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**CIVIL SOCIETY IN NIGERIA: REASONS FOR
INEFFECTIVENESS**

by

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March 2015

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CIVIL SOCIETY IN NIGERIA: REASONS FOR INEFFECTIVENESS

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria has experienced high economic growth over the last 15 years. Hailed as the “Giant of Africa,” the *Economist* confirmed in 2014 that Nigeria had the largest gross domestic product in the continent. Yet, after more than a decade of sustained growth using international metrics of measurement, the country has exhibited dismal performance across multiple measures of development, security, and democratic governance due to the mismanagement of its economic resources. The majority of Nigerians attest to this in successive Afrobarometer Network and Transparency International surveys conducted between 2008 and 2014. This thesis acknowledges these facts but draws the reader into an equally important exploration of the role of the masses and civil society in engendering democratic governance. The underlying premise is that civil society can play a role in facilitating representative governance, especially as it relates to service delivery and the Nigerian populace’s security. The thesis posits that civil society has been handicapped in its ability to fulfill this charter for three distinct reasons: weakened traditional institutions; lack of social capital and trust between the masses, civil society, and the state; and the detrimental impact of a primarily oil- and mineral-based economic model. These factors all hinder the government’s willingness to work toward the best interest of the society as a whole.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Action Congress
AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council
AG	Action Group
AMHiN	Accountability for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health in Nigeria
APC	All Progressive Congress
ATAP	Agriculture Transformation Action Plan
CDHR	Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
CLO	Civil Liberties Organization
CPROA	Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act
CSO	Civil Society organizations
CSRC	Civil Society Regulatory Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GONGO	Government-Owned NGO
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
ICAN	Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria
ICNL	International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practice Commission
IHDI	Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
ING	Interim National Government
LGC	Local Government Councils
MDF	Media Democratic Forum
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MKSS	Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
NANS	National Association of Nigerian Students
NAPP	National Association of Patriotic Professionals
NBA	Nigerian Bar Association
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NEC	National Electorate Commission
NEPAD	New Action Plan for Africa Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHA	National Health Account
NLC	Nigeria Labor Congress
NMA	Nigerian Medical Association
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NRC	National Republican Convention
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
PMNCH	Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRIA	Participatory Research in Asia

RGI	Resource Governance Index
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SOTU	State of the Union
TAGI	Transparent and Accountable Governance Index
TI	Transparency International
TUC	Trade Union Congress
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WIN	Women in Nigeria
YEAA	Youth Earnestly Asking for Abacha

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Ebola crisis and the kidnapping of girls and expanding persecution and murder of thousands by the terrorist group Boko Haram highlight the inability of the Nigerian state to deliver public goods such as security and health in an efficient manner. This is no surprise for Nigeria scholars, as poor governance and corruption have been characteristics of the Nigerian government since independence from Great Britain in 1960. Torn by political upheaval, the country has experienced multiple iterations of failed autocratic military and civilian regimes, ethno-religious conflict, and the siphoning of public funds, consigning many Nigerians to a daily struggle for survival in terms of their personal safety and basic needs. Professor Said Adejumobi posits that Nigeria vacillates between stunted and eroding democratic governance, as evidenced by trends showing acute “executive arrogation of power and a culture of impunity, institutional erosion, and welfare deficit.”¹ Across the board, good governance indicators such as horizontal and vertical accountability, transparency, rule of law, checks and balances, and active civil society are lacking.² Although a successful election and transition to civilian rule in 1999 was met with great hope and the promise of a new era of representative government, the state has yet to serve the population’s needs as expected in a democratic setting. In fact, increased violence suggests that the situation is getting worse.

This thesis explores why the Nigerian state, through its democratic system, has not been able to meet reasonable expectations of good governance. While the country suffers from a “resource curse” that, according to some theorists, disconnects the state from its citizenry, its resources have not translated into the relative egalitarian distribution of wealth seen in Gulf states such as Kuwait.³ This failure to convert revenue

¹ Said Adejumobi, *Governance and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria: Changes and Challenges* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 5.

² Wilfred L. David and Peggy A. David, “Resolving the African Development Cathexia: Empowerment of the People,” in *State and Society in Africa: Perspectives on Continuity and Change*, ed. Feraidoon Shams (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), 18.

³ Laura El-Katiri, Bassam Fattouh, and Paul Segal, “Anatomy of an Oil-Based Welfare State: Rent Distribution in Kuwait,” research paper, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance, and Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics and Political Science, Global Governance, January 2011, 1. www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/documents/Fattouh.pdf.

into development is attributed to Nigeria's comparative lack of management of resource income⁴ and further pushes the question of why the democratically elected government, which gains its legitimacy from representation, does not reflect public need. The deterioration of governance in Nigeria cannot be overstated. The annual failed-state index produced by the Fund for Peace in collaboration with *Foreign Policy* magazine generates a national-ranking score that is a compilation of 12 governance indicators ranging from human rights and rule of law to public-service distribution, security apparatuses, and economic decline. Grouped into three categories (economic, political, and social), the index depicts a steady decline in Nigeria's rating—from 22 in 2006 to 14 in 2012.⁵ Why is the state failing to meet its legitimizing objective? Democratic theory argues that the state responds to civil society. Civil society, then, is the tool that shapes state behavior. Thus, the question is why Nigerian civil society has been limited in this context, unable to pressure the state into responding to public needs.

This thesis studies the relationship between Nigerian civil society and the Nigerian state to determine why the civil society is unable to pressure the government into better representation. What are the missing relationships and linkages between these two entities that might promote institutional accountability and better representation? A number of theories are posited on the methods, tools, and elements required to engender good governance: parliamentary development, a free press, judicial autonomy, and an active civil society, to name a few. In reality, these component pieces of the solution ignore that Nigeria is missing some fundamental elements required to be in place for an effective civil society and state relationship. This thesis argues that the current civil society is unable to effectively reflect the needs of the citizenry or is insufficient in its ability to organize and make an impact on governance. Nigeria is a paradox when one considers the resources and potential at the country's disposal, such as its wealth-producing capacity, raw materials, human resources, and international position. The primary question of why this is the case drives this research. This thesis also provides a

⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁵ Failed States Index, Fund for Peace, <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-11-14-fs-failedstatesindex2011-1106p.pdf>; Failed States Index Trends Over Time, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi12-trends>.

comparative study of India, which has a similar legacy but has managed to achieve a more representative government due to pressures from a very vibrant civil society.

A. THE MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Examining why Nigerian civil society has not succeeded in pressuring the state to respond to public need, this thesis looks at the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in promoting institutional integrity and good governance. How effective have CSOs been at improving political accountability and weak institutions in Nigeria? Using India as a comparison, what lessons can be gleaned for improving CSO resiliency and effectiveness? Ultimately, transparency and accountability are foundational elements that, coupled with a rule of law meted out by an impartial justice system, improve governance and consolidate democracy within a country.⁶ What is hindering the ability of Nigerian CSOs to promote responsive governance?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Arguably, the greatest challenges for developing countries are endemic corruption, poor governance, and the debilitating effects that ripple through all aspects of existence when such detractors are in play. Economists and social scientists have wrestled with the causes, ramifications, and ameliorations of these problems for years. The ongoing tragedy of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the growing death toll from Ebola in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of which Nigeria is the lead nation, underscore the failure of governance in Nigeria.⁷ Rampant corruption has rendered the government incapable of meeting the basic socioeconomic needs of more than half the population, creating an environment in which extremism flourishes. Reports of the Nigerian military and police forces' botched attempts to protect affected citizens are widespread. An inability to locate and counter the predations of the terrorist group Boko Haram, which has caused over 6,000 fatalities

⁶ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5.

⁷ Blair Glencorse and Brooks Marmon, "The Cure for Ebola is Accountability: Africa's Ebola Outbreak Isn't Just a Healthcare Problem. It's Also about a Crisis of Governance," *Foreign Policy*, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/14/the_cure_for_ebola_is_accountability.

from 2009 to 2014 and kidnapped hundreds of girls,⁸ points to the ineptitude of the state in managing resources and providing basic security.⁹ As in the Ebola crisis, these problems further expose the inability of affected countries to respond in a cohesive manner for the entire region—due to lack of capacity and overreliance on foreign aid.¹⁰ These recent examples highlight the catastrophic ramifications of high corruption and poor governance in ECOWAS countries—Nigeria specifically.

The legitimacy of any democratic government generally stems from the participation of opposing sides in free and fair elections.¹¹ Democratic governance is seen as an ideal that incorporates a regime, the public realm, and citizens into a relationship that conceptually balances all parts.¹² However, according to democratic theory, democratization takes place over time and is fraught with problems. For developing nations, democratization is a double-edged sword. As Jack Snyder asserts, democratization without a foundation of “strong civic institutions” often leads to conflict as developing states “struggle to deal with the challenges of military security, economic growth, and popular participation in politics.”¹³ Nigeria embodies this dilemma. After four republics, the failure to establish strong institutions that function across ethnic divisions continues to threaten Nigeria’s stability. Meanwhile, the nationalism that fueled the push for independence has long since petered out.

Furthermore, despite substantial income from commodity-based resources and the development potential often associated with access to such wealth, the country’s dismal poverty level is palpable. Instead of institutionalizing services, political actors have institutionalized a gross abuse of power, resulting in corruption that has bled the national

⁸ “Terrorism in Nigeria: The Threat from Boko Haram and Ansaru,” (London: Henry Jackson Society, 2014), 6, <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Nigeria-Boko-Haram-Strategic-Briefing.pdf>.

⁹ Ibid, 17–20.

¹⁰ Glencorse and Marmon, “Cure for Ebola.”

¹¹ Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 12.

¹² Phillippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is...and Is Not,” *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 3 (Summer 1991):76.

¹³ Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: WW Norton, 2000), 266.

coffers and fostered a chronically unresponsive administrative system and a security and service morass that threaten the stability of the entire West African region.

This thesis examines how the citizen, as a participant in civil society, can facilitate government responsiveness to the needs of the population. Is it possible, through education and training, to strengthen a society's ability to demand transparency and accountability? What is the status of civil organizations in Nigeria, and what institutions are needed to improve the effectiveness of those civil organizations? Ancillary questions include: What role do citizens (the masses) and civil associations have in engendering change *between* election periods—that is, beyond periodically voting? Do citizens understand their role in the system? If not, why not? Understanding and fulfilling this role is central in the argument that civic participation somehow correlates to good governance.¹⁴

The Western model of democracy has always been held as an ideal construct for democratic representation, especially the idea that the citizens are the fundamental rulers of a nation and have the power to mandate change. Phillippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl state, “Citizens are the most distinctive element of democracies. All regimes have rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they are democracies do they have citizens.”¹⁵ In this thesis, *civil society* is understood to be the free association of citizens as they organize and police the officials they elected to execute public duties. If officials represent the people, then citizens should have certain responsibilities when these proxies fail to act in their best interests. As simple as that seems, countless examples spanning all forms of regimes illustrate the challenges citizens face in effecting improvements in governance from elected officials.

An example of the challenges Nigeria faces is inadequate funding of the medical system. The humanitarian issues associated with a limited medical infrastructure and inadequate medical staff severely handicapped the regional response to Ebola. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) tracks and ranks 187 countries across

¹⁴ Pierre Englebert, *State Legitimacy and Development in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 1.

¹⁵ Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is,” 77.

three basic factors of human development: “a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living.”¹⁶ Nigeria’s rank and human development index (HDI) has consistently fallen in the low development category. With a 2012 ranking of 153, Nigeria is comparable to Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which ranked 173 and 186, respectively.¹⁷ The sustained mismanagement of funds is a direct cause of Nigeria’s high poverty levels, low life expectancies, and comparatively low rankings.

These administrative challenges also reinforce ethnic and religious tensions, as manifested by the ineptness with which security problems like Boko Haram and the Niger Delta terrorists are handled.¹⁸ These insurgencies provide safe havens for the broader terrorist and Al Qaeda movements and inflict permanent instability in the region, which threatens development as the peoples’ focus on securing their basic personal safety precludes their ability to invest in progress and discourages foreign investment.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

Nigeria’s confluence of problems frustrates its ability to fulfill administrative duties and provide effective services and national security. The weakness of current institutions; pervasive, economically devastating corruption; and the deadly terrorist attacks of Boko Haram throughout the country stem from entrenched issues. Three reasons for these problems are posited here. First, the traditional governing institutions that were directly connected to the people were systematically coopted by the state, creating a vacuum of linkages between the state and civil society that were not replaced. The precolonial traditional leadership roles ranging from policy shaping and service execution to justice and accountability have been marginalized by colonial and postcolonial national practices.¹⁹ The current manifestation of traditional institutions is

¹⁶ UNDP, *2013 Human Development Report*, <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/NGA.pdf>.

¹⁷ Ibid. Table B, Nigeria’s 2012 HDI indicators relative to other countries.

¹⁸ Janes HIS, “Nigerian Armed Forces: Security Assessment,” www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html.

¹⁹ Daniel A. Tonwe and Osa Osemwota, “Traditional Rulers and Local Government in Nigeria: A Pathway to Resolving the Challenge,” *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance* 13/14 (November 2013): 131, <http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/cjlg/article/viewFile/3728/3869>.

weak and highly entrenched along ethnic lines, which is a reflection of a weak state. This poses a significant problem because it erodes the foundation of trust required to form inter- and intra-communal cooperation and to build a strong civil society that will be able to hold its officials accountable.

Second, there is an endemic public trust deficiency across all institutions, including the military, which again has prevented the development of a civil-state relationship. This lack of trust came from factors such as decades of failed leadership and broken promises from civilian and military leaders, historically regionalized politics (pre- and post-independence), alienation of minority ethnic groups throughout each of four republics, and prolonged (predatory) military interventions that failed to correct the injustices of previous civilian administrations and further entrenched ethnic divisions, to name a few. These elements have led to a high level of suspicion within religious or ethnic groups and have frustrated the ability of civil society groups to work in a cohesive manner to advocate for change.

Finally, the resource curse has further reinforced the disconnection between the state and its citizens and precludes the proper resourcing to develop a truly representative civil society and responsive state administration. Citizens feel completely disconnected from a political system that is wholly funded through oil and commodity income versus a tax-based system. Nigeria is a rentier state, and corruption has been systematically institutionalized by political actors over the course of four republics and 30 years of military rule. More than any other, the 1985–1993 regime of General Ibrahim Babangida is regarded as the period during which corruption permeated every aspect of life and destroyed the educational and intellectual base—the remaining bastion of opportunity for civic leadership.²⁰ Under Babangida, the military was delegitimized as a potential tool for resolving or arbitrating issues in democratic governance.²¹ Additionally, aided by the internationally mandated structural adjustment programs (SAPs),

²⁰ Wale Adebaniwi, *Authority Stealing: Anti-Corruption War and Democratic Politics in Post-Military Nigeria* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2012), 34.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

Babangida destroyed the nascent middle-class, decimated the cottage industries, ravaged three decades of careful intellectual husbandry, and had swollen the war-chests of a brigand military caste who today constitute a terrifying menace to fledgling democracy.²²

Nigeria's economic model is harmful to all aspects of life in the country and is not conducive to developing civil society. Civil society requires an equitable tax-based system that fosters vertical and horizontal accountability.

This study hypothesizes that the erosion of traditional institutions as a means of social accountability, the lack of public trust, and the rentier-state economic model are contributory factors to the inability of CSOs to effectively organize and pressure the Nigerian government to provide security and services for its citizens.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on civil society is extensive and generally falls into three broad functional categories: first, as an alternative to the state; second, as a supporter or ally to the state; and third, as a counterbalance to the state and its policies. The concept of civil society is uniquely Western in origin and, as a result, requires historical and contextual amplification when applied to postcolonial developing nations. Specifically, the unique circumstances surrounding India's and Nigeria's traditional societies before and during colonization, both countries' quests for independence, and the characteristics of the period following independence provide context for discussing how CSOs may be used to foster democratic governance.

1. Defining Civil Society

The underlying issue of multiplicity in defining civil society was studied in its early European context by philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Charles de Montesquieu, and Alexis de Tocqueville in terms of civil society's relationship to the state. Larry Diamond offers a resonant definition of civil society for this research and provides a list of attributes found in societies that conform to his definition. Diamond defines civil society as:

²² Ibid., 34.

the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, autonomous from the State, and bound by the legal order or set of shared rules... It involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the State, and hold State officials accountable. It is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the State.²³

He lists the characteristics of civil societies as follows:

1. An organized civil society serves as a check against the excesses of government, human-rights violations, and abuse of the rule of law and monitors the application of constitutional provisions.
2. It increases the participation and the skills of all the various segments of a society and instills a sense of tolerance, thrift, hard work, moderation, and compromise among the various competing parties in the society.
3. It serves as an alternative to political parties and can offer a refuge for those who are shut out from their rights due to non-membership in given political parties.
4. It serves to enhance the bargaining power of interest groups and provides inclusive mechanisms for them.
5. It has a role in mitigating the excesses of fundamentalist extremists and maximalists who tend to have a very narrow view of life, in the context of either/or. It thus also provides other alternatives for negotiation within a multifaceted society.²⁴

By contrast, authors such as Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato define civil society in terms of different spheres of association. They make a point of delineating the need to keep political society and economic society as separate but correlated components with which civil society is juxtaposed.²⁵

²³ Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 3 (July 1994): 4–7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 9–10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, x–xi.

a. *Civil Society as an Alternative to the State (Irrespective of Regime)*

The historical origins of the concept of civil society stem from Western ideas of transforming the postcommunist society. In *Civil Society: History and Possibilities*, Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani present a compilation of studies that addresses the manner in which a postcommunist society interacts with the state—especially in terms of the development of autonomous institutions of “all spheres of social life... outside the jurisdiction of the State.”²⁶ Besides the civil development of the postcommunist society, the compilation also explores the room for these new associational movements as a vehicle for “radical democratic aspirations.”²⁷

According to Kaviraj and Khilnani, contemporary discussions of civil society vis-à-vis Third World societies would best correspond to the 19th-century early industrialization period in Western societies. On this assumption, Khilnani addresses the developmental context of civil societies, placing both geographic spaces on an equal footing rooted in the “reorganization of their societies around the power of the modern State”²⁸ and defining associated developmental metrics and standards. In Africa in particular, the failure of many modern states to materialize has created a situation where some governments are unable to project influence, capability, or capacity beyond their immediate geographic (office) spaces. In this context, civil society is usually externally funded and primarily a service delivery agent.

In Africa, civil-society entities tend to be backed by foreign aid and fill the void that inefficient states leave in meeting the basic needs of their citizenry and alleviating crippling poverty.²⁹ In this role, CSOs literally fulfill the function of the state; hence, becoming an alternative for providing public good. According to Paulos Milkias, this observation goes hand in hand with the prevailing mission of most non-governmental

²⁶ Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, *Civil Society: History and Possibilities* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 6.

²⁹ Gayle Allard and Candace A. Martinez, *The Influence of Government Policy and NGOs on Capturing Private Investment* (OECD Global Forum on International Investment: 27–28 March 2008), www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40400836.pdf.

organizations (NGOs) to improve the stunted development-centric needs of people; e.g. health, education, and welfare.³⁰ Gayle Allard and Candace Martinez refer to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics that support the argument that CSOs are a vehicle for service delivery:

The funds that industrialized economies channeled through NGOs rose from 0.2% of their total bilateral official development aid (ODA) in 1970 to 17% in 1996. In Africa, by 1994 already 12% of foreign ODA was being funneled to the region through NGOs, and the number has continued to rise. Transfers of official developed-country aid to NGOs in 2006 totaled more than \$2bn of total ODA, about 123% more than in 2002.³¹

These NGOs and CSOs focused on humanitarian assistance and development have a rich history in Nigeria, which ranges from Canadian-sponsored sustainable agriculture promotion in specific states within Nigeria to Action Aid International that provides HIV/AIDS education and treatment. In most cases, these foreign aid sources have provided significant relief for the local populace but at the expense of retarding the Nigerian government's willingness and urgency to develop similar capabilities to support its constituents.³² This is further detailed in Chapter IV of this thesis.

b. Civil Society as a Component of the State

A second perspective on the nature of civil society is based on the idea that civil society is a key sector in the governance equation—what some researchers consider the fifth pillar of open democracy. Similarly, Guillermo O'Donnell posits that a consolidated democracy has both horizontal and vertical accountability because it has gone through the institutional reforms that

improve the representative functions of democratic governance by strengthening political parties and their linkages to social groups, reducing fragmentation in the party system, enhancing the autonomous capacity and

³⁰ Paulos Milkias, "The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Ethiopia," A paper presented at the Ethiopian American Council Conference hosting the Honorable Anna Gomes, European Union M.P. on the theme "Protecting the Democratic Rights of the Ethiopian People: Reflections and Next Steps," held in Los Angeles, California, on July 2, 2006, http://ethiomediamedia.com/carepress/author_paulos.pdf.

