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



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This Command History, 1971 Volume II, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam contains an 8 page Index of Chapters and Annexes contained in Volume II, in this running history of events for 1971.

Chapter X - Command Concerns. (Pages X-1 - X-80).
Annex A - Commanders & Principal Staff Officers. (Pages A-1 - A-8).
Annex C - The Enemy Outside RVN. (Pages C-1 - C-30).
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Annex D Appendix I - MACV Directive 525-13, 30 Dec 71. (Pages D-1-1 - D-1-28).
Annex E - Cross-Border Operations. (Pages E-1 - E-48).
Annex F - Redeployment of US Forces. (Pages F-1 - F-16).
Annex F Appendix I - Units Redeployed in Increments VI - X. (Pages F-1-1 - F-1-28).
Annex G - Free World Military Assistance Forces. (Pages G-1 - G-26).
Annex H - Trends in Territorial Security. (Pages H-1 - H-18).
Annex I - Military Assistance to Other SEA Areas. (Pages I-1 - I-12).
Chronology - (Pages J-1 - J-40).
Glossary of Acronyms - (Pages K-1 - K-16).
Index - (Pages L-1 - L-24).

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

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CHAPTER X

COMMAND CONCERNS

PRISONERS OF WAR

BACKGROUND

(U) Throughout 1971 the North Vietnamese and Peoples' Revolutionary Government continued to reject or ignore all Allied proposals aimed at alleviating the plight of the prisoners of war (PW); likewise they steadfastly resisted attempts to separate the humanitarian question from the political and military issues of the Indochina conflict.

(U) As of 31 Dec 71 there were 1,585 Americans officially listed as missing or captured in Southeast Asia. Of this number 482 were determined to be PW while 1,103 were listed as missing in action (MIA). Of those MIA, many were thought to be held captive in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; however, virtually no information was provided on personnel missing or captured in these countries. North Vietnam listed only 344 Americans as prisoners in their country. The enemy's consistent refusal to provide lists of prisoners and overall refusal to abide by the Geneva Conventions complicated the problems of accountability of PW/MIA and planning for their eventual return to friendly control. The enemy claimed that US prisoners were war criminals and as such not entitled to PW status. The Communist claim had no basis in international law: uniformed members of the US Armed Forces were clearly entitled to PW status.[1]

ENEMY PW

Internment of Enemy PW by GVN

(C) Pursuant to an agreement between COMUSMACV and the Chief of JGS, RVNAF, on 27 Sep 65, all enemy prisoners of war captured by US Forces were to be transferred immediately after tactical interrogation to the RVNAF for internment. In accordance with Article 12 of the Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of PW, the US retained a residual responsibility and was to take corrective action or request return of US captured PW if the GVN should fail to treat these PW in accordance with the provisions of the Conventions.[2]

(U) As of 31 Dec 71, 35,668 PW were interned in six GVN administered prison camps in South Vietnam. Of these, 15,365 were initially captured by US Forces.[3]

Release of Enemy PW by GVN

(U) The first MACV record of repatriation or release of enemy PW by the GVN was in 1966. Since that date small numbers of NVA and VC PW were periodically released or repatriated. The underlying reason for those actions was the hope that such initiatives would prompt a

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One of 13 disappointed NVN war prisoners is taken ashore from USNS Upshur after a day at sea waiting to be turned over to representatives of Hanoi.

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reciprocal release of US, GVN, or Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) PW. Although the enemy also periodically released small numbers of PW, none of these releases appeared to be a matter of reciprocity.[4]

Friendly Overtures on PW Repatriation During 1971

(C) In an attempt to break the PW deadlock, on 26 Jan 71 the GVN offered to repatriate or transfer all sick and wounded PW to NVN. No reply was made to this offer by the North Vietnamese. On 29 Apr 71 the GVN requested that the Communists conclude a bilateral agreement on direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-bodied PW who had undergone a long period of captivity. This request was also ignored.

(U) During May 1971 North Vietnam accepted a GVN offer to return 570 sick and disabled NVA PW. In their acceptance was the stipulation that repatriation would be by transfer at sea from civilian ship (s) near the 17th parallel at 1030 Hanoi time, 4 Jun 71. On 29 May 71 an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) interviewed 660 sick and wounded NVN PW. Only 13 of those interviewed were willing to return to NVN. On 3 June these 13 PW departed Da Nang, RVN aboard the USNS Upshur accompanied by a civilian tug and barge. The civilian craft were to be used for rendezvous with the NVN ships. While at sea, the NVN, by radio broadcast and through envoys at the Paris talks, cancelled the repatriation agreement because only 13 of the offered 570 PW were present at the repatriation site. The PW were returned to the Da Nang PW camp on 4 Jun 71 and no further substantive PW discussions took place during the remainder of 1971.[5]

(C) Prior to President Thieu's reelection in October 1971, he and the GVN were intransigent to US proposals to unilaterally release large numbers of long held, able-bodied enemy PW. President Thieu asserted on numerous occasions that he could not justify to the soldiers of South Vietnam, many of whom had been wounded or had lost comrades in combat, the release of able-bodied enemy prisoners. Consequently, until after the RVN presidential election, in spite of high level US Government urging, releases of enemy PW were largely limited to sick and wounded. Subsequent to the elections, in an abrupt change of policy, the GVN announced plans to release approximately 3,000 PW who had petitioned for release and had pledged loyalty to the GVN. In commemoration of Thieu's inauguration on 31 Oct 71 approximately 2,300 of these PW were transferred to Chieu Hoi centers and 623 VC PW were released to their home provinces.[6]

Recap of Enemy PW Released

(C) The cumulative total of PW released through 1 Mar 72 was 5,960. Of these 188 were repatriated to NVN, 904 were released in SVN, 1,784 were reclassified, and 3,084 were released to the Chieu Hoi program. This total also includes 623 VC PW who were released on 31 Oct 71 to commemorate President Thieu's inauguration.

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FRIENDLY PW

Releases Previous to 1971

(U) Since the beginning of the Vietnam conflict small numbers of US PW have been returned to friendly control, beginning with the release of two US Army NCOs near Da Nang on 1 May 62. A total of 52 US Armed Forces personnel were released during the period 1 May 62 through 1970. Of those released, 41 were US Army personnel, seven US Air Force, two USMC, and two US Navy.[7]

Release of US PW During 1971

(U) The only American PW released by the enemy during 1971 was Sgt John C. Sexton Jr, who was returned to friendly control on 8 Oct 71 in the vicinity of An Loc, Tay Ninh Province, South Vietnam. Sexton was captured 12 Aug 69 when his unit was ambushed near An Loc. Sgt Sexton was reportedly carrying two documents when released; one was a safe conduct pass, and the other an offer for a prisoner exchange. On 11 Oct 71 the US released an NVA lieutenant into the same general area where Sexton had been released. A US Government spokesman stated that the release was arranged

> . . . in response to indications that the enemy would welcome such a release. . . we have no assurance whatever at present that this reciprocal gesture will lead to the release of additional American prisoners, however, that is the goal toward which we are working.

There were no reciprocal gestures forthcoming during 1971.[8]

(U) Sgt Sexton was evacuated to Fitzsimons Army Hospital where he underwent treatment for the wounds and ailments which he suffered as a result of the ambush and subsequent period as a PW.

Treatment of US PW

(U) Although North Vietnam officially acceded to the Geneva Conventions, the Communists continually refused to recognize application of the Geneva Convention to the Vietnam conflict. They refused to allow the delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to enter NVN to oversee Communist handling of PW. In SVN, ICRC representatives were present, made regular inspections of PW camps and actively assisted the GVN in administration of the camps in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

(U) Curtailment of mail to and from American PW in NVN was a matter of deep concern to the US Government and to the relatives of PW during 1971. The US Department of Defense (DOD) charged that North Vietnam and its Allies had been withholding mail written by prisoners of war to their families in the United States.

(U) During the 135th session of the Paris Peace Talks, 4 Nov 71, US Ambassador William Porter complained that only 170 letters had been received from US PW held in North Vietnam since last May. Between May and October of 1970, he said, some 1,300 letters were received by American families, or eight times this year's figure. He stated: "North Vietnamese officials have said all prisoners may write monthly. By this standard the acknowledged 339 prisoners in North Vietnam should have sent over 2,000 leters in these half-year periods."

(U) Defense Department figures show that 2,646 letters were received during 1970, but in 1971 through 15 December, only 499 letters from 50 prisoners were received. When confronted with these allegations the NVN delegation at the Paris talks made evasive remarks and stated the NVN policy on PW mail: "It is a humanitarian policy, all are authorized to correspond once a month with their families and to receive a parcel weighing 3 kilos every 2 months and, exceptionally, at Christmas and New Year they can receive a parcel weighing 5 kilos...."[9]

(U) A DOD spokesman announced in late December 1971 that NVN had refused to accept more than 500 gift packages for American PW. The spokesman called the action "inhumane and uncivilized," and said that NVN was violating their own established policy of permitting US prisoners to receive one 6.6 pound package every 2 months. The rejected packages were returned to the US Postal Service through the medium of the Soviet Postal Administration and later returned to the senders.

(U) An American minister arrived in New York from Paris on 21 Dec 71 carrying 1,001 letters. He said that the letters were from most of the acknowledged 339 PW in Vietnam. The Reverend Richard Fernandez said the letters received from North Vietnam and Viet Cong representatives in Paris included the first mail from American PW held in South Vietnam.[10]

(U) At the US State Department, Frank A. Sieverts, who was in charge of prisoner of war affairs, said he felt the late delivery of the 1,001 letters came only in response to repeated protests made by the United States.

Repatriation and PW Rights Efforts

(U) Working through the United Nations, International Red Cross, and at the Paris talks, the US Government throughout 1971 continued attempts to secure humane treatment and release of American PW. On 4 Oct 71, the US House of Representatives unanimously passed, by a vote of 369 to 0, a resolution regarding humane treatment and release of PW. Regarding this resolution Ambassador Porter at the 131st Plenary Session at Paris on 7 October said:

> The resolution strongly protests the treatment of United States servicemen held prisoner by you and your Allies in Southeast Asia. It calls on you to comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. It also expresses approval and support of efforts by the people and Government of the United States, the United Nations, the International Red Cross, and other leaders and peoples of the world to obtain humane treatment for prisoners of war and immediate repatriation of the sick and wounded . . . I trust that you will give this unanimous resolution of the House of Representatives your most careful consideration . . . .[11]

(U) Private organizations, made up primarily of PW relatives, worked vigorously for their men. The concerned organizations were split on a modus operandi to aid their men. One group known as the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia was primarily concerned with efforts to help their men to have a better life while being held captive. Focusing attention on the plight of prisoners while they are held captive, said the league, is a humanitarian, noncontroversial goal. Specifically, the league wanted NVN to observe the Geneva Convention's requirement that PW camps be suoject to inspection by an impartial international group. Taking a different approach was a group known as POW/MIA Families for Immediate Release whose aim was to get the US to end the war immediately and get the men home. This group contended that the administration was primarily interested in backing the

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interests of the group beseeching Hanoi to follow the Geneva Convention. It explained its position this way:

> Some of our husbands and sons and brothers have been held captive in Indochina for as long as 8 years. It is appalling to us that at this late date the Government would want to focus attention away from the real goal, which is to end the war and bring the men home, and on to a goal that would at best let American prisoners rot in comfort.[12]

PW NEGOTIATION STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

Objectives

(S) Since the beginning of the Paris Peace Talks numerous proposals on settlement of the Vietnam conflict were offered to the Communists. The PW issue was a part of each proposal. At the regular session of the Paris talks on 8 Oct 70 Ambassador Bruce read President Nixon's peace initiative of 7 Oct 70. Included in this proposal was the stated objective that all PW, without exception or condition, be released to the place of their choice. The President's proposal was reiterated at several succeeding meetings throughout 1970 and 1971. Intermediate objectives to attain the overall goal were:

-- To obtain comprehensive lists of all PW and an accounting of all missing personnel.

-- Keeping the PW issue on center stage at the Paris Peace Talks until some agreement was reached.

-- Attempt to secure a PW repatriation agreement as part of a negotiated agreement for a ceasefire.

-- Insist on PW repatriation before completion of major US/FWMAF withdrawals, as part of the agreement on mutual withdrawal.[13]

Strategy and Policy

(U) In all negotiations on PW the following considerations guided US actions.

-- US was to assist the GVN in the release and repatriation of consenting PW. The US view was that the Geneva Convention does not require forcible repatriation. Raising the issue of "freedom of choice" would be avoided.

-- US would take the lead with respect to US PW repatriation.

-- If exchange of US for enemy PW was proposed, close coordination would be maintained with GVN, as GVN controlled all enemy PW.

-- US was to urge that the GVN reduce number of PW in camps prior to settlement. Reduction program was planned to be implemented on low key.

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-- The Geneva Convention was the basic international agreement concerning PW.

-- Although the GVN was the detaining power, the US had a residual legal obligation for PW captured by US forces.[14]

Planning for Release/Repatriation of US PW

(C) In the interest of facilitating uniformity in the processing of returned US PW and other detained military personnel, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) issued on 18 Jan 69 a SECDEF policy memorandum prescribing policy to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, each of the departments, theater commanders, and COMUSMACV developed or revised existing OPLANS and directives to conform with this policy. The current MACV OPLAN J190 on PW processing was developed during May and June 1971, approved by CINCPAC on 21 Aug 71, and distributed to all interested agencies on 4 Sep 71. This plan, short titled EGRESS RECAP, would be implemented at the appropriate level of command under one of the following circumstances:

-- The return of large groups of US PW (more than 10 from a single service or more than 15 aggregate) or, regardless of number when there are indications of a continuing flow of returnees. Under these circumstances (large scale repatriation) the Commander, 7th Air Force was tasked to establish and operate a Central Processing Center at Cam Ranh Bay. The other component commanders were tasked to provide administrative and logistical support.

-- The return of small groups of US, RVN, or Free World Military Armed Forces, (1 to 10 from a single service or fewer than 16 aggregate). Under these circumstances (small scale repatriation), the Deputy CG, USARV, Commander, 7th Air Force, and Commander US Naval Forces, Vietnam were tasked to establish and operate as necessary, returnee processing centers at Long Binh, Tan Son Nhut, Saigon, or Da Nang.

-- The return of US/RVN/third country civilians in conjunction with or separately from military PW, is the responsibility of the Deputy CG USARV in coordination with the US Embassy.

On-going Planning

(C) The continuing drawdown in personnel, retrograde of equipment, and closure of installation facilities would degrade MACV capability to conduct large scale returnee processing operations before the end of FY72. In anticipation of this situation, CINCPAC directed that staff liaison visits be conducted in potential out-of-country locations in the Pacific Command. On 31 Dec 71, CINCPAC designated three out-of-country locations: Clark AB, Philippines, Camp Kue, Okinawa, and the US Naval Station, Guam to assume co-equal responsibilities for returnee processing effective 1 Feb 72. MACV OPLAN J190 was rewritten to reflect this revised guidance.[15]

SUMMARY

(U) Release, repatriation, and treatment of PW remained a major enigma during 1971. The enemy remained intransigent to all proposals regarding PW treatment, release, or repatriation. This unyielding attitude was epitomized by refusal to accept 13 sick and wounded

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RACIAL INCIDENTS REFLECTED IN SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTS
(JAN–DEC 1971)



Source: MACIB FIELD INQUIRY

Figure X-1

NVA on 4 Jun 71, even though this was a unilateral effort by the US/GVN, requiring no reciprocal action. The enemy continued to ignore all principles set forth in the Geneva Convention of 1949. The Paris Peace Talks made no progress on PW issues, as North Vietnam continued to demand as a precondition for any PW agreement, a unilateral US commitment to withdraw all US and Allied forces by a specific date. NVN's hard line on the PW issue was further accentuated by the near cessation of prisoner releases. During the period 1968 to 1969, the enemy released 39 US PW; during 1970 through 1971 only two were released. As 1971 ended there were still 482 Americans officially listed as PW in Indochina, and 1,103 listed as missing in action. The PW issue continued to be a key issue at the highest levels of the US Government.

HUMAN RELATIONS

(U) In 1971 the racial situation in RVN continued to reflect the changing nature of society in the United States. Many black soldiers in RVN, increasingly more articulate, better educated, and more impatient than their predecessors, continued to view the military establishment as a racist institution, within which little redress was possible. To many of them, the war in Vietnam was viewed, rightly or wrongly, as a white man's war in which they had no vested interest. Outward manifestations of black pride -- afro haircuts, soul music, special handshakes and salutes -- continued to indicate a new black awareness among black soldiers in Vietnam. These developments, in 1971 as before, continued to exacerbate black and white tensions in units throughout Vietnam, tensions which contributed to the single most important racial problem of the day - a breakdown in communications.

RACIAL COMPLAINTS

(U) As in the past, the media continued to add to tensions among the races in RVN by their exaggerated reports of a racial maelstrom threatening to boil over at any moment,[16] when in actuality the situation was much less severe. Racial tensions existed, to be sure, and according to many observers the communication problem would exist for a long time to come in RVN as elsewhere. But to suggest that a race war was imminent seemed a massive case of overstatement. A MACIG study did reveal that racial incidents continued to occur in 1971, as in previous years, primarily in concentrated combat service support areas, as depicted in Figure X-1. Of 5,200 serious incidents analyzed, however, only 248 had racial implications, and as explained in Figure X-2, only 33 could actually be designated as racially oriented.[17]

(U) The MACIG investigation also announced a similarity of viewpoint on the part of disenchanted black soldiers in RVN, the newsmedia, and US public officials:[18]

Prevailing Themes of Malcontented Black Soldiers in RVN	Prevailing Themes of News Media and US Public Officials
Blacks are not getting their fair share of promotions.	Blacks have less chance for promotion than whites.
Blacks are assigned more hazardous duty or menial tasks.	Blacks are assigned menial tasks. Duty rosters are rigged unfavorably for blacks. (Frank W. Render II, Former DASD for Equal Opportunity, Pacific Stars and Stripes, 14 Aug 71.)

Prevailing Themes of Malcontented Black Soldiers in RVN	Prevailing Themes of News Media and US Public Officials
Blacks are court martialed more than whites.	Military justice is "lily white" (Nathaniel Jones, General Counsel, NAACP, The Washington Post, 12 Nov 71).
Punishment for blacks is greater than for whites for the same offense.	Frequency of punishment for black soldiers is greater than for white soldiers (Robert J. Brown, Special Assistant to President Nixon, Christian Science Monitor, 17 Nov 71).
Blacks must unite.	Violence is inevitable. (Thaddeus Garrett Jr, Assistant to Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D-NY), Pacific Stars and Stripes, 19 Nov 71.)

ANALYSIS OF 5200 SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTS (SIR)
(January - December 1971)

	Number of Incidents by Size of Group				Total Size/Type	Types of Incidents		
Month	2	3 - 9	10 - 25	25 or More		Racial	Unknown	Non Racial
Jan	5	8	2	2	17	1	7	9
Feb	8	14	3	1	26	2	14	10
Mar	4	13	3	3	23	5	12	6
Apr	5	6	1	2	14	2	6	6
May	1	10	8	1	20	4	11	5
Jun	8	4			12		5	7
Jul	5	11		2	18		8	10
Aug	10	22	2	5	39	9	13	17
Sep	8	16	2	3	24	3	12	14
Oct	4	10	6	2	22	2	9	11
Nov	4	13	1		18		5	13
Dec	4	5	1		10	1	5	4
Total	66	132	29	21	248	29	107	112

RESULTS OF FIELD SURVEY

SIR POSSIBLE RACIAL		SIR FIELD RESEARCH NOT POSSIBLE		SIR FIELD RESEARCH POSSIBLE		CONFIRMED RACIAL		NOT RACIAL
248	-	77	=	171	-	33	=	138

Source: MACIG Field Inquiry

Figure X - 2

(U) Concerning these views, a countrywide assessment indicated otherwise. Results of IG visits, analysis of complaint statistics, and discussions with individuals throughout RVN failed to substantiate these observations. In particular, a review of 100 cases of military justice administration revealed that, on the contrary, whites were receiving more severe punishment than blacks. It was determined as true however, that blacks were being punished more often than whites in those instances where they were committing proportionally more offenses than whites.[19]

MACV DIRECTIVE 600-12 - BASIC GUIDANCE

(U) Fully aware that there were no magic formulas to use in the fight for racial harmony in RVN, HQ MACV nevertheless met the problem head-on. Since its inception in 1970, the keystone of this effort continued to be MACV Directive 600-12, "Personnel - General Human Relations." To ameliorate racial conditions at all levels of command, this directive required all component and subordinate commanders to:

-- Assure equal opportunity and treatment of all military and civilian personnel.

-- Insure that, second only to mission performance, the duty of every officer and noncommissioned officer was to improve the welfare of his subordinates.

-- Recognize that effective leadership achieves harmonious relations among unit personnel.

-- Maintain open channels of lateral and vertical communications to expedite the exchange of information.

(U) In charging all commanders with responsibility for imbuing all members of the command with an awareness of personal sensitivities, the directive sought to put to use the "preventive medicine" approach. Furthermore, all units were to appoint a Human Relations Officer and establish a Human Relations Council, both to assist and advise the commander. If "people-to-people" communications, a prime necessity for viable racial relations, were to be effective, both of these important tools were essential. Finally, the regulation enjoined commanders at all levels to review critically those policies, devices, and practices by which communications with the soldiers were established and kept open.[20]

Efforts of the Services

(U) In compliance with the directive, each of the services followed the guidance mentioned above for their human relations endeavors for 1971:

-- HQ NAVFORV. Human relations meetings were conducted twice monthly, and HQ NAVFORV directed that all in-country human relations personnel attend at least one session. Follow-through action for all registered complaints and grievances was emphasized, with the Chief of Staff personally reviewing each case.

-- HQ USARV. To assess the human relations effort and climate, and to maintain continuity of periodically presenting human realtions workshops, DEPCGUSARV directed the USARV Human Relations Branch to visit all major subordinate units on a regular basis. In 1971, USARV continued to emphasize the chain of command and established



7th AF Human Relations Council convenes at Tan Son Nhut AB.



An Afro-American Cultural Association "rap" session.



Members of the Afro-American Cultural Association give a black solidarity salute.

agencies, such as the Inspector General, as the most efficient and effective solution to human relations problems. Human relations channels were to continue to be considered as an additional means for the redress of individual grievances.

-- HQ 7AF. Having received its first full-time Human Relations Officer in December 1971, HQ 7AF continued to work towards the goal of having a full-time Human Relations Officer at all bases of over 2,000 population. Their duties involved monitoring such vital areas as nonjudicial punishment, pretrial confinements, and promotions, to uncover any unusual developments. Along with their commanders and supervisors, officers in human relations positions required mandatory comments on their efficiency reports, reflective of their efforts towards support of the principles of equal opportunity.[21]

HUMAN RELATIONS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

(U) Two major aids to commanders to assist them in solving human relations problems during 1971 were included in the MACV directive. The first, the Human Relations Improvement Program, listed typical problem areas with their causes or indicators, prescribed and suggested remedies, and the medium through which they could be accomplished. Thus in the area of racial polarization during off-duty hours, commanders could respond by insuring through customer surveys and minority group representation on exchange and club advisory councils that the particular desires of these groups were being satisfied. Through effective use of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), the Human Relations Councils would publicize these accomplishments.

Small Unit Leader's Pamphlet

(U) The second was the "Small Unit Leader's Pamphlet." Adapted from material originally prepared by the 2d Marine Division, the document served as a guide for all small unit leaders in MACV. In outlining the lower echelon leaders' responsibilities, the pamphlet encouraged meeting the racial situation as essentially a leadership challenge, to be dealt with through increased awareness and understanding. HQ MACV encouraged the reproduction and dissemination of the document to the entire command.

(U) Both the Human Relations Improvement Program and the Small Unit Leader's Pamphlet sought to eliminate two problems that continued to be encountered at different command levels in 1971. The improvement program sought to remind senior officers in the colonel and lieutenant colonel grades that their responsibilities did not end just through implementation of a directive. It acknowledged that many senior officers do have some difficulty relating to the new breed of soldier, and attempted to show them that today's problems cannot be resolved through the simple solutions of yesterday. In the case of junior officers, the pamphlet sought to equip them to deal better with perhaps the most complex leadership problem at that level ever faced in the history of the US military.[22]

Human Relations Council

(U) By far one of the most significant aspects of the MACV racial scene in 1971 were the Human Relations Councils. Usually composed of a Human Relations Officer and members from a cross-section of ranks and ethnic groups, more than 725 councils were meeting monthly throughout the command by mid-October. Although these meetings sought to improve communications between divergent groups -- enlisted men versus NCOs and officers, for example -- they invariably dealt with the racial question. Movies, such as the popular "Black and White Uptight," spiced many of these council meetings, but generally they revolved around unstructured discussion sessions of varying topics. Subjects ranged from blacks complaining about discrimination on promotion boards to white NCOs questioning the appropriateness of the Afro haircut. As a staff officer of the Human Relations Branch, HQ USARV put it:

> When a person is isolated from a group, he never understands that group. He begins to rely on stereotypes. A white won't pay attention to another white guy wearing beads. But because of his stereotypes, if he sees a black with a black arm band, he may assume the black is a revolutionary. Disassociation breeds distrust.

(U) Regardless of the topics discussed during these meetings, it was the commander's responsibility to stimulate discussion and act upon legitimate complaints.

Human Relations Workshops

(U) A continuing problem throughout the command was the instability of these councils because of the large turnover in personnel accentuated by the accelerated withdrawal of American troops. USARV sought to ameliorate the situation by sponsoring Human Relations Workshops, as previously mentioned. By mid-October more than 40 had met throughout Vietnam.[23]

(U) A typical session was held at Headquarters, Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) in mid-November. More than 60 human relations personnel attended the 3-day affair, which began with a command briefing from CG, TRAC. Attendees received instruction in "role-playing" exercises and group conference dynamics. Movies, slides, filmstrips, literature, and other bibliographic material was made available. In dealing with the communications problem, workshop leaders at the TRAC conference stressed the following:

- Communications is not only a two-way process; it also involves a transfer of information and an exchange of feelings. Different perceptions of oneself and the situation, along with psychological and semantical barriers, hinder the communications process. To become more effective communicators, soldiers at all levels should strive for precision and accuracy, be sensitive to the feelings of others, and recognize that there are two levels of interpersonal communication.[24]

Battalion Awareness Teams

(U) USARV also established 10 Battalion Awareness Teams during 1971. First employed by Saigon Support Command, the concept utilized two or three enlisted men to assist the Human Relations Officer in monitoring progress and establishing discussion groups and workshops.[25]

A Black Awareness Group

(U) A significant development in race relations during 1971 was the incorporation of the Afro-American Cultural Association, a black-awareness organization based at Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base. Sanctioned by MACV in January 1971, this Air Force association sought through weekly meetings to stimulate awareness through collective, factual examination of the problems of the black serviceman. Open to members of all races, it maintained a small library, and through panel discussions, debates, festivals, classes, and use of the various media, attempted to bridge the communications gap. The club did much to defuse a potential race riot in August at the air base, when a black airman was slashed across the face by a Honda-riding Vietnamese "cowboy."[26]

The Lessons of Camp Baxter

(U) As 1971 ended, MACV continued to scrutinize reports of the few racially serious incidents that did occur during the year for clues to their causes. Analysis revealed that some of the conditions which led to the racial disturbances at Camp Baxter were still contributing to incidents elsewhere. Accordingly, MACV continued to stress the lessons learned from the Camp Baxter encounter for the benefit of subordinate commanders. Commanders were urged to relate to the troops, and to be responsive to complaints and problems, especially those of black soldiers. If weak and inexperienced junior officers and noncommissioned officers were not supervised, counselled, and supported, a permissive attitude could develop which would exacerbate racial tensions. Proper command attention to the morale and welfare of the troops had to be more than adequate if racial confrontations were to be avoided. Finally, if a commander was to be successful in dealing with racial problems, he must take the time periodically to sit down with the troops and explain policy to them.[27]

DRUG AND NARCOTIC ABUSE

BACKGROUND

(U) The use of hard drugs by American servicemen reached alarming numbers in 1971. For many servicemen the use of drugs in RVN was a mere continuation of experimentation that began before their entry into service or arrival in Vietnam. Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment, developed statistics showing that 80 percent of drug users detected in Vietnam had used some form of drugs before arriving in Vietnam. The unlimited availability of illicit drugs in RVN made continuation of drug usage a tempting diversion.

(U) Prior to early 1970 American drug abuse mainly involved the use of a relatively mild drug -- marijuana. At the time this drug became the subject of concerted attacks by MACV and GVN, there was a shift to the more dangerous use of heroin. The shift to use of hard drugs was made apparent in the third quarter CY70 when 598 narcotic offenders were identified as compared to 548 during the preceding 9 months. Increased command interest during 1971 brought about an even more spectacular rise in identification of drug offenders for possession or usage of narcotics. During 1971 7,026 narcotic offenders were identified, which is more than six times the total of 1,146 for 1970. This rise in use and possession of hard narcotics

was paralleled with a decreasing number of marijuana use and possession apprehensions. Detailed numbers of offenders in 1970 and 1971 are shown below.[28]

TABLE OF MILITARY DRUG OFFENDERS IDENTIFIED

Quarter	Narcotics	Dangerous Drugs	Marijuana	All Drugs	Population
1970					
1	98	336	2,141	2,575	475,400
2	212	487	2,279	2,978	434,000
3	238	489	2,029	2,756	409,200
4	598	439	1,712	2,749	360,600
1971					
1	1,084	215	1,397	2,696	326,700
2	2,274	222	1,163	3,659	264,700
3	1,939	120	629	2,688	223,200
4	1,729	25	364	2,118	185,344

Source: MACV Provost Marshal
Drug Suppression Summary CY71 (Data are FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.)

HIGH LEVEL CONCERN AND MACV ACTIONS

(U) The large upsurge in drug abuse was of great concern to the highest levels of the US Government. This concern culminated on 18 Jun 71 in a memorandum sent by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In part the memorandum stated:

> The President has directed that the critical national problem of drug abuse in the country and in the Armed Forces be given urgent and immediate attention. . . .As part of the national program addressing this matter the Secretaries of the military departments will immediately put into operation plans designed to meet the problem of heroin use among members of the armed forces in Vietnam. Such plans will insure that: within seven days identification is commenced of those service members departing Vietnam who are using or are dependent on narcotics; service members so identified shall undergo a five to seven day detoxification treatment prior to their return to the United States; service members whose terms of service are expiring who need and desire treatment will be provided the opportunity for a minimum of 30 days of treatment in military facilities in the United States when Veterans Administration or civilian programs are not available; service members with time remaining in service will insofar as possible be treated in military programs in the United States and afforded the opportunity for rehabilitation. . . .You will develop and implement at the earliest possible date plans to identify and treat all members in Southeast Asia at least 60 days before the date of their return from overseas. . . . Due to the urgency of the problem I expect that you will closely and personally follow the progress. . .

and I. . . will want to have periodic written reports on the progress made by each of the services. . . .[29]

COMUSMACV Actions to Curb Drug Abuse

(U) The urgent attention directed by the President added impetus to an on-going MACV program to curb drug abuse in Vietnam. In August 1970 a MACV Drug Abuse Task Force had been formed. As a result of several months' study on all aspects of drug abuse in RVN, MACV initiated a new drug abuse suppression program which provided for education, investigation, enforcement and rehabilitation. Specifically, as established in MACV Directive 190-4, 10 Dec 70, MACV instigated a drug abuse education program directed at convincing the nonuser not to experiment with drugs, the experimenter/casual user to discontinue its use, the addict to seek professional assistance, and the supplier to discontinue involvement in drug abuse; drug abuse suppression councils to aid each command in understanding the scope of the problem, methods used to determine drug abuse, legal aspects, and familiarization with the consequences of drug abuse; a Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment responsible for gathering intelligence information and providing a coordinated investigative capability to eradicate large supply sources of narcotics, dangerous drugs, and marijuana; a combined antinarcotics enforcement committee in each of the four MRs to serve as a focal point for joint US and Vietnamese law enforcement agencies to formally discuss drug problems and to formulate measures to combat them; a Joint Customs Group to provide customs inspections of postal packages, household goods/unaccompanied baggage of military personnel arriving and departing the RVN; ground and aerial marijuana search and destroy operations; an amnesty and rehabilitation program designed to aid the individual who wanted to discontinue his drug dependence; the design and administration of a system to survey the extent of illegal drug use; a drug abuse statistical reporting system; and more effective law enforcement designed to encourage the drug user or possessor to seek amnesty and rehabilitation as an alternative to a life of drug dependence and crime.[30]

(U) Emphasis on command structure and leadership. On 20 May 71 at the monthly commanders conference, major subordinate commanders were directed to correct the drug abuse problem through the existing command structure and application of strong leadership. Component commanders were directed to maintain sufficient resources to combat drug abuse during redeployment. The suppression program was made a special subject for IG inspections. As a means of centralizing administrative control and direction of the entire MACV Drug Abuse Control Program (DACP), the MACV ACofS J1, formed the J1's Drugs and Discipline Division to coordinate the various program elements, not only within MACV staff and subordinate commands, but also those of the components. This division was initially formed with three branches: Plans and Programs, Drug Education, and Discipline and Human Relations. The Plans and Programs Branch was responsible for coordinating and establishing the countrywide urinalysis program and for monitoring each component's treatment, rehabilitation, and exemption programs. In addition, the Statistical Section of the Branch served as a central file of all drug abuse data for the overall MACV DACP and provided the Command Group with daily figures on the program's progress. The Plans and Programs Branch was also responsible for compiling and publishing MACV Directive 600-16, Drug Abuse Control Program.

(U) Drug education program. Early in 1971 it was recognized that to combat drug abuse, drug education was needed. As an example, it was found that many MACV servicemen did not understand what they were dealing with when they became involved with the narcotics available in RVN. Ignorance about the following facts was common among servicemen.

-- Heroin, commonly referred to as "skag" or "smack", sold in RVN was usually 94 to 97 percent pure, whereas heroin obtained in the US was usually only 6 to 18 percent pure.

Because of high cost and low strength of heroin found in the US, most addicts there must intravenously inject the heroin they were able to afford, to obtain the same effects that they would obtain by smoking or sniffing the much stronger heroin available in RVN.

-- An individual could easily become physically addicted to heroin by only smoking or sniffing the high potency heroin sold in RVN. This was true of the vast majority of those who became addicted in RVN.

-- Cocaine, commonly referred to as "coke," was not known to be sold to servicemen in RVN. Laboratory analysis in every case of what was bought as cocaine proved it to be something else, usually high potency heroin.[31]

(U) In order to wipe out ignorance of drugs and drug abuse, a comprehensive MACV education program was put into effect during 1971. Component commanders were given the responsibility of providing a continuous program on drug information and education directed to the supervisory elements as well as to the potential user and the drug abuser. Specific tasks were to:

-- Conduct a unit drug information briefing for all incoming personnel within 3 days of their arrival in-country.

-- Conduct a unit drug briefing within approximately 7 days after an individuals arrival at his unit of assignment, or as consistent with service policy. Emphasis was to be placed on local aspects of the problem.

-- Monitor the programs of subordinate units to insure the accuracy and relevance of all material presented.

-- Provide medical, legal, and audio-visual support to subordinate unit educational programs.

-- Ensure that all staff personnel were educated in the ideals, attitudes, and purposes of the exemption and rehabilitation programs.

Drug Education Field Teams

(U) On 7 Sep 71 a new and vital concept in drug education was introduced in RVN with the fielding of the first Drug Education Field Team (DEFT). In October 1971 each DEFT was expanded; they ultimately consisted of five highly motivated and trained individuals -- one 02-03, one E4-E5, one Vietnamese expert, and two civilian exaddicts from the National Council for Prevention of Drug Abuse. In operation a team split into multiple units; the team chief and one civilian exaddict worked with officer and senior NCO groups, while the enlisted instructor and the second exaddict held discussions with junior enlisted men. The Vietnamese instructor talked to local nationals working at the US installation. Presentations lasted 20 to 30 minutes; discussions often extended 2 to 3 hours. This process was repeated three to four times each day by each DEFT, permitting effective instruction and dialogue with 400 to 500 individuals per team per day.

(U) The DEFTs presented a series of informal but factual briefings targeted specifically to inform and motivate different audiences including incoming personnel, officers and NCOs, lower grade EM, Vietnamese supervisors, and laborers. Instruction was taken to small groups at their place of duty or billets. Little emphasis was placed on prepared lesson plans, narratives, or charts, although instructors were well rehearsed and had clearly in mind specific points to be covered either during presentation or in follow-on discussion periods. During all DEFT sessions, emphasis was placed on rapport, informality, and effective communication. Since DEFTs

first became operational in the field, many favorable comments were received on the concept from young servicemen, NCOs, and officers including senior commanders. Attention level in classes was found to be exceptionally high and discussions were active and lengthy. Servicemen stated that they wanted more of this instruction and that the DEFT approach would alter the current drug-permissive environment. Eighty-nine percent of the officers and NCOs who were queried stated that the education effort would improve their ability to influence drug abuse in their units in a positive manner.[32]

(U) Favorable response to the DEFT program was indicated in the following excerpts from an article by an enlisted (E-4) reporter for the MACV Observer newspaper:

> They know how hard it is to kick and anything that helps them do it is 'the faith.' They may sound like evangelists, but if these guys come to your unit, rap with them because they've been there and came back clean -- not for two weeks before they DEROSed, but for two or three years back in the world with nothing to stop them from going back on but their pride. As you know, there are a lot of addicts, but damn few real, hard core exaddicts who have never once, not even for one hit gone back. They're worth listening to. Who are they and were are they coming from? They're civilians and part of MACV J13's new Drug Education Field Team (DEFT). These guys went out in the street and raised the money themselves to pay their way over here. They get no salary but what they've raised themselves. They're over here because they believe the drug problem in an American problem not just an Army problem. They are professional counselors and they give enough of a damn to come over to do something about it. . . . The reaction so far has been very favorable as witnessed by this reporter and as evidenced by questionnaires filled by random selection of each group addressed.[33]

(U) Identification and detection of users. Coincident with President Nixon's directive that the critical national problem of drug abuse be given urgent and immediate attention, on 18 Jun 71 MACV initiated a massive drug-user identification program. Urinalysis testing was to be performed on all servicemen in Vietnam. The immediate objective was to identify, bring under control, and provide treatment and care for all drug abusers. The longer-range objective was to detect drug abusers early, before they became seriously involved, and upon detection to carefully monitor the individual abuser. When users were identified by urinalysis test during outprocessing for departure from Vietnam, they were escorted to a Drug Treatment Center for medical treatment. If after medical observation it was determined that the individual was seriously involved or needed additional medical treatment he was aeromedically evacuated to one of several military hospitals or veteran facilities in the United States. There the soldier received rehabilitation treatment of the type and duration indicated by his particular condition and status. Individuals identified as users or drug experimenters, not yet addicted, were treated in the Drug Treatment Center until their urinalysis no longer showed positive and medical authorities determined release was appropriate. Upon release the individual was allowed to continue normal DEROS outprocessing.[34]

(U) Effective 15 Aug 71 the urinalysis and treatment program was expanded to include all US military personnel departing Vietnam on 14-day CONUS leave. Also included were personnel departing after 30 or more days TDY in RVN. On 15 Sep 71, this program was further expanded to include all personnel departing on R and R or 7-day leave. The latter program was subsequently determined to be the least productive of all testing programs since only a small percentage were found to be drug-involved. It appeared that drug users were not willing to leave their source of supply or submit themselves voluntarily to a test, and probably were unable to accumulate sufficient personal funds to permit the luxury of leave.

[redacted]

(C) After several thousands of tests of R and R and leave personnel, it became apparent that a change in testing procedures was needed. The deterrent of 100 percent testing was well publicized and effective, however it utilized time and talent needed in more productive programs such as unannounced unit testing. Consequently on 10 Jan 72 a new system of random unannounced testing of groups of leave and R and R personnel was tried. This random sampling testing was adequate to maintain an effective and credible deterrent to drug abusers.[35]

(U) The unannounced unit testing program which had been initiated on 25 Aug 71 became quite successful in early detection of drug users. Its ultimate objective was to test each unit in RVN at an unannounced time once each quarter. Units which exceeded certain levels of confirmed drug users received intense command attention, including a close look at living and working conditions, personnel administration, military justice, and drug education programs.[36]

(U) Detoxification and rehabilitation. The goals of the MACV drug abuse program were to detect users early, to treat properly, and to offer the most complete rehabilitation assistance possible within the environment of Vietnam. Detoxification and rehabilitation required a major effort by all MACV personnel involved. Component commanders were responsible for ensuring that all personnel with positive urinalysis results underwent detoxification; the MACV Command Surgeon was responsible for staff supervision of the drug treatment program; the Provost Marshal was involved in apprehension of users and suppliers; and the Staff Judge Advocate had staff responsibility for advising on legal questions such as the legal basis for involuntary giving of urine samples and questions raised by the Exemption Program.

(U) Detoxification occurred at drug treatment centers, rehabilitation centers, and confinement facilities as determined by each component command. Procedures were standardized to the maximum extent possible. The purpose of this program was to maintain a drug-free environment, eliminate drugs from the patient's body, treat withdrawal reactions, and provide preliminary psychiatric reorientation. The guiding concept was that of medically supporting the patient through the withdrawal period, while recognizing that further treatment and support would be needed later. The detoxification process was an integral part of the overall drug abuse control program and a critical step in the total rehabilitation of the drug user. The program included detoxification for amphetamine, barbiturate, and other dangerous drugs as well as for heroin or opiates.

(U) It was MACV policy that every individual with confirmed positive urinalysis results be detoxified as necessary. Individuals were to be held liable for any recalcitrance exhibited, and anyone apprehended for possession of or using drugs while undergoing detoxification was transferred to a drug treatment center to complete treatment. During treatment, each individual was required to submit to a daily urine test. Detoxification normally lasted approximately 5 to 7 days; the exact duration in each case was a medical decision as to when complications of withdrawal were over and no medical hazard existed.

(U) Rehabilitation policies and procedures, which continued the policies of the detoxification process, were designed to assist in restoring to effective military service the drug user who had demonstrated a sincere desire to reform. Long-term institutionalized rehabilitation programs were not considered possible in RVN. The following guidelines dictated the RVN in-country rehabilitation effort:

-- A carefully structured program of scheduled activities would be utilized.

-- Daily urine tests would be performed on all patients.

-- Psychiatric and other therapy services would be furnished if available.

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[redacted]

-- Physicians would release patients when no medical hazards existed which would preclude planned disposition.

-- The key to success in rehabilitation efforts was follow-up in all cases.

-- Each unit would have an individual to serve as a point of contact and provide follow-up support and information for all personnel undergoing rehabilitation.

-- While establishment of a strict time period for in-patient rehabilitation was not feasible, experience showed that normally less than 2 weeks was not sufficient.

-- Recalcitrant individuals would be handled per service directives.

The rehabilitation program was not intended for habitual offenders, individuals attempting to shirk responsibilities or evade disciplinary action, or those who become recalcitrant after admittance into the program. Rehabilitation consideration was given to all of the circumstances involved such as the number and nature of the offenses and type of drug abuse involved; the extent to which drug abuse had affected performance of his military duties or the health, welfare, or safety of other persons; and the diagnosed rehabilitative potential of the individual.

(U) Exemption Program. The objective of the Examption Program was to encourage voluntary self-disclosure of prior drug use. Exemption meant protection from punitive action under the UCMJ, or from administrative action leading to a discharge under other than honorable conditions for drug use, solely because of volunteering for treatment under the DOD Drug Identification and Treatment Program. This policy did not exempt members from disciplinary or other legal consequences resulting from violations of other applicable laws and regulations relating to the sale of drugs of the possession of significant quantities of drugs for sale to others.

(U) Examption did not preclude commanders from taking appropriate administrative actions including, but not limited to the following:

-- Suspension of access to classified or sensitive information.

-- Reclassification or withdrawal of military occupational specialties.

-- Suspension or revocation of flight status or hazardous duties.

-- Administrative discharge if appropriate.

-- Adverse line of duty determination due to drug use.

(U) Exemption applied only to self-disclosures which were voluntary and which were made prior to the time a member was apprehended for the drug use in question or was officially warned by military authorities that he was suspected of that offense. The exemption program required that the individual seeking exemption be sincere in his request for assistance. It was explained to him that failure to cooperate or demonstrated insincerity would be cause for appropriate administrative or disciplinary action.[37]

Actions on Drugs by the American Embassy

(U) To deal more effectively with the greatly increased volume of intelligence reporting on narcotics trafficking and drug abuse in Southeast Asia, in August 1971 the US Ambassador established a Narcotics Working Group (NWG) in Saigon. The NWG, which reports directly to the

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Deputy Ambassador, was chaired by the senior representative of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, who was responsible for the NWG's overall direction and for maintaining liaison with US and GVN operational enforcement elements. The other permanent members were [redacted] representative and a representative of MACV. Supporting personnel included military intelligence analysts, linguists, and clerks.

(U) The NWG was to encourage the maximum collection of current drug intelligence; to ensure timely evaluation and full exploitation of tactical intelligence; to disseminate intelligence to appropriate action agencies; and to minimize duplication of effort by the various narcotics investigative agencies. Military agencies such as the 525th Military Intelligence Group submitted reports to MACV J2, the program manager for the MACV special collection program called Tan Turtle. Upon receipt of these reports, the Tan Turtle program manager immediately sent a copy to the NWG.

(U) Major areas of interest to the NWG were the identity of narcotics smugglers and distributors, their methods of distribution, and the points of distribution; the points of entry of drugs into Vietnam; the location of opium and heroin refineries; and trends in the drug traffic. In order to develop useful intelligence on these subjects, the NWG analyzed the intelligence input from both military and nonmilitary agencies and collated it with existing data. The NWG then determined the most effective method and agency for action. Normally the evaluated intelligence was passed to the proper Vietnamese agency for action. These included the Military Security Service, the National Police Command, the National Police Narcotics Bureau, and the Fraud Repression Service of the Customs Directorate. Any information concerning the involvement of individuals within the US military establishment was passed to the office of the MACV Provost Marshal.

(U) The need for continued monitoring of narcotics traffic and effectiveness of control measures in Southeast Asia was evident. The NWG was a key agency in assisting the US mission in Vietnam to perform more effectively its role in helping to suppress illegal drug trafficking.[38]

(S) During December 1971 the NWG coordinated with CINCPAC, the American Consul, Hong Kong, the American Embassy, Bangkok, and other agencies to provide surveillance of possible narcotics-carrying vessels from Thailand. The results of one such intelligence effort were as stated in the following excerpts of a message from the American Consul, Hong Kong, to Headquarters Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Washington, DC:

> On December 4, 1971, officers of the Royal Hong Kong police narcotics bureau seized 2,790 lbs of opium and 418 of morphine base. . . . It is believed that the USG effort with respect to Thai fishing trawlers had a direct effect in this seizure. Intelligence information concerning departure of trawlers from Bangkok and subsequent sightings by the 7th Fleet have been furnished in each case to the Hong Kong authorities by BNDD. Through this intelligence, HK authorities have been able to plot the movement of these trawlers as well as establish their ETA. . . . It should be noted that for year 1970, when no USG effort was directed towards the Thai fishing trawler situation HK authorities seized only 99 lbs of opium during the year. To date for 1971, HK authorities' cumulative seizures of opium now stands at 12,200 repeat 12,200 lbs an all time record for HK. It is believed that this significant accomplishment is due in no small part to the continuing efforts of those involved in furnishing timely intelligence on the movement of the Thai fishing trawlers.[39]

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GVN ACTIONS TO CONTROL DRUG TRAFFICKING

(S) On 3 May 71, Ambassador Bunker and COMUSMACV had a detailed talk with President Thieu regarding trafficking in narcotics and the related problems of smuggling and customs control. The seriousness of the US Government's view on the drug problem was discussed in detail. In response to US urgings, President Thieu moved quickly to setup the machinery to deal with the problem. On 12 May 71, Thieu held the first of several meetings on this subject with his top military and civilian officials. He outlined his plans, ordered the officials to give highest priority to the suppression of smuggling and drugs, and directed them to cooperate fully with US officials engaged in the same effort. Among the first steps taken were: replacement of the Director General of Customs and some of the most corrupt customs service officials, including the Prime Minister's brother; tightening customs and security measures at Tan Son Nhut airport; replacement of all police, customs and military security service personnel at the airport; rearrangement of the airport costoms area to facilitate better control and deny access to unauthorized persons; designation of a team of five experienced intelligence and police officials, headed by LG Dang Van Quang to develop and carry out an effective program of action; creation of interministerial drug suppression committees at national and provincial level to enlist widespread participation in the effort; replacement of the chief of the narcotics bureau of the National Police and reorganizing and expanding the bureau from 26 to 52 personnel; appointment of a capable new assistant police commissioner to direct police efforts in the drug campaign; and organization of an undercover team to monitor enforcement activities.

(S) The success of these efforts is indicated by intelligence reports that narcotics smugglers in Laos and elsewhere have been forced to find other points of entry into Vietnam. Because of the increased interest and effort by GVN, in 1971 for the first time, Vietnamese police enforcement of narcotics laws reached the point where it had national coherence and interfaced with US civil and military drug suppression efforts.[40]

DRUG STATISTICS

(U) Throughout Southeast Asia, 1971 was a year of high drug usage and a year of concentrated counterattacks by US and GVN governmental agencies. It was also a time when alarmists, sensationalists, and others who lacked factual information created grossly incorrect pictures of the drug scene in Southeast Asia. For example, one news reporter who was allegedly escorted through the Newport dock facilities (near Saigon) during July 1971, stated in an article that one-third of the US Army personnel at Newport were using heroin. Urinalysis test results for the period 18 Jun to 31 Jul 71, of personnel departing Newport showed three heroin users out of 114 departees. The reported usage rate was more than ten times the proven rate.[41]

(U) In another case, US Representative Robert H. Steele returned from RVN in April 1971 saying that 15 to 20 percent of US troops were addicted to heroin. He said that the 5 to 6 percent figure, those found addicted so far, did not disprove his charge. "These guys know when the urinalysis is over there, it's part of their out-processing," Steele said". . . they know they can get through the test if they can just give up the drug for 24 to 72 hours."[42]

(U) On 21 Oct 71 a House subcommittee reported that heroin use among American soldiers in Vietnam was probably at least twice as high as the Army admitted. The subcommittee report was prepared after chairman Paul Rogers, and Representatives David E. Satterfield III, Peter N. Kyros, and Richardson Pryer, spent 17 days touring Thailand, South Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Japan. The report said the much publicized figure of 5 percent heroin addiction was not accurate. "The (subcommittee) members do not quarrel with estimates that drug addiction by

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enlisted men in many units ranges from 15 to 40 percent and believe the estimates that 10 percent of enlisted stationed in Vietnam are addicted to heroin to be cautious." The report said there was no way to determine exactly what percentage used drugs because the Army refused to supply any information. The report said, "Despite repeated requests, members of the subcommittee were not given statistical information which would indicate the extent of the use of heroin in Vietnam by US servicemen. Officials at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, stated that the instructions to withhold information came from the White House."[43]

(U) Contrary to the cited allegations and numerous other unfounded assertions, the drug abuse situation, although serious, was quite precisely that which had been reported by HQ MACV. The factual picture of the US Army drug abuse situation in RVN during 1971 can be drawn from the following figures. (Data are FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.)

US ARMY URINALYSIS TEST RESULTS: PERCENT POSITIVE

	1971							1972
Type Test	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
DEROS	2.38	4.69	5.18	5.03	4.57	3.90	3.21	2.83
Unannounced Unit sweeps				5.34	5.14	5.13	4.67	5.27
Leaves, R and R			.81	.99	.95	.54	.74	1.31

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF MACV IG STAFF

General

(U) The Inspector General (IG), a personal staff officer to COMUSMACV, was responsible for inquiring into and reporting on matters relating to the performance of mission, state of discipline, efficiency, and economy of the command, by conducting inspections, investigations, surveys, visits, and studies and by receiving, investigating, and reporting on allegations, complaints, and grievances of individuals and agencies. He was the principal US advisor to the IG, RVNAF.

(U) A percapita increase in the number of incidents, complaints, and requests for assistance requiring resolution at MACV level continued throughout 1971. While US Forces underwent a drawdown of approximately 54 percent, the number of complaints and requests for assistance reached a level slightly higher than the 1970 total. There were 752 cases received in 1970 as compared to 763 in 1971. Investigative actions more than doubled from a total of 87 in 1970 to 184 in 1971.

(U) The upward per capita trend was due to a variety of factors:

-- Increased public interest in corruption and illicit activities in the military.

-- The very low level of combat with attendant idleness and boredom leading to troop misbehavior.

-- Desire for redress of grievances, real or fabricated, by former members of the command or by news media personnel in attempts to create newsworthy copy during periods of relative combat inactivity.

Reorganization

(U) During the first and third quarters of CY71, the MACV Office of the Inspector General (MACIG) was reorganized to consolidate investigative activities and to meet increased advisory responsibilities. The additional advisory effort was necessary to provide personnel to participate in combined US/RVNAF IG inspections to oversee the US funded RVNAF Ration Supplement Program and to provide the requisite number of advisory personnel to support the reorganization of the RVNAF/JGS IG Directorate approved by the Vietnamese Minister of Defense on 5 Jun 71. The major increase in the advisory effort occurred during the third quarter when the MACIG Advisory Division was expanded by the addition of two branches, the General Inspections Advisory Branch and the Technical Inspections Advisory Branch. This then provided a counterpart organization to the three inspection divisions (Territorial Forces, General, and Technical) of the RVNAF/JGS IG Directorate. The authorized strength of the Advisory Division was established at 22 officer and eight enlisted spaces.

INSPECTIONS

Inspections and Audits

(U) During 1971 the Inspections Division, Military Assistance Command Inspector General (MACIG) conducted special inspections and audits throughout the command in accordance with MACV Directive 20-1. These inspections were made to provide the command with an impartial appraisal of the accomplishment of mission and the state of discipline, efficiency, and economy of subordinate commands, installations and activities. Special inspections and audits were conducted in accordance with a carefully planned schedule with sufficient advance notice to the inspected unit to facilitate preparation: 35 special inspections of advisory teams and 30 inspections/audits of open messes and special funds were conducted. The general scope of these inspections included personnel management; welfare and discipline; unit administrative procedures; operation and efficiency of postal services; sanitation; intelligence training; operational readiness; and logistical matters to include maintenance, adequacy of support, management of resources, and economy of operation. In addition to these general areas of interest, special subjects were inquired into as directed by COMUSMACV. These special subjects included management and control of nonappropriated fund activities; land-use concurrence and lease agreements between Vietnamese and US agencies; proper submission of combat operations after-action reports; operations of mobile advisory teams; and administration of the piaster conversion program. The scope of the inspections/audits of open mess and special funds included inquiry into the supervision, administration, operation, internal controls, and validation of the financial statement of funds.

Inspector General Visits

(U) On 26 May 71 COMUSMACV, in a memorandum for the Inspector General, directed that the MACIG establish a program of Inspector General visits to selected elements of the command to assess the effectiveness of the functioning of command. These functioning of command assessments supplemented the routinely scheduled special inspections. Unlike the special inspections, little advance notice was given to the inspected unit and preparation was neither required nor desired. The short-notice principle enabled the inspectors to evaluate the unit in an environment which more closely reflected the normal, day-to-day operations. This provided the command with useful and relevant, on-the-spot observations concerning the true picture of the situation and trends. Following each visit a fact sheet containing significant observations was prepared and forwarded to COMUSMACV for approval and subsequent dispatch through command channels for appropriate action. Visits covered organizations from all three services. There were five groups, 30 battalions and eight advisory teams or similar-size units visited. In addition, 70 other units were observed for which no separate reports were submitted. During the course of these visits which began in June 1971, 4,913 men, ranging in rank from private to colonel, were interviewed and observed as they carried out daily tasks.

Situation and General Command Trends

(C) It was determined that, generally within the installations and activities inspected and visited, commanders were competent, and accomplishing assigned tasks and missions in spite of the many new factors encountered during the year. Morale and esprit varied from good to excellent. Although MACIG inspections and visits revealed significant shortcomings in functioning of command at selected units, the general trend was that problems identified were within manageable proportions. Analysis of pertinent command functions evaluated over the year follows.

(C) Command. During the course of 43 visits, 21 colonels, 55 lieutenant colonels and majors and 96 captains and lieutenants commanding units at all levels were observed. These officers were highly motivitated and mission-oriented. In only one instance was there a battalion commander considered less than fully effective (because he was not providing adequate supervision to his rear elements). Overall, MACIG visits and inspections verified that there was effective functioning of command in US units throughout RVN.

(C) Mission. All major units were accomplishing assigned missions. However, there was some degree of mission impairment in two combat service support units due to high drug usage. An indication of this was that assignment of certain jobs to drug users was restricted because they could not be depended upon.

(C) Staff functioning. Observations of staff positions revealed that, in general, staff officers were not getting out to subordinate units. This limited their understanding and knowledge of field conditions, which in turn, reduced their own effectiveness in advising the commander and assisting the subordinate elements.

Personnel and Administration

(C) Of the functional staff areas, personnel and administration was the weakest. It accounted for the largest number of deficiencies noted. This category is subdivided into three major areas for examination: personnel accountability, availability, and utilization. The lack of adequate personnel accountability was a frequent deficiency. Attachment orders delineating responsibilities, were either not available or were not properly executed in a number of instances. Physical accountability within units was generally good. The problem was one of not accurately reflecting

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gains and losses on morning reports. The largest single factor contributing to this problem was poor supervision by unit administrative personnel.

(C) Personnel were available and performing their duties. However, in one instance, one combat battalion had only 50 percent of its strength available for field duty because of granting an excessive number of authorized absences. In one combat service support battalion, it was found that only 50 percent of personnel reported as present for duty were actually available.

(C) Personnel utilization in combat units was good. However, improper utilization was detected in some combat support units due to mismanagement, overstrength, malassignment, or overstaffing by grade. This was substantiated by the trend in IG complaints and requests for assistance received by MACV and USARV; 20 percent to 25 percent of these concerned transfer, reassignments, assignment, and utilization.

Pay

(C) Conversion to the new joint uniform military pay system caused some problems or late pay and allotment discrepancies. However, since this was a new system, errors were expected in data transmission, due to problems associated with interfacing equipment.

Operations and Logistics

(C) In the operational area, a challenging problem faced by commanders in 1971 was maintaining an adequate degree of unit and individual alertness in the face of the low level of enemy activity, stand down and redeployment, all of which contributed to a false sense of security. Most units had good operational plans and SOPs; however, there were indications that the lack of enemy-initiated action over a long period made it difficult to maintain a high degree of alertness. Examples of the types of deficiencies noted were: complacency, commanders and staffs not familiar with their own defense plans, lack of supervision of security troops, sentries not familiar with rules of engagement, claymore mines improperly positioned, sensor devices improperly used, communications and lighting poor, and inadequate bunker maintenance. In general, the fundamentals of defense were not being stressed sufficiently.

(C) In the area of logistics, supply accountability was generally good; however, many units had accumulated excess property which required turn-in to proper supply channels.

Discipline, Law and Order

(C) Personnel observed were healthy and in good physical condition. In general, they met acceptable standards of appearance, considering type of duty, location, and availability of facilities. The prevailing discrepancies were failure to wear headgear and hair longer than authorized.

(C) Drug abuse was present in most units, but was within manageable proportions. Many personnel interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the drug exemption program. One reason given was the fear of adverse comments on medical records and possible administrative action at a later date. Another was the fact that nonusers had to perform more than their share of the work load. As one indication of this, a unit posted a guard roster detailing more guards than required to compensate for drug users who were unable to perform guard duty.

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(C) There were few problems noted in discipline or military justice that were not being dealt with. A notable exception was observed in grades E5 and below, primarily with regard to acceptable standards of military courtesy and saluting and the few on-the-spot corrections by officers and NCOs.

(C) Few units visited had problems with military justice. Article 15 actions were being processed in 3 to 5 days at company level and field grade Article 15 actions took 7 to 15 days. There were occasional accusations of racial inequities in military justice, but these were found to be unsubstantiated. There was no evidence of inequality in military justice.

(C) As part of the MACIG overall effort to confirm or deny certain allegations concerning race relations being echoed by the news media, racial relations was made a subject of special interest for all MACIG inspections and visits conducted in 1971. During the course of these inspections and visits 4,913 individuals of all ranks, blacks and whites, were interviewed on the subject. In general, personnel interviewed were frank and expressed themselves freely and cogently. MACIG inspectors found that the racial climate in Vietnam was good. There was no tangible evidence of inequities in promotions, job assignment and in the handling of military justice insofar as blacks were concerned. (For additional information, see Human Relations section, this chapter.)

Base Turnover Program

(U) As redeployment of US forces continued at an accelerated pace during 1971, base turnover became an ever-increasing matter of concern. The success of the program, initiated in 1968, was evident by the small amount of misappropriated materials and equipment of 177 bases transferred to RVNAF. In spite of this, the program failed to attain favorable public opinion in the United States or Vietnam, due to unfavorable press coverage. Much criticism was misdirected and resulted from misinformation or lack of information. With continuing withdrawal of US forces and consequent reduced capabilities, it became necessary to fix responsibilities and provide more positive control of actions taken to insure that final disposition of property was made in accordance with basic country-to-country agreements. In MACV C/S Action Memo 71-68, 4 Sep 71, responsibilities were fixed to establish US control of the base turnover program. MACIG was directed to coordinate with RVNAF/JGS IG to form combined teams to monitor and spot-check the program. Three inspections were conducted on selected bases. The first inspection (preturnover), 30 to 60 days prior to transfer, was to establish the initial condition of the facility and to verify that planning for the turnover was in accordance with instructions. At this time site plans were verified and photographs taken. The second inspection (turnover) was made just prior to and during the actual transfer. Emphasis was given to compliance with the terms of the transfer agreement, verifications of buildings and facilities, and coordination between units. Again, the site plan was verified and photographs taken. The last inspection (post-turnover) was conducted 30 to 90 days after the turnover inspection to verify that Vietnamese use of the facility was in accordance with the transfer agreement and the building maintenance program was effective. The site map was again verified and photography repeated. In addition, checks were made to determine if there had been unauthorized stripping, vandalism, or abuse of mechanical equipment which had been transferred. Site maps, photographs, and results of these inspections were submitted by the MACV/JGS inspection team to their respective Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, copies of these combined inspection reports were provided to appropriate agencies such as MACDC. From 1 Sep to 31 Dec 71, combined inspection teams inspected 24 bases throughout RVN. The inspections were designed to foresee and minimize problems within the base turnover program and assure both governments that dismantled facilities were put to appropriate agreed-upon use.

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REPRESENTATIVE MACV INVESTIGATIONS

(U) The MACIG Investigations Division handled 184 investigations/inquiries and staff actions during 1971. Representative reports of investigations (ROI) are summarized below. The "MIV" number identifies the MACIG investigation control number.

Disaccreditation and Debarment of NBC Newsman (MIV-1-71)

(U) On 27 Dec 70, the XXIV Corps Chief of Staff, in a message to the MACV Chief of Staff requested immediate action be initiated to cause the disaccreditation and debarment of an NBC newsman for using abusive and threatening language towards the XXIV Corps Information Officer (IO). The MACV Acting Chief of Staff on 1 Jan 71 directed that the allegation be investigated. During early stages it was determined that the investigation would also include an investigation into the overall operation of the Da Nang Press Club. The investigation substantiated the allegation. The investigation further determined that the operation of the Da Nang Press Center by XXIV Corps had resulted in the unnecessary expenditures of government funds and resources in violation of MACV Directive 360-1 and that a press center operation and facility on the order and magnitude of the Da Nang Press Center was not necessary to support the news media in Military Region 1. As a result of the investigation the Press Center was closed. Corrective action, with respect to the correspondent, was referred to NBC. (For additional information, see Information and the Press section, this chapter.)

Racial Incident at Camp Baxter (MIV-2-71)

(U) This inquiry was prompted by racial incidents occurring on 17-18 December 1970 at Camp Baxter, base camp of the 5th Trans Comd, US Army SUPCOM, Da Nang. The incident began on 17 December with a fist fight in the 329th Trans Co but quickly deteriorated into a racial gang fight. This fight ignited further incidents. A group of black soldiers claiming discrimination in the administration of military justice, the promotion system, and the assignment system demanded and obtained the release of a black soldier from pretrial confinement. On 18 December, there was an attempted murder by "fragging" and indiscriminate firing of an M-16 rifle. A letter from a member of the 264th Trans Co to General Abrams alleging that racial tension and drug abuse were prevelant to such a degree that it was not safe for personnel living at Camp Baxter was forwarded to MACIG for appropriate action. A visit to Camp Baxter on 24-25 January revealed that the 17-18 December incidents were not isolated incidents, but a culmination of a long series of incidents and a deteriorating state of discipline over a 6-month period. On 9 Feb, the Chief of Staff, MACV approved and signed a Directive for Inquiry. A total of 68 witnesses were interviewed. Of these, 13 presented the view of the 5th Trans Co Commander and staff and the USASUPCOM, 13 presented the view from the company command level, 33 presented the view from the level of the troops who witnessed or participated in the events, and seven presented the view from outside the command. The inquiry addressed such matters as; command failure, discipline, assignment and promotion systems unfair to black soldiers, laxness of regulations concerning standards of appearance, possession of unauthorized weapons, lack of recreational facilities and programs, and unfair punishment systems. In addition to recommending corrective actions to be taken to solve the specific problems at Camp Baxter, it was further determined, that the racial situation followed a clearly predictable course of events encroaching on authority which could have been prevented by timely, appropriate command action. In addition to the inquiry a special paper was prepared titled "Lessons Learned: Racially Oriented Incidents" which received commandwide distribution.

Military Privileges and Logistical Support for Nonmilitary Personnel and Agencies (MIV-6-71)

(U) This investigation resulted from a MACJA recommendation that MACIG conduct an in-depth review and investigation of the military privileges and logistical support provided nonmilitary personnel and agencies due to the changing nature of US military involvement in RVN. The types of logistical support/privileges provided nonmilitary personnel and agencies in RVN were exchange, postal, commissary/field ration mess, military banking, communications, transportation, billeting, recreation and welfare, open mess, and medical/dental care. Authority to furnish this support was vested in COMUSMACV by DOD Directive 4000.6 and AR 700-32.

(U) The scope of the investigation included visits to 62 agencies, analysis of 80 regulations/directives, and examination of approximately 21,500 documents. The investigation concluded that MACV, subordinate component commands and agencies were not exercising adequate control over requisitioning and distribution of the MACV identification/privilege cards and ration cards used to control the privileges authorized. The MACV directives which prescribe the policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the granting of logistical support and privileges to nonmilitary personnel and agencies were found to be inadequate and conflicting. Furthermore, adequate supervision of the implementation of these MACV directives was not being exercised by MACV, subordinate commands or agencies.

(U) MACIG made 58 specific recommendations for improvement of the directives and system for providing logistical support/privileges to nonmilitary personnel and agencies. These recommendations, which were approved for implementation under overall supervision of MACJ4, called for:

-- Classification of categories of personnel authorized to use MPC, and a uniform definition of categories of personnel authorized support.

-- A new directive be published to prescribe MACV policy, procedures, and responsibilities for logistical support, coupled with a revision of the other MACV directives governing the implementation of this support.

-- Directive revision and procedural changes for the issuance and control of MACV privilege cards and ration cards, with a concurrent revalidation of requirements for support by nonmilitary personnel and agencies.

-- A new series of privilege and ration cards be issued.

-- Correction of other errors not requiring directive change.

Forced Labor Clearing Chau Doc Minefields (MIV-11-71)

(U) As a result of a message received from DA on 12 Jan 71, the C/S, MACV, directed MACIG to inquire into allegations that inhabitants of Ba Chau village were experiencing heavy casualties as a result of being forced to clear minefields, and that representation through channels by local US military personnel had been blocked at province level to prevent senior US personnel from becoming aware of these abuses. The inquiry determined that there were no friendly Vietnamese civilians forced to clear any minefields in the Chau Doc Province and many casualties were not sustained as alleged. It was further determined that in fact this project was initiated to secure the village and reclaim crop land, a vegetation clearing project suggested by the village inhabitants. This project had been approved by both US and GVN officials from military region down to village level. The inhabitants of Ba Chau village did participate in the community pacification project of clearing of vegetation for security, and reclamation of land. The allegations were not substantiated.

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Allegations made by LTC Anthony B. Herbert (MIV-19-71)

(C) This Report of Inquiry concerned certain allegations made by LTC Anthony B. Herbert, who was assigned to the 173d Abn Bde during the period 3 Sep 68 through 4 Apr 69. He served as an Acting Inspector General from 3 Sep 68 to 5 Feb 69, and from 6 Feb to 4 Apr 69 as a battalion commander. On 4 Apr 69, he was relieved from command for cause. Approximately one and one-half years later, he made a series of highly publicized allegations against the 173d Abn Bde and his two immediate superiors, COL Joseph R. Franklin, Deputy Brigade Commander, and BG John W. Barnes, Brigade Commander.

(C) LTC Herbert made a total of 21 allegations. All of these allegations, except three, were related to alleged war atrocities, failure to report, and failure to investigate, which were criminal matters that were referred to the CID for investigation. The remaining three allegations were considered to be Inspector General matters and were referred to the MACIG for investigation. These allegations were: (1) the general state of discipline in the 173d Abn Bde was disgraceful and the brigade was a substandard military organization that could not be considered a fighting unit; (2) in September 1968, Company A, 4th Bn, 503d Inf was overrun and sustained heavy casualties as a result of widespread use of marijuana and the 173d Abn Bde subsequently covered up the incident by publishing in its unit newspaper and releasing to the news media a false account of this incident; (3) during August 1968, the 2d Bn, 503d Inf, 173d Abn Bde had been ordered to level the hamlets surrounding LZ English in the vicinity of Bong Son, RVN.

(C) The MACIG inquiry established that: (1) evidence did not support the contention that discipline was disgraceful in the brigade nor that the brigade was a substandard organization; (2) an attack by sappers on Fire Base Lance on 7 Sep 68 was not covered up but was factually reported by both the brigade newspaper and the news media. Further there was no evidence that the use of marijuana contributed to the enemy penetration; (3) in the August 1968 incident there was a misunderstanding of orders which resulted in five or six houses being destroyed, but these acts were stopped by the brigade commander with immediate and positive action. The MACIG inquiry concluded that none of the three allegations were substantiated.

(U) Concurrently, a preliminary inquiry into the charges against the Dep Bde Cdr, Colonel Franklin, was conducted by the CG, DRAC under provisions of paragraph 32b, Manual for Courts-martial. The inquiry recommended the charges against Colonel Franklin be dismissed and this recommendation was approved by CG, DRAC on 15 Jul 71. An equivalent pretrial investigation was conducted at the direction of the Commanding General, Military District of Washington, with respect to the charges against BG Barnes. Charges against BG Barnes were dismissed on 15 Oct 71.

Friendly Helicopter Firing on Long Thanh Orphanage (MIV-29-71)

(U) The Orphanage Management Council of the Long Thanh orphanage, Bien Hoa, alleged that on 30 Jan 71 at 2000 hours, a US Army helicopter fired at the Long Thanh orphanage village while 2,700 orphans were sitting in the open air listening to instruction, and that hundreds of persons "witnessed the trajectories aimed at the houses of the orphans." The orphanage management council further alleged that at 2130 two helicopters illuminated the houses of the orphans thereby terrifying them. On 8 Feb 71, the MACV C/S directed MACIG to conduct an inquiry which revealed that two gunships and one helicopter lightship were employed against two enemy machine gun positions in the area of the Long Thanh orphanage at approximately 1940 on 30 Jan 71. The employment of the gunships and lightship was in response to a report that a helicopter approaching to land at Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat) had been fired at from the orphanage area. Subsequently, one gunship was fired on from two ground locations approximately 500 to 2,000 meters north of the orphanage. The gunship immediately returned suppressive fire on the

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position furthest from the orphanage. The inquiry further revealed that the lightship illuminated the area so that the pilots could see the target area, and that clearance to fire was obtained from the Vietnamese representative from Long Thanh District who was riding in the helicopter lightship. The gunships made one gun run on the target, firing only the mini-gun which impacted 400 to 500 meters from the nearest orphanage building. The helicopter gunships and lightship were again in the area of the orphanage at approximately 2200 hours and the lightship did use its searchlight to illuminate the area. The inquiry concluded that the employment of the helicopter was justified and the gunships did not fire at the orphanage as alleged.

Advisory Team 67 Rations (MIV-38-71)

(U) On 18 Feb 71, the wife of a member of MACV Advisory Team 67, Phuoc Long Province, wrote letters to President Nixon, a state governor, and seven congressmen. She complained that her husband and members of Advisory Team 67 were drawing "rations nonavailable" but could not obtain decent food; further, that after 4 Mar 71 there would be no source of American food in Phuoc Long Province, because the US firebases were pulling out. She alleged that her husband and members of his team had to trade what "hard liquor they could buy in Saigon for food, meat, fruit, etc" and that her attempts to send various canned and packaged meats to her husband were "risky" because mail service was poor. The C/S MACV directed MACIG to conduct an inquiry after DA had referred this to USARV, who then contacted MACV J4. The inquiry determined that members of MACV Advisory Team 67 were obtaining adequate US subsistence from the Class I supply point at Long Binh, and mail service in Phuoc Long Province was adequate. The soldier, upon being interviewed, voiced no complaints about the supply of food or about the delivery of mail, nor could he cite examples of poor service. On 26 Feb 71, he wrote a letter to the Team 67 Administrative NCO stating that he had no problems with respect to his wife's allegations.

Supply Irregularities at Stagefields in the Delta (MIV-40-71)

(U) On 11 Feb 71, Ambassador Samuel D. Berger sent a letter to CG, USA Headquarters Area Command (USAHAC) concerning gas diversion in Kien Giang Province. The letter was referred to MACIG for appropriate action. When it was determined on 5 Mar 71 that JGS IG already had the matter under investigation, MACIG offered to assist them in any matter involving US personnel. On 11 March JGS IG requested MACIG assistance in interrogating US personnel and obtaining data from US units. The 164 Combat Aviation Group (CAG) was visited at Can Tho on 14 and 15 March; and Rach Soi stagefield, Kien Giang Province, Delta logistical support activity and Binh Thuy AB during 23-26 Mar 71.

(U) MACIG investigation noted that significant amounts of petroleum and ammunition were being lost or diverted at Delta stagefields, with at least 2.4 million gallons of JP-4 fuel stolen between 1 Dec 70 through 28 Feb 71. Additionally, quantities of 2.75-inch rockets were lost within 164th CAG; total amounts could not be determined due to inadequate procedures for accounting for and controlling rockets. The investigation determined that the losses were attributed to improper command and staff supervision. In addition to inadequate training, the poor procedures used for receipting for and control of the POL and ammunition were significantly responsible for the diversions and theft. MACIG recommended that command and control be firmly exercised at all levels, and then made specific recommendations for correcting procedures.

[redacted]

Allegations Made Through News Media by a US Officer (MIV-67-71)

(C) A case was initiated in 1971 as a result of a colonel alleging, through the news media, that senior officers had received awards which were not deserved, submitted false after-action reports, falsified enemy body count due to excess emphasis, and committed acts of negligence during combat in Vietnam. He was critical of US policy concerning Vietnam and specifically criticized a general officer for his conduct while commanding a brigade of the 9th Inf Div. MACIG initially conducted an investigation to determine whether the allegations were true and to see if the individual making the allegations had violated any MACV directive concerning release of information to the public. The officer himself was interviewed during the period 29 Jun through 2 Jul 71. Since he had no evidence to substantiate his allegations and was scheduled to return to CONUS for retirement, he was allowed to depart the command for CONUS. The investigation was continued with 75 witnesses interviewed in RVN and CONUS and a total of 115 documents examined. As a result of the overall investigation, the original allegations were found to be unsubstantiated. However, during interviews of various witnesses with respect to his original allegations, evidence was revealed which was prejudicial to the colonel; as a result, the investigation was broadened. It was determined that the officer was directly involved in illegal money manipulations which included shipment of US currency into RVN, its conversion at blackmarket rates, and subsequent transfer back to CONUS and other countries as money orders, travelers checks, and checks for currency. The sum involved may have been as large as $150,000. He used his command influence over his subordinates in these matters and was also derelict in the performance of his duties by participating in or condoning such activities as use of marijuana, gambling for high stakes, dispensing false awards, prostitution, living with a woman not his wife, and operating unauthorized money-making enterprises within his unit.

(U) The ROI forwarded to COMUSMACV on 16 Aug 71, was approved and forwarded to USARV for appropriate action. A criminal investigation was continued and this matter was ultimately referred to the Department of the Army, where it was resolved.

Sapper Attack on FSB Mary Ann (MIV-60-71)

(C) On 28 Mar 71, FSB Mary Ann was attacked by mortars and sappers causing extensive damage and resulting in 30 US KIA and 82 US WIA. Enemy known losses were 15 KIA. Following the attack the CG, 23d Inf Div directed his IG to investigate the circumstances surrounding the attack. This investigation was subsequently forwarded by CG, 23d Inf Div through channels and given to the MACIG for review on 24 May 71. As a result of a complete analysis it was determined that the circumstances should be reinvestigated. The second investigation was conducted from 6 Jun to 5 Jul 71. The MACIG investigation concluded that this enemy attack was successful because of a combination of conditions and attitudes of personnel involved; failure to follow established doctrine for defense; and lack of effective functioning of command within the brigade. The battalion commander, specifically, was found to be derelict in the performance of his duty. It was also determined that there had been errors, failures, and weaknesses on the part of certain other officers and noncommissioned officers of the division. The approved report was referred to DCG, USARV for appropriate action.

Analysis of Investigation of Rocket Attack on Fire Support Base C-2 (MIV-72-71)

(C) On 24 May 71, at approximately 1730 hours, FSB C-2 received 11 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. All rockets landed within the base perimeter with one round scoring a direct hit on a personnel bunker. Using a delayed action fuse the rocket penetrated the overhead cover and detonated inside the bunker resulting in 29 KIA and 35 WIA, all US. The USARV IG conducted an investigation from 26 May through 9 Jun 71. The report, which was forwarded to MACIG for

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comprehensive review, concluded that the destroyed bunker was built in accordance with approved construction standards and the success of the enemy attack was not a result of inadequate bunker construction. It was attributed to highly accurate 122mm rocket fire, use of a long delay fuse option, and a false sense of security which had developed during previous unsuccessful rocket attacks. The troops failed to maintain adequate dispersion and unfortunately congregated in one bunker. Allegations made by two lieutenants, that the bunker did not provide adequate cover and that there was gross negligence on the part of the commander, were not substantiated. In conjunction with the review of this investigation, an analysis of the available information on the enemy's past tactics and techniques was also made; it was determined that the enemy had changed his technique in two ways: (1) he had increased his accuracy and ability to deliver the rockets on a small target, and (2) he had used the long delay fuse option with his rockets. These two factors would increase the vulnerability of all fire support bases. MACIG recommended that appropriate commanders be alerted to increased accuracy of 122mm rocket fire and possible increased use of delayed action fuses.

COMBINED INVESTIGATIONS

(U) Another important part of the MACIG Inspections Division's effort during 1971 was participating in the Combined Investigations Committee. In a directive dated 18 Feb 71, the RVN Minister of Defense announced the desire of President Thieu to organize a Combined Investigation Committee consisting of the representatives of Allied forces, the RVNAF IG Directorate, JGS J3, Central POLWAR Command, Military Police, JA, and the Military Security Department. The committee was to take immediate action to investigate instances concerning the actions of Allied forces and RVNAF military personnel in rapes, assassinations, air strikes on friendly forces, corruption, and any other matters which might bring discredit or unfavorable publicity. The interest shown in combined investigations at the VN national level was another milestone in the development of the RVNAF. The following summarizes a representative report of a combined investigation.

Combined Investigation of Vietnamese Naval Logistics Systems (MIV-63-71)

(U) On 28 May 71, Admiral Elmo W. Zumwalt, Jr., CNO, advised General Abrams of serious logistics deficiencies within the Vietnamese Navy. On that date General Abrams directed MACIG to prepare a directive for a combined JGS/MACV investigation of the VNN logistics system. During the course of the investigation seven logistic support bases, six intermediate support bases and three operating bases were visited. In addition, over 50 boats and craft were inspected. A combined team began the investigation on 3 June and concluded its first phase at the Vietnamese Naval Supply Center (VNNSC) on 20 Jun 71. Because of the unsatisfactory condition at the VNNSC it was decided to conduct six separate interrelated investigations, with the following results.

-- Phase Two, The Vietnamese Naval Shipyard Supply and Fiscal Matters: it was concluded that the shipyard supply department was incapable of providing adequate spare part support for overhaul of ships. It was further determined that there were no budgetary restrictions required of the fiscal department and therefore no appreciation of monetary control was in evidence.

-- Phase Three, The Support Bases and Their Ability to Support the Brown Water Navy: it was determined that support bases do not receive adequate support from the VNNSC, supply operation was unsatisfactory, and the bases received little support from ARVN for repair of Material Handling Equipment (MHE).

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-- Phase Four, VNN Personnel Problems: it was determined that the onboard strength of the VNN, approximately 40,000, caused a severe shortage of middle managers. This was particularly true in the Logistics Support Command where less than 50 percent of their authorized middle management officers and petty officers were aboard. This situation aggravated the overall VNN logistics problem.

-- Phase Five, VNN Transportation Problems: it was determined that the VNN Logistics Command had relatively little responsibility for transportation with the exception of delivery of supplies by a leased trucking firm to the inland LSBs and ISBs. All water transportation of supplies was made by ships under the operational control of the Central Logistics Command.

-- Phase Six, The Ability of the VNN Shipyard to Support the Fleet Command by Scheduled Overhauls and Emergency Repairs of Ships of the Blue Water Fleet: it was determined that the shipyard had a serious problem in lack of both numbers and qualifications of the employees. In addition, there was a lack of sufficient spare parts support from the supply center to permit timely overhauls.

-- Phase Seven, Base Maintenance Support for the Brown Water Fleet, and Planned Maintenance System: major problems uncovered at the bases were the lack of maintenance of ARVN common equipment, material handling equipment (MHE), and motor vehicles; and inefficient management and lack of effective VNN production planning. It was further determined that although at present there was no preventive maintenance system, the US advisors were in the process of installing a system for the majority of the fleet which from all appearances was progressing satisfactorily. The investigation was completed on 1 Sep 71, with the recommendation that all deficiencies noted be corrected, and that follow-up inspections be scheduled.

IG COMPLAINTS

(U) The MACIG Complaints Division assumed an expanded mission during 1971, which included special actions, projects, and studies assigned by MACIG. In addition, the division continued its basic mission of correcting injustices affecting individuals and eliminating conditions determined to be detrimental to the efficiency and reputation of MACV and the US military forces. Special actions and projects assigned during 1971 included such matters as:

-- Analysis of Serious Incidents Reports (SIR) and periodic briefings.

-- Review of R and R procedures.

-- Study of mail delivery procedures throughout RVN.

-- Study on piaster conversion facilities.

-- Preparation of an IG training course.

-- Review of currency control procedures.

-- Study of alleged racially oriented incidents.

-- Review of drug abuse program.

-- Study on military justice jurisdictional problems caused by frequent shifting of unit locations in RVN.

(U) Certain of these special actions, notably the study on availability of piaster conversion facilities and the review of R and R procedures, resulted in a revision of applicable command policies and procedures or more strict observance. The study of mail delivery procedures throughout Vietnam surfaced many requests for assistance. The majority of complaints centered on late delivery of mail and the fact that the mail came at convulsive intervals, in bunches, indicating that the mail was allowed to pile up at various points awaiting transportation and delivery. MACIG inspectors determined that lack of transportation and qualified mail handlers were the primary sources of poor mail delivery service. As a result of these visits and inquiries greater command interest was generated, alleviating some of the mail deficiencies.

