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“Getting More out of FID and SFA”

A Strategy for More Effective

Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance

As a way to Build Partnership Capacity

by

LTC Greg Townsend

U.S. Army

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**“Getting More out of FID and SFA”
A Strategy for More Effective
Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance
As a way to Build Partnership Capacity**

by

**LTC Greg Townsend
U.S. Army**

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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13 April 2015

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ABSTRACT

As part of its national security strategy to protect the homeland and secure U.S. interests abroad, the United States uses Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) to build partner capacity. While U.S. military personnel are effective in training foreign forces at the tactical level of warfare, military planners lack the ability to anticipate how and when these efforts translate strategically into lasting security. This research report provides an analytical framework to evaluate the potential effectiveness of FID/SFA activities to achieve sustainable security outcomes that should be of value in addressing this situation.

The study analyzes FID/SFA activities in two countries – Mali and Niger, because they represent areas where conflict over the next 20 years is most likely. That conflict includes a mix of traditional and irregular warfare fought by U.S. partners (often failing or fragile states) against non-state actors that resort to terrorism to create tension against the local government. U.S. policy-makers and military planners, working with the governments of Mali and Niger in 2002-2003, could have benefited from the framework identified in this thesis and used it to identify areas of risk to the success of FID/SFA activities in these countries. This research report also offers predictive analysis for Yemen, Nigeria, and Tunisia and makes the following recommendations as the United States moves forward with partnerships globally: 1) make FID/SFA a strategic investment; 2) increase diplomatic pressure on partner government(s) to strengthen governance; and 3) build operational/strategic level progression plans that carry forward yearly. These efforts will better ensure that U.S. leaders direct America's resources wisely to achieve sustainable security outcomes.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

During a 2014 address to the future leaders of the United States Military, President Barack Obama stated:

For the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to America at home and abroad remains terrorism. But a strategy that involves invading every country that harbors terrorist networks is naïve and unsustainable. I believe we must shift our counterterrorism strategy...to more effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold.¹

In this speech, the President calls for a strategy in which the security of the United States (ends) is achieved through building partnership capacity (ways) using the military and other instruments of national power (means). Partnership is a key component of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA), which are efforts to strengthen partner nation security forces to then increase local, regional, and international security. However, critics of FID claim this strategy carries excessive risk, citing Iraq and Vietnam as examples in which equipment provided by the United States ended up in the hands of enemy adversaries, thus decreasing the overall level of security and making it more difficult for the partner nation government to secure a lasting peace.²

In view of President Obama's 2014 directive to more effectively partner with other nations to combat terrorism, this thesis provides an analytical framework to evaluate the potential effectiveness of FID/SFA activities to achieve sustainable political outcomes. Using this analytical tool, planners should be able to determine areas of risk

¹ U.S. President, "Remarks by the President at the U.S. Military Academy Commencement Ceremony, May 28, 2014." <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/05/28/president-obama-speaks-west-point-graduates#transcript> (accessed September 1, 2014).

² Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "Advanced radios captured by Iraqi insurgents could spell trouble," *Washington Post*, June 16, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/06/16/> (accessed January 8, 2015).

that could inhibit effectiveness and develop appropriate risk mitigation measures. This includes a holistic assessment at the strategic level to determine areas in which the end state of U.S. security or regional stability cannot be achieved due to either inadequate resources (means) or inappropriate application of the ways (e.g. the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of U.S. national power are not synchronized to achieve unity of effort toward the end state).

To test the predictive analysis model, this study examines two recent applications of FID/SFA activities in North-West Africa (Mali and Niger) employing an analytic framework from a 2013 RAND study on building partnership capacity.³ These cases are relevant for several reasons. First, they are similar with regard to geography, culture (religion and ethnicity), and economic conditions; thus any differences in building partnership capacity may be held constant for these factors. Second, they are similar with respect to U.S. geo-political interests. The United States considers both countries increasingly important in the effort to combat terrorism, which if left unchecked, could potentially metastasize and threaten the homeland. Next, they potentially offer a contrast; Congressional testimony cites Mali as an example of what can go wrong, while recent articles lauded partnership efforts in Niger. Finally, they offer insight into future efforts to build partner capacity in the region, to include U.S. assistance to Nigeria as a way to contain and defeat violent extremist organizations, such as Boko Haram, or assistance to Tunisia to defeat Al Qaeda Associated Affiliates.

³ Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer Moroney, Joe Hagler, and Christine Leah, *What Works Best When Building Partnership Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013).

Chapter 2: Policy Background/ Strategic Framework

Both the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies (NSS) outline four U.S. national interests: security, prosperity, values, and international order. They advise that one primary method to achieve security is to “invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners.”¹ The NSS describes three ways to do this: foster security and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict; pursue sustainable and responsible security systems in at-risk states; and prevention of the emergence of conflict. In 2010, the United States applied many resources to the *aftermath* of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the guidance in the NSS called for a change in policy to better address threats and to provide stability *before* conflict materializes. As the 2010 NSS states, “proactively investing in stronger societies and human welfare is far more effective and efficient than responding after state collapse...this requires investing now in the capable partners of the future; building today the capacity to strengthen the foundations of our common security.”² The 2015 NSS further directs partnership efforts “with those fragile states that have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing for their people.”³

While the NSS provides policy and strategy from the President, current reductions in defense spending spurred interest in obtaining the most effective security outcomes for the least cost (both financial cost and the cost in lives expended during two major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan). Failing states, which are candidates for FID assistance, typically have the highest levels of instability, and thus pose the highest risk

¹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2010), 26 and U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, February 2015), 10.

² NSS, 2010, 27.

³ NSS, 2015, 10.

of succumbing to the terrorist threats they are trying to combat. Members of Congress are reticent to fund training and equipping programs for partner nations that may not be strong enough to outlast these insurgent elements, lest they become the scapegoat for equipping the next ISIL.⁴ Therefore, to obtain Congressional funding, efforts to build partner capacity must account for resource constraints.

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) merged the strategic vision of the National Command Authority with the constrained budgetary environment to establish national priorities for resource investment. The QDR builds on the President's guidance stating, "...with our allies and partners, we will make greater efforts to coordinate our planning to optimize their contributions to their own security."⁵ One point of emphasis regarding Africa is that:

The United States remains focused on maximizing our impact throughout Africa by actively working with key partners to foster stability and prosperity. The U.S. Armed Forces cooperate with counterparts on counterterrorism and counter-piracy efforts, partnership capacity building – especially for peacekeeping – and crisis and contingency response.

Therefore, the Secretary of Defense provided guidance in the QDR that reinforced the necessity to build partnership capacity as a way to increase the security of the United States. However, "building partnership capacity" is a very broad term, and even if adequately defined, the question remains how do you build partner capacity effectively?

Building partner capacity is a whole of government term that includes activities designed to improve the capabilities of allies or partners of the United States in the areas of security, stability, development, law enforcement, and governance.⁶ It includes the

⁴ ISIL is a term for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (formed from remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq).

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, March 4, 2014), vi.

⁶ Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partnership Capacity?*, 8.

efforts of the Department of Defense, Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and others. From a security perspective, building partner capacity includes Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance activities, and it includes partnership with national military and police security forces.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) includes activities that support, “the host nation’s (HN’s) internal defense and development (IDAD),” to include “the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from security threats.”⁷ FID is a multinational and interagency effort, requiring integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and legal/rule of law) from both the host nation partner and the United States. Security Force Assistance (SFA) is, “the set of Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces and supporting institutions.”⁸ The defining difference between FID and SFA is that Security Force Assistance activities extend beyond internal defense of the partner nation. This thesis uses the term “build partner capacity” to describe all DOD activities related to Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance, recognizing that other departments and agencies contribute to the effort in additional ways. For example, the Department of State funds foreign military sales programs and provides foreign assistance, with the objective to build partner capacity in security, infrastructure, or other areas. Next, how is building partner capacity most effectively conducted and under what conditions?

⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Foreign Internal Defense*, Joint Publication 3-22 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), ix.

⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Force Assistance*, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 29, 2013), vii.

A 2013 RAND study analyzed 29 partnered nations from 1992 through 2012 and determined the effectiveness of building partner capacity (BPC) over this 20 year period.⁹ The study produced several conclusions. First, BPC is most effective when both countries have mutually supporting national security interests and objectives. Supporting this effort, four additional conditions increase BPC effectiveness: 1) when the partnering activities align with the partner's baseline capabilities and absorptive capacity (ability to incorporate new material and training); 2) when the partner nation invests its own funds to support or sustain capability; 3) when the partner nation has high governance indicators; and 4) when the partner nation has a strong economy.

Additionally, independent of the partner nation, the United States can increase BPC effectiveness by: 1) spending more money on BPC or undertaking more BPC initiatives; 2) maintaining consistency in both funding and implementation of initiatives; 3) matching U.S. efforts with partner nation objectives and absorptive capacity; and 4) including a sustainment component in the initiatives. Finally, the study makes four observations that provide context for building partner capacity initiatives: 1) BPC takes time; 2) context extends beyond the partner to include its regional neighbors; 3) focused BPC is less dependent on contextual factors; and 4) the United States cannot want it more than the partner nation. Taking all of these factors into consideration, the potential effectiveness of building partner capacity is very good when, "BPC is consistently funded and delivered, supported and sustained, well matched to partner capabilities and interests, and shared with a partner that supports the effort and is healthy economically and in terms of governance."¹⁰

⁹ Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partnership Capacity?*, 8.

¹⁰ Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partnership Capacity?*, 8..

From a military strategic and operational perspective, these conclusions mostly align with Department of Defense planning guidance. The 2012 Theater Campaign Planning Planner's Handbook outlines five key steps during country planning mission analysis, after receiving and reviewing higher-level guidance.¹¹ First, assess the security environment of the partner country, analyzing geopolitical conditions, threats to the partner and neighboring countries, and the capabilities and resources of the partner nation. Second, define the desired security role(s) the U.S. Government would like the partner country to play (establish U.S. goals and objectives). The third DOD step is to determine the required conditions that must be present for the partner nation to perform the desired roles to fulfill U.S. security interests. For example, if building a counter-terrorism military role, identify the political, societal, and economic conditions that must be present to support a growing military institution. Fourth, assess the partner nation condition to play the desired role. During the assessment, a key output is identifying areas that require development during steady-state activities, to enable better security and stability. Next, identify partner nation security objectives, identify resources available, and execute the plan to build partner capacity. This includes Combatant Command (Service funded) Security Cooperation programs (Title 10), Foreign Military Financing (Title 22), State Partnership Programs (Title 32), and the resources of the partner country.

