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FROM POLITICAL DEFENSE TO WORLD LEADERSHIP

by

Hendrik Brugmans

College of Europe
Bruges, Belgium

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Authors of Advance Study Papers

NATO—PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

*Conference of The Center for Strategic Studies,
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Maurice Allais

Professor
Institut de Statistique de
l'Université de Paris

André Beaufre

Général, French Army (Ret.)
Director, Institut Français
d'Études Stratégiques, Paris

Kurt Birrenbach

Chairman, Foreign Affairs
Committee of the Bundestag
German Federal Republic

Karl Brandt

Director
Food Research Institute
Stanford University

Hendrik Brugmans

Rector
College of Europe
Bruges, Belgium

W. Randolph Burgess

United States Permanent
Representative to NATO,
1957-1961

Milorad Drachkovitch

Senior Staff Member
Hoover Institution on
War, Revolution, and Peace

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Pierre Uri

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FROM POLITICAL DEFENSE TO WORLD LEADERSHIP

The Present Situation

Certain problems of the modern world—such as widespread hunger and underdevelopment—are perhaps theoretically more important than the East-West conflict, and surely more of an inspiration to young Westerners who are anxious to contribute their share to a better standard of living for mankind. Moreover, in the struggle against communism we face a deadlock. Actions against economic and social backwardness require immediate measures in several fields: more investments, better vocational training, stabilization of prices of tropical products and raw materials, etc. On the one hand, there seems to exist a guardian duty to be patiently performed. On the other, there appears a multiplicity of concrete tasks to be fulfilled.

The rivalry between the two systems has global repercussions, disrupting every normal human intercourse between nations, races and continents, and influencing (or rather politicizing) any initiative made to improve living conditions of the underprivileged. On our side of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, "the front is everywhere."

The ubiquitous rivalry between the two systems of values has a very particular character which can hardly be compared with any other conflict in world history. Although the ironic mind may resent its harshness, this rivalry will continue to divide humanity as long as Peking and Moscow will aim at world revolution; i.e. for a period which may last indefinitely. Moreover, we are not facing here a "problem" to be "solved" by means of intellectual ingenuity. (In that sense, it obscures the terminology to speak about a Berlin or a Formosa "question.") We

face a power, political, and ideological conflict. Ideas and the force behind them will shape the basic data of our situation, at the very moment when mankind is entering "the era of global history." [Hans Kohn]

What Stalin used to call "peaceful competition" does not differ basically from what Khrushchev today terms "thaw," "peaceful coexistence," or "détente." Time and again, the present Soviet leader has clearly stated his view that there could be no end to "ideological class struggle" before the final defeat of capitalism. This, he said, was true both in the field of intellectual and artistic life inside the U.S.S.R. ("fight against the remnants of bourgeois ideology") as well as in international relations. We would be naive to hope for greater, lasting toleration, or even for a division of the world in "spheres of influence." In fact, any "de-tension" or "détente" at all results exclusively from a weakening of Communist dictatorship, as Khrushchev does not wield as much power as his predecessor used to enjoy. Stalinism without Stalin, as he would like to have it, is utopian. Similarly, East European countries could not be kept down after the events of 1956—at least not as before. We would be equally as foolish to believe in a change of heart of the Communist leaders, as to act as if their regime would be monolithic and not subject to the historical laws of change and evolution.

The only chance we have to decrease tensions lies in a change of the balance of powers to the detriment of the Communists; i.e. in a further weakening of the Communist bloc or in a strengthening of our side. Both would make our opponents realize that the times of victorious advance are over and that, consequently, a more "flexible" attitude is desirable. In other words, "liberalization" of a dictatorship (and a totalitarian, ideologically obsessed dictatorship at that) can never be obtained other than by its internal disintegration or by a series of external setbacks.

Finally, the conflict between Moscow and Peking, far from making the former more Western minded, may well force the Soviet leaders to insist on their implacable loyalty to the principles and doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. Any ideological weakness on their part will immediately be interpreted as fresh evidence of their "revisionism" and their having become unworthy of bearing the banner of world revolution in the "Third World."

"The Communist system is therefore already on what is practically a war footing." This statement, made by a Chatham House study group in 1950, when Stalinism was at its zenith, appears to be valid still, even if Mr. Khrushchev's wording may sometimes be less aggressive than Stalin's, and even if he has greater difficulties to face with less absolute power, which makes him more vulnerable and more careful. It might even be advocated that these circumstances will not always diminish but rather might increase Communist pressure on the outside world. In a comparable way, the French Revolution entered its most aggressive phase after Thermidor, when the crusading spirit of Jacobinism was on the wane and the Paris Government wavering.

