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USAID & DOD: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE DEVELOPMENT-MILITARY COOPERATION

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Ben Kauffeld

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FOREWORD

At the beginning of 2014, U.S. government agencies involved in national security, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), maintained a laser like focus on an imploding Syria, the impending transition in Afghanistan and the arc of instability spreading across Western Africa. Not on the radar screen was the horror movie unfolding in Ukraine or the explosion of unaccompanied children fleeing instability in Central America. As General Key, European Command's (EUCOM) planning chief, remarked at the late winter EUCOM Strategy Conference, "Our crystal ball is not so crystal."

Against this backdrop of unforeseen crises, the U.S. Government can ill afford to conduct pick-up games. In order to avoid this costly recurring phenomenon, a functioning, healthy relationship between key national security players such as the Department of Defense (DoD) and USAID directly underpins our ability to address a world of complex threats and challenges. Like any relationship, this one takes dedicated effort. USAID created a unique office in the federal bureaucracy called the Office of Civilian Military Cooperation (CMC) to address this need. The Office manages a pool of senior and deputy development advisors placed at the geographic combatant commands, U.S. Special Operations Command and the Pentagon and hosts military liaisons from these commands and most of the Services at USAID headquarters in Washington, D.C. CMC works on the USAID-DoD relationship every day. The goal of the office is to "align development and defense and leverage the unique capabilities of USAID and DoD to achieve better development outcomes in pursuit of national security goals and national values."

Ben Kauffeld, a USAID Foreign Service Officer and a recent graduate of the U.S. Army War College, provides an important accounting of the interaction between USAID and DoD in this monograph buttressed by key interviews among that special pool of people who have served in each agency's respective headquarters or commands. The Department of State (DOS) is also profiled in his monograph, underscoring the centrality of the 3D foundation formed by DoD, DOS and USAID. He gives the reader important information about the roles of both military and development personnel at every level – from the country team to the Pentagon and USAID's headquarters. More importantly, he offers critical prescriptions for improvement. As the military moves from large to small footprint operations in diverse locations, this important inquiry is incredibly timely for new and evolving requirements for the relationship between our nation's development and defense professionals.

A few important points that emerge from this monograph deserve special attention. The disparity in resources for personnel between USAID and DoD, a persistent barrier to effective coordination, makes it extremely difficult for USAID to have the float for training with our military colleagues. USAID has a relatively small pool of seasoned foreign service members who can act as development advisors in the number of commands out there without compromising strength in the missions. The agency also lacks the surge personnel who can deploy to planning headquarters for crises and the funds for critical joint planning that are above and beyond the separate agency planning processes that are the basis for current cooperation. The comparative size of USAID to DoD hinders effective cooperation. Follow on assignments that take advantage of this unique expertise in coor-

dination for both the military and USAID personnel should be seriously considered by both institutions. And, last but not least, the draft revision of USAID's Cooperation Policy with the Department of Defense (hopefully released by the time this monograph is published) already encompasses one key recommendation from Mr. Kauffeld. The Agency's Country Development Cooperation strategies (CDCS) will be shared in draft with relevant planners from DoD as a matter of policy. And THAT is a very positive step forward.

Beth Ellen Cole
Director
Office of Civilian Military
Cooperation
U.S. Agency for International
Development
July 25, 2014

ABSTRACT

The United States Department of Defense and U.S. Agency for International Development have interacted for 50 years to advance national security interests. With origins in the Marshall Plan, and through joint efforts in the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the two have developed policies, liaison systems, and joint programming to advance practical coordination. After closely-combined defense, diplomatic and developmental (3D) efforts, USAID and DOD have never appreciated each other's capabilities better. Despite this, significant challenges exist which impede sustained coordination, including resource imbalances, conceptual gaps, and personality-based rather than institutional relationships. As war efforts conclude, is a window of time closing on dev-mil coordination? What are the implications for unity of effort between military and development actors? This report analyzes the history, policies, coordination structures, and experiences of USAID and DOD interaction; identifies trends and challenges; and recommends continued interagency engagement, particularly through joint planning, field programming and broader staff exchanges.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

BENJAMIN D. KAUFFELD is a commissioned Foreign Service Officer holding the rank of Counselor. Over his 20-year professional career, he has worked in numerous international environments supporting United States national interests, foreign policy, and humanitarian imperatives. His work assignments include provision of food aid with U.N. World Food Programme in southern Sudan, refugee and host-community assistance in Albania and Serbia with American Red Cross, and multiple humanitarian, civil-military, and governance-related assignments with USAID, namely in Kenya, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Ghana, Jordan and Washington, DC. Mr. Kauffeld holds Bachelors Degrees in International Studies and Humanities from Pepperdine University, a Masters Degree in African Area Studies from UCLA, and a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. Mr. Kauffeld has been joined and supported throughout his international career by his wife, daughter, son and mother-in-law.

USAID & DOD: Analysis and Recommendations to Enhance Development-Military Cooperation

The organizational culture of USAID makes it difficult to operate in the interagency, because they come to it from a position of inferiority. USAID needs to be inside the tent influencing things - rather than outside complaining.

— Tom Baltazar,
Former Director USAID
Office of Military Affairs¹

Introduction

Despite disparities in size, resourcing and mandates, the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have interacted cooperatively for over 50 years to advance national security and foreign policy interests. With origins in the Marshall Plan, and through joint efforts in the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan wars as well as peacetime international development and humanitarian assistance, the two have developed policies, liaison systems, and joint programming to advance practical coordination. History reflects that when working together on the world's most difficult security and development challenges, significant and strategic results have been achieved. History also sheds light on recurring challenges which have impeded sustained coordination, including resource imbalances, gaps in operating concepts, and inter-organizational culture dynamics.² After closely-combined defense, diplomatic and developmental (3D) efforts during thirteen years of war, USAID and DOD have never appreciated and respected each other's capabilities better than

right now. But as these war efforts conclude, what are the implications for unity of effort between military and development actors? Is a unique window of time for development-military (dev-mil) cooperation closing? How does coordination change from personality-driven relationships to more institutionalized structures? This research attempts to answer these questions through an analysis of significant milestones in the inter-organizational history, policies, coordination structures, and first-person interaction experiences for USAID and DOD; it further identifies trends and challenges, and makes specific recommendations for improving interagency engagement, particularly through collaborative joint theater/mission planning and programming, expanding staff exchanges and fixing the substantial gap in organizational resources.

The relationship between the civilian actors of USAID and the military actors of DoD (noting that DoD does have civilian leadership and significant numbers of civilian employees) falls within the overall theory and study of civil-military relations. Such studies generally concentrate on one of two areas of theory: The first addresses the often-confrontational relationship between civilian leaders and the military generals and officers who they oversee and/or employ in the attainment of nation-state political ends through the application (or non-application) of military force. History's famed military theorists as diverse as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Samuel Huntington can be reviewed for opinions on sub-topics such as the friction caused when civilians' policy directives conflict with military commanders' control of wartime operations³; challenges in becoming entangled in civilian politics; and the role of civilian political leaders in maintaining oversight responsibilities.⁴ The second civil-military relations area (which is the focus of this study)

describes cooperation, coordination and unification of effort between military and civilian organizations. Interaction between military actors and civilian governmental international development counterparts is a specific sub-set of this - which I label as “development-military cooperation.” For definitional purposes, “development” does mean different things to different people and organizations (a factor in limiting effective coordination as will be shown), but the focus here is the USAID government international development form, function, and point of view.⁵

Historical Milestones of Development-Military Cooperation

DoD and USAID have been interacting in an overlapping space of U.S. foreign interests and policy implementation for over five decades. During that time, there have been myriad cooperation activities and inter-personnel interactions; so many that a full capturing would require writing a lengthy book. A few examples from history serve however to illustrate the experiences and legacy of DoD and USAID interaction. To this end, the following historical milestones deserve consideration: the Marshall Plan in post-World War II Europe, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support Program (CORDS) during the Vietnam War, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program (TSCTP), a current interagency initiative in Africa. The ‘bottom line up front’ takeaway from these historical cases are: that the two organizations can achieve fantastic strategic results through collaborative efforts; that development-military cooperative spirit is often entwined

with mistrust and competition; and that the two organizations struggle to find an mutually-accepted, effective, sustainable modality of collaboration.

The Marshall Plan in Post-World War II Europe

United States development-military cooperation traces its origins to post-World War II Europe and Japan. In the war's aftermath, civilian government officials and military generals overseeing the occupation of Germany and Japan knew millions of residents suffered from displacement and the destruction of their means of living. The first policy concern of the occupying forces was more towards force-protection than humanitarian empathy – as some officers feared post-war crisis in Europe and Japan threatened to place U.S. occupying forces in danger. The government's response to these challenges was the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) Program, which was designed “to prevent such starvation and widespread disease and civil unrest as would clearly endanger the occupying forces and permanently obstruct the ultimate objectives of the occupation.”⁶ Under GARIOA, the United States provided over \$1.5 billion to Europe and over \$500 million (\$15.7 billion/\$5.2 billion 2014-dollars adjusted for inflation)⁷ to Japan for emergency food aid, fuel, and fertilizer.⁸ In 1948, with the passage of the Foreign Aid Act, GARIOA was modified into the Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas Program in Japan, and the European Recovery Program (ERP) in Europe. The ERP soon became known as the “Marshall Plan”, after its leading advocate, Secretary of State George Marshall.

During the ERP's 1948 to 1951 program years, the United States provided sixteen European nations with

nearly \$13.3 billion (approximately \$119 billion 2014 dollars) in assistance in the initial forms of food aid, fuel and machinery, and then later as cash investments to rebuild and expand industrial capability.⁹ The Marshall Plan aid was administered by officials of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), a governing agency established within the Department of State by President Truman in 1948. The ECA, the precursor of today's USAID, established representative offices in each of the 16 countries; and program implementation decisions were made jointly between the ECA representatives, U.S. military officers, and local officials from the recipient countries.¹⁰ Under the ECA's Technical Assistance Program, the United States sent hundreds of technical advisors to Europe (and funded educational visits for thousands of European engineers and industrialists back to the United States) to advise and train on increasing economic productivity.¹¹ In addressing the significant post-war development challenges of Europe, the Marshall Plan was ambitious in partner engagement, large-scale in resources, and long-term in vision. While it engendered heated debate and criticism in its time, the program is considered as a vital component in the restoration of Western European economic power. The ERP's concept and implementation are indeed hailed as a hallmark exercise in civilian development and military security cooperation. In the words of retired Admiral James Stavridis, former Commander of U.S. European Command:

The Marshall Plan was a thoughtful and well-executed enterprise whose lessons still reverberate and serve as a beacon of light guiding us to maintain and enhance security in a globalized world through political-military partnerships.¹²

In the decade following ERP's termination, the executive and legislative branches often disagreed over the right structure for providing and coordinating military and economic assistance to developing countries. Several short-lived organizations were created and then modified, including the Department of State's (DoS) Point Four Program, the Mutual Security Agency, and the International Cooperation Administration. During the Kennedy administration, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act which merged the ECA-inheritor organizations and established (on November 3, 1961) the Agency for International Development. Since that time, USAID has been the leading government agency responsible for managing bilateral foreign development and humanitarian assistance to achieve foreign policy objectives including sustainable economic growth, effective social services, responsive democratic governance and timely humanitarian relief.¹³

The Vietnam War and CORDS

While executing the Vietnam War, the United States government faced a challenge to unify civilian efforts to stabilize the country with military efforts to defeat the Viet Cong insurgency. From 1954 to the mid-1960s prior to the onset of major conflict, U.S. civilian agencies independently managed various activities in Vietnam: USAID implemented rural development and government institution-building; DoS coordinated diplomatic negotiation; United States Information Agency conducted informational outreach, and the Central Intelligence Agency ran intelligence operations. In 1966, the agencies combined briefly

in the Embassy Saigon's Office of Civil Operations. This coordination effort however may have been 'too little, too late' for an anxious White House. The following year, dissatisfied with the lack of integration between civilians and the military in the deepening war effort, President Johnson issued National Security Memo 362, effectively bringing all civilian efforts under the authority of DoD's Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). MACV was led by General William Westmoreland with a senior civilian deputy, Ambassador Robert Komer.¹⁴ With the authority of Memo 362, Komer fused all civilian and military operations into a new, unified programmatic effort - the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support Program (CORDS).