The RAND study and DOD planning guidance provide useful recommendations for planning considerations, but do not offer enough specificity regarding the evaluation criteria. For example, the partner nation's economic conditions are important, but what metric should planners use? While military expenditure may be low in relation to U.S.

¹¹ Department of Defense, *Theater Campaign Planning Planner's Handbook* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2012), 14-16.

standards, what does it mean contextually for regional security? How does a planner evaluate governance? This thesis builds on the RAND study and DOD planning guidance by providing an analytical framework to conduct PMESII¹² level analysis as a way to predict the potential effectiveness of FID/SFA and to determine specific areas of risk regarding U.S. efforts to build partnership capacity. This includes strategic risk, defined as likelihood of not achieving the end state of U.S. security or regional stability due to inadequate resources (means) or inappropriate application of the ways (building partnership security capacity).

¹² PMESII includes Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information typically analyzed as part of the Operational Environment during a military operation.

Chapter 3: Evaluation Criteria and Methodology

Merging the RAND analytical construct with DOD planning guidance, this thesis examines two historical case studies from Mali and Niger using probability of success criteria. This process places numerical values to subjective assessments, but attempts to provide a logical analytical framework that FID/SFA planners can use to evaluate risk. The five categories are: 1) level that U.S./partner nation goals are mutually supporting; 2) governance indicators of partner nation; 3) absorptive capacity of partner nation; 4) financial commitment of partner nation; and 5) financial commitment of the United States. These categories came from the RAND study; however this thesis defines each category uniquely using independent analysis and the DOD Planner's Handbook. Additionally, this thesis presents a predictive analysis document as a way to quantify the likelihood of success while planning BPC activities.¹ The evaluation process begins with goals and objectives.

The level that U.S./partner nation objectives are mutually supporting or synchronized is a subjective assessment where extremely high is given a value of (5), high is (4), moderate is (3), low is (2), and extremely low is (1). Higher is better. For example, U.S. synchronization with Colombia concerning the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), varied greatly from 1990 to 1999. Initially, the Colombian government viewed the problem solely from a terrorist and insurgency lens, while the United States viewed it as part of the "war on drugs." By 1999, the Government of Colombia decided to confront FARC's funding through narcotics trafficking, and the United States adjusted goals to address the insurgent threat that FARC posed to

¹ See Appendix 1 for an example Predictive Analysis Document used to merge all evaluation criteria.

Colombia's government. The resultant Plan Colombia (combined U.S. and Colombian plan to build Colombian security capacity) "played a key role in reducing such lawlessness and helping to reassert the authority of the Colombian state...by 1999, Colombians had reached a collective conclusion that, if the deteriorating conditions remained unchecked, the viability of the nation was in question."² Therefore by 1999, U.S. and Colombia mutually supporting goals were "extremely high."

The second criterion is governance indicators of the partner nation at the start of the FID/SFA endeavor. This is an absolute value from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project which, "reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996-2013 for six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption."³ In 2013, countries that rank highest included Canada, Greenland, Norway, Sweden, and Australia. The lowest ranking countries were Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Libya.

Voice and accountability reflect perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Political stability and absence of violence reflects the actual level of violence and perceptions of the likelihood that a group will use unconstitutional or violent means to destabilize or overthrow a government, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. Government

² Michael Shifter, "Plan Colombia a Retrospective," *America's Quarterly*, summer 2012, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3787> (accessed February 15, 2015).

³ World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators," <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc> (accessed January 7, 2015).

effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Regulatory quality reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of law reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Finally, control of corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which elites and private interests exercise public power for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state.

Each of the six categories contains a value from the lowest (-2.5) to highest (2.5); therefore, a country may have a total value of -15 (lowest in all categories) to +15 (highest in all categories). For example, in 2012, the United States held raw values of 1.13, 0.63, 1.51, 1.29, 1.6, and 1.38 in each of the six categories with a cumulative value of 7.54 out of 15. Additionally, the WGI compares each country's raw score against the total number of countries, providing a relative score based as a percentage (higher is better). For example, out of 187 countries in 2012, the United States ranked in the 86th percentile for voice and accountability, 68th percentile for political stability and absence of violence, 90th percentile for government effectiveness, 87th percentile for regulatory quality, 91st percentile for rule of law, and 89th percentile for control of corruption. This thesis uses the average of all percentiles to produce a single value for the governance indicators, thus the U.S. average in 2012 was 85% or 0.85. Multiplying these values by a

factor of five then brought them in line with the other evaluation criteria which have a maximum value of (5).

Absorptive capacity of the partner nation is the third category and uses methodology from both the RAND study and earlier U.S. efforts to align U.S. security force assistance with the partner nation's abilities and capabilities. A 1984 analysis of arms transfers to Africa and the Middle East determined, "The ability of a recipient country to absorb military technology is constrained by two critical factors – infrastructure and human resources."⁴ Infrastructure includes the roads, rails, bridges, and overall transportation network, but also includes the "bureaucratic and administrative capability of the government"⁵ to assume responsibility for the security force assistance initiative. Human resources includes the, "individual and small-group skills and abilities to actually operate and maintain the transferred equipment."⁶ This thesis, using information from the RAND study, also includes the extent of existing training, technological sophistication (in relation to the type of equipment and training being provided by the United States), and doctrine/standing operating procedures (SOPs). Each of the seven sub-categories is evaluated as extremely high (5), high (4), moderate (3), low (2), extremely low (1), or non-existent (0). After summing the seven sub-categories, score the data in accordance with the following legend: Extremely High: 29-35/ High: 22-28/ Moderate: 15-21/ Low: 8-14/ Extremely Low: 0-7. Once the overall category is determined, a new value is assigned from (5) to (1); therefore overall absorptive capacity

⁴ Bruce E. Arlinghaus, *Military Development in Africa, the Political and Economic Risks of Arms Transfers*, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), 68.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

is evaluated as extremely high (5), high (4), moderate (3), low (2), or extremely low (1) after considering all sub-categories. Higher is better.

The fourth evaluation criterion is the partner nation's financial commitment to support and sustain partnering activities. While commitment is inherently a subjective assessment, this thesis uses the partner nation's military budget as a percentage of its overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While other partner nation expenditures contribute to overall security, this criterion measures commitment. For example, in 2012, the United States military budget was 4.4% of GDP and would therefore have a value of 4.4 for this study.⁷

The fifth and final evaluation criterion for starting activities to build partner capacity is the U.S. financial commitment. This thesis uses data from the U.S. Foreign Assistance office and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Economic Analysis and Data Services (EADS).⁸ While military assistance is considered, this thesis also accounts for Department of State and USAID economic assistance that contributes to security and building partner nation governmental capability. Because this report aggregates data from 2002 and before, the first annual data set starts in 2003. Total U.S. financial assistance is then divided by the partner nation's total population,⁹ producing a measure of U.S. financial aid per capita, which is then normalized on a five-point scale.

⁷ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "Military Expenditure Data," http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database (accessed January 5, 2015).

⁸ United States Agency for International Development, "U.S. Foreign Assistance," <https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/> (accessed February 15, 2015).

⁹ World Bank, "Population Data," <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL> (accessed February 15, 2015).

For context, Jordan receives a total of \$1.135 billion in foreign aid (\$303.7 million is military assistance), and recorded a 2013 population of 6,459,000 people. Jordan's aid per capita is \$175/person and would rate 5 out of 5, thus establishing a .029 correlation constant between aid per capita and evaluation rating. Therefore, $\text{aid/capita} \times .029 = \text{evaluation rating}$. Greater is better. Appendix 1 provides an example of all evaluation criteria consolidated into the BPC predictive analysis document.

Chapter 4: The Operational Environment and the Future of Warfare

Before beginning analysis of each country, it is useful to first answer the question, “Why study Mali and Niger?” There is growing literature in both academic and military circles that argues about a shift in war or warfare from state on state activities, to asymmetrical, drawn-out conflicts that seek no decisive action to destroy an enemy’s military force.¹ In these “new wars” that have been prevalent in Africa for several decades, “state disintegration” has replaced “state building” as the defining characteristic, as competing forces seek wealth and power, at the expense of good policy for the citizens of a country. In these cases, “disaster was nearly always the result when the West or former eastern bloc, by sending military advisers or supplying weapons and equipment, tried to accelerate state building or to halt a process of erosion already under way.”² This disaster came either in the form of an ineffective military force, or a force that only served the elites. Thus proponents claim that the object of “new war” is to seize power and wealth for an elite few and use the state system, “as a vehicle for personal enrichment.”³ Even if one discounts that this represents a new form of war or even warfare, one must accept that this characterization of war is prevalent in the world today and poses a threat to the achievement of U.S. goals and objectives while building partnership capacity. Consider the turmoil in North-West Africa during 2011.

While the United States set its sights on closing out the mission in Iraq, the citizens of several North African countries, including Libya, revolted against authoritarian rule setting off a chain of events referred to as the “Arab Spring,” producing

¹ Herfried Munkler, *The New Wars*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 7-9.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

various unintended consequences. While the September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi received widespread media coverage, nine months prior, an equally dangerous threat brewed in neighboring Mali. Disenfranchised Tuareg separatists seeking to create the independent state of Azawad in northern Mali allied with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and bolstered by weapons from the Libyan collapse, attacked and captured the northern town of Menaka.⁴ By March, they captured the Malian military base in Gao and later the historically significant city of Timbuktu. Outrage in the Malian military over inadequate equipping and governmental corruption spurred action against the central government, and on March 21, 2012, Captain Amadou Sanogo, an American trained officer, led a military coup d'état against President Touré. With chaos reigning in the central government, AQIM and the MNLA (Tuaregs organized as the Movement National for the Liberation of Azawad) controlled northern Mali and agreed to an alliance of convenience (which quickly disintegrated when AQIM members enacted shari'a law over the moderate Tuaregs). In a two-month span, the democratically elected government of Mali was deposed by an American trained officer and lost half the country to Islamic extremists (and separatists). In addition, these events occurred after the United States spent ten years funding, equipping, and training partner nation militaries in North-West Africa, originally under the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which evolved in 2005 to the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). How did this happen?

