

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER
ADB058835
NEW LIMITATION CHANGE
TO Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM Distribution limited to U.S. Gov't. agencies only; Proprietary Info.; 5 Jun 81. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center & Fort Leavenworth, Attn: ATZL-PTS-IS. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
AUTHORITY
USACGSC ltr, 18 Mar 2003

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
	AD-B058	8352
TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND PEACEKEEPING; The Pan-African Defense Force		5 June 81
AUTHOR(s)		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
Ojokojo, James S., MAJ, Nigeria		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 6027		
CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Attn: ATZL-SWG-DP		5 June 81
MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		13. NUMBER OF PAGES
LEVEL		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
		Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
Distribution limited to US Government agencies only; proprietary information. Other requests for this document must be referred to HQ, TRADOC, ATTN: ATCS-D Fort Monroe, VA 23651		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
This study looks into the major causes of conflicts in Africa and the efforts of the OAU in settling both interstate and intrastate conflicts. It attempts to determine if the Pan-African Defense Force (PADF) proposed by the OAU is capable of performing enforcement and peacekeeping missions because of the different political ideologies and the differences among the armies in Africa.		

AD B058835

MIC FILE COPY

DTIC
AUG 11 1981

20. (Continued)

The study reveals that any type of PADF created now is not capable of conducting an enforcement mission because of the different political ideologies and the logistics requirements to sustain the PADF. However, the PADF can conduct limited peacekeeping missions. The study proposes the creation of a Pan-African Defense College (PADC) which will solve some of the major problems.

4
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND
PEACEKEEPING: Pan-African Defense Force
LIBRARY
USA CGSC FT LEAVENWORTH, KAN.

100.

ACCESSION NO _____

PO REGISTR _____

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

(10)

JAMES S. OJOKOJO, MAJ, NIGERIA

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1981

Distribution limited to U.S. Gov't.
agencies only; *proprietary information*;
5 Apr 81. Other requests for this
document must be referred to: HQ TRADOC,
Attn: ATCS-D, Fort Monroe, VA 23651.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate MAJ James Sedeye Ojokojo

Title of thesis The Organization of African Unity and Peacekeeping:
The PAN-African Defense Force

Approved by:

LTC T. Smith, Thesis Committee Chairman

LTC G. C. Curren, Member, Graduate Faculty

COL Richard D. Hirtzel, Ph.D., Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 18th day of June 1981 by Philip J. Brooker
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☐
DTIC TAB	☒
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
<u>B</u>	

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND PEACEKEEPING: The Pan-African Defense Force, by Major James S. Ojokojo, Nigeria, 87 pages.

This study looks into the major causes of conflicts in Africa and the efforts of the OAU in settling both interstate and intrastate conflicts. It attempts to determine if the Pan-African Defense Force (PADF) proposed by the OAU is capable of performing enforcement and peacekeeping missions because of the different political ideologies and the differences among the armies in Africa.

The study reveals that any type of PADF created now is not capable of conducting an enforcement mission because of the different political ideologies and the logistics requirement to sustain the PADF. However, the PADF can conduct limited peacekeeping missions. The study proposes the creation of a Pan-African Defense College (PADC) which will solve some of the major problems.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT.	iii
Chapter	.
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Background	2
The Problem	4
Theoretical Framework.	5
II. CAUSES OF CONFLICTS.	7
Underlying Factors	7
OAU and Settlement of Disputes	12
Prospects for Peacekeeping	16
III. CASE STUDY: CHAD	22
Historical Background.	22
Nigeria's Mediation Efforts	28
Merger of Libya and Chad	31
IV. THE ARMIES OF AFRICA	37
Roles and Training	37
Organization	44
Major Military Equipment	46
Tactical Doctrine.	47
V. PAN-AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE	51
The Type of Force.	51
Missions	53
Political Problems	54
Composition of the PADF	58
Command and Control	60
Logistics Problems	61
Interoperability	66
A Proposal	70
LIST OF TABLES	v
LIST OF FIGURES AND MAPS.	vi
APPENDIX 1	79
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	86

LIST OF TABLES

	PAGE
1. Successful Peaceful Settlements	16
2. Foreign Military Presence	42

LIST OF FIGURES AND MAPS

PAGE

1. Organization of a Brigade	45
2. Organization of a Pan-African Defense College	74
3. Map, Africa	35
4. Map, Chad	36

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

On May 23, 1963 thirty African Heads of State met at Addis Ababa to sign the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).¹ This was a great achievement because there were several differences among its members on a wide range of issues. It could be formed under such circumstances only because of agreement that it was not intended as a super-national body but rather as a loose association based on voluntary co-operation.² Member States were very aware of problems as internal disruptions, threats of extra-regional aggressions, and the need for collective action against the remaining colonial holding.

Articles 2 and 3 of the OAU Charter - which define the OAU's goals and principles its members adhere to - make clear that the OAU was intended to assist members both in the peaceful settlement of intra-regional conflict and in against extra-regional aggression. The OAU is thus comparable to the Organization of American States (OAS) and the League of Arab States in having both internally and externally oriented security.

One of the purposes of the OAU as included in Article 2 of the Charter is "To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence." To achieve this, the heads of state agree that "Cooperation for defense and security" is necessary. Collective defense was, however, not well defined. The reasons for the undefined decisions were very understanding at that time. Members were more concerned about the

possibility of interference of one African state in the internal affairs of another than with the threat of interference by extra-regional forces. This belief was strengthened because of the relationship between most of the countries and their former colonial governments who were responsible for their defense. Some members were even more afraid of a few more powerful African states.

President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, during the founding conference, proposed the creation of a "common defense system with an African High Command to ensure the stability and security of Africa."³ The Ethiopian draft charter proposed a more modest Defense Board composed of each member's Chief of Staff and empowered to make recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State. There was little support for either of these proposals as some states mistrusted the intentions of others and feared any sharing of military information. However, a Defense Commission was formed to be responsible for defense and security cooperations of its members. It has rarely met.⁴

Since after the creation of the OAU, violent conflicts have occurred in different parts of Africa. Most of the conflicts have been internal, and in most cases the various factions of the conflicts receiving external support either from other Member States of the OAU or from external countries outside Africa. The OAU has been ineffective as a body to resolve most of these conflicts because of the limited capability of intervening into the internal conflicts of Member States. Peaceful settlement of disputes is restricted by the Charter to only mediation, arbitration and reconciliation. There is now a new dimension in the form of conflicts in Africa and that is the complete interference by some Member States of the OAU in the internal affairs of other coun-

tries. There is now a renewed awareness of the need to have a practical means of settling disputes in the form of conducting peacekeeping operation.

Proposals have been discussed calling for member governments to earmark contingents for a peacekeeping force but issues of command structure, financial arrangements, location of units and means for authorizing the use of an OAU force have hampered the creation of the force. In his report to the foreign ministers of the OAU states in 1979, the Secretary-General, Mr. Edem Kodjo, called for an establishment of a Pan-African Peacekeeping Force. "The first conclusion which imposes itself upon us is the urgent need to have in the OAU a structure for crises...similar to the United Nations Security Council,"⁵ he said. The urgent demand for such a force became apparent in view of the Uganda War. Edem Kodjo therefore warned that the war had involved a number of cardinal OAU principles, such as the inviolability of the borders inherited from the colonial era, non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States and non-aggression. He went on to say "We need a version of the Blue Helmets (the UN peacekeeping forces) capable of intervening in difficult situations and capable of backing the executive organs of the OAU and something more than mere will and words."⁶ Egypt's foreign minister, Dr. Bontros Ghali, in the same meeting, had suggested considering talking with some African countries in establishing a Pan-African peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula, if the Soviet Union used its Security Council veto to block the extension of the current UN force in the Sinai.⁷

In the OAU's summit meeting held in July 1979 at Monrovia, Liberia, a decision was reached setting up a Pan-African Defense Force

(PADF).⁸ A committee was set up to outline the provision of means to control the PADF. The committee was also to work out the funding and equipping of the PADF. The committee's proposals are yet to be published. Whatever decision the committee agrees upon, the tasks of the PADF will include enforcement (counter-aggression) and peacekeeping. There are certain requirements which are very vital for the success of any operation within the above two categories by international forces. Some of these requirements became very obvious through the various operations conducted by the UN and the OAS.

The Problem

The UN is continuously facing the problems of constituting and maintaining the various forces required for peacekeeping despite its long experience. A few contingents also face operational difficulties despite the massive UN logistics support. Can any PADF raised now be capable of conducting successfully both enforcement and peacekeeping missions? The types of conflicts are always very complex and Member States of the OAU are currently always split in discussing such issues because of the different political ideologies. Added to the political differences is the present outlook of the armies in Africa.

The long conflict in the Belgian Congo (Zaire) and the present conflict in Lebanon, despite the presence of peacekeeping forces, require an understanding of the causes of conflicts. Why has the OAU efforts in the peaceful settlement of disputes failed? How does the UN support its forces? Is the OAU capable of raising the required funds to maintain the PADF in prolonged peacekeeping operations or limited warfare such as in the Congo? The armies in Africa have long colonial background and ties with different types of training and equipment.

Can these armies operate together successfully?

This study is important in different aspects. Most of the developing countries have problems of instability because of continuous conflicts. It is, therefore, necessary to investigate the causes of conflicts so that when security assistance is requested from either side of the conflict, a right decision is taken or recommended. Peacekeeping operations are always complex because of the political and logistical problems involved. An understanding of the present system adopted by the UN would help in the planning of similar operations by other regional bodies.

This study will look into the main causes of problems in Africa and conduct a case study on Chad. UN peacekeeping operations will be limited to the UN operation in Congo (ONUC) and the UN Expeditionary Force (UNEF) in the Middle East, and current capabilities of some of the armies in Africa.

Theoretical Framework

The case study in Chad will provide a scenario for a hypothetical situation in which the OAU has decided to intervene in the conflict using a PADF. This is to provide a practical approach to assessing the problems both the OAU and the PADF will face in conducting both enforcement and peacekeeping missions. This is based on the assumption that the OAU will arrive at the decision to intervene. A proposal will be made in this thesis to reduce the problems that both the OAU and the PADF will encounter.

NOTES ON CHAPTER I

- ¹There are now 50 member countries.
- ²Yassin-EI Ayouty, The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 118.
- ³Kwame Nkrumah, "A Union Government for a United Africa," Addis Ababa Summit, 1963 (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Publications and Foreign Language Press Department, Ministry of Information, 1963), p. 47.
- ⁴"Sub-Saharan Africa," Institute of Strategic Studies (1980-81), p. 51.
- ⁵"Setting Off for the OAU Summit," West Africa (16 July 1979), p. 1261.
- ⁶Ibid.
- ⁷Ibid.
- ⁸"The Summit's Achievements," West Africa (30 July 1979), p. 1357.

CHAPTER II

CAUSES OF CONFLICTS

Underlying Factors

The rapid attainment of independence by the African nations from their colonial rulers was a surprise to the outside world. Starting from the end of World War II in 1945 to early 1966, political parties under the umbrella of nationalist movements were instrumental in the creation of thirty-six new countries out of the former colonial territories. White colonialism is now eliminated from Africa except the racist regime in South Africa and the South African control over Namibia. These initial achievements by the nationalist movements and later achievements by the liberation movements are remarkable. However, many of the colonies gained their independence without pressure by the nationalist movements but through mutual negotiations with the colonial powers.

The rapid and unceremonial disappearance from the scene of these political parties and their leaders¹ through violent and non-violent military coups were greater surprises to most people in and outside Africa. What were then the major causes of these leaders? Why are there frequent political instabilities in most of the countries? There were very few interstate conflicts or interferences in the internal affairs of neighboring states initially but this is now changing. What are the major reasons? Before answering these questions it is necessary to give a synoptic account of conflicts that have occurred in the continent in the last two and half decades.

As the British departed Sudan in 1955, the predominantly black Southern Sudan which is religiously oriented toward traditional African belief systems or Christianity began its struggle for autonomy. Through a massive military effort by the primarily Arab and Muslim north, the rebellion was crushed. By the end of the civil war in 1972, several hundred thousand lives were lost. In 1959, the Hutu rose against the Tutsis in which is now known as the Republic of Rwanda. The Tutsis had ruled and despised the numerically superior Hutu for generations. An estimated 20,000 lives were lost in the bloodshed that followed, and five times that number fled for refuge to neighboring countries.² In the neighboring nation of Burundi where the same ethnic communities live in the same proportion, the Tutsi predominant regime's discovery of a plot to overthrow the government resulted in reprisals that claimed 100,000 lives,³ the great majority being Hutu. Many more thousands fled the country.

The sudden grant of independence to the Belgian Congo (Zaire) by Belgium led to a civil war that lasted from 1960 to 1964 with great loss of lives. Political instability tribal rivalry, coups and counter-coups and the threat of complete disintegration of Nigeria caused by the secession of the Ibo majority Eastern Region led to a civil war. The civil war lasted from 1967 to 1970 and caused the deaths of thousands of lives. The power struggle between the various political parties after the departure of the Portuguese from Angola led to the war in that nation that also claimed thousands of lives. Religious differences between the Christians and Muslims and the power struggle among the various political leaders in Chad have placed that country in war-path for over a decade.

While all the cases briefly illustrated above show violence at higher scales, many other conflicts have occurred. Violent and non-violent coups have occurred in various countries. In discussing the major causes of conflicts, this chapter will discuss a few of the conflicts and the peaceful settlement efforts.