CORDS' organizational structure mandated closely-integrated civilian-military cooperation. The program created 44 provincial teams, each led by a Provincial Senior Advisor; half had a military commander with a civilian deputy, and half a civilian commander with military deputy.¹⁵ William Schoux, a USAID CORDS Officer, noted, "The military and the civilians were thus forced to integrate their efforts and their thinking and then contextualize their joint approach in the unique conditions of a specific district or province."¹⁶ Civilian agencies provided an unprecedented level of staff to man the CORDS effort. One study reports that DoS, USAID and USIA had a combined total of 2,685 civilian personnel (primarily direct hire governmental, not contracted employees) on ground in Vietnam in 1969.¹⁷ The integration of development and military efforts in CORDS did not sit well with everyone. USAID leadership had sought to advance alternative and less-directive cooperation mechanisms including multi-agency committees focused on

different geographic areas. After Komer's establishment of CORDS, USAID Administrator John Hannah and others expressed dissatisfaction over what they deemed as the program's militarization of USAID's development activities; and sought unsuccessfully to have USAID's programming removed from under the CORDS umbrella.¹⁸

As is known from history, the CORDS initiative was unsuccessful in changing the ultimate trajectory of the war; the failure of which points to deeper challenges with overall strategy and resourcing. As an interagency program however, CORDS was surprisingly successful in achieving its specific objectives. Schoux notes the program achieved significant results in a short period of time, including security provision to over 1000 villages and the negotiated surrender of numerous Viet Cong.¹⁹ In a study drawing linkages between CORDS and counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan, Henry Nuzum echoes this:

The organization effectively integrated, within its parameters, the security, political, and economic portions of the COIN campaign from the district to national levels and contributed to the defeat of the Viet Cong insurgency.²⁰

Some factors credited in CORDS's success are: the substantial civilian staffing effort; willingness of the military to provide security for the implementation of civilian-funded programs; a unified command structure; two-way dialogue from field to headquarters; and flexible leadership.²¹ Despite the achievement of these positive outcomes, it is nonetheless evidenced that CORDS created and left an enduring negative sentiment in the minds of USAID leaders. Reports and blogs from USAID CORDS Officers report enthusiastically positive experiences.²²

CORDS was not designed to defend South Vietnam from a major invasion campaign from the north, neither perhaps could engendered legitimacy for the government of South Vietnam in the eyes of the country's rural population. The program nonetheless presents an archetype of a fully-integrated civilian-military cooperation model. CORDS's legacy (as demonstrated in Nuzum's study) also had tremendous influence on the spirit and structure of development-military operations in later decades.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan

During the 1980s and 90s, excepting for disaster response coordination, by and large USAID had limited close engagement with the military. USAID focused deeply on Agency priorities of "basic needs" humanitarian assistance (in response to circumstances such as East Africa's and North Korea's recurring food shortages) and on economic development and employment issues.²³ The U.S. government's response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, however demanded a deeper collaboration between USAID and DoD. In 2002, after the rapid and successful ousting of Afghanistan's Taliban-led government, U.S. and coalition forces were aware that the invasion (and more significantly decades of underdevelopment and repeated war) had left the country with devastated infrastructure, collapsed governance, and a non-functioning economy. As U.S. government civilian agencies began to establish (or to restore previously-operated) headquarters offices in Kabul, there was an understanding that both stability and services would need to be quickly provided throughout the country's provinces.

In order to enhance security, facilitate reconstruction and extend the presence of the central government, the first PRTs were formed.²⁴ Though the model has multiple variances, in the Afghanistan version, PRTs are fundamentally joint military and civilian organizational constructs of 50-300 personnel. The military element (90-95% of total personnel) included the PRT Commander and his/her staff, a defensive-in-nature force protection unit, a sub-team of civil affairs officers, and various military specialists. The civilian element (5-10%) usually consisted of three to four officers including an international development specialist from USAID, a diplomatic officer from DoS, and an agricultural advisor from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The roles and functions of the PRT have varied from place to place and by local circumstances, but generally were to: facilitate reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, coordinate with local officials for provision of basic governmental services, and importantly to provide adequate military security to enable civilian officers to design and manage activities in insecure environment.

PRTs have been credited with significant contributions to the war efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In close coordination with local Afghan officials, PRTs utilized multi-agency resources to complete community-prioritized quick impact projects, to construct schools, clinics and governance facilities, and to implement projects designed to revitalize agricultural productivity and economic growth.²⁵ Using varying pots of resources creatively to accomplish reconstruction and security objectives was a trademark of the PRT model:

Effective PRTs are expert at mixing funding sources to accomplish their objectives. Increasingly, PRTs have tried to use development aid to neutralize local sources of conflict and to provide incentives for Afghans to oppose the Taliban.²⁶

The PRT model had recognized weaknesses as well. In testimony to the House Armed Services Sub-Committee on Oversight, Robert Perito of the United States Institute of Peace criticized the design and execution of the PRT program, suggesting PRTs were: “lacking an agreed concept of operations and organizational structure with a single chain of command”; that civilian agencies were unable to recruit adequate numbers of federal employees; that they generally failed to provide public outreach on their activities; and that there was a lack of agreed-upon evaluation metrics with which to determine operational effectiveness.²⁷ Henry Nuzum echoes these points, drawing attention to low civilian participation and particularly to the lack of an integrated military-civil chain of command.²⁸ Lacking unity-of-command, he argues that many PRTs either succeeded or failed to achieve objectives based upon the personality dynamics of the DoS, USAID and military officers.²⁹

Perhaps the most notable fact about PRTs as a model of development-military cooperation, and the one which presents a significant departure from the decades-earlier CORDS model, is that in both Iraq and Afghanistan USAID channeled its main funding and management efforts for reconstruction, governance, health and education, and humanitarian assistance not through its officers assigned to the provincial teams, but rather through its own independent Kabul headquarters-based structure.³⁰ USAID reports

programming over \$20 billion of assistance funding during the last decade in Afghanistan (achieving significant development impacts along the way)³¹; however its budget obligations reflect an obligation of only 3.9% of funds to PRT efforts during FY02-06 and 9.8% of funds during FY07-11.³² As a USAID PRT officer myself (PRT Farah, Afghanistan, 2010-11), I encountered many difficulties but also some successes in synchronizing the activities of the multi-million dollar development initiatives overseen by USAID Kabul officers and implemented locally by development contractors (for example, the \$400 million Local Governance and Community Development Project)³³, with the small-scale quick-impact projects designed, funded and implemented by the PRT utilizing Commander's Emergency Response Funds (CERP). As a side note of interest, history sometimes repeats itself, as Nuzum records in his study of CORDS, "A USAID officer in Saigon described the difficult coordination between long-term national programs run from the capital and local programs delegated to CORDS."³⁴ In a recent interview, a senior USAID official commented that several factors influenced USAID's decision to channel a small percentage of funds through PRTs, including "intense levels of auditing scrutiny," and that many of the limited-term civilians hired by USAID lacked agency-specific and contract-management experience.³⁵ DoD similarly faced administrative, legal and oversight issues with CERP funding, which (in some but not all cases) limited integration and oversight between military and civilian PRT Officers. Another interview presented the perspective that beyond civil-military coordination, the need to maintain a high 'burn-rate' (monthly/annual expenditure of allocated resources) and the concomitant "use it or lose

it” financial posture was the significant motivator for the expenditure decisions of both DoD and USAID.³⁶

The PRT development-military cooperation model had many complexities and variations in its multifaceted, multi-year, multi-national experience. In this most recent exercise in field-based, wartime development-military cooperation, there are important lessons to be learned regarding unity of effort, parity in numbers of staff, the overall concept of operations, and the question of whether development and military agencies have both confidence in, and bureaucratic authorization for, these joint teams in executing their primary funding and lines of effort.

A Next-Gen Model: The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

Unlike some past initiatives (including CORDS and PRTS) which have been of a reactive nature, current interagency cooperation activities are increasingly marked by measures intended to prevent or mitigate the conditions which lead to instability, insecurity and extremism. An excellent example of this is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which is a multi-year joint program of DoS’s Africa Affairs Bureau, USAID’s Africa Bureau and several country missions in Africa, and AFRICOM. Active since 2005, the program seeks to counter violent extremism in the trans-Sahara through increasing the governance capacity of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. The program also facilitates cooperation and relationship building between these countries and other U.S. partners in North Africa, namely Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

The program ties together diverse capabilities of the three governmental partners. AFRICOM through Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) provides training and military-to-military security assistance to the target countries. USAID supports development programs that build civil society organizations and strengthen representative governance; and DoS conducts public diplomacy activities which promote tolerance and seek to counter extremist viewpoints, especially as directed at youth and rural population audiences.³⁷ As each country in the trans-Sahara has its own character of economic development and internal security, the three U.S. government partners have had to engage in intense field-based discussions with each TSCTP host country to determine the best individualized assistance package. This has occasionally resulted in interagency disagreements on issues such as the fundamental drivers of social instability and extremist behavior, as well as which policy and programming activities may best serve as solutions.³⁸

A 2007 West Point study of the program noted that TSCTP has been successful in slowly building capacity and cooperation in the region despite many challenges. A key factor in this success has been interagency cooperative efforts on the ground; however the study's author notes that in many cases this ground coordination was reflective of ad-hoc personal relationships, rather than institutionalized arrangements. She writes:

The phrase "interagency cooperation" has often been considered an oxymoron, yet the success of the TSCTP depends on the presence of effective, ongoing collaboration among the participating agencies.³⁹

In testimony to Congress, USAID's Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa praised TSCTP as a positive example of collaboration between USAID and AFRICOM, noting that the program has "demonstrated positive impact...in strengthening the resiliencies that help prevent extremism from taking root in the Sahel."⁴⁰

Strategy, Doctrine, and Architecture of Modern Development-Military Cooperation

The current strategic and organizational framework for development-military coordination provides guidance, establishes specific coordination offices, and facilitates inter-personnel communication channels. It also reflects barriers to true interagency synchronization, such as fundamental definitional differences, policies that are out of sync with capability for implementation, and organizational structures reflecting divergent objectives and resource availability. This section examines some of the critical national strategy documents which provide highest-level strategic guidance; considers specific DoD doctrine and USAID policies which guide and authorize action and expenditures; and lastly considers the architecture through which such action is implemented by military and civilian professionals at headquarters and theater/country levels.

NSS Guidance and Definitional Issues

In its 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), the George W. Bush Administration White House conceptually elevated development and diplomacy to be equal with defense. Four years later, the second Bush

Administration NSS stated, "Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies."⁴¹ Both NSS documents are credited with introducing the concept that defense led by DoD, diplomacy led by DoS, and development led by USAID represent three pillars or the "3Ds" of American national security strategy.⁴² The 3Ds concept has been an enduring theme through the two terms of President Barack Obama, as highlighted in the May 2010 NSS:

We must balance and integrate all elements of American power...Our diplomacy and development capabilities must be modernized, and our civilian expeditionary capacity strengthened.⁴³

Former Secretary of State Clinton is noted for frequently citing development and diplomacy as important elements of 'soft power' (noting the phrase originates with international relations specialist Joseph Nye) which when combined with military and other national elements in foreign relations represents the application of "smart power."⁴⁴

These theoretical definitions of power are useful to academics, analysts and practitioners, however they also suggest a contradiction in conceptual models, which may result in an undermining of the strategic value attributed to development. This is particularly the case when the "3Ds" (popularly used in USAID's developmental and DoS's diplomatic policies and planning) are contrasted with the framework and acronym DIME or DIMEFIL (Diplomacy - Informational - Military - Economic - Financial - Intelligence - Law/Legal) frequently used by DoD and taught at

its War Colleges to describe the fundamental national elements of power. It is not at all clear where development falls under a DIMEFIL theoretical approach.⁴⁵ That the nation's development lead USAID does not have cabinet-level status is a practical manifestation that while international development may be a theoretical pillar of foreign policy, it does not yet hold the conceptual status of a true element of national power. Development itself is a very broad concept, incorporating such diverse approaches as strengthening governance, building infrastructure, supporting security and stability, conducting training, promoting health, stimulating economic growth, and providing humanitarian assistance. Many of these approaches are inherent in the work and objectives of organizations other than USAID but may not be implemented through the same methodologies and are not often labelled as development. One former USAID official, who is a retired military officer, suggests that this is a "dichotomy which has led to disconnects in our foreign policy."⁴⁶

While it may not have solved the definitional dichotomy, the recent issuance the September 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPDGD) has been an important initiative in that direction. In August 2009, the White House announced a Presidential Study Directive on Global Development (PSD-7). This study reviewed the work of USAID and other governmental actors conducting development activities, with intention to clarify roles and responsibilities between these agencies and to forge a common bipartisan approach to development.⁴⁷ One year after the study, the Obama White Houses released the PPDGD:

The directive calls for the elevation of development as a core pillar of American power and charts a course for development, diplomacy and defense to reinforce and complement one another in an integrated, comprehensive approach to national security.⁴⁸

In regards to development-military cooperation, the unclassified White House fact sheet on the PP-DGD indicates that through the directive, the United States will “balance our civilian and military power to address conflict, instability and humanitarian crises” with some additional detail on fostering integration to address complex security environments.⁴⁹ The PP-DGD instructs the USAID Administrator to participate in National Security Council meetings “as appropriate”, and establishes an Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) on Global Development.