⁴ Dona Stewart, *What is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 46

Following the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S. security policy in Africa shifted from “benign neglect” to a counter-terrorism focus.⁵ Because attacks on the U.S. homeland originated from the ungoverned spaces of Afghanistan, U.S. policy-makers sought to negate similar environmental conditions in Africa. Counter-terrorism rose to the forefront of national security and the U.S. State Department established the Pan Sahel Initiative to strengthen security in Saharan Africa, spending \$6.25 million in 2002 to build partner security capacity in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania.⁶ In 2005, the PSI changed into the TSCTP and assumed a broader focus, to include governance and development. The TSCTP therefore represents a whole of government approach to build partner capacity with the stated goal to, “...support African states’ efforts to improve border security and counterterrorism capacity while also facilitating regional cooperation, promoting democratic governance, and improving relations with the U.S.”⁷ Under the TSCTP, the regional framework expanded to include Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal and received \$100 million in funding for fiscal years 2007-2013.

While the U.S. whole of government approach to build regional security capacity in Trans-Sahara Africa is commendable, the results to date are not. As one critic states,

. . . the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most significant endeavors in Africa have been undertaken in pursuit of narrowly conceived goals related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Operations in North and East Africa, though couched in a larger framework of development, long-term counterinsurgency, and a campaign to win “hearts and minds,” have nonetheless relied on offensive military operations focused on short-term objectives.⁸

⁵ Kelechi A. Kalu and George Kieh Jr., eds., *United States-Africa Security Relations*, (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2014), 27.

⁶ Stewart, 46.

⁷ Ibid., 47.

⁸ Ibid., 46.

Despite good intentions, the United States often rushes to equip and train a partner nation security force, before the nation is capable of integrating, sustaining, and overseeing its implementation. Short-term security objectives do not translate into lasting regional or international security, because the partner nation is not committed to the same end state. To understand this better, this thesis now turns to two case studies.

Chapter 5: Case Study # 1: Mali (2002-2003)

Before analyzing Mali against the previously described evaluation criteria, it is helpful to review Mali's historical background which provides context for both its governmental effectiveness and absorptive capacity. Mali has a rich history due to its natural resources and unique blend of tribal and Islamic culture. In the 14th century, half of the world's gold and salt came from Mali. By the 15th century, Timbuktu became a center of Islamic scholarship and learning; by the 16th century, the city reached a population of 100,000,¹ outnumbering both London and Rome. Around 1650, the empire broke into three parts, and Morocco assumed ruling authority through the 18th century. During European colonialism, France claimed modern day Mali as part of French Sudan in 1890, linking Algeria to Senegal in the west and to Congo in the east. Tribal, ethnic, and religious diversity in Mali contributed to social and political disorganization that made it unable to repel colonial domination by France. Following World War II, France no longer had the economic ability to maintain its African influence and empire. In 1958, the Sudanese Republic (Mali) and Senegal joined a federation, and together they achieved independence in 1960 as the Mali Federation. After a few months, Senegal withdrew, and the Sudanese Republic was renamed Mali.² Modibo Keita became Mali's first elected president in 1960 and ruled until 1968.

In 1968, Mali's General Moussa Traoré overthrew Keita in a coup d'état and ruled with an iron fist for over twenty years, tolerating little dissent. In 1991, his actions led to another coup as recalled below.

In March 1991, Mali's military dictator made the fatal mistake of ordering his troops to fire on students protesting in the capital, and several hundred

¹ Stewart, 22.

² Ibid.

were killed. In the wave of shocked public reaction that followed, a key military commander, Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, joined the pro-democracy forces, and the dictatorship collapsed. Touré, better known as “ATT,” promised to hand over power to an elected government. Like Cincinnatus, the Roman farmer who took up arms and then returned to his fields, Touré kept his word, surprising many of his fellow Malians.³

Touré would still become a key figure in Malian history, but in 1991 his decision to relinquish power and support free elections sowed the seeds of democracy and gave hope to the rest of Africa. President Alpha Oumar Konare won the 1992 election and was re-elected in 1997. Konare peacefully passed presidential power in 2002 following another round of elections, this time back to the man who had relinquished it – Touré. Now a civilian, Touré was a popular choice and easily won the 2002 election, however, the seeds of discontent began to grow in northern Mali.

Policies enacted by the Malian government increasingly disenfranchised the ethnic Tuaregs, as the southern government had little interest in providing services for the sparse northern population. In 2006, Algeria brokered a peace agreement between Touré’s government and the Tuareg rebels, granting the Tuaregs increased autonomy in the northern desert region. While Touré won re-election in 2007, eventually, the MNLA, fueled by its alliance with AQIM and weapons from Libya, rose up in arms against Touré’s government in 2012, setting off the chain of events that led Captain Sanogo to stage his military coup. While Sanogo claimed that his actions were necessary to remove ineffective leadership (Touré), to then more effectively fight AQIM and the MNLA, the coup was a symptom of a larger problem in Mali.

³ Stewart, 46.

Bruce Whitehouse recounted a saying in Mali that “A fish rots from the head,”⁴ and this is exactly what occurred in Mali under Touré’s leadership. Typical of the wars described in Chapter Four of this thesis, Touré focused on himself and his small group of elites. Whitehouse states,

Touré purchased a temporary peace in the north but never made good on promises to reduce the acute poverty there. He accepted millions of dollars of US military aid, which was supposed to be used to drive out al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, but he never actually went after the group’s encampments. The military itself was racked by nepotism, and officers often skimmed off their soldiers’ ammunition and pay. As Touré’s second term approached its end, Malians had also lost faith in the rule of law. On the outskirts of Bamako, residents saw their property seized by members of the president’s inner circle, and were powerless to seek redress through the courts. Few Malians felt protected by the police, who were busy extorting bribes from motorists. Judges sold favourable verdicts to the highest bidders.⁵

It may be easy to see the façade now, but what about in 2002 when Touré came to power? The next section analyzes the conditions present in 2002 and uses a model to determine a predictive value of the potential effectiveness of FID/SFA.

As stated previously, counter-terrorism drove U.S. goals and objectives in Mali in 2002, with its primary goal of preventing another attack on the United States or a U.S. embassy. Under the lens of Amadou Touré’s assumption to power in 2002, Mali clearly sought financial resources to increase economic prosperity. However Touré’s eventual decision to cede control of northern Mali to the restive Tuaregs rather than secure the territory against Islamist extremists is a clear indication that U.S. goals did not align with the Malian government. While the Malian military goals did align with U.S. goals (greater resources spent to train and equip Malian military forces to increase their

⁴ Bruce Whitehouse, *What Went Wrong in Mali*, (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2012), under “Mali,” <http://africacenter.org/2013/01/what-went-wrong-in-mali-2/> (accessed January 7, 2015).

⁵ Ibid.

capability and salaries), the higher governmental obstacles were too large to overcome. As a result, the level that U.S. and Mali goals were mutually supporting, may be graded at the extremely low (1) level.

World Governance Indicators in 2002 pointed in a fairly positive direction. With the successful elections and peaceful transfer of power, the international community recognized Mali as a model of how democracy could coexist with Islam in Africa. Mali increased its governance indicators in four of six categories, most notably with voice and accountability increasing from a -0.11 raw value to +0.26. Percentage values for each category in 2002 were: voice and accountability .55; political stability and absence of violence .56; government effectiveness .32; regulatory quality .36; rule of law .45; and control of corruption .35. Mali's average rating graded out to .43 and multiplied by a factor of five, scored at 2.15. Data from the World Bank is portrayed in Table 1.



Table 1: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Mali in 2002 (Source: World Bank)⁶

Upon closer examination however, planners and policy makers would have discovered that one governance indicator significantly changed between 2000 and 2002, and it did so in a negative direction. Flipping almost an entire point from +0.31 to -0.53,

⁶ World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators," <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc> (accessed January 7, 2015).

control of corruption greatly decreased, indicating less governmental control over disparate forces that could negate U.S. efforts to build partner capacity.

The absorptive capacity of Mali in 2002 is low for several reasons. First, governmental administration was moderately strong given the opportunity for new leadership following presidential elections. The transportation network throughout Mali, while primitive, was still adequate for criminal networks to transit throughout West Africa and for tourists to visit Mali for the annual Festival in the Desert, a music festival that featured native Tuareg and other African music. While the government certainly could improve infrastructure by western standards, their ability to absorb pick-up trucks was adequate. Basic infantry skill levels were moderate, although combined arms skills associated with call-for-fire and air-to-ground coordination were low. Maintenance capacity was extremely low, and technological sophistication was low; doctrine was non-existent, although SOPs did exist for basic squad maneuvers, and education was extremely low. While this information is readily available retrospectively, these same evaluations could be determined over the course of a six-month period using Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events. The purpose of a JCET is to train U.S. SOF (Special Operations Forces), but the training event allows U.S. Soldiers to evaluate a partner nation force before, during, or after the provision of security force assistance. As a result, planners could evaluate Mali in 2002, as overall low for its absorptive capacity, with a cumulative grade of 11 and an overall new value of (2) as depicted in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Mali Absorptive Capacity	
Category	Grade (1-5)
Governmental administration	3
Infrastructure	3
Maintenance	1
Existing Training Programs	1
Technological Sophistication	1
Existing doctrine/ SOPs	1
Education of operators	1
Total	11 = Low = NV 2

Legend:

29-35 = Extremely High

(New Value= 5)

22-28 = High (New Value = 4)

15-21 = Moderate

(New Value = 3)

8-14 = Low (New Value = 2)

0-7 = Extremely Low

(New Value = 1)

NV = New Value for Assessment

Mali's financial commitment to national defense totaled \$49.4 million U.S. dollars in 2002 (\$88.8 million in constant U.S. dollars). This amount represents 1.5% of Mali's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002 and is a fairly constant GDP percentage over the past 30

U.S. commitment to building partner capacity in Mali included both military and economic assistance. Corrected for constant dollars, the U.S. committed \$400,000 (\$0.4 million) to Mali for military assistance in 2003 and \$63.6 million in economic assistance, including another \$400,000 in security support assistance. U.S. foreign aid totaled \$64.0 million,⁷ and Mali's population in 2003 was 11,219,737,⁸ producing an aid per capita amount of \$5/person. On a five-point scale, this translates to a score of (0.145).

