

THE HISTORY OF THE STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS FOR ELIMINATION (SJFHQ-E): “NO MORE AD HOC”

A Monograph

by

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ABSTRACT

THE HISTORY OF THE STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS FOR ELIMINATION (SJFHQ-E): “NO MORE AD HOC,” by LTC Kristofer D. Hopkins, U.S. Army, 54 pages.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) is a relatively new construct to the Department of Defense (DOD) in an attempt to prevent an ad hoc development of a Joint force capable of executing the combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) mission. The SJFHQ-E can trace its purpose back to the historical ALSOS mission in World War II. For the first time since WWII, DOD has attempted to develop a standing unit for the sole purpose of commanding and controlling the elimination of WMD on the battlefield.

This monograph captures the difficulties in creating a specialized, niche joint force headquarters during ongoing combat operations from 2006-2013. Given the proximity (in the past decade) to the development of the organization, a large portion of this monograph relies on the interviews conducted with select leadership and planning staff members across DOD, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The interviews span across critical points of development of theory, doctrine, and development from 2002 to 2013.

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ACRONYMS

75 th XTF	75th Exploitation Task Force
CBIRF	Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (US Marine Corps)
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives
CIED	Counter Improvised Explosive Devices
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
COCOM	Combatant Command (Geographic or Functional)
CST	Civil Support Teams (CST)
CWMD	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FCC	Functional Combatant Command
FORSCOM	Forces Command (U.S. Army)
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
HQ	Headquarters
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISG	Iraq Survey Group
JEC-E	Joint Enabling Capability - Elimination
JECE	Joint Elimination Coordination Element
JFCC	Joint Functional Component Command
JFCOM	U.S. Joint Forces Command

JRO	Joint Requirements Office
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF-E	Joint Task Force-Elimination
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NDT	Nuclear Disablement Team
NMS	National Military Strategy
NMS-CWMD	National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
NSS	National Security Strategy
NS-CWMD	National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
O&O	Operations and Organization
OIF	Operational Iraqi Freedom
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review Report
SCC-WMD	STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD
SJFHQ-E	Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination
STRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command (U.S. Army)
USANCA	U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency
VIPPSA	Very Important Persons Protective Support Activity
WCE	WMD Coordination Element
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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There is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.

— *National Security Strategy*, May 2010

INTRODUCTION

Since 1763, the United States has been familiar with the use of hazardous agents on adversary forces when British forces first distributed smallpox-infested blankets to Native Americans.¹ After World War I, the world became disgusted with the impacts of chemical agents on the battlefield. Many world powers that had amassed large amounts of weaponizable chemical agents during World War I began to destroy the munitions and bulk agents after the signing of the 1925 Geneva protocol against chemical and biological weapons. However, with the discovery of atomic fissure, the United States sought to develop the atomic bomb before Germany and formed a secret task force (code named ALSOS) to gather intelligence on Germany's progress towards the atomic bomb.

In 1944, at the height of World War II, the United States assembled a task force with the sole mission of exploitation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of Germany. The ALSOS mission was to locate, exploit, and assess German atomic capabilities. Led by U.S. Army Colonel Boris Pash, the ad hoc team was comprised of the commander and “no more than six scientists, six counterintelligence (CI) agents, and six interpreters.”² The ALSOS team eventually consisted of fourteen members. From inception, the ALSOS team's mission was very secretive, highly classified, and COL Pash knew that ALSOS would have to operate close to front lines (to protect the integrity of captured documents, sites, and scientists), operate within a ground command

¹The Public Agenda Archives, <http://www.publicagendaarchives.org/charts/notable-events-history-chemical-and-biological-warfare> (accessed August 29, 2013).

²Boris T. Pash, *The ALSOS Mission* (New York: Award House, 1969), 12.

operations area (requiring close liaison), and protect scientists while transiting the battlefield.³ The United States would not form another task force of this kind until 2003, when US forces would invade Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

After ALSOS, the next unified mission to locate, exploit, and dismantle WMD capabilities was during Operation Iraqi Freedom in the form of the 75th Exploitation Task Force (75th XTF) in early 2003. Formed around the 75th Field Artillery Brigade in February 2003, the 75th XTF was comprised of the brigade headquarters, elements of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and a host of other specialties from the Department of Defense (DOD) including intelligence specialists, microbiologists, physicists, chemists, and other scientific experts from the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA).⁴ Controlling numerous site assessment and exploitation teams, the 75th XTF was responsible for finding and securing Iraq WMD, with DTRA elements primarily responsible for disablement and elimination.⁵ Like ALSOS, 75th XTF did not have organic transportation capabilities, security capabilities, and always operated within other units' battlespace. By June 2003, the 75th XTF would hand over its mission to the interagency endeavor known as the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), in joint operation with the DOD but under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency. As ad hoc organizations, both of these historical CWMD missions (ALLOS in Germany and XTF 75/ISG in Iraq), with disparate amounts of experience and capabilities, experienced the same logistical and operational issues. Recognizing the drawbacks of such ad hoc organizations and a lack of coherent doctrine, DOD began making major changes in 2004 to address the shortcomings.

³Ibid.

⁴Rebecca K. C. Hersman, "*Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction: What's at Stake?*" Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, December 2004), 6.

⁵Ibid.

As DOD continued to develop the CWMD capabilities, DTRA became a central proponent to the process. DOD established DTRA as both a defense and a combat support agency on 1 October, 1998. DTRA was tasked to “reduce the threat to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) weapons ... as well as provide research and development and technical support on matters of WMD to components of the Department of Defense.”⁶ In order to organize the various United States efforts in combating WMD, in January 2005, the Secretary of Defense published a memorandum designating the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander as the lead combatant commander within DOD.⁷ This action made the STRATCOM Commander directly responsible for the integration and synchronization of DOD efforts in combating WMD, thus aligning DTRA support to DOD directly through one combatant command.⁸ By January 2006, STRATCOM established the STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD) to coordinate disparate DOD CWMD efforts. The SCC-WMD was designed to be comprised of 128 personnel from both STRATCOM and DTRA.⁹ In support of combatant commanders, the SCC-WMD published the first *Handbook for Joint Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Elimination Operations*, establishing the intent of the SCC-WMD to provide joint force commanders and their staffs with a standing Joint Elimination Coordination

⁶Bianka J. Adams and Joseph P. Harahan, U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), *Responding to War, Terrorism, and WMD Proliferation: History of DTRA, 1998-2008* (2008) (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2008), 18.

⁷US Strategic Command, *STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD) Organizational Concept of Operations (CONOP) Draft (Pre-Decisional)* (Offutt AFB, NE: Headquarters, US Strategic Command, September 2005), 1. The original Secretary of Defense memorandum is on a classified network. The reference to the published memorandum in this unclassified STRATCOM document will suffice to relay the importance and timing of the designation of STRATCOM as the lead COCOM for CWMD within DOD.

⁸*Ibid.*, 99.

⁹*Ibid.*, 99, 116.

Element (JECE) to complement their Joint Task Force for WMD Elimination under the new CWMD missions.¹⁰

In August 2007, the SCC-WMD JECE reached interim operational capability and began working with the recently established 20th Support Command (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives) (20th SUPCOM (CBRNE)), U.S. Army. In 2009, STRATCOM approved funding for a standing 30-person element (JECE) under the SCC-WMD. In February 2012, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) was activated (with only the JECE existing personnel), and tasked with the mission “to provide a command and control element for a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) or Joint Task Force (JTF) responsible for the elimination of WMD in hostile or uncertain conditions.”¹¹ The SJFHQ-E is a minimally-manned organization with a very resource intensive and broad mission set. The Joint publication *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*, JP 3-40, states that the WMD elimination mission encompasses those “actions undertaken in a hostile or uncertain environment to systematically locate, characterize, secure, and disable, or destroy WMD programs and related capabilities.”¹²

This study examines the formation of the SJFHQ-E and its antecedent organizations (the JECE and SCC-WMD) to understand the evolution of the SJFHQ-E capabilities. The study also seeks to assess the DOD’s progress in meeting the national guidance requirement of establishing ‘a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to plan, train, and execute WMD-

¹⁰Ibid., 116.

¹¹U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), *Fact Sheet*, (Fort Belvoir, VA) May 2012.

¹²U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2009), IV-2.

elimination operations.¹³ As of 2013, the Department of Defense has failed to adequately address the requirement to provide a command element capable of providing mission command and technical expertise in support of a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) during WMD-E missions or mission planning.

EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY

The attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, was conducted in one of the most horrifying ways – by a small number of individuals using civilian aircraft as munitions to create the effect of a WMD attack on US soil. After 9/11, national and military strategy concerning WMD grew rapidly to address the shortfalls of first responders to those attacks. By the end of September 2001, the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) made 20 mentions of weapons of mass destruction and CBRNE attacks, increased Civil Support Teams (CST) within the National Guard, and reinforced the role of the Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).¹⁴ The CST and CBIRF expansions attempted to correct deficiencies in state and federal support during CBRNE-related incidents after 9/11. However, national policy would not formally address the WMD-Elimination mission until the publishing of the National Strategy for Combating WMD (NS-CWMD) in 2002.

The growth of CWMD as a mission required new, WMD specific guidance to military commanders that was relevant and actionable. The *National Security Strategy (NSS)* is the foundational document from the President of the United States and, as it relates to CWMD, set forth an active strategy to counter transnational terror networks, rogue nations, and aggressive

¹³U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), 36.

¹⁴U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2001), 42.

States that possess or are working to acquire WMD.¹⁵ Subordinate to the NSS, the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* builds on the NSS and articulates a proactive and comprehensive strategy to counter WMD threats.¹⁶ Subsequently, the *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD* (NMS CWMD) established strategic objectives, eight CWMD mission areas, and defined the guiding principles and strategic enablers for the military's role in combating WMD.¹⁷ Figure 1 (Strategic Guidance for CWMD diagram) demonstrates the layering and hierarchy of the strategy publications. Absent from the diagram is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report process. The purpose of the QDR is to "set a long-term course for DOD as the QDR assesses the threats and challenges that the United States faces and re-balances DOD's strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats."¹⁸ In effect, the QDR identifies the military's capabilities to execute current national guidance, identify future threats, anticipate future guidance, and develop strategy to meet future needs while addressing current gaps or shortfalls.

¹⁵U.S. Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (February 13, 2006), prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington DC) 10.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*. <http://www.defense.gov/qdr> (accessed September 29, 2013).




Figure 1. Strategic Guidance for CWMD diagram. U.S. Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (February 13, 2006). Prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, DC. 12.

The NS-CWMD was the first of its kind in 2002, establishing the ‘three pillars’ of CWMD – counter-proliferation, non-proliferation, and consequence management.¹⁹ Within counter-proliferation, the NS-CWMD made mention of mitigation efforts to interdict attacks before attacks occur, but also to eliminate the threat of future attacks.²⁰ The NS-CWMD did not establish a clear idea of a WMD elimination (WMD-E) mission, but set the foundation for WMD-E operations. The NS-CWMD final statement towards the WMD-E development was:

The United States needs to be prepared to conduct post-conflict operations to destroy or dismantle any residual WMD capabilities of the hostile state or terrorist network. An effective U.S. response not only will eliminate the source of a WMD attack but will also

¹⁹U.S. Government, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (December 2002). Washington DC. 2.

²⁰Ibid., 3.

have a powerful deterrent effect upon other adversaries that possess or seek WMD or missiles.²¹

The 2006 QDR was the first document to address the WMD elimination mission and was the most formative. With the missions of the 75th XTF and Iraq Survey Group concluded, the QDR acknowledged the need for a prepared joint task force headquarters that is able to deploy and command and control forces in a WMD-E mission. DOD reaffirmed STRATCOM as the responsible headquarters for integrating and synchronizing the Departments' combating WMD efforts.²² As the United States learned in Iraq, and the 2006 QDR reiterates, "states could have hundreds of suspect facilities and storage sites that would need to be secured, searched and remediated."²³ The specific guidance in the 2006 QDR concerning WMD-E to DOD was: 1) establish joint command and control tailored for the WMD-E mission, 2) organize, train and equip joint forces for the WMD-E mission, 3) designate DTRA as the primary Combat Support Agency for STRATCOM in its role for integrating and synchronizing CWMD efforts, and 4) expand the US Army's 20th Support Command (CBRNE) capabilities to enable it to serve as a JTF to command and control WMD elimination and site exploitation missions by 2007.²⁴ The ad hoc, pick-up game of the 75th XTF and ISG would not be repeated if the United States conducted another WMD-E mission.

The 2006 NMS-CWMD expounded on the three pillars of CWMD from the 2002 NS-CWMD, creating eight mission areas within the three pillars. The eight mission areas were: offensive operations, elimination, interdiction, active defense, passive defense, WMD

²¹Ibid.

²²U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington DC: February 6, 2006) 6.

²³Ibid., 32.

²⁴Ibid., 35-52.

consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. The NMS-CWMD defined WMD elimination mission as “operations to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a state or non-state actor’s WMD programs and related capabilities in hostile or uncertain environments.”²⁵ Building on the 2006 QDR, the NMS-CWMD acknowledged that WMD-E operations would need to be able to reduce threats in conjunction with combat operations, just as the 75th XTF and the ALSOS missions did. In addition, any JTF-E would need to be capable of: 1) security operations to prevent the looting or capture of WMD and related materials; 2) rendering harmless or destroying weapons, materials, agents, and delivery systems that pose an immediate or direct threat to U.S. forces and the civilian population; and 3) conduct intelligence exploitation of program experts, documents, and other media as well as any previously secured weapons and material.²⁶ To accomplish these tasks, the NMS-CWMD directed DOD to “develop, institutionalize, and exercise a joint capability to eliminate WMD in uncertain environments.”²⁷ The 2010 QDR would be more direct in the intent to stand up a headquarters element.

The 2010 QDR served to clarify the intent of the joint force headquarters directed in the 2006 QDR. The 2010 QDR directed the ‘establishment of a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operations.’²⁸ This standing JTF HQ would address one of the primary challenges for DOD at the time – “locating, securing, or neutralizing WMD, key materials, and related facilities in the context of a loss of

²⁵U.S. Department of Defense. *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (February 13, 2006). Prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington DC. 23.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., 24.

²⁸U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (February, 2010). Washington DC. 36.

control of such weapons or materials, and thwarting the potential for a non-state adversary to acquire them.”²⁹ This new standing JTF-E headquarters would require increased nuclear disablement, exploitation, intelligence, and coordination capabilities to meet the shortfalls of past CWMD operations.³⁰

Thesis

Throughout the Iraq WMD elimination missions, US forces that were required to locate, identify, exploit, and dismantle WMD consisting of no less than 1,400 personnel and were still required to contend with logistical and security issues. In the case of the 75th XTF, an active, standing US Army brigade headquarters was not enough to overcome the rapid attachment of many disparate specialized units and civilian elements to successfully execute operations. The civilian-led ISG did not fare much better. Even with the integrated interagency approach and less reliance on military command, the ISG still had to coordinate with local commanders to conduct operations, provide local security, and garner logistical support. With the mission to provide a command and control element for WMD-E operations for a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC), the SJFHQ-E must be a sizeable headquarters to overcome the issues of both the 75th XTF and the ISG missions.

The WMD-E mission is of dire importance to US forces and national security as long as WMD threats persist. DOD has completed a significant amount of reorganization and growth in the CWMD field, but has further to go. Success of the SJFHQ-E, and the subsequent success of the supported GCC commander in WMD-E operations, requires that the SJFHQ-E be resourced, organized, and trained in a manner that reduces friction when integrating with COCOM or JTF

²⁹Ibid., 15.

³⁰Ibid., 36.

staffs, while integrating the inevitable interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational augmentation that accompanies the CWMD mission on foreign soil.

As of September 2013, the SJFHQ-E manning stood at twenty-two personnel of its' authorized thirty billets.³¹ With such a small staff element (when compared to the recent experiences in Iraq), the DOD failed to adequately address the requirement to provide a command element capable of providing mission command and technical expertise in support of a GCC during WMD-E missions or mission planning.

Methodology

A case study of the organizational development of the SJFHQ-E from 2002 through current operating capability in September 2012 was used to analyze pertinent questions in support of the thesis. First, has the DOD met the stated requirements of the 2010 QDR to provide a standing Joint force headquarters capable of planning, training, and executing WMD-E operations with increased nuclear disablement, exploitation, intelligence, and coordination capabilities? Second, was the SJFHQ-E organizational formation consciously based on Max Weber's organizational hierarchy or did it follow historical examples and Joint doctrine as exemplified by Anthony Giddens' structuration theory?³² Moreover, finally, was agency or any key leader or influencer overwhelmingly influential to the formation of the SJFHQ-E?