Development Policy – USAID’s Guidance for Development-Military Cooperation

Successive NSSs, the parlance of the 3Ds, and the PPDGD have elevated the appreciation and function of international development. USAID and DoS have taken this leadership support to advance their governmental status by developing new (and often joint) strategy, policies and procedures. These have made headway in addressing the conceptual challenges addressed above, however limitations and disconnects still separate policy and practical implementation. In 2009, under direction from Secretary of State Clinton, DoS and USAID conducted their first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), following a model of DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDDR was structured to be a “sweeping

review of diplomacy and development”, which would serve as a vehicle to build and enhance the work of the civilian agencies in “an era of sweeping change,”:

We must stay ahead of [this change]. To that end, we will build up our civilian power; the combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. government to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and prevent and respond to crises.⁵⁰

The current QDDR functions as the State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) for FY 2011-2016. This plan links strategic goals to specific NSS tasks, many of which imply some level of direct coordination with DoD. For example, NSS Task “Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts” corresponds to State/USAID Strategic Goal SG1: “Counter threats to the United States and the international order, and advance civilian security around the world.” People from within and without the development community have had varying opinions on the QDDR, though many USAID employees and outside non-governmental organization (NGO) actors have viewed it as a useful tool communicating the strategic importance of the USAID’s development work, and as a practical manifestation of the 3D concept.⁵¹

In September 2011, USAID released an umbrella policy set, Policy Framework 2011-2015, to translate the PPDGD and QDDR into operational principles. The framework identifies seven core development objectives for the current four-year period. Several relate to ‘traditional’ USAID mandates such as increasing food security, promoting global health, and facilitating economic growth; however the objectives “Preventing and responding to crises, conflict and instability” and “Expanding and sustaining the ranks

of stable, prosperous and democratic states” clearly inter-relate with broader strategic end-states sought by DoD.⁵²

In July 2008, in order to “clarify, formalize, and define the parameters of USAID’s interaction with DoD,” USAID approved a new Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy.⁵³ This policy provided guidance on a number of issues including resource management in development-military cooperation; collaboration with DoD at the Pentagon, Geographic Combatant Command, and theater/field levels, and stabilization and reconstruction efforts supported by the DoS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The policy can be seen as ambitious in its overall approach to mandating agency-wide cooperation between USAID and DoD:

*It is USAID’s policy for all operating units to cooperate with DoD in joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and communication in all aspects of foreign assistance activities where both organizations are operating, and where civilian-military cooperation will advance USG foreign policy.*⁵⁴ [Italics inserted]

In an interview, the Director of USAID’s Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC) acknowledged that USAID has not achieved implementation of this level of coordination. She indicates,

The gap between the 2008 policy and its implementation reflects primarily historical resource limitations at USAID. Closing this gap will require intentioned and prioritized efforts and particularly the assignment of resources and personnel.⁵⁵

CMC is current engaged in a 2014 update to the Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy, which is planned to reinforce previous guidance and specifically to promote newer opportunities for collaboration – such as cross-sharing and vetting of planning documents by USAID Regional Bureaus and DoD Geographic Combatant Commands.

DoD's Guidance for Development-Military Cooperation

This section describes key DoD doctrinal and planning documents which guide cooperation with civilian elements of the interagency, including USAID. The complexity and great detail of all of DoD's various guiding documentation cannot be summarized here only a few pages; however the intent here is to provide a snapshot of the critical documents which direct and impact DoD's approach to development and military cooperation, namely the National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Global/Theater Campaign Plans.

The National Defense Strategy, approved by the SECDEF, is the overall strategy of the armed forces and provides vision towards how DoD will achieve national security objectives in coordination with other elements of power. The National Military Strategy describes the ends, ways, means and risks of the NDS's objectives in greater detail. In its introduction, the 2011 NMS reflects a 3D approach, "America's foreign policy [IS] to employ an adaptive blend of diplomacy, development, and defense", as well as stating, "military power and our nation's other instruments of statecraft are more effective when applied in con-

cert.”⁵⁶ Following the strategic guidance of the NSS, NDS and NMS, the fundamental operational guidance for the Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) and Functional and Geographic Combatant Commands are the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The GEF provides “comprehensive, near-term planning guidance” and describes strategic end-states that the U.S. military should meet.⁵⁷ The JSCP captures the end-states described in the GEF and directs the Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders to develop theater campaign plans in order to achieve specific missions based on current capabilities. Neither the GEF nor JSCP provide specific detailed guidance on development-military cooperation, however both communicate broad objectives related to issues of security cooperation, global force posture, and contingency planning – all within a ‘3D environment’. As another minor definitional issue, the GEF and JSCP (and subsequent DoD planning) go beyond the phrase “3D” to characterize partnership and cooperation with a broader spectrum of U.S. and non-U.S. stakeholders – i.e., the Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment.

The responsibility of translating all the previously-discussed strategic and operational guidance into day-to-day operations and tactics falls to the commanders of the nation’s nine Combatant Commands, six of which are geographic-oriented: Pacific Command (PACOM), European Command (EUCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Africa Command (AFRICOM); and three which are functional: Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM),

and Strategic Command (STRATCOM). By weight of the capabilities, responsibilities and relationships they must manage, the four-star Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are among the most powerful individuals in the United States government. As authorized under U.S. Code Title 10, Chapter 6, CCDRs are responsible for exercising command authority over all forces assigned to their command; executing all military missions assigned within their area of responsibility (AOR); managing training, logistics and staffing relations with subordinate service commands (as an example, the EUCOM Commander receives and assigns forces from the Service component of U.S. Army Europe); and managing relationships with USG inter-agency actors and foreign military counterparts.⁵⁸

Using an iterative planning process called Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), the Combatant Commanders and their staff review the strategic guidance provided to them from documents such as the NMS, GEF and JSCP; merge that with their own understanding of the operational environment (obtained through assessing history, culture, socioeconomic factors, state and non-state actors, threats, challenges, etc.); define the problem sets the military assesses it can impact; and then develop an operational approach to solving those problems and to reach the intended positive end-states.⁵⁹ This process and the lines of effort selected to achieve these end-states are documented as Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs). TCPs are designed to be executed over the course of a specific CCDR's tenure in command; however they are updated continuously based on changing conditions. Military doctrine instructs CCDRs that engagement with the interagency should take place throughout and beyond the development of campaign plans:

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the US military and other instruments of national power...Through all stages of planning for campaigns, contingencies, and crises, CCDRs and subordinate [Joint Force Commanders] JFCs should seek to involve relevant USG departments and agencies in the planning process.⁶⁰

USAID gets an additional specific mention in Joint Publication 5-0; namely that the CCDR should coordinate AOR engagement with NGOs through the USAID Senior Development Advisor assigned to the command (more on this role below).⁶¹

A few other pieces of DoD guidance impacting US-AID-DoD cooperation deserve mention here as well, including DoD Instruction (previously Directive) 3000.05, Joint Publication 3-08 on Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, and Promote Cooperation. In November 2005, the DoD issued Directive 3000.05, which established as policy that stability operations (defined as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions”) are a core U.S. military mission.⁶² This was updated as DoD Instruction 3000.05 in September 2009. While the doctrine does clearly and repeatedly state that it is DoD’s role to support the stability operations of other U.S. Government departments and agencies with “interoperable and complementary solutions”, the policy also indicates DoD’s capability to perform a number of functions which (although not described as such) represent primary functions of other agencies, including USAID. Four capabilities specifically listed in DoDI 3000.05 which could present an issue of duplication of efforts are: “1) Establish civil security and civil control; 2) Restore or provide

essential services; 3) Repair critical infrastructure; and 4) Provide humanitarian assistance.” 2, 3, and 4 all represent capabilities of USAID, particular number 4 for which USAID manages as the lead U.S. Government agency.⁶³ Two other international stabilization activities which align closely with USAID’s work (and for which DoDI does specify an “assist” rather than lead role) are “strengthening governance and the rule of law, and “fostering economic stability and development.”⁶⁴ Both the Directive and Instruction 3000.05 stress integration of efforts and collaboration with member of the U.S. Government interagency; however it is clear from the language of the policy that DoD is prepared to develop and implement a capability to perform development and humanitarian assistance functions.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-08 on Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations is another important doctrinal guidance to the armed forces in interacting with civilian development partners and others. JP 3-08 stresses that the military should seek a “collaborative rather than competitive” civil-military relationship.⁶⁵ The doctrine recognizes that the unity of command and control that applies in all military action cannot be applied to the relationships of military and civilian partners, especially in cases where some civilian actors such as NGOs and International Organizations (IOs) lie outside the purview of governmental authorities. As an alternative, JP 3-08 encourages CCDRs to build consensus in order to achieve a “unity of effort.”⁶⁶ In considerable detail throughout the publication’s 412 pages, guidance is provided on how military and civilian partners can develop a common understanding, achieve common objectives and implement unified action. USAID gets significant

attention in the document, in regards to relationship management with NGOs (Section II-28), lead role in disaster response (IV-17), and for USAID Senior Development Advisors assigned to GCCs (IV-6). USAID also receives an eight-page specific annex (Annex-M-1-8) describing the agency's authorities, organizational structure, capabilities, and interagency relationships. It is noted in this section:

[USAID] carries out programs that complement DOD efforts in stabilization, disaster response, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance.⁶⁷

In passages such as this, despite the acknowledgement of USAID as the lead development and international disaster response, this doctrine (similarly perhaps with DODI 3000.05 as described above) fails to clarify with definition the dividing lines between the mandates of each agency - which could lead to operational and tactical confusion as to who is in charge for these missions.

One last DoD doctrine of note on coordinating with interagency partners is Promote Cooperation (PC). PC is an initiative through which the Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint Staff (OSD/JS) and Combatant Commanders engage the participation of members of other U.S. Government agencies in DoD's military planning and review processes.⁶⁸ OSD/JS at the Pentagon has established a Promote Cooperation Forum, which coordinates interagency initial inputs and follow-on contributions during In-Progress Reviews of Global and Theater Campaign Plans.⁶⁹ A number of interagency national security partners are consulted with (i.e., "plans are socialized with"⁷⁰) including: DoS, USAID, Departments of Treasury and

Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency and others.

Organizational Architecture of USAID-DoD Cooperation

From the strategic and doctrinal guidance established for providing vision and direction to military and civilian actors, it emerges that there is a broad, shared understanding that collaboration and whole-of-government approaches are important and necessary. Specific mission sets in fact imply close cooperation in order to achieve desired ends, especially stabilization and reconstruction, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, disaster response and security sector reform. Unlike during CORDS, there currently exists no single governmental authority which can operationalize these through providing command and control over both military and civilian activities. Nor does the United States foreign engagement apparatus have a British Empire-style 'Viceroy' with broad political and military authority. As such (and as directed by JP 3-08), military and civilian agencies must work in cooperation to achieve unity of effort, rather than unity of command.⁷¹ This section examines the organizational architecture of the interagency effort to achieve this, through a description of the structure and function of the primary offices within the National Security Community, and specifically within USAID, DOD and DoS.