³¹ Allard and Martinez, *Influence of Government Policy*, 4.

³² Ibid.

public accountability of legislatures and local governments, and *invigorating civil society*.³³

Steven Friedman argues that organized civil society is a tool for consolidating and strengthening democracy because it encourages the organization and participation of citizens, but he cautions against limiting that participation solely to CSOs. Friedman alludes to the pitfall of assuming that citizens can be represented through the civil-society paradigm only.³⁴

Acknowledging the benefits of civil society in helping educate and coalesce citizenship and nationalism, Daniel Hammett presents civil society as a Western concept that provides a viable tool for Africans. He asserts that organizing to promote citizen demands is not necessarily oppositional toward the state. He frames civil society as a multifaceted tool that can be molded to represent any heterogeneous society in working with the state or contesting political powers.³⁵ In this paradigm, civil society can fall prey to cooptation by the state. But it can also be used to project the value of heterogeneity and nationalism and to knit together the diverse interests active in public life. Evidence of this type of CSO was common during transitions between military and civilian regimes during the turbulent years of the 1980s and 1990s. New civilian authorities often created unions, truth and commission agencies, antigraft commissions, and other agencies with the premise of creating space for civil-state dialogue, action, and development. In almost all cases, these agencies are eventually coopted into the patronage stream. This is further detailed in Chapter IV.

³³ Larry Diamond, et al., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), xviii.

³⁴ Steven Friedman, "Beneath the Surface: Civil Society and Democracy after Polokwane," in *Testing Democracy: Which Way is South Africa Going?* Edited by Neeta Misra-Dexter and Judith February (Cape Town, South Africa: Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), 2010), 117–141.

³⁵ Daniel Hammett, "Civil Society and The Politics of Belonging in Southern Africa," in *The Handbook of Civil Society in Africa*, ed. Ebenezer Obadare, (New York: Springer, 2014), 125–142, doi: 10.1007/978-1-9614-8262-8_9.

c. Civil Society as a Counterbalance to the State

Civil society can also serve as a pure critic of the state. It can function as an oppositional watchdog that slants toward presenting a counterpoint to state actions. While this third perspective occasionally has undertones of the previous perspective, it primarily centers on the capabilities and capacity of civil society within the modern authoritarian construct. In this context, Stephen Ndegwa is among those who argue that CSOs, including NGOs, are charged with opposing “undemocratic governments and furthering and consolidating democracy.”³⁶ In this respect, the role of civil society is beyond filling the service void left by the state. Studies by Naomi Chazan, John Harbeson, Michael Bratton, and others promote this argument that the primary function of CSOs is to drive change.³⁷ Writing mostly in the 1990s, these analysts look beyond the role of civil society during the immediate transitions from authoritarian rule. They contend that civil society is charged with not settling for half-formed democracies, but rather, with pushing to the farthest extent possible from a grassroots level to a mature, fully oppositional party system.³⁸

As previously mentioned, theorists such as Montesquieu advocated that civil society was necessary to counter tyrannical authoritarian dictums.³⁹ As a counterpoint, writing in 2003, Howard Wiarda considers the prevalence of nondemocratic regimes in sub-Saharan Africa and how those regimes so “limit, co-opt, weaken, or destroy all civil-society groups that they cannot themselves control.”⁴⁰ He presents a fairly gloomy picture of civil society’s ability to make gains on behalf of citizens and argues that the form of civil society that emerges under authoritarian regimes is one of “corporatism” or state-owned civil society.⁴¹

³⁶ Stephen N. Ndegwa, *The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996), 2.

³⁷ John Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 5.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 26.

⁴⁰ Howard J. Wiarda, *Civil Society: The American Model and Third World Development* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 47.

⁴¹ Ibid.

Rejecting Wiadra's pessimism, Marie Perinova offers a more hopeful assessment of the prospects of civil society in authoritarian regimes by conducting an analysis of China, Burma, and Vietnam.⁴² Perinova states that civil society can exist beyond a corporatist role in an authoritarian setting. The countries she studies operate in a space that allows the governments to "preserve the regime" and simultaneously allows "associations [to] use the available space to defend their self-defined interests and achieve their goals."⁴³ This unique balance of authoritarian and democratic features ultimately serves the important role of representing the people's interests. Optimistic as Perinova's analysis is, the underlying caveat is that all three countries examined are market-based open economies. The economic goals of each regime are ultimately the driving factor behind the gradual liberalization that civil society is able to achieve.

Once again, Nigeria's tendency to oscillate between civilian and military regimes during the 1980s and 1990s also provides examples of these types of CSOs. In cases where unions or media criticized civilian administrations or mobilized through strikes and walkouts, the administration tended to disestablish unions, federalize media outlets, and even arrest lead organizers. Chapters II and III provide further evidence of this type of CSO activity.

2. The Disconnect between the Citizen (the Masses), Civil Society, and the State in Nigeria

As posited earlier, civil society is frustrated in its ability to galvanize the citizenry and promote responsive government actions for three main reasons. First, traditional institutions have been destroyed or coopted; second, trust is lacking between ethnic and religious divisions; and third, the economic model is corrupt. All three elements are critical to civil society development.

⁴² Marie Perinova, "Civil Society in Authoritarian Regime: The Analysis of China, Burma and Vietnam," (Lund University Department of Political Science, 2005), 4-5, <https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1330580&fileId=1330581>.

⁴³ Ibid.

a. *Traditional Institutions Destroyed*

Margaret Peil describes traditional norms of precolonial Nigerian societies where “greetings” or gifts are associated with paying homage and providing a token when seeking a favor from an elder or chief.⁴⁴ This system was a foundational aspect of the hierarchical chain of command around which societal life and personal accountability was built. It formed the basis of the community structure. The chief or council of elders represented the structure for order and discipline—meting out justice, arbitrating, and ensuring security and care of the community. In *A History of Nigeria*, Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton detail the erosion of these traditional institutions in Nigeria, which started with the British occupation.⁴⁵ The period of “indirect rule” started in earnest soon after amalgamation in 1914. As a concept, the British chose this method based on the premise of maintaining the continuity of traditional societies and promoting stability as they embarked on a process of “political, economic, and social transformation in Nigeria.”⁴⁶ In reality, this period of indirect rule is marked by the systemic alienation of “traditional authorities from their subject populations through their associations with the colonial regime.”⁴⁷

Both writers detail how the indigenous rulers who did not implement British colonial mandates were “ousted” and replaced with “more malleable replacements” between 1914 and 1929.⁴⁸ Further complicating this issue was the variance in application of British indirect rule in the Muslim caliphates in the north and the Ibo in the east, (these areas saw very limited British involvement), compared to the Yoruba land in the southwest (which had a significantly higher British involvement). This variance affected local awareness of regionalized politics and support for or opposition to independence.

⁴⁴ Margaret Peil, *Nigerian Politics: The People’s View* (London: Cassell, 1976), 53.

⁴⁵ Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 112.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 111.

The variance is also still evident in contemporary disputes for autonomy and the uneven administration that exists within the geographical boundaries.⁴⁹

Where existing institutions survived colonialism, and in cases where citizens relied on local councils for problem resolution or as a conduit for resources and other administrative solutions, the First Republic destroyed that connection. The persistent political interference of deposing or investigating local community councils ultimately broke the trust citizens had in those institutions.⁵⁰ Today, most traditional authorities are ceremonial in nature and often appointed by contemporary politicians who then use the connection to validate their legitimacy as members of a particular ethnic group—primarily for mobilizing electoral votes. Being coopted by the administration renders these traditional institutions ineffective as a source for civic mobilization to challenge the establishment.

b. Public Trust Deficiency

Trust deficit spans historically regionalized politics (pre- and post-independence), alienation of minority ethnic groups throughout each of four republics, and prolonged and predatory military interventions that failed to correct the injustices of previous civilian administrations and further entrenched ethnic divisions.

Peil lays out the context whereby “elites” that were in favor with the British administration in the 1940s and 1950s ultimately created an ethnic awareness and used it as a divisive tool that would reverberate throughout Nigerian history. She states,

Politicians seeking mass support found that only platforms based on local interests aroused any enthusiasm....in the first introduction of politics to the citizen, the medium itself dictated the style. Action Group leaders were also quick to find that they could best get Yoruba backing by focusing on anti-Ibo images. If the people were not concerned with domination by stranger, the politicians taught them that they should be.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ibid., 116–118.

⁵⁰ Peil, *Nigerian Politics*, 140.

⁵¹ Ibid., 74.

Political manipulation was critical to determine who would rule at independence, and by 1962 “it was clear that distribution of governmental power and resources (especially seats in parliament) was tied to population, and therefore informal means must be used to manipulate this bureaucratic imposition (as towns needed to be large enough to qualify for amenities).⁵² Regional power directly translated to federal power and was emphasized in the Constitution of the 1950s.⁵³ As a result, there was never any concerted effort to develop interregional associations.

The alienation felt by minority ethnic groups within the larger regional geographic areas caused even more complications, which eroded any semblance of unity and trust at the founding of the new nation and continue in the current political arena.⁵⁴ Regional fissures permeated the politics of the First Republic and tensions fed doubt as politicians took questionable actions to depict regional population growth—an effort to gain larger cuts of federal revenue-sharing profits. The census reports conducted in 1953 and 1963 were essentially a power struggle between the northern and the other regions and further eroded the trust of individual Nigerians in the new government’s political structure. Falola states, “The census crisis indicated to many Nigerians the extent to which governments in all regions were willing to lie and cheat in the pursuance of political power.”⁵⁵ That pursuit of power over people led to high levels of distrust that channeled down to the 1967 civil war and ushered in the military intervention.

The Nigerian military quickly proved to be another conduit of mistrust within society. Of the Nigerian military, Crawford Young discusses how the colonial practice of heavy recruitment from easy-to-control “hinterland communities such as the Tiv,”⁵⁶ based on the British divide-and-conquer tactics, would unfold in the 1966 military coups and subsequent Biafra civil war. While the military was heavily credited with salvaging a tenuous situation in its supervision of the post-Biafra reconciliation process, the young

⁵² Ibid., 97.

⁵³ Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 158.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 159.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 168.

⁵⁶ Crawford Young, *The Postcolonial State in Africa* (Madison, WI: Wisconsin University Press, 2012), 149.

military officers who made names for themselves during that period would later rise to the ranks of general officers, lead coups to take over the Nigerian state, and siphon off untold billions—all the while betraying the trust of the citizens. Young mentions Olusegun Obasanjo, Ibrahim Babangida, Yakubu Danjuma, and Shehu Yar’Adua as examples of contemporary military figures in the Nigerian political arena.⁵⁷ General Sani Abacha is an example of someone who spans both the trust deficit and the failed economic model. Over the period of a five-year dictatorship, he stole over \$4 billion in public funds after justifying his rise to power as an effort to root out the “incompetence, nepotism, atrocities,” and other sins of his predecessors.⁵⁸

Finally, Lanre Odeyemi also explains how the fear of religious domination by one group over the other continues to stoke the fire of mistrust by acts such as the introduction of the Shari’a legal system, which Christians in particular see as a violation of section 10 of the 1979 and 1999 constitutions.⁵⁹ He discusses the impact of divide-and-rule politics where a state loses its legitimacy when it caters to only one group of people, leaving other groups to find means of survival and solidarity. That search for survival and solidarity erodes any sense of national integration. From its use by British colonialists as a form of pacification, to the move under Babangida that enjoined the country to the Organization of Islamic Conference in 1986 to the present time, political elites have used religious domination as a divisive tool.⁶⁰

c. Failed Economic Model/Policies

Falola and Heaton discuss the precursor to the existing rentier state: a British economic model based on import-export markets of cash crops and minerals. The local economies that were centered on agriculture and capital accumulation were replaced with an extractive economic model where raw materials were exported and finished goods

⁵⁷ Ibid., 149–150.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 47.

⁵⁹ Lanre Olu-Adeyemi, “Ethno-Religious Conflicts and the Travails of National Integration in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” Department of Political Science and Public Administration, February 15, 2006, 3. www.academia.edu/1847639/Ethno-Religious_Conflicts_And_The_Travails_of_National_Integration_In_Nigerias_Fourth_Republic_2006

⁶⁰ Ibid., 7.

imported back. Where traditional economic systems were community focused, the British model “redirects economic activity toward external markets and thereby makes the colonial endeavor self-sustaining for the colonial government and profitable for British and European business.”⁶¹ This extractive economic model shapes the current rentier state in Nigeria.

One of the primary drawbacks of a rentier state is the concentration of power into the hands of a limited few, which leads to the indoctrination of cronyism and “personal loyalty in return for material reward.”⁶² The overreliance on commodities such as oil and gas left Nigeria in financial ruin after the 1970s’ oil collapse. With the withdrawal of Soviet funds, the World Bank SAPs became the only source of funds, and they were direly needed to prop up the country in the 1980s. A neoliberal ideology, SAPs were billed as a tool to reduce rampant inflation and stabilize the sub-Saharan countries’ economies that were in a free fall.⁶³ Most of these countries, Nigeria included, were under dictatorship during this time. The most significant adverse effect of SAPs on the country was the new breed of oligarchs who benefited from the dissolution of state assets. Cronyism permeated every aspect of the economy that was not bankrupted by privatization. Elaborate schemes are illustrated by the development of the Ajaokuta Steel Mill, which alone would see more than \$10 billion siphoned from government funds over a 30-year period—“without a single ingot ever emerging.”⁶⁴ By the end of the Babangida regime, the implementation of SAPs had completely devalued living standards across Nigeria.⁶⁵ The new and more efficient “adjusted” economy that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected has yet to emerge.

Like Young, Falola and Heaton also discuss the SAP, but go further in examining the overreliance on oil revenues in the 1990s when Abacha expedited the divestment of Nigerian foreign holdings, implemented a practice of printing excessive amounts of

⁶¹ Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 111.

⁶² Young, *Postcolonial State*, 175.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 174–176

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁶⁵ Larry Diamond et al., *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida* (London: Lynne Rienner 1997), 385.

currency—which caused high inflation, and even destroyed a significant number of oil refineries. All these machinations were glossed over because high oil prices at the time equated to high oil revenues.⁶⁶

Nigeria represents an example of the convergence of the worst-case scenarios of the economic and development theories of Karl Marx, Adam Smith, and Karl Polanyi. Despite years of abject inequality with the means of production concentrated in the hands of an elite few, a revolt (per Marxist predictions) has yet to materialize to overthrow the pseudo-capitalist system. But Nigerians are also not experiencing the trickle-down benefits that Smith foretells of an essentially laissez-faire regulatory market system. Any economic surplus is quickly redistributed within the elite, with no benefit to the population.

As presented above, erosion of traditional institutions, lack of trust between ethnic and religious groups, sustained corrupt military practices, and a failed economic model have all hindered the ability of a sustainable cohesive civil society to take root in Nigeria. In turn, civil society has been ineffective at advocating for services and security on behalf of Nigerian citizens.

3. Benchmark Case: India

Unlike Nigeria, India has had more success at mobilizing a sustained and inclusionary civil society,⁶⁷ and there is an extensive amount of literature on the country and its civil society. One of the most important and relevant to the comparison with Nigeria is that of social scientists, such as Partha Chatterjee and Ashutosh Varshney, who offer compelling evidence that current Indian civil society is strong because of the traditional governments that were nurtured by Nehru and Gandhi.⁶⁸ Additionally, Varshney provides a case study of six Hindu and Muslim cities to emphasize the critical

⁶⁶ Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 233.

⁶⁷ Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*, 290.

⁶⁸ Partha Chatterjee, “Post-colonial Civil and Political Society,” in *Civil Society: History and Possibilities*, eds. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 167; Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond,” *World Politics* 58, no. 3 (2001), 362-398.

necessity for intra-ethnic associations that have been nurtured in various parts of India since independence. The achievement of those associations' mitigating conflict and representing the needs of the constituents more successfully than other regions without a similar history further strengthens the argument.

However, not all evidence supports the strength of Indian civil society. Specifically, Indian political scientist Deepika Gupta finds fault with the structure of the Panchayat Raj system, which is a constitutionally ratified method to incorporate civil participation into the central government's growth and development plan.⁶⁹ The reader is left to make a final determination because in detailing the problems of the established structure, Gupta spends most of the article addressing a parallel system that inadvertently developed. Also addressing the panchayat, D. Bandyopadhyay, Saila K. Ghosh, and Buddhadeb Ghosh present a cautionary but hopeful joint analysis of the system—if it remains autonomous and does not get coopted by elites or the government.⁷⁰

One of the primary reasons for Indian success lies in the historical trajectory of British rule in India. Stronger democratic institutions were in place during the transition to independence, and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's post-independence administration strove to be inclusive and representative of the diversity in the new independent nation. Snyder posits that building a strong civil society requires an architecture built on functioning institutions before political participation can spread throughout society. India had this architecture. Unlike Nigeria, official British rule in India spanned a full century, during which time the British laid an infrastructure of representative institutions, built state administrative capacity, educated the elite, established English as the official language, and professionalized the legal system and press.⁷¹ The lasting impact of these early acts still resonates in the democratic experience in India.

⁶⁹ Deepika Gupta, "Reinvigorating Panchayat Raj System in Madhya Pradesh," *The India Journal of Political Science* 67, no.1 (2006): 97.

⁷⁰ D. Bandyopadhyay, Saila K. Ghosh, and Buddhadeb Ghosh, "Dependency versus Autonomy: Identity Crisis of India's Panchayats," *Economic and Political Weekly* 38, no.38 (2003), 3985.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

In this thesis, Nigeria is used as a single case study to conduct an analysis of civil society from the country's predemocratic through its democratic periods. The objective is to gain a better understanding of the components that define civil society and its role in vertical accountability in Nigeria. A key aspect of this research is exploring the relationships and levels of structure and agency that constrain the citizens in their interaction with the legislative, judicial, and executive institutions of government. The sources identified in the literature review as well as other reference materials and articles that apply to various aspects of the research is employed. India is used as a benchmark for empowered, participatory governance because of comparable factors such as being a former British colony and because both India and Nigeria possess diverse ethnic and religious factions. Due to time limitations and limiting the scope of this thesis, the research on India is not extensive. For Nigeria and India, primary sources include governmental and other official documents.

Secondary sources, such as books, journals, publications, relevant media, and expert analysis, enhance the research. Reliance is placed on generally accepted measures of accountability in governance as collected and depicted by Afrobarometer, Transparency International (TI), and Human Rights Watch, as well as World Bank data on aid effectiveness in reducing poverty and inequality and improving education, health, and other measures of human welfare.⁷² The data these research organizations have compiled provide concrete metrics of government commitment and records of the distribution and use of communal resources. A balanced literature of Western and African experts is presented.

Finally, articles from newspapers, periodicals, network news, press coverage, blogs, and other websites on current perspectives concerning the provision of services and security in Nigeria and India are drawn upon.

⁷² World Bank Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator#topic-2>.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

The thesis contains five chapters. Chapter I provides a historical overview of the Nigerian political environment since independence. It also covers the security and service challenges of traditional forms of institutions that existed just prior to independence compared to what exists in contemporary Nigeria. It also encompasses the larger concept of civil society—its limitations and potential. Additionally, the chapter contains a literature review and the methodology used.

Chapter II discusses the civil society disconnect within the context of the erosion of traditional institutions and the negative impact that erosion has on cohesively mobilizing contemporary civil society. It also examines the role of the citizen and vertical accountability as a check and balance to the state.

Chapter III analyzes the trust deficiency that exists throughout the Nigerian social, political, and economic landscape and the effect of that on civil society mobilization. It also takes an extensive look at corruption at all levels of government, using a local government level of Rivers State to illustrate the link between corruption and distrust.

Chapter IV looks at the effects of a broken economic model that is overly reliant on oil. It also delves into the Afrobarometer and other relevant surveys that provide the citizens' perspectives on government performance. The chapter looks at poverty and inequality trends and the effects of these trends on the citizens and on civil society.