This pressure will normally make itself felt in any area where a power, political, or ideological vacuum appears, since our opponent is likely to attack our weakest spots. Analyzing the world situation, we therefore have to ask ourselves where such weak spots appear.

Weak Spots on the Home Front

Some time ago a Dutch cartoonist portrayed Mr. Khrushchev, sitting at a control board wondering which button to push—Berlin, Vietnam, Cuba, etc. Today, the artist might have presented the same control board—adding perhaps a few new buttons (Zanzibar for instance and Kasai)—but showing two quarreling technicians behind it, as Mao has now come into the competition for world conquest. In any case,

whatever the number of button-pushers, they do have the means to open or close an incident in numerous part of the world, as they dispose of local "agents" who freely and even enthusiastically accept leadership of "the people" on the spot, organize mass movements, and follow instructions, even while using their own initiative. In other words, the buttons are made of human convictions, organizational skill, and energetic devotion, at least as much as of bribery and intimidation.

We in the West can at best count on governments, sometimes though not always corrupt, sometimes though not always successful, but hardly ever on spontaneous popular movements. This is only too understandable. The underdeveloped regions, where de-colonization more often than not has left chaos and incompetence—and consequently a power-political vacuum—are ruled by men who desperately look out for a "regime" to establish and to believe in. And in their view, mature "Capitalist" democracy hardly offers any solution. For that conviction they have at least two main arguments. (1) Western Democracy is represented either by ex-colonial countries or by the United States which is too powerful not to be "Imperialist" and too strongly interested in economic expansion not to cover new overseas markets. In any case, we are suspect and do not arouse the enthusiasm which is indispensable in an emotion laden world. (2) These freshly emerged countries cannot afford the luxury of opposition groups out of office, as all available political and technically skilled forces must be permanently mobilized for the common goal. Pluriformity and open criticism against the Government—values, which we cherish as essential prerequisites for freedom—in their view amount to disloyalty and disruption. Consequently our main argument against communism (or against fascism for that matter), that it does not provide room for free public debate, falls flat when the state is recent and the income per capita low. By contrast, communism appears to offer the passionately desired short-cut toward

political and administrative order, industrialization, and prosperity. True, it does not shrink from using the violent methods we have learned to discard. But overseas, these are considered inevitable in any case. With an "ideology" in mind, it seems to become easier to run a country and whip up national energy.

When we review the situation, it may therefore seem that communism, whether Russian or Chinese, has too formidable trump-cards not to win. In fact it sometimes seems that it is progressively winning over the "non-committed" peoples. This, however, is not necessarily our conclusion. Especially in Africa, experience with Communist "help" has aroused doubts, to say the least, as to whether these "allies in the struggle against neo-colonialism" are as disinterested, as competent, and as humane as was thought from a distance. None the less, we would be unwise and intellectually lazy should we reassure ourselves too easily, relying on the blunders which our opponents doubtlessly make and will repeat. What then, are the conditions for an inspiring, imaginative, and constructive world policy from our side?

Before considering what a Western program for the world should positively contain, we must first indicate the obstacles that stand in our way and hamper our progress. In other words, what are the weak spots at home which enable Communist propaganda to recover rapidly from tactical defeat. We then contend that the present world political situation forces us to consider anew our traditional concepts of "foreign" as opposed to "home" policy. We live in a glass house and should know that anything is likely to be used against us, so that the realm of "internal" affairs has been narrowed down more drastically than the average citizen in the West suspects.

This is particularly, though by no means exclusively, the case as far as interracial intercourse is concerned. A clash between Jamaicans and English rowdies in Manchester is no longer a local police affair;

it is world news. "Little Rock" is worth several rockets for the communist cause, and Governor Barnett is better known in Africa than President Johnson.

By contrast, General de Gaulle enjoys an enormous prestige in the "Third World." This is partly due to his purposeful energy but also (perhaps above all) to the fact that without any color consciousness he presided over the Brazzaville conference in 1942 and for 1962 granted independence to Algeria, helping this country afterwards in spite of its socialist regime. Consequently the West should realize that any strike, any conflict at home, any setback in economic expansion, means a world political defeat for the forces of freedom we have to lead. Of course this does not imply that we should transform our press into a propaganda machine or establish an authoritarian regime of any kind. We cannot expel the Devil with Beelzebub, nor communism with fascism. It does mean, however, that generosity always pays whereas prejudice and discrimination never do.