Development-Military Coordination at National Security Level

At the highest level of coordination, United States Cabinet Secretaries (leading government departments including DoD and DoS, but not USAID – which does not have cabinet-level status) meet with the President and often Vice-President in the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss national security and policy matters.⁷² The NSC is supported by multiple levels of committees of senior department officials who review, discuss, and prepare positions for NSC decision-making. Three are especially important in interagency coordination: the NSC Principals' Committee (NSC/PC), NSC Deputies' Committee (NSC/DC), and NSC Interagency Policy Committees (NSC/IPC).⁷³ The NSC/PC includes all of the cabinet secretaries and is the most senior interagency forum; in fact when the President joins the PC's meetings, the PC is re-labeled as the National Security Council. The NSC/DC (as per the name attended by department deputies) is an intermediary body below the NSC/PC which focuses on policy implementation and reviews the work of the sub-ordinate IPCs to "insure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision."⁷⁴ IPCs (which in the Obama administration replaced the prior Bush era Policy Coordination Committees) are fora of either a standing or ad-hoc nature which coordinate implementation of presidential decisions and develop policy analysis options for higher levels. There are IPCs for geographic regions as well as topical or functional issues – for example for Global Development. The NSC/PC, NSC/DCs and NSC/IPC all represent

critical, highest-level fora where major governmental strategy, policy and planning decisions are debated and determined.

One of the most important recent structural developments for civil-military coordination is the Defense, Diplomacy, Development (3D) Planning Forum (prior to 2014 titled Planning Group), which was chartered in February 2011, to “develop products and processes to improve collaboration in planning among these three [DoD, DoS, USAID] organizations.”⁷⁵ The 3D Planning Forum includes both a standing working group and steering committee of senior officials from DoD (namely the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, and Joint Staff J5), DoS (both the Director of Political-Military Bureau and Director of Conflict & Stability Operations), and USAID (Director of Policy, Planning and Learning Bureau and Director of Civilian-Military Cooperation Office). One of the initial work activities of the 3D Working Forum was to create a unified picture of the three governmental agencies’ planning processes and cycles, which could then enable more effective coordination. This work was documented in the July 2012 *3D Planning Guide*.⁷⁶ The Guide provides a clear and straightforward summary of each agency’s planning processes, including Defense’s GEF and TCPs, the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan, DoS’s Regional Strategies, and USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategies. The guide also addresses with frank language some of the challenges inherent in practical interagency planning coordination:

In an ideal world, various USG organizations concerned with national security in the international arena would operate from an overarching joint strategic

plan at the global, regional, and country level...The reality is that State, USAID, and DoD face significant hurdles to ensuring that their individual plans are based on shared assessments of conditions and appropriately aligned to account for each other's priorities and plans.⁷⁷

A USAID Officer regularly participating in the Forum's work noted in an interview that the group was originally conceived by some members to establish comparative definitions and ultimately to coordinate actual joint interagency planning functions. In time however, the scope of the Forum's engagement has been more limited; though recent meetings have taken up a task of identifying specific country coordinated planning efforts.⁷⁸ The 3D Planning Guide remains (with deliberate intention by 3D Forum members) a 'pre-decisional working draft.'

Civilian-Military Coordination Structures at USAID

Surprisingly, for most of its history (despite the dynamic engagements described in Section I), USAID has not had a centralized organizational structure to manage coordination with the military. CORDS coordination, for example, was managed by the USAID Vietnam Mission, not by its Washington office. This dynamic changed in 2005, when USAID (informed by strategic guidance from the NSS as well as from other governmental pressures around forging whole-of-government efforts in support of war-efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan) created an Office of Military Affairs within its Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA).⁷⁹ OMA was created with goals of "raising the profile of development and

USAID; improving relations with DoD; making effective use of USAID and DoD funds to help meet development goals; and encouraging the use of USAID resources to improve civilian military coordination and cooperation.”⁸⁰ In November 2011, OMA was renamed as the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC).

CMC has a core staff of about 25 employees including USAID career foreign service officers, civil service officers, personal service contracted employees, and also military liaison representatives from the Pentagon, SOCOM, and Geographic Combatant Commands. The office has advanced knowledge and coordinated planning in a number of areas, including coordinating USAID’s input to the GEF, QDR, TCPs and other DoD planning processes; providing pre-deployment training to civilian-military teams deploying to Afghanistan; developing processes for stabilization operations such as the District Stability Framework; and facilitating the recruitment and support to USAID Senior Development Advisors (SDAs) assigned to advise Combatant Commanders.⁸¹ In 2010, an external evaluation found that OMA/CMC after five years of operations had been successful in achieving its primary goals. The report however noted ongoing development-military coordination challenges, including an issue of unclear policy about which agency takes the lead in conflict- and crisis-affected countries. The report also stated broadly that despite CMC’s efforts, there is still “too little coordination between USAID and DoD.”⁸²

Two specific activities of CMC represent the practical application of CMC’s objectives - the Focus Country Initiative (FCI) and the Senior Development Advisor Program (SDA). Under the 2008-initiated FCI, CMC

took on a facilitation role to link USAID field missions in five countries together with DoD Combatant Commands in order to develop specific programming activities leveraging both agencies' capabilities.⁸³ In each of the focus countries, staff from USAID, DoD's Offices of Security Cooperation, and DoS met to discuss particular country challenges, identified potential courses of assistance action, and then implemented the project jointly. In the Albania Focus Country Initiative, interagency and host nation meetings resulted in a programmatic framework to cooperatively address national challenges including rural health care, munitions abatement and disaster preparedness.⁸⁴ Through the SDA Program, CMC recruits, trains and supports USAID senior staff for representative/liaison assignments to the Pentagon and Combatant Commands. Per USAID's website, "These personnel advise the four-star combatant commanders on development matters and ensure close cooperation in planning, field operations and exercises."⁸⁵ Speaking before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights in 2011, USAID Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator Sharon Cromer commended the provision of an SDA to AFRICOM:

This engagement has included an unprecedented level of USAID participation in the development of USAFRICOM's current Theater Campaign Plan...The SDA endeavors to ensure that USAID missions in Africa are fully aware of and coordinating with current and proposed USAFRICOM activities that may impact development programs.⁸⁶

The function and role of the USAID SDA in advancing development-military cooperation is also acknowledged in DoD's Joint Publication 3-08, "SDAs...

provide information about USAID programs and processes that should be considered during planning and operations.”⁸⁷ A number of prior and current USAID SDAs were interviewed for this study, and their reflections about this interagency engagement are recorded below in Annex II.

The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is a Washington headquarters-based unit which has had a long history of coordinating with the Department of Defense. OFDA (like CMC an office within USAID’s DCHA Bureau) “is responsible for providing international disaster and humanitarian assistance and coordinating the USG response to declared disasters in foreign countries.”⁸⁸ OFDA assigns representatives to the Geographic Combatant Commands and SOCOM to advise, develop planning and to maintain open lines of communication for the event of natural or technological disasters, and for humanitarian assistance during complex emergencies. During major international disasters, OFDA will exercise established protocols to request the provision of DoD assets and capabilities as required.⁸⁹ OFDA’s Military Liaison Team, a small unit consisting of several officers with former military professional backgrounds as well as disaster expertise, coordinates overall engagement with the DoD, as well as organizes training exercises such as the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) for military and civilian response actors.

Structurally, USAID has regional organizational bodies with a multi-country purview, including geographic Regional Bureaus in Washington, D.C. and overseas Regional Missions. These are not, however, fully comparable to the DoD’s Geographic Combatant Commands. Regional Bureaus in Washington per-

form an important role of establishing broad regional strategies and housing geopolitical and technical knowledge sets. Regional Missions are particularly important in coordinating region-based initiatives and managing activities in countries where USAID does not have a permanent presence. Fundamentally however, USAID's program planning, contracting, management and oversight generally takes place at country offices (which USAID calls 'Missions'). Within the Mission, inter-agency coordination, including project-level interaction with DoD and DoS, occurs within two lines of activity. First, the USAID Mission Director (a Senior Executive Service Foreign Service Officer, of O7-O9 equivalency) regularly attends meetings of the Ambassador's Country Team, which includes all the heads of U.S. government agencies stationed in country. The Country Team discusses security and strategic issues specific to that country and broadly coordinates plans of the various agencies. Synchronization of USAID, DoD and DoS activities may be a topic of discussion in the weekly country team meetings, or occur offline in separate discussions. Second, individual USAID officers (usually Directors of technical offices for health, education, governance programs, etc.) meet DoD counterparts in thematic working groups (such as U.S. Embassy Accra's "Maritime Security Working Group") to coordinate specific project planning and coordination. An example of this field project coordination is a 2008 health project in a remote area of Djibouti, where DoD's Combined Joint Task Force/Horn of Africa (CJTF/HOA) constructed a health clinic in the remote village of Guistir, linked to a joint USAID and Djibouti Ministry of Health initiative to expand health coverage to 400 rural families.

Civilian-Military Coordination Structures at DoD

The Department of Defense has structures engaging in civilian-military cooperation at headquarters, regional and country levels. At the Pentagon, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) and the Joint Staff (JS) coordinate interagency review and input to DoD planning processes.⁹⁰ Within OUSD(P), the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations has particular responsibilities for interagency coordination, especially as related to stabilization missions. This office is linked closely with another DoD interagency actor, the Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5).⁹¹ The J5 coordinates planning efforts across the four Services and with the Combatant Commands; and is charged with implementing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's guidance to ensure effective interagency engagement:

We must define and enforce interoperability standards for future capabilities and build joint exercises and war games that evaluate our ability to operate across the Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational environment.⁹²

Both OUSD(P) and J5 have historically represented the DoD in the interagency 3D Working Group/Forum.

The United States military's four Services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) as well as the National Guard and Reserves, also have interactions with international development actors, however typically, such interactions fall under the command authority of the Geographic Combatant Command to which those Service forces are assigned. It is noteworthy that the U.S.

Army (within the Reserves component) maintains the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, which holds a mandate for many activities which are closely related and/or possibly duplicative of USAID; however these are usually implemented in conflict-affected countries where USAID activities may not be present. Civil Affairs officers on deployment act as a liaison between the military forces and the local civil population; and they conduct activities such as information management, humanitarian assistance operations, and support to civil administration. In a recent web story from Iraq, one CA Colonel led his Battalion in opening water canals for farmers, establishing a medical clinic, and providing school-books to Iraqi children.⁹³

At the regional level, Geographic Combatant Commands conduct significant planning and coordination efforts with diplomatic and development counterparts. Interagency engagement is a critical component of the GCC's development of Theater Campaign Plans as already discussed. Every GCC has an organizational structure for interagency coordination, though these differ in names and functions, based upon the desired requirements of the individual CCDRs. Several have J9 offices for interagency coordination: AFRICOM's J9 Office of Interagency Coordination, the J9 Interagency Partnering Directorate at EUCOM and the J91 Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) at PACOM.⁹⁴ These directorates include senior civilian assigned officers from a number of government agencies (such as Departments of Energy, Interior, Justice, State and Treasury, USAID, Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, etc.) who conduct operations or have programming synergies with the GCCs. Two Commands, AFRICOM AND

SOUTHCOM, have established Civilian Deputy Commanders.⁹⁵ The former civilian deputy at AFRICOM was quoted on the Command's structure:

It represents a recognition of the reality that what we do to protect U.S. security interests in Africa is part of a much broader 'whole-of-government approach' to representing all our interests on the continent.⁹⁶

As reflected in the interviews with USAID SDAs (Annex II), the model of interagency coordination units at the Commands has been very effective in providing a platform for strengthening communication, mutual understanding and to some degree for coordinating activities, though this is also revealed as an ongoing, daunting challenge.