The recent development and establishment of the SJFHQ-E eliminated the possibility of any real written or recorded history other than sparse briefings and press releases. To ascertain the validity of the questions posed, the focused sampling of respondents represent crucial planners, staff members, and leadership that were known and available for this research project. Project

³¹Due to lack of official reporting mechanisms during the growth of these organizations, this data was obtained from multiple respondent interviews, respondents 3, 4, 8, and 11.

³²Mary Jo Hatch with Ann L. Cunliffe, *Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2006), 103 & 123.

respondents were instrumental in the development of the SJFHQ-E concept, analysis, and subsequent execution but do not represent all planners and leadership involved in the process. Most interviews were telephonic due to time and resource constraints, with the exception of one locally attained in-person interview. Before each interview, each respondent received an email with an overview of the topics, a reiteration that the interviews are conducted with full disclosure and with informed consent, and confirmation of anonymity unless otherwise requested. The interview plan was approved and the author obtained informed consent prior to each interview verbally or in written form.

The scope of this study is limited to the organizational development of the SJFHQ-E within STRATCOM, under the SCC-WMD. To that end, this study will not address the validity of the organization (whether or not the organization should exist at all), other joint and interagency organizations that also conduct CWMD missions, or the ability of subordinate commands within each military service to act as a Joint Task Force for Elimination (JTF-E). The SJFHQ-E organization will be assessed as sufficiently meeting the 2010 QDR requirements if: 1) the SJFHQ-E utilized Weber's hierarchical structure theory to maximize hierarchical methodology for command and control; 2) the SJFHQ-E is found to be adequate to execute the mission as stated in published directives when compared to WMD historical experience of the United States; and 3) the SJFHQ-E found to be adequately resourced as a standing JTF according to current joint doctrine found in Joint Publication (JP) 3-33 (*Joint Task Force Headquarters*).

Literature Review

The analysis of an organization's development requires a solid framework of theory to assess the organizational effectiveness. The three classic organizational theories that define how organizations form and function are Max Weber's hierarchy, Jan Carlzon's flat organizations, and

systems or network theory (as presented jointly by Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page).³³

Separate to the classic structures, a hybrid theory also exists but lacks definition of what ‘hybrid’ actually means. The often referred to “hybrid theory” of organizations is typically defined by the author for the purpose of their article and constitutes a conglomeration of other organizational theories. For the purpose of this discussion, the JTF headquarters doctrine from Joint Publication 3-33 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff *Baseline Organization and Functions for a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) - Core Element (CE)* will represent the hybrid theory.³⁴ Lastly, Anthony Giddens’ Structuration Theory provides insight into why organizations choose to form the way they do and how agency influences that formation.

Max Weber’s theory of ideal bureaucracy defined how an organization could enable employees to act rationally, serving their clients with impartiality and more efficiently.³⁵ According to Weber, “bureaucracy must consist of neutral professional public employees so that the organizational hierarchy can function as smoothly and effectively as possible.”³⁶ Identifying features of Weber’s ideal bureaucracy are: fixed divisions of labor, administrative hierarchy of offices, fixed salaries, employment constitutes a career, employees are selected based on technical qualifications, job advancement is dependent upon seniority or achievement, and strict discipline and control are established through a set of guiding rules.³⁷ Weberian bureaucracy derives its authority (formally or informally) from a higher authority and constitutes legal support

³³Hatch, 103. Jørgen Lægaard and Mille Bindslev, *Organizational Theory*, (Frederiksberg: Ventus Publishing ApS, Denmark, 2006), 16. Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, *Network Forms of Organization*, (Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24 (1998), 59.

³⁴Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Baseline Organization and Functions for a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) - Core Element (CE)* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008).

³⁵Hatch, 103.

³⁶Lægaard and Bindslev, 16.

³⁷Hatch, 103; Lægaard and Bindslev, 17.

of the leadership. The legal authority of an office in a Weberian bureaucracy represents the position filled by the employee, not the employee himself. Subsequently, transfer of legal authority automatically moves from the vacating employee to the occupying employee upon transition.³⁸ Alternatively, traditional or charismatic authorities are represented in the individual, not the office held by that individual as Weber's model represents.³⁹

Weber also defined five root causes for an organization to form a structure such as a bureaucracy. Weber defined the five causes as size, complexity, conflict, culture, and class struggle.⁴⁰ As an organization grows in size, informal relationships become more of a hindrance and less reliable – at this tipping point, an organization would need to formalize its structure, distributing tasks, creating rules to regulate work flow, and formalizing coordination. The complexity of tasks performed, or overall organizational function, requires specialization of employees into selective fields to work more efficiently. Inevitably, as an organization grows and competes on a higher level of performance, internal and external conflicts will arise. At this point, centralized leadership is required to resolve conflict and provide guidance for future decision-making. Weber asserted that people have an underlying need to 'belong,' as one 'belongs' to their family. As an organization grows, it can become more impersonal, almost clinical in daily functions. Leadership will need to create a sense of culture, an ideal environment that employees can identify with and respond positively to. Finally, Weber referred to class struggle as the right of subordinate leadership 'to manage and distribute work' within their realm of responsibility,

³⁸Hatch, 104.

³⁹Ibid., 30. Traditional authority is an inherited status such as the authorities in an aristocracy passing from one generation to the next. Charismatic authority is more subjective as it refers to the "powers of attraction" of leadership that enables their authority without a formal legitimization structure or process.

⁴⁰Lægaard and Bindslev, 19.

transferring power from the horizontal work process to the vertical structures.⁴¹

In contrast to Weber's hierarchical structure, Jan Carlzon identified an organizational structure that increased managerial span of control, eliminated numerous middle managers, and enabled vertical communications within an organization.⁴² Carlzon's 'flat' organization was not truly flat, but the increased horizontal differentiation of tasks within an organization can have positive and negative implications. Flat organizations empower managers with wider spans of control, more freedom of authority for decision-making, and broad parameters to operate within. In contrast to Weber's tall hierarchy that may have managers controlling 3-4 subordinates, a flat organization broadens that span of control to 7-10 individuals. The negative impacts of a flat organization become apparent – since all managers must be able to handle the increased span of control, each manager assumes a larger amount of responsibility and must divide their work and attention across a breadth of tasks. As a result, the organization increases its overall risk factors during reorganization, loss, or growth, as the impacts of the loss or promotion of any manager would be more pronounced since a flat organization can only distribute risk horizontally. In contrast, a hierarchical organization distributes the workload both horizontally and vertically throughout the organization which disburses and reduces organizational risk of losing leadership personnel.

Finally, a hybrid theory of organizational development is not a singular theory established by any person or persons. As previously stated, a hybrid theory of organization structure is a conglomeration of other organizational theories to suit the purpose of the organization and may reflect conflicting or competing paradigms of control. However, since this is a study of a (predominantly) bureaucratic organization, the likelihood of an open-ended

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., 26.

approach to structure as most hybrid models discuss, is very remote. As an alternative model to Weber's hierarchy, the JP 3-33 manual and the CJCS Manual *Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) Core Element (CE)* baseline will suffice.

Network theory has a multitude of theorists who attempt to define a theory of organization that is neither hierarchical nor market based. Without a clear definition of what constitutes network theory, Podolny and Page defined the theory as “an organization with a collection of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange.”⁴³ In contrast, the very nature of hierarchical organizations requires a recognizable, legitimate authority to resolve disputes. Due to the ambiguity of a recognizable form for network theory, the lack of an organized authority to resolve disputes is the only clear indicator that an organization is either hierarchical, flat (which is a more horizontal form of hierarchy) or, potentially, networked. However, none of these three theories (hierarchical, flat, network) describes how or why an organization may choose its structure.

Anthony Giddens developed the structuration theory of organizations, which acknowledges the impact of agency (defined here as an actor expressing free will within an organization) against structure (formally determined roles within an organization).⁴⁴ However, Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische defined structuration theory “by the key processes in which agents produce structure through iteration (repetition of past behavior), practical evaluation (as the basis for taking action in the present), and projection (looking ahead to future

⁴³Podolny and Page, 59.

⁴⁴Hatch, 123.

requirements).”⁴⁵ While Gibbens implied that agency is both enabled and restricted by the environment (structure) that the agency exists within, Emirbayer and Mische structuration noted how agents can use lessons from the past, recent experience, and future ideals to develop new structure. The variations of structuration are not exclusive, but demonstrate how the endless cycle of agency and structure interplay causes organizational development to display resemblances to current structures when fabricating a new organization.