Nationalism started with a minority of educated elite in the urban centers where the symbols of self-government and independence were understood and communicated. To get the support of the rural masses, the urban nationalists had contacts or middlemen whose duties included rallying supporters and coordinating party activities. Veterans who had served abroad during WW II and who had received training in the armed forces of European powers became the leaders of local party groups. In many areas, various self-help societies and tribal unions were organized to promote local improvements and unity.

The successes of the nationalists in a few cases met with initial hardships. A few of them were suppressed by the colonial administration. However, the momentum was maintained through trade-union movements, churches, women's and youth groups organized for social athletic purposes but now joined in the crusade for self-government and independence. The early nationalist leader therefore, had to be meticulous in dealing both with the colonial administration and in gathering support of the masses. He had also to contain the influence of the traditional ruler of the people to whom they had an unquestionable loyalty.

The major task, then, of the early nationalist parties was to establish a coherent structure providing close links between party activities gathered about the leader to the lowest unit of the village

committee. With emphasis on self-government and independence as party goals there was little room for any organized opposition. Those who failed to agree with the goals of nationalism were inevitably branded as traitors to the interests of the masses. However, opposition groups did exist at this early stage but they tended to form on a sectional or tribal basis. At independence, therefore, the nationalist parties virtually controlled all government organs.

The unity of effort among the political leaders within the various countries towards the achievement of independence gave an optimistic view of achieving unity among the countries in Africa. This optimism helped in the creation of the OAU. Unity in Africa was only on the surface, both in the respective nations and among the nations. Beneath the unity there were older and deeper realities: an inextricable maze of tribes and races, languages and religions, social structures and economic ties. Each one of these underlying factors existed and exerted its attraction on the people. During the period of European colonialism they had been neglected but not eliminated in the entities established for the purposes of administration. The result was that when the states became independent, their boundaries confined a geographical space, whose inner cohesion was occasionally less binding than that of some of its component parts. Frequently these parts also stretched from one country to another.

The outbreak of violence in many countries after independence could mostly be attributed to political leaders in power not accepting realistic demands for changes of government policies or regimes and their clinging to power or force despite unfavorable public opinion.

The underlying factors identified as major threat to peaceful coexistence in many nations could only be ignited when political rivalries start. Post-independence politics in Africa were characterized by the presence of a single party or a one-party dominant system. These parties were largely those that came to power at independence. Control over the masses was achieved through the organizational political set up before independence, the ability to appeal for support and in a few cases through coercion. Although most regimes went through the motions of periodic elections, no effective opposition in an institutionalized form was permitted.

The enthusiasm with which the political parties came to power started diminishing and the promises of better life for the masses made during the anti-colonial struggle could not be met. Discontent, therefore, among the masses started to increase. Oppositions and opponents to the regimes increased. When a strong opposition to the ruling party emerged or the elites disagreed over ideological lines, or over the best way to accelerate economic growth or transform the state and society, the situation rapidly deteriorated. Each competing faction gathered behind it parts of the tribal groups. These tribalized masses often did not understand the ideological course they supported.

The blind following of the masses of political leaders in conflict, and the use of combat forces by the government against the opposition had caused a few of the civil wars. The rifts between the contending parties deepened when the earlier and more coherent units acquired renewed awareness of their existence. The broader ethnic and religious groups, or a combination of both, reasserted themselves

in the youth state. The stronger side often using modern political tactics, consolidated its position and won control of the government. The minority ended up organizing a rival political or a less formal opposition. However, when the minority found no redress within the system, attempts were made to throw off the domination by proclaiming a new independent state. Since this meant a great loss in power, and, for fear of probable follow-up actions by other minorities, the central government was forced to combat the separatists.

The involvement by the military in most countries was to avoid situations that would lead to civil wars or mass unrest. The officer corps accepted the independence of their countries with great enthusiasm. They were, therefore, not ready to see the new nations dwindle in the hands of inept, corrupt, inefficient and in most cases uneducated politicians. They saw their countries losing the hard-won respect of the international community. The civilian politicians were failing to undertake the duties and responsibilities of power, and, since there was no free electoral system available to permit expression of mass discontent by choosing an alternative party to power, the military had to seize power.

OAU and the Settlement of Disputes

The UN, through peacekeeping operations is continuously settling international conflicts. However, under Article 52 of the UN Charter, every effort should be made to achieve settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements before referring them to the Security Council. The Charter further states under Article 53 that "...no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional

agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." How effective under these two articles, in as much as regional organizations such as the OAS, the Arab League and the OAU have settled interstate and intrastate conflicts? This section discusses the efforts of the OAU in settling interstate and intrastate conflicts, and the future prospects in conducting peacekeeping.

The OAU role in the settlement of disputes is guided by seven principles accepted by the members in May, 1963, at Addis Ababa. The principles are as follows:

1. The sovereign equality of all Member-States.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each Member-State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration.
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination, as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring States or any other States.
6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.
7. Affirmation of a policy on non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

The organ responsible for peaceful settlement of disputes within the OAU is the Commissions of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. This commission is specifically limited to examination "over disputes between States only" (Article 12). Legally, therefore, the OAU from the

start has shied away from intrastate disputes. However, the organization had intervened in a few intrastate disputes.

The OAU compliance to the "non-interference in the internal affairs of States" and "respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of each Member-State...", has restricted the effectiveness of the OAU in settling disputes. If the OAU had practical or legal powers of interfering into intrastate conflicts, a few of the major conflicts could have not escalated to civil wars. While the OAU is adopting the non-interference principle, its Member-States are now violating the principle. For example, Libya interfered in Uganda and now in Chad, and Tanzania also is still involved in Uganda.

The OAU tried to settle the Nigerian conflict without success. In 1967, the fourth Heads of State assembly in Kinghasa, appointed a mission to mediate in the conflict, but neither side accepted any negotiation. In 1968, the fifth assembly of Heads of State in Algiers agreed on a resolution supporting the federal government and asked Biafra to end the secessions. Biafra did not accept the resolution. Final efforts came in September 1969 during the sixth assembly of Heads of State in Addis Ababa. A cease-fire was called for but neither side accepted it. Peace talks also did not achieve anything. However, the war ended five months later in January, 1970 by a military victory. Peaceful settlement, therefore, can not succeed unless both sides agree to resolutions taken since the OAU has no jurisdiction over the internal affairs of nations. What is therefore, the solution to the problem? A review of the seven principles is urgently required.

The Charter should be reviewed to include some legal and practical means of intervening in intrastate conflicts. The OAU is now al-

ways divided when dealing with nations who interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. For example, during the OAU summit meeting in Monrovia in 1979, Tanzania's military intervention in Uganda was criticized by certain members, particularly President Nimeiri of Sudan who was the OAU chairman and General Olusegun Obasanjo, the then Nigerian Head of State. Others like President Nyeveve of Tanzania and President Binaisa of Uganda defended the action. The latter group supporting their stand by accusing Libya for her support of Idi Amin.⁴ The meeting, therefore, ended without any resolution of any outright condemnation.

The current crises in Zimbabwe and Libya's unchallenged moves in Africa should make the African leaders realize that the Charter needs changes. The first step towards this should be the dropping of the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of States" by the OAU. This should be replaced by an effective means of intervening in intrastate conflicts that threaten the human rights of the masses. Political stability or unity in Africa can only be achieved when there is stability in the various states.

The OAU has generally been more successful in settling interstate conflicts than intrastate conflicts. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration was to be composed of 21 individuals chosen by the Assembly for five-year terms, and it was empowered to take jurisdiction over interstate disputes on the request of the Council, the Assembly, either or both parties to the dispute. Its protocol authorizes the use of mediation, conciliation, or arbitration

to resolve issues within its jurisdictions. Despite the importance attached to the commission in initial OAU documentation, it was not established until 1965, did not meet until 1968, and has never functioned effectively.⁵ Though the commission exists, successes in most peaceful settlement of disputes have been attributed to the influence of respected senior heads of State. The commission has not been entrusted with the delicate task of dealing with major conflict or potential conflict.⁶ Table 1 shows how some interstate conflicts were settled peacefully.

TABLE 1
SUCCESSFUL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS

Conflicts	Means	Remarks
Algeria and Morocco	Heads of States	Preliminary efforts by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and Haman's Diori of Niger but finally settled in the 1972 Summit.
Tanzania and Uganda	Secretary-General and Council of Ministers	
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon	Secretary-General and Council of Ministers	
Tanzania and Burundi	Secretary General and Council of Ministers	
Burundi and Rwanda	Secretary-General and Council of Ministers	
Guinea and Senegal	Adhoc Committee of Heads of State in Liberia in 1972	

Prospects for Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is an extraordinary military art because it calls for

the use of soldiers not to fight and win, but to prevent fighting, to maintain cease-fires, and to provide order while negotiations are being conducted.⁷ These soldiers are supposed to be politically neutral and not authorized to fire unless fired upon. Currently, UN peacekeeping operations are only carried out when the host country or one of the parties to a dispute requests assistance or consents to the will of the UN majority. Peacekeepers serve as a deterrent because like the UN forces, neither side of the conflict will attempt any direct confrontation with the peacekeeper.

The UN has achieved a remarkable record of effective operation based on the contributions of many Member States including ten that have specifically earmarked contingents for UN use. Such nations include Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Italy, Iran, New Zealand and Britain.⁸ The need to settle disputes regionally before involving the world body has necessitated the creation of peacekeeping forces. However, the raising of regional forces also meet political disagreements.

The OAS peacekeeping operation in the Dominican Republic in 1965-66 did not get a unanimous approval by the member nations. It was only approved by fourteen to six, the minimum vote necessary.⁹ The success of this operation was because of the substantial US participation and backing. This was understandable because the US initiated the operation. The Dominican crises was caused by revolutionary activity which threatened to overthrow the government. Under the guise of protecting American citizens and other foreign nationals, the US acted promptly and unilaterally by dispatching marines and then a division of paratroopers. The US did intend to protect its citizens, but a more

fundamental reason for the intervention, as later confirmed by President Johnson, was that intelligence reports indicated that the revolutionary forces might be taken over by the Communists.¹⁰

The OAU as an institution has not conducted any peacekeeping though a few member countries have sent contingents for UN operations. The lessons to be learned through the UN involvements and the OAS experience in the Dominican crises are that: forces to be used do not necessarily need to be highly combat ready but require special skills, and at regional organization, there should be a near unanimous agreement among Member States. There is no single Member State in the OAU that can 'flex muscles' to influence other members or finance the operation alone. While the fundamental reason behind the OAS involvement was the struggle against the spread of a type of political ideology - communism - OAU involvements in peacekeeping will be to maintain African unity.¹¹

African armies presently cannot afford the aspect of maintaining special units or personnel for peacekeeping. The prospect of conducting peacekeeping operations requires special training in certain skills. Countries like Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Tunisia have contributed immensely to UN peacekeeping. While a few countries (Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria etc.) which were under the British rule conduct training on internal security and counter-insurgency operations at all levels, other countries, particularly the francophone countries, delegate that to the gendarmeries. An assumption is made here to continue any meaningful discussion on the prospects of peacekeeping, and that is the belief that OAU will not maintain a standing PADF. The PADF can only be raised by the contributions from requested States when

the necessity occurs.

The advantages of having a standing force are the easy deployment, the effectiveness of the force because of continuous training, and command and control. An alternative to achieve effectiveness is the establishment of a PADF Training Command for periodic joint training. The detailed establishment of the training command is discussed in future chapters. There are other factors in considering against the standing force.

There is no provision for establishing either a standing force or a training command. This could be achieved by an amendment of the Charter. The greatest problem is the financing of a standing force. For example, by making use of the estimates made by William R. Frye¹² in 1957, for a permanent peacekeeping force of 7,000 men for a period of six months to two years, we can agree that by 1981, this will be an expensive venture. Frye estimated that an adequate base, including training grounds, barracks, airfield, depots, and communication and recreation facilities, would cost in the vicinity of \$65,000,000, with maintenance and servicing at about \$1,000,000 annually. These estimates were based on a standing force to be equipped with light arms.

The role of the PADF is not yet defined but it can be rightly assumed that it would have a primary role of peacekeeping. Secondary roles would include counter aggression, as the UN operation in Korea, and in support of liberation movements. The establishment of any permanent force would plan for meeting the requirements of the primary and secondary roles. Therefore, the above estimates would not be appropriate because the secondary roles requires forces with heavy equipment and weapon systems.

The cost of maintaining a training command would be cheaper based on Lincoln Bloomfield estimates of 1964.¹³ He estimated that, the annual cost of maintaining a training command capable of training 2,500 men for a period of 6 months might be \$10,000,000. However, his estimate was based on using facilities available in a country. Can the OAU be able to finance either of the courses? Though the research work could not determine the current OAU budgetary status, it is better to attempt the lesser course.

There are other factors that might influence either course. These factors include selection of site, command, staffing, and political differences. Neither of these factors will create any major obstacles to the establishment of any course of action. What are the capabilities of any PADF raised now to perform any of the roles? Do these conflicts require the immediate use of PADF? Since there is no standing force now, it can only be possible to access the capability of a raised force from State's contingents. Chapters IV and V discuss the capabilities of performing peacekeeping and counter aggressions.