Is the West Ready to "Fight"?

These problems however, important though they are, are perhaps not part of the essential structures of Western society. In a way they are only incidental *Schönheitsfehler*, and one might imagine a moment to come when they would have been eliminated. Another phenomenon is far more fundamental, namely the fact that so many Westerners—especially Europeans—have lost their self-confidence, their certitude to stand for a good cause, their faith in the future and the values of their civilization. Here lie the roots of a widespread defeatism which sometimes materializes in pacifist illusions, sometimes in moral skepticism. In any case, a great many young Europeans perform their military duties without the slightest conviction and with the feeling of losing time. Both "how" and "why" of our military system have become problematic.

This psychological situation greatly differs from the one which prevailed in the thirties, when violent anti-fascist feelings flourished. True, even such emotion was not always powerful enough to prevent the sometimes shameful collapse of the Allied armies on the Continent in 1940. But there at least existed a source of inspiration for future resistance. Today only few desire the triumph of communism, but many regard it with a certain sympathy and consider it an historical necessity.

These feelings are partly due to the seemingly purely defensive attitude of the West. In fact the American deterrent plays the role which the Maginot Line performed in French public opinion thirty years ago. It looks as if the West was unable to produce a strategy, other than the classical answer of defense against aggression—trying to protect its territories, its spheres of influence, its vital interests, against enemy infiltration. Consciously or unconsciously, we have stuck to the old methods of *cordon sanitaire*, the best we could hope for being to achieve a military insurance for political *status quo*. [cf. André Kostolany, *La Paix du Dollar*.] True, when this *status quo* had been challenged by our less scrupulous and more dynamic opponents—in Berlin, Indochina, Korea, Cuba or the Indrapura Valley—we suddenly awoke and sometimes even scored a defensive victory. But each time, immediately after the shock, everything returned to normalcy again. We consequently make the impression of relying exclusively and placidly on material defense and weapons of mass destruction, leaving the political initiative to communism.

Communism, by contrast, looks more idealistic and less militaristic, as it has imagination and conquering faith. Facing it, we seem to hide behind the nuclear wall and to have retired inside a "fortress West," trying to hold our own and continue our *dolce vita* as long as possible. Consequently, in a world-conflict which is rightly felt to

be first and foremost a political and spiritual struggle, Western reliance on nuclear defense appears as a form of moral escapism and materialism.

Infinitely more drastically than Nazism ever did, communism puts before us the basic problem of the defensibility of our civilization. Nazism and fascism never presented a universal message, and when they were militarily defeated, only a few of their former enthusiasts stuck to their guns [cf. Ernst Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*], whereas communism has its impact all over the world, "promising" while the West can only "give." [Raymond Aron] If European morale is low, its defeatism is exactly proportional to the prestige of the ideological enemy. Europe, in fact, though not a spiritual vacuum, is badly in need of a banner around which to rally. Nationalism, although still strong enough to prevent rapid progress towards supranational integration, no longer provides a source of popular inspiration; European patriotism is slow to crystallize. Consequently, the question whether the West is ready to "fight" coincides with another one: "What does the West oppose to communism? What are its peace aims?"

It is sometimes said that we would be better off if we had a uniform ideology. The other side has one, so why not we? The present author has even been invited, some time ago, to join a panel of "experts" in order to elaborate one! Nothing could be more sterile. As political freedom is the basis of our society, and freedom implies pluriformity, there can never be a uniform Western creed. Moreover, the main wickedness of totalitarian movements lies in their ambition to offer a pseudo-religion, with its "orthodoxy" and its "heresies." Such an ersatz, whatever its precise contents, would be totally unacceptable to Christians, whereas non-Christian humanists would probably reject it for other reasons.