For the purpose of understanding the formation of a standing Joint Task Force headquarters, the current JP 3-33 (*Joint Task Force Headquarters*) establishes the current doctrine for US forces to create a JTF, its organizational makeup, and the authorities for establishment that are required. According to current Joint doctrine, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), a combatant commander, a subunified command commander, and the commander of a joint task force are the only legitimate authorities to establish a JTF.⁴⁶ As was done with 75th XTF, according to JP 3-33, the preferred option for establishing a JTF is to use a pre-existing headquarters of the appropriate size and rank.⁴⁷ The benefits of such a method would ensure that the foundation headquarters works well together, incorporates external augmentation easily, and has a reduced timeline for readiness to deploy.⁴⁸ Disadvantages include the requirement of the organization to offload any current duties, the need for significant augmentation to meet joint requirements for the mission, and, depending on the unit selected, the headquarters may require some joint level training before deployment. However, this is actually the only method that the JP

⁴⁵Ibid., 125.

⁴⁶U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, Joint Publication 3-33 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 30, 2012), I-1.

⁴⁷Ibid., II-1.

⁴⁸Timothy M. Bonds, Myron Hura, Thomas-Durell Young. *Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 65-66.

3-33 provides as it does not discuss a purely ad hoc JTF development. However, a recent study sponsored by RAND offers a few alternatives.

According to the RAND Corporation, a JTF is built along three prominent methodologies: 1) from scratch (with no pre-existing unit foundation), 2) through augmentation of a COCOM headquarters, or 3) developed from a standing JTF HQ (with augmentation).⁴⁹ Each of these methods has its own advantages and disadvantages. While a “built from scratch” JTF may be the most flexible in design, it would take the longest to establish, train, and deploy. Augmentation of a COCOM headquarters could also work, but the tyranny of distance from the tactical actions causes command decisions to be less relevant and timely. The final option, building upon a standing JTF, presents enticing opportunities. A standing JTF would enable combatant commanders to have trained, rapid-reaction headquarters to meet any needs within their area of operations. However, even a standing headquarters element is not without issue – it requires dedicated manning, training, and resourcing when garrisoned as well as when deployed. In addition, no standing JTF would be a ‘one size fits all’ build. For specialized or sensitive missions, it may require significant augmentation. Lastly, a standing JTF headquarters is still only the headquarters element – the ground, sea, or air forces assigned to it may require specialized training as well depending on the mission and the area of operations.

In 2008, the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published the *Baseline Organization and Functions for a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) - Core Element (CE)*. The CJCS manual defined the daily operation of a SJFHQ as a “cross-functional team structure consisting of Operations, Planning, Information Superiority, and Knowledge Management ... supported by administrative groups that are functionally aligned; these groups are Command, Plans, Operations, Information Superiority, Logistics, and Knowledge

⁴⁹Ibid., 63-79.

Management.”⁵⁰ The CJCS manual further defines the roles of a SJFHQ with respect to a supported combatant command (COCOM) commanders (CCDRs):

A SJFHQ provides CCDRs with a scalable core C2 element specifically organized to enhance the combatant commander’s ability to deter or quickly resolve a crisis. Should deterrence fail, the SJFHQ provides an effective means to assist in rapidly establishing a JTF immediately capable of conducting coordinated joint operations. The SJFHQ provides pre-crisis situational understanding of potential crisis areas, use of in-place collaboration tools, and increased capability to plan and integrate joint operations within today’s joint, interagency, and multinational operational environment. These core elements are capable of providing initial joint planning and control of operations.⁵¹

In addition, the CJCS manual (CJCSM) also describes three methods of employing a SJFHQ as: 1) serving as the nucleus or core of a JTF headquarters staff (but requires broad augmentation), 2) providing key augmentation personnel to an operational headquarters, or 3) retained at the GCC headquarters to form a headquarters executing operations through subordinate JTF.⁵² While the CJCSM offers broader concepts in the designation and employment of a JTF headquarters (specifically in the case of a standing headquarters); however, it was published in June of 2008. While the CJCSM could not have had an impact on the JECE in 2006, it may have influenced the 2010 formation of the SJFHQ-E.

⁵⁰CJCSM *Baseline Organization and Functions for a SJFHQ Core Element (CE)*, A-1.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., A-2.

I would say that I think we have made a lot of progress in organizing for a new type of threat, a threat that in many ways is more diffuse and more complex, certainly, than the Cold War threat – and even, arguably, than the way we perceived threats in the 1990s.

— Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, *Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Hearing on FY2007 Budget*, March 2006

NO MORE AD HOC

Over the past decade, to defeat the need for an ad hoc mission in the future, the DOD has organized its role in combating WMD under one executive agent, created two new headquarters, and re-missioned a separate Army command into a joint mission. The lessons-learned from the 75th XTF mission, the Iraq Survey Group, and the historic ALSOS mission drove the DOD to appoint the STRATCOM commander as the executive agent for the mission area of combating WMD. STRATCOM, saddled with a new mission set, subsequently created the SCC-WMD in coordination with DTRA to leverage the expertise resident in that agency. On a parallel path, the DOD selected the 20th Support Command (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE)) (20th SUPCOM) as the unit to fill the 2006 QDR requirement of a deployable Joint Task Force headquarters for WMD elimination. As a result of the new 20th SUPCOM mission, the recently developed JTF-E Concept of Operations (CONOP) would become the basis of new 20th SUPCOM design, augmented with a requisite joint capability that drove the requirement for creation of the JECE. The reorganization of the JECE into the SJFHQ-E in response to the 2010 QDR would be the final redesign (thus far) of CWMD forces to ensure that, “in future conflicts we should not end up playing ‘pickup games’ when we are trying to put together forces for eliminating WMD.”⁵³

⁵³U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Handbook for the Joint Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Elimination Operations* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007)., I-3.

STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS

Throughout 2005 and 2006, under GEN James E. Cartwright's new Joint Functional Component Commands (JFCC) construct, STRATCOM expanded its operational capabilities in most of its assigned mission areas. STRATCOM developed a JFCC with almost every combat support agency that it required constant interaction with. Under the JFCC construct, the supporting agency would accommodate STRATCOM forces within the agency footprint to enable operational planning and execution of STRATCOM functions within the proponent as needed. Some examples include the JFCC-Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) within the Defense Intelligence Agency, the JFCC-Network Warfare (NW) within the National Security Agency, and the JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense (IMD) located with the Missile Defense Integration-Operations Center.⁵⁴ During this time, 'dual-hatting' (or 'triple-hatting' in some cases) of the agency commander as the JFCC commander enabled STRATCOM access without undermining the roles and responsibilities of the host agency. Organizing a JFCC with DTRA proved to be a deviation from the past JFCC establishments.

Since its creation in 1998, a government civilian, not a uniformed military member, has led DTRA. Out of necessity, STRATCOM created a STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD) instead of a component command, in order to allow the Director of DTRA to be dual-hatted as the Director of the SCC-WMD. By the end of 2005, the SCC-WMD reached initial operating capability.⁵⁵ However, the new growth within DTRA was not without its difficulties.

⁵⁴STRATCOM public website, 2013. "Functional Components." Accessed on November 23, 2013. http://www.stratcom.mil/functional_components/.

⁵⁵U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), *Responding to War, Terrorism, and WMD Proliferation: History of DTRA, 1998-2008* (2008), by Bianka J. Adams and Joseph P. Harahan. Washington DC: Library of Congress. 100-102.

Internal to DTRA, the SCC had a number of challenges as it formed, not the least of which was a clearly defined mission to drive daily operations.⁵⁶ Throughout 2005 and 2006, the SCC leadership continually tried to understand how the JFCC construct would work in execution when applied to a civilian agency. Through multiple iterations of backbriefs and updates, the SCC was in a constant state of flux due to the lack of a clearly defined mission from STRATCOM. As the organization developed, one respondent clearly saw a pattern of “backing into the answer.”⁵⁷ Without a mission analysis prior to execution, the SCC was “building the ship as it set sail,” so to speak. The 2006 QDR appeared only to exacerbate the situation when it directed STRATCOM to establish “a deployable Joint Task Force headquarters for WMD elimination.”⁵⁸

In 2005, DTRA and the SCC-WMD were influential in developing the verbiage for the 2006 QDR. However, since the QDR is more of a guidance document and not an operational order, some of the ideas represented within it can be open to interpretation by the military services. According to one respondent who worked closely on the 2006 and 2010 QDR development, the evolution of the JTF-E mission and subsequent creation of the SJFHQ-E was not the original intent.⁵⁹ Through an analysis of the 75th XTF and ALSOS missions, the intent of the wording the 2006 QDR was to task the 20th SUPCOM as the “go to” unit for a JTF-E mission and align that mission under the executive agent, STRATCOM.⁶⁰ The effects of such simple language in the QDR and the results of its ambiguity are telling as each of the military services and DTRA interpreted the guidance differently.