(U) The MACIG "Complaints and Requests For Assistance System and Procedures" received major revisions in August as a result of the new standardized worldwide DA OTIG Complaint Categories System. The 26 defined complaint categories were provided to all IG throughout RVN along with monthly reporting requirements. Within the entire spectrum of "IG Complaints and Requests for Assistance" received, the majority were contained in the two major groupings of personnel administration and unit administration. Specific categories of complaints concerned transfer, reassignment, assignment and utilization, all caused by the individual personnel adjustments during the troop phasedown.

ADVISORY ACTIVITIES

General Development of the RVNAF Inspector General System

(U) During 1971 a major objective with respect to the development of the RVNAF Inspector General system was achieved. After the RVNAF IG system was established in 1967, there continued to exist duplicating and overlapping inspection elements within the various directorates and commands of the JGS. This became an obstacle to establishing the RVNAF IG system that had been envisioned. One of the MACV/JGS IG objectives established in 1967 was elimination of these fragmented inspectional elements and establishment at JGS level and throughout RVNAF of a single uniform IG system. A precondition for this was acceptance by the other directorates and commands of the fact that such a system would continue to support them to the same degree which they were currently supported by their own inspection element. From 1967 through 1970 gradual changes were made towards achieving this objective; however, not until June 1971 was the objective attained.

(U) On 5 Jun 71 the Minister of Defense (MOD) issued a directive for an RVNAF IG reorganization that accomplished the objective of establishing the single uniform IG system within RVNAF, and all other inspection activities within JGS be either eliminated or incorporated into the RVNAF/JGS Inspector General Directorate. Agencies and commands affected by this action were CTC, POLWAR, CLC, and the technical services and departments.

(U) This RVNAF IG reorganization also provided for expansion of corps/MR IG offices from approximately 10 personnel to 70 to 80 depending on the number of sectors and ARVN forces assigned. The personnel came from the old RF/PF inspection teams and the technical inspection teams of the ALC's. The division IG offices were increased to seven officers and two men by pulling in the personnel previously authorized at regimental level. Sector IG offices of three officers and two men were also established.

(U) Following receipt of the JGS implementing directive on 5 July, the RVNAF/JGS IG Directorate began the reorganization. The authorized strength was increased from 103 to 314 including 177 officers to staff 30 inspection teams. On 1 November the Technical Inspection Division was formed; by year's end there were five inspection teams operating. Two additional

Army inspection teams were added to the four existing teams of the General Inspection Division on 1 Jan 72. On 3 August an Inspection and Investigation SOP was published which defined inspections and investigations, compiled pertinent JGS regulations relating to IG operations and assigned responsibilities for the scheduling, conduct, and reporting of inspections, and for investigations, to the JGS Directorate and to corps/MR, division, and sector IG offices and sections. Following some 5 months of field use, this was amended on 26 December, to add special subjects for inspection. The first two selected were the Ration Supplement Program and unit in-place training, as prescribed by JGS Directive 300-24.

(U) In April the RVNAF/JGS IG initiated a program of monthly internal seminars. Attendance included the RVNAF IG, Deputy IG, IG Directorate, division chiefs, and the US Deputy Senior Advisor and advisor branch chiefs. The purpose of the seminars was to review the past month's achievements, study problem areas, and discuss activities scheduled for the next month. In addition to the monthly internal seminars, semiannual RVNAF IG seminars were scheduled. Attendees were all corps/MR, division and sector IGs and their advisors. The first RVNAF IG seminar was held during 6 - 8 July. The primary subject of discussion was the reorganization of the RVNAF IG System, which had been directed by MOD on 5 June.

(U) During the year two IG orientation courses were conducted. The first class from 7 to 27 October graduated 50 officers, and the second from 2 to 23 December trained an additional 59 officers. Advisor participation was limited to the presentations of 4 hours of instruction on the US IG system.

Advisor Support to the RVNAF/JGS IG Directorate

(U) Throughout the year, MACIG provided continuing advice and assistance to the RVNAF/JGS IG Directorate. Prior to the reorganization of the RVNAF/JGS IG Directorate this effort was accomplished primarily through the Office of the Deputy Senior Advisor and advisors assigned to the Territorial Forces Inspections Advisory Branch who advised and assisted the IG Directorate Territorial Forces Inspections Division in inspecting RF and PF units throughout RVN. As the ARVN personnel of the Territorial Forces Inspection Branch had previously been assigned to the RF/PF Inspection Department and were only integrated in the IG Directorate in November 1970, and because the Territorial Forces numbered over 500,000 personnel or about 50 percent of the ARVN, inspection of these forces was a major undertaking. Concentrated advisory effort was made to insure that the inspection of these units was thoroughly and efficiently conducted in accordance with prescribed IG standards, and that the resulting reports accurately reflected the status of inspected units.

(U) From February to June 1971 there were 20 RVNAF/JGS IG Territorial Forces inspections conducted which were advisor-accompanied. On 13 July, an analysis of these inspections, together with recommendations for improvement in the inspection program, was submitted to the RVNAF/JGS IG by the Deputy Senior Advisor. These recommendations included a proposed change in the manner in which inspections were to be conducted and an overall change in the time scheduled for inspection trips (from 10 to 6 days), which would result in the saving of two four-man inspection teams and approximately 2,000 man-days of TDY per diem annually. After consideration by his staff, the RVNAF/JGS IG directed the new inspection schedule be adopted on 1 Sep 71. This action resulted in a more effective utilization of personnel and a better utilization of the available inspection time by the inspection teams.

(U) Subsequent to the reorganization of the RVNAF IG Directorate, the MACIG Advisory Division was expanded to provide for an advisor to each of the organized inspection teams of the General and Technical Inspections Divisions through the formation of the General Inspections Advisory Branch and the Technical Inspections Advisory Branch. The basic mission of the IG

advisor continued to be threefold: (1) to advise the IG inspection team in the proper techniques for inspection and to evaluate their effectiveness during the conduct of inspections of RVNAF units; (2) to evaluate the mission performance of the inspected RVNAF unit and; (3) to evaluate the effectiveness of the US advisors assigned to the inspected units. In executing this mission, the advisor rendered reports to MACIG on the results of his observations during inspection trips and, as appropriate, made recommendations through US and/or RVN channels to improve the effectiveness of the inspection team, the units inspected, and the US advisors to the inspected units.

(U) Copies of all RVNAF/JGS IG inspection reports were received, translated, and typed in English by assigned Vietnamese civilian personnel and ARVN interpreters. These reports were analyzed by the advisory personnel and forwarded to appropriate MACV staff agencies and MACV subordinate commands, to bring to the attention of the US personnel concerned, the strengths and weaknesses existing in RVNAF units. Through this concerted effort, US advisory personnel at all echelons have been provided factual information concerning the status of the inspected RVNAF units, which in turn constituted the basis for presenting recommendations to counterparts to correct existing deficiencies.

(U) During the second half of the year a major project accomplished was the review and processing in US channels of the revised TOE for the RVNAF IG Directorate reflecting the personnel authorized and equipment required to support the new organization. As of the end of the year, the TOE had been completely coordinated with all technical services concerned and was awaiting review by the MACV TOE Watch Committee.

RVNAF/JGS IG Inspections

(U) General Inspections Division. The RVNAF/JGS IG General Inspections Division (GID) began the year with four authorized and operational Army inspection teams and one each authorized Air Force and Navy inspection team, which were not manned. The approved reorganization of the IG Directorate increased the authorized Army inspection teams by four to a total of eight, and on 1 Jan 72 an additional two Army teams began scheduled inspections. The GID which has the responsibility for inspection of units of the RVN regular forces completed 101 inspection trips and inspected 288 units throughout the year. MACIG advisory personnel accompanied the GID inspection teams during the inspection of 127 units. Evaluation of GID inspection reports revealed the existence of the following significant deficiencies in units inspected:

-- All units lacked school trained specialist personnel. The desertion rates in combat units were higher than the JGS acceptable rate. Combat service support and technical units were, in most cases, operating under outdated and/or inadequate TOEs.

-- Units in built-up areas showed complacency toward compound security. Most defensive positions were in need of improvement.

-- Most units, in particular technical units, were not complying with JGS Directive 300-24 as pertains to the conduct of in-place training.

-- In many units the accountability for QM clothing was poor. Generally, shortages were found to exist in QM equipment, barracks, storage space, electrical power and dependent housing.

-- Most units were short school trained personnel and authorized POLWAR equipment.

(U) Territorial Forces Inspections Division. The RVNAF/JGS IG Territorial Forces Inspections Division (TFID) functioned throughout the year with eight authorized and operational inspection teams. Seven were utilized for the conduct of regularly scheduled inspections of Territorial Forces units, while the remaining team was utilized as a special inspection team to make inquiries into all allegations made against military personnel assigned to sectors. The TFID completed 137 inspection trips and inspected 566 units during the year. MACIG advisory personnel accompanied the TFID inspection teams during the inspection of 444 units. Evaluation of TFID inspection reports revealed the following major recurring deficiencies throughout the units inspected:

-- Unit strengths were generally below JGS authorized manning levels. Desertion rates in most units exceeded JGS acceptable rates. Throughout most sectors, personnel strengths of RF and PF units were not properly balanced. S-1 and S-4 officers of RF battalions and subsector headquarters were not school trained nor experienced officers.

-- Defensive measures at units and installations were inadequate in the majority of units. Defense plans, including provisions for artillery fire support were incomplete and in some instances nonexistent. Defensive positions and barriers, particularly barbed wire, required improvement and upgrading.

-- Reports of operations conducted were generally exaggerated because units did not adhere to the criteria prescribed in JGS Memorandum 310-21. Most RF units were not employing the Starlight scope. In-place training was not being conducted in accordance with JGS Directive 300-24.

-- Ammunition and weapons storage and maintenance was unsatisfactory in many units. Vehicle deadline rates were excessive in many units due to the lack of spare parts.

(U) Technical Inspections Division. The RVNAF/JGS IG Technical Inspections Division (TID) which was authorized as a new inspection division under the approved IG Directorate reorganization was organized effective 1 Nov 71; however, inspections were continued under the old CLC schedule. This division was assigned responsibility to evaluate mission accomplishment of RVNAF combat service support units. Formal IG technical inspections were scheduled to commence in January 1972. Ten visits were made to 22 units, all accompanied by IG advisory personnel, by the end-1971. Sufficient data to comment on the status of RVNAF combat service support units was not available at the end of the period.

Inspection of RVNAF Ration Supplement Program

(U) An increase in US advisory effort was required to monitor and inspect the new RVNAF Ration Supplement Program (RSP). This US-funded program provided food supplements of meat, fish, poultry, and cooking oil to the 1,100,000 members of RVNAF. Receipt, storage, and distribution of the supplements were to be closely monitored to make certain that there were no abuses in distribution and that the commodities did not appear on the blackmarket. Under this program RVNAF was to issue 13,000,000 rations annually to 1,100,000 people at a first year cost of US$42.7 million. The blackmarket potential for an operation of this size was self-evident.

(U) The C/S, MACV, and the C/S, JGS, directed the formation of four special combined IG teams, composed of field grade officers from MACIG and the RVNAF/JGS IG to advise, assist, monitor, and inspect the program at all levels. One of these teams operated in each military region. Countrywide aspects of the program were monitored by the team responsible for MR 3. Teams were to observe the loading, unloading, and handling procedures, the accuracy of stock record cards maintained, and any indications of diversion or pilferage of food items. Particular

attention was given to the issue and control of the coupons used in the program as well as questioning of program administrators and individual RVNAF servicemen regarding their receipt of coupons and rations. In addition to regularly scheduled inspections by the special combined teams, the administration of the RVNAF Ration Supplement Program was a special subject for RVNAF/JGS IG inspection teams conducting inspections of RVNAF units.

(U) Inspections conducted during 1971 disclosed many problems in the program related to late arrival of foodstuffs in-country and transportation difficulties for distribution of supplies within country. These transportation problems were particularly acute in the movement by water of supplies from Saigon to Can Tho, slated for distribution within the southern part of MR 4, and within MR 3 after III Corps truck companies had been diverted to Cambodia to support cross-border operations. There was no evidence of diversion of food stuffs, nor of other corrupt practices with regard to the RSP, although some pilferage of stocks during shipment had been noted.

JGS Investigations and Complaints

(U) On 18 Feb 71 the Minister of Defense sent a letter to the JGS directing the establishment of a combined investigation committee of RVNAF and FWMAF personnel to cope with the increasing number of incidents involving FWMAF and Vietnamese personnel, both military and civilian. The RVNAF IG was assigned responsibility for this action. In July following an extended period of combined US/RVN IG effort, a bilingual "Standing Operating Procedures for Combined Investigations" was published and distributed through both US and RVN channels. This SOP provides guidance for the initiation, organization, and conduct of combined investigations by US and RVN Inspector Generals, and it represents a significant advance in the field of investigations.

(U) During 1971 the RVNAF/JGS IG Directorate made 978 investigations, with results as shown:

Category	Substantiated	Not Substantiated	Could not be determined
Corruption	191	175	14
Violation of individual rights	249	206	32
Conflicts between military personnel	91	19	5
Complaints by civilians	69	28	4
Total	500	423	55

(U) The RVN complaints system closely parallels the US IG complaints system. The procedure for handling complaints within RVNAF is contained in JGS Memorandum 337 dated 20 Mar 67. During all inspections the troops are afforded the opportunity to register complaints and all inspectors are required to make specific inquiry into leaves, pay, promotion, and assignments (the subject of most complaints in the past). Statistically the number of complaints is not large for a force of 1,100,000. One of the reasons is that complaints received during inspections which are solved in the unit prior to the inspection team's departure are not recorded as complaints.

(U) During 1971, 655 complaints and requests for assistance were processed and recorded by the JGS IG Directorate. A breakdown of subjects and findings showed:

	Justified	Not Justified	Total
Transfer/Discharge/Demobilization	59	75	134
Punishment/Demotion	42	53	95
Promotion	20	38	58
Pay	65	32	97
Appeals from penalties, Miscellaneous	68	89	157
Requests for assistance	61	53	114
Total	315	340	655

Summation of Results for the Year

(U) In September 1970, LTG Lu Lan, former II Corps Commander, was assigned as the RVNAF Inspector General. He brought to the IG Directorate, in addition to the necessary rank and prestige, the equally important interest and organizational/managerial abilities. His announced goal was to establish the credibility of the RVNAF Inspector General by securing and training sufficient qualified officers to fill the authorized IG positions down to division and sector level, and by proving to the individual soldiers that the IG exists, not as a tool of the commander, but rather to serve him by eliminating corruption and injustice within the RVNAF. During 1971 considerable improvement was noted in the depth, scope, and validity of RVNAF/JGS IG inspections. Continued advisor assistance was still required to effect standardization of inspection techniques and preparation of inspection reports. These were advisor goals for 1972. By 1 Jan 72, 19 of the 30 authorized inspection teams were operational. There was a need for continued advisor assistance in getting the remaining teams, particularly the Air Force and Navy teams, formed and operational. During 1972, with the continued drawdown of field advisors, the presence of IG advisors with the RVNAF IG Inspection Teams would serve not only to upgrade the performance of those teams, but would also provide a valuable US source of information concerning the problem areas within RVNAF and the combat effectiveness of RVNAF units.[44]

MACV ACCREDITED CORRESPONDENTS

(monthly average)
1968–1970



Source: MACOI

Figure X-3

INFORMATION AND THE PRESS

THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION

Mission

(U) The principal responsibilities of the MACV Office of Information (MACOI) were to provide maximum information to the public concerning the activities and operations of the US forces in Vietnam consistent with security requirements, and to provide a vigorous and substantive command information program of news and feature material for the uniformed servicemen. As a member of COMUSMACV personal staff, the Chief of Information was the principal advisor to the commander on all public and command information matters.

(U) Throughout 1971 the mission of MACOI remained unchanged. In spite of the accelerated decline in US assets and resources in RVN and the diminishing US combat role, the pressing demands of news correspondents remained reasonably high and, in fact, increased substantially in the latter part of the year when the GVN held its national election and presidential inauguration, and President Nixon announced substantial and significant redeployment of US troops.

(U) In fulfilling its responsibility of providing information, MACOI dealt with an average of 387 accredited correspondents daily during 1971.[45] (See Figure X-3.) The average number had decreased from 474 in 1968 and 1969, and from 445 the previous year. These correspondents represented both US and international news gathering organizations in all media including printed matter, still picture, radio, television, and motion picture. In addition to providing news, the office was also charged with the general support of correspondents pertaining to accreditation, transportation, messing, and billeting for newsmen in the field.

Organization

(U) As of 1 Jan 71 the MACV Office of Information was organized along functional lines with five support divisions.[46] The five divisions and their responsibilities were:

- The Public Information Division (PID) was charged with all external information including public release of information to correspondents and daily dealings with the press corps.
- The Command Information Division (CID) was charged with monitoring all internal information programs of the various component commands, and publication of the MACV weekly newspaper, The Observer.
- The Plans and Policy Division (PPD) was charged with long-range development of information policy and information contingency planning, and was the principal point of contact for coordination actions with other headquarters staff elements.
- The Information Advisory Division (IAD) was charged with directing the program to advise RVN commanders and units on information matters and the conduct of public information programs.
- The Special Projects Division (SPD) was charged with providing support to the press corps in all areas other than the dissemination of news. This included accreditation, transportation, messing and billeting, and the conduct of special press tours and air-

lifts for specific events.

(U) The American Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN) operated as a division of MACOI. The Chief of Information supervised the activities of the radio and television networks and was charged with the broadcast of radio and television news and entertainment of US military personnel in RVN.

Phasedown of Advisory Billets

(U) Early in 1971 MACOI was authorized 29 Information Officer (IO) billets specifically to advise RVNAF on public information matters at major headquarters. The JTD provided for 18 Army IO advisors at RVN corps and division level, eight Air Force, and three Navy IO advisors. Some difficulty was experienced in filling these billets with qualified officers.

(U) The shortage of IO advisors called for a readjustment of allocations. As the chief of IAD recommended in his end-of-tour report (14 Aug 71):

> The elimination of IO advisors. . . has resulted in undesirable shortages at the division level, particularly in MR 1. An acceptable alternative in the absence of division advisors is to authorize two US IO advisors at corps level. As the personnel squeeze begins to be felt more strongly, it is believed US IO advisors should be eliminated first from divisions and from military regiments, in turn, from south to north, in recognition of the fact that the majority of military activity and interest remains in MR 1. If possible, division information advisors should be retained through June of 1972 and at the corps level through the end of 1972.[47]

(U) By the end of 1971, IO advisor billets were reduced to 14: eight Army, five Air Force, and one Navy. They were retained only at corps or higher levels with advisors often performing dual functions of advisor to RVNAF and IO for the US advisory agency. Further elimination of IO advisory billets was anticipated in 1972 as the drawdown of US forces continued.

(U) Throughout 1971 extensive plans for consolidation and redeployment were developed. On 31 Dec 71, IAD and SPD merged to form a new division, the Information Advisory and Accreditation Division (IAAD).[48] Justification for the combined division was predicated on reduction of transportation services to the press corps plus an increased proficiency in the field by ARVN and US Information Officer advisors, reducing the necessity and frequency for field liaison visits by IAAD advisors. All division-level billets were either already eliminated or scheduled to be in the near future.

Termination of the Sound-on-Film Motion Picture Program

(U) From 1965 to 1971, MACOI operated five motion picture teams specifically to produce sound-on-film news material for the US television networks. The program was terminated, and the teams returned to their parent services on 30 Jun 71.

(U) The concept of the motion picture teams was originally recommended by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Arthur Sylvester to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance on 26 Oct 65. Secretary Vance approved the recommendation on 12 Nov 65, and five teams (two from the Army and one each from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps)

became operational under MACV in June 1966.[49] The stated purpose of the teams was to provide sound-on-motion picture coverage of the activities of US and Allied forces in Vietnam, to include civic action and nation building. The objective was to provide maximum visual/sound information on the everyday activities of these forces as opposed to the "hard news" and major events which were being covered by the film crews of the national television networks.

(U) The order to terminate the sound-on-film program was contained in a message in March 1971 from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Daniel Z. Henkin to COMUSMACV as follows:

> Effective June 30, 1971, the MACV V-series sound-on-film program will be terminated and those component manpower and equipment resources dedicated to MACV in support of the program will be returned to the components. The decision to end this program is based on budget reductions and the continuing reduction of the US military role in SEA. Please extend my personal thanks to all concerned for a job well done.[50]

Armed Forces Vietnam Network Stations

(U) Plans for the termination or consolidation of some of the radio and television operations of AFVN were developed in the latter half of 1971. The basic policy was to maintain stations where troop populations and physical security were adequate. The objective was to maintain broadcast service to all locations which had at least 100 men.[51] In early September 1971 the television station at Quang Tri was collocated with the GVN facility at Hue, and the television and FM radio facilities at Nha Trang were moved to Cam Ranh Bay.

(U) As 1971 ended, AFVN operated the network center at Saigon with broadcast outlets at Can Tho, Cat Lo, Phan Rang, Cam Ranh Bay, Tuy Hoa, Qui Nhon, Da Nang, Hue, and Pleiku. The first consolidation planned for 1972 was conversion of the radio station at Tuy Hoa into a transmitter and rebroadcast operation.

MACV News Publications

(U) The authorized MACV newspaper, The Observer, continued to be published throughout 1971 by the MACOI staff. In addition, 23 other periodicals, primarily newspapers, were printed and edited for subordinate units in support of the Command Information Program.[52] (See Figure X- 4.) At end-71 as US forces continued to deploy, eight had been discontinued and the number was expected to decrease further.

MILITARY PUBLICATIONS PRINTED BY MACOI
(1971)

Name of Publication	Unit	Term of Publication	Printing Frequency
Army Reporter*	USARV	Aug 69 - Current	Weekly
The Observer*	MACV	Jul 69 - Current	Weekly
7th AF News*	7th AF	Oct 71 - Current	Weekly
Screaming Eagle	101st Abn Div (Ambl)	Aug 69 - Current	Biweekly
Tropic Lightning News	25th Inf Div	Aug 69 - Mar 71	Weekly

MILITARY PUBLICATIONS PRINTED BY MACOI (Contd)
(1971)

Name of Publication	Unit	Term of Publication	Printing Frequency
Southern Cross	23d Inf Div	Aug 69 - Nov 71	Weekly
Cavalair	1st Cav Div (Ambl)	Aug 69 - Apr 71	Weekly
Firebase 173	173d Abn Bde	Aug 69 - Jul 71	Biweekly
Blackhorse	11th ACR	Aug 69 - Current	Monthly
Red Devil Brigade	1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)	Dec 69 - Jun 71	Biweekly
Castle Courier	USARENGRCOMDV	Aug 69 - Current	Biweekly
Communicator	1st Sig Bde	Jan 70 - Current	Biweekly
Narrative Summary	USAMEDCOMV	Jan 70 - Current	Monthly
Northern Log	USASUPCOM-DN	Dec 69 - Current	Monthly
Round Up	18th MP Bde	Aug 69 - Current	Monthly
III Corps Advisor	USAAG, III Corps (RVN)	Jan 70 - Apr 71	Monthly
Delta Dragon	DRAC	Jan 70 - Current	Monthly
Artillery Review	IFFV Arty	Jan 71 - Aug 71	Monthly
Hi-Lite	USASUPCOM-S	Jan 70 - Current	Monthly
4th Dimension	4th Trans Comd	Apr 71 - Current	Monthly
Charger	196th Inf Bde (Sep)	Dec 71 - Current	Biweekly
Gary Owen	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl)	May 71 - Current	Biweekly
Bay Window	USASUPCOM-CRB	Oct 71 - Current	Monthly
TRAC	TRAC	Sep 71 - Nov 71	Monthly

* A 12-page publication. All others were 8-page publications.

Source: MACOI

Figure X - 4

SPECIAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Operation DEWEY CANYON II/LAM SON 719

(U) Operation DEWEY CANYON II (Phase I of LAM SON 719) was initiated on 30 Jan 71, at which time HQ, XXIV (US) Corps relocated to a forward command post at Quang Tri. On 29 Jan 71, COMUSMACV declared an embargo on news coverage of the entire operation. The IO, XXIV Corps was charged with insuring that all correspondents in the area were informed of the embargo.[53] The Da Nang Press Center was in the process of closing, and the Information Office, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) was not adequately staffed or equipped to handle the large influx of civilian and military correspondents arriving to cover these operations. The XXIV Corps IO established a press camp at the Quang Tri airfield on 31 Jan 71 to provide mess and billeting accommodations, to arrange transportation, and to extend administrative and communications assistance to MACV-accredited correspondents.

(U) After much close-hold operational planning, the press was briefed simultaneously at Da Nang by the XXIV Corps IO and at HQ, MACV by MACOI. At these briefings the press was informed that all military operations in MR 1 were under an embargo immediately, except for operations contained in the MACV daily news release. The press was further briefed at 1830 local time at HQ, MACV on 30 Jan 71, at which time military operations and press coverage were explained in detail and transportation arrangements were made. The embargo announcement itself was not for publication, and press cooperation was solicited.

(U) The 30 January briefing touched only on the US side of the operation, DEWEY CANYON II. By this time there was speculation in foreign capitals that an "invasion" of Laos from RVN was underway or pending. This speculation probably stemmed from the fact that the NVA had anticipated at least part of the RVN operation. Hanoi made loud public pronouncements in all areas where they thought public indignation was beneficial. Speculation was difficult to separate from actual breach of the embargo.

(U) There were two practical difficulties in holding the embargo. First, there was no positive way to get all the Saigon press corps together, therefore MACOI could not be sure that everyone was informed. Second, the press was not taken entirely into the confidence of the command for reasons of policy and security. Briefings under an embargo did not cover sensitive areas which were the most newsworthy parts of the operation, i.e., the fact that it was going to be going on in Laos. Most of the press corps guessed that this was going on, which added to the frustrations and animosity between IOs and the press. The embargo was lifted at 0830Z 4 Feb 71 (1630 Saigon time). The press corps was notified that the embargo had served its purpose, that our casualties had been at an absolute minimum, and routine coverage could be resumed.[54]

(U) It was announced to the press on 9 Feb 71 that the term DEWEY CANYON II was being discontinued, and that future US operations in the area would be reported by action or engagement. Air and artillery support provided by RVN during operation LAM SON 719, Phase II, which began on 8 Feb 71, would be identified with that operation.[55]

(U) At 1700 on 12 February an ARVN spokesman briefed the press on the RVN operation into Laos. Effective that date, joint US/RVN briefings were conducted at the Quang Tri press camp each evening beginning at 1730 hours. During 66 days of operation, the Quang Tri press camp offered assistance to 234 correspondents from 68 agencies representing virtually every Free World nation.[56]

Drug Information Programs

(U) Early in 1971 the drug abuse incidents in Vietnam shifted dramatically from the use of marijuana to the use of heroin (see "Drug and Narcotic Abuse," this chapter). Following the publication of MACV Directive 190-4, "Drug Suppression Program" (December 1970), MACOI concentrated on expanding the drug information and education programs to emphasize the dangers of use of hard drugs. The MACV newspaper, The Observer, published 304 drug articles between 1 Jan and 30 Nov 71. In addition, an entire 12-page issue devoted to the drug problem was published in September 1971. Newspapers and periodicals of subordinate commands further publicized the harmful effects of drug abuse throughout 1971.

(U) MACOI published and distributed to the field a pamphlet entitled "66 Didn't Make It -- The Story of Drugs in the Republic" (March 1971) and an information booklet in a comic book format on the heroin abuse problem in Vietnam (September 1971).[57] The Command Information Quarterly Guidance (May 1971) and MACOI Fact Sheets (October 1971) further disseminated drug information to the field.[58]

(U) Several thousand copies of the Stars and Stripes article, "Cold Turkey," and the American Red Cross pamphlet, "Drugs and Their Abuse," were distributed to the field as support material for the campaign against drugs. AFVN also responded to the drug problem. From 1 Jan to 1 Jun 71 AFVN averaged approximately 35 radio spots per week. Some TV feature material from AFRTS was used on a regular basis; the TV spots produced by AFRTS, however, were not applicable to the Vietnam situation and local TV spots were written by AFVN addressing the particular problem in Vietnam. When efforts were accelerated in June

1971 to conduct a saturation campaign against heroin, radio spots on AM radio increased to 133 per week. Since AM radio had particular appeal to the 18 to 25-year old audience, more spots were broadcast there than on FM radio. Later and throughout the remainder of 1971 AFVN put equal emphasis on AM and FM radio to publicize the problems of drug abuse. Following is a copy of a typical radio spot: [59]

> I've been to the other world and back again. I've tried a little of everything. I've tried to get to know myself. I've tried to get away from myself. But the images I saw reflected were distorted, and I ran out of things to hide behind. I feel my body being torn from my mind, and I cry out, "Is there no one left to hear me?". . . Find a friend. The Saigon area drug rehabilitation center is in building 613 at the MACV Annex. Their phone is 923-3597.

PRESS RELATIONS

Logistic Support to Newsmen

(U) Throughout the course of US involvement in RVN, MACOI provided numerous support and logistic privileges to the members of the accredited press corps. Some of the services such as transportation, messing and billeting facilities, and vehicle support for newsmen covering operations with forces in the field were considered necessary for the press to properly perform its responsibility of reporting the war. Other support services, such as military exchanges, officer clubs, and postal privileges were not necessary for the press to do its job, but were considered minimal personal convenience services that could be provided without taxing the military support system.

(U) During the first half of 1971 the number of correspondents in RVN averaged 350. By mid-1971, however, diminishing US troop strength and the associated decline of the logistic support base resulted in a program to eliminate logistic support privileges authorized for a number of civilian groups, including the press corps. A study completed in November 1971 led to the withdrawal of support privileges consistent with troop withdrawals.[60] The new standards for privileges is further discussed in the "Investigations and Inspections" section of this chapter.

Morning Releases and Sunday Briefings Ended

(U) At the beginning of 1971 a MACV news release was distributed to correspondents each morning and afternoon (including Sundays) at the National Press Center in Saigon. A MACOI news briefer met with the press corps at 1615 hours daily and discussed or clarified information. As US participation in ground operations decreased, the number of correspondents attending the briefings also decreased which led to the MACOI announcement on 25 Jul 71 that the morning news releases would be discontinued the following day.[61] The afternoon news releases would continue as long as interest warranted. Special events would be briefed or released both mornings and afternoons.

(U) On 1 Sep 71 the Chief of Information announced that MACOI news briefers would no longer present formal briefings on Sundays at the press center. This action was taken because fewer news correspondents were attending the Sunday briefings, and was in keeping with the general drawdown of US forces in RVN. The printed news releases continued daily and briefings continued daily except Sundays into 1972.

Da Nang and Can Tho Press Centers Closed

(U) Consistent with the command's overall 1971 objectives of conserving assets and reducing personnel and expenditures, MACOI announced on 31 Mar 71 the closing of MACV press centers at Da Nang (MR 1) and Can Tho (MR 4). MACOI continued to use the GVN-operated National Press Center in Saigon for news releases and daily briefings.[62] The MACV centers originally were established to provide support services to members of the press corps operating from the two field locations. The Da Nang and Can Tho press centers were staffed with uniformed information personnel who provided transportation, movement of news material, and film processing support. They also maintained billeting, messing and club facilities for visiting correspondents.

Actions Against News Correspondents

(U) Three news correspondents were cited in 1971 for unprofessional conduct in RVN. Under the provisions of MACV Staff Memorandum 360-8, 21 Apr 70, COMUSMACV appointed a board of officers to investigate each allegation of misconduct and to make appropriate recommendations. This board consisted of an officer from MACOI, MACJA, and JUSPAO.

(U) Mr. Bert W. Okuley, correspondent for United Press International, was debarred on 13 May 71 for violations of GVN customs and exchange laws, because he had made an illegal currency transaction: by debarment he was denied all military support privileges and declared ineligible for employment in RVN under US Government financed contracts. Debarment was automatic ground for disaccreditation, so Mr. Okuley was permanently disaccredited on 11 Jun 71 and excluded from military facilities for the purpose of news reporting.[63]

(U) Mr. James P. Bennett of the National Broadcasting Company was determined by the board to have to have exhibited unprofessional conduct in that he used "loud, boisterous, abusive, vulgar, and threatening language" to the XXIV Corps IO. The recommendation of the board approved by COMUSMACV was that Mr. Bennett be suspended from all accreditation rights and privileges for 30 days beginning 21 Apr 71.[64] This incident initiated a concurrent investigation by MACIG (further discussed in Investigations and Inspections section, this Chapter) which ultimately resulted in the closing of the Da Nang Press Center on 31 Mar 71.

(U) Mr. Henry A. Colgate, freelance correspondent representing the National Broadcasting Company and Overseas Weekly, was determined by the MACV board to have used "loud, abusive, and threatening language" to the NCOIC of the 196th Inf Bde enlisted mess. Mr. Colgate was suspended from all accreditation rights and privileges for 30 days beginning 12 Aug 71.[65]

(U) These three actions in 1971 raised the total to 76 correspondents who either had been debarred from US military facilities, or had received temporary or permanent suspensions of accreditation between early 1967 to January 1972. (All relevant MACOI records prior to 1967 were destroyed by fire.) The reasons for withdrawals were unprofessional conduct, dealings on the black market, falsified documents, misrepresentations, failures to meet just financial obligations, subversive activities, money manipulations, and violations of the MACOI ground rules governing release of information.

Correspondents Casualties in SEA

(U) The press corps suffered 49 known casualties in SEA from 1954 to 1971. Since news correspondents had considerable independence in covering combat operations, records of

casualties in some cases were inaccurate or nonexistent. Casualties confirmed by their employers are marked with an asterisk. The following is an unofficial list of correspondent casualties in SEA in chronological order.[66]

-- CAPA, Robert, American, Life Magazine, 1954; killed by Viet Minh.

-- THIEL, Peter Ronald Van, naturalized American of Dutch extraction, May 1965, Mekong Delta, RVN; died of wounds.

-- ROSE, Jerry, American freelance writer, September 1965, near Quang Ngai; killed in a commercial plane crash.

-- *KOLENBERG, Bernard, American photographer, Associated Press, 2 Oct 65, near An Khe; killed in USAF plane crash.

-- *MY, Huynh Thanh, South Vietnamese staff photographer, Associated Press, 13 Oct 65, Mekong Delta; killed in a commercial plane crash.

-- CHAPELLE, Dickie, American war correspondent and photographer, 4 Nov 65, south of Da Nang; killed by booby trap.

-- HIGGINS, Margaret, American, Newsday, 3 Jan 66, Walter Reed Hospital; died of suspected hepatitis.

-- CHELLAPPAH, Charlie, Singaporean freelance photographer, 14 Feb 66, near Cu Chi; killed during combat action.

-- CASTAN, Sam, American, Look Magazine, 21 May 66, Central Highlands; killed by mortar fire.

-- FALL, Bernard B., French author on Vietnam, 21 Feb 67, near Hue; killed by suspected booby trap.

-- GALLAGHER, Ronald D., American free lance photographer, 11 Mar 67, in Mekong Delta; killed by artillery fire.

-- SCHUYLER, Felipa, American correspondent and concert pianist, 9 May 67, near Da Nang; killed in helicopter crash.

-- *DAVIS, Neil, American reporter, Visnews, 19 May 67, Mekong Delta; slightly wounded by hostile fire.

-- ELLISON, Robert J., American freelance photographer, 5 Mar 68, near Khe Sanh; killed in plane downed by hostile fire.

-- *PIGOTT, Bruce, Australian Assistant Bureau Chief, Reuters, 5 May 68, Saigon; killed by hostile fire.

-- *LARAMY, Ronald B., British correspondent for Reuters, 5 May 68, Saigon; killed by hostile fire.

-- CANTWELL, John L., Australian correspondent, Time Life, 5 May 68, Saigon; killed by hostile fire.

-- *BIRCH, Micheal Y., Australian reporter, Associated Press, 5 May 68, Saigon; killed by hostile fire.

-- *EGGLESTON, Charles, American photographer, United Press International, 6 May 68, Saigon; killed by hostile fire.

-- *MINE, Hiromichi, Japanese photographer, United Press International, 7 May 68, near Da Nang; died of wounds suffered on 5 May 68.

-- EZURRA, Ignacio, Brazilian correspondent, La Nacion, 8 May 69, Saigon; missing since 1968 TET offensive, presumed dead.

-- SAKAI, Tasuo, Japanese correspondent, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Aug 68, Saigon; killed during rocket attack.

-- *SAVANUCK, Paul, SP5, US military reporter, Stars and Stripes, Apr 69, near Cam Lo; killed by hostile fire while with C Trp, 3d Sqdn, 5th Cav.

-- *NOONAN, Oliver E., American photographer, Associated Press, 19 Aug 69, Quang Tin Province; killed in helicopter crash.

-- *SAINT PAUL, Alain, French correspondent, Agence France Press, Dec 69, near Dac Lo; killed by hostile fire.

-- *BELL, Steve, American correspondent, American Broadcasting Company, April 1970, Cambodia; captured for 12 hours.

-- *KHOO, Terrence, Singaporean cameraman, American Broadcasting Company, April 1970, Cambodia; captured for 12 hours.

-- *SENZAKI, Youki, Japanese TV soundman, American Broadcasting Company, April 1970, Cambodia; captured for 12 hours.

-- *BELLENDORF, Dicter, German correspondent, National Broadcasting Company, 8 May 70, Cambodia; missing in action.

-- MILLER, Gerald, American correspondent, Columbia Broadcasting System, 31 May 70, 60 miles south of Phnom Penh; killed by hostile fire.

-- SYVERTSEN, George, American correspondent, Columbia Broadcasting Company, 31 May 70, Cambodia; killed by hostile fire.

-- LEKHI, Raimanik, Indian correspondent, Columbia Broadcasting Company, 31 May 70, Cambodia; captured.

-- *HANGEN, Welles, American correspondent, National Broadcasting Company, 31 May 70, Cambodia; missing.

-- *COLNE, Roger, French correspondent, National Broadcasting Company, 31 May 70, Cambodia; missing.

-- *YOSHIHIKO, Waku, Japanese correspondent, National Broadcasting Company, 31 May 70, Cambodia; missing.

-- *BARRON, Xavier, French correspondent, Agence France Press, 8 Jul 70, Cambodia; captured (released 25 Aug 70).

-- PUISSESSEU, Rene, French correspondent, ORTF Television, 11 Jul 70, Cambodia; killed by hostile fire.

-- *FROSCH, Frank, American correspondent, Bureau Chief, United Press International (Cambodia), 28 Oct 70, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; killed by hostile fire.

-- *SAWADA, Kyoichi, Japanese photographer, United Press International (Cambodia), 28 Oct 70, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; killed by hostile fire.

-- *BURROWS, Larry, British photographer, Life Magazine, 11 Feb 71, Laos; presumed killed in helicopter crash.

-- *HUET, Henri, French photographer, Associated Press, 11 Feb 71, Laos; presumed killed in helicopter crash.

-- *POTTER, Kent, American photographer, United Press International, 11 Feb 71, Laos; presumed killed in helicopter crash.

-- SHIMAMOTO, Keisaburo, Japanese photographer, Jiji and Pana Press, 11 Feb 71, Laos; presumed killed in helicopter crash.

-- BAILLY, Francois, French freelance writer, United Press International, 21 Feb 71, Suong, Cambodia; found dead.

-- SULLEY, Francois, French correspondent, Newsweek, 23 Feb 71; killed in helicopter midair explosion.

-- *YOSEP, Lee, American correspondent, Visnews, 28 Mar 71, Cambodia; wounded by hostile fire, also captured Nov 71 and released Dec 71.

-- *WEBB, Kate, New Zealander correspondent, United Press International, 7 Apr 71, Cambodia; captured (released 1 May 71).

-- SO, Kim, Vietnamese cameraman, Visnews, 5 Jun 71, Pleiku, RVN; wounded slightly by hostile fire.

-- *QUAN, Le Thanh, Vietnamese cameraman, Visnews, 26 Oct 71, Dinh Quan District, RVN; presumed captured.

RVNAF Public Information Ground Rules

(U) On 31 Dec 71 the RVN General Political and Warfare Department (GPWD) published ground rules for the release of information to news correspondents covering the combat activities of RVNAF.[67] The ground rules were first published by JGS/RVNAF in January 1971 as a standing operating procedure which governed press releases of all military units until the final ground rules were published. RVNAF ground rules closely paralleled the MACV ground rules for US forces and military advisors, and the procedures for accreditation and discipline of newsmen were generally the same.

DATA MANAGEMENT AGENCY

MISSION

(U) The Data Management Agency (DMA), MACV was responsible for providing automatic data processing (ADP) services to all MACV staff elements except the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, J2. The mission of DMA encompassed three essential ADP functions.

-- First, DMA provided data processing support to MACV staff agencies and to other organizations in and around the Saigon area.

-- Second, as a member of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) for US Forces, DMA was responsible for development and promulgation of joint ADP policies, procedures, and organizational guidance to subordinate commanders.

-- Third, as the senior advisor to COMUSMACV on ADP matters, DMA had an advisory role to the JGS in development and promulgation of applicable RVNAF policies, organization, and procedures.

Organizational Changes

(U) During 1971 agency managers made a significant organizational change which improved the flow of work within DMA and facilitated more effective use of available personnel resources. The Systems Maintenance Office (SMO) which was responsible for design and maintenance of the DMA systems was functionally placed under the Chief, Data Processing Division, the primary user of the DMA operating system. Prior to 1971 the SMO reported directly to the Chief, DMA.

DMA Mission Planning

(U) A MACV ADP study group met on 14 Oct 71 to determine the future of the DMA and overall ADP support for the future MACV organization. The study group consisted of representatives from MACV, HQ 7AF, HQ USARV, and HQ NAVFORV. The study group concluded that there was a validated requirement for a multiprogramming ADP system to support an expected production level of 450 system hours per month on MACV mission-essential requirements through March 1973. It was therefore recommended and approved by the MACV Chief of Staff on 15 Dec 71, that DMA continue operations in its present configuration through FY73.

DMA SERVICES EXPANSION

(U) There was a continuing expansion of ADP usage during 1971. In addition to the daily support given to the MACV Headquarters complex, DMA extended its services to the 7th Finance Section, USARV, the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV), and US Navy Forces, Vietnam (NAVFORV).

(U) The large number of local nationals paid by the 7th Finance Section made the manual pay system cumbersome and difficult to administer. Recognizing the potential for reducing time-consuming manual tasks through the use of ADP techniques, DMA modified a USAID ADP system to provide time and attendance cards, compute pay, and provide leave and earning statements for the local nationals paid by this section.

(U) In September 1971 USAPAV requested that ADP support provided by the Data Service Center at Long Binh be transferred to the MACV DMA to save travel time between Long Binh at USAPAV Headquarters in Saigon. DMA approved the request and designed a data system to accomplish the requirements which included a master listing of all active, inactive, and retired contracts administered by USAPAV; a report on US invited contractors; a master source listing of all contractors doing business with USAPAV; a retired contract summary; and a listing of contracts being administered by each contracting officer.

(U) During the period 1 Dec 71 through January 1972 NAVFORV underwent a loss of ADP capability due to personnel redeployment. To offset this decrease in capability, on 1 Jan 72 DMA assumed a large portion of NAVFORV's ADP requirements. DMA supported NAVFORV in the following programs:

-- Maintained information concerning the training of RVNAF personnel in US DOD-operated and/or sponsored service schools and universities in the United States.

-- Assisted in management of US Navy materiel due to be retrograded to the US or turned over to the RVN Navy.

-- Assisted in the management and maintenance of USN aviation assets.

-- Assisted in the effective management of the status of assets funded by the Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF).

-- Provided computer data on all US Navy MASF requisitions, both outstanding and completed.

ADP Contract Changes

(U) Significant management improvement in 1971 resulted in an estimated annual savings of $80,000 in equipment rental. The MACV Chief of Staff approved a DMA recommendation which authorized the agency to enter into a 12-month lease plan for selected automatic data processing equipment in FY72. This fixed term contract resulted in an 8 percent savings on the basic rental and reduced the use (overtime) charges for installed equipment.

NEW PROGRAM CONCEPTS

(U) During 1971 DMA technicians successfully designed and programmed utility programs and subroutines to permit proper sorting, reading, and printing of data in the Vietnamese language. To expedite this development, while awaiting receipt of a Vietnamese print train from the IBM Corporation, USAID agreed to loan DMA their print train for testing. On 22 Sep 71, 17 Vietnamese card punch operators began practice in punching the special characters that were to be used to represent the Vietnamese alphabet and diacritics. Successful use of this added capability enabled DMA to produce completely intelligible plain-text Vietnamese products.

(U) Another new concept developed during 1971 was the use of ADP equipment to digitize map and chart information and create a magnetic tape of the resultant data. With this added capability, DMA then had the ability to produce digital representation of a desired object such as a map or chart. One application of this capability would be the conversion of a map of Vietnam to digital representation for processing with other geographical data.

ADP Training for Vietnamese

(U) Planning for the continuation of uninterrupted data processing in the face of reduced force levels was initiated during 1971. On 1 Jul 71, 17 Vietnamese programmer/analyst trainees were admitted to a local training course in programming on the IBM 360 Electronic Data Processing System. These trainees adapted well to ADP concepts and responded quickly to the programming course. They were expected to play an important role in future applications as Vietnamization accelerated.

Extent of ADP Support

(U) DMA was supporting 35 agencies with 64 operational systems as 1971 ended. In addition 31 systems were under development. Following are representative of the ADP systems which were being managed by DMA during 1971: force requirement and deployment monitoring, communication-electronics management, prisoner of war statistical accountability, hamlet evaluation system, weekly intelligence estimate update, and military pay voucher data.[68]

COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

General

(U) The Comptroller (MACCO) was the principal staff assistant to COMUSMACV on financial matters. His scope of responsibility fell into three functional areas represented by the Financial Affairs Division, the Advisory Division, and the Management Office.

MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

(U) The MACCO Management Office was responsible for conduct of management studies of MACV organization and functions, administration of the reports control program, and performance of audit liaison.[69]

(U) During 1971 the MACCO Management Office began to implement a US Government program to improve federal reporting and reduce related paperwork. At the beginning of FY72, MACV required approximately 250 reports costing an estimated US$4.3 million annually to produce. By 1 Jan 72, 60 of these reports were eliminated at an estimated annual savings of US$600 thousand.

FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

(U) The MACCO Financial Affairs Division had responsibility for establishment and execution of MACV policies and procedures for financial affairs including budgeting, accounting for appropriated and assistance-in-kind (AIK) funds, currency control, piaster expenditure reports, financial support to Free World Military Assistance Forces, monitoring of military banking facilities, and conduct of cost analyses.

OMN Support of HQ MACV

(U) In March 1971 the FY72 budget apportionment for support of HQ, MACV was finalized and forwarded to CINCPAC for submission to the Chief of Naval Operations. The request was for $7.925 million; however, only $7.016 million was approved, a decrease from the FY71 budget of $909,000. The decrease was realized through a reduction in the amount of funds required for travel and a significant reduction in procurement of supplies and equipment.

OMA Fund Support for MACV Advisors

(U) The FY72 Command Operating Budget of $7,688,400 for support of MACV advisors was completed and forwarded to USARV on 15 Feb 71. This represented an increase of nearly US$1.5 million over the FY71 advisor budget in spite of the drawdown in advisor strengths. The increase was mainly due to the transfer of funding costs of payrolls for local national civilians previously funded by assistance-in-kind funding.

OMA Funds for Rural Development Cadre Program

(U) On 15 Feb 71, the recommended FY72 Command Operating Budget for Rural Development Cadre (RDC) was completed and forwarded to USARV. Of the $35.4 million budgeted, $29,480,000 was approved under the annual funding program. During November 1971 the MACV Budget Execution Review determined that the approved amount was in excess of needs, and returned $864,000 to USARV for reprogramming.

Assistance-in-Kind Funding

(U) During CY71 the Director General for Finance and Audit, RVNAF, allocated $VN4.137 billion for AIK funds. This was in turn suballocated to fund managers throughout RVN for authorized purchases of goods and services which were not available through US or other military support activities to meet current requirements. AIK funds were used for such purposes as pay and allowances for indigenous employees, leases/rents, associated utilities, maintenance, and contractual services. As of 31 Dec 71 obligations against the program had reached $VN3.767 billion or 91 percent of the funds allocated.

ADVISORY ACTIVITIES

(U) The MACCO Advisory Division concerned itself primarily with rendering advice and assistance to the RVNAF through the Director General for Finance and Audit (DGFA). During 1971 Advisory Division personnel made monthly visits to RVNAF finance offices in each of the 44 provinces of RVN.

(U) Throughout the year, the Advisory Division engaged in numerous projects designed to increase the efficiency, capability, and professionalism of the DGFA and its agencies. Some of the projects undertaken were monitoring of the Ration Supplement Program; review of DGFA audit procedures; liaison visits to RVNAF finance office facilities; and review of equipment shortages, personnel deficiencies, and training.

CY71 GVN Defense Budget

(U) A major effort of the Advisory Division concerned the formulation of the GVN annual defense budget. On 20 Jan 71, President Thieu signed into law the CY71 GVN National Budget of VN$235 billion. Included in the amount was the defense budget of VN$129.4 billion. This was VN$35.9 billion less than the VN$165.3 billion contained within the US Mission Council CY71 GVN Defense Budget Guidance. Analysis of the GVN-approved defense budget indicated that the major areas which suffered considerable reductions were RVNAF pay and allowances, engineer supply, quartermaster, construction and maintenance, real estate, death gratuity allowance, and ordnance. The DGFA informed the MACCO Advisory Division that a CY71 supplemental budget estimated at VN$24.6 billion was being prepared to fill the gap between the approved CY71 defense budget and the requirements of the Ministry of Defense (MOND).

(U) MACCO Budget Screening Board (BSB) convened on 17 Feb 71 to review, analyze, and develop a BSB position on the GVN-approved CY71 Defense Budget. Primarily, the board was concerned with the redistribution of the US joint support funds. The BSB proposed to contribute VN$13.4 billion. BSB further recommended that VN$6.6 billion in joint support funds be set aside as a reserve to be used as leverage for negotiation of a supplemental defense appropriation.

(U) MACV notified the DGFA by letter on 23 Apr 71 regarding the distribution of VN$13.4 billion joint support funds within the approved budget, and that VN$6.6 billion had been set up as a reserve by MACV. The reserve would be released provided the GVN agreed to add VN$3 billion of its own funds to support minimum essential requirements identified by MACV as critically underfunded. Such action would require a defense budget supplemental of VN$9.6 billion.

(U) On 27 May, USAID transmitted a letter to Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid (DGBFA) which stated that MACV had modified its position since the DGFA letter of 23 Apr 71. In essence, MACV was willing to provide additional joint support funds to support the shortfall, leaving an unfunded balance of only VN$1.6 billion which GVN would be required to provide from its own resources. On 7 Jun 71, DGBFA responded to the USAID letter indicating that it had submitted a supplemental request to the GVN Legislature for VN$24 billion. With this supplemental, the total defense budget of VN$153.5 billion represented 57.6 percent of the national budget, causing an adverse reaction from the GVN Legislature. DGBFA further requested that MACV increase joint support funds from VN$13.4 to 20 billion. It pointed out that once the new budget of VN$153.5 billion was approved, MOND had the authority to reprogram funds to meet defense requirements, provided that the overall budget ceiling remained unchanged. MOND would consider MACV recommendations concerning the reprogramming of joint support funds when the budget became effective.

(U) In a series of negotiations involving MACV, USAID, and DGBFA, all budget chapters were reviewed and revised to support critically unfunded areas while awaiting final resolution of the budget impasse.

(U) On 3 May 71, President Thieu had signed and transmitted to the House of Representatives a supplemental request for the CY71 National Budget, raising the ceiling by VN$32 billion.

No action was taken on it until 22 Dec 71, when the Lower House approved a budget supplement of VN$37,069,818,000. This supplement included VN$24.1 billion for previous MOND shortfalls.

CY72 Defense Budget

(U) During September-October 1971 the MACV BSB completed its recommendations on the CY72 GVN defense budget. COMUSMACV approved the recommendations and on 27 Oct 71 the MACV position was approved by the US Mission. On 28 Oct 71 the Mission-approved defense budget guidance for CY72 was furnished to MOND.[70]

DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER

(U) Reduction in troop strength during 1971 did not reduce the types of serious disciplinary problems. There were still deserters who fled military discipline. Some soldiers used their exchange privileges for profit in the blackmarket. Others smuggled drugs or contraband to the US. Improvement in recreational activities helped morale on remaining bases, but there were inevitably soldiers who presented disciplinary problems, no matter what the conditions of combat or garrison duty. With the reduction in troops, numbers of offenses were reduced, and in the case of deserters, even the rate had dropped slightly by year's end.

MILITARY ABSENTEES AND DESERTERS

(U) At the end of 1970 the MACV Adjutant General (MACAG) estimated there were 2,500 military deserters in RVN, compared to 1,416 at the end of CY71. The MACAG records indicated there were 357 AWOL US military personnel in RVN at the end of 1971.[71]

(U) While the exact number is unknown, it is believed many US deserters have remained in Vietnam. The primary reasons for personnel going AWOL have not materially changed over the years: they are money manipulation, women, and dissatisfaction with the regimented life of the military. Individuals who deserted were normally unable to obtain legitimate employment and thus were attracted to the criminal underworld of large urban areas. They often used their American identity to deal in currency and commodity blackmarket operations. This was particularly true in the Saigon area with its large concentration of US troops. A reduction in the number of US military personnel in RVN, more stringent law enforcement procedures, reduction in the number of military exchanges, identification check by military police in selected post exchanges, combined US-GVN police operations, and placing areas off-limits, all assisted the military police in identifying, apprehending, and returning these personnel to military control.[72]

CURRENCY MANIPULATION

(U) Starting in 1965, wartime inflation in the RVN reduced the purchasing power of the Vietnamese piaster ($VN). As the piaster declined in value on the international market, the difference between the fixed legal rate and the actual value encouraged monetary speculation. This resulted in a currency blackmarket whereby persons holding large sums of Vietnamese currency would pay far more than the legal rate of exchange in order to get stable currency.

such as US dollars. Both parties to the illegal conversion would benefit financially: the Vietnamese by converting to a stable form of currency, and the American who sold him $US would receive $VN at more than the legal rate of exchange, which was $VN118 to $US1.

(U) In October 1970 the GVN approved a change in the exchange rate for US personnel which more nearly reflected the true buying power of the piaster. The new "personal accommodation rate" was $VN275 to $US1. However, as the value of the piaster continued to decline on the international market, the blackmarket exchange rate remained higher than the personal accommodation rate. Currency blackmarketing therefore remained a lucrative enterprise.[73]

(U) In November 1971 the GVN approved a new personal accommodation rate of $VN410 to $US1, although the official exchange rate for transactions between the US and GVN remained at $VN118 to $US1. Consequently the purchasing power of the US citizen who bought piasters at the accommodation rate was considerably higher than the local Vietnamese who was paid at the legal rate. Enterprising money manipulators who illegally accumulated Military Payment Certificates (MPC) often would induce US personnel to exchange MPC for local currency at the increased accommodation rate, offering a portion of the profit to the individual making the exchange.[74]

(U) In an effort to control the currency blackmarket, MACV developed an automated computer program to monitor currency transactions of US personnel. The Currency and Black Market Control System (CABOTS) initiated in 1968 monitored such transactions as bank deposits, purchases of money orders, travelers' checks, bank drafts, and the conversion of MPC to Federal Reserve notes. The system was intended to provide timely information on the quantity of negotiable dollar instruments purchased by authorized holders of MPC. Information on certain types of monetary transactions, considered "controlled" transactions, was provided as input to the CABOTS system. Persons who exceeded the acceptable criteria for monetary transactions were reported to MACV Provost Marshal (MACPM) in the form of a weekly machine record printout. Individuals exceeding established parameters were considered suspected violators, and appropriate action was taken to determine the nature of their transactions. Starting in July 1969 US Mission personnel were issued a currency control plate to use in recording monetary transactions and establishing personal identification.

(U) In September 1969 the CABOTS system was programed to produce a machine record printout reflecting the top 400 suspected violators each month. This list was distributed to the component commands for appropriate command inquiry. A query capability was established in the CABOTS system by which a commander or criminal investigator could obtain a complete monetary history of the controlled transactions of suspect individuals.

(U) Improvements in the CABOTS system in 1971 included:

-- Eliminating from update reports those individuals who were already under investigation as a result of a previous CABOTS report, thus eliminating possible duplication of investigative effort.

-- Discontinuing the "top 400" violator listing as impractical.

-- Reporting monthly the monetary transactions on currency control plates belonging to persons reported as having departed Vietnam, since use thereafter showed illegal use of the currency control plate.

-- Recording those MACV currency control plates reported as lost, stolen, or missing.

(U) Refinements planned at the end of 1971 were expected to increase the amount of data available on an individual, as well as narrow the criteria which would cause an individual to become suspect. With more experience in evaluating the data, a more accurate system of referring suspected monetary transactions for investigation by agencies using the CABOTS system had been developed.[75]

BLACKMARKET IN COMMODITIES

(U) The illegal introduction of duty free goods onto the Vietnamese economy had long been a significant problem for both the GVN and US military authorities. Many articles which were virtually unobtainable by the Vietnamese, or could be purchased only at an exhorbitant price, were brought in customs free in large quantities by US and Allied Forces, to support their forces. Through theft or by purchase from US and FWMAF personnel, Vietnamese vendors could obtain items for resale at a substantial profit on the local market, but at prices which undersold legitimate merchants who legally imported similar items and paid the required GVN customs duties. Items which US and FWMAF personnel were privileged to purchase duty free at low cost in the exchange, had a ready market on the Vietnamese economy. Both the individual and the black marketeer profited in these transactions.

(U) The commodities which were most frequently introduced into the blackmarket were electronic equipment, cameras, and photographic accessories, watches, and jewelry. Also in great demand were liquor, beer, soda, cigarettes, and food stuffs, found being resold in many local bars and restaurants. Street vendors did a thriving business in all types of products ranging from soap powder and toothpaste to mechanic's tools.

(U) There appeared to be two principal sources for blackmarket items: theft or pilferage, or resale of exchange purchases. Large-scale thefts of exchange goods usually occurred in-transit, resulting in losses at the depot level. Considerable pilferage from exchange retail outlets contributed on a smaller scale to the commodity blackmarket.[76]

(U) Measures to increase security were continually being reviewed so as to minimize exchange losses at all levels. In April 1971 the security of depots was improved by constructing perimeter barriers and improving the guard systems. Perimeter and roving guard posts were established and gate guard procedures were improved, including techniques for conducting inventory spot checks and searches upon departure of cargo and personnel. Shipping security was improved through the use of armed guards, MP escorts, improved logging procedures for in-transit accountability, having the cargo met by the consignee, and the use of sealed, locked, or closed vans. Improved storage procedures were also recommended to include door-to-door storage of CONEX containers to prevent depot pilferage.

(U) To prevent pilferage and unauthorized sales at exchange retail outlets, Military Police were assigned to check customers in all exchange stores conducting over $100,000 business each month. Security personnel assigned to the Vietnam Regional Exchange (VRE) conducted unannounced security visits to retail outlets showing high inventory shortages, and performed selected surveillance on post exchanges and suspected blackmarket drop-off points and sales stands in Vietnam.

(U) During CY71, VRE losses from pilferage and larceny amounted to $278,000, much of which is believed to have found its way into the blackmarket. Although the dollar amount appeared high, the percentage of loss of VRE merchandise compared favorably with similar civilian retail outlets in the US, indicating that the VRE, operating in an extremely vulnerable environment, was reasonably successful in its security measures.[77]

(U) There were numerous economic, social, and moral problems associated with the blackmarket. A major problem was loss of revenue to the GVN; goods sold on the blackmarket denied the Government a principal source of revenue i.e., taxes levied on imports. Corruption of legitimate business activities created by the unfair competition of vendors of blackmarket commodities further aggravated an already unstable and inflationary wartime economy. Profits realized from blackmarket activities were funneled back into the blackmarket or into currency manipulation which further upset the economic balance, devalued the local currency, and caused additional economic hardship for the average Vietnamese citizen. Although the blackmarket in commodities continued to flourish, the scope of such operations diminished substantially during CY71, due in part to increased US security measures.

JOINT CUSTOMS GROUP

(U) Contraband brought into the United States by US military personnel became an increasingly grave problem for the US Bureau of Customs (BOC) during 1969 and 1970. Since each service had been conducting its own customs inspections, no overall customs control was exercised by any one headquarters. It became apparent in 1970 that the increasing amounts of narcotics and government property were being illegally shipped, mailed, or carried into the United States by military personnel called for corrective action.

(U) To centralize the customs program, MACV designated USARV as the executive agent to administer a specialized customs unit on a joint service basis. The Joint Customs Group (JCG) was formed on 1 Dec 70, under the operational control of the 8th MP Group (CI). The JCG had members of the various component services attached, based on the component's proportional strength in RVN.[78]

(U) Initially there were 188 personnel assigned to the JCG. The Army provided 10 officers and 142 enlisted men, the Air Force 27 enlisted men, and the Navy nine enlisted men. Starting in May 1971, the JCG used marihuana-detector dogs to assist in processing passengers and in postal and hold-baggage inspections. Later, one dog, OS-15 (Prince), was successfully trained to detect heroin, one of the first anywhere.[79]

(U) The JCG program was developed in coordination with the BOC. In March 1 , th BOC advisory section of USAID assigned a customs officer as an advisor to the JCG; on 1 July this assignment became permanent. In September, two customs officers were assigned full time to the JCG. Training of the military customs inspectors was a continuous process, and the rotation of experienced inspectors was not a significant operational problem. The liaison with BOC provided feed-back from US ports of entry on seizures made by the BOC, thus providing the JCG with operational intelligence. The BOC advisors also gave technical advice concerning the design of passenger processing facilities and various methods of operation.[80]

(U) By April 1971, the JCG had established detachments at Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Long Binh/Bien Hoa and had assumed customs operations from the 90th and 22d Replacement Battalions at Long Binh and Cam Ranh Bay, respectively. The R & R processing centers at Camp Alpha (Tan Son Nhut) and Freedom Hill (Da Nang) were also manned by JCG personnel, and the USMC customs personnel and facility at Freedom Hill were placed under the operational control of the JCG. Each detachment was responsible for inspection of mail, household goods, and unaccompanied baggage, and to conduct DEROS and R & R passenger inspections on MAC contract flights. Customs inspection at Can Tho and Pleiku also came under the control of the JCG detachments.

(U) In April 1971, the BOC announced that parcel mail originating in Southeast Asia would be opened and inspected after it reached the United States. The Bureau was anxious to share



A marijuana-sniffing dog is used by a member of the Joint Customs Group to check baggage of military personnel leaving the R & R center of Long Binh.

this job with the military services, and by late 1971 the JCG was opening for inspection 85 percent of all parcel mail from Army APOs, which amounted to 55 percent of all parcel mail leaving RVN. Spot checks by the BOC in the United States showed that these inspections were unusually thorough.

(U) In CY71 the JCG opened over 63,000 parcels for inspection, checked over a million incoming and out-going passengers and their baggage, and almost 130,000 household goods shipments. In 1971 the JCG operating in RVN seized the following quantities of narcotics from all customs activities:

Heroin	608 grams
Opium	926 grams
Marihuana	19,864 grams
Hashish	504 grams
Dangerous drugs	35,774 dosage units

Because of the increasing coverage exercised by the JCG over all phases of customs activity in RVN, the number of contraband seizures gradually decreased. The strict customs control program decidedly deterred possible smugglars. Although the main reason for the JCG mission was to stop the flow of drugs to the United States, the mission was extended to prevent exportation of government property, firearms, ordnance, and other items of contraband. Nearly $700,000 worth of government equipment was recovered during 1971.[81]

(U) Based on an inquiry from CINCPAC, a study was made in July 1971 to determine the feasibility of JCG's performing inspections at all points where personnel or material left RVN. It was determined that the JCG could make these inspections if the number of personnel was increased to 416. However, with the greater drawdown of military personnel in RVN, the JCG strength was about 300 officers and enlisted personnel at year's end, with personnel at the aerial ports at Cam Ranh Bay, Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut, the deepwater port at Newport in Saigon, at all 11 household/hold baggage packing facilities, and at 28 Army APOs.[82]

(U) A significant decline in narcotics seizures in RVN was noted after April 1971, as a result of the JCG program. The BOC also reported a concurrent decline in seizures of narcotics from baggage, mail, and personnel returning from Vietnam through the US west coast ports. The JCG was a strong asset in the continuing battle against narcotics trafficking among returning Vietnam veterans.[83]

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

(U) The Staff Judge Advocate was the principal legal advisor to COMUSMACV, MACV staff elements, and other agencies of the US Mission in Vietnam. His duties fell into three distinct areas, represented by the Civil Law and Military Affairs, Advisory, and International Law and Military Justice Divisions.

CIVIL LAW AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(U) The MACJA Civil Law and Military Affairs Division advised and assisted the MACV staff and other agencies on the following matters: currency control, illicit exchange practices and black market operations; administrative jurisdiction and controls; real property disposal, land use concurrences, and lease disputes; legal interpretations and advice as to Vietnamese litigation procedures; purchasing and procurement directives; practices affecting the US Mission and its interests; policies and procedures of the Vietnam Regional Exchange; foreign claims inquiries; attempts by the GVN courts to exercise jurisdiction over USG agencies, and securing waivers of jurisdiction by the GVN over Class I and II US civilians; and GVN attempts to tax, inspect, regulate, or adversely affect the activities of US-invited contractors, including the imports of property and equipment in support of the US Mission.

(U) During a first quarter CY71 MACIG investigation concerning MACV-sponsored privileges, MACJA undertook a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the MACV-sponsored military privileges which were afforded to various civilian organizations, groups, and their employees. This study was designed to formulate and implement standardized definitions and categories of employers and employees who were entitled MPC privileges, and to make the granting of MACV military privileges to such groups and employees contingent upon authorization to acquire, possess and/or use MPC as specified in MACV Directive 37-6 and AR 37-103. A typical example which involved granting of MACV-sponsored privileges to newsmen is covered in detail in the Information and the Press section of this chapter.

(U) Documentation and assistance was provided to the Department of the Army, the Judge Advocate General and US Attorney in the continuing case of Asher et al. v. Laird et al. filed on 13 Mar 71 in the US District Court, Washington, DC. In this case 11 employees of Pacific Architects and Engineers were seeking injunctive relief to bar MACV from withdrawing MACV-sponsored privileges under MACV Directive 190-13. By the end of 1971 the court had denied two motions for injunctive relief and the case was still pending final action.

(U) In coordination with United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Department of Agriculture, MACJA was instrumental in revising a potential claim in favor of MACV and the US Government in the amount of US $1.26 million for excessive stevedoring and off-loading charges paid by MACV during a crash effort to decongest the Saigon harbor in 1968.

ADVISORY ACTIVITIES

(U) Throughout 1971 the MACJA Advisory Division assisted the RVNAF Directorate of Military Justice in its efforts to attain self-sufficiency, in keeping with the US policy of Vietnamization. A major effort was made by advisory personnel in a voluntary teaching program at the University of Saigon Faculty of Law.

(U) Advisory personnel made numerous inspection visits throughout the year to RVN military prisons in Da Nang, Nha Trang, Can Tho, and Saigon. Advice and recommendations on administration and security of the prisons was rendered on a continuing basis. Advisory personnel were actively involved in securing supplies and materials needed to improve and expand prison facilities. Beginning in the fourth quarter 1971, the Advisory Division began a series of inspection trips to the prisoner of war camps operated by GVN. The visits were useful in determining that US legal responsibilities were being met in regard to care and handling of prisoners.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY JUSTICE ACTIVITIES

(U) The MACJA International Law and Military Justice Division rendered advice and research assistance on various international law questions, including such matters as the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to MACV forces and the GVN; the status of military personnel and of civilians accompanying the military under the Pentalateral Agreement; and questions relating to PW and international agreements and war crimes. In late December 1971 the division handled a legal action concerning the abandonment of two Army barges BC 6302 and 6318 to Lotus Co. Ltd., the salvager. There was a possibility that about 20 US Army barges were sunk along the Vietnam coast which Lotus planned to eventually raise. One facet of the problem concerned possible conflict of DOD disposal regulations with a US-GVN agreement concerning disposal of US military property in RVN, which agreement provided for the GVN to have the first opportunity to purchase the property. The action was passed to the American Embassy, who provided legal counsel that the agreement did not cover disposal of the barges. On 20 Jan 72 letters of abandonment were approved by the MACV Chief of Staff and dispatched to the Lotus Company.[84]

LEAVE, REST AND RECUPERATION

(U) The Leave, Rest and Recuperation (R & R) program for US military forces RVN was developed early in 1962 to provide US servicemen a period of time out-of-country away from the tension and strain present in a combat zone. Although in-country R & R facilities were available, they served no more than as rest areas where combat troops could have a brief respite from their austere and dangerous existence. These in-country facilities supplemented but were in no way a substitute for the change of environment afforded by an out-of-country visit. The out-of-country R & R program was a key factor in maintaining the overall high morale of the US personnel in the RVN. [85]

Background

(U) In February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requested that CINCPAC develop an R & R program for personnel stationed in South Vietnam. The following recommendations were submitted by CINCPAC:

-- Three-day visits to resorts in RVN on a pass basis with frequency determined by COMUSMACV and his subordinate commanders.

-- One 7 to 10 day out-of-country trip per year to Bangkok, the Philippines, or Hong Kong on a space available basis. Dependents could travel without being accompanied by the sponsor provided suitable lodging and financing for the entire trip had been arranged.

-- Further details would be the responsibility of COMUSMACV.

(U) The JCS approved the plan except for the provision that dependents could not take part unless accompanied by the sponsor; travel of dependents of all ages was authorized if accompanied by the sponsor. [86]

(U) In September 1964 COMUSMACV requested that an exception be made to leave policies so that military personnel serving in RVN could participate in the out-of-country R & R program withoug charging the absence against an individual's accrued leave. Upon CINCPAC recommendation, the JCS approved the request on 10 Nov 64 with the stipulation that R & R be subject to the needs of the service and considered a privilege rather than a right. [87]

(U) Initially the R & R program was supported by three C-54s transporting approximately 900 personnel to Hong Kong and Bangkok each month. The airlift became inadequate in August 1965, therefore MACV requested additional airlift capabilities to allow 6,000 personnel per month to go on R & R, starting in September. By the end of December 1965, to accommodate the increased troop strength, request was made for a total of 13,500 R & R spaces per month.

Peak Program

(U) By December 1966 there were nine R & R sites available: Bangkok, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Taipei, Manila, Singapore, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and Hawaii. Beginning 1 Jan 67, Guam was also designated as a limited R & R site for servicemen of Guamanian origin. The 10 sites operating in 1967 had a combined capacity of 40,800 personnel per month. The utilization for September 1967 was 30,903 personnel. The projected requirement for 1968 was 36,000 per month utilization. In the spring of 1968 an additional R & R site was opened at Sydney, Australia. In 1969 there were 426,901 personnel who went on R & R, a monthly average of

38,575. In 1970 the utilization had decreased to 358,466 or an average of 29,872 per month.

(U) The R & R program was under continuous review and study, and changes were recommended and approved when warranted. Singapore was closed in February 1969. Penang and Kuala Lumpur were closed in May 1969. The Manila R & R site was closed in June 1970, and Tokyo was closed in September 1970.

(U) At the beginning of 1971 there were five out-of-country R & R sites which US military forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) personnel could visit: Hong Kong, Bangkok, Sydney, Taipei, and Hawaii. During 1971, 188,341 US military/civilian personnel and FWMAF personnel took advantage of the R & R program and visited the R & R and leave sites.

Leave to CONUS

(U) Early in 1971 COMUSMACV was directed by CINCPAC to make a feasibility study of combining leave and R & R so that personnel could return to the United States.[88] The study was completed by MACV and it was determined that effective 1 Oct 71 the MACV Leave, Rest and Recuperation Program would be modified to permit one of the two authorized 7 days ordinary leave to be taken in conjunction with 7 days R & R to Hawaii. During this combined 14-day period personnel would be authorized to visit the continental United States. R & R transportation would be provided at government expense round trip between the Republic of Vietnam and Hawaii.[89]

(U) The special category R & R and 7 days leave ("7 & 7") program authorized personnel to visit the continental United States, paying their own expense from Hawaii to their leave site and return. The travel to Hawaii and return to RVN would be provided by the government on a 747 aircraft operated daily by a commercial air line. Those departing on "7 & 7" were required to show evidence of a confirmed reservation from the west coast to Hawaii or have sufficient funds to purchase a ticket to Hawaii. Personnel were required to check into the Hawaii R & R center at 2300 on the 13th day (2 hours prior to flight departure). The flight arrived in RVN on the morning of the 15th day.[90] The "7 & 7" program significantly reduced the cost of such a trip to the individual. The round trip military standby fares between Hawaii and major cities on the west coast was about $125.00; to the central states about $220.00; and to the eastern part of the mainland, about $255.00. As a result, more personnel availed themselves of the opportunity to visit home while serving in Vietnam.[91]

Reduction in R & R Sites

(U) Due to the reduced space requirements MACV recommended to CINCPAC that Hong Kong be closed as an R & R site in October 1971.[92] The Hong Kong R & R site was authorized to close on 1 Oct 71 or as soon as possible thereafter, and was officially closed on 6 Oct 71. The R & R flights scheduled for Hong Kong during October, November, and December were diverted to Taipei, but Hong Kong remained an authorized leave site.[93] During the period Hong Kong had been designated an R & R site approximately 240,000 US servicemen and FWMAF personnel visited the colony. It was estimated that the visitors produced about US$170 million for Hong Kong businesses.[94]

(U) With the continued reduction of personnel in the RVN, MACV recommended that Sydney, Australia be closed about 3 months after the closing of Hong Kong. CINCPAC concurred and recommended to the JCS that the Sydney R & R site be closed at the end of CY71. Plans were

firmed and Sydney was closed as an R & R site 1 Jan 72. It remained an authorized leave site.[95]

(U) The R & R sites available for personnel in-country on 31 Dec 71 were Taipei, Bangkok, and Hawaii. With the continued reduction of personnel in-country, plans were being made to close Taipei about the end of March 1972.

(U) The MACV Leave and R & R Program, especially the "7 & 7," continues as one of the strongest and unprecedented morale boosters of US service personnel serving under the pressure and restrictions of duty in the Republic of Vietnam.

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

(U) HQ MACV processed 155 unit awards during 1971 as compared to 252 in 1970. DA general order 38, 20 Jul 71 and DA general order 42, 9 Aug 71, authorized the award of the Presidential Unit Citation to the following units:

4th Bn, 31st Inf, 196th Bde, 23d Inf Div	
Hq & Hq Co, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div	(1st Oak Leaf Cluster)
1st Bn, 8th Inf	
3d Bn, 8th Inf	
3d Bn, 12th Inf	(1st Oak Leaf Cluster)
Tp C, 2d Sqdn, 1st ACR	
Co B, 1st Bn, 69th ACR	(3d Oak Leaf Cluster)
Btry C, 6th Bn, 14th Arty	
Btry B, 5th Bn, 16th Arty	
Btry C, 5th Bn, 16th Arty	
Btry D, 5th Bn, 16th Arty	
6th Bn, 29th Arty	
Btry A, 4th Bn, 42d Arty	
2d Plt, Btry B, 4th Bn, 60th Arty	
Btry B, 1st Bn, 92d Arty	
52d Avn Bn	
Co A, 4th Engr Bn	
Co D, 704th Maint Bn	
1st Plt, 4th MP Co	
Co B, 4th Med Bn	
1st Plt, Co B, 12th Sig Bn	
Det 1, 374th Rdo Rsch Co	
Tm 1, 4th MI Det	

(U) The total number of individual awards approved by MACV and USARV during 1971 was 450,130 as compared to 707,879 during 1970. Awards ranged from 10,917 awards of the Purple Heart, for wounds received through enemy action, to 32 awards of the Distinguished Service Cross for heroism in combat. During 1971 the following awards were made by MACV and USARV.[96]

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS FORWARDED TO OTHER HEADQUARTERS

	MH	DSC**	NC	DSM	SS	LM	DFC	AMM	BSM	MSM	AM	COM*
Army	20	5	0	15	2	4	0	0	1	3	1	4
Navy	2	0	1	4	0	15	8	0	131	0	4	102
Air Force	0	0	0	2	0	39	2	1	343	0	1	312
Marines	2	0	0	0	0	17	3	0	64	0	1	53
RVNAF	0	1	0	0	0	3	3	0	1	0	0	3
Third Country	0	0	0	0	3	7	0	0	1	0	0	0
Total	24	6	1	21	5	85	16	1	541	3	7	474

* Includes Army, Navy and Air Force Commendation Medals
** Includes Distinguished Service and Air Force Crosses

AWARDS BY MACV TO ALLIED FORCES

AWARD	VN	ROK	THAI	CHINESE	PHILIPPINES	SPANISH
SS	8	0	1	0	0	0
LM	2	0	0	0	0	0
DFC	3	0	0	0	0	0
SM	1	0	0	0	0	0
BSM "V"	669	0	23	0	0	0
BSM	82	29	10	1	1	0
AM "V"	35	3	0	0	0	0
ARCOM "V"	1,192	0	57	0	0	0
ARCOM	835	835	1,397	4	6	6

CASUALTIES

US Military

(C) Deaths due to hostile action. During 1971 there were 1,380 US Armed Forces deaths due to hostile action in Southeast Asia (SEA). Of these 1,298 were killed in action (KIA) in South Vietnam, and the small remainder in Laos and North Vietnam. Combat deaths were approximately 31 percent of the 1970 total when 4,225 such deaths were reported. (See Figure X - 5 .)

(C) Deaths from other causes. Deaths of US Armed Forces personnel in SEA from other causes totaled 1,014 in 1971, which is approximately 53 percent of the 1970 total (4,225).

(C) Wounded, nonfatal. There were 8,997 US Armed Forces personnel nonfatally wounded in SEA during 1971, as compared with 30,644 in 1970. Approximately 54 percent of those wounded required hospitalization.

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COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES - SOUTHEAST ASIA (1960 - 1971)

US Military	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	Cum to Date
Deaths, hostile:													
Vietnam*	-	1	31	77	146	1,365	4,989	9,358	14,561	9,367	4,183	1,302	45,383
South Vietnam	-	(1)	(31)	(77)	(145)	(1,331)	(4,946)	(9,314)	(14,537)	(9,361)	(4,176)	(1,298)	
North Vietnam	-	(-)	(-)	(-)	(1)	(34)	(43)	(44)	(24)	(6)	(7)	(4)	
Laos	-	10	-	1	1	4	19	20	31	47	38	78	249
Subtotal	-	11	31	78	147	1,369	5,008	9,378	14,592	9,414	4,221	1,380	45,622
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	-	5
Total, SEA	-	11	31	78	147	1,369	5,008	9,378	14,593	9,414	4,225	1,380	45,627
Deaths from other causes:													
Vietnam*	-	2	18	36	48	359	1,043	1,679	1,917	2,110	1,841	953	9,997
South Vietnam	-	(2)	(18)	(36)	(48)	(359)	(1,043)	(1,537)	(1,899)	(2,076)	(1,829)	(946)	
North Vietnam	-	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(142)	(18)	(34)	(12)	(7)	
Laos	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	1	2	3	3	15	29
Subtotal	-	2	21	36	48	359	1,045	1,680	1,919	2,113	1,844	968	10,100
Thailand	-	2	8	11	8	24	56	57	102	91	67	46	472
Total SEA	-	3	29	47	56	383	1,101	1,737	2,021	2,204	1,911	1,014	10,498
Wounded, nonfatal:													
Hospital care													
Vietnam	-	1	39	218	521	3,307	16,520	32,359	46,783	32,898	15,177	4,727	152,544
Laos	-	1	2	-	1	1	6	12	16	42	34	90	205
Subtotal	-	2	41	218	522	3,308	16,526	32,371	46,799	32,940	15,211	4,817	152,749
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	4
Total SEA	-	2	41	218	522	3,308	16,526	32,371	46,801	32,941	15,212	4,817	152,753
Hospital care not required:													
Vietnam*	-	-	34	193	517	2,803	13,540	29,629	45,991	37,210	15,361	4,076	149,348
Laos	-	1	2	-	-	3	27	25	30	66	71	104	326
Subtotal	-	1	37	193	517	2,806	13,567	29,654	46,021	37,276	15,432	4,180	149,674
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Total SEA	-	1	37	193	517	2,806	13,567	29,654	46,022	37,276	15,432	4,180	149,675

COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES - SOUTHEAST ASIA (1960 - 1971)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	Cum to Date
RVN Military													
Deaths, hostile:													
RVNAF	2,223	4,004	4,457	5,665	7,457	11,243	11,953	12,716	24,323	18,938	21,385	21,982	146,248
Paramilitary									3,592	2,895	1,961	756	
Total									27,915	21,833	23,346	22,738	
Wounded, nonfatal:													
RVNAF	2,788	5,449	7,195	11,488	17,017	23,118	20,975	29,448	61,084	56,281	65,681	59,951	360,218
Paramilitary									9,612	8,995	5,901	988	
Total									70,696	65,276	71,582	60,939	
Missing:													
RVNAF	2,515	3,233	1,270	3,137	6,036	7,848	3,283	2,340	1,996	664	720	2,257	35,293
Paramilitary									464	259	230	68	
Total									2,460	923	950	2,325	
VC/NVA Military**													
Deaths, hostile	5,669	12,133	21,158	20,575	16,785	35,436	55,524	88,104	181,149	156,954	103,638	98,094	794,657
Prisoners of War (Cumulative)													35,654
Other Nation Military													
Deaths, hostile													
Australia - New Zealand	-	-	-	-	1	14	60	76	104	99	70	31	455
Korea	-	-	-	-	-	17	506	1,005	824	635	529	448	3,964
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	8
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	51	132	105	47	351
RVN Civilian													
Deaths, hostile	-	-	-	-	1,795	1,900	1,732	3,706	5,389#	6,202	5,947	3,771	

* Includes data for operations in connection with Cambodia and in waters adjacent to Vietnam which are within the limits of the designated combat zone

** Includes data for operations in connection with Cambodia and Laos where applicable

\# Excludes February for which data is not available

Note: RVN paramilitary casualty data is not available

Source: Directorate for Information Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller 15 March 1972

Figure X-5

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Free World Military Assistance Forces

(C) Free World Military Assistance Force deaths from enemy action in 1971 totaled 526, of which 448 were Korean, 47 Thai, and 31 Australian. This is approximately 75 percent of the 1970 total of 704 deaths.

RVNAF

(C) There were 22,738 reported RVNAF deaths from hostile action during 1971 as compared to 23,219 in 1970. Nonfatal wounded in the RVNAF totaled 60,939 as compared to 71,386 in 1970.

Summary

(C) The 1971 combined total of Allied armed forces deaths in SEA attributable to hostile action was 24,644. This compares with 98,094 VC/NVA deaths reported, creating a ratio of enemy to friendly deaths of 3.98 to 1.97



US chaplain holds field services.