There are a few disputes that require the immediate use of the PADF that fall into the primary and secondary roles suggested in this thesis. The complex conflict concerning the Western Sahara territory requires a peacekeeping force; the Chadian dispute requires counter aggression and/or peacekeeping and South African apartheid policy requires the support of liberation movement. The first and third conflicts are not discussed further. The Chadian dispute is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

NOTES ON CHAPTER II

¹A few of the deposed leaders are now back either as political party leaders or leaders or Heads of State. For example in Nigeria, Dr. Nnamidi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo are back as party leaders. Dr. Milton Obote is now back as President of Uganda.

²Helen Kitchen, Africa: From Mystern to Maze, (Massachusetts: Heat and Company, 1964), p. 45.

³Ibid.

⁴"At the OAU Summit," West Africa (23 July 1979): p. 1297.

⁵Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African Unity, (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 98-9.

⁶Helen Kitchen, Africa: From Mystern to Maze, p. 205.

⁷Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 4.

⁸Ibid., pp. 80-89.

⁹Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 58.

¹¹This author believes that different concepts of political ideologies are not the immediate concern of the Member States of the OAU.

¹²William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957), pp. 75-8.

¹³Lincoln P. Bloomfield, International Military Forces, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company Limited, 1964), p. 89.

CHAPTER III

CASE STUDY: CHAD

The civil war in Chad seems to be over but political uncertainty lingers on. Through Libya's military assistance, President Goukoni Wuddeyi forces defeated Defense Minister Hisseni Habre's forces in the after a decade and a half of civil war. While there was a divided attitude among African nations over Libya's intervention, there seems to be a complete non-acceptance of the amalgamation plans of Libya and Chad into a single Islamic state. Vehemently opposed to the plan are the neighboring nations of Niger, Nigeria and Sudan.

Condemnation of the plan has not been restricted to within African nations but a few Western nations, particularly France. There are complexities in the amalgamation efforts if successful. Libya is noted for its support of revolutionary movements in Africa where the movement's ideologies are in line with those pursued by Libya. Its unsuccessful assistance to Idi Amin of Uganda is still very fresh in the memories of many African leaders. This case study will cover the basic causes of the civil war and the various peace efforts; an analysis of the complications of the amalgamation plan.

Historical Background

Chad is one of the countries that formed the former French Equatorial Africa. It has an area of 780,672 square kilometers. In the south, Chad comprises a not very fertile part of the Sudanese Savannah belt; the country then stretches for about 1600 kilometers to the north

into the Sahel and the Sahara Desert. Chad is surrounded by the desert mountain sites of Tibesti, rising to over 3,000 meters, where no human being can normally live.

Chad is very far from the sea, a common factor in many African nations. The nearest possible harbor would be Port Harcourt in the eastern part of Nigeria, over 1600 kilometers away, or Lagos about 2,000 kilometers, or Douala in Cameroun, about the same distance. Its normal trade route is Bangui and Brazzaville, over 2,800 kilometers away. This makes imported goods more expensive than anywhere else in French-speaking Africa.

Chad has a population of about 4.5 million, an average density of six inhabitants per square kilometers. The density is higher in the Lake Chad basin area and reduces northwards. The population is not homogenous. There is a marked division between the north and south. The Northerners are fairly light-skinned with some Arab blood in their ancestry, devout Muslims; in the South, the largest ethnic group, the very dark-skinned Sara, either animists or Christian. The South has been harassed by invasions and slave-raids from the North since centuries ago.

Chad has no viable economy. Its resources are scanty. There are no exportable minerals and food is produced for only local consumption. Fishing and cattle breeding are carried out extensively. The only commercial crop is cotton.

Political instability has been witnessed in Chad since independence in 1960. Gabriel Lisette from Guadeloupe in the French West Indies was the first Prime Minister after independence. Before then, he served as a French colonial civil servant, represented Chad at the French Na-

tional Assembly. In 1957 he was elected mayor of Fort Lamy and in that year was appointed vice-president of the government council. After the referendum in September 1958, he became the Prime Minister. His political favoritism towards the Northern politicians caused his ousting from office by Francois Tombalbaye, a Sara from the South in March 24, 1959. Lisette became Tombalbaye's second-in-command of both the party and the government. In August 1959 while out of the country, he was dismissed from office and ordered not to return to the country.

The Northerners, however, were not ready to cooperate with Tombalbaye and were involved in plots to overthrow him. He was very severe with them and either arrested the plotters or excluded them from office. Tombalbaye, nevertheless frequently reorganized his cabinet and tried to achieve national unity by including as much as possible all factions of the country in the cabinet. To avoid any possible rivalry from the Northerners in open elections, on January 18, 1962, Tombalbaye banned all parties and held new elections on a one-list system. The new elected Assembly approved a new constitution of the presidential type. He became the President under the only national party - the Parti Progressive Tchadian (PPT).

Tombalbaye started facing political rivals mostly from the north. There was also mass discontent because of the poor economic situation and the arrest of some middle class politicians accused of corruption. Following the arrest of Kerallah, Konlamallah and Baptiste, leaders of the Muslim Parti National African (PNA), riots broke out in Fort Lamy in September 1963. Stern measures were used to suppress them. Peace was restored briefly. Relationships between the North and South became strained; street-brawls broke out between the North and South in

different parts of the country. Armed bands often crossed the north-eastern fronts of Chad from parts of Sudan to support the Northerners in several occasions only to be driven back by the Chad Army. He was able to suppress all these riots because he had the support of France.

In April 1964, the National Assembly passed a resolution requesting the withdrawal of all French troops for alleged interference by French officials in the domestic affairs of the government. Tombalbaye, however, did not make any formal requests to France because of fear of any diplomatic crises with France. France, nevertheless withdrew her troops as part of a new policy later on. This was, however, short lived because French troops were recalled during August-September under a defense agreement between France and Chad. The troops assisted in the crushing of a rebellion among nomadic guards and regular soldiers in the Tibesti. This, however, did not end the problems in Chad even after Tombalbaye's overthrow and his subsequent death.

President Tombalbaye was overthrown in a military coup on April 13, 1975 by a joint action between the army and the gendarmerie. He died later as a result of wounds sustained during the fight. It is appropriate here to explain the circumstances that led to the overthrow of Tombalbaye by his own men despite the army's support in suppressing the rebels for over a decade. When there is a growing dissention between the political leader and the army commanders, the stage is set for a show-down. There also were other contributory factors that set the stage.

The army was frustrated by a continuous fighting with the Front pour la Liberation Nationale (FROLINAT). In the speech after the overthrow the army leaders were quoted to have said among other things, "...useless spilling of the blood of compatriots in their constant loyalty

to the national cause and the heavy losses they had had to bear in the process."¹ The economic situation in the drought-stricken areas was becoming desperate. The increased control of government offices by the Saras increased tribal conflicts. Tombalbaye extended compulsory initiations into the "Yondo" rites of the Sara tribe. The Yondo society concept allowed holding of key appointments in the government service. This was applicable to both Muslim and Christian Saras.² Tombalbaye was made the tribal chief of the Saras and in appreciation to that he changed his Christian name of Francois to Ngarta. Why did the army and the Gendarmarie cooperate?

The cooperation between the army and the Gendarmarie in the coup could be attributed to the detention of both the Chief of Staff and the Commander respectively. Tombalbaye was consistent in taking drastic actions against any plot to overthrow him. In June 1973, Gen Felix Malloum, the Army Chief of Staff, was arrested on unspecified charges and confined to his house. He was arrested under the suspicion of collaborating with the rebel Toubou leader, Hissen Habre.³ On April 2, 1975, three Frenchmen, members of the Presidential bodyguard, were shot by FROLINAT prisoners who had disarmed their guards. Col Djine, the Commander of the Gendarmerie and his aide were arrested.⁴

The revolt began at the barracks in Boroko, some 200 kilometers north of the capital, where Lt Dimtolaum with his men drove to Gendarmarie Depot in Ndjamena. Here some elements of the Compagnie Tchadienne de Securitie joined the soldiers.⁵ About 5 a.m., the combined forces stormed the presidential residence. Gen Noel Odinga arrived later with more soldiers and took over command. By 8:30 a.m., the fighting was over.⁶ All roads to the capital were sealed off and a curfew was imposed

by Gen Odinga under his authority as interim commander.⁷

The non-interference of the French troops in Chad during the coup was surprising and as yet unexplained. The French had two battalions of about 2,000 men in Chad at a base near Njadema.⁸ These battalions with some helicopters and advisors were attached to the Chad armed forces. The French troops had previously helped in suppressing rebels.

A Superior Military Council (SMC) was established to rule the country. The SMC released Gen Felix Malloum from detention and appointed him as President of the Council. Malloum is a Sara and comes from the same province with the late Tombalbaye. Prior to his appointment as Chief of Staff, he was in the presidential cabinet in 1968 and an advisor of the President. Though Gen Odinga led the coup, he recognized Gen Malloum as his superior. Malloum's relationship with the FROLINAT leader Isene Habre was envisaged to achieve peace and unity between the North and South.⁹ Why did the guerrillas survive for such a long time and why did trouble continue after the military coup?

The FROLINAT rebels have consistently received external support in their struggle against the government. In the first instance, when Chad became independent in 1960, the Northern region still remained under the French army control until in 1965. In the early years of the war, the Sudanese government supported the rebels, partly out of sympathy with its religious overtones. In fear of retaliatory measures since Sudan had her own problems of unrest, Sudan publicly renounced FROLINAT.¹⁰ Libya has persistently defied the OAU by supporting the rebels. In 1971, Col Gadafi recognized FROLINAT and organized the attempted coup against Tombalbaye in September, 1971.¹¹ Efforts towards unifying or achieving peace between the North and South were made after the coup. Toward that

end, on 29 August 1978, President Malloum appointed Hissene Habre as the Prime Minister.

The activities of the FROLINAT rebels never ended even when Habre became the Prime Minister. At this time however, Habre was no longer heading FROLINAT. He had broken away with the group because of his disapproval with Libya after its President, Gaddafi seized another chunk of northern Chad.¹² FROLINAT was now under the leadership of Goukeni Wuddeyi and he controlled at least half of the country.¹³

The relationship between President Malloum and the Prime Minister did not last. In February 1979, soldiers numbering about 1,000 loyal to Habre launched an attack against loyal forces of Malloum.¹⁴ Habre at the end of the fight now controlled the capital city of Ndjamena. Ceasefire was achieved through mediation by French. It was not a lasting ceasefire. Nigeria started a mediation effort involving all the factions in conflict.

Nigeria's Mediation Efforts

Nigeria's foreign policy objectives include achieving lasting peace and unity in Africa. Towards that objective Nigeria had assisted or initiated peaceful settlement in both interstate and intrastate disputes. Nigeria is separated in her northeastern border with Chad by Lake Chad and a narrow strip of Cameroun. Nigeria and Cameroun are members of the Chad Basin Commission. Cultural ties exist between the two countries. In February, 1979, Nigeria invited the different factions of the Chadian conflict for mediation. They met at Kano and agreed on many things; among them were the stationing of a Nigerian Peacekeeping Force and the resignation of both the President and the Prime Minister.

Task Force 203¹⁵ (TF 203) was therefore sent to Chad.

TF 203 started the movement by 16 March 1979.¹⁶ The tasks for the force were to constantly patrol Ndjamena, guarding key and vulnerable points, providing escorts to deserving persons and demilitarization of Ndjamena.¹⁷ On 23 March, in accordance with the Kano Accord, the leaders of the different factions met with the Commander¹⁸ of the Nigerian troops in Chad. The different factions were: Gen Felix Malloum of the Forces Armes du Tchad (FAT);¹⁹ Mr. Hissen Habre of Forces du Nord (FAN); Mr. Goukeni Wuddeyi of FROLINAT and the Commander of Movement Populaire de Liberation du Tchad (MPLT).²⁰ President Felix Malloum and Prime Minister Habre resigned their appointments and a Provisional Council of State was formed under the chairmanship of Goukeni Wuddeyi. All faction leaders endorsed the document of the new arrangements.²¹

The demilitarization of Ndjamena started on 25 March.²² FAT elements who were occupying the barracks were escorted by elements of TF 203. While FAT elements cooperated, the other elements particularly Habre's FAN elements were reluctant and very difficult to control. However, normal life in Ndjamena was coming back by 29 March.

On 2 April 1979, a Chadian delegation of 62 led by the Nigerian Commander left for Kano, Nigeria for the second meeting. However, through certain rumors of maltreatment of a few elements of the delegation at Kano, events in Chad took a dramatic turn. Elements of FAN now moved into the capital and by 8 April were deploying in strategic points in the capital including the airport. Hostilities against TF 203 by elements of FAN started, aircraft bringing supplies to the force was refused permission to land at the airport by the French troops at the air-

port on the order of FAN leaders.²³

At the end of the second Kano Accord, a transitional government was announced. Highlights of the appointments were: Lol Mohammed Chaoua (MPLT), President; Gen Djogo (FAT), Vice President; Hissen Habre (FAN), Defense Minister and Goukoni Wuddeyi (FROLINAT), Interior Minister. The Council of State consisted of Gen Djogo, Hissen Habre, Goukoni Wuddeyi and Idris Adoum.²⁴ General Malloum by now had been completely denied any appointment. Meanwhile, tension in Chad was still high, spasmodic shootings were occurring everywhere, Libyan forces were attacking from the north and French troops were assisting the evacuation of troops from Abeche - the area of fighting.

