



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND
THEIR ROLE IN CRISIS RESPONSE ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA**

by

Daniel K. Chaves, David Christmas, and Tammy L. Sloulin

December 2018

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Sean F. Everton
Doowan Lee

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2018	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN CRISIS RESPONSE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Daniel K. Chaves, David Christmas, and Tammy L. Sloulin				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Throughout the past 70 years, the alliance between the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has persisted in a dynamic security environment in which South Korea emerged as a middle-power with robust crisis management capabilities. Conversely, the 1995 famine in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) showcased the DPRK's inability to provide basic services; it was the first time the regime solicited international humanitarian assistance, thus allowing international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to operate in the country. Social network analysis helps illuminate how the pedantic political relationship between the two Koreas caused fluctuations within the humanitarian assistance networks to the DPRK. Due to the ROK's humanitarian assistance capabilities and the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the United States is less likely to conduct unilateral humanitarian assistance operations. Although many capable nongovernmental organizations exist on the Korean Peninsula, the ever-changing geopolitical situation between the United States, ROK, and DPRK can restrict their ability to execute humanitarian operations there.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS nongovernmental organizations, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, HADR, civil affairs, international organizations, North Korea, DPRK, social network analysis, Republic of Korea, ROK, South Korea			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 91	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN
CRISIS RESPONSE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA**

Daniel K. Chaves
Major, United States Army
BA, Central Washington University, 2007

David Christmas
Major, United States Army
BA, Coker College, 1996

Tammy L. Sloulin
Major, United States Army
BS, Montana State University - Billings, 1995
MS, Webster University, 2010

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS
(IRREGULAR WARFARE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2018**

Approved by: Sean F. Everton
Advisor

Doowan Lee
Second Reader

John J. Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

Throughout the past 70 years, the alliance between the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has persisted in a dynamic security environment in which South Korea emerged as a middle-power with robust crisis management capabilities. Conversely, the 1995 famine in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) showcased the DPRK's inability to provide basic services; it was the first time the regime solicited international humanitarian assistance, thus allowing international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to operate in the country. Social network analysis helps illuminate how the pedantic political relationship between the two Koreas caused fluctuations within the humanitarian assistance networks to the DPRK. Due to the ROK's humanitarian assistance capabilities and the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the United States is less likely to conduct unilateral humanitarian assistance operations. Although many capable nongovernmental organizations exist on the Korean Peninsula, the ever-changing geopolitical situation between the United States, ROK, and DPRK can restrict their ability to execute humanitarian operations there.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	BACKGROUND	1
A.	RESEARCH QUESTION	4
1.	Deterrence and Strategic Options	4
2.	U.S. Department of Defense and the Republic of Korea	7
3.	Nongovernmental Organizations.....	10
B.	METHODOLOGY	13
C.	CHAPTER OUTLINE.....	15
II.	EVOLUTION OF HADR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.....	17
A.	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND HADR.....	18
B.	DEVELOPMENT AND REPRESSION OF THE INDEPENDENT SOCIETY	20
C.	NGOS AND THE ROK GOVERNMENT	22
III.	HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 1995–2017	27
A.	HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 1995– 2008.....	28
B.	HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 2009– 2017.....	33
C.	CHAPTER CONCLUSION.....	35
IV.	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DISASTER RESPONSE NETWORK TO NORTH KOREA	37
A.	NETWORK BOUNDARIES.....	38
1.	Network Ties (Relations).....	39
2.	NGO Characteristics (Attributes)	40
3.	Parsing Network Data by Organizational Capabilities.....	45
4.	Network Metrics.....	46
5.	Topography	47
6.	Centrality	48
B.	TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF THE NGO/IO NETWORK.....	50
C.	CHAPTER CONCLUSION.....	58
V.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	59
A.	CONCLUSIONS	59
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. FORCES IN HADR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA	61

APPENDIX. ACRONYM LIST OF NGOS AND IOS	67
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	71
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	75

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Notional Operations across the Conflict Continuum	8
Figure 2.	Civil Affairs Operations.....	9
Figure 3.	The UN Cluster Approach	13
Figure 4.	Complete NGO Network	46
Figure 5.	1995 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK	51
Figure 6.	2000 Humanitarian Assistance Network Supporting the DPRK	52
Figure 7.	2008 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK	54
Figure 8.	2010 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK	56
Figure 9.	2018 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK	58

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Topographical Measures of the Humanitarian Assistance Network.....	48
Table 2.	Top-Ranked NGOs/IOs by Centrality Scores.....	49

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
ARD	average reciprocal distance
CAO	civil affairs operations
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CARKOR	Caritas Korea
CVID	complete verifiable irreversible denuclearization
DoD	Department of Defense
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
GDP	gross domestic product
GLRS	Global Resource Services
GYUNGN	Gyungunam Unification Agriculture Collaboration Cooperation
HA	humanitarian assistance
HADR	humanitarian assistance disaster relief
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC	International Commission for the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IHL	international humanitarian law
IO	international organization
IOM	International Office of Migration
JOINTS	Join Together Society
KFHI	Korean Food for the Hungry
KNCCNK	Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea
KSM	Korean Sharing Movement
MDR-TB	multi-drug resistant tuberculosis
MOU	Ministry of Unification
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDS	public distribution system
PVOC	Private Voluntary Organization Consortium

ROK	Republic of Korea
SAMP	Samaritan's Purse
SNA	social network analysis
SOFI	<i>State of Food security and Nutrition in the World</i>
TGHUM	Triangle Génération Humanitaire
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOCHA DPR	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Democratic People's Republic, Korea
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States government
WFP	World Food Program
WMD	weapon of mass destruction

I. BACKGROUND

From one of the most ethnically homogenous groups of people in the world, two very different Koreas have emerged over the past 65 years.¹ Although external factors affected the state of affairs for North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, their pursuit of radically different types of government have resulted in extremely divergent civil societies and economies. For South Korea, the 1980s democracy movement coincided with the global expansion of nongovernmental organizations (NGO). During this time, NGOs gained government funding and became key implementers of aid across the region.² As the newly democratic ROK developed its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) capacity through NGOs, North Korea's totalitarianism has resulted in periodic humanitarian catastrophes.³

North Korea, which in the 1950s and '60s was the relatively more economically successful and politically stable country on the peninsula, now lags far behind South Korea on all development indices.⁴ While the political development of South Korea was historically more turbulent than that of North Korea, the end result in the South has been a wealthy, democratic society.⁵ As South Korea rose to global prominence, North Korea's regime pursued a nuclear weapons program as a means to ensure its survival.⁶ The quality of life for the average North Korean citizens, which pales in comparison to the quality of life of the average South Korean citizen, especially in terms of health care and food security, deteriorates further in a natural disaster or crisis.

¹ Victor Cha, *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future* (New York: HarperCollins, 2013).

² Korea Economic Institute of America, "Expected Role of South Korea and Major Stakeholders: NGO Contributions to and Roles in North Korea's Rehabilitation," accessed July 24, 2018, <http://www.keia.org/publication/expected-role-south-korea-and-major-stakeholders-ngo-contributions-and-roles-north-korea>.

³ Korea Economic Institute of America, "Expected Role of South Korea."

⁴ Cha, *The Impossible State*.

⁵ Scott Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

⁶ Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads*.

When Kim Jong-un took power in the DPRK in 2012, the increase in aggressive actions toward regional allies of the United States, and the deteriorating humanitarian conditions for the North Korean average citizen led to an increase in international pressure to mitigate the menace the country presented to its own citizens and neighboring countries.⁷ International pressure on the Kim Regime remains central to these efforts. Acts of aggression, such as testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017, have resulted in the toughening of international sanctions.⁸ However, attempts to limit the regime's ability to proliferate nuclear weapons through sanctions have also hindered its ability to provide basic services, such as food and medical care to the DPRK's 25 million citizens.⁹ That being said, sanctions are only partly responsible for the deteriorating conditions within the country. The strategic choice by the DPRK to focus on weapons development in lieu of medicine and food is also responsible for the poor humanitarian conditions in the country.¹⁰

North Korea did not allow the international community into the country until it was in dire need of assistance in the 1990s.¹¹ The famine of the 1990s, dubbed by the Kim Jung-il regime as the "Arduous March" due to its severity, prompted the DPRK to initially request aid from the United Nations (UN) in 1995. This crisis opened the DPRK's door to humanitarian organizations from the international community, including South Korea and the United States.¹² Now for over two decades, varying levels of humanitarian operations have been conducted in North Korea by a variety of both NGOs and international organizations (IO). As current geopolitical relations appear to become more collaborative, the potential for civic organizations, such as NGOs, to operate in the DPRK may increase.

⁷ Eleanor Albert, "What to Know about the Sanctions on North Korea" Council on Foreign Relations, January 3, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea>.

⁸ Albert, "What to Know about the Sanctions."

⁹ Tara O, *The Collapse of North Korea: Challenges, Planning and Geopolitics of Unification* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).

¹⁰ O, *The Collapse of North Korea*.

¹¹ L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003).

¹² Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*.

According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the ROK constitutionally claims sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula and its citizens. Humanitarian operations in North Korea by South Korea and the United States are conducted with the consent of both the North Korean and South Korean governments.¹³ While South Korea has the lead role in any humanitarian response on the peninsula, the international community through the UN, as well as the U.S. military, plays a key role in supporting and implementing HADR.¹⁴

Adequately responding to crises requires international and interagency cooperation. The international alliance and the military relationships between the ROK and its international partners are divided into the United Nations Command (UNC), the Combined Forces Command, and the United States Forces Korea Command. Each component has a different responsibility in a crisis. These commands are integrated into the greater crisis response plan by the government of South Korea. Their specific responsibilities are discussed in Chapter V.

The IOM research discusses how, in crisis management planning, NGOs are a critical part of policy as well as humanitarianism for the government of South Korea.¹⁵ From the ROK's perspective, NGO activities are an important component to stabilizing and unifying of the Korean Peninsula.¹⁶ The ROK government maintains tight control on IOs and NGOs based in South Korea and operating in North Korea. From a U.S. policy perspective, aid through any organization is tied to measurable outcomes in denuclearization by North Korea.¹⁷

¹³ International Organization of Migration, *Overview of the Republic of Korea's Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance System* (Geneva: International Organization of Migration, 2017).

¹⁴ International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

¹⁵ International Organization of Migration.

¹⁶ International Organization of Migration.

¹⁷ Leslie Young, "What Happens to North Korea's Aid Money," *Global News*, October 11, 2017, <https://globalnews.ca/news/3797235/north-korea-aid-money/>.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

What are the available and required HADR capabilities and capacities of IO and NGO networks that can provide direct assistance to address a humanitarian crisis in the DPRK in support of U.S. government (USG) objectives on the Korean Peninsula?

1. Deterrence and Strategic Options

The United States and its allies have attempted to prevent another armed conflict between the Koreas through deterrence. Although this has succeeded in averting repetition of armed conflict, it has failed to prevent the DPRK from developing nuclear weapons. DPRK proliferation, in conjunction with changing relationships and power dynamics between it and the United States, ROK, and China, has created an unsettled security atmosphere.¹⁸

The United States lacks a good strategic option for improving the security of the Korean Peninsula. Efforts, including sanctions placed on the DPRK, have failed to stop it from developing and testing nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. The DPRK appears to be extremely resilient to the increasingly stringent sanctions, but it remains unclear to what level the country can be economically stressed without falling into crisis.¹⁹

A crisis on the Korean Peninsula would exacerbate an already critical humanitarian situation for the people of North Korea. Currently, they suffer from malnutrition and chronic medical conditions, which has necessitated ongoing humanitarian assistance (HA) by the international community since the 1990s.²⁰ Despite the challenges, NGOs have been instrumental in relieving human suffering in the DPRK for over 20 years. In the absence of strategic certainty about the DPRK's future, building a comprehensive understanding the important role of NGOs on the Korean Peninsula aids in emergency planning.

¹⁸ Kelsey Davenport, "Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," Arms Control Association, last modified November 2018, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.

¹⁹ Sang-hun Choe, "Sanctions Are Hurting North Korea. Can They Make Kim Give In?" *New York Times*, April 30, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/20/world/asia/north-korea-trump-sanctions-kim-jong-un.html>.

²⁰ World Food Programme, "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," accessed November 8, 2018, <http://www1.wfp.org/countries/democratic-peoples-republic-korea>.

A nuclear-armed North Korea threatens not only the United States, but also U.S. allies in East Asia. As Paul Huth argues, “Following the end of the Korean War, the United States established an alliance and military presence in South Korea in support of a policy of extended-general deterrence against the threat of another invasion by North Korea.”²¹ Addressing the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program includes four strategic options: prevention, turning the screws, decapitation, and acceptance.²² Mark Bowden argues that all possible alternatives other than acceptance involve some type of military action. Options range from complete destruction of the weapons arsenal, leadership, and military to strategic options of removing leadership or forcing the administration to abandon its nuclear missile program.²³ Unfortunately, even with extended-general deterrence, North Korea is nuclear armed, and it continues to strengthen its nuclear capacity by producing ICBMs in addition to expanding its arsenal of short- and mid-range missiles.

The average North Korean citizen has paid a high price for the weapons program. The efforts by many in the international community to curb weapons development have contributed to increased food insecurity and limited access to medical care. To apply increased pressure on the regime, the UN has imposed some of the most historically stringent sanctions on North Korea, and those sanctions appear to be affecting the regime’s strategic decisions. Since 2006, these economic sanctions increased commercial constraints, which now include prohibiting imports or exports that can be associated with the production of nuclear or missile technology. Historically, the international community lifts and reapplies these types of sanctions based on the extent to which North Korea complies with international regulations on nuclear testing.²⁴

Although Kim Jung-un recently engaged in denuclearization discussions mostly with President Moon and made an initial commitment to eliminating its weapons program,

²¹ Paul Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 25–48.

