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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (26 Nov 69)

FOR OT UT 693030

4 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96490

AVDAMH

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
Headquarters, IIFV
ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H
APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I: OPERATIONS

1. (C) Operations:

a. General

(1) The reporting period covers the conclusion of the following operations.

(a) Operation MONTANA RAIDER (terminated 131200H May 1969).

(b) Operation COMANCHE WARRIOR (terminated 011200H Jun 1969).

(c) Operation CREEK II (terminated 221200H Jun 1969).

(d) Operation MONTANA SCOUT (terminated 231200H Jun 1969).

(2) The reporting period covers the initiation of Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR (initiated 241200H Jun 1969).

All the above operations are subsumed under Operation Toan Thang III which continued through the close of the reporting period.

(3) The May-July 1969 period saw a continuation of the roles, missions and functions initiated when the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) arrived in

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III Combat Tactical Zone (CTZ), but with some tactical changes. The 1st Air Cavalry Division continued operations throughout its tactical area of responsibilities to interdict enemy infiltration routes, and to destroy enemy forces operating within the area. During the first half of May, the Division conducted operations in Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces. During mid-May, the Division continued operations in these three provinces in addition to shifting forces south to operate in Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces. During the first week in June, Division forces were shifted from Bien Hoa to Binh Tuy Province. On 24 June, elements of the Division shifted north to open operations in Phuoc Long Province. As the reporting period ended, the Division was concentrating its efforts in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, Binh Duong and Phuoc Long Provinces.

During the reporting period, Division forces shifted as necessary, capitalizing on intelligence, to interdict and destroy enemy forces throughout northern III CTZ. The bulk of the Division's resources and the priority of effort were concentrated in War Zone C against the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions. Division Operations were continuous, with the changes in names (MONTANA RALDER, COMANCHE WARRIOR, CREEK II, MONTANA SCOUT, KENTUCKY COUGAR) reflecting no significant changes in the pattern or scale of operations: in fact, each of these "Operations" blended and overlapped with the others. Division combat forces were moved in accordance with shifts in the enemy posture and assumed shifts in his intentions--both within War Zone C and elsewhere. The Division's concepts of operation were also responsive to these actual and assumed changes in the enemy's intentions. When it appeared that major elements of the 1st NVA and/or 7th NVA Divisions were attempting to move south out of the 1st Air Cavalry Division's (1 ACD) area of operations (AO), then the majority of Division elements undertook an interdiction posture--a decentralized pattern of small unit ground reconnaissance missions and ambushes concentrated along critical avenues to the south,

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When these enemy units showed no inclination to move south but rather to remain in fairly large (one-or two-battalion) concentrations in base area bunker complexes, then the 1 ACD shifted its tactics to deliberate attacks on the lucrative targets which these assembled units represented. Combat in War Zones C and D took the form of jungle fighting against a heavily bunkered enemy.

Division operations during the three-month period inflicted damaging losses on the 1st NVA, 7th NVA, and 5th VC Divisions, and also severely disrupted the enemy's logistical redoubts in War Zones C and D. The kill ratio for the reporting period was 11 to 1, reflecting confirmed enemy dead; obviously, the actual kill ratio was much higher. Specific results of the May-July period were as follows:

a. Enemy: 2696 killed in action (KIA), 103 prisoners of war (PW), 164 crew-served weapons captured, 652 individual weapons captured, 4301 large caliber rounds captured, 173,804 small caliber rounds captured, and in excess of 500 tons of rice, salt, sugar, flour and other assorted foodstuffs either captured or destroyed.

b. U.S.: 247 KIA, 1781 wounded in action (WIA) with 732 of these evacuated from the Division, 1 armored personnel carrier (APC) destroyed, 11 OH6A (LOH) aircraft destroyed, 8 UH1H (Huey) aircraft destroyed, 6 AH1G (Cobra) aircraft destroyed, 2-3/4 ton trucks destroyed, 2 armored cavalry assault vehicles destroyed, and 1 tank destroyed.

(4) 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) forces operating in heavily jungled terrain against large troop concentrations in fortified base areas utilized a technique employing massed B-52 strikes followed by multi-company or multi-battalion exploitation of such targets. Extensive use was made of large amounts of CS crystal in conjunction with these operations; this aided in canalizing enemy movement and denying him his traditional bases. Multiple B-52 strikes,

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employed in packages against fewer targets, proved more effective than a series of single strikes against a greater number of targets. It is known, from battle-field body counts, and from a variety of intelligence sources, that severe damage was inflicted on two of the three regiments of the 1st NVA Division and supporting units, that the enemy's logistical traffic was severely disrupted, and in effect, that the initiative in War Zones C' and D' was totally wrested from the enemy. Between 1 May and 31 July, the Division concluded Operations MONTANA RAIDER and MONTANA SCOUT against elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions in War Zone 'C', Operations COMANCHE WARRIOR and CREEK II against elements of the 5th VC Division in War Zone 'D', and initiated Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR. All operations that were concluded during the reporting period will be discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. However, it must be understood that these are operations in name only, and, in fact, are AO's where operations by the Division continue on a daily basis.

(5) Operation MONTANA RAIDER, a three brigade effort reinforced with an armored cavalry regiment, was conducted from 13 April through 13 May throughout War Zone 'C'. This was a three-phased operation targeted against one regiment of the 1st NVA Division and two regiments of the 7th NVA Division with each brigade being buttressed when necessary by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR) to exploit massed B-52 strikes within designated areas of operation. The 1st Brigade, with the 11th ACR, conducted operations in the vicinity of the CRESCENT in AO RED against elements of the 95C Regiment, 1st NVA Division. In the initial phase of this operation, the 11th ACR encountered numerous anti-tank mines, but overall contact was light. The latter phase of the operation was characterized by heavy contact with massed enemy troops in fortified base areas. The 3rd Brigade, with the 11th ACR, conducted operations in AO Blue against elements of the 209th Regiment, 7th NVA Division. The conduct of

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operations in AO BLUE were similar to those in AO RED with contact being somewhat lighter. The 2nd Brigade, also with the 11th ACR, conducted operations in AO WHITE against elements of the 165th Regiment, 7th NVA Division. Again, the operations were similar to those described above with contact being even lighter. Cumulative final results of all the operations were:

a. Enemy: 353 KIA, 8 PW captured, 231 individual weapons captured, 96 crew-served weapons captured, 1788 large caliber rounds captured, 79,396 small caliber rounds captured, 131.91 tons of rice and 29.45 tons of salt captured.

b. U.S.: 39 KIA, 151 WIA, and 1 aircraft destroyed.

(6) Operation MONTANA SCOUT was predominantly interdictory in nature with the 1st and 2nd Brigades deployed along the southern frontier of War Zone 'C'. Small unit patrols and ambushes along enemy lines of communications characterized this Operation from 1 April to 23 June. The northern half of the MONTANA SCOUT AO was covered extensively by aerial reconnaissance and surveillance. During the period 3-23 June, the 1st and 2nd Brigades, reinforced with elements of the 11th ACR, attacked elements of the 95C Regiment, 1st NVA Division in the vicinity of the CRESCENT. During the period 8-23 June, the 1st Brigade employed three battalions in attacking elements of the 18B Regiment, 1st NVA Division in AO GOLD. In this operation, as in Base Area 355, massed B-52 strikes preceded the commitment of troops. Cumulative final results of the operations were:

a. Enemy: 1570 KIA, 39 PW captured, 399 individual weapons captured, 59 crew-served weapons captured, 1694 large caliber rounds captured, 78,256 small caliber rounds captured, 65.96 tons of rice and 14.73 tons of salt captured.

b. U.S.: 64 KIA, 376 WIA, 19 aircraft destroyed, and 1x105mm howitzer destroyed.

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(7) Operations COMANCHE WARRIOR (14 May through 1 June) and CREEK II (19 May through 22 June) were both roughly in the same geographical location, were targeted against the 5th VC Division and were conducted by the 3rd Brigade. Therefore, these operations will be discussed simultaneously. The mission of the 3rd Brigade was to interdict the southerly movement of the 5th VC Division out of War Zone D toward the heavily populated areas in the vicinity of the LONG BINH - BIEN HOA complex, interdict known crossing points on the Dong Nai River, and locate the 174th and 275th Regiments of the 5th VC Division. Operations of the 3rd Brigade were characterized by small unit patrols and ambushes along enemy lines of communication. Although few sharp contacts were initiated, this period was characterized by large cache discoveries. These discoveries were so large, that even though the 3rd Brigade did not decisively engage the 174th and 275th Regiments, intelligence indicated that these and other 5th VC Division units withdrew north into War Zone D base areas partly because of food shortages. Cumulative final results of these two Operations were:

a. Enemy: 132 KIA , 5 PW captured, 46 individual weapons captured, 21 crew-served weapons captured, 1826 large caliber rounds captured, 77,070 small caliber rounds captured, 194.56 tons of rice, 42.97 tons of salt, 8.5 tons of flour, 6 tons of sugar, 1000 cans of fish, and 70 tons of assorted foodstuffs captured.

b. 1st Brigade Operations:

(1) MONTANA SCOUT AO (1 May to 9 May): The 1st Brigade conducted operations from bases at Landing Zone (LZ) CAROLYN, LZ ST BARBARA, LZ IKE, and LZ GRANT against enemy lines of communications through central War Zone C. Ground reconnaissance operations were conducted to locate and destroy enemy base complexes within the Brigade AO. Maximum emphasis was placed upon ambush operations to interdict enemy movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. During

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the conduct of operations in AO BLUE, elements of the 2/5 Cavalry (Cav) and 2/12 Cav interdicted routes of withdrawal to the west and southwest from the AO. As increased enemy movement into Base Area 355 was detected, LZ WHITE was re-opened as a base of operations against this movement. LZ CAROLYN was closed and operations west of Highway 4 were minimized as 1st Brigade elements intensified operations in south-central WAR ZONE C. Continued emphasis was placed on saturation ambushes to interdict enemy movement into Base Area 355.

(2) MONTANA SCOUT/KENTUCKY COUGAR AO (10 May to 1 July): The 1st Brigade continued operations throughout June and into July with the 2/5 Cav, 2/7 Cav, 2/8 Cav, and 2/12 Cav to interdict enemy movement through the Brigade AO and to destroy all major enemy forces. As visual reconnaissance and usually reliable intelligence disclosed enemy concentrations in lower Base Area 355, the 1st Brigade initiated a two battalion seal-search and destroy operation with the 2/8 Cav, 2/12 Cav, and one tank company OPCON (under the operational control of the Cav units) from the 11th ACR. In mid June, responding to intelligence and ground contacts, the 1st Brigade reoriented its forces by: closing LZ CAROLYN; releasing LZ GRANT; opening LZ WHITE; and receiving LZ JAMIE from another brigade AO. Then, an eight-company operation was conducted between LZ's IKE and JAMIE against a battalion-sized enemy force. For this operation, the 1st Brigade received OPCON of 2/7 Cav and released OPCON of 2/12 Cav. Throughout the month, emphasis was placed on saturation ambushes to interdict enemy movement both into and out of the Brigade AO.

(3) KENTUCKY COUGAR AO (9 July to 31 July): The 1st Brigade continued operations through July with 2/5 Cav, 2/7 Cav, and 2/8 Cav to interdict enemy movement through the Brigade AO and to destroy all major enemy forces, supplies, and fortifications. As a result of operations stated in the above paragraph to-

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gether with continued intelligence reception, it was determined that the remnant of major enemy forces encountered had withdrawn to regroup and prepare for future attempts to infiltrate to the southeast. To preclude this, by maintaining close observation over the enemy and to allow his supply bases and fortifications positioned along his infiltration routes to be found and destroyed, it was determined that the Brigade disposition of forces be altered, shifting northward. The result was the establishment of LZ BECKY by the 2/8 Cav and the closing of LZ WHITE. To permit the massing of forces necessary to meet a threat in the 3rd Brigade AO, economy of force actions were taken resulting in the release of 12/7 Cav OPCON to the 2nd Brigade, 1 ACD. As further economy of force measures were necessitated, the 1st Brigade released OPCON 2/5 Cav to the 2nd Brigade and closed LZ IKE. Then the 1st Brigade received OPCON of 1/12 Cav and 2/7 Cav, assuming enlarged AO's and closed LZ DOLLY. Major responsibility for interdicting the Saigon River approaches to Base Area 355 was given to the 1st Brigade. Additionally, the 25th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for LZ ST BARBARA and a portion of the 1st Brigade's AO. Throughout the month, emphasis was placed on saturation ambushes to interdict enemy movement both into and out of the Brigade AO, and the destruction of all supply bases, caches, and fortifications encountered.

c. 2nd Brigade Operations:

(1) Operation TOAN THANG III:

(a) Operation TOAN THANG III continued throughout the reporting period. During this period, the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was given the mission of interdicting enemy infiltration routes, of denying him his traditional storage and staging locations, and preventing him from gaining the momentum to commence offensive operations. In carrying out this mission the 2nd

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Brigade maintained its headquarters at Lai Khe, and had OPCON of various Divisional organizations. On 27 July, the 2nd Brigade's AO was reoriented to the north and northeast of Phuoc Vinh and the Brigade was given the mission of locating and destroying the 5th VC Division.