⁵⁶Respondent 1 interview, October 31, 2013.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (February 6, 2006). Washington DC. 6.

⁵⁹Respondent 2 interview, November 15, 2013.

⁶⁰Ibid.

The military interpretations and development of supporting CONOPs in response to the 2006 QDR guidance lead to dysfunctional chains of command, establishment of collocated units, and eventual disestablishment of collocated units. On the surface, the designation of the 20th SUPCOM as a JTF-E appeared logical at the national level, even if the Army transformation of the unit was not intentionally aligned with the elimination mission set.

OPERATIONALIZING CONCEPTS

The 20th SUPCOM was established in 2004 in order to align disparate Army chemical units and some explosive ordnance (EOD) elements under one headquarters. Primarily, this served to alleviate the issue wherein the DA staff had some units that were reporting directly to DA Headquarters.⁶¹ In addition, the expeditionary transformation of the Army had dissolved the traditional hierarchy structures over these elements and the 20th SUPCOM would serve that role. By the end of 2005, the 20th SUPCOM consisted of two active component EOD Groups and one Chemical Brigade (with two Technical Escort Battalions).⁶² More importantly, by this time the 20th SUPCOM had reorganized a few critical elements from the 75th XTF mission into their own structure – namely the Nuclear Disablement Teams (NDT) and the CBRNE Coordination Elements (now termed the WMD Coordination Element or WCE).⁶³ In a quick glance, it is easy to see how DOD organizations drafting the 2006 QDR might view the 20th SUPCOM as an ideal unit for executing the WMD-E mission.

By June 2006, the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published the Operational and Organizational (O&O) Concept for the CBRNE Headquarters. Within the O&O,

⁶¹Respondent 3 interview, October 25, 2013.

⁶²20th SUPCOM, “20th Support Command (CBRNE) Command Brief”, November 1, 2005. Slides 8-9.

⁶³Ibid., slide 9.

the use of a CBRNE Headquarters as a JTF for WMD-E (JTF-E) was formalized. TRADOC's analysis was that the 20th SUPCOM, as the only CBRNE headquarters in the Army, was currently 1) not designed for major combat operations, 2) not able to function as an operational JTF, and 3) not capable of accomplishing the WMD-E task as defined by JP 3-40.⁶⁴ In recognition of this, the TRADOC O&O acknowledged that the 20th SUPCOM was designed as a functional JTF headquarters, able to command and control specialized CBRNE elements in support of WMD-E operations. The JTF-E concept was to deploy elements of the 20th SUPCOM to integrate into an established JTF headquarters or act as a functional JTF Headquarters for Elimination (JTFHQ-E) subordinate to the operational JTF. The JTFHQ-E would be augmented by a Joint Enabling Capability (JEC) for Elimination (JEC-E) and constitute the JTF-E.⁶⁵ The JEC-E would conduct elimination planning and function as the J5 of the 20th SUPCOM JTF or augment an existing JTF J5 cell.⁶⁶ For the 20th SUPCOM, the JEC-E (eventually renamed to the Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE)) provided the joint enabling capabilities that were required to meet the JTF requirements as mandated.⁶⁷

As the JEC-E developed under the JTF-E construct with a habitual relationship with the Army-based 20th SUPCOM, the JECE's Manning was designed around the JTF shortcomings of

⁶⁴U.S. Army, *Operational and Organizational (O&O) Concept for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Headquarters* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 2006), 10.

⁶⁵U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Handbook for the Joint Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Elimination Operations*, II-3 – II-4.

⁶⁶Multiple respondent interviews, 3, 4, 6, and 11.

⁶⁷Joint Forces Command J3 (MC), *Designation of the 20th Support Command (20SUPCOM) as a Joint Task Force Capable Headquarters (JTF HQ)* (Joint Forces Command, October 1, 2007); 20th Support Command (CBRNE), "JTF-E HQs Mission Analysis Brief to DCDR USJFCOM", April 21, 2008, Slide 7; Gordon R. England, "Memorandum Subject: Approval of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE)" (Deputy Secretary of Defense, December 3, 2007).

the 20th SUPCOM Operational Command Post (OCP).⁶⁸ Inevitably, the JECE was designed with only non-Army service billets (Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) since the JECE was to be collocated with the 20th SUPCOM headquarters at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD.⁶⁹ In addition to the absence of Army billets from the JECE because it was singularly tied to an Army unit, the command relationships between the 20th SUPCOM and the JECE was equally disjointed.

When 20th SUPCOM, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), DTRA, and the SCC-WMD developed the JECE command structure, four initial methodologies were proposed (figure 2, JECE Command Structure Options, July 20, 2006). In figure 2, options 1 and 2 represent two parallel structures maintaining service purity (Army is Army only, Joint is Joint only), while options 3 and 4 represent versions of a combined service and joint structure that would dual-hat the 20th SUPCOM Commanding General as the JECE Commander, either under STRATCOM (as the executive agent for WMD) or under JFCOM (as the responsible command for certifying and deploying joint forces). The JFCOM staff recommendation was option 3, with 20th SUPCOM and the JECE aligned under JFCOM.⁷⁰ In opposition, the SCC-WMD preference was option 4, with the JECE aligned under STRATCOM (the mandated WMD executive agent) and the SCC-WMD. The actual executed structure was option 2 – a parallel command chain where the JECE would be collocated with the 20th SUPCOM in a direct support role, but all command authorities would reside with the SCC-WMD and STRATCOM. The only caveat would be under deployment situations when the JTF-E was activated under the National Command Authority,

⁶⁸Multiple respondent interviews, 3, 5, 8, and 11.

⁶⁹England, “Memorandum Subject: Approval of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE),” (December 3, 2007); Multiple respondent interviews, 3, 5, 8, and 11.

⁷⁰Joint Forces Command J354, “Combating WMD, Joint Task Force WMD Elimination (JTF WMD-E)”, July 20, 2006, slide 8.

JFCOM would remain the JTF-E establishing authority until the JTF-E is transferred to the supported GCC.⁷¹




Figure 2. JECE Command Structure Options, July 20, 2006. Joint Forces Command J354, “Combating WMD, Joint Task Force WMD Elimination (JTF WMD-E),” July 20, 2006, slide 8.

DERAILED

From 2008 into early 2009, the JTF-E construct and supporting resourcing, training, and certification appeared to be on a glide path to meet the 2006 QDR guidance with one major exception – manning (which will be addressed later). From 2008 to 2009, 20th SUPCOM and the JECE participated in numerous CWMD exercises. Multiple respondents noted complications between the two elements in the performance of their duties. Most notably was the lack of CWMD experience resident within the JECE, but this was more likely a function of the impacts of the joint assignment process as well as the over-abundance of CWMD experience already

⁷¹England, “Memorandum Subject: Approval of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE).”

resident within the 20th SUPCOM headquarters. Other issues noted by respondents were associated with typical ‘growing pains’ of establishing new standard operating procedures for a relatively new mission set between separate commands. Outside of these issues, some operational commands saw value in having a JTF-E arrive to augment their headquarters in preparation for and in executing WMD elimination operations.⁷² However, a conglomeration of events in 2009 brought about drastic changes to the JECE and, subsequently, the JTF-E construct.

After sixteen respondent interviews and detailed document research, it would be naïve to state that any particular change was the sole cause for the 2010 QDR guidance to “establish a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters ... to better plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operations ... with increased nuclear disablement, exploitation, intelligence, and coordination capabilities.”⁷³ A quick look at the evolving situations in late 2008 through 2009 help shed light on the QDR standing JTF requirement. In late 2008, a new presidential administration was elected to office. Of course this is nothing new, but according to one respondent who worked through multiple administration changes, the new administration was intensely leery of previous administration initiatives and the trickle-down effect caused SCC to justify its mission and manning, as well as that of the JECE.⁷⁴ In addition, other factors such as the recent economic downturn of the US economy, the ongoing planning for withdrawal of forces from Iraq, changes in key military leadership at the 20th SUPCOM, STRATCOM, DTRA, and SCC-WMD, and the increasing concern over the state of the war in Afghanistan all added to the complication of justifying any new growth within DOD. In particular, the 20th SUPCOM and SCC-WMD leadership were commonly at odds on employment of the JECE. 20th SUPCOM

⁷²Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9), *United States Pacific Command Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Detect, Identify, Track and Eliminate Workshop* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Futures Lab, April 28, 2008); Multiple respondent interviews 3, 9, 11, and 12.