²² Mark Bowden, “How to Deal with North Korea: There Are No Good Options. But Some Are Worse than Others,” *The Atlantic*, July–August 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-worst-problem-on-earth/528717/>.

²³ Bowden, “How to Deal with North Korea.”

²⁴ Albert, “What to Know about the Sanctions.”

sanctions remain in place to ensure complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID).²⁵ Since the United States and its allies are unwilling to accept a nuclear-armed North Korea, some level of intervention may be inevitable if the terms of denuclearization cannot be achieved through current tactics, such as sanctions.

Sanctions exacerbate North Korea's fragile state structures and force it toward either a decision point or collapse. According to Robert Collins's "seven phases of collapse," North Korea appears to be half way through the seven phases. The famine in the 1990s fundamentally altered North Korea.²⁶ Firsthand reports by defectors and refugees state that the disaster increased the population's exposure to outside information and gave rise to an informal economy through black markets. This phenomenon pushed the country through Collins's Phase 3 (increase in corruption and rise of black markets) to Phase 4 (suppression).²⁷ Kim Jong-un's need to assert complete control of the country was obvious when he replaced over 50 percent of his senior military officials and advisors shortly after taking power.²⁸ If North Korea progresses through the final phases, the international community will have to address all the subpar state structures including a prison system with an estimated 200,000 prisoners.²⁹

One frequent component of protracted conflicts is the indifference to international humanitarian law (IHL), and North Korea is no exception.³⁰ Adequately reacting to the

²⁵ Kylie Atwood, "Mike Pompeo Floats Prospect of Officially Ending Korean War Ahead of Trump-Kim Summit," *CBS News*, September 28, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korea-pompeo-denuclearization-donald-trump-korean-war-kim-jong-un/>.

²⁶ Robert Collins is a retired Army master sergeant and a civilian area expert in South Korea. He outlined the seven phases of collapse to explain how the disintegration of North Korea could potentially be a drawn-out process over years instead of an instantaneous event. Phase 1 is resource depletion; Phase 2 resource depletion results in failure to maintain infrastructure; Phase 3 is the creation of independent organizations that circumvent the government; Phase 4 is the government's attempt to suppress the independent organizations; Phase 5 is resistance against the government; Phase 6 is the breakup of the regime; Phase 7 is the creation of new leadership. Robert D. Kaplan, "When North Korea Falls," *The Atlantic*, October 2006, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/when-north-korea-falls/305228/>.

²⁷ Kaplan, "When North Korea Falls."

²⁸ Kaplan.

²⁹ O, *The Collapse of North Korea*.

³⁰ "Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Action," International Committee of the Red Cross, September 6, 2016, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/protracted-conflict-and-humanitarian-action>.

disregard of IHL is important because failure to properly do so can result in strategic consequences, such as the catastrophic loss of life that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 and the Balkans in 1995. According to Daniel Tudor and James Pearson, the DPRK's political prison camps, known as *gwallisos*, are renowned for their brutality and the practice of punishing up to *three generations* of the accused's family, and as Victor Cha notes, the DPRK's political system "denies its citizens every political, civil, and religious liberty."³¹

Currently, the government of North Korea provides some services only to a select portion of the country. North Koreans suffer from multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), malaria, and malnutrition, all of which leads to poor brain development and stunting among other chronic health issues.³² In 2006, it was estimated that the North Korean regime spent only one dollar per person for health care. Hospitals lacked basic supplies and clean, running water.³³ A UN report titled *State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World* (SOFI), states that 10.3 million people out of the total population of 24.8 million were undernourished in 2017.³⁴ Average North Koreans are estimated to be three to eight centimeters shorter than their South Korean counterparts due to years of undernourishment and malnutrition.³⁵ Droughts in 2017 and 2018 reduced an already insubstantial annual food production and prompted additional requests for food aid by North Korea. Thus, a quick international response, when space arises to do so, is critical to prevent loss of life and alleviate human suffering.

2. U.S. Department of Defense and the Republic of Korea

A central goal of the Trump administration and the new President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, is the CVID of North Korea. The diplomatic state of affairs between the

³¹ Cha, *The Impossible State*, 163.

³² "DPR Korea Needs and Priorities March 2018," ReliefWeb, April 11, 2018, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/dpr-korea-needs-and-priorities-march-2018>.

³³ Cha, *The Impossible State*.

³⁴ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World* (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2017), <http://www.fao.org/3/a-I7695e.pdf>.

³⁵ "Nine Charts Which Tell You All You Need to Know about North Korea," *BBC News*, September 26, 2017, sec. Asia, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41228181>.

United States, the DPRK, and the ROK has shifted from hostile to cooperative in the two years since the 2016 U.S. elections. At this time, many efforts are underway to not only achieve CVID but to officially end the Korean War.³⁶ The Department of Defense's (DoD) Civil Affairs may be utilized to coordinate NGO HADR activities if there is a significant political change on the peninsula. DoD Directive 2000.13 obligates the DoD to maintain a capability to conduct multiple types of civil affairs operations (CAO) necessary to support DoD missions.³⁷ This includes coordination of military activities with other USG departments and agencies, supporting stability operations, and consideration of the civil populace throughout the range of military operations. The type of instrument of national power utilized depends where conflict lies on the peace to war continuum (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Notional Operations across the Conflict Continuum³⁸




³⁶ Atwood, "Mike Pompeo Floats Prospect."

³⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Civil Affairs*, DOD Directive 2000.13 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d2000_13.pdf.

³⁸ Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2018), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_57.pdf.

Given that all instruments of national power have a role somewhere on this continuum and because civil affairs activities occur in numerous environments, civil affairs forces can and will have a significant role to play in a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In FM 3-57, dated May 2018, CAO fall into three basic categories: civil affairs activities, military government operations, and civil affairs supported activities.³⁹ Figure 2 represents the functions nested under these three civil affairs competencies.

Figure 2. Civil Affairs Operations⁴⁰



Because South Korea is a sovereign nation with the fifteenth largest economy in the world capable of conducting its own HADR, the United States would likely leverage its resources in support of ROK critical event response. Supporting foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations, coordinating for FHA, supporting civil administration, and synchronizing civil-military effects are some of the primary tasks that need to be executed

³⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Field Manual 3-57 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2018), <https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/FM.aspx>.

⁴⁰ Source: U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

to support the joint force commander's efforts. Furthermore, civil affairs companies are proficient in conducting targeted HA, integrating united action partner support, and performing transition operations to meet the joint force commander's intent for stabilization of the operational environment. By leveraging the resources and expertise of NGOs with experience on the peninsula, the United States, and South Korea could effectively address key issues that might arise in an event altering the status quo.

3. Nongovernmental Organizations

Estimates put the death toll for the 1990s famine between 450,000 and three million. The famine led to the collapse of some of the basic government systems, such as the public distribution system (PDS) and healthcare within the country.⁴¹ One "benefit" of the crisis was that it opened the door to more NGO and international humanitarian operations within the country, which were critical to alleviate suffering. Barbara Demick notes how, in the absence of aid, the first to die from starvation were the average North Korean citizens who clung to strict societal rules and would not break the laws to acquire food illegally.⁴²

In general, humanitarian organizations were initially unprepared for the challenges of humanitarian operations in North Korea. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder describe NGO operations in North Korea from the initial aid request in 1995 through 2001 and the beginning of the "Sunshine Policy," as discussed later in Chapter III of this thesis. They note that a primary issue for humanitarian organizations in North Korea was accounting for the recipients of aid because of tight regulations and oversight by North Korean officials.⁴³ On a similar note, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland lay out the dilemmas of HA that arose for the international donor community from 1995 to 2006.⁴⁴ In general,

⁴¹ Andrew Lankov, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 81-82.

⁴² Barbara Demick, *Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea* (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010).

⁴³ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*.

⁴⁴ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

humanitarian aid allowed the DPRK to increase its funding for its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.

Although the operational conditions for outside organizations have changed over time, the North Korean regime still tightly regulates and controls NGOs that operate inside its borders. Depending upon the type of situation that develops in North Korea, regime interference and control and other types of manipulation of the North Korean people may create a unique operational environment that constrains HA to those in need. The South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) has sought to ensure that NGOs are better prepared to conduct operations in North Korea than in the past. However, limiting the North Korean regime's control of HADR continues to be challenging.⁴⁵

The literature suggests that while some things in North Korea appear to be constant, others are changing. A new generation of North Koreans has grown up post-1990s famine. For example, Jieun Baek depicts a country that is rapidly changing due to the marketization that resulted from the 1990s famine.⁴⁶ Changes include the opening of private markets as well as the information revolution carried into the country on SD cards and computer thumb drives. The implications of these changes for the regime and HA are yet to be seen, but recent multilateral actions indicate that South Korean aid channels may be opened to North Korea again.⁴⁷

Currently, experts estimate there are at least 15 foreign NGOs operating inside of the country. This number rises and falls based on the conditions inside the country and the political climate between the DPRK and other countries, specifically the United States and the ROK. It is thought that at least 215 NGOs have operated inside the DPRK over the past 23 years.⁴⁸ NGOs provide health services, education, humanitarian relief, development,

⁴⁵ International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

⁴⁶ Jieun Baek, *North Korea's Hidden Revolution: How the Information Underground Is Transforming a Closed Society* (New Haven: Yale University, 2016).

⁴⁷ Miah Park, discussion with authors, July 12, 2018, Seoul.

⁴⁸ Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings, "Aid from the Enemy: American and S. Korean NGOs in the DPRK," *NK News*, December 6, 2016, <https://www.nknews.org/2016/12/aid-from-the-enemy-american-and-s-korean-ngos-in-the-dprk/>.

and informal diplomacy—albeit with varying degrees of autonomy and success. Some NGOs operate covertly in and around North Korea to provide underground support to defectors and regular citizens. This assistance includes human smuggling, money transfers, and phone calls from outside North Korea.⁴⁹ This said, the majority of NGO assistance targets food insecurity, health care, and sanitation.⁵⁰ The base of operations for most NGO activity on the peninsula is in South Korea and the United States.

Recent reports indicate continued sanctions on the DPRK impact its economy and food security. It is plausible that some type of humanitarian crisis of the same or greater magnitude of the 1990s famine is possible on the peninsula, but the effects could be more significant due to the weakened state of the regime.⁵¹ The Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) ranked the DPRK its number one under-reported humanitarian crisis in 2017. CARE also estimated that two in five North Koreans are malnourished.⁵²

Even though NGO-formed coalitions and associations are focused on many problem sets (not just food insecurity) on the Korean Peninsula, there is not a comprehensive assessment and analysis of all the capabilities and services offered by NGOs in and around North Korea. Although capabilities of NGOs operating on the peninsula could be leveraged in a humanitarian emergency event, unfortunately, there appear to be gaps in these critical capabilities needed to address social vulnerabilities on a grand scale. Thus in the future, it is important also to assess and analyze the essential humanitarian services that are not currently carried out by NGOs.

Based on what is known about the full range of possible events on the Korean Peninsula that could increase NGO activity in North Korea, this thesis's contribution is to identify and map the networks of NGO and IO operations and assess the scope and scale

⁴⁹ Baek, *North Korea's Hidden Revolution*.

⁵⁰ ReliefWeb, "DPR Korea Needs and Priorities."

⁵¹ Jonathan Cheng, "U.N. Appeals for Aid to North Korea as Donations Drop," *Wall Street Journal*, April 13, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-appeals-for-aid-to-north-korea-as-donations-drop-1523609690>.


⁵² CARE International, "Suffering in Silence," accessed April 29, 2018, <https://www.care-international.org/suffering-in-silence/>.

of those operations. This is to assist the United States and South Korea to efficiently utilize their resources to quickly alleviate human suffering in the DPRK.

B. METHODOLOGY

We identify NGOs that operate on the Korean Peninsula through open-source media and research. The UN cluster approach organizes HA capabilities into 11 categories (see Figure 3).⁵³ These deconflict responsibility for HA response and provide a structure for organizational responsibility in an emergency. As such, this thesis uses this model to categorize and classify the NGOs on the peninsula to assess their capability and determine relational ties between these organizations for humanitarian emergency response.

Figure 3. The UN Cluster Approach⁵⁴



⁵³ "Cluster Approach (IASC)," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], accessed July 25, 2018, <https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/61190/cluster-approach-iasc>.

⁵⁴ Source: UNHCR, "Cluster Approach (IASC)."

Specifically, this thesis analyzes networks that exist between NGOs (often through IO implementation) that operate on the Korean Peninsula. We evaluate NGO activities on the peninsula organized by the UN cluster approach and plotted through social network analysis (SNA) to gain a clearer understanding of what resources already exist and how they are organized and leveraged. Analysis of HA operations with the program enables the team to construct visual representatives of networks and NGO activity over time.

Research and Methodology Limitations

The language barrier between English and Hangul (the Korean language) limits the information available for research. Although we used available reference material in English, and we consulted Korean speakers on source material in Hangul, the inability to conduct research in Hangul excluded access to some information. We used English-language secondary sources when primary sources in Hangul or English were unavailable.

There are over 300 NGOs registered with the MOU in South Korea. This thesis does not analyze NGO operations by South Korean NGOs in other regions of the world. Rather, its focus is on the role of NGOs included in the HA and crisis response plans of the government of South Korea for operations on the Korean Peninsula. To be concise, it was necessary to limit the scope by focusing on only active organizations and organizations that are short-listed by the MOU for crisis response in the DPRK.

Humanitarian operations and activities in the DPRK are the most secretive of any country in the world. We made some inferences based on external evidence about the existence and capability of some organizations because we lacked the ability to independently verify their operations. The testimony of defectors and self-reporting by NGOs of what activities are conducted in North Korea are two types of sources from which we made inferences. Long-standing humanitarian organizations, such as the Eugene Bell Foundation, and respected media outlets, such as *NK News*, form the backbone of inferences and predictions about humanitarian operations in North Korea.