This, however, does not at all imply that we should be content with occasional, improvised hand-to-mouth solutions, half-hearted compromises, reluctant retreats, moral sermons and incidental, defensive local successes. "Decline begins when people no longer ask 'What shall we do?' but 'What is going to happen?'" [Denis de Rougemont] Why did President Kennedy so rapidly become popular and why did his death come as such a shock to all of us? He embodied the hope for a Western renovation, based upon two complementary requirements: a moral revival and a practical, long-run program of action. He too suffered occasional defeats such as the Cuba landing, but he seemed to have put an end to the disheartened feeling of our being constantly outwitted and always taken by surprise by an opponent who seems to play a cat-and-mouse game with us. He too, of course, gave considerable attention to the problems of material defense as do the Russians, but he realized that no increase of divisions or missiles, no modernization of equipment could enable us to win the war of ideas. Military over-equipment might even be a political disadvantage.

This leads us to a closer examination of the *duo necessaria*.

Moral Revival and a Long-Range Program

Civilizations are built on ethics [Dr. Schweitzer], and ethics in turn have their roots in religion. Therefore it is hardly possible that the moral revival of the West should not coincide with religious rebirth. Societies live as long as they take their own inspiration seriously, and there are no cultures based on skepticism. Of course, individual ethical consciousness is not necessarily linked to revealed religion, but ethical systems as a social phenomenon have never maintained themselves outside a *Weltanschauung*.

True, such *Weltanschauungen* are by definition universal and not "Western" or "European": this is even specifically the case with

present day Christendom, as it is freeing itself from its historic — Mediterranean, Atlantic and white man's past. None the less, moral inspiration, in our part of the world, has been concretely linked with the preaching of the Gospel rather than with the Koran or the Upanishad, and it is difficult to imagine an ethical and religious renaissance in our countries that would not bear the mark of Jerusalem. In fact, such a renaissance is clearly underway, both in the Jewish, the Protestant and the Roman Catholic communities. However, this problem is outside our range here.

As to the practical program: in order to be effective, it has to be both political (as opposed to inspired by economic interest) and international (as opposed to inspired by national interest).

Of course, it can be said with a large amount of good sense that the Communists are very far from being disinterested in their world policy, so that their supporters become those "nationalists of a foreign power" whom Léon Blum denounced. But the fact remains that these supporters have freely allowed themselves to be persuaded that the Communist empires are not empires but ideologically progressive communities. By contrast, wherever the United States, Britain or France operate, they will regularly be accused of serving the cause of well defined "capitalist" groups, such as United Fruit Co., Shell, Michelin, Firestone or Unilever. What is worse, such criticism may well be justified up to a certain degree. Consequently, it is only fair to say that our unpopularity results partly from the confusion which appears between our foreign policy and the requirements of our "profit-making, worker-exploiting" regime.

First things first. If we believe that the most important item on the list of our priorities consists of promoting prosperity everywhere, developing civil liberties, increasing social responsibility, and thereby repelling the Communist onslaught, we must draw the consequences

therefrom. Although the interests of our great firms do not necessarily conflict with the political aims we pursue, neither do they necessarily coincide. In cases of conflict between the two, the priority must lie with our political aspirations—which means that private business has to be subjected to political supervision as soon as it operates in particularly "hot" spots where competition with communism is fiercest.

Neither should we forget that the conflict is not between communism and one particular country in the West, not between America and Russia, but between the West in general and communism as a whole. It therefore is a dangerous illusion to be disillusioned by one's allies and consequently decide to "go it alone." This holds true for the smaller countries of the alliance, such as France—and also for its leader, the United States. Understandably enough, each nation has its own geographical position, its historic background and therefore its special sensitiveness. None the less, the fact that President Kennedy, in his Cuba broadcast, constantly referred to "this hemisphere" and to the direct threat which Castro's Russian missiles meant to "this nation" rather than to the free world at large, suggested to many European listeners that, after all, they were not directly involved in this quarrel. And this conclusion did much to clear the ground for Gaullist "separatism" within the West.

In this context three remarks are in order.

First, a plan for deliberate internationalism in Western policy is by no means incompatible with the acceptance of nationalism as a positive force elsewhere. It is both honest and effective to strengthen movements for national independence outside the free world, even while making interdependence the keynote of our own efforts. In fact, the word "nationalism" is ambiguous, and in mature nations connotes insularism and reaction. In newly emancipated territories, however, it represents progress and human dignity.

"Algeria for the Algerians" is a potentially anti-Communist slogan, as it may inspire a refusal of Chinese or Russian interference. "Britain for the British" has an entirely different connotation. In other words, nationalism, however naive, is an indispensable force of State building in regions where that process has still to be started, whereas it constitutes only a factor of disintegration and disruption in well established political communities.

