are primarily led by maneuver advisors but also include enabling advisors that specialize in explosive ordinance disposal, fires, intelligence, logistics, maintenance, medical, and signal operations. The fourth SFAB battalion is capable of providing six fires teams. These teams consist of four artillery advisors that specialize in advising joint fires operations. The fifth SFAB battalion is

capable of providing six maneuver support teams. These teams consist of four combat engineers that specialize in advising maneuver support operations. The SFAB is capable of providing 36 maneuver teams, 6 maneuver support teams, and 6 fires teams, totaling 48 company level and below advisor teams.



Figure 3. SFAB Advisor Teams

Source: Analysis of the 2nd SFAB MTOE 2018.

The sixth SFAB battalion is the BSB. The battalion headquarters consist of the S1, S2, S3, S4, S6, and the Support Operations (SPO) staff sections. Compared to BCT, the SFAB BSB has fewer personnel authorizations in each staff section. The battalion's

organizational structure differs from the BCT in that it commands only one company, the Headquarters Support Company (HSC) (see figure 4). The HSC consists of a medical, distribution, maintenance, and field fielding sections. The primary role of the BSB is to provide direct support to the SFAB. The MTOE is not structured to have a permanent advisor teams; however, the unit is designed to rapidly generate an ad hoc logistics advisor team if needed. This is possible by pulling 11 trained advisors from the BSB command group, battalion staff, distribution, maintenance, and medical sections in order to create a logistics advisor team. Due to the limited number of personnel authorizations, these advisors are still responsible for accomplishing their primary support role.



Figure 4. Headquarter Support Company (HSC), 6th Battalion (SFAB) Source: Analysis of the 2nd SFAB MTOE 2018.

The three key components of the SFAB are the command structure from the brigade to company level, the types of advisor teams, and the structure of the BSB. It is important to understand the capabilities and relations of each element in order to understand how to effectively support the SFAB. This can be achieved by synchronizing each element in order to create a unity of effort that accomplishes the mission.

Training

The SFAB is required to maintain proficiency in two different training focus areas. The first area is the Army's standardized Mission Essential Task List (METL) requirements, while the second area is the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) requirements. The SFAB must be proficient in both focus areas in order to be successful at their mission.

The Department of the Army publishes a standardized METL for all units with a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). The METL is comprised of several Mission Essential Tasks (METs) that an organization must train on in order to accomplish their assigned mission or to be proficient at a designated capability (HQDA 2016, 1-8). Below is an example of six METs that the SFAB must be proficient at in order to succeed at conducting SFA operations (see table 1). According to Army doctrine, the "commander provides top-down guidance in training focuses, directions, and resources, while subordinate leaders provide feedback on unit [MET] task proficiency, identify needed training resources, and execute training to standard" (1-3). The degree unto which a commander trains on each MET will depend on the commander's priorities and the feedback that they receive from subordinate commanders. By training the SFAB to the Army's standardized METL, the SFAB is able to ensure that the unit remains proficient at accomplishing its assigned mission and provide the military with SFA capabilities.

SFAB METL - SAMPLE
Organize Foreign Security Forces (71-BDE-7361)
Train Foreign Security Forces (71-BDE-7362)
Advise Foreign Security Forces (71-BDE-7365)
Support Foreign Security Forces Operations (71-BDE-1076)
Conduct Partnered Area Security Operations (07-BDE-1077)
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations (BDE) (55-BDE-4800)

 Table 1.
 Sample SFAB Mission Essential Task List

Source: Data from the Army Training Network standardized METL tool.

In 2012, the U.S. Army introduced the RAF concept, which aligns Army units with Geographical Combatant Commands (GCC) (McLivaine 2012). Under RAF, the Army provides a tailored force that is familiar with the operational environment inside of the GCC's Area of Responsibility (AOR) (Miller 2015, 1). To ensure this, the GCC standardizes regional training requirements by publishing the Cultural, Regional Expertise and Language (CREL) standards (CAC 2015b, 17). These standards ensure that units assigned to the GCC are prepared to conduct operations throughout the AOR. Furthermore, it is important for RAF units to understand these standards because of the adverse effect that they may have on a unit's ability to sustain itself (Miller 2015, 77). For example, a religious holiday could momentarily delay host national support that is needed for an operation. This makes it essential for RAF units to understand CREL and to master basic expeditionary skills in order to overcome any undefined sustainment challenges that they may face (77). Since each SFAB is regionally aligned, they must

incorporate the GCC directed CREL and RAF requirements into their training plans in order to succeed in the environment that they will be advising in.

The SFAB must maintain its proficiency in both the METL and RAF training requirements in order to succeed at conducting SFA operations. The commanders will assess and improve their unit's ability to accomplish their mission by training to the Army's standardized METL. Additionally, by training on RAF requirements, the SFAB will be prepared to advise in their aligned AOR.

Material

Having the proper material solutions correlates directly with a unit's ability to accomplish their mission. In determining how to support a unit, there are two questions that must be answered. First, "What does the unit need in order to accomplish the mission?" Second, "What sustainment capabilities are available to support those requirements?" By answering these two questions, there will be enough information to determine the unit's resource requirements, sustainment capability and develop a plan to mitigate shortfalls. The SFAB is intended to be expeditionary and have the capability to tactically sustain itself with all of its assigned equipment. The unit's sustainment requirements can be determined by calculating the assigned personnel and equipment with their estimated consumption rates. According to the 2nd SFAB MTOE, the unit is authorized 816 personnel, 227 vehicles, and 26 generators. If each Soldier in the SFAB consumes three meals a day, the SFAB will require 2,448 meal servings per day. Under hot and arid conditions, the unit is estimated to consume 5,934 gallons of potable water each day (see table 2). Fuel consumption will vary, depending on the operational tempo. Under continuous operations, the SFAB is estimated to consume 368 gallons per day

from their supporting generators (see table 3). To support field feeding, the SFAB is estimated to consume 184 Gallons of fuel per day with only 16 hours of burner use (see table 4). Vehicle fuel consumption will have the greatest variance, depending on the operational tempo. To fill every vehicle to maximum capacity, the SFAB will require an estimated 8,221 gallons of fuel (see table 5). Assuming that—during a high tempo operation— each vehicle consumes at least one fuel tank a day, the SFAB will consume an estimated 8,773 gallons of fuel per day. If the SFAB drives their vehicles for only two hours a day and leave their vehicles idling for two hours a day, the brigade is expected to consume up to 3,138 gallons of fuel per day. By knowing the SFAB sustainment requirements, logistics planners can project and coordinate the sustainment support required to maintain operations.