Chapter V examines how India's approach to incorporating traditional institutions, its economic model, and the concerted effort to build intercommunal associations set a different trajectory for contemporary civil society vis-à-vis Nigeria. It then synthesizes this research and presents conclusions and recommendations.

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II. THE CITIZEN AND TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Chapter II covers the larger concept of civil society, and specifically civil society in the postcolonial developing nation of Nigeria—its history, successes, and limitations. The primary focus is on the erosion of traditional institutions and the negative influence that erosion has on mobilizing contemporary civil society to have an impact on the state.

A. INTRODUCTION

The concept of NGOs or CSOs is predicated on the idea that citizens are the core element of the organization. However, across the globe, the administrative structure of these organizations is primarily an elite-driven cadre that are able to organize around a set of interests such as human rights, women’s rights, education, and budget transparency. According to democratic theory, these varied interests lead to a proliferation of different interest-based CSOs. The ensuing competition among the CSOs should lead to mass mobilization and some form of government response. In Nigeria, NGOs and CSOs are numerous, yet limited mass mobilization around interests means the state does not respond to the masses or the elites that run the organizations. The reasons for this are varied and problematic as articulated in the research published in 2006 by Professor Obiora Chinedu Okafor.⁷³ The study looks at the composition, structure, and geopolitical locations of the range of NGO/CSO categories that exist in Nigeria—civil/political rights NGOs, social/economic rights NGOs, gender-focused NGOs, and minority/environmental rights NGOs—and conclusions are extrapolated across the general NGO/CSO population in Nigeria.⁷⁴ For example, most Nigerian CSOs are urban based (in Lagos or Abuja). Yet because most of the Nigerian population is rural, the ability to gain legitimacy at the grassroots level is limited.⁷⁵ Another issue is the personalistic nature of most CSO/NGO administrations—most are externally funded and locally “managed” as opposed to funding through membership which would potentially

⁷³ O.C. Okafor, *Legitimizing Human Rights NGOs: Lessons from Nigeria* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006), 54.

⁷⁴ Okafor, *Legitimizing*, 54–69.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

broaden the influence and legitimacy of the organization with the grassroots population. As a result, Okafor concludes that

virtually all of these NGOs are, in practice, controlled (with few effective internal checks) by a powerful founder/CEO, who is the oga (or undisputed boss) of his/her organization. Without a powerful membership, such founder/CEOs usually reign over their organizations largely unconstrained by the local community. Having thus largely excluded from their real ranks the very population of average Nigerians whose interests they want to advance.⁷⁶

Okafor further concludes that the primary driver for the personalistic default is to maintain control of the associated funding flow. Other factors that seem to dilute the effectiveness of the entire NGO/CSO community include the urban bias of most CSOs, which leads to significant neglect of rural areas, and the proliferation of NGOs leading up to and since the 1999 democratic rule, which has proved somewhat detrimental in that the growth of NGOs (many of which are very transient because they lack structure and objectives and therefore fail within a short timeframe). Ultimately, Okafor concludes that the (mainly intentional) “exclusion of the vast majority of Nigerians [rural and urban] from participation in the structure and governance of these NGOs helps explain the limited nature of success that these groups have had in engendering the transformation” and grassroots mobilization that would engage the state.⁷⁷

In December 2014, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) published an assessment of NGO/CSO guidelines in Nigeria. Of note, the 1999 and 2010 modifications to the Nigerian Constitution continue to guarantee the freedom to freely form associations that serve in a watchdog capacity for state policies.⁷⁸ The ICNL assessment discusses the 2014 federal initiative to create a series of pending CSO/NGO legislative actions primarily focused on regulating the acceptance and utilization of financial contributions from donor agencies. Nigerian NGOs/CSOs are primarily externally funded, meaning the proposed bill has the potential to curtail CSO/NGO

⁷⁶ Ibid., 69.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Section 40 of 1999 Constitution of the Government of Nigeria as referenced in the International Center for Not-for-profit Law), www.icnl.org/research/monitor/nigeria.html.

functionality in Nigeria. The proposed bill also introduces the first attempt by the federal government to engage with and fund CSO efforts in Nigeria. The ICNL describes the bill as follows:

The creation of a “Civil Society Regulatory Commission (CSRC),” which would be “peopled by civil society activists and. .. free from undue State’s interference that will regulate the conduct and activities of civil society organizations in Nigeria,” with the following functions:

1. Registering CSOs in Nigeria;
2. Sanctioning CSOs that abuse the ethics or rules of the Commission; and
3. Proposing that grants be made available by the National Assembly to CSOs.

The Conference report proposed that “statutory funds to be known as “Civil Society Grants/Fund” be annually appropriated by the National Assembly for civil society activities, in order to strengthen the ability of CSOs to perform their watchdog roles, act as checks against impunity by State actors, and to enthrone an open, just and accountable society. The Fund/Grant shall be managed by the CSRC.⁷⁹

The proposed bill is expected to be voted on after the 2015 elections. As ICNL posits, the closed nature of the Nigerian federal government means that, if implemented, the bill poses a threat to the freedoms that most CSOs currently experience.

The current situation is precarious. If the federal government does set up the CSRC, then the state is showing some steps of validating that CSOs are a vital component of the democratic process—and that they represent the people. On the other hand, the limits that ICNL warn about in its assessment suggest that if these new laws are passed as they are currently written, the federal government will impose restrictions that could further hamper CSO activities. CSOs could also face pressure to conform to the states mandates, essentially turning most of them into patronage vehicles or government owned NGOs (GONGOs).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

B. HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Civil society has experienced two specific periods of significance in Nigerian history. The first was during the independence drive in the 1950s when the elites organized against the colonial state. Once independence was achieved, the civil society associations began to collapse because independence was the initial goal, and, once achieved, they seemingly had no cohesive holistic plan with regard to the development of a sustainable postcolonial inclusive government. This exposed a critical limitation that CSOs in Nigeria are still unable to overcome. Instead, the devolution of disparate efforts occurred along ethnic or regional lines as elites fought for control of state power and resources. The ensuing conflict culminated in the 1967–1970 Nigeria-Biafra Civil War and the subsequent 30-year military rule.

Nigeria experienced a proliferation of CSOs in the push to end military rule. These CSOs ranged from professional and nonprofessional associations such as the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS); the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA); the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO); the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA); the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR); and Women in Nigeria (WIN).⁸⁰ While elites mobilized to end military rule, the failure to plan beyond the transition to civilian rule handicapped their effectiveness. The lack of a cohesive agenda for the postmilitary consolidation created a void that was initially filled by government-sponsored oppositional CSOs—causing confusion among the Nigerian masses and a level of disorganization that still exists among contemporary CSOs. The question that then rises is why is this the case? What continues to disconnect civil society in Nigeria from the state? The answer lies in multiple issues. This chapter looks at the historical legacy of the colonial period and the early independence phase, which effectively undermined the tribal structures that initially formed the basis of traditional civil society, and then it examines the possible reasons the new civil society has remained disconnected to the state.

⁸⁰ Diamond et al., *Transition without End*, 380.

C. CIVIL SOCIETY DISCONNECT

The first evidence of disconnect from the state was during the transition agenda laid out by General Ibrahim Babangida. In 1989, the National Electorate Commission (NEC)—a state agency—issued highly restrictive guidelines for political parties that were forming in preparation for the democratic transition. On 7 October 1989, Babangida negated all elite efforts by unilaterally denying political party rights to 13 potential associations.⁸¹ Instead, he and the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) created two new parties: the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC).⁸² The move was condemned by all CSOs as it imposed a top-down political party organization on citizens and associations, in essence “ordering and manipulating actors at will.”⁸³

Another example of the disconnect is evidenced by the states’ concerted effort to create its own state-sponsored CSOs in response to the backlash from the international and citizen-driven CSOs, who protested the cancellation of the 1993 presidential election. In spite of Babangida’s and the AFRC’s attempts to stifle CSO efforts to push for civilian rule, M. K. O. Abiola won what to date is still considered to have been “the fairest, freest, and most peaceful election in Nigerian history.”⁸⁴ Despite international efforts that entailed Britain and remaining European communities suspending aid to Nigeria,⁸⁵ Babangida refuses to recognize the election results and instead turns over authority to an Interim National Government (ING), which is taken over in short order by another military officer—General Sani Abacha.⁸⁶ These series of events underscored a theme that still resonates in Nigeria today: the state, and whoever is in charge, is not beholden to elites or citizens.

⁸¹ Ibid., 179.

⁸² Ibid., 183–184.

⁸³ Ibid., 183.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 259.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 491.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 491–492.

Under the Abacha regime, the government embarked on a cooptation agenda that led to divisions within the CSO community. First, the state created or sponsored a number of GONGOs/CSOs, such as the Media Democratic Forum (MDF), the Youth Earnestly Asking for Abacha (YEAA), the National Association of Patriotic Professionals (NAPP), and many more, in an effort to counter the democratization efforts of the community based CSOs.⁸⁷ Second, the Abacha government encouraged and took measures to reinforce cleavages that existed along ethnic and regional lines. E. Remi Aiyede posits that allowing the northern region to remain fairly closed left the impression that democracy was only a southern agenda.⁸⁸

The 2007 presidential election was more proof to CSOs that the state could take any action without consequences and with even less regard for their input or objections. After failing to buy a third term in office, President Obasanjo embarked upon an elaborate plan to maintain political influence by rigging the entire election process. Despite the objections of domestic CSOs, the president pressured the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to disqualify his two main rival candidates. The INEC then proceeded to use questionable citizen registration tactics that domestic organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) strenuously objected to—only to be ignored. The subsequent voting process, which domestic and international observer groups noted as having anywhere from a 5-to 14-million turnout, was disregarded as the INEC announced a victory for Yar'Adua (who was handpicked by President Obasanjo) by 24 million votes.⁸⁹ Despite domestic and international CSOs' condemnation of the entire process, to include the NDI observer led by former U.S. secretary of state Madeline Albright, the ECOWAS Observer Mission and others, the results were certified by the INEC.⁹⁰ Perhaps more than any other, this incident highlighted the disconnect between CSOs and the state. Ultimately, international leaders

⁸⁷ E. Remi Aiyede, "The Dynamics of Civil Society and Democratization Process in Nigeria," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 37, no.1 (2003): 9.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁸⁹ John Campbell, *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 107.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 109.

such as the United States accepted the new president-elect, and the Nigerian citizens accepted the results without any civil disturbance, leading former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell to conclude that

for most Nigerians a stolen election was not worth a riot, a police beating, and jail. Their reaction was evidence of their divorce from their formal institutions of government. In the public's perception, the Nigerian government was now as "colonial," irrelevant, and exploitative as the British regime had ever been. Their defense was to have as little to do with the government or the state as possible, to migrate internally into the worlds of family, ethnic group, and religion.⁹¹

The culmination of these series of events proved to CSOs that any gains they would get would only occur if the state were willing. It also proved to the citizenry that the CSO structure could not compel the state to act in a fair and representative manner.

D. ELITE DISCONNECT FROM THE MASSES

In the modern postmilitary democracy that exists in Nigeria, the widening gap between the elite and the average citizen is extensive. Specifically, since the Babangida and Abacha eras, power and access to power has equated to comfortable living that is increasingly outside the scope of most Nigerians. For CSOs, previously stated history of cooptation and patronage has also led to many CSO leaders' benefiting as members of the elite—further alienating them from the average citizen. In 2013, the CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation sponsored a study to assess six West African states—including Nigeria. The findings show that CSOs face a number of challenges including funding related issues, resource deficiencies (human resources and physical equipment), donor relations difficulties, unsound internal management practices, internal regulations, limited collaboration with other CSOs, and a disconnect with the society they serve, which is reflected in the low impact on the local communities and on policies of the state.⁹² Why has this happened and what are some of the reasons for the disconnect between the grassroots population and the state? As stated in the hypothesis, various

⁹¹ Ibid., 111.

⁹² Andrew Firmin and Patricia Deniz, "CIVICUS Civil Society Index Rapid Assessment: West Africa Regional Report," March 2014, www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Nigeria_Country_Report.pdf

factors over a period of time have contributed to the weakening of communication between the state and society in Nigeria today. Some of those are discussed in the previous sections. Another dimension deals with the disconnect between the citizens and civil society that positioned itself as the citizens' advocate. As the primary advocates, the tribal system became weaker with the formation of the central government in the postcolonial period and in subsequent administrations..

1. The Nigerian Citizen and Vertical Accountability

In the larger topic of democracy, of which civil society is a component, citizenship also warrants a discussion. Essentially, the citizen is the one who is disenfranchised in Nigeria; therefore, the citizen has a role to play in reversing that trend. Any civil society attempt to mediate between the state and the citizen will have a greater impact if individuals are as invested as the CSOs that aim to represent their interests to the government. As Uwem Essia and Afzal Yearoo state, "It is now broadly accepted that democracy should extend beyond conducting free elections. Open and democratic societies require an informed citizenry, public participation and governing processes that are transparent and realistic."⁹³ Stated differently, a democracy is the space where the state, the public realm, and citizens compete, cooperate, or reach consensus on policies that are representative of the interests and values of those governed. That competition requires access for individuals and parties and a fair means to hold any elected official accountable for his or her actions.⁹⁴ All this amounts to vertical accountability, which is an essential component of democracy.

Writing on the essential need for civil society or "intermediate groups" to foster a sense of solidarity and provide a space for citizens to shape norms and values, social scientist Thomas Janoski quotes Peter Ekeh: "Short-term exchanges with expectations of benefit for every cost tend to destroy solidarity, while long-term exchanges benefiting a

⁹³ Uwem Essia and Afzal Yearoo, "Strengthening Civil Society Organizations/Government Partnerships in Nigeria," *International NGO Journal* 4, no. 9, (Sept 2009): 370, www.academicjournals.org/article/article1381501695_Essia%20and%20Yearoo.pdf

⁹⁴ Schmitter and Karl, "What Democracy Is," 103-105.

large segment of the population increase it.”⁹⁵ Of significant importance in Ekeh’s statement is that without those intermediate groups or civil society, the likelihood of developing those long-term mass-population exchanges and benefits is unlikely. The short-term and elite-focused nature of benefits in Nigerian society suggests weak citizen solidarity.

In a related theme, Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan’s comparative assessment of public attitudes in 18 African countries support the argument that while most Nigerians want democracy and do vote, they do not yet embrace or know the full responsibility of citizenship as it relates to its role in securing democracy.⁹⁶ They posit that constituents of the study have adopted a delegative vice a representative expectation of their elected officials—engaging in electoral politics, then essentially ceding their rights to unilateral rule or existing institutions of horizontal accountability.⁹⁷ For example, Figure 1 shows the 2005–2006 survey results of those who believe that “voters” have the responsibility of holding parliament accountable for its actions.

⁹⁵ Thomas Janoski, *Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 24.

⁹⁶ Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan, “Voters But Not Yet Citizens: The Weak Demand for Political Accountability in Africa’s Unclaimed Democracies,” *Afrobarometer, Working Paper No 63* (September 2005): 1.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3–6.

**Figure 1: Popular Demand for Vertical Accountability,
of legislative representatives to voters, 2005-6**




Figure 1. Popular demand for vertical accountability in Nigeria⁹⁸

A 2013 follow-up publication edited by Bratton revealed no significant change in results and perception of citizens and vertical accountability.⁹⁹

2. The Masses, the Elite, and Civil Society in Nigeria

Writing about civil society and democratization in Nigeria, Aiyede cites the characteristics of the various regimes over time, many of which entailed suspension of constitutions and varying degrees of personal rule that “involved the denial of the peoples’ rights to participate in the decision-making process.”¹⁰⁰ He posits that civil society efforts initially provided hope for reclaiming the citizens’ role and place in governance, but perhaps with too high expectations. While civil society has opened up democracy in Nigeria, it has been less effective at sustaining or consolidating those representative ideals.

⁹⁸ Bratton and Logan, *Working Paper No. 63*, 13.

⁹⁹ Michael Bratton, *Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013), 197–218.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

The average Nigerian citizen needs to be enjoined at a grassroots level, and this has been the most significant hurdle yet to be scaled. Over the years, Nigeria has seen vigorous civil society activity in mobilizing for democracy. Labor unions, women's groups, and the press have all taken active roles that ebbed and flowed over the years. The different military or civilian regimes, however, have exerted equally active efforts to undermine and reverse civil society's gains.

In addition to the efforts previously mentioned, the regimes' strategies General Buhari's decrees banning unions and dismantling the rights of workers to organize, his muzzling of the press by authorizing arrests for "false accusations against public officials" from 1983 to 1985, and subsequent administrations' repressive tactics, which ranged from using spies to infiltrate and subvert agendas to the assassination of leadership of independent media outlets.¹⁰¹ These combined subversive efforts splintered any cohesion in civil society efforts, and the state succeeded in creating a divide between the average disenfranchised citizen and CSOs.

Aiyede goes on to say that civil society in Nigeria has been primarily elite-driven. The prodemocracy associations were initiated mainly by elites who had a lot to lose with the increasingly overbearing military dictatorships. This group included leaders of labor unions and professional associations that were concerned about the impact of state economic restructuring measures, and human rights NGOs, which leveraged international funding and attention to press for the release of colleagues who had been detained.¹⁰² These points go to Aiyede's more general emphasis on the political "disengagement" of the grassroots citizen from civil society.¹⁰³ Consequently, while unemployed youth in urban areas may be mobilized to riot and march in Nigeria, the average grassroots citizen does not yet see the link between participating in these associations and "resolving deep-seated national problems."¹⁰⁴ The trauma from years of failed leadership and elite issue-driven initiatives are two explanations for this level of disengagement.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 7.

¹⁰² Aiyede, "The Dynamics of Civil Society," 15–16.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 11.


¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

E. WEAKENING OF TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS (INDIRECT RULE)

Essential to a comprehensive understanding of the current political and social failures in Nigeria must be a historical understanding of the development of government and political institutions. The role of the citizen and state are placed in a more relevant context when analyzed from a historical perspective. At the beginning of the establishment of British colonies in Nigeria at the turn of the 19th century, early European explorers interacted with the various indigenous groups that occupied the territory, as depicted by Figure 2.

Ethnic diversity

Major ethnic groups (% of population)



1 Bokobaru	5 Nupe	9 Idoma	13 Tarok
2 Kanbari	6 Gbagyi	10 Berom	14 Jibu
3 Zuru	7 Igala	11 Efik	15 Somyev
4 Edo	8 Kaje	12 Jukunoid	16 Mumuye

Source: Ulrich Lamm

Figure 2. Major ethnic-group dispersion¹⁰⁵

These groups, mainly composed of Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo, were organized into various independent geopolitical structures.¹⁰⁶ For the purpose of this thesis, traditional institutions of governance refer to the systems of governance that have carried over to the present since precolonial times. In Nigeria, obas, igwes, sultans, emirs,

¹⁰⁵ From BBC News Africa, Nigeria Elections: Mapping a Nation Divided; www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31101351?fb_ref=Default. The map is not the exact representation of 1899 but is meant to depict the major ethnic groups. The country borders did not exist in 1899; therefore, an inclusive map of Africa would reflect the Kanuri spread into Cameroun, Chad, and Niger. Likewise, the Yoruba would be spread west into Benin.

¹⁰⁶ Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 94.

and other titled chiefs are ranked into first-, second-, and third-tier structures. The honorable Justice of Ogun State provides a list of various federal and state chiefs' laws and edicts that guide the incorporation of traditional structure into the government structures, including, Chiefs' Appointment and Deposition Law of Ekiti state; the Chiefs' Edicts of Imo, Ogun, Ondo, Benue, Osun, and Oyo states; the Western Region Appointment and Recognition of Chiefs Law; the Traditional Rulers and the Autonomous Communities Law No. 11 of 1981 Imo state.¹⁰⁷

1. Traditional Northern Institutions (Northern Caliphates)

In the north, the Hausa and Fulani formed a highly centralized and powerful Islamic composed of emirates under one caliphate. The Kanuri and other ethnic groups also had strong centralized caliphates with similar emirships. The governmental institutions of the emirates had well-established military, security, educational, taxation and fiscal systems, as well as judiciary and communication or *Kofa*¹⁰⁸ systems between the caliphate's central government in Sokoto—headed by the sultan—and the outlying emirates. Occasional uprisings of different emirs from the 1700s to 1903 suggest that, while not perfect, the northern economy, culture, and political institutions were united through the Islamic religion under varying levels of Shari'a law across the different emirates.¹⁰⁹ Ironically, this highly centralized structure made the caliphate the ideal candidate for British “indirect rule”—described as “using local authorities and power structure to rule rather than imposing external force.”¹¹⁰ This reduced direct colonial influence and presence in the north would have long-standing implications over the years since independence until present. The current political system in the northern part of Nigeria still centers around Shari'a and civil law. Shari'a law governs Muslims who

¹⁰⁷ <http://theleaderassumpta.com/2014/05/06/an-inquiry-into-the-legal-processes-for-the-creation-of-autonomous-communities-and-the-selection-appointment-installation-recognition-and-removal-of-traditional-rulers-in-imo-state/>

¹⁰⁸ Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 67. Kofa systems were instituted to improve communications between the caliph and the emirs. They also served as the means of collecting required tribute from emirs. (page 67 of *A History of Nigeria*)

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 69–73.