This thesis's classification level is unclassified. However, the complete details of ROK crisis management plans are confidential and have not been released to the public. The military operational plans of both the United States and ROK are classified. We

derived the most accurate account of crisis response possible with the available open source information. Our recommendation is for a secondary effort to further develop this thesis through the use confidential and classified source documentation.

C. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter I has introduced the conditions in which NGOs can operate in the DPRK and the complexity of humanitarian operations in the closed society. It has also described strategic options in limiting the DPRK's WMD program and how some options impact humanitarian operations and civilian living conditions in the country.

Chapter II lays out how the donor-recipient relationship developed on the Korean Peninsula. It highlights the changes that took place after the fall of the Soviet Union and how those changes created an aid-dependent DPRK. Chapter II also describes the reasons for the development of a robust HADR capability in South Korea.

Chapter III outlines the historical involvement of NGOs in North Korea. It expands on greater regional dynamics over the past 23 years that impact aid to a greater level than just need alone. This chapter lays the foundation for Chapter IV by providing context for the changes in NGO operations and the different levels of funding to NGOs over the years.

Chapter IV draws on SNA to analyze the NGO network over time. This approach assists with understanding the qualities of NGOs that make them the most persistent and resilient organizations conducting operations in a constrained environment. The chapter also demonstrates how the wider geopolitics of U.S.-ROK-DPRK relations affect HADR in North Korea.

Chapter V offers conclusions based on the thesis's analysis, as well as recommendations for U.S.-ROK HADR capacity building and utilization. Finally, it also describes the current conditions for HADR in North Korea and makes recommendations for U.S. forces in crisis response planning for NGOs on the Korean Peninsula.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. EVOLUTION OF HADR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

This chapter lays out some of the distinct historical conditions and events that shaped the development of HADR NGOs in South Korea. The North Korean government has prevented the growth of independent organizations, and so North Korean citizens have been completely reliant on government institutions that weakened after the end of the Cold War, a situation that ultimately has resulted in a series of crises. Economic success and repeated crisis events on the Korean Peninsula have motivated the ROK government and humanitarian organizations to foster crisis response capacity to respond to humanitarian crisis in North Korea partly for the purpose of unification.⁵⁵ This chapter outlines the development of NGOs in South Korea and the participation of the South Korean government in NGO HADR capacity-building. It also discusses how HA to North Korea is both apolitical and political.

For purposes of general discussion, we use the terms “crisis” and “disaster” interchangeably.⁵⁶ While there are some subtle differences between the use of “disaster” and “crisis” in the literature, there is no single definition of catastrophic events. Here, we refer to catastrophic events or events that exceed the ability of people to maintain daily life operations and cause significant harm, as both “crisis” and “disaster” with no distinction between the two.⁵⁷ We also use the terms “aid” and “assistance” interchangeably because different organizations refer to the same type of humanitarian support in North Korea by both terms.

⁵⁵ International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

⁵⁶ Hajer Al-Dahash, Menaha Thayaparan, and Udayangani Kalatunga, “Understanding the Terminologies: Disaster, Crisis, and Emergency,” *Proceedings 32nd Annual ARCOM Conference 2* (2016): 1191–1200, <http://www.arcom.ac.uk/-docs/proceedings/9ac79958d9024495cd81e13909ed08cb.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Al-Dahash, Thayaparan, and Kalatunga, “Understanding the Terminologies.”

A. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND HADR

There is a relationship between poor governance, economics, and humanitarian need.⁵⁸ External assistance is usually leveraged to save lives and promote stability for countries lacking internal crisis response capacity.⁵⁹ Economic conditions and politics in the DPRK and the ROK impact the degree of vulnerability from disaster and the crisis response capacity by each country. On the Korean Peninsula, South Korea can leverage resources that North Korea cannot leverage. This is unfortunate since potential disasters range from extreme seasonal weather patterns, such as typhoons and earthquakes, to all-out war.⁶⁰

North Korea's 1990s famine was a pivotal moment for disaster response on the peninsula. It claimed an estimated three million North Korean lives.⁶¹ The extent of the crisis shocked the international community, including the responding NGOs.⁶² Flake and Snyder identified how North Korea's appeal for HA was the first opportunity for organizations such as NGOs and international humanitarian aid organizations to gain access to the closed society.⁶³ More symbolically, North Korea became the recipient of aid from its greatest rival, South Korea.⁶⁴

The reversal of economic fortunes of the Koreas impacted the population's access to resources and its resiliency in crisis since financial health of a country is a critical component to HADR. An economically strong South Korea and economically weak North Korea was not an obvious outcome in the decades shortly after the end of the Korean War. As described by Victor Cha in his book *The Impossible State*, at the end of WWII, North

⁵⁸ Lael Brainard, *Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty and American Leadership* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 25-26.

⁵⁹ Brainard, *Security by Other Means*.

⁶⁰ International Organization of Migration, "Overview of the Republic of Korea's Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance System."

⁶¹ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

⁶² Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*.

⁶³ Flake and Snyder.

⁶⁴ Flake and Snyder.

Korea had a more advanced industrial capacity due to rich natural resources imperial Japan developed during the colonial era.⁶⁵ Whereas South Korea was an agricultural center, North Korea was an industrial hub, containing 80 percent of the heavy industrial capacity on the peninsula in 1945.⁶⁶ Even though much of this capacity was destroyed in the 1950–1953 Korean War, China and the Soviet Union quickly aided the DPRK in rebuilding.⁶⁷

Cha goes on to discuss that by many standards, North Korea was the more advanced country on the peninsula for approximately 30 years. During the 1960s and 1970s, it enjoyed relative economic success while the South Korean economy sputtered in spite of the fact that it received robust foreign aid, principally from the United States.⁶⁸ Continued foreign assistance, such as economic aid and trade pacts with Cold War allies, were fundamental to the North Korean economic strength and the development of its industries, infrastructure, and agriculture.⁶⁹

There are several factors why the North Korean economy began its downward turn from the late 1980s through the 1990s. The most significant factor was the end of aid it received from the Soviet Union and China.⁷⁰ From the end of the Cold War in the 1980s, the North Korean economy stagnated while the South Korean economy began a distinct upward trajectory as the country democratized.⁷¹ The economic reversal of fortunes eclipsed previous predictions and expert analysis on North and South Korea. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 2015 the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for North Korea was \$1,700. In the same year, South Korea had a per capita GDP of \$37,000.⁷² South Korea currently boasts the fifteenth largest

⁶⁵ Cha, *The Impossible State*.

⁶⁶ Cha.

⁶⁷ Cha.

⁶⁸ Cha.

⁶⁹ Cha.

⁷⁰ Cha.

⁷¹ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

⁷² Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea,” accessed October 15, 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>.

economy in the world.⁷³ The economic gap between the two countries continues to tangibly impact the day-to-day circumstances of North Korea citizens as well as North Korea's ability to prevent and respond to crisis events.

The results of the two economic paths and governmental spending priorities is most apparent in the areas of food security and health care. Over the past 30 years, South Korea has advanced in providing universal health care coverage, and the country has one of the longest life expectancies in the world, while North Koreans suffer from MDR-TB, malaria, and malnutrition, which leads to poor brain development and stunting among other chronic health issues.⁷⁴ In 2006, it is estimated that the North Korean regime spent only one dollar per person for health care. Hospitals lacked basic supplies and clean, running water.⁷⁵ The 2015 SOFI report stated that 10.3 million people out of the total population of 24.8 million were undernourished in 2017.⁷⁶ By these measures, the people in the DPRK live in a perpetual low-level humanitarian crisis situation.

B. DEVELOPMENT AND REPRESSION OF THE INDEPENDENT SOCIETY

The inequality in crisis management and disaster response capacity between the two Koreas is in part economic, but it is also in part due to the very different conditions of the individual citizens in each country. NGO development requires a passionate society with a space to organize and the belief that social issues are the responsibility of the people, not just the government.⁷⁷ South Korea's independently-minded culture has been instrumental in shaping the country's success, even its modern democracy. By contrast, North Korea's totalitarian regime has actively discouraged independent thought and

⁷³ Cha, *The Impossible State*, 7.

⁷⁴ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *State of Food Security*; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes: Policies for Better Health and Quality of Care*, OECD Health Policy Studies (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Publishing, 2015), <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264233010-en>.

⁷⁵ Cha, *The Impossible State*.

⁷⁶ World Food Programme, "Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

⁷⁷ David Korten, *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda* (Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1990).

activities, and this has created complete dependency upon the government, as is intended.⁷⁸ In North Korea, there is no concept of an organization that is “nongovernmental.”⁷⁹ Every aspect of a North Korean’s personal and public life is regulated by the state.⁸⁰ For North Korea, duties and rights are based on collectivism. Individualism is seen as a threat and a negative trait.⁸¹ The highly structured and controlled lives of North Koreans, as well as the regime’s use of fear and mutual mistrust, undermines the ability of individuals to organize outside of official state functions.⁸²

The *inminban*, or “people’s groups,” is a particularly effective mechanism for the state to surveil its citizen’s private lives in their homes and communities. The *inminban* records finite details of daily life, such as which families share common areas as well as their incomes and assets. It is responsible for reporting suspicious activity by any member in the community. Travel outside of one’s village, which is a routine pattern of life for most people in the world, requires a pass.⁸³ Even beyond physical controls and monitoring, the required indoctrination and “mutual criticism sessions” control peoples’ time.⁸⁴ The combination of the constant monitoring and control with the fear of internment (sometimes including one’s family members) in political prison camps successfully quells outright deviation from any prescribed behavior.⁸⁵

The former PDS was the cornerstone to the distribution of all goods but most importantly, food rations.⁸⁶ Laws prohibiting the private sale of grains, and the relative unavailability outside of the rationing system of most goods, cemented complete control of the population by the state. When the PDS ceased to function during the famine of the

⁷⁸ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*.

⁷⁹ Flake and Snyder.

⁸⁰ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

⁸¹ Cha, *The Impossible State*.

⁸² Cha.

⁸³ Cha.

⁸⁴ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

⁸⁵ Lankov.

⁸⁶ Lankov.

1990s, North Korean citizens forced to survive without government support did so through activities such as the creation of private market exchanges. Although these are now a common part of the society, they are not publicly acknowledged activities since, technically, they are illegal.⁸⁷

In South Korea, civil society space is mostly unrestricted. South Korea grew much of its democracy out of coordinated grassroots political activism in the “June Democracy Movement in 1987.”⁸⁸ As democratic ideals took root, so did domestic civic organizations such as NGOs.⁸⁹ This eventually led to their incorporation into the South Korean governmental institutional organization.⁹⁰

The famine in the 1990s in North Korea was a catalyst for the expansion of HADR organizations in South Korea. South Korean religious organizations shaped government policy through their robust HADR response to starvation in the DPRK.⁹¹ This increased capability in disaster assistance led to increased funding for NGOs by the South Korean government and greater South Korean participation in international HA.⁹² The increased capacity of South Korean NGOs and networks of experts, donors, and other IO support HA has been a critical component of peaceful reunification.⁹³

C. NGOS AND THE ROK GOVERNMENT

Aid to North Korea by the South Korean government is constrained by both the regional security environment and domestic politics.⁹⁴ NGOs can operate when

⁸⁷ Daniel Tudor and James Pearson, *North Korea Confidential: Private Markets, Fashion Trends, Prison Camps, Dissenters and Defectors* (Rutland, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 2015).

⁸⁸ Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads*.

⁸⁹ Hyuk-Rae Kim, “The State and Civil Society in Transition: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in South Korea,” *Pacific Review* 13, no. 4 (January 2000): 595–613, <https://doi.org/10.1080/095127400455341>.

⁹⁰ Kim, “The State and Civil Society.”

⁹¹ Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads*.

⁹² International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

⁹³ International Organization of Migration.

⁹⁴ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*.

intergovernmental conflict prevents direct country-to-country aid, and South Korean NGOs can facilitate inter-Korean reconciliation in a manner that ROK to DPRK governmental interaction cannot.⁹⁵ Thus, NGOs play an important role in inter-Korean relations and efforts toward unification. They are also a critical component of the government of South Korea's HADR planning and disaster response.⁹⁶

Articles 3 and 4 of the South Korean Constitution assert that the entire Korean Peninsula is its legitimate territory. As such, the South Korean government sees the people living in North Korea as citizens to whom it is responsible to extend protection and assistance.⁹⁷ For many South Koreans, assistance to the people living in the DPRK is a legal obligation, but more importantly, it is viewed as a moral imperative to extend democracy and freedom to the entire peninsula.⁹⁸

Operations by domestic South Korean NGOs are divided into two categories: North Korean or other. Although some organizations conduct both North Korean-focused activities and non-North Korean activities, there is a defined internal organizational separation between the two distinct operational foci. The division of operational focus typically includes separate allocations of personnel and resources.⁹⁹

During the 1990s famine in North Korea, NGO aid and HA uncontrolled by the ROK impacted the ROK's government's ability to use aid as a political tool.¹⁰⁰ According to Flake and Snyder, the ROK's attempt to control North-South activity and prevent HA through a "single-channel" policy resulted in conflict between it and the NGOs.¹⁰¹ The strongly-held belief by many South Koreans that NGOs should be able to provide aid culminated in the 1996 Peace Conference where there was a mass call for a multichannel

⁹⁵ Flake and Snyder.

⁹⁶ International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

⁹⁷ International Organization of Migration.

⁹⁸ O, *The Collapse of North Korea*.

⁹⁹ Park, "NGOs in South Korea."

¹⁰⁰ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*.