BULK WATER	NUMBER ASSIGNED	GALLONS PER PERSON/ PER DAY	TOTAL GALLONS PER DAY
Universal Unit Level	816	3.45	2,816
Meal Preparation	816	1.75	1,428
Hygiene	816	2.07	1,690
DAILY WATER CONSUMPTION:			5,934

Table 2. SFAB Water Consumption

* Note: Planning factors are for a Hot-Arid Climate.

Source: Analysis of the 2nd SFAB MTOE 2018, HQDA 2015b, ATP 3-34, and HQDA 2015d, Appendix A.

GENERATOR VARIANTS	NUMBER ASSIGNED	AVERAGE GALLONS PER DAY	TOTAL GALLONS
GEN 30 Kw	1	46	46
GEN 18 Kw	7	30	246
GEN 10 Kw	9	18	162
GEN 5 Kw	7	10	70
GEN 3 Kw	1	6	6
DAILY GENERATOR FUEL CONSUMPTION:			368

Table 3.SFAB Generator Fuel Consumption

Source: Analysis of the 2nd SFAB MTOE 2018 and Technical Manual associated with each Generator.

EQUIPMENT VARIANTS	NUMBER ASSIGNED	AVERAGE GALLONS PER DAY	TOTAL GALLONS
Assault Kitchen*	4 (8 Burners)	64	64
Containerized Kitchen*	2 (8 Burners)	64	64
MRTCS	1	24	24
Food Sanitation Center*	2 (6 Burners)	48	48
DAILY FIELD FEEDING CONSUMPTION:			184

 Table 4.
 SFAB Field Feeding Fuel Consumption

* Note: Planning factors of 16 Hours of Airtronic or Modular Burner Unit (MBU) use. Planning factors do not include supporting generators.

Source: Analysis of the 2nd SFAB MTOE 2018 and Technical Manual associated with each equipment.

VEHICLE VARIANTS	NUMBER ASSIGNED	AVERAGE GALLONS PER TANK	TOTAL GALLONS
HMMWV	180	25	4,500
FMTV	36	56	2,016
HEMTT	11	155	1,705
VEHICLE FUEL CONSUMPTION:			8,221

Table 5.SFAB Vehicle Fuel Consumption

Source: Analysis of the 2nd SFAB MTOE 2018 and the CASCOM Class III Bulk Estimation Tool.

The SFAB is capable of sustaining itself for a short duration. Depending on the type of rations being issued, the BSB can provide between 2,200 to 2,600 servings each meal (see table 6). The BSB has one Multi-Temperature Refrigerated Containerized
System (MTRCS) that is doctrinally designed to store three days' worth of refrigerated rations in support of 800 personnel (HQDA 2015b, 2-53). Spread out across the unit, the SFAB is capable of storing up to 15,200 gallons of potable water (see table 7). 6,400 gallons are stored at the company level across the brigade, while 8,800 gallons are stored in the BSB distribution section. The distribution section is also capable of storing and distributing up to 10,000 gallons of fuel (see table 8). In addition to its fuel-storing capabilities, the distribution section can move up to 10 flat-racks in a single lift with its five Load Handing Systems (LHS) Trucks and five LHS trailers. The medical section in the BSB can provide enhanced Role I that is nearly commensurate with Role II medical support. The Army defines Role II medical care as basic treatment and advanced trauma management capable of delivering packed blood, with limited x-ray, clinical laboratory, dental support, combat and operational stress control, and preventative medicine (HQDA 2013c, 19). The medical section in the BSB has all of these medical capabilities, with the exception of dental support and combat and operational stress control. The section also does not have a patient holding capability. Furthermore, every maneuver advisor team and battalion headquarters have combat medic assigned to them in order to provide medical care. This gives the SFAB an adequate medical capability. The BSB maintenance section is capable of providing field maintenance support to the entire brigade. This section has the tool kits to support a variety of electronics, vehicles, and weapon systems. This section also has three HEMTT wreckers that are capable of recovering any vehicle assigned to the SFAB. Furthermore, each advisor team has a senior mechanic with a general mechanics tool kit that can provide direct field maintenance support. All of these capabilities allow for the SFAB to independently

sustain itself for two to three days, depending on the operational tempo and actual consumption rates.

KITCHEN VARIANTS	NUMBER ASSIGNED	SERVINGS PER MEALS PER KITCHEN	TOTAL SERVINGS PER MEALS
Containerized Kitchen	2	800 x (UGR-A)	1,600 (UGR-A)
Assault Kitchen	4	150 x (UGR-A) Or 250 x (UGR-H&S)	600 (UGR-A) Or 1,000 (UGR-H&S)
TOTAL FIELD FEEDING CAPABILITY:			2,200 (UGR-A) Or 1,600 (UGR-A) & 1,000 (UGR-H&S)

Table 6.	SFAB	Field	Feeding	Capabilit	y
			<i>L</i>)		~

Source: Analysis of the 2nd SFAB MTOE 2018 and planning factors from HQDA 2015d, 5-11, 5-24.