¹¹⁰ Stephen Wright, *Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 11.

submit to the religion, while Christians and others in the north (about one-third of population in that region) are subject to the civil laws of Nigeria. Shari'a and civil law operate congruently based on the choice of the individual and in line with his or her faith.

2. Traditional Southwest Institution (Yoruba)

The Yoruba Empire historically dominates the southwestern region. The precolonial empire encompassed 14 kingdoms extended over a vast area and organized into sophisticated forms of a centralized government headed by the *alafin* (king) of Oyo and city-states headed by chiefs or related proxies of the king. The Yorubas are very homogenous and subscribed to the traditional institutions where the royal lineage leadership of kings and chiefs, from the central state to the outlying provinces, served political, religious, military, and related administrative functions in support of their constituents.¹¹¹ Despite their homogeneity, divisions between various kingdoms over the years led to a series of wars between the Yoruba provinces, weakening the empire, and which were “ended only with the negotiation of peace in 1886 by the British, who used the opportunity to gain a foothold in Yoruba land. British intervention ultimately resulted in the consolidation of a protectorate, which initiated colonial rule in the region in 1893.”¹¹² The centralized nature of traditional Yoruba institutions along with the inadvertent arbiter role facilitated the imposition of British rule.

3. Traditional Southeast Institutions (Ibo)

The southeastern region is composed mainly of the Ibo tribe, a more egalitarian society. Unlike the other two main groups, the Ibo were amorphous and loosely organized and had no strong political institutions before the British intervention. Instead, they had a fairly republican structure manifested through varying levels of “village government maintained by family heads or elders sitting together in consultation with the senior elder, or *okpara*, who chaired meetings but did not rule.”¹¹³ The decentralized nature of authority of the Ibo and the smaller tribes in the eastern region proved

¹¹¹ Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 50.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 76.

¹¹³ Wright, *Nigeria*, 11.

challenging for the subsequent British “indirect rule” model.¹¹⁴ The challenges still resonate in the Delta region that is a part of the southeast. Ascendancy to Ibo chieftaincy is based on the candidate’s curriculum vitae, which captures achievements and efforts that have improved the community.

F. FIRST STAGES OF TRADITIONAL INSTITUTION EROSION

The weakening of traditional forms of governance can be traced as far back as the slave-trade era. From precolonial through independence, the state-level effort to neutralize the power of these institutions continues till present day.

As a result of the different structures of authorities and institutions in the three main geographical regions and over a forty-year period ending in 1903 with the occupation of Sokoto, the British approached colonization (development and administration) differently in each region.¹¹⁵ In the southwest and east, Christianity spread quickly and firmly for one particular reason: “Leaders of the southwest recognized the link between Christian missionaries and British military power. .. therefore [the traditional leaders] saw Christian missionaries as ambassadors through whom they could enlist British support against their enemies.”¹¹⁶ Among other things, the missionaries also established schools that taught English speaking, reading, and writing, which the traditional leader felt provided an economic advantage in trade negotiations with the British.¹¹⁷ Conversely, as they pushed further inland from the coastal regions, missionaries bent on spreading their faith and eradicating the slave trade and uncivilized animist traditions and beliefs lobbied for more British protection and a stronger British intervention in established traditional institutions.¹¹⁸ Growing trade interests, which are discussed in Chapter IV, also influenced British colonization.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 85.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 88.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 87–88.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 89.

The erosion of traditional institutions began in earnest in 1851 when the British used military force to depose the reigning king of Lagos (Kosoko, who resisted overt missionary and British trade activity), replacing him with a more amenable ruler who subsequently was unable to enforce structure and control over the region. His failure led to the region's political collapse and the transition from traditional institutions to British rule under a British governor in 1861.¹¹⁹ Between 1861 and 1894, the British would use military coercion and bombardment to force most of the Yoruba leaders, (including all the strongest kingdoms such as Ijebu and Oyo) to sign away their sovereignty and join the expanding colony.¹²⁰ In the southeast and Delta region of the Ibo and smaller tribes, the period of the 1840s through 1885 saw the demolition or bombardment of communities as the British became "kingmakers,"¹²¹ creating or replacing local rulers and councils with new ones or forcing the current ones to accept British rule. In all instances, the newly established foreign political and judicial institutions undermined the sovereign authority of the indigenous rulers.

The final push through the hinterlands to the north culminated in 1903 with the installation of a new and more amenable sultan in Sokoto.¹²² For Frederick Lugard, who would become the first high commissioner of the new colony, the distance, the expanse of the northern caliphate, and associated maintenance costs precluded further administrative interference. As a result, the British tactic in the north was to strike agreements to not interfere with the Muslim religion and to prevent Christian missionaries from migrating into Muslim territories. In exchange, "the emirate mechanism. . . [with] its ability to control and tax the northern population, was retained to levy taxes to be passed over to the colonial authorities in return for allowing the emirs to retain some traditional power and authority within the region—even though the north was still under the supreme authority of the crown."¹²³ The autonomy retained in the north

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 95.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., 96.

¹²² Wright, *Nigeria*, 14.

¹²³ Ibid., 15.

was not the same policy applied in the south. Additionally, the 1914 amalgamation of all regions facilitated the use of income generated in the southwest, to cover operating and other expenses of the northern and eastern regions. This unique dynamic of an autonomous north reliant on southern funds, would reverberate through colonial times, independence, and to the present day.

The current structure of traditional institutions is one where hereditary and appointment measures are both utilized. Kingmakers (i.e, Oyo Mesi in Yoruba proper)¹²⁴ and ruling houses are factors in determining chieftaincies in modern-day Nigeria. The federal government also has a vote in some cases, which has sullied the once-venerated determination of kings. The 2014 appointment of the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sanusi Lamido, devolved into a tumultuous volley of allegations and counter-allegations when the kingmakers picked Lamido but the federal government designated someone else.¹²⁵ The kingmakers' decision was upheld—partly owing to the civil protests that erupted.

The federal government issues the final approval and certificates for all paramount ruler positions. In the modern-day governance structure, chiefs and kings serve in advisory capacity to various tiers of government. The most significant role they have held in contemporary times was during the Shagari Regime from 1979 to 1983, when first class obas and chiefs (i.e., paramount rulers) were designated as pro-chancellors of universities in an effort to facilitate their participation in passing on traditions and educating the youth of Nigeria. Today, most obas and chiefs perform in a ceremonial capacity to mobilize local community development efforts, but primarily as a reminder of history and culture to the citizens.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Samuel Johnson, *The History of the Yoruba's* (Lagos, Nigeria: CSS Bookshops Limited, 1921), 50.

¹²⁵ www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/paradox-sanusis-emirship/

¹²⁶ Comments on the traditional structure were provided by Dr. Oluwole Songonuga and the Honorable Chief Justice Olopade of Ogun State.

G. EMERGENCE OF NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

As amalgamation and indirect rule became entrenched, the number of Western-educated personnel grew in all areas of social life. Ideas of self-rule began to take hold, spreading through churches, women's groups, and trade groups. These ideas were spread by a rapidly growing independent media. To the detriment of traditional institutions, the primary focus of most of the new associations was to counter the Western perception that Africans were uneducated and incapable of self-rule; as a result, many traditional attributes were actively replaced with Western ones.

1. Elite and Mass Mobilization

In the southwest, and Lagos in particular, the British governor established a legislative council that employed newly formed "traditional elites" to advise the governor on "traditional Yoruba law regarding such issues as land ownership, marriage customs, and ceremonial procedures."¹²⁷ As the European-educated middle-class elite grew in numbers, the aversion to the British notion that Africans were inferior to Europeans also grew and would manifest itself in form of new African-led churches that took a divergent approach to traditional and cultural rights. The 1920s and 1930s also saw the emergence of an independent press that began to criticize the oppressive and prejudicial colonial regime.¹²⁸ While the educated elite promulgated their message and the nationalism drive through churches and the press, Falola and Heaton also highlight the shared discontent and subsequent mobilization of "working class-Nigerians and peasant farmers" who were fed up with being alienated by traditional chiefs and kings. According to them, "whereas chiefs and kings had traditionally maintained power by ruling in a fashion that pleased their subjects, under colonial rule traditional elites maintained their power by pleasing the British colonial authorities first and foremost."¹²⁹ These frustrations, along with the imposition of taxes in the southwest region in particular, would culminate in mass

¹²⁷ Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 114.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 130–131.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

demonstrations and riots in 1929—led by women and called the Women’s War.¹³⁰ The colonial government’s response to the civil mobilization, while limited, was to restructure the administrative system in a more localized and representative manner to suit its needs. Ironically, the mobilization of the peasant and the European elite educated class forced the colonial authority to expand African representation on the central governments legislative council. This response by the colonial powers was to ensure division among Nigerians by appeasing the opposition. Meanwhile, the continued use of coopted traditional chiefs and elders instead of the educated elites fomented tensions both between elites and traditional rulers and along ethnic lines, which suited the colonial powers initially.¹³¹

2. New Forms of Civic Associations

Numerous other associations were formed to represent an educated and capable Nigeria. These institutions’ initial goal was to counter the Western perception that Africans were inferior to the foreigners who occupied the administration immediately following independence. These organizations evolved into the CSOs that led the drive for independence and democracy. Through each administration, the drive to assimilate into the global society and the paradigm of democracy meant building connections beyond ethnicity. As a result, the First Republic destroyed that connection for the tribal institutions that survived colonialism in cases where citizens relied on local councils for problem resolution or as a conduit for resources and other administrative solutions. The persistent political deposing or investigating of local community councils ultimately broke the trust citizens had in those institutions.¹³² Today, most traditional authorities are ceremonial in nature and often appointed by contemporary politicians, who use the connection to validate their legitimacy in a particular ethnic group—primarily for mobilizing electoral votes. Being coopted by the administration renders these traditional institutions ineffective for civic mobilization to challenge the establishment.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 133.

¹³¹ Wright, *Nigeria*, 21.

¹³² Peil, *Nigerian Politics*, 140.

H. CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown the systematic weakening of the traditional institutions that advocated for the needs of its citizens. The advent of independence and the influx of educated Nigerian elites, plus the changing dynamics of a global push to democratization, ultimately pressured the new Nigerian elites to move to less tribal forms of advocacy. The resulting CSOs conformed to theoretical Western ideas of representation—evidenced by a successful push for independence, and an end to military rule. Unfortunately, these modern forms of advocacy have failed the citizenry, as they have been incapable of pushing successive administrations to act in a sustained representative manner. As a result, the average Nigerian citizen is disconnected from civil society, which in turn is disconnected from the state. As this chapter suggests, the reasons for such disconnect include an elite-centered agenda, a lack of unity and focus among CSOs, and a record of failed efforts in dealing with a closed Nigerian state. Chapter III addresses the entrenched lines of mistrust that has evolved over the various administrations and leads into Chapter IV, which shows how commodity-based economics have resulted in this citizen-CSO-state disconnect.

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III. TRUST AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

This chapter starts with a review of the perspectives found in the literature on trust, social capital, and civil society. After establishing the necessity of trust in building and maintaining associations, by focusing on Francis Fukuyama's 2001 paper on social capital, the chapter depicts how the circle of mistrust has metastasized over the years in Nigeria—specifically, historical events and military actions over the course of various civilian and military administrations. The thesis also acknowledges the challenges inherent in measuring trust. Despite that weakness, this thesis agrees with the argument that trust and social capital are vital parts of congealing civic participation and associations and mobilizing that resulting civil society into actionable pressure on the government. By extension, the erosion of trust in Nigeria correlates to the inability of civil society to make the state provide representative governance to citizens.

A. TRUST IN THE SOCIAL REALM

Research on trust centers on two different circles: social and political. Each influences the other in varying degrees and as a result of numerous factors. Additionally, the terminology is dependent on the researcher. What political scientists William Mishler and Richard Rose call *trust*, Fukuyama calls *social capital*. For the purpose of this thesis, the essential element of trust in social or political circles is that it can be learned or earned and unlearned or unearned. Trust is performance based—especially in the political arena. In the social arena, it is essential for breaking down barriers and developing shared interests. To link the concept to the citizen, civil society, and the state, Mishler and Rose consolidate the research of social theorists such as Adam Seligman and S.N. Eisenstadt, who argue that “trust is essential to the establishment of civil society, the institutions of which create within citizens a sense of community and connect them to government.”¹³³ At the individual participatory level, Mishler and Rose summarize the argument of theorists such as Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, Jae-On Kim, and Robert Dahl and posit that

¹³³ William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies,” *Journal of Politics* 59, no.2 (1997): 419.

trust is necessary so that individuals may participate voluntarily in collective institutions, whether in political institutions, such as political parties, or in economic and social institutions, such as labor unions, business associates, and churches. Trust in civil institutions does not diminish democracy but completes it, enhancing the effectiveness of political institutions, creating the “social separation of powers” which checks the emergence of an overly strong State.¹³⁴

In this respect, researchers Nojin Kwak, Dhavan Shah, and R. Lance Holbert agree, emphasizing that trust is essential to shape the efforts of smaller associations that grow into wider civic engagement and collective action. These informal or formal settings ultimately foster discussion on “political issues and mobilization and resource and community building.”¹³⁵ In their study of postcommunist nations in Europe, Mishler and Rose also cite the findings of Ronald Inglehart, David Easton, and others who argue that the values and benefits individuals perceive to determine trust are usually a result of factors such as education, gender, age, and socioeconomic status.¹³⁶

B. TRUST IN THE POLITICAL REALM

Like social trust, political trust is heavily influenced by personal experience. Kenneth Newton argues that while both are important on their own merits and critical for a democracy, the two are also very different. Newton’s analysis led him to conclude that membership in voluntary organizations does not highly affect political trust. Yet social trust is influenced by a plethora of factors, to include those identified by Mishler and Rose, and voluntary organizations.¹³⁷ Furthermore, Newton surmises that political trust requires a certain level of distrust to be a necessary component for providing adequate scrutiny of political behavior.¹³⁸ The level of distrust influences a range of things from

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Nojin Kwak, Dhavan V. Shah and R. Lance Holbert, “Connecting, Trusting, and Participating: The Direct and Interactive Effects of Social Associations,” *Political Research Quarterly* 57, no 4, (2004): 643 and 645.

¹³⁶ Mishler and Rose, “Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism,” 434.

¹³⁷ Kenneth Newton, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 22, no. 2, (2001): 204.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 205.

the likelihood of citizens' paying taxes to their not reelecting politicians who have lost that trust.

Building on Newton's assessment of political trust being a report card on government performance, political scientists Marc Hutchison and Kristin Johnson conducted a study of trust in 16 African countries over the period spanning 2000 to 2005. Using 32 different Afrobarometer surveys, they found that African countries with poor institutional capacity in functional areas such as legal systems, corrupt police forces, and corrupt bureaucracies all inspire low levels of political trust from citizens.¹³⁹ Their conclusions are reasonable and unsurprising specifically as they relate to fractured states. In a complementary but less specific study, Francis Fukuyama reaches conclusions that build on all the main points espoused by the researchers previously discussed. His insight also presents the most ideal setting in which to examine the issue of trust in Nigeria.

C. SOCIAL CAPITAL: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TRUST

Francis Fukuyama states, "Social Capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals."¹⁴⁰ He describes social capital as a norm that develops over time to facilitate cooperation between two parties. Much like trust, social capital also develops and evolves into shared norms when "virtues like honesty, keeping of commitments, reliable performance of duties, [or] reciprocity"¹⁴¹ have been observed and exhibited. While Fukuyama stresses the positive potentiality of social capital, he cites Partha Dasgupta's research by discussing the "positive and negative externalities" of social capital.¹⁴² Positive equates to treating all people morally—and having the capacity to extend courtesies beyond a nuclear group that shares the same norms, but to a wider social group; negative externalities equates a more stunted

¹³⁹ Marc L. Hutchison and Kristin Johnson, "Capacity to Trust? Institutional Capacity, Conflict, and Political Trust in Africa, 2000–2005," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 6 (2011): 737–752.

¹⁴⁰ Francis Fukuyama, "Social Capital, Civil Society and Development," *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (2001): 7.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

sharing of norms—where members outside the nucleus or cooperative of shared norms are viewed with hostility.¹⁴³

These circles of shared norms lead to cooperation and are often at the crux of groups ranging from ethnic tribes to religions and wider associations of cooperation. The challenge to highly fragmented societies such as Nigeria is that circles of trust need to widen, and that occurs through the development of overlapping social groups to which people belong. Fukuyama rightly warns that fragmented societies are often characterized by an us-versus-them mentality. The circle of trust can be limited to such a narrow group that the government is perceived as being far outside that circle and stealing from the government to give to the circle of trust is not condemned.¹⁴⁴

At this very point theorists such as Tocqueville would inject the value of democracy. Democracy offers people the opportunity to organize and associate in groups that are “important for all aspects of their lives.”¹⁴⁵ If that happens and larger circles of trust are built, citizens have more leverage when they choose to participate in the political dialogue. When larger circles of trust develop, the foundations for a dense civil society—one that will balance the power of the government structure—is firmly in place.¹⁴⁶ But first, citizens must see the value in associations, and Nigerians have yet to see the value in these associations.

The roots of distrust were sown as far back as the First Republic in the political maneuvering that unfolded during the British turnover of power. The southwest, the most westernized and containing the most educated administrators able to effectively run the government, was represented by the Action Group (AG) party chaired by Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba. The north was represented by the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and led by Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, who was named the first prime minister as Nigeria prepared for independence. According to the 1958 census report, the north won

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 9.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 11.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

the most seats in the new central government legislature.¹⁴⁷ Allying with the NPC to sway votes in support of Balewa, the eastern region, represented by the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) and led by Nnamdi Azikwe, was primarily Ibo. The overwhelming strength of regional identities over a loosely constructed national identity was pervasive and instilled high levels of fear, which paralyzed the ability to develop any cross-regional associations and build trust.

As Falola and Heaton state, “The greatest fear of most Nigerians in the 1960s was that their region would become ‘dominated’ by another.”¹⁴⁸ By 1964, the level of corruption and “ethnic baiting” left most Nigerians believing that the federal system needed to be disbanded; this belief set the stage for the first military overthrow in 1966 and the subsequent bloody civil war from 1967 to 1970.¹⁴⁹ The Biafran war of secession revealed the level to which trust had eroded and was marked by broken alliances that remain in modern Nigerian politics and society.

As if speaking of Nigeria, Fukuyama accurately describes the adverse effects of having low levels of social capital—it leaves the state unchecked, creating the space for rent seeking and corruption—and captures the trust climate existing in Nigeria. Specific to this thesis, Fukuyama’s discussion of how the state indirectly fosters or hinders the creation of social capital through its ability to “provide necessary public goods, particularly property rights and public safety” is particularly relevant as it ties together the previous discussions on political trust as a product of state performance and the erosion effect of coercive forces that take over when the civilian state leaves a power vacuum.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 158.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 159.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society,” 18.