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CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES

(U) Consistent with its expanded advisory mission, the Field Advisory Element (FAE) of the Command Chaplain's staff grew rapidly during 1971, resulting in the largest chaplain personnel strength in the history of MACV. Initially 18 chaplains, the FAE increased to 32 in a concentrated effort to provide ministries for US and FWMAF personnel. The area coverage mission of the Command Chaplain also expanded as US and FWMAF units deployed. The residual elements of the redeployed forces were, for the most part, left without chaplaincy services and, in keeping with their mission, MACV chaplains assumed this responsibility. In many instances, the composition of the FAE chaplains' parish was non-MACV, i.e., residual USARV, Navy, Air Force, and FWMAF. Geographical dispersion, weather, reduced security in outlying areas, and diminishing transportation resources further made mission accomplishment more difficult. Nevertheless, the chaplains' mission was carried out, and successfully.[98]

(U) To ensure cogent and contemporary ministry, the Command Chaplain (MACCH) revamped in-country training. MACV chaplains attended 2-day quarterly training conferences at HQ MACV at which they were addressed by such persons as COMUSMACV, Ambassador Bunker, the ACofS J1, and the Right Reverend Henri Forest, S.J. Subjects of command interest and chaplaincy concern were further brought before the conferees by such groups as the MACV Drug Education Field Teams, the Pioneer House staff, medical and psychiatric teams from the 3d Field Hospital, and the MACV staff. Thus the conferees discussed and gained insight on subjects of immediately practical concern as:

-- Communications with the young-adult.

-- Utilization of contemporary media in ministry.

-- Community relations.

-- Drug update.

-- Human (race) relations.

The FAE chaplaincies enthusiastically received this educational program, which proved to be an immeasurable asset to accomplishing in-country ministry.[99]

(U) The MACCH advisory mission in 1971 focused primarily on assisting the Vietnamese chaplaincies to achieve the status of self-sufficient organizations. The following goals were emphasized:[100]

-- Removal of the three Vietnamese Chaplain Directorates (Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant) from the General Department of Political Warfare.

-- Establishment of each Vietnamese Chaplain Directorate as separate General Departments responsible to the Chief, JGS, through the Chief of Staff.

-- Obtaining ample expendable supplies for the three Directorates to support their mission for CY73 and CY74.

-- Ensuring that, as US chapels became available, they were transferred to the Directorates in keeping with their requirements to provide religious services to the RVNAF.

(U) The Table of Organization and Equipment of each Directorate was increased both in personnel and equipment. The Buddhist and Catholic each increased from 135 chaplains to 191, and the Protestant Directorate from 19 to 44 chaplains. Equipment was augmented to correspond with the increased personnel level. In the field, MACV FAE chaplains developed intimate working

relationships with the RVNAF chaplains, sharing in interfaith ministries, participating in transcultural activities, and joining forces in the accomplishment of charitable and social welfare projects.

(U) During 1971, the media ministry of the MACCH office was expanded to include a weekly television program telecast throughout the four Military Regions by American Forces Vietnam Television (AFVN-TV). This program (Religion in the News), was favorably received by US forces serving in-country and was a significant asset to the MACCH mission accomplishment. Through the efforts of the MACCH, Sunday worship services were transmitted directly from the International Church of Saigon on AFVN radio.

(U) In addition to providing religious services during the Holy Season, MACCH was responsible for the distribution of 70,000 Christmas greetings from concerned citizens to US forces in RVN.[101] Numerous Christmas packages were received and distributed through the regional staff chaplains, particularly to US forces in hospitals. Private donations from the United States and from designated chapel offerings in-country were distributed by MACCH to Vietnamese charities and social action projects.

(U) MACCH initiated a program of monitoring the religious life in the GVN prisoner of war camps in 1971, to ensure the provisions of the Geneva Convention regarding religion were honored.[102] This program developed both spiritual, logistical, and monetary support of an expanding effort of Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant ministry to the prisoners of war. MACCH working in concert with the RVNAF chaplains insured that chapels were constructed, introduced religious literature, and made available the services of tridenominational clerics in the PW camps.

COMMAND CONCERNS - Chapter X

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10. Pacific Stars and Stripes, 24 Dec 71, pp 1, 24.
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33. MACV Observer, 12 Nov 71, pp 6 - 7.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

(AS OF 31 DEC 71)



Source: SJS/MHB

Figure: A-1

ANNEX A

COMMANDERS AND

PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS

HEADQUARTERS USMACV

COMUSMACV			
Creighton W. Abrams	GEN	USA	
DEPCOMUSMACV			
Frederick C. Weyand	GEN	USA	
DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Ops/ Cdr 7AF			
Lucius D. Clay, Jr	GEN	USAF	
John D. Lavelle	GEN	USAF	Aug 71
DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS			
William E. Colby	AMB	Civ	
#George D. Jacobson	GS 18	Civ	Jun 71
Frederick C. Weyand	GEN	USA	Oct 71
Chief of Staff			
Welborn G. Dolvin	MG	USA	
Donald H. Cowles	MG	USA	Jun 71
Deputy Chief of Staff			
James M. Vande Hey	BG	USAF	
Albert J. Bowley	MG	USAF	Feb 71

Note: First named incumbent occupied the position on 1 Jan 71. Date of successor is indicated.

#Acting

Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs			
William W. Watkin, Jr	BG	USA	
John A. Wickham	BG	USA	Oct 71
Secretary Joint Staff			
John G. Jones	COL	USA	
Edward P. Crockett	COL	USA	Aug 71
ACofS for Personnel, J1			
Lawrence V. Greene	BG	USA	
William S. Hathaway	COL	USA	May 71
James B. Adamson	MG	USA	Jun 71
ACofS Intelligence, J2			
William E. Potts	MG	USA	
ACofS for Operations, J3			
Donald H. Cowles	MG	USA	
Frederick J. Kroesen	MG	USA	Jun 71
Rolland V. Heiser	BG	USA	Jul 71
John T. Carley	MG	USA	Aug 71
ACofS for Logistics, J4			
Herron N. Maples	MG	USA	
ACofS for Plans, J5			
Rexford H. Dettre, Jr	MG	USAF	
Jimmy J. Jumper	MG	USAF	Aug 71
Raul B. Perez	CAPT	USN	Dec 71
ACofS for Comm-Elect, J6			
Geoffrey Cheadle	BG	USAF	
Daniel L. Miller	COL	USA	Jun 71
Floyd H. Trogdon	BG	USAF	Jun 71
ACofS for CORDS			
George D. Jacobson	GS 18	Civ	
Deputy ACofS for CORDS			
Eugene P. Forrester	BG	USA	
James A. Herbert	BG	USA	Aug 71
ACofS for Military Assistance (MACMA was disbanded and functions merged into other staff agencies 1 Nov 71.)			
Thomas J. Camp, Jr	BG	USA	
Thomas W. Brown	BG	USA	Mar 71
Homer R. Bivin	CAPT	USN	Oct 71

Comptroller			
Joseph Brigandi	COL	USA	
John W. Currier	COL	USA	Apr 71
Inspector General			
Robert M. Cook	COL	USA	
Chief of Information			
Robert W. Leonard	COL	USA	
Phillip H. Stevens	COL	USA	Jul 71
L. Gordon Hill	BG	USA	Jul 71
Staff Judge Advocate			
Robert K. Weaver	COL	USA	
James S. Haught	COL	USAF	Jun 71
Lawrence P. Hansen	COL	USA	Jun 71
William A. Crawford, Jr	COL	USAF	Sep 71
James F. Senechal	COL	USA	Nov 71
Science Advisor			
John E. Kirk	GS 18	Civ	
Georges Duval	GS 17	Civ	Jun 71
Adjutant General			
Walton A. Rutledge	COL	USA	
Chaplain			
John W. Betzold	COL	USA	
William V. O'Connor	COL	USA	Sep 71
Headquarters Commandant			
Howard W. Greer	COL	USA	
Roy R. May, Jr	COL	USA	May 71
William F. Wadsworth, Jr	COL	USA	Sep 71
Command Surgeon			
Robert Bernstein	BG	USA	
Director, Construction Directorate			
Robert P. Young	MG	USA	
Director, Training Directorate			
John Q. Heflon	BG	USA	
Stan L. McClellan	BG	USA	Jun 71
Chief, Free World Military Assistance Office			
Willard W. Hawke	COL	USA	

Chief, Data Management Agency			
James F. Reidy	COL	USA	
Gunther A. Brumme	COL	USA	Jun 71
Provost Marshal			
Thornton E. Ireland	COL	USA	
Peter Slusar	LTC	USA	Apr 71
Byron H. Russell, Jr	COL	USA	Jun 71
Chief, Studies and Observations Group			
John F. Sadler	COL	USA	

MACV ADVISORY UNITS

Chief, Naval Advisory Group/ COMNAVFORV			
Jerome H. King, Jr	VADM	USN	
Robert S. Salzer	RADM	USN	Apr 71
Chief, AF Advisory Group			
Kendall S. Young	BG	USAF	
James H. Watkins	BG	USAF	Feb 71
Senior Advisor MR 1/ CG, XXIV Corps			
James W. Sutherland	LTG	USA	
Welborn G. Dolvin	LTG	USA	Jun 71
Senior Advisor MR 2/ CG, I FFORCEV/Dir SRAG*			
Arthur S. Collins, Jr	LTG	USA	
Charles P. Brown	MG	USA	Jan 71
John P. Vann*	FSR 1	Civ	May 71
Dewitt C. Armstrong III**	BG	USA	May 71
George E. Wear**	BG	USA	Nov 71
Senior Advisor MR 3/ CG, II FFORCEV/TRAC***			
Michael S. Davison	LTG	USA	
Jack J. Wagstaff	MG	USA	May 71
James F. Hollingsworth	MG	USA	Dec 71

* I FFORCEV was redesignated Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC) on 30 Apr 71. Mr. John P. Vann became Director SRAC in May. Unit was redesignated Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG) on 16 May.

** CG USARMYF MR2/Military Deputy SRAG under Director SRAG.

*** II FFORCEV was redesignated Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) on 30 Apr 71.

CG, Delta Military Assistance Command/DRAC*			
Hal D. McCown	MG	USA	
John H. Cushman	MG	USA	May 71

SERVICE COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

Air Force

Cdr 7AF/DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Ops			
Lucius D. Clay, Jr	GEN	USAF	
John D. Lavelle	GEN	USAF	Aug 71
Vice Commander, 7AF			
Ernest C. Hardin, Jr	MG	USAF	
Winton W. Marshall	MG	USAF	Sep 71
Commander, 834th Air Division (Unit inactivated Dec 71)			
John H. Herring, Jr	MG	USAF	
John H. Germeraad	BG	USAF	Jun 71

Army

DEPCG, USARV			
William J. McCaffrey	LTG	USA	
CG, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) (Unit redeployed Mar 71)			
George W. Putnam, Jr	MG	USA	
CG, 23d Inf Div (Unit redeployed Nov 71)			
James L. Baldwin	MG	USA	
Frederick J. Kroesen	MG	USA	Jul 71
CG, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) (Unit redeployed Dec 71)			
John J. Hennessey	MG	USA	
Sidney B. Berry (Acting)	BG	USA	Jan 71
Thomas M. Tarpley	MG	USA	Jan 71

* Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) was redesignated Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC) on 30 Apr 71. The CG DRAC is the Senior Advisor in MR 4.

CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)			
(Unit redeployed Aug 71)			
John G. Hill, Jr	BG	USA	
Harold H. Dunwoody	BG	USA	May 71
CG, 173d Abn Bde			
(Unit redeployed Aug 71)			
Elmer R. Ochs	BG	USA	
Jack MacFarlane	BG	USA	Jan 71
CG, USA Engr Command			
Charles C. Noble	MG	USA	
Robert P. Young	MG	USA	Aug 71
CG, 1st Avn Bde			
Jack W. Hemingway	BG	USA	
Robert N. MacKinnon	BG	USA	Aug 71
CG, 1st Signal Bde			
Hugh F. Foster, Jr	MG	USA	
Wilburn C. Weaver	BG	USA	May 71
CO, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)			
(Unit redeployed Mar 71)			
Michael D. Healy	COL	USA	
CO, USA Hq Area Command			
Michael J. L. Greene	BG	USA	
Willard W. Scott, Jr	BG	USA	May 71

Navy

COMNAVFORV/CHNAVADVGRP MACV			
Jerome H. King, Jr	VADM	USN	
Robert S. Salzer	RADM	USN	Apr 71
DEPCOMNAVFORV/Dep Comdr for Ops			
Herbert S. Matthews, Jr	RADM	USN	
Arthur W. Price, Jr	RADM	USN	May 71
COMNAVSUPPACT Saigon/SA VNNSC/ DEPCOMNAVFORV (L&A)			
Philip S. McManus	RADM	USN	
James B. Wilson	RADM	USN	Dec 71
Dep Dir, PACNAVFACSEA/OICC			
Albert R. Marschall	RADM	USN	
Forster M. Labor, Jr	RADM	USN	Mar 71

Marine Corps

CG, III Mar Amphibious Force*			
Donn J. Robertson	LTG	USMC	
CG, 3d Mar Amphibious Brigade			
(Unit redeployed Aug 71)			
Alan J. Armstrong	MG	USMC	
CG, 1st Mar Division			
(Unit redeployed Apr 71)			
Charles F. Widdecke	MG	USMC	
CG, 1st Mar Air Wing			
(Unit redeployed Apr 71)			
Alan J. Armstrong	MG	USMC	
CG, Force Log Command			
(Unit redeployed Apr 71)			
James R. Jones	BG	USMC	

COMMANDERS OF MAJOR FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES

Australian Forces Vietnam			
C. A. E. Fraser	MG		
D. B. Dunstan	MG		May 71
New Zealand Vietnam Force			
V. B. Brown	LTG		
Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam			
Yi Se-ho	LTG		
Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam			
Serm Na-Nakorn	LTG		
Tawit Bunyawat	MG		Jul 71

* On 14 Apr 71 III MAF redeployed and the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade was activated in its place.

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ANNEX C

THE ENEMY OUTSIDE RVN

NORTH VIETNAM

NVN LEADERSHIP AND GOALS IN 1971

Background

(S) In 1971, as it had in the past, Communist strategy for the war emanated from Hanoi. Military operations continued to be directed by the High Command of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces either directly or through major tactical headquarters in Laos and the northern portion of the RVN. Military control of Communist forces committed outside North Vietnam (NVN) continued to be divided on a geographical basis. Laos was still divided into northern and southern areas, while northern RVN continued to be divided into the Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH), the B-5 Front, Military Region (MR) 5, and the B-3 Front. The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) retained tactical command over the remainder of the RVN and all of the Khmer Republic through its military arm, the so-called South Vietnam Liberation Army Headquarters. Hanoi's overall goal remained simplistic; complete domination of the RVN and establishment of a sphere of influence throughout Indochina. The drive to conquer SVN was still dictated by both the desire to expand its area of political control and by the need to secure the rich agricultural areas of the south. Enemy activities in Laos and the Khmer Republic stemmed from the need to control vital base areas and lines of communication (LOC) and from the desire of Hanoi leadership to seek political power.

(S) In 1971, then, the leaders of NVN continued to implement their policy of protracted war, a policy they had developed the year following TET 68. There was little change in the organization supporting the overall NVN effort. Figures C-1 and C-2 provide an overview of the organizational structure. For a complete and detailed discussion of the leadership, strategy, and organization of the apparatus in NVN which controlled the enemy effort, see Annex D, "The Role of North Vietnam," MACV Command History, 1970, which applied to the 1971 time frame as well.

Leadership Changes

(C) During April 1971 NVN voters went to the polls in the People's Council elections. While there was virtually no information available concerning names of candidates and methods of choosing them, there was little doubt that results were pre-ordained by the Party. People's Councils were the Government half, at the local level, of the dual Party/Government ruling system operated throughout NVN. People's Council members frequently held positions at comparable levels in local Party chapters. As the "organs of state authority," the Councils were charged by the Constitution with insuring "observance and execution" of state laws and managing economic activities within their jurisdiction. In a more general sense, they executed party policy (see Figures C-1 and C-2). Propaganda concerning People's Council elections was similar to that for National Assembly balloting and suggested that elections would help

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ACTUAL FUNCTIONING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF NORTH VIETNAM - 1966



* Lao Dong Party is an extraconstitutional body, the principal members of which also occupy all key government positions.

Source: Department of the Army

Figure C-1

THE FORMAL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF NORTH VIETNAM-1966



*Convened when necessary by the President. The first conference was held in March 1964.

Source: Department of the Army

Figure C-2

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DRV GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL CHANGES



Source: MACJ2

Figure C-3

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mobilize the people in support of the regime. More particularly, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) media implied that the elections would be used to improve the efficiency of local government. As spelled out by the Constitution, one of the first acts of a new Council was to appoint an Administrative Committee, the real governing entity at the local level. North Vietnamese public statements suggested that the voting would be used to upgrade the performance of these bodies. The Party newspaper Nhan Dan noted on 24 April that "by consolidating the People's Councils at various levels, we can consolidate the administrative committees at various echelons and improve their quality...."[2]

(C) During the late May 1971 First Session of the Fourth National Assembly in North Vietnam, several personality changes were announced in some North Vietnamese governmental organizations, notably in the National Defense Council (NDC) (see Figure C-3). President Ton Duc Thang assumed the NDC chairmanship left vacant by Ho Chi Minh's death. Of the two Vice Chairmen of the NDC, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, only Dong was reappointed, with Giap redesignated as a regular member. Le Duan and Truong Chinh were added to the council membership. Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh and Secretariat member Nguyen Van Tran were dropped. Finally, Pham Hung was omitted from the list of Vice Premiers. Two factors militated against over-emphasizing the importance of these shifts and looking for sudden policy changes. First, all the shifts came in governmental organizations and not in the Lao Dong Party, which remained the locus of power. Second, the changes were not the result of a vote in the Fourth National Assembly, but rather reflected decisions most likely made at the time of the 19th Lao Dong Party Congress, in January and February, 1971.

(C) The appointment of Ton Duc Thang as Chairman was probably a formality fulfilling a stipulation of the Constitution rather than an indication of any influence he wielded within the regime. The shift in Vice Chairmen in the NDC appeared on the surface to be a de facto demotion for Giap relative to Pham Van Dong, Le Duan, and Truong Chinh. This "demotion" was possibly due to the addition of Le Duan and Truong Chinh to the council, both of whom outranked Giap on the Lao Dong Party Central Committee. This shift might have indicated a lessening of Giap's influence, but it seemed unlikely to some observers that a regime so determined to preserve its image of unity would publicly announce such a visible demotion of a popular leader. In spite of the recent "demotion," Giap continued to appear at official functions and as far as was known retained his position as Politburo member, Minister of Defense, and head of the Party military committee.

(C) Pham Van Dong's retention of the Vice-Chairmanship was probably because protocol required that he, as Premier, rank first in any governmental organization. It may have indicated that he had a power base independent of direct control by Duan or Chinh. Le Duan's addition to the council may have indicated an increasingly important role for the NDC in the future. This was his only government office and was believed to be the first that he actively sought. Truong Chinh probably joined to balance Duan and preserve the image of government unity. The removal of Foreign Minister Trinh and Party Secretary Tran appeared to be to allow them to concentrate on other duties. Their removal could be considered as demotions, but both apparently retained their Party positions and participated in important state functions in 1971.

(C) The NDC thus contained four of the top five men in the Party and more closely reflected the power hierarchy of the Politburo. It indicated growing NDC importance and could have been in line with announced policy to increase the control of the Party over the military. Only four of the 11 NDC members were military, whereas before the shift it was four of nine. The shift to the NDC could have been a move to circumvent the influence of the Party Military Council, which had all military members.

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(C) The only other important shift was the omission of Pham Hung, the head of COSVN, from the list of Vice Premiers. This formalized his relinquishment of duties as Vice Premier since his last reported public appearance in North Vietnam in 1967. Hung could have been slated for a position in the PRG.[3]

Goals

(S) Le Duan's primacy in the Party was established early when he enunciated the principles behind the DRV's two-track policy of economic improvement and defeat of the US, but Party leadership had been united since Ho's death in 1969. Whatever may have been the individual positions taken on issues of economic rehabilitation and development, it was evident that the leadership as a whole coalesced behind modest goals which emphasized the revitalization of DRV's human resources; goals which were in consonance with the realities of the situation which the regime faced. These included a very weak economic base and shortages of competent personnel. Both of these problems were compounded by the heavy burdens imposed by the war. Moreover, there was little popular elan, and the regime was under no illusion that problems would ease as the war went on.[4]

RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Propaganda and Visits

(S) North Vietnam continued to maintain close relationships with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) during 1971, a fact evidenced by several significant happenstances. The year began with a scathing attack by the PRC Foreign Ministry on the US for adopting "a series of grave steps to further expand its war of aggression in Indochina" and vaguely warned that the PRC and its people were closely watching alleged US plans to launch new military ventures. Peking pledged anew its "firm and unshakable support" for the Indochinese people and China's powerful backing until the US was driven from the three countries. It was believed by US officials that Foreign Ministry statements dramatizing PRC solidarity with the Indochinese Communists were designed to deter the US from stepping up military action in the area, such as bombing NVN.[5]

(C) The tirade exemplified above was a surface indication of PRC support of the DRV (as well as Communist organizations in other Indochinese countries), provided for public consumption. More definitive evidence was readily available in the form of exchanges of visits of high-ranking government officials of both Communist regimes. The first visit, perhaps the most significant during the year, was Chou En-lai's March trip to Hanoi. It was the most dramatic move Peking had made to demonstrate support for NVN and to help discourage the expansion of Allied activity. Accompanied by a People's Liberation Army (PLA) deputy chief of staff who was director of rear services, the trip suggested that logistical support to the DRV was a topic of discussion.[6] The text of speeches by Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong gave further clues to the nature of the visit. Chou noted that in his talks with Vietnamese officials a complete identity of views had been reached in discussions of the situation in Indochina and the question of further strengthening of friendly cooperation and mutual support and assistance. Later Chou mentioned that China would not flinch "even from the greatest national sacrifices" in taking all necessary measures to render all-out support. Pham Van Dong characterized the extent of PRC assistance already promised for 1971 as "huge."[7] The second visit occurred in May of 1971 when DRV's Le Duan arrived by special aircraft in Peking. The atmosphere of scheduled talks was described by the Communists as one which fully demonstrated the fraternal unity and militant friendship between the two parties. Chou and Le Duan reiterated in their

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banquet speeches the usual platitudes about harmonious Sino-Vietnamese relations.[8] The third trip, another one to Peking, was made by NVN's Premier Pham Van Dong during the period 20 - 27 November. A joint communique issued on 26 November reflected the restoration of PRC/DRV relations -- at least on the public level -- back to the high mark reached when Chou En-lai visited Hanoi.[9] The Premier was ostensibly pleased with the result of his trip, which was deemed to be in line with the generally harmonious bilateral relations which had prevailed since the end of August (prior to August, Hanoi was engaged in anti-Peking polemics). Although the DRV was anxious to avoid friction with the PRC, Hanoi probably remained deeply suspicious of Peking's intentions over the short-term. From the NVN point of view the visit did not mark any major change in relations with mainland China, but Hanoi had previously made it clear that it was willing to maintain good relations with Peking provided they were not at the expense of North Vietnam's objectives. Despite the warmth of the propaganda on both sides during the visit, the North Vietnamese, believing that in the best of times Moscow and Peking helped Hanoi only to serve their own parochial ends, were unlikely to regain complete confidence in the Chinese, at least until the results of scheduled visit by President Nixon to the PRC were known. The DRV leadership remembered that when Chao En-lai visited Hanoi he stated he would not flinch from the greatest national sacrifice. Certainly, US/PRC relations were an implicit, if not acknowledged, purpose of the last important visit of 1971.[10]

Economic Assistance

(C) Economic and military assistance to the DRV also gave testimony to continued satisfactory relationships with the PRC. In February an economic delegation from the DRV visited the PRC, probably to lay the groundwork for future aid.[11] In September a Chinese delegation arrived in Hanoi; this delegation was to sign the basic aid agreement for 1972. The remarks of DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi at the welcoming banquet suggested that Hanoi intended to pursue a middle-of-the-road course between its principal allies. Nghi vowed that "the DRV government and the entire Vietnamese people" were determined "to make an all-out effort for the further consolidation of the friendship and militant solidarity of the Vietnamese and Chinese peoples." Nghi also thanked the Chinese for their timely assistance in overcoming the "aftermath of floods."[12] On 27 September the 1972 agreements for aid were signed at the Presidential House, after which both sides "enthusiastically proposed toasts to the new development of the great friendship and militant solidarity between the peoples of Vietnam and China."[13] DIA estimated in late 1971 that the amount to be given to Hanoi in 1972 would approximate $200 million.[14] See Figure C-4 for a compilation of aid provided the DRV by the PRC for the years 1969, 1970, and 1971.

ASSOCIATION WITH USSR

(U) As were relations with Red China, Hanoi's association with the USSR in 1971 took the form of receipt of Russian progaganda support and economic assistance. Typical, and suggestive of the continued Russian interest in the overall Indochina situation, was a statement made by the Russian Government concerning the US air attacks on the DRV which took place during the last few days of December. Their response was one of condemnation. At the most authoritative level, the Soviet press carried a statement which called the attacks "new US criminal acts" and which cited USSR concern over the "dangerous situation with all seriousness." The statement was flanked by brief Tass announcements that as a result of negotiations in Moscow "having important significance," the Soviet Union has concluded agreements with the DRV providing for supplemental grant military assistance.[15]

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(S/NF) The economic assistance scheduled for the DRV in 1972 was believed to be similar in kind and in value to that of previous years. During the fall, when the economic agreements were concluded between Moscow and Hanoi, it was estimated that Russia would provide approximately $415 million to NVN during 1972. This estimate was based on an average of aid provided over the previous 3-year period. (In 1971 Russia provided $90 million worth of military aid and $330 million worth of economic aid [see Figure C-4]). As in the past, the military aid took the form of provision of heavy military items, ground equipment, aircraft, air defense weapons, ammunition, and POL.[16] For the period 1964 to June 1971 it was estimated that USSR had provided a total of $2,560 million worth of military aid and a total of $2,570 million worth of economic assistance.[17]

VALUE OF USSR AND PRC AID TO DRV
(Millions of dollars)

		1969	1970	1971
USSR:	Military	150	70	90
	Economic	250	360	330
	Total	400	430	420
PRC:	Military	130	85	80
	Economic	90	95	120
	Total	220	180	200

Source: DIA

Figure C-4

LAOS

BACKGROUND

(S/NF) Communist forces controlled more than half of Laos in 1971, with their domination extending the length of the country along the Vietnamese border to include all rugged mountain terrain. The Pathet Lao (PL) received all logistical support from Communist countries, primarily from NVN, with PRC and the USSR providing minimal support. NVN also stationed military forces in Laos to support logistical, training, and tactical activities of the PL as well as to conduct operations of their own. It was believed that Hanoi controlled and directed the military and political activities of the PL by means of the NVA advisors in PL units or through the high ranking members of the Neo Lao Hak Xat/Lao Patriotic Front (NLHX), who were also members of the Lao Dong Party. The PL Headquarters was believed to be near the town of Sam Neua. The facade of being neutralist was maintained to give the Communists a possible second voice in the Tripartite Government of Laos under the 1962 Geneva Accords. The Communists had hoped to be successful in pressuring the Royal Lao Government (RLG) into recognizing "Dissident Neutrals" as the center element of the government.

Communist Control Mechanism

(S/NF) The three primary Communist or Communist controlled organizations in Laos were the NLHX, the Phak Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party, PPL), and a small group of Lao members of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, the Lao Dong Dang (the Workers' Party, LDD).

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The NLHX was the main front of the Communist Party, and the largest and most active of the three groups. It was a legal and supposedly nationalist organization whose platform included ostensible support for the Monarch and Buddhism. Consequently, it contained many non-Communist members, although these individuals did not hold significant positions. The NLHX was granted official representation in the coalition government by the Geneva Accords of 1962. Representation included two Ministers with portfolio and several lesser Secretaries of State, however, the NLHX informally withdrew from the government in April 1963. The individuals who filled these positions in 1971 and who belonged to the NLHX were listed as "Acting Minister or Secretary." Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister, repeatedly asked the NLHX to return and participate in the Government, but the offer was habitually refused.

(S/NF) The PPL was a clandestine Communist organization with the mission of guiding and directing the NLHX and its military arm, the Pathet Lao (PL). Though its actual size was unknown, the PPL was significantly smaller than the NLHX. It maintained complete control over the front organization, as leaders of the PPL held similar positions in the NLHX.

(S/NF) The most important group within the Laotian Communist structure was the LDD, a small core of Communists within the PPL who held the highest positions in both the PPL and NLHX. They were also members of the North Vietnamese Communist Party and as such were the connecting link between policy decisions in Hanoi and their implementation in Laos.

(S/NF) Nouhak Phoumsavan, a member of the Central Committee, was probably the real director of the PL, with Committee Chairman Prince Souphanouvong who served as a "front man" about third in the chain of command. The military command was probably administered through regular army control and regional commanders.

(S/NF) The Pathet Lao organization was based on a regional or zone command system. Available information precluded detail, but indications were that the country was divided into three to six regions with boundaries fixed by existing historical or political lines, ethnic backgrounds, or surface configurations. Regions appeared to be subdivided into zones whenever necessary, and appeared to be based on tactical considerations (see Figures C-5 and C-6).[18]

Enemy Strategy

(S) The war in northern Laos was a strategic adjunct to the main conflict in the RVN. Peace efforts were promoted by NVN, whose military position on the Plain of Jars allowed it to apply political leverage on the RLG. Hanoi possibly desired to minimize its resource input to northern Laos while attempting to obtain a reduction or cessation of Allied air and ground interdiction along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The logistics war of southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia had become the critical conflict for the VC/NVA; the enemy now had to expand and protect the trail system through southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia and keep the system operating if he was to be militarily effective in southern Indochina. For the first time in the war, NVN was required to commit troops to hold and secure major supply routes to the COSVN area, thus making a large manpower commitment without significantly increasing fighting strength.

(S) The magnitude of the enemy's preparations in 1971 surpassed previous logistical campaigns, and a much greater effort was planned. Indications of this effort included the construction of new road bypasses and storage facilities, development and use of natural waterways, and extension of POL pipelines southward into Laos. Military operations included the seizure of Attopeu and Saravane and attempts to prevent friendly forces from interdicting LOC and harassing supply installations. There were early indications that the enemy intended to start a crash logistics campaign in mid-October 1971.

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PATHET LAO REGIONAL ORGANIZATION



Note: Below the High Command level the entire command structure of the PL was unclear. There were multiprovincial headquarters, provincial headquarters, and battalion headquarters. It was suspected that there were separate command structures for regular, regional, and guerrilla forces. In addition, there was evidence that some commanders used impressive sounding but inaccurate titles to impress their subordinates, which resulted in two or three different persons having the title of "PL Commander, South Laos." In standard Communist techniques, commanders were changed frequently in an attempt to keep loyalties with the Party or the organization and not to an individual.

Source: USARPAC

Figure C - 5

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

Source: USARPAC

Figure C-6

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(S) True to forecasts, the enemy launched his 1971 dry season campaign earlier than the previous year: his objective was to reestablish control of the Plain of Jars, while continuing to exert pressure on the RLG for a total bombing halt throughout Laos. With NVN personnel replacements, supplies, equipment, and regular NVA units, the enemy expanded and improved forces in the Plain of Jars to the point where by the end of 1971 enemy forces included elements of eight regiments. In southern Laos the enemy endeavored to replenish his BAs and protect his LOC running from the passes of the DRV through the Laotian panhandle to Cambodia and the COSVN area of the RVN. He began to make a major effort along primary LOC to substantially increase the level of throughput to the RVN over that of 1970 - 1971. In addition, he began to consolidate his control over the Bolovens Plateau and develop LOC in central Laos.[19]

(S) By November 1971, it was possible to forecast for 1972 the probable enemy courses of action in terms of the Laotian situation. In southern Laos it was believed that the enemy's main effort would be directed toward rebuilding, developing, operating, and protecting his vital LOC. He would also be expected to secure LOC against Laotian forces in the western Bolvens area. For northern Laos, there would be continuation of pressure, both military and political, to effect cessation of US bombing in the Laotian Panhandle, but there would be no attempt to overthrow the Vientiane Government.[20]

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Declaration of a State of Emergency in Laos

(C) On 12 Feb 71 the Royal Laotian Government declared a state of emergency throughout the kingdom, stating that recent military developments were the reason for its imposition. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma charged the commander of the RLG forces with assuring the security of the country as long as required by the general situation. The actual decision to impose the state of emergency was taken at a cabinet meeting at which a strong RLG condemnation of the illegal presence of NVA troops in Laos was made.[21]

Peace Negotiations

(S) Efforts to negotiate a peace between the RLG and the enemy during 1971 were less than successful. The year's efforts began on 21 January when a 16 January letter written by Prince Souphanouvong was delivered to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. (Souphanouvong, half-brother of the Prime Minister, was chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist-front NLHX and Deputy Prime Minister of the RLG in absentia.) Typically, the letter described US defeats, the impending US retreat from Indochina, and the US expansion of the war into Cambodia and Laos. The US was accused of encouraging the extreme rightists in Laos to effect a coup, and the NLHX standard peace propositions were presented as the only way to peacefully solve the Laotian situation. Souphanouvong cited these propositions as representative of a concession on the part of the NLHX. The Prime Minister replied:

> . . . I have received your message number 128 of 16 January, and I strongly regret that the NLHX is retrenched in the same intransigent attitude. . . . This intransigent and negative attitude of the NLHX is the origin of all the difficulties in the peaceful settlement of the Laos problem. . . . To put an end to all the difficulties which could go on indefinitely, on one part or the other, I propose to you the city of Luang Prabang as the meeting place of our plenipotentiary representatives. . . . I hope that the NLHX will seriously examine my proposition and consider it favorable. I hope you find this agreeable. . . .

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(C) Again on 13 February in a strongly worded telegram, Prime Minister Souvanna pointed out to PL leader Prince Souphanouvong that Hanoi and those who follow in the so-called Indochinese common front were bent on imposing new political systems on the three Indochinese nations through force of arms. The Prime Minister warned the Pathet Lao of dangers to the Kingdom of Laos stemming from actions by the Indochinese front, and stressed that the front should not be surprised by defensive measures provoked by its aggressive actions. Souvanna added that he realized the PL depended on Hanoi and had little freedom of action.[23] A new message was received by the Prime Minister on 23 March from the PL leader Souphanouvong which again posed conditions for talks which were unacceptable to the RLG. These specific conditions at the time included cessation of bombing and withdrawal of GVN and Thai troops.[24]

(C) Other exchanges occurred during the ensuing months and on 18 August Souvanna Phouma replied to earlier peace proposals. This reply was ridiculed by clandestine Radio Pathet Lao as being "old and ambiguous" in its rejection of PL peace proposals[25] and was treated lightly by Souphanouvong. The peace proposals rejected by the Prime Minister on 18 August had actually been solidified by clandestine Radio Pathet Lao in the following 22 June proposition:

> 1. To achieve at once a ceasefire throughout the territory of Laos, including the cessation of the US bombing raids, and a ceasefire-in-place by the armed forces in Laos with cessation of all hostile military activities on the ground and in the air, and all acts of violation or nibbling operations against the zone under the control of the other side.
>
> 2. The Lao parties concerned to meet right after the cease-fire in the whole territory of Laos and to discuss all questions of common concern with a view to achieving peace and national concord in Laos. The meeting place will be in turn the Plain of Jars and Vientiane.[26]

(C) Not until November were other exchanges made between the two leaders, this when the Prime Minister received a letter from Souphanouvong dated 20 November. It was deemed as "the single most vituperative piece of LPF [Lao Patriotic Front] propaganda" of the year's Souvanna-Souphanouvong exchanges. It began: "The situation in our country is increasingly deteriorating because of the dark intrigues of the Nixon administration." At a later point the letter called President Nixon "the most barbarous assassin of our time" and condemned Souvanna for having allegedly conspired with President Nixon during Souvanna's Washington visit to step up US bombing and increase Thai volunteer force levels in Laos. It castigated Souvanna for having "sought by all means to reject reasonable LPF proposals" and warned that "Lao people will never pardon you if you do not return rapidly to the path you followed in 1961-62." The letter concluded with the standard formulation of the Lao Patriotic Front position that the "US must end aggressive war in Laos, and immediately and unconditionally cease bombing the totality of Lao territory to create conditions permitting the Lao to meet and settle their own affairs, without foreign intervention."[27]

(S) Another Souphanouvong letter was received by Souvanna Phouma in December. Dated the 16th, and ending the 1971 exchanges and peace probes, it so irritated the Prime Minister that he decided not to reply. Among other things it warned that "the bombing must stop or you will suffer the consequences." This particular item, coupled with depression over the Pathet Lao invasion of the Plain of Jars was believed to be the reason for the decision not to reply.[28]

Lao Peoples Liberation Army Defections

(S) Beginning in March, large numbers of Pathet Lao troops rallied to the RLG side: nearly 100 in March, 18 in April, and 55 in May. Including officers, some ranking as high as lieutenant

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COMMUNIST CHINESE ROAD CONSTRUCTION (U)
MID-1971



Source: USARPAC

Figure C-7

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colonel, the troops presumably rallied because of friction between PL and NVA troops caused by poor treatment of the Laotian civilian population by the North Vietnamese. It was reported that armed clashes actually took place between NVA and PL troops who were intent on rallying. Allied propaganda efforts also assisted in creating the defections.[29]

RLG Request for ICC Intervention

(U) On 19 May Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma requested the International Control Commission to take appropriate measures to stop further acts of aggression by DRV troops against Laos and to have those troops removed from Lao territory without delay. This letter, which cited the finding of bodies of NVA troops on the battlefield, charged that the DRV was continuing to violate Lao territory and to commit acts of aggression against the Royal Laotian Army and to violate its own word and signature affixed at the Geneva Accords of 1962.[30]

RED CHINESE ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN LAOS

(S) Chinese road construction in northwest Laos during the 1970-71 dry season proceeded at a steady pace. Motorable roads were constructed from Muong Houn southeast to Ban Nammao (Rte 46) and from Muong La to Muong Khoua (Rte 452/45/451/19) (see Figure C-7). Most of the Chinese effort consisted of maintenance of newly constructed roads and roads completed during the 1969-70 dry season. Several new road upgrading projects anticipated in the 1970-71 dry season were not started. The route between Batene and Nam Tha remained a trail in poor condition. The route between Muong Xai and Nam Bac was in limited motorable condition. No construction effort was started on the Route 321/32/322 complex and Route 191 between Phong Saly and Muong Khoua; it remained in nonmotorable condition.

(S) In the 1971-72 dry season the Chinese would probably continue Route 46 through Pak Beng and then on to the Thai border. Other lesser construction was planned to take place as well.

(S) Road construction activity in Laos evolved into a definite pattern characterized by four phases:

-- an existing track or trail was selected and a single motorable lane was cleared, primarily to facilitate construction activity;

-- prior to the initiation of actual construction work in an area, the Chinese prepositioned supply depots, air defense positions, and construction related facilities;

-- the roadbed was constructed; road alignment, gradients, and surfaces were improved, and bridges and culverts were added;

-- road maintenance was performed.

(S) Estimates of Chinese presence in Laos ranged from 15,000 to 20,000 personnel, of which the majority were construction workers and the remainder were antiaircraft and road security cadre. Roads were built by a combined civil/military labor force; military engineers and technical cadre directed the work of a large coolie force. Reports indicated that the construction force consisted of Chinese Communists, North Vietnamese, PL, and local indigenous conscripts.[31]

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(S) During the 1971 rainy season the Chinese continued their construction efforts, but added relatively little actual mileage. Maintenance of existing nets appeared to have priority.[32]

THE KHMER REPUBLIC

BACKGROUND

(S/NF) The first few months after the March 1970 coup were a critical period for the Khmer Republic. Government ground forces numbered only 36,000 men compared to 60,000-plus men for Communits forces. During this period, Communist forces moved toward the interior of Cambodia, overrunning outposts and inflicting heavy losses on unprepared and ill-equipped Forces Armées Nationale Khmer (FANK) forces. This initial phase enabled Communist forces to acquire large segments of Cambodian territory, particularly in the northcentral and northeastern areas. During the summer months the situation slowly stabilized -- at least in terms of controlled territory. FANK forces began to organize into brigades, regiments, battalions, and territorial forces. This rapid mobilization and reorganization was supplemented by arms, equipment, and other material received from various countries. Toward the end of the summer, VC/NVA forces were halted long enough to permit distinction between enemy-held and friendly-held territory. Beginning in September 1970 and continuing to end-1971 Government forces began their counteroffensive phase which, although limited in scope, was supported by their own and Allied air power.

(S/NF) The national military objectives of the new Government Khmer Republic (GKR) fell into two phases: (1) stablize and halt further Communist advances; and (2) eliminate Communist presence in Cambodia. The short-term objective of stabilizing the military situation required that FANK maintain control over the vital land routes, particularly Route 5 (from Phnom Penh to the Thailand border), Route 4 (from Phnom Penh to Kompong Som), and Route 1 (from Phnom Penh to the South Vietnam border), and control the Mekong River and important tributaries (see Figure C-9). Control over these vital lines of communications would enable FANK to reinforce outposts along its perimeter and provide, if necessary, a means of transporting materiel and personnel into Cambodia should an emergency arise. Secondly, the stabilization phase required that GKR forces hold, at all costs, Phnom Penh and other strategic population centers vital to the existence of their defensive line. Likewise, they had to prevent isolation of major cities. For achievement of the objective it was necessary for FANK to improve overall combat effectiveness of its ground forces. An attempt would also have to be made to win support of the people in the countryside, thus preventing Communist forces from attaining a vital source of support. Another objective which had to be carried out simultaneously was that FANK had to consolidate its holdings, a phase which had to be completed prior to the long-term objective of eliminating Communist forces present in Cambodia.

(S/NF) The long-term objective, by far the most difficult, called for the removal of VC/NVA forces from Cambodia. To achieve this objective, FANK would have to retake major lines of communications now under Communist control, i.e., Routes 6 and 13. It would also require reoccupation of territory now held by the VC/NVA, particulary in northcentral and northeastern Cambodia. At the same time, the Government would have to utilize pacification programs similar to those of the RVN to win the support of the populace and combat the enemy infrastructure. Cambodian forces also had to be combat-superior to the VC/NVA in tactics, ability, and numerical strength. Due to a number of factors, it was doubtful if the objective could be achieved within the immediate future.[33]

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NVN Goals

(S) Hanoi's objectives in Cambodia were varied but were all tied to the ultimate intent of dominating the Republic of Vietnam. The primary objective was to have a government in Phnom Penh which would accept VC/NVA use of Cambodia. It was doubtful whether NVN wanted to overthrow the Government directly, as in the past difficulties were encountered in population control. They were probably reluctant to assume the problems of governing Cambodia themselves, and they did not consider the Khmer Communist movement to be strong or reliable enough to govern.

(S) For the short-run, the VC/NVA concentrated on disruption of Cambodia to try to prevent Allied forces from moving against the Mekong corridor. They sought to accomplish their objectives in three ways.

-- First, organize a Khmer infrastructure in rural areas. This infrastructure was to be used to siphon off Cambodian economic resources, including manpower, to supplement the depleted base of the VC/NVA. Its major purpose, however, was to serve the political objective of organizing a shadow government to improve population control and to aid the Khmer Communists in their insurgent effort.

-- Second, spread the war to western Cambodia and attempt to keep the expanding FANK Army out of the strategic Mekong corridor by attacking towns and major LOC, thus tying Government forces into static positions. It was also possible that the enemy had long-range plans to develop a logistical base in western Cambodia to support his forces both in Cambodia and in Vietnam. The Tonle Sap basin and Battambang Province, which produced large quantities of fish and rice, would provide him such a base and would have furnished food for personnel in the rice deficit areas of southern Laos and northeast Cambodia.

-- Finally, the NVA attempted to weaken and disrupt the GKR by undermining its economic base and political influence. They attacked the economic base by inhibiting marketing of crops on both the domestic and international scene and by interdicting movement of commodities to and from Phnom Penh. The political influence of the Cambodian Government was attacked by propaganda, by isolating rural areas from government communications, and by acts of terrorism. An important part of this program was harassment and attempted isolation of population centers, particularly Phnom Penh. Most of the highways leading to the capital were interdicted for periods ranging from several days to several months. Friendly shipping on the Mekong was fired upon. The interdiction of LOC could also have been intended to isolate FANK forces sent to keep routes open, thus increasing their vulnerability to defeat. Cambodia's determination to oppose the Communists, and ARVN's aggressive operations in support of FANK, disrupted enemy plans. Large numbers of enemy troops were held in a defensive posture east of the Mekong, while only a relatively small force was engaged in offensive operations west of the river. Allied operations had degraded the enemy position, further reducing his capabilities and available options.[34]

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

(U) Two events require mention as being noteworthy for 1971, both of which were politically related: Lon Nol's illness and the beginning of rule by decree.

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Lon Nol's Illness

(C) On 8 February, Marshal Lon Nol suffered a mild stroke: he left Cambodia on 13 February for Hawaii for treatment and a period of recuperation. Apparently the decision to leave was a difficult one for Lon Nol to make, and he did so only at the urging of his doctors and close collaborators, and with full cabinet approval. Despite possible political repercussions outside of the country, the Government decided that Honolulu provided the facilities and distance required for a quiet recovery. Early local reaction was muted, but it was anticipated that a quiet period of adjustment in command channels and the decision-making process would occur, dependent upon the pace and degree of Lon Nol's recovery.[35] The Prime Minister ultimately pursued a course of prescribed therapy coupled with great will power and dedication in the conviction that he would recover, which he did. By year's end he was as active in the government as ever.[36]

Rule by Decree

(C) On 20 October Prime Minister Lon Nol announced that he was dismissing the National Assembly and would henceforth rule the country of Cambodia by decree. It was not a military coup, but a reassertion by the Government (Lon Nol backed by Sirik Matak) of an authority which it possessed since March 1970 and which it wished to retain without serious challenge. The military was behind the move, and there was believed to be significant civilian support as well. Noteworthy was the fact that the actual decision to abandon the legislative assembly came from Lon Nol, not the military. There was, to be sure, civilian opposition, but in the Assembly itself only a minority challenged the Government.[37] The principal reaction to the Government's action was the effort of several Buddhist monks to arouse support among their colleagues for a show of concern at the direction which events were taking. In retrospect, it was determined that the reason behind the action was that Lon Nol became concerned that opposition, in the form of a number of former Democratic Party members, was reaching the point where it posed a potential threat to the authority of the Prime Minister.[38]

1971 In Review

(S/NF) In summary, as 1971 drew to a close, the Khmer Republic found itself in approximately the same position as that from which it began the year. While it could be argued that there were improvements in several areas, and there were, it could also be argued that there was backsliding in other areas. The net effect was that the Republic improved its position ever so slightly economically and militarily, and its political stability deteriorated to a degree which was not entirely clear. There were ups and downs in all areas, but from the uncertainty surrounding Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol's illness early in the year, through what was probably the high point of Prime Minister Delegate Sisowath Sirik Matak's visit to the US, into the aftermath of the CHENLA II reverses (in the fall of 1971 GKR forces were defeated by the enemy in a series of engagements along Route 6, an LOC vital to the Communists' effort), the Khmer Republic found itself about where it was a year ago. Cracks in the Lon Nol/Sirik Matak governmental foundation began to appear, and it was unlikely that the political solidarity between them -- not to be confused with their personal amity -- would ever be quite the same again.[39]

(S) For 1972 the enemy was expected to continue essentially the same style of operations which he conducted in 1971. Specifically, his main effort would be toward the operation, development, and protection of logistical and base area systems, especially along the Mekong River where they would be less vulnerable to cross-border operations. Hanoi would attempt to extend control in the northwestern reaches of Cambodia and attempt development of food production in the area. It was expected that there would be no direct attempt to overthrow the GKR, for reasons discussed earlier, but that efforts would be made to discredit it to the fullest extent

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possible. Continued efforts would be made to isolate the strategically located Phnom Penh. As for the fledgling infrastructure, the Communists would continue their efforts to develop it to the greatest extent possible.[40]

STATISTICS/ACTIVITIES

Summary

(S/NF) During 1971 enemy forces increased in numerical strength, mainly due to increased Khmer Communist forces. But the enemy had problems too. Enemy logistical arrangements were more complicated than those of FANK and he did not appear to be able to maintain himself in battle over an extended period of time. Hence enemy actions tended to be cyclical, unable to maintain pressure on FANK for very long. There were indications, however, that the enemy could maintain himself somewhat longer in late 1971 than in the summer of 1970, and it was likely that this capability would increase. Despite friendly airpower, the enemy held his own against FANK. He had to worry about ARVN incursions into base areas east of the Mekong, and thus could not devote full attention to FANK. The threat of ARVN was an important factor in the Cambodian war, and it was likely that, occasional Cambodian Government statements to the contrary, ARVN's role in Cambodia would be required during 1972. While this fact continued to cause some political problems for the Cambodian Government, it was unlikely that the Cambodians would make any serious efforts to eliminate ARVN military action on Cambodian soil.[41]

Statistics

(C) Figure C-8 provides data concerning enemy activity in Cambodia for 1970 (May through December only) and 1971, the only 2 years that such was available.[42]

(S/NF) Data available for estimated enemy strength in Cambodia for 1971 was derived from jointly held MACV/CINCPAC figures. Current as of 30 Sep 71, the total enemy strength in Cambodia was 78,585. This figure consisted of VC/NVA considered a threat to RVN (52,285), VC/NVA not considered a threat to RVN (11,300), and Khmer Communists (15,000).[43]

MONTHLY CAMBODIAN STATISTICAL DATA
(1970)

1970	AS	AF	AM	HAR	TER	SAB	PRO	AAF	Total Incid	En KIA	En Wpns Captured IW	CS
M	8	10	3	66	0	0	0	69	156	9154	14002	1918
J	15	34	2	133	0	0	0	229	413	2321	7421	377
J	16	24	1	55	0	0	0	62	158	1329	1038	98
A	16	22	0	41	0	0	0	33	112	493	155	26
S	3	15	1	45	0	0	0	21	85	717	137	23
O	3	5	1	29	0	1	0	41	80	495	353	31
N	5	5	0	24	0	1	0	35	70	823	235	28
D	7	12	2	35	1	1	0	74	132	678	215	37
T	73	127	10	428	1	3	0	564	1206	16010	23556	2538

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
THAILAND
LAOS
VIETNAM
SOUTH
CHONG KAL
ROUTE 68
ROUTE 6
ROUTE 21
ROUTE 13
O TAPONG
PARAY
ROUTE 5
ROUTE 7
ROUTE 4
ROUTE 2
ROUTE 3
ROUTE 1
PICH NIL PASS
KOMPONG SOM
CHUP RUBBER PLANTATION
ROUTE 153 / KG CHAMLANG
CAMBODIA
International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
Phnom Penh, Bokor, Kep, and Sihanoukville are autonomous municipalities.
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

Figure C-9

MONTHLY CAMBODIAN STATISTICAL DATA
(1971)

1971	AS	AF	AM	HAR	TER	SAB	PRO	AAF	Total Incid	En KIA	En Wpns Captured IW	CS
J	10	6	4	29	1	0	0	19	76	868	204	37
F	17	50	11	69	2	0	0	33	215	2592	487	113
M	8	47	4	92	0	0	0	104	270	1989	293	84
A	6	51	3	113	1	0	0	142	331	2008	141	4
M	10	18	2	115	1	0	0	126	289	1020	170	25
J	2	11	0	15	1	0	0	120	151	1375	256	23
J	0	1	1	9	0	0	0	62	73	374	62	8
A	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	57	63	373	198	20
S	3	8	0	15	3	0	0	82	111	314	84	12
O	2	23	0	119	0	0	0	104	248	844	116	54
N	1	7	1	27	0	0	0	132	168	725	208	22
D	5	33	0	85	0	1	0	124	248	922	303	74
T	64	249	26	689	10	1	0	1105	2243	13404	2522	476

Source: MACJ2

Figure C-8

Activities

January

(S/NF) During the first week in January enemy harassment activity remained at the high level of December 1970 in Kompong (KG) Cham, KG Speu, KG Seila, the Pursat Subdivisions, (Figure C-9) and the Phnom Penh Special Military Region (PPSMR). The enemy attacked a POL barge in the Mekong River, and a bridge on Route (RT) 5, near C Tapong, was damaged and possibly destroyed. For the week beginning 7 January the only significant activity continued to be in the KG Cham/RT 7 area and the RT 4 area. Ninety Khmer Communists rallied to the Government side at Svay Rieng. There were sporadic and minor enemy contacts throughout the country, and large enemy sightings were reported in KG Thom on 12 January. Until 21 January enemy harassment continued to be at a low level throughout the country with the exception of the Pich Nil Pass area where ARVN clearing operations were underway. On 22 January unidentified enemy sapper and artillery elements combined to attack and do large scale damage to the Phnom Penh Airport. By 23 January enemy activity had increased in KG Cham Subdistrict (SD), Prey Veng SD, and Svay Rieng SD. Contacts were reported in the PPSMR along the Mekong River and about 10 km north of Phnom Penh. ARVN continued to make progress in the Pich Nil Pass AO. From 24 through 28 January enemy initiated activity was sporadic, however, three terrorist incidents were reported in Phnom Penh when one government and other buildings were damaged by explosive devices. One of the incidents occurred at the Vietnamese Embassy when a young boy threw an explosive device into the lobby. Other than in the southwest, where several contacts were reported along RTs 4 and 5, enemy activity remained at a low level for the remainder of the month. One of the contacts along RT 4 was the enemy ambush of a 71-truck convoy 21 km north of Veal Renh.

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February

(S/NF) For the first week in February enemy activity was generally at a low level. The most significant activity took place in KG Cham SD in response to an ARVN initiated operation into the Chup rubber plantation area, a normal habitat for sizeable enemy forces; it was this operation which contributed to the overall countrywide decrease in activity. This trend of activity continued into the week ending 18 February as ARVN forces were successful in invading key enemy logistical bases. There were a number of contacts in KG Spieu and Siem Reap SD of PPSMR, but their significance was marginal. Since a successful reopening of RT 4 by ARVN forces there was little enemy action in that area. Enemy capability to attack Phnom Penh by fire was again demonstrated with a three-round rocket attack on the night of 13-14 February. For the period beginning on 18 February higher levels of enemy activity in the Chup area continued; significant activity was reported in the PPSMR area, and an increase in activity was reported around Prey Veng where the enemy appeared to be concentrating on interdiction of RT 1, an action which would block traffic from RVN to Phnom Penh. A bridge was ultimately destroyed along the route near Neak Luong.

March

(S/NF) On the morning of 2 March the enemy launched an attack on the Kompong Som oil refinery where four large storage tanks and their contents were destroyed by explosions and fire -- it was later determined that the attack had been primarily the result of standoff fire. Other activity during the first week was sporadic, consisting mostly of attacks-by-fire. Resistance to ARVN incursions in the Chup area continued, as did harassment of RT 1. For the period ending 17 March enemy activity was light in all areas of the country with two exceptions, however, these were related to Allied operations. The two operations in question were the on-going Chup area ARVN sweep, where contact was made with a battalion size enemy force on 16-17 March, and in the PPSMR where FANK operations were geared to clearing suspected enemy forces from areas around the capital. From 17 March to the end of the month enemy activity remained at low to moderate levels throughout the country, with most action occurring in the western portion of the Republic. Interdiction of LOC and defense of BAs were of prime importance to the enemy. Renewed fighting along RT 4 offered clear evidence that the initiative of the war in Cambodia continued to rest with the Communists. They were able to expend very little effort in routing troops, pointing up weaknesses which continued to plague the Cambodian army.

April

(S/NF) During the first week in April, renewed enemy pressure against KG Cham constituted the most significant Communist action. A two-battalion attack, in which a village near KG Cham was overrun, gave evidence of new threats to an area which was the eastern-most boundary of actual government control and which served as a jumping-off place for Allied operations into the Chup area. Another friendly effort was begun to reopen RT 4. Elsewhere, enemy activity was light. For the week ending 14 April, enemy activity was generally confined to reactions against Allied efforts in two areas, RT 7 (an ARVN effort), and the on-going FANK effort to reopen RT 4 near Pich Nil Pass. As the next week began the picture was generally the same as enemy forces continued to harass two FANK battalions in the Pich Nil Pass area as well as relief columns along RT 4. The enemy was content to keep this road closed to friendly logistical activity and to keep Allied forces pinned down in the area. There were several sharp clashes between enemy forces and ARVN units in the Chup area related to Operation TOAN THANG 01/71. By 28 April the RT 4 clearing operation had begun to make progress in the face of continued enemy resistance.

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May

(S/NF) The first week in May was characterized by increasingly heavy enemy activity in the PPSMR, where small scale attacks and harassment appeared to be the predominant theme -- there was no threat to the capital, however. In other significant developments, enemy movements were noted in the KG Thom and KG Chang areas. Allies made progress in the Pich Nil area, and heavy contact with enemy forces was made in the vicinity of KG Cham. Finally on 7 May a convoy of 41 trucks moved from KG Som to Phnom Penh without enemy initiated incident, the first time since March that this had been possible. Enemy activity throughout the country remained light for the next 2 weeks. In one action on 13 May FANK succeeded in retaking Chong Kal in MR 4 (Oddar Meanchey Province) and were counterattacked 2 days later -- the counterattack was successfully repulsed. During the period beginning 18 May enemy activity began to increase with harassments being reported in KG Cham and the PPSMR. A Mekong River convoy was attacked on 19 May with two vessels being slightly damaged, and there were heavy enemy attacks in Oddar Meanchey Province. Near the Thai border on RT 68, also in Oddar Meanchey Province, two former FANK outposts remained under enemy control despite Allied bombing. The last week of the month was characterized by sporadic enemy activity and enemy preoccupation with movement to prepare for the coming wet season. In the north, the enemy continued to apply pressure to the RT 68 area in that it was believed that he was interested in extending control over the associated supply route. Late month reports indicated that the enemy was attempting to reassert pressure in the Route 6/7 area west of KG Cham.

June

(S/NF) The enemy resumed combat initiative during the first week in June, with main force reinforcements moving from KG Cham and striking FANK units along the Tonle Toch River, and along the Mekong River itself. There were several 122mm rocket attacks in the vicinity of Phnom Penh, which in two cases struck the outskirts of the city. Most of the activity was in the form of ground attacks with supportive mortar and automatic weapons fire. The most significant single activity occurred on 8 June when an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 VC/NVA ambushed a FANK relief column on RT 153 about 2.5 km west of KG Chamlang. As the period ending 15 June came to a close it was believed possible that the enemy was changing tactics. For the past few months he had been avoiding offensive activity against FANK, presumably because of preoccupation with supply matters. But heavy action was continuing in the Tonle Toch River area, and the enemy lashed out against FANK units on RT 3 south of the capital. Elsewhere, harassment appeared to be on the increase. In the RT 1 area, FANK was unable to wrest the town of Srang from enemy forces; it had alternated between friendly and enemy control since 11 June. Other contacts also occurred in this RT 3 area of operations. Enemy activity also increased near RT 5 near KG Chhang, with fighting northwest of the city on 18 and 19 June. Fighting also continued around Phnom Penh as FANK operations continued and they approached what was believed to be the CP of a VC regiment. As the month drew to a close an enemy threat to Phnom Penh's eastern flank subsided, but government forces continued to be harassed. Enemy activity on RT 4 increased sharply on 26 June as enemy forces launched a heavy rocket and mortar barrage against government positions at an armored half-brigade camp. Sapper tactics were also used in the attack; extensive damage resulted.

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July

(S/NF) During the first week of the month enemy initiated activity was characterized as relatively low level. Centered around the area of KG Cham, RT 7, and the Mekong River areas of MR 1 there appeared to be an enemy build-up of forces. On 6 July FANK reported engaging the enemy in heavy action just north of the Mekong River. After 2 hours of fighting, contact was broken with the assistance of TACAIR. Other major activity in-country was the result of Allied operations. Sporadic activity continued to be reported in the Tonle Toch and the KG Cham areas. These two areas continued to be the center of enemy activity through 14 July, with little activity elsewhere. During the period of 22-28 July enemy activity increased slightly throughout the country, attributed in part to several sweep and clear operations launched by Cambodian forces. The most significant Communist action during the period consisted of a gradual upsurge in pressure against Phnom Penh's western environs, while KG Cham and the Tonle Toch areas continued to receive some attention with a total of 17 and 14 reported incidents, respectively. Action west of the capital consisted of harassment of government forces north of RT 4 in terms of attacks-by-fire and ground attacks.

August

(S/NF) The first few days of August were characterized by a low level of enemy initiated activity throughout Cambodia, with most occurring in the continuing ARVN TOAN THANG 01/71 operation. In the Tonle Toch area, along RTs 4 and 7, and in the vicinity of KG Thom, the enemy appeared to be intent upon keeping FANK forces confused by occupying as many different parts of the country as possible, while at the same time employing economy of force tactics. From the period beginning 4 August and ending on 25 August the level of combat activity was lower than for several months. There was an increase in combat activity north of Tang Kouk as a result of FANK activities in Operation CHENLA II, a GKR operation designed to deny RT 6 to the enemy. After heavy fighting, FANK elements succeeded in taking a village at the junction of RTs 6 and 21 on 31 August: the towns of Rumlong and Baray had been captured by FANK on 24 and 28 August, respectively.

September

(S/NF) The relative lull in enemy activity which had characterized the previous few weeks was temporarily interrupted on 10-11 September when enemy forces launched an attack in the Operation CHENLA II AO, along RT 5, and in KG Speu. Likewise, during the period ending 22 September the tempo of military activity increased again throughout most of the country, possibly in response to continued government successes in Operation CHENLA II. A reduction in activity was noted in the RT 7 area of KG Cham Province as well as the Tonle Toch AO. In the PPSMR, on 19-20 September, an enemy rocket attack against Phnom Penh's largest POL storage facility destroyed an estimated 50 percent of the installation, the most spectacular enemy action to occur in the capital area since the January attack on the airport. Elsewhere in the capital area several attacks-by-fire were noted in the city's outer defensive belt. Generally, military action was centered around the villages of Rumlong and KG Thmar with significant skirmishes occurring north of the latter. Attacks in MR 2 were against small outposts along RT 2. Near Siem Reap City increased contacts and harassing actions were noted, with the city airfield being subjected to mortar and RR rifle fire on 15 September, the third attack within a week. As September drew to a close, enemy activity decreased. Action was still focused on the PPSMR and in the Operation CHENLA II AO. Government forces had succeeded in reopening RT 6 to KG Thom for the first time since June 1970.[44]

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October

(S/NF) Compared to the last weeks in September, the level of activity in October decreased throughout much of the country, with most of the action yet being focused in the PPSMR. Northeast of Phnom Penh a Cambodian naval gun barge was sunk on 2 October after a plastic explosive device was detonated on its hull. Another sabotage incident occurred on 3 October when an attempt was made to destroy a FANK artillery position near the city. South of the city increasing harassment was noted near Srang, suggestive of enemy intentions to keep supply lines open to the CHENLA II AO. RT 6 continued to remain open. The period 6-13 October also saw a low level of combat activity with the total number of incidents lower than any of the previous three week periods. Enemy forces continued to harass FANK positions along RT 7 and near KG Cham City. Little contact was reported in the CHENLA II area; the one significant action was a friendly engagement of enemy forces believed to be units of a VC regiment. Enemy activity continued to remain at a very low level during the third week in the month, with most action resulting from enemy attacks-by-fire, some of which occurred in Phnom Penh's northern and western environs. For the week ending 27 October, however, activity increased by about 50 percent. Major attention was once again focused on the CHENLA II area, as well as RT 4 between KG Speau and Pich Nil Pass, and along RT 5 northeast of KG Chang. Combat activity subsided in eastern KG Cham Province and in the capital's peripherial areas. In the CHENLA II area itself, enemy forces attacked several villages along RT 6; heavy fighting was reported in the vicinity of Rumlong and Prakham on 27 October. The enemy also destroyed a bridge south of Skoun, isolating a CHENLA II column north of that village. During the final days of the month, activity continued to be centered in the CHENLA II area. Enemy forces continued to launch artillery and ground attacks on several FANK outposts along RT 6. Heavy fighting took place near Rumlong, and the sector of RT 6 between Rumlong and Tang Kouk remained in enemy hands preventing reinforcements from moving north. The inability to repair the previously destroyed bridge south of Skoun also hampered friendly operations. Enemy resistance was believed to be in the form of four brigades, necessitating FANK reinforcements from Phnom Penh. Elsewhere in the country activity was sporadic, characterized by harassing attacks, the most significant of which took place near Takeo City in MR 2.[45]

November

(S/NF) The tempo of combat activity increased significantly throughout much of the country during the month of November. These increases were noted primarily in MRs 3 and 4 and in the PPSMR, while in MR 2 it was at its lowest in at least 4 months. During the month, enemy forces continued pressure on government positions in the CHENLA II area while at the same time initiating a new round of attacks near Phnom Penh and along RT 5. Following nearly 3 weeks of heavy fighting friendly forces renewed efforts to regain control over RT 6. CHENLA II forces were then instructed to reorganize and consolidate their positions to the north and south of Rumlong in an effort to stave off further enemy gains in the area. However, elements of the enemy's 9th Division continued pressure on FANK positions along RT 6 north of Rumlong. The focus of attention changed in early November from CHENLA II to Phnom Penh and RT 5 where enemy harassment increased following the relocation of the 1st NVA division. On 10 November enemy forces launched a rocket and mortar attack against Phnom Penh's airfield, followed by similar attacks against communications sites and an ammunition depot, and the destruction of an RT 5 bridge north of Phnom Penh. To counter the enemy threat, Operation TUOL LEAP was launched in the city's western environs. Additionally some 20 FANK battalions were relocated from CHENLA II to help bolster the city's defenses. Despite numerous small clearing operations, the enemy continued to shell the airport and harass government positions throughout most of Phnom Penh's western periphery. As of the end of the month, government forces had made little progress in pushing major elements of the 1st NVA Division from

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positions near the capital. In the northwest, increased enemy activity between Muong and KG Chhang and the destruction of two bridges on RT 5 caused the government to reduce the number of rice convoys from Battambang to Phnom Penh. The rail line west of Muong was also destroyed and five rail cars derailed. Military activity also increased in MR 1. In mid-November several enemy attacks southwest of KG Cham City resulted in 3 KIA, 36 WIA, 117 MIA, 134 weapons and three radios lost while armed villagers in the area suffered 100 MIA and 99 weapons lost. In eastern KG Cham Province, South Vietnamese forces began a new dry season offensive against major enemy BAs north of RT 7 on 22 November. As of the end of the month, ARVN task forces had encountered little enemy resistence. Elsewhere in MR 1, a heavy artillery attack on Prey Veng City, a 122mm rocket attack on Neak Luong village, and indirect fire on two riverine convoys signaled a possible increase in pressure along the Mekong River corridor. To the southeast, government positions around Svay Rieng City received sporadic harassing attacks as did Kampot City in MR 2. No significant losses were reported, however enemy forces succeeded in closing RT 4 after destroying one span of a bridge, placing further restriction on the Government's capability of resupplying Phnom Penh. November was a difficult and sobering month of main force war fought against the largest force and the most sophisticated collection of weapons the FANK had faced. This greatly increased effort saw deployed against FANK some 16,000 enemy MF combat troops and raised the question whether the enemy might not have switched to a "Cambodian strategy" wherein he would concentrate on dealing a decisive blow to FANK in the hope that this might launch a chain of events calculated to break the stalemate in South Vietnam.[46]

December

(S/NF) The high level of combat activity that prevailed during November continued throughout most of December, declining slightly toward the end of the month. A generally even distribution of combat actions was reported in each of the MRs with the highest incident rate noted in the PPSMR and MR 1, with MRs 4, 2 and 3 following. The focus of attention during the month centered on RT 6, Phnom Penh and Khmer LOC. In the northeast enemy forces continued to harass FANK positions at the southern and northern end of the former CHENLA II column; the offensive itself terminated on 4 December. The enemy's presence in strength raised the spectre of another psychological and military setback. The loss of Tang Kouk would have been a severe blow. Responding to the threat, FANK initiated Operation CIVA, involving a three-brigade force from Phnom Penh, and against little resistance managed to relieve beleaguered forces at Prakham and regain a firm hold over Route 6 between Skoun and Tang Kouk. Although government forces were subjected to daily harassment towards the end of December, the threat of a major enemy assault lessened. Farther north along Route 6, early enemy pressure around KG Thom was reduced to minor harassing attacks with no major losses. Government efforts concentrated on maintaining the security of KG Thom and RT 6 between KG Thom and Phnom Santuc Mountain. The expansion of the airstrip southeast of the town to accommodate larger aircraft was planned to help ease resupply problems for the 45,000 military and civilian personnel in the area. In the PPSMR, Operation TUOL LEAP forces made little headway in routing 1st NVA Division elements from their month and a half old positions in Phnom Penh's western environs. Despite numerous clearing operations to the south and west, the enemy continued to avoid contact, electing instead to initiate actions that were to his advantage, including three rocket attacks on the Phnom Penh airport. FANK maneuvering in the area did, however, preempt probable enemy intentions to carry the war closer to the capital. During mid-December, a major portion of the 1st NVA Division redeployed to BAs in the southwest, presumably having accomplished its objectives. By 25 December, FANK units had successfully reoccupied all territory which had previously been under enemy control. An increase in harassment along the Tonle Toch River indicated renewed enemy interest in that area. FANK had gained control of this region in June and effectively denied the enemy a major logistic corridor to the south. Consistent with normal dry season activity, the enemy demonstrated continued interest in economic isolation of Phnom Penh by paralyzing strategic LOC. On 28 December a 28-meter

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span of a bridge east of KG Som was destroyed, interdicting RT 4. The enemy also succeeded in interdicting RT 1 by destroying a key bridge east of Neak Luong on 19 December, which was subsequently reopened utilizing ferry services. Despite small scale harassing attacks along RT 5, rice convoys continued to pass without interference. In MR 1, several small scale actions occurred near KG Cham City which were probably provoked by the return of the 9th Division elements from the CHENLA II area. The most significant incident was an enemy attack against an armed village in which 28 villagers were captured and 55 individual weapons confiscated. Similar situations were reported near Svay Rieng, KG Thom and Takeo urban centers which resulted in some 120 civilians killed and many more wounded or missing. In eastern KG Cham Province South Vietnamese forces began the dry season offensive into the enemy base areas. After encountering heavy fighting near Dambe, ARVN forces moved into the Chup rubber plantation, later withdrawing to defensive positions east along RT 7, a move which was probably prompted by reports of heavy enemy build-up north of the plantation. As of the end of December, only 9,000 of the original task force of some 12,000 men remained in the TOAN THANG 01/71 AO. Elsewhere in MR 1, sporadic harassing attacks occurred around Svay Rieng and Prey Veng cities. Combat activity in MR 2 continued at a low level with most activity occurring along RTs 2 and 3 near Takeo City, in the vicinity of Kampot, and along the southern portion of RT 4. In MR 3, enemy forces conducted a series of ground attacks against friendly positions located east of KG Chhang. The sudden surge of activity in this area suggested enemy intentions to reactivate the northern supply corridor from RT 6 to the southwestern part of the country.[47]



Results of air strikes on Ban Karai Pass, a key infiltration route.

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

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ANNEX D

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

REVISION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

(C) It has always been an essential goal in the conduct of combat operations in Vietnam to employ firepower for its maximum effectiveness. Concurrently, prudent military planners have always recognized the need for exercising this power very carefully to avoid civilian casualties, minimize destruction of private property, and avoid unwarranted destruction of resources. Thus, as directed by higher headquarters, MACV and JGS have established rules of engagement (ROE) which impose positive controls upon the use of firepower by military forces in the battle area. With a civilian population that was experiencing an increasingly secure environment in 1971, and hence becoming more inclined to ignore curfews and restricted areas the ROE assumed even greater importance.[1] Furthermore, the shift to small unit operations, the continued improvement of target detection and weapons delivery systems, along with the impact of Vietnamization and redeployment, dictated an even more judicious application of the ROE in all aspects of the conduct of the war. Accordingly in late 1970 MACV directed a major revision of the existing ROE directive, MACV Directive 525-13. In the face of five published changes and continuing suggestions from field commanders concerning major points requiring clarification, this effort seemed warranted. Users felt that many definitions were too imprecise and vague, that clearance procedures were too complicated, and that confusion would often ensue in the application of the ROE at certain levels of command.[2]

MACV Directive 525-13

(C) The new document, published in May 1971,[3] sought to simplify the ROE for all users. The basic rules for the application of fire to a target would still apply; the target must be clearly identified as hostile, and appropriate military and political clearance to fire was essential. However, the new directive was reworded to focus attention on the changing nature of combat operations and the importance of controlling firepower. The vagueness as to what constituted a village or hamlet was eliminated by changing the definition to the more inclusive term "inhabited area." While the earlier regulation referred to "appropriate" GVN and US/FWMAF/RVNAF clearance authorities, the new document specified the level of responsibility of those who would have clearance authority.

(C) A major simplification in the new regulation was that it included five annexes geared to types of weapons systems, so that an individual needed only to read the basic document and the annex pertaining to his particular area of concern. This was a major improvement over the previous document which contained one annex for all surface operations and one for all air operations. The new annexes covered surface weapons (excluding naval gunfire), rotary wing

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air operations, air defense, fixed wing air operations (discussed in Chapter VI), and naval gunfire (discussed in Chapter V). ROE pertaining to cross-border operations are discussed in Annex E.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

Surface Operations

(C) Furnished for guidance in the conduct of both offensive and defensive operations, the ROE annex for surface operations included the control of organic and supporting surface weapons as well as riverine gunfire. This annex emphasized the need for the exercise of sound judgment in the originating of fire requests, in gunnery procedures, and in the use of observed fire at all times except in the most urgent circumstances. Even within a Special Strike Zone (SSZ), unobserved fire would not be conducted unless cleared by the appropriate military and political authority.

(C) Concerning the conduct of fire in uninhabited areas outside of a SSZ, clearance instructions were precise:

-- In uninhabited areas, fire may be directed against VC/NVA forces in contact without obtaining approval of the province chief, district chief, sector commander, or subsector commander and US/FWMAF/RVNAF battalion or higher commander.

-- Observed fire may be directed against targets of opportunity which are clearly identified as hostile without obtaining approval of the province chief, district chief, sector commander, or subsector commander.

-- Unobserved fires may be directed at targets and target areas clearly identified as hostile, other than VC/NVA forces in contact, only after approval has been granted by the province chief, district chief, sector commander, or subsector commander and US/FWMAF/RVNAF battalion or higher commander.

(C) In view of the enemy's goal of drawing support from the people, voluntary or otherwise, ROE standards concerning fire support in occupied areas were even more explicit. There were to be three categories of populated zones:

-- Inhabited areas from which hostile fire is received.

- Surface commanders of units engaged in operations involving the maneuver of surface forces in or through inhabited areas may respond with direct fire without prior warning and without prior clearance if, in the judgment of the company or higher commander, his mission or troops would be jeopardized by such warning or delay. However, the response should be designed for self-protection and directed only at the source of hostile fire after the source had been positively identified.

- Indirect fire missions will be controlled by an observer and may be executed only after approval of the province chief or district chief, and the attacking battalion or higher commander. The only exception to this would be a situation in which the hostile fire presents an immediate threat to friendly forces despite the employment of direct fire.

-- Inhabited areas containing observed or suspected VC/NVA targets but from which hostile fire is not received.

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- Surface commanders may initiate direct fire against positively identified enemy targets only after securing approval of the province or district chief and the attacking battalion or higher commander.

- Indirect fire missions will be controlled by an observer and will be executed only after approval by the province or district chief and attacking battalion or higher commander. Civilians will be given prior warning by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means and given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

-- Inhabited areas not immediately associated with the maneuver of surface forces will not be fired upon without prior warning by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means, even though fire is received therefrom. Should friendly troops be placed in jeopardy, they will be free to protect themselves with return fire.

(C) The use of firepower in urban areas was controlled as stringently as possible because of the special care needed to preclude unnecessary destruction of property and loss of life. Accordingly:

-- The decision to conduct indirect fire missions in urban areas is retained by the senior tactical commander and requires his approval and that of the ARVN corps commander. The exception to this policy is the built-up areas of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh City. CG TRAC is authorized to delegate authority to Commanding Officer, CMAT, for the employment of indirect fire in these areas. No further delegation is authorized.

-- All indirect fire missions will be controlled by an observer.

-- Direct fire, flat trajectory weapons are authorized in a direct fire role in urban areas at the discretion of the battalion or higher commander without prior approval of the senior tactical commander, or in the case of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh City, the Commanding Officer of CMAT. Direct fire weapons will be used to the maximum in the elimination of enemy strong points or fortified structures in urban areas. All types of munitions, except incendiary (white phosphorus), may be used in direct fire weapons including flechette (beehive), HEAT, and canister rounds.

-- Maximum use will be made of helicopters to maneuver troops and heavy weapons to roofs of key buildings and other locations to expedite cordoning.

-- Prior to firing in urban areas, leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means will be utilized to warn and secure the cooperation and support of the civilian populace even though fire is received from these areas.

(C) Thus, while the ground war continued to slacken in 1971, MACV sought to insure that ground commanders could still achieve the goal of maximum effectiveness in combat operations, while applying the most prudent control possible in the use of firepower.

Control of Gunship Fire

(C) With the incorporation of new ROE guidance for the employment of helicopters, separated from fixed wing operations, it was believed that field commanders would encounter fewer problems in the use of this formidable firepower asset. The refinement of policy with regard to helicopter gunships would be even more important than before, foreshadowing the "dynamic defense" tactics of the commitment of US/FWMAF helicopter assets later in the summer. Already scheduled for the latest possible redeployment, assault helicopter companies were to play

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a major role in providing the essential firepower for RVNAF forces during the crucial period when qualitative RVNAF improvements were expected to offset the degradation created by diminishing US assets.

(C) As in the past, gunships would have to be under the positive control of and in direct radio contact with the controlling headquarters during combat operations, while visual identification of the target and friendly and civilian positions had to be ascertained. In urban areas, the instructions were even more precise than for ground weapons. Only point targets could be engaged, and the approval of the ARVN corps commander and the senior tactical commander on the ground would be necessary. And even if the aircraft were attacked first, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or some other appropriate means prior to the attack. Additionally, the inhabitants had to be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

Air Defense

(C) Though Allied forces had enjoyed air superiority throughout the war, the enemy did possess a tactical air capability, especially in the northern portion of RVN. Accordingly, all directives then in effect were incorporated into a new annex dealing with the interception and identification of unknown aircraft in RVN. This portion of the ROE emphasized close coordination between VNAF and USAF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) personnel, and clearly defined hostile acts.[4]

Problems of Interpretation

(C) In spite of the revised guidance concerning ROE provided in the new directive, subordinate commanders still required guidance on application. In August 1971 USARV queried MACV regarding a strict interpretation of the ROE, wherein perimeter guards, having positively identified individuals as hostile, were required to seek further permission from superiors to fire, thereby possibly jeopardizing their lives and military property.[5] In reply, MACV emphasized that the ROE should not be construed as precluding any commander from exercising the inherent right and responsibility for the self-defense of his forces. Instead, commanders were to use the ROE as a guide, along with existing directives regarding physical security, in establishing specific guidelines tailored for local base camp circumstances. MACV directed that a perimeter guard could conceivably fire without order on an intruder if he had been challenged, had penetrated a substantial physical barrier, posed an imminent threat to life or mission essential equipment, or endangered the guard if he were first to inform his superior of the situation before opening fire.[6]

(C) In still another example of clarification of ROE interpretation, MACV replied to a query raised in October by the Commanding Officer, 23d Arty Gp. Keeping in mind the basic ROE for all targets, MACV commented on the following examples:

Possible Target	MACV's Interpretation
Personnel in blue-grey and green uniforms.	Hostility would be established if positively identified as VC/NVA forces.
Khaki packs on bicycles.	Personnel operating vehicles must be identified as hostile.
Heavily loaded Lambrettas.	Same as above.

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Possible Target (contd)	MACV's Interpretation (contd)
Personnel who take cover and/or run to a village when they determine they are being observed.	No indication of hostility; a normal reaction in many areas of SEA.
Bunkers, trenches, and fortifications.	If confirmed to be occupied by VC/NVA and/or hostile fire is received from these locations, it would indicate a valid target.
Garden plots and rice paddies.	The determination of hostility by air observation is very difficult for this type target. Most cases would require RVNAF ground forces.[7]

US in Support Role

(C) The new directive notwithstanding, another problem encountered concerning application of the ROE began to appear towards the close of 1971. The impact of Vietnamization on the war effort as well as redeployment of US/FWMAF units began to affect ROE implementation even more than MACV planners had anticipated. Although the MACV directive did not directly apply to the RVNAF, US advisors were encouraged, as in previous ROE, to promote RVNAF compliance, and could suspend US fire support if it were not being employed within established ROE guidelines. Furthermore, MACV had encouraged the RVNAF to publish a ROE directive which was almost an exact copy of the MACV document.[8] Nevertheless, by November, certain inconsistencies began to appear between the two documents which suggested the MACV directive might not adequately provide the shift in ground operations to predominantly RVNAF efforts with US forces in a supporting role. For example, during a ground engagement on 1 November, a US regimental advisor technically violated the MACV regulation when he authorized the employment of armed helicopters against enemy forces without the required province chief approval, an authority which MACV specified could not be delegated. Placed in a difficult situation because of the tactical urgency of the affair, he had complied with his counterpart's request for fire because the latter had received delegated clearance authority.[9] This and similar examples showed the need for a new directive which would reflect more appropriately the diminishing US role in the war. Accordingly, MACV published on 30 Dec 71 a new ROE directive to improve the guidance of the previous directive, which it superseded.

December 1971 Revision

(C) The new directive, which is reproduced in its entirety as Appendix 1, demonstrated MACV desire to be as precise and accurate as possible. The regulation defined three basic requirements for target engagement: hostility, political and military clearance. These definitions placed the political authority with the province chief or his authorized representative. The ARVN corps commander and the US senior advisor retained military clearance authority. Both of these officers could delegate the responsibility as appropriate for a particular type of target engagement situation. Accordingly, the incident of 1 November, discussed earlier, could not have occurred under the new regulation.

(C) The helicopter annex in the new directive also sought to ease interpretation problems. The May 1971 version, even though separate from the fixed wing annex, nevertheless had incorporated the tactical airstrike conceptual approach for gunship operations. The first revision

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to the May directive attempted to correct this annex without success. The December 1971 version was rewritten to apply to the unique characteristics of the helicopter weapons system and its technique of employment.

(C) As stated in the May 1971 directive, the rules for engaging hostile watercraft were also confusing and required clarification. The new regulation provided this clarity by defining territorial, inland, and international waters. Furthermore, each annex now included a paragraph on ROE for watercraft.[10]



The Rules of Engagement provide guidance for the employment of weapons such as this 175mm (SP) gun.

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APPENDIX 1
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*MACV Dir 525-13

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-13

30 December 1971
(MACJ3)

MILITARY OPERATIONS

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF FIREPOWER IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. This directive provides specific rules of engagement (ROE) for the conduct of the air and surface operations within the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. (U) APPLICABILITY. This directive is applicable to all MACV staff agencies and subordinate commands.

3. (U) GENERAL.

a. The changing nature of operations in the RVN has necessitated a new approach to the ROE for the employment of firepower. The shift to predominantly Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) operations supported and advised by US forces, coupled with a civilian populace that is less inclined to observe curfews and restricted areas, makes it imperative to ensure against the indiscriminate use of firepower. While the goal is maximum effectiveness in combat operations, every effort must be made to avoid civilian casualties, minimize the destruction of private property, and conserve diminishing resources. Accomplishment of these objectives requires that the ROE be adhered to by all friendly armed forces.

b. This directive will not be modified by subordinate commanders nor will directives modifying or interpreting substantive rules in this directive be published by subordinate commands. Unit commanders are authorized to issue instructions to users, provided such instructions do not circumvent the substantive rules contained in this directive.

c. This directive will serve as the basis for standing operating procedures for the conduct of all fires to include artillery, mortar, tank, riverine, strike aircraft, armed helicopters, air defense artillery, and naval gunfire.

d. It is not the intent of this directive to restrict any commander from exercising the inherent right and responsibility of self-

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*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 525-13(C), 1 May 1971.

defense of his forces. Commanders at all echelons must establish a balance between the force and weapons necessary to accomplish their mission yet ensure safety of noncombatants who are in the area.