Second, however, even in countries where a minimum of (national) order has to be built and where national idealism is a source of strength and self-confidence, nationalism is not enough, and movements like Pan-Africanism have to be supported. For example, priority aid has to be given to those development plans in which more than one State participates.

Third, the principle of Western cooperation should include a fair amount of division of labor among different countries. We are in the same boat, but we are not identical in our possibilities. Curiously enough, the former colonial powers do enjoy a growing prestige in their former possessions, and the economic ties between them and the former mother-lands are still far from negligible.

It was therefore natural that Britain should intervene in East Africa and that French-speaking nations of West Africa should continue to have their eyes fixed on Paris. Even the Dutch seem to rediscover a certain privileged position in Indonesia, after the transfer of West Irian. No doubt that these favorable positions should be used to the utmost, be it in the general framework of a coherent common Western policy.

Forms of Western Cooperation and Confederation

It might be asked whether any attempt to strengthen the West through closer cooperation and unity would not be looked upon with suspicion in the "Third World." In fact, regional concentrations such

as the European Community and Atlantic partnership, whatever their precise institutional forms, obviously represent power political blocks. This will initially frighten newcomers in historic life, as they want to dream—and want us to dream—in terms of "idealistic" weakness. Let us, however, not allow ourselves to be too much disturbed by such reactions. In practice, respect for power belongs to the fundamentals of public action, and—although power may corrupt the sinful human soul—it is not evil in itself. On the contrary, it is the indispensable instrument of any policy, either good or bad. [cf. Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power*.]

Recent events confirm this observation. The United States was never more respected than in October 1962 when it brought the world, rightly, to the verge of war. China's operation against India brought discredit rather than pity to Nehru, whose moralistic pacifism then appeared as what it was: the "ideological superstructure" of military unpreparedness and political inadequacy. Consequently, as together we are powerful anyway—and therefore suspected—we should use our power in a convincing manner, rather than try to hide it. Guilt complexes in that respect only make us less efficient, certainly not more popular.

Therefore, the only real problem remaining is how to use our power, which in itself will never be too strong. The answer to this question is that we should use our strength by producing and trying to enforce a scheme of institutional world order.

Does this necessarily mean World Government? By no means. True, some basic issues in the modern world—such as the struggle against hunger, illiteracy and underdevelopment—can be dealt with only on a global scale, and this is the case even more for the threat of nuclear warfare. But the Communist states do not dream of sharing any part of their sovereignty with their capitalist opponents. We cannot blame them for that: supranationality is only possible—and even

then far from easy—among nations who have at least some basic values in common and therefore share a degree of mutual confidence. We have to limit our cooperation with the Communist bloc to technical and politically neutral matters, and to fields where both accept the practicing of "peaceful competition." (On this last point, the West can afford to be very liberal, as its methods will prove to be more efficient than those of the totalitarians—at least in the long run.)

But even around the Atlantic Ocean, free-world government would be difficult to establish, as it is unlikely that the medium States in Europe are prepared to enter a federation where one power — America — is predominant. Naturally enough, they consider such an enterprise an attempt to institutionalize American leadership and hegemony, whereas the United States would not unnaturally argue that no effective administration can work without an Executive that is able to decide and carry out its decisions.

Moreover, let not the word "federalism" deceive us. Whereas America is a "nation" from coast to coast just as much as a "union," there is no European "nation" in the making, let alone an Atlantic one. If Western Europe is ever to federate, it will be through institutions extremely different from those of the American type. The European institutions, in fact, should not only provide a high amount of inner, administrative decentralization—a more or less technical device after all; they should also assure the continuity of ancient fatherlands, each of them with its own secular history, its cultural personality, its language of languages. It would therefore be wholly unrealistic to put the European "States" on the same footing as those that formed their "more perfect union" in North America around 1780, or to merge both types into one federation, "The United 'States' of the Atlantic." The French would call such an operation "the marriage between carp and rabbit." In fact, on both shores of the ocean, statehood is of a different

nature so that the building materials of an Atlantic union are not fifty odd States on the one side, and six or sixteen on the other. The material has to be two-fold: Europe and America, both of them "united."

What, then, has to be done if disunity means ruin and Atlantic federation remains utopian? As was already indicated, the only long-range perspective seems to be a free world confederacy, based on regional, continental federations rather than on individual nation-states. This requires an undogmatic analysis of how different functions could best be performed and by whom—"undogmatic" in the sense that there should be no global doctrine as to who does what: no nationalism but no systematic "Europeanism" either, as well as no uncompromising "Atlanticism." The only principle to be respected is "subsidiarity": when in doubt, choose the smaller community, which is likely to be closer to people's hearts and more easily equipped for democratic control. For the rest, efficiency is the supreme rule.