¹⁰¹ Flake and Snyder.

policy to aid the DPRK.¹⁰² Organizations solicited increased support for North Korea and formed the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) to provide aid for the purpose of reconciliation.¹⁰³ By 1997, the multichannel policy allowed for individual NGOs to operate in North Korea.¹⁰⁴

Flake and Snyder explain how South Korea's Sunshine Policy was an attempt by President Kim Dae-jung to improve the inter-Korean relations. From 1998 to 2007, ROK NGOs were able to expand efforts from aid to capacity building.¹⁰⁵ NGOs assisted in furthering the government's intent to demonstrate goodwill toward North Korea through assistance and cooperation.¹⁰⁶ In 2001, the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (KNCCNK) was established to improve the relationship between NGOs and the South Korean government.¹⁰⁷

Currently, South Korean NGO activities in North Korea are channeled through the MOU, which was established in 1969.¹⁰⁸ All domestic and international NGOs based in South Korea are registered with the MOU. There are several reasons for the registration requirement. First, NGO capacity is considered a national-level resource that could be mobilized as part of the government's North-South unification plan.¹⁰⁹ Second, due to the sensitivity of North-South operations and laws regulating independent interactions with North Korea by South Koreans, the MOU is the important control point for all activities in the DPRK.¹¹⁰ Third, sanctions prohibit the transfer of some material and equipment into North Korea. Even charitable activities of NGOs require oversight and regulation to

¹⁰² Flake and Snyder.

¹⁰³ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁰⁴ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁰⁵ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁰⁶ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁰⁷ International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

¹⁰⁸ International Organization of Migration.

¹⁰⁹ International Organization of Migration.

¹¹⁰ International Organization of Migration.

prevent the unlawful transfer of contraband.¹¹¹ Finally, the MOU independently vets the capacity and capability of NGOs and places them on a separate list of authorized response organizations. This ensures that each NGO has the adequate qualifications to conduct crisis management or HADR activity in the DPRK.¹¹²

The ROK now has organizations with robust HADR capacity and formal structures in both its greater society and in the government. And yet, due to a unique historical state of affairs between the DPRK and the ROK, the establishment of NGOs in South Korea and their role in disaster relief in North Korea for over 20 years has distinctive qualities separate from NGO operations in other countries. The challenges of providing aid continue to shape organizations and approaches to assisting the people of the DPRK when crisis emerges. The historical operations of NGOs in North Korea, specifically South Korea NGOs, are explained in the following chapter.

¹¹¹ International Organization of Migration.

¹¹² “Brief Information,” Ministry of Unification, accessed October 15, 2018, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/about/aboutmou/infomation/.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 1995–2017

The surreptitious manipulation of many humanitarian operations in North Korea has often obscured the humanitarian objectives of such aid. Aid to North Korea has become a political tool used by both the international community and the DPRK to meet their own objectives. Since it is an instrument of power for both the donor and recipient, the amount and type of aid is often determined more by the desire to achieve a particular political outcome than a particular need.¹¹³ Since the administration of aid originates with or through NGOs, their operations are nested within the context of greater aid relations with North Korea.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea has relied on other international assistance.¹¹⁴ Uncontrollable environmental conditions, poor farming practices, extreme seasonal flooding made worse by deforestation, and lack of chemical fertilizers have made North Korean food self-sufficiency unrealistic, if not impossible. Medical services fare no better. For example, North Korea has one of the highest tuberculosis rates in the world.¹¹⁵ Early on, HA and international governmental generosity hinged on the belief that supporting the needs of North Koreans in the short term was beneficial because the regime's collapse was believed to be imminent.¹¹⁶ However, nearly 23 years since North Korea asked for assistance from the UN, it has defied analysts' dire predictions, and its economy is growing at a steady pace.¹¹⁷ Ironically, however, its

¹¹³ Choe, "Sanctions Are Hurting North Korea."

¹¹⁴ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*; Cha, *The Impossible State*.

¹¹⁵ Kwonjune Seung, "Why Is the Global Fund Pulling out of North Korea?" May 2, 2018, <https://www.nknews.org/2018/05/why-is-the-global-fund-pulling-out-of-north-korea/>.

¹¹⁶ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

¹¹⁷ David Volodzko, "North Korea's Secret Weapon? Economic Growth," *Bloomberg*, September 14, 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-09-14/north-korea-s-secret-weapon-economic-growth>.

economic growth is linked to the increased size of the privatized market, which the government does not officially acknowledge.¹¹⁸

North Korea receives a disproportionate amount of aid compared to other countries of similar size.¹¹⁹ From 1995 to 2005, the international community gave it millions of dollars in unfettered aid in an attempt to build trust and encourage its leadership to abandon their nuclear weapons program.¹²⁰ Over 10 million metric tons of food aid alone was sent to the DPRK during those 10 years.¹²¹ Yet, it is estimated that by 2005, the regime had diverted 30 percent of the aid to support its own agenda, including weapons development and its military.¹²²

A. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 1995–2008

Since 1995, the presence of NGOs and financial support for humanitarian operations has reflected the nature of geopolitical relationships and activities more than the humanitarian needs inside North Korea. The North Korean government attracts aid by playing games with the international community.¹²³ For example, by creating a crisis to escalate tensions, it has extorted payments and compromises from the international community in return for restoring the peaceful status quo.¹²⁴ Even before the DPRK sought aid in 1995, it used various tactics to extract aid. For instance, since 1994, several major diplomatic efforts to curb aggressive rogue activity by the regime has been tied to aid.¹²⁵ The North Korean government prefers unconditional aid, and it tries to manipulate the international community to acquire aid packages that lack the standard oversight conditions

¹¹⁸ Volodzko, “North Korea’s Secret Weapon.”

¹¹⁹ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

¹²⁰ Lankov.

¹²¹ “Total Humanitarian Aid,” North Korea in the World, accessed May 10, 2018, <https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/humanitarian/humanitarian-aid>.

¹²² Haggard and Noland, *Famine in North Korea*.

¹²³ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

¹²⁴ Lankov, 191.

¹²⁵ Arms Control Association, “Chronology of US-North Korean.”

for monitoring.¹²⁶ In addition, it places more stringent controls on NGOs from the United States and South Korea. It does not grant them residency in Pyongyang, and so they must rely on organizations inside North Korea, such as the World Food Program (WFP), to administer and monitor their aid.¹²⁷

The mid-1990s collapse of the North Korean PDS was thought to be a watershed moment for international community intervention into North Korea's closed society.¹²⁸ Flake and Snyder illustrate that the PDS was the primary method through which food and resources were distributed to North Korean citizens.¹²⁹ Although the PDS system was nonfunctional, the early stages of aid distribution in North Korea challenged aid workers because they lacked a humanitarian space to operate in. Previous experience and training were insufficient to understand the complexity of the crisis and the political dynamics to operate in such a unique humanitarian environment.¹³⁰ Even so, Flake and Snyder state that in 1996, the UN WFP set up offices to manage the aid distribution and NGO operations. At that time, there were approximately 15 NGOs operating in North Korea although not all of them had permanent residency.¹³¹

Furthermore, they argue that the first years of HA to the DPRK (1995–2001) set the conditions and tone for future NGO and governmental crisis response and HADR operations. Unlike governments of other countries facing similar humanitarian challenges, the North Korean government acquired and retained control of humanitarian operations inside the country. This reduced the ability of NGOs to transparently administer aid and abide by humanitarian norms. Additionally, it was difficult for them to assess the need and impact of aid accurately, monitor where assistance was going, and ensure that resources were utilized as donors intended.¹³² For example, many districts were off limits to

¹²⁶ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

¹²⁷ Zadeh-Cummings, "Aid from the Enemy."

¹²⁸ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*.

¹²⁹ Flake and Snyder.

¹³⁰ Flake and Snyder.

¹³¹ Flake and Snyder.

¹³² Flake and Snyder.

humanitarian organizations, and the DPRK insisted on unilateral assistance to the restricted areas.¹³³ Later, the international community learned that this was because of the DPRK's intentional effort to fund its weapons program by using humanitarian aid to augment its own expenditure on food and not to supplement its limited supplies.¹³⁴ Ironically, international humanitarian aid was instrumental in funding the weapons programs the international donors condemned.

Operational constraints in violation of humanitarian norms continue to affect aid to North Korea.¹³⁵ From the outset, the North Korean government monitored and controlled all interactions between aid workers and North Koreans, and until 2004, the DPRK only permitted non-Korean speaking aid workers into the country.¹³⁶ This forced NGOs to operate with limited information and only indirect contact with the average North Korean.¹³⁷ It also ensured that the NGOs did not expose the average North Korean to external ideas or information.¹³⁸

Flake and Snyder illustrate how the DPRK prevented NGOs and other international organizations from monitoring food deliveries per humanitarian operational norms.¹³⁹ NGOs were unable to validate whether their resources reached the intended recipients.¹⁴⁰ This systematic control of humanitarian operations by the government led to two responses by NGOs to continued HADR operations in the DPRK. Some ceased all operations and withdrew from the country. According to Flake and Snyder, others continued to operate, believing that their efforts had the potential to bring positive change to North Korea.¹⁴¹

¹³³ Haggard and Noland, *Famine in North Korea*.

¹³⁴ O, *The Collapse of North Korea*.

¹³⁵ Seung, "Why Is the Global Fund Pulling out of North Korea?"

¹³⁶ Haggard and Noland, *Famine in North Korea*.

¹³⁷ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*.

¹³⁸ Flake and Snyder.

¹³⁹ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁴⁰ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁴¹ Flake and Snyder.

The dissemination of “negative information” was a constant concern for North Korean officials.¹⁴² Flake and Snyder illustrate how careful orchestration of the aid worker activities protected it from outside criticism.¹⁴³ The inability to conduct accurate assessments and submit accurate reports created a dilemma for NGOs. An NGO reporting on the current humanitarian situation and conditions in North Korea risked expulsion or increased constraints on their humanitarian activities.¹⁴⁴ However, the under-reporting of the extent of the humanitarian crisis frustrated humanitarian organizations and contributed to donor fatigue for North Korean causes.¹⁴⁵

Several other points are noted by Flake and Snyder. The insertion of ROK aid into North Korea was highly controlled by the South Korean government. The ROK enacted a single channel policy from 1995 to 1998, which meant that aid was routed through the ROK Red Cross to the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) for delivery into North Korea.¹⁴⁶ In 1998, however, ROK NGOs began unilaterally supplying aid to the DPRK.¹⁴⁷ The opening of multichannel policy increased participation by NGOs which could now independently set up operations with contacts in North Korea.

Since 1997, the level of aid given to North Korea by South Korea has fluctuated depending upon whether the president is from the conservative or progressive party.¹⁴⁸ Conservative administrations take a hardline stance and favor a policy of containment, whereas progressive administrations prefer a policy of engagement.¹⁴⁹ The Sunshine Policy was initiated by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in 1997 and lasted through the presidency of his successor, Roh Moo Hyun, in 2008.¹⁵⁰ The policy’s relatively long

¹⁴² Flake and Snyder.

¹⁴³ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁴⁴ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁴⁵ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁴⁶ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁴⁷ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁴⁸ Park, “NGOs in South Korea.”

¹⁴⁹ Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads*.

¹⁵⁰ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

length was due to the fact that both Presidents Kim and Roh were progressives who believed that the road to the normalization of relations, and perhaps even unification with North Korea, would occur through political and economic engagement.¹⁵¹ They assumed that engagement with North Korea would force the international community, including North Korea, to support greater involvement in the international market community.¹⁵² In 2007, at the height of the Sunshine Policy, private and government sources gave North Korea \$466,707,349 in aid.¹⁵³ In 2001, South Korean NGOs accounted for almost 80 percent of the total South Korean aid, which well exceeded that given by the international community.¹⁵⁴ The original expansion of NGO efforts began with the DPRK's request for aid, but NGO numbers surged with South Korea's increased support.

Creative approaches to humanitarian operations by NGOs and international organizations allowed for greater access and coordination of efforts. One example is the NGO consortium named InterAction. This U.S.-based association, in cooperation with United States Agency for International Development (USAID), was instrumental in the initial coordination of NGO activity in North Korea.¹⁵⁵ InterAction founded the InterAction North Korean Working Group as a platform for information dissemination and coordination for U.S. NGOs operating in North Korea.¹⁵⁶ It assisted with the creation of the Food Aid Liaison Unit in Pyongyang, which represented resident and non-resident NGOs and facilitated communication between NGOs and Pyongyang, as well as carrying out monitoring and coordination.¹⁵⁷ However, the efforts of InterAction in North Korea were complicated by NGOs fearing consolidated efforts assisted the DPRK in controlling

¹⁵¹ Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads*.

¹⁵² Snyder.

¹⁵³ "North Korea in the World: Humanitarian Aid," North Korea in the World, <https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/humanitarian/humanitarian-aid>.

¹⁵⁴ Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads*.

¹⁵⁵ Flake and Snyder, *Paved with Good Intentions*.

¹⁵⁶ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁵⁷ Flake and Snyder.

the aid it received.¹⁵⁸ InterAction also assisted in forming the U.S. Private Voluntary Organization Consortium (PVOC), which, in part, oversaw the distribution of U.S. aid from 1997 to 1999. At the height of its operations, the PVOC had a total membership of 10 IOs and NGOs.¹⁵⁹ However, although organizations affiliated with InterAction continue to conduct humanitarian operations in the DPRK, very little information about their activities is available.

During the early 2000s, NGO operations in the DPRK were subjected to external and internal operational stressors. The international community contributed a total of \$2.3 billion of assistance to North Korea from 1995 to 2005. However, by 2002, donor fatigue set in due to North Korea's uncooperative humanitarian environment and the strain on the humanitarian community to respond to crisis events in other parts of the world, and in 2008, U.S. NGOs delivering aid were expelled from North Korea for unknown reasons.¹⁶⁰

B. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 2009–2017

Many factors affected HA to the DPRK in the years between 2009 and 2017. During this period, the United States provided very little assistance. It reduced aid to the DPRK when the latter withdrew from the six-party talks and continued its missile and nuclear weapon testing.¹⁶¹ At first, South Korea supplemented some of the aid, but it eventually reverted to a policy of containment. For many years, China has supplemented the downturn in U.S. and ROK aid in part to stabilize North Korea and prevent North Koreans from crossing the border into China.¹⁶² Aid to North Korea from the UN and NGOs fell to its

¹⁵⁸ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁵⁹ Flake and Snyder.