4. (U) RESPONSIBILITY.

a. Advisors will take all necessary advisory action to encourage RVNAF compliance with these ROE.

b. Senior tactical commanders and senior advisors will:

(1) In coordination with their RVNAF counterparts, where applicable, insure that all units conduct operations in accordance with this directive, and develop positive, practical, and understandable target clearance procedures to preclude error or misunderstanding.

(2) Insure that all personnel engaged in fire support activities are fully cognizant of the contents of this directive, with specific emphasis on procedures pertaining to clearance for fires and air strikes. Periodic testing of personnel on their knowledge of ROE is encouraged.

(3) Require advisory personnel to insure that US fire support resources provided in support of RVNAF operations are employed in accordance with this directive. If the request of a RVNAF unit falls outside the provisions of this directive, the advisor will take action to suspend the US fire support which is in violation of the ROE.

5. (U) DEFINITIONS.

a. Air Strike. An attack on specific objectives by fighter, bomber, or attack aircraft on an offensive mission. ARC LIGHT strikes will be governed by MACV Directive 95-14(S).

b. Armed Helicopters. For the purposes of this directive, all helicopters having an attached ordnance delivery system including door guns are considered armed helicopters.

c. Close Air Support. Air attacks against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

d. Curfew, Inland Waters. The Army, Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) military region (MR)/corps commanders in coordination with local authorities may designate curfews on inland waters.

Such curfews will be reported through channels to the Joint General Staff and Headquarters, MACV.

e. Hostile Fire. Fire directed from a hostile source toward friendly forces. It may be delivered by either direct or indirect fire weapons. It does not include devices such as mechanical ambushes, booby traps, and mines unless command detonated.

f. Hostile Watercraft. A watercraft or vessel (surface or subsurface) which is engaged in one of the following acts:

(1) Attacking or acting in a manner which indicates within reasonable certainty an intent to attack US or friendly forces or installations, including the unauthorized landing of troops or material on friendly territory.

(2) Laying mines within friendly territorial seas or inland waters without permission of the Government of Vietnam (GVN).

(3) Direct support of attacks against friendly forces.

g. Inhabited Area. Includes any dwelling or group of dwellings as well as established hamlets and villages that do not qualify as an urban area.

h. Military Clearance Authority. The US military clearance authorities are the senior tactical commanders, senior advisors or their authorized representatives. The RVN military clearance authorities are the ARVN corps commanders or their authorized representatives.

i. Political Clearance Authority. The RVN province chiefs, or their authorized representatives are the political clearance authority for their respective provinces.

j. Senior Tactical Commanders and Senior Advisors. Includes CG, XXIV Corps/SA, I Corps and MR 1; DIR/SA, SRAG/USARMYF MR 2; DSA/CG,USARMYF MR 2; CG, TRAC/SA, III Corps and MR 3; CG, DRAC/SA, IV Corps and MR 4; COMNAVFORV/CHNAVADVGP and Cdr, 7th AF/SA, Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

k. Specified Strike Zones (SSZ). An area designated for a specific period of time by an ARVN corps commander in which there are no friendly forces or populace and in which targets may be attacked on the initiative of US, Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), or RVNAF commanders. SSZ will not be referred to as "free fire zones." Furthermore, the term "free fire zone" will not be used under any circumstances.

l. Strike Aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft of the fighter, bomber,

and attack classification capable of conducting an air strike.

m. Troops In Contact (TIC). A unit is considered in contact when it is engaged with an enemy force, being fired upon, and returning fire. The supported unit commander is responsible for making the "in contact" determination.

n. Urban Area. Those areas depicted as built-up areas on an Army Map Service 1:50,000 scale map.

o. Waters.

(1) Territorial. The belt of sea adjacent to the RVN coast three miles wide measured from the low water mark.

(2) Inland. Waters to landward of the territorial sea.

(3) International. Waters to seaward of the territorial sea.

6. (C) GENERAL RULES.

a. All possible means will be employed to limit the risk to the lives and property of friendly forces and civilians. In this respect, a target must be clearly identified as hostile prior to making a decision to place fire on it.

b. Precautionary measures will be taken to avoid the violation of operational and national boundaries.

c. The enemy is known to take advantage of areas normally considered as non-military targets. Typical examples of non-military targets are places of religious or historical value and public or private buildings and dwellings. When the enemy has sheltered himself or installed defensive positions in such places, the responsible brigade or higher commander must positively identify the preparation for, or execution of, hostile enemy acts before ordering an attack. During the attack, weapons and forces used will be those which will insure prompt defeat of enemy forces with minimum damage to structures in the area.

d. The exception to the above policy is the palace compound in Hue Citadel. For this specific area, commanders will employ riot control agents and take all other possible actions to avoid damage to the compound.

e. The use of incendiary munitions in inhabited or urban areas will be avoided unless friendly survival is at stake or it is necessary for the accomplishment of the commander's mission.

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f. Riot control agents (RCA) will be used to the maximum extent possible. RCA can be effectively employed in inhabited and urban area operations to flush enemy personnel from buildings and fortified positions, while reducing the unnecessary danger to civilians and the likelihood of destruction of civilian property.

g. The ARVN corps commander in each MR has the authority to designate, modify, suspend temporarily, or cancel a SSZ. Notification of SSZ designation, modification, temporary suspension, or cancellation will be disseminated by the ARVN corps commander to all commands operating in the MR with a minimum of 72 hours notification prior to the change becoming effective. Notification of US and FWMAF will be through US command channels. Requests for SSZ changes will be submitted to the ARVN corps commander via appropriate command channels.

h. Specific ROE for the employment of weapons and weapon systems in the RVN are outlined at Annexes A through D.

7. (U) REPORTS. This directive requires no report.

8. (U) REFERENCES.

a. MACV Directive 95-4(C).

b. MACV Directive 95-14(S).

c. MACV Directive 335-12(U).

d. MACV Directive 525-3(U).

e. MACV Directive 525-9.

f. MACV Directive 525-11(C).

g. MACV Directive 525-11(C).

h. MACV Directive 525-216(C).

i. 7th AF OPORD 71-7(TS).

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MACV Dir 525-13

FOR THE COMMANDER:



DONALD H. COWLES
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

W. A. RUTLEDGE
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

Annexes
A. Rules of Engagement - Surface Weapons
B. Rules of Engagement - Strike Aircraft Operations
C. Rules of Engagement - Armed Helicopter Operations
D. Rules of Engagement - Air Defense
E. Index

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - SURFACE WEAPONS

1. (U) PURPOSE. This annex provides guidance for the control of organic weapons and the artillery, mortar, tank, naval, and riverine gunfire provided to the surface commander by US, FWMAF, and RVNAF.

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. These rules of engagement apply to the conduct of surface operations to include the employment of artillery, mortar, tank, naval, and riverine gunfire by US, FWMAF, and RVNAF in both offensive and defensive situations within the RVN. These rules also apply to the employment of US, FWMAF, and RVNAF fire support resources in cross service support missions for all forces.

b. Artillery, mortar, tank, naval, and riverine gunfire requires that care and attention be exercised in the formulation of fire requests and the application of all gunnery techniques. The exercise of sound judgment on the part of all personnel involved in originating requests for fire, solving the gunnery problem, and exercising precise gunnery procedures will provide the best assurance against endangering friendly forces and noncombatants or destroying civilian property.

c. Procedures applicable to the conduct and control of naval gunfire are contained in the effective CTG 70.8 Operation Order 320. Market Time units will comply with the provisions of COMCOSURVFOR Operation Order 201.

3. (C) CONDUCT OF FIRE.

a. Every effort will be made to observe fires regardless of the target location. Unobserved fires will be employed only where absolutely necessary for mission accomplishment and will be in accordance with the criteria outlined herein.

b. SSZ. Unobserved fire may be directed against all targets and target areas located within a SSZ after obtaining military clearance.

c. Uninhabited Areas Outside a SSZ.

(1) In uninhabited areas, fire may be directed against Viet Cong (VC)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in contact without obtaining military or political clearance.

(2) Observed fire may be directed against targets of opportunity which are clearly identified as hostile without obtaining military or political clearance.

(3) Unobserved fires may be directed at targets and target

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areas clearly identified as hostile, other than VC/NVA forces in contact, after obtaining military and political clearance.

d. Inhabited Areas. Fire missions directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in, or in the immediate vicinity of, inhabited areas will be conducted as follows:

(1) Inhabited areas from which hostile fire is received.

(a) Surface commanders of units engaged in operations involving the maneuver of surface forces in or through inhabited areas may respond with direct fire without prior warning and without prior clearance if, in the judgment of the commander, his mission or troops would be jeopardized by such warning or delay. However, response should be designed for self-protection and directed only at the source of hostile fire.

(b) Indirect fire missions will be controlled by an observer and may be executed after approval of the political and military clearance authority. The only exception to the clearance requirement would be a situation in which the hostile fire presents an immediate threat to friendly forces despite the employment of direct fire.

(2) Inhabited areas containing observed or suspected VC/NVA targets but from which hostile fire is not received.

(a) Surface commanders may initiate direct fire against positively identified enemy targets after securing political and military clearance.

(b) Indirect fire missions will be controlled by an observer and executed only after political and military clearance has been granted. Civilians will be given prior warning by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means and given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

(3) Inhabited areas not immediately associated with the maneuver of surface forces will not be fired upon without prior warning by leaflets, loudspeaker, or other appropriate means, even though fire is received therefrom. Should friendly troops be placed in jeopardy, the provisions of paragraph 3d(1), above, apply.

e. Urban Areas.

(1) Fire missions directed against known or suspected VC/NVA

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targets in urban areas must preclude unnecessary danger to civilians and destruction of civilian property.

(2) Fire support in urban areas will be governed by the following:

(a) Approval by both the senior tactical commander and the ARVN corps commander is required to conduct fire missions in urban areas. This authority will not be delegated except for the built-up areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh City. CG, TRAC, is authorized to delegate authority to Commanding Officer, Capitol Military Assistance Team, for the employment of indirect fire in these areas. No further delegation is authorized.

(b) All indirect fire missions will be controlled by an observer.

(c) Direct fire, flat trajectory weapons are authorized in a direct fire role in urban areas at the discretion of a battalion or higher commander without the prior approval of the senior tactical commander, or, in the case of Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh City, the Commanding Officer, Capital Military Assistance Team. Direct fire weapons will be used to the maximum in the elimination of enemy strong points or fortified structures in urban areas. All types of munitions, except incendiary, may be used in direct fire weapons including flechette (beehive), HEAT, and canister rounds.

(d) Maximum use will be made of helicopters to maneuver troops and heavy weapons to roofs of key buildings and other locations to expedite cordoning.

(e) Prior to firing upon urban areas, leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means will be utilized to warn and secure the cooperation and support of the civilian populace even though fire is received from these areas.

f. Watercraft.

(1) Fire will not be employed against waterborne craft in international or RVN territorial (coastal) waters unless the craft is positively identified as hostile and firing clearance is granted by the appropriate coastal zone commander or coastal surveillance center.

(2) Return of fire when fired upon and firing in support of friendly forces receiving hostile fire in RVN territorial or

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international waters is authorized if the watercraft is positively identified as hostile.

(3) Illumination rounds are authorized over RVN territorial or international waters when specifically requested or cleared by a coastal surveillance center.

g. Vicinity of the RVN Border. Fire missions along or across the RVN border will be in accordance with current MACV border and cross-border authorities.

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - STRIKE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

1. (U) PURPOSE. This annex defines ROE for US, FWMAF, and RVNAF fixed wing strike aircraft in the RVN.

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. All pilots will receive an air or ground briefing to determine the disposition of friendly forces and civilians prior to initiating an air to ground attack.

b. Pilots will endeavor to minimize civilian casualties and civilian property damage. Air attacks will not be executed where identification of friendly forces is in doubt.

c. US strike aircraft may be controlled by any of the following:

(1) US Forward Air Controller (FAC).

(2) VNAF FAC/Forward Air Observer (FAO).

(3) Flight leader control utilizing US Air Force LCRAN or beacon-tracking, sensor-equipped aircraft.

(4) US Air Force MSQ-77 (SKY SPOT).

(5) US OV-10 aircraft commanders. In an emergency, US OV-10 aircraft commanders may mark a target for themselves and expend their own ordnance. They may also exercise FAC control of each other when operating in elements of two or more.

d. In an emergency, when compliance with the provisions of paragraph 2c, above, is not possible, the following personnel may designate the target for strike aircraft:

(1) The commander of a company or larger ground unit or US advisor of any unit engaged with enemy forces.

(2) The US, FWMAF, or RVNAF pilot of an aircraft supporting a ground unit, who has radio contact with the ground unit involved and can identify friendly and enemy positions.

(3) The US, FWMAF, or RVNAF pilot of an aircraft required to operate within the vicinity of a hostile inhabited area for the purpose of conducting medical evacuation or supply missions and where enemy fire presents an immediate threat to the lives of the aircraft crew.

e. Commanders of units assigned strike aircraft will ensure that records of ordnance expended are maintained a minimum of three months. Records will include as a minimum:

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(1) Type and amount of ordnance expended on each target.

(2) Coordinates of target.

(3) Date and time of initial and final engagement of the target.

(4) Unit supported.

3. (C) CONDUCT OF FIRE.

a. SSZ. Air attacks against targets or target areas in a SSZ, excluding the Demilitarized Zone, may be made under flight leader control after obtaining military clearance.

b. Uninhabited areas outside a SSZ. Military and political clearance are required for airstrikes against targets in uninhabited areas outside a SSZ except:

(1) When in close support of friendly troops in contact (paragraph 4, below).

(2) When returning ground fire. (paragraph 4b(5), below).

c. Inhabited Areas. Fixed wing aircraft close air support missions that involve strikes in inhabited areas must be controlled by a FAC and be initiated only after political clearance has been obtained. The conduct of such air operations also must be approved by the attacking battalion or higher commander.

(1) An attack deemed necessary on an inhabited area may be made without warning (prescribed in paragraph 3c(2), below) or delay provided all three of the following requirements are satisfied:

(a) Enemy fire is being received from the area.

(b) The attack is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area.

(c) In the judgement of the battalion or higher commander, his mission would be jeopardized by prior warning.

(2) If the attack on an inhabited area is not in conjunction with an immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means prior to the attack, and given sufficient time to evacuate the area. Once the inhabitants of a target area have been adequately warned that the area has been selected as a target and given sufficient time to evacuate, the area

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may then be struck without further warning. An exception may be made for herbicide missions in cases where prior warning may jeopardize the safety of the spray aircraft (MACV Directive 525-216).

d. Urban Areas. Air attacks directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in urban areas must preclude unnecessary danger to civilians and destruction of civilian property, and by their nature require greater restrictions than the rules of engagement for less populated areas. Therefore, the following specific US, GVN, and RVNAF clearance procedures and restrictions must be strictly adhered to:

(1) Approval by both the senior tactical commander and the ARVN corps commander is required to conduct air attacks in urban areas including support of RVNAF. This authority will not be delegated except for the built-up areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh City. CG, TRAC, is authorized to delegate authority to Commanding Officer, Capitol Military Assistance Team, for the employment of US and FWMAF tactical air in these areas. No further delegation is authorized.

(2) Air attacks in urban areas will be controlled by a FAC.

(3) Prior to subjecting urban areas to an air attack, even when fire is being received from the area, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means prior to the attack and given sufficent time to evacuate the area.

e. Watercraft.

(1) Fixed wing aircraft are not authorized to engage watercraft of any description in international or RVN territorial (coastal) waters, except as authorized in paragraph 3e(3) below. This restriction does not deny aircraft commanders the right to return hostile fire in the exercise of self-defense.

(2) Watercraft on inland waters may be engaged after being positively identified as hostile and with military and political clearance granted. During hours of announced curfews, any waterborne craft on inland waters may be presumed hostile and engaged after military and political clearance has been granted.

(3) Specific instructions for engagement of watercraft by fixed wing aircraft in the TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN and MARKET TIME tactical area of responsibility (TAOR):

(a) TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN and MARKET TIME TAOR is defined as the water area off the coast of the RVN out to a distance of forty nautical miles. The northeastern

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boundary is 17 degrees North Latitude; and the northwestern boundary is the seaward extension of the RVN/GKR border.

(b) Fixed wing aircraft will not engage watercraft in this TAOR except in support of TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN or MARKET TIME surface forces.

(c) Surface craft must be positively identified as hostile and firing clearance must be granted by the appropriate coastal zone commander or coastal surveillance center except when firing is in support of a TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN or MARKET TIME unit under actual attack.

4. (C) SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (DAY OR NIGHT).

a. The FAC will:

(1) Have a thorough knowledge of the scheme of ground maneuver.

(2) Maintain reliable communications with the ground unit and strike aircraft.

(3) Make positive identification and mark the target.

(4) Insure that strike pilots are aware of friendly locations in relation to target, characteristics of target area, and local weather conditions.

(5) Use 1:50,000 or larger scale maps of target area and photographs when available.

b. During a strike, pilots of strike aircraft will:

(1) Always be under the control of, and in direct radio contact with, a FAC or designated control agency, airborne or ground, except in a SSZ when flight leader control is authorized (see paragraph 3a, above).

(2) Have visual contact with the target or target marker. During night strikes, the target must be visually identified through illumination e.g., illumination flares, ground marking flares, fires, lunar illumination, etc. A waiver of this requirement is granted for aircraft equipped with night observation devices.

(3) Always ascertain the position of friendly forces (or civilians when applicable).

(4) Ascertain local conditions regarding weather, target area, and surrounding terrain characteristics.

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(5) Defend themselves against ground fire provided:

(a) The source of the fire can be visually identified.

(b) The strike can be positively oriented against the source.

(c) The fire is of such intensity that counteraction is necessary.

(6) Utilize LORAN or beacon-tracking sensor systems for instrument flight rules (IFR) deliveries. Aircrews making LORAN or beacon-tracking, sensor-directed strikes will be in direct radio contact with a designated control agency, airborne or ground, except in a SSZ.

5. (U) AIR INTERDICTION. Air interdiction missions will be conducted and controlled in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4, above.

6. (C) VICINITY OF THE RVN BORDER.

a. US and FWMAF military fixed wing aircraft will not penetrate the DMZ, Laotian, or Khmer Republic airspace unless specifically authorized by COMUSMACV/DEPCOMUSMACV for Air, 7th AF.

b. All FAC operating in the vicinity of the borders will have a 1:50,000 or larger scale map of the target area. Maps, mosaics, and photographs will be made available to the pilots whenever possible.

7. (C) JETTISON.

a. Munitions will be jettisoned in designated jettison areas.

b. During night or IFR conditions, aircraft will be under positive radar control while jettisoning, except during emergencies as indicated in paragraph 7d, below.

c. During day visual flight rules (VFR), jettisons will be monitored by radar whenever possible.

d. Aircraft may jettison munitions in other than designated areas during emergencies when there is an immediate threat of injury to the crew or damage to the aircraft. Every effort will be made to insure that munitions are not jettisoned so that they impact into or near inhabited areas.

e. Emergency jettisoning of herbicides will be reported immediately to the MACV Command Center giving date-time, coordinates, agents, volume, and circumstances.

8. (C) AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS. Aerial —

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reconnaissance and surveillance missions conducted in the vicinity of the DMZ, Khmer Republic or Laotian border, and in Khmer Republic, Laotian, or North Vietnamese airspace will be in accordance with authorities established by separate MACV directives.

9. (U) AIR TO AIR RESTRICTIONS. 7th AF rules of engagement for air-to-air combat in the RVN are published in 7th AF OPORD 71-7.

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - ARMED HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

1. (U) PURPOSE. This annex defines specific operational restrictions and rules of engagement for US, FWMAF, and RVNAF armed helicopters operating in the RVN.

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. Ordnance delivery systems in armed helicopters will be fired only when authorized by the aircraft commander.

b. All pilots and gunners will receive an air or ground briefing to determine the disposition of friendly forces and civilians prior to initiating an air attack.

c. Pilots and gunners will endeavor to minimize civilian casualties and civilian property damage. Air attacks will not be executed where identification of friendly forces is in doubt.

d. Commanders of units assigned helicopters with an attached weapons system which is fired by the pilot or copilot will ensure that records of ordnance expended are maintained for a minimum of three months. Records will include as a minimum:

(1) Type and amount of ordnance expended on each target.

(2) Coordinates of each target.

(3) Date and time of initial and final engagement of the target.

(4) Unit supported.

e. Pilots of armed helicopters will:

(1) Fire only when all three of the following requirements are satisfied:

(a) They are under the control of, and in direct radio contact with, the designated control agency, airborne or ground, except in a SSZ when a designated flight leader is authorized to control.

(b) The target or target marker can be visually identified.

(c) Friendly and civilian positions are positively identified.

(2) Ascertain local conditions regarding weather, target area, and surrounding terrain characteristics.

(3) Defend themselves against ground fire provided:

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(a) The source of fire can be visually identified.

(b) The return fire can be positively oriented against the source.

f. The following personnel may designate targets for armed helicopters:

(1) The commander of a ground or VNN surface unit or the US advisor of any unit in contact with enemy forces.

(2) The US, FWMAF, or RVNAF pilot of a helicopter supporting a ground unit who has radio contact with the ground unit and can identify friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

(3) The US, FWMAF, or RVNAF pilot of a helicopter required to operate in the vicinity of a hostile inhabited area for the purpose of conducting medical evacuation or supply missions, and where enemy fire presents an immediate threat to the lives of the helicopter crew.

g. Airborne test firing of weapons will be conducted only after obtaining military and political clearance.

h. When appropriate, US Army, US Air Force and US Navy armed helicopter operations will be coordinated within the operational area with controller aircraft of the other services.

3. (C) CONDUCT OF FIRE.

a. SSZ. Armed helicopters may attack targets and target areas in a SSZ, excluding the DMZ, after obtaining military clearance.

b. Uninhabited Areas Outside an SSZ. Military and political clearances are required to engage targets in uninhabited areas outside an SSZ except:

(1) When in close support of friendly troops in contact.

(2) When returning groundfire (paragraph 2f(3), above).

c. Inhabited Areas.

(1) Armed helicopters involved in air attacks on inhabited areas must receive the approval of, and always be in direct radio contact with, the designated control agency of the responsible ground commander. Attacks may be initiated after military and political clearances have been obtained.

(2) If the attack on an inhabited area from which enemy fire is

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being received is deemed necessary, the attack may be made without warning (as prescribed in paragraph 3c(3), below) or delay provided all three of the following requirements are satisfied.

(a) The enemy fire is being received from the area.

(b) The attack is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area.

(c) In the judgement of the commander, his mission would be jeopardized by prior warning.

(3) If the attack on an inhabited area is not in conjunction with an immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or some other appropriate means prior to the attack and given sufficient time to evacuate the area. Once the inhabitants of a target area have been adequately warned that the area has been selected as a target and given sufficient time to evacuate, the area may then be attacked without further warning.

d. Urban Areas.

(1) Air attacks directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in urban areas must preclude unnecessary danger to civilians or destruction of civilian property, and by their nature require greater restrictions than the rules of engagement for less populated areas. Approval by both the senior tactical commander and the ARVN corps commander is required to conduct US and FWMAF air attacks in urban areas, including supporting RVNAF. This authority will not be delegated with the exception of the built-up areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh City. CG, TRAC, is authorized to delegate authority to Commanding Officer, Capital Military Assistance Team, for employment of armed helicopters in the built-up areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh City. No further delegation is authorized.

(2) Only point targets, e.g., a specific building, will be engaged and these targets must be positively identified to the pilot. The engagement of area targets in urban areas is prohibited.

(3) Prior to subjecting urban areas to air attack, even when fire is received from the area, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or some other appropriate means prior to the attack and given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

e. Watercraft.

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(1) Helicopters are not authorized to engage watercraft of any description in international or RVN territorial (coastal) waters except as authorized in paragraph 3e(3), below. This restriction does not deny aircraft commanders the right to return hostile fire in the exercise of self-defense.

(2) Watercraft on inland waters may be engaged after being positively identified as hostile and with military and political clearance granted. During hours of announced curfews, any waterborne craft on inland waters may be presumed hostile and engaged after military and political clearances have been granted.

(3) Specific instructions for engagement of watercraft by helicopters in the TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN and MARKET TIME TAOR:

(a) TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN and MARKET TIME TAOR is defined as the water area off the coast of the RVN out to a distance of forty nautical miles. The northeastern boundary is 17 degrees North Latitude; and the northwestern boundary is the seaward extension of the RVN/GKR border.

(b) Helicopters will not engage watercraft in this TAOR except in support of TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN or MARKET TIME surface forces.

(c) Surface craft must be positively identified as hostile and firing clearance must be granted by the appropriate coastal zone commander or coastal surveillance center except when firing is in support of a TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN or MARKET TIME unit under actual attack.

4. (C) JETTISON.

a. Munitions will be jettisoned in designated jettison areas.

b. During night or IFR conditions, aircraft will be under positive radar control while jettisoning, except during emergencies covered in paragraph 4c, below.

c. Aircraft may jettison munitions in other than designated areas during emergencies when there is an immediate threat of injury to crew or damage to the aircraft. Every effort will be made to ensure that munitions are not jettisoned so that they impact into or near inhabited areas.

d. Emergency jettisoning of herbicides will be reported immediately to the MACV Command Center giving date-time, coordinates, agent, volume, and circumstances.

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5. (C) VICINITY OF THE RVN BORDER.

a. US and FWMAF military rotary wing aircraft will not penetrate the DMZ, Laotian, or Khmer Republic airspace unless specifically authorized by COMUSMACV/DEPCOMUSMACV for Air, 7th AF.

b. Aerial reconnaissance flights along or near the Cambodian or Laotian border are vital to the security of the RVN and US defense efforts. However, extreme care must be exercised in planning and executing in-country missions by reconnaissance aircraft of all services to ensure that inadvertent overflights do not occur. All aircraft involved in coordinating close air support and operating in the vicinity of the border will have a 1:50,000 or larger scale map of the target area. Maps, mosaics, and photographs will be made available to pilots whenever possible.

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - AIR DEFENSE

1. (U) PURPOSE. This annex provides guidance for the interception and identification of unknown aircraft, and the engagement of hostile aircraft in the territorial airspace of the RVN.

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. In accordance with directives of the services concerned, the individuals occupying the following positions have been delegated authority to declare aircraft hostile and to direct engagement:

(1) Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, 7th AF, Tan Son Nhut, or his designated representative, for US actions.

(2) Commander, VNAF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), Tan Son Nhut, for RVNAF actions.

b. Coordination will be maintained between USAF TACC and VNAF TACC to avoid actions which may endanger friendly forces or interfere with authorized operations.

c. Caution and judgment will be exercised in directing the engagement of unknown aircraft. Consideration must be given to the possibility that such engagement could be contrary to US and RVN interests. Examples of such instances include:

(1) Civilian aircraft which intrude into RVN airspace because of navigational error or equipment malfunction.

(2) Communist aircraft whose aircrews or passengers desire to defect.

3. (C) HOSTILE ACTS. The following or similar acts of known enemy aircraft, missiles, and drones or aircraft which remain unidentified shall be considered hostile unless other circumstances clearly show that such acts do not involve a clear and present danger:

a. Aircraft releasing bombs, launching missiles, or firing guns, rockets, torpedoes, or other weapons at any water, air, or ground target other than on recognized firing ranges.

b. Aircraft conducting minelaying operations along the approaches to or in territorial (coastal) waters of the RVN.

c. Aircraft not obviously in distress, releasing parachutes or towing gliders over the territorial (coastal) waters of land masses of the RVN.

d. Aircraft opening fire on interceptor aircraft maintaining surveillance, or engaging in other aggressive actions which indicate that

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the aircraft is preparing to attack friendly aircraft, vessels, installations, or personnel.

e. Aircraft opening bomb bay doors or performing other actions which indicate that bombs may be dropped or missiles fired.

f. Missiles or drones not known to have been fired or launched by friendly forces or whose track indicates a possible threat to friendly forces.

g. Aircraft visually identified as belonging to a communist bloc country, operating within the boundaries of territorial waters or land masses where means of diverting or bringing the aircraft under control are not feasible, unless it has proper clearance or is obviously in distress.

4. (C) PROCEDURES.

a. Aircraft, missiles and drones declared hostile under the provision of paragraph 3, above, will be engaged and destroyed. Engagement orders will be directed by the officers designated in paragraph 2a, above, and passed to US or VNAF interceptor aircrews by the senior director of the appropriate Control and Reporting Center (CRC).

b. The engagement of hostile aircraft, missiles, or drones by US Army or US Navy air defense artillery batteries or surface to air missiles placed in defense of installations will be as prescribed by the commander responsible for the air defense of the respective area.

c. If an armed attack is initiated against US, FWMAF, or RVNAF military or nonmilitary personnel, aircraft, vessels, or installations in RVN territory, interceptor aircrews will take immediate and aggressive protective measures.

d. Visual identification of airborne objects will be made before firing unless the track has been designated hostile by proper authority or indicates commitment of a hostile act.

e. Precise location of friendly aircraft, vessels, and ground forces will be ascertained prior to issuing a clearance to engage enemy aircraft, missiles, or drones. Clearance will not be granted to engage slow speed targets if the track extends into an area occupied by ships.

f. In those circumstances where an intruding aircraft, missile, or drone is to be intercepted and escorted, but not engaged, the International Intercception Signals and Procedures published in the Enroute Supplement of the Flight Information Publication (FLIP) will be used. All pilots flying in RVN airspace will

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maintain familiarity with these procedures.

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1. MACV Directive 525-13 (C), 1 May 71, Subj: Rules of Engagement for the Employment of Firepower in the RVN (U), Gp-4.

2. DF (C), MACJ3-06, 30 Dec 70, Subj: Publication of MACV Dir 525-13 (U), Gp-Not stated.

3. Same as # 1.

4. Same as # 1.

5. Msg (U), CG USARV to COMUSMACV, 150835Z Aug 71, Subj: Rules of Engagement.

6. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 271230Z Aug 71, Subj: Rules of Engagement (U), Gp-4.

7. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG TRAC, 011544Z Oct 71, Subj: Clarification Rules of Engagement (U), Gp-4.

8. MFR, (C) MAJ Cash, SJS/Mil Hist, Subj: Comments by LTC Cooper, J-3 Action Officer for ROE (U), dated 22 Feb 72.

9. Letter (S), CG DRAC to COMUSMACV, Subj: Rules of Engagement (U), 24 Nov 71, Gp-4.

10. MACV Directive 525-13 (C), 30 Dec 71, Subj: Rules of Engagement for the Employment of Firepower in the RVN (U), Gp-4.

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ANNEX E

CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS

RVN OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

INTRODUCTION

(S) By late 1970 Hanoi was encountering major problems in providing logistic support for the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA) war against the Republic of Vietnam. Previously the naval blockade of the South Vietnamese Coast, Operation MARKET TIME, had effectively forced the enemy to rely mainly on the port at Kompong Som, formerly Sihanoukville, and on land lines of communication (LOC) through northeastern Cambodia to storage base areas along the Cambodian - South Vietnamese border (see Figure E-1).

(S) The March 1970 change in government in Phnom Penh and the resulting cancellation of trade agreements with Hanoi had denied the port of Kompong Som and limited infiltration of personnel and supplies principally to the Ho Chi Minh trail.

(S) The eviction decree of all NVA/VC elements by Marshal Lon Nol on 12 Mar 70 led to a warmer relationship with the GVN and cooperative military actions against a common enemy. The NVA reacted strongly to this decree and attempted to overthrow the Lon Nol government by isolating the capital city, discrediting the government and backing the ultimate reinstatement of the former ruler, Prince Sihanouk.[1] In April 1970 the NVA began offensive operations along the RVN-Cambodian border. The VC/NVA forces were soon successful in controlling a corridor 10 to 15 miles wide from Mimot, Cambodia, to the Gulf of Thailand and in so doing had complete freedom of movement along the border. Enemy efforts could then be turned toward isolating Phnom Penh.[2]

(S) In reaction Allied forces began a military incursion into the Cambodian sanctuaries on 29 Apr 70; 13 major combat operations were conducted in the 2 months that followed. Only two of these operations involved US ground combat units, but US advisors accompanied all ARVN operations and US air assets supported all operations as required until 30 Jun 70. US ground forces and US advisors confined their operations to a depth of 30 km. The success of the Cambodian incursion of 1970 was measured in part by the capture of individual weapons sufficient to equip 55 full strength VC infantry battalions, sufficient crew-served weapons to equip 82 to 90 VC battalions, and enough small arms ammunition to provide a basic load for 52,000 soldiers.[3] Although strategic results of the cross-border operations were difficult to define, it was evident that the operations successfully forestalled an immediate counter-offensive by the NVA/VC against the Lon Nol government. In addition to promoting Vietnamization, the most significant result was the exacerbation of the enemy's logistical, tactical, and psychological problems within an expanded area of conflict.[4]

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ARVN infantrymen proceed through thick jungle vegetation during a 1971 cross-border operation into Cambodia.

RVNAF cross-border operations accounted for huge quantities of enemy materiel such as these crew-served and individual weapons.



Source: MAC J231

Figure E-1

OPERATION TOAN THANG 01/71
AREA OF OPERATION
(1971)



Source: JGS/RVNAF

Figure E-2

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CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS - 1971

(S) Beginning in September 1970 and continuing through 1971, the Khmer Republic Armed Forces, Forces Armees Nationale Khmer (FANK), undertook a counteroffensive, which was limited in scope and was supported by their own and Allied air resources. The offensive was designed to enforce the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) decree to remove VC/NVA forces from within its borders. In order to achieve this goal, FANK began to control major LOC and reoccupy territories formerly held by the VC/NVA. At the same time the GKR initiated pacification programs to win the support of the populace and to combat the enemy infrastructure.

Operation TOAN THANG 01/71

(S) In December 1970 COMUSMACV requested special authority to support the III Corps (RVN) dry season campaign cross-border operations into Cambodia. The operation, designated TOAN THANG 01/71, was planned to open and secure Route (RT) 7 from the RVN border to Tonle Bet, to destroy and dislodge the enemy in base areas north of RT 7, to spoil reinfiltration attempts into RVN, and to support FANK operations by removing enemy pressure in populated areas east of the Mekong River between RT 7 and RT 1. (See Figure E-2.) CINCPAC concurred with the US support plan which provided for TACAIR, fixed wing and helicopter gunships, B-52 air strikes, troop lifts, and Medevac beyond VNAF capability. [5]

(C) The TOAN THANG 01/71 operational area in Cambodia was divided into three general sectors: (1) the Chup-Dambe area which extended east from Kompong Cham along RT 7 to Phum Krek (Krek) and north along RT 75 to Chhlong; (2) the Snuol area which extended west to Mimot, north to Kratie and east to the SVN border; (3) the southern sector which was bordered by RT 15 to the west, RT 1 to the south, RT 7 to the north, and the SVN border to the east. [6] (See Figure E-2.)

(S) Seven RVN multibattalion task forces (TF) engaged in the operation. On 4 Feb 71, two task forces moved north on RT 22 then west on RT 7 from Tay Ninh, SVN, through Krek to the vicinity of the Chup rubber plantation. One task force moved into the Chup plantation proper while the other maintained route security. Four enemy contacts in the vicinity of the Chup plantation resulted in 317 enemy KIA while ARVN suffered only light casualties. The task forces conducting search and reconnaissance operations in the Snuol area and the southern sector had several scattered brief contacts. Total results of the first week of the operation were 440 enemy KIA, 40 PW, 88 IW and 16 CSW captured. An ARVN TF headquarters was attacked-by-fire during the first week of the operation in the Chup area resulting in the destruction of 4,500 rounds of mortar and artillery ammunition and a large stock of POL.

(S) Numerous contacts were reported during the first 10 days of the operation. The enemy seemed to be avoiding a decisive engagement although intelligence sources indicated that sufficient enemy strength was present in the operational area to sustain an attack when conditions were favorable. Enemy contacts were limited to small attacks-by-fire, probing actions, and ambushes of logistics convoys along RT 7.

(S) The task force near Dambe continued along RT 75, reaching its final objective of Chhlong on 22 Feb 71, and met only light resistance. Friendly initiated contacts with the enemy generally increased throughout the AO during the first week of March as RVN task forces effectively employed tactical air (TACAIR) and gunships to exploit their reconnaissance. Cumulative results of the campaign as of 10 Mar 71 were 3,374 enemy KIA, 352 friendly KIA, and 1,787 WIA.

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OPERATION TOAN THANG 01/71
BATTLE OF SNUOL
(26 MAY-1 JUN 71)



Source: Debriefing Report
CG-TRAC

Figure E-3

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(S) Concurrently, and as an adjunct to Operation TOAN THANG 01/71, the RVNAF conducted Operation DONG KHOI within its own borders in MR 3. (This operation is discussed in Chapter IV, Plans and Operations.)

(S) Enemy contacts remained light and sporadic throughout the TOAN THANG 01/71 area until 17 Mar 71 when the two TFs operating in the Chup Plantation area became heavily engaged with an estimated enemy regiment. Contact lasted for 2 days and was supported by RVN artillery, US helicopter gunships, USAF and VNAF TACAIR, and ARC LIGHT strikes. RVN commanders reported killing 409 of the enemy with friendly losses of 8 KIA and 50 WIA. Further bomb damage assessment (BDA) on 21 Mar 71 discovered an additional 312 enemy bodies, presumed killed by artillery and air support. After this battle, activity returned to a relatively low level in the Chup Planatation area.

(S) On 31 Mar 71 in the Chup-Dambe area near Soung, an ARVN task force was attacked by an estimated 160 rounds of mortar and artillery followed by a 5-hour ground battle with an estimated enemy battalion. Enemy losses were reported as 225 KIA, and 13 B-40 rocket launchers and 25 AK-47 rifles captured. Three days later an additional 100 enemy bodies were found presumably killed by air (KBA).

(S) Immediately following this battle, the tempo of the action in the Snuol area increased as task forces continued search and reconnaissance operations. On 3 Apr 71 a cache of 5,500 pounds of rice was destroyed. Small unit actions for 3 and 4 April accounted for 218 enemy KIA. The high level of friendly initiated activity continued until 6 Apr 71 resulting in 466 enemy KIA and numerous weapons and ammunition captured or destroyed. ARVN losses were reported as 26 KIA, 143 WIA, and 125 MIA. Following these battles, enemy contacts quickly reduced in number and intensity.

(S) This phase of Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 coincided with Operation LAM SON 719 (30 Jan - 6 Apr 71), an RVNAF operation into the Laos panhandle across from SVN MR 1 border, discussed later in this annex. The disruption of enemy supply and infiltration activities caused by the two simultaneous operations significantly eased the pressure on FANK elements protecting Phnom Penh and the vital LOC to the coastal areas as well as RTs 5 and 6 to the northwest of the capital. The interdiction of the enemy's lifeline from the north was possibly responsible for the lessening of enemy-initiated contacts throughout the Khmer Republic during Feburary and March 1971.[7]

(S) The general lull of activity which began in mid-April continued for approximately 1 month as contacts were limited to occasional attacks-by-fire (ABF) and harassment of convoys along major Cambodian land LOC. RVN task forces continued to conduct search and reconnaissance operations from Kompong Cham eastward to the SVN border and began preparation for the southwest monsoon phase of the operation to begin in late May or early June. As a part of this phase, the 5th ARVN Div planned a withdrawal of the task force operating in the Snuol area on 25 Apr 71 and replace it with a smaller task force.[8] Indications were that the enemy possibly knew of the planned withdrawal as harassment of convoys on RT 13 increased as did ABF. Assembly positions, bunkers, and antiaircraft positions were reported being built around Snuol and along RT 13 to the south.[9]

The Snuol Battle

(C) On the night of 25 May 71, the enemy encircled and attacked the fire bases along RT 13 as well as blocked the planned withdrawal route (see Figure E-3). Since the main supply route was blocked from the south, helicopter resupply operations were attempted, however enemy close-in antiaircraft weapons prohibited the undertaking.

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

Source: USDAO DAMS Reports, Cambodia

Figure E-4

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(C) After 3 days of constant contacts with an estimated enemy force of three regiments, Snuol became untenable. An operation was initiated to relieve the entrapped task force. RVN committed a brigade-size task force to attack north from Loc Ninh with the objective of clearing RT 13 to a point midway between the border and Snuol and support the withdrawing force. The relief force was attacked by indirect fire followed by a ground assault before it had reached its objective and closed into night defensive positions. A senior US Army advisor described the situation as . . . "What had been a controlled operation was turned into a rout as units that were supposed to occupy night defensive positions continued down the road and suffered heavy personnel and equipment losses."[10]

(C) The relief operation was completed 31 May 71. Friendly losses as a result of the Snuol battle as reported by RVN JGS were 133 KIA, 494 WIA, 130 MIA, 947 IW, 83 CSW, 41 mortar and artillery pieces, 18 APCs, 6 tanks, 41 vehicles, and numerous radios. The enemy lost 1,143 KIA (500 KBA) and 186 weapons.

Tonle Toch Operations

(S) The end of May battle in the Snuol area coincided with a significant battle in the Tonle Toch area east northeast of Phnom Penh. (See Figure E-4.) FANK elements operating in the area from the Mekong River east to RT 15 were in constant contact with the enemy forces in that area from 28 May 71 to 3 Jun 71. Reinforcements from Phnom Penh were introduced into the area by boat on 1 Jun 71. The contact was supported by RVN, GKR, and US TACAIR and other air support. Friendly losses from the battle as reported by FANK were 22 KIA and 201 WIA. Enemy losses were reported as 562 KIA, however US observers said this figure was exaggerated somewhat. Heavy contacts in the Tonle Toch area continued through the month of June 1971 and resulted in FANK losses of 169 KIA and 1,097 WIA. FANK reported 1,284 enemy KIA but the US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) estimated 600 enemy KIA. The fighting decreased gradually during July and early August, and the operation was terminated on 11 Aug 71.

CHENLA II Operation

(S) Generally, activity throughout the southern half of Cambodia reduced significantly from mid-July to late September. RVN forces were withdrawn from the Snuol area as the wet season phase began and RVN participation was limited to road clearing and main supply route (MSR) security. The most significant FANK operation during the summer months was CHENLA II with the mission of opening and securing RT 6 from Kompong Luong to Kompong Thom. This operation later met with stiff enemy reaction and resulted in FANK losses of 156 KIA and 656 WIA. Enemy losses for the operation were reported as 3,984 KIA (994 body count), 16 PW, and 203 ralliers. Equipment captured was reported as 296 IW, 23 CSW, 3,600 bags of food stuffs, 630 barrels of POL and approximately 100 tons of rubber. RT 6 was temporarily opened on 6 Oct 71 for the first time since June 1970 for approximately 3 weeks. Enemy pressure again forced closure of RT 6 by late October and FANK units operating north of Baray were resupplied by air. Portions of RT 6 were under enemy control as the year ended. The operation started in October and ended in early December 1971.

The Krek Battle

(C) Active patrolling was conducted by RVN elements in the Krek area and along MSR during the dry season without significant contacts. As time passed patrolling became less aggressive, possibly due to lack of enemy contacts and poor road trafficability as a result of the onset of the summer monsoon rains. The enemy took advantage of this break in activity by moving small units into entrenched positions on each side of RT 22 between Tay Ninh and Krek. Enemy positions

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

Source: Debriefing Report, CG, TRAC

Figure E-5

were fortified with mortars, antiaircraft weapons, RPGs and an array of other automatic weapons. It was later estimated that the enemy had spent 5 or 6 months preparing fighting positions. In keeping with NVA tactics, the fighting positions were used for offensive operations at the most opportune time.

(C) On 26 Sep 71 the enemy initiated an attack against the fire bases in the Krek area. All fire bases were attacked-by-fire, but the main ground attack was against a fire base just east of Krek. (See Figure E-5.) The enemy's intent, revealed later by PW statements, was to overrun this fire base, apply heavy pressure on the remaining Krek bases, and force a withdrawal of RVN forces. The enemy had sufficient strength in the area to intercept the withdrawing forces and cut the ground LOC. By 27 Sep 71, main supply routes (MSR) connecting the firebases (RTs 7 and 22) were held by the enemy. Unlike the Snuol battle, helicopter resupply was successful at all fire bases except the one east of Snuol which was heavily defended by antiaircraft weapons. Instead of withdrawing, RVN commanders decided to reinforce their units in place by airlift, and to attack north from Tay Ninh astride RT 22 with an armored/infantry brigade-size task force.

(C) As the battle developed, a US Light Operational Support Coordination Group was established at Tay Ninh to assist in coordinating fire support and other operational support.

(C) The ground maneuver plan of the Krek battle was integrated with heavy fire support from B-52 ARC LIGHT strikes, TACAIR, helicopter gunships, and artillery. The fire power used in the Krek battle:

ARC LIGHT strikes	89
USAF TACAIR sorties	1,156
VNAF TACAIR sorties	1,398
US helicopter gunship sorties	3,699
US artillery rounds	4,800
ARVN artillery rounds	153,960

(C) On 2 Oct 71 RVN committed a second brigade task force to relieve the encircled bases. By 5 Oct 71 the siege of all firebases had been broken and the enemy began to withdraw his forces. The MSR to the Cambodian border (RT 22) was cleared by 15 Oct.

(C) The heavy volume of firepower coupled with effective operations by RVN ground forces caused significant losses to the enemy compared to friendly losses. The enemy suffered 2,581 KIA, and 19 captured, while RVN casualties were 198 KIA, 1,194 WIA, and 56 MIA.[12]

RVN - FANK Cooperation Grew

(S) The level of RVN-FANK cooperation increased during November 1971 as RVN forces supported FANK with airlift of troops, emergency resupply missions, and ground operations into the Chup-Dambe sector. High level discussion on ways to coordinate future military operations against a common enemy was evidence of improved cooperation between the GKR and GVN.

(S) On 22 Nov 71, III Corps (RVN) began a four division operation to exploit the success of the Krek operation, to strike at the NVA 5th and 7th Divisions in the Chup-Dambe and Snuol areas, and thereby relieve the pressure along RT 6 in the FANK CHENLA II AO. Daily contacts were made in the Dambe area as RVN continued operations along RT 75. The most significant battle took place during the period 7 to 19 Dec 71. As friendly forces attempted to move southwest from Dambe on RT 75, they encountered an estimated enemy battalion entrenched along

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

Source: PACAF, CHECO Report

Figure E-6

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each side of the road. B-52 and TACAIR support enabled the RVN ground elements to break through the enemy positions and continue operations in the Chup area. Results of the December battles throughout the AO as reported by JGS/RVNAF were 1,376 enemy KIA, 40 detainees, 154 IW, and 52 CSW captured as opposed to friendly losses of 92 (5 US) KIA, 243 (11 US) WIA, and 3 MIA.[13]

(C) A comparison of enemy and friendly losses is:

	Enemy	Friendly
KIA	2,581	198
WIA	Unknown	1,194
MIA	Unknown	56
PW	21	Unknown
IW	172	42
CSW	66	4
Vehicles destroyed	0	19
Artillery pieces destroyed	0	7

(S) By mid-October, the general level of enemy activity in the border area had declined to a low level as reconnaissance and route security operations continued in the TOAN THANG 01/71 AO. Throughout the rest of Cambodia, contacts continued at a moderate pace as the enemy harassed supply lines and government outposts by small unit ambushes and attacks-by-fire.

Mekong River Convoys

(S) Water convoys on the Mekong River continued to be vital to the logistic support of Phnom Penh and the GKR during 1971. RVNAF and US air support provided security for these convoys from Tan Chau, RVN to Phnom Penh and return. (See Figure E-6.) An average of three convoys monthly, consisting initially of 8 to 10 cargo vessels and 24 to 30 riverine escort craft, reached Phnom Penh under continual harassment by the enemy. The most serious incident occurred on 22 Feb 71, 25 km southeast of Phnom Penh, when a tug boat was heavily damaged, an ammunition barge was sunk, and a barge burned as a result of hostile action.[14]

(S) Air cover for the convoys was provided by US Army and US Navy helicopter gunships, USAF and US Navy TACAIR, USAF and VNAF gunships, all controlled by the 7AF. (A further description of convoy cover is found in Chapter VI, Air Operations.)

(S) Convoys increased in size toward the end of 1971 to 15 to 18 cargo vessels and barges while the support requirement was reduced to 38 escort craft. FANK officially assumed bank security and command and control on 1 Mar 72. RVN agreed to supplement the Marine Nationale, Khmer (MNK) upon request.[15]

CONCLUSIONS

(S) Combined ground and air operations by FANK and RVNAF with US support brought about a stabilization of the military situation in Cambodia as the year 1971 ended. The interdiction of supplies, war materiel, and personnel along the Ho Chi Minh trail network and the disruption of enemy logistics operations along the RVN-Cambodian border had greatly assisted the new government in the Khmer Republic in its effort to evict Communist forces. Cambodian cross-border operations had cost the enemy heavily to achieve even limited objectives.

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LAM SON 719: ENEMY BASE AREAS AND ROAD NETWORK

(1971)



Source: HQ XXIV Corps
Combat After Action Report

Figure E-7

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(S) The enemy's overall tactical moves indicated that Hanoi's "Cambodian strategy" was to concentrate his forces on paralyzing strategic LOC and economically isolating Phnom Penh rather than controlling population and land areas. The VC/NVA continued to recruit Khmer Communists to provide security and participate in small-scale actions. Intelligence sources further indicated that VC/NVA objectives for 1972 remained focused on RVN and that they would try to develop new and improve existing logistics bases along the border. In addition, his offensive tactics would be limited to small scale operations in the immediate future.[16]

RVN OPERATIONS IN LAOS: OPERATION LAM SON 719

INTRODUCTION

(C) For the first time in their history the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in late January 1971 launched a corps-level campaign on a foreign battlefield. The operation, LAM SON 719, was a careful and deliberate effort to strike at the core of the enemy's resupply and infiltration routes for the strongest possible disruption of his logistics effort during a period of peak activity.

(C) Traditionally, the NVA had taken advantage of the dry season to move huge amounts of war materials along the Ho Chi Minh trail complex. This complex had become increasingly vital to waging the war in the south. Events in Cambodia during 1970 had denied the Communists the port of Kompong Som, impeded local purchases in the new Khmer Republic, and restricted the use of much of northeast Cambodia. Consequently when the RVNAF moved against the trail complex area, the NVA chose to vigorously defend their LOC and to strive to defeat the RVNAF. As a result the fighting was the most intensive since the TET 1968 offensive.

(U) Operation LAM SON 719 underlined the progress made in Vietnamization since 1968. Then, only 3 years before, the RVN units had been heavily engaged against enemy forces close to South Vietnam's own population centers. The 1971 RVN offensive into Laos demonstrated even more conclusively than their 1970 Cambodian campaign that the RVNAF could deal with enemy threats in border sanctuary areas without the support of US ground combat forces or advisors. By 1971 the RVNAF also exhibited the ability to mount a complex multidivision combat operation in unfamiliar terrain against a well-prepared enemy.

PLANNING FOR LAM SON 719

Background

(C) In the fall of 1970 joint USARV, RVNAF, and GVN intelligence estimates, coupled with current enemy actions, strongly indicated that the enemy had two primary goals for the approaching dry season. He would conduct an intensified resupply and reinforcement operation in southern Laos and also build up supplies and equipment in RVN's northern MR 1 to support large scale operations in that area during the 1971 dry season. This action was in keeping with the overall enemy plan to cut off the capital of Cambodia and cause the overthrow of the Lon Nol government.[17]

(S) By December 1970 - January 1971 there were sharp increases in the amount of supplies moved into the southern Laos base areas 604 and 611 (see Figure E-7). At the same time, the enemy was showing his intentions of increasing the tempo and scope of his operations in RVN MR 1. In addition to increased attacks against Allied personnel and installations, there were

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OPERATION LAM SON 719
PLAN OF ATTACK



Source: HQ XXIV Corps
Combat After Action Report

Figure E-8

indications that the enemy was conducting resupply activities in and north of the DMZ and preparing for a campaign to be launched toward the end of January 1971 against the northern two provinces of RVN. Agent reports indicated that the NVA would launch major campaign offensives during the spring and summer of 1971 to control the lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.[18]

(C) The enemy buildup in southern Laos and western MR 1 was intensely watched and discussed through normal liaison channels between USMACV and JGS/RVNAF. A major planning consideration to counter the threat imposed by this buildup was the resources which could be made available in view of other operations in progress and the redeployment of US and other FWMAF. Approval for an operation into Laos was obtained from higher authority by early January 1971 and sufficient guidance given to begin planning on an extremely close-hold basis.

(C) Operation LAM SON 719 was conceived as a large-scale offensive operation against the enemy's lines of communications in Laos, the area of operations being that part of Laos immediately adjacent to the two northern provinces of RVN. The RVNAF would provide and command the ground forces operating against the NVA forces, while the US forces, which were specifically enjoined from a ground role in Laos, would furnish aviation, airlift, and the majority of the supporting firepower.

(S) The operation envisioned US ground forces securing, repairing and rebuilding RT 9 to the Laotian border. Concurrently, forward operating bases and airfields would be established to support and facilitate future operations to the west. Artillery and fire support bases (FSB) would be prepositioned near the border while US and RVNAF elements established blocking positions south of the DMZ to blunt any major enemy conteraction from that area. Operations into Laos envisioned a two-pronged attack by RVNAF to the west using ground and airmobile operations to block resupply routes (see Figure E-8).

(C) LAM SON 719 was to be limited in time and space, as President Thieu confirmed in a radio broadcast on 8 Feb 71. The RVNAF final objective was the seizure of Tchepone, with A Luoi an intermediate objective. A withdrawal was planned either directly east along RT 9 or southeast through BA 611 into SVN (see Figure E-7). The option for the route and time of withdrawal would be determined at a later date based upon the development of the situation. Since the operation was not to be tied to a tightly controlled time frame, the plan permitted maximum flexibility.[19]

Rules of Engagement

(C) Strict rules governing US military operations outside RVN made LAM SON 719 a unique operation. US forces, being specifically prohibited against operating on the ground in Laos, would be restricted to air operations across the border. The RVNAF, on the other hand, could operate freely on the ground and in the air within the Lao operations area.[20]

Planning Considerations

(S) Enemy strength in the operational area was estimated to be between 22,000 and 25,000. The enemy had the capability to reinforce with tanks, rockets, mortars, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons. Enemy dispositions in North Vietnam, Laos, and RVN would permit him to reinforce his combat, transportation, and rear service personnel in the LAM SON 719 area with up to seven regiments by D+21. Available for reinforcement within 1 week were four regiments.

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

Source: HQ XXIV Corps
Combat After Action Report

Figure E-9

(U) The terrain in the operational area was generally mountainous and heavily covered with vegetation. Through the center of the operational area runs the Xe Pon River valley in an east-west direction, with RT 9 generally paralleling the north bank of the river from the Vietnamese-Laotian border to Tchepone. South of this river an escarpment rises abruptly from the river valley, stretching east-west from the border to Tchepone. The floor of the valley varies in width from 2 to 5 kilometers (see Figure E-9). Open areas are littered with large boulders and outcroppings of rocks. The Xe Pon River became the single most useful navigational aid for aircraft operating under conditions of restricted visibility.[21]

(U) Since tactical air (TACAIR) support, troop lift, and air LOC would be vital to the success of the operation into Laos, the planners had to give special consideration to the weather. Any conditions causing lower than operating minimums along the eastern coastline of South Vietnam, the Annamite Mountain Range, and southern Laos would affect the overall operation. Helicopters providing troop lift support could operate with a minimum ceiling of 1,000 feet above ground level (AGL), but TACAIR required 3,000 feet AGL. Logistic support by C-130 aircraft from bases throughout RVN required landing minimums into Khe Sanh.

(U) General weather conditions during the northeast monsoon (early January to mid-March) are characterized by ceilings from 2,000 to 4,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) over eastern Laos and ceilings of 500 to 1,500 feet along the coastal areas of South Vietnam. Higher elevations of the Annamite Mountains are obscured in clouds. A gradual improvement during the day usually would provide flying weather in all areas from 1200 to 1800 hours daily. The southeast monsoon beginning in late March is characterized by a general improvement in the weather conditions throughout the operational area, except for early morning fog in eastern Laos, which usually dissipates by mid-morning. The transitional effects of the monsoon weather in both Laos and South Vietnam had a direct bearing on the conduct and timing of all airmobile operations in support of LAM SON 719.

ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATIONS

Task Organization

(S) A total of 42 RVNAF maneuver battalions plus supporting elements were committed to LAM SON 719. Of these, 34 actually operated in Laos at some time during the operation, while the remainder operated in Quang Tri Province. US forces consisted of 11 maneuver battalions plus supporting elements.

HQ I Corps (RVN), under control of CG, I Corps:

- I Corps, with one Arty Bn
- 1st Area Logistic Command (ALC)
- 1st Armd Bde with six Armd Cav Sqdns
- 1st Abn Div with three Abn Inf Bdes and Div Arty
- 1st Inf Div with four Inf Regts and the 10th Engr Gp
- Vietnamese Marine Division with four Bdes

HQ XXIV Corps (US), under the command of CG, XXIV Corps:

- 108th Arty Gp with four Arty Bns
- 45th Engr Gp with two Engr Bns
- 212th Cbt Avn Bn
- 54th MP Bn

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101st Abn Div (Ambl)(minus)
101st Div Arty with three Arty Bns
1st Bde 101st Abn Div (Ambl)(reserve)
3d Bde 101st Abn Div (Ambl) with four Abn Inf Bns, reinforced with an engineer TF
101st Cbt Avn Gp, reinforced with five Avn Bns and one Trans Bn
1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech), reinforced with two Mech Inf Bns, one Abn Inf Bn, one Cav Sqdn, one Armd Bn, and two Arty Bns
11th Bde 23d Inf Div, with two Inf Bns, one Cav Sqdn, one Arty Bn, and one Spt Bn

(U) All units were supported by the US Army Support Command - Da Nang (USASUPCOM-DNG). Air support was provided by USAF B-52 bombers and USAF, USN, and USMC tactical air support units.

(U) The organization of US Army aviation assets was unique in that CG, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) commanded all US Army aviation units employed in direct support of the operation. A total of five combat aviation battalions and one transportation battalion (aircraft maintenance) were further placed under operational control of CO, 101st Cbt Avn Gp, who received request for aviation support and allocated resources according to established priorities. There was also some participation by aircraft of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

Command and Control

(C) CG, I Corps (RVN) planned and commanded the ground campaign, while CG, XXIV Corps (US) command all supporting forces and coordinated airmobile operations in support of the ground commander's plans. The unique command arrangement for LAM SON 719 was based on cooperation and coordination, and command and staff relationships between the US and Vietnamese were generally effective throughout the operation.

(C) The XXIV Corps (US) command post (CP) (forward) was established at Quang Tri on 29 Jan 71. Weather delayed the airlift of communications equipment, and the forward CP actually became operational on 31 Jan 71. I Corp (RVN) concurrently established a forward CP at Dong Ha (see Figure E-9). By 2 Feb 71, effective communications had been established with all US and RVN major tactical and service support units.

(C) Early in Phase II it became apparent that greater coordination was required between I Corps and XXIV Corps in planning the use of US assets in support of RVNAF effort in Laos. In order to make US assets more responsive and to provide the CG and staff of RVN I Corps with the most up-to-date information, a Joint Coordination Group (JCG) was formed. This group, which served as personal liaison between the CG, XXIV Corps (US) and the CG, I Corps (RVN), consisted of representatives from XXIV Corps G-3, Corps Artillery, the 101st Abn Div (Ambl), and the US Air Force. The JCG was established 1 March with CG, XXIV Corps Artillery as the Chief. Communications were established immediately with tactical, service, and service support agencies committed to the operation.[22]

(S) COMUSMACV described the JCG as "highly effective . . . in improving response from US operational support and better coordinating all joint and combined support."[23]

Fire Support Coordination

(C) Fire support coordination was accomplished by the US 108th Arty Gp in direct liaison with each RVNAF division and separate brigade. Coordination with US artillery units was accomplished by the XXIV Corps Fire Support Element (FSE). The mission of the support

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artillery changed as the operation progressed; however, the 108th Arty Gp was primarily used in the general support/reinforcing role.

(C) Fire support coordination evolved into a highly complex task, mainly because of the extensive use of air assets and because of the language difficulty inherent with supporting RVNAF units. The problem was compounded by the fact that US advisors could not accompany the maneuver units into Laos. RVNAF division headquarters remained in Vietnam, and US advisors at division level continued their normal functions. Coordination with USAF and Army aviation elements was critical, centering around destruction and neutralization of enemy antiaircraft positions, scheduling of preparation fires for airmobile operations, and conducting a flak suppression program in conjunction with air resupply activities. Combined efforts were made at Corps level for the solution of the problems incurred, mainly between Fire Support Element (FSE), USAF Direct Air Support Center (DASC), and Corps Army Aviation Element (AAE).[24]

(C) Coordination at the corps level centered around targeting intelligence from all available sources to identify antiaircraft threats and allocate resources to neutralize these threats. Specific emphasis was placed on flight routes and adjacent terrain to insure flak suppression and landing zone preparation.

(C) Coordination below corps level was of equal importance and was solved by an exchange of liaison between the supported-to-supporting as well as supporting-to-supported. This extensive liaison concept aided the full dissemination and exchange of target information between US and RVNAF units. The use of fire support coordination lines (FSCL), no bomb lines (NBL), and unit boundaries were imperative for troop safety and as a basis for unrestricted engagement of targets beyond the FSCL.[25]

Air Support

(C) TACAIR for LAM SON 719 was provided through the USAF tactical air control system (TACS) under the control of the forward Direct Air Support Center (DASC) VICTOR established and collocated with the XXIV Corps (US) forward CP at Quang Tri. TACAIR support for Phase I was requested through the currently established tactical air request (TAR) system. TACAIR support for Phases II, III, and IV was to be submitted through DASC VICTOR direct to 7AF Operations Fighter Division (Frag Shop). Tactical air control parties (TACP) with each RVNAF division CP and forward air controllers (FAC) continued support to assigned ground units. A detachment from the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) was deployed to Quang Tri Army Air Field (AAF) to provide FAC support in Phases II, III, and IV into Laos.

(C) English-speaking Vietnamese military personnel were assigned to the 23d TASS detachment (HAMMER) to fly with USAF FACs as interpreters between the Vietnamese ground commanders and the US airborne FACs.

(C) The 7AF Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) provided controller positions which accepted and directed preplanned TACAIR sorties to predetermined rendezvous points for HAMMER FACs control. The ABCCC would also support any additional requests from HAMMER FACs by diverting aircraft already airborne and by requesting immediate air strikes.

(C) The USMC Air Support Radar Team (ASRT) installations at Quang Tri planned to relocate to Khe Sanh, when required, in order to provide extended radar control coverage over the LAM SON 719 area during periods of darkness and adverse weather.[26]

(C) COMMANDO VAULT (15,000 lb) bombs were to be deployed for landing zone (LZ) preparation and construction, or for various lucrative targets such as enemy truck parks, storage

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OPERATION LAM SON 719
LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN





Source: HQ USASUPCOM - Da Nang Figure E-10

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areas, enemy troop concentrations, and base camps. Gunships were to be used during the hours of darkness, mainly to interdict enemy vehicular traffic and to provide close air support at night for friendly base camps.[27]

(S) ARC LIGHT (B-52) aircraft were provided by Commander, 8th AF, Strategic Air Command (SAC) under operational control of DEPCOMUSMACV for Air, with priority given to Operation LAM SON 719. The ARC LIGHT force normally supported SEA operations with high altitude area saturation strikes against selected targets appropriate for heavy aerial bombardment. The objectives of the ARC LIGHT support were:

-- Aid the defense of friendly forces under attack.

-- Interdict enemy LOC to include attacks on his stockpiles, staging facilities, and means of transportation.

-- Support friendly ground activities.

-- Apply maximum concentration against troops and weapons during enemy preparations to mount offensives (spoiling operations).

-- Attack enemy fixed and semifixed facilities to include base camps, bivouac areas, caches, and command and control facilities.

-- Take full advantage of the psychological effect of heavy aerial bombardment to harass the enemy and destroy his will to fight.[28]

(S) Task Force 77, the air arm of the US 7th Fleet, was also available to support LAM SON 719 by providing strike sorties from aircraft carriers on Yankee Station. These operations were planned coincident with other strike operations in southern Laos and North Vietnam.[29]

Logistics Support

(C) The G-4, I Corps (RVN) began logistics planning for Operation LAM SON 719 on 8 Jan 71. For initial planning the troop strength to be supported was placed at 33,000. Planning covered all classes of supplies, maintenance, potable water, administrative move of units, graves registration, supply distribution, and retrograde of repairables.[30]

(C) The basic plan visualized that the USASUPCOM-DN would establish a US base support area (BSA) near Quang Tri. As the attack progressed toward Khe Sanh, a forward support area (FSA) would be established near Vandegrift base camp and become operational on D-Day. As RT 9 was improved, a second FSA would be established near Khe Sanh and operational by D+6. From D+7 to D+18, the US could support RVN forces with Class V (ammunition) to allow build-up of the RVN I Corps Area Logistic Center (I ALC) in the forward area by D+17. (See Figure E-10.)

(C) The stockage objectives were 15 days at the BSA, 3 days at FSA-1, and 3 days at FSA-2. One-way traffic on RT 9 limited tonnage that could be moved overland. Accordingly, the plan incorporated a daily delivery by C-130 aircraft of 500 tons of materiel into the Khe Sanh airfield beginning on D+4. Included in the 500 tons were 48,000 gallons daily delivery of JP4 aviation fuel. Further plans required the delivery by truck of 1,000 tons per day to FSA-2. After D+17, airlift into Khe Sanh (FSA-2) would be devoted to support RVNAF.

(C) It was planned that all support would be rendered by the US 26th General Support Group, which was normal for all US forces in the area. However, continuous coordination with HQ, XXIV Corps was required to insure adequate support.[31]

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OPERATION LAM SON 719
PLAN OF ATTACK PHASE I
(30 JAN–7 FEB 71)



Source: HQ XXIV Corps Combat After Action Report

Figure E-11

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OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

Planned Phases

(S) The planned concept for LAM SON 719 called for an operation of four phases.

Phase I. The clearing of western Quang Tri Province and RT 9 to the Laotian border, the maneuvering of US and RVN combat and support forces into areas adjacent to the Laotian border, and the establishing of forward logistics bases at Khe Sanh and at Vandegrift base camp. This phase was to be accomplished during the period 30 Jan - 7 Feb 71.

Phase II. The moving of RVN forces, assisted by US support forces (Army aviation, artillery, TACAIR, and other air elements) into Laos, the establishing of fire support bases, and the rapid advance to Tchepone. This phase was to be accomplished during the period 8 Feb - 6 Mar 71.

Phase III. Consolidating of positions throughout the operational area, and the systematic search for and destruction of enemy supplies in the vicinity of Tchepone. This phase was to be accomplished during the period 7 - 9 Mar 71.

Phase IV. The withdrawal of forces from Laos either directly eastward along RT 9, or in a more southerly direction through the major enemy base area in the general vicinity of the Laotian and Vietnamese salients and Base Area 611. The first alternative was to be accomplished during the period 10 Mar - 6 Apr 71.[32]

Phase I - (DEWEY CANYON II) 30 Jan to 7 Feb 71

(C) Phase I, renamed Operation DEWEY CANYON II, was primarily a US operation. It was initiated at 300001H Jan 71 as lead elements of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) attacked with an armored cavalry/engineer task force on two axes from Vandegrift base camp toward Khe Sanh. (See Figure E-11.) Meanwhile, RVNAF made final preparations and moved adminstratively into position for the attack across the Laotian border. The main attack was conducted on Axis Gold along RT 9 toward Khe Sanh. A secondary attack was conducted along Axis Brown to the southwest as the engineer force began constructing a pioneer road to the airfield at Khe Sanh. A three-battalion infantry force was airlifted into the operational area commencing at 300830H Jan and completed at 301530H Jan 71.

(C) The 14th Engr Bn (Cbt), operating behind the attacking force, installed bridges and culverts along RT 9. Meanwhile at Khe Sanh construction began on an assault airstrip which was to be used until the abandoned mat strip could be repaired. It was estimated that the assault strip was operational by 3 Feb 71.

(C) Artillery support was provided by battalions located at Khe Sanh, Vandegrift, and Camp Carroll base camps. The 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) provided security for these fire bases and engineer operations along RT 9 from Vandegrift to Rockpile. The brigade also began a reconnaissance in force from Khe Sanh along RT 9 toward the Laotian border securing the route by 5 Feb 71. As soon as RT 9 was opened for track vehicles, heavy artillery began deployment to Khe Sanh.

(C) During this phase, the RVN 1st Armd Bde and the 1st Abn Bde with supporting artillery moved into forward assembly areas and established FSBs in preparation for D-Day. The rest of the two divisions assembled at Khe Sanh in preparation for air assaults across the border.

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OPERATION LAM SON 719
CONSOLIDATION OF FORCES,-PHASE II (8 FEB-6 MAR 71)



Source: HQXXIV Corps
Combat After Action Report

Figure E-12

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US helicopter units prestocked fuel and munitions at Khe Sanh by medium lift helicopters and surface vehicles, since bad weather had delayed construction of the assault airfield causing delays in C-130 operations. Logistic support was provided by I ALC during the phase as planned.

(C) Enemy resistance during Phase I was light and sporadic with three attacks-by-fire and no major ground contacts. The enemy suffered 14 KIA and 5 IW captured.

Phase II - 8 Feb to 6 Mar 71

(C) Phase II began with the helicopter assault of six ARVN combat battalions and an armored brigade task force thrust along RT 9 into Laos. The operation was preceded by 11 ARC LIGHT strikes and massive artillery fires. Combat units met with light sporadic enemy resistance from small (10 to 18 men) forces. Two additional battalions were inserted near A Loui and linked up with the armored task force. (See Figure E-12.)

(C) I Corps forces continued to build up in eastern Laos to support the armored thrust toward Tchepone. Contacts with the enemy increased as units began search and patrol operations in the vicinity of their LZs and along the armor axis of advance. These operations began producing significant quantities of captured materiel and supplies.

(C) US forces continued operations in-country to curtail enemy harassment of RT 9. With the airfield at Khe Sanh completed, logistic support continued to build. On 18 Feb 71, elements of the US 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav cut two 6 to 8 inch pipelines which sent flames 30 feet into the air. Another unit reported overrunning the 308th NVA Div Hq. This marked the beginning of a notable increase in heavy contacts, some of which lasted through the night, and it appeared that the enemy was grouping for a determined stand against RVN forces. TACAIR, artillery, and helicopter gunship support increased rapidly as the attack gained momentum. Bomb damage assessments by units on the ground comfirmed that ARC LIGHT, TACAIR, and helicopter gunships had inflicted heavy damage to enemy supply depots, vehicles, ammunition storage areas, and weapons. As an example, on 19 Feb 71 there were eight B-52 strikes, 133 TACAIR sorties and 602 helicopter gunship sorties flown which resulted in 33 secondary explosions of a magnitude of two to ten, 37 vehicles destroyed, 13 gun sites destroyed, and two cache sites destroyed.[33]

(C) One of the major battles of the campaign was on 19 Feb 71, when the 39th Ranger Bn faced an estimated 400 to 500 enemy force. After a fierce battle the ranger battalion abandoned the position with 178 men killed or missing and 148 wounded. Enemy casualties were reported as 639 KIA, 423 AK 47 rifles destroyed, 400 automatic rifles destroyed, and 40 machine guns destroyed.

(C) From 24 Feb through 3 Mar 71, the enemy continued to impede resupply and Medevac of RVN fire support bases by indirect fire, ground attacks and antiaircraft fires. This period also marked the first tank/infantry attack launched by the enemy. The attack was successful in seizing the FSB Delta, although TACAIR and the defending forces destroyed 15 enemy tanks. Heavy contacts continued as search and destroy operations met enemy multicompany forces.

(C) As a result of the continued heavy contact in RVN Airborne Division AO, the RVN 1st Div was directed to make the main attack to sieze Tchepone (see Figure E-13). An RVN Marine Bde was airlifted into the former 1st Div AO as a two battalion force air assaulted near Tchepone.

(C) Sightings of the first surface-to-air missile (SAM) were reported near the triborder area, denoting an intensification of enemy antiaircraft defenses. Resupply and troop movement became extremely difficult and often required gunship escort for single ship missions. Enemy troop units and locations were as shown in Figure E-14.

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OPERATION LAM SON 719
MODIFIED PLAN OF ATTACK PHASE II
(8 FEB-6 MAR 71)



Source: HQ XXIV Corps
Combat After Action Report

Figure E-13

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OPERATION LAM SON 719
ENEMY DISPOSITION
(1 FEB 71)



Source: HQ XXIV Corps
Combat After Action Report

Figure E-14

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OPERATION LAM SON 719
BATTALION AREAS OF OPERATION-PHASE III
(7-16 MAR 71)



Source: HQ XXIV Corps
Combat After Action Report

Figure E-15

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(C) US forces continued the build-up of logistics by improving roads and airfields, although support bases received 15 attacks by fire and two sapper attacks during the period 24 Feb - 3 Mar 71. Elements of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) provided security for the RT 9 complex by conducting operations to the northwest and south of Khe Sanh.

(C) RVN combat units continued to reinforce as the battle moved westward toward Tchepone. The tactical success coupled with relatively low casualties increased morale throughout the battlefield. Key terrain which controlled the Xe Pon River Valley and RT 9 was firmly held by RVN forces. Fire support was increasingly responsive, and logistic support operated at maximum efficiency.

(C) Cumulative results of Phase II were:

ALLIED				ENEMY	
Personnel losses	US	RVNAF	Total	Personnel losses	
KIA	77	410	487	KIA	5,341 (1,758 KBA)
WIA	364	1,473	1,837	PW	15
MIA	31	99	130		
				Materiel lost/destroyed	
Materiel lost/destroyed				Radios	13
Individual weapons			109	Trucks	153
Crew-served weapons			13	Tanks	73
Tanks			20	Ammunition	132 tons
Trucks			20	Rice	394 tons
APCs			24	Individual weapons	1,982
Artillery pieces			28	Crew served weapons	401
POL			8,600 gals		
Ammunition			1,105 tons		

Phase III - 7 Mar to 16 Mar 71

(C) Although Phase III was planned as a 2-day operation, the success of search and destroy operations dictated that the phase be extended. ARVN 1st Inf Div elements successfully operated in the Gia Lam and Bach Mai objective areas. (See Figure E-15.) Toward the end of the period, emphasis shifted from search and attack operations to the phased extraction from Laos.

(C) The ARVN Abn Div continued to screen north of the Ze Pon River and east of FSB A Luoi as two Marine brigades continued operations astride RT 926. The enemy's main effort was concentrated generally south of A Luoi. Bad weather during the period 12 through 15 March hindered RVNAF operations by reducing the effectiveness of TACAIR and helicopter gunship support. Intelligence sources indicated that the enemy used this lull in air support to regroup his forces, which may have led to the increase in contacts. Enemy contacts had been generally light during this phase until 14 Mar 71 when FSB Lo Lo began receiving heavy attacks-by-fire followed by ground attacks. These attacks resulted in the abandonment of the base on 16 Mar 71. The enemy then concentrated indirect fire weapons against FSBs A Luoi, Sophia, and to a lesser extent, Delta.

(C) Improved weather conditions on 16 Mar 71 permitted maximum air support as over 200 TACAIR sorties and 1,300 helicopter gunship sorties were flown. During the entire Phase III 1,350 TACAIR sorties, 84 ARC LIGHT sorties, and 4,361 helicopter gunship sorties were flown

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

Source: HQ XXIV Corps
Combat After Action Report

Figure E-16

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in support of RVNAF in Laos. Troop lift and logistic support received over 12,000 helicopter sorties.

(C) US forces continued to provide security for installations supporting RVNAF in Laos. During this period the enemy commenced his long anticipated attacks-by-fire against the Khe Sanh base complex, but the attacks achieved only limited results. In one attack the enemy penetrated the perimeter of FSA 1 at Vandegrift base camp and destroyed 40,000 gallons of JP4 (aviation fuel) and 8,600 rounds of 20mm ammunition.

(C) RVNAF units reported 123 KIA and 478 WIA, while the enemy losses were reported as 2,281 KIA and three PW. During the same period, 1,100 IW, 237 CSW, 54 trucks, and 22 tanks were destroyed. Over 125 tons of rice were captured or destroyed.

Phase IV - 17 Mar to 6 Apr 71

(C) The mission of disrupting the enemy LOC and destroying his supplies was for the most part accomplished. Further search and destroy operations could have been conducted and undoubtedly would have uncovered additional war materials. But since the operation was planned for a limited duration, the execution of the RVNAF extraction plan (see Figure E-16) began on 17 Mar 71 with the initiation of a phased delay by the armored task force.

(C) Enemy interdiction effort caused heavy losses of armored and wheeled vehicles. TACAIR and US artillery enabled the task force to break contact and continue the withdrawal. The bulk of losses suffered by the task force occurred during an ambush on 19 Mar 71 along RT 9. As a result of this battle, as well as moderate losses the preceding week, some units were reduced to an ineffective combat status. The withdrawal on the ground was further marred by the abandonment of tanks, APCs, engineer equipment, and trucks along the withdrawal route. Many of the abandoned tank weapons were used by the enemy as stationary gun platforms.

(C) All other RVNAF units were extracted by helicopter with some difficulty. Frequently, lifts were halted by unacceptable levels of enemy antiaircraft fire, forcing ground units to move to new pickup zones (PZ). Heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy, principally by TACAIR and ARC LIGHT strikes, as the extractions continued.

(C) On 6 Apr 71 the campaign ended when the extraction of all RVNAF units was completed. Emphasis shifted to an active defense in SVN. US combat forces continued security operations with emphasis on destroying the enemy's artillery and rocket capability. One additional maneuver battalion was moved to the western portion of the AO to assist RVNAF in their passage of lines from Laos.[34]

ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS

Enemy Losses

(C) While the total effects of LAM SON 719 on the enemy may not be completely evaluated for some time, conclusive results that were stated as early as 1 Apr 71 were:

-- Enemy plans for movement of supplies and equipment south during the months of February and March were dramatically changed.

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PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES
LAM SON 719

	ALLIED			ENEMY		
	US	RVNAF	Total	Caused by US	Caused by RVN	Total
Personnel						
KIA	215	1,549	1,764	4,795	14,565	19,360
WIA	1,149	5,483	6,632			
MIA	38	651	689			
Captured				8	49	61
Equipment						
Small arms, I W	363	2,107	2,470			5,170
Small arms, CSW	98	320	418			1,963(1)
Vehicles	143	298	441			2,001(2)
Tanks	17	54	71			106
Radios	61	1,516	1,577			98
Bulldozers	6	31	37			
Ammunition	8,600*					170,340(3)
Rice						1,250***
Fuel	40,000**			Unknown		

Note: (1) Number reported by USAF, RVNAF ground troops confirmed 422
(2) US verified 88
(3) US verified 20,000 tons
*Rounds, 20mm
**Gallons, JP4
***Tons

Figure E-17

Source: HQ XXIV Corps

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-- Enemy units and replacements enroute south were diverted to the enemy forces opposing LAM SON 719 forces.

-- Thousands of tons of ammunition, POL, and other supplies and equipment were destroyed.

-- Enemy plans to use these supplies in support of future operations or to stock large quantities of supplies in Base Area 604 were no longer valid. Specific enemy losses as reported to HQ, MACV are as stated in Figure E-17.[35]

(S) Enemy forces operating in South Vietnam were also greatly affected by LAM SON 719 as the replacement of losses was a severe drain on the already critical need for junior leaders. The loss of such leadership affected the morale and capability of VC local force units.

(S) Although the major battles of the campaign were fought in Laos, enemy forces normally stationed north of the DMZ suffered heavy losses. Force buildups just north of the DMZ from Novmeber 1970 to February 1971, for what was suspected to be a later offensive in the south, were of necessity committed to the LAM SON 719 battles. Intelligence sources reported a high degree of turbulence in the political, social, and economic life of NVN civilians as a result of the Allied operations. Numerous reports of home guard unit mobilization and forced migration of civilians stirred resentment among religious leaders and their followers, thereby causing a substantial drop in production.[36]

Enemy Tactics

(S) The overall enemy strategic and tactical reaction to LAM SON 719 demonstrated the Communists' intentions of pursuing their aggression in Southeast Asia. To protect his vital supply and infiltration links in southern Laos, the enemy committed elements of five divisions to include 12 infantry regiments, at least one armored regiment, and two artillery regiments. Only a small part of these forces had been in Laos at the start of the incursion.

(S) For the defense of his base areas against RVNAF, the enemy chose to mass his forces. In this way he expected to compensate for his inferiority in firepower; however, his massing improved the effectiveness of Allied firepower. His attacks on RVNAF FSBs and defense of potential LZs cost him heavily. Overall, it is estimated that the enemy sustained approximately 20,000 casualties (killed or seriously wounded) from among his best front-line troops and most experienced leaders. In addition, the NVA lost about 25 percent of its entire tank resources and over 6,000 weapons.[37]

(S) The NVA skillfully deployed an extensive, [illegible] well-integrated, highly mobile air defense system. Large numbers of antiaircraft weapons were strategically positioned, well camouflaged, and effectively dug in. There was evidence that some of the weapons were radar controlled. Whenever possible, the NVA employed a combination of antiaircraft, artillery, and infantry weapons against aircraft in the air and helicopters on the ground. The enemy quickly massed his antiaircraft weapons against friendly troop positions and known or probable LZs and PZs.

(C) Among the effective techniques used by the NVA was the employment throughout the operational area of 10- to 12-man combat teams armed with small arms, machine guns, a mortar, and one or two RPG rocket launchers. These teams were capable of placing a variety of fire on virtually every friendly position.

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

ARVN troops are proud of the crew-served weapon captured during LAM SON 719 in Laos.



A 155mm howitzer battery of the ARVN's 10th Artillery supports Vietnamese infantrymen with massed fires during LAM SON 719.

(C) The NVA infantry and antiaircraft gunners frequently moved in as close as possible to friendly forces who occupied FSBs or PZs. This "hugging" tactic afforded the enemy protection from friendly artillery, TACAIR, and armed helicopters.