Taking into account all five evaluation criteria, planners in 2002-2003 could have predicted that the relative likelihood of success of building partner capacity in Mali was low. While these calculations are not absolute and involve subjective assessments, they are intended to be used as a planning tool and a way to identify areas of risk if the decision to build partner capacity is made.

⁷ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Foreign Assistance," <https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/> (accessed February 15, 2015).

⁸ World Bank, "Population Data," <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL> (accessed February 15, 2015).

Table 3: Mali Overall Assessment	
Evaluation Criteria	Score
Mutually Supporting Obj	1
Governance Indicators	2.15
Absorptive Capacity	2
PN Financial Commitment	1.5
U.S. Financial Commitment	0.145
Total	6.795

Legend:
Extremely High (21-25)
High (16-20)
Moderate (11-15)
Low (6-10)
Extremely Low (0-5)

In 2002 – 2003, the Mali narrative would state the following:

While Mali is a country of interest for the United States as a partner in the global war on terrorism, the country's government is an area of risk that is likely to impede progress. While the country recently conducted elections and peacefully transferred civilian power, Mali has increased its level of corruption, as public power is increasingly used for private gain. While Mali holds a low absorptive capacity, this can likely be overcome if the government institutes more corruption and education reform. The partner nation financial commitment while low is still on par with most developing countries. U.S. financial commitment is currently low, but it should be increased if the Malian government conducts governmental reform and controls corruption. The United States should make security force assistance and aid conditional on a Malian initiative to control corruption and provide transparency to both the United States as its partner nation and its citizenry. The citizens of Mali must benefit and perceive this benefit in order to prevent the escalation of ethnic and tribal tensions, most notably the Tuaregs in northern Mali. Finally, the U.S. should ensure that its goals to combat terrorism are nested with Mali's goals which may not be fully articulated to U.S. policy-makers. The United States and Mali cannot achieve their mutual security goals if U.S. security force assistance is misdirected to an elite few because of corruption.

See Appendix 2 for the consolidated Mali BPC Predictive Analysis Document.

Although the United States did commit resources to building partnership capacity, U.S. efforts were not synchronized with political reform. In this context, Captain Sanogo's coup was almost inevitable, and the United States subsequently withheld direct assistance to Mali from 2012-2013 per the Foreign Assistance Act. However, other countries (e.g. France) with interests in Mali increased partnership and counter-terrorism

efforts, which highlight a key point: U.S. allies and western partners may have larger interests that permit the United States to invest smaller amounts or to take a longer-term approach to sustainable security. Due to French involvement, the United States is now able to re-calibrate its approach to security in Mali by doing what it should have done in 2002: make future military partnership conditional upon governmental corruption reform.

Chapter 6: Case Study # 2: Niger (2002-2003)

As a neighbor to Mali in the Trans-Sahel region, Niger shares many of the same historical legacies associated with the region. Niger was also a stop in the ancient trade routes spanning from the North African Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea, particularly the portion of Niger that includes the Niger River, flowing through the capital of Niamey. Also part of French colonial rule in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Niger became independent from France in 1960. Niger experienced autocratic, military rule for 30 years until 1993 when the country held its first multi-party democratic elections. Political infighting followed, and Colonel Ibrahim Bare led a coup that overthrew the president in 1996. Colonel Bare refused to relinquish power, and another group of military officers organized a counter-coup in 1999 with the intent of restoring democratic rule and placing term limits on future leaders. Niger held elections, and Mamadou Tandja was elected president to his first of two five-year terms. Upon his reelection in 2009, Tandja attempted to organize a constitutional referendum to increase presidential term limits and extend his power. This promptly led to a 2010 coup which ousted Tandja, dissolved the cabinet, and led to new elections. The Nigerien people elected Issoufou Mahamadou to the presidency in 2011.¹

While Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world, it maintains rich deposits of uranium in its northern regions, which have active mines predominantly operated by France. The Nigerien army leadership does not trust the civilian leadership, in part because the military was forced from power in 1991, and in part because the military has been compelled to stop corrupt (or perceived as corrupt) civilian governments. While

¹ Historical Synopsis taken from British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), "Niger Profile," <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13944995> (accessed January 7, 2015).

ethnic Tuaregs in the north are marginalized, they do have more representation than those in Mali. For example, in 2011 President Issoufou appointed an ethnic Tuareg, Brigi Rafini, to the post of Prime Minister. While this did heal some of the wounds from conflict in 2007-2008 (when disenfranchised Tuaregs attacked several military targets), political inclusivity would be more effective if the Tuareg clans did not experience economic marginalization. The central government's 2009 promise to provide the Tuaregs more governmental resources largely remains unfulfilled.²

Economically, a large financial boon occurred in 2012 when Niger became a primary country of U.S. interest due to its proximity to both Libya and Mali. As Libya collapsed, Niger became the primary transit route for foreign fighters and weapons traveling from Libya to Mali and vice versa. Despite only being three years removed from its last coup, Niger was chosen to host the 2014 Flintlock Exercise, which included over twenty nations during the annual counter-terrorism training exercise designed to build partner security capacity. However, how should planners and policy-makers have viewed the prospects of building partner capacity in Niger in 2002?

Similar to U.S. goals in Mali, the United States was committed to building partner capacity to secure ungoverned spaces in the Trans-Sahel in 2002, and Niger was included in the original Pan Sahel Initiative. Three years removed from the 1999 coup, President Tandja sought ways to improve the economic condition of his country. In 2002, he was more concerned with the threat from Boko Haram spilling over from northern Nigeria, than any other external threat. While Nigerien Tuaregs were at times restive, they did not present a significant security challenge. Therefore, while President Tandja's government

² Sebastian Elischer, "After Mali Comes Niger," *Foreign Affairs*, February 12, 2013, under "Niger security," <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/136046> (accessed January 7, 2015).

did not oppose U.S. efforts to build security in the region, he certainly did not give it much emphasis, accepting the financial injects, but not overly concerned with oversight. Additionally, he put more emphasis on securing his southern border over expending assets to find and defeat a nebulous AQIM in the north. In summary, the score for mutually supporting objectives between the United States and Niger was low with a value of (2).

World Governance Indicators in 2002 were extremely low with the ability to contain corruption dropping from 0.31 in 2000 to -1.07 in 2002, an absolute value change of nearly 1.4. Niger's governance indicators decreased in four of six categories, despite three years of relative political stability following elections in 1999. Percentage values for each category in 2002 were: voice and accountability .41; political stability and absence of violence .38; government effectiveness .19; regulatory quality .25; rule of law .27; and control of corruption .098. Niger's average rating graded out to .27 and multiplied by a factor of five, is 1.33. Data from the World Bank is portrayed in Table 4.




Table 4: 2002 Worldwide Governance Indicators for Niger³

³ World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators," <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc> (accessed January 7, 2015).

The absorptive capacity of Niger in 2002 was also low, but for slightly different reasons from Mali. First, governmental administration was extremely weak and the prospect for governmental oversight of security force assistance was unlikely based on the high level of corruption and low level of governmental effectiveness. The transportation network connecting the capital to the Niger delta in the south was adequate, but the road network in northern and eastern Niger was practically non-existent. While the Nigerien military could also absorb pick-up trucks, their usefulness in the north was severely constrained and their ability to maintain them was low. Basic infantry skill levels were moderate, although again, combined arms skills associated with call-for-fire and air-to-ground coordination were low. Technological sophistication was extremely low, education was extremely low, and SOPs existed for basic infantry squad operations. As a result, the overall absorptive capacity of Niger in 2002 could be graded as (9) with an overall new value of (2) as depicted in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Niger Absorptive Capacity	
Category	Grade (1-5)
Governmental administration	1
Infrastructure	2
Maintenance	2
Existing Training Programs	1
Technological Sophistication	1
Existing doctrine/ SOPs	1
Education of operators	1
Total	9 = Low = NV 2

Legend:

29-35 = Extremely High = New Value of 5

22-28 = High = New Value of 4

15-21 = Moderate = New Value of 3

8-14 = Low = New Value of 2

0-7 = Extremely Low = New Value of 1

Niger's financial commitment to national defense totaled \$20.7 million U.S. dollars in 2002 (\$37.7 million in constant U.S. dollars). This amount represents 1.0% of Niger's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002 and is also a fairly constant GDP percentage over the past 30 years.⁴ For this thesis, Niger's financial commitment value is (1.0).

U.S. commitment to building partner capacity in Niger was extremely low, largely because its geo-political importance was low, even with the increased effort through the Pan Sahel Initiative. Corrected for constant dollars, the United States committed \$100,000 (\$0.1 million) to Niger for military assistance in 2003 and \$17.4 million in economic assistance, with no additional security support assistance. Total U.S. foreign aid totaled \$17.5 million,⁵ and the population of Niger was 17,831,270,⁶ producing a per capita aid rate of \$.98/person. On a five-point scale, this translates to a score of (0.028).

Taking into account all five evaluation criteria, planners in 2002-2003 could have predicted that the relative likelihood of success of building partner capacity in Niger was low (per table 6). Again, while this assessment is not surprising, planners could have better understood why the likelihood of success was low and addressed key areas of risk, if decision-makers still chose to pursue building partner capacity. Even more, planners could have worked with the country teams and interagency partners to sequence foreign

⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "Military Expenditure Data," http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database (accessed January 7, 2015).