On 23 May 1979, the Nigerian forces in Chad were requested through an official letter from the Chadian Defense Minister to withdraw.²⁵ A third conference was held in Lagos on 25 May 1979. The conference condemned the transitional government on its composition and the different factions were given up to 25 June to form an acceptable new government embracing all factions. However, the withdrawal of the Nigerian forces started on 2 June 1979.

The peacekeeping operation in Chad though, involving only one country reinforces the belief that, it is a very difficult operation to handle. It becomes more complex when guerrilla activities are involved. While it was easy getting the support of the regular forces, it was 'no-go' with the rebels. Tribal, religious and political differences were also contributing factors. Therefore, in raising a PADF for anywhere in Africa, these factors must be considered as to the composition of the force. Exclusion of any existing external forces operating in the country prior to the operation is very necessary. The influence of French

troops in Chad added to the difficulties of TF 203.

Merger of Libya and Chad

At the end of the negotiations by Nigeria, a ceasefire was achieved and a new government was formed. Goukoni Wuddeyi became the President while Hissen Habre became the Defense Minister. It turned out to be a rickety arrangement. Both members had earlier disagreed over Gaddafi; they maintained their respective forces - Wuddeyi 6,800 men and Habre about 5,000;²⁶ power struggle started and war renewed between them. They represented also rival interests between two foreign nations: Habre associated with France and Wuddeyi with Libya.²⁷

In December, 1980 Wuddeyi's forces supported by Libya's troops defeated the forces of Habre. Though a military victory is presumed to be achieved, the struggle still continues. Habre has not finally given up the struggle. Meanwhile, Libya's Gaddafi and FROLINAT's Wuddeyi are planning for a merger of the countries as one Islamic State. The initial motives of Gaddafi are now clear. Annexation through aggression is almost being achieved. While it is not wrong for two nations by mutual arrangements to merge for common goals, it is wrong when the people of one nation are in disagreement. Therefore, Nigeria's attitude towards Libya should be supported by the OAU as a body. What are the options for OAU?

The OAU should unanimously instruct both Gaddafi and Wuddeyi to stop all merger moves. Though, expulsion of any Member State is not included in the Charter, this is a possible solution through amendments. Chad as a nation is not totally involved because the people are still divided. If a peaceful approach is not achieved and assuming Member States reach a decision to use force against Libya and Wuddeyi's faction,

what are the probabilities of success? The answer to this question forms the bases for the next two chapters.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

- ¹"What Happened in Chad?" West Africa No. 3017 (21st April, 1975), p. 442.
- ²Ibid.
- ³Ibid., p. 443.
- ⁴Ibid.
- ⁵Ibid., p. 442.
- ⁶Ibid.
- ⁷Ibid.
- ⁸Ibid.
- ⁹"Matchet's Diars." West Africa No. 3017. (21st April, 1975), p. 445.
- ¹⁰"Behind Chad's Rebellion." West Africa No. 3017 (21st April, 1975), p. 445.
- ¹¹Ibid.
- ¹²"Chad. Desert Coup." Time (February 26, 1979), p. 45.
- ¹³Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill: "France's Forgotten War in Chad." West Africa No. 3194 (2 October, 1978), p. 1945.
- ¹⁴"Africa. Civil War in Chad." Newsweek (February 26, 1979), p. 47.
- ¹⁵TF 203 was an armored reconnaissance battalion equivalent of a U.S. Cavalry squadron, established at the request of the UN for use in Namibia.
- ¹⁶"Task Force 203, War Diary" (hereafter cited TF 203 WD), p. 5.
- ¹⁷Ibid.
- ¹⁸The Commander of the Nigerian troops in Chad was different for TF 203 Commander.
- ¹⁹FAT was the regular Chadian Army.
- ²⁰"TF 203 WD"
- ²¹Ibid.

22 "TF 203 WD"

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.


26 "Chad Shattered Truce." Time (April 7, 1980), p. 43.

27 Ibid.

MAP 1. AFRICA



MAP 2. CHAD



CHAPTER IV

THE ARMIES OF AFRICA

Roles and Training

The pre-independence armies in Africa in most countries were established, organized, equipped and trained in the interest of the colonial powers. Three major reasons could be attributed for this. These were as a source of reserve manpower which could be used for mobilization in case of war; strategic mobility to world powers; and the defense of capital investments. The first and second reasons were taken seriously throughout the colonial era but the third reason became more important after independence.

France has looked back on black Africa as a source of military manpower for the defense of France since 1914,¹ while the use of African forces was only considered by the British during the Second World War. The maintenance of routes through Africa to other countries was of strategic importance to the colonial powers. The British regarded Africa in terms of the route to India and the Far East. The importance of keeping these routes open was clearly seen in the discussions which took place between the British and the French staff officers at Nairobi in 1950. The important theme in the conference was the protection of air routes across Africa.² The route from Takoradi to Entebbe via Kano and the Southern Sudan was of great importance to both the British and the French because it could be used for supplying bases in the Indian Ocean or farther east. Land routes were also maintained

for possible movement of troops.

The colonial powers had a lot of investments in their territories and also used these territories as means of providing raw materials. To safeguard these investments and the flow of raw materials, security forces were maintained even after independence. The French in developing their force de frappe, were interested in those minerals in Africa which were important in the manufacture of atomic weapons.³

The use of the army for internal security (IS) tasks was not considered until 1948. IS roles were given to special police forces within the British territories and to the gendarmerie by the French. The British first used the army during the coal miners strike in Enugu, Nigeria in 1948 when the police force failed to suppress the strike. Subsequently, the army was used in other countries for major IS problems.

The organizations and equipment of the armies were tailored to perform the above limited functions. Few armies invested in expensive weaponry. The basic branch of arm was infantry. Technical training was limited and restricted in many armies to driver's training. In both the British and French territories, the majority of the staff appointments were held by the colonial officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO's). In the British units, the staff, quartermaster jobs, vehicle mechanics and communication elements were mostly expatriates.

By 1955, the British and French started a gradual decolonization program for the armies. Training of African officers started through provision for certain quotas with the British training institutions - Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, other officer cadet schools, and specialist training establishments. However, the British did not grant commissions to African officers until the enacting of the Army

Act of 1955 but the French granted commissions to deserving African officers prior to this year. The French introduced the creation of a single army within the French community. The French believed that their most important obligation was to create the right state of mind among the new African officer cadre. The general use of the French language was aimed at achieving unity within the territories.⁴ However, by 1959, this policy was reviewed to allow for the creation of national armies.

At independence every new regime had a choice of redesigning its armed forces. New concepts were needed to meet the security problems the countries envisaged. It was, however, difficult to decide the right force structure immediately after the grant of independence. The peaceful grant of independence in most cases made it possible for the former colonial powers to impose or influence the direction of any new organizational concepts. In most countries, the expatriate officers still remained after independence to help in training and organizing the armed forces. For example, the British officers working in Kenya argued against any expansion of the Kenyan army, because they considered that aid from the outside world would always be forthcoming if there were serious threats of invasion from Somalia which had disputes with Kenya.⁵

In a few countries the military was designed according to the fears of the new regime instead of the security of the country. There were less fears on interstate conflicts. Greater fears were therefore, focused on the survivability of the regime through internal security problems. The anticipated IS problems led to the maintenance of armies for IS roles. Emphasis was placed, therefore, on providing efficient infantry units with adequate transport, though, a few armies procured light

armored fighting vehicles (AFV's) and scout cars. These vehicles were used to establish reconnaissance (cavalry) units for patrol duties or periodic road marches or a "show of force missions".

Political and financial considerations were other factors that controlled the supplies of military equipment. These differed between the Anglophone and the Francophone countries. The former had a much greater range of choice because they received from the colonial authorities, armies which were already operational within the states. On the other hand the latter relied on French assistance in the reconstruction of French units, which had been liable to service anywhere within the French community.

The significant change in most of the countries after independence was the role assigned to the armed forces. The redefined roles include: the defense of the country from external aggression; maintaining the territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation of land, sea or air; suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order; and to honor all arrangements or agreements which may be entered into from time to time by the governments as a result of their memberships of international organizations such as the OAU and the United Nations Organization (UNO).

In fulfillment of the above tasks, the various armies introduced extensive training programs. The first step towards training was to adopt concepts suitable to the local environments. To achieve this, most countries established various military training institutions such as military academies and service schools. Training of officers and NCO's though continue in the institutions of the former colonial masters, foreign training teams are contracted to conduct mass training. Among

other advantages, this latter system is cheaper and quicker. Initial training concentrated on producing junior grade officers and priorities were therefore, given to military academies and junior staff colleges. However, a few armies are yet to establish military academies and so rely on foreign institutions. A very few countries now have senior staff colleges, though a greater percentage of the instructors such as in Ghana and Nigeria are through foreign military training teams.

African nations are supposed to be in the family of "non-aligned" nations. Presently, it is difficult to believe or agree that all the nations maintain the concept of non-alignment based on the current trend of military alliance in one form or the other. Foreign military bases are now springing up in the various geographical regions in Africa. A few of the military treaties are concerned with airforce bases or landing rights and naval bases or anchorage rights. Other treaties include the physical presence of military personnel. These categories as shown in Table 2⁶ include minor army combat units, major army combat units and military advisors, intelligence, communications and surveillance.

The external powers with bases or/and army units in Africa are Cuba, France, USA and USSR. Though it is difficult to know the contents of the various treaty agreements, it could be assumed that the foreign forces will assist in the security of the respective nation from both interstate or intrastate conflicts in addition to the massive supply of equipment and training.

There are advantages and disadvantages to the existence of the foreign military bases. The advantages include the buildup of equipment and weapon systems hitherto not available or difficult to get through

TABLE 2
FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE

Country	Foreign Country	Naval Base	Air Force Base	Military Advisors	Army: Minor Combat Forces	Army: Major Combat Forces
Algeria	Cuba			X		
Angola	Cuba					X
CAR	France				X	
Congo	Cuba					X
Djibouti	France	X			X	
Egypt	USA	X	X			
Equatorial						
Guinea	Cuba			X		
Ethiopia	Cuba					X
Ivory Coast	France				X	
Guinea Bisau	Cuba			X		
Kenya	USA	X	X			
Madagascar	Cuba			X		
Mauritania	France			X		
Morocco	USA	X	X			
Mozambique	USSR	X	X			
Senegal	France	X	X		X	
Somalia	USA	X	X			
Tanzania	Cuba				X	
Zambia	Cuba				X	

the normal diplomatic channels of procurement. Appendix 1 shows the buildup of equipment in some countries. It reveals that countries with USSR/Cuba combat troops have significant large quantity of equipment. Of particular interest are Ethiopia and Angola. Another advantage is that it provides a sort of deterrance to other neighboring countries with smaller armies. The disadvantages among other points include the suppression of any likely antigovernment movements or opposition against any government's unpopular policy or program; it destabilizes regional military balances; it makes the country vulnerable to the political ideology of the patron nation even if it is against the wishes of the people; and it helps to create disunity in the OAU.

The most disturbing problem as identified in Table 2 is the continuous presence of major combat forces in certain areas in Africa. Ironically, the OAU seems not to be too concerned about it, particularly when the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia has a concentration of Cuban troops. External military assistance in most cases came as an aid to liberation movements and suppression of anti-government movements. While there is nothing wrong in requesting for and receiving security assistance from an allied nation in crisis period, its continuous stay after the crisis is not acceptable to the peaceful co-existence with the neighboring states. The formation of a PADF will be greatly affected by the continuous presence of these forces. The first task of the OAU is therefore, to ensure that the foreign combat troops are gotten rid of in Africa. There is, however, nothing wrong in the use of bases or training teams.

Another direction in the current trends is the joint military exercises among a few armies in Africa and foreign armies. The recently


conducted exercises include the USA-Egypt and France and some Francophone countries. While these joint exercises are designed to improve the operational capabilities of the host and patron armies, they contribute to a drifting apart of the African armies outside these communities. What is needed to improve the relationship of armies is joint military exercises among them. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

Organization

There is a common concept adopted in the organizational framework of the armies irrespective of the different external influences. The common concept is the adaptation of the "brigade base concept." This concept is aimed at maintaining the brigade integrity during combat operation. The brigade as shown in Figure 1 consists of the headquarters, three or four battalions each with three or four line companies, an organic combat support and combat service support tailored to support its maneuver battalions.

The building block of the armies is the battalion. This is what is presently maintained by smaller countries. Though its strength varies from country to country, it contains the line companies and an administrative company to provide logistic support for the battalion. The most senior battalion commander acts for the brigade commander when the latter is out of station or killed in action since there is no assistant brigade commander. The operational planning at the brigade headquarters is the responsibility of the commander assisted by his two principal staff officers - the brigade major (BM) and the deputy assistant adjutant general and quartermaster general (DAAG & QMG). The BM is

FIGURE 1
ORGANIZATION OF A BRIGADE



for operational and training planning and the DAAG & QMG is for logistics.

A few large armies have infantry or armored divisions consisting of three or four brigades. However, the brigades are still organized as shown on Figure 1.

Major Military Equipment

The armies inherited from their former colonial powers very light equipment suitable in most cases for counter insurgency or internal security tasks. Post-independence governments have been, therefore, responsible for procuring suitable equipment and weapon systems for their armies. The equipment and weapon systems being procured, however, are not the best in the world markets. The constraining factors include politics and the economy. Though most of the countries had the money to buy heavy weapon systems, there was no consideration for the immediate use of them. The maintenance of internal security was the priority aim of equipping the armies; for example, Nigeria only maintained armored cars and few armored personnel carriers (APC's) for her reconnaissance regiments. They were provided for internal security and ceremonial purposes.