Let us take, for instance, the military problem.

It might be considered useful to lay the responsibility for the protection of Western Europe in the hands of a renewed European Defense Community, having at its disposal plurinational supplies and standardized armaments, including tactical nuclear weapons. There also would exist an "integrated" European command. However, the Community should immediately conclude an agreement with the United States, in view of a renewed, better balanced NATO. At the same time, as it seems undesirable that nuclear deterrents should remain in the hands of any individual State—be it America, France or Britain—control of strategic nuclear weapons should be handed over to an Atlantic authority. In this field, technical cooperation between the allies should be total, and the elaboration of a common world policy for the maintenance of peace based on Atlantic partnership and dialogue.

Such plans, like the ones rejected above, may be said to be utopian. And indeed, in the present state of affairs we seem to be far away from their practical application. However, the aim of this paper, as the writer understood it, was not to provide possible compromises for diplomatic intercourse here and now, but rather to outline a long-range program which would be audacious enough to be inspiring, and at the same time sufficiently close to the lasting realities of the Western world. Whatever the concrete political situation after General de Gaulle's latest press conference, or after the forthcoming elections in Britain, or after the possible success or collapse of the Italian *apertura a sinistra*, the author thinks that his basic arguments will remain valid. One coherent Western policy, even if it is open to criticism, is preferable to continuing the present cacophonia—the multiplicity of conflicting methods, doctrines and approaches in world affairs, the chaos through which no policy can really develop its full potentialities. (The recent Anglo-American dispute on Cuba is an example.)

Action Behind the Curtains

Whatever forms the West may finally adopt for its consultation, cooperation, and integration, the body responsible for Western political strategy will find one problem on its table: the attitude to adopt towards the countries behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that the institutional problems are settled and that it has become impossible for members of the democratic community to deal with Communist countries in competition with other Atlantic nations. Whatever our policy, it would have become a common one. All of us, or none of us, would have recognized Continental China—all of us, or none of us, would have the possibility of exporting pipelines to Russia. A considerable step forward would have been made. But the main job would remain to be done—namely, to define the contents

of such a common policy. It seems useful to devote some thought to this problem. As the writer does not feel competent to discuss China, he will concentrate on Eastern and Central Europe.

This policy should be free of the "Maginot mentality" we mentioned earlier. It should be politically "aggressive." This is elementary strategic common sense: in a life-or-death battle, victory can be won only by those who are able to grasp the offensive. If, therefore, the West should consider the Communist countries as definitely "lost," whereas the Communists from their part consider any country a potential field of propaganda, a territory to be "freed" later or earlier—the final result cannot be doubtful. Moreover, such a purely defensive attitude on our side would neglect the fact that the inner stability of the Communist regimes is far from assured. Especially in the so-called satellite countries, mental resistance to communism is widespread, although it cannot take the active forms which organized resistance took during the war, when the masses in the Nazi occupied countries waited for military liberation. In this case, military liberation is of course ruled out, and the peoples know it, at least since October 1956. None the less, they have lost their illusions about a system of government and production, which, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, is often considered the most "progressive" in the world. The population in Eastern and Central Europe—located "behind the enemy lines," to speak in military terms—amounts to 120 million men and women. It is of supreme importance for its own sake. It also influences deeply the policy of the U.S.S.R.

Bringing "our secret Allies" into the picture does not imply that we should recruit "agents" among them, either for national spy-nets or for an "integrated" intelligence service. This would be morally wrong and politically unwise. The peoples behind the Curtain have become extremely sensitive to being "used" by anybody. They know that the U.S.S.R., far from having "liberated" them from "the bondage of

capitalism," far from having in mind their happiness and well-being, simply and cynically makes them a piece on their chessboard, a trump in their game, a unit in their campaigning forces. But Communist propaganda has probably been successful in so far as the "capitalist" West is no longer thought to be altruistic. Consequently, any attempt to win over individual citizens to our side and make them "work" for us, remains far below the standards which we claim to be ours.