D. THE MILITARY AS AN AGENT OF DISTRUST

For Nigeria, the impact of the successive military regimes has been detrimental to prospects of building political trust and social capital. After receiving high praises for removing a corrupt civilian administration, in his 1966 inaugural speech Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon stated

Fellow countrymen, I sincerely hope we shall be able to resolve most of the problems that have disunited us in the past and really come to respect and trust one another in accordance with an all-around code of good conduct and etiquette...Troops must not terrorize the public, as such action will discredit the new National Military Government. You are to remember that your task is to help restore law and order and confidence in the public in time of crisis...I promise you that I shall do all I can to return to civil rule as soon as it can be arranged.”¹⁵¹

When the civil war ended in 1970, Gowon again promised to relinquish control to democratic rule in 1976. As the years passed, the promise faded because of the concentration of wealth at the federal level and the ease with which personal wealth could be amassed. The drive for wealth and political influence superseded the promises made by the military and set up the country for the next coup and military administration in 1976. Max Siollun describes the coup as a watershed moment because for the first time “executors of a coup apportioned political appointments between themselves.”¹⁵²

Military actions worsened as evinced by the Buhari regime of 1983–1985, when calls for return to civil rule resulted in the muzzling or disbandment of CSOs, labor unions, and other professional associations. The decrees discussed in Chapter II heavily criminalized associational acts and inclinations and “placed the government above the law by removing all actions of the government from the jurisdiction of the courts.”¹⁵³ Fukuyama’s reference to rent-seeking behavior becomes endemic during the Babangida regime of 1985–1993. As the regime implemented the SAPs that resulted in a dramatic fall of living standards across the country, calls for change and civilian rule were again

¹⁵¹ Max Siollun, *Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture (1966–1976)*, (New York: Algora, 2009), 231–232.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 185.

¹⁵³ Aiyede, “The Dynamics of Civil Society,” 6.

met with active cooptation of civil associations and community leaders and the institution of nepotism, which further eroded any potential remnants of trust.

Aiyede describes a scenario where the regimes of Babangida and his successor, Abacha, either bought off segments of civic organizations that voiced opposition or instituted a network of spies and secret agents and complemented such tactics with the assassinations of leading journalists and activists such as Dele Giwa in 1986 and Ken Saro Wiwa in 1995.¹⁵⁴ The annulment of the 1993 presidential elections that would have brought back civilian rule under Abiola instead ushered in the Abacha regime and led to high levels of violence and militancy.¹⁵⁵ Such acts made citizens suspicious of each other, eroded trust in associations and the government, and instilled fear across the board.

E. CORRUPTION: THE ENDURING ENGINE OF TRUST EROSION

Corruption is the enduring cause of distrust among all elements of the private and public fabric of society. This thesis subscribes to the World Banks' two-part definition of corruption. The first type is state capture, defined as

actions of individuals, groups, or firms in both the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies (that is, the basic rules of the game) to their own advantage by means of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials.¹⁵⁶

The second form of corruption is administrative corruption which is manipulating existing laws to “provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private gain to public officials.”¹⁵⁷ Essentially, this is the redirection of public funds into private coffers. In Nigeria, the history of corruption is extensive and encompasses both definitions.

More disturbing is the fact that despite numerous anticorruption initiatives, corruption is rampant. Examples of the initiatives include:

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 8–10.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch, Rivers State, 17.

¹⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch, Rivers State, 17–18.

1. The Nigerian Constitution, which specifically mandates a code of conduct for public officials to mitigate corruption;¹⁵⁸
2. President Obasanjo’s Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act (CPROA) in 1999,¹⁵⁹ which led to the creation of the Independent Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC) in 2000;¹⁶⁰
3. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2002;¹⁶¹
4. Regional ECOWAS and continental-level initiatives such as the New Action Plan for Africa Development (NEPAD), which aim to expunge corrupt practices from development partnerships between African and non-African countries;¹⁶²
5. The African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption in 2003;¹⁶³ and,
6. Efforts in conjunction with the G8 and the OECD to increase transparency on revenue and income from the oil and mineral trade.¹⁶⁴

Pressured by CSOs, Nigeria joined the United Kingdom–led Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative aimed at increasing visibility on all transactions between companies, governments, and government entities.¹⁶⁵ All these initiatives are aimed at proscribing corruption, yet the problem persists. The laws are in place, but the enforcement and willingness to abide by said laws is severely lacking. Despite the laws and regulations mandating transparency, to include CSO pressure via the “Publish What You Pay” and “Publish What You Earn” campaigns (aimed specifically at increasing

¹⁵⁸ Nigerian Constitution (1999) Schedule 5 section as cited by Ijeoma Opara, “Nigerian Anti-Corruption Initiatives,” *Journal of International Business and Law* 6, no.1, article 4, (2007): 76–78 <http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1137&context=jibl>.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 70. The 2003 update to CPROA is also referenced as ongoing government initiatives. <http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1137&context=jibl>.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 77.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 74.

visibility in the oil industry),¹⁶⁶ transparency remains elusive, and corruption, in turn, thrives in such obscurity.

1. Leadership and Policymaking in a Trust-Deficit Environment

Afrobarometer created the Transparent and Accountable Governance Index (TAGI), composed of 13 survey questions, to measure the level in which 34 African governments are perceived as transparent and open by their constituents.¹⁶⁷ The score is then compared to other measures of transparency such as the Resource Governance Index (RGI), which is produced by Revenue Watch International and examines 58 countries with extractive industries, and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), which is produced by Mo Ibrahim Foundation and evaluates 52 African countries across four categories to determine the governments' ability to meet their obligations to their constituencies.¹⁶⁸

With a TAGI index of 0.68, Nigeria ranked 25th of 34 Afrobarometer countries and received a *not open* designation. With a low 40 percentile score on both the RGI and IIAG, Nigeria proved to be consistent across all matrices for high corruption, low transparency, low accountability and consistently low efficacy at meeting its obligation to its constituency.¹⁶⁹ Surveys and statistics such as these merely codify what Nigerians

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ TAGI looks at 34 African countries, including all 22 extractive industry countries. It is devised by rescaling and averaging responses to the 13 survey questions for each respondent, then computing a country average. The score is then used to rank all 34 countries into four categories: very open, with TAGI scores of between 0.96 and 1.15; fairly open, with scores between 0.87 and 0.94; not open, with scores between 0.65 and 0.83; and not all open, with scores between 0.49 and 0.59. All scores can be found on Table 2: Transparent and Accountable Governance Score in Afrobarometer, "Oil & Mining Countries: Transparency Low, Impunity High," (11 December 2013), http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno6.pdf.

¹⁶⁸ RGI is produced for 58 countries with sizeable extractive industries; encompassing four categories of variables: institutional and legal setting; reporting practices; safeguards and quality control; enabling environment. IIAG covers 52 African countries and the index consists of four main categories: safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunities; and human development. Compiled by combining over 100 variables from more than 30 independent African and global sources, the IIAG is the most comprehensive collection of data on African governance. www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/.

¹⁶⁹ Afrobarometer, "Oil and Mining Countries," Table 2, Figure 10A and 10b. www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno6.pdf.

experience—despite the pledges and reform efforts that are published by each new state or federal administration.

Echoing the sentiments of the indices on lack of transparency in the Nigerian government, Dr. Aminu Magashi, a medical professional who writes on the state of health governance in Nigeria, looks at the lack of transparency in the budgeting process in Nigeria—and specifically, how that lack affects the country’s health budget and planning. The four-day Advocacy for Women’s and Children’s Health Conference in August of 2013 was organized by the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH), the World Health Organization (WHO), and other relevant development partners. Nigerian CSO stakeholders as well as government representatives were in attendance to gain insight into developing budget advocacy strategies—the premise being that these individuals on the CSO and government representative side would have access and knowledge of the same information as it related to the Nigerian Ministry of Health’s and the overall national plan. The inability of Nigerian CSOs and media to engage in critical planning, costing, and advocacy discussions was inadequate at best due to three independently corroborated factors that Magashi identifies as attributable to a lack of budget transparency by the Nigerian Ministry of Health:

1. Nigeria scored 16 percent in Open Budget Index, earning a designation of *implied scant* or *no information* as it relates to measurement of budget transparency, the publishing of significant budget information, and participation.¹⁷⁰ As a form of reference, Transparency International rates the current Open Budget Index at 18 percent—still the lowest designation.¹⁷¹
2. Magashi cites a qualitative study by the Evidence for Action Project where 23 percent of respondents “give a low score to the ease of accessing information on national health budget, maternal and health budget, and on maternal and health outcomes at the state and local government level.”¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Aminu Magashi, “Nigeria: How Transparent in Nigeria’s Health Budget and Plan?” *The Daily Trust*, 24 September 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201309240487.html>.

¹⁷¹ Open Budget Index, Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA>.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

3. The Nigeria Accountability Framework, which assesses planning and implementation of health, scored very low marks for categories labeled “monitoring resources of the National Health Account (NHA).” Additionally, federal steering committees did not have local or CSO involvement; and while the federal health ministry had an officially approved framework for the NHA, the committee only functioned in an ad hoc capacity with “no clear system and budget line to support tracking of expenditures at all levels.”¹⁷³

Magashi emphasizes the lack of access to information and the close-hold tendency of the Nigerian government as it relates to resources that have been specifically set aside for health. When funding streams, budgets, the framework with which health budgets are developed and executed, the manner in which issues are lobbied or advocated is not transparent, the trust deficit is exacerbated.¹⁷⁴

Circumstances such as Magashi describes further illustrate the lack of trust that exists between CSOs and the government, even when structured attempts to collaborate are made.

TI’s and the UNDP’s efforts to map corruption and governance in sub-Saharan Africa echo the same sentiments regarding the lack of transparency and accountability in tracking public health expenditures. TI implemented the Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) in 14 countries and has been tracking these since 1996. The PETS were instituted to “track leakage of public funds or resources prior to reaching the intended beneficiary.”¹⁷⁵ In 2007, the published report indicated that for the Nigerian health sector, “attempts to conduct PETS in the health sector have been seriously hampered by unreliable and inconsistent budgets and/or little systematic information on financial flows at facility level.”¹⁷⁶ Magashi’s reporting seven years later show that not much has changed.

¹⁷³ Ibid. Also www.who.int/pmnch/media/events/2014/amhin.pdf?ua=1.

¹⁷⁴ Magashi, “Nigeria.”

¹⁷⁵ Transparency International, “Mapping of Corruption and Governance Measurement Tools in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *UNDP* (December 2007): 61.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 62.

On a parallel trajectory, the removal of the oil subsidy in Nigeria was another example of lack of transparency in decision making at the federal level. Writing on the topic in 2012, Osita Ogbu, a visiting fellow at the Africa Growth Initiative posits that the first instance of deception related to the removal of the subsidy lay in the failure of President Goodluck Jonathan to include such a measure in his election platform—a measure which would have provided ample notification to the citizens (who would be most affected) and would have afforded the opportunity for citizen participation by voting on the measure. As a secondary option, Ogbu posits that the subsidy elimination would have been more palatable for citizens if the government had built domestic support by publishing a plan and then followed up with publicizing the gradual implementation of that plan. Ogbu suggests that if the grand plan had included complementary government actions such as “stabilizing electric power supply (most Nigerians rely on fuel based generators for power), repairs to strategic roads, prosecution of corrupt high-level officials and reallocating recouped funds to fuel balancing efforts; and finally, improving the efficiency of refineries to at least half their installed capacity,”¹⁷⁷ all these efforts would have signified to the citizens that their government was attempting to mitigate and lessen the impact of such a drastic measure as cancelling oil subsidies.

The gradual reduction in subsidies and ongoing debate as to their eventual removal is attributable to the lack of confidence in state and local governments who, in theory, would receive any income recouped from ending subsidies. These are the same governments who Nigerians currently do not trust in their management of existing funding streams. The fundamental issue, Ogbu posits, rests therein: The Nigerian federation is incapable of being accountable for the funds it currently manages. Eliminating subsidies amounts to robbing from the citizens (who do not have much) and increasing the amount that government officials will divert for private use.¹⁷⁸

January 15, 1966, is significant in the record of the first military coup in Nigeria. Major Nzeogwu, a key planner behind the coup, declared martial law in northern Nigeria

¹⁷⁷ Osita Ogbu, “The Removal of Oil Price Subsidy in Nigeria: Lessons in Leadership and Policymaking in a Trust-Deficit Environment,” Brookings Institute, January 26, 2012, 1–6 www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/26-oil-subsidy-nigeria-ogbu

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

in a speech that referenced the reasons for the coup, the challenges that lay ahead, and the promise to citizens of Nigeria,

Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent, those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalist, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigeria political calendar back by their words and deeds. Like good soldiers we are not promising anything miraculous or spectacular. But what we do promise every law abiding citizen is freedom from fear and all forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field of human endeavor, both nationally and internationally.¹⁷⁹

Since that time, every military and civilian administration in Nigeria has stated something similar, yet 50 years later, none has taken adequate steps to provide budget and fiscal transparency and management—the first action required to mitigate the root cause: corruption. See Appendix 2 for the Africa Fiscal Transparency report for Nigeria as compiled by Internationalbudget.org. The budget process remains convoluted in a manner that guarantees the continuation of corrupt practices.

2. The Niger Delta: Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State

The federal government is not the only purveyor of corruption in Nigeria. The nature of the Nigerian Constitution means that responsibilities are shared among all three levels of government: the 36 states governments are further divided into 774 local government councils (LGCs).¹⁸⁰ On a monthly basis, the federal government allocates 20 percent of its revenue to the LGCs so they can fulfill their array of services to their constituents.¹⁸¹ LGCs may use any means to supplement their allocated funds, but most

¹⁷⁹ Siollun, *Oil, Politics and Violence*, 228.

¹⁸⁰ “Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria,” *Human Rights Watch* 19, no. 2(A), (January 2007): 11.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid* 11–14. The federal government uses a criterion that results in a “roughly equitable distribution of income across most of the LGC.” Corruption in this area is recorded based on the number of LGCs in each state. Per the federal government computations, the most populous state in Nigeria, Lagos, has 20 LGCs. The second most populous state, Kano, has 47 LGCs. The end result is that Lagos State leaders over the last 15 years have supplemented their revenue by implementing the taxes.

LGCs do not.¹⁸² Of note, the amount of funds that LGCs receive is directly tied to the federal government's income from oil—which in turn is based on global oil prices.¹⁸³ Additionally, oil-producing states rate up to an additional 13 percent of revenues from their region.¹⁸⁴ The report also notes that state governments are mandated to contribute to LGCs in their constituencies—a mandate that is rarely met and is not enforced.¹⁸⁵ In January 2007, the Human Rights Watch published a report using Rivers State, Nigeria (located in the oil rich Niger Delta region), to illustrate the impact of local government corruption. The case illustrates a phenomenon known as *Chop money*— Nigerian slang for embezzling government funds. The report ultimately illustrates the collusion between all levels of government in perpetuating corruption and leaving the poorest Nigerians without services, and thus further entrenching distrust within communities for all levels of government.

Specific to this illustration, the health and educational responsibilities that are primarily LGC responsibility will be examined. Concerning health, the nation's 13,000 government-run healthcare centers are the responsibility of the LGC communities in which they are located.¹⁸⁶ The 2007 report states that “local government responsibilities include building and maintaining the physical infrastructure of primary health centers, payment of staff salaries and stocking facilities with medicines and other necessary resources.”¹⁸⁷ Concerning education, LGCs are funded to implement education policy and daily operations ranging from maintenance of school facilities to providing materials and amenities within their LGCs.¹⁸⁸

Per the report, Rivers State is Nigeria's largest oil-producing state and has the wealthiest state government. It also has “23 LGCs that have been allocated more than

¹⁸² The report notes that in many LGCs, the federally allocated funds amounts to up to 80 percent of LGCs total income and they are responsible for supplementing as needed.

¹⁸³ “Chop Fine,” 14.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

\$636 million from the federation account since 1999.”¹⁸⁹ That said, it confounds reasonable thought when one analyzes the dismal failures in Rivers State in the context of the income the different levels of government administration receive. Although some progress has been made in recent years, the 2007 report ranked the Niger Delta region as one of the worst in terms of infant mortality and educational enrollment in 2006.¹⁹⁰ Citing 2004 revenue estimates of approximately a \$6 billion allocation split between four oil-producing states in the Niger Delta (Rivers State was one of the four), the failure of funds to reach the intended targets fueled the rise of oil bunkering, kidnapping, violent protests, and militancy by such groups as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).¹⁹¹

Closer examination presented in the report shows that phantom construction projects such as malls, schools, women’s centers, and office spaces (that often get abandoned before completion or do not physically exist), have trumped health and education needs.¹⁹² Further complicating the matter is the lack of transparency and accountability in budget development and reconciliation during the fiscal life cycle. This lack of transparency contributes to the “disappearance” of funds for line items such as salary bonuses that certain sectors of local government are entitled to receive.¹⁹³ Other mismanagement examples include one LGC where the health sector budget was \$23,000 dollars while the travel budget for the chairman of the LGC was \$53,800 dollars.¹⁹⁴ At the Rivers State macro level, the depth of such fraud, waste, and abuse is better contextualized by comparing the Rivers State budget to that of other countries in 2006, as reflected in Table 1.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 25.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 20.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 23. Local government officials often cite heavy federal deductions for payment of salaries, which leaves the administration with little funds to perform any other services.

¹⁹² Ibid., 29–31.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 34.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 37.

Table 1. Comparison of population and 2006 budget of Rivers state against those of selected West African countries¹⁹⁵

Country/State	Central Government Budget, 2006	Population
Senegal	\$1.68 billion	11.7 million
Rivers state, Nigeria	\$1.33 billion	Between 4 and 5 million
Mali	\$1.29 billion	10.5 million
Guinea	\$642 million	8.44 million
Niger	\$320 million	11.3 million

F. CONCLUSION

The current levels of violence and government mistrust that escalated in Nigeria in 2012 are similar to those of the 1990s. Fukuyama accurately describes the situation, saying, “People cannot associate, volunteer, vote, or take care of one another if they fear for their lives when walking down the street.”¹⁹⁶ Years of authoritarian civil and military rule have impacted the development of circles of trust and left Nigerian citizens still searching for associations that they can rely on to develop institutions that foster a representative relationship.¹⁹⁷ The trust is simply not there in the manner that Mishler and Rose describe. In terms of civil society and government, “Citizens must perceive the performance of political and civil institutions as providing some reasonable measure of individual and collective good.”¹⁹⁸ In politics, trust is performance based; it is learned and can be unlearned. Chapter IV expands on the impact the broken economic model in Nigeria has had on fostering mistrust, ineffective institutions, and an unrepresentative and closed state.

¹⁹⁵ From Human Rights Watch, 2006, 76.

¹⁹⁶ Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society,” 18.

¹⁹⁷ Mishler and Rose, “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism,” 419.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 419.

IV. ECONOMIC POLICIES AND IMPACTS

The Nigerian economy was primarily agriculture based before the discovery oil in the 1950s. The country once boasted the capability to produce enough food for both consumption and exportation. Since the shift to oil and natural resources, and to now importing food for consumption, the concept of the Dutch disease has led to a significant drop in investment in all other sectors of industry. The federal government controls access to the oil resources and manages the revenue rents generated from its export. Over the years, the elite group that has held federal-level positions has siphoned off billions of dollars in oil revenue to the detriment of the rest of the Nigerian populace. The impact of oil, corruption, income inequality, and poverty are all discussed in this chapter. Emphasis is placed on how a nontax-based revenue source serves to further disconnect the state from its constituents.

Nigeria has failed to diversify its economy and has relied on oil-based rents as the primary source of revenue. Because oil is a commodity that requires heavy machinery for extraction and refining, the federal government has been able to control access and, by default, the income that comes from this resource. The mismanagement of the oil revenue over the course of 50 years has resulted in dismal inequality, high poverty rates, and an exorbitant amount of wealth in the hands of a limited elite. Other factors such as corruption, the weakness of institutions since colonial rule, and the enduring mistrust and conflict stemming from state borders that were randomly drawn with no consideration of ethnic, regional, or religious differences contribute to the economic stagnation. Additionally, the reasons behind the lack of economic growth extend to intangible elements such as the nature and character of individuals who comprise the government and the civil society. The interests that drive each of these components determine whether a state's development and economic policies are sound and progressive—and directed toward advancing the welfare and safety of its constituency—or destructive and stagnant, with little regard for others outside the immediate power circle. The state is not an abstract entity; it is people who make good or bad policies. For the citizen, the choice lies in having the willingness to mobilize and demand responsive and responsible economic

policies—and change predatory leadership—or repeatedly acquiescing to economic and political practices that widen the inequality gap and perpetuate the unfulfilled potential of the Nigerian social and economic capital.