⁵ USAID, "U.S. Foreign Assistance," <https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/> (accessed February 15, 2015).

⁶ World Bank, "Population Data," <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL> (accessed February 15, 2015).

aid that improved governance without creating military juntas that would subvert the very organizations they should support.

Table 6: Niger Overall Assessment	
Evaluation Criteria	Score
Mutually Supporting Obj	2
Governance Indicators	1.33
Absorptive Capacity	2
PN Financial Commitment	1.0
U.S. Financial Commitment	0.028
Total	6.358

Legend:
Extremely High (21-25)
High (16-20)
Moderate (11-15)
Low (6-10)
Extremely Low (0-5)

The narrative for Niger in 2002 might have said the following:

Niger is a partner against violent extremist organizations such as AQIM, but does not consider AQIM their number one security threat. Instability from Boko Haram near the southern border is more threatening to the government, and Niger will likely direct any U.S. military aid to the southern border rather than the north. This may increase Tuareg discontent, as the northern Tuaregs already feel disenfranchised from the government. If Niger can increase political inclusivity and provide government services for its northern citizens, then it will likely remain stable. The Nigerien government will welcome security force assistance but will likely squander the aid if rampant corruption persists. U.S. financial commitment is currently low, and should remain low unless the operational environment changes and unless the Nigerien government increases governmental effectiveness and controls corruption.

See Appendix 3 for the consolidated Niger BPC Predictive Analysis Document.

Despite a military coup in 2011, Niger did improve political representation of the Tuaregs from 2002 to 2015, which led to increased stability. Nigerien Tuaregs did not seek collaboration with AQIM as Malian Tuaregs did in 2012, and the United States was able to synchronize its counter-terrorism goals with the Government of Niger over time. Niger successfully hosted the 2014 Flintlock Exercise and continues to be a partner with the United States against violent extremism, although its military sustainment capacity as a function of absorptive capacity remains lacking.

Chapter 7: Applying Predictive Analysis to Current Security Dilemmas

This thesis now offers predictive analysis regarding building partnership capacity in three countries of interest to the United States – Yemen, Nigeria, and Tunisia. Yemen is important due to its geographic position on the Arabian Peninsula along the Gulf of Aden, AQAP’s use of Yemen as a training ground and base from which to project terrorism, and the recent military and political revolution which has led to the expansion of militant Iranian influence and power. Nigeria is included because of U.S. interest in preserving access to petroleum in the Gulf of Guinea, while also containing the rise of Boko Haram, an anti-western violent extremist organization. Finally, Tunisia contains the same geo-political and counter-terrorism threads of the previous two countries, while also being a country that recently experienced a democratic political transition. While all three countries have been partners of the United States to varying degrees, three distinct policy recommendations using the predictive analysis document are: no immediate engagement in Yemen regarding building partnership security capacity, cautious and selective engagement in Nigeria, and full engagement in Tunisia.

Yemen

As recently as September 2014, President Obama cited U.S. strategy in Yemen as a positive example of working with partners to combat terrorism, stating “This strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years...to mobilize partners wherever possible to address broader challenges to international order.”¹ Leveraging

¹ U.S. President, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” September 10, 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1> (accessed February 24, 2015).

“partnership” with the autocratic Government of Yemen, the United States routinely targeted militants in Yemen belonging to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with the tacit endorsement of Yemeni leaders. However, recently Houthi rebels (Shia militants backed by Iran), over-ran the government and seized control of the capital city, sending the Sunni leaders into exile. While President Obama pledged that U.S. counter-terrorist operations against AQAP in Yemen will continue, policy-makers will certainly consider whether to assist the exiled government by building partnership capacity as a way to restore stability in the country.

U.S. and Yemeni goals were moderately synchronized prior to the rebel attack. The United States focused on access to combat AQAP, and Yemen was content to let the United States lay siege to the terrorist group. Meanwhile the root causes of instability festered. As the U.S. Institute of Peace reported,

The key to stability lies in significant government restructuring and reform—some of which has already been agreed upon in the NDC [National Dialogue Conference] but now must be implemented. In the past, the use of the Yemeni state as a patronage system, poor service delivery, and overly centralized governance have reinforced divisions, feeding instability.²

The Yemen predictive analysis document³ reinforces this position; Yemeni governmental capacity was extremely low, grading at the bottom 2% of all countries for political stability/absence of violence and the bottom 9% for control of corruption. Just as critical, lack of governmental administration, a key component of absorptive capacity, would greatly hinder future efforts to build security capacity. Assuming the government retained the ability to administer resources, historical financial commitment by Yemen is

² U.S. Institute of Peace, “Yemen in Transition: Between Fragmentation and Transformation,” <http://www.usip.org/publications/> (accessed February 24, 2015).

³ See Appendix 4: Yemen BPC Predictive Analysis Document

moderate and generally positive at nearly 3% of GDP. U.S. financial commitment to Yemen scores at \$10.59/person, but it is still extremely low. However, committing additional resources to Yemen in the midst of a coup, without first generating governmental stability and reform, is comparable to repairing the roof of a house in the middle of an earthquake. The first step after the initial crisis should be ensuring the foundation is stable. This requires a whole of government and multi-national approach and would require further assistance from the Gulf Cooperation Council via the National Dialogue Conference.⁴ Again, governmental development and reform should *precede* or occur *concurrently with* any military options that focus on building partner security capacity.

Nigeria

U.S. goals in Nigeria historically centered on access to petroleum located in the fertile Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. While Nigeria's security forces focused their efforts on securing this economically important area, the government neglected the northern portion of Nigeria, providing a breeding ground for the violent extremist organization Boko Haram. Largely considered a Nigerian domestic issue, Boko Haram is a terrorist group whose name in Arabic translates to "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teaching and Jihad," and literally means in the native Hausa dialect that conventional education or "boko," is forbidden.⁵

Over the past decade, Boko Haram attempted to impose shari'a law in northern Nigerian provinces that have little or no control from the central government. As an

⁴ The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) is an on-going international effort to achieve stability in Yemen. For more information see: <http://www.ndc.ye/default.aspx>

⁵ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Human Rights, and International Organizations (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, June 11, 2014), 1.

indication that U.S. and Nigerian goals were not synchronized regarding Boko Haram, the United States did not designate Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) until 2013. Following the coup d'état in Mali in 2012, Boko Haram increased its collaboration with AQIM, leading to higher profile attacks and expansion of its influence into neighboring Niger and Chad. As a result, the United States declared Boko Haram a FTO and began initial efforts to synchronize elements of national power against the threat. This represented both a change in policy and a more unified alignment of goals and objectives between the United States and Nigeria, producing a subjective “high” assessment using the BPC predictive analysis document.

However, Nigeria is still largely inept at addressing the root causes of instability. Using the predictive analysis document, Nigeria’s governance indicators rank in the bottom quartile in all categories and corruption is one of the highest, ranking in the bottom ten percent. As Dr. Peter Pham stated in his testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Human Rights, and International Organizations, “The government, Federal and state, must also better address legitimate grievances which have rendered meaningful segments of the population amenable to the extremist message.”⁶ Persistent corruption inhibits governmental programs to provide services and security, enabling Boko Haram’s message to spread, “...even if the tactics the group has adopted are repugnant to the overwhelming majority of Nigerians irrespective of their ethnic identification or religious affiliation.”⁷

Nigeria’s absorptive capacity is low and grades lowest in governmental administration, infrastructure, maintenance, and operator education. Additional

⁶ Ibid., 9.

⁷ Ibid.

assessments support this conclusion which state, “Nigeria does not want for material resources; however what does want is maintenance and how to use that equipment.”⁸

The recent deployment of U.S. unmanned aerial systems in Nigeria was in part due to the fact that, “...none of the Aerostar tactical drones purchased from Israel by Nigeria several years ago today fly.”⁹

Nigeria’s financial commitment to national defense totaled over \$2.4 billion in 2013 representing 1% of GDP. The U.S. financial commitment to Nigeria in 2013 was \$335.9 million or \$1.94/person, translating to an extremely low score of .056. Compiling all data, the overall assessment is that building partner capacity stands a low probability of success in Nigeria, *given current conditions, resources, and implementation plans*. This essentially is the risk. If building partner capacity in Nigeria is in the best interests of the United States, an implementation plan should address ways to increase the key areas that score lowest, to increase the probability of success and lower the risk of failure.¹⁰

For example, the Government of Nigeria must first decrease corruption at levels measurable by the world governance indicators, with diplomatic pressure applied by the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, the Secretary of State, and if required, the President. Next, establish a training and maintenance program for Nigerian security forces in northern Nigeria and sustain the effort with a specific financial commitment from the United States for these activities. As revenue for Nigeria decreased significantly with the reduction in oil prices, it is unrealistic to assume that Nigeria can increase its financial

⁸ Ibid., 11.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See Appendix 5: Nigeria BPC Predictive Analysis Document

commitment above the current 1% of GDP. While U.S. financial commitment could increase, a more realistic approach is to focus current expenditures into programs and events that sustain training and maintenance. In summary, the United States should capitalize on the convergence of U.S. and Nigerian goals to combat Boko Haram, but the strategy to better secure Nigeria and the United States must address the following shortfalls regarding ways and means: 1) increase control of corruption by the Government of Nigeria; 2) increase training of Nigerian security forces in the utilization of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and 3) develop sustainable support packages for sustainment training and maintenance, likely funded by the United States or the international community.