(C) Enemy forces registered mortar, artillery, and rocket fires on most potential LZs and PZs, particularly those on high ground. Consequently nearly every LZ or PZ came under indirect fire soon after an airmobile operation began. This tactic was countered to an extent with the use of COMMANDO VAULT bombs for preparation of new LZs and PZs.[38]

(S) The enemy reacted well in meeting the RVNAF armor threat. He chose to defend critical terrain that restricted lateral movement and employed mortars and automatic weapons to disperse the accompanying infantry elements. Enemy armor repeatedly moved to well camouflaged ambush positions and did not move until fired upon. The VC/NVA effectively employed armor in the attacks of LZ 30 (see Figure E-12) by using tank guns as a direct fire support means. In the attack of FSB 31, the enemy employed tank/infantry teams in the assault, supported by indirect fire. Tank machine guns were further used as antiaircraft weapons, particularly against helicopters. The NVA aggressively pursued the redeployment of the ARVN armor TF during Phase IV with a heavy volume of artillery and rocket fire in support of their assault.[39]

(S) Enemy artillery -- consisting of 76mm, 100mm, 130mm, 152mm howitzers and guns reinforced with 107mm, 122mm, and 140mm rockets, and a variety of mortars -- were dispersed around RVNAF positions as opposed to being employed by units. The weapons were well dug in and protected, and the enemy could deliver rapid, accurate fire against RVNAF positions.[40] Both US and ARVN units had extreme difficulty in locating and countering enemy artillery, mortar and rocket positions as the enemy took full advantage of concealment and selective positioning.[41]

Evaluation of Command and Control

(S) The command and staff relationship between US and Vietnamese staff structures was cordial, professional, and generally effective throughout the operation. But the existence of two equal headquarters in the same general area with overlapping tactical areas of interest led to some conflicts. Because of the strict security measures and the close-hold nature of the plan, the normal functions of both US and ARVN staff agencies were hampered.[42] The necessity for detailed coordination between the two corps staffs led to the establishment of the Joint Coordination Group (JCG) discussed earlier. The JCG greatly facilitated the needs and priorities of the CG, I Corps as well as expediting implementation of orders of CG, XXIV Corps.[43]

(S) Initial operations proceeded generally according to plan, and RVN commanders and staffs had firm control of the situation. As the operation progressed beyond the initial phases, there was a noticeable decline in their efficiency and decisiveness. When strong enemy reaction, political directions, and slowness in execution by some units necessitated changes in plans, the RVN I Corps staff's ability to react was hampered by an apparent lack of staff guidance, aggressiveness, and accurate battlefield information. Staffs at all levels were hesitant to press for current information from subordinates unless first requested by the senior commanders. Information was often inaccurate and usually incomplete; therefore, the I Corps Commander, his staff and other senior commanders were unable to properly assess the situation and influence the action.[44]

Employment of Army Aviation

(C) The mobility afforded the RVN commanders by US helicopter support was undoubtedly one of their greatest assets as it provided them with a means to economize forces and to mass

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resources. But they often relied on the helicopters as an exclusive means of transportation which constituted a misuse of valuable assets.

(C) The high density of enemy antiaircraft weapons throughout the LAM SON 719 AO required special planning for each mission to avoid heavy losses. It was soon learned that LZs on slopes and relatively low ground were less likely to be anticipated by the enemy; these were used whenever possible.

(C) In order to avoid losses extensive fire support of TACAIR, artillery fires, B-52 ARC LIGHT strikes, and helicopter gunships were used in preparation of the LZs, approach and departure routes, and adjacent areas. Priority of AF TACAIR was given to the support of air assaults to augment the helicopter gunships in an escort or flak suppression role.

(C) Air reconnaissance elements of the air cavalry units were used continually to provide the ground forces commanders with current information on enemy activity. These elements often selected LZs and flight routes for the assaulting forces and in some cases directed and adjusted support fires.

(C) A special team was formed to recover downed aircraft during the operation since US personnel were not permitted on the ground in Laos. The team consisted of a CH-47 Chinook and rigging crew, a command helicopter, a Medevac crew, an escort gunship, and a ground security force. The Black Panther Company of the 1st Inf Div (RVN) formed the ground security force.

(C) Forward refueling, rearming, and other logistical and maintenance support were provided by the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) Support Command at Da Nang. This unit was responsible for all missions ancillary to the combat assaults and was of crucial importance to those participating in the operation.[45]

(C) The helicopter proved survivable in the midintensity air defense environment in Laos. Airmobile operations were confronted with heavy small arms fire, antiaircraft weapons, and mortar and artillery fires.

(C) Below is a summary of Army aviation support by type sortie in support of LAM SON 719.[46]

US ARMY AVIATION SUMMARY - LAM SON 719

(30 Jan - 7 Apr 71)

Type Sortie		In RVN	In Laos
Gunship		17,159	17,014
Troop lift		37,681	13,098
Medevac		1,829	909
Air cavalry		10,603	7,284
Logistic support		51,342	7,523
	Total	118,614	45,828

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US ARMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES

(30 Jan - 7 Apr 71)

Type Aircraft	Non-hostile Damage	Non-hostile Loss	Hostile Damage	Hostile Loss
OH-6A		1	25	9
OH-58			15	6
UH-1C	1		62	8
UH-1H	2	1	314	52
AH-1G	1	2	157	24
CH-47			26	3
Total	4	4	601	102

(C) Weather often varied from staging area to PZ to LZ. This same weather variance had an even greater effect on the employment of TACAIR due to the more stringent minimum weather standards required for effective employment.[47] Only on a few days was the weather bad enough to cancel operations. Delays in takeoff of FAC pilots and the air shipment of supplies to Khe Sanh presented some problems. On many days early morning fog obscured most terrain and prevented the launch from Khe Sanh until almost noon. By midafternoon cumulus buildups restricted airspace, and haze and dust limited visibility, creating near instrument flight conditions. Midday offered the best overall conditions. The table below illustrates the percent of time ceilings in the coastal plains and western Quang Tri Province and eastern Laos portions of the AO met minimum aviation standards. In general, ceilings above 2,500 feet mean sea level (MSL) on the coast resulted in ceilings above 1,000 feet above ground level (AGL) throughout the AO.[48] (MSL is measured from standard sea-level pressure while AGL is that distance from the surface of the ground to the cloud bases.)

Areas	Percent of Time Ceiling Met Minimum Standards	
Coastal plains	1,000 ft. (+) AGL	3,000 ft.(+) AGL
0800 - 1800 hours	80	54
1200 - 1800 hours	91	69
Western Quang Tri (Khe Sanh) and eastern Laos		
0800 - 1800 hours	33	25
1200 - 1800 hours	64	45

Air Support Summary

(C) The massive firepower provided by air strikes was especially useful in support of air-mobile operations, particularly combat assaults. TACAIR was employed as a part of the ARC LIGHT - artillery - helicopter gunship team in the preparation of LZs, approach and departure routes. The Tactical Air Control System (TACS) established for the operation proved adequate. The technique of providing English-speaking Vietnamese observers with USAF FACs was highly successful.[49] ? Not always.

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

US helicopters flew an average of more than 1,000 sorties daily from bases in South Vietnam, in support of LAM SON 719.



ARVN forces advance along the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos during LAM SON 719.

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(C) The experiences in LAM SON 719 indicated that more emphasis must be placed on Army and Air Force coordination planning for large scale operations involving TACAIR. Specifically, combat assaults and large helicopter resupply efforts supported by TACAIR must be coordinated in detail, to include number of sorties required for LZ preparation, ordnance configuration, and aircraft availability. [50]

(C) A new concept in COMMANDO VAULT utilization was initiated in LAM SON 719. COMMANDO VAULT bombs had previously been employed only for creating instant LZs when accuracy was not a prime factor. During this operation they were employed against large mass targets such as suspected troop concentrations and storage areas. PDAs received were not significant, and the effectiveness of this use of COMMANDO VAULTs remained inconclusive. [51] Of the 25 bombs delivered by C-130 aircraft, 6 were used for LZ/PZ construction, while 19 were used for various lucrative targets.

(C) The number of sorties flown during LAM SON 719 with the known BDA is as indicated below. [52]

USAF TACAIR SUPPORT
(30 Jan - 7 Apr 71)

	In Laos	In RVN	Total
Sorties flown	7,104	2,010	9,114
Average sorties per day	103	29	132
Highest number of sorties on any one day (8 Mar 71)			277
Tons of ordnance delivered	10,931	3,100	14,031
Number of aircraft lost			7
Results from known BDA:			
Enemy KBA	3,103	61	3,164
Secondary explosions	6,694	234	6,928
Secondary fires	779	207	986
Structures/bunkers destroyed	471	421	892
Trucks destroyed	197	1	198
Tanks destroyed	59	0	59
Antiaircraft weapons	165	2	167
Radar sites destroyed	1	0	1

(C) Fixed wing gunships were employed exclusively at night to interdict enemy vehicles and to support the defense of Allied base camps. With their high rate of fire, the gunships proved highly effective in rapid response missions to troops in contact. The 127 sorties flown were credited with 50 to 60 enemy vehicles destroyed. [53]

ARC LIGHT Support

(S) Most ARC LIGHT strikes were initially planned against targets based on hard intelligence. B-52s were often diverted from scheduled targets to support troops in contact. A distinct disadvantage of using ARC LIGHT strikes within 3 kilometers of friendly troops was the loss of wide target coverage when B-52 aircraft were required to fly in trail formation. Commanders were encouraged to plan targets so as to avoid having troops within this waiver distance. ARC

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LIGHT strikes were also used effectively in the preparation of LZs in conjunction with other supporting fires. Normally, a strike was placed on the target 12 to 15 hours before LZ time. [54]

(S) One of the problems encountered during LAM SON 719 was that I Corps (RVN) and US divisions had to submit requests for ARC LIGHT strikes to XXIV Corps (US) 36 to 60 hours before target time. A more streamlined request procedure would have been more responsive in a fast-moving situation such as an airmobile operation. Another major problem was getting ground troops into the strike zone following an ARC LIGHT strike to perform a complete BDA. Only 52 of the 615 strikes received a complete BDA from ground elements because the weather or the tactical situation would not allow it. [55]

(S) As a result of the 408 ARC LIGHT strikes observed, 3,155 secondary explosions were reported. B-52s delivered 46,402 tons of bombs in support of the operation, resulting in 2,644 enemy KBA, and 1,529 IW or CSW, 450 mortars or rocket launchers, over 20,000 tons of food and ammunition, and approximately 152,000 gallons of fuel destroyed. (These statistics were based only on the targets receiving a ground BDA.) [56]

(S) The majority of VNAF air resources during the months of February and March 1971 were employed in support of RVN operations in SVN and Cambodia. VNAF aircraft flew 230 close air support sorties in support of Operation LAM SON 719 during March 1971 and provided limited helicopter troop lift support. [57]

Results of Artillery

(C) Although the weather and antiaircraft weapons limited the use of aerial observers, they were employed over both the US and RVNAF AOs. When observer aircraft were maintained over suspected areas, it seemed to inhibit the enemy's use of indirect fire weapons. [58] In addition to visual observation, some missions were targeted as a result of OV-1 Mohawk aircraft infrared sensings.

(C) The extensive use of English-speaking RVN personnel with both USAF FACs and Army aerial observers contributed significantly to solving the language barrier between the RVNAF maneuver elements and US fire support elements. The system also established a method of fire control for counterbattery targets, and aided in the full dissemination and exchange of target information. The system also proved most helpful in the exchange of fire support coordination line information between all units.

(C) Since RVNAF corps and divisions headquarters remained in SVN an extensive liaison system was organized to improve the responsiveness of artillery support. Vietnamese liaison officers (LnO) were sent to the supporting US artillery unit and the 108th Arty Gp fire direction center (FDC). This liaison provided a double channel of fire requests for the RVNAF, thereby reducing response time. The first channel was from RVNAF units to RVN division or separate brigade headquarters. The 108th Arty Gp LnO located at each RVN division or separate brigade received the mission and processed it to the 108th Arty Gp FDC. The second channel was directly from the requesting unit to the RVN LnO located at the 108th Arty Gp headquarters. The RVN LnO then passed the request directly to the 108th Arty Gp FDC. US fire requests were sent directly to the 108th Arty Gp FDC by FACs, aerial observers or air cavalry teams. Requests for aerial rocket artillery (ARA) support were processed through the 108th Arty Gp FDC direct to the ARA unit. [59]

(C) Throughout the operation both US and RVNAF units were unfamiliar with the characteristics and limitations of heavy artillery and many times sent requests which exceeded their capabilities. For example, the RVN Abn Div requested 2,500 rounds be fired over an 8-hour

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period to replace five cancelled ARC LIGHT strikes. In many cases the maximum rate of fire would have been exceeded in order to accomplish the mission. RVNAF commanders were reluctant to fire within established "danger close" criteria of 500 meters for the 175mm gun and 300 meters for the 8-inch howitzer.

(C) Heavy artillery FSBs suffered a high incident rate from direct and indirect fire attacks due to the lack of provisions for protective screening by maneuver elements.[60] Major US equipment losses as a result of enemy action were:

Items	Number
Wheeled vehicles	26
Tracked vehicles	6
Trailers	13
Generators	7
Small arms weapons	52
175mm guns	4

(S) RVNAF left 96 artillery tubes on FSBs in Laos when extraction was impractical due to heavy enemy fire. This loss might have been reduced by expansion of FSB perimeters to permit helicopter extraction.[61]

(C) A total of 7,700 fire missions of 25,053 rounds were fired in support of US forces while 5,019 fire missions of 28,034 rounds were fired in support of RVNAF. BDA disclosed the following results:[62]

Items	Number
Fighting positions destroyed	13
Bunkers and huts destroyed	86
Mortar positions silenced or destroyed	6
Rocket positions silenced or destroyed	1
Artillery positions damaged or destroyed	4
Antiaircraft positions silenced or destroyed	9
Secondary explosions	57
Enemy KIA	1,979
Tanks damaged or destroyed	11
Trucks damaged or destroyed	40
Supply areas damaged or destroyed	1

(S) In general, Vietnamese artillery was effectively employed in support of LAM SON 719 operations. Within division and separate brigade areas, artillery fire was properly coordinated to provide mutually supporting fires. Conversely, there were indications that artillery fires were not always coordinated between these areas.

(S) Both US and RVNAF had extreme difficulty in locating and countering enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket positions. Enemy indirect fire weapons hit RVNAF FSBs from all directions and made it very difficult to determine enemy firing positions. The positions were well concealed in mountainous terrain and very difficult to destroy.[63] The enemy also used weapons with ranges greater than RVNAF weapons. TACAIR was the most effective means of destroying these positions.[64]

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Logistics Analysis

(C) The most significant problem identified during the planning phase was the equipment and supplies needed to support the massive aviation assets for airmobile operations. Facilities for rapid refueling stations were immediate needs as were slings, cargo nets, and other air items for helicopter resupply operations. Airfield matting and related items were critical for the rebuilding of the airfield at Khe Sanh as well as cargo handling equipment for logistics operations. These items were obtained from other military regions, Pacific installations, and CONUS in sufficient time and quantity to prevent delay in the operation. [65]

(C) Because of the security measures during the planning phase, an effective reporting system was not established thereby causing some delays in the early stages. Logistical support for the 12th Signal Group was overlooked during the planning phase. Mission essential signal items were received belatedly, however an adequate communications network was established throughout the AO.

(C) The resupply of aviation POL products remained critical throughout the early phase of the operation. The airfield at Khe Sanh was not operational for C-130 aircraft on D+4 as planned. The shortage of 5,000 gallon and 1,200 gallon tankers was critical. The situation was further aggravated by an enemy ambush on 7 Feb 71 which destroyed six 5,000 gallon tankers. Tanker operations were also hampered by restricted one-way traffic on RT 9. Surface transportation proved inadequate, so cargo helicopters were diverted from combat support missions to move JP4 fuel from Vandegrift to Khe Sanh. US Marine CH-53 aircraft were also diverted for the emergency airlift of JP 4. [66]

(C) The BSA at Quang Tri (see Figure E-10) operated by the 26th General Support Group (GSG) (forward) was operational on D-Day. FSA 1 also opened on D-Day with limited assets available. Local security which was to be provided by combat elements was not available, so provisional companies were formed from the support command resources. Engineer support to build protective berms for POL and ammunition storage areas was critically short. The first elements of FSA 2 arrived on D+4 and were operational on D+6. Logistics buildup was delayed by bad weather and the poor condition of RT 9.

(C) Troop strength of the service support elements was significant in that they indicate the magnitude of Operation LAM SON 719. Approximately 6,000 troops were required to operate the logistics facilities, with two-thirds of these used at the BSA and FSAs. The estimated 33,000 troop strength for the operation was revised to 45,000 as the operation progressed. POL handlers and parachute riggers were the most critical special skill needed.

(C) The coordination between I ALC and the support command was outstanding, which in part prevented the failure or even postponement of any combat operation. Although the supply points were collocated, the stocks were not mingled, thereby facilitating accountability. Mutual support and cooperation prevailed throughout the operation. [67]

(C) Since Operation LAM SON 719 was announced for a limited duration, plans for terminating the FSAs were prepared well in advance so that actual close-out was accomplished with little confusion. A final sweep was made of RT 9 between Khe Sanh and Vandegrift base camp on 3 Apr 71 at which time battle damaged equipment and loose ammunition were recovered. Personnel, supplies, equipment, and ammunition were redistributed and retrograde operations were well underway by the official termination date of 7 Apr 71.

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CONCLUSION

(S/NF) LAM SON 719 did not lessen the North Vietnamese intent to continue aggressive operations in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia. It did limit the enemy's ability to conduct combat operations in the near future. To the extent that he was kept occupied until the onset of bad weather, his recovery was slowed. He had to divide his recuperative efforts among on-going campaigns; rebuilding, refitting, and retraining decimated units; repairing and rebuilding roads and storage areas; and moving new supplies from the north. Under these circumstances, the level of enemy activity in MR 1 progressed from moderate to very low from April to September 1971. As this time frame put him into the northeast monsoon period, LAM SON 719 might even have forestalled any major offensive until the spring of 1972.[68]



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24. Same as # 22, p G-3.

25. Same as # 22, p G-4.

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27. Same as # 22, p 1-F-5.

28. Same as # 22, p 2-F-1.

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46. Same as # 22, p 1-F-1.

47. Same as # 18, p I-3.

48. Same as # 22, pp C-2, C-3.

49. Same as # 21, p 10.

50. Same as # 22, p 1-F-6.

51. Same as # 22, p 1-F-6.

52. Same as # 22, p 1-F-4.

53. Same as # 22, p 1-F-5.

54. Same as # 22, p 2-F-2.

55. Same as # 22, p B-2-F-1.

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ANNEX F

REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES

REDUCTION OF US FORCES IN RVN

(U) From the time US combat forces were first committed in Vietnam the withdrawal of forces was a public issue. President Kennedy on 2 Sep 63 said in a TV interview:

> It is their war, they are the ones who have to win it or lose it, we can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors, but they have to win it -- the people of Vietnam. . . . All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw.

Shortly thereafter he told another reporter:

> What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw.[1]

(U) In late September 1963 President Kennedy ordered Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his personal representative, General Maxwell D. Taylor, to go to South Vietnam to review the military situation. This fact-finding trip culminated in a White House announcement, on 2 Oct 63, that by the end of 1963 the US program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 US military personnel could be withdrawn from RVN, and that "the major part of the United States military task in Vietnam can be completed by the end of 1965."[2] The 1,000 withdrawal was carried out as scheduled.

(U) The withdrawal assessment carried over into the Johnson Administration. In a report to President Johnson in March 1964 Secretary McNamara and General Tayler recommended regarding the Vietnam situation: "The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese."[3]

(U) President Johnson made the US and Allied position on withdrawal from Vietnam quite clear when he spoke on 4 Nov 66 for the Troop Contributing Countries who had just met at Manila:

> We don't want to occupy that country. . . . When the aggression, infiltration, and violence cease, not a nation there wants to keep occupying forces in South Vietnam. . . . If infiltration would cease from the viewpoint of our adversary, the Allies would gladly reciprocate by withdrawing their troops. . . in a period of not to exceed 6 months.

In his address to the nation on 31 Mar 68 wherein he announced that he would not seek reelection, President Johnson reaffirmed the pledge made at Manila and offered "the first in what I hope will be a series of mutual moves towards peace."[4] This move toward peace was influenced by a multitude of factors -- the length of the conflict, heavy casualties, monetary drain on the national economy, divisiveness in the United States, and adverse world opinion.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND VIETNAMIZATION

(U) President Nixon, when he took office in January 1969, intensified efforts for peace in a series of new initiatives. At the same time, the Administration began a conscious policy of Vietnamizing the war. By the summer of 1969 the President had formulated the Nixon Doctrine and was embarked on a program of withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam.

(U) As enunciated by the President in July 1969, the Nixon Doctrine contained three basic propositions:

-- The US will keep its treaty commitments.

-- The US will provide a shield, if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied to us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

-- In cases involving other types of aggression, the US will furnish military aid and economic assistance when requested and appropriate, but the US shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense.

(U) Consistent with this latter principle -- that the threatened nation provide manpower for its own defense -- the US began the process of Vietnamization, the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam on an orderly, scheduled timetable based on the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. As President Nixon reported to the nation on 3 Nov 69:

> In the previous administration we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace. . . . In July. . . I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.[5]

US WITHDRAWALS

(U) The first announcement of US troop withdrawal followed the meeting of President Nixon and President Thieu at Midway Island on 8 Jun 69. At the Midway Conference the two presidents reviewed with particular attention the steps being taken to modernize and improve the Vietnamese armed forces. President Thieu informed President Nixon that the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam were now reaching the point where they could assume an increasingly large share of the burden of combat. In response, President Nixon announced:

> As a consequence of the recommendation by the President and the assessment of our own commander in the field, I have decided to order the immediate redeployment from Vietnam of a division equivalent of approximately 25,000 men. This troop replacement will begin within the next 30 days and will be completed by the end of August.

In accordance with this decision redeployment of US forces began on 1 Jul 69.

[redacted]

(C) Reduction of the US force level was carried out in a series of increments, each keyed to a Presidential announcement on withdrawal. Each reduction was made in the face of certain risks, requiring a continuing assessment of a number of variables bearing on Vietnamization. Prime consideration was given to:

-- assessment of the NVA and VC threat giving special attention to the advantages accruing to the enemy from having nearby bases and sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam;

-- retention of considerable US combat support until RVNAF capabilities became adequate under the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP). Major shortfalls in the CRIMP existed in the areas of aviation and logistics;

-- the combat performance of RVNAF units.[6]

(C) Thus, Vietnamization and the redeployment of US forces were interrelated, with decisions dependent on estimates of the threat, demonstrated improvements in RVNAF's performance, and progress in pacification. Effective coordination between MACV and JGS, and between the US Embassy and the GVN on US redeployment planning, reduced the political and psychological misgivings associated with the initial announcements of US withdrawals, resulting in an orderly transfer of responsibilities to RVNAF.[7]

(S) Operational requirements sometimes necessitated adjustments in redeployment plans. For example Operation LAM SON 719 early in 1971 caused changes in the planned withdrawal in order to retain sufficient combat aviation support. In both initial planning and subsequent adjustments for each increment, the key factor considered was force structure balance.

(U) Throughout 1971, US forces continued to be redeployed as Vietnamization progressed, with the ultimate objective being to have only a small residual force in RVN. The mission and purpose of the residual forces is best described by President Nixon in his troop withdrawal announcement of 12 Nov 71:

> If we do not get a negotiated settlement, then it is necessary to maintain a residual force for not only the reason -- and this is, of course, a very primary reason -- of having something to negotiate with, with regard to our prisoners, but it is also essential to do so in order to continue our role of leaving South Vietnam in a position where it will be able to defend itself from a Communist take-over.[8]

(C) Between 1 Jul 69 and 31 Jan 72 the US military presence in Vietnam was reduced from a high of 549,500 to 139,000, a reduction of more than 410,000. The ceiling levels for the various redeployment increments are shown below (Figure F-1), followed by a discussion of the spaces and major units withdrawn in each increment.

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REDEPLOYMENT OF US SPACES



Source: MACJ3-03 FACT SHEET, 1 Feb 72

Figure F-1

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Redeployment of Increments I - V 1969-1970

Spaces Reduced

	Incr I	Incr II	Incr III	Incr IV	Incr V
Army	15,384	14,082	29,443	16,779	38,100
Navy	1,222	5,412	2,050	8,800	1,300
Air Force	0	2,541	5,607	7,400	600
Marine	8,394	18,483	12,900	17,021	0
Total	25,000	40,500	50,000	50,000	40,000

Major Units

Increment I - KEYSTONE EAGLE (1 Jul 69 - 31 Aug 69)	9th Inf Div (-) 9th RLT 3d Mar Div one Mar Hel Sqdn one Tac Svc Sqdn
Increment II - KEYSTONE CARDINAL (1 Sep 69 - 15 Dec 69)	3d Mar Div 3d Bde 82d Abn Div (-) five NMCB two Tac Ftr Sqdn one Spec Op Sqdn one Tac Bmr Wg
Increment III - KEYSTONE BLUE JAY (16 Dec 69 - 15 Apr 70)	1st Inf Div 3d Bde 4th Inf Div 26th RLT one Tac Ftr Wg three Tac Ftr Sqdn one Tac Recon Sqdn three Mar Atk/Ftr Sqdn one Mar Hel Sqdn
Increment IV - KEYSTONE ROBIN ALPHA (1 Jul 70 - 15 Oct 70)	2/1st Armd Cav Sqdn 3d Bde 9th Inf Div 199th Lt Inf Bde 7th RLT three NMCB two Tac Ftr Sqdn
Increment V - KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO (16 Oct 70 - 31 Dec 70)	25th Inf Div (-) 4th Inf Div (-) USS Benewah one River Asslt Sqdn one Tac Recon Sqdn



Source: MACJ3-08 OPREP 4, 1 Jan 71–1 May 71

Figure F-2

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US Force Redeployment, 1971

(C) Redeployment of US Forces accelerated in 1971. The force ceiling level was reduced 185,000 spaces by the end of the year through four completed increments (160,000) and one on-going increment (25,000 in Dec 71). All USMC combat forces were withdrawn, ending service in RVN which had begun with the deployment of the first US combat forces in March 1965. The year 1971 also signaled a reduction in the remainder of the troop-contributing countries of the Free World Military Assistance Forces. Redeployment continued to require careful, yet flexible, planning to maintain the delicate balances required between increased capabilities of the RVNAF and the need for US combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

(U) In a speech on 7 Apr 71 President Nixon announced a new withdrawal of 100,000. This became the basis for redeployment increments VII, VIII, and IX. In his speech the President reemphasized US intentions by stating:

> The American involvement in Vietnam is coming to an end. The day the South Vietnamese can take over their own defense is in sight. Our goal is total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and we will reach that goal through our program of Vietnamization.[9]

(U) Redeployment of each increment during 1971 is discussed below. Appendix I contains detailed listings by increment of each unit drawndown or redeployed during 1971.

Increment VI

(U) Increment VI, KEYSTONE ROBIN CHARLIE, began on 1 Jan 71 and terminated 30 Apr 71. This increment resulted in a 60,000 space reduction of US forces. These spaces were divided among the component forces as follows.[10]

	Combat	Combat Support	Combat Service Support	Total
Army	14,379	9,839	17,630	41,848
Navy		168	5,432	5,600
Air Force			373	373
Marine	3,471	3,537	5,171	12,179
Total	17,850	13,544	28,606	60,000

(C) The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), which had seen service in three Military Regions and fought in some of the war's hardest battles, was programmed to return to the United States to form the major portion of the Army's new tricapability division (TRICAP). In keeping with this plan, the 1st Cav Div's headquarters with two brigades was redeployed to Fort Hood, Texas by April 1971. Remaining in MR 3 was the division's 3d Bde consisting of four airmobile infantry battalions and support elements. These forces were used to structure the 3d Bde Task Force, stationed at Bien Hoa just north of Saigon, to participate in the dynamic defense of US installations in the area.

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

Source: MACJ3-08 OPREP 4, 1 May 71, 1 Jul 71

Figure F-3

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(U) Other major US Army redeployments in Increment VI:

-- The last remaining brigade of the 25th Inf Div, the 2d Bde, and its four infantry battalions.

-- The 11th Armd Cav Regt (-) (ACR), redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washington. The 3d Sqdn, 11th ACR remained in MR 3 to participate in dynamic defense and security operations.

-- The 5th Special Forces Group, one of the oldest US units in operation in Indochina underwent a drawdown in strength to zero balance by a force structure change action on 15 Apr 71.

-- One battalion of the 173d Abn Bde, redeployed from Binh Dinh Province, MR 2.

(C) Increment VI continued the rapid reduction of the USMC's presence in the RVN. A major portion of the III Marine Amphibious Force to include Hq Bn 1st Mar Div and the 5th Mar Regt redeployed during March and April. From a peak of 81,786 in April 1969, nearly half of the 25,257 Marines remaining in Vietnam on 1 Jan 71 were redeployed by 31 Apr 71.

(C) At the beginning of the increment there were 54 US maneuver battalions (48 US Army, 6 USMC) in-country. By the end of the increment there were 39 (36 US Army, 3 USMC).[11]

Increment VII

(U) Increment VII, KEYSTONE ORIOLE ALPHA, began on 1 May 71 and terminated 30 Jun 71. This increment resulted in a 29,300 space reduction of US forces. These spaces were divided among the component forces as follows.[12]

	Combat	Combat Support	Combat Service Support	Total
Army	3,277	1,556	10,197	15,030
Navy			516	516
Air Force			985	985
USMC	4,071	4,983	5,536	13,590
USMC Debit/ Credit Acct			-821	-821
Total	7,348	5,539	16,413	29,300

(C) This increment signaled the conclusion of the USMC's active combat role in the Vietnam war. With the redeployment to Okinawa of the 3d Mar Amph Bde, the 1st Regt 1st Mar Div, two attack fighter squadrons of the 1st Mar Air Wing, and the remaining combat support and combat service support elements, the USMC's strength in Vietnam was reduced to 546 as of 30 Jun 71. This level is comparable to the USMC Vietnam-strength in the spring of 1963, (March 1963, 532; April 1963, 580).[13]

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

Source: MACJ3-08 OPREP 4, 1 Jul 71-1 Sep 71

Figure F-4

(U) Principal US Army combat forces withdrawn were two battalions from the 23d Inf Div and one from the 101st Abn Div (Ambl), all from MR 1.

(C) Increment VII's redeployment decreased the US strength from 39 maneuver battalions (36 US Army, 3 USMC) to 33, all US Army.[14]

Increment VIII

(U) Increment VIII, KEYSTONE ORIOLE BRAVO, began on 1 Jul 71 and terminated 31 Aug 71. This increment resulted in a 28,700-space reduction of US forces. These spaces were divided among the component forces as follows.[15]

	Combat	Combat Support	Combat Service Support	Total
Army	6,475	7,328	7,966	21,769
Navy			1,122	1,122
Air Force	1,783	1,618	2,299	5,700
Marine	4	26	79	109
Total	8,262	8,972	11,466	28,700

(U) The US Army lost two combat brigades in the increment: the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (mechanized), which was redeployed and inactivated, and the 173d Airborne Brigade (-), which redeployed to Fort Campbell, Ky for continued duty in the active Army.

(C) The US Navy's principal redeployment in this increment involved three vessels, the USS Satyr, USS Sphinx, and the USS Askari, under the Naval Support Activity's (NSA) control. These were landing craft repair ships, termed ARLs. Each had a crew of 212 men. The Sphinx had departed the RVN in mid-May but was credited to the USN's space reduction for Increment VIII. The Askari was redeployed to Subic Bay, Philippines. The Satyr did not depart; its spaces were redeployed and in September 1971, the ship was turned over to the VNN.[16]

(C) A number of USAF combat units were affected by Increment VIII. One tactical reconnaissance squadron of RF-4s and two tactical airlift squadrons redeployed, and four tactical fighter squadrons of F-100s were inactivated at Phan Rang AB. There was also one special operations squadron of AC-119s which redeployed to Thailand.[17]

(C) Increment VIII redeployments reduced US Army maneuver battalions from 33 to 27.[18]

Increment IX

(U) Increment IX, KEYSTONE ORIOLE CHARLIE, began on 1 Sep 71 and terminated 30 Nov 71. This increment resulted in a 42,000-space reduction of US forces. These spaces were divided among the component forces as follows.[19]

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

Source: MACJ3-08 OPREP4, 1 Sep 71 – 1 Dec 71

Figure F-5

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	Combat	Combat Support	Combat Service Support	Total
Army	8,253	11,452	15,295	35,000
Navy		54	1,346	1,400
Air Force	1,819	2,141	1,640	5,600
Total	10,072	13,647	18,281	42,000

(U) The 23d Infantry Division (Americal) (-) to include two of its brigades, six infantry battalions, and five field artillery battalions comprised the main portion of the US Army's reduction in firepower. The remaining Americal brigade, the 196th Inf Bde, and three of its battalions and one field artillery battalion were relieved from the division on 1 Nov 71 and assigned to XXIV Corps for dynamic defense and tactical security of US installations in Da Nang.[20] There were also two armored cavalry squadrons redeployed, one each from MR 1 and MR 2. The remainder of the US Army space reductions were other combat support and combat service support units.

(U) Nearly all of the USN's 1,400 space reductions were combat service support elements. One mobile construction battalion of 348 spaces redeployed and the Naval Support Activities of Saigon and Da Nang underwent a drawdown.

(U) The USAF lost two F4D tactical fighter squadrons from Phu Cat AB in Binh Dinh Province redeployed during this increment. Two tactical airlift squadrons, a C-123K squadron from Da Nang and a C-7A squadron, Cam Ranh Bay, and a special operations squadron of AC-119G gunships from Tan Son Nhut were inactivated in-country.

(C) The continued redeployment of US maneuver battalions resulted in reduction from 27 on 1 Sep 71 to 19 on 30 Nov 71.[21]

Increment X

(U) Increment X, KEYSTONE MALLARD, began on 1 Dec 71 and terminated 31 Jan 72. This increment resulted in a 45,000-space reduction of US forces. These spaces were divided among the component forces as follows.

	Combat	Combat Support	Combat Service Support	Total
Army	7,561	11,339	17,818	36,718
Navy		608	1,409	2,017
Air Force	879	1,740	3,646	6,265
Total	8,440	13,687	22,873	45,000

(U) The 1st Brigade (-) and 3d Brigade, 101st Infantry Division (Ambl), one separate infantry battalion, and five field artillery battalions comprised the major reduction in ground firepower. The remaining US Army spaces were other combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

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

Source: MACJ3-08 OPREP 4, 1Dec 71 – 1 Feb 72

Figure F-6

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(U) All USN space reductions were combat service support elements.

(U) USAF combat units withdrawn were the 535th Tactical Air Lift Squadron and the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron.

(U) There were 13 US Army maneuver battalions remaining in Vietnam upon completion of KEYSTONE MALLARD redeployment.[22]

FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCE REDEPLOYMENTS

(C) Concurrent with redeployment of US forces, Free World Military Assistance Forces began withdrawal of troops. Australian and New Zealand forces began redeployment from Vietnam in three phases or increments starting on 19 Aug 71 to continue to 7 Mar 72. As of 31 Dec 71 all except approximately 1,600 of the Australian and New Zealand forces were redeployed. A small number (approximately 100) of the remaining force comprised an Army Training Team.

(C) The Republic of Korea planned to withdraw 10,000 troops in two phases between December 1971 and April 1972. Forces to be redeployed included a marine brigade and a logistical command. The remaining contingent consists of two divisions and support elements (approximately 39,000 troops).

(C) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Forces, Vietnam began standdown on 9 Dec 71 and commenced redeployment on 3 Jan 72. Redeployment is scheduled to be completed by May 1972.

(C) The Philippine and Nationalist Chinese governments continued to have only small contingents remaining in-country.

(U) Spain terminated its assistance to RVN on 15 Dec 71.

(U) Free World Forces activities and troop redeployments are discussed in greater detail in Annex G.[23]

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US Marines lower the American flag for the last time in February 1971, at an outpost north of Da Nang.

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APPENDIX 1

UNITS REDEPLOYED IN INCREMENTS VI TO X

(U) This appendix lists all units redeployed, reduced, or inactivated in redeployment Increments VI through X, 1 Jan 71 to 31 Jan 72, totaling 205,000 spaces. Units are listed by increment and are grouped by major element within each Service. The actual unit space reduction is classified SECRET; the designation of a unit and its dates are unclassified. Information on number of personnel spaces authorized prior to reduction is not available for units in Increment VI.

(C) Previous redeployment listings are contained in the MACV Command Histories for 1969 and 1970.

SUMMARY OF REDEPLOYMENTS
(1 Jul 69 to 31 Jan 72)

Increment	Period	Authorized Ceiling	Spaces Reduced	Combat Power Mvr Bn	Combat Power Arty Bn	Atk/Ftr Sqdn**
I	1Jul69 - 31Aug69	524,500	25,000	9	6	1
II	17Sep69 - 15Dec69	484,000	40,500	10	6	4
III	30Dec69 - 15Apr70	434,000	50,000	17	11	6
IV	1Sep70 - 15Oct70	384,000	50,000	11	5	11
V	16Oct70 - 31Dec70	344,000	40,000	14	8	0
VI	1Jan71 - 30Apr71	284,000	60,000	15	6	3
VII	1May71 - 30Jun71	254,700	29,300	6	2	2
VIII	1Jul71 - 31Aug71	226,000	28,700	6	5	5
IX	1Sep71 - 30Nov71	184,000	42,000	8	10	2
X	1Dec71 - 31Jan72	139,000	45,000*	6	5	2

* 25,000 spaces in December 1971; 20,000 spaces in January 1972
** Includes both USAF and USMC Sqdns

Source: MACJ3

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REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT VI

(KEYSTONE ROBIN CHARLIE)

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Reduced
US ARMY		
1st Cav Div (Ambl)		
1 Cav Div (Ambl) HHC	29Apr71	201
1 Bde HHC	29Apr71	230
2 Bde HHC	1Apr71	230
3 Bde HHC	Dd	27
1/5 Inf Bn (Ambl)	5Apr71	920
2/7 Inf Bn (Ambl)	27Mar71	920
5/7 Inf Bn (Ambl)	29Mar71	920
1/8 Inf Bn (Ambl)	29Apr71	920
2/12 Inf Bn (Ambl)	29Apr71	920
1/9 Air Cav Sqdn (D Trp)	Dd	649
Co H (Ranger) 75 Inf	Dd	73
25 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	27Mar71#	31
37 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	16May71#	28
62 Inf Plat (Cbt Tracker)	Dd	13
Div Arty HHB	29Apr71	162
2/19 FA Bn (105 T)(Ambl)	Dd	334
1/77 FA Bn (105 T)(Ambl)	28Mar71	436
1/30 FA Bn (155 T)(Ambl)	7Apr71	598
2/20 FA Bn (ARA)(Ambl)	Dd	329
E/82 FA Avn Btry	10Apr71#	108
273 FA Det (Rdr)	15Apr71#	8
11 Avn Gp HHC	Dd	181
11 Avn Co (GS)(Ambl)	Dd	92
8 Engr Bn (Cbt)	Dd	457
191 MI Co (Div)(Ambl)	Dd	48
545 MP Co (Ambl)	Dd	139
13 Sig Bn (Ambl)	Dd	256
DISCOM HHD (Ambl)	Dd	43
15 Sup Svc Bn (Ambl)	Dd	281
27 Maint Bn (Ambl)	Dd	244
15 Med Bn (Ambl)	Dd	245
15 AG Co (Admin)	Dd	386
42 Det (Pub Info)	28Apr71#	5
184 Cml Plat (DS)	8Mar71#	41
15 Trans Bn (Acft Maint)	Dd	202
150 TC Det (Acft Maint)	19Apr71	51
171 TC Det (Acft Maint)	25 Mar 71#	54
564 TC Det (Acft Maint)	10Apr71#	40
2d Bde, 25th Inf Div		
2 Bde HHC	30Apr71	219
1/5 Inf Bn (Mech)	30Apr71	908
2/12 Inf Bn	16Apr71	920
3/22 Inf Bn	21Apr71	920
1/27 Inf Bn	30Apr71	920
Co F (Ranger) 75 Inf	15Mar71#	61
38 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	9Mar71#	28
66 Inf Plat (Cbt Tracker)	6Mar71#	10
1/8 FA Bn (105 T)	30Apr71	641
54 Engr Co	14Apr71#	165
584 MI Det	30Mar71#	32
544 MI Plat	25Apr71#	40
225 Spt Bn	30Apr71	544
532 Sig Co	25Apr71#	102
18 Mil Hist Det	29Apr71#	2
20 Det (Pub Info)	29Apr71#	5
9 Cml Det (CBR Cen)	6Mar71#	5

Note: Dd - drawndown in authorized strength
- unit inactivated in-country

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Reduced
11th Armd Cav Regt		
11 Armd Cav Regt HHT	6Mar71	314
1/11 Armd Cav Sqdn	6Mar71	1146
2/11 Armd Cav Sqdn	Dd	102
3/11 Armd Cav Sqdn	6Mar71	1146
919 Engr Co (Armd)	Dd	169
541 MI Det (ACR)	Dd	28
7 AG Det (APU Type Y)	6Mar71#	16
17 Det (Pub Info)	6Mar71#	5
37 Med Co	Dd	61
28 Mil Hist Det	6Mar71#	2
398 TC Det	Dd	11
173d Abn Bde		
3/319 FA Bn (105 T)	Dd	107
1/503 Inf Bn	27Apr71	920
4th PSYOP Gp		
6 SW Bn (PSYOP)	Dd	40
8 SW Bn (PSYOP)	Dd	30
10 SW Bn (PSYOP)	16Apr71	81
244 SW Det (PSYOP Ln)	1Mar71	4
5th Special Forces Gp		
634 MI Det	16Feb71#	8
703 MI Det (Intel-Corps)	16Feb71#	2
5 SFGA	Dd	265
B/5 SW Co SFGA	Dd	291
C/5 SW Co SFGA	Dd	9
D/5 SW Co SFGA	Dd	9
E/5 SW Sig Co SFGA	Dd	109
588 MI Det (Corps)	16Feb71#	11
613 MI Det (Corps)	16Feb71#	11
641 MI Det (Corps)	16Feb71#	11
23d Arty Gp		
2/35 FA Bn (155 SP)	13Mar71	537

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Reduced
509 Radio Research Gp		
101 ASA Co (RR)	Dd	107
371 ASA Co (Spt-Div)	Dd	89
372 ASA Co (Spt-Div)	5Mar71#	148
409 ASA Det (Spt)	5Mar71#	70
856 ASA Det (Spt)	5Mar71#	62
525 MI Gp		
45 MI Co (Imag Inter)	Dd	60
519 MI Bn (Fld Army)	Dd	10
MACV		
Hq MACV (Army)	Dd	100
USARV Assets		
507 TC Gp (Mov Con)	Dd	50
TC Comd (Mar Maint Act)	Dd	202
Hq USARV	Dd	164
AG Data Svc Center	Dd	20
Det (Reg Exch)	Dd	81
7 Det (Pub Info)	1May71#	13
Fin Ctr USA VN	Dd	17
15 Mil Hist Det	5Mar71#	2
Med Rsch Team	1May71#	19
Prop Disp Agcy	Dd	160
USARV Debit/Credit Acct	Dd	390
XXIV Corps Assets		
1/44 AD Bn (AW SP)	Dd	142
I FFORCEV Assets		
2/17 FA Bn (105 T)	26Apr71	528
7/15 FA Bn (8" How SP)	Dd	5
5/16 FA Bn (8/155 SP)	26Apr71	612
1/92 FA Bn (155 T)	Dd	4
52 FA Gp HHB	Dd	2

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Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Reduced
5/27 FA Bn (105 T)	Dd	8
6/32 FA Bn (8/175 SP)	Dd	10
4/60 AD Bn (AW/SP)	Dd	24
Hq I FFORCEV	Dd	37
HHB I FFORCEV Arty	Dd	28
297 TC Co (Car)	Dd	2
54 Sig Bn (Corps)	17Feb71	250
55 MI Det (Corps)	Dd	42
64 Engr Det (Terrain)	1 Feb71	11
6/26 FA HHB (Tgt Acq Bn)	28Apr71	176
13 Mil Hist Det	30Apr71#	2
II FFORCEV Assets		
5/2 AD Bn (AW/SP)	Dd	623
HHB II FFORCEV Arty	Dd	186
517 Engr Det (Terrain)	12Apr71#	11
44 AG Det (APU Type S)	27Apr71#	9
HHC II FFORCEV	Dd	147
16 Det (Pub Info)	12Apr71#	13
29 Cml Det (CDR)	12Apr71#	5
7 Mil Hist Det	12Apr71#	2
219 MI Det (Corps)	Dd	27
9 TC Co	Dd	61
53 Sig Bn (Corps)	Dd	472
6/25 FA Bn (Tgt Acq)	2Feb71	30
265 FA Det (Rdr)	20Mar71#	8
Aviation Assets		
11# Avn Co (Asit Hel)	Dd	121
54 Avn Co (Util Airplane)	16Feb71#	168
68 Avn Co (Asit Hel)	1Apr71#	288
184 Avn Co (Util Airplane)	Dd	104
205 Avn Co (Asit Spt Hel)	16Mar71#	288
269 Avn Bn HHC	4Apr71	108
520 Med Det	16 Jan 71 #	8
18 Avn Co (Util Airplane)	16Apr71#	168
155 Avn Co (Asit Hel)	1 Feb71#	288
178 Avn Co (Asit Hel)	1 May71#	288
185 Avn Co (Asit Hel)	1 Mar71#	288
# Med Det	1 Feb 71#	8
336 Avn Co (Asit Hel)	1 Feb71#	288
758 Med Det	1 Apr71#	8
326 Avn Det (Afld Op)	2Apr71#	17
341 Avn Det (Afld Op)	1Jan71#	21
342 Avn Det (Afld Op)	1Jan71#	21
348 Avn Det (Afld Op)	6Mar71#	21
Avn Comd (Afld Op)	Dd	70
Engineer Assets		
46 Engr Bn (Const)	Dd	850
62 Engr Bn (Const)	Dd	205
93 Engr Bn (Const)	Dd	242
94 Engr Det (Quarry)	Dd	115
100 Engr Co (Float Bridge)	Dd	96
227 Engr Det (Topo)	Dd	8
547 Engr Det (Map-Dep)	26Feb71	29
572 Engr Co (Lt Equip)	22Mar71#	186
589 Engr Bn (Const)	Dd	899
937 Engr Gp (Cbt) HHC	Dd	120
USA Engr Comd VN Districts	Dd	76
Medical Assets		
2 Med Det (Disp Gen)	1Mar71#	18
3 Med Det (Pvnt Med)	1Mar71#	11
25 Med Det (Disp)	15Apr71#	16
32 Med Det (Depot)	Dd	40
39 Med Det (Dental)	1Jan71#	37
45 Med Co (Air Amb)	30Apr71#	249
70 Med Bn HHD	2Feb71	36
93 Med Hosp (Evac)	30Apr71#	249
105 Med Det (Pvnt Med)	1Mar71#	11
176 Med Det (Vet)	15Apr71#	54
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194 Med Det (Disp)	15Mar71#	31
438 Med Det (Amb)	15Mar71#	10
440 Med Det (Amb)	1Jan71#	10
459 Med Det (Vet)	1Mar71#	8
498 Med Det (Amb)	1Jan71#	10
499 Med Det (Dental)	1Jan71#	19
522 Med Det (Hq Vet)	1Mar71#	4
568 Med Co (Clr)	2Mar71#	107
926 Med Det (Pvnt Med)	1Mar71#	11
936 Med Det (Vet)	1Mar71#	14
61 Med Det (Pvnt Med)	15Apr71#	11
222 AG Co (Pers Svc)	Dd	16
439 Med Det (Amb)	15Apr71	10

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Reduced
Signal Assets		
DCA	Dd	19
Sig Det MR 4 Soc Trang	16Jan71#	22
Sig Det MR 2 An Khe	Dd	45
Sig Det MR 3 Da Nang	Dd	13
Sig Det (Div Cbl) Phu Bai	21Apr71#	68
Sig Co (MACV Comm Cen)	Dd	63
Sig Det Ang (MACV DCA)	16Jan71#	19
Sig Co (Rdo/Wire) Phu Lam	Dd	60
Sig Co (Strat) Nha Trang	Dd	214
Sig Det MR 1 Phu Bai	Dd	114
Sig Det MR 2 Cam Ranh Bay	Dd	85
Sig Det MR 4 Can Tho	Dd	37
Sig Cen (Log Spt Det)	Dd	28
Sig Co (Area) Long Binh	Dd	10
Sig Co (Rdo) Long Binh	Dd	14
Sig Spt Plat Long Binh	Dd	40
1 Sig Sch FAC Long Binh	Dd	5
14 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	11
52 Sig Bn (Spt) MHC	Dd	93
62 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	21
86 Sig Bn (Spt) HHD	1Jan71#	77
221 Sig Co (Plat)	Dd	13
261 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	41
275 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	29
307 Sig Bn HHD	16Jan71#	33
331 Sig Co (Army Area)	Dd	7
A/361 Sig Bn (ICS)	Dd	18
B/361 Sig Bn (ICS)	Dd	36
C/361 Sig Bn (ICS)	Dd	16
A/369 Sig Bn (Comm)	25Apr71#	242
B/369 Sig Bn (ICS)	25Apr71#	161
C/369 Sig Bn (ICS)	Dd	140
576 Sig Co (Cable Const)	16Jan71#	270
579 Sig Co (Army Area)	1Jan71#	125
588 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	12
595 Sig Co (Spt)	30Apr71#	260
596 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	15
Sig Det MR 3 Ca Chi	Dd	33
Sig Det MR 2 Qui Nhon	Dd	49
Sig Det MR 4 Vinh Long	Dd	25
Sig Fac Cam Ranh Bay	25Apr71#	91
Sig Fac Long Binh	Dd	91
Sig Co (Tel Ops) Saigon	25Apr71#	16
Sig Det (Sup) Vung Tau	Dd	20
Sig Co (Tel Op) Long Binh	Dd	60
USASUPCOM - Da Nang		
63 TC Co (Lt Trk)	30Apr71#	179
USASUPCOM - Qui Nhon		
514 QM Co (Petrl)	Dd	8
Hq SUPCOM Qui Nhon	Dd	60
86 Sup & Svc Bn (DS) HHC	Dd	34
149 Lt Maint Co (DS)	16Apr71#	183
552 Lt Maint Co (DS)	Dd	128
USA Log Dep Qui Nhon	Dd	886
134 QM Co (Petrl Sup)	2Feb71	50
240 QM Bn (Petrl) HHD	Dd	11
8 TC Mtr Trans Gp HHD	29Apr71	59
64 TC Co (Mdm Trk)	Dd	86
520 TC Det (Trans)	30Apr71#	10
541 TC Co (Lt Trk)	26Jan71#	170
669 TC Co (Lt Trk)	1Feb71	174
62 Hq Maint Spt Bn	Dd	10
854 TC Co (Tml Svc)	30Apr71	55
USASUPCOM - Cam Ranh Bay		
630 Ord Co (Ammo)	Dd	93
68 Engr Det (CO-2 Gen)	3Mar71#	13
109 QM Co (Air Delivery)	Dd	56
255 QM Det (Petrl Bulk)	5Mar71#	8
486 TC Det (Reefer Barge)	Dd	16
194 QM Det (Air Drop Svc)	5Mar71#	38
USASUPCOM - Saigon		
Hq SUPCOM - Saigon	Dd	20
USA Log Dept - Long Binh	Dd	345
530 AG Co (Pers Svc)	30Apr71#	52
Det (Mortuary) - Saigon	Dd	21
135 Lt Maint Co	16Mar71#	183
124 TC Co (Tml Svc)	1Mar71#	107
22 Fin Sec	Dd	39

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Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Reduced
3 Ord Bn (Ammo) HHC	Dd	23
74 Engr Det (CO-2 Gen)	20Mar71#	13
81 QM Plat (Ldry-Bath)	30Apr71#	73
383 QM Det (Sup-Maint)	2Feb71#	63
297 Sig Det (Radio Mbl)	16Apr71#	4
349 Sig Det (Mortr Rdr Maint)	16Apr71#	5
351 Sig Det (Storage Issue)	16Apr71#	20
3 TC Mov Con Ctr HHD	Dd	63
4 TC Trans Comd Aug HHC	Dd	38
223 Sup & Svc Co	Dd	139
259 QM Det (Ldry-Bath)	22Mar71#	21
154 TC Co (Tml Svc)	22Apr71#	107
59 Sig Co (Dep)	1Feb71#	180
262 TC Det (Crane)	25Apr71#	2
94 Maint Spt Co	Dd	38
275 TC Det (Patrol Boat)	25Apr71#	3
372 TC Co (Tml Trf)	Dd	56
402 TC Co (Tml Trf)	Dd	97
474 TC Det (Barge)	20Feb71#	4
567 TC Co (Tml Svc)	Dd	4
485 TC Det (Barge)	16Feb71#	4
506 TC Det (Tlr/Trf)	16Feb71#	16
339 TC Det (Tug)	23Feb71#	3
610 Hq Maint Spt Bn	Dd	56
559 TC Det (Barge)	25Feb71#	4
560 TC Det (Barge)	1Mar71#	4
561 TC Det (Barge)	1Mar71#	4
588 TC Det (Mat Hdlg)	15Mar71#	8
588 Co (Maint Spt)	Dd	139
368 TC Co (Tml Svc)	Dd	22
379 TC Co (Med Trk)	Dd	44
534 TC Co (Med Trk)	Dd	45
4 TC Trans Comd HHC	Dd	69
233 QM Det (Petrl)	22Mar71#	8
US NAVY		
32 Naval Const Regt	30Apr71	102
Nav Air Fac, Cam Ranh Bay	Dd	24
Harbor Clr Tm	Dd	86
Nav Sup Fac, Cam Ranh Bay	Dd	21
Nav FAC, Da Nang	Dd	27
VX 8 Det	1Dec70	85
OICC SVN Dep SEA	Dd	4
USAID SEABEE Tms	Dd	78
Mine Sqdn Det	30 Apr71	34
Const Bn Maint Unit 302	Dd	405
OICC Saigon	Dd	5
Naval Spt Fac, Da Nang	Dd	794
Naval Mbl Const Bn 74	30Apr71	729
Naval Mbl Const Bn 3	Dd	388
Naval Mbl Const Bn 133	22Mar71	180
NSA Saigon	Dd	1290
NAVFORV Staff	Dd	68
Nav Comm Sta, Cam Ranh B	Dd	28
VP Sqdn Det	Dd	25
USN w/1st Mar Div	Dd	435
USN w/1st MAW	Dd	59
USN w/Force Log Comd	Dd	64
USN w/III MAF	Dd	6
Reduce TAD Acct	Dd	75
Reduce Debit/Credit Acct	Dd	588
US AIR FORCE		
Reduce 7AF Debit/Credit Acct	Dd	373
US MARINE CORPS		
III MAF Hq	Dd	45
Hq Bn (-), 1st Mar Div	Dd	927
Hq Co, 5th Mar	24Mar71	220
1st Bn, 5th Mar	15Apr71	1157
2d Bn, 5th Mar	24Mar71	1157
3d Bn, 5th Mar	12Mar71	1157
Hq Btry, 11th Mar (-)	Dd	173
2d Bn, 11th Mar	21Mar71	659
Det 4th Bn 11th Mar	28Mar71	241
1st Recon Bn (-)	Dd	202
Det 1st Force Recon Co	24Mar71	30
MAW Hq Gp-1	14Apr71	371
Hq & Hq Sqdn 1 (-)	14Apr71	142
Hq & Hq Sqdn 18 (-)	Dd	197
Mar Wing FAC Sqdn 1	14Apr71	141
Mar Wing Comm Sqdn 1	14Apr71	259
Ftr Atk Sqdn 115	1Mar71	324

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Reduced
HMM Sqdn 364	11Mar71	249
Mar Air Con Sqdn 4	1Feb71	269
VMO (Obs) Sqdn 2	Dd	240
2d Spec Scty Comm Tm	23Apr71	10
3d Spec Scty Comm Tm	14Apr71	8
5th Interpreter Tm	28Mar71	6
7th Interpreter Tm	23Apr71	6
11th Inter Transl Tm	23Apr71	11
13th Inter Transl Tm	21Apr71	11
Det 5th Comm Bn	Dd	116
1st Rad Bn (-)	Dd	238
1st Engr Bn (-)	Dd	529
1st Med Bn (-)	Dd	90
1st Motor Trans Bn (-)	Dd	137
11th Motor Trans Bn	23Apr71	400
Det Hq & Maint Sqdn 11	Dd	4
Det Hq & Maint Sqdn 13	9Apr71	92
Det Hq & Maint Sqdn 16	Dd	143
Det Hq & Maint Sqdn 17	9Apr71	293
11th Dental Co (-)	Dd	2
Det 1st Dental Co	12Apr71	2
Force Log Comd	Dd	809
NAVFORV	Dd	12
Hq Staff MACV	Dd	30
AFRTS	Dd	24
Fld Adv Element	Dd	36
1st ANGLICO	Dd	17
Combat Photo	Dd	5
Reduce Debit/Credit Acct	Dd	27

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REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT VII

(KEYSTONE ORIOLE ALPHA)

US ARMY

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawdown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
1st Cav Div (Ambl)			
1/9 Armd Cav Sqdn	28Jun71	517	517
227 Avn Bn HHC (Aslt Hel)	Dd	653	97
228 Avn Bn HHC (Aslt Hel)	Dd	415	89
98 TC Det (Acft Maint)	28Jun71	63	63
151 TC Det (Acft Maint)	28Jun71	63	63
23d Inf Div (Americal)			
4/21 Inf Bn	28Jun71	920	920
5/46 Inf Bn	21May71	920	920
101st Abn Div (Ambl)			
3/506 Inf Bn	15May71	920	920
4th PSYOP Gp			
4 SW Gp (PSYOP)	Dd	294	14
8 SW Bn (PSYOP)	26Jun71	110	110
108th Arty Gp			
108 FA Gp HHB	Dd	143	9
509th Radio Research Gp			
101 ASA Co (RR)	Dd	147	26
303 ASA HHC Bn (Corps)	15Jun71	215	215
313 ASA HHC Bn (Corps)	15Jun71	202	202
144 Avn Co (RR)	Dd	229	47
525 MI Gp			
45 MI Co (Imag Intrp)	Dd	491	25
519 MI Bn (Fld Army)	Dd	304	63
525 MI Gp HHC	Dd	187	12
575 MI Det	Dd	99	23
Hq MACV			
Hq MACV	Dd	984	39
Hq MACV (SAE)	Dd	1682	197
II Corps JTD (FAE)	Dd	673	106
DMAC IV Corps	Dd	1008	173
JUSPAO Elem MACV	Dd	70	28
CORDS Elem JTD	Dd	6642	1075
USASSG MI Det MACV	Dd	40	12
USASSG MI Det SOG	Dd	6	1
USARV			
AG Data Svc Cen	Dd	279	18
Hq USARV	Dd	954	104
Det USARV Rgn Ex	Dd	431	81
ACTIV	Dd	38	4
Patient Acct	Dd	2600	800
TDY Acct	Dd	300	100
USA Prop Disp Agcy	Dd	494	344
85 Ord Det (EOD)	11Jun71#	10	10
XXIV Corps			
1/44 AD Bn (AW/SP)	Dd	550	21
HHB 24 FA (Corps Arty)	Dd	158	19

Note: Dd - drawdown in authorized strength
- unit inactivated in-country

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Reduced
F/26 FA Btry (Tgt Acq)	Dd	248	60
G/8/29 FA Btry (Slt)	Dd	150	12
1/83 FA Bn (8"/175 SP)	11Jun71	565	565
1 FFORCEV			
C/4/60 AD Bn (AW/SP)	Dd	668	141
52 FA Gp HHB	26Jun71	109	109
USASSG MI Det	Dd	10	2
II FFORCEV			
5/2 AD Bn (AW/SP)	22Jun71	69	69
D/71 Btry (50 Cal mg)	25Jun71#	122	122
264 FA Det (Rdr)	29Jun71#	8	8
268 FA Det (Rdr)	28Jun71#	8	8
269 FA Det (Rdr)	27Jun71#	8	8
USASSG MI Det	Dd	3	2
53 Sig Bn Corps	22Jun71	150	150
Aviation Assets			
539 TC Co (Acft Maint)	30Jun71#	236	236
307 Avn Bn HHD (Aslt Hel)	14Jun71	108	108
262 FA Det (CM)	30Jun71#	9	9
317 Avn Det (Afld Ops)	11Jun71#	17	17
324 Avn Det (Aflt Op)	31May71#	17	17
361 Avn Det (Afld Op)	26Jun71#)	21	21
US Army Med Comd			
222 AG Co (Pers Svc)	Dd	156	29
Med Comd USA HHC	Dd	131	16
6 Med Cen (Conv)	Dd	254	60
27 Med Hosp (MASH)	16Jun71#	166	166
32 Med Dep (Fwd Plat)	Dd	419	42
40 Med Det (Den Svc)	30Jun71#	37	37
67 Med Hosp (Evac Smbl)	Dd	310	38
498 Med Co (Air Amb)	Dd	249	82
Signal Assets			
Sig Det Spt - Long Binh	6May71#	56	56
Sig Det Spt - Vung Tau	Dd	8	7

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Reduced
Sig Det Spt - Pleiku	6May71#	75	75
Sig Det Spt - An Khe	6May71#	41	41
Sig Det Spt - Da Nang	Dd	30	29
Sig Det Spt - Cam Ranh Bay	6May71#	72	72
Sig Det Spt - Can Tho	Dd	57	2
Sig Det Spt - Vinh Long	Dd	7	6
Sig Det Spt - Cu Chi	6May71#	6	6
Sig Det Spt - Chu Lai	11Jun71#	88	88
Sig Det Spt- Phu Bai	Dd	39	8
Sig Det Spt - Qui Nhon	Dd	80	3
B/40 Sig Bn	Dd	662	5
C/40 Sig Bn	Dd	657	5
C/52 Sig Bn	Dd	635	65
D/52 Sig Bn	11May71#	570	110
69 Sig Co (Rdo/Cable)	Dd	246	38
175 Sig Co (Spt)(-)	Dd	119	90
261 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	182	35
275 Sig Co (Spt)	24Jun71#	167	167
361 Sig Bn HHC (Rdo/Cable)	30May71	3	3
A/361 Sig Bn Aug (ICS)	Dd	250	237
B/361 Sig Bn Aug (ICS)	Dd	256	252
C/361 Sig Bn Aug (ICS)	1May71#	258	258
369 Sig Bn (Rdo/Cable)	1May71#	21	21
504 Sig Co (Army Area)	Dd	126	88
550 Sig Co (Army Area)	Dd	126	11
556 Sig Co (Spt)(-)	Dd	161	16
588 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	199	42
33 Sig Det (Mwave)	1May71#	8	8
36 Sig Det (Mwave)	1May71#	8	8
43 Sig Bn HHD	30May71	77	50
62 Sig Co	Dd	166	114
211 Sig Det (Mwave)	1May71#	8	8
220 Sig Det (Mwave)	1May71#	8	8
221 Sig Det (Mwave)	1May71#	8	8
USASUPCOM - Cam Ranh Bay			
518 AG Co (Pers Svc)	Dd	117	14
504 Ord Det (Ammo Renv)	Dd	65	26
606 Ord Co (DS/GS)(Ammo)	Dd	191	75
630 Ord Co (DS/GS)(Ammo)	Dd	127	77
237 QM Det (Petrl)	16Jun71#	5	5
293 Sig Det (Mbl Rdo)	29May71#	4	4
271 TC Det (Tug)	16May71#	7	7

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Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
486 TC Det (Barge Reefer)	16Jun71#	8	8
567 TC Det (Tug)	16May71#	7	7
67 Engr Det (Gas Genr)	30Jun71#	26	26
70 TC Det (Cgo Docu)	Dd	9	1
97 TC Co (Hvy Boat)	Dd	171	3
124 TC HHC (Term Comd)	Dd	115	7
158 TC Det (Cgo Docu)	Dd	9	1
266 TC Det (Ptl Boat)	Dd	3	1
378 TC Det (Cgo Docu)	Dd	9	1
611 Ord Co (Ammo Spt)	Dd	191	2
USASUPCOM - Da Nang			
104 Data Proc Det	16Jun71#	57	57
USA Dep - Da Nang	Dd	802	136
523 QM Plat (Ldry)	Dd	58	31
525 QM Co (Petrl Depot)	Dd	190	10
263 TC Det (Crane Op)	26May71#	2	2
403 TC Co (Tml Trans)	Dd	266	88
USASUPCOM - Qui Nhon			
527 AG Co (Pers Svc)	Dd	117	43
Log Dep - Qui Nhon	Dd	434	93
Hq Spt Comd	Dd	202	81
304 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	128	19
528 Lt Maint Co (DS)	Dd	183	13
552 Co (Lt Maint)(DS)	Dd	55	8
573 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	128	25
794 Maint Co (DS)	Dd	180	66
548 Maint Bn	30Jun71#	183	183
13 Fin Sec (Disb)	Dd	200	16
79 QM Plat (POL op)	Dd	20	10
240 QM Bn HHC (Petrl)	26Jun71	32	32
861 Sig Det (Rdo Rpr)	6Jun71#	8	8
USA TC Tml Unit	Dd	316	40
64 TC Co (Mdm Trk Cgo)	16Jun71	92	92
124 TC Bn HHD (Trk)	16May71	33	33
USASUPCOM - Saigon			
537 AG Co (Pers Svc)	Dd	170	1
HQ SUPCOM	Dd	261	43
5 Lt Equip Co (GS)	30Jun71#	206	206
29 Gp HHC (GS)	Dd	95	21
79 Bn HHD (GS Maint)	Dd	52	12
94 Maint Spt Co	Dd	142	15
185 Bn Hq (Maint Spt)	Dd	277	12
229 Co (DS) Sup & Svc Bn	Dd	168	27
266 Sup & Svc Bn HHC	Dd	109	24
483 Co (Fld Svc)	Dd	223	92
506 Co (DS) Sup & Svc Bn	Dd	168	41
588 Maint Spt Co	15May71#	41	41
610 Heavy Maint Spt Co	30Jun71#	221	221
22 Fin Sec (Disb)	30Jun71#	73	73
USA Dep - Long Binh	Dd	1650	371
3 Ord Bn HHC (Ammo)	Dd	79	18
550 Ord Det (Ammo Sup)	30Jun71#	29	29
14 QM Plat (Tml Sup Co)	Dd	63	29
3 TC HHD (Mvt Con Ctr)	Dd	50	11
4 TC HHC Tml Cmd	Dd	180	39
4TC HHC Tml Cmd (Aug)	Dd	50	11
6 TC Bn HHD (Mtr Trans)	Dd	42	9
7 TC Bn HHD (Mtr Trans)	Dd	42	9
47 TC Co (Mdm Trk)	Dd	170	6
48 TC Gp HHD (Mtr Trans)	Dd	50	11
71 TC Bn HHD (Tml)	Dd	48	11
159 TC Bn HHD (Tml)	29Jun71	58	58
241 TC Co (Dept)	2May71#	159	159
274 TC Det (Fltg Crane)	30Jun71#	9	9
368 TC Co (Tml Svc)	Dd	207	111
372 TC Co (Tml Trans)	Dd	110	6
396 TC Co (Barge)	21May71#	2	2
402 TC Co (Tml Trans)	30Jun71	100	100
440 TC Co (Tml Trans)	Dd	110	6
538 TC Co (Mdm Trk Petrl)	Dd	171	5
538 TC Det (Tug)	30Jun71#	3	3
567 TC Co (Tml Svc)	Dd	103	33
626 TC Det (Tug)	30Jun71#	5	5
US NAVY			
USN w/III MAF	Dd		65
USN w/1st Mar Div	Dd		325
USN w/1st MAW	Dd		113
USN w/FLC	Dd		70
Increase Debit/Credit Acct 57	Dd		57

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
US AIR FORCE			
Reduce Debit/Credit Acct 985	Dd		985
US MARINE CORPS			
3d Mar Amph Bde Hq	27Jun71#	369	369
Det Hq Bn 1st Mar Div	13May71	60	60
Hq Co 1st Mar Regt	13May71	220	220
1st Bn 1st Mar	3May71	1157	1157
2d Bn 1st Mar	19May71	1157	1157
3d Bn 1st Mar	13May71	1157	1157
Comb Action Gp Hq	17May71#	76	76
Comb Action Co Hq	17May71#	48	48
Comb Action Plats	17May71#	476	476
Det VMO-6	13May71	53	53
HML 367	2Jun71	228	228
HMM 263	13May71	248	248
VMA (AW) 225	1May71	304	304
VMA 311	12May71	216	216
Det VMGR (KC-130)	30Jun71	64	64
Det Hq Btry 11th Mar	13May71	57	57
1st Bn 11th Mar	13May71	659	659
3d How Btry 8"	24May71	222	222
Det 1st Recon Bn	13May71	131	131
Comm spt Co 7th Comm Bn	22Jun71	201	201
Det 5th Comm Bn	22Jun71	34	34
Det 1st Rdo Bn	13May71	85	85
Co A (Rein) 7th Engr Bn	10Jun71	284	284
Det 1st Engr Bn	22Jun71	234	234
5th CIT	22Jun71	16	16
1st MP Bn	7Jun71	585	585
1st Inter Tm	13May71	6	6
3d Inter Transl Tm	22May71	11	11
3d CI Tm	22May71	16	16
Det 1st Med Bn	22Jun71	30	30
Co C 1st Support Bn	22Jun71	76	76
Det 1st Maint Bn	22Jun71	82	82
Det 11th Dental Co	7Jun71	2	2
Hq & Maint Sqdn 11	1Jun71	401	401
MABS 11	9Jun71	390	390
Hq & Maint Sqdn 16	13May71	458	458
MABS 16	4Jun71	571	571
Mar Air Tac Cont Unit 68	15Jun71	68	68
Det MASS 3	2Jun71	207	207
Force Log Comd	27Jun71#	2217	2217
TDY (Admin Drop)		1	1
STRAAD Fld Team (Admin Drop)	8Jun71#	1	1
MAW MAESU Ln (Admin Drop)	8Jun71#	2	2
HMM 262	13May71	247	247
HMH 463	27May71	236	236
HML 167	10Jun71	229	229

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REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT VIII

(KEYSTONE ORIOLE BRAVO)

US ARMY

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech)			
1/5 Mech Inf Bn HHC	21Aug71	349	349
1/77 Armd Bn	23Jul71	615	615
1/11 Inf Bn	5Aug71	920	920
1/61 Inf Bn	1Aug71	908	908
43 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	8Jul71#	31	31
5/4 FA Bn (155mm SP)	1Aug71	658	658
77 Inf Det (Cbt Track)	6Jul71#	10	10
A/7 Engr Co	6Aug71#	256	256
298 Sig Co (Lt Inf Bde)	30Jul71#	102	102
48 Det (Pub Info)	11Aug71#	5	5
86 Cml Det (CBR Cen)	16Jul71#	5	5
75 Spt Bn HHD	21Aug71	823	823
517 MI Det	9Aug71#	38	38
173d Abn Bde			
173 Inf HHC	25Aug71	327	327
2/503 Inf Bn	21Jul71	920	920
3/503 Inf Bn	5Aug71	920	920
4/503 Inf Bn	20Aug71	920	920
534 Sig Co	21Jul71#	102	102
172 MI Det	16Jul71	38	38
24 Mil Hist Det	26Aug71#	2	2
E/17 Armd Cav Trp	20Aug71	210	210
39 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	21Jul71#	31	31
75Inf Det (Cbt Tracker)	11Jul71#	10	10
N/75 Inf Co (Ranger)	25Aug71#	61	61
173 Engr Co (Cbt Abn)	16Jul71	194	194
46 Det (Pub Info)	20Aug71#	5	5
51 Cml Det (CBR Cen)	21Jul71#	10	10
173 Spt Bn Abn	25 Aug71	704	704
101st Abn Div (Ambl)			
557 Inf Plat (Tracker)	10Jul71#	23	23
47 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	10Jul71#	31	31
58 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	10Jul71#	31	31
23d Inf Div			
1/55 AD Btry (50 cal)	31Jul71#	142	142
1st Cav Div (Ambl)			
F/77 FA Btry (Aer Rkt)	12Aug71#	126	126
XXIV Corps			
1/44 AD Bn (AW/SP)	Dd	529	344
F/26 FA Btry (Tgt Acq)	31Jul71#	188	188
G/65 AD Btry (50 cal)	Dd	142	122
SRAC			
4/60 AD Bn (AW/SP)	Dd	527	230
5/27 FA Bn (105mm T)	3Aug71	520	520

Note: Dd - drawdown in authorized strength
- unit inactivated in-country

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
7/29 FA Btry (Slt)	31Aug71	125	125
77 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
Hq SRAG Arty	Dd	147	119
C/1/92 FA Bn (155mm T)	31Aug71#	125	125
237 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
241 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
242 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
243 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
244 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
253 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
254 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
255 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
256 FA Det (Rdr)	31Jul71#	9	9
C/75 Inf Co (Ranger)	Dd	230	158
1 Cml Det (CBR Cen)	11Jul71#	5	5
Hq USARV			
2 Civil Affairs Co	27Jul71#	171	171
Patient Acct	Dd	1800	190
23d Arty Gp			
7/8 FA Bn (175/8" SP)	28Jul71	565	565
2/12 FA Bn (155mm T)	29Aug71	598	598
278 FA Det (Rdr)	31Aug71#	8	8
3/319 FA Bn (105mm)	23Aug71	484	484
Aviation Assets			
179 Avn Co (Aslt Hel Spt)	23Aug71	268	268
235 Avn Co (Atk Hel)	17Aug71	254	254
243 Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	8Aug71	268	268
166 TC Det (Acft Maint)	30Aug71#	38	38
243 Avn Det (Afld Op)	16Jul71#	21	21
Engineer Assets			
14 Engr Bn (Cbt)	29Aug71	812	812
15 Engr Co (Lt Equip)	29Aug71#	186	186
20 Engr Bn (Cbt)	30Aug71	812	812
103 Engr Co (Cosnt Spt)	Dd	143	110
509 Engr Co (Panel Brg)	29Aug71#	126	126

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
584 Engr Co (Lt Equip)	Dd	186	154
630 Engr Co (Lt Equip)	28Aug71#	186	186
864 Engr Bn (Const)	30Aug71	899	899
553 Engr Co (Fltng Brg)	Dd	157	131
614 Engr Det (Power Line)	15Aug71#	13	13
Signal Assets			
Sig Agcy Comm Op Cen	Dd	78	22
Sig Agcy (Tel Mgmt Agcy)	16Jul71#	48	48
Sig HHC Reg Comm Gp	Dd	251	18
1 Sig Sch	Dd	74	18
Sig Det (Spt) - Qui Nhon	21Aug71#	77	77
Sig Det (Spt) - Binh Hoa	8Jul71#	37	37
16 Sig Det (Pictorial)	18Jul71#	5	5
36 Sig HHD (Bn Cbt Area)	27Aug71	77	77
51 Sig Det (Mwave)	8Jul71#	8	8
63 Sig Det (DCO)	8Jul71#	25	25
201 Sig Det (DCO)	8Jul71#	25	25
206 Sig Det (DCO)	26Aug71#	25	25
221 Sig Co (Pictorial)	Dd	217	26
224 Sig Det (DCO)	26Aug71#	25	25
261 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	147	61
337 Sig Co (Mwave)	Dd	204	23
262 Sig Co (Mwave)	Dd	366	155
459 Sig HHC (Bn Cbt Area)	Dd	88	76
459 Sig Co (Bn Co A)	21Jul71#	170	170
459 Sig Co (Bn Co C)	11Jul71#	108	108
506 Sig Det (DCO)	31Aug71#	25	25
518 Sig Co (Rdo Relay)	Dd	254	48
542 Sig Co (Spt)	11Jul71#	176	176
556 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	145	64
588 Sig Co (Spt)	31Aug71#	157	157
589 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	168	24
Medical Assets			
8 Med Hosp (Fld)	30Aug71	73	73
18 Med Hosp (Mbl)	31Aug71#	132	132
498 Med Co (Amb)	30Aug71	167	167
930 Med Det (Gen Disp)	31Jul71#	21	21

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Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
USASUPCOM - Da Nang			
40 AG APU	31Aug71#	16	16
85 Maint Co (Lt DS)	6Aug71#	183	183
233 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	16Jul71#	26	26
625 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	214	148
196 Engr Det (Fld Maint)	31Aug71#	10	10
92 Fin Det	Dd	217	25
54 Ord Co (Ammo)	Dd	219	92
206 QM Det (Ldry/Bath)	31Jul71#	12	12
57 TC Co (Lt Trk)	26Aug71#	179	179
Log Dep - Da Nang	Dd	636	37
USASUPCOM - Qui Nhon			
Hq SUPCOM - Qui Nhon	Dd	187	46
Log Dep - Qui Nhon	Dd	341	7
USASUPCOM -Cam Ranh Bay			
Log Dep - Cam Ranh Bay	Dd	1298	212
62 Heavy Maint Co (DS)	Dd	267	34
19 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	128	20
97 TC Co (Hvy Boat)	Dd	168	40
98 Maint Co (Lt Equip)	Dd	206	9
136 Maint Co (Lt DS)	Dd	183	15
160 Maint Co (Hv Equip)	Dd	292	28
630 Ord Co (Ammo)	Dd	50	10
514 QM Co (Ptrl Sup)	Dd	108	15
10 TC Co (Mdm Trk)	Dd	178	50
545 TC Co (Lt Trk)	Dd	179	133
USASUPCOM - Saigon			
229 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	141	76
483 Fld Svc Co	Dd	90	30
506 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	168	30
794 Maint Co (DS)	Dd	114	63
510 Engr Co (Maint DS)	Dd	195	14
Log Dep - Long Binh	Dd	1302	150
71 Ord Co (Ammo DS GS)	Dd	223	107
440 TC Co (Trnl Trans)	Dd	104	5
534 TC Co (Mdm Trk)	Dd	133	10
532 TC Co (Mdm Trk)	Dd	166	28

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
US NAVY			
USS Satyr (ARL*-23)	23Aug71	212	212
USS Sphinx (ARL*-24)	13May71	212	212
USS Askari (ARL*-30)	10Aug71	212	212
*ARL - Landing Craft Repair Ship			
US AIR FORCE			
14 SOP Wg	Dd	125	50
18 SOP Sqdn (AC-119)	25Aug71	91	91
832 CEH Sqdn	15Jun71	399	399
35 TF Wg	16Jul71#	181	181
615 TF Sqdn (F-100)	16Jul71#	117	117
352 TF Sqdn (F-100)	16Jul71#	117	117
612 TF Sqdn (F-100)	16Jul71#	117	117
614 TF Sqdn (F-100)	16Jul71#	117	117
35 Avn Sqdn	16Jul71#	124	124
35 FDM Sqdn	Dd	429	330
14 FDM Sqdn	Dd	454	172
435 MUM Sqdn	Dd	389	294
35 COS Gp	Dd	210	25
35 CEG Gp	Dd	248	43
35 SEP Sqdn	Dd	595	79
35 SER Sqdn	Dd	98	30
35 Sup Sqdn	Dd	354	79
35 TRS Sqdn	Dd	135	36
35 DIS DS	Dd	84	10
537 TAL Sqdn (C-7)	31Aug71#	131	131
12 Avn Sqdn	Dd	176	18
12 FDM Sqdn	Dd	337	97
12 COS Gp	Dd	196	7
12 CEG Sqdn	Dd	227	6
12 SEP Sqdn	Dd	511	1
12 SER Sqdn	Dd	72	6
12 SUP Sqdn	Dd	311	10
12 TRS Sqdn	Dd	126	5
19 TAL Sqdn (C-123)	15Jun71	221	221

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
0460 TR Wg	31Aug71#	250	250
12 TR Sqdn (RF-4)	18Aug71	275	275
460 Avn Sqdn	Dd	303	202
460 FDM Sqdn	Dd	568	259
377 COS Gp	Dd	361	34
377 CEG Gp	Dd	398	29
377 SEP Sqdn	Dd	606	7
377 SER Sqdn	Dd	78	27
377 SUP Sqdn	Dd	425	54
377 TRS Sqdn	Dd	191	25
377 DIS DS	Dd	128	5
Debit/Credit Acct			1620

US MARINE CORPS

NAVFORV	Dd	5	2
I Corps JTD	31Aug71	3	3
NAVADVGP JTD	Dd	80	4
SOG JTD	Dd	17	5
DCA JTD	Dd	11	6
Sub Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO	Dd	180	5
DCPG LND JTD	31Aug71	3	3
NOG DET TCV-10	23Aug71	21	21
Debit/Credit Acct			60

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REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT IX

(KEYSTONE ORIOLE CHARLIE)

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
US ARMY			
23d Inf Div (Americal)			
23d Inf Div HHC	29Nov71	247	176
11th Inf Bde HHC	13Nov71	128	128
3/1 Inf Bn	29Oct71	920	920
4/3 Inf Bn	5Nov71	920	920
1/20 Inf Bn	25Oct71	920	920
E/1 Armd Cav Tp	18Oct71#	210	210
198 Inf Bde HHC	13Nov71	128	128
1/6 Inf Bn 198 Bde	21Nov71	920	920
1/52 Inf Bn 198 Bde	1Nov71	920	920
4/31 Inf Bn 196 Bde	25 Oct71	920	920
H/17 Armd Cav Tp	29Sep71#	210	210
26 Engr Bn (Cbt)	27Nov71	972	736
723 Maint Bn	28Nov71	854	530
HHB 23 Div Arty	21Nov71	199	199
6/11 FA Bn (105 T)	27Oct71	411	411
1/14 FA Bn (105 T)	17Oct71	641	641
3/16 FA Bn (105 T)	Dd	598	473
1/82 FA Bn (155/8" SP)	8Nov71	616	616
3/18 FA Bn (175/8" SP)	8Oct71	565	565
23 AG Co Admin	12Nov71	545	391
31 Public Info Det	20Sep71#	5	5
87 Cml Det (CBR Cen)	20Sep71#	5	5
251 FA Det (Rdr CM)	20Oct71#	9	9
252 FA Det (Rdr CM)	22Oct71#	9	9
57 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	21Sep71#	28	28
59 Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	21Sep71#	28	28
G/75 Inf Co Ranger	26Sep71#	118	118
635 MI Det Sep Inf Bde	Dd	80	47
90 Cml Det (CBR Cen)	20Sep71#	5	5
23 SUPCOM Bn HHC	29Nov71	60	60
23 Sup & Trans Bn	25Nov71	485	361
523 Sig Bn HHD	23Nov71	641	506
101st Abn Div (Ambl)			
3 Sqdn 5 Cav	Dd	1114	856
XXIV Corps			
XXIV Corps HHC	Dd	371	15
XXIV Corps Arty HHB	29Nov71	139	139
8/4 FA Bn (175/8" SP)	17Nov71	565	565
8/29 FA Btry G (Slt)	16Nov71#	138	138
108 FA Gp HHB	22Nov71	134	134
76 FA Det (Rdr CM)	16Nov71#	9	9
79 FA Det (Rdr CM)	16Nov71#	9	9
239 FA Det (Rdr CM)	16Nov71#	9	9
US Army Forces MR 2			
1/10 Armd Cav Sqdn	7Nov71	1050	857
Hq USARMYF MR 2	Dd	263	113
5 MI Det (Public Info)	1Nov71#	10	10
6/32 FA Bn (175/8" SP)	2Nov71	555	555
1/92 FA Bn (155 T)	2Nov71	469	469
270 FA Det (Rdr)	1Nov71#	8	8
C/75 Inf Co Ranger	25Oct71#	72	72
55 MI Det (Intl Corps)	6Oct71#	33	33

Note: Dd - drawdown in authorized strength
- unit inactivated in-country

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Reduced
573 Sup & Svc Co/DS	Dd	103	22
524 QM Co (Petrl)	Dd	151	6
297 TC Co (Car)	Dd	38	12
959 QM Det	28Nov71#	8	8
23d Arty Gp			
23 FA Gp HHB	Dd	175	175
6/27 FA Bn (175/8" SP)	21Nov71	447	447
D Btry, 71 Arty (50 cal)	Dd	132	41
7/15 FA Bn (175/8" SP)	28Nov71	560	560
4th PSYOPS Gp			
4 PSYOPS Gp	20ct71	270	270
Hq MACV			
SAE JTD	Dd	1486	57
I Corps JTD	Dd	552	59
SMAG JTD	Dd	566	14
TRAC JTD	Dd	952	107
DMAC MR 4 JTD	Dd	863	108
Hq CORDS JTD	Dd	207	28
CORDS MR 1 JTD	Dd	868	441
CORDS MR 2 JTD	Dd	920	149
CORDS MR 3 JTD	Dd	966	230
CORDS MR 4 JTD	Dd	1773	538
USARV			
Hq USARV	Dd	850	30
USARV Dog Det	Dd	40	10
42 Ord Det (EOD)	3Sep71#	10	10
133 Ord Det (EOD)	15Nov71#	10	10
Hq Sp Trps	Dd	169	8
364 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	109	23
US Engr Comd			
Engr Comd USARV	Dd	334	9
Engr Comd Vn Dist	Dd	194	11
31 Engr Bn (Cbt Army)	Dd	659	153
34 Engr Gp (Const Log)	[illegible]	674	674
34 Engr HHC (Const Gp)	Dd	125	96