Moreover, in our dealing with the peoples under Communist domination, we should make it clear that we do not think an economic and social restoration either possible or desirable. Those who reject the totalitarian forms of socialism—no doubt the majority, at least among the thinking elite, including in the working class—remain convinced that private ownership of the means of production and an economy for individual profit constitute a wicked regime. They may consider that private capitalism is probably less harsh than the state capitalism they live under—none the less, they do not dream of replacing one sort of capitalism by another. The Hungarian Revolution has taught us a significant lesson in that respect: whereas disgust of the Rakosi regime was unanimous, there was hardly any "looking backward" among those who fought the Russian tanks. Consequently, our action in East and Central Europe should aim at providing the peoples concerned with the real freedom to choose the production system they prefer.

It is sometimes thought that the Communist dictatorships have successfully locked the frontiers of their empire, so as to prevent any news from the West to penetrate. This may have been their intention and sometimes even the result of their action, but today this is less true than ever. Touristic intercourse is increasing in both directions, and "reading between lines" in the State controlled press supplies useful knowledge. Even if Western broadcasts are jammed, this is not always done drastically enough to prevent a good many comments from

oozing through. For example, the success of the European Common Market is much more widely known than pessimists might have foreseen. Consequently, our main problem is not how to get through to the East Europeans, but in which style to approach them. It is this writer's opinion that the problem of communication can be dealt with successfully only by men and women who know and love the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, and above all, show the mental attitude we would describe as post-Communitic. They should not consider communism an intermezzo, but an essential phase in history, one day to be integrated in Europe's living past.

Traditional Western diplomacy is hardly prepared to carry out tasks—be it only in the cultural and economical spheres—which would be considered "interference in another State's internal affairs." Indeed, we do want to "interfere." From their point of view the Communist regimes rightly consider the success of a well presented piece of American technology, a French *chansonnier*, an Austrian opera, an exhibition of Dutch abstract paintings, or a German lecturer, as political setbacks. But that is no reason not to pursue a policy of cultural exchange: just the opposite! In any case, our national possibilities and methods should carefully be compared, adapted to the circumstances, and "integrated," again leaving room for well-planned inter-Western division of labor. In any case, we may be assured that the population behind the Curtain looks to the West as a whole for the modest amount of fresh air it longs for.

The same is true for commercial relations, [cf. John P. de Gara, *Trade Relations between the Common Market and the Eastern Bloc*] where we should try to escape the thoughtless and sterile alternatives of either economic boycott, or business as with everybody else. Here again, political motives should prevail on the immediate interests of one firm or one nation. The days of uncontrolled trade, when Lenin

was justified in saying that "capitalists would even sell the rope with which they are hanged," should rapidly be brought to a close, whatever policy one might wish to pursue [cf. *U.S. News and World Report*, 30 December 1963: "British bankers and industrialists are straining at the leash to go to Khrushchev's aid."]

Our commercial behavior towards the bloc should be part of our world strategy. True, it is an illusion to think that "ideas follow the goods" and that there would exist an automatic relation between material and spiritual intercourse. On the other hand, the tighter the frontiers, the less chance we have to reach our friends in the East. Since the rulers there are desperately in need of Western aid and trade, we should make this a means to re-establish the contact with those Europeans who are separated from us, politically, for the time being, but should realize that they are still considered part of our cultural community.

A final word on this point. Western defeatism is the main cause of our weakness. Whereas public opinion in the bloc countries, after many years of uninterrupted propaganda and pressure, remains able to distinguish between official facts and the real ones, the West seems to consider them "lost." Whereas Mr. Khrushchev goes on repeating that he is going to bury us, we hardly ever show that our conviction is the opposite. A combative self-confident spirit has to inspire our attitude in this field. Not impressed by ideological intimidation, we should constantly show the serene certitude that "we'll bury them." The considerable prestige of General de Gaulle, East of the Curtain, is due to his strongly affirmed belief in France's future, his total "un-impressedness" in the face of Communist boasting.

In Conclusion

The fundamental problem of the West in the struggle for the world is the following: it has to transform its inner diversities from a disadvantage into an asset.

In military as well as in political warfare, democratic communities are bad starters, as they have considerable difficulty in imposing discipline on their diverging components. Freedom as to each individual's, each group's, each nation's "pursuit of happiness" means that nobody wants initially to give up his prejudices, his special interests, and his way of life. Instinctively we incline toward an attitude of "live and let live." Some of our European States are tempted by isolationism, now that colonialism is over. Some of the smaller ones feel happy to look at the world from their balcony and enjoy their prosperity. The United States itself feels hurt, as it is accused of being so immensely powerful and therefore constantly forced to interfere with other people's business.