1. The 5/7 Cav continued operations in the vicinity of LZ JOE until 7 May 1969 when the battalion was released OPCON to the 11th ACR. On 11 May, 5/7 Cav again returned OPCON to the 2nd Brigade and remained under its control until 26 June when it was airlifted to LZ BUTTONS and released OPCON to the 3rd Brigade.

2. The 1/5 Cav continued to operate in the vicinity of LZ DOLLY until it was released OPCON to Division Artillery on 7 July. During this period, the 1/5 Cav had the responsibility of LZ DOLLY and the surrounding AO with emphasis on ground reconnaissance, trail interdiction and ambushes.

3. The 2/7 Cav continued operations in the vicinity of LZ JAMIE until 8 June when it was released OPCON to the 1st Brigade. On 14 July, 2/7 Cav again became OPCON to the 2nd Brigade and conducted ground reconnaissance operations 4 kilometers southwest of LZ WHITE until 27 July when it was released OPCON to the 1st Brigade.

4. The 1/12 Cav had one company become OPCON to the 2nd Brigade on 24 May with the responsibility of base defense of LZ JAMIE. The remainder of the battalion became OPCON to the 2nd Brigade on 29 June. The 1/12 Cav had responsibility for base defense of LZ GRANT and conducted search and clear operations in its surrounding AO. On 27 July, 1/12 Cav became OPCON to the 1st Brigade.

5. The 2/12 Cav became OPCON from Division Artillery to the 2nd Brigade on 6 July and had responsibility for LZ DOLLY and the surrounding AO. It was released OPCON to the 3rd Brigade on 17 July and returned to OPCON of the

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2nd Brigade on 27 July, picking up the responsibility for LZ O'KEEFE and the surrounding AO.

b. The month of May was a highly successful month for the 2nd Brigade. It was characterized by numerous contacts throughout the month, most of these occurring with small enemy elements in bunkers. Numerous bunker complexes were discovered, exploited and destroyed. The most significant event of the month was the discovery on 26 May in the vicinity of LZ PHYLLIS of one of the largest caches of the entire war. This cache was discovered by B Troop 1/9 and exploited by it and two companies of the 1/5 Cav. The following is a list of their findings: 90,000 lbs. of rice, 23,000 lbs. of salt, 132 B-41 rockets, 90x107mm rockets, 88x120mm mortar rounds, 65x82mm mortar rounds, 2 AK-47 rifles, 3 bikes, 11 NVA KIA, 20 to 25 cases of weapons (destroyed by air strikes), 23 cases of B-40 rockets, 1 case of rocket propelled grenade (RPG-6) launchers, and 10 cases of .50 caliber ammunition. During May, there were two significant attacks on fire bases. On 12 May, LZ JAIME received 200 rounds of 107mm rocket and 82mm mortar rounds (mixed), and a heavy barrage of small arms fire, B-40 rockets and grenades. This was followed by a heavy ground attack. "Shadow" (a C-47 equipped with mini-guns), Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA), and air strikes were brought in around the LZ. A first light sweep found 53 NVA KIA on or inside the perimeter wire. During the height of the attack, the enemy breached the wire with bangalore torpedoes and occupied two bunkers on the perimeter for a short period before they were killed. Enemy forces were later identified as elements of the 1st NVA Division. On 12 May, LZ JOE received 43 rounds of mixed RPG and 82mm mortar fire with light damage and no casualties reported. The 2nd Brigade operations in May resulted in 249 enemy KIA and 7 PW. Numerous heat casualties were recorded throughout the month and there were several ground-to-air firings. A minimum of friendly casualties was sustained during this time.

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(c) The month of June began with moderate enemy resistance in the Blackhorse (2nd Brigade) AO. On 1 June, B Company (Co), 2/7 Cav made contact with an estimated enemy platoon which resulted in 8 NVA KIA's. On 2 June, D Co, 1/5 Cav, about 6 kilometers northeast of LZ JAMIE, spotted and engaged 6 individuals in bunkers. This short contact resulted in 1 NVA KIA. On 5 June, A Co, 1/5 Cav made contact with 10 to 15 enemy troops in bunkers. Air strikes were employed along with ARA. The result of the contact was 5 NVA KIA's. During the night of 5-6 June, LZ JAMIE received a standoff attack from rockets, mortars, and small arms fire. The 2/7 Cav engaged with its organics, ARA, artillery, and "Shadow". A sweep of the area on 6 June resulted in a total of 7 NVA KIA from the action. An ambush on 7 June, conducted by elements of B Co, 1/5 Cav, resulted in 5 NVA KIA. On 13 June, A Co, 1/5 Cav found a weapons and munitions cache 9 kilometers northeast of LZ WHITE which yielded the following: 4x7.62 machine guns, 8x12.7 machine gun barrels, 100x82mm mortar rounds and 800x12.7 rounds. On 14 June, A Co, 1/5 Cav found the following additional items in the vicinity of its 13 June cache find: 71 Soviet carbines, 1 SKS carbine, 1x75mm recoilless rifle, 1 German M-34 machine gun, 2 type 53 machine guns, 3 Browning automatic rifles and 9x81mm mortars. On the same date, the reconnaissance platoon of E Co, 1/5 Cav ambushed an estimated 15 individuals which resulted in 9 NVA KIA. On 28 June, B Co, 1/5 Cav found a large amount of NVA equipment and a mass grave 5 kilometers west of LZ JOE which contained 62 NVA bodies.

(d) The month of July was again characterized by numerous contacts in the Brigade AO. The most significant event of the month occurred on 2 July when C Co, 1/12 Cav made contact with an unknown-sized enemy force in bunkers. This contact, supported by air strikes, artillery, and ARA, lasted all day, and on 3 July, C Co, in a sweep of the contact area, found 31 NVA bodies from the contact

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and a large amount of medical supplies and other items. The large complex contained nearly 100 bunkers, many of which appeared to have been used as a medical treatment facility. On 12 July, A Co, 1/12 Cav made contact with an unknown-sized enemy force in bunkers. The contact broke after 20 minutes to allow air strikes to be placed into the area. A sweep of the contact area on 13 July revealed the bodies of 16 NVA KIA and numerous items were seized. On 23 July, D Co, 1/12 Cav, while conducting a bomb damage assessment (BDA) of a B-52 Strike, found the bodies of 9 NVA, several munitions, and 1400 lbs. of rice. On 24 July, D Co, 1/12 Cav found an additional 19 NVA killed by the B-52 strike.

d. 3rd Brigade Operations:

(1) During the 92-day reporting period, 1 May through 31 July, the 3rd Brigade continued offensive operations in its AO in the vicinity of the Cambodian border with the mission of interdicting enemy infiltration routes and employing deliberate ambushes on major trail networks to the maximum extent possible. During this 92-day period, 9 days were taken up with troop movements, and the remaining 83 days with Brigade operations.

(2) The month of May was characterized by numerous light contacts in the 3rd Brigade AO. On the morning of 11 May, B Troop, 1/9 Cav, in support of 3rd Brigade operations, began a series of contacts with enemy units entrenched in bunkers. B Troop, 1/9 Cav utilized several air strikes throughout the day resulting in 7 NVA killed by helicopter (KBH) and 9 NVA killed by artillery. The most significant contact of the month occurred during the early morning hours of 12 May at LZ ANDY (3rd Brigade Command Post). The LZ received a heavy rocket and B-40 attack followed by a ground probe and a sapper attempt which resulted in several of the enemy inside the perimeter wire. Total enemy casualties were heavy with the 3rd Brigade sustaining light casualties. On 14 May, the 3rd Bri-

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gade ceased operations in the Montana Raider AO and commenced operations in the Comanche Warrior AO. In the early morning hours of 21 May, LZ ANDY again came under heavy attack from 100x82mm mortar rounds, all impacting outside the perimeter. This initial onslaught was followed by small arms, B-40, and rocket fire. Friendly casualties were extremely light and 1 NVA was captured. During the month, emphasis was placed upon ambush operations and the interdiction of infiltration routes.

(3) The month of June was one of light contact throughout the 3rd Brigade AO. On 2 June, A and B Companies, 1/8 Cav entered into a series of contacts 14 kilometers northeast of LZ LIBBY which continued throughout the better part of the day. During the course of the battle, heavy mortar and B-40 rocket fire was received, while a total of six air strikes were deployed in retaliation against the enemy. Supporting the 1/8 Cav, a Cobra and LOH from C Troop 1/9 received hits from ground-to-air fire and were classified as "no fly." Results of the action revealed light friendly casualties with 29 NVA KIA. The most significant action of the month occurred in the early morning hours of 12 June when the 1/7 Cav Command Post at LZ JOY came under a heavy indirect fire attack followed by a ground assault. The battle raged on for approximately two hours with several of the enemy attaining access inside the wire. After heavy fighting, the enemy was repulsed leaving behind 35 dead. U.S. casualties were extremely light considering the intensity of the battle. There were numerous accounts of small arms fire and B-40 rocket attacks throughout the month of June. Friendly casualties were light with enemy casualties amounting to 98 KIA with an unknown number of enemy WIA.

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(4) The month of July, like the previous two months, was one of numerous but light contacts. At 0145 hours on 4 July, a Nighthawk (a Cobra and Huey used for night-time surveillance) spotted and engaged 15 to 20 sampans 21 kilometers northwest of Phuoc Vinh resulting in 5 sampans destroyed. On 5 July, LZ ANDY received 85x82mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA . Early in the morning of 21 July, a Nighthawk north of LZ CAROLYN along the Cambodian border received ground-to-air fire. Later in the morning, C Troop, 1/9 17 kilometers east of Phuoc Vinh spotted approximately 75 grey tubes 3½ feet long. The tubes were engaged with organics resulting in numerous secondary explosions. On 27 July, B Troop, 1/9 30 kilometers northeast of Phuoc Vinh spotted approximately 60 individuals and engaged them with organics and artillery resulting in 10 NVA KBH and 14 NVA killed by Artillery. Friendly casualties during the month were light with moderate enemy casualties.

e. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

On 11 May, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was placed OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and initiated operations in support of its three Brigades. This support lasted until 14 May when the 11th ACR was released OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division. On 22 June, the Regiment was again placed OPCON to the 1st Air Cavalry Division with the mission of conducting interdiction and security operations in the vicinity of An Loc along Highway 13, and in the vicinity of Loc Ninh. At the end of the reporting period, the 11th ACR was operating with two organic squadrons. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment prepares and submits a separate ORLL direct to II FFV.

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f. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations:

(1) During the quarter, A, B, and C Troops remained under 1/9 Cav control, and in support of the 1st, 3rd, and 2nd Brigade areas of operations respectively. The Squadron remained in general support of THE FIRST TEAM.

(2) During the quarter, the Squadron continued to conduct extensive reconnaissance and surveillance operations throughout the Division AO on a daily basis.

(3) Routine missions for the Squadron included: Locating targets for air strikes, bomb damage assessments, "sniffer missions" (an airborne method for detecting enemy locations), reconnaissance in direct support of friendly ground units, insertion of the Aero Rifle Platoon to conduct ground reconnaissance, and security of downed aircraft in the Division's AO. Insertion, extraction, and support of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, and providing support for the Division's Combat Tracker Teams were also a part of the Squadron's routine missions. During this quarter, a new emphasis was placed on reacting to intelligence information and implantation of sensor devices. Much of the intelligence received and gathered by the Squadron determined the location of enemy forces and their ultimate destruction.

(4) Many of THE FIRST TEAM's significant contacts during the quarter were a direct result of sightings or contacts by units of the Squadron.

(a) May

1. On 10 May, A Troop sighted 40 NVA in the open, which began a day long operation resulting in 40 NVA KBH, 15 NVA KBA, and 10 NVA killed by Artillery.

2. On 24 May, B Troop Blues were inserted and swept the area around LZ PHYLLIS. This sweep resulted in the discovery of 72x107mm rockets, 68x120mm

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mortar rounds, 86 RFG rounds, 30 tons of rice destroyed, and 2 NVA were killed.

3. During the month of May, C Troop's Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted 16 times resulting in 4 enemy contacts and large amounts of rice and other foodstuffs destroyed.

(b) June

1. On 2 June, on a sweep through a bunker complex in the vicinity of LZ PHYLLIS, B Troop's Aero Rifle Platoon made contact with an unknown-sized enemy force. Support by scout teams, tube artillery and ARA resulted in 11 NVA KIA.