This chapter explores how the people who comprise the state have made economic and policy decisions that have thus far failed to diversify the economy and how that further disconnects the citizen from the state. Overreliance on the extraction of primary commodities by foreign interests continues to leave Nigeria vulnerable to exogenous shocks such as the current global oil bust. History continues to repeat itself with regard to the effect of failed economic policies on the citizenry. The international community response thus far seems to be centered on providing a salve in the form of foreign aid to the Nigerian government. In exchange, for minimal interference in failed development and distribution policies, the international community is able to maintain access to extract Nigeria's natural resources. This access translates to the continuous enrichment of a few members of the inner circle of the state and foreign interests. Indicators such as the gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national income (GNI) reveal the willingness of international interests and the Nigerian state and citizens to be pacified by Western measures of economic growth. The Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) and Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), however, reveal the real impact of Nigeria's economic policies on its citizens.

A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY

From a historical perspective, the inception of the economic structure in Nigeria begins with the colonial administration that facilitated the creation of the state and the administrative architecture that set the tone for relations between the state and the citizen. The exploitative nature of colonial institutions is not debatable. Nonetheless, history shows that extractive commercial trade practices extend back to the early 19th century and included moving commodities such as high volumes of palm oil, rubber, cocoa, and timber from the Niger Delta to Europe.¹⁹⁹ The trade routes in the north and coastal

¹⁹⁹ Heilbrunn, John *Oil, Democracy, and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 70. Ibid., 70.

regions were controlled by an exclusive elite of middlemen (kings, chiefs, then finally British-sanctioned African firms) who highly benefited from trade with the Europeans.²⁰⁰ The erosion of trust in traditional forms of authority links back to this critical time in the evolution of the Nigerian economy. As kings and chiefs built trade alliances with their European trading partners, the accountability links to their communities began to weaken, skewing in favor of increased influence with international power brokers for weapons (power and authority) and wealth. As social scientist John Heilbrunn states, “Participation in the governing structures meant nothing less than control over patronage positions and state largess. First, political elites used their positions to allocate jobs, money, and access to public contracts to their clients.”²⁰¹

That the British exploited these interests and divisions is evidenced by the regional amalgamation and regionalization of elites that persisted through the Nigerian independence. The British maximized the production of rubber, oil, and other cash crops in southern Nigeria—taking full advantage of the climate, the peasant labor, and the infrastructure that supported the full capacity by exporting resources in support of European industrial needs. Reinforcing the extractive ideology, the colonial administration built railroads in the vicinity of the resource sites and between staging and distribution areas across the country. They determined the prices for the commodities and controlled access to the external non-Nigerian markets that purchased the commodities. The British also compensated chiefs and kings, setting a one-sided leadership paradigm in favor of those with authority and access.

Nigeria’s dependency on these easily marketable cash crops foreshadowed the lopsided reliance on oil in the modern Nigerian economic paradigm. Just as the British determined the prices during colonial times, Nigerian governments did not rely on the market to determine supply and demand. Instead, commodity prices were set by commodity market boards.²⁰² Writing about the impact of these policies during the 1960s

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 71.

²⁰² T. Ademola Oyejide, *The Effects of Trade and Exchange Rate Policies on Agriculture of Nigeria* (Research Report 55) (Washington, DC, : International Food Policy Research Institute, 1986), 19.

and 1970s, T. Ademola Oyejide discusses the effect of the government's efforts to stabilize supply by price fixing.²⁰³ The end result for farmers and producers was dependency on government subsidies and a diminished incentive to produce.²⁰⁴

Agriculture was the trade of the citizens, the traditional export commodity that supported the Nigerian economy. Although exploited by the British during precolonial and colonial times, and later by the new Nigerian government, agriculture was labor intensive and a net export industry until the 1970s. By fixing prices below the international value, the Nigerian government essentially caused export farmers to lose heavy earnings potential from the international market and simultaneously decimated domestic food producers who could not compete with cheap imported foods. The boom associated with the exportation of oil represented a comparative advantage for Nigeria and had the potential to industrialize and expand the agricultural industry. Instead, the sector was neglected. Oyejide notes the drop of the agriculture sector's share of total government revenue from "89 percent in 1960 to 4 percent in 1981."²⁰⁵ A different perspective of the same phenomenon shows that annual food imports rose from less than \$2 million in 1962 to an excess of \$2 billion in 1984.²⁰⁶ Specifically looking across sectors, Oyejide provides a concise appreciation for the impact of the neglect of agriculture on various aspects of the economic spectrum (see Table 2).

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 36.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

Table 2. Changes in sectoral contributions to output, employment, and exports, 1970 and 1982²⁰⁷

(in percent)	Share of Output		Share of Employment		Share of Exports	
	1970	1982	1970	1982	1970	1982
<u>Sector</u>						
Agriculture	48.78	22.19	75.00	59.00	71.90	2.40
Oil & Mining	10.22	24.87	0.20	0.40	15.40	97.50
Manufacturing	7.15	5.64	15.00	17.70	12.70	0.10
Services	33.85	47.30	9.80	22.90	---	---

B. IMPACT OF OIL AND THE RESOURCE CURSE

The emphasis on the management of resources as the root of Nigeria's economical and developmental issues stems from the widely accepted premise that states with ample reserves of natural resources (in this case oil) are not automatically susceptible to the natural resource curse. The contrary is very possible. For example, in 2013, Michael Ross writes, "Countries like Norway, Canada, and Great Britain, which have high incomes, diversified economies, and strong democratic institutions, have extracted lots of oil and had few ill effects."²⁰⁸ Ross cites economists such as Jacob Viner, Arthur Lewis, and Melville Watkins, who argued in the 1950s and 1960s that such resources would help development, and posits that "countries blessed with natural resource wealth would be the exception, since they would have enough revenues to invest in the roads, schools, and other infrastructure that they needed to develop quickly."²⁰⁹ Ross drills down further to the point at which inefficiency enters the equation and suggests that relatively low production costs (i.e., the costs of extracting and associated payments to oil companies), are quickly overshadowed by the high rents that often accompany them. When the cost of extraction is subtracted from the cost per barrel, the remainder represents the rents that have historically been mismanaged in Third World countries like Nigeria.

²⁰⁷ From Oyejide, *Effects of Trade and Exchange Rate Policies*, 36.

²⁰⁸ Michael L. Ross, *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 2.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

The variance between extraction costs and rent per barrel across a selected number of countries in 2008 is illustrated in Figure 3.²¹⁰




Figure 3. Oil prices and rents in selected countries²¹¹

Heilbrunn supports Ross' concerns about the proper management of oil revenue being the main vulnerability for political, economic, and social development in Third World countries.²¹² Heilbrunn goes a step further by identifying the strength of state institutions at the discovery of the natural resource as a critical indicator for the success or failure of resource and revenue management. He states:

If politicians manage oil windfalls efficiently, the economy grows; payments for resource extractions smooth expenditure, and political leaders can set aside a percentage of the windfall earnings for future generations. If, on the other hand, the task exceeds policymakers' abilities, the economy is vulnerable to a range of adverse economic outcomes. Price volatility exposes the economy to Dutch disease effects. In many States, political leaders are likely to divert revenues to satisfy their supporting coalitions or reinforce authoritarian rule. Outcomes, whether optimal or

²¹⁰ Ibid., 35. The graph depicted represents a variance ranging from US\$6 per barrel in Canada to US\$42 per barrel in Nigeria.

²¹¹ After Ross, *The Oil Curse*, 36. This graph is an approximate recreation of the one in the book. The recreation strives to capture the significant variance between oil prices per barrel, actual extraction costs, and padded portion that represents rents (which historically have been siphoned off to some hundreds of billions of dollars).

²¹² Heilbrunn, *Oil, Democracy, and Development*, 12–14.

inefficient, are variable and reflect circumstances in the country when it becomes a petroState.²¹³

By all measures, the Nigerian policy makers did not embark on economic plans that would have leveraged the windfall from oil and mineral revenues. As illustrated by Table 1, the effects of a large influx of foreign currency from the discovery of oil reserves led to the diminishing of all other revenue sectors, resulting in the Dutch disease phenomenon that continues today in Nigeria.²¹⁴ The Nigerian economy relies mainly on oil and mineral exports. The enduring economic model has centered on exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods. Attempts to industrialize have been limited and unsuccessful, primarily due to the willingness of policy makers to stick with the status quo.

Of the research done on the impact of oil on the Nigerian economy, the empirical study conducted by Xavier-Sala-i-Martin, professor of economics at Columbia University, and Arvind Subramanian, economist at the IMF, perfectly captures the link between the nearly exclusive reliance on oil and minerals as the source of economic revenue and the abject mismanagement of the revenue, which is the primary cause for a dismal institutional development in the country.²¹⁵ Their research ties the mismanagement and theft of revenues to the high poverty levels previously evident in Nigeria. Funds that should have reinforced development initiatives and deepened the realization of democratic ideals for many Nigerians, to include physical and economic security, have instead been siphoned off to a few elites over the last 50 years. The two researchers used data covering 1970 to 2000, and published their initial findings in 2003 and a slightly modified version in 2012. The charts, tables, and graphs in this chapter cite heavily from the initial May 2003 publication. The rest of this section cites heavily on that research to support the belief echoed by most Nigerians: the root of the endemic poverty, lack of services, and a failed and worsening security climate is not the oil and minerals but the corrupt tendencies of the people who have comprised the state.

²¹³ Ibid., 14.

²¹⁴ Ross, *The Oil Curse*, 35–37.

²¹⁵ Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria,” *Journal of African Economies* 22, no. 4 (2012): 573.

C. MISMANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES: 1970–2000

The 30 years between the first coup and the return to democratic rule represent a period of astronomical revenue and an equally unprecedented case of economic decline. Military and civilian administrations alike proved incapable of managing revenue and human capital, which ultimately resulted in the collapse of all non-oil related sectors, the collapse of the Nigerian middle class, and high poverty levels.

1. Revenue

Revenue allocation and generation has been a persistent political issue in Nigeria. The regionalization, then federation of states within the country directly correlates to the share of national revenue that each region/state receives. As a concept, regional development is tied to the funds. Each state governor or representative is charged with enhancing all aspects of social and economic welfare for his or her constituency with their allocation of national revenue. Over the years, Nigeria's revenue has been primarily driven by the income from oil and minerals. This has led to disputes ranging from the Biafra war to the ongoing destabilizing efforts of MEND in the Niger Delta. One of the primary challenges with an extractive-based revenue source like oil is that the control of the revenue at the national level is almost absolute. As a result, there is a significant discrepancy between the revenue realized at the national level, and the amount that makes its way to state and local levels—and by extension, to meet citizens' needs.

A key component of the 2003 research is the following statement:

Over a 35-year period, Nigeria's revenues from oil (after deducting the payments to the foreign oil companies) have amounted to about US\$350 billion at 1995 prices. In 1965, when oil revenues per capita were about US\$33, per capita GDP was US\$245. In 2000, when oil revenues were US\$325 per capita, per capita GDP remained at the 1965 level. In other words, all the oil revenues—US\$350 billion in total—did not add to the standard of living at all.²¹⁶

²¹⁶ Ibid.

Figure 4 offers an illustration of the statement.²¹⁷




Figure 4. Revenues from oil, 1965–2000 (at 1995 Prices)²¹⁸

With the revenue for that timeframe set, the researchers focused on key indicators that affect the average Nigerian citizen, and juxtaposed each indicator with the revenue to determine the revenue’s impact and the causes behind the impact.

2. Poverty

According to the World Bank and other international poverty indicators, poverty rates depicting the number of people surviving on less than US\$1 per day ballooned during the research time frame—per the authors’ calculations.²¹⁹ Figures 5 and 6 depict the increase both as a percentage of the population and as the number of people who were pushed below the poverty line over the same period.²²⁰

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid., 571.




Figure 5. Poverty rate: 1970–2000 based on 2003 calculations²²¹




Figure 6. Poverty count: 1970–2000 based on 2003 calculations²²²

3. Detrimental Effect of Natural Resources on Institutional Quality and Growth

Institutions are the formal and informal parameters that directly affect the citizenry and civil society by modulating relationships. Institutions guide property rights and the voracity of rule of law. Formal and functioning institutions that are accessible to all citizens provide order to chaos and propagate the sense of equity that mitigates the class- or ethnic-based disenfranchisement that often leads to conflict or apathy—both of which are endemic in Nigeria.

²²¹ From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 571.

²²² From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 571.

Here the authors created specific formulas using the World Bank Development Indicator for growth rates of per capita Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP. The authors rely on Daniel Kaufmann's 2002 research to define the institutional components that were then measured against natural resources. These components include voice and accountability (representation); rule of law (physical security, business and property rights, equitable applicability across all demographics); and control of corruption (improper use of office or authority—bribery, shadow courts), to name three.²²³ All are subjectively evaluated based on citizen's perceptions of their government's abilities and performance in each area. (Dani Rodrik et al. also focus on property rights and rule of law in their detailed analysis of institutions.)²²⁴ After running the growth regression, the authors concluded that natural resources have no direct negative impact on growth. The regression model used to determine the impact of natural resources on institutional quality conclusively determined that natural resources have a significant negative impact on the quality of institutions.²²⁵ Of greater significance, they found that oil and minerals (more than agriculture or other resources) have a higher likelihood of adversely impacting institutional quality. Thus, "It is the lobbying for and allocation of the rents associated with such resources, which is detrimental to economic and political institutions."²²⁶ Additionally, Michael Ross' arguments on the rents associated with oil and minerals support this particular conclusion.

²²³ Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, "Governance Matters II—Updated Indicators for 2000/01," World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 2772 (February 2002), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15733/multi0page.pdf?sequence=1>

²²⁴ Dani Rodrik, Avinand Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Integration and Geography in Development," *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9305*, (October 2002), www.nber.org/papers/w9305.pdf.

²²⁵ Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse," 580.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 584.

4. Proving Waste and Fraud

Heavy investment into physical capital (from the oil boom) with an equally rapid decline of productivity over the same period leads to the conclusion that the money was expensed, but ultimately there is little to show for it. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian's research emphasizes this abuse of finances by comparing two graphics (see Figures 7 and 8). Figure 7 shows the growth of physical capital: "A substantial part of the increase was accounted for by public capital spending financed by surging oil revenues."²²⁷




Figure 7. GDP, Capital and TFP, 1965–2000 (Index, 1965 = 100)²²⁸

Given the growth of capital investment and spending by the government, a parallel trajectory should exist in capacity utilization (Figure 8) that is a measure of productivity and should capture the output for the capital investment reflected in Figure 7. Instead, the data showed an inverse relationship over the same period.

²²⁷ Ibid., 595.

²²⁸ From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse," 596.




Figure 8. Average Capacity Utilization in Manufacturing, 1975–2000 (percent)²²⁹

Concrete evidence to support such low productivity is evinced by examples such as that of the Ajaokuta steel complex that, despite a more than US\$20 billion investment since it was commissioned in 1979, has yet to produce any steel.²³⁰ The caveat to this is that average capacity utilization in Nigeria in the decade since 2000 has only slightly improved, languishing in the mid-50 percentile range.²³¹

5. Graphic Depiction of Collapse of Economic Sectors

The final relevant portion of the Sala-i-Martin study relates to the sharp decline of sectors that represented a competitive advantage for Nigeria in the 1960s (cash crops/agriculture). Figure 9 shows the juxtaposition of the expansion of government in administration and services and depicts the move to civil service and the reliance on the government for employment and “payouts or kickbacks.” The previous section clearly depicts that government spending did not translate to tangible improvements in other sectors. Instead, the government grew as a method of patronage.

²²⁹ From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 597. Source of data is the Central Bank of Nigeria database. www.cenbank.org/OUT/2010/PUBLICATIONS/STATISTICALBULLETINS/2009/PartC/PartC.html.

²³⁰ “Nigeria: Completing the Ajaokuta Steel Complex,” *The Guardian*, 24 September 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201409240832.html>.

²³¹ Table C.4.1: Average Capacity Utilization, Central Bank of Nigeria, www.cenbank.org/OUT/2010/PUBLICATIONS/STATISTICALBULLETINS/2009/PartC/PartC.html.




Figure 9. Shares of the sectors in real GDP, 1965–2000²³²

Viewed through the context of poverty increase over the same time frame, one can conclude that significant waste and mismanagement of oil revenues hampered Nigeria’s development from 1965 to 2000. The next sections looks at the period since 2000 and updates some of the metrics covered by the Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian.

D. ECONOMIC TRENDS 2000–PRESENT

By the leading global standards, the decade since the 2003 Sala-i-Martin study has been one of impressive growth for the Nigerian economy.²³³ Some state economies within Nigeria, primarily those associated with the All Progressive Congress (APC) Party, have slowly but successfully phased in a tax-based revenue system to supplement existing oil-based revenue streams. Equally irrefutable is that the “decade of growth” has not translated to meaningful advancement in mitigating endemic poverty, improving infrastructure to facilitate better economic opportunities, or improving institutions of government such as the rule of law and security apparatus that would improve the overall standard of living conditions for most Nigerians.²³⁴ All that said, the current Nigerian economic situation centers around a small but increasing effort to diversify beyond

²³² From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 601, Figure A.


²³³ Jan Hofmeyr, “Africa Rising? Popular Dissatisfaction with Economic Management Despite a Decade of Growth,” *Policy Brief No. 2*, (October 2013), www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno2.pdf.

²³⁴ Ibid.

resource based revenues; a struggle to translate positive growth and positive international economic indicators into tangible gains at the citizens level; and a sense of desperation as Boko Haram–led terrorism is penetrating deeper into all regions of the country, adding additional stress that widens the disconnect between the state and citizens.

1. Current Graphs and Maps

As Figure 10 shows, crude oil prices have fallen by 50 percent over the last year.



Source: Drilling Info International

Figure 10. Depicts the current bust of oil prices²³⁵

The impact of this change has the potential to push more local state governments into the tax-based revenue scheme that APC states have been slowly building on.

²³⁵ From BBC News Africa Report, “Nigeria elections: Mapping a nation divided,” (8 February 2015), www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31101351?fb_ref=Default. Oil and gas accounts for 35 percent of Nigeria's GDP and pays for 70 percent of government spending. Petrol products account for 90 percent of the country's export earnings. The recent fall in oil prices has forced the government to revise its budget and cut growth forecasts. For the first time since 1999, Nigeria's government revenue is shrinking and the value of the national currency, the *naira*, is falling.

2. Tax-Based Revenue (Lagos + 5 APC States)

Necessity has spurred the introduction of tax-based revenue within the southern states. Political vindictiveness stemming from the 1999 return to democratic rule led to a political map where states with newly elected APC (initially called Action Congress (AC) Party) governors had to find supplemental income to accomplish state business—because the federally elected president was a member of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Lagos State was one of the APC states and the governor demonstrated strong leadership first by using the federally allocated funds to deliver on his campaign promise to improve living conditions and governance in Lagos State. The precedent he set by delivering on his pledge to the citizens facilitated his efforts to set up a credible and workable tax collection system, and thereafter he used the Lagos state radio as an effective community mobilization tool to urge the citizenry to pay their taxes to enable the government to sustain, improve, and expand on the facilities and amenities. The citizenry have responded positively and enthusiastically to the change, and, most promising, other APC states have followed suit. Economist Robert Looney describes the situation as follows:

The reform government initially contracted with a private company to collect taxes, offering it a percentage of the gain as incentive. And it subsequently cleaned its own house, replacing a compliant bureaucracy with one that owed allegiance to the reform governor. As a result, tax collections (adjusted for inflation) increased six-fold between 1999 and 2011. Nearly three-quarters of Lagos’ revenues are now internally generated, leading other states to follow its example.²³⁶

This tax-based revenue initiative can be easily seen when depicted on a map that shows the APC states, as laid out in Figure 11 from the 8 February 2015 BBC report.

²³⁶ Robert Looney, “Nigeria Faces the Abyss,” (forthcoming article), 7, www.relooney.com/NS4053/Rel-Nigeria-Milken-Review-2014.pdf/

Politics

Controlling parties by state

■ APC ■ PDP ■ APGA



Figure 11. The 2015 APC states that are in various stages of tax-based revenue sourcing²³⁷

Looney rightly points to the unlikelihood of the federal government implementing similar schemes due to the general unwillingness to adhere to stricter transparency and accountability measures when dealing with tax-based revenue.²³⁸ To this point, the 2013 Afrobarometer survey of citizens' views on transparency of utilization of tax revenue at the federal level reveals that 69 percent of respondents believe the Nigerian governments use of tax revenue is "opaque, and very difficult" to track.²³⁹

²³⁷ From BBC News, 8 February 2015. The tax-based schemes have received wide spread support in the APC states. The administration in those states has been able to deliver on improvements to basic infrastructure and other public services. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31101351?fb_ref=Default.