WATER STORAGE	NUMBER ASSIGNED	WATER STORAGE PER TANK	TOTAL WATER STORGE
CAMEL II	1	800	800
HIPPO	4	2,000	8,000
BUFFALO	16	400	6,400
TOTAL WATER STORAGE CAPABILITY:			15,200

 Table 7.
 SFAB Water Storage Capability

Source: Analysis of the 2nd SFAB MTOE 2018 and planning factors from HQDA 2015d, Chapter 5.

TANKER VARIANTS	NUMBER ASSIGNED	STORAGE GALLONS EACH	TOTAL FUEL STORAGE
TANKER M978	1	2,500	2,500
MFS	3	2,500	7,500
TOTAL FUEL STORAGE CAPABILITY:			10,000

 Table 8.
 SFAB Fuel Storage Capability

Source: Analysis of the 2nd SFAB MTOE 2018 and planning factors from HQDA 2015c, Appendix N.

Having the proper material solutions is critical for the SFAB to conduct its mission. By knowing the unit's resource requirements, the Army logistician can use existing capabilities to fill those needs. As the SFAB is now structured, it can conduct independent short-term operations or continuous operations with uninterrupted external support.

Leadership and Education

In 2017, the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, took on the responsibility for professionally developing the Army's SFA advisors. This is achieved through a standardized professional military education program. Soldiers selected to be advisors in the SFAB must attend the Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA) and complete the Combat Advisor Training Course (CATC) (MATA 2018). Upon completing the month-long CATC, these advisors are sent to a variety of advanced training courses to enhance their individual skills (MATA 2018). For the foreseeable future, the Maneuver Center of Excellence will continue to train future SFA advisors through a standardized professional military education program.

Personnel

Finding qualified personnel is a challenge for any organization. According to Colonel Scott Jackson, the 1st SFAB Commander, "the right people [for the SFAB] are the most mature people . . . [who] have all done their job before" (Dickstein 2018). The Army requires all SFAB candidates to volunteer for SFAB duty and complete an assessment process (Johnson 2017). After being selected and trained, the Army manages SFAB advisors by assigning them skill identifiers. Enlisted soldiers that complete the CATC receive the skill qualification identifier "3," while officers that complete the course receive an additional skill identifier "S9" (HQDA 2017, Ch. 4). In order to incentivize recruitment and the retention of personnel, the Army offers a \$5,000 bonus to enlisted soldiers and has created a special promotions category that accelerates junior enlisted promotion rates (Johnson 2017). By being selective and incentivizing retention, the Army is ensuring that the right personnel are being assigned to the SFAB.

Facilities

The facility requirements for the SFAB are still being developed as the SFAB concept matures. Currently, the Army is geography dispersing the six SFAB across multiple military installations. The 1st SFAB was activated at Fort Benning, Georgia, on 8 February 2018, while the 2nd SFAB is projected to be activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (Ophardt 2017). The Army is still deciding the locations for the remaining SFABs. The facility requirements will remain fluid until the SFAB concept is mature and the Army solidifies the SFAB force structure.

Operational Environment

As stated earlier in this chapter, joint doctrine identifies two types of operational environments in which the United States will employ conventional forces to conduct SFA operations. Those environments involve a host nation that is willing to accept either a limited overt U.S. presence or a large-scale U.S. presence. In order to comprehend these types of operational environments, there are two recent military operations that will be studied.

Operation United Assistance (OUA) is an example of an operational environment in which the host nation permits a limited overt U.S. presence in the country. In the fall of 2014, West Africa experienced an Ebola outbreak in Liberia. The GCC, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), directed the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) to support the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in containing the spread of the Ebola virus (CAC 2016, 1). USARAF's force structure was incapable of deploying a forward command post in support of contingency operations, and the command had no subordinate forces assigned to it (10). The DoD decided to deploy the 101st Airborne Division headquarters to serve as the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters for the operation. (41). The 101st Airborne Division had a support relationship to USAID, which was the lead agency for the operation (2). Liberia is a politically permissive environment that required the U.S military to request permissions in order to maneuver around the country or occupy land (6). The JTF relied heavily on the U.S. Embassy's General Services Officer (GSO) to leverage host nation logistics support in order to set the theater (7). Liberia has an immature infrastructure that hindered the JTF's size and ability to sustain daily requirements (11). Additionally, the country's infrastructure does not have

any medical centers that can operate to western standards, and the average medical evacuations normally took between 48 to 96 hours (9). The majority of Liberian vendors would not accept electronic-funds, requiring USARAF to employ trained teams to serve as field ordering officers and pay agents. This required the JTF to manage and distribute operational funds (OPFUND) throughout the theater. The JTF continued to support USAID until May 2015 when the DoD terminated the operation. Operation United Assistance is a textbook example of an operational environment that required U.S. forces to operate with a limited overt presence.

Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) is an example of the operational environment in which multiple host nations permitted a large-scale presence of a U.S. led coalition in their countries in order to conduct operations. OAR was established in 2014 to enhance security cooperation throughout Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partner nations (CAC 2017a, 17). This was in response to the 2014 conflict in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatist (6). The operation consists of deploying U.S. forces into European theater and conducting multiple combined exercises with partner nations (17-18). The intent of the operation was to improve NATO's interoperability and to deter potential adversaries (12). The U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) maintains a constant presence throughout Europe to ensure that the theater remains set. "A theater is considered set when it has the necessary forces, footprints, and agreements in place to support regional operations and missions" (11). The maturity of the existing infrastructure provides the U.S. with both reliable and flexible sustainment options (3). OAR continues to this day and is an example of an operational environment in which the host nations permit a large U.S. presence.

OUA and OAR are both examples of the two types of operational environments that the SFAB is doctrinally expected to operate in. OUA demonstrates an operational environment that permits only a limited U.S. presence, while OAR demonstrates an operational environment that permits a large U.S. presence.