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Reduced
35 Engr HHC (Const Gp)	23Nov71	125	125
39 Engr Bn (Cbt)	Dd	812	659
69 Engr Bn (Const Type B)	17Nov71	899	899
104 Engr Co (Dmp Trk)	1Nov71#	113	113
169 Engr Bn (Const)	Dd	899	604
299 Engr Bn (Cbt Army)	17Nov71	812	653
523 Engr Co (Port Const)	Dd	225	79
610 Engr Co (Const Spt)	Dd	143	111
Prop Disp Agcy	Dd	104	104
26 PIO Det	8Oct71#	5	5
38 Engr Det	8Oct71#	2	2
82 Engr Co	Dd	94	34
153 Engr Det	16Oct71#	14	14
156 Engr Det	8Oct71#	2	2
577 Engr Bn	Dd	674	422
51 Engr Plat	16Nov71#	32	32
579 Engr Det	16Oct71#	11	11
306 Engr Det	16Oct71#	6	6
510 Engr Det	16Oct71#	28	28
23 Engr Det	15Nov71#	5	5
588 Engr Det	15Nov71#	2	2
1st Sig Bde			
Sig Agy (CEE)	Dd	166	47
Sig Reg Comm Gp	Dd	233	66
Sig SEA Sig Sch	11Oct71#	56	56
Sig Comm Fac	11Oct71#	54	54
Sig Spt Det	16Oct71#	74	74
Sig Spt Det	16Sep71#	128	128
Sig Spt Det	16Sep71#	31	31
Sig Cen COMSEC Log Spt	Dd	362	132
2 Sig HHD Gp STRATCOM	23Oct71	140	111
14 Sig Spt Co	Dd	212	50
21 Sig Gp HHD	Dd	141	121
52 Sig Bn HHD	Dd	460	444
87 Sig Det (DCO)	6Sep71#	25	25
146 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	217	61
221 Sig Co (Pictorial)	Dd	191	34
327 Sig Co (Rdo Rly UHF)	Dd	312	103
362 Sig Co (Rdo Rly UHF)	Dd	211	61
504 Sig Co	6Sep71#	38	38
518 Sig Co (Rdo Rly UHF)	Dd	206	129
269 Sig Co (Spt)	Dd	145	35
40 Sig Bn	1Nov71#		191

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Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Reduced
1st Avn Bde			
14 Avn Bn HHD	27Oct71	108	108
16 Avn Gp (Cbt) HHC	13Nov71	93	93
21 Avn Co (Util Airplane)	8Nov71#	123	123
71 Avn Co (Ambl Lt)	10Oct71#	288	288
132 Avn Co (Mdm Hel)	8Nov71	268	268
174 Avn Co (Ambl Lt)	8Nov71#	288	288
176 Avn Co (Ambl Lt)	10Nov71#	288	288
183 Avn Co (Util Airplane)	30Nov71#	123	123
191 Avn Co (Ambl Lt)	10Oct71#	288	288
221 Avn Co (Servl Lt)	16Nov71#	146	146
242 Avn Co (Asslt)	20Oct71	268	268
271 Avn Co (Mdm Hel)	26Sep71	268	268
335 Avn Co (Ambl Lt)	6Nov71	288	288
534 Med Det	28Nov71#	8	8
756 Med Det	23Oct71#	8	8
335 TC Co (Acft DS)	25Nov71#	225	225
59 Avn Co (Asslt Hel)	28Nov71	208	208
123 Avn Bn (Asslt) HHD	7Nov71	370	370
USA Med Comd, VN			
4 Med Det (Vet Svcs)	Dd	91	12
32 Med Dep	Dd	377	80
54 Med Det (Hel Amb)	29Nov71	48	48
67 Med Hosp (Evac Smbl)	Dd	272	92
82 Med Det (Hel Amb)	29Nov71	48	48
91 Med Hosp (Evac Smbl)	29Nov71	305	305
138 Med Det (Neurosurgical)	1Nov71#	7	7
172 Med Det (Pvt Med Svc)	Dd	76	24
175 Med Det (Vet)	Dd	70	32
518 Med Det (Dem Svc)	14Sep71#	37	37
566 Med Co (Amb)	Dd	85	45
23 Med Bn	6Nov71	386	257
USASUPCOM - Da Nang			
226 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	26Nov71	157	157
227 Sup & Svc Bn HHC	Dd	108	68
596 Lt Maint Co	30Nov71	183	183
533 Engr Det (Maint)	16Nov71	22	22
D/87 Inf Co Rifle/Scty	Dd	160	55
Log Dep - Da Nang	Dd	572	94
54 Ord Co (Ammo DS-GS)	Dd	119	59
661 Ord Co (Ammo DS-GS)	30Nov71	220	220
4 QM Det (Bakery)	16Nov71	29	29
523 QM Plat (Ldry)	31Oct71	27	27
525 QM Co (Petrl Dept)	Dd	169	56
547 Sig Det (Rdr Maint)	11Nov71	5	5
62 TC Co (Mdm Trk Cgo)	Dd	178	45
329 TC Co (Hvy Boat(-))	Dd	151	51
401 TC Co (Tml Trf)	Dd	178	27
544 TC Co (Mdm Boat)	Dd	160	10
563 TC Co (Mdm Trk Cgo)	30Nov71	178	178
632 TC Det (Tg Crew)	15Oct71	12	12
Log SUPCOM - Da Nang	Dd	258	10
48 Cml Det (CBR Cen)	30Nov71	5	5
USASUPCOM - Cam Ranh Bay			
794 Maint Co (DS)	28Nov71	51	51
13 Fin Sec Disb	Dd	184	36
92 Fin Sec Disb	Dd	192	30
Log Dep - Cam Ranh Bay	Dd	1124	360
191 Ord Bn HHC (Ammo DS)	Dd	100	25
514 QM Co (Petrl)	Dd	93	67
444 TC Co (Mdm Trk Cgo 12T)	28Nov71#	178	178
670 TC Co (Mdm Trk Cgo 12T)	28Oct71#	139	139
606 Ord Co (Ammo Spt)	Dd	116	50
79 QM Plat	28Nov71#	10	10
969 QM Det (Petrl)	28Nov71	8	8
10 TC HHD Bn (Tml)	28Nov71	56	56
97 TC Co (Hvy Boat)	Dd	128	80
266 TC Det (Ptl Boat)	28Nov71#	2	2
54 GS Gp HHC	Dd	87	12
21 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	208	6
USASUPCOM - Saigon			
228 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	172	22
261 Maint Det (DS Tml)	30Nov71#	32	32
229 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	55	40
549 Lt Maint Co (DS)	Dd	183	110
510 Engr Co (Maint DS)	Dd	181	14
518 Engr Det (Gas Gen)	30Nov71#	26	26
292 Fin Sec Disb	Dd	106	10
Log Dep - Long Binh	Dd	957	239

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
14 QM Plat (Tml Ops)	Dd	34	14
235 QM Det (Petrl)	Dd	8	4
534 TC Co (Tml Trfr)	Dd	123	42
1099 TC Co (Med Boat)	Dd	177	118
266 Sup & Svc Bn HHC	Dd	16	16
483 Sup & Svc Fld Svc Co	Dd	7	7
506 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Dd	11	11
US NAVY			
USAID Seabee Team	Dd	91	13
5 Naval Const Bn	15Nov71	348	348
3rd NCB Staff	15Nov71	2	2
Mobile Spt Team	Dd	61	8
COMDELTA Naval Force	Dd	17	9
COMNAVFORV Staff	Dd	453	53
Patrol Aircraft Dets	Dd	186	44
Beach Jumper Unit - 1	Dd		14
SEALS	Dd	116	8
USAID CBPAC Det	Dd	23	3
NAVSPECWARGRU Det	Dd	20	2
CICC Saigon	Dd	86	9
NSA Saigon	Dd	1648	437
NSA Da Nang	Dd	638	210
NAV SUPPFAC - Cam Ranh Bay	Dd	208	26
US AIR FORCE			
6250 SUT Sqdn OLAV	30Nov71	2	2
834 ADH DV OLAF	Dd	9	1
619 TCT Sqdn 0003	Dd	71	13
8 APO Sq 0007	Dd	22	3
6255 AB Sqdn	Dd	236	31
6005 SUT Sqdn OL6I	Dd	7	6
20 SOP Sqdn	Dd	198	30
483 TAL Wg	Dd	202	44
536 TAL Sqdn CA	15Oct71#	82	82
FRANTIC GOAT ROTE	Dd	23	23
21 TAS Sqdn	Dd	607	8
903 AME Sqdn	Dd	95	34

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
26 AOS FT	Dd	46	4
483 FDM Sqdn	Dd	660	163
483 OMT Sqdn	Dd	353	88
483 COS Gp	Dd	26	16
483 CEG Sqdn	Dd	327	13
483 SEP Sqdn	Dd	534	15
483 SER Sqdn	Dd	95	11
483 SUP Sqdn	Dd	427	23
483 TRS Sqdn	Dd	233	11
483 Hosp	Dd	470	4
9a SOP Wg OLAA	Dd	57	57
9 SOP Sqdn	Dd	55	13
620 Tac Sqdn	Dd	264	43
22 CS FT	Dd	46	19
14 SOP Wg	Dd	75	75
17 SOP Sqdn	10Sep71#	116	116
9 SOP Sqdn	Dd	128	16
315 TAL Wg	Dd	50	16
311 TAL Sqdn	5Oct71#	88	88
311 CLM Sqdn	Dd	294	99
14 FDM Sqdn	15Oct71	282	282
435 MUM Sqdn	Dd	95	9
315 COS Gp	Dd	185	19
315 CEG Sqdn	Dd	205	16
315 SEP Sqdn	Dd	516	33
315 SER Co	Dd	68	16
315 SUP Sqdn	Dd	175	29
315 TRS Sqdn	Dd	99	14
6005 SUT Sqdn OL6E	Dd	20	1
35 DIS DS	Dd	74	4
6250 SUT Sqdn OLAX	Dd	3	3
834 AD Div	Dd	7	7
17 SOP Sqdn OLAA	10Sep71#	95	95
12 TFG WG	Dd	47	30
480 TFG Sqdn	1-6Nov71	169	169
389 TFG Sqdn	26Oct71	169	169
15 APO Sqdn 0002	30Nov71	48	48
12 AVN Sqdn	Dd	116	55
483 CDM Sqdn	1Nov71	139	139
12 FDM Sqdn	Dd	202	117
412 MUM Sqdn	1Nov71	143	143
36 AER Sqdn 0013	24Oct71	31	31
600 MLS Sqdn	20Oct71	23	23
600 PHO Sqdn 0016	1Nov71	22	22
30 WEA Sqdn 0023	20Nov71	18	18

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Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
12 COS Gp	Dd	19	8
12 CEG Sqdn	Dd	22	12
12 SEP Sqdn	Dd	20	4
12 SER Sqdn	Dd	15	6
12 SUP Sqdn	Dd	24	16
12 TRS Sqdn	Dd	19	11
6005 SUT Sqdn OL6J	Dd	7	7
PPCRG 1510	30Nov71	19	19
1005 Si Gp 5009	30Nov71	5	5
1883 CMN Sqdn	30Nov71	169	169
12 DIS DS	Dd	6	4
620 TCT Sqdn 0002	Dd	54	14
6254 AB Sqdn	Dd	223	42
6004 SUT Sqdn 0004	Dd	20	4
7AFH AF	Dd	1214	180
12 RIT Sqdn	Dd	237	29
505 TCT Gp	Dd	66	2
619 TCT Sqdn	Dd	126	45
2 APO Gp	Dd	45	1
6005 SUT Sqdn OL6A	Dd	22	6
6250 SUT Sqdn OL AH	Dd	18	3
834 ADH Div OL AN	Dd	11	1
834 ADM Div OL AV	Dd	5	1
619 TCT Sqdn	Dd	172	114
1 WEA Gp CL OD	Dd	2	1
6005 SUT Sqdn 0006	Dd	33	2
Hq Staff JTD	Dd	280	60

REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT X

(KEYSTONE MALLARD)

US ARMY

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
USARV			
6 AG Det (APU Type X)	31Jan72#	12	12
USARV Dog Trg Det	Dd	30	15
USARV Hq	Dd	820	150
ACTIV	Dd	34	5
US Army Comd Vung Tau	Dd	233	18
Spec Trp USARV	Dd	341	100
1/22 Inf Bn	30Jan71	921	921
981 MP Co (Sentry Dog)	Dd	191	45
3 Ord Bn HHC (Ammo DS)	Dd	60	8
59 Ord Det (EOD)	16Dec71#	10	10
3 Mil Hist Det	11Dec71#	2	2
8 Mil Hist Det	31Jan72#	2	2
22 Mil Hist Det	9Dec71#	2	2
26 Mil Hist Det	11Dec71#	2	2
47 Mil Hist Det	11Dec71#	2	2
266 Sup & Svc Bn HHD	Dd	69	29
10 TC Co (Mdm Trk)	Dd	128	7
534 TC Co (Mdm Trk)	Dd	81	50
MACV			
Stars & Stripes	Dd	10	3
Hq Unit Trg Spt	Dd	72	57
Hq Sp Msn ADGRU	Dd	136	34
USARV Trg ADGRU	Dd	666	165
CORDS MR 1 JTD	Dd	427	76
CORDS MR 2 JTD	Dd	737	108
CORDS MR 3 JTD	Dd	730	101
CORDS MR 4 JTD	Dd	1166	184
Cen Pur Agcy Vn	Dd	17	5
SRAC JTD	Dd	536	132
TRAC JTD	Dd	817	222
DMAC/MR 4 JTD	Dd	650	129
MACV AFRTS	Dd	111	21
MACV JUSPAO	Dd	42	13
SAE JTD	Dd	1284	108
Hq MACV Staff	Dd	1000	50
SRAC			
41 AD Btry E 50 Cal	20Dec71#	142	142
6/60 AD Bn AW SP	21Dec71	297	297
XXIV Corps			
1/44 AD Bn AW SP	20Dec71	185	185
65 AD Btry (50 Cal)	26Nov71	20	20
XXIV Corps JTD	Dd	585	106
XXIV Corps HHC	Dd	363	59
28 Civil Affairs Co	23Dec71#	139	139
235 FA Det (Rdr CM)	5Dec71#	9	9
245 FA Det (Rdr CM)	5Dec71#	8	8
Fin Ctr USA Acct VN	Dd	260	23
209 Sig Det	16 Dec71#	5	5
101st Abn Div (Ambl)			
101 AG Co (Admin)	Dd	536	320
101 Avn Bn (Aslt Hel)	Dd	824	291
101 Avn Gp HHC (Cbt)	19Jan72	221	221

Note: Dd - drawndown in authorized strength
- unit inactivated in-country

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Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
158 Avn Bn (Aslt Hel)	23Dec71	824	824
159 Avn Bn (Aslt Hel)	Dd	797	236
163 Avn Co (GS)	Dd	203	174
25 Pub Info Det	18Dec71#	5	5
10 Cml Plat (DS)	Dd	41	39
20 Cml Det (CBR Cen Abn)	Dd	5	3
101 DISCOM HHC	19Jan72	163	163
426 Sup & Svc Bn	Dd	481	329
801 Maint Bn	Dd	337	248
2/17 Cav Sqdn	Dd	1022	640
326 Engr Bn (Cbt)	Dd	621	505
A Btry 377 FA Bn	12Jan72	166	166
1/39 FA Bn (175mm/8")	21Dec71	537	537
2/11 FA Bn(155mm T)	1Jan72	598	598
2/319 FA Bn (105 H)	20Dec71	436	436
2/320 FA Bn (105 H)	Dd	532	435
4/77 FA Bn (ARA)	Dd	575	412
101 Inf Div Arty HHB	17Jan72	162	162
101 Inf Div HHC(Ambl)	Dd	201	63
75 Inf Co Ranger	6Dec71#	118	118
1 Inf Bde HHC	19Jan72	230	230
3 Inf Bde HHC	21Dec71	230	230
3/187 Inf Bn (Ambl)	10Dec71	920	920
2/502 Inf Bn (Ambl)	19Jan72	920	920
1/506 Inf Bn (Ambl)	21Dec71	920	920
2/506 Inf Bn (Ambl)	14Dec71	920	920
5 TC Bn (Acft Maint)	Dd	582	390
326 Med Bn	Dd	375	289
101 MI Co	Dd	153	133
101 MP Co (Ambl)	Dd	189	141
501 Sig Bn (Ambl)	Dd	399	266
266 FA Det (Rdr)	9Dec71#	8	8
42 Scout Dog Plat	26Dec71#	31	31
1/327 Inf Bn (Ambl)	20Jan72	920	920
23d Arty Gp			
23 FA Gp HHB	28Jan72	50	50
2/32 FA Bn (175mm SP)	22Jan72	565	565
D/71 AD Btry (50 Cal)	Dd	91	41
USASUPCOM - Cam Ranh Bay			
62 Maint Spt Bn HHC	Dd	233	95
86 Maint Bn	22Dec71	55	55
98 Lt Equip Maint Co	Dd	197	160
129 Maint Co (DS)	Dd	216	19
160 Hvy Equip Maint Co	Dd	264	151
865 Engr Det (Gas Gen)	11Dec71	8	8
Log Dep Qui Nhon	Dd	222	67
13 Fin Sec Disb	Dd	148	58
606 Ord Co Ammo (DS-GS)	31Jan72#	66	66
630 Ord Ammo (DS-GS)	31Jan72#	40	40
504 Ord Det (Ammo Renv)	31Jan72#	39	39
109 QM Co (Air Dlvr)	31Jan72#	121	121
514 QM Co (Petrl Sup)	16Dec71#	26	26
495 TC Det (Cgo Dock Sec)	Dd	9	5
518 Sig Det (Rdr Maint)	11Dec71#	5	5
235 TC Plt (Lt Trk)	31Jan72#	50	50
USA TC Tml Unit	Dd	276	244
545 TC Co (Lt Trk 5 Tn)	31Jan72#	46	46
566 TC Co (Mdm Trk Cgo)	31Jan72#	21	21
SEA Sig Pic Cen	20Dec71#	12	12
22 Repl Bn HHD	Dd	53	22
544 AG Repl Co	31Jan72#	27	27
557 Maint Co	Dd	183	30
25 Ord Det (EOD)	17Dec71#	10	10
21 Co Sup & Svc (DS)	Dd	202	42
USASUPCOM - Da Nang			
China Beach R&R	Dd	78	30
Log SUPCOM - Da Nang	Dd	273	27
26 Gen Spt Gp HHC	30Jan72	91	91
67 Maint Co	6Jan72#	180	180
43 Engr Det Fld Maint	16Jan72#	10	10
571 Ord Co (Ammo DS-GS)	Dd	223	154
3 QM Plat (Mbl-Lab)	21Dec71#	8	8
64 Fin Sec Disb	Dd	173	41
92 Fin Sec Disb	Dd	162	64
528 QM Co (Petrl Sup)	Dd	190	100
848 QM Plt (POL Op)	15Dec71#	67	67
57 TC Co (Lt Trk)	16Dec71#	100	100
329 TC Co (Hvy Boat)	Dd	100	46
515 TC Co (Lt Trk)	Dd	179	133
544 TC Co (Mdm Boat)	Dd	150	96
585 TC Co (Mdm Trk)	Dd	178	42
666 TC Co (Lt Trk)	4Jan72#	172	172
526 AG Co Repl	31Jan72#	36	36
Log Dep - Da Nang	Dd	478	48

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Reduced
USASUPCOM - Saigon			
USA Mortuary	Dd	58	18
Hq Spt Comd Saigon	Dd	221	60
228 Sup & Svc Co (DS)	16Dec71#	15	15
295 QM Det (Mat Stor)	16Dec71#	10	10
483 Fld Svc Co Fwd	16Dec71#	25	25
524 Engr Det (Fld Maint)	Dd	22	18
292 Fin Sec Disb	Dd	96	42
7 Fin Sec Disb	Dd	113	8
MI Det 101 Div	Dd	9	4
71 Ord Co (Ammo DS-GS)	1Jan72#	116	116
78 Ord Det (Ammo Renov)	31Jan72#	65	65
MI Det 23d Inf Div	Dd	9	4
235 QM Det (Petrl)	31Jan72#	4	4
14 QM Plat (Tml Op)	31Jan72#	20	20
538 TC Co (Mdm Trk Ptl)	1Jan72#	137	137
355 TC Det (Liq Barge)	31Jan72#	24	24
440 TC Co Tml Trans	Dd	99	38
492 TC Det (Reefer Barge)	31Jan72#	6	6
4 TC HHC Term Comd	Dd	141	4
4 TC HHC Term Comd (Aug)	Dd	39	12
624 TC Det (Patrol Bt)	31Jan72#	3	3
629 TC Det (Tug)	31Jan72#	4	4
631 TC Det (Tug)	31Jan72#	6	6
526 TC Det (Tug)	31Jan72#	12	12
556 TC Det (Liq Barge)	31Jan72#	4	4
Aviation Assets			
C/7/1 Cav Sqdn	Dd	1037	231
A/3/17 Cav Sqdn	Dd	1037	231
Avn Comd (Afld Op)	31Jan72#	80	80
58 Avn Det	31Jan72#	41	41
116 Avn Co (Ambl)	22Dec71#	288	288
134 Avn Co (Ambl Lt)	29Dec71#	288	288
165 Avn Gp HHC	30Jan72	93	93
192 Avn Co (Ambl Lt)	20Jan72#	288	288
219 Avn Co (Surv Dt)	24Dec71#	146	146
220 Avn Co (Surv Lt)	23 Dec71#	146	146
222 Avn Bn HHC	14Dec71	108	108
225 Avn Co (A Surv)	24Dec71#	331	331
238 Avn Co (A Wpn)	24Dec71	154	154
240 Avn Co(Ambl Lt)	24Dec71#	288	288
244 Avn Co (Aslt Hel)	24Dec71#	208	208
282 Avn Co (Ambl Lt)	31Jan72#	288	288
307 Avn Co (Air Trf Con)	30Jan72	453	453
315 Avn Det (Afld Op)	21Dec71#	17	17
41 Med Det	2Dec71#	8	8
93 Med Det	15Jan72#	8	8
134 Med Det	31Jan72#	8	8
12 Armd Cav Tp	1Jan72#	266	266
62 Sig Det (Avionics)	1Jan72#	6	6
518 TC Det (Cgo Hel)	1Jan72#	56	56
359 Avn Det (Afld Op)	22Dec71#	21	21
10 Avn Bn HHC	30Jan72	108	108
214 Avn Bn HHC	2Jan72	108	108
268 Avn Bn	21Jan72	108	108
193 Med Det	31Jan72#	8	8
433 Med Det	31Jan72#	8	8
87 QM Det (Petrl)	21Dec71#	8	8
391 QM Det (Petrl)	31Jan72#	8	8
59 Sig Det (Rdo Rep Avn)	1Jan72#	6	6
92 Avn Co (Ambl Lt)	1Jan72#	288	288
128 Avn Co	30Jan72	288	288
212 Avn HHC Bn	23 Dec71	108	108
131 MI Co (A Surv)	Dd	313	73
Engineer Assets			
Engr Comd USA VN	Dd	325	112
Engr Comd USA VN Dist	Dd	183	48
Engr Comd (Hydro Tm 1)	23Dec71#	10	10
Engr Det (Maint)	1Jan72#	35	35
27 Engr Bn (Cbt)	30Jan72	812	812
36 Engr Bn (Const)	Dd	899	717
45 Engr Gp HHC (Const)	30Jan72	125	125
46 Engr Det (Util)	21Dec71	28	28
59 Engr Co (Land Clr)	21Dec71#	132	132
60 Engr Co (Land Clr)	16Jan72#	132	132
66 Engr Co (Topo)	Dd	141	93
67 Engr Co (Dump Trk)	29Jan72#	133	133
73 Engr Co (Const Spt)	23Jan72#	143	143
82 Engr Co (WS)	29Jan72#	60	60
95 Engr Det (Fire Trk)	30Jan72	4	4
100 Engr Co (Fltg Brg)	16Dec71#	26	26
114 Engr Det (Fire Trk)	30Jan72	24	24
169 Engr Bn (Const)	Dd	295	247

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Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Reduced
171 Engr Det (Well Dig)	29Jan72	5	5
213 Engr Det (Util)	16Jan72#	83	83
497 Engr Co (Port Const)	Dd	225	3
506 Engr Det (Util)	1Jan72#	28	28
511 Engr Co (Panel Brg)	1Jan72#	126	126
513 Engr Co (Dump Trk)	16Jan72#	113	113
515 Engr Plat (Asphalt)	29Jan72#	32	32
520 Engr Det (Ffgt)	30Jan72	24	24
523 Engr Co (Port Const)	29Jan72#	146	146
525 Engr Det (Water Tk)	24Jan72#	2	2
526 Engr Det (Util)	31Jan72#	83	83
531 Engr Det (Util)	1Jan72#	28	28
536 Engr Plt (Const)	Dd	63	3
538 Engr Co (Land Clr)	22Dec71#	132	132
542 Engr Det (Powerline)	29Jan72#	13	13
551 Engr Det (Well)	19Jan72#	5	5
553 Engr Co (Flt Brg)	29Jan72#	26	26
554 Engr Bn (Const)	Dd	899	701
562 Engr Det (Fire Trk)	30Jan72	4	4
565 Engr Det (Water Tk)	29Jan72#	2	2
573 Engr Det (Water Tk)	29Jan72#	2	2
577 Engr Bn (Const)	30Jan72	252	252
585 Engr Co (Dump Trk)	29Jan72#	113	113
591 Engr Co (Lt Equip)	1Jan72#	186	186
702 Engr Det (Powerline)	29Jan72#	13	13
984 Engr Co (Land Clr)	16Dec71#	132	132
227 Engr Det (Topo)	Dd	9	5
Medical Assets			
14 Med Disp (Gen)	16Jan72#	38	38
16 Med Disp (Gen)	16Dec71#	14	14
43 Med Det (Amb)	16Dec71#	10	10
53 Med Det (Surg)	16Jan72#	7	7
68 Med Det (Hel Amb)	30Jan72	48	48
85 Med Hosp (Evac Smbl)	30Jan72	305	305
152 Med Det (Disp)	16Dec71#	16	16
346 Med Det (Disp)	16Dec71#	16	16
437 Med Det (Den Svc)	16Jan72#	37	37
500 Med Det (Amb)	11Dec71#	10	10
584 Med Co (Amb)	16Dec71#	84	84
872 Med Det (Amb)	11Dec71#	10	10
874 Med Det (Amb)	31Jan72#	10	10
933 Med Det (Neuro Surg)	11Dec71#	7	7
32 Med Det (Dep)	Dd	297	40

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Reduced
67 Med Gp (HHD)	31Jan72	59	59
Patient Acct	Dd	850	250
Signal Assets			
63 Sig Co (Spt)	16Jan72#	135	135
128 Sig Co(Dep)	Dd	168	26
221 Sig Co (Pictorial)	Dd	157	98
232 Sig Co (Spt)	20Dec71#	94	94
269 Sig Co	16Jan72#	110	110
Sig Agcy (COMMCEN)	Dd	67	12
Sig Rgn (Comm Gp)	Dd	167	107
Sig Spt Agcy	Dd	232	122
Sig Cen (COMSEC Log Spt)	Dd	230	50
Sig Fac (Tape Relay)	20Dec71#	238	238
Sig Co (Rdo & Cbl)	Dd	182	132
518 Sig Co(Rdo Rly UHF)	20Dec71#	77	77
556 Sig Co (Spt)	26Jan72#	81	81
589 Sig Co (Spt)	26Jan72#	144	144
Military Police Units			
16 MP Gp HHD	20Dec71	38	38
89 MP Gp HHD	20Dec71	38	38
93 MP Bn HHD	20Dec71	26	26
127 MP Co	30Jan72	162	162
595 MP Co (Sentry Dog)	Dd	191	45
34th GS Gp			
614 Lt Equip Co	15Jan72	163	163
79 TC Co(Acft DS)	Dd	305	155
7th PSYOPS Bn			
7th PSYOPS Bn	20Dec71	143	143
Audit Agency			
USAAA	Dd	34	18

Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced	Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
US AIR FORCE							
6250 SUT Sqdn	1Jan72	4	4	15 APO Sqdn	31Dec71	30	30
834 ADH Div	Dd	19	9	6259 ABS Sqdn	31Dec71	739	739
8 APO Sqdn	Dd	171	70	6005 SUT Sqdn	31Dec71	4	4
1 COE Gp	Dd	40	4	PPC Rg	31Dec71	5	5
6251 ARS Sqdn	Dd	664	306	1883 CMN Sqdn	31Dec71	18	18
PPC Rg	Dd	11	4	834 ADH Div	Dd	10	3
1005 SI Gp	Dd	5	1	620 TCT Sqdn	Dd	40	27
1877 CMN Sqdn	Dd	141	112	1878 CMN Sqdn	Dd	151	33
834 ADH Div	1Dec71	8	8	0007 AFH AF	Dd	999	24
619 TCT Sqdn	Dd	58	48	834 ADH Div	Dd	191	70
8 APO Sqdn	1Dec71	19	19	12 RIT Sqdn	Dd	208	16
6255 AB Sqdn	1Dec71	195	195	619 TCT Sqdn	Dd	81	23
6005 SUT Sqdn	1Dec71	2	2	2 APO Gp	Dd	43	23
PPC Rg	31Jan72	4	4	8 APO Sqdn	Dd	520	70
1005 SI Gp	31Jan72	3	3	600 PHO Sqdn	Dd	115	18
1880 CMN Sqdn	Dd	95	84	1 WEA Gp	Dd	74	10
556 RC Sqdn	31Dec71	14	14	30 WEA Gp	31Jan72	9	9
483 TAL Wg	Dd	194	20	1876 CMN Sqdn	Dd	681	142
535 TAL Sqdn CRB	24Jan72	85	85	30 WEA Sqdn	Dd	15	4
14 APO Sqdn	Dd	389	32	1964 CMN Gp	Dd	104	12
483 AVN Sqdn	Dd	130	21	834 ADH Div	Dd	10	3
483 FDM Sqdn	Dd	307	166	834 ADH Div	1Dec71	3	3
483 COS Gp	Dd	272	7	619 TCT Sqdn	1Dec71	18	18
483 CEG Sqdn	Dd	314	6	620 TCT Sqdn	1Dec71	49	49
483 SEP Sqdn	Dd	519	13	8 APO Sqdn	1Dec71	30	30
483 SER Sqdn	Dd	91	5	14 APO Sqdn	1Dec71	33	33
483 SUP Sqdn	Dd	403	10	15 APO Sqdn	1Dec71	55	55
483 TRS Sqdn	Dd	224	4	3 AER Gp	31Jan72	11	11
1881 CMN Sqdn	Dd	187	5	5 WEA Sqdn	31Jan72	39	39
485 GIA Sqdn	31Jan72	245	245	1881 CMN Sqdn (AFCS)	31Jan72	27	27
6990 SC 0001	1Dec71	100	100	1883 CMN Sqdn	31Jan72	18	18
COMFY ECHO	31Dec71	129	129	1972 CMN Sqdn	31Jan72	19	19
483 HSP HP	Dd	393	29	1881 CMN Sqdn ALOC	31Jan72	2	2
620 TCT Sqdn	Dd	221	41	1878 CMN Sqdn	31Jan72	4	4
15 APO Sqdn	Dd	293	11	1881 CNN Sqdn 0001	31Jan72	13	13
1972 CMN Sqdn	Dd	346	65	USAF ADGRU JTD	Dd	1131	202
19 TAS Sqdn	15Jan72	747	747	Hq Staff JTD	Dd	275	9
600 PHO Sqdn	Dd	26	17	TDY Acct	31Jan72	825	825
1882 CMN Sqdn	Dd	170	70	Debit/Credit Acct			914
834 ADH Div	31Dec71	5	5				

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Unit	Redeployed/ Drawndown	Spaces Initial	Spaces Reduced
US NAVY			
SEALS	7Dec71	54	54
BSU-1 (Mobile Spt Team)	7Dec71	29	29
NAVSPECW/ RGRU Det	16Jan72	16	16
VP Sqdn Det	7 Dec71	142	142
NAVAIRFAC Cam Ranh Bay	Dd	451	283
FASU Da Nang	Dd	173	48
COMFAIRWING ONE	7Dec71	14	14
HAL-3	Dd	599	60
Nav Comsta Cam Ranh Bay	Dd	133	53
COMNAVFORV Staff	Dd	123	56
NSA Saigon	Dd	1117	36
USAID Seabee Tms	Dd	78	26
USAID Seabee Pac Det	Dd	20	5
CBMU 302	25Jan72	600	600
Debit/Credit Acct		605	595

REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES IN RVN - Annex F

1. Rpt (U), Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (6th revised edition), prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Jun 70, pp 202-204.
2. Same as # 1, p 205.
3. Same as # 1, p 207.
4. Same as # 1, pp 287-289.
5. Same as # 1, pp 326-327.
6. Briefing (C), J3-03, 18 Nov 71, Subj: US and FWMAF Redeployments, pp 1-3, Gp-Not stated.
7. Same as # 6, p 1.
8. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to DCG USARV et al., 130951Z Nov 71, Subj: President Nixon's Troop Withdrawal Announcement and Press Conference, pp 11-12.
9. Bulletin (U), JUSPAO, 7 Apr 71, Subj: Text of President Nixon's Address on Further Reduction of US Forces in Vietnam.
10. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ3-03, 14 May 71, Subj: Increment VI.
11. Msgs (C), MACJ3-08 OPREP 4, 1 Jan thru 1 May 71, Gp-4.
12. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ3-03, 1 May 71, Subj: Increment VII.
13. Msg (C), CINCPAC to AIG 7871, 072215Z Jul 71, Subj: Completion of KEYSTONE ORIOLE (ALFA) Redeployments (U), Gp-Not stated; Fact Sheet (C), MACAG, 4 Jul 71, Subj: Effective Fighting Strength of US Units (U), Gp-4.
14. Msgs (C), MACJ3-08, OPREP 4, 1 May through 1 Jul 71, Gp-4.
15. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ3-03, 31 Aug 71, Subj: Increment VIII; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to Chief, JGS, RVNAF, 251133Z Jun 71, Subj: Force Planning, Vietnam (U), Gp-4.
16. Same as # 15.
17. Same as # 15.
18. Msgs (C), MACJ3-08, OPREP 4, 1 Jul thru 1 Sep 71, Gp-4.
19. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ3-03, 30 Nov 71, Subj: Increment IX.
20. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to Cdr 7AF et al., 180440Z Sep 71, Subj: Redeployment of Forces, Increment IX, Change 1.
21. Msgs (C), MACJ3-08, OPREP 4, 1 Jul thru 1 Dec 71, Gp-4.

22. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to Cdrs FWMAF, 280840Z Nov 71, Subj: Force Planning Vietnam (U), Gp-4; Msg (S),COMUSMACV to Cdr 7AF et al., 111030Z Dec 71, Subj: Redeployment of Forces, Increment X, Change 1, Gp-4.

23. Briefing (C), MACJ3-03, undated, Subj: US and FWMAF Redeployments (U), p 4, Gp-Not stated.

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ANNEX G

FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES

INTRODUCTION

(U) This Annex contains a synopsis of the military assistance rendered to RVN by nations of the Free World other than the US.

(U) In April 1964 President Johnson initiated the "More Flags" concept in which he publicly requested that other nations of the Free World contribute military assistance to RVN in its counterinsurgency efforts. Prior to this request, the United States and Australia were the only nations supporting the RVN with military assistance.[1] With planning assistance from US Government agencies, a list of assistance requirements was prepared, and in July 1964 the GVN formally requested assistance from 36 nations of the Free World. By January 1965 at least 26 nations had responded with assistance to the GVN.[2]

(U) Each of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) to the Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF), entered into Military Working Arrangements with COMUSMACV. These arrangements were largely based on extensions of the Pentalateral Agreement of 1950 which governed the furnishing of US military assistance to Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and the French Union in Indochina. The working arrangements specified command and control relationships, logistical responsibilities, and the rights, privileges, and exemptions to be accorded to FWMAF personnel. Command of FWMAF forces was exercised through the command structure of the TCC, while operational control was generally exercised by COMUSMACV. An exception to COMUSMACV exercise of operational control was the relationship of coordination and cooperation which existed between Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFV) and US forces.[3]

(S) Free World Military Assistance Policy Councils had been established to coordinate and control actions of the Free World Military Assistance Forces. Each council consisted of the Chief, Joint General Staff, RVNAF, COMUSMACV, and the senior commander of the respective FWMAF command concerned. These councils coordinated the assignment of tasks and missions and assured mutual agreement between RVNAF, USMACV, and the forces concerned. In practice, the councils rarely met in formal session as most actions were taken through normal staff channels at the Free World Military Assistance Office (FWMAO).

(U) At the peak of their employment in Vietnam, Free World military forces totaled nearly 70,000 men. Combat forces employed were equal to more than three full US Army infantry divisions. Besides the obvious combat power which was made available to the RVN, these forces served to demonstrate to the Government and people of RVN and to the rest of the world that other free countries were interested in helping the Vietnamese people maintain their freedom and achieve peace and security.

(U) The Australians contributed considerable resources, money, and manpower to the RVN. Military expenses incident to Australian involvement were in excess of $225 million, borne entirely by the Australian Government. In addition, Australia contributed more than $21 million to the RVN in economic assistance. New Zealand, like Australia, was self-supporting and paid its own way in military and economic assistance to the RVN. Military costs, not

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including pay to its forces, exceeded $11 milliion. New Zealand also contributed economic assistance of approximately $3.8 million.[4]

(C) Aside from the monetary considerations, there was a heavy sacrifice of men that should be given proper recognition. Australia lost more than 415 men killed in action (KIA), and more than 2,200 men wounded in action (WIA). The small New Zealand contingent suffered 37 men KIA and 172 men WIA.[5]

(C) Korean and Thai contributions came in the form of major combat units: two divisions and a marine brigade for the ROK, and a Thai division. Korean forces suffered more than 3,950 men killed in action while inflicting more than 37,500 deaths upon the enemy forces. Thai forces suffered more than 350 men KIA while accounting for approximately 2,900 enemy KIA.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE TO RVN

(U) In addition to the combat and combat-support contributions which were made by Free World countries to the RVN, a major effort was made by friendly nations to help the RVN develop socially and economically. During the period July 1964 to December 1970, grants in economic and social aid to the RVN, official and private, exceeded $160 million. This aid came from 47 countries and principalities, as well as the Asian Development Bank, the League of Red Cross Societies, and several agencies of the United Nations.

(U) Some of the most significant activities and contributions (amounts in US dollars) of the various countries were:

-- Australia provided building materials, medical assistance, scholarships for overseas study, expert advisors, and a variety of public works at a cost of more than $21 million.

-- Belgium provided University of Belgium scholarships and medical assistance costing more than $420 thousand.

-- Canada provided nearly $13 million assistance in grants for technical assistance, food, construction equipment, medical equipment and supplies, scholarships, and relief and welfare projects.

-- The Republic of China provided nearly $4 million in a program which emphasized agricultural improvement programs and public works.

-- Denmark contributed approximately $100 thousand for medical, welfare, and relief programs.

-- France contributed in excess of $31 million with heavy emphasis on provision of cultural, educational, and technical assistance.

-- The Federal Republic of Germany contributed more than $37 million -- largely in medical, welfare, and relief projects.

-- Iran sponsored medical projects at a cost of more than $600 thousand.

-- Italy contributed in excess of $1 million for education, welfare, and relief.

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-- Japan furnished more than $11 million for agricultural improvement, medical assistance, education, and welfare.

-- The Republic of Korea contributed more than $7 million primarily to support agricultural improvements.

-- Malaysian contributions of more than $300 thousand went for education, welfare, and relief.

-- The Netherlands gave approximately $3.5 million to support education and cultural projects, conduct public works, and provide technical expertise.

-- Switzerland provided nearly $1.5 million for medical assistance, supplies and training, and relief projects.

-- Thailand provided approximately $550 thousand for welfare and relief.

-- The United Kingdom provided nearly $8 million for education, medical assistance, public works, public administration, industrial development, and welfare and relief.

(U) In addition to these contributions, there were scores of other modest contributions from other countries which served to underline the concern for the well-being of the Republic of Vietnam.[7]

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

(U) In response to GVN requests, the Republic of Korea (ROK) began providing military and economic assistance to RVN on 22 Sep 64. The initial contributions to the RVN counter-insurgency effort consisted of a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) and a group of Tae-Kwon-Do instructors. (Tae-Kwon-Do is an advanced form of hand-to-hand combat similar to Judo.) Instruction in this art has been given to several thousand RVN armed forces and police personnel.[8]

(U) On 31 Oct 64 a working arrangement was signed by representatives of RVN and ROK which established rules governing the activities of the Korean MASH and Tae-Kwon-Do instructors. This document covered matters such as location of the force, construction of base facilities, supply procedures, security to be provided, and the functions of the ROK groups. Included in the agreement was the key point that the ROK forces would be subject to the provisions of the 1950 Pentalateral Agreement thus granting, in effect, diplomatic immunity for these personnel. Confirmation of these Pentalateral Agreement rights was made by the passage of a diplomatic note between the two governments.[9]

(U) In early January 1965 the GVN decided that additional assistance was needed to combat growing Viet Cong pressure; as a result the ROK was requested to provide additional noncombatants. The reason for this request was that the GVN had been forced to divert military troops to civic action projects, so as to combat the devastation caused by heavy flooding during the fall monsoon in 1964. The Government of Korea (GOK) agreed that more support could be provided and decided to furnish a ROK Army engineer task force. This task force was to become known as the "Dove Unit." In a military working arrangement signed on 5 Feb 65 between COMUSMACV and the ROK Commander, it was stated that this task force would function under operating parameters established by what became known as the Free World Military

REPUBLIC OF KOREA FORCES VIETNAM

(1 JAN 71)



Figure G-1

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Assistance Policy Council (FWMAPC). In addition, the Dove Unit would be "responsive" to the overall commander in any given area of operations. The arrangements further provided that both the COMUSMACV and RVNAF would provide logistical support for the ROK force.[10]

(U) On 15 Feb 65 the advance element of the Dove Unit arrived, to be followed on 16 March by the main party. The group was located at a base camp in Bien Hoa Province (see Figure G-2). Cumulative results of construction by the Dove Unit and other ROKFV units as of 1 Sep 71 included 142 bridges, over 480 km of roads, 340 classrooms, over 1,530 houses, and over 740 public installations including community centers, clinics, temples, churches, hamlet offices, and public baths.[11]

(U) Considering the achievements of the Korean noncombatant groups, the Vietnamese Government requested that the Korean Government dispatch more forces. Following negotiations between the two governments, the ROK sent a Military Assistance Group to Vietnam (ROKMAGV). The first task force of approximately 2,000 personnel arrived in RVN 16 Mar 65. Subsequent to the arrival of ROKMAGV, in response to a GVN request and US urging, on 12 Aug 65 the GOK approved of an additional deployment of combat forces to RVN.[12]

(U) On 25 Sep 65 the ROK Force Vietnam (ROKFV) was organized at Seoul, Korea. It was to become the controlling headquarters of ROK forces in RVN. On this same date ROKFV was integrated as a partner of the Free World Military Assistance Forces. On 20 Oct 65 ROKFV was transferred from Seoul and activated at Saigon, RVN.[13]

(S) During the aforementioned negotiations to increase ROK forces in RVN, the political sensitivities of ROK officials were such that they refused to sign a formal agreement giving operational control of their forces to COMUSMACV. Instead, a new working agreement was negotiated which contained no reference to command and control except for the clause that FWMAPC would continue to provide operational guidelines. In further discussions between the ROK Commander and COMUSMACV it was determined that CG FFORCEV would have de facto operational control over ROK forces, however, orders would be phrased as requests.[14]

(U) On 9 Oct 65 the 2d ROK Marine Brigade landed at Cam Ranh Bay, marking the introduction of major ROK combat forces into RVN. After this initial arrival of combat forces, larger combat and combat-support units of the ROK armed forces continued to arrive over a period of several months, reaching a peak strength of approximately 50,000 personnel in 1968. Forces which were introduced included the Capital (Tiger) Division with initial elements landing on 22 Oct 65, a naval transportation unit which was activated on 15 Mar 66, the 100th Logistical Support Command established on 1 Jun 66, the 9th (White Horse) Division on 9 Aug 66, the 11th Aviation Company on 10 Apr 67, and an aerial support group on 1 Jul 67 (see Figure G-1).[15]

(U) ROK forces were deployed in five provinces along Highway No. 1 on the coastal plains of central Vietnam for clean-up operations, pacification of rural areas, and support of construction projects (see Figure G-2).[16]

(U) ROK combat operations in 1971 were highlighted by three large scale operations, the first of which was a search and clear operation code named Doksuri 71-1. The combined forces of the Tiger and White Horse Divisions conducted Doksuri 71-1 in Phu Yen Province, approximately 17 miles northwest of Tuy Hoa in Central Vietnam during the period 22 Feb through 11 Mar 71. Results of this operation were 427 enemy KIA; 3 PW taken; and 103 IW and CSW captured, while sustaining 23 friendly KIA and 74 WIA. The other two major operations conducted in 1971 were known as ROK summer operations, 1st and 2d phases. Both phases involved use of all combat units of the ROKFV, two infantry divisions and the ROK Marine Brigade.

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
ROK FORCES IN RVN
(1 JAN 71)
HUE
HOI AN
20 MARINE BDE
PLEIKU
QUI NHON
CAPITAL INF DIV
NINH HOA
9th INF DIV
NHA TRANG
100th LOG CMD
& Hq FLD CMD
BIEN HOA
SAIGON
CONST SUP GP
(DOVE UNIT)
VUNG TAU
CAN THO
20 1st MOBILE ARMY SURGICAL HOSPITAL

Figure G-2



While a CH-47 helicopter hovers above, ROK soldiers practice rappeling techniques north of Phu Cat.



ROK infantrymen advance across rice paddies during search and clear operations west of Qui Nhon.



A Royal Thai Army Voluntier Force patrol leader briefs the RTAVF commander at a night defensive position south of Bien Hoi.


AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND FORCES IN RVN
(1JAN 71)
HUE
HMAS PERTH WITH US 7th FLEET
NZ TRI-SVC MED TEAM
PLEIKU
PHAN RANG
2D RAAF SQDN
CHI LANG TNG CTR
NZATTV
SAIGON
NUI DAT
1st ATF
V CO NZATF
HQ AFV
HQ AATTV
HQ RAAF
HQ RAN
HQ NZVF
DONG TAM
RAN PILOTS WITH 135th US ARMY ASLT HEL CO
1st ALSG
1st FLD HOSP
ARMY LSM
17th CONST CO
5th RAASC CO
9th RAAF SQDN
35th RAAF SQDN
NZ LOG SPT ELEM

Figure G-3

[redacted]

These operations initiated in the Central Highlands during the periods 23 Apr to 14 May and 21 Jun to 11 Jul 1971 were planned to counter enemy plans to disrupt the RVN congressional election in August 1971 and the presidential election in October 1971.[17] The area of operations for both phases was in the Central Highlands, 50 miles northwest of Qui Nhon City, and 12 miles northwest of Tuy Hoa City; and 26 miles southwest of Da Nang. Combined results of both summer phases were 1,253 enemy KIA, 74 PW taken, 554 IW captured, and 58 CSW captured or destroyed. ROKFV reported that they killed the enemy at a ratio of 50 to 1 during Phase 1 of the summer operation and reported the loss of 12 KIA and 48 wounded during this period. During Phase 2 ROKFV losses were not reported.

(U) In the more than 6 years of military involvement in RVN, ROK armed forces have inflicted considerable losses upon the enemy. During this period they launched more than 1,100 combat operations of battalion or larger size. The results of ROK combat operations in terms of enemy losses were more than 37,500 enemy killed, 4,590 PW captured, 2,422 defectors detained, 17,840 small arms and 1,551 CSW captured. These battlefield results were not attained without scarifice, as during the same period the ROK forces suffered more than 3,950 KIA and 7,500 WIA.[18]

(C) During 1971 the Governments of Korea and RVN agreed that the security situation within RVN was such that elements of ROKFV could be redeployed to Korea. Plans for implementation of this decision were promulgated in COMUSMACV OPLAN J 211, which set forth the details for redeployment of the ROKFV 2d Marine Brigade, elements of the 100th Logistical Command and elements of HQ, ROKFV. This initial redeployment of ROK forces would be accomplished in seven increments. Increments 1 and 2, consisting of 2,449 men and associated equipment, redeployed from RVN during December 1971. The remaining five increments were scheduled for redeployment during the period January - April 1972.[19]

AUSTRALIA

(U) Australia was the first of the Free World countries to join the United States in providing military assistance to RVN. During July 1962 a 30-man team of officer and warrant officer volunteers arrived in Vietnam. This contingent became the nucleus of what was called the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (AATTV). AATTV was integrated with American advisory teams who were working with the Vietnamese in Army training centers. Most of their effort was concentrated in MR 1.[20]

(U) A working agreement between COMUSMACV and Australia was signed on 27 Jul 62 which placed AATTV under the operational control of COMUSMACV.[21]

(U) During August 1964 a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) detachment arrived in Vietnam and was employed under the operational control of COMUSMACV as part of the Southeast Asia (SEA) airlift. This unit, known as No. 35 Squadron, was based at Vung Tau with six Caribou aircraft and 74 personnel (see Figure G-3).[22]

(U) In April 1965, the Australian Government decided to increase its assistance to the RVN. This resulted in the formation of the Australian Army Force in Vietnam (AAFV). Elements of AAFV arrived in Vietnam during May - June 1965. Included in this contingent was a battalion of the 1st Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), a logistical support company, a cavalry troop, and a signal troop. In September 1965 a contingent of 350 reinforcements arrived in RVN which

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AUSTRALIAN FORCES ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

(1 JAN 71)



Figure G-4

consisted of artillery, engineer, signal, aviation, and logistical elements. Under a renewed working agreement with COMUSMACV, AAFV was placed under the operational control of COMUSMACV.[23]

(U) In June 1966 there was a substantial increase in Australia's commitment. At this time the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) was formed at Nui Dat and HQ AAFV was reorganized to include Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) representation (see Figure G-3). The principal units of the Task Force were the 5th and 6th Battalions, RAR; the 3d Special Air Service Squadron; two batteries of Australian artillery; and one New Zealand battery (see Figure G-4).[24]

(U) The RAAF contribution in RVN consisted of No. 9 Squadron, deployed in June 1966, which provided helicopter support to the ATF; No. 2 Squadron, deployed in April 1967, equipped with Canberra bombers; No. 35 Squadron equipped with Caribou aircraft which provided resupply runs into Saigon, Nui Dat, and Vung Tau; and two squadrons of Hercules air transports which provided support in Vietnam from their bases in Australia. The bomber squadron was located at Phan Rang Air Base (see Figure G-3) and was used to interdict and attack enemy targets throughout South Vietnam.[25]

(U) The RAN contribution in RVN consisted of naval destroyer ships which operated in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin, a contingent of naval helicopter personnel (eight pilots, four air crewmen, and 30 ground crewmen), and a detachment of naval clearance divers. The first destroyer to see duty in the waters of Vietnam was HMAS Hobart, which was assigned in March 1967 to duties with the US 7th Fleet. In September 1967 the Hobart was relieved by HMAS Perth, and the two ships alternated in 6-month tours of duty until 1969 when HMAS Brisbane and HMAS Vendetta took over the duties of performing alternating tours with the US 7th Fleet. The last Australian destroyer to be assigned to the 7th Fleet, HMAS Brisbane, was returned to Australia in September 1971.[26]

(U) Until October 1967 the strength of the Australian Forces in Vietnam was approximately 6,300. In that month the government announced that Australia's commitment would be increased to more than 8,000 including Navy, Army, and Air Force components. This increase included the 3d Battalion, RAR, a squadron of Centurion tanks, and combat and logistical support units.[27]

(U) Civic action in Phuoc Tuy Province was a vital aspect of the work of the 1st ATF since it began its operational role in the province in 1966. In mid-1967 the 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit was formed and sent to Vietnam with the primary mission of assisting the people of the province. Major projects in which the ATF was involved were construction of 600 houses for Vietnamese soldiers and their families, at 13 different sites throughout the province; rebuilding and resurfacing of Route 2, the main highway which runs north-south through the province; the construction of bridges over the Song Rai River on Route 23; and provision of technical advice and materials for village self-help projects.[28]

(U) The Australian Civil Affairs Unit was active in improving agricultural methods. Many notable improvements were made in rice quality, chicken and pig breeding, and sorghum production. On the medical side, the Civil Affairs Unit in conjunction with the combat elements of the ATF conducted MEDCAP operations, constructed several small dispensaries, and made repairs and improvements on Phuoc Tuy's main hospital in Baria. Other Australian assistance to the province included the building of new classrooms and schools; construction of several windmills, reticulation systems, and water systems; building of markets, community centers, sporting facilities, and village offices; and provision of electricity generating plants.[29]



An Australian soldier teaches brick-laying to a South Vietnamese apprentice building Regional Force barracks in Baria, Phouc Tuy Province.

(U) Following a series of announced US withdrawals in 1969 the Prime Minister, Mr. John Gorton, announced on 16 December that Australian forces would be reduced by one battalion and some support troops. In November 1970 the 8th Battalion was returned to Australia and was not replaced. On 18 Aug 71 the new Prime Minister, Mr. William McMahon, announced that the 1st ATF would be withdrawn and that most of the combat elements would be home by Christmas 1971. From 15 Sep to Dec 71 Australian units closed out their base camp at Nui Dat, redeployed a large portion of the ATF to Australia, and prepared for redeployment of the remaining elements of the task force.

(U) As of 8 Jan 72 strength of Australian Forces in RVN stood at 1,618. Of this number, 251 were members of the Australian Force Headquarters elements in Saigon, 71 were stationed in Phuoc Tuy Province as part of the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam, and the remaining 1,296 personnel were at Vung Tau preparing for redeployment.[30]

(U) The AFV strength was projected to be reduced to 150 personnel as of 31 Mar 72. These personnel were to man a much reduced headquarters in Saigon and constitute the AATTV which would remain in RVN in a training role for an indefinite period.[31]

NEW ZEALAND

(U) New Zealand (NZ) began its assistance to the RVN on 29 Jun 64 when a small team of Army Engineers was deployed. These engineers were tasked to assist the RVN in civic action projects and were stationed in Thu Dau Mot in MR 3. On 30 Jun 64 the NZ team was extended rights, privileges, and exemptions provided for in the Pentalateral Agreement of 1950.[32]

(U) In response to a request from the GVN in early 1965, the New Zealand Government decided to commit a combat force to the RVN. The first NZ combat contribution was the 161 Battery, Royal NZ Artillery, which arrived at Bien Hoa on 21 Jul 65. For 1 year it was attached to the US 173d Airborne Brigade. The battery supported many brigade engagements in War Zone D. In July 1966, 161 Battery was redeployed to Nui Dat where it supported both Australian and New Zealand forces in Phuoc Tuy Province until its withdrawal in April 1971.

(U) In April and May 1967, as an adjunct to the combat forces, the 1st New Zealand Services Medical Team was dispatched to RVN. The team commenced work at Bong Son village in Binh Dinh Province, where they expanded the dispensary and eventually established a small hospital (see Figure G-3). The medical team provided outpatient medical service and assisted province officials in educating the people in various aspects of public health.

(U) The next combat unit to arrive was V Company, Royal NZ Infantry Regiment. The company arrived at Nui Dat on 13 May 67 and initially was attached to the 6th Bn Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), later being transferred to 2d Bn RAR. In December 1967 the second infantry company arrived at Nui Dat and was designated W Company. This company was also attached to the 2d Bn RAR for operations. The last NZ combat unit to be deployed to the RVN was 4 Troop, NZ Special Air Service. This troop arrived at Nui Dat in December 1968 and was attached to the Australian Special Air Service Squadron, 1st Australian Task Force (see Figure G-3). During its tour, 4 Troop was employed in an intelligence gathering role and participated in extensive long-range patrolling and established an excellent combat record.[33]

(U) From the time of their arrival in Vietnam, the combat elements of the NZ force were deployed almost continuously on operations. The artillery battery fired 230,659 rounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition and sustained 4 KIA and 16 WIA. Total casualties sustained by all New Zealand forces from 1965 until completion of redeployment on 10 Dec 71 was 37 KIA and 172 WIA.[34]

(C) Command and control of the New Zealand Army Force Vietnam (NZFV) was spelled out in a series of Military Working Arrangements (MWA) between the Commander, New Zealand Army Force Far East (COMNZAFFE) and COMUSMACV. The latest of these arrangements was signed on 10 May 68. These arrangements provided that COMNZFV would exercise command of NZ troops in RVN while COMUSMACV would have operational control of NZ forces. This operational control was normally exercised through the Australian Task Force (ATF).[35]

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ROYAL THAI FORCES VIETNAM

(1 JANUARY 1971)



Figure G-5

(C) Under the Military Working Arrangements, COMUSMACV was tasked to provide logistical and administrative support through the ATF to New Zealand forces serving with the Australians. Support was provided on the same basis as that provided for US Forces.[36]

(U) Withdrawal of New Zealand forces has been made in consonance with US and GVN plans. During November 1970 W Company became the first New Zealand combat unit to withdraw from RVN. The NZ Special Air Service, 4 Troop was withdrawn to NZ in February 1971. During April and May 1971 the 161 Battery was withdrawn from Nui Dat and redeployed. On 10 Dec 71 the final withdrawal of NZ combat forces was accomplished with the redeployment of V Company and the 1st New Zealand Service Medical Team.[37]

(U) After all NZ combat forces had been withdrawn from RVN, NZ continued to assist RVN with the New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (NZATTV). This team of 25 men was stationed at the Chi Lang National Training Center, in Chau Doc Province, where it provided leadership training for Regional Force officers. In addition to NZATTV, NZ had a four-man contingent serving with Australian Army Training Team (AATTV) at Van Kiep in Phuoc Tuy Province. Their mission there was training Regional and Popular Force officers and NCOs in jungle warfare techniques.[38]

THAILAND

(U) The Royal Thai Government (RTG) began providing limited military assistance to RVN on 29 Sep 64, with the introduction of a small training team of Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) pilots and flight engineers into RVN. This group, known as the "Victory Flight," manned RVN and US aircraft with RTAF markings and assisted in the training of RVN Air Force pilots and flight crews.

(U) The RTG, in coordination with the US Government, approved of subsequent increases in military assistance to RVN. In preparation for these increases on 22 Feb 66, the RTG established a command and control element in Saigon known as the Military Assistance Group, Vietnam (MAGV).[39]

(U) The first of these increases in military assistance consisted of a naval force equipped with one landing ship tank (LST-3) and one patrol gunboat medium (PGM). The LST HMS Pa-Ngan was placed under the operational control of the US Military Sea Transport Service, Saigon. Its area of operations included the coastal areas from the 17th parallel down to the Mekong Delta area to include the Saigon River. The mission of the Pa-Ngan was to transport supplies, equipment, and personnel from main depots located at the various ports along the Vietnamese coast within the area of responsibility assigned in Operation MARKET TIME (see Chapter V). The PGM was granted authority by the GVN to make arrests, to stop and inspect all vessels in Vietnamese waters, and if necessary to apply needed force. Its main mission was to help prevent Communist infiltration from the coastal areas.[40]

(U) Thai ground combat forces were introduced to RVN in August 1967 when a volunteer infantry brigade, the Queen's Cobras, was assigned to RVN. At this time the Thai MAGV was reorganized and named Headquarters, Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam (RTFV) (see Figure G-5).

(U) Late in 1967, RVN requested that Thailand increase the number of its ground combat troops to an infantry division. Thailand responded by sending an 11,000 man division to RVN in July 1968. This force officially designated as the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF), was also known as the Black Panther Division (name changed to Black Leopard in July 1970).

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
THAI FORCES IN RVN
(1 JAN 71)
HUE
PLEIKU
NHA TRANG
SAIGON
LONG THANH
CAMP BEARCAT
RTAVF
CAN THO
HQ RTFV
SEA HORSE
(LST & PGM)
VICTORY FLIGHT

Figure G-6

This light infantry division was based at Camp Bearcat, northeast of Saigon, and had an area of operations which covered the entire area of Long Thanh District, Bien Hoa Province, and the western parts of Xuan Loc District, Long Khanh Province (see Figure G-6). This area was further subdivided into brigade and battalion areas of responsibility. Within the RTAVF area of operations (AO), nine semipermanent fire support bases (FSB) were established. These battery-size FSB were geographically located so that they could provide mutual fire support and support the ground-gaining elements throughout the AO, without frequent displacement of the firing batteries.[41]

(U) The general mission of the RTAVF was to conduct combat operations within their AO with particular emphasis on protection of the southern flank of Long Binh Post, provision of fire support and on-call ground reinforcements to the US Army installation at Long Thanh North Airfield, and keeping Highway 15 secure and open to friendly traffic. Highway 15 is the main supply route between the seaport at Vung Tau and the Long Binh-Saigon area.[42]

(U) The RTFV rotated by units instead of individually. The division rotated one of its two regiments every 6 months, replacing it with a new regiment. The crews on the ships were rotated by replacing one-half of the crew every 6 months. HQ RTFV rotated during July of each year, being replaced by a complete new headquarters and commander. The first rotation of the RTAVF occurred in May 1967, and there were five subsequent rotations. The 6th and final rotation arrived in RVN during February 1971.[43]

(U) Besides engaging in combat operations, the Thai Armed Forces in the RVN participated extensively in various civic action projects including community development and medical treatment in remote and inaccessible areas. The Thai mobile aid and medical units visited isolated hamlets distributing relief, helping construct or repair schools, government offices, monasteries, roads, and bridges, and giving medical treatment. The Thai civic action effort consisted of nine projects that were conducted jointly by Thai soldiers and the Vietnamese Government. Five projects were directed toward aiding groups of children, three in assisting religious groups, and one to helping poor adult groups.

(U) A major part of the Thai civic action program centered around the medical team that was located at Thu Duc Health Center in Gia Dinh Province. The center operated daily and provided rooms with approximately 30 beds for maternity use. In addition to their daily schedule, the doctors and nurses visited orphanages three times weekly in the afternoons. The Vietnamese Ministry of Health provided all medical equipment for the Thu Duc Health Center and the orphanages. The medicine used in the treatment of patients was taken from the US allowances of medical supplies issued for Thai soldiers.

(U) The welfare work conducted by the Thai Forces included providing necessities to such charitable organizations as orphanages, the Veterans Organization, and medical centers. Donations to these organizations included sewing machines, knitting machines, rice, construction materials, cholera and typhoid vaccines, condensed milk, carp fingerlings, and cement.[44]

(U) On 12 Jan 71 Prime Minister Thanom Kittikarhorn of Thailand announced plans for redeployment of the RTFV from RVN. The phaseout of Thai combat forces was to be accomplished in two major increments. The first withdrawal during July - August 1971 consisted of the 5th rotation RTAVF which was redeployed to Thailand without replacement. Upon completion of this rotation of one brigade and a portion of the RTAVF support elements, the Black Leopard Division at Camp Bearcat was redesignated as a Task Force. The PGM redeployed to Thailand on 8 May 1971. With this reduction in force, the Headquarters RTFV in Saigon was reduced from an authorized strength of 292 to 202 personnel, and the Commander RTFV was concurrently downgraded from Lieutenant General to Major General. The 45-man Air Force "Victory Flight"

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Royal Thai Army medical teams conduct medical examinations of children at Binh Son village, Bien Hoa Province.

redeployed to Thailand Nov/Dec 1971. During the period 3 Jan to 4 Feb 72 the 6th rotational increment of the RTAVF deployed to Thailand.

(C) A residual Thai force consisting of approximately 800 men remained as a temporary headquarters element in Saigon. This element administered all uncompleted administrative and logistical actions pertaining to the RTFV. Final phaseout of RTFV was scheduled for April 1972.[45]

PHILIPPINES

(U) Long before the signing of the Geneva Accords in July 1954, the people of the Philippines were concerned over the plight of war-torn Vietnam and its people. In 1953 because of this concern, a group of volunteers, sanctioned by the Philippine Government, decided to extend assistance to those who were suffering from the ravages of war. This privately-sponsored group of doctors, nurses and psychological operations personnel was known as Operation Brotherhood. They were dispatched to Vietnam in early 1954. Upon arrival, the specialists were divided into small teams and dispatched to population centers of South Vietnam, ranging from Quang Tri Province in the north to An Xuyen Province in the southern Delta region. These teams, in addition to providing medical assistance and civic actions, attempted through psychological operations to unify the people in support of their newly constituted government in Saigon.[46]

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(U) As a member nation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Philippines was bound by agreements and commitments to fight against Communist aggression. In consonance with this obligation, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 4165 on 21 Jul 64, authorizing the President to send economic and technical assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. In August 1964 pursuant to this Act, a 34-man contingent, consisting of physicians, surgeons, nurses, psychological and rural development workers from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was dispatched to Vietnam. This Philippines contingent (PHILCON I), was divided into four teams, which were located 60 miles northwest of Saigon at Tay Ninh, 40 miles southwest of Saigon at My Tho, 15 miles north of Saigon at Phu Cuong, and at Kontum in the central highlands, 265 miles northeast of Saigon.[47]

(U) On 14 Apr 65 the GVN requested increased aid from the Government of the Philippines. This resulted in the authorization and subsequent deployment of the Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam (PHILCAGV), which arrived in the fall of 1966. It consisted of an engineer construction unit, medical and rural development teams, a security battalion, a field artillery battery, a logistics support company, and a headquarters element. On 1 Oct 66, the PHILCON teams were placed under the administrative and operational control of PHILCAGV.[48]

(C) The specific mission of the PHILCAGV was to provide civic action assistance to the RVN by construction, rehabilitation, and development of works, utilities, and structures, plus improvement of public health and communications facilities. The Military Working Agreement signed on 20 Jul 66, specified that the PHILCAGV missions would be determined by the Free World Military Assistance Policy Council. Command and control was vested in the Commanding General PHILCAGV. The rural health teams and the provincial hospital medical/surgical teams provided services on a mission basis in coordination with the RVN Ministry of Public Health, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).[49]

(U) PHILCAGV assumed responsibility for all of the PHILCONV projects and was charged with several new tasks. To carry out this mission more effectively, a new plan was put into effect. It provided for the continuation and revitalization of all civic action activities and the introduction of additional projects within its area of operations. These activities were grouped into four distinct programs; Engineering Civic Action Program (ECAP), Medical and Dental Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), Miscellaneous Environmental Improvement Program (MEIP), and PHILCAGV to People Program (PPP).

-- The ECAP covered major construction, rehabilitation, alteration, and repair of facilities such as roads, bridges, culverts, pavements, buildings, and other public utilities.

-- The MEDCAP administered to the improvement of health of the civilian populace. Both fixed and mobile medical teams operated in the five provinces of Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, Dinh Tuong, Binh Duong, and Gia Dinh.

-- The MEIP projects were intended to supplement the rural development program of the RVN. The emphasis here was on minor, short-range but immediate impact projects. Activities under MEIP include: the construction of refugee centers for displaced persons; maintenance of a demonstration farm planted with Philippine miracle rice to serve as a model to farmers throughout the RVN; clearing of forests for future community sites; setting up poultry and swine projects; education of the people in matters of hygiene; minor road repairs, and other activities designed to help improve the environment of the people.

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-- The PFP was a special civic action effort utilizing the excess or otherwise idle resources of PHILCAGV units to help the people of selected hamlets to help themselves. Eleven hamlets were sponsored under this program. The program included distribution of foodstuffs, clothing, school supplies, and playground equipment; repair and repainting schools, hamlet headquarters buildings, churches, and temples; sponsorship of student scholarships, provision of entertainment at small social affairs in hamlets, and other minor activities which served to bring the Philippine soldier closer to the people.[50]

(C) In 1969, an election year in the Philippines, PHILCAGV became a public and political issue. As a result of these pressures, on 14 Nov 69, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) decided on withdrawal of PHILCAG from Vietnam. Withdrawal of PHILCAGV began on 1 Dec 69 and was completed on 15 Dec 69.



A PHILCONV dental officer and dental technician attend to patients at the out-patient clinic of Binh Duong province hospital.

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(C) As PHILCAGV phased out, PHILCONV was reconstituted on 6 Dec 69, with an authorized strength of 56 personnel.[51] Upon reconstitution, PHILCONV reverted to its original primary mission of providing medical, surgical, and dental assistance to the civilian populace of central Vietnam. PHILCONV was headquartered in Saigon and had small medical, surgical, and dental teams located in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Dinh Tuong, and Hau Nghia Provinces. Medical services which have been provided by these teams is summarized below:

AVERAGE WEEKLY NUMBER OF CASES TREATED BY PHILCONV TEAMS
(1969 - 1971)

Province	Out Patient Care	Surgical Cases	Dental Cases
Tay Ninh	240	250	103
Binh Duong	200	60	300
Dinh Tuong	432	230	350
Hau Nghia	2,840	17	105

(U) As of 6 Dec 71 PHILCONV had 60 personnel. This contingent, PHILCONV XIV, was due for rotation back to the Philippines in June 1972. The Commander of PHILCONV XIV recommended to his superiors that future contingents include as many highly skilled medical specialists as possible, as opposed to sending general medical practitioners. The skills of these specialists would be determined by the recorded history of the particular medical needs in the PHILCONV area of operations.[53] Two examples of past needs for specialists are:

-- On 12 Feb 71 a 14-year old Vietnamese girl from Kien Hoa Province was brought to the province hospital with grievous wounds over the heart and in the abdomen. Lt Benedicto Mina, a cardiac surgeon, worked on the patient for several hours and the girl survived despite the critical wounds, because of the presence of a cardiac surgeon.[54]

-- On 2 Dec 68, a boy from Cam Long hamlet was operated on by a team of specialists for a harelip and perforated palate. Because of the available expertise the operation was a success and 12 days later the boy's family returned to the hospital to express their thanks to PHILCAGV.[55]

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(U) The Republic of China (ROC) began providing military assistance to the RVN on 8 Oct 64 with the arrival in Saigon of 14 officers who made up a political warfare training team. Upon their arrival, the Military Assistance Group, Republic of China, Vietnam (MAGROCV) was formed.[56]

(C) On 6 May 65 the Commander MAGROCV and the Chief of Staff USMACV signed a Military Working Arrangement. Under this agreement, command of all ROC units and personnel assigned to MAGROCV was vested in COMROCMACV, guidance on general concept of employment was furnished by FWMAPC, the GVN Ministry of Health exercised operational control of

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the ROC provincial health assistance teams in coordination with USAID, and USMACV was tasked to provide administrative and logistical support. The Military Working Arrangement of 1965 was superseded by another one signed on 19 Dec 68, which did not significantly change the command and control arrangements.[57]

(U) The ROC provided political warfare military advisors to the RVNAF on a continuing basis since 1964. These advisors were assigned to each of the four RVNAF MR headquarters, the RVNAF Political Warfare School at Da Lat, and the General Political Warfare Department, RVNAF Joint General Staff, Saigon. ROCMAGV personnel were utilized only as political/psychological warfare advisors on noncombatant type missions.[58]

(U) In addition to noncombatant military assistance, the ROC furnished nearly US $4 million in economic and social welfare aid to the RVN during the period 1964-71. This aid was largely concentrated on agricultural assistance. The Chinese agricultural technical mission program emphasized agricultural programs and had projects in plant adaption, agricultural extension services, livestock, poultry, fisheries, farmer organizations, and village improvement. Other activities included commodity grants to the Ministry of Communications and Post, a dredging project and training for selected Vietnamese officials in Taiwan.[59]

(U) In 1971 there were 31 officers assigned to the ROCMAGV. This strength was projected to remain constant.[60]

SPAIN

(C) On 29 Nov 65 the Spanish Council of Ministers approved a request from the GVN to dispatch a 12-man medical team to the RVN. On 9 Sep 66 the team consisting of four doctors, seven nurses, and one quartermaster captain arrived. They were stationed in Go Cong Province 30 miles south of Saigon in the RVN Delta region.

(C) A working agreement was negotiated and signed by the Head, Spanish Medical Mission and the Deputy Chief of Staff, USMACV on 22 Jul 67. The agreement provided that command of all Spanish medical personnel would be vested in the Head, Spanish Medical Mission, that FWMAPC was to be established to prescribe general concepts of employment of the team, and that USMACV would provide administrative and logistical support.[62]

(U) During most of 1971 the Spanish Medical Mission consisted of seven army medical officers. In coordination with the Office of Public Health USAID, they assisted the GVN Ministry of Health in the care and well-being of Vietnamese civilians. The Spanish team operated from the Go Cong provincial hospital and its efforts were entirely humanitarian.[63]

(U) During November 1971 the Spanish Government informed the Chief, Free World Military Assistance Organization that the Spanish medical team in Vietnam would terminate on 15 Dec 71, due to the shortage of technically qualified personnel.[64]

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FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES - ANNEX G

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27. Same as #24, pp 3-4.

28. Same as #24, pp 6-7.

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30. Memo for the Chief FWMAO (U), 8 Jan 72, Subj: Unit Strengths and Locations of Australian Force, Vietnam, pp 1-2.

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ANNEX H

TRENDS IN TERRITORIAL SECURITY

(C) By the end of 1970 improved security prevailed throughout RVN as the number of VC controlled hamlets was reduced and enemy activity continued to decline. The GVN recognized that progress in territorial security was imperative in order to maintain a steady rate of improvement or prevent regression in the face of US and other Free World Military Assistance Sources (FWMAF) unit redeployments. The enemy's adoption of small unit actions, increased terrorism, and proselyting of resources caused the GVN to revise plans for security and development at the local level.[1]

SECURITY CONCEPTS

(C) The GVN 1971 Community Defense and Local Development (CD and LD) Plan provided that security responsibility for an area would be the responsibility of a single individual, the province chief/sector commander, an infantry division commander, or a Border Defense Forces commander. According to the plan, the concept for area security was:

> . . . aimed at providing protection for the population already in secure areas, extending security to people not yet living in secure areas, neutralizing the enemy found among the people, and eliminating armed enemy units from the country.[2]

The concept allowed for transition from military to civilian control with the ultimate objective of providing effective security for the entire population of RVN.

(C) The CD and LD Plan defined four types of areas under the area security concept (see Figure H-1). A secure area was a populated area where the normal functions of local government were conducted under the control of the province chief. There was freedom of day and night movement, no imminent attacks, and only occasional acts of terrorism or fire attacks. The consolidation zone was under the province chief's control in which intensive pacification was being undertaken. Night curfew was strictly enforced. Enemy attacks were not imminent, but frequent acts of terrorism and indirect fire attacks could be expected. This zone was to prevent the enemy forces from reaching the secure area. The clearing zone was a contested area under the infantry division or other tactical unit commander's control where combat operations were conducted to neutralise enemy forces and base areas. The province chief retained responsibility for all civil functions in the clearing zone. The border surveillance zone was that area contiguous to the national borders. Tactical commanders had the responsibility for the detection of enemy buildup and reinforcement of security.[3]

(C) The principal task in the secure areas was to maintain and improve existing security. Popular Forces (PF), People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF), and National Police (NP), in a coordinated effort under the control of the village chief, would maintain security and law and order in secure areas, with the support of the Regional Forces (RF) if required. The principal task of units acting within the consolidation zone was to provide an outer belt of protection for the secure area and to raise the level of security to the same as the secure zone. RF/PF were to have primary responsibility in the consolidation zone with the field police providing patrol and law enforcement capabilities.

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AREA SECURITY CONCEPT



Source: MACJ3

Figure H-1

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(C) The mission of the forces operating in the clearing zones was to rid the area of the enemy, particularly VC/NVA main and local forces, and prevent their re-entry. As a part of this task, the enemy had to be separated from the population. When the enemy threat was reduced or neutralized and base areas were abandoned or isolated, the newly cleared area would be added to the consolidation zone. RVN regular forces, assisted by FWMAF, were normally assigned this mission.

(C) MR commanders were to have the responsibility for the border surveillance zone where the major tasks were detecting and engaging the enemy and deterring infiltration attempts. Operations conducted in the border surveillance zone were conducted by RVN and FWMAF, closely coordinated with border camp and unconventional warfare forces.

Security Forces

(S) Employment of forces. In accordance with the area security concept, RVNAF with US and other FWMAF assistance continued operations during 1971 which supported pacification, thereby making it possible for the Territorial Forces to maintain local security. Regular force operations included clearing operations into VC/NVA base areas and interdicting enemy supply lines, both in-country and cross-border. Border surveillance and training of Territorial Forces also continued to be a major function of regular forces during the year.

(S/NF) In MR 1 some regular forces were employed for the protection of installations and cities at Da Nang and Hue, but most of these forces were deployed in the border highlands and along the DMZ to block the entrance of large organized enemy forces.[4]

(C/NF) Population security in MR 2 was difficult because of the large area, wide dispersion of enemy units, and numerous infiltration routes. Consequently, more RVNAF/FWMAF were assigned local security missions in MR 2 than in any other MR. At the end of 1971, 12 of the 31 infantry battalions were assigned pacification and development missions. Except for two infantry battalions providing security for Cam Ranh and Tuy Hoa, US combat forces completed their withdrawal from MR 2 in August. Security forces were further reduced in Binh Dinh Province with the deployment of the 22d ARVN Div to Pleiku and Kontum provinces. The Capital and 9th ROK Divisions remained to secure the coastal area.[5]

(S) For the most part, regular forces in MR 3 conducted mobile, interdiction, and cross-border operations as prescribed in the CD and LD Plan. The ability of the Territorial Forces to assume security responsibility freed the regular forces for these missions as well as reducing the gap left by the redeployment of US and other FWMAF. Although regular forces were not used directly in support of pacification, they effectively assisted in preserving territorial security by providing a protective shield along the border areas.[6]

(S) Most territorial security operations in MR 4 were conducted by RF/PF and PSDF units, with the exception of the 7th Inf Div whose mission was consolidation, occupation, and pacification in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Vinh Binh provinces. Regular forces concentrated on clearing operations to destroy enemy base areas and intercept supplies, both in-country and cross-border. The 9th and 21st Divisions (ARVN) supported pacification by clearing operations which established GVN control and permitted resettlement of secure areas.[7]

Territorial Forces and the Force Transition Concept

(C) A new "force transition concept" was instituted by the RVN Joint General Staff (JGS) with MACV assistance on 24 Jul 71 to extend and improve territorial security throughout RVN.

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This National Police Field Force rifleman, with hi modern M16, helps the Territorial Forces maintain security.

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The concept replaced the "Territorial Forces concept" which envisioned RF/PF units operating exclusively in their own villages. Under the force transition concept, National Police and PSDF would defend the secure areas. RF/PF units, after a training program, would conduct operations away from secure villages into the unpopulated areas. The concept involved transferring strength allocations to establish new units, moving entire units, and transferring missions and areas of operations (AO) from RF/PF to National Police and PSDF. An RVN JGS memorandum (6 Dec 71) stated the reasons for reallocation of forces:

> The Territorial Security program has not obtained satisfactory results. . . . Because progress of the program has not reached the preplanned level, it may possibly delay [achievement] of the 1971 plan and it will not create favorable circumstances for the forthcoming 1972 plan. In order that this situation can be reversed and in order that the Territorial Security program can be more strongly developed in the remaining three months of the plan. MRs, Special Areas and sectors will immediately apply measures aimed at reconciling the Regional and Popular Forces to the D, E, and V hamlets where additional units are required.[8]

(C) Reallocation of forces was designed to achieve the following:

-- Extension of security into areas only partially controlled.

-- Recovery of population elements presently under enemy domination.

-- Security for resettlement of valuable land areas.

-- Control and security of lines of communication linking land areas.

Reallocation of forces was a key factor in territorial security by the end of 1971.[9]

(U) Regional Forces. The mission of RF under the force transition concept was to support pacification and development efforts by conducting unilateral and/or coordinated mobile offensive operations against enemy provincial mobile and local forces. These tasks required the RF to shift from manning outposts in secure areas to conducting continuous offensive operations in unpopulated areas. Only in the most compelling cases were the RF to be used for protection of LOC, important installations, or village and hamlet. RF companies, RF battalions (four companies), and RF groups (three to five companies) would be used to attack enemy local/main force units. RF units were controlled by the province chief.[10]

(C) The assigned RF strength in RVN as of 31 Dec 71 was 95.8 percent of the authorized strength. Although the assigned strength decreased slightly, it was still considered satisfactory. The RF assigned strength increased in MRs 2 and 4, and decreased in MRs 1 and 3. Leadership improved during the year as the number of authorized officer and noncommissioned officers increased. Critical shortages remained in the grades E-8, and O-3 through O-6. The planned activation of 7 RF battalions, 41 group headquarters elements, and 131 companies would demand more leaders.

(C) Desertions continued to be the single greatest drain on manpower resources. The JGS/RVNAF established rate (8 per 1,000) was exceeded in the last 4 months of the year: 10.5 in September and October up to 11.7 in November, and down to 9.5 in December. The desertion rate was the highest in MR 4 (14.1) and lowest in MR 1 (5.1), compared to the overall RVNAF rate of 12.3. The pay raise for RF soldiers in November 1971 was expected to reduce the desertion rate.

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Territorial Forces manning defensive positions like this one on the very edge of Saigon, are the first to sound the alarm and engage enemy forces.

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(C) As US mobile advisory teams (MAT) continued to phasedown in 1971, Vietnamese Mobile Advisory Teams (VMAT) assumed responsibility for training of Territorial Forces by supplementing the national training centers and conducting refresher training for RF battalions.[11]

(C) Popular Forces. During 1971, the PF were the primary agency for security of villages and LOC between villages. PF platoons were dedicated to providing a 24-hour security force under the control of the village/hamlet chief. PF units were organized into platoons with an authorized strength of 29 men. Previously, the authorized strength was reduced from 35 men to 32 men, and finally to 29 men: this action increased the number of platoons authorized and provided the basis for recruiting more men to fill the vacancies. PF assigned strength in RVN was 96.6 percent of that authorized as 1971 ended. In each MR the percentage varied slightly: MR 1 (97.7), MR 2 (94.3), MR 3 (91.4), and MR 4 (96.7).[12]

(C) The quality of leadership improved in 1971, but more junior leaders were required with the organization of 29-man platoons. Cadre training for platoon and squad leader continued at training centers, with the objective of upgrading leadership.

(C) Training of the approximately 1,000 new platoons created by the reduction in the platoon strength levels continued to progress satisfactorily. By December, 553 platoons had completed training. Some of the new platoons received only 3 weeks of basic unit training while others formed with all new personnel received the full 15-week program. Of the approximately 600 remaining platoons, approximately 200 were in training during December and would complete the required training in early 1972. The remaining new platoons were to be formed and trained in 1972. Refresher training for PF platoons fell short of the 1971 goals, as only 64 percent completed training. The shortfall was caused, in part, by the priority training given to the newly activated platoons.

(C) Desertions continued to drain PF units of needed manpower. JGS/RVNAF established an acceptable desertion rate of 5 per 1,000. The countrywide desertion rate averaged 7.6 percent of assigned strength, compared to the overall RVNAF rate of 12.3.

(C) Evaluation of Territorial Forces. The performance of the Territorial Forces was monitored by the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES), a joint US/Vietnamese report outlining the monthly RF/PF mission performance, problems associated with mission performance, and unit training.[13] Factors considered in the evaluation of the Territorial Forces were leadership, training, desertion rate, logistics support, strength, and mission assignment. Figures H-2 and H-3 show the monthly results of RF company operations in terms of personnel and weapons losses.