²³⁸ Looney, "Nigeria Faces the Abyss," (forthcoming article), 8, www.relooney.com/NS4053/Rel-Nigeria-Milken-Review-2014.pdf

²³⁹ E. Gyimah-Boadi, Daniel Armah-Attah Mohammed Awal, and Joseph Luna, "Oil and Mining Countries: Transparency Low, Impunity High," 11 December 2013, *Policy Brief No. 6.*, Afrobarometer, http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno6.pdf. Figures 1 and 2 are in Appendix A and Appendix B.

3. Return to Agriculture

Given the unlikely success of a federal government tax-based revenue approach, Looney offers additional insight into other measures taken by the federal government in recent years to diversify beyond oil and minerals. He discusses the resurgence of the agriculture sector in two relevant articles. Specifically, the government took steps to revitalize the agriculture sector by launching the Agriculture Transformation Action Plan (ATAP) in 2011.²⁴⁰ Looney cites gradual but steady growth of commercial banking loans from a miniscule fraction to almost U.S. \$250 million to the sector by 2013, to the government's assertion that 500 thousand jobs have been created over that same time frame.²⁴¹ Both claims support the general consensus that this particular economic policy initiative is supported by the citizens and is working to raise overall productivity, with the potential in the long-term of reducing poverty and unemployment and Nigeria's overreliance on food imports.²⁴² The prospect of returning to its traditional agricultural strengths would allow Nigeria to capitalize on a sector that once represented a comparative advantage (extensive labor market and arable lands).

An assessment of Nigeria's current economic policies and how those policies translate to the citizens ultimately has to consider all the topics previously discussed, which encompass historical practices, the role of leadership, the role of international actors and indicators of growth, new economic policies, and the citizen's perspective on how it all affects him or her. This final piece is easily overlooked by the federal government in Nigeria—due to the reliance on a revenue source that precludes the citizen's input. But as former French president Nicolas Sarkozy states, “Nothing is more destructive than the gap between people's perception of their own day-to-day economic well-being and what politicians and statisticians are telling them about the economy.”²⁴³

²⁴⁰ Robert Looney, “Nigeria: Economy,” Europa World Plus online, (London: Routledge), retrieved 13 February 2015 from [//www.europaworld.com/entry/ng.ec](http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng.ec).

²⁴¹ Ibid., 3; Looney, “Nigeria faces abyss,” 7.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Robert Looney, “The Boko Haram Economy,” *Foreign Policy* (July 15, 2014), 2, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/15/the-boko-haram-economy/>.

This statement speaks directly to the disconnect between Nigeria’s “decade of growth” and that growth not translating to real gains for the average Nigerian citizen. In spite of factoring in industries such as the highly successful Nollywood (Nigerian film industry), the fashion industry, telecoms, and other service and manufacturing gains that boosted the overall GDP, “Nigerians are no richer than they were before the GDP figures were revised.”²⁴⁴

Equally disturbing is the growing threat represented by Boko Haram to these diversification efforts. As reflected in Appendix A, the BBC report offers insight into the expanding efforts by the terrorist organization as it takes aim at destabilizing more regions across the country, destroying the already fragile infrastructure and instilling fear into citizens and foreign investors alike—who are less likely to pursue loans to start businesses or make impactful investment partnerships, respectively, due to the volatile security environment.²⁴⁵ Looney cites Nigeria’s ranking of 122nd out of 126 countries on the 2013 Positive Peace Index as a deterrent for foreign investors.²⁴⁶ Finally, the federal government’s slow response to the destabilizing threat of Boko Haram has further exploited the disenfranchisement rooted in religious, ethnic, and regional politics. The government inaction reinforces that despite the democratic title and visage, it is a closed administration that is less obligated to act when prompted by citizens and civil society alone.

E. IMPACT OF BAD ECONOMIC POLICIES ON THE CITIZEN

The social factors in Nigeria, measured by matrices collected from the UNDP HDI, the Afrobarometer, and others, clearly indicate that despite economic growth depicted in the GDP and other international economic measures, the plight of the citizen vis-à-vis services and security has stagnated or worsened.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ See Appendix A for maps depicting growing attacks.

²⁴⁶ Looney, “The Boko Haram Economy,” 2.

1. Afrobarometer Perceptions on the Economy and Personal Living Conditions

In 2008, Afrobarometer published its findings from a “comparative series of national public attitude surveys on democracy, markets and civil society in Africa.”²⁴⁷ The nine-part compendium offers an insight into citizens’ assessment of their reality in their own country. It is a counterbalance to a lot of the progress that the empirical data in earlier sections of this chapter alludes to. The importance of the citizen’s opinion is aptly captured by the authors’ statement: “Perceptions are paramount in the interest-driven realm of the marketplace and the ideological realm of politics. Whether or not attitudes exactly mirror exterior circumstances, an individual’s interior perspective *forms the basis of any calculus of action.*”²⁴⁸ Specific to Nigeria, the representative sample size of 2,324 adults (over age 18 and voter eligible) was conducted from 13 to 25 May, 2008.²⁴⁹

Two parts specifically deal with the citizen’s perception of the economic situation in Nigeria and how it directly affects them. With regard to national economic conditions, 61 percent of respondents felt that Nigeria’s economic condition was “fairly/very bad.” An additional 4 percent felt that the current year was either the same or much worse than the previous year, and 75 percent predicted an even worse economic situation in the following year.²⁵⁰ When asked about their personal economic conditions, more than half the respondents had less than favorable opinions on their present living conditions—with 32 percent responding “fairly/very bad.” This particular opinion was tempered by over 80 percent having a more positive outlook for living conditions in the following year.²⁵¹

The perceived economic woes continued in 2013 despite a decade of growth—per World Bank indicators. In a follow-up survey by Afrobarometer, 67 percent of

²⁴⁷ Eric Little and Carolyn Logan, Afrobarometer Network, “The quality of democracy and governance in Africa: New Results from Afrobarometer Round 4: A Compendium of Public Opinion Findings from 19 African Countries, 2008,” *Working Paper No. 108*. www.afrobarometer.org.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 36.

respondents in Nigeria felt that the national economy was either bad or very bad.²⁵² Similarly, 42 percent of respondents felt that their personal living conditions were fairly to very bad in 2013—10 additional percentage points worse than 2008. And much like 2008, 85 percent had a positive outlook for improvements in the following year.²⁵³

In ranking the top three problems in Nigeria, respondents picked economic, agricultural, and then social issues and services as first, second and third. At 59 percent, improving economic conditions superseded maintaining order, protecting rights, and improving political checks and balances.²⁵⁴ Specifically, the central government received dismal ratings in its handling of economic matters ranging from improving living standards, ensuring people have enough to eat, creating jobs, and maintaining roads and bridges (critical to commerce) to narrowing gaps between the wealthy and poor, keeping prices down, and fighting corruption. The high inflation rate due to economic policies contributed to high prices rating the worst with 81 percent of respondents saying that the government performance was very bad.²⁵⁵ The round of questions about the central government's performance on services such as providing water and sanitation services, providing reliable electricity supply, and protecting rivers and forests all equally had low ratings, with 75 percent reporting fairly to very bad provision of reliable electricity—which is critical to all aspects of life.²⁵⁶

A 2013 basic services performance ratings survey conducted by Afrobarometer provides insight into the continued downward spiral of water and sanitation (71 percent) and electrical (79 percent) services in Nigeria. In both cases, the 2013 assessment was worse than that in 2008. Drilling further down to the local government levels, respondents seemed to have a slightly better opinion of performance on parallel matters. Maintaining local roads, maintaining marketplaces, removing refuse, and protecting local

²⁵² Jan Hofmeyr, "Africa Rising? Popular Dissatisfaction with economic management despite a decade of Growth," *Afrobarometer Policy Brief No. 2*, (October 2013): 13. www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno2.pdf

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁵⁴ Little and Logan, *Working Paper No. 108*, 19.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.

community assets all had better responses with only a low 60th percentile responding as being fairly or very badly handled by local governments.²⁵⁷

2. Inequality and Poverty

In chronicling some local poverty metrics in Nigeria, the 2008 survey shows that too many Nigerians went without enough food to eat, clean water for use in the home, fuel to cook, and cash income. Additionally, the survey found that 75 percent of respondents felt that the economic policies benefited only an elite few. The 2013 update reinforces these views on inequality with 84 percent stating that the government does a fairly or very bad job of creating jobs and 88 percent of respondents saying that the government does a fairly or very bad job of reducing the gap between the rich and poor in Nigeria.²⁵⁸

3. Human Development Index and Inequality

The HDI is a widely accepted composite index that looks beyond economic growth to evaluate the basic development levels of 187 countries.²⁵⁹ Specifically, HDI “is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.”²⁶⁰ There is an illusion of progress when one looks at the raw data concerning Nigeria compiled over a range of years by the UNDP, which is reflected in Table 3.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 23.

²⁵⁸Hofmeyr, *Policy Brief No.2*, 18.

²⁵⁸Hofmeyr, *Policy Brief No.2*, 18.

²⁵⁹ United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, Human Development Index, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

Table 3. Nigeria's HDI trends bases on consistent time series data and new goalposts²⁶¹

	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
1980	45.6	6.7		4,259	
1985	46.4	8.6		3,202	
1990	46.1	6.7		2,668	
1995	46.1	7.2		2,594	
2000	46.6	8.0		2,711	
2005	48.7	9.0	5.0	3,830	0.466
2010	51.3	9.0	5.2	4,716	0.492
2011	51.7	9.0	5.2	4,949	0.496
2012	52.1	9.0	5.2	5,176	0.500
2013	52.5	9.0	5.2	5,353	0.504

²⁶¹ From 2014 Nigeria HDR: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf.

Focusing specifically from 2005 to 2013 in the 2014 Human Development Report (HDR) on Nigeria, the composite index is deconstructed to show the trend of each component. As depicted in Figure 12, the trend for the indices over the nine-year period generally seems positive. As is discussed below, both Table 3 and Figure 12 depict a promising picture of reality. Figure 12 shows the contribution of each component index to Nigeria’s HDI since 2005.




Figure 12. Trends in Nigeria’s HDI component indices 2005–2013²⁶²

In 2010, the UNDP started factoring in the extensive inequalities seen across many countries despite the economic growth that the same countries were experiencing. UNDP developed the inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) to capture the inequality inherent in each country and present a rebased HDI that accounts for that inequality. Of the IHDI, the UNDP states:

²⁶² From 2014 Nigeria HDR: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf.

The IHDI is basically the HDI discounted for inequalities. The “loss” in human development due to inequality is given by the difference between the HDI and the IHDI, and can be expressed as a percentage. As the inequality in a country increases, the loss in human development also increases. We also present the coefficient of human inequality as a direct measure of inequality which is an unweighted average of inequalities in three dimensions.²⁶³

To illustrate, the 2014 HDR computes the adjusted IHDI (the HDI discounted for inequality) for Nigeria as follows: The HDI for 2013 is 0.504. However, the IHDI is 0.300, a loss of 40.3 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the dimension indices, as reflected in Table 4. The average loss due to inequality for low HDI countries is 32.6 percent and for sub-Saharan Africa, it is 33.6 percent. The human inequality coefficient for Nigeria is equal to 40.2 percent.

Table 4. The adjusted HDI²⁶⁴

	IHDI value	Overall loss (%)	Human inequality	Inequality in life	Inequality in education (%)	Inequality in income
Nigeria	0.300	40.3	40.2	40.8	45.2	34.5

The IHDI essentially tempers the propensity to automatically project progress reflected in a growing GDP and GNI to improvements in the lives of the average Nigerian. Instead, the 0.300 value portrays a more dismal and accurate picture of development in Nigeria.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ After “Table C: Nigeria’s IHDI for 2013 relative to selected countries and groups”

The low level of development also validates the results of MPI that were first computed in the 2010 HDR.²⁶⁵ The computations for 2011 are reflected in Table 5 of the 2014 HDR report and show a country where 68.0 percent of the population lives below the income poverty line of U.S. \$1.25 per day, with 25.7 percent of those in severe poverty. The IHDI statistics are commensurate with the Afrobarometer findings regarding hardships related to challenging living standards faced by many Nigerians.

²⁶⁵ As stated by UNDP: “The MPI identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in education, health and living standards. The education and health dimensions are each based on two indicators, while the standard of living dimension is based on six indicators. All of the indicators needed to construct the MPI for a household are taken from the same household survey. The indicators are weighted to create a deprivation score, and the deprivation scores are computed for each household in the survey. A deprivation score of 33.3 percent (one-third of the weighted indicators), is used to distinguish between the poor and nonpoor. If the household deprivation score is 33.3 percent or greater, the household (and everyone in it) is classed as multidimensionally poor. Households with a deprivation score greater than or equal to 20 percent but less than 33.3 percent are near multidimensional poverty. Definitions of deprivations in each dimension, as well as methodology of the MPI are given in Technical note 5 and in Calderon and Kovacevic 2014.” Definition found in the 2014 Nigeria HDR: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf.

Table 5. Most recent MPI for Nigeria²⁶⁶

	Survey year	MPI value	Head-count (%)	Intensity of deprivations (%)	Population share (%)			Contribution to overall poverty of deprivations in (%)		
					Near poverty	In severe poverty	Below income poverty line	Health	Education	Living Standards
Nigeria	2011	0.239	43.3	55.2	17.0	25.7	68.0	32.6	26.9	40.4

²⁶⁶ From Table “F” of 2014 HDR http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf.

F. IMPACT ON CIVIL SOCIETY

In articulating what civil society is, Leslie Fox states, “Civil society is a political concept because it is essentially about power; the power of non-state actors to participate in making decisions that have an impact on them.”²⁶⁷ By this definition, civil society has not realized many victories or gains in Nigeria. Victories in areas related to women’s health issues and AIDS have been pushed and funded by international NGOs, and local extensions of those NGOs have leveraged the international visibility to maintain some of those gains. Nigeria’s civil society has had limited confrontational or complementary efforts with the Nigerian government in recent years. Admittedly, Goran Hyden describes the most fundamental challenge that CSOs face:

Civil society presupposes the existence of a public realm in which there is a clear delineation of rights and obligations between individual citizens and the State. There needs to be a legal and constitutional framework which applies equally to everyone. A society lacks in civility if some members believe they stand above the law. In States where this is the case the rule of law is in question. In these countries, the task of building civil society cannot be seen in isolation from building the State. If the latter lacks what Max Weber refers to as a “legal-rational” foundation for its authority, building civil society is bound to run into special problems. This is the challenge particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.²⁶⁸

By extension, the same applies to Nigeria. Internal organizational inefficiencies are exacerbated by external institutional inefficiencies, such as weak rule of law and weak CSO funding. All these issues frustrate the ability of CSOs to realize the political impact that Fox describes.

Nigerian CSOs face several funding constraints ranging from setting up and maintaining advocacy groups for building and sustaining the momentum behind initiatives to the cost associated with maintaining a reliable communication infrastructure in a country with unreliable power sources. This problem is further exacerbated when

²⁶⁷ Goran Hyden, “Building Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium,” in *Beyond Prince and Merchant: Citizen Participation and the Rise of Civil Society*, ed. John Burbidge, (New York: Pact Publications, 1997), 17.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 39.

ethnic and religious tensions are factored in. When regional economic and social development is added to this mix, the associated funding becomes politicized and is no longer a nationalist struggle for CSOs, who, as they solicit funding for these expenses, must then also contend with regional alliances and interests. Janice Jiggins describes these frustrations in detail when writing on the successes and challenges of advocating for women's health in Nigeria since the 1980s.²⁶⁹

Marina Ottaway notes the same constraints in her analysis of civil society in Third World countries. She frames her points by observing that the donor-heavy effort of cultivating civil society in these countries has thus far led to a donor-driven definition of CSOs and donor-driven areas of focus since it is the donor that controls the purse strings—regardless of what issues the average citizen may actually be interested in advancing. Ottaway concludes that the foreign nature of funding has hindered the strong connection with grassroots or citizens.²⁷⁰ Ottaway describes a dilemma faced by foreign donors: to support trustee entities that they can control but that have a shallow connection with the grassroots or to put their funding toward grassroots associations and professionalize them in a manner that fosters their ability to balance foreign funding with local interests.²⁷¹ The success of either approach is summarily panned by Dambisa Moyo, who cites numerous studies in concluding that civil society requires a middle class with an interest in holding its government accountable and foreign aid funding hinders the government's interest in developing a middle class—often it chooses not to institute economic policies that would foster enough independence and elevate the middle class to one with the potential of challenging the government.²⁷² Moyo's point on the strength of mobilization and influence a tax-paying middle class has speaks directly to what is missing in Nigeria. Finally, she links it all together, pointing out that the most critical

²⁶⁹ Janice Jiggins, "Women Remaking Civil Society," in *Beyond Prince and Merchant*, ed. John Burbidge (New York: Pact Publications, 1997), 207–214.

²⁷⁰ Marina Ottaway, "Social Movements, Professionalization of Reform, and Democracy in Africa," in *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*, eds. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press), 78.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 85.

²⁷² Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 57.en58.

component of strong, effective, and efficient civil society is a strong middle class with interests to hold government accountable to.²⁷³

While Moyo raises credible points on the influence of foreign aid, an area with very little research so far is the nature of Nigerian federal funding of CSOs. In the very few cases where federal funding occurs, the CSO seems to be an extension of the federal or state patronage system. Recent effort is being made by CSOs that are funded by the government to separate their stance from one that is merely an extension of the federal source of funding so they can advocate on behalf of the masses. This change is evinced first by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), who recently established a Whistleblower Protection Fund to protect members and the public from litigation expenses related to possible reprisals from the government.²⁷⁴ The efforts by a coalition of 10 CSOs under the umbrella of the State of the Union (SOTU) and in collaboration with Accountability for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health in Nigeria (AMHiN) represents the second example. These CSOs, along with the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) joined efforts to pressure President Jonathan's administration to follow through on its financial pledge to spend approximately US\$ 10 million of national funds toward combating the Ebola virus. This collaboration stemmed from back-pedaling by the minister of health on the use of the funds that were pledged when the president declared a state of emergency on Ebola. As of the end of 2014, this was still an ongoing battle of interests.²⁷⁵

G. CONCLUSION

For oil-based economies such as Nigeria, phenomena such as the Dutch disease and the resource curse are fairly common conditions because the core economic model

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Andy Nssien, "Nigeria: ICAN Sets Up N50 Million Whistleblowers' Protection Fund," 12 December 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201412121443.html>.

²⁷⁵ Sylvester Enoghase and Hassan Zaggi, "Nigeria: CSOs Battle Jonathan Over Assent to National Health Bill," *Daily Independent*, 30 November 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201411300176.html>.

for the country is centered on resource extraction and sale. Terms such as these matter because they are the most significant barrier to the citizen and, by extension, civil society development. The bottom line is that the federal administration in Nigeria is a closed state—a trait it shares with many oil-based economies around the world. Is this a common fate for all resource-rich developing economies? The answer seems to be no when discussing the global population of countries but yes for Nigeria and African countries. Extensive research conducted and published by entities ranging from Global Governance to independent researchers suggest that a number of factors can mitigate the likelihood for the Dutch disease in these economies. Those factors include the nature of the leadership, the diversification of revenue sourcing, and the strengthening of the middle class.

The IMF, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and other prominent international agencies set an 8 percent (of total GDP) threshold to categorize countries that are supported by extractive minerals. Nigeria is in a league with numerous other African countries where a high percentage of GDP is attributable to extractive minerals.²⁷⁶ Apart from petroleum, Nigeria's other natural resources include natural gas, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, and arable land. The oil and gas sector accounts for about 35 per cent of GDP, and petroleum exports revenue represents over 90 percent of total exports revenue.²⁷⁷ Commodities are subject to the bust and boom of the market and, as such, represent a precarious foundation upon which to base revenue source for any nation's development.

Even more concerning is the high possibility of mismanagement of the rents associated with commodity-based revenue. Commodities can be a vital part of revenue but should be a component of a diverse program. To foster vertical accountability in all aspects of government and society, citizens have to be connected to their elected leadership. In turn, the leadership is obligated to make sound economic and policy decisions that are in the best interest of those they represent. Tax-based revenue is the

²⁷⁶ Gyimah-Boadi et al. "Oil and Mining Countries."

²⁷⁷ Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm.

main economic vehicle to engender such a relationship. The state is open, civil associations are emboldened by and enabled to advocate on behalf of citizens, and citizens are empowered to exercise their constitutional rights and recall or elect officials at all levels of government who will create policies and results that are beneficial to the security and living conditions of the majority, rather than to an elite few.