Tunisia

Tunisia is a fragile state still making its way through a tumultuous but hopeful political transition that started with the “Arab Spring” in 2011. Political and economic protests in 2011 led to the ouster of President Ben Ali and the resignation of Prime Minister Ghannouchi.¹¹ While the Ennahda Islamist party won parliamentary elections in October 2011, it did not hold an outright majority. Thus it reached out to other parties to increase its governing power, leading to the election of former human rights activist Moncef Marzouki as the country’s new president. Despite political violence during 2013, the country successfully navigated through the peaceful transfer of political power from 2013 to 2014, when the ineffective Islamist party passed power to a transitional government, and the secular Nidaa Tounes party won the largest block of seats during subsequent parliamentary elections in October 2014. In December, Nidaa Tounes

¹¹ Historical Synopsis taken from British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Tunisia Profile,” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14107720> (accessed April 8, 2015).

candidate Beji Caïd Essebsi was elected President, leading some foreign policy experts to label Tunisia as a “Light unto the Arab nations.”¹² However, Tunisia’s political success merely presents a window of opportunity that could quickly melt into chaos if the new government is unable to adequately provide security and implement economic reform. The World Bank outlined Tunisia’s next hurdle in a May 2014 economic report titled “The Unfinished Revolution,” which describes three major initiatives to realize Tunisian economic potential: remove the onshore-offshore economic division, remove the dichotomy between the coast and the interior, and fix segmentation of the labor market.¹³

However, these reforms cannot be realized if Tunisian security does not permit economic investment. Recent attacks by the Islamic State have threatened foreign investment and the tourism industry, highlighting the importance of security as a prerequisite for economic prosperity. Therefore, Tunisia is essentially at a crossroads where political reform meets potential economic reform. If Tunisia can strengthen its security capacity in this one to two year window in order to realize the potential of economic reform, then this thesis proposes it will translate to better regional security and sustainable political outcomes. Data from the BPC predictive analysis document supports this argument.

The level that U.S. and Tunisian goals are mutually supporting is at an all-time high with Nidaa Tounes in control as the ruling party. Both countries are committed to combating terrorism, free-market capitalism, and democratic government, therefore this

¹² The Economist, “The Relative Success of Tunisia - A Light unto the Arab nations,” October 25, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21627622-tunisia-works-it-fragile-rest-world-should-give-it-hand-light-unto> (accessed April 8, 2015).

¹³ World Bank, “Tunisia Development Policy Review: The Unfinished Revolution,” http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/09/16/000456286_20140916144712/Rendered/PDF/861790DPR0P12800Box385314B00PUBLIC0.pdf (accessed April 8, 2015).

criterion is assessed as “high.” While world-wide governance indicators are in the average range globally, they are well above average for Africa, with governmental effectiveness rated in the 55th percentile and control of corruption in the 54th percentile producing an overall value of 2.20. Additionally, Tunisia’s absorptive capacity (relative to counter-terrorism training, equipment, and sustainment) is high due to Tunisia’s existing training programs, infrastructure and governmental administration capacity. Tunisia spends 2% of its GDP on military expenditures which is normal for a country of its size, leading to the final criterion, financial commitment of the United States. Currently rated as extremely low, U.S. foreign aid to Tunisia is \$13.59/person. Therefore, since other factors are relatively high and positive, increasing U.S. security and economic aid would move Tunisia from the “moderate” to “high” likelihood of success range in achieving sustainable security outcomes. In summary, Tunisian goals are aligned with U.S. goals, and Tunisian governmental effectiveness is relatively high which increases its absorptive capacity. Therefore, a window of opportunity exists to strengthen security and implement economic reform, which could be facilitated by an increased U.S. financial commitment to build Tunisian partner capacity. The risk in this case is not acting soon enough, allowing the Islamic State and Libyan based foreign fighters to degrade security, or not implementing economic reform in accordance with the guidelines from the World Bank, which could exacerbate tensions between the coastal (northern) and interior (southern) populations.¹⁴

¹⁴ See Appendix 6: Tunisia BPC Predictive Analysis Document

Chapter 8: Conclusion and Recommendations

While policy-makers are often quick to request military options to deal with emerging crises, military planners and policy-makers should better understand the conditions under which Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance are most effective in building partnership capacity. FID/SFA are attractive alternatives to a nation weary of combat operations, but throwing money at building partner capacity without a comprehensive whole of government approach is unlikely to produce sustainable political outcomes. Reluctant partners, reticent to make the necessary governmental reforms to address the root causes of instability, should either not receive assistance or receive incremental assistance conditioned upon progress toward internationally recognized *standards*.

While representative, democratic government may be the U.S. ideal, FID/SFA does not require this form of government – only an acceptable level of governmental effectiveness and control of corruption according to international standards espoused by the World Bank and United Nations. Once established, the United States and partner nation should define and agree upon goals for partnering activities. Goals that do not align should be tabled for later consideration, allowing the opportunity for initial partnering toward the most immediate objectives and the opportunity to build trust at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Next, the remaining factors should be considered – the level of partner nation and U.S. commitment and the absorptive capacity of the partner nation. Tactical training, while positive, is merely one component of the evaluation process. The support and maintenance of the partnering force is an essential

component of long-term viability. Areas of weakness will likely require mitigation by both the United States and the partner nation.

For example, Exercise Flintlock is an annual Special Operations exercise in North-West Africa designed to increase the counter-terrorism proficiency of African Partner Nations as part of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program. Flintlock is an excellent way to train tactical forces how to shoot weapons and conduct basic movement techniques. Additionally, the exercise attempts to improve operational proficiency at the Joint Task Force level by training the host nation to establish and operate a combined/joint headquarters. At the strategic level, Exercise Flintlock is designed to increase regional stability by synchronizing partner nation efforts to combat terrorism. While well intentioned, the exercise and the U.S. approach in the region, needs an operational and strategic recalibration.

First, in strategic priority, consider that one F35 fighter aircraft costs more money to build (\$101 million) than the entire seven year budget for the TSCTP (\$100 million).¹ If the United States is serious about building partner capacity to better secure its interests, greater expenditures are required, but should be targeted to achieve sustainable progress along a 20-30 year growth plan. Second, the U.S. ambassadors to the African host nation(s) should provide diplomatic pressure on the African government(s) to promote governmental reform, to include greater ethnic representation in the African military force(s). David Gutelius from Johns Hopkins University testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stating,

¹ James Fallows, "The Tragedy of the American Military," *The Atlantic*, January 2015, <http://www.theatlantic.com/personal/archive/2014/12/the-atlantic-the-tragedy-of-the-american-military-james-fallows-asks-why-the-best-soldiers-in-the-world-keep-losing/384087/> (accessed January 7, 2015).

From the beginning in 2003, key Tamashek and Arab populations were largely left out of PSI-sponsored activities, exacerbating the long-standing ill will between these groups and the national governments of Niger and Mali. This fact, combined with the rhetoric U.S. officials and their local allies used at the time very quickly brought out older tensions and suspicions, and linked them to the U.S. military.²

A military program that disenfranchises large segments of the population, breeds distrust toward the African and U.S. governments, enhances the ability of African nations to overthrow civilian authority, and suppresses internal opposition, is not in the best interests of the United States. Therefore, African partner nations should demonstrate some level of inclusivity and representativeness in their government and their military force to become eligible to participate in exercises such as Flintlock and to receive security force assistance.

Third, the current training efforts are analogous to the criticism of U.S. military policy in Vietnam – that the United States did not fight a ten-year war in Vietnam but rather fought ten one-year wars. Despite the valiant efforts of the skilled special operators leading training, there is little progression from year to year. In 2013, training culminated with a basic live fire exercise including an assault force and support-by-fire force. In 2014, the culmination exercise was even less complex, when trainers omitted the support-by-fire force due to concerns over potential fratricide. Four reasons help explain this lack of progression. The participating countries have real world security obligations in other regions and may send their premier forces to these peacekeeping or regional security missions. The host country has an obligation to secure the exercise area

² U.S. Congress, The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategies Across Africa’s Sahel Region,” (Washington DC: U.S. Senate, November 17, 2009), <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GuteliusTestimony091117a1.pdf> (accessed January 7, 2015).

and may use their best forces to do this task. The U.S./Western Partner nations rotate forces and may not be experienced with the previous iteration. And most importantly, there is no operational or strategic level progression plan that moves forward from year to year.

Finally, the training does not have strategic depth, because it is not sustainable after the exercise. While FID sustainment training has increased over the past two years, it is still inadequate and needs greater resourcing from the United States, western allies, and African partner nations. A regional commander in northern Niger commented in 2014 that his forces cannot sustain operations along the borders with Libya and Mali, because he cannot supply and maintain them over 30 days. As a consequence, VEOs and criminal networks wait for the military to refit, and then operate unimpeded for two weeks until the Nigerien security forces reoccupy their positions. During Flintlock, military planners focused on running the exercise tend to marginalize long-term sustainment objectives. As a result, European contractors funded via U.S. Contracting Command in Italy, provide much of the sustainment. This produces a short-term solution to logistics that provides little long-term benefit to the host nation other than the contracts let to build infrastructure. In defense of military planners, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) between the United States and African host nations are subject to corruption, as the African partner nations receive money but do not fulfill their obligations to provide clean fuel, functioning generators, or adequate transportation. Fulfillment of ACSA obligations therefore requires diplomatic pressure.

Two final points are important regarding FID and SFA. These are efforts to work with a partnered nation of choice. If conditions do not permit a U.S. investment, other

nations may be able and willing. After the 2012 coup in Mali for example, France increased partnered operations while the United States provided indirect assistance. Additionally, current plans to fund and equip security forces in and around Syria are unconventional warfare plans, not FID. The United States is training a select group of fighters to combat ISIL and potentially to overthrow the Assad government. While some of the same analysis explained in this thesis may prove useful for policy-makers and planners (e.g. absorptive capacity of the partnered force), Syria is different, because there is no existing government that controls the U.S. backed security force. Therefore, the conflict in Syria resides outside of the purview of this thesis.

However, the nature of the conflict in Syria continues to typify the operational environment in many of the areas under consideration for building partnership capacity. This thesis focused primarily on Africa, but the predictive analysis document is a tool with potential utility in any region. While both quantitative and qualitative, the document much like operational design, requires the planner to combine art and science into his or her approach for building partner capacity. *The document is not a short cut or a panacea to determine whether FID/SFA will succeed or fail, but rather it is an additional tool in the kit bag for planners and policy-makers to understand the operational environment with more clarity.* Most importantly, the document provides a starting point for the calculation of strategic and operational risk, so that ways and means can be weighed against desired end states. Through thoughtful analysis using the predictive analysis document, planners and policy-makers may be better equipped to synchronize the elements of national power to achieve sustainable political outcomes and ultimately a better peace.