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RF COMPANY OPERATIONS: 1971
(Personnel - loss Ratio)

CY71 Month	RF Ops	RF Ops w/contact	Percent RF Ops w/contact	En KIA	RF KIA	Ratio
Jan	189,689	3,199	1.7	1,337	473	2.8: 1
Feb	186,111	4,638	2.5	1,876	700	2.7: 1
Mar	171,920	5,488	3.2	2,627	857	3.1: 1
Apr	177,019	3,625	2.0	2,970	724	4.1: 1
May	152,106	2,981	2.0	2,475	713	3.5: 1
Jun	203,761	2,855	1.4	2,665	667	4.0: 1
Jul	216,496	2,899	1.3	2,032	531	3.8: 1
Aug	189,480	2,538	1.3	2,092	550	3.8: 1
Sep	218,610	2,662	1.2	1,876	544	4.1: 1
Oct	212,570	2,628	1.2	1,751	550	3.5: 1
Nov	205,884	2,318	1.1	1,585	505	3.1: 1
Dec	177,364	2,536	1.4	2,963*	327	8.8: 1

* Includes enemy KIA by RF in Cambodia

Source: MACJ3-05

Figure H - 2

(C) The TFES also evaluated RF unit performances in terms of weapons-loss ratio. Figure H-3 shows the monthly results of RF company operations.

RF COMPANY OPERATIONS: 1971
(Weapons - loss Ratio)

CY71 Month	Indiv Wpns Captured by RF	Indiv Wpns Captured by Enemy	Ratio	CS Wpns Captured by RF	CS Wpns Captured by Enemy	Ratio
Jan	514	80	6.4: 1	54	1	54.0: 1
Feb	742	188	4.1: 1	76	7	10.9: 1
Mar	1,031	157	6.6: 1	93	7	13.3: 1
Apr	321	169	1.9: 1	89	3	29.7: 1
May	899	117	7.7: 1	75	2	37.5: 1
Jun	943	167	5.6: 1	68	4	17.0: 1
Jul	828	104	8.0: 1	69	0	--
Aug	716	136	5.3: 1	79	1	79.0: 1
Sep	722	151	4.8: 1	51	1	51.0: 1
Oct	769	172	4.3: 1	60	2	30.0: 1
Nov	597	64	9.3: 1	46	0	--
Dec	520	161	3.2: 1	42	4	10.5: 1

Source: MACJ3-05

Figure H - 3

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(C) The TFES evaluated the performance of PF platoons in the same manner as RF Companies. Figures H-4 and H-5 show the monthly results of PF platoon operations in 1971.

PF PLATOON OPERATIONS: 1971
(Personnel - loss Ratio)

CY71 Month	PF Ops	PF Ops w/contact	Percent PF Ops w/contact	En KIA	PF KIA	Ratio
Jan	309,641	3,823	1.2	610	478	1.3: 1
Feb	304,520	3,972	1.3	853	503	1.7: 1
Mar	294,681	3,749	1.3	778	662	1.2: 1
Apr	305,263	4,016	1.3	826	622	1.3: 1
May	291,515	3,009	1.0	688	502	1.4: 1
Jun	322,843	3,168	1.0	809	478	1.7: 1
Jul	358,866	2,874	0.8	552	464	1.2: 1
Aug	345,878	3,616	1.0	618	434	1.4: 1
Sep	353,801	2,253	0.6	683	425	1.6: 1
Oct	379,848	2,240	0.6	545	356	1.5: 1
Nov	344,913	2,061	0.6	736	358	2.1: 1
Dec	331,352	1,993	0.6	817*	177	4.6: 1

* Includes enemy KIA by PF in Cambodia

Source: MACJ3-05

Figure H - 4

PF PLATOON OPERATIONS: 1971
(Weapons - loss Ratio)

CY71 Month	Indiv Wpns Captured by PF	Indiv Wpns Captured by Enemy	Ratio	CS Wpns Captured by PF	CS Wpns Captured by Enemy	Ratio
Jan	277	202	1.4: 1	19	1	19.0: 1
Feb	382	291	1.3: 1	30	3	10.0: 1
Mar	334	263	1.3: 1	31	1	31.0: 1
Apr	27	270	0.1: 1	27	0	--
May	310	127	2.4: 1	28	2	14.0: 1
Jun	310	167	1.9: 1	14	3	4.7: 1
Jul	288	194	1.5: 1	27	0	--
Aug	197	88	2.2: 1	13	1	13.0: 1
Sep	283	129	2.2: 1	18	2	9.0: 1
Oct	277	114	2.4: 1	10	0	--
Nov	256	150	1.7: 1	11	2	5.5: 1
Dec	294	98	3.0: 1	6	0	--

Source: MACJ3-05

Figure H - 5

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

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MR 1 ———	76.6	71.6	70.7	72.0	72.3	72.2	73.3	72.8	79.0	79.1	79.4	84.4
MR 2 – – –	63.9	61.7	63.0	62.4	63.1	64.5	62.7	60.0	62.4	65.5	66.5	71.7
MR 3 —·—·	88.3	87.7	90.1	90.5	90.7	90.2	91.3	90.6	92.2	92.6	93.2	94.7
MR 4 ·····	65.5	66.4	70.0	70.7	70.5	74.3	75.1	74.6	79.3	79.2	79.2	81.8
RVN ▰▰▰	73.9	72.8	74.8	75.3	75.4	76.8	77.3	76.3	80.1	80.7	81.1	84.3

Figure H-6

Source: MACCORDS

(C) TF Logistics Support. The responsiveness and effectiveness of the Territorial Forces logistics system approached a level of self-sufficiency during 1971 which permitted a selective withdrawal of US logistic advisory efforts. Advisors considered the system basically sound and capable of providing the necessary support required by the Territorial Forces. The system had developed to the point where efforts could be directed toward refinement and improvement of overall operational efficiency. As the base for logistics support within the individual provinces, the Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Centers (SM&DSLC) had developed, in most cases, an adequately trained core of experienced specialists, but the need continued for command emphasis to maintain and improve the centers' efficiency.

(C) The US funded ($26.5 million) SM&DSLC facilities upgrade program progressed to approximately 87 percent completion. Twenty-nine projects were completed during the year with 15 remaining under construction. Estimated completion date for the total program was the third quarter of CY72. Once completed, the physical capability of the system for storage, maintenance, distribution, and administration would be largely achieved.

(C) A major problem still existed in the inequitable distribution of material. Shortfalls of supplies and equipment, particularly communication and vehicle repair parts, reflected shortages within the total RVNAF pipeline. This problem was aggravated by imbalances in priority distribution based on the relative security of the area or zone. As the SM&DSLC facility approached self-sufficiency, a critical need existed to intensify command emphasis in RF/PF logistics at the corps/military region level to assure more effective coordination between the Regular Forces and the Territorial Forces, and the respective Area Logistics Commands.[14]

MEASUREMENT AND INDICATIONS OF TRENDS

(C) Although progress in territorial security was somewhat slower than hoped for under the CD and LD Plan, the gains were nevertheless significant. The percentage of population living in secure areas, progress in resettlement of land, number of enemy initiated incidents, and number of proselyting incidents provided valuable statistics for measuring the relative security of an area, and were factors used in the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) ratings of individual villages and hamlets described below.[15]

Hamlet Evaluation System

(U) The HES was a valuable tool in the measurement of pacification goals and had been in use since 1967. It provided a method of rating individual hamlets through the evaluation of responses to a series of standard questions. Each question with a series of possible responses had a numerical value assigned to each response. A mathematical, computerized assessment resulted in letter ratings: A or B - Secure; C - marginally secure; D or E - insecure; and V - VC controlled. By monitoring changes to responses and the resulting ratings, officials were able to determine security and pacification trends and plan activities and allocate resources more efficiently. HES underwent constant revisions, as the situation changed, in order to improve its reliability.[16]

RVN Trends

(C) By the end of 1971, the percentage of population living in secure areas advanced from 71.9 percent to 84.3 percent. Each MR also showed a trend toward improvement during the year (see Figure H-6). The continuous cross-border operations into Cambodia, and Operation LAM SON 719 into Laos, together with operations into enemy in-country strongholds such as the U Minh

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Forest, contributed significantly to the overall improvement in security of population. These operations were largely made possible by Territorial Forces improvement in each MR. Figures H-7 and H-8 show the primary missions performed by RF and PF units respectively during 1971.

MISSION ASSIGNMENTS FOR RF UNITS: 1971

Primary Mission	Number of RF Companies Assigned											
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Security of:												
Vil/Hmlt	573	585	600	603	620	616	588	579	569	561	518	513
Dist Hq	92	92	82	78	78	89	90	87	88	82	78	68
Prov Cap	32	34	32	31	30	31	30	29	26	25	26	25
Key Mil Instl	125	128	129	133	150	146	149	147	157	154	158	158
Key Econ Instl	18	20	17	19	16	15	16	15	14	13	16	15
LOC	101	97	101	105	104	103	103	111	108	107	113	110
Bridges	75	74	78	77	80	76	88	89	85	83	74	75
Training	3	9	16	21	25	30	37	28	30	34	35	49
Support	10	6	7	5	5	5	3	4	7	8	5	5
Operations*	281	339	374	383	383	387	413	422	417	431	489	514
Misc**	364	314	264	245	206	205	177	182	176	182	/	144

* Includes reaction force, offensive operations, intelligence collection, ARVN joint operations, and FWMAF combined operations

** Includes command and control, administration, recruitment and/or reconstitution

Source: MACCORDS

Figure H - 7

MISSION ASSIGNMENTS FOR PF UNITS: 1971

Primary Mission	Number of PF Platoons Assigned											
Security of:	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Vil/Hmlt	4115	4414	4715	4796	4823	4883	4958	4973	5028	5157	5156	5181
Dist Hq	305	318	337	340	355	354	384	399	430	420	405	419
Prov Cap	38	38	36	38	42	44	49	49	48	47	47	42
Key Mil Instl	241	232	247	241	233	242	235	237	253	259	260	274
Key Econ Instl	45	40	32	34	34	38	45	47	50	58	51	51
LOC	393	403	449	452	453	454	481	482	461	468	482	498
Bridges	297	309	328	350	350	360	363	376	388	406	419	447
Training	51	71	85	71	106	109	177	185	201	207	227	224
Support	6	8	8	7	7	7	10	9	9	9	9	15
Operations*	256	256	269	256	250	263	271	312	307	282	333	393
Misc**	1531	1257	878	826	820	1006	859	837	784	712	/	535

* Includes reaction force, offensive operations, intelligence collection, ARVN joint operations, and FWMAF combined operations

** Includes command and control, administration, recruitment and/or reconstitution

Source: MACCORDS

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Territorial Security by Military Region

(C) MR 1. Early in 1971, the buildup of enemy supplies in the lowlands of MR 1 suggested an enemy offensive after the TET holiday period. The holiday period was relatively quiet with only a few ABF and terrorist incidents reported. RF/PF units continued to report significant results from small unit actions. Since RF/PF proficiency had reached an acceptable level, Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) were instructed to devote attention to the more critical problem of hamlet defense plans, PSDF improvement, and redeployment of RF/PF units to fill vacancies of departing US units.

(C) In February 1971 as RVNAF regular forces were engaged in operation LAM SON 719, Territorial Forces faced an increase of enemy initiated incidents, both ground attacks and terrorist incidents. This trend continued into March when the highest number of terrorist incidents (399) ever recorded in a single month occurred. Territorial Forces were credited with killing approximately 50 enemy troops in March. The expected decline in HES rating was countered by concentrated pacification efforts by the 1st Mar Div and 51st Inf Regt (ARVN).

(C) During April and May 1971, enemy activity declined in the northern provinces but remained high in the southern sectors. Terrorism, particularly abductions, disrupted pacification efforts. Redeployment of US aviation units limited the RF/PF capability to counter enemy actions. The reduction of US troop density in some areas caused minor migration of civilians to more secure areas. GVN quickly reacted by increasing the number of PF platoons to 106 in the MR, although the size of each platoon was reduced from 35 to 32 men.

(C) The VC made a major effort to exploit the withdrawal of US forces by attacking district capitals and religious symbols, and increasing mining incidents and rocket attacks.[17] Despite elaborate security precautions, including the use of elements of the US 196th Inf Bde, 51st ARVN Regt, ROK Marines, and Territorial Forces, a group of 60,000 to 80,000 pilgrims and high ranking government officials was attacked on 29 May 71 by an estimated VC/NVA force of three battalions. Extensive damage was done to homes in the area and 20 civilians were killed, but the enemy suffered 200 KIA.

(C) Enemy activity generally decreased during June and July although intelligence sources indicated that the enemy planned a three-phase summer campaign. Fire Support Base (FSB) Fuller was attacked on 20 Jun 71, the most serious enemy initiated incident. Continued rocket attacks of Da Nang caused a reorganization of defenses under a unified command.

(C) Implementation of the "force transition concept" met limited success during July as province chiefs were reluctant to make significant changes until after the elections. RF units continued to conduct operations in western Thua Thien Province and to guard bridges [illegible] 1. In southern MR 1, RF units deployed to assist in the initial opening of the Thang Binh-Hiep Duc road. In Quang Ngai Province the 103d RF Bn was deployed for the first time as a complete battalion for an extended operation in the coastal lowlands.

(C) Despite Lower House elections in August and the Presidential referendum in October, enemy initiated incidents and acts of terrorism remained low. The expected enemy summer campaign did not occur, possibly due to the increased security during the elections. After the elections the GVN concentrated on restructuring security forces in MR 1 by organizing the 3d ARVN Division. Territorial Forces provided 2,000 recruits for the new division.

(C) During November and December, Territorial Forces concentrated on small unit, saturation, and combined operations with ARVN main force units. The first combined operation with the new 3d ARVN Div yielded favorable results. Terrorism decreased during November, but increased in December as abductions continued. Despite enemy efforts to disrupt pacification,

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GVN progress in local security operations resulted in a 5.0 percent increase in HES AB-rated hamlets over November (see Figure H-6). In Quang Ngai Province, 11 hamlets previously HES V-rated were upgraded by GVN pacification efforts. The year ended with MR 1 meeting one of its goals of eliminating all HES V-rated hamlets.[18]

(C) MR 2. Compared to the other MRs, MR 2 had the lowest percentage of population living in secure areas during 1971. The reasons for the lack of security were difficult to define but were generally attributed to large geographical area, varied terrain, high level of enemy activity, and a general indifference of the people toward GVN goals. US and other FWMAF redeployments were forcing more GVN attention toward solving territorial security problems.

(C) The lull in enemy activity during January failed to improve the security situation in MR 2, as indicated by HES ratings. Enemy activity increased toward the end of February and continued through March, possibly as a reaction to the RVNAF cross-border operations and reduction of troop density throughout the MR. Enemy actions were characterized by small unit attacks of Territorial Forces and abductions of civilians. US forces conducted saturation patrolling operations near the border area as ROK forces conducted multiregimental operations in their assigned area of operations. RF/PF units conducted small anti-ambush and security operations inconsistent results.

(C) During April, May, and June enemy activity returned to a low level throughout the MR and dropped to the lowest level of the year in the southern provinces. HES ratings improved only slightly for the period as Territorial Forces failed to produce significant results from enemy encounters and did not aggressively patrol their assigned areas. An enemy attack on 18 Jun 71 of a district capital in Phu Yen Province and adjacent fire bases was successfully repulsed by RF/PF with US helicopter gunship and TACAIR support. Territorial Forces surrounded the enemy force, estimated at battalion size, and inflicted heavy casualties.

(C) Combat activity in MR 2 during the period July - September 1971 remained at a low level as the enemy increased political activity in connection with national elections. HES ratings continued to decline, showing 4.5 percent less in August than in June. The decline was attributed to increased enemy political initiatives and redeployment of US forces from the region. By HES standards, 64 villages/hamlets were V-rated in MR 2 as of the end of August. Some security improvements were noted in heavily populated areas in preparation for presidential elections in October.

(C) During the remaining 4 months of 1971 a definite trend toward improved security developed. The HES ratings began to improve during September and continued upward through December, resulting in a 10.7 percent increase. Favorable trends were attributed to reallocation of forces, GVN leadership initiatives, and disorganized enemy activity. Territorial Forces conducted operations into contested areas with improved kill and weapons loss ratios. RF unit refresher training was completed in December, but PF unit training was only 68 percent completed. ARVN and Territorial Forces' assumption of tactical AOs left by departing US forces continued smoothly. Successful enemy penetrations of two outposts near Pleiku resulted in new defense tactics for small unit outposts. Ambush positions were established beyond the perimeters which prevented enemy close-in assaults.

(C) As 1971 ended, a positive trend had been established in MR 2 with improved leadership, better trained Territorial Forces, and improved GVN leadership at the village/hamlet level.[19]

(C) MR 3. As was true throughout the country, enemy acts of sabotage, terrorism, and attacks were low during January 1971 in MR 3. HES ratings in MR 3 at the beginning of the year were 88.3 percent, highest of all MRs. In February, GVN initiated Phase I of Operation DONG KHOI ("start together" or saturation operations), which involved simultaneous attacks of all VC/VCI

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targets by all available Territorial Forces. The operation was an adjunct to RVN regular forces' cross-border operations into Cambodia discussed in Annex E, Cross-Border Operations. The involvement of Territorial Forces in the coordinated campaign seemed to improve their morale and confidence throughout the MR. Training continued as 18 territorial artillery platoons and seven sector artillery command sections completed training and were deployed by the end of February.

(C) During March 1971, HES rating improved from 87.7 to 90.1 percent in MR 3, as GVN began a campaign called "Formidable Five." The purpose of the campaign was to focus attention on the five most insecure districts in the MR: Trang Bang, Phu Hoa, Long Thanh, Xuan Loc, and Dat Do. Phase II of Operation DONG KHOI was also conducted in March which resulted in 449 enemy neutralizations and 234 weapons captured, while friendly losses were 132 KIA, 512 WIA, and 41 weapons lost. The campaign proved that Territorial Forces could operate in the field for extended periods of time and were qualified to conduct operations without extensive air support or other US assistance. By the end of March, 231 PF platoons completed training given by the 1st Cav Div (Ambl), and four additional territorial artillery platoons were deployed.

(C) During April, May, and June, enemy initiated incidents were limited to terrorist incidents in Tay Ninh and Binh Tuy provinces, while RF/PF initiated engagements in April tripled those in March. During the 3-month period Phases III, IV, and V of Operation DONG KHOI were conducted without significant results. Combat operations in support of Vietnamization were almost totally RVN conducted.

(C) During July and August Operation DONG KHOI Phase VI and VII was conducted without significant contacts, but served to keep the enemy off balance.

(C) GVN activities during September and October were focused almost totally on the lower-house and Presidential elections. The National Police successfully countered multiple student and political demonstrations without seriously injuring demonstrators or causing fatalities. Although enemy activity increased, the Communist attempts at influencing or disrupting the election were complete failures. The HES territorial security rating improved 2.0 percent during the period, and improved performance was noted in RF/PF units.

(C) Enemy [illegible] decreased during November and remained at a low level through December. RVNAF operations in Cambodia increased and RF/PF units improved their kill and weapons loss ratios. The redeployment of the Australian units from MR 3 had little effect on security as the number of HES AB-rated hamlets increased by 2.1 percent over October.[20]

(C) MR 4. By the beginning of 1971, GVN influence had been extended into virtually every area of MR 4, but the VC still controlled 17 hamlets. RVN main force elements conducted operations into traditional enemy strongholds such as the U Minh Forest, Seven Mountains, and Three Sisters areas. Territorial Forces employed 601 RF companies and 3,307 PF platoons throughout the MR. USN and Vietnamese Navy (VNN) brown water operations interdicted enemy supplies in the vast river and canal network as RVN ground forces conducted cross-border operations into Cambodia. VC/NVA units continued to disrupt pacification efforts by attacking outposts, extorting food stuffs, and terrorist activities. Throughout the year the enemy employed economy of force tactics together with ambushes, mines and booby traps, and attacks-by fire, avoiding large-scale contacts and concentrating on challenging Territorial Forces at outpost locations. The reduction of RVN and US troop units in the Delta made territorial security operations the responsibility of RF/PF units. Progress in Vietnamization was difficult to assess on a daily basis, but cumulative results for the year showed the greatest improvement in security during the year of all the MRs.

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(C) During the first 3 months of 1971, enemy activity increased as nine outposts were overrun in January, 20 in February, and nine in March. GVN countered with DONG KHOI type operations and employed the 21st Div (RVN) in the U Minh Forest to improve the security conditions. The number of HES-rated secure villages increased 4.5 percent from January to March.

(C) Enemy-initiated incidents generally decreased during April and May. The enemy overran 17 outposts in April, but aggressive action by GVN officials reduced that number to six during May. Security generally improved during the summer months as the national elections neared. Anticipated disturbances during the elections failed to materialize. In September a sharp increase in friendly initiated contacts occurred as a concentrated effort was made to preempt the enemy's plans. RVN units made heavy contact with NVA units in the U Minh Forest.

(C) In keeping with the national force transition concept of moving Territorial Forces from secure areas into less secure areas, five RF companies and ten PF platoons redeployed from An Giang Province to AOs in Kien Giang and Chau Doc Provinces. Two RF groups consisting of eight RF companies were redeployed from An Giang Province to the Seven Mountains and Three Sisters Mountains areas. Five RF companies from Go Cong Province operated in Kien Hoa and Kinh Tuong provinces. Later four RF companies of volunteers from Go Cong Province assisted in the pacification of the U Minh Forest.

(C) The last 3 months of the year, GVN improved outpost security to the extent that only eight outposts were attacked in the entire 3-month period. During October, the 9th ARVN Div elements conducted operations in the 44th Special Tactical Zone (STZ). Between 15 and 18 Oct 71, a corpswide DONG KHOI operation was conducted without significant results. Territorial Forces continued operations against enemy base areas. Friendly initiated incidents continued to rise in November as DONG KHOI operations produced good results. Realignment of forces and AOs continued to improve unity of command and coordination of operations. Territorial Forces operations in Dinh Tuong Province during November cleared areas of dense vegetation, mines and booby traps. The 15th Regt, 9th ARVN Div was deployed in Chuong Thien Province and initiated operations against the 303d and 309th VC Bns. Territorial Forces in Dinh Tuong Province completed Phase I of the mini-base elimination campaign by clearing a 40 kilometer-square area.

(C) Progress in local security during 1971 in the Delta was measured in two areas: HES ratings indicated that the security in MR 4 was the most improved of all MRs, and rice production was the highest in the history of the region. Successful marketing of rice demonstrated the diminishing ability of the enemy to interdict lines of communications and tax the farmers.[21]

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TRENDS IN TERRITORIAL SECURITY - Annex H

1. MACV Command History 1970 (S/NF), Vol II, p VIII-94, Gp-4.

2. Plan (C), RVN Central Pacification and Development Council, 7 Jan 71, Subj: Community Defense and Local Development Plan (U), p 10, Gp-Not stated.

3. Same as # 2, p 1-A-2-1.

4. Rpts (C/NF), HQ XXIV Corps, Jan-Dec 71, Subj: CORDS XXIV Corps Military Region Overview (U), Gp-4; Rpt (S), Semi-Annual Review, Combined Campaign Plan 1971-AB 146, Jan-Jun, MR 1 (U), Gp-4; Rpt (S), Semi-Annual Review, Combined Campaign Plan 1971-AB 146, Jul-Dec, MR 1 (U), Gp-4. All information about MR 1 was taken from these reports.

5. Rpts (C/NF), SRAG, Jan-Dec 71, Subj: CORDS/SRAG Military Region Overview (U), Gp-4; Rpt (S), Semi-Annual Review, Combined Campaign Plan 1971-AB 146, Jan-Jun 71, MR 2 (U), Gp-4; Rpt (S), Semi-Annual Review, Campaign Plan 1971-AB 146, Jul-Dec, MR 2 (U), Gp-4. All information about MR 2 was taken from these reports.

6. Rpts (C/NF), TRAC, Jan-Dec 71, Subj: CORDS/TRAC Military Region Overview (U), Gp-4; Rpt (S), Semi-Annual Review, Combined Campaign Plan 1971-AB 146, Jan-Jun, MR 3 (U), Gp-4; Semi-Annual Review, Combined Campaign Plan 1971-AB 146, Jul-Dec, MR 3 (U), Gp-4. All information about MR 3 was taken from these reports.

7. Rpts (C/NF), DRAC, Jan-Dec 71, Subj: CORDS/DRAC Military Region Overview (U), Gp-4; Rpt (S), Semi-Annual Review, Combined Campaign Plan 1971-AB 146, Jan-Jun MR 4 (U), Gp-4; Rpt (S), Semi-Annual Review, Combined Campaign Plan 1971-AB 146, Jul-Dec, MR 4 (U), Gp-4. All information about MR 4 was taken from these reports.

8. Memo (C), JGS/RVNAF, HQ I Corps (RVN) et al., 6 Dec 71, Subj: Improvement of Territorial Security (U), Gp-1.

9. Ltr (C), DEPCOMUSMACV to CG XXIV Corps, et al., Subj: Improvement of Territorial Security (U), Gp-4.

10. Bklt (U), CORDS-TSD, 1 Jan 71, Subj: RF/PF, Aavisors Handbook (U), p 2.

11. Bklt (S/NF), MACJ3-05, Dec 71, Subj: USMACV Measurments of Progress (U), pp 6c - 6e, Gp-3.

12. Same as # 10, p 3.

13. Same as # 10, pp 46-47.

14. Same as # 11, pp 6e - 6f.

15. Rpts (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Jan-Dec 71, Subj: HES Results (U), Gp-4.

16. Briefing Manuscript (U), MACCORDS-RAD, 25 Jan 72, Subj: CORDS Standard Briefing of the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan, p 14.

17. Msg (C), Amconsul Rep at Da Nang to SECSTATE, May 1971, Subj: What will Happen in Quang Nam After the Marines Are Gone (U), Gp-3.

18. Same as # 4.

19. Same as # 5.

20. Same as # 6.

21. Same as # 7.

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ANNEX I

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OTHER SEA AREAS

ASSISTANCE GIVEN THE KHMER REPUBLIC

SYNOPSIS OF 1970 ACTIVITIES

(C) US military and economic assistance to Cambodia terminated in 1964 as a result of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's association with the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese (VC/NVA). In March 1970, to halt the possible Communist take-over of Cambodia, Marshal Lon Nol, Prime Minister of Cambodia, deposed Prince Sihanouk and appealed to the world community for assistance in removing the VC/NVA forces from his country. Cambodia was proclaimed the Khmer Republic (KR) in October 1970.

(C) In response to the appeal from Lon Nol, the US resumed military assistance to Cambodia by Presidential Decree of 22 Apr 70. Expeditious action was required to implement the decree, and a formal Military Assistance Program (MAP) was selected as the most rapid funding means. On 26 May 70, SECDEF placed MAP, Cambodia under the management of COMUSMACV with CINCPAC supervision.[1] COMUSMACV administered Cambodian FY70-71 assistance through the remainder of 1970 and planned Khmer force structure, funding, and expenditures for FY70-76.[2]

Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia

(S) The early guidance of the President and SECDEF concerning military assistance to Cambodia was clear. The military assistance program was to be unsophisticated, simple, and designed to maintain a non-Communist government in Cambodia. US military participation in the program was to be restricted to those persons assigned or attached to the US Embassy, Phnom Penh. Also, every possible effort was to be made to encourage the application of the concepts of the Nixon Doctrine. This broad guidance never changed.

(C) Maintenance of a minimum US profile in Cambodia made administration of the MAP unique and the protection of US interests difficult. As a result, MACV and CINCPAC petitioned for adequate US military representation in Phnom Penh to properly discharge MAP responsibilities. The American Ambassador, Phnom Penh, was reluctant to admit US military personnel for use exclusively for the MAP. However, upon the arrival of the new Ambassador in September 1970, an agreement was reached between Ambassador Swank and CINCPAC which permitted two officers and four NCOs to be placed in Phnom Penh for the specific purpose of fulfilling MAP responsibilities.[3] The problem even then was not entirely solved. The limitation of the number of personnel in Cambodia did not permit free flow of information nor provide the assets necessary to accomplish proper audit of delivered equipment as required by the Foreign Assistance Act.

(U) The problem became more acute as the level of assistance increased. During November 1970, in response to a request from CINCPAC, COMUSMACV provided comments on US military representation in Cambodia and recommended that a Cambodia Military Assistance Group, a joint service organization consisting of 111 personnel, be established. CINCPAC basically

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
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SAIGON
VUNG TAU
VINH LONG
MEKONG
CAMBODIA
(KHMER REPUBLIC)
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDRY
ROAD / ROUTE
NATIONAL CAPITAL

Source: MHB

concurred with the concept and so recommended to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS, however, recommended to SECDEF that a military equipment delivery team (MEDT), consisting of approximately 110 personnel, be established. On 28 Dec 70 SECDEF approved the JCS recommendation and on 30 Jan 71, CINCPAC activated the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) composed of 60 people; 16 were to be located in Cambodia and the others would be collocated with HQ MACV. Colonel Walter H. Roemer was designated Acting Chief, MEDTC, pending arrival of BG Theodore C. Metaxis on 8 Feb 71.[4]

(U) The Chief, MEDTC functioned under the supervision of the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, Cambodia and was SECDEF's representative to the Khmer Ministry of Defense. Initially the Chief, MEDTC supervised Khmer MAP deliveries through RVN from HQ MACV. As the supplies and equipment continued to build up in the Khmer Republic, long-range control became increasingly difficult. In May 1971, SECDEF added 53 new spaces to the MEDTC staff, seven of which were in-country authorizations. In July 1971, SECDEF permitted a phased move of 27 additional MEDTC members to Phnom Penh. This brought the total MEDTC (Forward) authorization to 50. In August, the Chief, MEDTC relocated to Phnom Penh and by 9 October there were 41 US military personnel permanently located in Cambodia. The remaining nine were phased in by the end of December 1971.[5]

MACV ASSISTANCE TO KHMER FORCES

(C) Upon activation, MEDTC assumed responsibility for administering and directing MAP, Cambodia. COMUSMACV was designated coordinating authority to insure compatibility of US military assistance to Cambodia with Vietnamization. The coordination authority of MACV included the planning of force structures, programming of materiel, storage and delivery of equipment, and all other functions which would affect the planning and orderly execution of US and third country programs in the RVN and the Khmer Republic. In addition, COMUSMACV would provide administrative and logistic support to the MEDTC to include airlift.[6]

(S) Throughout 1971, MACV supported and assisted MEDTC in providing materiel and training support to the Khmer Republic. This support was constrained by and consistent with the top priority of US policy in Southeast Asia -- Vietnamization.

Tripartite Deputies

(C) In January 1971 the Deputies of MACV, RVNAF, and the Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (FANK) initiated periodic Tripartite Deputies meetings to discuss and resolve problems of mutual concern. The first meeting, held on 15 January 1971, was conducted using French as the principal language, a practice which continued in all Tripartite activities. The next meeting was held on 17 May and meetings continued biweekly until early August. Thereafter meetings were held monthly.

(C) By June it was evident that an international working group and a MACV staff element were needed to implement the recommendations of the Tripartite Deputies and to monitor and report progress on continuing projects. The Tripartite Deputies Working Group, composed of Khmer, Vietnamese, MACV and MEDTC members, was established on 28 Jun 71 and assigned the mission to serve as the single point of contact for all matters of interest to the Tripartite Deputies and to provide liaison between the Deputies and the MACV, RVNAF and FANK staffs. The MACV members of the Tripartite Working Group were assigned to a newly constituted Tripartite Actions Branch, Operational Plans Division, MACJ3. This Branch served as the nucleus of the Working Group.

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(C) The medium of the Tripartite Deputies provided a means to promote closer coordination and cooperation among MACV, RVNAF, FANK, and MEDTC. Significant areas addressed by the Tripartite Deputies during CY71 were security of the Mekong River line of communication (LOC) to Phnom Penh; air/ground operations in the Khmer Republic; security of the Highway 4 LOC, from the port of Kompong Som to Phnom Penh; and disputes between Khmer and RVN forces.[7]

Khmer Force Structure

(S) From 1970 through 1971 the FANK expanded from a force of approximately 35,000 to over 200,000. This contributed significantly to US objectives; the Khmer Republic maintained its independence and neutrality, and assisted Vietnamization by forcing the VC/NVA to divert approximately four divisions into Cambodia in order to secure and maintain their LOCs. As the Khmer forces expanded and their capability increased, new force structure proposals for FY73-76 were coordinated with MACV and submitted as follows to CINCPAC in September 1971.[8]

PLANNED KHMER FORCE STRUCTURE, 1 Sep 71
Major Units by US Fiscal Year

	FY71	FY72	FY73	FY74	FY75	FY76
ARMY (KA)						
Light Inf Div Hqs	0	1	3	3	3	3
Infantry Bde	10	18	32	32	32	32
Mechanized Bde	1*	1	1	1	1	1
Artillery Bde	1*	1	1	1	1	1
Eng Bde	1*	1	1	1	1	1
Signal Bde	1	1	1	1	1	1
Transportation Bde	1	1	1	1	1	1
Military Police Bde	0	1	1	1	1	1
Special Forces Cmd	1	1	1	1	1	1
POLWAR Bn	0	0	1	1	1	1
Logistics Command	1	1	1	1	1	1
Military Region Hq	6*	6	6	7	8	8
Sub Military Reg Hq	23*	23	23	27	31	31
Mil Reg Log Base	5*	5	5	6	7	7
Sub Mil Reg Log Base	15*	15	15	18	21	21
Reg Inf Bn (SEP)	32	74	74	118	118	118
Inf Co (SEP) 1/	234	561	561	521	521	521
Arty Btry (75mm) (SEP) 2/	0	5	5	5	0	0
Arty Btry (105mm) 3/	14	14	24	27	31	31
NAVY (MNK)						
Coastal Surv Sqdn	0	1	1	1	1	1
Patrol Craft (PC)	2	2	2	2	2	2
Patrol Craft Fast (PCF)	0	20	20	20	20	20
Landing Ship Inf (LSIL)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Coast Guard Patrol Craft (WPB)	0	0	8	15	15	15
Landing Craft Tank (LCT)	1	1	1	1	1	1

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PLANNED KHMER FORCE STRUCTURE, 1 Sep 71 (contd)

NAVY	FY71	FY72	FY73	FY74	FY75	FY76
Mine Cntrmeasures Sqdn	0	1	1	1	1	1
Mine Sweepers (PBR)	0	4	4	4	4	4
River Assault Interdiction Div (RAID)	1	2	4	5	5	5
Command and Patrol Boat (CCB)	0	2	4	5	5	5
Monitor (MON)	1	6	8	10	10	10
Armored Troop Carrier (ATC)	0	14	14	14	14	14
Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB)	4	4	4	4	4	4
LCM Refueler (REF)	0	4	4	5	5	5
LCM-6 (Flame)	0	2	4	5	5	5
Riverine Craft (MSM)	0	2	2	2	2	2
Riverine Craft (MSR)	0	4	4	4	4	4
River Patrol Group (RPG)	1	2	3	4	5	5
River Patrol Boat (PBR)	20	40	60	80	100	100
River Patrol Craft Small (Thai Resources)	8	8	8	0	0	0
Logistics Operating and Support Sqdn	0	1	1	1	1	1
Landing Craft (LCM-6)	18	24	30	30	30	30
Landing Craft (LCM-8)	0	5	7	10	10	10
Landing Craft Utility (LCU)	1	3	4	4	4	4
Mobile Base	0	2	4	4	4	4
Tug (YTL)	2	2	2	2	2	2
Tug (YTB)	0	0	1	1	1	1
Landing Craft Inf (LCI)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Salvage Boat (CSB)	0	1	1	1	1	1
Floating Drydock (AFDL)	0	1	1	1	1	1
Floating Crane (YD)	0	1	1	1	1	1
Support Bases and Activities	0	2	5	6	6	6
Marine Battalions	0	5	6	6	8	10
AIR FORCE (KAF) 4/						
Air Force Hq	1	1	1	1	1	1
Air Region Hq	0	1	2	3	3	3
Tactical Air Base Wing	1	1	2	3	3	3
T-28D Fighter Sqdn	1/18	2/32	2/40	3/48	3/48	3/48
AC-47 Attack Sqdn	1/6	1/8	1/11	1/12	1/12	1/12
O-1 FAC Observation Sqdn	1/17	1/25	2/44	3/60	3/60	3/60
A-37 Fighter Sqdn	0	0	0	1/18	1/18	1/18
C-47 Transport Sqdn	1/13	1/13	2/24	2/30	2/30	2/30

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PLANNED KHMER FORCE STRUCTURE, 1 Sep 71 (contd)

AIR FORCE

U-1A Lt Trans Sqdn	1/12	1/18	1/18	1/18	1/15	1/12
C119G Transport Sqdn	0	0	0	1/8	1/16	1/16
UH-1H Lt Helo Sqdn	1/16	1/16	1/26	3/36	3/46	3/46
Tng Air Base Wing	0	1	1	1	1	1
T-41 Training Sqdn	1/10	1/18	1/18	1/18	1/16	1/14
T-28A Training Sqdn	0	1/8	1/8	1/8	1/8	1/8
Lt Helo Tng Sqdn	0	0	1/4	1/5	1/5	1/5
Air Base Sec Bns	1	6	10	10	10	10
Base Communication Sqdn	1	1	1	1	1	1

PARAMILITARY FORCES

National Police Directorates	6*	6	6	6	6	6
Commando Groups	100	1,400	1,900	3,000	4,000	4,500

MILITARY MANPOWER
(in thousands)

Army	170	186	211	236	236	236
Navy	5	7	10	12	16	18
Air Force	4	8	10	10	12	20
Defense Agencies	15	19	25	25	25	25
Sub Total	194	220	256	283	289	299
Paramilitary	103	143	197	307	407	457
Total	297	363	453	590	696	756

* Not MAP supported prior to FY72

1/ May function as an independent company or as part of an infantry battalion. In FY74, 39 separate companies will be infused into Regional Infantry Battalions.

2/ Employed under control of Military Region Commander. Each battery consists of 4 tubes each.

3/ Each battery consists of 4 tubes each.

4/ 1/14 indicates numbers of squadrons/aircraft.

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Khmer Training by US Forces

(U) Training of Khmer personnel by RVNAF and US forces began in May 1970. In addition to the RVNAF training efforts described in Chapter VIII, the US contribution was also substantial. Over 17,000 Khmers had been US-trained by the end of FY71, with 25,000 more to be trained during FY72.

(C) Training by US Army. The largest US effort centered on the conduct of battalion training at three sites: Dong Ba Thin, near Cam Ranh Bay, MR 2, and Long Hai and Phuoc Tuy, near Vung Tau, MR 3. The US training cadre were former members of the 5th Special Forces Group who remained in Vietnam when the 5th Group redeployed. During CY71, 31 Khmer battalions were trained and returned to Cambodia. Thirty of these battalions were programmed for FY71 training and one battalion was the first of 48 scheduled to be trained during FY72. These 31 battalions accounted for 19,292 of the 19,978 Khmers who completed US training during CY71. As a follow-on to the Khmer Artillery Mobile Training Teams trained by the ARVN in 1970, the US Army trained 74 artillery cadre on the 75mm pack howitzer during October and November 1971 at Long Hai. These Khmers returned to Phnom Penh to form the nucleus of two 75mm artillery regiments.

(C) The US Army also trained 336 Khmer specialists during CY71. These included UH-1 and U-1A pilots, aircraft mechanics, air/ground operations personnel, and intelligence specialists. This total also included 60 FANK nurses trained at Long Hai between 12 May 70 and 20 Jan 71.

(C) Training by the US Navy. Training in the maintenance and repair of fiberglass hulls was begun by the US Navy in 1970 and continued through 1971. In addition, a 25-man MNK mobile support base crew completed training at Tan An, near Saigon, MR 3, on 23 Aug 71. Fourteen additional convoy craft crewmen completed training in September and October at Tan Chau, near the Cambodian border in MR 4. These crewmen returned to Cambodia as did nine patrol boat (PBR) maintenance supervisors who completed US Navy training at Nha Be, near Saigon in January 1971.

(C) Training by US Air Force. During CY71, the 7th US Air Force trained 42 Khmer aviation personnel in several diverse specialties: O-1A pilots, T-41D pilots and mechanics, air base civil engineers, and intelligence officers. Sixty-four specialists completed training in air/ground coordination operations, and 10 air/ground trainees received additional classes in methods of instruction which would permit them to establish an in-country capability in that speciality. An additional 22 Khmers were trained in sophisticated aircraft maintenance techniques, supply, and other support functions. All aviation training was conducted at Bien Hoa or Tan Son Nhut Air Bases, MR 3.

(U) In addition to teaching aviation-related skills the US Air Force, as a result of a special request from the US Ambassador to Phnom Penh, trained 180 special Khmer security forces during 1971 to be used as a protective force for US Embassy personnel in the Khmer capital. This training, conducted at Tan Son Nhut, was completed on 6 Jan 72.

(U) Altogether for the fiscal year, US MAP training of Khmer forces in Vietnam totaled 17,857 at the end of June 1971. By end-FY72 the number would increase by over 25,000. US and RVNAF efforts combined would exceed 84,000 trainees by the end of the FY72 program.[9]

(S) FANK seminar. In November 1971, MEDTC advised COMUSMACV of staff problems which the FANK were experiencing. FANK had adopted the American general staff organization structure, yet the officials manning the various key positions were those incumbents who had operated under the former French staff system. They were not sure how to make the new system work and would fall back on their old staff training; this caused major confusion, lack of command

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and control, and a complete breakdown in staff communications and coordination procedures. MEDTC solicited MACV's assistance in conducting a "one shot" program tailored for the senior FANK decision makers.[10]

(U) On 31 Dec 71, COMUSMACV announced that a high impact program of instruction, a FANK Command Seminar, would be given for Khmer senior officers from 31 Jan 72 to 15 Mar 72. The course was to be 2 weeks in length and instructed by qualified officers from MACV resources. Three separate sessions of 20 students each were to be held for senior staff officers and commanders, ranking from general officers through lieutenant colonel.[11]

Improvement of Khmer In-Country Training Capability

(S) At the invitation of FANK authorities MACV and MEDTC conducted an in-country survey of Khmer training sites to determine the degree of existing training potential and offer advice and assistance regarding ways in which FANK could enhance its training capability. The survey established the fact that an in-country training capability did exist and could be improved to satisfy existing and forecasted operational and professional requirements; renovation and/or new construction at three school complexes, one company level training center, and one battalion training area was required. Cost estimates were subsequently developed by MACV and MEDTC and forwarded to CINCPAC for funding consideration.[12]

(U) Team reports were also given to the Khmer Director General of Instruction for his use with detailed blueprints for establishing an in-country capability. Progress was slow during CY71 but MACV and MEDTC hoped that by CY73 the Khmers would be in a position to conduct the majority of their training using in-country facilities.[13]

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Logistic Support to MEDTC

(S) In addition to training assistance, MACV provided several other areas of support to MEDTC through MACV staff agencies and the component services.

(S) Airlift support. COMUSMACV was authorized to provide airlift support to Cambodia on a judicious basis to reduce excessive backlogs and to provide emergency airlift support

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when requested by the US Embassy, Phnom Penh. Intercountry USAF cargo and personnel airlifts averaged 76 sorties per month, predominantly by C-130 aircraft. Aerial resupply drops, primarily for ammunitions and rations, averaged one sortie per month, utilizing the container delivery system (CDS).

(S) Ammunition. Ammunition storage, handling, security, and transportation were accomplished by US Army Vietnam (USARV) and 7th Air Force. USARV stored 7,000 tons of ammunition for MEDTC and received and issued approximately 3,000 tons per month. USARV also administered the civilian contracts for dockside handling and barge transportation of ammunition. The Air Force stored, handled, and transported approximately 2,000 tons of MEDTC ammunition per month.

(S) Helicopter maintenance and repair. USARV expended 1,400 man hours per month in maintaining and repairing Khmer helicopters. Occasional temporary replacement of FANK helicopters down for extensive maintenance was also made from USARV assets.

(S) Support for MNK watercraft. Repair parts and Navy vehicular lubricants for support of various Khmer small craft were provided by the Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV). COMNAVFORV also provided accounting services for Navy MAP funds totaling $423,000 per fiscal year.[15]

(U) Medical assistance. To assist the FANK medical situation, MACV provided medical advice, guidance, and technical assistance through MEDTC. Initially, little substantive information was available on FANK medical needs. As a first step in January 1971, members of the MACV Command Surgeon's office visited the Khmer Republic to obtain valid data as a basis for providing medical assistance.

(U) As a result of the visit it was determined that basic items of materiel were needed immediately to enable FANK to expand their existing capabilities. Based on the MACV medical assessment, MEDTC recommended to CINCPAC that MAP funds be expended to provide additional hospital facilities and support FANK medical training and medical units. During CY71, CINCPAC approved MAP expenditures which provided FANK with four 100-bed field hospitals and one 400-bed station hospital modified and structured similar to RVN Medical Service concepts. Training aids and equipment were provided to the Cambodian Military Medical School and selected students were trained in RVN at the RVNAF Medical School. In addition, force structure modifications were made to provide MAP-supported surgical teams and ambulance units.[16]

(C) Communications assistance. During 1971, MACV provided varied communications assistance to US agencies in Cambodia and to the Khmer Armed Forces. An AN/TRC-129 tropo-system, installed in September 1970, connected Phnom Penh and Saigon and carried circuits in support of the US Embassy, Phnom Penh, DAO, MEDTC, RVNAF, and FANK. MACV continued to monitor and validate the requirements for this communications system, which was vital to the process of assessing Khmer requirements and providing essential supplies and equipment on a timely basis.

(C) MACV conducted three significant surveys of FANK communications facilities during CY71 at the request of MEDTC and the Tripartite Deputies. In October 1971 the Tripartite Study Group for Air/Ground Operations conducted a study of the Khmer Army and Air Force communications capabilities, and presented wide-ranging recommendations for improvement in equipment and operational procedures. As a result of these recommendations, MACV initiated action in November 1971, to conduct a countrywide survey with a view toward upgrading the existing Khmer VHF multichannel system. In December, MACV provided a survey team to conduct a detailed assessment of the MNK riverine and coastal communications capabilities, with particular emphasis on Mekong River convoy security and operations.

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(C) The results of the Air/Ground Study Group and MNK communications projects were forwarded with MEDTC recommendations for MAP funding and were subsequently approved by CINCPAC. The VHF multichannel study was completed during December and the results would be forwarded to MEDTC during the first quarter of CY72.[17]

THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT TO GKR

(S) In addition to the training assistance given to the Khmer Republic by third countries, the GKR also negotiated the following agreements to obtain required military and economic support:

-- Medical supplies and ambulances from Japan.

-- Six C-47 aircraft from Australia.

-- Bridging materials from Britain.

-- Rebuild of Allouette helicopters in Hong Kong.

-- Rebuild of non-MAP supported ships in Singapore.

-- Rifles and ammunition from New Zealand.

-- A loan to purchase machine tools and other equipment from France.

-- Negotiations were underway at the end of CY71 to purchase uniforms and equipment from Korea on long-term credit.[18]

ASSISTANCE TO LAOS

(S) In addition to the close air support and interdiction efforts which the US Navy and Air Forces provided for Laos (see Chapter VI), MACV assisted in providing specialized training during CY71

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Palletized ammunition is ready at Tan Son Nhut Air Base for C-130 transporation to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Training of firefighters nearby caused smoke in background.

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OTHER SEA AREAS - Annex I

1. DF (TS), MACMA, 19 Dec 70, Subj: Staff Contribution to Overview Report on MACV 1968-1970 (U), Folder #7, p 1, Gp-Not stated.

2. MACV Command History, 1970, Top Secret Supplement, pp TSS 35-37, Gp-1.

3. DF (TS), MACJ44, 24 Feb 71, Subj: Staff Contribution to Overview Report on MACV 1968-1970 (U), Tab K, pp 5, 23, Gp-Not stated.

4. MFR (U), MACMA-FP, 28 Jan 71, Subj: Cambodia Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDTC).

5. Msg (U), SECDEF to Unified and Specified Commands, 111954Z Aug 71, Subj: Briefing by DASD/PA Friedheim, 11 Aug 71, 11 a.m.; Rpt (S), MEDTC-PP, 18 Feb 72, Subj: February Cambodian MAP Conference Report (U), Tab C, Gp-4.

6. Terms of Reference (C) for the MEDT, Cambodia (U), Feb 71, Appendix A to JCMS-81-71 (TS), Gp-4.

7. Memo (U), MACV C/S Action Memo No 71-48, 28 Jun 71, Subj: Tripartite Working Group (U), Gp-4; Briefing (C), MACJ3-04, 14 Nov 71, Subj: Briefing on Tripartite Activities (U), Gp-4.

8. Plan (S), MEDTC, 1 Sep 71, Subj: Assistance to Cambodia (U), p 16, Gp-4.

9. Same as #102, Chap VIII; Fact Sheet (C), MACT, 15 Jan 72, Subj: Chronological History of Khmer Training Completed in RVN, CY71 (U), Gp-4.

10. Msg (S), MEDTC (Fwd) to COMUSMACV, 080900Z Nov 71, Subj: FANK Staff Problems (U), Gp-4.

11. Memo (S), MACV C/S Action Memo No 71-94, 31 Dec 71, Subj: FANK Command Seminar (U), Gp-Not stated.

12. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 160032Z Jul 71, Subj: FANK Training Facilities Survey (U), Gp-4; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG DRAC, 291830Z Jul 71, Subj: Cambodian Training Centers (U), Gp-4.

13. Same as #102, Chap VIII.

14. Same as #5, 18 Feb 72, Tab J, p 4, Gp-4; Rpt (S), MEDTC, 20 Mar 72, Subj: Summary of Military Assistance and Sales, Republic of Cambodia, FY 1973-1976, p I-6, 7, Gp-Not stated.

15. Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, 300047Z Dec 71, Subj: Support Provided MEDTC (U), Gp-4; Msg (S), CGUSARV to COMUSMACV, 311025Z Dec 71, Subj: Support for MEDTC (U), Gp-4; Msg (S), 7AF to COMUSMACV 312245Z Dec 71, Subj: Support for MEDTC (U), Gp-4.

16. Fact Sheet (U), MACMD, 19 Mar 72, Subj: Cambodian Assistance.

17. Fact Sheet (C), MACJ633, 24 Apr 72, Subj: Communications Assistance to Cambodia (U), Gp-4.

18. Same as #14, MEDTC, 20 Mar 72.

19. Fact Sheet (S), MACT-PPA, 10 Dec 71, Subj: Helicopter Gunship Crew Training (U), Gp-3.

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CHRONOLOGY

January

1-- US military strength in RVN at the beginning of the year is 335,794; Free World Forces, 67,444; RVNAF (includes ARVN, VNN, VNMC, VNAF, RF, and PF), 1,074,410.

-- Sir Robert Thompson, British expert on guerrilla warfare, returns to RVN at President Nixon's request to inspect US and GVN police and public safety programs.

-- Two USCG ocean-going cutters, the USCGC Yakutat (WHEC-380) and USCGC Bering Strait (WHEC-382), are turned over to the VNN, completing the planned turnover of WHECs.

-- Operation WASHINGTON GREEN initiated 15 Apr 70 in Binh Dinh Province is terminated (En: 1,957 KIA, 5,152 Det, 123 returnees, 834 IW, 65 CSW, 65 tons of rice captured; Fr: 227 US KIA, 2,237 US WIA, 8 KCS WIA, 6 IW, 2 CSW).

2-- Two UH-1H helicopter squadrons, the 23d at Da Nang and the 221st at Bien Hoa, are activated as the fifth and sixth of eight VNAF UH-1H squadrons.

4-- The first group of VNAF aircrew members to train in-country in US combat aircraft start C-123 flight training.

-- US Special Forces end more than 5 years of operations in RVN border camps with the turnover to GVN forces of the last two outposts, Duc Lap and Ben Het in the central highlands.

6-- A mortar attack on ARVN ammunition storage area at Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh Province, destroys an estimated 6,300 tons of munitions.

8-- Operation HIEP DONG 5 initiated 18 Dec 70 in Quang Tin Province is terminated (En: 161 KIA, 24 Det, 142 returnees, 108 IW, 8 CSW; Fr: 12 KIA, 32 WIA).

-- Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird arrives in RVN to assess the progress of the Vietnamization program.

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January (contd)

9-- The first New Zealand Army Training Team (25 personnel) arrives in RVN to become part of the RVN/NZ training team located at Chi Lang National Training Center in Chau Doc Province.

-- MG Charles P. Brown, USA, assumes command of the I Field Force Vietnam and the duties of Senior Advisor, MR 2.

-- Elements of the 4/8 ARVN Inf Bn on search operations 13 km east of Dau Tieng, Binh Duong Province discover a weapons and ammunition cache totaling 20 tons of ammunition and 2 tons of weapons.

10-- The Special Subcommittee on Alleged Drug Abuse in the Armed Forces, from the House Armed Services Committee, arrives in RVN to assess the drug abuse problem.

11-- President Park of Korea announces his government is planning a step-by-step withdrawal of its military forces in RVN.

-- A convoy of the 18th ARVN Inf Div on a resupply mission is ambushed 8 km north of Thien Ngon, Tay Ninh Province, by an unknown size enemy unit (En: 25 KIA, 3 IW, 1 B-40 RL; Fr: 7 KIA, 8 WIA, 15 2 1/2-ton trucks combat loss, 8 2 1/2-ton trucks lightly damaged, 1 PRC-25 radio lost, 1 IW).

12-- The VNN initiates Operation TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII to counter the numerous sinkings and attacks on merchant ships carrying fuel and ammunition between the Cambodian/RVN border and Phnom Penh. The convoy escort operation consists of VNN assets and employs both ARVN and Cambodian ground troops for bank security.

-- Thai Prime Minister Kittakochorn announces redeployment of all Thai troops from RVN by February 1972. The first 5,000 will leave in July 1971.

14-- The 416th RF Co engages an estimated 50 enemy 11 km southwest of Long My in Chuong Thien Province (En: 20 KIA, 1 IW, 1 CSW; Fr: 1 KIA, 8 WIA, 6 MIA, 6 IW).

16-- Operation TOAN THANG 81 initiated 28 Jul 70 in Tay Ninh Province is terminated (En: 219 KIA, 14 Det, 218 IW, 1 CSW; Fr: 62 KIA, 225 WIA).

-- Operation TOAN THANG 72/18 initiated 22 Jul 70 in Cambodia is terminated (En: 1,194 KIA, 42 Det, 295 IW, 47 CSW; Fr: 174 KIA, 639 WIA).

-- Operation TOAN THANG 72/25 initiated 22 Jul 70 in Cambodia is terminated (En: 641 KIA, 236 Det, 71 returnees, 256 IW, 22 CSW; Fr: 68 KIA, 266 WIA, 1 IW).

17-- Assisted by US gunships, GVN paratroops raid an enemy PW camp inside Cambodia, where 20 US were believed held. The camp is found to be empty but 30 enemy soldiers are captured.

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January (contd)

18-- The 165th RF Co on a ground clearing operation 12 km northwest of Tay Ninh, Tay Ninh Province, engages an estimated enemy platoon. ARVN artillery supports the engagement (En: 35 KIA, 1 Det, 3 CSW, 7 IW, 20 B-40; Fr: 3 KIA, 6 WIA).

19-- Operation HOANG DIEU 101 initiated 24 Nov 70 in Quang Nam Province is terminated (En: 538 KIA, 300 Det, 45 returnees, 144 IW, 27 CSW; Fr: 43 KIA, 279 WIA).

21-- GVN announces it will observe a 24-hour cease-fire commemorating the TET lunar new year from sundown 26 Jan to sundown 27 Jan. The Communists earlier announced a 4-day cease-fire to begin on 26 Jan.

-- Communist troops attack Phnom Penh airport with rockets and mortars, causing heavy damage.

-- Cambodia's Prime Minister Lon Nol makes courtesy calls on Ambassador Bunker and GEN Creighton W. Abrams in Saigon.

23-- Elements of the 412 RF Bn supported by VNAF tactical air and USN OV-10 airstrikes engage an unknown size enemy force 11 km northwest of Cai Nuoc in An Xuyen Province (En: 38 KIA; Fr: 4 RF WIA).

24-- Operation CUU LONG 44/02 initiated 13 Jan in Cambodia is terminated (En: 211 KIA, 2 Det, 45 IW, 16 CSW; Fr: 16 KIA, 87 WIA, 4 M-113 destroyed).

-- The GVN returns 37 NVN PWs to North Vietnam during a temporary cease-fire in the DMZ.

25-- The VC/NVA begin a 4-day TET cease-fire.

26-- The Department of Defense announces the US will speed delivery of planes and helicopters to Cambodia to replace equipment destroyed in the attack on Phnom Penh airport on 21 January. The equipment will be part of the $255 million in aid provided by the MAP.

-- The GVN/US 24-hour cease-fire is observed from 261800 to 271800 January.

27-- The USN transfers custody of eight river patrol boats to the Cambodian Navy, the first such transfer of combat craft under the Military Assistance Program. The Cambodian crewmen for the boats were trained by the VNN.

30-- Operation WOLFE MOUNTAIN initiated 22 Jul 70 in Quang Tri Province is terminated (En: 299 KIA, 31 Det, 61 IW, 20 CSW; Fr: 34 KIA, 336 WIA).

-- Operation DEWEY CANYON II (LAM SON 719, Phase I) is initiated by US forces in MR 1 to secure western Quang Tri Province and to set up an LOC in support of the RVN thrust into Laos.

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January (contd)

31-- US military strength in RVN is 334,850. FWMAF strength in RVN is 67,433. RVNAF strength is 1,054,125.

February

2-- Elements of the 1/46 ARVN Inf in night defensive position 10 km northwest of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province, are attacked by an unknown size enemy force (En: 26 KIA, 6 CSW, 9 IW; Fr: 4 WIA).

3-- MG Albert J. Bowley, USAF, assumes duties as Deputy Chief of Staff, MACV.

-- MACV announces it is giving full air support, including helicopter gunships, medical evacuation, and aerial supply drops for the new RVN dry season campaign in the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak areas of Cambodia.

-- An estimated two enemy companies enter Vinh Hoa Hamlet, 12 km northeast of Song Cau, Phu Yen Province, and engage VC cadre and PSDF units (En: 37 KIA, 16 Det, 2 radios; Fr: 6 KIA, 21 WIA).

4-- Operation TOAN THANG 72 initiated 22 Jul 70 is terminated (En: 1,866 KIA, 189 Det, 648 IW, 71 CSW; Fr: 767 KIA, 905 WIA).

6-- The 1/45th ARVN Hq receives an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds 18 km south of Ban Me Thuot, Darlac Province (En: 25 KIA, 4 IW, 2 CSW; Fr: 5 KIA, 23 WIA).

8-- Operation LAM SON 719, Phase II, begins as the RVNAF attack into Laos with the objective of disrupting NVA logistics along the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos. President Nguyen Van Thieu announces the attack.

-- Cambodian Premier Lon Nol suffers a heart attack and gives up all official duties. Vice Premier Sisowath Sirik Matak will serve as acting premier.

10-- In Operation LAM SON 719 two VNAF UH-1H helicopters receive hostile ground fire and crash 28 km east of Tchepone, Laos (En: N/A; Fr: 13 KIA, including the G-3 and G-4 of I Corps, plus 5 newsmen and 4 US).

11-- The US 235th Helicopter Sq is officially turned over to the VNAF and the VNAF 530th Fighter and 229th Helicopter Sqdns are designated operationally ready.

12-- The 6th increment of the RTAFV (5,600 officers and men) replaces the 4th increment, completing the last rotation of RTAFV brigades.

-- Elements of the 23d Inf Div locate an enemy PW camp in MR 2 and recover nine RVN civilians. No US or FWMAF personnel were at the camp. Two Hoi Chanhs led the recovery forces to the site.

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February (contd)

13-- The USS Camp (DER-21) is transferred to the VNN under the USN ACTOV program. The destroyer escort is renamed Tran Hung Dao, Hq 1.

-- US military authorities impose a 24-hour curfew on US personnel in Qui Nhon in the wake of 2 days of anti-American rioting resulting from the death of two VN civilians caused by a US military guard accidentally firing an M-79 rocket grenade.

-- Cambodian Premier Lon Nol is flown to Hawaii for treatment at Tripler Army Hospital.

15-- In Qui Nhon US military authorities lift the 24-hour curfew and US compounds are opened as the city remains quiet.

-- BG James H. Watkins, USAF, assumes the duties of Chief, Air Force Advisory Group.

16-- The New Zealand Government announces it is withdrawing its Special Air Service troops by the end of the month. The troop of about 30 men has served in a reconnaissance role.

-- Operation CUU LONG 9/9 initiated 5 Oct 70 in Chau Doc and Kien Giang Province is terminated (En: 700 KIA, 109 Det, 161 IW, 30 CSW; Fr: 192 KIA, 1,505 WIA, 17 IW, 1 CSW).

-- COL Gerald V. Kehrli, USAF, the highest ranking US officer ever to face a court-martial in RVN, is sentenced to three years hard labor and fined $15,000 after conviction on seven counts of illegal possession and transfer of marijuana.

17-- President Nixon declares he will place no limits on the use of US airpower anywhere in Indochina.

-- Terrorists throw fire bombs against the US Embassy fence in Saigon on the third successive day of terrorists attacks against US property in the capital.

18-- The China Beach R and R Center in La Nang welcomes its 10,000th guest. The center was opened in June 1970 after the R and R facility at Vung Tau closed.

19-- The first tank-vs-tank action of the war takes place near Highway 9 in Laos during Operation LAM SON 719 when a M41A3 (26 tons, 76mm gun) of 1st Troop, 11th ARVN Cav destroys a Soviet T-34/85 (32 tons, 85mm gun).

20-- MACV announces that herbicides will no longer be used for crop destruction in SVN. Limited herbicide operations, controlled under strict guidance will continue away from heavily populated areas around allied fire bases, in order to deny the enemy cover.

21-- A unit of the US 1st Cav Div (Ambl) finds $50,000 in US currency and one million piasters among the supplies of an enemy unit which they routed 26 km northeast of Dong Bo, Long Khanh Province.

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February (contd)

21-- Heavy NVN attacks stall the Operation LAM SON 719 push into Laos for the fourth successive day, with heavy casualties on both sides.

-- In Khanh Hoa Province an enemy unit attacks the 136th RF Co in night defensive position 16 km west of Nha Trang (En: 32 KIA, 12 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 5 RF KIA, 12 WIA, 1 CSW).

22-- In Chuong Thien Province, a PF platoon from Thrang Chanh village and one RF Intel Sq from Duc Long District engage an unknown size enemy force 10 km northwest of Vi Thanh (En: 21 KIA, 8 sampans, 13 grenades; Fr: 3 WIA).

23-- In Kien Giang Province an enemy unit shells and attacks the 4/31st Inf in its night defensive position 29 km southwest of Kien An (En: 22 KIA, 1 Det, 5 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 3 KIA, 7 WIA, 2 IW).

-- LTG Do Cao Tri, CG, III Corps, is killed in a helicopter crash. Also killed are Francois Sully of Newsweek Magazine, 4 VN officers, and 4 crewmen.

24-- Operation CUU LONG/BL/02 initiated 20 Feb in Bac Lieu Province is terminated (En: 127 KIA, 68 Det, 27 IW; Fr: 2 KIA, 33 WIA).

-- The 711th RF Co while searching 11 km southwest of Quang Ngai, Quang Ngai Province engage an unknown size enemy force. US gunships and artillery support (En: 47 KIA, 2 Det; Fr: 6 RF KIA, 7 RF WIA).

25-- The 7th Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) rotates to Australia and is replaced by the 3d RAR.

-- In Operation LAM SON 719 elements of the 3/1st ARVN Inf Bn checking an ARC LIGHT strike area 40 km southeast of Tchepone, Laos find 92 KBA, 11 CSW, 2 tons of 37mm ammunition, and 6 tons of unknown type ammunition .

-- Operation CUU LONG/DK/BX/02 initiated 20 Feb in Ba Xuyen Province is terminated (En: 104 KIA, 16 Det, 30 IW, 2 CSW; Fr: 3 KIA, 46 WIA).

-- Operation CUU LONG/DK/CT/02 initiated 20 Feb in Chuong Thien Province is terminated (En: 132 KIA, 4 Det, 50 IW; Fr: 10 KIA, 25 WIA, 2 MIA, 5 IW).

-- In Quang Ngai Province an enemy unit attacks the 713th RF Co 10 km southwest of Binh Son (En: 35 KIA, 5 IW, 3 CSW, 90 grenades, 4 claymore mines; Fr: 1 RF KIA, 2 RF WIA).

26-- In Operation TOAN THANG 1/71 NB elements of the 36th ARVN Rgr Bn on search operations 4 km southwest of Dambe, Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia, engage an estimated enemy battalion. VNAF tactical air supports (En: 250 KIA; Fr: 77 ARVN WIA, 7 MIA, 3 2 1/2-ton trucks, 1 1/4-ton jeep, 1 3/4 ton ambulance, 2 M-113 APC, 6 IW lost).

27-- In Operation LAM SON 719 a forward air controller reports sighting 200 KBA and 8 destroyed tanks in an area 23 km east of Tchepone, Laos.

-- Elements of the 2/3 ARVN Inf on search operations 42 km southeast of Tchepone, Laos in Operation LAM SON 719 find 157 enemy KBA, 15 IW, and 8 CSW.

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February (contd)

27-- The 7th AF announces the apprehension of about 40 enlisted airmen following a month-long investigation into a narcotics ring at the Cam Ranh Bay Air Base.

28-- US military strength in RVN is 323,797. FWMAF strength is 67,791. RVNAF strength is 1,049,163.

March

1-- President Nguyen Van Thieu issues a decree establishing the National Police Command to replace the Directorate General of National Police.

-- RADM Forster Lalor relieves RADM Albert R. Marschall as Deputy Director of PACNAVFACSEA.

-- In Operation LAM SON 719 elements of the 17 ACS and the 3d Abn Bde operating 25 km east of Tchepone, Laos receive a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force (En: 200 KIA, 150 IW; Fr: 2 KIA, 50 WIA, 6 M-113 APC destroyed).

-- Operation IRON MOUNTAIN initiated 18 Mar 69 in Quang Ngai Province is terminated (En: 4,476 KIA, 2,724 Det, 1,130 IW, 94 CSW; Fr: 440 KIA, 2,858 WIA).

-- Operation FREDERICK HILL initiated 18 Mar 69 in Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces is terminated (En: 7,514 KIA, 2,572 Det, 1,848 IW, 192 CSW; Fr: 572 KIA, 3,910 WIA, 2 MIA).

-- Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE initiated 29 Jun 70 in Quang Tin Province is terminated (En: 261 KIA, 228 Det, 96 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 20 KIA, 302 WIA).

-- Operation GENEVA PARK initiated 18 Mar 69 in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces is terminated (En: 2,237 KIA, 1,458 Det, 532 IW, 49 CSW; Fr: 231 KIA, 1,796 WIA).

-- Operation NANTUCKET BEACH initiated 20 Jul 70 in Quang Ngai Province is terminated (En: 630 KIA, 634 Det, 207 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 57 KIA, 651 WIA).

2-- The Cambodian Government and the US Government sign an agreement covering $18.5 million of economic aid. The money is to help Cambodia avoid excessive inflation and other major distortions in its economy.

3-- In Operation LAM SON 719, hundreds of US helicopters advance RVN troops 6 miles deeper into Laos. The advance puts RVN forces 24 miles west of the Laos border and 1/2 mile from Tchepone.

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March (contd)

3-- In Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 NB in Cambodia, elements of the 1/52 ARVN Inf and 15th ACS, 18 ACS and 30th Rgr Bn on search operations 5 km southwest of Dambe, Kampong Cham Province, engage an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of previous ARC LIGHT strikes (En: 210 KIA, 12 B-40 RL, 1 75mm RR; Fr: 8 WIA, 150 of the enemy were KBA).

-- The VC announce on Liberation Radio that they will release on 4 or 5 March 39 RVN PWs captured 1 May in fighting in the Central Highlands.

4-- US Ambassador at Large David M. Kennedy arrives in Saigon for a week of consultations with US and VN officials on the RVN economic situation.

-- GVN military spokesmen announce that the VC have not freed any PWs as announced in a radio broadcast on 3 May, and are instead shelling the region of the proposed release.

5-- MG D. B. Dunstan assumes command of the Australian Force, Vietnam.

6-- Elements of the 3/2 ARVN Inf on a search operation 7 km east of Tchepone, Laos, find an area hit by air strikes (En: 31 KBA, 1,000 tons of rice, 2,000 protective masks, 11 AK-47 rifles, 9 B-40 RL, 7 7.63mm machine guns).

7-- Operation TRUNG 22/4 initiated 13 Feb 71 in Kontum Province is terminated (En: 329 KIA, 4 IW, 2 CSW; Fr: 25 KIA, 83 WIA, 274 MIA, 393 IW).

8-- The Xa Hiep My village OP, 7 km south of Cau Ngang, Vinh Binh Province, is penetrated by an enemy sapper unit with the aid of a traitor (En: 2 KIA, 1 IW; Fr: 11 KIA, 9 WIA, 20 VN civilians killed, 13 civilians wounded).

9-- Operation HOANG DIEU 103 initiated 3 Feb in Quang Nam Province is terminated (En: 330 KIA, 1 8 Det, 10 returnees, 128 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 46 KIA, 359 WIA, 2 MIA).

10-- SECDEF Laird approves the designation of Cambodia as a hostile fire area for special pay, retroactive to 1 Jan 71.

r- Operation TRAN HUNG DAO I, the second oldest operation of the SEA LORDS campaign, initiated 21 Nov 68 to interdict enemy infiltration from Cambodia is terminated (En: 723 KIA, 53 Det; Fr: 53 KIA).

-- Elements of the 1/1st ARVN Inf Bn searching 22 km southeast of Tchepone, Laos, find an open area hit by air strikes (En: 144 KBA, 44 IW, 4 trucks, 100 122mm rounds, 2 37mm guns destroyed).

-- Elements of the 4/1 ARVN Inf on a bomb damage assessment mission 16 km southeast of Tchepone find 391 enemy KBA, 18 Russian trucks, 500 barrels of fuel, 30 82mm mortars, 644 AK-47s, 8 tons of mixed ammunition, 6 tons of rice, 64 radios, 3 122mm guns, 2 122mm RL, 2 37mm guns, 4 12.7mm machine guns, 18 B-40 RL, 8 tracked vehicles, 26 CSW and 100 rounds of 122 rocket ammunition, and 8 wounded PWs.

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March (contd)

13-- SECDEF Laird directs a PW/MIA task group be established to improve the direction and coordination of matters relating to these personnel.

14-- In Operation LAM SON 719 elements of the 6th ARVN Abn Bn on search operations 39 km southeast of Tchepone, Laos, find an area hit by ARC LIGHT strikes (En: 70 KBA, 4 82mm mortars, 500 rounds mortar, 2 57mm RR, 200 rounds of 57mm ammunition, 4 radios, 7 telephones, and 1,000 lbs of rice).

-- An American civilian reporter is seriously wounded in Saigon when he fails to stop his vehicle for a RVN National Police check-point.

15-- Operation DOK SOO RI initiated 22 Feb in Phu Yen Province is terminated (En: 410 KIA, 5 Det, 96 IW, 6 CSW; Fr: 23 KIA, 74 WIA).

16-- The 145th RF Co 35 km south of Pleiku, Pleiku Province, receives an attack-by-fire on its compound followed by a ground attack by an estimated enemy company (En: 20 KIA, 6 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 4 KIA, 8 WIA).

-- The Phu Nhon District Hq and US Advisory TM 36 in Pleiku Province, 48 km south of Pleiku, receive an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds and B-40 fire followed by a sapper attack by an estimated enemy company. Gunships and artillery support the engagement (En: 57 KIA, 22 IW; Fr: 21 KIA, 11 WIA).

17-- In Operation LAM SON 719, 19 km southeast of Tchepone, Savannakhet Province, Laos, elements of the 1st ARVN Inf Regt report being in heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of LZ LoLo (En: 1,100 KIA, 270 IW, 45 CSW, 8 radios; Fr: 66 KIA, 190 WIA).

-- Operation CUU LONG/DK/CT/03 initiated 13 Mar in Chuong Thien Province is terminated (En: 165 KIA, 46 Det, 35 IW, 1 CSW; Fr: 3 KIA, 32 WIA, 2 IW).

-- Operation CUU LONG /DK/AX/03 initiated 13 Mar in An Xuyen Province is terminated (En: 114 KIA, 30 Det, 2 returnees, 26 IW; Fr: 9 KIA, 15 WIA).

-- In Operation TOAN THANG 01/71, 6 km north of Suong, Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia, the 5th ARVN ACS in night defensive position is attacked by an estimated enemy battalion (En: 350 KIA; Fr: 8 KIA, 50 WIA, 3 M-113 heavily damaged).

18-- Nineteen km southeast of Tchepone, Laos, in Operation LAM SON 719, elements of the 4/1 ARVN Inf Bn report a 24-hour contact with an unknown size enemy force (En: 567 KIA, 172 IW, 48 CSW, 120 blocks of TNT; Fr: 50 KIA, 80 WIA).

-- The Honorable John J. Gorton, Australian Minister of Defense, visits RVN for an update on the situation.

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March (contd)

18-- The New Zealand Prime Minister announces the NZ Artillery Battery will commence redeployment beginning 1 May.

19-- In Operation LAM SON 719 elements of the 4/2 Inf engage an unknown size enemy force 26 km southeast of Tchepone, Laos (En: 195 KIA, 6 IW, 15 CSW; Fr: 5 KIA, 91 WIA, 13 MIA).

-- Elements of the 4/8 ARVN Inf Intel and Recon Sq on ground reconnaissance 11 km southwest of Phuoc Vinh, Binh Duong Province, engage an estimated enemy platoon with small arms. US gunships and ARVN artillery support the contact (En: 36 KIA; Fr: 2 WIA, 2 MIA, 5 IW).

21-- Operation QUANG TRUNG 45/20 initiated 16 Mar in Pleiku Province is terminated (En: 130 KIA, 1 IW, 2 CSW; Fr: 28 KIA, 47 WIA).

-- The 9th ARVN Recon Co operating 4 km southwest of Snuol, Kratie Province, Cambodia, discovers a cache of unpolished rice weighing approximately 45 tons.

-- In Operation LAM SON 719, elements of the 4/2 and 2/2 Inf Bns operating 24 km southeast of Tchepone, Laos, receive an attack-by-fire followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force (En: 245 KIA, 65 IW, 90 CSW, 8 flame throwers, 5 radios; Fr: 37 KIA, 58 WIA, 15 MIA).

22-- Operation QUANG TRUNG 47/44 initiated 16 Mar in Pleiku Province is terminated (En: 178 KIA, 1 Det, 22 IW, 9 CSW; Fr: 14 KIA, 47 WIA).

-- Katum Airfield, 30 km northeast of Tay Ninh, Tay Ninh Province, receives 5 rounds of 82mm mortar which impact in the ammunition and POL storage area resulting in 28,000 gallons JP-4 and 24 tons of assorted ammunition destroyed.

24-- In Operation LAM SON 719 elements of the 7/17 US Cav operating in Savannakhet Province, Laos, 16 km southwest of Khe Sanh sight 21 enemy tanks and engage them with helicopter gunships (En: 7 tanks destroyed, 2 damaged).

25-- Elements of the 22d ARVN Rgr Bn in night defensive position 28 km southwest of Kontum, Kontum Province, are engaged by an unknown size enemy force (En: 23 KIA, 2 IW; Fr: 4 KIA, 9 WIA).

26-- The first anniversary of the promulgation of the Land-to-the-Tiller Law is celebrated throughout Vietnam. President Thieu announces a new 5-year rural and economic development program for Vietnam.

-- An RF supply convoy of three LCM 8s transporting POL and ammunition is ambushed 11 km southwest of Kien An, Kien Giang Province by 2 - 4 enemy using B-40 rockets (En: unknown; Fr: 2 VNN KIA, 1 US WIA, 4 US MIA, 20 VN civilians killed and 33 wounded, 32 houses destroyed by fire from burning POL, 1 LCM 8 sunk, 9,000 gallons fuel destroyed).

-- FSB Vandergrift, 20 km northeast of Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province, receives an attack-by-fire consisting of 17 122mm rockets (En: unknown; Fr: 3 US WIA, an estimated 242.4 tons of 8 inch ammunition destroyed.

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March (contd)

28-- FSB Mary Ann, 42 km southwest of Tam Ky, receives an estimated 50 to 60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack of sappers which penetrated the perimeter of the base. The base is manned by an element of the 196th Bde, 23d US Inf Div (En: 12 KIA; Fr: 33 KIA, 76 WIA).

-- At Cang Long, Vinh Binh Province, Cang Long district town receives a mixed mortar attack followed by an attack on the 676 RF Hq and the National Police Hq (En: 6 KIA, 2 Det, 2 IW; Fr: 45 KIA, 72 WIA).

29-- In the An Hoi area of MR 1, the Duc Duc district Hq and several surrounding villages are overrun by enemy forces (En: 59 KIA, 22 IW, 6 CSW, 3 Det; Fr: 20 KIA, 46 WIA, 100 civilians killed, 96 civilians wounded, 1,451 civilian homes destroyed).

30-- USN helicopters sight an enemy infiltration trawler, a SL-6, 18 km southeast of Nam Can. SEALs inserted into the area report that the steel-hulled vessel has been stripped and abandoned, apparently due to engineering difficulties. The trawler is estimated to have been in place 4 to 6 months.

-- The Australian Government announces that between May and November, 1,000 of the 7,000 remaining Australian troops in RVN will be withdrawn.

31-- During March there were 20 recorded mining incidents on the Cua Viet River as the enemy made a determined effort to interdict the flow of supplies in support of Operation LAM SON 719 in Laos.

-- Operation HIEP DONG 6 initiated 2 Feb in Quang Tin Province is terminated (En: 591 KIA, 50 Det, 90 returnees, 219 IW, 16 CSW; Fr: 51 KIA, 153 WIA).

-- Operation QUYET THANG 405A initiated 1 Jan in Quang Ngai Province is terminated (En: 302 KIA, 61 Det, 3 returnees, 108 IW, 10 CSW; Fr: 9 KIA, 44 WIA).

-- Operation QUYET THANG 504A initiated 1 Jan in Quang Tin Province is terminated (En: 179 KIA, 21 Det, 5 returnees, 67 IW; Fr: 2 KIA, 6 WIA).

-- Operation QUYET THANG 603A initiated 1 Jan in Quang Ngai Province is terminated (En: 469 KIA, 134 Det, 8 returnees, 183 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 31 KIA, 222 WIA, 14 MIA).

-- Operation TRUNG 22/FWD/4 initiated 7 Mar in Kontum Province is terminated (En: 158 KIA, 15 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 19 KIA, 81 WIA).

-- US military strength in RVN is 302,097. FWMAF strength is 67,513. RVNAF strength is 1,057,676.

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April

1-- Operation SOLID ANCHOR is turned over to the VNN at Nam Can, An Xuyen Province, ending the USN river patrol mission in RVN.

-- The curfew in the greater Saigon area for US forces is changed to the period 0100 to 0530, corresponding to the RVN civilian curfew hours.

2-- In Operation QUANG TRUNG 22/FWD/4, the 2/41 Inf moves onto FSB 6, joining the 1/41 Inf. Heavy contact continued (En:355 KIA, 10 IW, 1 CSW; Fr: 7 KIA, 54 WIA).

4-- FSB 6, 13 km southwest of Tan Canh, Kontum Province, receives an attack-by-fire followed by a ground attack (En: 287 KIA, 72 IW, 13 CSW; Fr: none).

5-- RADM Robert S. Salzer, USN, relieves VADM Jerome H. King, Jr, as Commander US Naval Forces, Vietnam.

-- Nine km northwest of Phu Cat, Binh Dinh Province, the 201st RF Bn engages an unknown size enemy force during a search operation. US supports with gunships and tactical air (En: 27 KIA; Fr: 8 KIA, 29 WIA, 8 IW).

-- In Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 NB in Cambodia, 3 km southwest of Snuol, Kratie Province, elements of the 2/7 ARVN Inf, 3/8 Inf, and 1st ACS engage an enemy force. ARVN artillery and helicopter gunships support (En: 218 KIA; Fr: 8 KIA, 47 WIA, 82 MIA).

6-- The 360th RF Co OP, 2 km southeast of Mo Cay, Kien Hoa Province, is attacked by an enemy sapper unit aided by 3 RF traitors (former Hoi Chanhs). The outpost is overrun and a nearby bridge 50 percent destroyed (En: unknown; Fr: 16 RF KIA, 3 RF WIA, 14 MIA, 3 RVN civilians wounded, 32 IW, 1 60mm mortar, 1 CSW).

-- Elements of the 2/42d ARVN Inf Regt operating 5 km east of Dak To, Kontum Province engage the enemy (En: 56 KIA, 4 Det, 15 IW, 7 CSW; Fr: 2 WIA).

7-- President Nixon announces plans for the withdrawal of 100,000 more US troops from RVN by 1 Dec 71. This will leave 184,000 personnel on that date.

-- New Zealand announces it will withdraw its 130-man artillery battery early in May. This will leave 264 New Zealand troops in RVN.

-- Nine km north of An Hoa, Quang Nam Province, a forward observer for the 1st Mar Regt observes 25 enemy. Artillery and 81mm mortars are employed. A search of the area reveals 30 enemy killed.

-- Elements of the US 7th Sq, 17th Air Cav on a visual reconnaissance mission 25 km northwest of Dak To, Kontum Province, observe 15 enemy personnel and 5 elephants loaded with rockets headed south. The enemy unit is engaged with helicopter gunships (En: 8 KIA, 3 elephants killed; Fr: none).

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April (contd)

7-- Plei Ring De village, 17 km southwest of Pleiku, Pleiku Province, is attacked by an unknown size enemy force (En: unknown; Fr: 34 MIA, 28 IW).

-- Elements of the 53d ARVN Inf on a search operation 6 km southeast of Ben Het, Kontum Province, contact a large enemy force (En: 260 KIA; Fr: 12 KIA, 38 WIA).

8-- Operation LAM SON 719 initiated 30 Jan is terminated. Initial reporting: (En: 13,642 KIA, 56 Det, 5,066 IW, 1,935 CSW, 106 tanks, 422 trucks, 1,250 tons of rice, 4 tons medical supplies, 98 radios, 20,000 tons ammunition captured or destroyed; Fr: 1,707 (176 US) KIA, 6,466 (1,042 US) WIA, 693 (42 US) MIA, 3,060 IW, 198 CSW, 75 tanks, 103 APCs, 152 trucks, 98 artillery pieces, 207,500 gallons POL, 1,498 tons ammunition, 37 bulldozers lost or destroyed).

-- At the Paris Peace Talks the GVN offers to intern in a neutral country PWs who have been held for a long period. They identify 1,200 PWs who have been detained 4 years or more.

9-- Elements of the 4/10 ARVN Inf engage an estimated enemy company 5 km west of Truc Giang, Kien Hoa Province, with organic weapons. OV-10 aircraft and gunships support (En: 20 KIA, 4 IW; Fr: none).

10-- In Cambodia, 10 km southeast of Suong, Kampong Cham Province, the 33d Rgr Bn, supported by ARVN artillery, engages an unknown size enemy force (En: 100 KIA; Fr: 1 KIA, 5 WIA).

-- Elements of the 2/43d Inf on search operations engage an unknown size enemy force 14 km southeast of Suong, Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia (En: 40 KIA, 2 CSW, 4 IW; Fr: 3 KIA, 9 WIA, 2 trucks destroyed).

11-- Operation HIEP DONG 7 initiated 7 Apr in Quang Tin Province is terminated (En: 109 KIA, 30 Det, 42 IW, 11 CSW; Fr: 4 KIA, 10 WIA).