Chapter Summary

There are three elements of the SFAB that must be understood in order to determine how to effectively support the SFAB. The mission governs what the SFAB must do. The force structure defines what the SFAB is capable of doing. The operational environment demonstrates the challenges that the SFAB will have to overcome in order to succeed. By analyzing these three elements, this paper will be able to answer the question, "How can the Army most effectively support the SFAB mission?"

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To answer the primary and subordinate research questions, this thesis will use a qualitative research methodology with a case study design. The purpose of this research is to identify how the Army can effectively support the SFAB mission. This particular problem needs to be studied because current military doctrine does not adequately incorporate the SFAB concept, nor does it capture the complexity of the sustainment challenges that the SFAB will encounter. In order to understand the research methodology, this chapter will explain the rationale for selecting a qualitative methodology, describe the case study research design and clarify how the data will be analyzed.

Methodology

The research methodology selected for this thesis is a qualitative inquiry. Qualitative research can be defined as "an inquiry process of understanding based on a distinct methodology that explores a social or human problem" (Creswell 2007, 249). The intent of this thesis is to understand the complexity of the SFAB and explore the most effective methods for supporting the mission. This problem is social in nature because it involves the support relations between the SFAB and the Army. Furthermore, qualitative research is conducted because a problem needs to be explored and the existing theories do not adequately capture the complexity of the problem that is being examined (39–40). This type of methodology suits this problem because of the lack of relevant research available regarding the SFAB and the complexity of the mission requirements. This research will provide a holistic view of what the SFAB is and how capable it is in sustaining itself in different operational environments.

Research Design

The research design for this methodology is a case study. This design is appropriate since a qualitative inquiry tends to collect data from the natural environment of the problem (Creswell 2007, 37). There are two types of environments that the SFAB will be doctrinally employed. This thesis will use a collective case study model that comprises two cases that illustrate the sustainment challenges the SFAB will encounter in each environment (74). The case studies will be organized with an embedded rhetorical structure, meaning that a broad picture of the case study will be presented, followed by a narrow picture in order to focus on the issues being analyzed (197). The intent of this structure is to illustrate issues that SFAB is susceptible to and prevent the distraction of irrelevant issues.

Embedded Analysis

The data from each case study will be examined by conducting an embedded analysis. An embedded analysis is a method that analyzes data by focusing on a few key analytic aspects of each case (Creswell 2007, 75). The key aspects in which this research is focused are the relationships between the SFAB force structure and the operational environment. Of the seven DOTMLPF domains, there are three being analyzed with the case studies (see table 9). Those sections are doctrine, organization, and materiel.

Doctrine is "the fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in a coordinated action toward a common objective" (JCS 2015a, C-3).

The aspects that will be analyzed in this section are: "Does doctrine support the employment of the SFAB to the operational environment?" and "Would the SFAB be able to sustain operations in the operational environment utilizing one or more of the doctrinal support methods?" These questions need to be answered in order to understand if the current Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) is institutionalized to integrate and fulfill the SFAB requirements.

Organization is the structure of a unit that enables the unit to coordinate with subordinate units and other elements to cooperate systematically towards accomplishing a mission (JCS 2015a, C-4). The aspects that will be analyzed in this section are: "Does the structure allow the subordinates in the brigade to cooperate systematically towards accomplishing the mission in the operational environment?" and "Does the structure allow for the brigade to cooperate systematically with external military forces in the operational environment?" These questions need to be answered in order to understand if the SFAB is able to communicate requirements and effectively operate with other military units in the operational environment.

Materiel encompasses all the items necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military operations (JCS 2015a, C-4). The aspects that will be analyzed in this section are: "Does the SFAB have the capabilities to sustain itself in the operational environment?" and "Is the SFAB capable of leveraging external support in the operational environment?" These questions need to be answered in order to understand the external resources that the Army must commit to supporting SFAB operations.

DOTMLPF EVALUATION				
<u>Section</u>	Definition	Relationship to OE		
Doctrine *	The employment of U.S. military	• Does doctrine support the employment of the SFAB to the OE?		
	forces in a coordinated action toward a common objective.	• Would the SFAB be able to sustain operations in the OE utilizing one or more of the doctrinal support methods?		
Organization *	A structure through which	• Does the structure allow the brigade to cooperate systematically towards accomplishing the mission in the OE?		
	to accomplish a common mission.	• Does the structure allow for the brigade to cooperate systematically with external military forces in the OE?		
Training	Training using doctrine to prepare forces to respond to operational or tactical requirements, considered necessary by the commander, to execute their assigned missions.	• Do the training requirements prepare the SFAB to operate in the OE?		
Materiel *	All items necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support	• Does the SFAB have the capabilities to sustain itself in the OE?		
	military operations.	• Is the SFAB capable of leveraging external support in the OE?		
Leadership	Professional development of the individual learning continuum that	• Does the professional development framework prepare advisor teams to		
Education	comprises training, experience, education, and self-improvement.	operate in the OE?		
Personnel	The personnel component primarily ensures that qualified personnel exist to support capability requirements.	• Does the SFAB have qualified personnel to sustain SFA operations?		
Facilities	Real property of primary importance for the support of military operations.	• Does the SFAB have the required facilities to sustain SFA operations?		

Table 9.DOTMLPF Evaluation

* Sections being analyzed in Chapter 4.

Source: DOTMLPF definitions from JCS 2015a, Enclosure C, 3–5.