DoD has two distinct sets of personnel working at the country-level within the United States Embassies' Country Team framework. The senior military representative in-country will usually be the Defense Attaché, who perform representational and military intelligence-collection functions; and their assignment and management is coordinated by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Generally the Attaché has little engagement with USAID's international development activities, aside from interactions with the USAID Mission Director within the Country Team. There is more country-level development-military coordination, however with DoD's second country function, the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC). OSC is responsible for day-to-day military-to-military coordination between the United States and host nation, as well as coordination of foreign military financing and sales. USAID Mission staff and OSC personnel

meet regularly to coordinate activities, when there are pressing challenges that require ongoing inter-agency synchronization (as in the Djibouti example above, or in conflict-challenged locations like Yemen or Mali), as well as for implementation of occasional DoD assistance programs such as Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) or activities such as Pacific Partnership (through which the U.S. hospital Naval Ship Mercy makes humanitarian ports of call in the Asia-Pacific region). It is interesting to note that the 3D Planning Guide comments that DoD planning (and in particular coordination of planning with other interagency partners) at the country-level is constrained by a number of challenges, including representation of multiple offices, programming and resource influence from GCCs, and a “need to balance a number of tasks whose objectives may not necessarily be congruent.”⁹⁷ In my experience from working at six USAID overseas Missions and having visited scores more - regular interaction and cooperative programming between USAID and the DoD elements in country is more an exception than it is a rule, though this may be trending upwards.

Lastly, DoD assigns a number of personnel to serve as liaison officers within USAID’s Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation. USAID/CMC currently hosts nine such officers (most at the O6 level) representing the GCCs of AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM and PACOM, the Functional Command SOCOM, as well as several Services. These exchange staff, often called “Mil-Reps” as short for Military Representatives, support CMC’s overall functions of planning, policy development, training, exercises and program coordination. A number of the current DoD liaison officers assigned to USAID/CMC were interviewed

for this study; and their responses to questions about development-military cooperation issues are recorded below in Annex III.

Civilian-Military Coordination Structures at DoS

The Department of State, as a cabinet level department and one of the key pillars of United States foreign policy and engagement, is a critical leader in civil-military cooperation. This research paper has not devoted much space thus far to the history, policies and functions of DoS (though one might argue that the need for such is less considering the volumes already written on these subjects); nonetheless it is important to identify the primary structures within DoS for civil-military cooperation, as these also impact on USAID and DoD's development-military interactions.

The fundamental structure at DoS responsible for diplomatic-military engagement is the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM). PM "provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade."⁹⁸ With a significantly broader purview than USAID's CMC (considering that DoS is present in nearly every country overseas while USAID focuses on approximately 80 countries), PM does perform some similar activities such as providing DoS inputs into DoD strategy documents and provides training on the military to DoS officers. PM also similarly manages a program through which senior foreign policy advisors (known as POLADs) are provided to the Pentagon and Combatant Commands. POLADs usually work in the Interagency Coordina-

tion Groups or Directorates alongside the USAID SDAs and other government liaisons.⁹⁹ As mentioned above, in certain cases, State Department officials have been appointed as Deputy Commanders at the GCCs. In a recent speech, Undersecretary of State Andrew Shapiro commented that DoS has had a challenging historical relationship with DoD, but notes that DOS/PM has in recent years taken assertive actions (including dramatically expanding the POLAD program) to revitalize the relationship. He states, "In the broad area of foreign policy in the security sector, it is impossible to find an instance where State-DOD dialogue is not occurring."¹⁰⁰ Concurrence with this point of view came out strongly in several interviews with USAID senior staff, who commented that DoS has been more effective than USAID in '3D positioning' (see Annex I). DoS/PM includes sub-offices performing a variety of work on international topics such as Counter Piracy and Maritime Security, International Security Operations, Security Negotiations and Agreements, and Weapons Removal and Abatement among others.

Another Department of State structure which exercises functions important to the interaction of diplomacy, defense and development is the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO). CSO was founded in January 2012 incorporating the previously existing (2004-2011) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). CSO's mandate is "advance U.S. national security by driving integrated, civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states, setting conditions for long-term peace."¹⁰¹ CSO deploys civilian staff to countries impacted by conflict to strengthen civilian leadership capacity (as in the case of Syria's unarmed opposition), to support violence prevention

efforts (per recent efforts in Kenya and Honduras) and to conduct public education (such as landmine awareness in Burma).

Opinions towards Development-Military Cooperation – What’s Works Well and What Doesn’t?

As we have seen, development and military cooperation occurs in intentional and ad hoc fashion within the complex milieu of national and departmental strategy, doctrine and policies, and multi-level organizational structures. What does this look like in the day-to-day for USAID and DoD officers? How do they view one another; as well as the successes and challenges of collaborating as interagency partners? The following is an overview of perspectives and experiences as communicated by a set of USAID and DoD senior leaders, all of whom are currently (or have been very recently) working in directly collaborative efforts in Washington or in theater/field positions. Those interviewed fall into three different categories: 1) USAID Senior Leaders (Senior Executive Service) current or recently serving at the Office Director/Deputy Assistant Administrator level; 2) USAID Senior Development Advisors/Humanitarian Advisors (SES or FS1 level) current or recently assigned to Geographic or Functional Combatant Commands; and 3) DoD Officers (O5/O6 level) current or recently assigned as Liaison Officers (LNOs) to USAID Headquarters. Interviews with these officials were conducted by phone or email between December 2013 and March 2014; and the methodology used and full text of their responses can be found in Annexes 1-3. The following narrative presents commonalities as well as some interesting divergent responses.

USAID senior leaders interviewed appear split on whether USAID has achieved a strategic 3D position after 13 years of combined war-time efforts. Several noted that the agency has achieved improved understanding of its role and function within the interagency and among DoD personnel, and one reflected that the same has brought improved presence and influence. The leaders have for the most part a positive perspective on the level of coordination between USAID and DoD, while several discussed USAID's limitations in matching DoD's contributions and enthusiasm for joint planning and exercises, given its smaller staffing size and resource levels. Others commented that USAID's has had limited success in inculcating cooperation between its Regional Bureaus and DoD; and in injecting USAID influence into primary DoD's planning processes such as the GEF. One former USAID leader opined about an organization cultural difference, suggesting that USAID often approaches the interagency "from a position of inferiority." All reflected opinions that the USAID Senior Development Advisor initiative has been successful and is an important cooperation modality. Several commented that the initiative may not be positioned where it should be within the organization however; that it tends to be significantly influenced by personality dynamics; and that it raises questions about the absence of a civil-military career track within USAID. When asked on future directions for development-military cooperation, the USAID leaders provided diverse yet interesting responses – highlighting the strategic and operational importance of dev-mil collaboration in light of global insecurity and underdevelopment linkages, as well raising the question about what will happen to USAID-DoD cooperation without the "forcing functions of Iraq and Afghanistan."

USAID SDAs and Humanitarian Assistance Advisors reported in near unison about their positive experiences in supporting GCC planning, HA/DR operations in theater, and contributing to GCC doctrine development. There was general consensus among them that their efforts had resulted in both strategic and operational/tactical enhancements to the Commands' work. Several mentioned however the staffing/capability imbalance of seeking to provide USAID expertise - as one individual assigned to advise a Command of hundreds of DoD employees working on a multi-country theater of operations. Despite being 'one man or woman' among many, the SDAs/HAAAs reported receiving strong support and receptive ears from the Combatant Commanders and staff. One said, "Support was phenomenal, I felt wanted." A sizeable minority of the respondents indicated that relationships with the Command leadership were either not good to start with, or deteriorated from good to bad, based on individual personality dynamics, and the interest of the Commander in receiving USAID advice.

On the nature and character of the SDA position, the SDA/HAA officers reported that a length of two to three years is appropriate. They had mixed responses regarding the level of resource support available to them from USAID; with most reporting that they had little to no budget or travel resources, but that this was expected given the advisory nature of the position. There were mostly positive but mixed responses as well on the degree of influence and USAID-DoD relationship building they were able to effect back to USAID at headquarters and mission level. Again this points to personality dynamics - as one commented, "It all depends on relationships - some USAID Mis-

sion Directors were interested, others were not.” All but one of the respondents opined that the SDA program is valuable and an effective cooperation modality. Several noted in their responses however that they advocate for additional liaison staff at multiple rank levels; and that they support the development of a career path in civil-military engagement, both to build skills for future SDAs and to create linked/associated positions that SDAs finishing assignments could move into.

In terms of the most significant achievements as well as constraints and limitations of the SDA/HAA position, the SDAs similar to the USAID senior leaders reported increasing DoD Command staff recognition and awareness of USAID’s capabilities and objectives. One officer summed this up, “It’s a success when military people come to USAID for advice.” Others mentioned specific joint work plans and projects as successful elements of their work. On the flip side, the most commonly reported limitation of the SDA position was an issue of limited access (sometimes a factor of rank disparity) to Command decision makers. One respondent reported many challenges in the assignment, which were driven by organizational culture differences. The SDAs also highlight a personnel issue for USAID to come to terms with –whether or not engaging in interagency assignments (such as civil-military engagements, attending the War Colleges, serving as an SDA, etc.) should be reflected as a defined technical backstop area and promotable career path. Interestingly, this also emerged in one interview with a DoD Liaison Officer, who commented,

USAID could greatly benefit from a pool of trained FSOs who are specifically trained to work with DoD,

have a CAC card, DoD email, have a TS/SCI and can unplug from USAID/W and join an organization rapidly as a crisis begins to develop.

Several SDAs suggested USAID create linked assignments whereby an SDA could maintain his/her relationships with the Combatant Command by serving as a USAID Mission Director in the Command's AOR.

DoD personnel assigned to USAID as Liaison Officers (LNOs) presented views that USAID-DoD mutual understanding and cooperation are on a positive and improving upward trend. The officers commented that there is generally clear understanding among DoD personnel about USAID's role and responsibilities, though one officer notes that this gets complicated in Phase 2-3 operations, as USAID staff often have a weak understanding about military operations. Another officer commented that cooperation within the interagency depends upon the "on the ground equities" that DoD commanders and USAID field directors perceive that they have and they need from others. The officers generally concurred that cooperation and communication between the organizations could be improved.

The LNOs universally reflected that the USAID SDA Program and LNO Program has been positive initiatives, especially in the advisory capacity of "making marriages and defusing fires." They also suggested several areas of weakness of the programs, however, including personality dynamics which occasionally negatively impact effectiveness, and that the SDA program needs more staff to support coordination at multiple levels. The officers highlighted several areas of dev-mil cooperation success, includ-

ing increasing positive consideration of interagency engagement across the Combatant Commands and enhanced disaster and stabilization activities. One officer highlighted DoD's liaison work creating positive improvement in USAID Regional Bureaus taking a more "effects-based" approach. Another commented, "Collaborative planning can be cost effective and lead to increased sustainability in programs." The LNOs reported three areas - resource imbalance, diverging cycles of planning and operations, and challenges in establishing contacts and relationships as the major limitations or constraints in USAID-DoD cooperation. On a similar note to the SDAs, one LNO suggested that DoD link onward assignments to allow for better application of interagency skills gained through the advisory experience.

Analysis

USAID and DoD's collective history shows that integrated civilian-military approaches to addressing world problems can result in tremendous successes. At the level of grand strategy, the Marshall Plan's commitment to rebuild Europe presents an obvious example. Even the more contentious CORDS Program delivered specific accomplishments that could not have been achieved through separate efforts. The positive accomplishments of collaboration are always accompanied by hard challenges however, which sometimes results in the actors questioning the overall benefits of cooperation. Our experiences in CORDS and with PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that we don't always get the broader strategy or even the structural models right; and we don't always fully trust the operating and funding principles of the other.

Increasingly over the last 15 years, United States national security strategies, DoD doctrines and USAID policies have all pushed for further interagency integration and collaboration. However, implementation clearly lags far behind these doctrinal statements; and much that has been written as official guidance still only exists as ‘words on paper’. As the LTL study on Civilian-Military Relations suggests, this represents a “disconnect between the philosophical approach of policy-makers and the pragmatic approach of those in the field.”¹⁰¹ I would argue that the longer this disconnect continues (either through deliberate flouting of strategic/policy guidance, or through under-resourcing and incapacity to implement said policy) the more that both U.S. government civilians and military actors question the validity of interagency engagement as being a worth-while and necessary approach. We have to broaden and deepen our cooperation efforts.