The economic history of Nigeria supports a track record of disconnect within the civilian population. Influence is restricted to foreign investment sources and oligarchs that have materialized since the introduction of some liberalization initiative by Gowon in the early 1970s. Endemic corruption leads to a state with a closed economy. These factors have limited and continue to limit the ability of civil society to have meaningful impact in advocating for the interests of citizens. The bottom line is that the state has to be willing and open to working with citizens and society.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis examined three reasons why civil society is handicapped in its ability to promote democratic governance in Nigeria. The argument attributes this failure to a disconnect between the essential components of democratic governance: the civil society (comprising the masses and the elites that represent the CSO administrative structure), the state, and the economy.

First, this thesis posits that traditional/tribal civil society weakened as a consequence of modernization. However, the new civil society has yet to connect with the state in order to produce effective representative governance. The systematic weakening and cooptation of the traditional institutions that attended to the security and service needs of citizens was reduced for several reasons. The proliferation of Western religion and education through Christian missionaries broke the bonds to traditional practices and introduced new beliefs and concepts of success. These new concepts led to the migration of many from rural to urban areas in pursuit of new ideals. Chinua Achebe and other noted authors have charted the effects of Western influence on traditional institutions in Nigeria. Eventually, new “Nigerian” administrations (military and civilian alike), also undermined the traditional institutions by force or other means. The new administrations felt the need to either neutralize the power and influence of traditional institutions, or they used them to legitimize their own authority and relevance with the “old” ways. As a result, traditional institutions are now relegated to ceremonial and cultural heritage roles.

The second reason for the disconnection relates to the lack of trust among the three essential components already mentioned. The disappointment related to promises that were not kept has fed a cycle of distrust between the masses, the elites that run CSOs, and the state. Additionally, high levels of corruption by individuals and all levels of government proved devastating for building the trust or social capital needed to promote cooperation between individuals and groups.

The third reason for the disconnection is the oil- and mineral-based economic model that essentially renders the citizen irrelevant to the state for revenue—leading to a closed state. Since the government does not operate on tax-based revenue, it has not been and is not obligated to the citizens. The evidence of this critical disconnect is in the lack of development and the corresponding low performance ratings that Nigerian citizens have given the state. As a result of these three factors—weak traditional institutions, distrust, and an ineffective economic model—there is a disconnect between the citizen and the citizen’s role as it relates to attaining vertical accountability (individually or through the civil society vehicle). The disconnect renders civil society ineffective. Despite the suppositions by extant literature that civil society may not be applicable to non-Western societies such as Nigeria, the evidence suggests that it is. The depth of CSO impact is, however, a valid topic of contention. Notwithstanding, the fact remains that Nigerian societies have well-documented traditional practices of communal interaction and social obligation that predate the modern civil society paradigm.

A. INDIA IN COMPARISON

India is in the echelon of nations that are not geographically west, but subscribe to Western ideals of democracy, liberty, and capitalism—led by a secular state. India offers a good case for comparison because of the similarities it shares with Nigeria. Those similarities make it especially relevant in trying to ascertain the divergence in approaches to civil society in both countries. In advocating for strategic alliances between Nigeria and India, risk analyst Ronak Gopaldas states the most obvious similarity: both countries are parliamentary democracies with a federal system of government where states have autonomy in governance.²⁷⁸ The significance of this contemporary similarity reverberates through every aspect of social and political fabric in both countries. A state has more autonomy when revenue is tax based. The autonomy affects the federal and state governments’ propensity to work with CSOs and the masses. When funding is top down, it skews the relationship in favor of the federal government.

²⁷⁸ Ronak Gopaldas, “Why Nigeria and India Would Make Excellent Bedfellows,” *Business Day*, www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/05/24/why-nigeria-and-india-would-make-excellent-bedfellows.

In India, civil society and the state have a history of working together. The evolution of civil society in India is steeped in a symbiotic approach to development. Civil society evolved from the concept that the state has the revenue, capacity, and responsibility to guarantee that individual rights are equitably realized by Indians of all ethnic and religious factions and that civil society is a partner in helping the state achieve that goal in a manner that respects the rights of citizens—a la Hegel and Locke. To that end, the panchayat (traditional self-rule institutions) and local governments leverage one another's influence to advance the needs of the masses. Passed in 1992, the 73rd and the 74th constitutional amendments,

declared the three-tier panchayat raj institutions and municipalities as institutions of self-government, implying their rights to be treated as autonomous institutions. The amendments also made mandatory provisions to hold regular elections to these bodies and gave direction to the state legislatures to devolve powers and responsibility to them, so that they could discharge certain local level government functions in respect of development in an autonomous manner.”²⁷⁹

More than 20 years later, there remains an active debate about whether the formal incorporation of the panchayat structure has benefited civil society in India. Regardless, bottom-up participation in India is a success story as it relates to development and advocating for the rights of the masses.

Ultimately the relationship and attitude toward civil society is fostered by three factors in India: First, panchayat and local governments have an extended history of trust and support of each one's efforts, to the point where local government politicians advocate for the land rights management by panchayats (where applicable). Granted, there are enough exceptions to the rule to believe that this long-standing relationship is becoming more tenuous and could erode to the point of irrelevance if steps are not taken to foster the relationship. Second, the problematic trust triad in Nigeria between the masses, the state, and the CSO management exists to a lesser degree in India. Again, recent pressures associated with the proliferation of CSOs and the changing dynamics of CSOs in India suggests that this relationship may be strained. Third, and most

²⁷⁹ D. Bandyopadhyay, Saila K. Ghosh, and Buddhadeb Ghosh, “Dependency versus Autonomy: Identity Crisis of India's Panchayats,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 38, no. 38 (September, 2003): 3987.

importantly, the economic model employed in India is vastly different than that of Nigeria. India has a diversified economic base. Revenue comes from natural resources, manufacturing, use of the high labor market, and the software technology sector, and, most importantly, India has an electronic tax-based revenue sourcing capability.²⁸⁰

1. Traditional Institutions, the State and Civil Society

Writing about state-civil society relationship in modern India at the end of the 20th century going into the 21st century, Gurpreet Mahajan draws the essential link that India must maintain to maximize the potential of each component and secure the equitable rights and liberties of its citizenry. Citing John Keane, she states,

Universal laws cannot emerge spontaneously from civil society; their formulation and application entails the involvement of the state...As such, it is difficult to detach civil society from the state or to conceive it without the latter. Indeed the institutions of civil society are, and must be viewed as, parts of the democratic constitutional state.²⁸¹

What makes her comments more relevant is that they are a critique of the skewed pendulum swing at the end of the 20th century that placed more emphasis on CSOs outside the realm of the state. The years leading up to her statement had seen the burgeoning role of panchayats in fostering participation at the lowest levels as a counter to the Indian government's market efficiency and national security agenda. The state's focus was elsewhere and not necessarily on development²⁸²—a gap that panchayats championed quite effectively. Mahajan's observation was to temper this growing divide between the "mass politics"—represented by panchayats, and the state. She cautions against this separation and advocates that the strength of both traditional institutions and the state is essential for a representative democracy.²⁸³

²⁸⁰ "Paying Taxes 2014: The global picture. A Comparison of Tax Systems in 189 Economies World-Wide," PWC, www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes/assets/pwc-paying-taxes-2014.pdf.

²⁸¹ Gurpreet Mahajan, "Civil Society and Its Aytars: What Happened to Freedom and Democracy?" *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 15, 1999, 1195–1196.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 1193.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 1194.

While Mahajan emphasizes the state's role in the equation, Indrajit Roy champions the bottom-up approach for a representative democracy, a "demand-driven" decentralized approach that drives Indian society. Roy believes that the 73rd Constitution merely codified a strong self-governing history that had evolved from precolonial times in India. The formal state government physically lacks the sheer capacity to manage such a diverse population and as such, "micro-community" participation to address these issues of development is essential to the Indian society.²⁸⁴ Grassroots organizations in India tend to proliferate at the rural level—in the villages where the needs arise. This physical presence facilitates their relevance and impact to the citizens and the government structure. An example is the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in the north Indian state of Rajasthan who were able to successfully mobilize rural participation by pushing the right-to-information act from the lowest level to the state level in a long-term anticorruption initiative. The goal was to gain insight into the state's minimum wage and food subsidies program, which was adversely impacting the local community.²⁸⁵ Proximity to the masses facilitated MKSS' ability to get buy-in from elites, intellectuals, activists, the media, the poor, women, and all other affected groups.²⁸⁶ The initiative was successful in gaining the access to government-held information that is critical to all aspects of governance—in this case "the notion that citizens have a right both to know how they are governed and to participate actively in the process of auditing their representative."²⁸⁷ In light of the rural embedment of these participatory organizations in India, the urban persuasion of similar organizations in Nigeria is a stark contrast and a possible factor that limits the Nigerian organizations' ability to foster the connection required to mobilize the masses. Nigerian civil society has a more top-down structure than a bottom-up configuration. The potential exists for true mobilization if civil society in Nigeria can adopt this decentralized paradigm.

²⁸⁴ Indrajit Roy, "Development and its Discontents: Civil Society as the new lexicon," *Society for International Development* 46, no. 1 (2003): 83–84.

²⁸⁵ Rob Jenkins and Anne Marie Goetz, "Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical Implications of the Right –to-Information Movement in India," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 3 (1999): 604.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 619.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 603.

2. Trust and Social Capital in India and Nigeria

As discussed earlier, the role of CSOs in India has historically been to promote participatory governance and democracy. The success that CSOs have had in advocacy has led to implementation of acts such as “Right to Information, Rural Employment Guarantee, and Domestic Violence.”²⁸⁸ Additionally, the close working relationship between CSOs and local governance structures such as the Panchayat Raj Institutions continue to reinforce trust. Issues that are important to the masses have translated into legislative action, and all levels of government want to show they are open to the partnership.

Ashutosh Varshney discusses the emphasis that Mahatma Gandhi and others placed on advocating for lowest-level associational networks that were built across ethnic boundaries specifically to mitigate polarization of communities.²⁸⁹ Gandhi’s efforts started in the 1920s and were aimed at preparing a multiethnic, multireligious Indian society to work together on issues that remain relevant in contemporary Indian society. Recognizing the essential need to build trust between individuals and different ethnic and religious communities, Gandhi’s efforts focused on building intercommunal associations that would not only “do a better job of withstanding exogenous communal shock—like the partition in 1947, or the desecration of holy places [Babri mosque in December 1992]; they also constrain local politicians in their strategic behavior,” especially as it relates to political electoral objectives.²⁹⁰ This early drive to engender trust beyond members of the same religion, ethnic, or immediate relationship metric speaks directly to Francis Fukuyama’s discussions on social capital.²⁹¹ It also stands in contrast to the regional, religious, and ethnic divisions used in the critical period in Nigeria when new associations and CSOs were being created. The Nigerian equivalent was intra-communal in nature, and the ramifications from that are still evident in contemporary issues.

²⁸⁸ Debika Goswami, Rajesh Tandon, and Kaustuv K. Bandyopadhyay, “Civil Society in Changing India: Emerging Roles, Relationships and Strategies,” *Society for Participatory Research in Asia*, (2012): 6, www.c2d2.ca/sites/default/files/Civil%20Society%20Study%20Report_India.pdf.

²⁸⁹ Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society,” 364.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 375–377.

²⁹¹ Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development,” 7

3. INDIA (Economy, Civil Society and Masses)

A number of economic factors have facilitated cooperation between the three component stakeholders in India. Beyond the constitutional recognition of traditional self-rule institutions, the Indian government also recognizes the role CSOs and NGOs play in service delivery of public health, education, and environmental development in its five-year plans.²⁹² The recognition by the state came with an increased financial responsibility by the state to fund CSO and NGO activities. India embarked on a series of economic reforms in the 1990s that led to 6–8 percent growth rates over the last decade.²⁹³ The country diversified its economy in last 25 years. The 2012 Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) report also notes the following economic facts as areas of Indian economic diversification: advances in information technology, manufacturing, and innovations and growth in PPP that is projected to be third behind China and the United States by 2025. India also has a developed formal tax system where more than 35 percent of the people pay income taxes with growing pressure to increase that number.²⁹⁴ The Indian economy is diversified and at least partially obligated to some form of accountability vis-à-vis the tax-paying (individuals and businesses) constituents. This simple fact is game changer for mass mobilization, transparency, and accountability initiatives. The state has more pressure to respond to these citizen-driven requests.

With respect to civil society interests and funding, as the Indian economy matured, there has been a corresponding decrease in the amount of ODA and international aid—meaning that the state and civil society were forced to work even closer together to achieve the interests of the masses.²⁹⁵ In many respects, the state is the funder and regulator of CSOs.²⁹⁶ It is in this capacity as regulator that CSOs and NGOs

²⁹² Maya Unnithan and Carolyn Heitmeyer, “Global Rights and State Activism: Reflections on Civil Society—State Partnerships in Health in NW India,” *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 46, no. 3 (2012): 289.

²⁹³ Debika Goswami, Rajesh Tandon, and Kaustuv K. Bandyopadhyay, “Civil Society in Changing India: Emerging Roles, Relationships and Strategies,” Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), (2012): 2, www.c2d2.ca/sites/default/files/Civil%20Society%20Study%20Report_India.pdf.

²⁹⁴ “Paying Taxes 2014,” 76.

²⁹⁵ PRIA, 10.

²⁹⁶ PRIA, 10.

in India face a precarious future. While the state is obligated to engage society in the expenditure of funds, the economic boom in India has led to recent actions by the Indian government to drop foreign funding of CSOs and to withdraw from receiving the aid of numerous other bilateral donors.²⁹⁷ These funding changes are forcing many CSOs away from advocacy issues to strictly service delivery and government program executor capacity.²⁹⁸

By contrast, in Nigeria, the lack of transparency in Nigeria's budget remains a handicap for CSOs. The lack of structured and reliable government funds and the limited research available on such funding makes it hard to evaluate which source of funding (national or foreign) has the most impact on development. One can argue that the ethical pitfalls that are sometimes associated with international funding make this the lesser choice. As laid out by Moyo, those pitfalls include the tendency for donor nations to mandate requirements that have long-term detrimental effects to the citizens; the tendency for the receiving nation to coopt the funds into the corrupt cycle as argued; the tendency for receiving nations to retard all national efforts to develop the skills or tools to perform the service requirement themselves; and the tendency for local branches of internationally driven CSOs to have a stronger fidelity to the international entity vice the citizens they aim to serve. Despite all of these factors, the fact that an established need is consistently addressed with a reliable presence (organizational representatives and funding), is better than a potentially disjointed and unreliable national response.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The colonial histories of both countries cannot be viewed in isolation from their current circumstances. Past colonial influence still has an impact on the contemporary governments in each country. Specifically, the ramifications of colonial practices continue to have long-term effects on current governance structures. Nigeria, more than India, is struggling to navigate a political and social quagmire that existed at independence and continues till today. In Nigeria, the colonial impact can still be seen in

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 17.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 18–20.

resource rights that favor British and Western companies and through mandated SAPs that decimated a fledgling middle class in the 1980s, and they continue now through resource rites that still favor a manufactured-goods import-reliant economic model in Nigeria. This is not an attempt to absolve contemporary Nigerian administrations of their obligations to democratic governance as understood by the masses, but the handicap does exist and needs to be acknowledged.

Handicap aside, the Nigerian state continues to squander opportunities that may be precariously close to terminating. The states' inability to channel more than five decades of revenue into meaningful infrastructure development (power grid, communications, transportation) that would further propel the economy and foster investment is inexcusable—especially when juxtaposed against the massive amounts of personal wealth that a very limited elite have accumulated. As long as Nigeria remains reliant on oil and a revenue source that does not rely on the taxes or labor or human capacity of the masses, the state will always be predisposed to decisions that only benefit the elite. There will never be a reason to open up dialogue with civil society or any entity that advocates for the masses.

Ironically, civil society has an opportunity to capitalize on a dynamic political and social climate that exists in Nigeria right now. The transformation that results when the masses are connected and mobilized could occur if the tax-based system continues to spread to more Nigerian states. A formal tax-based revenue structure has the potential to increase lowest-level vertical accountability action and mobilize the masses in a way that strengthens civil society and forces the state to respond.

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APPENDIX A. GROWING BOKO HARAM ATTACKS


Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria




2012 1,663 civilians killed



2013 2,978 civilians killed



2014 9,033 civilians killed



2015* 2,146 civilians killed



*Figures accurate to 24 January
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof. Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex

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APPENDIX B. AFRICA (NIGERIA) FISCAL TRANSPARENCY

NIGERIA



Civilian rule was established in Nigeria in 1999, after 30 years of military dictatorship. The budget system requires fundamental reform in order to bring about real transparency and accountability.

Legal framework for transparency

Nigeria does not have a fiscal transparency code or a budget law specifying roles for ministries and other stakeholders in the drafting of the budget. Existing laws and regulations include provisions that are contradictory and ambiguous.

The Constitution provides for parliamentary approval of the annual budget. However, it is vague in many respects. For example, the Constitution does not specifically require parliamentary approval for annual revenue estimates or the financial plan of government.

The legal framework does not provide any clarity on the extent of legislative powers, for example its powers to amend the budget.

There is no law that specifies the budget format, what documents are to accompany the budget or how and when budget information is to be disseminated. Similarly, there is no requirement to release information on actual in-year spending, procurement, public assets and liabilities.

The legal framework does not provide for public participation in the budget process and is generally inadequate to support transparency and accountability.

Clarity of roles and responsibilities

The Constitution assigns roles and responsibilities to the different arms of government in the budget process. However, it does not clarify the role of the various departments in the executive in budget preparation and implementation.

Contesting interpretations of the constitutional provisions and a lack of clarity around the role of departments has led to friction and an overlapping of functions in practice.

The roles and responsibilities of the legislature remain unclear, leading to conflict and frequent delays.

Resources allocated to sub-national government by the Constitution do not match the enormous responsibilities assigned to them.

The poor definition of roles and responsibilities undermines transparency in the budget process and obscures public accountability.

Public availability of information

Budget preparation in Nigeria is a closed process, falling exclusively within the responsibility of non-elected members of the executive.

Available budget information is not comprehensive enough and lacks adequate classification. In general, information on actual spending by government is irregular, incoherent and inadequate.

The reliability of budget information is questionable, marked by significant discrepancies between projected and actual expenditure.

Budget information is not explicitly linked to policy objectives and contains very little background on expenditure areas, assumptions and priorities.

Capacity and systems in the budget process

While some improvements are apparent, current financial management systems in Nigeria fall short of ensuring transparency in the budget process.

There is a lack of capacity for effective fiscal management in the Department of Finance's Budget Office, with a severe shortage of skilled staff and inadequate office infra-structure.

The departments dealing with financial management within the respective ministries similarly lack the skills and equipment needed to carry out their responsibilities.

The office of the auditor general confirmed a corresponding lack of capacity and resources, including inadequate information and accounting systems.

There is poor co-ordination between different agencies charged with budget monitoring, leading to ineffective control and accountability.

Parliament lacks the capacity and skills to undertake thorough budget analysis and monitoring. However, it has increased its efforts to hold the executive accountable for the reform of critical systems in the budget process.

MANAGEMENT OF EXTRA-BUDGETARY ACTIVITIES

Nigeria has a large public enterprise sector, with an on-going privatisation process underway. There are also a number of government-owned public financial institutions and contingent liabilities that fall within the sphere of extra-budgetary activities.

There is no legal requirement in Nigeria for the systematic publication of information on these extra-budgetary activities. No information at all is available about the accounts of some extra-budgetary funds. For others, records are kept independently by separate government agencies without any form of reconciliation.

Not all off-budget funds are open to public audit because they fall outside the mandate of the auditor general.

There are no known rules governing deposits into and withdrawals from various accounts and funds.

PARTICIPATION IN THE BUDGET PROCESS

Donor agencies participate in the budget process as experts on strategies for budget implementation and fiscal management. They also have units that monitor the implementation of grants, loans or funds donated to government.

Civil society participation in the budget process is weak. There are generally few access points for groups and individuals to engage with the process.

Inadequate budget information further diminishes their capacity to interact with public institutions.

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY research team in NIGERIA

The research was conducted by Soji Apampa and Tunde Oni. Both work with Integrity, a Nigerian civil society organisation advocating the protection and promotion of human rights against corruption.

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