2. On 11 June, on a last light recon, A Troop observed 15 to 20 individuals riding bicycles down a trail. The bicycles were heavily loaded with rice and clothing. Engagement of the area resulted in 15 NVA KBH and 19 bicycles destroyed.

3. On 23 June, C Troop's Aero Scout Platoon sighted a large rice cache which included cans of fish, beans, sacks of flour, and other foodstuffs. This sighting was made on an island in the Dong Mia river. This cache was destroyed by employment of Tactical air strikes.

(c) July

1. On 12 July, C Troop Blues found a rice cache containing 2000 lbs. of rice which had Cambodian and Laotian writing on the bags. The Blues also made contact with two individuals which resulted in 2 NVA KIA .

2. On 21 July, a scout team from A Troop received heavy ground-to-air AK-47 and .51 caliber fire from approximately 15 individuals in a trench line. Engagement of the area with organic weapons, artillery and air strikes resulted in 11 NVA KBH and 2x.51 caliber positions destroyed.

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3. On 27 July, a B Troop element observed numerous camp fires in an area. The team received intense automatic weapons fire from approximately 60 individuals. The area was engaged with organics, artillery and air strikes. The results were 10 KBH and 14 NVA killed by Artillery.

g. Division Cumulative Results: Results of Operations from 1 May to 31 July 1969.

(1) Enemy: 2696 KIA , 103 PW captured, 164 crew-served weapons captured, 652 individual weapons captured, 4301 large caliber rounds captured, 173, 804 small caliber rounds captured.

(2) U.S.: 247 KIA , 1781 WIA out of which 732 required evacuation.

h. Combat Support Elements Operations:

(1) Division Artillery: Submitted Separately

(2) 11th Aviation Group

a. General: The 11th Aviation Group continued to provide general, tactical, and logistical support for divisional and non-divisional units in III CTZ. B Company of the 227 AHB relocated on 12 July to Phuoc Vinh, providing better support to units and to base defense. All major installations in the Division area of operation received numerous indirect fire attacks during the reporting period. Effects of these attacks on 11th Aviation Group aircraft are contained in TAB AF.

b. Tactical Operations: TOAN THANG III started prior to the reporting period and has continued through the current reporting period. The 227th & 229th AHB's have rendered extensive support to large reaction forces daily. Increased Nighthawk operations have proved very successful in observing and destroying enemy infiltration at night. During the reporting period, the 1st Air Cavalry AO extended to II CTZ boundary, with the 228th moving numerous fire support bases in the relocation of the 2nd & 3rd Brigades into this area.

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c. Unit Disposition

Phuoc Vinh:	HHC 11th Avn Gp
	11th GS Co (-)
	227 AHB (-)
	228 ASHB (-)
Tay Ninh	229th AHB (-)
Dau Tieng	Co B, Co D, 229th AHB
Bearcat	Co A, Co B, 228th ASHB
Vung Tau	Asta Flat, 11th Gen Spt Co
Lai Khe	Co A, Co D, 227th AHB

d. Traffic control elements of 11th Avn Gp reported the following air traffic at Division Base airfield for the months of May, June, and July 1969:

1. VFR

R/W Day	R/W Night	F/W Day	F/W Night
93,302	11,485	9636	1427

2. GCA 2021

3. During the reporting period, both GCA and NDB approaches were flight checked and certified.

(3) 13th Signal Battalion Operations

a. During the period covered by this report, the 13th Signal Battalion provided communications for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the conduct of Operations MONTANA RAIDER, MONTANA SCOUT, COMANCHE WARRIOR, CREEK II, and KENTUCKY COUGAR.

b. Operation MONTANA RAIDER: This operation was in process at the start of the reporting period and terminated on 13 May 1969. Communications installed in support of this operation were reported in the ORLL ending 30 April 69

c. Operation MONTANA SCOUT: Communications support for this operation was reported in the last ORLL.

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d. Operation CONANCHE WARRIOR: This operation was conducted during the period 14 May - 1 June 1969. Communications to support the tactical operations were provided as follows:

1. Nine telephone and teletype channels were provided through the Army Area Communications System and terminated with Division assets:

(a) Four common user voice circuits from Skyking Switchboard to Shotgun Switchboard at Bien Hoa.

(b) One hotline voice circuit from DTOC Switchboard to Shotgun 8-3.

(c) One teletype circuit from Skyking Comcenter to Shotgun Comcenter.

(d) One teletype circuit for passing intelligence.

(e) Two voice circuits from Division Artillery to 1/21 Artillery.

2. FM radio retransmission facility established at Phuoc Vinh to link 3rd Brigade elements remaining at Quan Loi with the forward CP at Bien Hoa. This facility was maintained for the Brigade B-1 and B-2 radio nets until a Brigade relay could be established at Nui Chua Chan.

3. Two AN/MRC-112 four channel systems

(a) Bien Hoa to LZ LOIS

(b) Bien Hoa to LZ LIBBY

4. One HF SSB radio with voice and radioteletype capability.

e. Operation CREEK II: The Army Area voice and teletype circuits in operation at Bien Hoa were extended and reterminated at Blackhorse-Long Giao. The following additional communications were installed:

1. Two additional voice circuits from Shotgun-Quan Loi to Shotgun-Blackhorse.

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2. FM retransmission facility was established on Mui Chua Chan to provide the Brigade access to the D-1 and D-2 nets.
 3. One additional artillery coordination circuit to BHTAC and one to 18th ARVN Division at Xuan Loc.
 4. Two AN/MRC-112 four channel VHF systems were deployed; Blackhorse to LZ ROCK and Blackhorse to LZ LIBBY.
- f. Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR: The following communications were provided to each Brigade:
1. One HF SSB radio team to use in the Division Delta-3 net.
 2. One HF SSB radio team to use in the Division Delta-4 net with provisions for telephone patch capability when required; reverts to Delta-3 backup when not in use.
 3. One complete 4 channel VHF system to each brigade, deployed as follows: 1st Bde - LZ GRANT to Tay Ninh; 2nd Bde - LZ DOLLY to Lai Khe (changed 29 July: LZ O'KEEFE to LZ MARY); 3rd Bde - LZ WESCOTT to Quan Loi.
 4. One HF SSB radio team to use in the D-7 net.
 5. One SB-22 switchboard and wire installation team for the Brigade FSE.
 6. Nine channels per brigade were provided utilizing the Army Area Communications System:
 - (a) Four common user voice circuits from Skyking to the brigade switchboard
 - (b) One hotline from DTOC switchboard to the brigade S2/3.
 - (c) One teletype circuit from Skyking Comcenter to brigade comm-center.

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(d) One teletype circuit from division level RRU company to brigade level RRU platoon.

(e) One voice circuit from Division Artillery to Direct Support artillery battalion.

(f) One voice circuit from the LCC Forward to the brigade FSE.

7. An additional MF SSB radioteletype was sent to LZ BUTTONS for use by the FSE in the D-7 radio net.

8. The OPCON of the 11th ACR created the requirement for additional circuits to the Division Headquarters.

(a) Two common user voice circuits to Skyking Switchboard.

(b) Three sole user circuits; G-3, G-2, and G-3 Air.

(c) One teletype circuit to Skyking Commcenter.

(d) One voice circuit from Division Artillery to Blackhorse FDC.

g. During all of the period covered by this report, the 13th Signal Battalion also provided:

1. FM radio terminations in all Division and field force nets (for the Division Headquarters), and Support Command Headquarters.

2. AM HF SSB radio terminations in all Division Nets for the Division Headquarters and the Support Command Headquarters.

3. Four channel VHF systems for the 11th Avn Gp between Phuoc Vinh, Dau Tieng, and Tay Ninh.

4. Switchboard and wire installation service for the Division Hqs.

5. Message Center and courier service for the Division Headquarters and Support Command Headquarters.

6. Terminations for approximately 25 voice and teletype channels to higher and adjacent headquarters (circuits provided by the Army Area Communications System).

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(4) 8th Engineer Battalion Operations

a. During the reporting period, the greatest part of the 8th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed towards support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Operation Toan Thang III. The Battalion was involved in operations for 92 days during the reporting period. The 8th Engineers constructed or reopened 18 fire bases for the Division, upgraded eight other fire bases which were operated by the Division, and dismantled eight fire bases which were no longer required for tactical operations. A chronological listing of fire base openings and closings is included in TAB K. Non-divisional engineer effort in III Corps continued to be directed toward upgrading the facilities in division base camps at Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, and Quan Loi. The effort by non-divisional engineer units was coordinated by the 8th Engineer Battalion. This effort has been significant and has enabled the 8th Engineer Battalion to devote the majority of its time and effort to direct combat support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at Phuoc Vinh during the reporting period. HHC supported the line companies with construction equipment and water points. The movements of equipment and materials required 520 CH-54 and CH-47 sorties in support of the construction effort. The divisional water points produced over 1.6 million gallons of potable water during the period. The equipment platoons were involved in several construction and maintenance projects in the division area. The upgrading of the Prek Klok airfield to C-130 capability was completed in May, the repair of the C-130 airfield at Bunard was initiated on 17 July and completed on 20 July. The upgrade of the road net in Area 20 at Bien Hoa was completed on 29 July, and work continues on the upgrade of drainage and roads in Phuoc Vinh. Helicopter pads and roadways received applications of 72,000 gallons of asphaltic penetrative soil binder.

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c. Company A remained in support of the 1st Brigade during the period with its base camp at Tay Ninh. Direct combat support included demolition and minesweep teams to support the infantry. The fire bases at IKE, GRANT, CAROLYN, and ST BARBARA were maintained and upgraded during the period. Major assistance on the construction of LZ WHITE was given to the ARVN and a new fire base was constructed at LZ BECKY. The fire base at LZ CAROLYN was dismantled and closed. In Tay Ninh, limited construction projects were completed on a mission request basis. Major projects completed at Tay Ninh included the construction of SEA huts for brigade units, a fire direction center and tactical operations center. On 15 July, a platoon (-) displaced to Phuoc Vinh to build SEA huts for divisional units. This element remains at Phuoc Vinh at the close of the reporting period.

d. Company B remained in direct support of the 2nd Brigade with its CP at Lai Khe. Direct combat support included daily minesweep and demolition support to infantry units in the field and construction, rehabilitation and closing of fire bases in the brigade AO. During the reporting period, fire base BETTY was opened, fire base LORI was reopened and existing fire bases at DOLLY, JOE, and JAMIE were upgraded to improve their defensive posture. The fire bases at LORI and BETTY were dismantled and closed when there were no longer requirements for their use in brigade operations. One platoon remained in general support of the division at Phuoc Vinh until 13 July when it returned to Lai Khe. During this period, the platoon constructed SEA huts throughout Phuoc Vinh, at the Division EM Club, and the Pegasus Theatre at Division Headquarters.

e. Company C remained in direct support of the 3rd Brigade with its CP at Quan Loi. Minesweeps and demolition support were provided to the infantry on an as requested basis. The construction, rehabilitation, and closing of fire bases in the brigade AO was the company's main concern during the reporting period.

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New fire bases were constructed at LZ's LIBBY, ROCK, JOY, WESCOTT, JULY, VIVIAN, and O'KEEFE. Old fire bases were reopened at LZ's KELLY, LOIS, CINLY, and ELLEN in support of the brigade, while those at KELLY, JAKE, CINDY, LIBBY, and ROCK were dismantled and closed when no longer required in support of tactical operations. One platoon remains at Quan Loi upgrading the defensive wire and providing limited general support of the brigade base camp.

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2. (C) Significant Activities

a. General: See paragraph 1a.

b. Significant activities occurring within the Division AO during the reporting period.

(1) 1 May: Troop M, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) discovered 20,400 pounds of rice stored in 200 and 250 pound packages 4 kilometers southeast of LZ BECKY; 10,000 pounds was extracted while the remainder was destroyed in place.

(2) 2 May: Company C, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, while conducting an operation in conjunction with elements from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, in AO BLUE, discovered 30,000 pounds of rice packaged in 150 pound bags. A further search of the general area produced one SKS rifle, 200 pounds of bandages, thirty bottles of medicine and equipment for intravenous feeding.

(3) 6 May: Companies C and E, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry defending LZ CAROLIN received a mortar and rocket attack followed by a regimental size ground attack by NVA forces. The ground assault was launched simultaneously from the southwest and north at 0200 hours; breaching a portion of the perimeter at 0225 hours and destroying a 105mm howitzer ammunition area at 0315 hours. Fighting continued throughout the early morning, with U.S. forces utilizing all available support. Counter attacks reestablished the perimeter and the enemy force began withdrawing at 0415 hours, with contact finally breaking at 0600 hours. At first light three company sized units were air assaulted to block and interdict avenues of escape to the north and west. Final results of the NVA assault were 198 enemy KIA, 30 PW, 10 of which were wounded. Enemy equipment captured consisted of 2x60mm mortars, 81xAK-47

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rifles, 11 Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), and 2 rocket launchers, 9 RPD machine guns, 1 type 57 machine gun, 128 RPG rounds, 100x60mm mortar rounds, 11x82mm mortar rounds, 10x75mm Recoilless Rifle rounds, 12,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 285 grenades, 325 satchel charges, 3 Chicom radios, 3 pole charges, and 1x82mm mortar sight. Friendly casualties were 10 US KIA and 73 WIA.