The Training, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities sections will not be used to analyze the case studies. This is due to the numerous variables outside of the case studies that cannot be logically narrowed down to answer the problem. For example, the SFAB training requirements depend on the commander's priorities and assessment of the unit. During a deployment to Africa, the SFAB could experience a multiple sustainment issues related to the unit's pre-deployment training. During a second deployment to Africa, the same SFAB under a different commander, could experience a completely different set of sustainment issues related to the unit's pre-deployment training. Since training standards can change significantly based only on the commander's priorities, this DOTMLPF domain is not appropriate for this study. The focus of this thesis is "How can the <u>Army</u> effectively support the SFAB mission?" and not the effectiveness of each commander's training requirements. By using an embedded analysis and narrowing the key aspects to doctrine, organization, and materiel, this thesis will develop a better understanding the problem

EVALUATION MATRIX				
<u>Section</u>	Analytic Aspects	<u>Analysis Summary</u>	<u>Rating</u>	
Doctrine #1	Does doctrine support the employment of the SFAB to the OE?			
Doctrine #2	Would the SFAB be able to sustain operations in the OE utilizing one or more of the doctrinal support methods?			
Organization #1	Does the structure allow the brigade to cooperate systematically towards accomplishing the mission in the OE?			
Organization #2	Does the structure allow for the brigade to cooperate systematically with external military forces in the OE?			
Materiel #1	Does the SFAB have the capabilities to sustain itself in the OE?			
Materiel #2	Is the SFAB capable of leveraging external support in the OE?			

Table 10.Evaluation Matrix Template

Source: Created by author.

During the analysis, an evaluation matrix will be used to demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the SFAB in each operational environment (see table 10). A brief analysis summary, followed by a rating, will be given to each aspect in order to understand the significance of the problem and the impact on the mission. There are three possible ratings that will be given, and these are:

Green – Little to no impact on the SFAB mission.

Amber – Reduction in the SFAB's ability to effectively accomplish the mission.

Red – Significant impacts preventing the SFAB from accomplishing the mission.

From this analysis, the data will show the various aspects of the SFAB that need to be

improved in order to effectively support the SFAB mission.

Chapter Summary

By using a qualitative methodology, this thesis will be able to overcome the information gaps pertaining to the SFAB and answer the question, "How can the Army effectively support the SFAB mission?" This will be accomplished through a collective case study design with an embedded rhetorical structure and examining the data through an embedded analysis. By using the overview of the two operational environments presented in the literature review, the next chapter will provide a narrow description of each case, outlining the sustainment challenges and conducting an analysis of the SFAB's ability to overcome them. The end result will be an understanding of aspects that the Army will have to mitigate in order to effectively support the SFAB mission.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this research is to discover how the Army can effectively support the SFAB mission. This is achieved by understanding the SFAB mission, the SFAB force structure, and the operational environments in which the SFAB will be employed. By conducting an embedded analysis, this chapter will compare two case studies of the operational environment with the SFAB force structure. To methodically analyze the data, this chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section is a narrowed examination of the two operational environments presented in Chapter 2. The intent is to highlight the major sustainment challenges that the military units will encounter in each environment. The second section will analyze the data by comparing the sustainment challenges identified in the operational environment with the SFAB force structure and determine the SFAB's capability to overcome those challenges. The end result will be a comprehensive understanding of the SFAB and aspects of the force structure that the Army needs to address in order to effectively support the mission.

Case Study

Operation United Assistance (OUA) and Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) are two examples of operational environments that the SFAB can doctrinally be employed to. OUA represents an environment in which the host nation is only willing to accept a limited overt U.S. presence. OAR represents an environment in which a host nation is willing to accept a large U.S. presence. This section will present a narrowed examination of each case study in order to illustrate the sustainment challenges in each environment.

Operation United Assistance (OUA)

The 101st Airborne Division (ABD) encountered numerous sustainment challenges during OUA in Liberia. The major sustainment challenges are linked to the initial setting of the theater-meaning the initial theater opening, RSOI, and common user logistics. Doctrinally, the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) is responsible for planning and setting up the theater for Army Service Component Command (ASCC) in support of a Ground Component Commander (GCC) (HQDA 2013b, 1-1). USARAF, the ASCC for USAFRICOM, did not have a TSC assigned to the command that could plan and coordinate sustainment operations (CAC 2016, 14). This gap in doctrinal sustainment mission command resulted in the 101st ABD Sustainment Brigade and the Division G4 coordinating directly with strategic level organizations to leverage reach-back capabilities (14). Those organizations included the Army Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) (15). To mitigate this planning and coordination gap, the 101st ABD embedded 24 liaison officers (LNO) across USAFRICOM, USARAF, the U.S. Embassy, the Government of Liberia, and the United Nations (29). Traditionally, setting the theater requires the employment of logistics units to conduct sustainment operations; however, this was not possible due to the limited number of logistics units capable of rapidly deploying in the required timeframe (4). To mitigate this shortfall, the 101st ABD leverage the U.S. Embassy general services officer (GSO) in Liberia to set the theater (7). The GSO coordinated between the DoD and host national logistics assets to mitigate the Army's capability shortfalls (7). Additionally, operational contract support (OCS) became key in reducing the logistical lines of communications, enabling troops to procure goods and services

locally (17). By adapting to the operational environment, the 101st ABD was able to overcome these challenges through the employment of LNOs, leveraging GSO support, and utilizing OCS.

Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR)

Units participating in OAR encounter a completely different set of sustainment challenges than OUA. USAREUR has the 21st TSC assigned to the command and is capable of assisting in sustainment planning and coordination in order to continually set the theater (CAC 2017a, 64). Additionally, OAR utilized RAF for combat power; this means units were constantly training for and rotating into the theater (10). In 2017, the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (3/4 ABCT) was selected to deploy as a RAF unit supporting OAR. During the 3/4 ABCT rotation, they encountered numerous sustainment challenges. Communicating their requirements early was critical because the 16th Sustainment Brigade needed at least 30 days to process diplomatic clearances for convoy crossing international borders (65-66). In order to prevent in-transit issues, deploying units must provide accurate equipment data generated by the Unit Movement Officers (UMO) and Mobility Warrant Officer (MWO) (CAC 2017b, 14). The distribution network for OAR passes through multiple international borders and utilizes various modes of transportation; wrong equipment data could result in untimely delays (14). Additionally, the anticipation of supply requirements was also important because the supply support activity (SSA) maintained a limited authorized stockage list (ASL) that is built from historical supply demand. During the 3/4 ABCT rotation, the brigade faced Class IX repair part shortages because the SSA did not have the historical data or posture to support an armor brigade (CAC 2017a, 66). This resulted in long wait times, as

supply request were being pushed back to the continental U.S. (66). 3/4 ABCT eventually overcame these issues and successfully completed its RAF rotation. Key lessons from the 3/4 ABCT rotation are: to integrate with the sustainment units early, provide accurate equipment data, and anticipate support requirements.

Summary

OUA and OAR are both examples of the operational environments in which the SFAB is expected to be employed. OUA demonstrates an environment with a limited overt U.S. presence. Units in this environment faced challenges of setting the theater in order to conduct military operations. While OAR demonstrates an environment with a large U.S. presence, units in this environment faced challenges in integrating with the theater sustainment assets. This examination of the case studies illustrates the challenges that the SFAB must overcome in each operational environment in order to succeed.

Embedded Analysis

This section will analyze the data by comparing the sustainment challenges identified in each operational environment with the SFAB force structure and determine if the SFAB is capable of overcoming those challenges. The three DOTMLPF domains being analyzed are the doctrine, organization, and materiel aspects of the SFAB force structure. The end result is an understanding of the SFAB's capabilities and an analysis of the aspects that the Army must mitigate for the SFAB mission to succeed.

The aspects of doctrine that are being evaluated include: "Does doctrine support the employment of the SFAB to the operational environment?" and "Would the SFAB be able to sustain operations in the operational environment utilizing one or more of the doctrinal support methods?" In a limited U.S. presence environment, doctrine does support the employment of SFAB forces and provide effective methods of sustaining forces in this environment. In essence, the SFAB is not adequately structured to leverage strategic reach-back as a support method without being augmented with additional forces. This assessment is based on the limited number of staff positions and the dual advisor role that the staff holds across each command echelon. Part of the 101st ABD success during OUA is attributed to the use of dedicated LNOs that integrated with outside organizations (CAC 2015a, 28-29). Relying solely on host nation and multi-national support is risky because the success of the operation depends on the partner nation's ability and willingness to provide the support. In a large U.S. presence environment, doctrine does support the employment of SFAB forces and provide effective methods of sustaining the force in this environment. This assessment is based on the current force structure and the assumption that in a large U.S. presence, units will be available to provide the doctrinal sustainment mission command and bridge the strategic to tactical logistics support. The key takeaway from this analysis is that integrating LNOs into the SFAB is an effective method that the Army should incorporate as a doctrinal principle to improve coordination and employment of SFAB forces.

The aspects of organization that are being evaluated include: "Does the structure allow the subordinates in the brigade to cooperate systematically towards accomplishing the mission in the operational environment?" and "Does the structure allow for the brigade to cooperate systematically with external military forces in the operational environment?" The organization of the SFAB does allow for the brigade to achieve an internal unity of effort to accomplish the mission in both operational environments. There

is a clearly defined command structure that is similar to a BCT, and the SFAB incorporates a permanent rear detachment headquarters that can provide home station mission command. All of the staff sections are commensurate to a BCT and capable of integrating with a higher headquarters while deployed. However, the SFAB S4 is missing a critical capability normally found in a BCT S4. The SFAB is not authorized a Mobility Warrant Officer (MWO). The purpose of an MWO is to assist the commander in planning and executing deployment operations (HQDA 2015a, E-1). Additionally, the MWO trains unit personnel in conducting deployment-related tasks (E-1). Since all of the brigade and battalion METLs include conducting expeditionary deployment operations, the lack of a deployment expert is a major capability gap. When it comes to integrating with external military forces, the SFAB is organized to build habitual staff relationships with higher echelons; however, without the MWO, the SFAB is lacking a critical enabler for integrating with the strategic military deployment community. The key takeaway from this analysis is that the Army should augment the SFAB with technical mobility expertise in order to effectively support deployment and redeployment operations.

The aspects of materiel that are being evaluated include: "Does the SFAB have the capabilities to sustain itself in the operational environment?" and "Is the SFAB capable of leveraging external support in the operational environment?" The SFAB is capable of independently sustaining itself for two to three days. This assessment is based on estimated consumption rates and the SFAB storage capabilities. In a limited U.S. presence environment, the SFAB is dependent on external support for any operation lasting longer than three days. This can cause significant issues in a limited U.S. presence environment. For example, during OUA, some of the local transportation companies took up to 13 days to transit through portions of the country (CAC 2015a, 52). Without a larger storage capability, the SFAB will be reliant on continued resupply operations that may not be feasible in the operational environment. The SFAB is equipped with the modernized military sustainment equipment. This means that in an environment with a large U.S. presence, the SFAB can easily leverage external military sustainment assets. For example, the SFAB's modular fuel systems can be quickly exchanged or refilled by a supporting sustainment brigade. In this type of environment, it may also be more feasible to receive the frequent resupply required to sustain SFA operations. The key takeaway from this analysis is that the Army should look at ways to increase the SFAB's storage capabilities when employing the unit to a limited U.S. presence operational environment.