The desire for the procurement of heavy weapon systems such as tanks, air defense systems and artillery guns for the armies, jet fighters, helicopters and transport aircrafts for the airforces came as there were increased inter-state conflicts and civil wars. The urgent need for this equipment necessitated a few countries to approach external countries for security assistance and resulted into the penetration of political concepts such as community ideology into Africa. For example, during the Nigerian Civil War, the British refusal to sell combat aircraft to the

Nigerian Government resulted in Nigeria going to Moscow to buy MIG 15 and 17 Jet Fighters and Illyushin IL27 bombers for the Nigerian Air Force.⁷ Nigeria as a result of the Western attitude towards her during the civil war, now has in her military inventory mostly USSR equipment as shown in Appendix 1. Angola also had the same faith in her civil crisis.

There exists a principle of flexibility in the procurement of military equipment by some countries. Most armies have in their inventories equipment from the West and the East. The flexibility is because of the unstable political situations. Another reason is to avoid putting all the eggs in one basket. Nigeria had problems of getting ammunition for most of her weapons during the civil war when the countries previously supplying the ammunitions failed to support the country or when these equipment and the ammunition were supplied to the rebels. For example, France supplied Panhard armored vehicles and 155mm artillery guns to the rebels;⁸ this Panhard vehicle was also in the Federal side without ammunition.

At the end of the war based on the experience with France and some other countries, Nigeria now has in her armored units British, French and USSR equipment. Egypt which maintained closed relationships with USSR and equipped her military inventory with Soviet equipment during her wars with Israel now maintains close relationship with the USA. On the other hand, Ethiopia which had USA equipment initially, now has Soviet tanks and equipment. There are advantages and disadvantages to this flexibility principle. The significant advantage is the political aspect of falling back to another country when diplomatic relationship is severed with one country. The greatest disadvantages are the logistic

problems of supply and maintenance. These will also create an interoperability problem within the armies of Africa in joint military operations.

Tactical Doctrine

The armies in Africa have not deviated significantly from tactical doctrines inherited from the colonial armies. There are many factors leading to this. First is the fact that, the evolving of new doctrine requires considerable experience and continuous updating through trials. Trials are both through actual battlefield environment or field trials with equipment. With the exception of Egypt most armies don't have that battlefield experience and sufficient equipment or weapon systems to equip their armies. The fear of shortening the life span of the available systems through initial doctrinal trials results in adopting foreign concepts.

The second factor is the inability to identify potential threat. Though, this factor is not too constraining, the knowledge of what you are training against gives a more realistic approach. For example, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries train against each other and change doctrines when the need arises. Egypt for example at the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War readjusted her doctrine and changed concepts for training as was seen in the 1973 Middle-East War. The third factor is the presence of foreign training teams. A few of these training teams come not only to assist but establish either the Service schools, junior and senior staff colleges, and in certain armies, officers' cadet academies. These training teams come with their armies tactical doctrines and conduct training accordingly. For example, Ghana and Nigeria have British Train-

ing Teams for both their junior and senior staff courses; the concept of training is therefore, similar to the British Staff College, Camberley.

The fourth factor is the non-availability of military institutions in certain countries. A great majority of the Francophone countries conduct their training of officers and NCO's in French military institutions. The military treaties between France and her former colonies in Africa result in the establishment of common tactical doctrine. The newly independent countries and other smaller armies conduct their training either in other African countries or in foreign countries. What are the significant differences in the doctrines of the British, French and the Soviet doctrines? Can these differences affect joint military operations in Africa? The effect of the differences depends on the mission of the PADF. In operations concerning normal peacekeeping, there is less interaction between the forces, therefore, there will be no impact on the operation. On the other hand, adversary missions which require offensive and defensive operations involve interaction and cross-attachment of units, therefore, differences will have tremendous effect.

The differences are not only in the tactical concepts. There are significant differences in the operational graphics, communication procedures and combat procedures. These differences are discussed in more details in the next chapter. In this discussion, British concepts are generally applied to the following countries: Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sudan. French concepts are applied to; CAR, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Upper Volta and Zaire. Soviet concepts are applied to: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Egypt, Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Libya and Zambia.

NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

¹J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 27.

²Ibid., p. 28.

²Ibid., p. 27.

⁴Ibid., p. 36.

⁵Ibid., p. 60.

⁶Michael Kidron & Ronald Segal, The State of the World Atlas, (New York: Pluto Press Limited, 1981), map 7.

⁷Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command, An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70, (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Ltd, 1980), p. 145.

⁸Ibid.

CHAPTER V

PAN-AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE

The Type of Force

The Pan-African Defense Force (PADF) which was agreed upon during the OAU summit in July 1979 for which a committee was set up to work out the details is still in the planning phase. The purpose of this thesis is not to formulate any proposal for acceptance, rather it looks into the feasibility of the PADF conducting any operation successfully based on the conflicts now going on in Africa. Though, the committee is yet to come out with any proposal, the thesis discusses the available options for the creation of international forces based on various researches carried out on the topic. These researches include those of the Study Group set up by The David Davis Memorial Institute, to undertake a Study on United Nations Forces,¹ Lincoln P. Bloomfield,² Arthur M. Cox³ and Colonel Robin Eveleigh.⁴ The options are: permanent forces, stand-by forces and ad hoc forces.

The needs of the OAU for the settlement of disputes necessitated the assumption that the committee will propose an ad hoc force. The permanent force such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Europe is not yet feasible because of the political situation in the continent. There is no apparent need for any collective defense in Africa. The political inclinations to different ideological concepts and the Super Powers' influences particularly the Soviet Union, are a few of the factors that will hinder any arrangements for any

collective security measures.

The type of stand-by force recommended by Lincoln Bloomfield like the permanent force is not feasible. Bloomfield recommends a stand-by reserve force of 25,000 men plus several specialized units. This force is to be formed from 25 or 50 countries contributing battalion-strength units of either 500 or 1,000 respectively. The force he proposes to be "...trained and equipped for the proper jobs, and in an appropriate condition of readiness and availability when needed." The men when not needed stay in their different armies. The political reasons given against the permanent force also apply to this proposal. The choice of countries to provide contingents requires a broad spectrum of political ideologies so that when the need arises some of the forces might not be available for use because of the likely political differences.

In proposing the ad hoc force, a few other factors were considered. The most important factor is the proposed use of the force. What the OAU needs now is a force to intervene in most of the trouble spots in the continent. This calls for an urgent need. The stand-by force and the permanent forces are both long range plans. The stand-by force recommended by Bloomfield's estimation would require a five-year period to be built up to the required strength.⁴ The next factor is the consideration of the capabilities of the various Member States to place at readiness a battalion-size unit in addition to the local duties performed by the armies. Most of the States maintain small-size armies. The next consideration is the mission of the force. The UN utilization of forces in the various geographical regions for settlement of disputes could be grouped into two basic missions. These are adversary

(enforcement) and non-adversary (peacekeeping) missions with their associated tasks.

The PADF is not capable of conducting any enforcement mission involving full scale operations such as the UN operations in Korea and Congo. However, any ad hoc Force created will be able to perform peacekeeping missions. The first premise is based on the present political problems in Africa, the logistics requirements based on the experience in Korea and the Congo operations, and the interoperability problems. Using the Chad case study, and a scenario based on a hypothetical situation in which the OAU has decided to intervene using a PADF to eject the Libyan troops now in the territory, these problems will be discussed fully. The hypothetical situation is based on the recognition that there is no legal government in Chad, and the OAU is meeting the request by Hussein Habre and his faction in the conflict. All political persuasions have failed to appease Libya. This scenario will involve both enforcement and peacekeeping missions. However, the peacekeeping mission can only take place after the success of the enforcement mission.

Missions

The success of the operation in this scenario like any other military operations depends initially on well defined guidance to the Force Commander. This is the responsibility of the political authority defined by the OAU. The tasks associated with peacekeeping in particular are very complex as was experienced by the Nigerian troops in Chad and the current UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. Normally, the process in the decision making covers the relationship between the host nation and the force, however, difficulties are always encountered

during the conduct of the operation. In this scenario, it is now assumed that all problems involving legitimacy or consents have been ironed out.

The enforcement mission requires a complete military operation to achieve full military victory or force the enemy to surrender unconditionally. The tasks under this mission require well trained and adequately equipped units. Joint forces need joint training to improve the efficiency of the troops to conduct any type of operation - defense, offense, retrograde etc. In this situation, the PADF will consist of battalion-sized units with different types of training. Since cross-attachment of subunits is required at this level, understanding each other is an envisaged problem. If it is possible to raise only task forces from every contingent, cross-attachment will be minimal. The capability of the Force can not be accessed by the capabilities of the various contingents.

The tasks under the peacekeeping mission generally are either the insulation of local conflict from outside intervention or to separate warring nations or factions or supervise the implementation of a truce and to prevent them from further clashes, or the implementation of a specific solution. The situation in Chad after the elimination of the Libyan troops will include combinations of the identified tasks above. Though these tasks require special skills by the troops, they do not involve the requirement for cross-attachment of troops from the different contingents.

Political Problems

The political differences will affect the composition of the PADF and the financial contributions associated with the operation in

Chad. In the military balance of African nations, some of the nations depend upon Cuba/USSR for supplies and training. These countries, like Libya, are closely linked with USSR in political ideologies and are likely not to pitch battle against each other. Though these countries will not contribute forces against Libya, they will also not contribute forces for Libya against the PADF. There are other countries likely to stay neutral. These countries will include some members of the Arab League. The other countries left to contribute forces are, however, capable of providing the required force. A few of these countries like Egypt, Nigeria and Sudan have large armies; a few others like Ghana, Kenya and some members of the Francophone countries have moderate size and well trained troops. The joint efforts of these armies have the capability of conducting any operation against Libya and Goukoni Wuddeyi's faction of the Chadian troops if there is no direct assistance from either Cuba or USSR.

There are other problems that most of the armies will face. Appendix 1 shows that even the large armies like Egypt and Nigeria have mostly Soviet weapon systems in their inventory. These include their main battle tanks (MBT) and combat aircrafts. The problems of continuous procurement of spares and ammunitions will be encountered because the Soviets will surely cut off all necessary supplies to these armies unless other provisions such as local manufacture or third-party suppliers are available. This assumption is made because the Soviet Union is the main arms supplier to Libya and supports Libya's policies.

The maintenance of the PADF will rely on the financial power of the OAU. This therefore, requires some discussions because of the political problems. The problems faced by the UN in maintaining UNEF will

be identical to what the OAU will face in Chad pertaining to the financial arrangements. On 21 December 1956, the UN passed Resolution 1089 (XI), in which the Assembly decided that "the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force, other than for such pay, equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished without charge by governments of Member States shall be borne by the United Nations." The General Assembly also approved Resolution 1151 (XII) on 22 November 1957 with respect to the equipment of the contingents; the United Nations would bear the cost of replacement of equipment destroyed or worn out or for its deterioration beyond what might be envisaged in normal depreciation schedules.

These resolutions above and other similar resolutions adopted by the UN are likely resolutions to be reached by the OAU though with a few probable variations. These financial responsibilities will create burden for both the OAU as a body and the Member States. There are other numerous expenses the OAU will encounter as the UN in the UNEF or ONUC operations. Some of these include: the cost of provisions and the upkeep of the troops, and a daily overseas allowance, as well as travel and subsistence allowances, the operation of leave centers and the costs of motor transport, barrack stores, workshop equipment, stationary, etc., and the use of contracted civilian planes and other military planes that might be supplied by any Member State. Others are the costs of communications, the issuing of supplies and the satisfaction of successful claims against the OAU. How did the UN satisfy these arrangements? The budgetary arrangements to meet the UNEF operations had difficult problems because of differences between the Member States.

The operation in Chad will be an expensive one and will be be-

yond the normal budget of the Organization. The funds necessary to keep the PADF functioning have to be provided from other sources. For example, the UN General Assembly in November 1956, decided that, an initial amount of \$10 million outside the regular budget should be raised.⁵ In the same Resolution, the Assembly gave the Secretary General authority, for accounting purposes, to set up a Special Account to which all funds received by the United Nations for the purpose of the Force should be credited.⁶ The two main sources of supply for the Special Account were by voluntary contributions by Member States and contributions assessed on the Organization's membership as a whole.

These sources of raising funds were not accepted by some Member States. In its Resolution of 27 February 1957, the General Assembly invited Member States to make voluntary contributions to meet the sum of \$6.5 million so as to ease the financial burden for 1957 on the United Nations membership as a whole,⁷ though not all members contributed. The remainder of the total cost was supposed to be gotten by contributions assessed on the Member States. Did this work? There were various excuses for some Member States opposing these arrangements. The Soviet bloc maintained that the General Assembly's creation of UNEF was illegal, and refused to vote for any decision whereby the Organization was engaged to pay the expenses of the Force, and, further, refused to pay any amount towards its expense.⁸

From the above example, two basic questions will confront the planning of the operation in Chad or in other area of conflict involving political complexities. The first question is the capability of Member States to participate in both voluntary and mandatory contributions. The next question is the ability of the OAU to rally around other external

sources for financial or material support. These questions are however, outside the scope of this thesis. The political differences encountered by the UN in UNEF will also be encountered by the OAU.