⁷³U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, 36.

⁷⁴Respondent 2 interview, November 15, 2013.

focused on training for the JTF-E mission while SCC-WMD wanted the JECE to play a larger role through DTRA in interagency and foreign assistance missions.⁷⁵ In spite of all this, after successful completion of the KEY RESOLVE exercise in South Korea in March 2009, the 20th SUPCOM Commanding General declared the 20th SUPCOM role in the JTF-E construct as reaching Full Operational Capability (FOC.)⁷⁶ However, when discussing the new JTF-E mission and the organizations that made up the construct (20th SUPCOM and JECE,) manning growth was the issue of the day.

IT'S ALL ABOUT THE NUMBERS

During the mission analysis of both the 20th SUPCOM assumption of the JTF-E mission and the subsequent build of the JECE to support it, the outlying issue was the manning required to support the JTF-E headquarters construct. Since the 20th SUPCOM is an Army headquarters and not a joint element, it would require significant augmentation to meet the stated needs. During the development of the JECE, JFCOM, STRATCOM, and the 20th SUPCOM developed the joint manning document (JMD) that would support the activation of the JTF-E headquarters.⁷⁷ Altogether, the 20th SUPCOM OCP comprised 112 billets, the JECE filled 30 billets, and the remaining 363 requirements were submitted on a JMD in 2009.⁷⁸ While JFCOM stated the requirement of creation and validation of a JMD would be executed NLT April 2008, no JMD

⁷⁵Respondent 16 interview, December 2, 2013.

⁷⁶20th SUPCOM, "20th Support Command (CBRNE) History Brief", undated. slide 8.

⁷⁷Respondent 3 interview, October 25, 2013.

⁷⁸20th Support Command (CBRNE), "JTF-Elimination Draft Joint Manning Document (JMD)," (Department of the Army, June 2009).

was ever actually approved for either organization.⁷⁹ Internal to the SCC, manning the JECE brought its own issues separate of the 20th SUPCOM.

In 2006, the initial manning of the JECE was almost entirely supported by DTRA personnel acting under a ‘dual-hat’ to the SCC-WMD.⁸⁰ As the organization moved from initial operating capability (IOC) to full operational capability (FOC), the JECE would be manned as new personnel transferred to Aberdeen, MD, to collocate with the 20th SUPCOM headquarters. The first major issue the JECE had was to convince the services to fill the joint billets with personnel of the appropriate skillset.⁸¹ While JFCOM had justified the billet creation for the JECE, as a new organization, each service assignments officer was largely unaware of its mission, purpose, or importance.⁸² In addition, the Army acceptance of the JECE as an augmenting element to the JTF-E construct was contingent on the approval of JMD. This last issue became a continuous point of friction between the 20th SUPCOM and the STRATCOM staff (and subsequently, the SCC-WMD) who was supposed to pass the JMD requests on to the applicable combatant command for approval.⁸³

Throughout 2008 and 2009, 20th SUPCOM and the JECE were continuously undermanned as they competed for resources in opposition to ongoing war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁸⁴ Recognizing the difficulty with garnering manpower resources in a constrained environment, the DTRA team working on the QDR sought to leverage the recently published

⁷⁹Joint Forces Command J3 (MC), *Designation of the 20th Support Command (20SUPCOM) as a Joint Task Force Capable Headquarters (JTF HQ)*; Multiple respondent interviews, 3, 4, and 11.

⁸⁰Dr. James Tegnalia, “SCC Update to General Cartwright, USSTRATCOM” (USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD / DTRA, October 5, 2005), slide 7.

⁸¹Multiple respondent interviews, 2, 6, and 11.

⁸²Respondent 11 interview, November 17, 2013.

⁸³Respondents 3 and 4 interviews.

⁸⁴Multiple respondent interviews, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 11.

Baseline Organization and Functions for a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) - Core Element (CE) manual from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The SJFHQ document specifically stated that all “SJFHQs will receive priority full-time manning based upon validated requirements.”⁸⁵ The idea was obvious to the team drafting the CWMD portions of the 2010 QDR – recognize the JTF-E (which included both the JECE and the 20th SUPCOM) as a SJFHQ and manning requirements would be a priority for fill among the services.⁸⁶ However, as with the 2006 QDR, a lack of clear intent and endstate caused multiple strategies to be devised to accomplish the new SJFHQ mission.

Adding more confusion to the JTF-E construct and 20th SUPCOM / JECE relationship was a call from a representative of the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-Policy). In late 2009, Ms. Rebecca Hersman from OSD-Policy inquired of the 20th SUPCOM to provide the JTF-E command view (which was from the dual-hatted perspective of the 20th SUPCOM Commanding General) of any issues with the JTF-E concept.⁸⁷ The 20th SUPCOM response was sent back to Ms. Hersman, but was not vetted through the Army chain of command for the unit (which at this time would have been FORSCOM, then DA staff, then OSD-Policy). The exclusion of the Army staff was not intentional by the unit since the 20th SUPCOM CG was responding as a JTF-E commander who had the responsibility to respond, but lacked the authority to do so since authorities as JTF-E CG only applied under JFCOM if activated under National Command Authority. Regardless, the inadvertent exclusion of the Army command structure caused a significant amount of ‘angst’ on the DA staff and within the Army CBRNE community towards what appeared to them as a push from OSD-Policy to criticize the JTF-E progress thus

⁸⁵Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Baseline Organization and Functions for a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) - Core Element (CE)* (Washington, D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008), 1.

⁸⁶Respondent 2 interview, October 31, 2013.

⁸⁷Respondent 16 interview, December 2, 2013.

far.⁸⁸ The ‘sore spot’ of the reach from OSD down to a tactical Army headquarters and deliberate bypass of the chain of command had ramifications keenly felt after the publishing of the 2010 QDR. By the end of 2009, the 20th SUPCOM OCP and the JECE were still undermanned. The 20th SUPCOM OCP stood at approximately seventy of 112 billets filled (or 63% filled) and the JECE had twenty-two personnel against thirty required billets (73% filled).

AMBIGUITY STRIKES AGAIN

The 20th SUPCOM growth as an organization prior to 2006 was, as stated before, due to Army transformation necessity or to gain new efficiencies by aligning functionally similar units under one coherent headquarters. However, with the reorganization of units to the 20th came the assumption of new missions – specifically some select Title 10 of the US Code responsibilities in the contiguous United States such as EOD support to civil authorities, Very Important Persons Protective Support Activity (VIPPSA) for the US Secret Service and Department of State, and the standing support requirement to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) for CBRNE consequence management for emergency response.⁸⁹ To make the 20th SUPCOM into a SJFHQ would take some major changes, not the least of which would be a revisit of the command structure of the 20th SUPCOM, a possible new JECE relationship, as well as possible relief of some Title 10 responsibilities (or assumption of such responsibilities by the new command).

After the publishing of the 2010 QDR, the Joint Staff conducted a mission analysis of the possible tasking of the 20th SUPCOM as a SJFHQ. During this Joint Staff process, a host of concerns were expressed that defeated this idea. First, STRATCOM appeared willing to work with 20th SUPCOM, but would not accept the Title 10 responsibilities. Also, the DA was

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹20th SUPCOM, “20th SUPCOM Command Brief,” (November 1, 2005), slides 10-12.

unwilling to relinquish any control of the 20th SUPCOM due to the invested missions it conducted for the Army and the recent DA issues with OSD-Policy. Finally, the JECE role had grown since its first inception through the SCC-WMD evolutionary build of the unit that, if subordinated to the 20th SUPCOM, would require new joint authorities for the 20th SUPCOM commander.⁹⁰ The end result of these interactions in 2010 was that STRATCOM would need to create its own SJFHQ for elimination missions, separate of the current JECE/20th SUPCOM relationship.