Appendix 1: BPC Predictive Analysis Document

Mutually Supporting Goals & Objs

- 1) What are U.S. goals & objs regarding the partner nation security force?
 - 2) What are the PN goals and objs regarding its security force?
 - 3) What are the goals and objs of U.S. policy in the region?
 - 4) What are the goals and objs of the PN in the region?
 - 5) What does the U.S. characterize as the greatest threat in the PN country/ region?
 - 6) What does the PN consider the greatest threat to its security/ regional security?
 - 7) At what level of intensity does each country rate the previous threats?
 - 8) Subjectively, how mutually supporting are the overall goals and objectives of the U.S. and the partner nation?
- 1 = Extremely Low; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; 4 = High; 5 = Extremely High

Absorptive Capacity

Category	Grade (0-5)
Governmental admin.	
Infrastructure	
Maintenance	
Existing Training Programs	
Technological Sophistication	
Existing Doctrine/ SOPs	
Education of operators	
Total	
New Value (NV)	

29-35 = Extremely High (NV = 5)

22-28 = High (NV = 4)

15-21 = Moderate (NV = 3)

8-14 = Low (NV = 2)

0-7 = Extremely Low (NV = 1)

Governance Indicators

Indicator	Percentile
Voice/Accountability	
Pol. Stab./ Abs. Viol.	
Gov. Effectiveness	
Regulatory Quality	
Rule of Law	
Control of Corruption	
Total/ 6 = Avg	
New Value = Avg x 5	

Scale: 5 = Highest/ 0 = Lowest

Data from World Bank's World Governance Indicators Database

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc>

Financial Commitment of Partner Nation

Military spending as a % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

% GDP = numerical value for assessment

Financial Commitment of United States

U.S. total foreign aid/ Population = Aid per capita

Aid per capita x .029 = New Value for assessment

U.S. Foreign Aid Data (USAID):

<https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/>

Population Data (World Bank):

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

New Value from 0 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest)

Overall Assessment

21-25 = Extremely High

16-20 = High

11-15 = Moderate

6-10 = Low

0-5 = Extremely Low

Evaluation Criteria	Score
Mutually Supporting Objs	1 to 5
Governance Indicators	0 to 5
Absorptive Capacity	0 to 5
PN Financial Commitment	0 to 5
U.S. Financial Commitment	0 to 5
Total	1 to 25

Narrative to Accompany the BPC Predictive Analysis Document

Narrative describes the reasoning behind the quantitative and qualitative assessment and addresses areas of risk that could inhibit the ability to achieve sustainable security outcomes.

Appendix 2: Mali BPC Predictive Analysis Document

Mutually Supporting Goals & Objs

- 1) What are U.S. goals & objs regarding the partner nation security force?
- 2) What are the PN goals and objs regarding its security force?
- 3) What are the goals and objs of U.S. policy in the region?
- 4) What are the goals and objs of the PN in the region?
- 5) What does the U.S. characterize as the greatest threat in the PN country/ region?
- 6) What does the PN consider the greatest threat to its security/ regional security?
- 7) At what level of intensity does each country rate the previous threats?
- 8) Subjectively, how mutually supporting are the overall goals and objectives of the U.S. and the partner nation?

1 = Extremely Low; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; 4 = High; 5 = Extremely High

Absorptive Capacity

Category	Grade (0-5)
Governmental admin.	3
Infrastructure	3
Maintenance	1
Existing Training Programs	1
Technological Sophistication	1
Existing Doctrine/ SOPs	1
Education of operators	1
Total	11
New Value (NV)	2

29-35 = Extremely High (NV = 5)

22-28 = High (NV = 4)

15-21 = Moderate (NV = 3)

8-14 = Low (NV = 2)

0-7 = Extremely Low (NV = 1)

Governance Indicators

Indicator	Percentile
Voice/Accountability	.55
Pol. Stab./ Abs. Viol.	.56
Gov. Effectiveness	.32
Regulatory Quality	.36
Rule of Law	.45
Control of Corruption	.35
Total/ 6 = Avg	.43
New Value = Avg x 5	2.15

Scale: 5 = Highest/ 0 = Lowest

Data from World Bank's World Governance Indicators Database

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc>

Financial Commitment of Partner Nation

Military spending as a % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

1.5 % GDP = 1.5

Financial Commitment of U.S.

U.S. total foreign aid/ Population = Aid per capita

\$64,000,000/11,219,737 = \$5.00/ person

5.00 x .029 = .0145 = New Value

U.S. Foreign Aid Data (USAID):

<https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/>

Population Data (World Bank):

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

New Value from 0 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest)

Overall Assessment

21-25 = Extremely High

16-20 = High

11-15 = Moderate

6-10 = Low

0-5 = Extremely Low

Evaluation Criteria	Score
Mutually Supporting Objs	1
Governance Indicators	2.15
Absorptive Capacity	2
PN Financial Commitment	1.5
U.S. Financial Commitment	.0145
Total	6.795

Narrative to Accompany the Mali BPC Predictive Analysis Document (2002)

While Mali is a country of interest for the United States as a partner in the global war on terrorism, the country's government is an area of risk that is likely to impede progress. While the country recently conducted elections and peacefully transferred civilian power, Mali has increased its level of corruption, as public power is increasingly used for private gain. While Mali holds a low absorptive capacity, this can likely be overcome if the government institutes more corruption and education reform. The partner nation financial commitment while low is still on par with most developing countries. U.S. financial commitment is currently low, but it should be increased if the Malian government conducts governmental reform and controls corruption. The United States should make security force assistance and aid conditional on a Malian initiative to control corruption and provide transparency to both the United States as its partner nation and its citizenry. The citizens of Mali must benefit and perceive this benefit in order to prevent the escalation of ethnic and tribal tensions, most notably the Tuaregs in northern Mali. Finally, the U.S. should ensure that its goals to combat terrorism are nested with Mali's goals which may not be fully articulated to U.S. policy-makers. The United States and Mali cannot achieve their mutual security goals if U.S. security force assistance is misdirected to an elite few because of corruption.

Appendix 3: Niger BPC Predictive Analysis Document

Mutually Supporting Goals & Objs

- 1) What are U.S. goals & objs regarding the partner nation security force?
 - 2) What are the PN goals and objs regarding its security force?
 - 3) What are the goals and objs of U.S. policy in the region?
 - 4) What are the goals and objs of the PN in the region?
 - 5) What does the U.S. characterize as the greatest threat in the PN country/ region?
 - 6) What does the PN consider the greatest threat to its security/ regional security?
 - 7) At what level of intensity does each country rate the previous threats?
 - 8) Subjectively, how mutually supporting are the overall goals and objectives of the U.S. and the partner nation?
- 1 = Extremely Low; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; 4 = High; 5 = Extremely High

Absorptive Capacity

Category	Grade (0-5)
Governmental admin.	1
Infrastructure	2
Maintenance	2
Existing Training Programs	1
Technological Sophistication	1
Existing Doctrine/ SOPs	1
Education of operators	1
Total	9
New Value (NV)	2

29-35 = Extremely High (NV = 5)

22-28 = High (NV = 4)

15-21 = Moderate (NV = 3)

8-14 = Low (NV = 2)

0-7 = Extremely Low (NV = 1)

Governance Indicators

Indicator	Percentile
Voice/Accountability	.41
Pol. Stab./ Abs. Viol.	.38
Gov. Effectiveness	.19
Regulatory Quality	.25
Rule of Law	.27
Control of Corruption	.10
Total/ 6 = Avg	.27
New Value = Avg x 5	1.33

Scale: 5 = Highest/ 0 = Lowest

Data from World Bank's World Governance Indicators Database

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc>

Financial Commitment of Partner Nation

Military spending as a % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

1 % GDP = 1

Financial Commitment of U.S.

U.S. total foreign aid/ Population = Aid per capita

\$17,500,000/17,831,270 = \$.98/ person

.98 x .029 = .028 = New Value

U.S. Foreign Aid Data (USAID):

<https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/>

[Population Data \(World Bank\):](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL)

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

New Value from 0 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest)

Overall Assessment

21-25 = Extremely High

16-20 = High

11-15 = Moderate

6-10 = Low

0-5 = Extremely Low

Evaluation Criteria	Score
Mutually Supporting Objs	2
Governance Indicators	1.33
Absorptive Capacity	2
PN Financial Commitment	1
U.S. Financial Commitment	.028
Total	6.36

Narrative to Accompany the Niger BPC Predictive Analysis Document (2002)

Niger is a partner against violent extremist organizations such as AQIM, but does not consider AQIM their number one security threat. Instability from Boko Haram near the southern border is more threatening to the government, and Niger will likely direct any U.S. military aid to the southern border rather than the north. This may increase Tuareg discontent, as the northern Tuaregs already feel disenfranchised from the government. If Niger can increase political inclusivity and provide government services for its northern citizens, then it will likely remain stable. The Nigerien government will welcome security force assistance but will likely squander the aid if rampant corruption persists. U.S. financial commitment is currently low, and should remain low unless the operational environment changes and unless the Nigerien government increases governmental effectiveness and controls corruption.