-- The 36th and 52d Rgr Bns, supported by the 15th and 18th ACS engage an estimated enemy regiment 14 km southeast of Suong, Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia, while operating on Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 (En: 200 KIA, 2 82mm mortar, 18 .51 cal machine guns; Fr: 6 WIA).

12-- USN elements supported by helicopter gunships and VNAF aircraft engage and sink a NVN SL-8 infiltration trawler inside the 12-mile territorial limits of RVN 39 km southeast of Ca Mau City. The trawler returned fire before blowing up and sinking.

-- US command announces that its biggest conventional bomb, the 15,000 pound "daisy cutter," has been used for the first time against enemy troops near FSB 6. The bombs explode just above the ground and blast a clearing as big as a ballfield.

-- Premier Lon Nol returns to Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Sirik Matak continues as Acting Prime Minister.

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April (contd)

12-- The Phuoc Long PRU on a ground operation engages an estimated enemy company 15 km northwest of Phuoc Binh, Phuoc Long Province (En: 32 KIA, 2 IW, 15 anti-tank mines, 26 120mm mortar rounds, 30 M-26 grenades, 150 B-40 charges, 40 B-41 charges, 20 82mm mortar rounds, 20 60mm mortar rounds, 2 radios, 80 B-40 rounds, 50 B-41 rounds captured; Fr: none).

13-- Operation DONG KHOI/04 initiated 10 Apr throughout MR 4 is terminated (En: 690 KIA, 194 Det, 171 IW, 6 CSW; Fr: 36 KIA, 267 WIA, 1 MIA, 7 IW).

-- Elements of the 3d Bn/44th Regt on search operations engage an unknown size enemy force 14 km west of Tan Canh, Kontum Province (En: 96 KIA, 28 IW, 4 CSW; Fr: 4 KIA, 37 WIA, 6 MIA).

-- Elements of the 38th ARVN Rgr Bn operating 7 km southeast of Suong, Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia, receive an attack by an unknown size enemy force. ARVN artillery and VNAF support (En: 148 KIA, 2 CSW, 8 IW; Fr: 16 KIA, 48 WIA).

14-- LTG Donn J. Robertson, CG, and the III Marine Amphibious Force redeploy, leaving the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade which is activated under the command of MG Alan J. Armstrong. Redeploying with III MAF is the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

19-- Foreign Minister Choi Kyu Hah of South Korea announces his government's plans to withdraw an infantry division from SVN before the end of the year. This will involve 13,000 to 15,000 men.

20-- Prime Minister Lon Nol of Cambodia resigns with his entire cabinet. Lon Nol cites his health and incapacity to resume full duties as the reason.

-- Operation HOANG DIEU 104 initiated 8 Mar in Quang Nam Province is terminated (En: 342 KIA, 86 Det, 18 returnees, 122 IW, 15 CSW; Fr: 51 KIA, 152 WIA).

-- Operation DONG KHOI/04, Phase II, initiated 17 Apr in MR 4 is terminated (En: 817 KIA, 204 Det, 55 returnees, 272 IW, 12 CSW; Fr: 75 KIA, 304 WIA, 1 MIA, 22 IW).

-- LTC Peter Slusar, USA, assumes duties of MACV Provost Marshal.

21-- Operation HOANG DIEU 105 initiated 27 Mar in Quang Nam Province is terminated (En: 121 KIA, 9 Det, 37 IW, 4 CSW; Fr: 27 KIA, 98 WIA).

-- Operation GREENE SURE initiated 14 Mar in Binh Dinh Province is terminated (En: 168 KIA, 4 Det, 39 IW, 4 CSW; Fr: 17 KIA, 157 WIA, 3 IW, 2 CSW).

23-- The USS Garrett County, AGP-786, is turned over to the VNN as part of the continuing USN ACTOV Program.

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April (contd)

23-- MACV announces the start of the seventh phase (Keystone Oriole Alpha) of troop redeployments a week ahead of President Nixon's timetable. The redeployment will account for 29,300 spaces.

-- In Cambodia, 3 km southeast of Snuol, Kratie Province, a VNAF FAC observes an unknown size enemy force and engages them with tactical air strikes (En: 50 KBA; Fr: none).

24-- In Quang Ngai Province an enemy unit attacks FSB Honey 21 km northwest of Quang Ngai City (En: 21 KIA, 8 IW; Fr: 22 ARVN KIA, 49 ARVN and 2 US WIA).

25-- Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor visits RVN for an update on Vietnamization progress.

-- In Khanh Hoa Province, an enemy unit attacks Duc My Rgr Training Center, 15 km northwest of Ninh Hoa (En: unknown; Fr: 3 KIA, 15 WIA, 8 VN civilians killed, 24 VN civilians wounded, 1 bulldozer, 1 truck, and 100 houses destroyed).

26-- In Binh Dinh Province, elements of the 1/41st ARVN Inf Bn on a search operation 6 km southeast of Phu My engage an unknown size enemy force (En: 41 KBA, 4 IW; Fr: 3 KIA, 14 WIA).

-- In Quang Tin Province the 132d, 182d, 199th PF platoons, while searching 20 km northwest of Tam Ky, engage an unknown size enemy force (En: 42 KIA, 1 Det, 16 IW, 4 CSW; Fr: 2 WIA).

27-- Twenty-five km southeast of Pleiku, Pleiku Province, the district intelligence platoon ambushes an unknown size enemy force (En: 20 KIA, 5 IW; Fr: none).

28-- The VNN receives its first logistic support base when the USN turns over operation of its Cat Lo facility, 40 miles southeast of Saigon near Vung Tau.

29-- The GVN announces at the Paris Peace Talks a proposal for the release of 570 sick and wounded PWs. Also included is an offer to intern temporarily in a neutral country 1,200 NVN PWs who have been imprisoned longer than 4 years.

-- Premier Lon Nol submits his final resignation and Chief of State Cheng Heng immediately nominates Deputy Premier Sisowath Sirik Matak to fill the post. Cheng Heng nominates Lon Nol to the position of Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff of the Cambodian armed forces.

-- In Binh Dinh Province an enemy unit attacks the 42d RF Cp Hq 10 km northeast of Phu My (En: 22 KIA, 4 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 1 KIA, 18 WIA, 2 IW, 1 radio lost).

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April (contd)

30-- US operational headquarters are redisignated. I Field Force becomes Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC); II Field Force becomes Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC); Delta Military Assistance Command becomes Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC).

-- Sirik Matak declines an invitation to form a new Cambodian Government, saying new men are needed.

-- US military strength in RVN is 272,073. FWMAF strength is 66,563. RVNAF strength is 1,058,237.

May

1-- Mr. David S. Thomson, New Zealand Minister of Defence, arrives in RVN for updating on the situation.

-- The hospital ship USS Sanctuary, AH 17, redeploys to the US ending a 4-year tour in RVN.

-- The VNN assumes all explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) responsibilities from the USN in a ceremony at Cam Ranh Bay.

-- Catherine M. Webb, the UPI Phnom Penh bureau manager, was freed by the Viet Cong after 23 days in captivity. Miss Webb, correspondent Toshiichi Suzuki, and four Cambodian interpreters and photographers were freed about 40 miles southwest of Phnom Penh.

-- Operation CUU LONG 9/10 initiated 17 Feb in Chau Doc and Kien Giang Provinces is terminated (En: 355 KIA, 222 Det, 189 IW, 29 CSW; Fr: 60 KIA, 457 WIA, 3 MIA, 7 IW).

-- Operation CUU LONG 9/10 initiated 17 Feb in Cambodia is terminated (En: 153 KIA, 76 Det, 80 IW, 8 CSW; Fr: 26 KIA, 113 WIA).

3-- Cheng Heng, Cambodia's Chief of State, announces a new government organization plan making ailing Premier Lon Nol the President or "moral authority." LTG Sirik Matak, deputy premier, would be the "delegate" actually running the government.

4-- Operation CUU LONG/7/2 initiated 1 Jan in Kien Hoa, Vinh Long, Sa Dec, Vinh Binh, Dinh Tuong, and Go Cong Provinces ends (En: 1,232 KIA, 232 Det, 317 IW, 30 CSW; Fr: 105 KIA, 963 WIA, 5 MIA, 7 IW).

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May (contd)

5-- The Chief of US Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Mr. Robert Ingersoll, meets with President Thieu to discuss the severity of drug abuse among US servicemen and the need for an unprecedented effort by the RVN to suppress drug availability.

-- Seven km northeast of Long Phu, Ba Xuyen Province, the Long Phu RF Co and three PF platoons engage an estimated 60 enemy (En: 32 KIA, 11 IW, 1 CSW; Fr: 3 WIA).

6-- The US Customs Bureau orders intensified inspections of US soldiers returning from SEA and complete inspection of military mail parcels in a crackdown on the flood of high grade heroin and other hard narcotics coming into the US.

-- Operation DONG KHOI/05/71 initiated 2 May in all provinces of MR 4 is terminated (En: 523 KIA, 126 Det, 166 IW, 11 CSW; Fr: 34 KIA, 196 WIA, 1 MIA, 10 IW).

-- Elements of the 2/8 Inf Bn and the 2/1 ACS engage an estimated two enemy companies 3 km southeast of Snuol, Kratie Province, Cambodia (En: 72 KIA, 3 IW, 2 CSW; Fr: 1 KIA, 6 WIA).

8-- In honor of Buddha's birthday, the GVN announces a temporary cessation of offensive operations from noon 8 May to noon 9 May. The enemy Provisional Revolutionary Government had previously announced a 48-hour ceasefire to run from 0700 8 May to 0700 10 May.

-- The 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery, consisting of 10 officers and 121 men, redeploys to New Zealand.

-- Operation IMPERIAL LAKE initiated 20 Aug 70 in Quang Nam Province is terminated (En: 305 KIA, 153 Det, 215 IW, 16 CSW; Fr: 26 KIA, 208 WIA).

9-- The Royal Thai Navy PGM-12 with 29 personnel assigned redeploys to Thailand. The PGM had been attached to and operating with the USN TF 115 (MARKET TIME) since 17 Dec 66. The remaining unit of the Sea Horse Element, LST-5, with 155 personnel will redeploy in April 1972.

-- Twelve km northwest of Quang Tri City, Quang Tri Province, a sampan water taxi with 44 civilians moving from Mai Xa Chanh to Dong Ha is mined (Fr: 4 KIA, 26 civilians killed, 18 civilians missing, 4 civilians injured).

-- Operation PONG TAM 1 initiated 24 Apr in Quang Ngai Province is terminated (En: 106 KIA, 8 Det, 36 IW, 6 CSW; Fr: 17 KIA, 38 WIA).

10-- COL Roy R. May, Jr, USA, assumes duties as Headquarters Commandant, MACV.

13-- Hanoi agrees to formally accept a group of 570 PWs held in SVN. The release is scheduled for 4 Jun.

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May (contd)

14-- The Marine Corps announces it will court-martial Sgt Jon M. Sweeney on charges of aiding the enemy while imprisoned by the NVN. This is the first case of its kind stemming from the war.

-- The 19th Tactical Airlift Squadron, organized at Tan Son Nhut Air Base on 8 Oct 64, is deactivated and turns its aircraft and equipment over to the RVNAF. The recently organized 421st Transport Squadron VNAF receives 16 C-123s, the first VNAF unit to operate this aircraft in RVN.

-- Operation MENG HO 16 initiated 23 Apr in Binh Dinh Province is terminated (En: 252 KIA, 1 Det, 110 IW, 35 CSW; Fr: 13 KIA, 60 WIA).

15-- MG John H. Cushman, USA, becomes CG, Delta Regional Assistance Command.

16-- The Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG) is activated and the Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC) inactivated. Mr. John P. Vann is designated Director SRAG and Senior Advisor to CG, II Corps and MR 2. US Army Forces, MR 2 is activated at the same time.

17-- Stringent new checking systems begin at Saigon area post exchanges with MPs scrutinizing identification and ration cards of all persons entering the exchanges. Major purchases are also recorded. Exchange sales drop an average of about $11,000 a day.

-- Approximately 130 policemen, customs officers, and other officials at Tan Son Nhut Airport are shifted to other jobs as part of a stepped-up GVN drive against smuggling.

-- USCGC Blackhaw, WLB-390, redeploys from RVN terminating 3 1/2 years duty maintaining maritime navigational aids in RVN.

19-- Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor announces that after a review of the My Lai case, MG Samuel Koster will receive a letter of censure, a vacating of the temporary appointment in his current grade, and withdrawal of a Distinguished Service Medal awarded during the period he served with the 23d Division. BG George Young also receives a letter of censure and withdrawal of his Distinguished Service Medal.

20-- Operation QUANG TRUNG 22/1 initiated 1 Apr in Kontum Province is terminated (En: 3,534 KIA, 7 Det, 511 IW, 142 CSW; Fr: 220 KIA, 624 WIA, 148 MIA, 113 IW, 10 CSW).

21-- Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor resigns ending 6 years' service starting from the beginning of the Vietnam buildup in 1965.

-- Six km southwest of Con Thien, Quang Tri Province, FSB C-2 receives an attack-by-fire of 11 rounds of rocket fire. One direct hit on a personnel bunker ouries the individuals inside (En: unknown; Fr: 29 US KIA, 33 US WIA).

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May (contd)

22-- Operation CUU LONG/DK/05/II initiated 18 May in MR 4 is terminated (En: 869 KIA, 173 Det, 235 IW, 20 CSW; Fr: 54 KIA, 293 WIA, 4 MIA, 15 IW).

23-- Enemy unit shells and attacks elements of the 2/42 Inf Regt operating 8 km southwest of Tan Canh, Kontum Province (En: 139 KIA, 11 Det, 23 IW, 11 CSW, 1 flame thrower; Fr: 5 WIA).

-- At Cam Ranh Bay, Khanh Hoa Province, enemy sapper attack on the POL tank farm number 1 destroys 1,680,000 gallons of JP-4 and 210,600 gallons of aviation gasoline.

-- Two VNAF UH-1H aircraft collide in midair and crash 38 km southwest of Kien An, Kien Giang Province, while approaching a LZ in support of the 2/32 ARVN Inf (Fr: 28 killed).

25-- Operation QUANG TRUNG 23-4 initiated 16 May in Pleiku Province is terminated (En: 215 KIA, 8 Det, 24 IW, 7 CSW; Fr: 30 KIA, 100 WIA).

26-- MG Jack J. Wagstaff takes command of the Third Regional Assistance Command.

-- MACV announces that effective immediately all RVN pharmacies and drug stores are off limits to US military personnel. All known bars, hotels, and other business establishments and areas where there is evidence of trafficking of narcotics and dangerous drugs are also to be placed off limits.

-- The RVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that the NVN conditions for the release of 570 sick and wounded NVA PWs are acceptable. The exchange is to be made 4 June at Cau Tung on the 17th parallel.

-- Terrorists set off an explosion in a crowded market killing three civilians and wounding 32 civilians and 11 RF soldiers, 50 miles south of Qui Nhon.

-- Elements of the 2/8th ARVN Inf Bn and the 1/5th ACS operating in Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 NB in the vicinity of Snuol, Cambodia, engage an estimated enemy company (En: 75 KIA; Fr: 12 KIA, 62 WIA, 2 3/4-ton trucks, and 1 M-113 damaged).

27-- MACV discloses the use of a new bomb which sprays an explosive mist that produces a blast and concussion when ignited. The new bomb, which is reported to have the blast effect of a 500-pound iron bomb but makes no crater, is considered highly effective in clearing landing zones of mines and booby traps.

28-- The USN turns over its An Thoi logistic support base to the VNN. The base, located on Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Thailand, supports coastal surveillance forces assigned to the VNN Coastal Flotilla 4. For the past 5 years the base has been a key base for allied coastal patrol forces.

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May (contd)

28-- ARVN elements participating in Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 NB engage an estimated enemy battalion in the vicinity of Snuol, Kratie Province, Cambodia (En: 115 KIA, 2 CSW, 3 IW; Fr: 8 KIA, 18 WIA).

-- Elements of the 1/52 US Inf Bn operating 15 km northwest of Quang Ngai find 21.7 tons of rice.

30-- ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr, Chief of Naval Operations, while visiting RVN announces the beginning of a 30-day amnesty program for sailors addicted to drugs in RVN.

-- Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky announces plans to run for the Presidency of RVN in the October election.

-- Elements of the 2/17 ARVN Cav and 161st RF Co engage an estimated enemy battalion 12 km southwest of Hoi An, Quang Nam Province. ARVN artillery supports the engagement (En: 215 KIA, 4 Det, 15 CSW, 30 IW, 3 radios captured; Fr: 5 KIA, 35 WIA, 1 IW, 19 civilians killed, 30 civilians wounded, 170 homes destroyed).

31-- An enemy unit attacks the 54th ARVN Regt CP 10 km northwest of A Luoi, Thua Thien Province (En: 56 KIA, 15 IW, 6 CSW, 2 radios captured; Fr: 15 KIA, 28 WIA).

-- Elements of the 5th ARVN Div abandon Snuol, Cambodia with heavy losses in men and equipment following an enemy attack which began 24 May. ARVN reinforcements attempting to break through were blocked. The task force of 2,000 men lost 89 KIA, 489 WIA, 197 MIA. Equipment left behind or destroyed included: 839 IW, 110 CSW, 14 artillery pieces, 9 tanks, 15 armored personnel carriers, 64 trucks.

-- US military strength in RVN is 252,210. FWMAF strength is 66,586. RVNAF strength is 1,060,597.

June

1-- MG Donald H. Cowles, USA, assumes duties as Chief of Staff, MACV.

-- US servicemen in RVN begin using US coins instead of military payment certificates in denominations less than a dollar.

-- In Kontum Province, the enemy shells and attacks elements of the 2/42d Inf Regt at FSB 5, 11 km southwest of Tan Canh (En: 57 KIA, 11 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 4 KIA, 9 WIA, 2 105mm Howitzers, 1 57mm RR damaged).

2-- MG Frederick J. Kroesen, Jr, USA, assumes duties as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, MACJ3.

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June (contd)

2-- BG John W. Donaldson is charged with murdering six Vietnamese civilians and assaulting two others while flying over Quang Ngai Province during operations in late 1968. He is the highest ranking officer accused of killing civilians in the VN war and is the first US general to be charged with a war crime in 70 years.

-- Operation HIEP DONG 8-2 initiated 20 May in Quang Tin Province is terminated (En: 107 KIA, 49 Det, 38 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 7 KIA).

3-- Ten km northwest of Krek, Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia, 63 Cambodian Communists rally to elements of the 3/52 ARVN Inf Bn.

4-- Thirteen disabled NVN PWs are returned to prison in RVN after NVN announces in Paris they had cancelled an agreement to accept the PWs in a transfer off the coast of the DMZ. Only 13 among 660 PWs interviewed by the ICRC had agreed to return to North Vietnam.

-- Cambodia and RVN sign accord on the suppression of smuggling and transportation of commercial goods. The accord is aimed at clamping down on illegal drug traffic between the two nations.

5-- Elements of the 9th VNMC Bn operating 16 km southwest of Cam Lo, Quang Tri Province are attacked by an unknown size enemy force (En: 100 KIA; Fr: 10 KIA, 20 WIA).

-- At Katum, Tay Ninh Province, enemy sappers penetrate Katum Base Camp defenses and destroy two JP-4 fuel bladders containing 16,000 gallons of fuel.

6-- US OV-10 and helicopter gunships sight an estimated enemy battalion 13 km southwest of Long Toan, Vinh Binh Province (En: 22 KBA, 11 sampans, 6 structures destroyed, 1 large secondary fire followed; Fr: none).

-- Operation CUU LONG/KG/21/01 initiated 12 May in Kien Giang Province is terminated (En: 238 KIA, 10 Det, 56 IW, 21 CSW; Fr: 26 KIA, 27 WIA).

-- Elements of the 5th VNMC Bn operating 6 km northwest of FSB Sarge in Quang Tri Province are attacked by an enemy unit (En: 83 KIA, 1 Det, 12 IW, 17 CSW; Fr: 21 KIA, 12 WIA).

7-- Operation HOANG DIEU 106 initiated 23 Apr in Quang Nam Province is terminated (En: 795 KIA, 213 Det, 235 IW, 59 CSW; Fr: 117 KIA, 452 WIA).

-- Operation CUU LONG/DK/06/71 initiated 31 May in MR 4 is terminated (En: 583 KIA, 102 Det, 35 returnees, 177 IW, 6 CSW; Fr: 42 KIA, 271 WIA, 14 IW).

8-- An estimated enemy company attacks the Tan Cong RF OP 4 km northeast of Don Nhong, Kien Hoa Province (En: 30 KBA; Fr: 1 RF KIA, 16 RF WIA, 4 civilians wounded).

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June (contd)

8-- Operation QUANG TRUNG 23-4 initiated 25 May in Pleiku Province is terminated (En: 249 KIA, 19 IW, 6 CSW; Fr: 17 KIA, 85 WIA, 17 MIA, 21 IW).

9-- LTG Welborn G. Dolvin, USA, assumes command of XXIV Corps from LTG James W. Sutherland, Jr, USA.

-- GVN spokesmen in Saigon announce that MG Nguyen Van Hieu has been relieved as commander of the 5th ARVN Div due to losses by his forces while abandoning Snuol, Cambodia, on 31 May.

12-- Elements of the 4/43 ARVN Inf Bn and 5th ACS receive 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack while operating 5 km northwest of Krek, Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia, on Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 NB (En: 45 KIA, 1 Det, 11 IW, 1 CSW; Fr: 4 KIA, 9 WIA, 2 IW, 1 PRC-25 radio lost, 2 M-113 damaged).

15-- MACV announces that US battalion advisory teams, the first units to accompany ARVN troops into combat a decade ago, will be phased out within 2 weeks. The elimination of the teams, usually made up of about five officers and enlisted men, is another step in the Vietnamization program.

-- In Qui Nhon harbor, suspected sappers mine the US merchant ship USS American Hawk outside the hull beneath the engine room, flooding the engine room.

16-- BG Stan L. McClellan, USA, assumes the duties of Training Directorate, MACV. Mr. Georges Duval assumes the duties of Science Advisor, MACV.

17-- President Nixon announces plans for an all-out offensive against drug abuse, including immediate establishment of testing and initial rehabilitation procedures in RVN.

-- Operation CUU LONG/DK/06/II initiated 13 Jun in MR 4 is terminated (En: 617 KIA, 102 Det, 54 returnees, 214 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 66 KIA, 258 WIA, 2 MIA, 18 IW).

-- In Quang Tri Province, an enemy unit attacks elements of the 5th VNMC Bn operating 3 km north of FSB Sarge (En: 63 KIA, 14 IW, 7 B-40, 1 flame thrower, 1 radio captured; Fr: 9 KIA, 17 WIA, 1 MIA).

18-- MACV announces it will begin a program to identify and provide initial rehabilitation to military personnel who are heroin users prior to their return to the US. All personnel scheduled for return will be given a drug test urinalysis on arrival at out-processing centers.

-- In Quang Tri Province, an enemy unit attacks elements of the 5th VNMC Bn operating 14 km southwest of Cam Lo (En: 183 KIA, 14 IW, 12 CSW, 1 flame thrower, 1 radio, 69 RPG rounds, 200 blocks TNT; Fr: 25 KIA, 35 WIA, 1 helicopter damaged).

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June (contd)

18-- At Cung Son, Phu Yen Province, the 2/53 RF Gp Hq, and 202 ARVN Arty Plt receive mortar rounds followed by a ground attack from an estimated enemy battalion. US helicopter gunships support. (En: 87 KIA, 3 Det, 41 IW, 4 CSW; Fr: 20 RF KIA, 50 RF WIA, 1 US WIA).

19-- MG James B. Adamson, USA, assumes the duties of Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, MACJ1.

22-- The last US Marine combat unit departs the five northernmost provinces, MR 1, with the ending of Phase VII redeployments (Keystone Oriole Alpha).

-- The commander of the US forces in the Delta region (MR 4) orders a crackdown on drug traffic. All servicemen are confined to their compounds except on official business, and extensive searches are held of all personnel and vehicles entering and leaving the compounds.

-- Explosions at the ammunition supply point of the Quang Tri Combat Base, believed caused by enemy satchel charges, destroy 605 tons of assorted munitions.

-- An unknown size enemy force enters Suon Trai hamlet, 5 km west of Cung Son, Phu Yen Province and abducts 70 Vietnamese civilians; 30 later return.

-- BG Floyd H. Trogdon, USAF, assumes the duties of Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics, MACJ6.

23-- An RVN ammunition supply point at Qui Nhon is hit by 82mm mortar fire, which destroys 413 tons of mixed ammunition and mines.

24-- Mr. Robert C. Seamans Jr, Secretary of Air Force, arrives in RVN for a 3-day visit to check on the progress of the Vietnamese improvement and modernization program.

25-- COL Gunther A. Brumme, USA, assumes the duties of Chief, Data Management Agency, MACV.

-- COL Lawrence P. Hansen, USA, assumes the duties of Staff Judge Advocate, MACV.

26-- Phase VIII troop withdrawal program, Keystone Oriole Bravo, begins 5 days earlier than planned with the standdown of the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing. The redeployment will include the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

-- During Operation LAM SON 720, elements of the 4th VNMC Bn receive a ground attack 4 km northwest of FSB Sarge, Quang Tri Province, from an unknown size enemy force (En: 79 KIA, 18 IW, 11 CSW, 132 B-40/41 rockets, 1 flame thrower, 300 blocks of TNT, 15,000 rounds of small arms ammunition are captured or destroyed; Fr: 3 KIA, 22 WIA).

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June (contd)

28-- An estimated enemy battalion attacks and overruns the 979th RF Co OP 7 km northwest of Cau Ke, Vinh Binh Province (En: 3 KBA; Fr: 20 RF KIA, 5 RF WIA, 2 civilians killed, 27 IW, 1 CSW, 2 PRC-25 radios, and assorted ammunition lost, 4 IW and 1 M-60 MG destroyed).

29-- The US Navy turned over to the VNN its intermediate support base at Rach Soi 125 miles southwest of Saigon. The base is the second of its type to be transferred to the VNN under the Accelerated Turnover of US Navy Assets to the Vietnamese (ACTOV) program.

-- At Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh Province, an ARVN ASP receives an estimated six rounds of mortar fire which ignites five pads of ammunition, destroys an estimated 2,775 metric tons of ammunition.

-- Operation QUYET THANG 20/B initiated 3 May in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin and Kontum Provinces is terminated (622 KIA, 23 Det, 185 IW, 30 CSW; Fr: 43 KIA, 154 WIA).

-- In Cambodia on Operation CUU LONG 44/41/10 the 67th Rgr Bn engages an estimated enemy battalion 21 km southwest of Svay Rieng. VNAF tactical air supports (En: 58 KIA, 3 IW; Fr: 10 KIA, 18 WIA, 1 PRC-25 radio destroyed).

-- COL Byron H. Russell Jr assumes the duties as Provost Marshal, MACV.

30-- Ambassador William E. Colby, Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, returns to the US due to family illness. Mr. George D. Jacobson becomes Acting Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS.

-- The Qui Nhon ammunition dump, the largest in the central region of SVN, is again hit by enemy mortars. More than 10,000 tons of ammunition are destroyed.

-- The USN announces that the 30-day trial drug amnesty program in RVN is being extended indefinitely.

-- Operation QUYET THANG 603/B initiated 1 Apr in Quang Ngai Province is terminated (En: 412 KIA, 18 Det, 109 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: [illegible] KIA, 147 WIA).

-- Operation QUYET THANG 504/B initiated [illegible] Apr in Quang Tin Province is terminated (En: 434 KIA, 16 Det, 125 IW, 28 CSW; Fr: 27 KIA, 87 WIA).

-- Operation QUYET THANG 405/B initiated 1 Apr in Quang Ngai Province is terminated (En: 399 KIA, 31 Det, 1 returnee, 125 IW, 6 CSW; Fr: 12 KIA, 71 WIA).

-- US military strength in RVN is 239,528. FWMAF strength is 66,842. RVNAF strength is 1,060,129.

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July

1-- In MR 1 military commanders launch an intensive campaign against drugs and crime. Tight restrictions are put on all personnel entering and leaving compounds.

-- Operation FINNEY HILL initiated 1 Mar in Quang Ngai Province is terminated (En: 454 KIA, 74 Det, 1 returnee, 241 IW, 33 CSW; Fr: 32 KIA, 280 WIA).

-- Operation CAROLINE HILL initiated 29 Apr in Quang Nam Province is terminated (En: 161 KIA, 66 Det, 1 returnee, 81 IW, 10 CSW; Fr: 15 KIA, 162 WIA).

-- Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK initiated 1 Mar in Quang Tin Province is terminated (En: 463 KIA, 206 Det, 6 returnee, 122 IW, 16 CSW; Fr: 50 KIA, 473 WIA).

-- At the Paris talks, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh makes a new seven-point proposal for the PRG which includes a provision for the release of all prisoners captured in the war by Communist forces provided a date is set for the withdrawal of US forces and Allies from RVN.

2-- MACV announces a new modified R and R program "7 and 7" allowing personnel to take one of two authorized 7 day leaves in conjunction with 7 days R and R in Hawaii, effective 1 Oct. CONUS may be visited during this time.

3-- Dr. Henry Kissinger, assistant to the President for National Security, visits the RVN for discussions on the local situation.

6-- Action in SVN comes almost to a standstill as Typhoon Harriet inundates the country's northern provinces with up to 8 inches of rain.

-- Operation BAK JUE 26 initiated 21 Jun in Khanh Hoa Province is terminated (En: 240 KIA, 115 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 5 KIA, 7 WIA).

-- Operation CUU LONG 44/41/10, conducted in Cambodia, is terminated (En: 162 KIA, 32 Det, 30 IW, 1 CSW; Fr: 22 KIA, 46 WIA, 3 IW).

8-- ARVN troops take control of Fire Base Alpha, the northernmost US fire base in RVN.

-- The US rejects Communist demands for unconditional withdrawal of US forces contained in the 1 July seven-point proposal, but moves to negotiate the whole new VC peace plan in private talks. The Communist delegation, however, rejected the bid for private sessions.

-- Thailand has begun withdrawing its forces from South Vietnam with about 5,000 troops leaving during July and August and all Thai troops withdrawn by end-1972. The first Thai troops arrived in Vietnam in September 1967.

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July (contd)

9-- Secretary of Navy John H. Chafee orders a one-time-only exemption of USN drug users from punishment if they cooperate in their own rehabilitation. The order stresses voluntariness and the disclosure must be made before arrest or official warning. Persons involuntarily identified by the drug testing program are also granted exemption.

-- Dr. Jerome H. Jaffe, special consultant to the President on narcotics and dangerous drugs, visits RVN to inspect the urinalysis testing program, detoxification centers and treatment facilities, and the amnesty program.

-- In a ground operation 12 km northeast of Thoi Binh, An Xuyen Province, elements of the 31 Recon Co engage an enemy company. ARVN artillery and USN OV-10 aircraft support the engagement (En: 20 KIA, 1 Det, 1 IW, 2 CSW, 20 grenades captured; Fr: 2 KIA, 2 WIA).

-- MG Frederick J. Kroesen, USA, relieves MG James L. Baldwin as commander of the 23rd Inf Division.

-- BG Rolland V. Heiser, USA, assumes the duties of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, MACJ3.

-- Truong Vinh Le announces he will run as a Vice Presidential candidate on the ticket of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky.

-- Fire Base Charlie 2, the last American base along RVN's northernmost line of defense, is turned over to the ARVN.

14-- COL Phillip H. Stevens, USA, assumes the duties as Chief, Office of Information, MACV.

-- Three persons were killed and 10 wounded when terrorists tossed two grenades at a militia team patrolling a market in a Mekong Delta town 50 miles southeast of Can Tho.

15-- A 3-week strike by some 800 South Vietnamese dock workers, which tied up thousands of tons of military cargo at the US Army's Newport piers, is settled.

19-- Communist gunners hit a US aviation unit less than 16 miles from Saigon with about five 107mm rockets, causing light casualties and damage.

21-- Twenty-one South Vietnamese rangers are killed and 31 injured when a US Army Chinook helicopter crashes 50 miles south of Da Nang. Five American crewmen were injured in the crash.

-- Operation CUU LONG/DONG KHOI/MR 4 initiated 14 Jul is terminated (En: 269 KIA, 80 Det, 83 IW, 14 CSW; Fr: 39 KIA, 146 WIA, 21 IW).

-- BG L. Gordon Hill assumes the duties of Chief of Information, MACV.

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July (contd)

22-- MACV announces US combat losses are the lowest since 1965 when the US troop build-up began in Vietnam. US units have suffered more than 345,000 casualties since 1 Jan 61, with 45,384 KIA, 300,952 WIA and 1,481 captured or missing. An estimated 759,516 enemy soldiers were killed during the same period.

24-- President Nguyen Van Thieu formally announces he will seek reelection to a second 4-year term as President of RVN. Former Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, a senator, will be his running mate.

25-- MACV announces it is discontinuing its morning war communique, one of two issued daily, citing the low level of activity involving US forces in RVN.

26-- Narcotics agents from Thailand, US, and SVN conduct their first combined operation and crack a major heroin ring supplying soldiers in RVN. Ninety-seven pounds of pure heroin and 660 pounds of smoking opium are seized.

-- GEN Duong Van (Big) Minh announces he will run in the October presidential election. Catholic Deputy Ho Van Minh will be his Vice Presidential contender.

-- Operation DONG BO-17 initiated 12 Jul in Khanh Hoa/Ninh Thuan Provinces is terminated (En: 245 KIA, 1 Det, 126 IW, 11 CSW; Fr: 1 KIA, 3 WIA).

27-- Communist sappers armed with satchel charges wounded two Americans and destroyed four helicopters of the 1st Aviation Brigade at Lai Khe, 30 miles north of Saigon.

-- During Operation CUU LONG 9/11 in Cambodia, elements of the 3/15 Inf Bn on search operations engage an unknown size enemy force 6 km northwest of Kampong Trabek, Prey Veng Province (En: 79 KIA, 8 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 8 KIA, 26 WIA).

28-- President Nixon announces Ambassador David K. E. Bruce is leaving the post as head of the US delegation to the Paris Peace Talks. Mr. William J. Porter will be his replacement.

-- MACV announces that it will extend the drug testing program in RVN to personnel applying for extension of tours in country.

-- Operation HAE SAN JIN 10 initiated 13 Jul in Phu Yen Province is terminated (En: 200 KIA, 79 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 5 KIA, 13 WIA).

-- Operation CUU LONG/DONG KHOI/MR 4 Phase III initiated 23 Jul in MR 4 is terminated (En: 359 KIA, 79 Det, 130 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 74 KIA, 169 WIA, 14 MIA, 42 IW).

29-- During Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 in Cambodia, elements of the ARVN 50th Regt and B/3/17 US Air Cav engage an unknown size enemy force 18 km northwest of Svay Rieng, Svay Rieng Province (En: 79 KIA, 5 Det, 13 IW; Fr: 1 WIA).

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July (contd)

31-- US military strength in RVN is 225,106. FWMAF strength is 64,762. RVNAF strength is 1,057,924.

August

1-- MG Jimmy J. Jumper, USAF, assumes duties as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, MACJ5.

-- The MACV program to test all servicemen rotating from RVN for heroin use is expanded to include a check for amphetamine and barbiturate users.

-- GEN John C. Lavelle, USAF, assumes duties as DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Operations/Cmdr 7 AF.

2-- COL Edward P. Crockett, USA, assumes duties as Secretary Joint Staff, MACV.

5-- The GVN Supreme Court rules that Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky did not qualify as a candidate for the 3 Oct presidential election. Ky's petition was rejected because 39 of his 102 endorsements from provincial and municipal councilmen duplicated endorsements already given to President Thieu and thus were invalid.

7-- The 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) is redeployed after 3 years' service in the RVN.

8-- The GVN has ordered the International Voluntary Services (IVS), a Quaker-sponsored group, out of Vietnam by 31 August.

11-- MG John T. Carley, USA, assumes the duties of Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, MACJ3.

12-- MACV announces the beginning of Project Home Run Extended, a multimillion dollar program to ship war surplus machinery and equipment back to the US in connection with the drawdown of US forces in RVN. The program covers civilian goods and supplies, and is separate from Operation RETROGRADE which sends back military supplies and reconditioned vehicles.

-- The Department of Defense announces the total of 66 US battle deaths for July was the lowest monthly figure since May 1965.

15-- US forces in Vietnam extend the drug testing and treatment program to personnel leaving the country on the 14-day CONUS leave program.

-- In Quang Tri Province, 35 km northwest of FSB Sarge, an unknown size enemy force attacks elements of the 6/258th VNMC Bn (En: 200 KIA; Fr: 31 KIA).

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August (contd)

17-- In Qui Nhon harbor, Binh Dinh Province, an explosive device estimated to be 500 to 600 pounds is detonated against the outer hull of the S S Green Bay, a cargo ship. The explosion results in a 45 to 70 foot hole in the ship's side and injures four individuals.

-- Operation HIEP DONG 9 initiated 10 Aug is terminated (En: 112 KIA, 7 Det, 28 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 7 KIA, 25 WIA).

18-- The Governments of Australia and New Zealand announce that they will withdraw all of their combat troops from the RVN, most of them by the end of the year.

-- Operation HOANG DIEU 108 initiated 28 Jun in Quang Nam Province is terminated (En: 128 KIA, 20 Det, 63 IW, 7 CSW; Fr: 19 KIA, 152 WIA).

20-- Retired GEN Duong Van (Big) Minh announces he is withdrawing from the RVN October 3rd presidential election. This leaves President Thieu as the only candidate.

-- MACV announces that the drug testing urinalysis program has been extended to all personnel on temporary duty in RVN for 30 days or longer.

21-- The RVN Supreme Court accepts a petition on the behalf of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and reinstates him as a candidate in the October presidential election.

23-- Vice President Ky announces that he will not campaign for the Presidency in the 3 Oct election despite being reinstated on the ballot.

24-- MACV orders all US servicemen to stay inside their compounds unless they are on official business. The order is to be in effect through the end of the GVN lower house elections on 29 Aug.

-- BG James A. Herbert, USA, assumes the duties of Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS, MACV.

-- Operation DO KAE BI initiated 10 Aug in Phu Yen Province is terminated (En: 325 KIA, 139 IW, 10 CSW; Fr: 2 KIA, 15 WIA).

25-- At Cam Ranh Bay in Khanh Hoa Province an enemy satchel charge causes an explosion in the Tri-Service Ammunition Storage Area and destroys an estimated 6,000 short tons of munitions.

-- Da Nang Air Base and Da Nang City in Quang Nam Province receive an attack-by-fire consisting of two 122mm rockets (En: unknown; Fr: 3 civilians killed, 11 civilians wounded; a fire caused by the rockets destroys 137 houses).

-- MACV initiates a program of unannounced testing of units by urinalysis.

29-- Despite Viet Cong terrorists attacks and widespread shellings, South Vietnamese turned out in near-record numbers to elect a new Lower House of the National Assembly.

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August (contd)

29-- Communist gunners fire 3 107mm rockets into Tan Son Nhut AB as attacks reach a 4-month peak in the 24 hours leading up to Vietnam's national assembly elections. Two rockets are duds. The rocket which explodes inside the base is the first since December 1969. There are no casualties or damage.

30-- In Phuong Dinh Province, 22 km southwest of Can Tho, elements of the US 191st Avn Co on a reconnaissance flight observe an unknown size enemy force in a bunker complex (En: 27 KBA; Fr: none).

31-- Operation LAM SON 720 initiated 14 Apr in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces is terminated (En: 3,104 KIA, 12 Det, 560 IW, 232 CSW; Fr: 346 KIA, 1,257 WIA, 23 MIA, 5 IW).

-- The Vietnamese Supreme Court removes Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky from the presidential ballot at his own request.

-- US military strength in RVN is 216,528. FWMAF strength is 61,256. RVNAF strength is 1,052,353.

September

1-- MACV announces the beginning of redeployment increment nine. By 1 Dec 42,000 spaces will be redeployed including one-third of the 19 maneuver battalions in the 101st Airborne and 23rd Infantry Divisions.

-- The GVN announces that the presidential election will be held 3 Oct as scheduled with President Nguyen Van Thieu as the only candidate.

4-- COL William F. Wadsworth, Jr, USA, assumes the duties as Headquarters Commandant, MACV.

9-- In Binh Thuan Province, 5 km northeast of FSB Sandy, an estimated enemy battalion attacks the 88th RF Co with small arms and mortars (En: 25 KIA, 1 Det, 1 CSW, 1 PRC-10 radio captured; Fr: 1 RF KIA, 4 RF WIA).

10-- The 61st PF Plat operating 10 km north of An Hoa in Quang Nam Province ambushes an estimated enemy company (En: 29 KIA; Fr: none).

11-- President Nguyen Van Thieu announces he will step down if he receives fewer than 50 percent of the votes actually cast in the 3 Oct election.

12-- Operation CUU LONG/DONG KHOI initiated on 7 Sep throughout MR 4 is terminated (En: 356 KIA, 74 Det, 116 IW, 4 CSW; Fr: 49 RF/PF KIA, 186 RF/PF WIA, 112 IW).

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September (contd)

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14-- The GVN announces it is creating another army division, its first since 1965, to serve along the DMZ defense line vacated by departing US Forces.

-- Operation KET HOP 12 initiated 7 May in Quang Tri Province is terminated (En: 117 KIA, 16 Det, 87 IW, 27 CSW; Fr: 51 KIA, 99 WIA).

15-- The drug testing program is expanded to include all personnel leaving RVN on R and R.

-- The Cholon PX closes in Saigon. At its peak the PX, which first opened in April 1965, had the largest dollar volume of any PX in the world.

-- During Operation LAM SON 810 elements of the Hac Bao Co operating 13 km northwest of Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province find and destroy 20 large storage bunkers containing 100,000 rounds of 37mm ammunition, 300,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 4,000 liters gasoline, 200 bags of rice containing 50 kilos each, 10,000 meters of communication wire; total approximate weight is 99.3 tons.

-- Elements of the 33d ARVN Inf on an airmobile operation 35 km south of Kien An in Kien Giang Province engage an unknown size enemy force. US and VNAF helicopters and gunships support (En: 28 KIA, 11 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 4 KIA, 9 WIA, 24 MIA).

-- A bomb explodes in a downtown nightclub in Saigon: 1 US civilian is killed, 14 VN civilians killed, 7 US military injured, and 50 VN civilians are injured. The building suffers 70 percent damage.

-- The key town of Pak Song, on the Bolovens Plateau, is retaken by RLG forces.

16-- Elements of the 4/32d ARVN Inf Bn at FSB Bien Nhi, 24 km west of Thoi Binh in An Xuyen Province, receive a mortar and rocket attack followed by a ground attack by an unknown size enemy force (En: 21 KIA, 10 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 26 KIA, 69 WIA).

-- An ARVN vehicle containing the Tri Tam district S-3 is ambushed on Highway 14, 3 km south of Tri Tam, Binh Duong Province. The reaction force led by the district chief is also ambushed (En: 23 KIA, 4 IW; Fr: 28 RVN and 3 US KIA including the RVN District Chief, Security Chief, Police Chief, Executive Officer, and S-2, and the US District Senior Advisor; 24 WIA, 4 MIA).

18-- RVN commanders decide to end LAM SON 810 ahead of schedule, due to disruption of essential air support because of the onset of monsoon rains.

-- Elements of the 2/31st ARVN Inf in night defensive position 18 km northwest of Dam Doi in An Xuyen Province receive a mortar attack followed by a ground attack by an unknown size enemy force (En: 19 KIA, 11 IW, 11 grenades; Fr: 6 KIA, 10 WIA).

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September (contd)

18-- Saigon police and students battle into the night in antigovernment demonstrations.

19-- Operation LAM SON 810 initiated 6 Sep in Quang Tri Province is terminated. The operation was the largest since the invasion of Laos. Final cumulative results of Operation LAM SON 810: En: 125 KIA, 1 Det, 32 IW, 11 CSW (includes 122mm field guns); Fr: 13 KIA, 90 WIA. An estimated 124 tons of assorted ammunition, 10 tons of rice, 11,000 gallons of fuel, 4 trucks, 1 track vehicle, 12,000 meters communication wire, 1 field phone, 1 pair of binoculars, 2 radios, and 45 field packs were captured or destroyed by RVNAF.

-- Enemy sappers attack the 531st ARVN ammunition dump 1 km north of Gia Dinh in Gia Dinh Province and destroy three pads of ammunition containing approximately 340 tons of materiel.

20-- Elements of the 31st ARVN Regt on ground operations 27 km southwest of Kien An in Kien Giang Province engage an unknown size enemy force. Navy OV-10s and Army helicopter gunships support the engagement (En: 53 KIA, 6 IW, 5 CSW; Fr: 1 KIA, 1 WIA).

-- The 18th ARVN Div base camp located 2 km west of Tay Ninh in Tay Ninh Province receives 50 rounds of 82mm mortar and a sapper attack by an estimated enemy battalion (En: 52 KIA, 9 Det, 17 IW, 2 CSW, 48 satchel charges, 16 M-26 grenades, 10 mines, 1 radio; Fr: 21 KIA, 63 WIA, 1 1/4-ton truck destroyed).

-- Enemy sappers traveling by sampan under cover of mortar barrage infiltrate the Esso and Shell storage depots in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The resulting explosions destroy 18 large storage tanks causing shortages in the city's fuel supply.

22-- Elements of the 1st Bn, 43d ARVN Inf on ground operations 12 km north of Tay Ninh City in Tay Ninh Province engage an unknown size enemy force. ARVN and US artillery and US helicopter gunships support the engagement (En: 20 KIA, 3 IW, 4 CSW; Fr: 16 WIA).

-- Operation BUN GAE 23 initiated 9 Sep in Phu Yen Province is terminated (En: 173 KIA, 4 Det, 78 IW, 4 CSW; Fr: 4 ROK WIA).

-- Captain Ernest L. Medina, the last officer charged in the My Lai massacre, is cleared of all counts.

24-- All US Forces in Vietnam are placed on alert because of the preelection atmosphere.

25-- The USS Forster (DER 334) is turned over to the VNN as part of the continuing USN ACTOV Program. The ship is now the Tran Khanh Du (HQ-4).

-- Students in Saigon firebomb US vehicles and war veterans burn election posters in anti-government and anti-American demonstrations.

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September (contd)

26-- Elements of the 30th ARVN Ranger Bn and the 172nd FANK Inf Bn are attacked by an unknown size enemy force 7 km east of Krek in Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia (En: 29 KIA, 9 IW, 5 CSW, 660 lbs TNT, 100 B-4 rocket rounds, 2,000 meters telephone wire; Fr: 7 KIA, 15 WIA).

28-- The USN turns over to the VNN the Logistics Support Base at Dong Tan and the repair barge YRBM-21 at Tan Chau.

29-- Sir Robert Thompson arrives in Vietnam for a 10-day visit and briefings.

30-- The USN turns over the Repair Ship USS Satyr (ARL-23) to the VNN at Long Xuyen.

-- US military strength in RVN is 212,596. FWMAF strength is 60,638. RVNAF strength is 1,047,890.

October

1-- HMAS Brisbane (DLG-41) ends deployment with the US 7th Flt closing 4 1/2 years of Australian Naval support in RVN.

-- Elements of the 5th ARVN Abn Bn engage an estimated two enemy companies 27 km northwest of Tay Ninh City in Tay Ninh Province (En: 35 KIA, 11 IW; Fr: 8 KIA, 3 WIA).

-- Operations QUYET THANG 405/c, 504/c, and 603/c initiated 1 August in the provinces of Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin are terminated (En: 1,300 KIA, 270 Det, 271 IW, 50 CSW; Fr: 51 KIA, 214 WIA).

3-- Saigon receives 122mm rocket fire, the first attack on the city since 19 Dec 70. A truck in a USN compound and six small Vietnamese shops are destroyed).

4-- BG John A. Wickham, USA, assumes the duties of Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs, MACV.

-- South Vietnamese forces report killing 364 Communists during 2 hours of fierce fighting near Krek, Cambodia.

6-- Hong Kong, an R and R site since mid-1965, closes its R and R center but will continue to be a leave site.

8-- Army SSG John C. Sexton, Jr, is returned to US Forces, having been held as a PW since 12 Aug 69. SSG Sexton is the 24th PW released by the VC since 1962.

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October (contd)

10-- Elements of the 1st and 2d Armd Cav Sq and the 15th Recon Co engaged an unknown size enemy force 9 km northeast of Kampong Trabek in Prey Veng Province, Cambodia (En: 58 KIA, 16 IW, 2 CSW; Fr: 6 KIA, 18 WIA).

13-- Elements of the 1/33d ARVN Inf Bn engaged an unknown size enemy force 15 km northwest of Hieu Le in Kien Giang Province (En: 44 KIA, 8 IW, 1 PRC radio, 30 B-40 rounds; Fr: none).

-- Elements of the ARVN 30th Rgr Bn and 2/18th Armd Cav Sq engage a company size force 6 km east of Krek, in Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia (En: 29 KIA, 3 CSW, 15 antitank mines destroyed; Fr: none).

-- An unknown number of enemy sappers penetrated the defense of a US helicopter unit at the Di An Base Camp near Saigon, destroying two helicopters and damaging three others.

15-- GVN and US undercover agents and police seize 5,100 vials of heroin, valued at more than $10,000, and arrest seven people near the large US military installation at Long Binh.

16-- General Fred C. Weyand, DEPCOMUSMACV, is concurrently named Deputy to COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS).

18-- Operation QUANG TRUNG 44-127 initiated 11 October in Binh Thuan Province is terminated (En: 51 KIA, 9 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 6 WIA).

-- Elements of the 31st ARVN Regt on ground operations engage an estimated enemy battalion 17 km north of Thoi Binh in An Xuyen Province (En: 40 KIA, 5 IW; Fr: 4 KIA, 5 WIA, 5 MIA).

20-- Cambodian Premier Marshal Lon Nol announces the setting up of a military dictatorship to "combat anarchy" and forms a new government.

21-- The GVN Supreme Court rules that President Nguyen Van Thieu's unopposed reelection on 3 Oct was legal.

-- The US Court of Appeals in Boston decides that the President's conduct of the Indochina war is constitutional, dismissing a suit brought by the state of Massachusetts.

23-- Typhoon Hester hits a 200-mile stretch of RVN coast south of the DMZ, causing extensive damage to military equipment and facilities and leaving at least 200,000 persons homeless, about 75 dead, and many injured. The rice crop in Quang Tin Province is estimated to be 90 percent destroyed.

24-- Operation DO KAE BI 2-3 initiated 10 Oct 71 in Phu Yen Province is terminated (En: 57 KIA, 26 IW; Fr: none).

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October (contd)

25-- Operation QUANG TRUNG 22 initiated 15 Oct in Kontum Province is terminated (En: 93 KIA, 14 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 2 KIA, 32 WIA).

-- At Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province a fire caused by a ruptured pipeline destroys 250 Vietnamese houses, 100 buildings and 80,000 gallons of gas.

27-- Elements of the ARVN 30th Rgr Bn and 3/18 Cav on a search mission 7 km east of Krek in Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia, find 20 enemy bodies (En: 20 KIA, 1 60mm mortar; Fr: none).

29-- The Combined Campaign Plan for 1972 is signed by GEN Abrams, COMUSMACV, GEN Vien, Chief of RVN Joint General Staff, and GEN Tawit, Commander of Royal Thai Forces in Vietnam.

-- The US Senate votes to reduce foreign aid, affecting $341 million in aid to Cambodia.

-- Elements of the ARVN 53d Abn Co on a search mission 5 km south of Thien Ngon in Tay Ninh Province find nine graves, each with 10 bodies and 70 other bodies scattered around the area (En: 160 KIA; Fr: none).

-- Elements of the ARVN 4/43 Inf engage an estimated enemy battalion 7 km southwest of Xuan Loc in Long Khanh Province (En: 38 KIA; Fr: 5 WIA).

31-- Inaugural ceremonies for President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam are held in Saigon, beginning President Thieu's second 4-year term. US Treasury Secretary John B. Connally represents the President of the United States at the inaugural ceremonies.

-- US military strength in RVN is 198,683. FWMAF strength is 58,813. RVNAF strength is 1,043,232.

November

1-- A new ARVN Inf Div, the 3d ARVN Div, is activated. This division will be responsible for tactical operations in northern and northwestern Quang Tri Province.

-- The Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG) is redesignated SRAG/US Army Forces, MR 2 (SRAG/USARMYF MR 2).

-- The ACofS for Military Assistance, MACV (MACMA) is disestablished and its functions assigned to other staff agencies.

-- Elements of the ARVN 3/49th Inf Regt are attacked 8 km southeast of Tri Tam in Binh Duong Province (En: 30 KIA, 4 IW; Fr: 1 US KIA, 6 ARVN KIA, 41 ARVN WIA, 1 ARVN MIA, 4 IW, 2 radios).

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November (contd)

3-- US gunships engage an enemy convoy of ten 2 1/2-ton trucks 16 km west of A Shau Valley in MR 1 (En: 1 KIA, 10 trucks destroyed; Fr: none).

-- SECDEF Melvin R. Laird, Chairman of JCS Adm Thomas H. Moorer, CINCPAC Adm John S. McCain, and various assistants arrive in Vietnam for a visit and update to prepare a report to President Nixon on the progress of Vietnamization.

7-- Australian Forces Vietnam turn over the military installation at Nui Dat to the RVNAF.

-- The HMAS Sydney departs with about 400 Australian Forces Vietnam personnel being redeployed to Australia.

-- Elements of the 390 RF Co ambush an unknown size enemy force 37 km southwest of Quang Ngai City in Quang Ngai Province (En: 45 KIA, 2 CSW, 1 IW; Fr: none).

-- Elements of the 1/3 ARVN Inf Bn encounter an unknown size enemy force 15 km southwest of Hue in Thua Thien Province (En: 25 KIA; 14 IW, 2 CSW; Fr: none).

8-- Operation QUANG TRUNG 41/PAC-3 initiated 15 Jun in Binh Dinh Province is terminated (En: 103 KIA, 161 detained, 2 IW; Fr: 8 KIA, 5 WIA, 1 IW lost).

10-- Nguyen Van Bong, a Vietnamese politician and a leading candidate for prime minister, is killed when a plastic bomb explodes in his car.

11-- A helicopter gunship belonging to the 17th US Avn Gp, while on a support mission, accidentaly fires on the 1st Co 4/41 ARVN Inf Bn; 8 ARVN troops are killed and 21 wounded.

12-- President Nixon announces at a press conference that 45,000 US Forces will be withdrawn from Vietnam over the next 2 months. The troop ceiling for 1 Feb 72 will be 139,000.

13-- Elements of the 4/43 ARVN Inf Bn engage an estimated enemy platoon 30 km southwest of Plei Me in Pleiku Province (En: 20 KIA, 4 IW, 2 CSW; Fr: 1 WIA).

18-- Elements of the 101 RF Co with US gunship and TACAIR support engaged an unknown size enemy force 25 km east of Dak To in Kontum Province (En: 145 KIA (est 125 KBA), 3 IW, 20 hand grenades and an unknown quantity of equipment captured; Fr: none).

19-- Operation KONTUM 94/71 initiated 15 Nov 71 in Kontum Province is terminated (En: 176 KIA, 2 Det, 10 IW; Fr: none).

-- Operation QUANG TRUNG 23-7 initiated 7 Nov 71 in Pleiku Province is terminated (En: 182 KIA, 4 Det, 62 IW, 13 CSW; Fr: 31 KIA, 45 WIA, 4 MIA, 25 IW).

25-- US troop strength in Vietnam is reduced ahead of President Nixon's previously announced schedule, leaving 182,400 US servicemen in Vietnam; other Free World Forces total 57,800.

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November (contd)

25-- Elements of 4/33 ARVN Inf Bn, assisted by US helicopters, gunships and ARVN artillery, engage an unknown size enemy force 15 km west of Kien Long in Chuong Thien Province (En: 24 KIA, 1 AA gun, 2 82mm mortar tubes; Fr: none).

-- Operation DONG KHOI initiated 20 Nov 71 in MR 4 is terminated (En: 330 KIA, 52 Det, 119 IW, five CSW; Fr: 65 RF/PF KIA, 146 RF/PF WIA, 1 RF MIA, 14 IW).

-- Operation CUU LONG HQ/CD/U-MINH (U Minh Campaign) initiated 30 Nov 70 in An Xuyen, Chuong Thien, and Kien Giang Provinces is terminated (En: 4,903 KIA, 524 Det, 1,170 IW, 253 CSW; Fr: 490 KIA, 1,302 WIA, 9 MIA, 33 IW).

26-- The RVNAF establish the Communications Management Agency (CMA) to manage the Single Integrated Military (Telecommunications) System (SIMS) for RVNAF long-haul telecommunications requirements.

-- Operation HOANG DIEU 110 initiated 19 Oct 71 in Quang Nam Province is terminated (En: 382 KIA, 201 Det, 132 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 41 KIA, 132 WIA).

27-- The 23d Inf Div turns over the US base at Chu Lai to the RVNAF. The large facility was originally built by US Marines in 1965.

28-- A US CH-47 Chinook helicopter, enroute from Da Nang to Phu Bai with 28 passengers and a crew of five, crashes with no survivors.

29-- Quach Phat, publisher of the two largest Chinese publications in Saigon, is assassinated.

30-- US military strength in RVN is 178,266. FWMAF strength is 58,526. RVNAF strength is 1,040,640.

December

1-- CAPT Raul B. Perez, USN, assumes duties as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans as MAJ GEN Jimmy J. Jumper, USAF, transfers to assume duties as 7AF Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

2-- Elements of the 3/51 and 3/56 RF Gp on a search operation 19 km southwest of Tay Ninh in Tay Ninh Province are engaged by an estimated two company size enemy force employing 82mm mortars and B-40 rockets. The 964 RF Co reinforced and ARVN artillery and US helicopter gunships supported the operation (En: 32 KIA, 12 IW, 3 CSW; Fr: 24 RF KIA, 24 RF WIA, 12 RF MIA).

4-- ROK troops begin withdrawing from Vietnam as 1,200 Marines of the "Blue Dragon" Brigade depart, ending the unit's 6 years of service in RVN.

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December (contd)

8-- The 4th Bn, Royal Australian Regt, the last Australian combat battalion in RVN, redeploys to Australia.

10-- The USS Enterprise and a task force of destroyers and amphibious ships are ordered to leave their stations off the coast of Vietnam for positions in the Strait of Malacca off Singapore.

13-- Elements of the 2/1 R F Gp CP in Quang Tri Province receive a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. The 112 and 188 (-) R F Co reinforce and VNAF flare ships assist (En: 23 KIA, 15 IW, 2 CSW, 30 hand grenades, 30 B-40 rockets, 100 blocks of plastic explosives; Fr: 8 RF KIA, 6 RF WIA).

14-- A US Army U-21 with seven passengers goes down in bad weather over water about 18 miles north of Da Nang.

16-- Dr. Wilbur, Assistant Secretary of Defense(Health and Environment) and BG Singlaub, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Drug and Alcohol Abuse), visit RVN to receive briefings and visit various drug treatment and rehabilitation facilities.

19-- The Indochina war is 25 years old, dating from the 19 Dec 46 attack against French garrisons in Hanoi by Vietnamese revolutionaries under Ho Chi Minh.

20-- RADM James B. Wilson relieves RADM Philip S. McManus as Commander, US Naval Support Activity Saigon and Deputy Commander, US Naval Forces Vietnam.

-- Communist gunners fire two 122mm rockets into Saigon's waterfront district, the first rocket attack against the capital since 3 Oct 71.

21-- The US Coast Guard ends active participation in RVN as it turns over to the VNN two high endurance cutters, the Castle Rock (WHEC 383) and Cook Inlet (WHEC 384). A total of 957 sea craft have been turned over to the Vietnamese.

22-- The GVN announces plans to free 689 political prisoners on Christmas day.

-- The 10th anniversary of the first US combat death in Vietnam, SP 4 Jac[illegible] Davis, US Army, of Livingston, Tenn., was killed 22 Dec 61.

23-- ADM John S. McCain, Jr, CINCPAC, arrives in Saigon for his 4th annual Christmas visit to troops throughout the country.

-- Part of a small area near Tan Son Nhut AB which had been declared off-limits 31 Aug 71 because of drug sales is put pack on-limits.

25-- The Allied Christmas cease-fire ends at 1800 hours with reports of three minor incidents against US Forces.

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December (contd)

28-- Communist terrorists have killed 52 civilians, wounded 13 and kidnapped 70 in 48 incidents reported since 4 Dec 71, according to a Vietnamese National Police communique.

29-- James Cardinal Cooke, Archbishop of New York, arrives in Vietnam for a pastoral visit with US servicemen.

30-- USAF and USN planes end 5 days of air strikes against NVN, flying 1,000 sorties during the heaviest bombing campaign in more than 3 years.

-- Senator Stuart Symington and party visit Saigon briefly.

31-- Two US soldiers were killed, 50 wounded and six missing or captured in SEA the last week of 1971.

-- US military strength in RVN is 158,119. FWMAF strength is 54,497. RVNAF strength is 1,046,254.

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GLOSSARY

AA	Antiaircraft
AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AAE	Army Aviation Element
AAF	Army Airfield
AATTV	Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam
AB	Air Base
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ABF	Attack-by-Fire
Abn	Airborne
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACTOV	Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese
ACTOVRAD	Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese Radar
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADB	Agriculture Development Bank
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AF	Air Force
AFCCC	Air Force Command and Control Center
AFGP	Air Force Advisory Group
AFRTS	American Forces Radio and Television Service
AFVN	American Forces Vietnam Network
AG	Adjutant General
AGP	Motor Torpedo Boat Tender (Auxiliary General Purpose)
AID	Agency for International Development
AIK	Assistance-in-Kind
AKL	Auxiliary Cargo Lighter
ALC	Area Logistics Command
AM	Air Medal
Ambl	Airmobile
Amemb	American Embassy
AMM	Airman's Medal
ANGLICO	Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO	Area of Operations
APL	Auxiliary Personnel Lighter
APT	Armed Propaganda Team
ARA	Aerial Rocket Artillery
ARCOM	Army Commendation Medal
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASC	Automatic Switching Center
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ASRT	Air Support Radar Team
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATF	Australian Task Force
ATSB	Advanced Tactical Support Base
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Data Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network

[redacted]

Avn	Aviation
AWOL	Absent Without Leave
BA	Base Area
BCAT	Battalion Combat Assistance Team
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment
Bde	Brigade
BG	Brigadier General
BIG MACK	Viet Cong Infrastructure Periodic Report
Bn	Battalion
BNDD	Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
BOC	Bureau of Customs
BSA	Base Support Area
BSB	Budget Screening Board
BSM	Bronze Star Medal
BT	Binh Tram (Enemy Logistical Command and Control Agency)
Btry	Battery
C	Confidential
CAB	Combat Aviation Battalion
CABOTS	Currency and Black Market Control System
CAC	Current Affairs Committee
CAG	Civic Action Group; Combat Aviation Group
C&GSC	Command and General Staff College, RVNAF
Cal	Caliber
C&C	Command and Control
CAPT	Captain (Navy O-6)
[redacted]	
Cav	Cavalry
CB	Construction Battalion
CBMU	Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit
Cbt	Combat
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CCB	Command Communication Boat
CCP	Combined Campaign Plan
CCRSFF	Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces
CD	Combat Development
CD and LD	Community Defense and Local Development
CDIC	Committee for the Development of the Industry of Construction
Cdr, 7AF	Commander, Seventh US Air Force
C - E	Communications - Electronics
CEI	Communications - Electronics Instructions
CEIMP	Communications - Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan
CG	Commanding General
CHECO	Contemporary Historical Evaluations of Combat Operations
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
Chieu Hoi	Open Arms Program
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICC	Combined Interdiction Coordinating Committee
CICV	Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam
CID	Command Information Division; Criminal Investigation Division
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific

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CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief, US Army, Pacific
CIP	Commercial Imports Program
Civ	Civilian
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJGS	Chief of the Joint General Staff
CLC	Central Logistics Command
CMAC	Capital Military Assistance Command
CMAT	Capital Military Assistance Team
CMD	Capital Military District
CNC	Cuc Nghien Cuu (North Vietnamese Central Research Agency)
C/NF	Confidential/No Foreign Dissemination
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
Co	Company
CO	Commanding Officer
CofS	Chief of Staff
COL	Colonel
COMAFV	Commander, Australian Force, Vietnam
COMMANDO VAULT	Operational Name for 15,000 Pound Space Clearing USAF Conventional Bomb
COMNAVFORV	Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam
COMNAVSUPPACT	Commander, Naval Support Activity
COMNZAFFE	Commander, New Zealand Army Forces, Far East
COMROCMAGV	Commander, Republic of China Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMUSMACV	Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSSEASIA	Commander, US Forces, Southeast Asia
CONEX	Container Express
CONUS	Continental United States
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
COSVN	Central Office for South Vietnam
CP	Command Post
CPDC	Central Pacification and Development Council
CPT	Captain (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps O-3)
CPWC	Central Prisoner of War Camp
CQY	Cuc Quan Y (RVNAF Surgeon General's Office)
CRC	Control and Reporting Center
CRIMP	Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan
CS	A Tear Gas-Type of Riot Control Agent
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
CSAF	Chief of Staff, Air Force
CSAS	Common Service Airlift System
CSFF	Commander, SEATO Field Force
CSOP	Combined Strategic Objectives Plan
CSW	Crew-served Weapon
CTC	Central Training Command
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CWC	Civilian War Casualty
CWCP	Civilian War Casualty Program

CVA	Attack Aircraft Carrier
CY	Calendar Year
DA	Department of the Army
DART	Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCA-SAM	Defense Communications Agency-Southeast Asia Mainland
DCAT	Division Combat Assistance Team
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
DCS	Defense Communications System
DEFT	Drug Education Field Team
DEPCG	Deputy Commanding General
DEPCOMTHD	Deputy Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO
DEPCOMUSMACV	Deputy Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
DEPCORDS	Deputy for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DER	Radar Picket Escort Ship
Det	Detained
DFC	Distinguished Flying Cross
DGBFA	Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid
DGFA	Director General for Finance and Audit
DGOH	Directorate General of Highways
DIOCC	District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center
DIT	Development Interteam
Div	Division
DMA	Data Management Agency
DMAC	Delta Military Assistance Command
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DNBI	Disease and Nonbattle Injuries
DOD	Department of Defense
Dong Khoi	Saturation Operation
DRAC	Delta Regional Assistance Command
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DS	Direct Support
DSA	Deputy/District Senior Advisor
DSC	Distinguished Service Cross
DSM	Distinguished Service Medal
DSPG	Dependent Shelter Program Group
DSTE	Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment
DTE	Dial Telephone Exchange
DTP	Delta Transportation Plan
Duffle Bag	Electronic Sensing Devices; the US Sensor Program
Dustoff	US Army Aeromedical Evacuation Helicopter Units; an Aeromedical Helicopter Evacuation
ECAP	Engineering Civic Action Program
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
Embtel	Embassy Telegram
En	Enemy
Engr	Engineer
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESSG	Engineer Strategic Study Group
FA	Field Artillery
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAE	Field Advisory Elements
FANK	Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (Khmer Armed Forces)
FANSONG	Enemy Ground Radar Used to Guide SAMs to Their Target
FASU	Fleet Air Support Unit
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FFORCEV	Field Force, Vietnam
FLIP	Flight Information Publication
FLIR	Forward-Looking Infrared
Flt	Fleet
FMR	Financial Market Rate
FNC	Floating Naval Club
FOM	French Patrol Boat
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FPO	Fleet Post Office
Fr	Friendly
FRAC	First Regional Assistance Command
FSA	Forward Support Area
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center
FSCL	Fire Support Coordination Line
FSE	Fire Support Element
FSI	Force Structure Increases
FSL	Force Structure List
Ft	Fort
Ftr	Fighter (Aircraft)
FWF	Free World Forces
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FWMAO	Free World Military Assistance Office
FWMAPC	Free World Military Assistance Policy Council
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCA	Ground Controlled Approach
GDRS	General Directorate of Rear Services
GEN	General
GFCS	Gunfire Control System
GIS	Government Information Service
GKR	Government of Khmer Republic
GNP	Gross National Product
GNVN	Government of North Vietnam
GNZ	Government of New Zealand
GOA	Government of Australia
GOC	Government of Cambodia
GOCO	Government Owned/Contractor Operated
GOK	Government of South Korea
GOP	Government of the Philippines
Gp	Group
GPW	Geneva Prisoners of War Convention
GPWD	General Political and Warfare Department
GSG	General Support Group
GVN	Government of South Vietnam

HAC	Headquarters Area Command
HAL	Helicopter Attack Squadron
H&I	Harassing and Interdiction Fire
HEAT	High Explosive, Antitank
HF	High Frequency
Hel	Helicopter
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
HEP	High Explosive Plastic
HIMS	Historical Information Management System
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone
Hoi Chanh	VC/NVA Rallier
How Bn	Howitzer Battalion
HQ	Headquarters
HSSC	Heavy Salvage Craft
HVRP	High Value Reward Program
IAAD	Information Advisory and Accreditation Division
I&M	Improvement and Modernization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	Integrated Communications System
ICS-SEA	Integrated Communications System - Southeast Asia
IESS	Interservice Excess Screening System
IFFORCEV	I Field Force, Vietnam
IFR	Instrument Flight Rules
IIFFORCEV	II Field Force, Vietnam
IG	Inspector General
Indiv Wpn	Individual Weapon
Inf	Infantry
Instl	Installation
Intel	Intelligence
IO	Information Office/Officer
IR	Infrared
IRHA	Injuries Resulting from Hostile Action
ISB	Intermediate Support Base
ISD	Instructional System Development
IW	Individual Weapon
JCG	Joint Coordination Group
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JGS/RVNAF	Joint General Staff/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
JSCM	Joint Service Commendation Medal
JUSPAO	Joint US Public Affairs Office
JVREC	Joint Vietnam Regional Exchange Council
JWTC	Jungle Warfare Training Center
KA	Khmer Army
KAF	Khmer Air Force
KBA	Killed by Artillery/Air
KC	Khmer Communist
KCI	Khmer Communist Infrastructure
KCS	Kit Carson Scout
KEYSTONE	Redeployment Code Name
KG	Kompong (Cambodian for Province)

Khon	Urban Subdivision
KIA	Killed in Action
KIT	Key Interteam
KLF	Khmer Liberation Front
KR	Khmer Republic (Cambodia); Khmer Rouge (Insurgent Group)
KSB	Boston Whaler
LASR	Long An Subregion
LAW	Light Antitank Weapon
LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LCMMS	Landing Craft Mechanized, Minesweeper
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel, Large
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel
LDD	Lao Dong Dang (Lao Workers' Party)
LDHB	Land Development and Hamlet Building
LDNN	Lien Doi Nhoui Nhai (Frogman Group VNN)
LF	Local Force
LIB	Light Infantry Brigade
Lien Doi	RF Group
LIMDIS	Limited Distribution
LLLTV	Low Light Level Television
LM	Legion of Merit
LN	Local National
LnO	Liaison Officer
LOC	Lines of Communication
Log	Logistics; Logistical
LOH	Light Observation Helicopter
LORAN	Long Range Airborne Navigation
LP	Listening Post
LRRP	Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LSB	Logistic Support Base
LSIL	Landing Ship Infantry, Light
LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
LSM-H	Landing Ship, Medium - Hospital
LSSL	Landing Ship, Support, Large
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
LT	Lieutenant
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTG	Lieutenant General
LTL	Lien Tinh Lo (Interprovincial Highway)
Luc Luong	Kit Carson Scouts
LZ	Landing Zone
MA	Military Assistance
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAC	Military Affairs Committee, Military Airlift Command; Military Assistance Command
MACAG	Military Assistance Command, Adjutant General
MACCH	Military Assistance Command, Chaplain
MACCO	Military Assistance Command, Comptroller
MACCORDS	Military Assistance Command, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support

MACDC	Military Assistance Command, Directorate of Construction
MACDMA	Military Assistance Command, Data Management Agency
MACEA	Military Assistance Command, Economic Affairs
MACIG	Military Assistance Command, Inspector General
MACJ1	Military Assistance Command, Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel
MACJ2	Military Assistance Command, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
MACJ3	Military Assistance Command, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations
MACJ4	Military Assistance Command, Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics
MACJ5	Military Assistance Command, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans
MACJ6	Military Assistance Command, Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications - Electronics
MACJA	Military Assistance Command, Judge Advocate
MACMA	Military Assistance Command, Military Assistance
MACMD	Military Assistance Command, Surgeon
MACOI	Military Assistance Command, Office of Information
MACPM	Military Assistance Command, Provost Marshal
MACST	Military Assistance Command, Special Troops
MACT	Military Assistance Command, Training Directorate
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAGROCV	Military Advisory Group, Republic of China, Vietnam
MAGV	Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
Maint	Maintenance
MAP	Military Assistance Program
Mar	Marine
MARKET TIME	USN anti-infiltration blockade of SVN Coast
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MASFP	Military Assistance Service Funded Program
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MAT	Military Advisory Team; Mobile Advisory Team
MATT	Mobile Advisory Training Team
MCA	Military Construction, Army
MCAF	Military Construction, Air Force
MCN	Military Construction, Navy
MDD	Municipal Development Directorate
MDEM	Ministry for the Development of Ethnic Minorities
Mech	Mechanized
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
Medevac	Medical Evacuation
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
MEIP	Miscellaneous Environmental Improvement Program
MF	Main Force
MFGP	Main Force Group
MG	Major General; Machine Gun
Mgt	Management
MH	Medal of Honor
MHB	Military History Branch
MHE	Materials Handling Equipment

MI	Military Intelligence
MIA	Missing in Action
Mig	Russian Fighter Aircraft
Mil	Military
MILCON	Military Construction
MIO	Military Intelligence Office
MLMS	Motor Launched Minesweeper
MMASF	Military Mutual Aid and Savings Fund
MMIP	Marine Modernization and Improvement Plan
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MNK	Marine Nationale Khmer (Khmer Navy)
MOAT	Mobile Operational Advisory Team
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOI	Ministry of Information; Ministry of Interior
MOND	Ministry of National Defense
MOOSE	Move Out of Saigon Expeditiously
MOP	Measurement of Progress
MORD	Ministry of Rural Development
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MP	Military Police
MPC	Military Payment Certificate
MPCC	Medical Policy Coordinating Committee
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
MR	Military Region
MRTTH	Military Region Tri Thien Hue
MSM	Meritorious Service Medal; Minesweeper, Mechanized
MSO	Military Security Office (COSVN)
MSR	Minesweeper, River
MSS	Military Security Service
MSW	Ministry of Social Welfare
MTNV	Military Telecommunications Network-Vietnam
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MWA	Military Working Arrangement
NAG	Naval Advisory Group
NAS	National Academy of Sciences
NAVADVGRP	Naval Advisory Group
NAVCAT	Naval Civic Action Team
NAVFORV	Naval Forces, Vietnam
NBL	No Bomb Line
NC	Navy Cross
NCB	Naval Construction Battalion
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDC	National Defense Council
NDP	Night Defensive Position
NFLSVN	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL, NLF)
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NILO	Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer
NLHX	Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front)
NM	Nautical Mile
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
NMCS	Naval Mobile Construction Support
NMMA	National Materiel Management Agency
NOAT	Night Operations Assistance Team

NP	National Police
NPC	National Police Command
NPFF	National Police Field Force
NSA	National Security Agency; Naval Support Activity
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NTC	National Training Center; Naval Training Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVAF	North Vietnam Air Force; North Vietnamese Armed Forces
NVN	North Vietnam; North Vietnamese
NZ	New Zealand
NZATTV	New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OB	Order of Battle
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OIC	Officer In Charge
OICC	Officer In Charge of Construction
OIR	Other Intelligence Requirements
OJT	On the Job Training
OMA	Operations and Maintenance, Army
OMAF	Operations and Maintenance, Air Force
OMN	Operations and Maintenance, NAVY
OP	Observation Post
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSA	Office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador
OSD (ISA)	Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PARP	Pacific AUTODIN Restoral Plan
Pathet Lao	Lao Group under Communist/NVA Direction
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
Pax	Passengers
PB	Patrol Boat
PBR	Patrol Boat River
PC	Patrol Craft
PCE	Patrol Craft Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft, Inshore
PDO	Property Disposal Operation/Office
PF	Popular Force
PG	Patrol Gunboat
PGM	Patrol Gunboat Medium
PH	Purple Heart
PHILCAGV	Philippines Civic Action Group, Vietnam
PHILCONV	Philippines Contingent, Vietnam
PHREEX	Phung Hoang Re-examination Study
Phung Hoang	Anti-VCI Campaign
PIOCC	Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center
PID	Public Information Division
PL	Pathet Lao; Public Law

PLA	People's Liberation Army
PL 480	Food-for-Peace Program
Plt	Platoon
PM	Preventive Medicine
PMG	Provost Marshal General
PMS	Planned Maintenance System
POC	Police Operations Center
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
PPD	Plans and Policy Division
PPDC	Provincial Pacification and Development Council
PPL	Phak Pason Lao (Lao People's Party)
PPP	Philippines to People Program
PPSMR	Phnom Penh Special Military Region
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government
PRP	People's Revolutionary Party
PRU	Province Reconnaissance Unit
PSA	Province Senior Advisor
PSD	Public Safety Directorate
PSDF	People's Self Defense Force
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PURA	PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency
PW	Prisoner of War
PX	Post Exchange
PZ	Pickup Zone
QC	Quan Canh (ARVN Military Police)
QL	Quoc Lo (National Highway)
QM	Quartermaster
Qtr	Quarter
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAC	Regional Assistance Command; River Assault Craft
RAD	Research and Analysis Directorate
RADM	Rear Admiral
RAG	River Assault Group
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division
RAMMS	RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RAR	Royal Australian Regiment
RBDB	Ranger Border Defense Battalion
RCA	Riot Control Agents
RCAT	Regimental Combat Assistance Team
Rd	Round
RD	Rural Development
RDC	Rural Development Cadre
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Recon	Reconnaissance
RED HORSE	Rapid Engineering Deployment and Heavy Operational Repair Squadrons, Engineering
Regt	Regiment
RF	Regional Force

RF/PF	Regional Force/Popular Force
RFTC	Regional Force Training Center
Rgr	Ranger
Rkt	Rocket
RL	Rocket Launcher
RLA	Royal Laotian Army
RLAF	Rayol Laotial Air Force
RLG	Royal Lao Government
RMK/BRJ	Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen/Brown-Root-Jones Construction Firm
ROC	Republic of China
ROCMAGV	Republic of China Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROI	Report of Investigation
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKFV	Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
ROKMAGV	Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
ROKMC	Republic of Korea Marine Corps
ROP	Republic of the Philippines
RPC	River Patrol Craft
RPD	River Patrol Division
RPDC	Regional Pacification and Development Councils
RPG	River Patrol Group; Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RR	Recoilless Rifle
RSG	Rear Service Group
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
RT	Route
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTAFV	Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force
RTFV	Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam
RTG	Royal Thai Government
RTN	Royal Thai Navy
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
S	Secret
SA	Senior Advisor; Small Arms
SAB	Scrap Ammunition Brass
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAM	Surface to Air Missile; Space Available Mail
SAR	Search and Rescue
SC	Signal Corps
SD	Subdistrict
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEA-ATS	Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System
SEAL	Sea, Air, and Land
SEA LORDS	Southeast Asia Lake-Ocean-River-Delta Strategy
SEARA	Southeast Asia Research Associates
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SEACORDS	Secure Voice Cordboards
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
Sep	Separate

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SF	Special Forces
SIMS	Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System
SIO	Strategic Intelligence Office
SITS	Single Integrated Telecommunications System
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SLAR	Side-Looking Airborne Radar
SM	Soldier's Medal
SM&DSLC	Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Center
SMO	Systems Maintenance Office
S/NF	Secret/No Foreign Dissemination
[redacted]	
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures; Strategic Objectives Plan
SP	Self-Propelled
Spt	Support
Sqdn	Squadron
SR	Subregion
SRAC	Second Regional Assistance Command
SRAG	Second Regional Assistance Group
SS	Silver Star
SSG	Special Support Group
SSS	Shadow Supply System
SSSG	Special Supply Support Group
SSZ	Special Strike Zone
STON	Short Ton (2,000 pounds)
STRDC	Son Thon Rural Development Cadre (for Montagnards)
STZ	Special Tactical Zone
SUL	Small Unit Leader
SUPCOM	Support Command
Svc	Service
SVN	South Vietnam
SVNLA	South Vietnam National Liberation Army
TA	Table of Allowances
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TAR	Tactical Air Request
TASE	Tactical Air Support Element
TASS	Tactical Air Support Squadron
TC	Training Center; Transportation Corps
TCN	Third Country National
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TE	Table of Equipment
TET	VN Lunar New Year Holiday
TF	Task Force
TFES	Territorial Forces Evaluation System
TFG	Tactical Fighter Group
TFID	Territorial Forces Inspections Division
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TG	Task Group; Transportation Group
TIC	Troops in Contact

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TIGHT JAW	Vietnamese Controlled Unattended Ground Sensor Program
Tm	Team
TMA	Traffic Management Agency
TMS	Training Management System
TNT	Trinitrotoluene
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TRAC	Third Regional Assistance Command
TRU	Technical Reconnaissance Unit
TS	Top Secret
TS/NF	Top Secret/No Foreign Dissemination
Tu Cuong	Self-reliance
U	Unclassified
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UDT-	Underwater Demolition Team
USA	United States Army
USAAG	US Army Advisory Group
USACAV	US Army Construction Agency, Vietnam
USAECAV	US Army Engineer Command, Vietnam
USAF	US Air Force
USAHAC	US Army Headquarters Area Command
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USAMEDCOMV	US Army Medical Command, Vietnam
USAPAV	US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam
USAPDAV	US Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam
USARMYF	US Army Forces
USARPAC	US Army, Pacific
USARV	US Army, Vietnam
USC	US Code
USCG	US Coast Guard
USG	US Government
USIA	US Information Agency
USINFO	US Information Office
USMC	US Marine Corps
USN	US Navy
USNS	US Navy Ship
USS	US Ship
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTB	Utility Boat
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VADM	Vice Admiral
VAL	Light Attack Squadron
VARS	Visual Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance
VC	Viet Cong
VCI	Viet Cong Infrastructure
VC/NVA	Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army
VDPP	Vietnam Developmental Procurement Program
VECCO	Vietnam Engineering and Construction Company
Vedette	Interceptor, Cutter, Surveillance
VEV	Voice Excited Vocoder
VFR	Visual Flight Rules
VICCO	Vietnamese Industrial Construction Corporation

VINAVATCO	Vietnamese Transportation Corporation
VIP	Voluntary Informant Program
VIS	Vietnamese Information Service
VMAT	Vietnamese Mobile Advisory Team
VN	Vietnam; Vietnamese
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VN$	Vietnamese Piaster
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNSC	Vietnamese Naval Supply Center
VNNSY	Vietnamese Naval Shipyard
VR	Visual Reconnaissance
VRE	Vietnam Regional Exchange
VSD	Village Self-Development
WAFC	Women's Armed Forces Corps
WBGP	Water-borne Guard Post
WHEC	US Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter
WIA	Wounded in Action
WIP	Work-in-Place
WLV	Coast Guard Light Ship
WP	White Phosphorous
WPB	US Coast Guard Patrol Craft
Wpn	Weapon
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System for US Forces
Yankee Station	Carrier Force Area off Coast of VN
YC	Open Lighter
YD	Floating Crane
YFR	Refrigerated Covered Lighter
YFU	Harbor Utility Craft
YLLC	Salvage Light Lift Craft
YOG	Yard Oiler
YR	Floating Workshop
YRBM	Submarine Repair, Berthing, and Messing Barge
YTL	Small Harbor Tug
YTM	Medium Harbor Tug

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