STRATCOM and DTRA staff conducted a new mission analysis of the requirements to establish and operate a stand-alone SJFHQ. While the staff conducted a full Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTLMPF) analysis, the most crucial element (and the most controversial) was the amount of personnel required. The mission analysis was a re-hash of the original JTF-E and JECE mission analysis, producing almost exactly the same recommendations.⁹¹ Three options for manning a SJFHQ were proposed: 1) a core element of approximately thirty personnel that would require a large JMD (status quo) when activated, 2) a Brigade-size staff (near to the 75th XTF manning) of 98-120 with a small JMD requirement, and 3) a fully-manned and capable staff with no JMD requirement of around 350 personnel.⁹² The recommended course of action by the STRATCOM and DTRA staffs was option 3 (a near-brigade size staff with a minor JMD augmentation when activated). However, the zero-sum growth of the services in 2010 and the lack of a clearly-defined, daily relevancy mission

⁹⁰These overarching views were represented by most respondents. However, it is important to note that none of the respondents were on the Joint staff, STRATCOM Staff, or DA staff at the time of this analysis and discussion. The three major ideas here represent discussions respondents had through indirect contacts with the higher headquarters staffs. The JECE role growth is a reference to the roles it executed outside of the simple augmentation of the 20th SUPCOM JTF-E construct such as inter-agency development and exercises, as well as foreign internal defense development exercises it conducted through DTRA in 2008 and 2009.

⁹¹Respondent 2 interview, November 15, 2013.

⁹²Multiple respondent interviews, 2, 3, 8, and 9.

of the SJFHQ-E led the STRATCOM leadership to decide that option 1 was the most palatable and subsequently recommended the reassignment of the current JECE as the SJFHQ-E.⁹³

On December 8, 2010, the SJFHQ-E was established and reassigned to STRATCOM under the SCC-WMD.⁹⁴ However, even the establishment of the SJFHQ-E was not the final step in this process and brought a host of issues to light with respect to its new stated mission, its relationship with the 20th SUPCOM, its current office location at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD, and drew questions as to the status of the JTF-E construct.

TRANSITION ENDEAVORS

Over the years from 2010 to 2012, the SJFHQ-E and the 20th SUPCOM came to represent two parallel organizations for executing WMD-E operations in two completely different ways. When the SJFHQ-E activated on February 2012, the stated purpose of the organization was captured in a press release by the DTRA:

The SJFHQ-E will provide a full time, trained joint command and control element that can quickly integrate into a Geographic Combatant Command's (GCC) structure to provide WMD elimination expertise in planning, intelligence, and operations. This new headquarters will be a scalable, flexible, and deployable capability that can augment a GCC or existing Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters staff, or be attached to a GCC as the core of the headquarters of a JTF established for elimination.⁹⁵

⁹³Respondent 2 and 15 interviews. Particularly of note, respondent 15 recalled that a number of discussions attempted to compare the relevancy of the proposed SJFHQ-E mission against that of other ongoing JTF missions such as JTF-Horn of Africa (HOA) with ongoing anti-piracy and regional stability missions, JTF-CS with emergency response capacity in CONUS, and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (CJSOTF-PI) with ongoing anti-terrorism and foreign internal defense operations. Respondent 15 felt that relevancy, more so than manpower restrictions, drove STRATCOM to accept the current manning in hopes of discussing the manning shortage at a later date. Under these conditions, it is important to note that the Army, through the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence analysis, non-concurred with the remissioning of the JECE on the grounds that it conflicted with the JTF-E construct.

⁹⁴Respondent 15 reading of a memorandum from the office of the Secretary of Defense. The original memorandum is unclassified, but at the time of the project, the respondent did not have a method to move the file from the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) to an unclassified network.

⁹⁵Stand up of SJFHQ-E Enhances CWMD Mission, DTRA Press release, <http://www.prweb.com/releases/SJFHQ/Activated/prweb9186286.htm> (accessed November 24, 2013).

This stated mission for the SJFHQ-E was a near verbatim of STRATCOM's recommended mission statement to the Secretary of Defense after mission analysis in January 2011.⁹⁶ However, one can note the redundancy of the new SJFHQ-E mission and the original JTF-E concept for the 20th SUPCOM WMD-E mission of providing a "deployed headquarters (that) integrates into an established JTF headquarters to provide C2 of Army and/or joint forces for WMD-E."⁹⁷ In addition, while the 20th SUPCOM had undergone multiple Force Design Updates (FDUs) since 2006, the JECE had remained relatively unchanged and under resourced. The 20th SUPCOM and Army staff soon realized after STRATCOM's decision to establish a separate SJFHQ that the JTF-E construct that drove 20th SUPCOM updates from 2006 to 2010 may no longer be applicable to that unit.

After the activation of the SJFHQ-E in February 2012, 20th SUPCOM worked with U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) staff to seek relief from the JTF-E mission as delegated from JFCOM in October 2007. In March 2012, in a memorandum to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7, the FORSCOM G3/5/7 recommended that the 20th SUPCOM not be required to maintain its certification as a JTF-E, but should "seek joint training exercise opportunities that closely align" with the WMD-E mission.⁹⁸ In response, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, DA G3/5/7, concurred with FORSCOM in that the 20th SUPCOM would not be required to recertify

⁹⁶Chilton, Kevin P., General, "Memorandum Subject: Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E)," (Commanding General, STRATCOM, January 24, 2011). Actual recommended mission statement: "The SJFHQ-E plans and trains for command and control of elimination operations in support of geographic combatant commands (GCCs); upon order, deploys to enable an existing headquarters or to provide the core of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters that will execute elimination operations."

⁹⁷U.S. Army, *Operational and Organizational (O&O) Concept for the CBRNE Headquarters*, 21.

⁹⁸Graham, Mark A., Major General, "Memorandum Subject: Policy Clarification on Joint Task Force Elimination (JTF-E) Certification of 20th Support Command (CBRNE)," (FORSCOM Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, March 8, 2012).

as a JTF-E, but “must ensure sustained readiness of the unit to support all related missions to include serving as a JTF-E headquarters with support from the SFHQ-E.”⁹⁹ However, the DA G3/5/7 ensured that the Army was not perceived to maintain the JTF-E role for the long term by reiterating that the SJFHQ-E, “upon activation, still assumes all tasks, missions, and operations of the JECE, to include augmenting existing headquarters, providing command and control expertise, and forming the core of the JTF-E Headquarters.”¹⁰⁰

At this point, it was apparent to all (DTRA, FORSCOM, DA, STRATCOM, and 20th SUPCOM) that the SJFHQ-E was neither a subordinate to the 20th SUPCOM, nor an augmentation unit to its JTF-E Headquarters. In addition, the Army saw the JTF-E mission tied more strongly to the SJFHQ-E than to the 20th SUPCOM. This led to the inevitable decision by STRATCOM to move the recently established JECE from their current collocation with the 20th SUPCOM Headquarters back to DTRA Headquarters at Fort Belvoir, VA, in order to be collocated with the SCC-WMD.¹⁰¹ With the completed move of the SJFHQ-E back to DTRA (completed in September 2013), the tyranny of distance control issue with the SCC-WMD was solved, as well as the complete dissolution of the operational relationships between the 20th SUPCOM and the SJFHQ-E leadership.

⁹⁹Campbell, John F., Lieutenant General, “Memorandum Subject: Policy Clarification on Joint Task Force Elimination (JTF-E) Certification of 20th Support Command (CBRNE),” (DA Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, May 11, 2012).

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Respondent 8 interview, November 6, 2013.

“Failure does not strike like a lightning bolt from the blue; it develops gradually according to its own logic.”

— Dietrich Dörner, *Logic of Failure*, 1996

CONCLUSION

In the attempt to understand the history of organizing the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E), the Department of Defense has failed to adequately address the requirement to provide a command element capable of providing mission command and technical expertise in support of a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) during WMD-E missions or mission planning. However, this is with one important caveat that the SJFHQ-E is not the command element capable of executing the assigned mission as it currently stands. The SJFHQ-E has neither the capacity nor the resources necessary to act as a functioning JTF, nor does it have any approved augmentation plan to ensure that it would have the capacity once activated.

Throughout the study, respondents made numerous observations of the difficulties in developing executable courses of action to meet the stated national guidance on the development of a JTF-capable command and subsequently, a Standing Joint Force Headquarters. At all levels of participating commands and agencies, the interconnectedness of the parties involved caused an almost uniform theory for implementation as the JECE construct was developed. Government bureaucratic development of a new organization (JECE) that resembles current institutional models (such as Joint Forces Command’s JECC) is also supported by Giddens’ structuration theory. Both the SCC WMD and the 20th SUPCOM utilized existing hierarchical models to develop the JECE and SJFHQ-E. According to all respondents, at no time were contradicting theories of an organization discussed such as flat or network-centric theories.