Composition of the PADF

There are many factors to be considered in deciding the composition of the Force in this or other situations. It will always be a political decision concerning the use of the Force but it is the responsibility of the military planners to decide the composition or the required strength based on the existing situation. Since there is no existing military staff in the OAU Headquarters, the first step in this scenario is to appoint a Joint Military Staff (JMS) consisting of army and air force personnel; there is no requirement for navy. The JMS is to recommend the required strength for approval by the existing Defense Committee. For planning purposes, I will recommend an infantry division and one or two independent brigades. The division will consist of three brigades and each brigade organized as shown in figure 1.

The suggested composition above took cognizance of the second factor in deciding any composition. This factor is the type of operation likely to be carried out. As stated before, the situation in Chad involves both enforcement and peacekeeping functions. The first function requires military units equipped for armed hostilities while the latter function requires lightly equipped units and military observers. However, the second function will be based on the outcome of the first function.

The next step in the planning is the consideration of which States to provide contingents. This is based on the capability of the

respective States. This is further guided by the political situation and willingness of the respective States. This is however, the most difficult part of the planning. The proposed organizations require States providing either battalion-size task forces (consisting of tank and mechanized companies) or pure tank or infantry battalions with their administrative elements. The initial planning calls for 12 to 15 battalions. This means that at least twelve States are required to send contingents. The respective State will also be prepared to send replacements for casualties. This calls for at least two company-size units on stand-by at home base.

Based on the perception of the actual motives of Libya by Member States, contingents or assistance can be assumed to come from countries who have severed diplomatic relationships with Libya. These countries at the time of writing are: Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.⁹ The Francophone countries which are putting pressure on France to counter Libyan destabilization throughout West and Central Africa, and in particular to intervene again in Chad,¹⁰ will be willing to provide whatever assistance is requested by the OAU. Other countries likely to provide support will include Kenya, Malawi, Sudan and Zaire. These countries therefore, will be able to meet the required manpower strength.

A few of these countries are capable of providing up to two or three battalion-sized task forces. These countries include Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan and Kenya.¹¹ These countries will also be able to hold reserves at home bases for replacements when the demand occurs. What is, therefore, the likely outcome of any possible fighting between these forces and Libya/Wuddeyi's faction of the Chadian Army? This is the simplest question in this thesis to answer. If all foreign nations

stay clear and leave it for the Africans to decide this war, it will be a clear victory for the PADF. This answer looks like contradicting my earlier statement - that, the PADF cannot conduct any successful major operation.

Battles are not won by mere numerical strengths in manpower and equipment as seen in the various wargaming exercises conducted in the USA Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and in the Middle East Wars. In this scenario, the main constraints are logistics and funds to sustain the Force, and the external influences.

Command and Control

Staffing of the division and the brigade headquarters will be made up of staffs from the contributing nations. There will be a Force Commander and his staff. This staff will consist of operational staff (G), administrative staff (A), and logistic staff (Q). Like the division and the brigade staffs, the personnel of the Force Command will also be a joint staff. The appointment of the Force Commander is always a controversial issue. For example, three different methods have been used by the UN in appointing Force Commanders. The UN operation in Korea, though it had a unified command under the United States, the Resolution met with opposition. At the 476th meeting on 7 July, 1950, a United Kingdom/France draft Resolution was adopted, its terms:

"...Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council Resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States; Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces; Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating, Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on

the course of action taken under the unified command."¹²

In UNEF, the Commander was appointed directly by the General Assembly,¹³ and in ONUC, it was by the Secretary General.¹⁴ The OAU can adopt any method suitable but must consider the requirements for such appointment. The Force Commander will require very explicit directives but must be allowed the free hand of planning and controlling the force. However, this must aim at achieving the overall political goal.

Logistic Problems

The success of any operation requires sound logistics planning at all levels of command. This planning becomes very apparent when international forces operate together. There should be an adequate communication network, safe and reliable transportation arrangements (road, rail and air), and supplies. What are the arrangements being used by the UN in the logistic support of the different contingence? Articles 29 and 30 of the UN Charter specify the regulations. These articles were adopted by the Security Council. The provisions in the articles are as follows:

Article 29

Member Nations of the United Nations which in accordance with special agreements, have placed armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council on its call for the carrying out of measures envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter will provide their respective forces with all necessary replacements in personnel and equipment and with all necessary supplies and transport.

Article 30

Each Member Nation will at all times maintain a specified level of reserves to replace initial personnel, transport, equipment, spare parts, ammunition and all other forms of supply for the forces which it has agreed to place at the disposal of the Security Council on its call. This reserve level will be prescribed in the special agreements under Article 43 of the Charter.

The concept in the above two Articles is a problematic approach for the logistic support required. In one aspect, it tends to over task the countries providing contingents. In other aspects it calls for establishment of so many supply lines. There is, however, no problem about the personnel replacement. Problem spots will be in supplies, maintenance of equipment because of spare parts since most developing armies particularly in Africa, depend on foreign supply, and transportation. How has this concept worked in the UN? It is interesting to note that, though this concept is the legally accepted arrangement, the major operations conducted by the UN with the exception of Korea, did not adopt the concept. In the UNEF and the ONUC operations, the contingents were initially self-supporting for a limited time but the UN assumed more logistics responsibility.¹⁵

Briefly, the concept used in UNEF and ONUC called for participating Member States to send their contingents to the theater of operation with their full complement of men and equipment, with a basic supply of ammunition, in accordance with the standards laid down by the government in its "Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE)." This equipment included: personal clothing, personal equipment such as kit-bags, sleeping-bags, canteens, etc., and small arms and ammunition. The participating government was required to send copies of the TOE, and of its regulations for basic loads of ammunition, to the UN Headquarters, and to the Chief Logistics Officer (CLO). Once a particular unit entered the area of operations, all supplies which it required, and which the UN may be called upon to pay for, were requisitioned through the logistics channels of the UN Force.¹⁶ The UN assumed the responsibility for the continuing operation of the units of the Force once they were within the area

of operations. As part of this responsibility the UN provided billeting and rations for the troops, including the rental and purchase of premises.¹⁹

The overview above is necessary so as to understand the logistics problems involved in planning for joint international military forces such as the PADF. In summation the latter arrangements for the UNEF and ONUC are preferable to what are contained in Articles 29 and 30 of the UN Charter. The latter arrangements are therefore recommended for any PADF operation. The success of the operation calls for a centralization and standardization of equipment. I am not calling for a standardization of equipment of all armies in Africa to meet this requirement, rather advocating for a gradual buildup of essential equipment for the OAU to be positioned or stockpiled in an area. This concept or proposal will be discussed later. What are therefore the apparent problems the OAU will face in the scenario in Chad? There are numerous problems ranging from no existing arrangements to lack of funds. Based on the equipment status of the various armies and particularly the Member States likely to contribute forces for the PADF, centralized procurement of spare parts, ammunition for all weapon systems requires negotiations with China, France, UK, USA and USSR. There will be no problems with China, France, UK and USA but problems with the USSR because of the political affiliations.

The major weapons systems needed for this operation are tanks, anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW), anti-aircraft guns, field artillery guns and combat aircrafts. There will be different types of ammunition and spare parts. This calls for a complex logistics organization. This problem can, however, be worked out through proper coordination and planning;

adequate staffing of logistics elements; bases, and depots. The greatest difficulty will be the replacement and supply of major end items like tanks and aircrafts because of the cost of these items. It is assumed here that the Western Countries including the United States will be willing to sell these major items. As initially pointed out, the problem will be the raising of funds. This is of course, one of the reasons in support of the thesis that, the OAU is not in a position now to raise any PADF for major military operations.

The next consideration for this operation is the availability of bases close to Chad. This consideration is discussed for two main reasons. The first is assuming that the OAU can raise the funds to carry on with the operation, and the second is the consideration of transportation of personnel and material. Map 2 on page 36 shows the various approaches to Chad. These are from Niger in the west, Sudan in the east, Central African Republic in the southeast, and Cameroun and Nigeria in the southwest. These countries are all "friendly"¹⁸ countries. The situation in this scenario involves the intervention from either one or a combination of these countries. The selection of the bases depends on the tactical concept of the operation. The selection of the best approach or approaches is the responsibility of the Force Commander and his staff. However, based on terrain analysis and the threat,¹⁹ I am recommending the likely approaches from CAR and Sudan. Concentration of forces will be in the two countries and Nigeria for contingents from East/Central, North and West Africa respectively.

These countries selected provide adequate bases with suitable airports. The old French military base in Bouar (CAR) is an ideal base. The base has a 1,800 foot runway for both Transalls and Jaguars. Though

there is no refueling capacity now, plans are in progress to refurbish Bouar to include provision of aviation fuel.²⁰ Bangui, the national capital has an adequate base for contingents. Operationally, CAR has a 1,000 kilometers frontage with Chad. Sudan also has adequate bases for the Force and has about 1,200 kilometers frontage with Chad. Nigeria, on the other hand has an international airport at Kano capable of handling large aircrafts and another airport at Maidugiri, both airports are close to Chad and CAR.

Nigeria is eliminated here as a front because of the major river obstacles. Movement to Chad from Nigeria involves crossing River Chari after Cameroun before getting to Chad. Lake Chad is also a major obstacle. Nigeria provides an initial stop over for airlifting of troops and materiel to either CAR or Sudan and later provides a shorter supply line to N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, when operations go beyond Southern Chad. Nigeria provides also short turn-around bases for combat aircrafts.

The movement of personnel and materiel of most of the contingents will be by airlifts. Since the OAU has no aircrafts, contractual arrangements will have to be made between the OAU and various national airlines and available military transport of Member States. The problem will be the movement of heavy weapon systems such as tanks and self-propelled artillery guns to either Sudan or CAR. There is no Member State with the US C-5 aircraft which is capable of lifting tanks. Other materiel could be moved by the C-130's (or similar size aircraft) which a few armies have. Such difficulties will be encountered by Nigeria, Tanzania and a few of the Francophone countries.

Road movement of these heavy weapon systems will be the greatest movement problem. It involves driving through long stretches of roads.

Tanks will require a lot of tank transporters that will pass through numerous narrow road networks with narrow bridges. The only countries with fewer problems are Egypt, Kenya and Zaire because of the proximity to either Sudan or CAR. The OAU will have to spend more funds for both air and road movements. The major logistics problems will, therefore, be the procurement of materiel and the movement of both personnel and materiel. Any arrangements to solve these problems require considerable amount of money; this means tasking Member States to contribute significant amounts of money; and with the political situation among Member States of the OAU, some countries will not subscribe to the OAU efforts as the USSR did not subscribe to the UNEF operation. For the OAU to provide adequate logistics support for the PADF, external assistance will be required, most of which will come from the Western nations including the United States.

Interoperability

In this chapter, I have so far proposed an ad hoc PADF against either a stand-by or a permanent PADF; a possible composition of an ad hoc Force for an hypothetical situation in Chad for which the OAU is sending the Force to enforce the withdrawal of Libyan troops; and the problems involved in constituting the required Force and the logistic support. This section discusses the interoperability of the contingents that form the PADF. Interoperability is the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. In this thesis, it reflects the ability of the systems and the units of the various contingents operating together.

There are always problems of interoperability ranging from language differences to differences in tactical doctrines when international forces operate together. This becomes complex when there are cross-attachment of forces. In peacekeeping operations where combat activities are least expected, this problem is insignificant. The scenario in this thesis for the PADF involves an expected cross-attachment of subunits from the various contingents to achieve combined arms operation because certain units will only be able to send pure infantry units.

The proposed composition of the Force calls for a "brigade base" concept, with the headquarters staffed by staffs from the contributing Member States. The line units consisting either of a mixture of subunits from the various contingents or the respective contingent. Whatever method is adopted based on the tactical mission, there will be an interaction of the units because maintaining brigade integrity during operations is important. This means permitting elements of one brigade to work with another - contingents from different countries working together.

Three major external influences dominate the orientation of the armies in Africa. These are French, UK and USSR. The interoperability problems will stem from these external influences. The significant differences are the language, a few areas in tactical concepts and equipment. At this level of interaction, there is no problem of organization for combat because cross-attachments will be at subunits of the battalions. In the scenario above, USSR influence on tactical concepts is minimal because of the elimination of countries under the influence of Cuba/USSR. The only country with significant Soviet doctrinal

influence is Egypt.

The language differences will be the most acute problem. While other problems could be tackled through proper liaison and coordination, it is difficult to alleviate the language problem through the suggested means. The major languages popularly spoken are Arabic, English and French. The consolation here is that all the Francophone countries can communicate to each other through the French language, the Anglophone countries can also do so through English, and the North African countries can communicate with the Arabic language. The specific areas of envisaged problems are in the issuance of verbal combat orders, radio and line communication, and verbal exchange of ideas through conversation to achieve unity and understanding within the Force.

There are no problems without workable solutions, so certain actions are suggested here to eliminate the language problem. The first of these actions is to ensure that cross attachment of subunits are carried out as much as possible within the linguistic groups, however, not sacrificing desired effectiveness. Secondly, staffing of both the divisional and brigade headquarters elements should as much as possible concentrate on officers who can at least speak two of the languages. Finally, there should be liaison and coordination between flanking units.