¹⁶⁰ Haggard and Noland, *Famine in North Korea*.

¹⁶¹ Mark. E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, *Foreign Assistance to North Korea* CRS Report No. R400095 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), <https://fas.org/sfp/crs/row/R40095.pdf>.

¹⁶² Lankov, *The Real North Korea*.

lowest level in 2010. This was a response to North Korea's sinking of a South Korean naval ship, the *Cheonan*, which led to the death of 46 sailors.¹⁶³

In general, NGOs that foster their own working relationships in North Korea are usually able to preserve operations during times of political tension. The Eugene Bell Foundation, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and the Christian Friends of Korea (CHFK) are all examples of small religious NGOs that have built structurally-sound working relationships in North Korea and can usually operate outside of the geopolitical constraints.¹⁶⁴

The Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (KNCCNK) is an umbrella organization for more than 50 NGOs based in Seoul. Founded in 1999, it has persisted in overseeing NGO operations and humanitarian aid to North Korea, even if those efforts are limited by the geopolitical situation.¹⁶⁵ The number of participating NGOs in the KNCCNK has grown from 21 members in 2001 to 54 members in 2015, many of which are registered with the MOU.¹⁶⁶

Aid to North Korea is factored into South Korea's annual budget and is reflective of needs and geopolitical dynamics as documented in a report by the IOM.¹⁶⁷ Aid is administered through the government, ROK NGOs, or the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (i.e., the Korean channel for international organizations).¹⁶⁸ South Korea's governments from 2009 through the beginning of 2017 were relatively conservative, which is why they embraced a policy of containment instead of engagement and funneled aid through IOs and NGOs in lieu of direct support.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ He-suk Choi, "'Government Looking into Ending May 24 Measures on NK': Foreign Minister Kang," *Korea Herald*, October 10, 2018, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20181010000750>.

¹⁶⁴ Zadeh-Cummings, "Aid from the Enemy."

¹⁶⁵ International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

¹⁶⁶ International Organization of Migration.

¹⁶⁷ International Organization of Migration.

¹⁶⁸ International Organization of Migration.

¹⁶⁹ International Organization of Migration.

The IOM report documented how different administrations focused on different types of aid. The Kim Yong-sam (1993–1998), Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), Roh Moo-huyn (2003–2008), and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) administrations focused primarily on vulnerable populations, while the administration of President Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) focused on general aid and emergency relief.¹⁷⁰ Changes in operational focus require different NGO and humanitarian response capacities. The increase in support for NGO activity in 2017 by the Moon Jae-in administration bolstered NGO activity and capacity.¹⁷¹ In 2017, there were officially 100 NGOs registered with the MOU in South Korea. The majority of these are faith-based and focused on inter-Korean unification and reconciliation.¹⁷² Chapter IV of this thesis further identifies how variation in administration priorities requires different NGO capabilities which are leveraged to achieve the South Korean government’s goals.

C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Although NGO capacity has grown in the United States, Europe, and South Korea, only half the humanitarian organizations operating in North Korea in 2010 are still operating today.¹⁷³ Sanctions debilitate NGO resourcing, and the underfunding of general aid affects the ability of organizations to conduct HA and crisis management in North Korea. The UN has stopped some nutritional programs due to a 90 percent funding shortfall.¹⁷⁴ In the current environment of efforts, cooperation toward denuclearization and the economics of humanitarian aid and politics are closely linked, and NGOs find themselves caught in a unique operational environment. However, there is growing

¹⁷⁰ International Organization of Migration.

¹⁷¹ International Organization of Migration.

¹⁷² International Organization of Migration.

¹⁷³ Anna Fifield, “Sanctions Are Hurting Aid Efforts—and Ordinary People—in North Korea,” *Washington Post*, December 16, 2017, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sanctions-are-hurting-aid-efforts--and-ordinary-people--in-north-korea/2017/12/15/df57fe6e-e109-11e7-b2e9-8c636f076c76_story.html.

¹⁷⁴ Hyonhee Shin, “As Food Crisis Threatens, Humanitarian Aid for North Korea Grinds to a Halt,” *Reuters*, August 20, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-aid-insight/as-food-crisis-threatens-humanitarian-aid-for-north-korea-grinds-to-a-halt-idUSKCN1L529H>.

potential for NGO operations in North Korea as the “neo-Sunshine Policy” relations between the ROK and DPRK continue to progress toward a peaceful resolution to a decades-long conflict.¹⁷⁵

Since 1995, North Korea has allowed at least 215 NGOs to operate in North Korea.¹⁷⁶ How external and internal factors affect the number and type of NGOs operating at any one time can be visually depicted using SNA software. Thus, the focus of Chapter IV is to analyze the changes in the capabilities and size of NGO networks from 1995 to 2018. This provides the baseline data for recommendations on NGO integration into HADR planning by U.S. forces in Korea and the ROK.

¹⁷⁵ Berkshire J. Miller, “Great Aspiration: Inter-Korea Relations Going Forward,” *Aljazeera*, May 4, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/great-aspirations-inter-korea-relations-180504095245725.html>.

¹⁷⁶ Zadeh-Cummings, “Aid from the Enemy.”

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DISASTER RESPONSE NETWORK TO NORTH KOREA

This chapter draws on SNA to analyze the NGO-IO network over time. SNA is “a collection of theories and methods that assume the behavior of actors (whether individuals, groups, or organizations) is profoundly affected by their ties to others and the networks in which they are embedded.”¹⁷⁷ SNA not only allows analysts to record the actors and the ties between them, it also includes tools to allow them to quantify, test, and predict various social phenomena within the network.¹⁷⁸ Put differently, as Everton explains, “SNA is based on the assumption that actors’ behavior is driven by how they are linked to others and the network in which they are embedded.”¹⁷⁹ Moreover, as Everton also notes, “social networks are an important concept for understanding the needs, motivations, and capacities of individuals in a society.”¹⁸⁰ In the context of our thesis, SNA can assist with gaining an understanding of the qualities of NGOs that make them the most persistent and resilient organizations conducting operations in a constrained environment. Building on the historical involvement of NGOs in North Korea discussed in Chapter III, this chapter provides analysis and visual representation of the NGO network as it changed over time in reaction to the broader geopolitics of U.S.-ROK-DPRK relations toward HADR in North Korea. Unless noted otherwise, we conducted this chapter’s SNA using the Programs UCINET, ORA, and PAJEK.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5.

¹⁷⁸ Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, and Philip Murphy, *Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

¹⁷⁹ Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 5.

¹⁸⁰ Everton, 5.

¹⁸¹ Stephen P. Borgatti, Martine G. Everett, and Linton C. Freeman, *UCINET* (version 6.666) (Harvard MA: Analytical Technologies, 2002); Kathleen M. Carley, *Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA)* (version 1.2) (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon); Vladimir Batageli and Andrej Mrvar, *PAJEK* (version 5.01) (Ljubljana, Slovenia: University of Ljubljana, 2017).

A. NETWORK BOUNDARIES

The data and information we used to build this dataset are exclusively constructed from open source materials regarding the humanitarian efforts from both ROK NGOs and/or IOs specifically for North Korea. The data we derived from these sources cover the years 1995–2018. We used 1995 as the beginning point because it is when North Korea reached out to the international community for HA in light of a significant natural disaster that was beyond the capacity of the North Korean government to address. The data for 2018 are unfortunately (but necessarily) incomplete because as of this writing 2018 still has two months to go; we take this into account in our analysis below. The data and humanitarian information came from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Democratic People’s Republic (UNOCHA DPR) Korea needs and priorities yearly documents, International IOM 2018 document on the Korean Peninsula, Congressional Research Service reports, Relief Web, MOU website, and the *NK News* scraping feature of multiple news sources reporting on North Korean events. In building the network and deciding which actors to include, we used a hybrid of both the realist and nominalist approaches. The realist approach is when the actors define the boundaries, whereas with the nominalist approach the analyst imposes the network boundaries.¹⁸² We used five basic criteria when deciding which NGOs and IOs to include in our network:

1. They had to be based in South Korea.
2. They had to be included in one of the following “lists”:
 - a. Listed in the IOM document as NGOs working on humanitarian assistance to North Korea and officially approved by MOU.
 - b. Affiliated under the KNCCNK, including the ones that were not in the IOM document.
 - c. IOs with residence in North Korea, to include the European Union Project Support units.
 - d. Any additional IOs listed on the UNOCHA DPR Korea needs and priorities yearly documents as other nonresident agencies.

¹⁸² Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 77-78.

Although plenty of sources were collated on the general topic of larger NGOs and other IOs operating within North Korea, credible or existing sources that revealed specific NGOs, their capacity, and area of operation was severely limited, thus stifling our ability to provide comprehensive information on the topic. A total of 108 NGOs/IOs are included in the network. See Appendix 1 for a complete listing of all 108 NGOs/IOs.

1. Network Ties (Relations)

We created a two-mode network titled *Years Active* consisting of 108 NGOs and IOs by the years (1995 to 2018) in which they provided HA to North Korea, whether the assistance was ongoing or in response to a natural disaster. Data for IOs were more readily available through open-source sites than they were for ROK NGOs. We used the MOU registration date as the year the ROK NGOs became active in the network. If the date was unavailable, then we used the date provided on the NGO's website or from open-source documentation. The base document for when ROK NGOs were active came from the MOU website and lists when the ROK government financially supported HA efforts to North Korea through NGOs. Unfortunately, this does not provide the names of specific NGOs, so we had to make some assumptions regarding a particular NGO's activity in certain years. In building the dataset for NGO and IO activity within a particular year, we weighted our level of certainty concerning whether they were active providing HA to North Korea. In particular, we assigned a weight of "3" in the year that a ROK NGO registered with the MOU or the year that an NGO or IO established HA efforts in North Korea. If reliable open-source documentation supporting HA efforts of an NGO or IO in North Korea in a given year was available, we assigned it a weight of "2." If we believed with some certainty, through previous activity or the ROK government's focus on certain capabilities, that the NGO or IO was active that year, we assigned it a weight of "1." If the ROK government did not support HA efforts financially through NGOs, or IOs did not operate that year, and we found no open-source information to support an organization's activity, then we assigned it a weight of "0" (i.e., it was not active in that year). This network was then transformed into a one-mode network where a tie between two NGOs/IOs indicates that in the same year they both participated in at least one HA activity (albeit, not necessarily the same HA activity).

2. NGO Characteristics (Attributes)

We collected two sets of attribute (characteristic) data on the 108 organizations included in our network: capabilities and membership. For the former, we drew on the “UN cluster approach” (see below for description) to categorize each organization’s response capabilities for providing HA to North Korea. Because the ROK NGOs do not define their capabilities in alignment with the UN cluster approach, we developed a process for accurately capturing their capabilities. We chose the UN cluster approach since the UN and governmental organizations who currently operate and have been primarily engaged with North Korea since the late 1990s use this model to manage organizational capabilities for an HADR response. It is designed to enhance predictability, accountability, and partnership of UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations.¹⁸³ Some organizations have a specific capability, while others are more diverse and have multiple ones. These capabilities are contextually associated with humanitarian activities that NGOs and IOs execute to build local and host-nation capacity, to minimize suffering, and to mitigate the adverse effects caused by natural disasters. The 11 clusters defined below are paramount in coordination to lessen the gaps and overlaps of assistance delivered to countries globally from humanitarian organizations.¹⁸⁴

a. Camp Coordination and Camp Management

This involves coordinating actors to prevent duplication of efforts and provide minimal humanitarian standards. According to Humanitarian Response, the role of the cluster is the following:

coordinates humanitarian actors with regards to all services provided to displaced populations within any communal settings (i.e., camps, informal settlements, collective centers); and working with the affected population to ensure representation, on-site governance and access to information about services provided.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Humanitarian Response, “Humanitarian Response-Clusters,” accessed November 6, 2018, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters>.

¹⁸⁴ Humanitarian Response.

¹⁸⁵ Humanitarian Response.

We placed NGOs and IOs that performed capabilities dealing with housing and living conditions into this category. It would be plausible for them to work closely within this cluster for identifying gaps and coordinating efforts.

b. Early Recovery

Humanitarian Response defines the early recovery cluster the following way, “The cluster for early recovery leads global and interagency efforts to establish and maintain standards and policy, build response capacity and operational support.”¹⁸⁶ We placed NGOs and IOs that worked primarily in livelihood and longstanding intervention into this cluster.

c. Education

According to Humanitarian Response,

The education cluster brings together NGOs, UN agencies, academics, and other partners under the shared goal of ensuring predictable, well-coordinated and equitable provision of education for populations affected by humanitarian crises.¹⁸⁷

This cluster deals primarily with capacity building through sharing of information and best practices. We placed NGOs and IOs that listed this as their primary capability into the education cluster.

d. Emergency Telecommunications

According to Humanitarian Response, “Emergency telecommunications cluster is a global network of organizations that work together to provide shared communications services in humanitarian emergencies.”¹⁸⁸ None of the NGOs or IOs in our network fell into this cluster. This is a capability best suited for global organizations.

¹⁸⁶ Humanitarian Response.

¹⁸⁷ Humanitarian Response.

¹⁸⁸ Humanitarian Response.

e. Food Security

According to Humanitarian Response, the food security cluster “coordinates the food security response during a humanitarian crisis, addressing issues of food availability, access, and utilization.”¹⁸⁹ We placed NGOs and IOs into the food security cluster if their primary capability was providing food to vulnerable populations.

f. Health

According to Human Response, the health cluster involves “working to meet the health needs” of affected people “to relieve suffering and save lives in humanitarian emergencies while advancing the well-being and dignity of affected populations.”¹⁹⁰ We placed any organization listing their primary capability as health or medical care into the health cluster. This is the most likely cluster the organizations would coordinate under to ensure proper coverage of the crisis-affected area.

g. Logistics

The primary role of the logistics cluster is to “act as a liaison between humanitarian actors, where logistics operations are concerned.”¹⁹¹ The logistics cluster works to support organizations and staff through logistical support. According to Humanitarian Response,

The logistics cluster provides coordination and Information Management to support operational decision-making and improve the predictability, timeliness, and efficiency of the humanitarian emergency response. Where necessary, the Logistics Cluster also facilitates access to common logistics services.¹⁹²

If an organization dealt with the logistical movement of supplies, then we placed them into this cluster.