(4) 6 May: Companies C and E, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry defending LZ JCF received an estimated 125-150 mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds followed by a ground probe from an unknown size enemy force at 0320 hours. The enemy force broke contact and evaded at 0430 hours. Two rifle companies were airlifted to LZ JCF to conduct operations to the south and southwest attempting to reestablish the contact. A first light search of the battlefield produced 8 NVA KIA, 3xAK-47 rifles, 1xB-40 rocket launcher, 360xAK-47 rounds, 5 hand grenades, 5 bangalore torpedoes, and 5 gas masks. Friendly casualties were 4 US KIA, and 25 US WIA.

(5) 12 May: Companies A and E, 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry defending LZ GRANT received a mortar and rocket attack followed by a two company ground assault that breached a portion of the western perimeter and occupied two bunkers. Massed fire from ARA and artillery supported the counter attack that reestablished the perimeter. A search of the battlefield disclosed 45 NVA KIA, 3 NVA PW, 7 individual and 8 crew-served weapons were captured. The NVA assault accounted for 5 US KIA, and 40 US WIA.

(6) 12 May: Company E, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry defending LZ JAMIE received a mortar and rocket attack of 200 rounds followed by a battalion size ground assault that breached one bunker on the perimeter.

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The bunker was quickly neutralized and the perimeter reestablished; the NVA force broke contact and withdrew at 0615 hours. A sweep of the battle area produced 70 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW (WIA), 26 individual weapons, 5 rocket launchers, 47x82mm mortars and 200 hand grenades. The NVA assault resulted in 7 US KIA, and 35 US WIA.

(7) 12 May: 3rd Brigade Headquarters, on LZ ~~ALICE~~, and Company E, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry defending LZ ~~PHILIP~~ received mortar and rocket attacks followed by ground probes from sappers and NVA infantry elements. Results of the action included 13 NVA KIA, miscellaneous ammunition, grenades and demolitions captured. This resulted in 3 US KIA and 32 US WIA.

(8) 21 May: Companies A and E, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry defending LZ ~~IKE~~ received small arms, B-40 rocket, and grenade attack from an unknown size enemy force. The contact was initiated at 0248 hours and continued until 0440 hours, with the 2-5 Cav employing organic weapons and Shadow in support. A check of the battlefield produced 12 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW, 7xAK-47 rifles, and miscellaneous grenades and demolitions. Friendly casualties were 2 US WIA.

(9) 23 May: Company E, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry defending LZ ~~JOE~~ received a mortar and rocket attack of 200 rounds and a ground assault from an estimated NVA company. The ground assault started at 0340 hours and contact ceased at 0420 hours. Enemy losses were 8 NVA KIA, 4 NVA PW (WIA), 1x82mm mortar, 50 rounds of mortar ammunition, and 8xAK-47 rifles captured. The attack resulted in 13 US WIA.

(10) 23 May: Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry operating in conjunction with elements of 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry discovered a cache

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consisting of 153 mortar rounds, 134 B-40 rounds, 90x107mm rockets, 100 tons of rice, 15.2 tons of salt, and 31 cases of assorted weapons and ammunition.

(11) 24 May: Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Blues operating with one platoon of D Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry discovered a cache of 103x107mm rockets, 124x B-40 rounds, 40 tons of rice, and 15 tons of salt. Two NVA were killed and twoxAK-47 rifles were captured in the near vicinity which resulted in no friendly losses.

(12) 27 May: Troop C, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry while conducting a Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) of an air strike, 11 kilometers southwest of LZ ROCK, discovered a cache of 175x200 pound bags of salt. A similar BDA later in the day discovered between 100 and 150x100 pound bags of rice.

(13) 28 May: Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry while conducting a combat assault to the northeast of LZ ROCK received small arms fire from a bunker complex. The enemy force was engaged with organic weapons, artillery, and two air strikes as Company B swept through the bunker area. A search of the area revealed 1 SKS rifle, 150 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 4,015 pounds of flour, 315 pounds of rice, 1,100 pounds of noodles and miscellaneous medical supplies and documents. There were no US casualties.

(14) 29 May: Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry while conducting an offensive operation northeast of LZ ROCK found a cache containing 9,750 pounds of sugar, 28,100 pounds of salt, 20,250 pounds of rice, 2,600 pounds of peanuts, and miscellaneous cooking utensils such as pots, plates and silverware. Company B, also while conducting a search of the area northeast of LZ ROCK, found a cache containing 187x60mm mortar rounds, 67 RPG rounds, 19 RPG-7 rounds, and a variety of other ammunition, fuzes and mines.

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(15) 31 May: Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry while continuing their sweep northeast of LZ ROCK discovered three bunkers containing 20,000 pounds of salt, 3,000 pounds of rice and 65 cooking pots.

(16) 2 Jun: Sporadic enemy contacts erupted throughout the Division AO as elements continued their mission of interdicting and destroying enemy forces. The largest contact was by Companies A and B, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry northeast of LZ ROCK, in vicinity of the cache sites. Total enemy losses for the day were 54 NVA KIA, with miscellaneous medical, food and weapons supplies captured. As a result of the days contacts 14 US were KIA and 53 WIA.

(17) 11 Jun: Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry operating in vicinity of LZ JOY and Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry operating north of LZ ROCK uncovered two sizeable caches. Enemy equipment and food captured consisted of 9 individual weapons, 42.3 tons of salt, 5 tons of flour, varying amounts of other food stuffs such as cooking oil, sugar, dried fish, noodles, and tobacco; additional supplies captured were medical supplies, clothing, photo paper, 3 bicycles and assorted bicycle parts.

(18) 12 Jun: Companies D and E, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry while defending LZ JOY received a mortar and rocket attack of 300 rounds, along with heavy small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 fire. The NVA force broke contact at 0445 hours with the friendly units employing organic weapons, artillery fire and Shadow. The unsuccessful attack resulted in 35 NVA KIA, 2 NVA PW, and capture of 22 AK-47 rifles, assorted ammunition and mines. The friendly forces sustained 5 US KIA, and 10 US WIA.

(19) 14 Jun: Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry conducting operations north of LZ DOLLY discovered a bunker complex containing 71 Soviet

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carbines, 1 SKS rifle, 2x75mm Recoilless Rifles, 9x81mm mortars, 3 machine guns,
and 3 automatic rifles.

(20) 18 Jun: Companies D and E, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry defending LZ IKE received a mortar and rocket attack along with small arms and automatic weapons fire as NVA sappers attempted to penetrate the perimeter. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, ARA, Shadow, and withdrew at 0330 hours. The NVA conducted a stand off attack on LZ GRANT at the same time the sappers were attempting to penetrate IKE. Results of the attack on LZ IKE were 37 NVA KIA, 3 NVA PW, assorted individual weapons, mines, and ammunition captured. The attack cost 3 US KIA and 11 US WIA.

(21) 20 Jun: Companies D and E, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry continuing to defend LZ IKE were subjected to their second mortar and rocket attack, in three days followed by an assault by an NVA Battalion. The attack commenced at 0103 hours and the NVA force was engaged by organic weapons, artillery, ARA, and Shadow until they withdrew from the battle area and broke contact at 0240 hours. Final results of the NVA assault were 90 NVA KIA, 5 NVA PW (WIA), 6 machine guns, 33 individual weapons and 10 rocket launchers captured along with numerous rounds of rocket, small arms, and Recoilless Rifle ammunition. Friendly casualties were 7 US KIA, and 19 US WIA. The NVA Battalion assault on LZ IKE was coordinated with stand off attacks directed toward LZ's JAMIE, ST. BARBARA, GRANT and WHITE.

(22) 28 Jun: Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry while conducting BDA of a B-52 Strike 12 kilometers east of LZ WHITE, found 54 Killed by Air (KBA) and numerous small items of equipment and ammunition.

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(23) 3 Jul: Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry while conducting a sweep southeast of LZ GRANT where there had been contact the previous day, found 32 NVA KIA, 15 million units of penicillin and assorted small arms munitions. A Demolitions cache was also captured during the same sweep.

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SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

I. Personnel: None

II. Operations:

*. Tactical Operations against bunker complexes:

(1) Observation: Tactics and techniques used against bunker complexes has always been a matter for command concern within the 1st Cavalry Division. During the month of April 1969, as the Division expanded its operations within War Zone C, an increased number of bunker complexes were discovered that were extremely well fortified. Due to an increase in US casualties, combined with the variation of tactics within the Division and the wide variation of results attained, a need for, and the development of a standardized sequence of tactical events when operating in or against a bunker complex was recognized.

(2) Evaluation: Basically two bunker area situations confront the battalion and company commander. The first one, classed as, "Attack of a Known Bunker Complex," troops not in contact. The second situation, and the most common to date, is classed as a "Meeting Engagement in a Bunker Complex", troops in contact. It usually develops when the point man becomes a casualty and the lead elements are pinned down by enemy fire.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Techniques developed by the 1st Cavalry Division in tactical operations against bunker complexes be disseminated to other RVN units for their consideration.

b. Attack of a known bunker complex, troops not in contact, is a planned attack. The sequence of tactical events (shown below) is based on the use of Division resources, and upon a planning cycle beginning early the evening before the attack. The most critical step and often the most difficult, in this sequence, is reconnaissance of the area in order to locate and define the complex. During the actual execution phase of the attack, all timing is keyed to a planned air strike which must take place 10 minutes after CS is initially delivered into the bunker area. Normally the CS is delivered in the form of E-158 bomblets dropped from a Cav helicopter. The attacking ground forces, controlled from a Command and Control helicopter, must be located so they can begin the assault on the bunkers 30 minutes after the CS has been placed on target. Timing of the tactical sequence must be rigid due to the use of CS; the operation must be well planned and executed in order to achieve the maximum results.

ATTACK OF A KNOWN BUNKER COMPLEX (TROOPS NOT IN CONTACT)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
M	DELIVER CS IN BUNKER AREA BY CAV HELICOPTER.	E-158 BOMBLETS DROPPED FROM A BN LOG BIRD.
M PLUS 10	AIR FORCE DELIVERS CLUSTER BOMB UNIT 25'S IN THE CS AREA, WITH 750LB BOMBS AND NAPALM	AIR FORCE PLANES MUST BE ON STATION BY M MINUTES.

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<u>TIME</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
M PLUS 15	PUT MORE CS INTO THE AREA.	CAV LOG READ
M PLUS 25	SATURATE THE AREA WITH TUBE ARTILLERY.	MIX FUZE DELAY AND QUICK. CONTINUE UNTIL TROOPS APPROACH.
M PLUS 30	USE ARA AND SCOUTS DURING THE FINAL ENTRY INTO THE BUNKERS.	

c Meeting engagement in a bunker complex, troops in contact is a most difficult situation to control. The first action by friendly forces must be rapid application of fire power followed by exploitation using fire and maneuver. If these actions fail, the sequence of tactical events (shown below), the recovery of casualties, and disengagement from enemy forces begin simultaneously. Three critical areas with troops in contact in a bunker complex are firing of available smoke to allow disengagement; marking of friendly positions early to reduce identification time prior to ARA and Air Force fighter strikes; and getting a Command and Control helicopter airborne to control the action and sequence of events.

MEETING ENGAGEMENT IN A BUNKER COMPLEX (TROOPS IN CONTACT)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
C	CONTACT	REQUEST AIR STRIKES, CS, ARTILLERY SMOKE.
C PLUS 2	DELIVER ARTILLERY SMOKE ON FRIENDLIES. EXTRACT CASUALTIES.	SHOULD BE AN AUTOMATIC ACTION BY FO & CO COMMANDER.
C PLUS 15	ENGAGE WITH ARA UNTIL ARRIVAL OF CS BIRD; DELIVER CS IN THE BUNKER AREA.	USE BN LOG BIRD FOR CS.
C PLUS 25	SATURATE THE AREA WITH TUBE ARTILLERY UNTIL FIGHTERS ARRIVE.	ONCE DISENGAGED DO NOT USE ARA.
C PLUS 45	DELIVER NAPALM ON THE COMPLEX; FOLLOW WITH 750LB BOMBS IF AVAILABLE.	AT THIS TIME FRIENDLY UNIT IS CONSIDERED TO BE REGRUOPING AND PREPARING TO ATTACK.