The differences in the weapon systems and equipment have been discussed under the logistic problems, however, in this section the effect on the operation itself is discussed. A detail logistic planning is required at both battalion and company levels. For example, if a Nigerian tank company which is equipped with the T-55 Tank is cross attached to Kenyan task force equipped with the Vickers Tank, the company is not expected to be self-sustaining because the ammunition, fuel and spare parts

are incompatible. This is also applicable to other weapon systems, so there will be a great demand for liaison and coordination and planning before any plans for cross-attachment. This difficulty is, however, not a major operational problem if all necessary coordinations are made at all levels of command among the contingents. The burden as previously stated is that of the military planning staff at the OAU Headquarters and the PADF Headquarters.

There are no significant doctrinal differences at the levels of command under consideration. Defense, offense and retrograde operations are conducted in very similar concepts. The main areas for coordination to achieve interoperability, include issuing of written and oral orders because of the language used in delivering the order. Fire support plannings are to be worked out in detail because of the different type of artillery guns and mortars. The exchange of liaison officers will be an effective means of providing responsive fire support to maneuver units from any artillery.

The differences in control measures and graphics are particularly important during combined artillery operations. However, it is not only important in artillery operations but in other phases including the planning. There are not much differences but symbol presentations differ. The techniques of placing common control measures on an overlay may in some cases result in serious misinterpretation of orders and concepts of operation. The different techniques of illustrating control measures will be a disadvantage to cross-attachment of the different contingents. It is the responsibility of the commander to ensure that when such cross-attachments are made, detailed coordination of plans and liaison are made. Without extensive combined training and the availability of a qualified

liaison officer, this area of doctrinal difference is a major disadvantage to combined operations at brigade level and below. Advanced coordination though is a requirement for success, it is seldom possible during actual hostilities.

A Proposal

There are no identified problems without workable solutions even if the solutions are partial or incomplete. African problems do not need the miracle of Camp David to find means of settling them. The problems are within the capabilities of the OAU to handle. What the OAU needs since it has survived so long is a change of policy in looking into intrastate and interstate disputes. While accepting the fact that the root causes of most conflicts in Africa emanate from the geography, ethnic grouping, political structure, resource endowment, religious differences and historical experience, political leaders are the perpetrators of the outbreaks. Since the colonial powers prior to independence were able to relegate these differences to the background, it is no over-optimism to believe that wise and unselfish African political leaders could achieve this feat.

Since the arbitration, mediation and reconciliatory efforts have not been very successful by the OAU in settling disputes, the plans for the creation of a PADF is a decision in the right direction. Though the use of force by itself is always not the end of achieving peace, its presence limits escalation or provides the OAU the means to enforce certain resolutions against radical and unrealistic leaders.

The present demands for the PADF do not fall into the category of collective security of Africa and therefore, a permanent force is not

necessary. While stand-by and ad hoc forces are both acceptable alternatives, the present political arena and economic situation preclude the creation of a stand-by force. An ad hoc PADF is, therefore, an ideal for consideration. Above all advantages is the flexibility in the constitution of the force based on the political situation. For example, a PADF for use in the present situation in Chad would differ from that for use in Western Sahara. The likely missions for a PADF are either enforcement involving the actual utilization of combat troops in a limited war situation or in peacekeeping.

In the previous sections I outlined the major constraints the OAU will have in maintaining a PADF for both enforcement and peacekeeping missions. The major constraints are logistics and lack of funds; while lack of joint training or exercises within the African armies and interoperability problems will limit the effectiveness of joint operations by the contingents of the PADF. My proposal is, therefore, aimed at eliminating partially both the OAU and the PADF constraints. The proposal is also based upon the formation of an ad hoc PADF.

I am, therefore, proposing a Pan-African Defense College (PADC) under the OAU Secretary General. The primary mission of the PADC is to conduct joint training for the Member States' armies in peacekeeping tasks. The college will additionally have the following roles:

1. Research.
- b. Plans, policy and operations.
- c. Supervise and conduct joint military exercises.
- d. Procurement and trial of equipment.
- e. Production of field manuals (FM's) and training manuals

(TM's).

Though the primary mission of the PADC is to conduct training in peacekeeping tasks for the present and immediate future, the PADC through the other roles should fulfill the requirement for collective defense in the far future. This is, however, only feasible when there is an improvement in the African political arena.

The PADC stands as an alternative to a permanent Military Staff in the OAU Headquarters. Before considering the organization and functions of the PADC, it is appropriate to consider the requirements for the siting of the PADC. The major consideration is that the PADC must be located in a town or city or even in a country having no foreign military bases or troops. The PADC should be located in a town or city in a country with these additional facilities:

- a. Existing adequate infrastructure to temporarily accommodate the PADC while the permanent site is being constructed.
- b. Have sufficient area for training and conducting field exercises.
- c. Airports and seaports.
- d. Universities or colleges; a Command and General Staff College or its equivalent to assist in conducting research works; and Service Schools to assist in field exercises.

The primary mission and the roles of the PADC call for a staff to conduct both training and the other roles. It should have at least elements from all Member States as members of the various staff. The staffing should, however, not be on quota system to satisfy every country but should be on merits and experience on peacekeeping, particularly for the instructors. Their practical experiences would contribute immensely. A proposed organization is shown in Figure 2.

The present and the immediate future requirements of the OAU are to achieve some political stability and be able to conduct peace-keeping. Hopefully radical minded leaders with expansionist ideas like Moammar Gaddafi would not create an arena for full enforcement missions. Based on this thinking, the type of equipment needed are light armored vehicles and personnel carriers; landrovers or jeeps; and 5-ton trucks for the immediate needs. I do not intend covering in detail the equipping of the PADC, however, there are a few vehicles worth recommending based on their well tested performances. These are the US M-113A1 APC, the M-114 Command Vehicle; and the AMC Jeep; the French Panhard AML 60/90 series; and the British Leyland Landrover. For long range future requirements on collective security, tanks and other weapon systems would be required. The above vehicles are the requirements for peace-keeping and their procurement should be planned simultaneously with the creation of the PADC.

The two major activities for the PADC are the primary mission of conducting courses and the supervision of joint military exercises. The initial courses should be aimed at training officers and NCO's. The idea of training officers and NCO's initially is to facilitate the future training of their respective enlisted men in their local units. This concept achieves two things. It reduces the cost of training, and more men could be trained in the various armies with the same doctrine. The duration of the course depends on the course curriculum. Two courses should be planned annually. Therefore, the duration of the course should not exceed 6 months.

The suggested training objective suggested below are some of the requirements for the various tasks associated with peacekeeping. There are, however, other subjects to be included in the curriculum.

COMMANDANT




FIGURE 2. ORGANIZATION OF A PAN-AFRICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE

The subjects recommended therefore include:

- a. Language course (English or French).
- b. Observation and patrol duties.
- c. Enforcing ceasefires.
- d. Making accurate vehicle and head counts at checkpoints.
- e. Surveillance and reporting techniques.
- f. Intelligence gathering.
- g. Signal communication.
- h. Crowd control and dispersal.
- i. Protection of officials, convoys, vulnerable and key points.
- j. Cordon and search of buildings.
- k. Joint training with the police and civil authorities.
- l. Loading and unloading military aircrafts.

The field exercises fall into two categories. The first category involves the assembly of an ad hoc PADF consisting of battalion-size units from selected Member States. The contingents from the selected countries will contain the elements already trained in the PADC and troops trained by them subsequently. This is to monitor their achievements. This is to be carried annually or once in every two years. This exercise will cover all tasks of peacekeeping and counter insurgency. The second category is a joint military exercise at a higher scale covering all phases of war in a non-nuclear environment. It does not necessarily require using only troops trained at the PADC. Its aim is to improve the interoperability problems of the armies.

The logistics problems involved could be worked out through mutual coordination by Member States of the OAU. The first category of exercise will use the prepositioned equipment in the PADC, therefore, contingents will carry only equipment agreed jointly not to be included

in the prepositioned stock. Such equipment will include personnel weapon and other personal items peculiar to the respective army. For the second category, units are to move their equipment and weapon systems to the exercise site on their own arrangements. However, feeding and quartering in all instances would be the responsibility of the OAU.

The financial arrangements to provide the funds for the running of the PADC and the joint exercises should be included in the annual OAU budget. It only requires an increase in the annual mandatory contributions of the Member States. The success of the PADF in any mission depends mostly on the financial support given by the Member States to fund the operation even if it is beyond the budgetary limits of the OAU. However, if the OAU really wants a PADF, the Member States must make sacrifices. Sacrifices must include over dependence on foreign security assistance and contributing to the cost of running the PADC and the procurement of all the required equipment. If all the necessary equipment and logistics support are provided, any ad hoc PADF will perform the required missions of both enforcement and peacekeeping; otherwise the PADF as it stands is not capable of performing any enforcement mission but can carry out limited peacekeeping operations.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

¹D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, A Legal Study, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964).

²Lincoln P. Bloomfield, International Military Forces, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company Limited, 1964).

³Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967).

⁴Bloomfield, International Military Forces, p. 80.

⁵Resol. 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956; A/3572, p. 61.

⁶Ibid., para. 1.

⁷Resol. 1090 (XI).

⁸Bowett, United Nations Forces, p. 147.

⁹"Libya," The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd (1st Quarter 1981): p. 6.

¹⁰"France: Intervention Capability," Africa Confidential (1 January 1981): p. 1.

¹¹This assumption is based on the current strength and equipment holding of the respective countries.

¹²S/1588, adopted by 7 votes, with 3 absentions (Yugoslavia, Egypt, India) and 1 member absent (USSR).

¹³Anta, p. 115; UNEF Reg. 5 (a).

¹⁴ONUC Reg. 5 (c).

¹⁵Bowett, United Nations Forces, p. 392.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 393.

¹⁸Friendly countries refer to all countries in this thesis who are likely to provide assistance to the OAU.

¹⁹The threat here is referred to Libya and eliminating Niger is because of the proximity to Libya and Algeria which is a close ally to Libya.

²⁰"France: Intervention Capability," Africa Confidential, p. 2.

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1
MILITARY BALANCE 1980-81 OF SELECTED
AFRICAN COUNTRIES

ANGOLA

Army: 30,000.

2 motorized infantry brigades.

17 infantry brigades.

14 anti-aircraft brigades.

85 T-34, 150 T-54 medium, 50 PT-76 light tanks; 200 BRDM-2 armoured cars; 150 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, OT-62, some M-3 APC; 120 guns, including 76mm, 105mm, 122mm; 500 82mm and 120mm mor; 100 BM-21 122mm MRL; ZIS-3 76mm ATK guns; 2,000 75mm, 82mm and 107mm RCL; Sagger ATGW; ZPU-4 14.5mm, 37mm towed, ZSU-23-4, 40 ZSU-57-2, SP AA guns; SA-7 SAM.

Air Force: 1,500; 29 combat aircraft.

15 MiG-17F, 12 MiG-21MF, 2 G-91R4 fighters.

Transporters (tpts) include 6 Noratlas, 2 L-100-20, 3 C-47, 6 An-2, 5 An-26, 4 Turbo-Porter, 2 Islander, 10 Do-27.

Helicopter (hel) include 17 Mi-8, 30 Alouette III, 2 Bell 47

(All the above weapon systems are from the USSR).

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Army: 1,650.

1 infantry battalion, 1 engineer battalion, 1 signal company and 1 transport company.

10 Ferret scout cars; 81mm mortar; 106mm RCL.

Air Force: 125.

1 DC-4, 4 DC-3/C-47, 1 Caravelle, 1 Falcon 20, 1 Corvette, 6 Broussard tpts; 1 Alouette II, 4 H-34 hel.

EGYPT

Army: 320,000, including Air Defense Command.

2 armored divisions.

3 mechanized infantry divisions.

5 infantry divisions.

1 Republican Guard Brigade (division).

3 independent armored brigades.

7 independent infantry brigades.

2 airmobile brigades.
 1 parachute brigade.
 4 artillery brigades.
 2 heavy mortar (mor) brigades.
 1 ATGW brigade.
 6 commando groups.
 2 SSM regiments.
 850 T-54/-55, 750 T-62 medium, 80 PT-76 light tanks; 300 BRDM-1/-2 scout cars; 200 BMP-1 MICV, 2,500 OT-62/-64, BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, Walid, 50 M-113A2 APC; 1,300 76mm, 100mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm and 180mm guns/howitzers; about 200 SU-100 and ISU-152 SP guns; 300 120mm, 160mm and 240mm mor; 300 122mm, 132mm, 140mm and 240mm RL; 30 FROG-4/-7, 24 Scud B, Samlet SSM; 900 57mm, 85mm and 100mm ATK guns; 900 82mm and 107mm RCL; 1,000 Sagger, Snapper, Swatter, Milan, Beeswing, Swingfire and TOW ATGW; 350 ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 SP AA guns; 20 SA-7/-9, Crotale SAM. (On order 244 M-60 medium tanks; 550 M-113A2 APC; 100 M-106A2 and M-125A2 mor carriers; Swingfire ATGW; 12 batteries Improved HAWK SAM.)

AIR DEFENSE COMMAND (75,000): 360 SA-2, 200 SA-3, 75 SA-6 SAM; 2,500 20mm, 23mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, 85mm, and 100mm AA guns; missile, gun and electronic warfare radars.

Air Force: 27,000; about 363 combat aircraft.