EVALUATION – LIMITED U.S. PRESENCE				
<u>Section</u>	Analytic Aspects	<u>Summary Analysis</u>	<u>Score</u>	
Doctrine	Does doctrine support the employment of the SFAB to the OE?	Doctrine supports the employment of SFAB forces in this OE.	Green	
Doctrine	Would the SFAB be able to sustain operations in the OE utilizing one or more of the doctrinal support methods?	Lacks the dedicated personnel to leverage multiple support methods.	Amber	
Organization	Does the structure allow the brigade to cooperate systematically towards accomplishing the mission in the OE?	Structure is commensurate to BCT & incorporates a permanent rear detachment.	Green	
Organization	Does the structure allow for the brigade to cooperate systematically with external military forces in the OE?	Lacks a mobility section to plan and execute deployment & redeployment operations.	Amber	
Materiel	Does the SFAB have the capabilities to sustain itself in the OE?	Requires frequent resupply that may not be feasible for the operational environment.	Amber	
Materiel	Is the SFAB capable of leveraging external support in the OE?	Equipment is interoperable & capable of receiving support if external units are available.	Green	

Table 11. Evaluation Matrix - Limited U.S. Presence

Source: Created by author.

EVALUATION – LARGE U.S. PRESENCE				
<u>Section</u>	Analytic Aspects	<u>Summary Analysis</u>	<u>Score</u>	
Doctrine	Does doctrine support the employment of the SFAB to the OE?	Doctrine supports the employment of SFAB forces in this OE.	Green	
Doctrine	Would the SFAB be able to sustain operations in the OE utilizing one or more of the doctrinal support methods?	Capable of leveraging all three methods of support.	Green	
Organization	Does the structure allow the brigade to cooperate systematically towards accomplishing the mission in the OE?	Structure is commensurate to BCT & incorporates a permanent rear detachment.	Green	
Organization	Does the structure allow for the brigade to cooperate systematically with external military forces in the OE?	Lacks a mobility section to plan and execute deployment & redeployment operations.	Amber	
Materiel	Does the SFAB have the capabilities to sustain itself in the OE?	Properly resources to sustain operations until the unit can be feasibly resupplied.	Green	
Materiel	Is the SFAB capable of leveraging external support in the OE?	Equipment is interoperable & capable of receiving support from external units.	Green	

Table 12. Evaluation Matrix – Large U.S. Presence

Source: Created by author.

Analysis Summary

After comparing the sustainment challenges of operational environment with the SFAB, this analysis shows that there are three aspects of the SFAB force structure that requires mitigation (see table 11). In a limited U.S. presence environment, the SFAB lacks personnel dedicated to leveraging strategic reach-back capabilities. To mitigate this, the Army should use LNOs to integrate with the outside organizations capable of leveraging those capabilities. Without a mobility section in the S4, the SFAB is missing the expertise to plan and coordinate deployment operations. This expertise is critical to ensuring that the SFAB can effectively conduct deployment operations. Lastly, the SFAB is limited to operational environments that can provide continuous resupply in three-day

increments. This rate of continuous resupply is not feasible in all operational environments. This analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the aspects in the SFAB must mitigate in order to effectively support the mission. By understanding these issues, the Army can create effective solutions to support the SFAB mission.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Security Force Assistance Brigade provides much need help to our special operations forces . . . many of who are conducting security force assistance around the globe today . . . To be very clear the Security Force Assistance Brigade is not and will not be special forces . . . The SFABs will provide professional advisors, will partner primary with conventional host nation forces, and we have learned over the last 16 years just how importance the synchronization and synergy is between special forces and conventional Forces, and the SFABs will accentuate the best of both. —General Mark A. Milley, 1st SFAB Activation Ceremony

The purpose of this study is to pinpoint the sustainment challenges that the SFAB must overcome in different environments and identify possible solutions to overcome them. The primary research question driving this study is: "How can the Army effectively support the SFAB mission?" To answer this question, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section contains the findings of both the primary and subordinate research questions. The second section provides recommendations and solutions for improving the Army's ability to effectively support the SFAB mission. The third section identifies areas outside of the scope of this research that should be studied further. At the conclusion of this chapter, there will be a comprehensive understanding of how the Army can effectively support the SFAB mission and of the possible solutions to overcome the challenges identified.

Findings

The answer to the primary research question, "How can the Army effectively support the SFAB mission?" is comprehensive. The SFAB requires a combination of internal force structure changes and external support in order to sustain operations in a variety of environments. The key takeaways from the analysis are: The Army should establish dedicated LNOs to integrate with the outside organizations, provide deployment expertise, and create solutions to extend the BSB storage capacity when required. The issues identified during the analysis would not prevent the SFAB from accomplishing its mission; however, these issues could degrade the responsiveness and effectiveness of the SFAB. The implication of these findings is that the Army should change the SFAB force structure to be self-sufficient or establish formal support relationships with external units that can mitigate these challenges. In doing so, the Army can provide effective support to the SFAB mission.

The answer to the first subordinate research question, "What are the best practices for providing logistics support to the SFAB with the current force structure?" is to augment the SFAB with enablers or to establish formal support relationships with external units. The support requirements will vary, depending on the operational environment. In doing so, the Army can leverage the existing force structure of the other military units to effectively sustain the SFAB. During this research, it was unexpected to discover that the SFAB force structure did not include MWO. The MWO is a standard authorization in both a BCT S4 section and within a Special Forces Group SPO section. The implication of this issue is that the SFAB's higher headquarters will have to provide this deployment expertise until there is a force structure change.

The answer to the second subordinate research question, "Is the SFAB force structure appropriate for the two types of operational environments that the SFAB will be operating in?" is: The effectiveness is contingent on the environment—meaning that if the SFAB is able to receive continuous resupply, the SFAB can operate seamlessly in both environments with the current force structure. However, there is a higher risk in a limited U.S. presence environment to feasibly provide that support. The implication of these finding is that the Army should develop solutions for temporarily expanding the BSB storage capacity when needed.