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B. Tactical Methods of Conducting BDA's of "Heavy Artillery" concentrations and Air Strikes:

1 Observation: During the past three months, elements of the Division have on occasion made contact while conducting a BDA of a "Heavy Artillery" Concentration or Air Strike. Aerial reconnaissance has frequently detected bunkers having been rebuilt and ground movement throughout the area after such a strike. Since units are required to conduct either air or ground BDA's of each strike, a pattern is quickly established that the enemy can easily ascertain.

2 Evaluation: The concept of considering areas of "Heavy Artillery" strikes as being cleared of enemy forces must be avoided. The enemy knows that either a ground or air BDA will be conducted and will often return to the area of the strike in anticipation of inflicting personnel and/or equipment losses.

3 Recommendation:

a Careful reconnaissance by air should be accomplished prior to insertion of ground forces. Artillery follow-ups, adjusted by scout teams, is effective in placing fire on areas that show the possibility of enemy forces being present. The BDA reconnaissance must vary in time and not be conducted on a scheduled basis after the strike.

C. Bangalore Torpedoes Against Fortified Enemy Positions:

1 Observation: Two major problems a rifle company encounters when in contact with enemy elements located in a bunker complex are; well camouflaged bunkers and hidden lanes of fire.

2 Evaluation: The bunkers are constructed in such a manner as to seal off all avenues of approach. This is accomplished by constructing the complex in thickly vegetated bamboo with interlocking lanes of grazing fire. Because of the enemy's expertise in the use of cover and concealment, it is extremely difficult to detect and place effective organic fire on his positions.

3 Recommendation:

(a) The bangalore torpedo is an effective means of clearing fields of fire for the employment of organic weapons. The torpedo can be brought to the contact area by helicopter and dispersed to the lead elements, slid under the bamboo and detonated. The bangalore will clear a large field of fire which enables the ground commander to engage the enemy with organic weapons.

D. Marking Unit Locations for Supporting Aircraft During Periods of Reduced Visibility or Darkness without the Benefit of Ground Control Approach Radar (GCA).

1 Observation: Aircraft supporting ground units, while in contact with enemy forces, have the initial problem of finding the unit and becoming orientated after arriving on station.

2 Evaluation: When a unit is in contact during the hours of reduced visibility or darkness, it becomes necessary to provide a long range means of identifying the unit's exact location for ARA, aerial resupply or other supporting aircraft.

3 Recommendation:

a Firing a white phosphorous marking round in the vicinity of the unit enables approaching aircraft to be guided to the general location where conventional means of identification may be employed.

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E. Leaflet Missions:

1 Observation: Frequently, ground contacts are light and so short-lived that leaflet coverage could not be accomplished with any assurance that the enemy was still in the area.

2 Evaluation: An "on the spot" leaflet coverage system, where limited amounts of leaflets could be distributed, was needed by the battalions for local use. An "on the spot" reaction box containing five different types of leaflets that could be used in support of the battalion's mission, was made up for each battalion. Instructions were posted in each box telling the user what the leaflet's themes were and how they might be distributed. Emphasis was placed on "hand distribution of leaflets" by US soldiers as they moved thru populated areas, down trails, or thru enemy bunkers.

3 Recommendation:

(a. Battalion S-5's maintain on hand, a limited number of leaflets, of various common themes for immediate distribution (air or ground), when PSYOP exploitation of the situation can support their mission

F. Rice Destruction:

1 Observation: The Division has been plagued by the time required and the method of destroying large amounts of rice.

2 Evaluation: A method of destroying rice on a large scale is needed using materials readily available from a fire base (forward) to the company in the field.

3 Recommendation:

(a. A method used by this Division is by either digging a large hole or using an existing artillery or bomb crater; partially filling the hole or using an existing artillery or bomb crater; partially filling the hole with JP4 or MOGAS and stacking the rice and deadfall in layers over the crater thus making a large oven. By igniting the fuel with a trip flare, the rice will be turned into blackened ash within 6-12 hours. The heat generated by the fuel is enough to break down the composition of the rice leaving it totally unusable by the enemy

G. Use of CS to Contaminate Rice:

1 Observation: Units continue to find large amounts of rice, which raises the problem of how to destroy it if it can't be evacuated.

2 Evaluation: It has been found in the 1st Cav Div AO that the enemy will not attempt to use rice that has been contaminated with persistent CS. This is not to say that rice contaminated with CS cannot be eaten, but merely that the enemy's fear of CS and possibly his lack of protective equipment keep him from attempting to use the contaminated rice. Contaminating rice with CS is probably the quickest means available to render the rice useless.

3 Recommendation:

(a. That caches of rice that cannot be evacuated be contaminated with persistent CS.

H. CS Drum Drops:

1 Observation: A 30% dud rate was experienced with the XM925 Fuzing System for CS drum drops.

2 Evaluation: Experimentation revealed that the Tetryl explosive in the XM923 fuse did not have the necessary force to set off the explosive rod in the XM55 Burster. A small amount of C-4 explosive placed between the XM923

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fuze and the XM55 Burster has reduced the dud rate to less than 1%.

(3. Recommendation:

a. Until new lots of XM923 fuzes with an improved charge becomes available, units dropping CS with the XM925 system can reduce malfunctions by placing a small amount of C-4 between the XM923 fuze and XM55 Burster.

I. E-158R2 CS Munitions:

1. Observation: A high dud rate was being experienced while dropping the E-158's from 2000 feet.

2. Evaluation: Practically all E-158R2 munitions arrive with the initiator set for 1500 feet. It has been observed that altering this setting will increase the dud rate. This indicates that the initiator is probably accurate for 1500 feet only. Dropping the E-158R2 at 1500 feet has lowered the dud rate to less than 1%.

(3. Recommendation:

(a) That E-158R2's continue to be dropped with the fuze set at 1500 feet until improved munitions are available.

J. The 250 watt loudspeaker and public address set (AN/FIQ-5A):

1. Observation: Due to the combat loss of two 1000 watt aerial loudspeakers, the Division had difficulty in conducting extensive loudspeaker coverage over the AO. Those speakers frequently being used in one brigade AO, were concurrently needed in another AO for quick reaction exploitations.

2. Evaluation: The Division PSYOP section tested the 250 watt speaker mounted in an LOH. The 250 watt speaker proved to be the most effective at about 1000 feet. Engine noise produced by the LOH did not interfere with reception at ground level. The Division also tested the public address set (AN/FIQ-5A) from an LOH and found it to be less effective than the 250 watt speaker.

(3. Recommendation:

a. When there is not a 1000 watt speaker available, the 250 watt speaker or the public address set can be used as a media for rapid exploitation of contacts.

K. Cross talk on radio remote units:

1. Observation: The remote unit from the USAF, MRC-108 radio, can cause interference when used in close proximity to the RT-524 radio.

2. Evaluation: Exhaustive tests, line changes, re-grounding of equipment and frequency changes failed to solve the problem. The cross talk occurred only when both remotes were keyed simultaneously. It was finally eliminated by adding a full MX-306 "donut roll" in series with the FM remote unit. It is assumed that the MX-306 acted as an RF choke in the remote line, decreasing the interfering signal to an acceptable level.

(3. Recommendation:

a. That the use of the MX-306 be noted as a field expedient method for reducing cross talk between remote control units.

L. Capture of PW:

1. Observation: Many NVA soldiers pinned down outside a fire base after a night attack will surrender at first light if properly handled.

2. Evaluation: Timely and effective means of persuasion must be employed to convince enemy soldiers to surrender. The enemy is most susceptible to capitulation when his group (squad, platoon, etc.) has been effectively disorganized or destroyed. The use of PSYOP broadcast equipment, both air and

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ground, can be an effective determinant in causing enemy surrender.

3 Recommendation:

a. After a night attack has been stopped, units should continue to fire over and behind enemy elements to keep them from withdrawing or picking up their wounded.

b. Immediately after an enemy attack has lost its momentum, Psychological Operation teams should begin their work of persuading enemy soldiers to surrender.

c. A firebase should have a simple reception plan for bringing in PW

d. All personnel should know the SOP concerning fire discipline when receiving PW.

e. After a night attack, both ground and air loudspeakers should be used by the PSYOP teams.

f. Fresh troops should be brought in to sweep the area; they will be more inclined to take PW than the men who fought most of the night defending the fire base.

III. Training: None

IV. Intelligence: None

V. Logistics:

A. Movement of Fire Base Kits to Forward LZ's:

1. Observation: Fire Base Kits are normally moved by CH-47 to the LZ in one day. With the movement of troops and other organic equipment this creates an overload of available organic lift capabilities.

2. Evaluation: Fire Base Kits can be moved over a period of two or more days without adversely affecting the construction project. This can lessen the daily lift requirement, thereby allowing normal resupply missions to continue without interruption. Under the present concept, resupply missions often must be delayed or in some cases cancelled the day the Fire Base Kits are moved. In addition, movement of Fire Base Kits lasting two or more days would preclude the pile-up of supplies on LZ's which often creates a problem. Phased movement would result in better use of available aircraft and also assist in the construction project.

3 Recommendation:

a. The lift of Fire Base Kits to LZ's can be accomplished in a period of two or more days instead of one day. Priority of materials to be lifted daily must be made by the commander.

B. Orderly, timely arrival of Fire Base Kits to new LZ's:

1. Observation: The sudden mass arrival of Fire Base Equipment can lead to confusion, wasted effort, and lost time unless there is direct control and supervision over the arrival of loads.

2. Evaluation: The insertion of the standard Fire Base Kits normally require 26 to 30 CH-47 sorties. In order for the material to arrive on a timely basis and continue to flow smoothly, direct control and coordination is needed.

3 Recommendations:

a. "Hard" missions as opposed to logistical missions must be

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scheduled to insure arrival of Fire Base Kits at the time required.

b The Fire Base material must be drawn the night before the planned insertion and rigged for sling-out.

c, Priorities on loads must be established with a representative sample of all the material moving in the initial lifts. Those items which should go in the first lifts are: water, 500 gallons of MCGAS, 500 gallons of diesel fuel, nails, culvert, sandbags, and draming material.

d The first lift of Fire Base material should move approximately 30 minutes after the insertion of the ground troops. This should be an on-call mission allowing enough time for proper security of the LZ.

e Once the material starts to move, close attention must be paid to maintain an adequate supply of slings and nets. The de-rigging crew on the LZ must work fast in getting the slings and nets off the loads and returning them to the airhead.

f Each soldier should carry with him:

- (1) Ten sandbags
- (2) One five gallon can of water per 3 men
- (3) One case of C-rations per 3 men
- (4) In addition each man should carry one 81mm mortar round,

and one claymore per two men.

g If the above procedures are followed, adequate material and supplies will be available to the men for one night's operation.

C. Assignment of M16A1 Rifles:

1 Observation: It is not essential that each individual retain an M16A1 rifle.

2 Evaluation: The original concept within the Division was that all ranks should be initially issued and retain an M16A1 rifle. This policy was followed without regard to the individual's later assignment, i.e., machine gunner, grenadier, aviator, etc. Such a procedure caused the unnecessary storage and stockpiling of weapons that could have been used elsewhere. Accordingly, the policy was changed so that M16A1 rifles would not be issued to field grade officers and aviators. In addition, an individual receiving a duty assignment where an M16A1 rifle was not required turned in the M16A1 rifle. Rather than stockpiling the weapons at the unit they were then retrograded to Division Rear for re-issue to incoming personnel.

3 Recommendation:

a This policy should be considered for adoption by other divisions whenever a requirement exists for rear area weapons zeroing and training.

D. CH6A Aircraft Barrier Filter System:

1 Observation: The CH6A aircraft incorporates a barrier filter system to prevent ingestion of foreign objects through the engine. When this filter becomes clogged the pilot can select a by-pass position which allows unfiltered air into the engine. Prolonged operation in this position accumulates dirt and other objects around the fuel control sensor and the bleed bond actuator, resulting in a partial engine failure.

2 Evaluation: The barrier filter of the CH6A is required to be cleaned daily with a vacuum cleaner. Since all units in the forward areas do not have such equipment, soap and water works equally well. If the latter method is used the filter must be allowed to dry thoroughly.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969

(3. Recommendation:

a. That all units with CH6A aircraft maintain an extra filter on hand so that while one is being used the other can be cleaned and dried.

E. Ground Surveillance Radar:

1. Observation: The ground surveillance radar program in use until 1 June was not sufficient to maintain operational radar sets on all Fire Support Bases (FSB).

2. Evaluation: Until 1 June, control, accountability, and retrograde was decentralized to battalion level. No centralized float was maintained. The rapid turnover rate of radar sets outstripped replacement capability. To increase the replacement capability a centralized float was established at HQ's, 27th Maintenance Battalion, Bien Hoa Army Base (BHAB) and close liaison was maintained between the repair unit and float facility. Divarty assumed responsibility for maintaining an operational radar set on each FSB. Divarty was tasked to provide helicopters on a priority basis to retrograde D/L sets directly from FSB to BHAB for direct exchange and return to the FSB.