The structural effect of USAID’s under-resourcing in the balance of the 3Ds is significant and real, and ultimately impairs an effective whole of government approach. It limits USAID’s overall external reach, as well as its capability to match DoD with personnel at multiple levels. A number of recent civil-military relations studies have emphasized the DoD and USAID mismatch in personnel and budgetary resources, including RAND’s 2008¹⁰² and 2009¹⁰³ studies, LTL’s 2009 study¹⁰⁴, JCOA’s report on a “Decade at War”¹⁰⁵, and CSIS’s November 2013 study on “Rethinking Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction,” which specifically noted:

There will always be pressure to intervene in foreign crises. Most U.S. interventions use civilian power. The demand for civilian power exceeds the supply. Civil-

ian agencies do not have the support needed to meet the demand.¹⁰⁶

Interviews with USAID senior leaders and SDAs reinforced this message, through reflections on how USAID liaison personnel are too few in numbers and stretched too thin with duties. While USAID's leadership plays a key role in advocating to the Executive Branch and Congress for additional budgetary resources, many of these decisions are beyond the agency's control. Internally however, USAID is responsible for its own internal allocation of resources. While OCMC is recognized for a "bang-up job" as far as designing and facilitating coordination – the poor resourcing and placement (perhaps ghettoization?) of military engagement within the technical DCHA Bureau calls into question the Agency's overall internal financial and organizational commitment to inter-agency/DoD coordination.

The architecture of USAID-DoD collaboration is still predominantly individual organization based (i.e., stove-piped), and as such does not support multi-level integration to fulfill whole-of-government strategy, doctrine and policy. While USAID through CMC has made advances in liaison/representative-style coordination arrangements, DoD is moving faster on developing institutional structures for interagency collaboration. This is demonstrated by the Combatant Commands' institutionalization of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups and innovative integrated civil-military command approaches at AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM. These civil-military models raise an interesting question – Which is the most effective and successful path to interagency cooperation at the Theater-level? Through personnel-(and personality-)

based advisory relationships, or through a more systemic interagency integration?

As reflected in the experiences of both USAID SDAs and DoD liaison officers, there are clear positives such as mutual respect, commitment and camaraderie that accompany USAID-DoD inter-personal relationships. One CMC staff member acknowledged in an interview that much of USAID-DoD activity is “personality driven”; however adding that this is not always a bad thing, and can be used to advantage.¹⁰⁷ A challenge definitely occurs, however for interagency effectiveness when these relationship dynamics don’t work out, or don’t even get started in the first place. SDAs interviews show that personality dynamics and inconsistent access to the Command Group were major constraints to effective interagency engagement at the Combatant Commands. These constraints were also reported USAID-DoD field collaborations, including PRTs and TSCTP. Joint Publication 3-08 succinctly describes an aspect of this challenge,

One difficulty of coordinating operations among US agencies is determining appropriate counterparts and exchanging information among them when habitual relationships are not established.¹⁰⁸

Suggesting a far more integrated structural model than today’s advisor/liaison positions, a number of civil-military analyses (and some interview responses) point to the possibility of a large-scale interagency and national security community reorganization. Some have suggested this might manifest itself as an upscale variation of CORDS or a “*Goldwater-Nichols II*” for civilian agencies, referencing the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, which restructured the nation’s

military's commands. Initiating this would involve a coordinated effort between the nation's Executive and Legislative Branches to realign and synchronize the international functions of USAID, DoS and DoD. Such an approach could represent a physical and probably permanent institutionalization of USAID's leadership of development within the 3Ds, as well as addressing interagency structural misalignments, reducing redundancies, and increasing unity of effort. It is obvious that in the current political context, the bureaucratic hurdles to be overcome for approval of such reform would be daunting. Tom Baltazar notes,

Current laws are not conducive to true interagency cooperation. Committees and sub-committees overseeing civilian and military budgets and policy don't talk to each other and none will give up perceived power – the reason that, in my opinion, there will never be a Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency. Having said that, I believe that Congressional action is the only thing that can change the current dynamic.¹⁰⁹

While it may be years before an effective interagency policy and practice regime is established as described above, there are current, practical areas of collaboration that can be expanded. *Joint planning* is the primary, critical arena for USAID and DoD cooperation at multiple levels, highlighted in such examples as: the 3D Working Forum in Washington; CMC and its DoD liaison officers efforts to align USAID/DoS regional and country plans with theater campaign plans; and through USAID Mission and country-level DoD staff coordinating localized projects. Planning is viewed by both partners as a safe, well understood, and practical node for cooperation; it is clear however that planning cycles need to be better aligned, and more joint planning exercises need to occur.

Lastly, evidence reflects a growing shared awareness among civilian and military U.S. government officials about the utility and usefulness of interagency coordination (and between USAID and DoD in particular), but there is much farther to go. DoD officials, from the SECDEF on down, increasingly view international development actors as key contributors in preventing global threats to security, and in reinforcing the stability of nations so that future military interventions will not be required. DoD has also incorporated key international development concepts into its primary operations. In testimony to the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs; Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for DCHA Bureau Susan Reichle illustrated this point,

DoD has also begun to adopt key approaches used by USAID. For example the concepts of sustainability and capacity building are becoming central themes of DoD's efforts worldwide. We must aim to help countries build governments which promote democratic principles and can outlast, endure and dominate local threats.¹¹⁰

It is apparent from this statement and the interviews that USAID's leadership and personnel directly engaged in civilian-military cooperation view collaboration in a positive light.

It is not so clear however that this viewpoint is universally shared throughout the development agency. USAID has often been an embattled organization, having to frequently fight for sufficient resources, personnel and at times even its own existence. At regular junctures, USAID's personnel have been deeply influenced by concerns the organization will be subsumed

into DoS; or even that core functions will be taken over by DoD. CORDS demonstrated that this can be a real possibility. USAID's approach and organization of interagency engagement therefore reflects a degree of paranoia. Culturally, many of its officers originate from humanitarian and non-governmental positions often far removed from military operations; and through their careers often fail to receive a standardized professional education which instills a sophisticated understanding of the interagency and of USAID's role in advancing national security and foreign policy. A small cadre of only several thousand, USAID officers operationally address great challenges including illiteracy, poverty, disease and political disenfranchisement; and often consider activities pulling them away (such as interagency planning) from this work as burdensome. As such, as mentioned by one interviewee, USAID may indeed present a sometimes schizophrenic approach to civil-military cooperation. I believe a process of evolution is at work here; and over time (with appropriate policies and structures to drive and reward cooperation) more USAID officers will develop familiarity and desire to work in partnership with DoD.

Conclusions

This research has identified that development-military cooperation has achieved numerous positive effects throughout the last fifty years. History illuminates as well the challenges the U.S. organizations have encountered in designing mutually acceptable concepts and structural modalities. Numerous strategies, policies and organizational structures have been crafted to define and guide whole-of-government col-

laboration, however implementation in the field remains behind the curve, due to limitations caused by organizational and interpersonal cultural differences¹¹¹, misalignments of planning cycles and geographic coverage, and resource and personnel imbalances.¹¹² In spite of these challenges, numerous positive cooperation effects are currently being achieved by SDAs and LNOs, by GCCs and Regional Bureaus, and by Country Teams as USAID and DoD officers find strategic value in working together to address the root causes as well as the symptoms of conflicts. Interviewed USAID and DoD officers communicate strongly positive views towards this collaboration, while still noting abiding challenges.

As a concluding thought, it is important to recognize that the second decade of the 21st Century is a time of intense complexity for U.S. foreign policy organizations. American DIMEFIL power remains predominant in the world, and will likely remain so; however the country faces an inevitable realignment following the conclusion of thirteen years of war. It is likely that the U.S. military's force size and the number and types of missions will be reduced. Strategically, the Obama administration has signaled an interest to pivot U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific after decades of spending blood and treasure on Middle East conflicts – even as that region looks more volatile than ever in light of the Arab Spring events of 2011 and Syria's bloody civil war. On the home political front, the U.S. legislature has never before been so divided along partisan lines, nor so uncooperative on strategic issues – making prospects for effective interagency redesign extremely unlikely in the short term. All these factors have important implications for the future of USAID and DoD relations. It is possible (as one USAID SDA

commented) that budgetary reductions will force further integration and cooperation in order to maximize resources. It is also possible the same drivers will push agencies deeper into their core mandates, resulting in a de-emphasis and defunding of cooperation. From this crossroads, USAID and DoD leadership and personnel should each move forward in a positive direction, based upon a solid history of collaboration, the logic of efficient partnership, and policy/doctrine requiring unity of effort. USAID, in particular, should boldly and confidently step up to a leadership role in coordinating with DoD and the interagency.

Recommendations for Enhancing USAID - DoD Cooperation

- To address longstanding resource imbalances, USAID and DoS should request, and Congress should consider, an increase in budgetary resources to back up the critical roles and balance of development and diplomacy within the foreign policy 3Ds. Within this, USAID should request additional resources to expand the cadre of interagency (and specifically to DoD) liaison/advisor personnel. USAID should additionally expand the resourcing of the SDA Program, including aspects such as travel allowances and possibly project resources.
- In order to move from interagency cooperation 'paper to practice', further practical applications of doctrine/policy should be explored and piloted by USAID and DoD, including but not limited to country-level joint planning exercises. Programmatic models such as FCI and TSCTP should be evaluated and where applicable replicated.

- DoD and USAID should look at key policies and doctrine which currently reflect definitional or conceptual disagreements or present an overlapping of roles and mandates. Particular issues of concern include stabilization activities under DODI 3000.05, humanitarian assistance in JP 3-08, and the functional capabilities of U.S. Army Civil Affairs.
- The 3D Working Forum should continue to advance research and practical application of joint planning between USAID, DoS and DoD. This should be expanded on a pilot basis with specific Geographic Combatant Commands, USAID Regional Bureaus and targeted Country Missions.
- USAID should develop broader general officer and leadership training on the interagency, with specific emphasis on civil-military practical engagement.
- USAID should consider either a division of, or a revision to, the current Backstop 76 Crisis, Stabilization & Governance technical career path to directly reflect and incorporate interagency and civil-military assignments, and to build necessary experiential and knowledge skillsets for Deputy-SDA, SDA and strategic Mission leadership positions.
- USAID/OCMC and Regional Bureaus should engage in a strategic review/dialogue on the role of SDAs; and should consider whether Regional Bureau management of the SDAs might create deeper programmatic linkages between the Combatant Commands, Bureaus and Missions.
- SDA assignments should be directly linked to, or at least considered with priority consider-

ation for, Mission Director positions in the AOR of the SDA-assignment Geographic Combatant Command.

- In country and regional planning processes, USAID should make a policy and procedural requirement that draft CDCS/RDCS be shared with the associated Geographic Combatant Command for review and input.
- USAID should consider conducting a white paper study on conducting leadership to promote a structural reorganization effort within the Executive Branch for civilian foreign policy agencies, described by some as a “Goldwater-Nichols II” for the interagency.

ANNEX 1: Interview Methodology and Interviews with USAID Senior Leadership

Methodology: Annexes 1-3 present interview responses conducted between December 2013 and March 2014. Using standard series of semi-structured qualitative questions, three sets of interviews were conducted (via telephone or email) with USAID and DoD officials as follows:

- 1) Five USAID Office Director/Deputy Assistant Administrator-level (O7-O8 equivalent) employees directly engaged in significant aspects of development-military cooperation were asked strategic-level questions on the state of USAID-DOD relations.

- 2) Ten current or recent USAID SDA or Humanitarian Assistance Advisors (HAAs) assigned to the Pentagon and Combatant Commands (all USAID FSOs at the FS01 (O6 equivalent) or higher levels) were emailed questions on operational and tactical USAID-DOD collaboration.

- 3) Ten active-duty DoD Liaison Officers currently or recently assigned to USAID were emailed questions on operational and tactical USAID-DOD collaboration.

The comments are presented anonymously, with each bullet point representing a different officer's response. The responses are copied as spoken/submitted (with minor editing for clarity, and with changing individual, command and country names for anonymity). Not all questions and responses asked have been included here; and some lengthy responses have been shortened. As a last point, these responses are personal opinions (not official agency statements!) about real experiences – so some negative things are said. However no offense to any individual, office,

command or agency/department is intended by the contributors or this author.

Interviews with USAID Senior Leaders

Q1: It is around 12 years since the concept 'Three Ds - Three Pillars of Foreign Policy' was coined. In this time-frame, has USAID been successful in achieving a strategic position in the balance of the 3Ds?