Recommendations

The analysis conducted throughout this paper is an example of 'Military Science.' The unit requirements and capabilities are defined and measurable. The solutions to overcome these challenges are examples of 'Military Art.' There is not a set solution to solve each of these challenges but a multitude of options that military commanders can choose from. From the information gathered during this research, below are three recommendations for improving the Army's ability to effectively support the SFAB mission:

Recommendation #1

The Army should create a permanent 'Liaison Element' for every ASCC that a SFAB is aligned with. In 2005, the army created the 528th Sustainment Brigade (SB) (Special Operations) to provide unique logistics and health service support (Ragin 2005, 28). One of the unique logistics capabilities that the 528th SB sustains are liaison elements that can work directly with the ASCC and TSC in order to bridge the SOF to CF logistics gap (Burkett 2016, 65). This concept was born during Operation Enduring Freedom, because U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was focused primarily on supporting large scale operations and was not able to accommodate SOF requirements (Rodriguez 2005, 8). The liaison elements were created to fill this gap by aiding the planning and coordination of SOF support operations (8). Similar to the 528th SB, the Army should create liaison elements dedicated to aiding the planning and coordination of SFA support operations. This concept has been proven effective for SOF units operating in multiple environments over the last decade. The creation of this element will enhance the SFAB's ability to plan and coordinate logistics support in any operational environment.

Recommendation #2

The Army should modify force structure to include mobility expertise. The Army approved the MWO concept in 1997 in order to provide commanders with a skilled technician that understands the Defense Transportation System and can operate in the joint environment (Everitt 2003, 2). To fill this capability gap, the Army can either change the current SFAB force structure to include an MWO or build this capability into the future SFA division concept. This is assuming the future SFA division are commensurate to maneuver division. Under the current maneuver division force structure, the Division G4 has a Division Transportation Officer (DTO) that "is the focal point for transportation technical guidance and assistance for the staff in areas of planning and in the execution of operations" (HQDA 2013a, 5-2). The DTO normally has a small staff that includes an MWO assigned to it. As an option, instead of changing the SFAB force structure, the Army could increase the SFA division's DTO staff to provide this mobility expertise to each of the SFABs. Another model that is proven effective is the Group Support Battalion (GSB) model, in which, the MWO is located in the SPO section. In the end, the creation of any of these positions will enhance the SFAB's deployment operations. Since the secondary mission of the SFAB is to rapidly expand in

to a BCT, any changes to the force structure to integrate mobility expertise should be compatible to a BCT to streamline the unit's transformation.

Recommendation #3

The Army should develop a modular sustainment command structure that is adaptive to SFA operations. In March of 2018, BG Brian Mennes, the Department of the Army Director of Force Management, told the Army Times that the Army has "a vision of creating two security force assistance divisions and a corps" (Myers 2018). With this vision in mind, the Army should create a modular sustainment brigade dedicated to supporting SFA operations (see figure 5). This brigade would be responsible for planning and synchronizing current and future sustainment of all SFA operations. Additionally, a sustainment brigade could provide mission command for the SFA liaison elements and any additional sustainment units assigned to support SFA operations. As stated earlier in this chapter, the Army should develop solutions for temporarily expanding the BSB storage capacity when needed. Under this sustainment brigade construct, the SFA Corps can retain key sustainment capabilities and employ them as needed. This will ensure that the Army is effectively employing its resources. Additionally, this brigade should be capable of supporting a command relationship with key Army Reserve units that are aligned with the SFA mission. In doing so, the Army can balance the capabilities needed in the active versus the reserve component. While this model is similar to the 528th SB. It's important to recognize that SFA is not SOF. The two mission sets can complement each other; however, the acceptable logistics footprint and mission requirements may vary significantly. This is partially due to the different operational environments that these forces are employed. The Army should also consider retaining force provider,

forward surgical, fuel storage, refrigeration and water production capabilities that are tailored to the SFA mission. If these capabilities are built into deployable detachments, the sustainment brigade would be able to create a modular Forward Support Company (Expeditionary) or a Logistics Task Force (LTF) that can be attached to a BSB. This would increase the BSB logistics capabilities and increase the SFAB's overall operational reach. The creation of a sustainment brigade would assist in planning and synchronizing of sustainment for SFA operations, provide mission command to the SFA liaison elements, and provide the SFA Corps with unique sustainment capabilities.



Figure 5. Notional Sustainment Brigade (SFA)

Source: Created by author.

Areas for Future Studies

During this study, there were three areas requiring additional research in order to further understand effective ways for supporting the SFAB mission. These areas either fell outside the scope of this thesis or were emerging concepts with a limited amount of information available. The first is the Army's rapid deployment of the 1st SFAB to Afghanistan in support of Operation Freedom Sentinel in the spring of 2018. The lessons learned from this deployment will validate the theoretical issues presented in this paper or identify new challenges that the SFAB must overcome. The second area is the Army's plans to develop two SFA divisions and a corps headquarters. As alluded to during the recommendations, the force structure of the division and corps headquarters can have significant impacts on the Army's ability to effectively support the SFAB mission. The third area is how the SFAB will be employed in terms of force structure. Will the SFAB always be employed as a brigade, or can it be divided into multiple task forces? If it is divided into multiple task forces, what will be required to sustain their operations? Further research in all three of these areas could enhance the understanding of how to effectively support the SFAB mission.

Conclusion

The purpose of this research is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the challenges that the SFAB must overcome and to identify possible solutions. To fully understand the complexity of these challenges, this research studied the SFAB mission, the SFAB force structure, and the different types of operational environments that the unit will be employed. After conducting an embedded analysis, there were three key takeaways: the Army should establish dedicated LNOs to integrate with outside

organizations, provide deployment expertise, and create solutions for temporarily extending the BSB storage capacity. This paper was able to achieve its intent of exploring the most effective methods for supporting the SFAB mission. The significance of this study is that it can be used to assist future researchers in filling the academic gaps pertaining to the SFAB and understand how to effectively support the mission.

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