1 bbr regt with 23 Tu-16 (some with AS-5 ASM).
 4 FB regts: 2 with 33 F-4E, 50 MiG-21/PFM/F, 40 Ch F-6; 1 with 30 MiG-17F; 1 with 46 Mirage IIIEE/DE.
 4 FGA/strike squadrons (sqn): with 60 Su-7BM; 1 with 18 Su-20, 14 Mirage 5.
 3 interceptor sqns with 45 MiG-21 MF/U. (Further aircraft in reserve include up to 100 MiG-21, 20 MiG-23S/U, 100 MiG-17, 60 Su-7, 25 Su-20.)
 Tpts include 20 C-130H, 26 II-14, 16 An-12, 1 Falcon, 1 Bceing 707, 1 Boeing 737.
 Hel include 20 Mi-4, 12 Mi-6, 55 Mi-8, 27 Commando, 54 Gazelle.
 Trainers include 50 MiG-15UTL, 100 L-29, 40 Gomhouria, 36 Yak-11.
 Air to Air Missiles (AAM): AA-2 Atoll, R-530, Sparrow, Sidewinder.
 Air to Surface Missiles (ASM): AS-1 Kennel, AS-5 Kelt, Maverick. (On order: 40 F-16, 20 F-6, 30 F-7 fighters; 20 Gazelle hel; Sparrow, Sidewinder AAM; Maverick ASM; Ch CSA-1 SAM).

ETHIOPIA

Army: 225,000.

14 infantry and motorized divisions with some 12 tank battalions.
 1 light division.
 4 parachute/commando brigades.
 30 artillery battalions.
 2 engineer battalions.
 2 engineer battalions.
 40 M-47, 100 T-34, 500 T-54/-55 medium tanks; 12 V-150 Commando armored cars; BRDM-2 scout cars; 40 BMP-1 MICV, about 70 M-113, 500 BTR-40/-60/

-152 APC; 75mm, 52 105mm, 150 122mm, 130mm, 152mm, 12 155mm towed, 12 M-109 155mm SP how; 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, 120mm, 280 M-2/-30 4.2in, 107mm, 120mm mor; BM-21 122mm MRL; Sagger ATGW; 37mm towed, ZSU-23-4, ZSU-57-2 SP AA guns; SA-2/-3/07 SAM.

Air Force: 3,000; 100 plus combat aircraft.

6 FGA sqns: 1 with 7 F-5A/E, 1 with 20 MiG 23.
1 COIN sqn with 6 T-28A, Saab T-17 Supporter.
1 tpt sqn with 14 An-12, 4 An-22, 3 C-47, 2 C-54, 6 C-119G, 3 Dove,
1 II-14, 1 DHC-3, 3 DHC-6, 2 Do-28.
Trainers include MiG-21U, 20 Safir, 11 T-33A, 2 F-5B.
Hel include 6 AB-204, 3 Alouette III, 10 Mi-6, 12 Mi-8, Mi-24, 6 UH-1H,
1 Puma.

GHANA

Army: 14,700.

2 brigades (6 infantry battalions and support units).
1 reconnaissance battalion.
1 mor battalion.
1 field engineer battalion.
1 signal battalion.
1 airborne battalion.
60 Mowag Piranha, 26 Saladin armored fighting vehicle (AFV), 23 Ferret scout cars; M-56 105mm how, 81mm, 10 120mm mor; Carl Gustav 84mm RCL.

Air Force: 1,500; 12 combat aircraft.

1 COIN sqn with 6 MB-326F, 6 MB-326K.
2 tpt sqns with 8 Islander, 6 Skyvan 3M.
1 training sqn with 12 Bulldog.
1 communication/liaison sqn with 6 F-27, 1 F-28, 5 C-47.
Hel: 2 Alouette III, 2 Bell 212.

KENYA

Army: 12,000.

2 brigade headquarters.
1 armored battalion (forming)
1 armored car battalion.
6 infantry battalions.
2 artillery battalions.
1 air cavalry battalion (forming).
1 engineer battalion.
1 tpt battalion.
12 Vickers MK 3 medium tanks; 3 Saladin, 30 AML-60/-90 armored cars; 15 UR-416, 10 Panhard M-3 APC; 8 105mm light guns; 20 81mm, 8 120mm mor; 56 Carl Gustav 84mm, Wombat 120mm RCL; Milan, 8 Swingfire ATGW; 2 Hughes 500MD Scout hel.
(On order: 38 Vickers MK 3 medium tanks; Rapier SAM; 30 Hughes 500MD hel).

Air Force: 2,100, 20 combat aircraft.

1 FGA sqn with 10 F-5E, 2 F-5F.
1 COIN sqn with 5 BAC-167 Strikemaster, 3 Hawk.
1 training sqn with 14 14 Bulldog.
2 light tpt sqnd: 1 with 6 DHC-4 Caribou, 1 with 6 DHC-5D Buffalo,
6 Do-28D
Hel: 10 Puma, 2 Bell 47G, 2 Hughes 500D.

LIBYA

Army: 45,000.

12 tank battalions.
24 mechanized infantry battalions.
1 National Guard Battalion.
2 artillery, 2 AA artillery battalions.
1 special forces group.
1 SSM battalion.
2,400 T-54/-55/-62/-72 medium tanks; 200 BRDM-2, 100 Saladin, 300 EE-9
Cascavel armored, 140 Ferret scout cars; 250 BMP MICV, 900BT R-40/-50/
-60, OT-62/-64, Fiat 6614 and M-113A1 APC; some 600 M-101 105mm, 122mm,
130mm, 152mm towed, M-1974, 122mm and M-109 155mm SP how; 250 B-11 107mm,
BM-21/RM-21/RM-70 122mm and M-51 130mm MRL; 106mm RCL; 450 81mm, 120mm,
160mm and 240mm mor; 3,000 Vigilant, Milan and Sagger ATGW; 12 FROG-7,
30 Scud-B SSM; 450 23mm, 30mm, L40/70, 57mm towed and ZSU-23-4 SP AA guns;
SA-7/-0 SAM.

Air Force: 4,000; some 287 combat aircraft.

1 bbr sqn with 17 Tu-22 Blinder A.
1 interceptor sqn and 1 OCU with 50 MiG-23 Flogger E, 35 MiG-25 Foxbat A,
20 MiG-21.
4 FGA sqns and OCU with 30 Mirage IIIE, 10IIIB, 40 5D/DE, 10 5DD, 50 MiG-
23, Flogger F.
1 reconnaissance sqn with 10 10 Mirage IIIR, 10 5DR, 5 MiG-25R/U (Soviet
crews).
2 training sqns with 38 Galeb.
2 tpt sqns with 7 C-130H, 1 Boeing 707, 9 C-47, 1 II-76, 14 DHC-6, 9
F-27, 1 Falcon, 2 Jetstar, 1 Corvette 200, 2 King Air.
4 hel sqns with 10 Alouette III, 6AB-47, 5 AB-206, 1 AB-212, 8 Super Fre-
lon, 20 CH-47C, 12 Mi-8, 26 Mi-24.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, R-550 Magic.
3 SAM brigades with 30 Crotale, 300 SA-2/-3/-6 SAM.

NIGERIA

Army: 130,000.

4 infantry divisions each with 3 infantry brigades and 1 armored brigade.
1 Guards brigade.
4 artillery brigades.

4 engineer brigades.

64 T-55 medium, 50 Scorpion light tanks; 20 Saladin, 65 AML-60/-90 armored cars, 75 Fox scout cars; 105mm, 122mm, 130mm guns/how; 81mm mor; 76mm ATK guns; 20mm, 40mm towed, ZSU-23-4 SP AA guns.

Air Force: 8,000; 21 combat aircrafts.

3 FGA/interceptor sqns: 1 with 3 MiG-17, 2 with 18 MiG-21MF.

2 tpt sqns with 6 C-130H, 1 F-27, e F-28, 1 Gulf-stream II.

Hel incl: 20 BO-105C/D, 13 Puma, 10 Alouette III, 3 Whirlwind.

3 training/service sqns with 2 MiG-15UTI, 2 MiG 21U, 25 Bulldog, 15 Do-27/-28, 3 Navajo, 20 L-29.

AAM: AA-2 Atoll.

(On order 12 AlphaJet FGA, 6 CH-47C hel.).

SUDAN

Army; 65,000.

2 armored brigades.

7 infantry brigades.

1 parachute brigade.

3 artillery brigades.

3 AD artillery regiments.

1 engineer regiment.

70 T-54, 60 T-55 medium, 30 Ch Type 62 light tanks; 50 Saladin AFVs, 60 Ferret scout cars; 100 BTR-40/-50/-152, 60 OT-64, 49 Saracen, 45 V-150 Commando, 50 AMX-10P APC: 55 25 pdr, 40 100mm, 20 M-101 105mm, 18 122mm guns/how; 30 120mm mor; 30 85 AA guns; 80 40mm, 80 37mm, 85mm AA guns; SA-7 SAM.

(On order: 50 M-60A1 medium tanks, 100 M-113 APC.)

Air Force: 1,500; 36 combat aircraft.

2 FGA/interceptor sqns with 24 Mirage 50.

1 FGA sqn with 12 MiG-17F/F-4.

1 tpt sqn with 6 C-130H, 5 An-24, 4 F-27, 1 DHC-6, 4DHC-5D, 8 Turbo-Porter, 6, EMB-110P2.

1 hel sqn with 10 Mi-8, 12 Puma

AAM: AA-2 Atoll.

(On order: 10 F-5E, 2 F-5F, 12 Ch F-6 fighters; 2 C-130 tpts; 6 BO-105 hel.)

TANZANIA

Army; 50,000.

2 divisional headquarters.

9 infantry brigades.

1 tank battalion.

2 artillery battalions.

2 mor battalions.

2 AA artillery battalions.

1 SAM battalion with SA-3.

2 ATK battalions.
2 signal battalions.
20 Type 59 medium, 20 Type 62, 6 Scorpion light tanks; 60 BTR-40/-152,
20 K-63 APC; 76mm, 122mm guns; 82mm, 122mm mor; M-20 75mm RCL; BM-21
122mm MRL; 14.5, ZU-23, 37mm AA guns, SA-3/-6/-7 SAM.

Air Force; 1,000; 19 combat aircraft.

3 fighter sqns with 8 MiG-21, 3 MiG-17/F-4, 8 Mig-19/f-6.
1 tpt sqn: 1 An-2, 3 HS-748, 4 DHC-5D, 1 F-28.
Trainers: 2 MiG-15, 11 Cherokee, 6 Cessina 310.
Hel: 2 Bell 47G, 6 AB-205, 6 AB-206.

UPPER VOLTA

Army; 3,700.

3 infantry regiments.
1 reconnaissance sqn.
1 parachute company.
1 artillery battery.
15 AML-60/-90, 10 M-8, 30 Ferret scout cars; 105mm how; 60mm, 81mm mor;
75mm RCL.

Air Force; 75

2 C-47, 2 Nord 262, 1HS-748, 1 Aero Commander, 3 Broussard tpts; 1
Supper Skymaster light aircraft.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Ayouty, Yassin-El. The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.
- Bloomfield, Lincoln P. International Military Forces. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964.
- Bowett, D.W. United Nations Forces. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964.
- Bozeman, Adda B. Conflict in Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Cowon, Gray L. The Dilemmas of African Independence. Walker and Company, 1964.
- Cox, Arthur M. Prospects for Peacekeeping. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967.
- Decalo, Samuel. Coups and Army Rule in Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Frye, William R. A United Nations Peace Force. New York: Oceana Publications, 1957.
- Kidron, Michael & Segal, Ronald. The State of the World Atlas. New York: Pluto Press Limited, 1981.
- Kitchen, Helen. Africa: From Mystery to Maze. Massachusetts: Heath and Company, 1976.
- Lee, John Michael. African Armies and Civil Order. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.
- Lusignan, Guy de. French-Speaking Africa Since Independence. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969.
- Obasanjo, Olusegun. My Command, An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70. Ibadan: Heineman Educational Books (Nigeria) Ltd., 1980.

Periodicals

- "Setting Off for the OAU Summit." West Africa, 16 July 1979, p. 1261.

"The Summit's Achievements." West Africa, 30 July 1979, p. 1357.

"At the OAU Summit." West Africa, 23 July 1979, p. 205.

"What Happened in Chad?" West Africa, 21 April 1975, p. 442.

"Matchet's Diary." West Africa, 21 April 1975, p. 445.

"Chad. Desert Coup." Time, 26 February 1979, p. 47.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
1 REYNOLDS AVENUE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-1352

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

ATZL-SWY

18 March 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTN: Larry Downing, DTIC-ACQ, Defense Technical
Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite, 0944,
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

SUBJECT: Change in Distribution

1. Request a distribution statement change to the following documents:

ADB077059, Hector Rene Fonseca, "Honduras: Will the Revolution Come?" dated 1983.

ADB058835, James Sedeye Ojokojo, "Organization of African Unity and Peacekeeping: The Pan-African Defense Force" dated 1981.

2. The distribution statement should read the following: (A) Approved for public release:
Distribution unlimited.

4. POC for this request is Rusty Rafferty or John Rogers, Reference Librarians Classified Documents Section, DSN 585-3128 or COM 913-758-3128 or FAX: DSN 585-3014 or COM 913-758-3014.

EDWIN B. BURGESS
Director
Combined Arms Research Library
(913) 758-3033
burgesse@Leavenworth.army.mil