While Weber’s theory of bureaucracy applicability is evident, it is only because the democratic government of the United States represents the Western model Weber articulated in

his theory. To develop a governmental organization that did not uphold to the same rules and hierarchy would be out of place. More relevant to the organizational structure of the SJFHQ-E were the JP 3-33 and CJCS Manual *Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) Core Element (CE)*. As a more hybrid model, JP 3-33 and the CJCSM acknowledged the standard hierarchy of a joint staff but ensured organizations are not limited by it. These two publications also acknowledge the necessity of having a core of highly trained staff augmented by external elements in a time of need. This hybrid organization could then grow and shrink as mission requirements dictated. However, as the JP 3-33 and CJCSM note, an approved Joint Manning Document (JMD) is a requirement of a standing joint headquarters. The resulting SJFHQ-E was as much a product of this hybrid model as it was the result of resource limitations and conflicting national and strategic command priorities at the time of formation.

After the 75th XTF and ISG in Iraq, organizations that were comprised of 1000-1500 members respectively, the Department of Defense took on a “no more adhoc” mentality.¹⁰² To date, multiple iterations of guidance in the form of QDRs, the establishment of one functional component center, two new military organizations, and the remissioning of a separate Army command took place to meet the simple goal of “no more adhoc.” However, at some point in the development of a command capable of acting as the command and control element in the combating WMD mission, the Department of Defense lost sight of the original intent and became fixated on the idea of a standing joint headquarters with a highly-specialized, niche mission. The QDRs themselves represent a likely culprit of the clear lack of shared understanding and intent within DOD.

¹⁰²Judith Miller, “After The War: Unconventional Arms; A Chronicle of Confusion in the U.S. Hunt for Hussein's Chemical and Germ Weapons,” *New York Times*, July 20, 2003 (accessed 18 January 2014), <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/20/world/after-war-unconventional-arms-chronicle-confusion-us-hunt-for-hussein-s-chemical.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>.

The lack of shared understanding and a clear endstate between the DOD offices and the military services in the execution of the QDR guidance in 2006 and 2010 caused a rift between STRATCOM, Headquarters for the Department of the Army (HQDA) staff, and the Joint Staff. The 20th SUPCOM and the JECE met the “no more adhoc” intent within the JTF-E construct in 2009. The JTF-E had exercised numerous times on CWMD scenarios and even deployed to South Korea in support of emerging CWMD exercises. However, the breakdown in communications and unity of effort between the various elements within DOD caused senior leaders to question the ability of the JTF-E to actually meet the original intent. In turn, this perception resulted in the more detailed iteration of a standing joint headquarters in the 2010 QDR. While the intent of the 2010 QDR was to reinforce the JTF-E construct, the rift between the elements within DOD caused various interpretations and a clear separation of the Army’s approach from that of STRATCOM.

In light of the current resource-constrained environment, senior leaders across DOD are developing innovative ways to capitalize on the resources they currently possess to meet the mission requirements levied on them. The CWMD mission presents one more area where an in-depth, unbiased analysis of the current capacity of DOD would yield alternative methods to ensure mission success. As recently as March 2013, the Joint Staff Joint Resource Office (JRO) concluded a study on the CWMD organization capacity with the overall finding that GCCs lack the enabling capabilities needed to achieve CWMD mission objectives.¹⁰³ Supporting this JRO finding, the study also concluded that CWMD forces are out of balance while the need for a single operational headquarters with the structure, authorities, regional focus, and habitual

¹⁰³*Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Force Posture Study (Defense Planning Guidance FY14-18)*, 8 March 2013, to VCS, JRO J8. This study represented the conclusions of elements of the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commands, Military Services, SJFHQ-E, DTRA, DIA, and the National Defense University.

relationships to provide options to assist GCCs with CWMD planning, execution, and situational understanding still exists.¹⁰⁴

The CWMD mission is still relatively new to military doctrine. However, with time and effort, COCOMs will eventually learn how to adapt to the CWMD mission and institutionalize lessons learned just as the military has done with the Countering Improvised Explosive Device (CIED) mission. After the rampant expansion of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) on the battlefield in 2003-2004 in Iraq, DOD created numerous organizations to tackle the emerging threat. However, today most of those organizations no longer exist as military forces have developed new methods and technologies to defeat these devices. Like IEDs, WMD is a persistent threat for the foreseeable future. If DOD is to be properly prepared to combat WMD on the battlefield or in a conflict environment, the military must present a unified CWMD element that can answer a GCCs needs and support national military objectives.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., Slide 4.

APPENDIX 1: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

To Respondent: Thank you for your time and willingness to participate in this interview. This will be an open-ended interview using a semi-structured instrument to discuss my monograph topic of the development of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) and its antecedents, the STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD) and the Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE). This interview will be conducted with FULL DISCLOSURE and the informed consent of the respondent. This interview will not be transcribed. Do you agree? Y/N

Opening

Confirm quantifiable background data:

- Profession / Branch
- Education Level -- Bachelor, Master, PhD
- Education (degree, scientific, organizational) -- University, College, Agency
- Commission Source (if military) -- ROTC, OCS, USMA
- Time spent in WMD-related career field -- Approximate Years or Months
- Experience with 75th XTF -- Command, Plans, or Operator
- Experience with Iraq Survey Group -- Position / Time
- Experience with the 20th SUPCOM -- Command, Plans, or Operator, and
Time in position

SCC-WMD Development

Position, department, and rank during the development of the SCC-WMD (2003-2005)

Where you a key decision-maker (Commander, Director, etc), planning staff, or operational director?

How did you and/or your office participate in its creation?

What was the impetus for the creation of the SCC-WMD organization?

What mission analysis was conducted in support of the establishment of the SCC-WMD?

- Was there any particular personality (decision-maker or staff member) that had overwhelming influence in the development?
 - o How so?
 - o Why?
 - o To what end? (what were the outcomes of the influence)

JECE Development

Position, department, and rank during the development of the JECE (2006-2010)

Where you a key decision-maker, planning staff, or operational director?

How did you and/or your office participate in its creation?

When did the idea that a separate and distinct element from SCC-WMD would need to be created? Why?

What organizational analysis was conducted in support of the establishment of the JECE?

- What was the original recommended staffing (size)?
- What was the recommended make-up of the organization?
- What was the framework used for its establishment? (JP, Org Theory, History?)
- Did the leadership within the organization agree on its establishment and analysis?
- Were there any dissenting views?
 - o If so, what were they?
 - o In hindsight, do you think they were valid? Why / why not?
- Was there any particular personality (decision-maker or staff member) that had overwhelming influence in the development?
 - o How so?
 - o Why?
 - o To what end? (what were the outcomes of the influence)

SJFHQ-E Development

Position, department, and rank during the development of the SJFHQ-E (2010-2012)

Where you a key decision-maker, planning staff, or operational director?

How did you and/or your office participate in its creation?

When did the idea that a command element under the SCC-WMD would need to be created?

Why was the JECE organization not enough?

When did the idea that the SJFHQ-E needed to be more (capable and separate) develop?

What organizational analysis was conducted in support of the establishment of the SJFHQ-E?

- What was the original recommended staffing (size)?
- What was the recommended make-up of the organization?
- What was the framework used for its establishment? (JP, Org Theory, History?)
- Did the leadership within the organization agree on its establishment and analysis?
- Were there any dissenting views?
 - o If so, what were they?
 - o In hindsight, do you think they were valid? Why / why not?
- Was there any particular personality (decision-maker or staff member) that had overwhelming influence in the development?
 - o How so?
 - o Why?
 - o To what end? (What were the outcomes of the influence?)

Closing Remarks

Within your current function/role, do you believe the SJFHQ-E (as it is currently resourced and organized) is able to meet its QDR-tasked mission to “provide a command and control element for a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) or Joint Task Force (JTF) responsible for the elimination of WMD in hostile or uncertain conditions”?

- Why or why not?

Any final thoughts or observations not discussed that may be pertinent to this case study?

Are you willing to have your name recorded as a participant in this study?

May I contact you again if I need more information or clarification of anything discussed today?

Again, thank you for your time and support to this study. When the final paper is approved, I will be sure to send a copy for your records.

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