3. Recommendation:

a. That the Division continue the present program and increase Division ground surveillance radar capability.

b. That an aggressive operator-maintenance program be established with emphasis on use and care of radar sets under field conditions.

V. Organization: None

VII. Other:

A. Breaching Concertina Barbed Wire:

1. Observation: Triple standard concertina can easily be breached when not properly tied down.

2. Evaluation: Because of the skill with which the VC/NVA are able to crawl under the concertina, the currently used method of construction is not as effective as it should be.

(3. Recommendation:

a. That two single strands of barbed wire be run at ground level through each of the two concertina roles and then secured to each picket. The strand should then be tightened to preclude lifting the concertina off the ground.

B. Barbed Tape Concertina Wire:

1. Observation: When barbed tape concertina wire is employed at the recommended 15 meters per roll it will not support the third roll in a triple standard concertina.

2. Evaluation: The barbed tape is not as rigid as the normal concertina wire.

3. Recommendation:

a. That a concertina roll of barbed tape be stretched only 10 meters. Computation of material requirements when using barbed tape must reflect that the tape only covers 10 meters instead of the recommended 15 meter per roll.

C. Kit Carson Scout Program:

1. Observation: The Division Kit Carson (KCS) program was not retaining Montagnards employed as KCS. Fifteen Montagnard scouts have either quit or left employment during the reporting period.

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2. Evaluation: Although these Montagnard scouts were recruited from within the Division's AO, those units employing them have had to move from the Montagnard's home areas. These scouts have very strong family ties and prefer employment when the units are in close proximity to their family and village. Reenlistment attempts have been unsuccessful when the units are located in areas away from the Montagnard settlements. The Montagnards prefer to stay within their village boundaries.

3. Recommendation:

a. That Montagnards employed as KCS be thoroughly briefed as to the possibilities that scout work may require them to leave their family, and that commanders employing Montagnard scouts be made aware of the importance of giving frequent passes for the purpose of allowing the scout to visit his family.

D. Civic Action:

1. Observation: A method of counteracting the VC propaganda which states "Saigon is in ruins", and "The GVN is tottering", was needed in rural areas.

2. Evaluation: By coordinating with local school teachers and village chiefs, school children have been flown to Saigon, and have been given a tour of the city to include government buildings, religious edifices and the city zoo. Upon returning home, the children have been most talkative, and have informed their parents and others of the vitality of the city and the government.

3. Recommendation:

a. That major commands operating among rural populations make every effort to arrange trips such as these when the tactical situation permits.


SECTION III: HQS, DA SURVEY INFORMATION

Escape, Evasion and Survival: None

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. E. DOYLE
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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TAB A: Task Organization
TAB B: Weather and Terrain
TAB C: Aerial Surveillance
~~TAB D: Intelligence Activities~~
TAB E: Training/Combat Developments
~~TAB F: Key Personnel Roster~~
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TAB I: Casualty Statistics
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TAB AA: Logistic Operations
TAB AB: Logistics
TAB AC: Civil Affairs
TAB AD: Psychological Operations
TAB AE: Chemical Activities
TAB AF: 11th Aviation Group Statistics

Tabs D, F, G, H and J thru Z wd, HQ, DA.

DISTRIBUTION:

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AVFBC-RE-H (4 Sep 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 13 SEP 1969


THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for the period
ending 31 July 1969 as corrected (Tab A).

FOR THE COMMANDER:


B. G. MACDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).


2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "CS Drum Drops," section II, page 35, paragraph 2H. This headquarters is unable to evaluate the performance of the modified fuze burster. This item has been forwarded by separate correspondence to Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland for evaluation.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "E-158R2 CS Munitions," section II, page 36, paragraph 2I; concur. This item has been forwarded by separate correspondence to Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland for information.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Cross talk on radio remote units," section II, page 36, paragraph 2K; concur. The one-half mile roll of wire does act as a choke and may be used by units who feel that feedback from high powered radios coming over the wire line is excessive. This feedback is only heard by the transmitting operator at the remote site and then only when the remote is keyed at the same time as the high-powered radio. This feedback is not transmitted and therefore is only annoying to the transmitting radio operator.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for  *for* *may. Alce*
C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Cav Div (AM)
II FFV

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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GPOP-DT (15 Aug 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB A: Task Organization

Task Organization

- a. 1st Air Cavalry Division
 - HHC, 1 ACD
 - Security Plat (Prov)
 - 184th Cml Plat (DS)
 - 14th Military History Det
 - 1-9 Cav
 - 62nd Inf Plat (Combat Trackers)
 - Ground Sensor Plat (Prov)
 - 8th Engr Bn
 - 13th Sig Bn
 - Co H (Ranger), 75th Inf
 - 545th MP Co
 - 26th Cml Det
 - 371st RR Co
 - 191st MI Det
 - 583rd MI Det
 - Operational Location #2, 5th Weather Sqdn (USAF)
 - 322nd Avn Spt Det
 - 391st QM Det
 - 273rd Avn Co (Hvy Hel)
- b. 1st Bde
 - 2-7th Cav
 - 2-8th Cav
 - 1-12th Cav
- c. 2nd Bde
 - 2-5th Cav
 - 2-12th Cav
- d. 3rd Bde
 - 1-7th Cav
 - 5-7th Cav
 - 1-8th Cav
- e. Div Arty
 - 1-5th Cav
 - HQB, Div Arty
 - 2/19th Arty
 - 2/20th Arty
 - 1/21st Arty
 - 1/77th Arty
 - Btry E (Avn), 82nd Arty
 - 1/33th Arty
 - 268th FA Det (Radar)
 - 273rd FA Det (Radar)
 - 3rd Prov Plat, 4/60th Arty
- f. 11th ACR
 - 1-11 ACR
 - 1-12 ACR
- g. 11th Avn Gp
 - HHC, 11th Avn Gp

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB A: Task Organization (Cont)

- ATC Plat (Prov)
- 11th Avn Co (GS)
- 227th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel)
- 228th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel Sat)
- 229th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel)
- h. Division Support Command
 - HHC & Band
 - 15th Admin Co
 - 41st PI Det
 - 42nd PI Det
 - 15th Med Bn
 - 15th Sup & Svc Bn
 - 15th Trans Bn
 - 27th Maint Bn
 - 25th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
 - 34th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB B: Weather and Terrain

1. Operation TOAN THANG III

a. The terrain in the Division AO is generally flat. Some portions of Tay Ninh are rice and marshlands while the north and east are forested. Binh Long Province is flat with dense forests in the north and forests mixed with rubber plantations in the south. Phuoc Long Province consists of a rising plain to the west and a mountain range in the northeast. The province is generally heavily vegetated, primarily with multicanopied forest. Four rivers, the Vam Co Dong, the Saigon, the Be, and the Dong Nai, flow through the 1 ACD AO. These rivers present an obstacle to ground movement due to their depth and steep banks. There are three prominent land masses in the area; Nui Ba Den, the Razor Back, and Nui Ba Ra.

b. Weather:

(1) During the month of May the weather conditions were similar to that of the Southwest Monsoon; however, the Southwest flow was very shallow. On 22 May winds aloft, up to 20,000 feet, shifted to the Southwest marking the onset of the Southwest Monsoon. Except for isolated patches along river valleys, fog was a rarity with scattered morning stratocumulus clouds characterizing the AO. In the afternoon thunderstorms prevailed which reduced ceilings and visibility. The weather for the month of June was dominated by the Southwest Monsoon with the moisture content of the air mass increasing significantly because of its long trajectory over water. This situation resulted a substantial increase in the total monthly precipitation. The Equatorial Trough (Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone) moved south twice during the month to a position over the AO providing further assistance for rainshower and thunderstorm formation and resulting in several days of exceptionally large areas of intense showers. Morning stratus and fog became a major factor during the last half of the month with higher elevations completely obscured by fog between 0600 hours and 0900 hours on several occasions. During July the weather was again dominated by the Southwest Monsoon with increased winds aloft somewhat causing an increase in cloud cover and precipitation which in turn lowered temperatures. Typhoons Tess and Viola affected the AO with Camp Gorvad receiving 2.01 inches of precipitation on the day Typhoon Tess reached land near the DMZ. Typhoon Viola caused an increase in winds and middle cloudiness during the last week of July with stratus forming around 600 feet almost daily after 0200 hours around Song Be and Quan Loi.

(2) Maximum Temperatures: May - 104°, June - 103°, July - 98°.

(3) Minimum Temperatures: May - 76°, June - 73°, July - 74°.

(4) Relative Humidity: May - 90% morning and 62% afternoon; June - 90% morning and 55% afternoon; July - 92% morning and 68% afternoon.

(5) Rainfall: May - 2.55 inches, June - 10.98 inches, July - 21.07 inches of precipitation.

(6) Maximum Density Altitudes: May - 3722 feet, June - 3657 feet, July - 3251 feet.

(7) Minimum Density Altitudes: May - 1563 feet, June - 1613 feet, July - 1416 feet.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB C : Aerial Surveillance

1. Mission Statistics for the period 1 May - 31 July 1969.

<u>MISSION TYPE</u>	<u>SCHD/COMP</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
IR	306/277	277 IIRs
SLAR	185/181	181 IIRs
PHOTO	86/84	84 IPIRs
PHOTO (Hand Held)	3/3	3 IPIRs

2. General Comments: Flying weather, especially during the last two months of the reporting period was poor. Maintenance of aircraft or equipment was not a significant problem.

a. IR During the quarter 90.5% of the missions were completed. 29 missions were cancelled, 26 due to weather, 2 due to IR system malfunction, and 1 due to contact artillery fire in the area.

b. SLAR During the quarter 97.8% of the SLAR missions were completed. 4 missions were cancelled, 2 due to sensor malfunction and 2 due to weather.

c. PHOTO During the quarter 97.8% of the photo missions were completed. 2 missions were not completed, 1 due to weather, and 1, which is still pending at this time, due to insufficient coverage.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB E : Training/Combat Developments

1. Division Training:

a. THE FIRST TEAM ACADEMY at Bien Hoa conducted individual replacement training for all incoming replacement personnel during the reporting period. 704 officers and 5,592 enlisted men received the three-day course of instruction.

b. The Combat Leaders Course (CLC) graduated 202 personnel during the quarter. The 10 day POI provides training for selected E-3 thru E-5 personnel who are programmed to be team leaders and squad leaders in the line units. The subjects stressed are small unit Air Cav tactics, map reading, communications procedures, weapons employment, first aid and leadership.

c. The Kit Carson Scout Training Program graduated 78 personnel during the quarter. The objective of the program is to provide Cav maneuver units with well-trained indigenous scouts familiar with enemy tactics and procedures as well as the area of operations of the rifle companies and reconnaissance platoons of the Division. The training includes basic Air Cav tactics, care and operation of US equipment, English language, proficiency, and the mission of the Kit Carson Scout Program.

d. The Division Sniper Program was initiated during the reporting period. As of 31 July THE FIRST TEAM ACADEMY had graduated 32 snipers. The program is designed to train carefully selected personnel from the ground units in the advanced marksmanship and sniper ambush techniques. Included in the course are communications procedures, map reading, adjustment of indirect fire support and night firing techniques. Upon graduation, the trained snipers are returned to their parent battalion for employment as a battalion asset.

2. Non-Divisional Training Programs and Schools:

a. The Division made use of the USARV school system to the maximum extent possible during the reporting period. The following figures indicate which schools and how many students participated:

	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>
Army Aviation Refresher Training School	180	27
MACV Recondo School	15	
US Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade	22	

b. Twenty-two aviators attended the Jungle Environmental Survival Training (JEST) course in the Phillipines during the reporting period.