Unfortunately—or rather fortunately—we belong to a world which, for the first time in history, has a common destiny. Wars have become world wars, economic depressions are world depressions, revolutions world revolutions. Consequently, nationalism has become parochial and even continental integration may develop into a new form of provincialism. Meanwhile, in this uniting world, freedom is constantly in retreat.

On the other hand, it might well be that the Communist bloc has entered a period of inner disintegration, whereas ours painfully and reluctantly chooses the road of integration. The rift between Belgrade, Moscow, and Peking not only weakens Communist power politically, but is in complete contradiction with the very principle of "proletarian internationalism." It also defeats their fundamental contention that conflicts between states, inseparable from capitalist anarchy, would automatically disappear after the rise to power of the working class.

Consequently, Marxism-Leninism will more and more lose the prestige of its self-awarded infallibility, as it is losing control over the evolution it has provoked. So much the more reason for us not to be too impressed by Mr. Khrushchev's trumpeting. On the other hand, however, the internal difficulties in the Communist bloc only give us time to act, and if we don't act wisely and energetically, our opponents may recover. In that case, it would be small consolation to think that, after our defeat, the victorious Communist powers might quarrel over our spoils.

Our trump-cards are diversity and adaptability, but our weakness is disorganization. National pride and state sovereignty, the illusion that we can at the same time be faithful allies and unrestricted competitors, and mental laziness and lack of imagination are the main obstacles which prevent us from having in the world the authority we deserve and need.

The first step toward the necessary concentration of Western strength is a pooling of our intellectual resources. A recent example: the Atlantic Institute in Paris undertook a large study on the educational prerequisites of economic and social expansion. It is simply scandalous that up till now billions of dollars have been spent in total ignorance upon an essential item like this. We therefore should start with a systematic stock taking of our problems so as to examine them, one by one, in working parties where different national, confessional, political, and intellectual tendencies would be confronted. Our own meeting gives the model of such a procedure, but this method should be applied on a larger scale.

The second step is to provide adequate organizational machinery for action in the sphere of government. In this field, the highest degree of pragmatism is recommended, as every pre-established dogma (be it of national sovereignty *per se*, or European federalism *a priori*) has to

stand the test of its applicability *ad hoc*. This machinery has to meet two requirements. On the one hand it should give room for adequate consultation among all members of the Western group: nothing would be more fatal than the institutionalization of a hegemonist-satellites position between the United States and her allies. Not being consulted or being consulted only *pro forma* creates feelings of frustration which disrupt the alliance. On the other hand, an efficient executive body should be set up, speaking for the West as a whole, in any field where neither America nor Europe would be able to take full responsibility alone. However, the prerequisite of such a world-wide "integration" is a United Europe, speaking with one voice and handling her own affairs. Organized Atlantic partnership, which becomes possible once the Europeans will have recovered strength and established unity, constitutes the strongest concentration of know-how, natural resources and maybe even political wisdom, in the world. It would be unbeatable.

Finally, we have to educate public opinion in view of these perspectives. It would be senseless to unite the West under the banner of democracy, while allowing democratic control to be undermined, as is the case now. Free-world government, based on inter-continental partnership, has to deal with a limited number of problems—indeed, world problems—but it cannot stand for freedom if it does not allow public opinion to criticize it and, possibly, force it to modify its political line. True the problems of emerging international parliamentarianism have hardly been approached so far [cf. Kenneth Lindsay, *European Parliamentarianism*] but they are not much more disturbing than were those of America when the frontier was reached and conditions of transport were still primitive. In Europe, an experiment of this nature is being carried out and, although the difficulties remain numerous, evidence exists now that supranational assembly can function, where the dividing lines between the competing parties do not always coincide with the ones traditionally valid in the member states. There

is no doubt that the average American or European has not yet been brought to think in those new terms. More often than not, their interest still goes to the familiar debates within the familiar community. None the less, uneasiness is already widespread, as it is instinctively realized that national parliamentarianism is no longer "sovereign" on the most essential issues. The decline of our national democracies even leads to skepticism toward the democratic ideal as such. Consequently, the growth of European and Atlantic democracy—both in institutions to be set up, and in public opinion to be informed—constitutes perhaps the greatest contribution we could make to the rebirth of the liberal West.