- We have met the objective that DOD should coordinate with us and understand our mandate. DoD more fully comprehends and values USAID capabilities. We are still lacking staff and budget resources, but we are equal partners for the most part. Where we have lost positioning on 3D is with Department of State colleagues. State has become more expeditionary, was able to promote cultural change with their leadership, and has more people trained and 'out there' doing development-like activities. We have a deeper partnership with DoD but a weaker one with DoS. DoS has become more operationally aware, better positioned in the 3Ds – so diplomacy is currently a higher pillar. S/CRS however has not been terribly effective.
- There is an overall disfunctionality of the process - conceptually 3D is fine, but implementation is faulty. This has two prongs: 1) Legislative – no legislation holds Executive branch agencies accountable for working together. Power drives the budget. For more effectiveness, you would need to dissolve and reorganize committees and there is no appetite for

that. 2) The Executive branch – there is no incentive to work together, only if there is mutual self-interest. There is a need to “get left” of integrated planning – to get USAID information into the GEF. We made a previous high level effort to engage the GEF and it was too complicated. There is also a need for USAID Regional Bureaus to engage and influence DoD’s TCPs – this was never truly embraced, mainly for cultural reasons. Military planners came with a draft plan (mostly cooked) and didn’t give enough time to review. USAID headquarters is thin and overworked. Coordinated planning has improved in subsequent cycles – but with diminishing returns for USAID. DoD’s Planning Cycle requires inputs at same time AID has to do its annual budgeting. Mechanics make it problematic.

- When the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars began, USAID was not at the PC and DC tables – and we are there all the time now. CMC has been able to increase understanding of AID at the COCOMs – which influences things at the NSC level. Some Commands have promoted their ties with USAID as an additional form of legitimacy for the programs they want to do. DoD wants us at the table now.
- No, USAID has not been successful. “3D” has become an unhelpful construct – the agencies have become constrained rather than enlightened by it. You may be familiar with the 3Ds Venn diagram where we’re all the same size side-by-side. In reality though, you have a

massive DoD ring, a small ring for USAID and a tiny ring for DoS. In some situations there is overlap driven by context, in others there is complete overlap and DoD dominates the others. In the Deputies Committees, USAID is only one person there up sitting against the wall. We're not absent, but nowhere near present.

Q2: The 2010 Evaluation Report of USAID/OMA (now CMC) gives the office credit for achieving four primary goals, but yet concludes that there is still "too little coordination" between USAID and DoD. Any comment?

- For USAID there is a risk of overexposure to the military and having them want to continuously contact USAID. DoD's structure is so large – USAID can be "overwhelmed with love" – meaning many requests to join so many different wargames, exercises, etc. Coordination is better now, but we lack capacity to respond to every request. Now is not a time for USAID to devote more money, time and people to DoD cooperation. Policy and expeditionary efforts drove DoD into the development arena, likely that they will now change focus, shrink their profile. The 3D model is recalibrating itself – and is more measured now. We need to continue to engage and train.
- USAID is often the naïve foreign service entering the fray, shielded from the day-to-day knife fighting of the interagency. The organizational culture of USAID makes it difficult to operate in the interagency, because they come to it

from a position of inferiority. USAID needs to take a position of superiority. I agree that State has emerged stronger than USAID after a decade in wartime 3D cooperation. People love to complain about the interagency – but they don't present an alternative solution. Focus Countries was a positive example of working together – the 'taking charge' piece. DoD has more affinity to work with USAID than with State because "AID does stuff".

- I would give CMC an A- for effort and a B+ for execution. The office has no money; it can only work on relationships. They have only one person assigned to key commands, covering multiple countries. We need to reach an agreement on joint priority countries. I give kudos to USAID/OFDA for their efforts in educating the military – but it has come at a huge cost. CMC will never have their resources. CMC has to focus on key issues, key countries – to make the most strategic use of limited funds.
- Coordination is resource-driven, for example the military has Professional Military Education, they have TTSH accounts for training; and it is built into their staffing pattern to participate in joint trainings and exercises. USAID does not have staff and resources for continual training and engagement. Even with the resources – would USAID prioritize doing that? Some people in this building don't believe we should have any appreciable cooperation below the National Security level.

Q3: What are your thoughts on the USAID Senior Development Advisor Program?

- I'm a strong supporter of SDAs, and people with humanitarian assistance capabilities with AFRICOM, and there is a need to maintain those relationships. Do we need to rethink what we want the SDAs to do? To educate DoD about USAID? Be the counter-balance to the POLAD? We haven't always put our most senior people in those positions. Career path is an issue. OMA/CMC should not have been placed in DCHA Bureau – it may be that in the Administrator's office military cooperation gets seen as a "DCHA issue" rather than an agency-wide one.
- Yes, we should continue with the SDA program but it needs to be matured. We started off as Regional Bureau Reps yet managed by OMA. It might have been better for the sake of ownership to have the Region Bureaus manage the SDAs. Problem of unifying a civ-mil policy throughout the agency. MilReps should bring a holistic picture from region back into USAID and link to the GEF. We never got to the point of an effective umbilical. Administrators didn't give enough time and effort to consider the positive effects of coordination. Military engagement is also not part of USAID's professional development cycle; vision and incentives are required. It would be disastrous if we stopped the SDA program.

- It is our good fortune that the SDA program has been maintained, because it was frozen for a while. Recently, the program has even been expanded with four new deputy positions added. There has been a difficulty however in filling the positions for SDAs, which threatens to jeopardize the trust we have built up with DoD. On the career path issue, we know that people who have served in interagency capacities and attended the War Colleges have retained in agency service longer and have gone on to leadership positions, but it is still hard to get traction on these assignments. It's a hard slog.
- It is very personality driven. Making the connections for good personal relations between an SDA and CCDR is guesswork for USAID. Perhaps it might be more effective if the USAID Administrator and CCDR interviewed several individuals. SDA positions should be linked with follow-on assignments to leadership positions in that Commands AOR.

Q4: The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly changed the 3D dynamic, but we are facing a new era of reduced global military engagement and perhaps even force size. What do you think are the implications of this for 3D cooperation and specifically for USAID?

- The challenge for USAID is non-permissive environments, and how to operate in places without the security umbrella of the military. Either we will not be there or will be unable to provide professional work. There are concerns

of closing operations. Currently we're in a very negative period, and there is little appetite for risk.

- Collaboration with DoD is not resource-intensive. AFRICOM is a fertile ground for working together. Intervention strategies that can prevent insecurity would be of major interest to DoD. It is better to be inside the tent influencing things, rather than outside complaining.
- Budget cuts are actually pushing deeper interagency coordination. How can the U.S. retrench from places like Mali, Syria? DoD needs USAID, needs to understand what we do – how we can put our meager resources together to make something happen. The world is tough, and we can't solve problems alone. That being said, in the future we won't have the forcing functions of Iraq and Afghanistan.
- A lot depends on personality. There is no codification of the lessons learned over the last decade. Under the Clinton Administration we had PDD56 [on complex contingency operations] which was a prescriptive list for civ-mil planning and cooperation. The Bush administration scrapped PDD56, and after that we made it up as we went along. There have been no improvements during the Obama administration as well. I hope that current interpersonal relationships will lead to interagency relationships, but these are personal linkages.

ANNEX 2: Interviews with USAID Senior Development/HA Advisors

Q5: Briefly describe the major activities of Combatant Command engagement you participated in:

- Joint planning (Theater Campaign Plan, Country Plans, Regional Plans), Training, operational planning for Syria and Afghanistan
- Main focus was civ-mil coordination on humanitarian assistance, and particularly in the health sector, as well, the earthquake and response became one year of dedicated effort. I also convened a Section 1207 meeting to examine stability issues in the region and to review embassy concepts for participating – a great workshop.
- Joint planning, HAO, HCA, Excess Property, design and management of a USAID-funded pandemic response preparedness program, oversight of a disaster preparedness program, HIV/AIDS program oversight, policy development, training, budgetary/resource decision-making, project design, inter-agency collaboration, supervising the design and implementation of table-top exercises, liaison with NGOs and UN, mentoring [COMMAND] personnel on development concepts.
- Policy & doctrine (e.g. Joint Pubs, Presidential Policy Directives, USAID policy & strategies) – contributed to formulation, led socialization within the Command, identify key doctrinal

issues pertinent to USAID, represent & speaking engagements on USAID policies germane to Special Ops [such as] Women Peace & Security, Security Sector Reform, CVE/I Policy; Joint planning exercises, Training; Considerable coordination with AIDW – all geographic & sectoral bureaus, and especially OTI, on global and regional issues. E.g. countering violent extremism, transnational organized crime, linking wildlife trafficking in Africa to Asian demand.

- Joint planning, disaster preparedness and risk reduction
- Providing policy guidance, seeking opportunities for collaboration. Imparting development knowledge (after 25 years at USAID) to the Command.

Q6: How would you describe the cooperation/support you received as a Development Advisor from the Combatant Commander and his/her Senior Staff?

- Excellent – the USAID-DoD relationship, including with the Command Group, greatly intensified in the [DISASTER] response
- Started out great but then zeroed out; always well received by the 2-star J5 and the J5 team
- I had a unique position since I was embedded within the J5 where I managed a substantial budget and supervised both civilian DoD employees and military personnel, including writing their evaluations. My staff (max. 14

at one time) provided excellent support. The GCC Commander and his senior staff generally were receptive and responsive to me because I controlled money and personnel despite being buried in the hierarchy. I also had complete access the whole way up the Chain to the Commander when I needed it.

- As [CCDR] & I arrived at the same time, it took some time for him to recognize the importance of USAID, beyond humanitarian & NGO stereotypes. Relationships are key and they evolved overtime as I improved understanding of USAID & promoted USAID's role.
- In general it was positive but not very strong. They liked that there was interagency cooperation but not really willing to spend a lot of time and resources on it.
- Support was phenomenal, great. I felt wanted. Over two Generals' tenure at [COMMAND], the SDA position was consolidated. That being said, it was often an unknown, ambiguous position – I was often explaining the position to others.
- So far excellent, [CCDR] has involved me in deep dives on the countries in the AOR. Good access to the CCDR, rank has been useful on this.

Q7: Do you think that your advice on interagency/development issues was sought out, taken up, and implemented by the Combatant Command?

- [COMMAND] was always interested in the USAID perspective, they weren't always sure why they were interested, nor did they always understand development principles and operations very well, but they did want to consult (and frequently did it out of a requirement to consult)
- Generally, No. [COMMAND] is retracting into its core mission and objectives that reflect the military courses of action.
- Military personnel at the 06 level and above think they know everything. Advice given to them by outsiders especially by development professionals and diplomats is frequently viewed as a nuisance and is certainly not sought out. However, if you learn to communicate using their language and their approaches you can be very effective. You cannot expect them to come to you. You must instead identify where your inputs are important and then determine how best to convey the information so that it will be received. On the other hand officers at the 05 level and below were eager to learn how to work better in an interagency context and wanted to understand development and Africa. We substantially improved the programs we managed (over \$120 million/year) during the time I was at the Command.

- I have nearly always felt my advice/guidance was welcomed, listened to and if possible followed—not in a GCC setting—but in the field settings where I have operated with military colleagues. As more military personnel became exposed to humanitarian principals and operations, the more they understood and valued USAID’s role.
- I was dissatisfied with the level of understanding and uptake of advice from all senior civilian interagency advisors. The CCDR is clearly committed to broadening the [COMMAND’S] network by increased engagement in the interagency as well as with international partners. Somehow this message did not translate down to the minions who were responsible for planning and conducting events. They did not listen to advice when told, for instance, that UN General Assembly week is not the right time to plan an event and expect high level DoS or USAID representation. They constantly expected to have the top senior official at meetings & events, not necessarily the most knowledgeable participants who may be of lower rank. They were mute to protocol considerations – including seating [A SENIOR USAID OFFICIAL] behind all the general & retired ambassadors at an event (the consequences of which will likely follow my USAID career at least for the next 2 years!) In the end, even with his intense schedule, I did have an open door to the CCDR and other leadership.