3. Combat Developments:

a. On 1 May 1969, the Division received nine 300 watt, Hydrazine Air Fuel

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB E : Training/Combat Developments (Cont)

Cells. The items were requested for immediate development under ENSURE 80 and were intended to serve as silent power sources for the AN/VRC 12 series radios and small equipment operating within that power rating on forward fire bases. After a preliminary training period for the operators, the fuel cells were moved to the 2-12 Cav forward fire base and placed in operation on 1 June 1969 to begin a 90 day test. At the end of the first week all nine cells were inoperative due to acid leaks in the cooling fan housings. The test was terminated and the cells were returned to CONUS for further modification.

b. On 10 June 1969, the Division received its first increment of the XM-76 Anti-Oscillation Sighting Device. The instrument, designed for Airborne use, is an electrically controlled gyro-stabilized monocular with a power zoom lens extending from 3x to 9x power. Preliminary testing during the reporting period indicates that the device will be extremely useful for use in C & C and reconnaissance aircraft. The test and evaluation was not complete at the conclusion of the reporting period.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB I: Casualty Statistics

	CASUALTIES			NON-HOSTILE	
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DEATH</u>	<u>INJURY</u>
MAY 69	102	716	0	18	82
JUN 69	101	709	0	11	71
JUL 69	44	356	2	16	136

COMMENTS: 1. The following problem areas exist in the area of casualty reporting:

- a. Delayed and incomplete casualty reports are being submitted from the field.
2. A continuing effort is being made by this office to provide guidance to field commanders in proper casualty reporting procedures. Unit commanders have been requested to send their unit casualty reporters to this office for a complete briefing in casualty reporting.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AA: Logistic Operations

1. During the reporting period, 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969, Division Support Command provided or coordinated combat service support including supply, maintenance, medical service, transportation, evacuation of captured materiel and salvage, bath, laundry, and graves registration for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), attached elements, and contiguous units.

a. The 1st FSSE, collocated with and supporting the OPCON battalions of the 1st Brigade, remained at Tay Ninh. The 1st FSSE provided materiel and transport for three new firebases, moved three battalion rears and trains, and accomplished logistical resupply by CH-47 of an 11 ACR Troop for two weeks. 1st FSSE movements control moved 14,240 tons of cargo and 7032 passengers from its consolidated sling-out pad, and 2955 tons of cargo and 20,509 passengers from the fixed wing air strip at Tay Ninh.

b. During the reporting period, the 2nd FSSE staffed three locations in support of the 2nd Brigade, providing continuous liaison with the 2nd Brigade CP at Lai Khe, principal FSSE operations at Quan Loi, and resupply capabilities at Tay Ninh in proximity to 2nd Brigade fire support bases located in the western portion of the 2nd Brigade AO. Because of a shortage of personnel, the 2nd FSSE Tay Ninh operation was discontinued in July. Materiel and transport for six fire support bases were provided by 2nd FSSE, and 28,834 passengers together with 2293 tons of cargo were moved through 8th Aerial Port at Quan Loi.

c. The 3rd FSSE, in support of 3rd Brigade operations, moved to Blackhorse in May and set up a supply transfer point at Xuan Loc. Supplies were moved from the Long Binh-Bien Hoa complex along Highway One, staged at Xuan Loc, and slung-out by CH-47 to 3rd Brigade fire support bases. In contrast to this type of support, LZ's Libby and Rock were the first 1 ACD fire support bases to receive direct support resupply by convoy. 1 ACD provided convoy security, air cover, the convoy commander, ready reaction forces and artillery in support of the convoys provided by the 48th Transportation Group and other general support units. On 25 June, the 3rd FSSE returned to Quan Loi and merged with the 2nd FSSE to provide area support for tenant units.

d. On 22 May, Headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam, assigned responsibility for the Army Aircraft Logistical Areas (AALA) at Song Be and Quan Loi to the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The AALA provide US helicopter refuel-rearm service on an area support basis. The Song Be refuel facility is operated by the 391st Quartermaster Detachment, OPCON to the 15th S&S Battalion. Personnel from the 11th Aviation Group operate the Song Be rearm point. The 15th S&S Battalion operates the Quan Loi refuel point while using aviation units provide rearm point operation. The two-part facility at each location is under the operational control of DISCOM. Relocation of the refuel-rearm point at Song Be and construction of a new rearm point at Quan Loi is pending resolution of construction designs. Late in the reporting period, the program of instruction for the DISCOM Logistics Operations Course was expanded to include aerial delivery support, medical service and aircraft maintenance, and supply subjects. In addition, DISCOM has re-established the Division Support Command Orientation for replacement officers and senior NCO's at the 1st Team Academy.

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 TAB AA: Logistic Operations (Cont)

2. During the reporting period, the 27th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts supply for all ground equipment (less medical and cryptographic) of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile). This "Anywhere--Anytime" support was evident in the fact that the following percentages of equipment were operational at the end of the quarter:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>% OPERATIONAL</u>
Vehicles	98.1%
Artillery.....	100.0%
Generators	96.2%
Communications	96.3%

a. During the quarter there were 25 technical assistance visits conducted by units of the Battalion.

b. The Battalion AIM Team visited a total of 24 units during the reporting period.

c. The disposition of elements of the Battalion as of 25 July 1969 was as follows:

- Headquarters and Company A Bien Hoa
- Main Support Detachment..... Phuoc Vinh
- B Detachment..... Quan Loi
- C Detachment..... Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, and LZ Buttoms
- D Detachment..... Tay Ninh

d. The consolidated Battalion production for the reporting period shows the following completed jobs:

	HQ/Co A	MSD	B	C	D	TOTAL
	Bien Hoa	Phuoc Vinh				
Automotive	220	226	156	86	133	821
Engineer	177	339	229	127	204	1016
Electronics	589	2105	962	651	1156	5463
Armament (Artillery)	0	23	9	13	27	72
(Small Arms)	333	694	656	288	480	2451
(Instruments)	234	491	176	76	167	1144
Other	245	1158	158	124	101	1786
	1738	5036	2346	1365	2268	12,753

NOTE: "Other" categories of completed work order requests shown above include machine shop work, welding, canvas repair, glass cutting, office machine repair and fuel and electrical components repair.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AA: Logistic Operations (Cont)

e. Summary of supply data for the quarter reveals the following:

(1) Total ASL requests received	32,566
(2) Total Fringe requests received	6127
(3) Average demand accommodation	80.3%
(4) Average demand satisfaction	29.0%
(5) Average ASL lines stocked	6389
(6) Average zero balance lines	3303
(7) Average fringe lines on hand	0
(8) Fringe lines turned in	1900
(9) Units supported by ASL	93
(10) Lines inventoried during the period	5742

f. Receipt of repair parts at the supply base at Bien Hoa for the quarter was as follows:

Red Ball Receipts	28,525 lbs
Parcel Post	6015 lbs
Normal Stockage	462,179 lbs

3. The 15th Supply and Service Battalion (AM) continued to support the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) during the reporting period. The Battalion operated from a base area in Bien Hoa and forward locations in Tay Ninh, Quan Loi and Phuoc Vinh. Major operational achievements were:

(a) Full supply support to Phuoc Vinh: The forward support platoon at Phuoc Vinh took over the responsibility for providing Class I and Class III supplies. This area-support mission, in addition to the existing Class II & IV supply mission, means that the Battalion now has responsibility for total supply support of 1st Cavalry Division (AM) units located in the Phuoc Vinh area.

(b) Supply by air to Song Be: The Battalion was originally assigned the mission of providing Class III support to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) units located at Song Be. The 391st QM Detachment (PCL) was placed under operational control of the Battalion for the performance of this mission. However, the required support increased and presently the Battalion is providing all classes of supplies to Song Be. All resupply is being effected by air; supplies are being flown in on a daily basis from Bien Hoa, a distance of approximately 65 air miles. Perishable rations are packed in insulated containers (Dow boxes) in order to preserve them.

(c) Forward shipment of supplies: The Battalion obtained dedicated truck support from 48th Transportation Group as a means of supplementing organic transportation assets. This added transportation capability enabled the Battalion to be responsive to the needs of the user and to ship supplies as far forward as possible. During the reporting period, the Battalion moved 7198 tons of supplies by trucks.

(d) Establishment of transfer point at Xuan Loc: During June, the Battalion moved the major elements of a fourth forward support platoon into Xuan Loc to operate a transfer point. Supplies were moved from the base at Bien Hoa to the transfer point by land convoy; from there, supplies were slung out by CH-47 helicopters to three different landing zones, which were spread out

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AA: Logistic Operations (Cont)

in a radius of more than twenty air miles from Xuan Loc. This three week operation was successfully accomplished by the Battalion without downgrading the accomplishment of other mission requirements.

(e) Class I point established at Bien Hoa Army Base: The Battalion established a Class I supply point to service all 1st Cavalry Division (AM) units located at Bien Hoa Army Base. This supply point has eliminated the requirements for units to travel to Long Binh to draw rations.

(f) Technical assistance given for AALA's: The Class III and Class V sections were called upon to give technical advice and assistance during the establishment of AALA's at Song Be and Quan Loi. Personnel of the Class III and Class V sections were able to give recommendations related to efficient operation, safety and security.

(g) Class I Issues:

(1) Rations:	<u>Feb-Mar-Apr</u>	<u>May-Jun-Jul</u>
"A" rations	1799 tons	1562 tons
"B" rations	1215 tons	1201 tons
"C" rations	1,719,551 meals	1,315,762 meals
LRRP rations	72,380 meals	114,655 meals

(2) Ration Supplements:		
Ice	5852 tons	3702 tons
Sundry packs	373 tons	370 tons
Milk	1,829,600 pints	2,712,986 pints
Ice cream	41,017 gals	19,340 gals

(h) Class II & IV Issues:
Quarterly total 1796 tons 4783 tons

(i) Class III Issues:

JP-4	2,670,500 gals	5,769,400 gals
AVGAS	53,300 gals	77,400 gals
MCGAS	607,170 gals	1,049,500 gals
DF-2	837,000 gals	1,512,900 gals

(j) Class V Issues:
Quarterly total 11,794 tons 13,828 tons

4. Maintenance Operations

(a) Decentralized Maintenance

(1) During the reporting period, the 15th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) received the nineteen shop sets required to move the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) into the Decentralized Maintenance Concept. The shop sets were received short a few essential items which has prevented all operational units from accepting a direct support maintenance function. Further, special tools and repair parts have been received to support the new maintenance concept for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). A PLL requisitioned for each detachment has received fill which varies from 57% for a pure AH-1G unit to 80% for the CH-47 units. The 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion has assumed a direct support maintenance capability.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AA: Logistic Operations (Cont)

(2) Company A of this Battalion has gone to zero strength since the 228th ASHB accepted a direct support maintenance role on receipt of their KF teams. Company C now provides back-up direct support maintenance for the 228th ASHB and maintains the authorized stockage list for 1st Cav CH-47 repair parts and components.

- (b) Production Control
 - (1) Aircraft Work Orders Received 2596
 - (2) Aircraft Released 2575
- (c) Shop Office
 - (1) Production Control Internal Work Orders 3148
 - (2) Direct Support Internal Work Orders 4183
- (d) Production Maintenance Manhours 294,216
- (e) Recoveries 1
- (f) EIR's submitted 111
- (g) Technical Assistance Visits to Units 48
- (h) Unit Locations

LOCATION

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

BEAR CAT	HHC (-) A CO (-)
CU CHI	B CO (-)
LONG THANH NORTH	C CO (-)
PHU LOI	D CO (-)

(i) Armament

(1) The 15th TC DSU's are turning in all excess armament subsystems to the 34th Group or to Sharpe Army Depot.

(2) On 16, 17, and 18 July, a courtesy inspection was made by the 15th TC Armament NCO of HQ, A, B and C Troop 1/9th Cav.

(j) Avionics

- (1) Complete turn-in of ARC - 122 from 15th TC Bn to USAFV
- (2) A Company Avionics shop has been transferred to Hq 228th ASHB.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AB: Logistics

1. The quarter has been characterized by a steady improvement in the vehicle status of the Division. As this is written some 107 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks have been received along with 82 $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trucks. No further allocations of 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks are expected considering the Division's excess position. No further $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks (mules) are expected for the balance of the year. Despite the receipts mentioned above, shortages still exist in those classes along with 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton ambulances, and fuel servicing trucks.
2. The Division's position on night observation devices has also improved over the quarter. This was particularly true with the PVS-3 where an additional 59 became part of the inventory. Combined PVS-1/2 totals increased by 17 and TVS-2's by 2. Prospects for the forthcoming receipt of 10 TVS-4 remained as July came to a close.
3. The radio situation remained fairly static for the period. 6 GRC 106's were received, but nothing in the PRC 25/77 area or the VRC 12 family.
4. Ammunition continued to command greater attention because of problem areas with 81mm HE and the 10 lb 2.75" PD rocket. During previous ASR periods it was found that the allocation of HE mortar rounds was particularly short because of the relatively small number of 4.2 mortars in the Division. Other II FFV divisions were being allocated approximately 14,000 81mm HE rounds along with about 13,700 4.2 HE for a total of 27,700 HE rounds. The 1st Air Cavalry Division, on the other hand, was receiving the 14,000 figure, but only 1,700 4.2 HE because of the small number of 4.2 weapons in the Division. None the less, this put the Division at a decided disadvantage as the 81mm mortar was expected to handle the work load that in other divisions was shared with the 4.2" mortar. The situation was causing the Division to request continual increases. The problem was recognized by Hq's II FFV and allocations of 81mm HE rounds have been quite satisfactory.
5. A more pressing and still outstanding problem in ammunition has been that of the 2.75" 10 lb PD rocket. Previous allocations on this item have been in the area of 45,000 monthly. Starting with the 24 June - 24 July period the allocation for this rocket was reduced to just under 20,000 with the situation expected to remain the same until September. The shortage was traceable to a problem in the CONUS manufacture of the rocket motor. The problem received the personal attention of the CG who talked personally with the commanders of the using units and issued a message limiting the use of this particular rocket. In addition, greater usage of the other rockets in lieu of the 2.75" 10 lb PD was urged. These restraints have paid dividends as the Division kept well within the allocations for all rockets until the end of the period when, urged to draw up to their allocation, slight overdraws occurred. The prospects for the 24 July - 24 August period brightened somewhat with the allocation of 23,088 2.75" 10 lb PD rockets.
6. Fortification materials became increasingly scarce during the quarter. It was difficult to accomplish work required above and beyond that already completed with the basic fire base materials. Specific lumber 1X, 2X, 4X, and $\frac{1}{2}$ "

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AB: Logistics (Cont)

plywood became USARV command controlled. Attempts by the Division to secure emergency materials for fire bases damaged through enemy attack resulted in USARV applying a monthly lumber ration. This in turn resulted in a temporary freeze on Division lumber resources while an inventory of on hand assets was conducted. It has become apparent that strict lumber rationing must be instituted within the Division. The amounts allocated by USARV must not only cover fortification projects, but installation activities as well.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AC: Civil Affairs

1. (C) POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL

a. Refugees:

(1) During the reporting period, 12,690 pounds of food were distributed to refugees within the Division's TAOR, primarily in the Tay Ninh area.