¹⁸⁹ Humanitarian Response.

¹⁹⁰ Humanitarian Response.

¹⁹¹ Humanitarian Response.

¹⁹² Humanitarian Response.

h. Nutrition

According to Humanitarian Response, the nutrition cluster safeguards and improves “the nutritional status of crisis-affected populations by enabling coordination mechanisms to achieve timely, quality, and appropriate nutrition response to effectively and accountably meet the needs of people affected by humanitarian crises.”¹⁹³ We placed organizations into the nutrition cluster if they listed their primary capability as dealing with malnutrition or child care.

i. Protection

According to Humanitarian Response, the protection cluster does the following:

coordinates and provides global level inter-agency policy advice and guidance on the implementation of the cluster approach to Protection Clusters in the field, supports protection responses in non-refugee situation humanitarian action as well as leads standard and policy setting relating to protection in complex and natural disaster humanitarian emergencies, in particular with regard to the protection of internally displaced persons.¹⁹⁴

We placed organizations into the protection cluster if they mentioned dealing with welfare of displaced persons.

j. Shelter

According to Humanitarian Response,

The Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) is an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) coordination mechanism that supports people affected by natural disasters and internally displaced people affected by the conflict with the means to live in a safe, dignified and appropriate shelter. The GSC enables better coordination among all shelter actors, including local and national governments, so that people who need shelter assistance get help faster and receive the right kind of support.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ Humanitarian Response.

¹⁹⁴ Humanitarian Response.

¹⁹⁵ Humanitarian Response.

Some organizations listed their capabilities as assisting in providing heating and temporary housing. In this instance, we placed them into the shelter cluster.

k. Water Sanitation and Hygiene

The water, sanitation and hygiene cluster ensures coordination of all organizations that provide assistance to crisis areas, while also remaining culturally sensitive to those effected. According to Humanitarian Response,

The Global Water Sanitation and Hygiene Cluster, or Global WASH Cluster (GWC) is a partnership grouping 32 partners and aiming at improving the coordination and the humanitarian response in the WASH Sector. It is managed through a governance system designed to facilitate the achievement of the 2016–2020 GWC Strategic Plan in a transparent and efficient manner.¹⁹⁶

If an organization provided water, sanitation, and hygiene as their primary capability, they were categorized together. This means that they would likely coordinate with one another to identify the locations and persons needing assistance during a crisis event.

We categorized each organization’s membership in order to analyze the affiliations of organizations within the network and their relationship to one another through time and capabilities. The categories are defined as follows:

1. MOU registered
2. Affiliation under the KNCCNK umbrella organization
3. ROK NGO
4. IO with residence in North Korea
5. U.S. organization
6. Non-U.S. international organization.

¹⁹⁶ Humanitarian Response.

3. Parsing Network Data by Organizational Capabilities

As noted above, we transformed our two-mode NGO network into a one-mode network wherein a tie between two NGOs/IOs indicates that in the same year they both participated in at least one HA activity. However, just because two NGOs/IOs were active in the same year does not necessarily mean that they actually interacted with one another. Thus, we chose to only assume that they did if, in addition to participating in an HA activity in the same year, they also engaged in one or more of the same capabilities described above.¹⁹⁷ Figure 4 presents the complete NGO network. The network displays high concentration of ties and actors toward the middle of the network. On the periphery, it shows that there are less actors that are clustered into smaller subgroups or solitary actors (not isolates). The subgroups are labeled according to their UN cluster capability that they provide toward the humanitarian effort. Generally, if the subgroup provided only a single capability, then the subgroup tended to be on the periphery. However, once the subgroups possessed more than one UN cluster capability and was active in humanitarian operations over several years, it became more central to the network. Individual actors scoring high in terms of eigenvector centrality (see definition below) are highlighted by the larger blue nodes and illustrate those that are key for coordination, collaboration, and facilitation of HA activities in the DPRK over the last 23 years.

¹⁹⁷ This parsing of the network was accomplished using UCINET's "Boolean" function, which allows analysts to execute "if-then" statements with network data. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 114.

4. Network Metrics

In the end, we generated network data for 23 years (1995–2018). We analyze the complete network, as well as for five particular years (1995, 2000, 2008, 2010, and 2018). We chose these years because we believe they best illustrate the changes that occurred in the NGO network over time. They were significant to the network and the overall narrative of NGO's varying capabilities in the DPRK because of geopolitical decisions by the ROK, DPRK, and the international community. We analyze the networks in terms of their topography and the centrality of key NGOs/IOs. We now briefly consider the metrics used in our analysis.

5. Topography

We use several measures to explore the topography of the NGO network. *Network size* refers to the number of actors in a network. *Network density*, which is one of the more common metrics, is the proportion of actual to maximum possible number of ties in a network.¹⁹⁸ Because it can be problematic to use network density to compare networks that vary in size, we also use *average degree*, which is not sensitive to network size and equals the average number of ties among all actors in a network.¹⁹⁹ Another topographical measure, *connectedness* (also known as cohesion), equals the proportion of connected pairs of actors in a network (i.e., ratio of actual over maximum). We also include *compactness*, which is the distance-weighted version of connectedness; more specifically, the proportion of connected pairs is weighted by the network's average distance (see definition of average distance below).²⁰⁰ In other words, if there are two networks, A and B, with the same number of actors and level of connectedness but the average distance of network A is less than that of network B, then we consider A to be more "compact" than B (i.e., it will have a higher compactness score).

We also consider the *centralization* of the network; centralization captures the extent to which a network is centralized around a single actor.²⁰¹ Centralization measures are a function of the type of centrality used to identify a network's central actors. Here, we use *degree* and *betweenness* centralization. The former uses the variation in actor degree centrality within the network to measure the level of centralization, while the latter uses variation in actor betweenness centrality. More variation yields higher network centralizations scores; less variation yields lower scores.²⁰² We also consider the network's average distance, which is the average length of all the shortest paths (i.e.,

¹⁹⁸ Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 399.

¹⁹⁹ Everton, 397.

²⁰⁰ A network's average distance equals the average length of all the shortest paths (i.e., geodesics) between all pairs of connected actors in a network. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 397.

²⁰¹ Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 398.

²⁰² Everton, 12.

geodesics) between all pairs of connected actors in a network.²⁰³ Finally, we examine the network's *diameter*, which equals the length of the longest geodesic in a network.²⁰⁴ Table 1 presents these metrics for the entire network and by year.

Table 1. Topographical Measures of the Humanitarian Assistance Network

	Complete NGO Network	1995	2000	2008	2010	2018
Size	108	7	32	75	26	29
Density	0.422	0.612	0.740	0.717	0.689	0.679
Average Degree	45.111	4.286	23.688	53.040	17.231	12.900
Connectedness	0.840	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Compactness	0.631	0.857	0.882	0.858	0.845	0.839
Degree Centralization	0.504	0.364	0.247	0.289	0.330	0.291
Betweenness Centralization	0.306	0.180	0.017	0.009	0.041	0.023
Average Distance	1.498	1.286	1.236	1.283	1.311	1.321
Diameter	2	2	2	2	2	2

6. Centrality

For identifying central nodes within the complete NGO-IO network,²⁰⁵ we use four measures of centrality: degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. We have already described degree and betweenness above. *Closeness* centrality captures how close each actor is to all other actors in a network. Because our network contained isolates, we used the average reciprocal distance (ARD) to calculate closeness. *Eigenvector* assumes that ties

²⁰³ Everton.

²⁰⁴ Everton.

²⁰⁵ By complete, we mean the NGO network before we break it down into particular years.

to central actors are more important than ties to peripheral actors and thus weighs each actor's summed connections to other actors by their degree centrality scores.²⁰⁶ Table 2 presents the top-ranked NGOs and IOs for the complete network.

Table 2. Top-Ranked NGOs/IOs by Centrality Scores

Degree	Closeness (ARD)	Betweenness	Eigenvector
SAMP 98	SAMP 98	SAMP 226.736	SAMP 0.155
ICRC 97	ICRC 97.5	ICRC 212.514	ICRC 0.155
GYUNGN 89	GYUNGN 93.5	IFRC 156.328	GYUNGN 0.151
IFRC 89	IFRC 93.5	GYUNGN 132.276	IFRC 0.147
CHFK 81	CHFK 89.5	KSM 97.761	JOINTS 0.143
TGHUM 81	TGHUM 89.5	CHFK 90.846	CARKOR 0.139
KSM 80	KSM 89	TGHUM 90.846	KSM 0.139
AFSC 79	AFSC 88.5	GLRS 87.118	KFHI 0.139
GLRS 79	GLRS 88.5	AFSC 84.905	JEJUCINK 0.139
JOINTS 79	JOINTS 88.5	EUGBEL 69.207	IKECCF2 .139

Notes: All centrality scores are normalized except degree, which reflects the count of an NGO's ties.

Actors in bold lettering appear three or more times in the centrality scores.

For a complete list of NGOs, see appendix.


²⁰⁶ Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*.

Based on the degree centrality score of the complete NGO network, the key organizations that consistently showed up over 23 years are Samaritan's Purse (SAMP), International Commission for the Red Cross (ICRC), Gyung-Nam Unification Agriculture Collaboration Council (GYUNGN), IFRC, CHFK, Triangle G  n  ration Humanitaire (TGHUM), KSM, AFSC, Global Resource Services (GLRS), and Join Together Society (JOINTS). These organizations reveal seven international organizations that conduct HA globally—four of which are from the United States, with the other three claiming residence in the DPRK. The three from the ROK are affiliated with the Korean umbrella group KNCCNK. In short, it appears that international organizations generally scored higher than ROK-based nongovernmental organizations in terms of centrality. So, unpacking the network and providing analysis by specified years is the most logical step to understanding the dynamics of the network.

B. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF THE NGO/IO NETWORK

1995 was the first annual data point that was collected because this was the most notable year in which NGO operations first gained their notoriety but were also very limited in their capability and size. Hence, the number of actors in the network involved in HA activities totaled only seven: Korean Food for the Hungry (KFHI), IFRC, AFSC, CCHFK, Mercy Corps, Agape International, and M  decins Sans Fronti  res represented in Figure 5. In 1995, the network yielded the highest betweenness centralization score for an individual year aside from the complete NGO network. This is obvious for two reasons. First, the network has very few actors that share similar capabilities and probably assisted to the same HADR events in that year. Second, is most of the NGOs are well-established international organizations that have provided HA in other countries, so it is likely previous relationships were made before humanitarian efforts in 1995. By the end of 1996, the international community increasingly placed attention on the humanitarian crisis allowing more actors and enhanced capabilities toward the problem set.

Figure 5. 1995 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK




a. 2000

The network grew rapidly from 1995 to 2000, increasing in size from seven actors to 32, reflecting the fact that more relief organizations were involved in HA and disaster relief (in Table 1). Over the same time period, average distance scored the lowest in the entire network, suggesting that in 2000, on average, NGOs could collaborate with each other for HA activities and operational support more than in the previous five years. The collaboration that occurred was vital to initial success for most actors.

Some NGOs (especially ROK NGOs) may have sought out other actors in the network if their internal capabilities were insufficient for a specific humanitarian disaster. Individual actor's centrality scores were an indicator to whether they may have cooperated at a greater rate. As an example, the highest scorers in eigenvector centrality for this year were Caritas Corea (CARKOR), Good Neighbor International, SAMP, KFHI, and JOINTS (see Figure 6). All of these organizations are ROK NGOs, except for SAMP. This meant that many organizations that were not as central to the network, were likely to reach out to

these five organizations because they may be leaders in their HA sectors, but also they are very well-connected to other lead organizations.

Figure 6. 2000 Humanitarian Assistance Network Supporting the DPRK



b. 2008

Changes from 2001 to 2008 showcase the two Korean governments' eagerness and willingness to work to minimize humanitarian suffering, to growing the social capacity of institutions in North Korea, and to continuing cross-border exchanges. This is reflected in the number of actors in the network. The network doubled in size from 32 to 75 and most of these NGOs actively participated as a direct result of the ROK's single-channel policy, which forced all ROK NGOs to go through the MOU if they wanted to receive funding and participate in humanitarian activities. Furthermore, the network exhibited the lowest betweenness centralization score of all of the five years we analyzed. This highlights that

although there is growth in the network, the network became more decentralized. Therefore, some NGOs that just entered the humanitarian effort in 2008 may not have relationships with other NGOs because the variation in capabilities that have entered the network reduced the chances of NGOs working at the same humanitarian event.

In the earlier years of the network, specifically in 1995, we observed that the leading actors in the network were mainly international NGOs, primarily due to the amount of access to funding and resources they generally had at their disposal. However, this was not the case at the height of President Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy, which contributed nearly \$400 million in aid.²⁰⁷ Actors that were ROK registered NGOs or international NGOs based out of South Korea saturated the network and scored the highest in every single metric. As an example, in 2008, CARKOR, GONI, Gyungunam Unification Agriculture Collaboration Cooperation, Inter-Korea Cooperation and Development Council, and Jeju Center for Inter-Korea Exchange & Cooperation had the highest total degree and betweenness scores (see Figure 7, blue actors). In this particular year, if an actor consistently ranked in the top 10, it is assessed to have steadily provided two or more capabilities over eight years. More telling is that it belonged to the larger humanitarian coordination group, the KNCCNK, which acts as an advocacy group and liaison to the ROK government. This may infer that ROK NGOs were able to compete with international organizations if they had a heightened standing within the KNCCNK.