- Varied greatly among staff, sections, and topic.
- Sometimes the interagency position was misunderstood. I had access to the 4-Star; others without access sometimes felt disenfranchised.
- I think this depends on the quality of what you can offer.

Q8: At the Strategic or Organizational level (i.e., mission, vision, goals) - do you think the presence of a USAID Development Advisor contributed to improvements within the Combatant Command, and how so?

- I think in the area of humanitarian assistance, I was a useful advisor and raised consciousness about development principles. I often felt like a “referee,” telling them whether their ideas were go/no-go from a development and interagency perspective (they were often no-go from my opinion).
- Yes, provided a conscience to many of the planning teams.
- Because I participated in a wide range of discussions outside of my own shop, I was able to contribute quite effectively. One key contribution had to do with the interagency development of UNSC 1325 on women, peace, and security (WPS) where I worked with high level people back at DoD to shape the military’s contributions to this important USG strategy, then got the 4-star to accept that WPS would be a core part of [COMMAND]’s agenda. I trained

people at the Command to begin implementing different activities which subsequently were expanded and continued after my departure. I was also the first person to insist that no humanitarian assistance activities take place in a country without USAID concurrence.

- While I can't speak directly for the GCC, I have no doubt that continuous exposure to USAID officers and our field operations has had a positive effect on DoD and the way they approach their HA operations.
- On the positive side, there is a growing appreciation of USAID at [COMMAND] - even while a more sophisticated understanding is yet to be fully developed. However, the challenges that will always be part of this relationship are that [COMMAND] out-mans, out-resources and out-paces USAID in every respect. This makes it difficult to get ahead of the curve as well as to respond to constant requests for engagement.
- On a limited basis. For example, interagency input into the Theater Campaign Plans allowed for increased awareness on what other USG agencies were doing in the region and identify potential areas for collaboration.
- I helped get proposals through the system, reduced the bureaucracy. Helped foster linkages between the Command and non-governmental community.

Q9: At the Operational or Tactical level (plans, operations, activities), do you think the presence of a USAID Development Advisor contributed to improvements within the GCC, and how so?

- USAID in [COMMAND] was a key driver of the OHDACA guidance changes in 2009, that required USAID to clear on any proposed OHDACA activities – during the [DISASTER] response, the SDA (and certainly OFDA reps) played an important role in steering DoD involvement, ensuring that DoD stayed within an appropriate mission, and to promote understanding of the role of USAID, UN/OCHA and other development agencies
- There is Deputy Development Advisor that sits in the J3 – contributes significantly to the review of operational plans.
- The Command's entire approach to pandemic preparedness and later disaster preparedness was shaped by a multi-sectoral, inter-agency, cross-culturally sensitive approach which I designed and which allowed considerable buy-in on the part of host nations. Working closely with my OFDA counterpart we also reined in many of the inappropriate ideas in the humanitarian/emergency domain that would have occurred had we not been there. A good example was when the Ambassador thought we should provide a massive response to landslides which in reality was not as large a disaster as hyped originally and OFDA and military personnel on the ground confirmed.

- Evidence strongly demonstrates that my participation at various planning exercises was greatly appreciated and made a difference. I could not keep up with the constant request. However, I was only one small voice and frequently the ONLY civilian at such events (which allowed the planners to tick the interagency box, i.e. [SDA] is here, we've completed the requirement of including the interagency!).
- Yes. USAID input into location of small infrastructure activities increased probability of them being sustainable.

Q10: Do you think that your experiences and work as a Development Advisor to a Combatant Command resulted in strategic and/or operational improvements/changes back to USAID (at the Global and/or Mission-level)?

- Less so...I am not sure we did much differently at USAID as a result of my work at [COMMAND], but there was better awareness of [COMMAND'S] HA programs.
- No. There was initially an attempt to share the CDCS drafts with the [COMMAND] team but few, if any, comments were considered or reflected in the final products. USAID does not share policy work outside of the agency prior to publication.
- I was able to influence how USAID interacted with Defense Attaches/OSC Chiefs in designing and implementing HA projects in certain

countries but even more importantly, I helped improve the relationship between USAID and the military with regards to pandemic preparedness and disaster preparedness programs.

- I frequently passed along valuable information and contributed input to USAID policies which seemed to be greatly valued at CMC. The best example of actual impact is the [COMMAND]-USAID Joint Sahel Project.
- Operationally yes. Was able to leverage GCC resources to contribute to USAID objectives.
- There is a disconnect with USAID Mission Directors in the region – I think there is a need for high level introductions for the SDA. It's a numbers issues – Missions are stretched thin and there's a time and opportunity cost with engaging with the military. We need a more agile process to understand what the military and COCOMs are doing.
- It was positive to build relationships for USAID with the military on issues such as maritime security, anti-terrorism. It all depends on relationships – some USAID Mission Directors [in the Command's AOR] were interested, others were not.

Q12: Do you think the length of assignment to the Combatant Command was appropriate to achieve the determined purpose and objectives?

- I think 2-3 years is adequate
- I spent three years there — that was appropriate or up to 4 years would be plenty.
- A two year assignment should be considered appropriate time to establish strong working relationships and expose DOD colleagues to the way we think and operate.
- [COMMAND] is complex and fast-paced. Having SCI clearance is vital or one can be completely side-lined without it. I found it took nearly 6 months for me to have the necessary familiarity and relationships to be effective. That said, time outside the USAID mainstream has its costs so there would be few who would find it realistic to commit any longer than two years' time.
- Yes, three years is a reasonable amount of time. It could probably be extended to four. It takes a while to figure out how GCCs operate and where are the points of entry for having an impact

Q13: Do you think that as an SDA you had access to/ authority over sufficient resources to accomplish your objectives?

- As an agency rep, I was supported well enough, though not through any specific program funding.
- Difficult to reach back inside USAID Regional Bureaus to get real-time info.
- I had considerable resources and authority.
- No/none resources from USAID side (even for travel to AID Washington more than once a year). Fortunately, I was able to secure resources from [COMMAND] and, in some cases, bring them to USAID.
- SDAs don't really have authority over any resources. You have to be skilled at using others' resources to accomplish your objectives. This requires developing good working relationships with relevant GCC staff.

Q14: As related to your SDA Assignment, what do you think were the most significant accomplishments or successes of DoD Combatant Command/USAID interagency cooperation?

- Recognition that OFDA is not the main effort within USAID; recognition there is a difference between USAID and State

- Constant engagement at all levels to further understanding of USAID, its mission and capabilities. Critical inputs to USG policies (e.g. Security Sector Reform, Sahel-Maghreb Strategy) and [COMMAND] plans (e.g. Yemen, Nigeria, and Mali).
- Developing joint work plans between [COMMAND] and [USAID COUNTRY] Mission; increasing civ-mil coordination on the Lower Mekong Initiative; increasing coordination on disaster preparedness and risk reduction with OFDA; demonstrating shared interests between [COMMAND] maritime security and USAID's Coral Triangle Initiative; getting [COMMAND] planners to think about climate change impacts; strengthening coordination between Civil Affairs Officers and USAID within Embassies.
- It's a success when military people come to USAID for advice. Inculcating the partnership approach, concepts such as public-private partnerships.
- Creating a better awareness of who the inter-agency is, and how we can help the Command. Just being at the table with the 4-Star and his staff, I was present for lots of important decision-making that affects USAID.

Q15: As related to your SDA Assignment, what do you think were any limitations, constraints, or challenges of DOD GCC/USAID interagency cooperation?

- At the outset I was embedded as a J9 Section Chief in the J9, so supervised civilian and military personnel – I did this for over a year, had to learn military personnel evaluation systems, etc [which was] a mistake, and we agreed to get me out of a supervisory role in the second year
- Gaining access within [COMMAND], at the GO/FO level, in the decision making process
- Almost too numerous to mention. The military's rigid planning process does not lend itself to considering real world realities. There are huge cultural differences in how USAID and DOD see the world. As long as senior personnel remain disdainful of the knowledge and professional expertise of non-military personnel and think they can do our jobs better, it will be hard to make fundamental change. We fooled around at the margins and made some significant contributions but the problem is few military people ever do a GCC rotation or stay for more than 2 or 3 years and there are limited numbers of DIA employees who actually become FAOs so there is no incentive on the military's side to become cross-culturally or inter-agency savvy.
- The fact that I wasn't a Senior Foreign Service Officer limited my exposure to [COMMAND] command leadership.

- Access was always an issue for interagency actors. There's a need for clearer lines of communication for those without regular access. The job description could be clearer, but I liked that I had the flexibility to shape the position.
- As an SDA you are kind of alone, so you need to have a knowledge/resource link back to AID. CMC plays a very important role, as it's difficult sometimes to reach back into the various USAID initiatives.

Q16: Overall, do you think the placement of USAID SDAs to GCCs is currently an effective modality for field/theater-based interagency engagement?

- I think so, but it was always a question of opportunity cost given USAID staffing shortages – access as an FS-1 was also somewhat of an issue, given the mentality that access to the Command leadership should be SES level – but in the [DISASTER] response, that broke down
- No, should be at the action officer level; O-6 maximum
- I believe having USAID in key positions in a GCC is a good idea and felt that I was able to make significant contributions, BUT the main reason I was listened to was because I had money and I knew the rules behind spending it. The SDAs always complained that they were just advisors and had limited clout. Perhaps more HA positions should be considered in other GCCs.

- Yes, as part of a holistic effort that includes increased engagement in the field and in Washington.
- Yes, it is an effective way of engagement, but we need more. We need liaisons with the Regional Bureaus; we need liaisons in the major initiatives (like food security). I think the SDA function, or civil-military, should be a career track at USAID. SDA experience should be positively considered for USAID Mission Director positions. A deputy to the SDA would be a good thing. Overall USAID needs to move beyond an SDA to a team-based approach. We should get involved in early stages of GCC planning.
- These are super important positions. If possible, USAID should try to institutionalize high level access to the CCDRs. There is a need for additional support at the Washington level – such as the institutionalization of SDA support staff.

ENDNOTES

1. Tom Baltazar, COL U.S. Army, ret., Former and First Director of USAID/Office of Military Affairs, telephone interview by author, January 13, 2014.

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4. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Boston: Belknap of Harvard University Press, 1957), 2.

5. Note that this work is entirely a product of the author’s own research and synthesis. It in no way reflects any official policy position of the United States Agency for International Development (except where official policy is directly cited). Quoted interviews with current or retired USAID employees similarly reflect the individual opinions of those interviewed – not official USAID policy.

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13. A definition and description of bilateral foreign aid can be found at U.S. Agency for International Development, *Automated Directive System, Chapter 101, 101.3.3.3 Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, October 2007), 154.

14. Henry Nuzum, *Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency*, Letort Paper, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2010): 46-51.

15. *Ibid.*, 52.

16. William P. Schoux, *The Vietnam CORDS Experience: A Model of Successful Civil-Military Partnership?* Report for Academy for Educational Development, Inc. (USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse, 2006): 10.

17. Mandy Hohn et al., "A Legacy of Vietnam: Lessons from CORDS", *InterAgency Journal*, 2, no. 2, (Summer 2011). It is interesting to note that among current USAID staff it is somewhat of an unquestioned urban legend that 'up to 7000 USAID officers were stationed in Vietnam during the war'. While the war period does

represent the Agency's peak staffing of nearly 15,000 employees (10,000 direct hires), multiple sources (Schoux, Hohn, Nuzum) indicate the assignees in Vietnam to number between 1000-1500.

18. Henry Nuzum, *Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency*, 53.

19. Schoux quotes and references extensively from a paper by Stephen B. Young, *Defeating Insurgency: Civil Operations and Rural Development Support during the Vietnam War 1967-1972*, which is incompletely referenced in Schoux's report.

20. Henry Nuzum, *Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency*, ix.

21. William P. Schoux, *The Vietnam CORDS Experience: A Model of Successful Civil-Military Partnership?* 14, 17, 19, 22.

22. See Bruce Kinsey, "The CORDS of War," *State Magazine*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 2012), <http://digitaledition.state.gov/publication/?i=108925&p=18> (accessed on February 23, 2014); and Michael W. Cotter, "Plus ca Change", *American Diplomacy*, (Chapel Hill: American Diplomacy Publishers, August 2005), http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2005/0709/life/first_post1.html (accessed on February 23, 2014).

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