(2) At the request of the village chief, the village of Hoa My, Chon Thanh District, Binh Long Province was moved four kilometers to a new and more secure location. With the help of 1st Cavalry Division trucks, the entire village was moved in one day to its new location. The 410 villagers were enthusiastic about the move, and did the bulk of the preparatory work for the move by themselves.

b. Security Control:

Thru the Division's Commodity Distribution Program, 17,000 pounds of barrier material were given to villages and hamlets throughout the TAOR.

2. (U) CIVIC ACTION

a. Through close coordination with civic action platoons, and District and Province Officials, the Division provided support in the building and furnishing of 5 schools, 2 dispensaries, 2 hamlet offices and one orphanage. Additional material and technical support has been given to village and hamlet chiefs for self-help projects in conjunction with the 1969 Pacification Plan.

b. During the reporting period, 48 MEDCAPS and 33 ICAPS, with a MEDCAP as their focal point, treated 4566 patients.

c. Through the use of the Voluntary Civic Action Fund, a Scholarship Assistance Program was instituted to help needy Vietnamese students. In addition to Scholarship Assistance, eight Grants-in-Aid have been awarded to needy students at the Bien Hoa School of Nursing to defray the cost of books, uniforms and living expenses over the length of the course.

d. The functioning of the Community Relations Council and the Friendship Council continued to be an effective means through which mutual problems are discussed, and resolved, and potential problems averted.

e. During the quarter, the Division sponsored weekly trips to Saigon for children and their teachers, who came from the outlying rural districts. The children were given Vietnamese Flags and "Tee" shirts preparatory to the trip. A two fold benefit resulted from these tours; firstly, the children, in the vast majority of cases, saw for the first time the seat of their National Government.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AC: Civil Affairs (Cont)

Secondly, the children created a viable counter to the NLF Propaganda that says Saigon lays in ruins due to VC offensive action.

f. Spoken English classes were conducted for approximately 80 students on a three meetings a week basis during the reporting period.

g. 7021 pounds of soap, 610 health kits, 680 pounds of clothing, and 10,000 board feet of lumber were distributed to needy families over the period.

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TAB AD: Psychological Operations

1. General: As the quarter commenced, THE FIRST TEAM continued its operations against major enemy units. The 1st and 7th NVA Divisions had withdrawn to their sanctuaries in Cambodia, Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces, to regroup after the losses of his WINTER/SPRING Offensive. The enemy was subjected to constant reminders of his desperate situation through Division PSYOP efforts. Using all available PSYOP media, known vulnerabilities stressing themes of loneliness, health, morale, and poor leadership were exploited. As the Division's demoralization campaign against the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions in AO MONTANA SCOUT continued, the 3rd Brigade deployed to AO CREEK to conduct operations against the 5th VC Division. A vigorous PSYOP campaign against the 5th VC Division was undertaken as soon as ground operations commenced. Large caches were uncovered in WAR ZONE D. Leaflets and tapes were produced capitalizing on the enemy's loss of supplies. Concurrent with offensive operations, the Audio-Visual team was employed in AO CREEK to support CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYOP. Broadcasting public information, distributing literature, and publicizing MEDCAF's and ICAP's, the HE team aided greatly in the AO CREEK PSYWAR effort. In AO MONTANA SCOUT, the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions ventured from their secure areas to attack several FIRST TEAM firebases. Division PSYOP assets were immediately employed to take advantage of the enemy during and after contacts. In every instance, loudspeaker aircraft were on station at BMNT, giving instructions to the enemy on how to safely be taken prisoner. In addition, ground teams utilizing portable bullhorns were dispatched to persuade those on the battlefield and in the immediate area to surrender. Increased emphasis was made in the use of PW "good treatment" themes. In June, the 5th VC Division moved North to Phuoc Long Province. The 3rd Brigade deployed to the Binh Long/Phuoc Long area. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, OPCON to THE FIRST TEAM, and division units continued combat operations against the enemy main force units. Under the guidance of the Division G-5, Brigade and 11th ACR S-5's increased PSYOP in support of the accelerated Chieu Hoi Program and vigorously supported two new II FFV PSYOP Campaigns, "Operation Exploiter" and "Family Tree." Brigades S-5's established close liaison with provincial PSYOP coordinating committees for development and deployment of PSYOP media by US and GVN agencies in support of pacification.

2. Support:

a. The 5th Special Operations Squadron (USAF) supported the 1 ACD PSYOP effort with leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. Using both U-10 and C-47 aircraft, 41,075,000 leaflets were dropped in pre-planned target areas specified by THE FIRST TEAM. Loudspeaker appeals totaling 78 hours were broadcast to selected target audiences.

b. The 6th PSYOP Battalion, located at Bien Hoa, provided general support with personnel, equipment, technical advice and media. The battalion furnished one HA (liaison officer) team, three HB (ground) loudspeaker teams, and one HE (Audio-Visual) team to the Division PSYOP effort.

c. 1 ACD Brigade HB PSYOP teams operating from Division UH-1 helicopters broadcast 563 hours, and dropped 27,192,000 leaflets. Brigade operations included weekly pre-planned and daily planned target areas, as well as quick

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AD: Psychological Operations (Cont)

reaction PSYOP exploitation.

d. The Division PSYOP capability is dependent on the equipment available to accomplish the mission. With this in mind the Brigades, with the help of G-5, began and successfully conducted a program to maintain equipment at the lowest possible echelon. As a result, days lost to repair were reduced resulting in greater use of organic PSYOP equipment.

e. The Division PSYOP section continued to improve its knowledge of enemy units. Current intelligence dossiers listing vulnerabilities of all major enemy units down to battalion level were maintained by G-5. Increased coordination between G-2 and G-5 intelligence analysts provided daily PSYOP essential elements of information on enemy activities. PSYOP was thus able to program PSYWAR campaigns while maintaining the flexibility to react to any immediate situation, should it arise.

f. With an additional mission to support the GVN 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, the 1st Cavalry, PSYOP broadened its areas of interest. Increased emphasis was placed on the inducement of Hoi Chanhs, the 3rd Party Inducement Program, use of Armed Propaganda Teams, expanded ICAPs and MEDCAPs, and PSYOP support to the enhancement of the GVN image in populated areas.

g. The 1 ACD experienced an increase in Prisoners of War taken as a result of stressing the PSYOP theme "Good Treatment for PW". PSYOP emphasis in support of the GVN Chieu Hoi Program continued throughout the reporting period. For the quarter, 127 Hoi Chanhs returned to GVN authority within THE FIRST TEAM AC, 4 Hoi Chanhs returned to GVN thru Division elements, and 105 PW's surrendered.

3. Kit Carson Scouts: G-5 increased recruiting activities in Binh Long, Phuoc Long and Bien Hoa Provinces as well as in the IV Corps area and at the National Chieu Hoi Center. Special recruiting posters were distributed to the centers and a recruiting brochure was planned for reproduction and distribution to KCS candidates. The Division's KCS regulation was written for implementation pending approval. Emphasis was placed on improving the program of instruction the scout receives in his initial four weeks of instruction at THE FIRST TEAM ACADEMY. A new POI was written and implemented using English/Vietnamese language texts. A special booklet of military terms in English and Vietnamese was made up for the scout's use during training and later during his field duty. Administrative processing procedures were improved and measures were taken to update all scout records. Special leave/pass forms written in English and Vietnamese were produced and distributed to units employing KCS. Pay roll procedures were improved using KCS ID cards and KCS pay day was changed so that scouts would be paid on the same day as 1st Air Cav Troopers by battalion pay officers. An additional ARVN interpreter was added to the instructor staff for KCS training and an additional officer from the ACofS, G-5 office was assigned to the KCS Program. Chief Brigade Scouts were designated and assigned to the brigades to assist in supervising the scout activities within the brigades. Plans were implemented to assign Battalion Chief Scouts within each

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TAB AD: Psychological Operations (Cont)

battalion. Special KCS pocket patches were designed, produced and distributed to the scouts for wear. A number of Montagnard KCS recruited from Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces either quit or requested release from employment. Their family ties are very strong and they preferred to live with their families. Despite these losses, the Division KCS strength was 145 at the end of the quarter. One scout was killed and two were wounded in combat operations.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AE: Chemical Activities

1. Operations:

a. General: During the reporting period 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969, there was an increase in the use of RCA (Riot Control Agents), flame field expedients, and sniffer missions. Chemical contact teams were again established at all three Brigades to work under the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer.

(1) During the reporting period, FIRST TEAM Chemical personnel dropped several sorties of CS drums at night using the GCA radar guidance. GCA personnel are given the coordinates of the start and stop points on the target run prior to the start of the mission. They plot these two points on their radar scopes. When the CH-47 comes on station, GCA personnel vector the ship onto the target line and tell the pilot when to start dropping and when to stop. Accuracy of this system is dependent upon the experience of the GCA operators and the distance from the GCA location to the target.

(2) THE FIRST TEAM also conducted night drops of E-158's CS canister clusters utilizing GCA guidance. On clear, moonlight nights the accuracy of the GCA radar can be checked by having artillery mark the target with WP.

(3) THE FIRST TEAM has developed an expedient munition to contaminate bunkers with persistent CS. It is called the Bunker Use Restriction Bomb or BURB. It consists of the cardboard container for a 2.75" RKT Warhead, 2 N.E. Blasting Caps, approximately 25 secs of time fuze and a fuze ignitor. A hole is drilled in the container just below the removable cover. The time fuze is inserted in the hole and a blasting cap is attached on the inside of the container. The second B cap is taped to the first B cap. A fuze ignitor is attached to the other end of the fuze and taped to the outside of the container. The point where the fuze enters the container is sealed with rubber cement. The container can then be filled with CS and taped shut. The two N.E. Blasting caps provide sufficient force to rupture the container and spread the CS without causing the CS to flash. Approximate weight of the filled munition is 2-3 pounds.

2. Operational Totals: Totals for the reporting period includes most but not all of the chemical support given to THE FIRST TEAM.

CS Drum Drops

56 sorties for 1588 drums (127,040 lbs)

Sniffer Missions

276

Fougasse Installed

659 55 gal Drums

E-158 Missions

283 Munitions dropped

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AE: Chemical Activities (Cont)

Bunkers Contaminated by Chemical Personnel

263

Insecticide Missions

37 missions 3700 gals of Malathion solution

Napalm dropped

45 drums 2250 gal

Flame Operations on Perimeter at Camp Gorvad

69,500 meters sq Burned

Husch Flares

102 Installed

AE2

65

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
TAB AF: 11th Aviation Group Flight Statistics

	<u>UHLH</u>			
	May	June	July	Total
Hours Flown	10,682	11,227	10,194	32,103
Sorties	35,607	33,463	29,766	98,836
Pax	47,935	44,886	48,320	141,191
Cargo tons	1,670	1,174	1,192	4,036
A/C % CR	77%	76%	76%	77%
Hits fly	8	12	9	29
Hits No fly	8	17	10	35

	<u>AHLG</u>			
Hours Flown	1,642	1,733	1,518	4,893
Sorties	3,024	3,511	3,632	10,167
A/C % CR	64%	64%	82%	70%
Hits fly	3	2	0	5
Hits No fly	0	1	0	1

	<u>CHL7</u>			
Hours Flown	2,851	2,741	3,040	8,632
Useful Sorties	4,230	4,202	9,205	18,137
Total Sorties	7,219	6,603	11,141	24,963
Pax	22,276	20,490	26,847	69,613
Cargo Tons	11,592	10,415	22,239	44,246
A/C % CR	64%	73%	76%	71%
Hits Fly	0	0	7	7
Hits No Fly	0	0	1	1
Tactical A/C Recoveries	17	15	18	50

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