By contrast, ICRC and SAMP are the only non-ROK NGOs ranked in the top 10 at number nine and 10 (see Figure 7, green actors), a stark contrast in actors compared to 1995 and 2018. The 2008 HA network demonstrated that ROK-based NGOs were certainly a vital component to the humanitarian efforts at the time.


The rapid growth of the network from 2000 to 2008 did not substantially alter the network's compactness (0.882–0.858 out of a score of 1) (as in Table 1). Compactness may reflect the level of trust and cooperation among a group's actors. Typically, when actors have trust in an organization or a group, they tend to stay longer, invest resources, and develop that group to sustain it. Therefore, the score suggests that the actors involved in

²⁰⁷ Ministry of Unification, "Brief Information."

the network maintained relatively good mutual trust in one another over time, despite the network's growth.

To get a more comprehensive idea of centrality, compactness, and actors within the network, Figure 7 presents the top 10 scoring actors in terms of eigenvector centrality as either blue or green nodes (blue indicates ROK-based NGOs; green indicates IOs) and where their size varies in terms of their centrality score. The other NGOs are represented in pink but did not score in the top 10. Finally, the 2008 network helps visualize the height of NGO participation and activities in the DPRK, as the years that followed showed significant degradation in both capabilities and actors.

Figure 7. 2008 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK




c. 2010

Two years later, the network experienced serious attrition due to the cessation of six-party talks, the sinking of a South Korean naval ship (the *Cheonan*), and the Republic of Korea reverting to a policy of containment rather than engagement. As a consequence, the number of actors in the network dropped from 75 to 26. This directly reflects the reduced financial contributions for HA provided to the DPRK by the ROK, United States, and other international actors. The ROK-based NGOs were significantly affected by the geopolitical issues that influenced humanitarian operations and the funding the ROK provided. In 2010, the resource-deprived environment forced many NGOs to leave the network, or focus on specific capabilities such as nutrition, health, and food security that both the DPRK and ROK emphasized.

The shrinking of the network helps explain why it became more centralized (.330) than any other single year (Table 1). The organizations that managed to maintain a central position in the network were funded by United Nations subsidiary organizations such as WFP, World Health Organization, or fell under the European Union Program, which provided additional resources. Moreover, the ROK-based organizations that remained in the network did so because the ROK government allowed them to operate as an extension of its policy. Once again, the three ROK-based NGOs central to the network are members of the KNCCNK. Their affiliation extends their breadth and reaches to other relevant actors that conducted operations in 2010. Over the next eight years that followed, the network did not regenerate with nearly the same number of actors it did when aid funding and inter-Korean policy created the conditions for a robust HA network to thrive (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. 2010 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK



d. 2018


The network in 2018 consisted of only 20 actors, and all but World Vision Korea (dark green actor) was a non-ROK NGO (see Figure 9). It is important to note again that research collection ended in early 2018; therefore, it is possible more organizations entered the network. That noted, much of the observed attrition was due to President Park Guen-hye's policies, which limited aid contribution to North Korea and often used third party entities, such as China, to avoid direct interaction. Also, much of the HA provided by the ROK came with stipulations to ensure it would go to North Korea's most vulnerable populations, rather than being used internally for North Korean regime members. Hence, the HA the DPRK requested after 2010 was particularly geared toward capacity building in nutrition and health sectors along with education, which many international organizations were able to provide.

The NGOs that ranked within the top five in degree centrality in 2018 were SAMP, IFRC, ICRC, TGHUM, and AFSC. This is a strong indicator that all five organizations shared certain capabilities in the capacity building fields, but also were active in disaster

relief, attended the same charitable events, and belong to other umbrella groups. Another measure such as average distance can also showcase how actors communicate or exchange information and ideas. In this instance, the average distance for the overall network (scored a 1.321) meant that if TGHUM needed help regarding a specific task for water sanitation and hygiene -based capability, reaching out to SAMP would be slightly more difficult to do in 2018 than it would have been in 2000 (scoring a 1.236). Consequently, the actors that needed to reach out for supplemental capabilities could generally look to the top five, if not the top three actors to meet help mitigate the humanitarian crisis.

The network displayed a noticeable topographical aspect in 2018 (see Figure 9): a cluster appeared, and a subgroup with three actors was defined outside of the primary cluster of actors. The organizations Chosun Exchange, Mennonite Central Committee, and Handicap International (blue in Figure 9) all formed a subgroup that had brokerage ties to IFRC, SAMP, and ICRC (red in Figure 9). This is a significant subgroup because despite the network being highly centralized, a subgroup emerged that has one capability (capacity building in the health sector), it could offer to the HA effort in 2018. Thus, if governmental entities or other international organizations are interested in subject matter exchanges or outreach programs, SAMP, IFRC, and ICRC are the best organizations to contact for a broad array of capabilities.

Figure 9. 2018 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK



C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Analyzing the HA network over 23 years and from a temporal aspect helped determine which actors that are central to the network, elements of their centrality, and the metrics that supported what their position in network meant to HA efforts in the DPRK. There are two important conclusions we draw from our analysis of the network. The first is that it revealed that every top-ranked ROK NGO also belonged to the KNCCNK. This potentially meant that for a South Korean NGO to gain prestige and relevancy, the KNCCNK was effective at advocating on NGOs' behalf to the ROK government. Second, inter-Korean relations are a critical component in determining the type of capabilities both international organizations and ROK-based NGOs should deliver to meet the needs of the DPRK. More specifically, international organizations, such as SAMP, IFRC, ICRC, TGHUM, and AFSC, should continue to position themselves within the network to serve equally as deliverers of HA and key interlocutors in the future.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The focus of this chapter is conclusions and recommendations from our research. Our conclusions reflect the historical context for HADR activities on the peninsula and the changes that have occurred to HADR capacity as relates to potential future operations. Our recommendations emphasize how resource integration between the ROK and NGOs could support crisis response; they also stress the importance of collaboration to address civil vulnerabilities.

A. CONCLUSIONS

Since the Korean War's armistice, differences in economic prosperity and the level of civil liberty between the DPRK and the ROK have greatly affected each country's crisis resiliency and crisis management capacity. It was a crisis in the form of a natural disaster and the resulting humanitarian emergency that established the aid donor-recipient relationship between the two countries in the 1990s.²⁰⁸ Since that time, IOs and NGOs have had varying levels of success conducting a range of humanitarian operations in the DPRK. Although the recent warming of U.S.-ROK-DPRK relations may include additional humanitarian exchanges, a major crisis or regime collapse still appears likely.²⁰⁹ For example, a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies revealed the undisclosed location of and ballistic missile activity near the demilitarized zone, one of an estimated 20 undisclosed locations where North Korea continues to pursue its ballistic missiles and weapons programs.²¹⁰ This activity is in stark contrast to other public gestures made by the regime in an effort to gain sanctions relief from the United States without actually making tangible security concessions.²¹¹ Recently, tensions have again risen

²⁰⁸ Lankov, *The Real North Korea*, 185.

²⁰⁹ Jamie Metz, "What If North Korea Collapsed?" *National Interest*, October 18, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/what-if-north-korea-collapsed-33827>.

²¹⁰ Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha, and Lisa Collins, "Undeclared North Korea: The Sakkanmol Missile Operating Base," *Beyond Parallel*, November 12, 2018. <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/undeclared-north-korea-sakkanmol-missile-operating-base/>.

²¹¹ Bermudez, Cha, and Collins, "Undeclared North Korea."

because denuclearization talks have stalled, and North Korea is increasingly frustrated with the United States for maintaining its tough stance on sanctions.²¹²

HA remains a political tool for both North and South Korea. It was more than for pure humanitarian reasons that led to the expansion of NGO numbers and capabilities in South Korea since the 1980s. Even when aid from NGOs is misused by the DPRK, it continues to be an important means to respond to crisis and increase interaction with North Korea in reunification efforts through the MOU.²¹³ As such, the international community considers NGOs a valuable resource for a range of operations, from steady state to stability.

NGO operations in the DPRK have varied over time, and the type of operations have ranged from crisis response with emergency aid to capacity building through educational outreach. Both are multinational efforts and aimed at preventing large-scale disasters. According to our research, because of geopolitical constraints limiting IO and NGO funding and operations since 2010, international funding has primarily focused on vulnerable populations and nutrition.

It is important to understand changes in NGO operations over time because many factors affect which NGOs conduct humanitarian operations. Our research suggests that there are a few IOs and NGOs that maintain consistent operations in North Korea despite regional political changes and/or funding modifications, and they share several similar characteristics. One such similarity is that organizations that maintain a reliably central role in HADR are adaptable. They offer a variety of capabilities that they can leverage to gain access to North Korea and address multiple sectors of humanitarian activities. A second, regular operations, which are key to the long term, are independently fostered organizational relationships with North Korean entities and the ROK government that weather shocks to the political system on both sides of the border.

²¹² Nicole Gaouette, Michelle Kosinski, and Barbara Starr, “North Korea ‘Really Angry’ at US as Tensions Rise,” *CNN*, November 7, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/politics/north-korea-trump-pompeo-tensions/index.html>.

²¹³ International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

Through its “whole of government” approach, the South Korean government is actively increasing its internal capability to conduct HADR through training, education, and logistical resources for both domestic and foreign disaster response.²¹⁴ NGOs are an integral component of the ROK crisis response plan through the MOU.²¹⁵ Our recommendations are based on how the international community would integrate with the ROK and its resources to respond to a crisis. They also consider how the international community, primarily the United States and the ROK, should prepare to address civil vulnerabilities in a crisis.²¹⁶ It is to those recommendations that we now turn.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. FORCES IN HADR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The ROK retains a holistic capability during a crisis on the peninsula that is recognized by the international community. When needed, support to South Korea during crises includes the synchronization of plans and available resources. Our analysis has illustrated some of the ways by which the UNC and the ROK could more fully integrate efforts to ensure a coordinated disaster response that would include all relevant agencies and organizations. For U.S. Army Civil Affairs, steady state operations present an opportunity for greater integration with the ROK, which, in turn, would ensure unity of effort to maximize available resources.

First, the ROK and UNC must synchronize their concepts of stability operations and stability operations planning for a collapsed North Korean regime. This would maximize the coordination of civil population focused organizations such as U.S. Civil Affairs, IOs, and NGOs. Currently, the UNC and the ROK perceive stabilization efforts differently. Because of its constitutional claim over the entire peninsula, the ROK sees stability operations as a unilateral endeavor. The UNC does not fully support this when it

²¹⁴ Chang-kwoun Park, “Defense Cooperation for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Missions,” *Korea Times*, November 8, 2018, sec. Editorial, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2018/10/202_257588.html.

²¹⁵ International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

²¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

comes to the autonomous administration of the liberated regions.²¹⁷ This is captured in our SNA of the 2008 HA network. The ROK-based NGOs saturated the network because of their capacity as extensions of the MOU support for the single channel policy in an attempt to maintain primacy over HADR in the DPRK. Therefore, it complicates the employment of both civil affairs forces and the control of humanitarian operations across the peninsula.

Second, clarification of the methodology for employing and directing CAO is critical, especially in terms of a complete regime collapse scenario. Civil affairs should be fully integrated into the civil military operations centers, allied civil-military cooperation entities, and with U.S. interagency elements throughout the theater to support and sustain stability operations in the ROK.

Currently, civil affairs forces are assigned to different types of commands in Korea as part of steady-state operations. Some have minimal freedom of action and engagement. Although this was done to prevent miscommunication and “engagement-fratricide” between U.S. organizations and ROK organizations, it limits civil affair’s ability to develop humanitarian networks and gain situational awareness, such as firsthand knowledge of the capabilities of South Korean NGOs and their experience working in the DPRK.

Since precise crisis plans for both the United States and the ROK are classified, but we were still able to derive from our open-source research what we believe to be the most beneficial use of civil affairs forces in a crisis. In a total war scenario in which the ROK requests assistance from the United States, possible employment of civil affairs would be to pair civil affairs forces with USG agencies. Civil affairs could provide continual assessments of the population’s needs and grievances as well as act as an interlocutor between the ROK ministries, USG counterparts, and NGOs identified to provide HA.

Third, increased focus on interagency capacity building of NGOs and relevant ROK organizations will improve coordinated crisis response efforts by the UNC and the ROK. It is essential that capacity-building remain an integral part of steady-state operations on the Korean Peninsula because increasing organizational capability cannot be undertaken

²¹⁷ International Organization of Migration, *Overview*.

during a crisis response. Foreign internal defense is a civil affairs supported activity which strengthens the capability of the ROK military to conduct civil-military operations in conjunction with the ROK government which is responsible for the CAO.²¹⁸

Given that the ROK military does not do CAO, expert exchanges should also include relevant HADR organizations. Civil affairs and organizations with significant HADR experience (e.g., USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and IOM) can partner with relevant ROK entities to educate, train, and collaborate on disaster response for multiple scenarios. For example, the HA network of 2018 highlighted resilient international organizations, such as SAMP, IFRC, ICRC, TGHUM, and AFSC, which maintained operations during periods of political volatility. These were some of the key actors to the HA effort in the DPRK and should be seriously considered for future collaboration. Other relevant organizations include ROK ministries such as the Ministries of National Defense, Unification, and Interior and Safety.

Fourth, civil reconnaissance and multi-agency access to civil information of the DPRK needs to be improved. Since it is impossible to enter the DPRK to conduct civil reconnaissance, it is imperative to expand through digital civil reconnaissance (DCR). We can use satellite technology and open source reporting and information about the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure to better understand the complexity of civil-military operations and HADR in different geographic regions. Recently, the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command in Daegu South Korea began using DCR for civil reconnaissance in North Korea (named Project W for Wonsan, North Korea). With DCR, it is possible to identify areas of civil vulnerability, resources that could be leveraged in a crisis event, and basic information about supplies, food production, and transportation.²¹⁹ In addition, it can help collect data that could further distinguish highly capable actors in a network, their operational capacity, and how well connected they are to other relevant actors in a HA network for future analysis.

²¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

²¹⁹ 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, "Project Wonsan" (dialogue, Daegu, South Korea, September 2018).

To maximize the value of these types of assessments for cross-organizational planning, they must be accessible by all relevant organizations. A consensus should be arrived at for a single platform that possesses an unclassified structure in order to maximize access. For example, a tactical assault kit is a portable device that allows users to conduct collaborative planning from remote locations, communicate, and maintain real-time situational awareness of the common operating environment.²²⁰ Digital data repositories that support various types of reporting and types of digital information platforms such as the protected information exchange encourage the interchange of ideas and information across various types of organizations. A well-resourced platform would enhance both governments and nongovernmental entities comprehensive understanding of HADR to apply assets toward the problem set adequately.

Finally, the use of SNA helped showcase the importance of non-governmental organizations as vital actors with the ability to mitigate the suffering used by persistent humanitarian crises in the DPRK. In the future, nongovernmental organizations and international organizations can play an even greater role on the Korean Peninsula if the United States, ROK, DPRK, and other regional actors provide better opportunities for synchronization, resourcing, and exchanges to occur.

There were several limitations to the research that could serve as pivot points for future research on this topic. Research of NGOs in Hangul could expand the amount of information and the ability to utilize primary sources. Research utilizing classified documentation may illuminate some of the specific operations by NGOs that are obscured in open-source documentation. In addition, gaining a comprehensive understanding of how the MOU plans to employ NGOs if the conflict escalated toward provocations and hostilities would greatly benefit the United States planning process. This would enhance the USG's ability to support the ROK during HADR. With more insight into MOU plans,

²²⁰ Michael Ferriter, Phil Schupp, and Sverre Wetteland, "Organizing Chaos: The Tactical Assault Kit Collaborative Mission Planner" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/56915/17Dec_Ferriter_Schupp_Wetteland.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

the USG could assess the ROK's priorities for HADR in the DPRK, address their capabilities and gaps, and further support interoperability between the two nations.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX. ACRONYM LIST OF NGOS AND IOS

ROK NGOs Included in the IOM Document and KNCCNK
Umbrella Organizations (86 Total)

CARKOR	Caritas Korea
CHAKOR	Catholic Health Association of Korea
CLCC	Climate Change Center
COSM	Coal Sharing Movement
CRKPEOP	Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People
DGPR	Dairy Goat Project
EUGBEL	Eugene Bell Foundation
EV1K	Evergreen One Korea
F4P	Forest for Peace
FUFO	Future Forest
GOOF	Good Farmers
GOODHAN	Good Hands
GOODHEL	Good Helpers
GONI	Good Neighbors International
GNM	Good News Mission
GOPI	Good People International
GRD	Green Doctors
GRONK	Green One Korea
GTKO	Green Tree Korea (Charity Foundation)
GUCFK	Green Umbrella Child Fund Korea
GCSNKEC	Gwangju city South-North Korea Exchange Cooperation Council
GYUNGN	Gyung-Nam Unification Agricultural Collaboration Cooperation
HFRC	Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture
IKECCF1	Inter-Korean Economic and Cultural Cooperation Foundation
IKECCF2	Inter-Korea Cooperation and Development Council
INKAS	Inter-Korean Kangwon Association
INAID-K	International Aid Korea
INFF	International Corn Foundation

INLF	International Love Foundation
JEJUCINK	Jeju Center for Inter-Korea Exchange & Cooperation
JEORINAS	Jeollanamdo Resident Interchange Association
JOINTS	Join Together Society
KIMDJPC	Kim Dae Jung Peace Center
KFHI	Korea Food for the Hungry
KOAHP	Korea Association of Health Promotion
KOMEA	Korea Medical Engineering Association
KOPF	Korea Peace Foundation
KOPAF	Korea Peninsula Agro-fishery
KUNET	Korea Unification Network
KFWOA	Korean Foundation for World Aid
KOAUD	Korean Academy of Unification for Dentistry
KLTMO	Korean Living Together Movement
KOMAS	Korean Medical Association
KOUNESCO	Korean National Commission for UNESCO
KNTUBA	Korean National Tuberculosis Association
KSM	Korean Sharing Movement
LIGHTF	Lighthouse Foundation
LCIKSA	Lions Club International, Korea State Council
LOK	Love One Korea Foundation
MAID-C	Medical Aid for Children
MO41K	Movement for One Korea
NANU-I	Nanum International
NRCO	Nation Reconciliation Committee
NCSAEUM	National Council of Saemaul Undong Movement
KYMCA	National Council for YMCAs of Korea
NWNP	New World Nice People
NEW2000	New Millennium Life Movement
NOBIS-PA	Nobis Pacem Foundation
NEAFOR	Northeast Asian Forest Forum
OKEDFEC	Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture
OCIK	Okedongmu Children in Korea

OGKM	One Green Korea Movement
1KBM	One Korea Buddhist Movement
PRIINKEEX	Private Inter-Korean Economic Exchange Council
PAPERC	Paper Culture Foundation
RELFU	Religion Forum for Unification
SAMCINT	SAM Care International
SARANG	Sarang Baskets
SPKF	Service for Peace Korea Foundation
SHTW	Share the World
SHATOS	Sharing Together Society
S-NCIV	South-North Civil Exchange Council
S-NORAL	South-North Oral Healthcare Council
S-NSHA	South-North Sharing Campaign
CP3000	The Corea Peace 3000
FOINTK	The Foundation for Inter-Korea Medical Cooperation
GAPRES	The General Assembly of Presbyterian Church of Korea
KAPSL	The Korean Association of People Sharing Love
KOMC	The Korean Methodist Church
SAKT	The Salvation Army Korea Territory
TOPIK	Towards Peace in Korea
UWCK	UWC Korea Nauen Foundation
WITH-A	With Asia
WON-BM	Won-Buddhist Movement for Sowing
WOR-V	World Vision
0TBW	Zero TB World

International Organizations with Residence in DPRK (9 Total)

PRUINT	Première Urgence International
STC	Save the Children
CONWOR	Concern Worldwide
DEU-W	Deutsche Welthungerhilfe
TGHUM	Triangle Génération Humanitaire
HAND-IN	Handicap International
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Corporation

Non-resident Organizations Assisting in HADR for DPRK (13 Total)

AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
AGAPE	Agape International
CHEX	Chosun Exchange
CHFK	Christian Friends of Korea
FiBL	FiBL Reseach Institute of Organic Agriculture
GAiN	Global Aid Network
GLRS	Global Resource Services
iFOAM	International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MERCO	Mercy Corps
OXFAM	Oxfam Hong Kong
SAMP	Samaritan's Purse

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Al-Dahash, Hajer, Menaha Thayaparan, and Udayangani Kalatunga. "Understanding the Terminologies: Disaster, Crisis, and Emergency." *Proceedings 32nd Annual ARCOM Conference 2* (2016): 1191–1200. <http://www.arcom.ac.uk/docs/proceedings/9ac79958d9024495cd81e13909ed08cb.pdf>.
- Albert, Eleanor. "What to Know about the Sanctions on North Korea." Council on Foreign Relations. January 3, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea>.
- Atwood, Kylie. "Mike Pompeo Floats Prospect of Officially Ending Korean War Ahead of Trump-Kim Summit." *CBS News*, September 28, 2018. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korea-pompeo-denuclearization-donald-trump-korean-war-kim-jong-un/>.
- Batageli, Vladimir, and Andrej Mrvar. *PAJEK* (version 5.01). Ljubljana, Slovenia: University of Ljubljana, 2017.
- BBC News. "Nine Charts Which Tell You All You Need to Know about North Korea." September 26, 2017. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41228181>.
- Bermudez, Joseph, Victor Cha, and Lisa Collins. "Undeclared North Korea: The Sakkanmol Missile Operating Base." *Beyond Parallel*. November 12, 2018. <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/undeclared-north-korea-sakkanmol-missile-operating-base/>.
- Borgatti, Stephen P., Martine G. Everett, and Linton C. Freeman. *UCINET* (version 6.666). Harvard MA: Analytical Technologies, 2002.
- Bowden, Mark. "How to Deal with North Korea: There Are No Good Options. But Some Are Worse than Others." *The Atlantic*, July–August 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-worst-problem-on-earth/528717/>.
- Brainard, Lael. *Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty and American Leadership*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007.
- Carley, Kathleen M. *Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA)* (version 1.2). Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon.
- Central Intelligence Agency. "North Korea." Accessed October 15, 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>.
- Cha, Victor. *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future*. New York: HarperCollins, 2013.

- Cheng, Jonathan. "U.N. Appeals for Aid to North Korea as Donations Drop." *Wall Street Journal*, April 13, 2018. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-appeals-for-aid-to-north-korea-as-donations-drop-1523609690>.
- Choe, Sang-hun. "Sanctions Are Hurting North Korea. Can They Make Kim Give In?" *New York Times*, April 30, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/20/world/asia/north-korea-trump-sanctions-kim-jong-un.html>.
- Choi, He-suk. "'Government Looking into Ending May 24 Measures on NK': Foreign Minister Kang." *Korea Herald*, October 10, 2018. <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20181010000750>.
- Cunningham, Daniel, Sean Everton, and Philip Murphy. *Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
- Davenport, Kelsey. "Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy." Arms Control Association. Last modified November 2018. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.
- Demick, Barbara. *Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea*. New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010.
- Everton, Sean F. *Disrupting Dark Networks*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Ferriter, Michael, Phil Schupp, and Sverre Wetteland. "Organizing Chaos: The Tactical Assault Kit Collaborative Mission Planner." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017. https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/56915/17Dec_Ferriter_Schupp_Wetteland.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
- Fifield, Anna. "Sanctions Are Hurting Aid Efforts—and Ordinary People—in North Korea." *Washington Post*, December 16, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sanctions-are-hurting-aid-efforts--and-ordinary-people--in-north-korea/2017/12/15/df57fe6e-e109-11e7-b2e9-8c636f076c76_story.html.
- Flake, L. Gordon, and Scott Snyder. *Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003.
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. *State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2017. <http://www.fao.org/3/a-I7695e.pdf>.
- Gaouette, Nicole, Michelle Kosinski, and Barbara Starr. "North Korea 'Really Angry' at US as Tensions Rise." *CNN*, November 7, 2018. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/politics/north-korea-trump-pompeo-tensions/index.html>.

- Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
- Huth, Paul. "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 25–48.
- International Organization of Migration. *Overview of the Republic of Korea's Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance System*. Geneva: International Organization of Migration, 2017.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Publication 3-57. Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2018. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_57.pdf.
- Kaplan, Robert D. "When North Korea Falls." *Atlantic*, October 2006, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/when-north-korea-falls/305228/>.
- Kim, Hyuk-Rae. "The State and Civil Society in Transition: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in South Korea." *Pacific Review* 13, no. 4 (January 2000): 595–613. <https://doi.org/10.1080/095127400455341>.
- Korea Economic Institute of America. "Expected Role of South Korea and Major Stakeholders: NGO Contributions to and Roles in North Korea's Rehabilitation." Accessed July 24, 2018. <http://www.keia.org/publication/expected-role-south-korea-and-major-stakeholders-ngo-contributions-and-roles-north-korea>.
- Korten, David. *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda*. Hartford, CT: Kumanian Press, 1990.
- Lankov, Andrew. *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Manyin, Mark E., and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. *Foreign Assistance to North Korea* CRS Report No. R400095. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pdf>.
- Metzi, Jamie. "What If North Korea Collapsed?" *National Interest*, October 18, 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/what-if-north-korea-collapsed-33827>.
- Miller, Berkshire J. "Great Aspiration: Inter-Korea Relations Going Forward." *Aljazeera*, May 4, 2018. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/great-aspirations-inter-korea-relations-180504095245725.html>.
- O, Tara. *The Collapse of North Korea: Challenges, Planning and Geopolitics of Unification*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.

- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. *Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes: Policies for Better Health and Quality of Care*. OECD Health Policy Studies. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Publishing, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264233010-en>.
- Park, Chang-kwoun. "Defense Cooperation for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Missions." *Korea Times*, November 8, 2018. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2018/10/202_257588.html.
- Seung, Kwonjune. "Why Is the Global Fund Pulling out of North Korea?" May 2, 2018. <https://www.nknews.org/2018/05/why-is-the-global-fund-pulling-out-of-north-korea/>.
- Shin, Hyonhee. "As Food Crisis Threatens, Humanitarian Aid for North Korea Grinds to a Halt." Reuters, August 20, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-aid-insight/as-food-crisis-threatens-humanitarian-aid-for-north-korea-grinds-to-a-halt-idUSKCN1L529H>.
- Snyder, Scott. *South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.
- Tudor, Daniel, and James Pearson. *North Korea Confidential: Private Markets, Fashion Trends, Prison Camps, Dissenters and Defectors*. Rutland, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 2015.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Civil Affairs Operations*, Field Manual 3-57. Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2018. <https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/FM.aspx>.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Civil Affairs*, DOD Directive 2000.13. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d2000_13.pdf.
- Volodzko, David. "North Korea's Secret Weapon? Economic Growth." *Bloomberg*, September 14, 2017. <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-09-14/north-korea-s-secret-weapon-economic-growth>.
- World Food Programme. "Democratic People's Republic of Korea." Accessed November 5, 2018. <http://www1.wfp.org/countries/democratic-peoples-republic-korea>.
- Young, Leslie. "What Happens to North Korea's Aid Money?" *Global News*, October 11, 2017, <https://globalnews.ca/news/3797235/north-korea-aid-money/>.
- Zadeh-Cummings, Nazanin. "Aid from the Enemy: American and S. Korean NGOs in the DPRK." *NK News*, December 6, 2016. <https://www.nknews.org/2016/12/aid-from-the-enemy-american-and-s-korean-ngos-in-the-dprk>.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California