Appendix 4: Yemen BPC Predictive Analysis Document

Mutually Supporting Goals & Objs

- 1) What are U.S. goals & objs regarding the partner nation security force?
 - 2) What are the PN goals and objs regarding its security force?
 - 3) What are the goals and objs of U.S. policy in the region?
 - 4) What are the goals and objs of the PN in the region?
 - 5) What does the U.S. characterize as the greatest threat in the PN country/ region?
 - 6) What does the PN consider the greatest threat to its security/ regional security?
 - 7) At what level of intensity does each country rate the previous threats?
 - 8) Subjectively, how mutually supporting are the overall goals and objectives of the U.S. and the partner nation?
- 1 = Extremely Low; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; 4 = High; 5 = Extremely High

Absorptive Capacity

Category	Grade (0-5)
Governmental admin.	0
Infrastructure	3
Maintenance	1
Existing Training Programs	1
Technological Sophistication	1
Existing Doctrine/ SOPs	1
Education of operators	1
Total	8
New Value (NV)	2

29-35 = Extremely High (NV = 5)

22-28 = High (NV = 4)

15-21 = Moderate (NV = 3)

8-14 = Low (NV = 2)

0-7 = Extremely Low (NV = 1)

Governance Indicators

Indicator	Percentile
Voice/Accountability	.11
Pol. Stab./ Abs. Viol.	.02
Gov. Effectiveness	.12
Regulatory Quality	.24
Rule of Law	.12
Control of Corruption	.09
Total/ 6 = Avg	.12
New Value = Avg x 5	.60

Scale: 5 = Highest/ 0 = Lowest

Data from World Bank's World Governance Indicators Database

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc>

Financial Commitment of Partner Nation

Military spending as a % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

2.9 % GDP = 2.9

Financial Commitment of United States

U.S. total foreign aid/ Population = Aid per capita

\$258,500,000/24,407,381 = \$10.59/ person

10.59 x .029 = .31 = New Value

U.S. Foreign Aid Data (USAID):

<https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/>

Population Data (World Bank):

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

New Value from 0 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest)

Overall Assessment

21-25 = Extremely High

16-20 = High

11-15 = Moderate

6-10 = Low

0-5 = Extremely Low

Evaluation Criteria	Score
Mutually Supporting Objs	3
Governance Indicators	.60
Absorptive Capacity	2
PN Financial Commitment	2.9
U.S. Financial Commitment	.31
Total	8.81

Narrative to Accompany the Yemen BPC Predictive Analysis Document (2015)

Yemeni governmental capacity is extremely low, grading at the bottom 2% of all countries for political stability/absence of violence and the bottom 9% for control of corruption. Just as critical, lack of governmental administration, a key component of absorptive capacity, would greatly hinder future efforts to build security capacity. Assuming the government retained the ability to administer resources, historical financial commitment by Yemen is moderate and generally positive at nearly 3% of GDP. U.S. financial commitment to Yemen scores at \$10.59/person, but is still extremely low. However, committing additional resources to Yemen in the midst of a coup, without first generating governmental stability and reform is inadvisable. The first step after the initial crisis should be solidifying governing capacity, and this requires a whole of government and multi-national approach with further assistance from the Gulf Cooperation Council via the National Dialogue Conference. Governmental development and reform should *precede* or occur *concurrently with* any military options that focus on building partner security capacity.

Appendix 5: Nigeria BPC Predictive Analysis Document

Mutually Supporting Goals & Objs

- 1) What are U.S. goals & objs regarding the partner nation security force?
 - 2) What are the PN goals and objs regarding its security force?
 - 3) What are the goals and objs of U.S. policy in the region?
 - 4) What are the goals and objs of the PN in the region?
 - 5) What does the U.S. characterize as the greatest threat in the PN country/ region?
 - 6) What does the PN consider the greatest threat to its security/ regional security?
 - 7) At what level of intensity does each country rate the previous threats?
 - 8) Subjectively, how mutually supporting are the overall goals and objectives of the U.S. and the partner nation?
- 1 = Extremely Low; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; 4 = High; 5 = Extremely High

Absorptive Capacity

Category	Grade (0-5)
Governmental admin.	1
Infrastructure	1
Maintenance	1
Existing Training Programs	3
Technological Sophistication	2
Existing Doctrine/ SOPs	3
Education of operators	1
Total	12
New Value (NV)	2

29-35 = Extremely High (NV = 5)

22-28 = High (NV = 4)

15-21 = Moderate (NV = 3)

8-14 = Low (NV = 2)

0-7 = Extremely Low (NV = 1)

Governance Indicators

Indicator	Percentile
Voice/Accountability	.27
Pol. Stab./ Abs. Viol.	.04
Gov. Effectiveness	.16
Regulatory Quality	.25
Rule of Law	.12
Control of Corruption	.09
Total/ 6 = Avg	.16
New Value = Avg x 5	.78

Scale: 5 = Highest/ 0 = Lowest

Data from World Bank's World Governance Indicators Database

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc>

Financial Commitment of Partner Nation

Military spending as a % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

1 % GDP = 1

Financial Commitment of United States

U.S. total foreign aid/ Population = Aid per capita

$\$335,900,000 / 173,615,345 = \$1.94 / \text{person}$

$1.94 \times .029 = .056 = \text{New Value}$

U.S. Foreign Aid Data (USAID):

<https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/>

Population Data (World Bank):

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

New Value from 0 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest)

Overall Assessment

21-25 = Extremely High

16-20 = High

11-15 = Moderate

6-10 = Low

0-5 = Extremely Low

Evaluation Criteria	Score
Mutually Supporting Objs	4
Governance Indicators	.78
Absorptive Capacity	2
PN Financial Commitment	1
U.S. Financial Commitment	.056
Total	7.84

Narrative to Accompany the Nigeria BPC Predictive Analysis Document (2015)

If the United States considers Nigerian security to be of vital interest to U.S. security, then efforts to build security capacity must be synchronized with governmental capacity and effectiveness. Specifically, U.S. assistance should be made conditional on Nigerian efforts to decrease governmental corruption (notably in northern provinces), at levels measurable by the world governance indicators, with diplomatic pressure applied by the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, the Secretary of State, and if required, the President. Next, establish a training and maintenance program for Nigerian security forces in northern Nigeria and sustain the effort with a specific financial commitment from the United States for these activities. As revenue for Nigeria decreased significantly with the reduction in oil prices, it is unrealistic to assume that Nigeria can increase its financial commitment above the current 1% of GDP. While U.S. financial commitment could increase, a more realistic approach is to focus current expenditures into programs and events that sustain training and maintenance. In summary, the United States should capitalize on the convergence of U.S. and Nigerian goals to combat Boko Haram, but the strategy to better secure Nigeria and the United States must address the following shortfalls regarding ways and means: 1) increase control of corruption by the Government of Nigeria; 2) increase training of Nigerian security forces in the utilization of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and 3) develop sustainable support packages for sustainment training and maintenance, likely funded by the United States or the international community.

Appendix 6: Tunisia BPC Predictive Analysis Document

Mutually Supporting Goals & Objs

- 1) What are U.S. goals & objs regarding the partner nation security force?
 - 2) What are the PN goals and objs regarding its security force?
 - 3) What are the goals and objs of U.S. policy in the region?
 - 4) What are the goals and objs of the PN in the region?
 - 5) What does the U.S. characterize as the greatest threat in the PN country/ region?
 - 6) What does the PN consider the greatest threat to its security/ regional security?
 - 7) At what level of intensity does each country rate the previous threats?
 - 8) Subjectively, how mutually supporting are the overall goals and objectives of the U.S. and the partner nation?
- 1 = Extremely Low; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; **4 = High**; 5 = Extremely High

Absorptive Capacity

Category	Grade (0-5)
Governmental admin.	3
Infrastructure	4
Maintenance	3
Existing Training Programs	4
Technological Sophistication	2
Existing Doctrine/ SOPs	4
Education of operators	3
Total	23
New Value (NV)	4

29-35 = Extremely High (NV = 5)

22-28 = High (NV = 4)

15-21 = Moderate (NV = 3)

8-14 = Low (NV = 2)

0-7 = Extremely Low (NV = 1)

Governance Indicators

Indicator	Percentile
Voice/Accountability	.45
Pol. Stab./ Abs. Viol.	.19
Gov. Effectiveness	.55
Regulatory Quality	.40
Rule of Law	.49
Control of Corruption	.54
Total/ 6 = Avg	.44
New Value = Avg x 5	2.20

Scale: 5 = Highest/ 0 = Lowest

Data from World Bank's World Governance Indicators Database

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc>

Financial Commitment of Partner Nation

Military spending as a % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

2.0 % GDP = **2.0**

Financial Commitment of U.S.

U.S. total foreign aid/ Population = Aid per capita

\$147,900,000/10,886,500 = \$13.59/ person

13.59 x .029 = **.39** = New Value

U.S. Foreign Aid Data (USAID):

<https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/>

Population Data (World Bank):

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

New Value from 0 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest)

Overall Assessment

21-25 = Extremely High

16-20 = High

11-15 = Moderate

6-10 = Low

0-5 = Extremely Low

Evaluation Criteria	Score
Mutually Supporting Objs	4
Governance Indicators	2.2
Absorptive Capacity	4
PN Financial Commitment	2.0
U.S. Financial Commitment	.39
Total	12.59

Narrative to Accompany the Tunisia BPC Predictive Analysis Document (2015)

The level that U.S. and Tunisian goals are mutually supporting is at an all-time high with Nidaa Tounes in control as the ruling party. Both countries are committed to combating terrorism, free-market capitalism, and democratic government, therefore this criterion is assessed as “high.” While world-wide governance indicators are in the average range globally, they are considered well above average for Africa, with governmental effectiveness rated in the 55th percentile and control of corruption in the 54th percentile producing an overall value of 2.20. Additionally, Tunisia’s absorptive capacity (relative to counter-terrorism training, equipment, and sustainment) is considered high due to Tunisia’s existing training programs, infrastructure and governmental administration capacity. Tunisia spends 2% of its GDP on military expenditures which is normal for a country of its size, leading to the final criterion, financial commitment of the United States. Currently rated as extremely low, U.S. foreign aid to Tunisia is \$13.59/person. Therefore, since other factors are relatively high and positive, increasing U.S. security and economic aid would move Tunisia from the “moderate” to “high” likelihood of success range in achieving sustainable security outcomes. In summary, Tunisian goals are aligned with U.S. goals, and Tunisian governmental effectiveness is relatively high which increases its absorptive capacity. Therefore, a window of opportunity exists to strengthen security and implement economic reform, which could be facilitated by an increased U.S. financial commitment to build Tunisian partner capacity. The risk in this case is not acting soon enough, allowing the Islamic State and Libyan based foreign fighters to degrade security, or not implementing economic reform in accordance with the guidelines from the World Bank, which could exacerbate tensions between the coastal (northern) and interior (southern) populations.

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VITA

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