

SENIOR LEADERSHIP: SUCCESSION EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE

A Monograph

by

MAJ Min K. Choi
United States Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Name of Candidate: MAJ Min K. Choi

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Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Ricardo A. Herrera, Ph.D.

_____, Seminar Leader
John Paganini, COL

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Hank Arnold, COL

Accepted this 31st day of October 2013 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

SENIOR LEADERSHIP: SUCCESSION EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE, by MAJ Min K. Choi, 51 pages.

Private sector research on organizational performance impact due to senior leadership succession has been inconclusive. However, the research generally falls under three main theories. They are common sense theory, vicious cycle theory, and scapegoating theory. They state positive relationships between an organization's performance and senior leadership succession, negative relationship between an organization's performance and senior leadership succession, and no relationship between an organization's performance and senior leadership succession respectively. In addition to these three major theories, the research also shows less disruption with insider succession and more strategic change with outsider succession.

Looking at senior commanders at United Nations Command and Eighth United States Army during the Korean War reflects the lack of consensus in private sector research on senior leadership succession. When measuring strategic objective achievement rate, friendly casualty rate, territory gained, number of Medal of Honor recipients, and public opinion poll, the organizations performed better in three out of five areas before the relief than after relief. Most conclusive research contradicts private sector research on insider succession. When measuring the five variables, organizations performed better with outsider succession than insider succession.

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ACRONYMS

CCF	Communist Chinese Forces
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CINC	Commander in Chief
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EUSA	Eighth United States Army
GLS	Generalized Least Square
MLB	Major League Baseball
NFL	National Football League
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USFEC	United States Far East Command

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INTRODUCTION

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 states that operational art is “the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.”¹ The definition implies that an operational artist must have understanding of both strategic objectives and tactical actions.

On 11 April 1950, President of the United States of America, Harry Truman, relieved the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (UNC)/United States Far East Command (USFEC), General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. General MacArthur’s view on the strategic objective conflicted with that of the President Truman. This different perspective, in essence, was General MacArthur’s failure of understanding of the strategic objective, which led President Truman to relieve General MacArthur. The purpose of this monograph is not to pass judgment or study whether or not President Truman made the right decision. The purpose of this monograph is to examine the impact of senior commander succession on an organization’s performance.

The common belief in strategic management literature is that top leaders play a strong role in the performance of the respective organization.² Undoubtedly, the departure of the top leader, in any form, marks a critical and important event for the history of the organization.³ In the U.S. Army, any senior commander will relinquish command at some point in one form or another. The senior commander will either complete the command, die, be injured, or be relieved of command. It is critical for the organization that an effective succession plan is in place.

¹U.S. Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 4-1.

²John Child, “Organizational Structure, Environment and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice,” *Sociology* 6, no. 1 (January 1972): 1-22.

³Sydney Finkelstein and Donald Hambrick, *Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and Their Effects on Organizations* (Minneapolis/St. Paul: South-Western College Pub, 1996).

The private sector houses research that demonstrates the implications of appropriate senior leader succession on an organization. One particular research area is on an organization's performance impact due to senior leader succession.⁴ Despite the many studies on this particular topic and field, there is no conclusive data on the relationship between senior leader succession and an organization's performance. However, there are three major schools of thought or theories on this matter. One theory asserts that there is a positive relationship between senior leader succession and an organization's performance (common sense theory; an organization's performance increases after senior leader succession); another states that there is a negative relationship between senior leader succession and an organization's performance (vicious cycle theory; an organization's performance decreases after senior leader succession); the last theory contends that there is no relationship between senior leader succession and an organization's performance (ritual scapegoating theory; senior leader succession does not affect the organization's performance).

Along with the three schools of thought or theories mentioned above, researchers and scholars have also examined the difference between inside senior leader succession and outside senior leader succession. Inside succession occurs when a person from within an organization succeeds the outgoing senior leader. Outside succession occurs when a person from outside an organization succeeds the outgoing senior leader.⁵ Just as the three theories mentioned above, there is no conclusive data on the concrete relationship between inside/outside senior leader succession and an organization's effectiveness. However, a number of studies generally state that

⁴Robert C. Giambatista, W. Glenn Rose, and Suhaib Riaz, "Nothing Succeeds like Succession: A Critical Review of Leadership Succession Literature since 1994," *Leadership Quarterly* 16, no. 6 (December 2005): 963-991.

⁵Not all scholars and researchers used the same definition of insider/outsider succession. For example, Allen, Panian, and Lotz defined insider as anyone who was employed by the organization for at least a year prior to the succession.

an organization that experiences inside senior leader succession faces less organizational disruption.⁶ On the other hand, an organization that experiences outside senior leader succession is more likely to experience significant strategic change.⁷

The senior commander succession during the Korean War provides an interesting opportunity to study senior leader succession and its impact on organizational performance. Then Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgeway first succeeded Lieutenant General Walton Walker as the Eighth United States Army (EUSA) commander on 26 December 1950. General Ridgeway then succeeded General MacArthur as the commander in chief of UNC/USFEC on 11 April 1951. When then Lieutenant General Ridgeway succeeded Lieutenant General Walker (who died in an auto accident), Lieutenant General Ridgeway was an outsider. When General Ridgeway succeeded General MacArthur, General Ridgeway was an insider.

This monograph will examine how the different schools of thought on senior leader succession in the private sector can be applied in the military through the examination of the United Nation's combat operations during the Korean War from 25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953. The monograph will briefly review the different schools of thought and attempt to examine the UNC's performance, which resulted from the senior leader succession from General Douglas MacArthur to General Matthew Ridgeway and General Matthew Ridgeway to General Mark Clark. The monograph will also attempt to examine the EUSA performance that resulted from the senior leader succession from Lieutenant General Walker to Lieutenant General Ridgeway, senior leadership succession from Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgeway to Lieutenant General Van Fleet, and senior leadership succession from Lieutenant General Van Fleet to Lieutenant General Maxwell Taylor.

⁶Oscar Grusky, "Reply," *American Journal of Sociology* 70, no. 1 (1964): 72-76.

⁷Margarethe F. Wiersema, "Strategic Consequences of Executive Succession Within Diversified Firms," *Journal of Management Studies* 29, no. 1 (1992): 73-94.

THEORY

This section describes the different theories on senior leader succession and its impact on an organization. In each of the theories, the monograph will cover the basis of the theory or its relevant case study that demonstrates the theory. Almost all of the case studies in the private sector involve public corporations, non-profit organizations, and sports organizations. All three different types of organizations easily provide identifiable and quantifiable objective performance measurement data. Sports organizations provide an additional benefit of using easily identifiable, divided time frames to compare and analyze information.

Common Sense Theory

The common sense theory expresses the positive relationship between senior leader succession and subsequent organizational performance. The positive relationship exists because the successor is likely to bring new perspectives and expertise to overcome the predecessor's deficiencies. The common sense theory of senior leader succession states that the decision maker chooses a person with the expertise and experience to enhance the organization's performance to replace the outgoing senior leader.⁸

Peter Drucker: The Effective Executive⁹

In 1967, Peter Drucker, a renowned expert on organizational management, authored a book titled *The Effective Executive*. By no means was the book about organizational effectiveness and senior leader succession. However, in the book, Drucker studied what effective executives do that other executives do not in order to lead an organization effectively. The insight from this

⁸Idalene F. Kesner and Terrence C. Sehora, "Executive Succession: Past, Present & Future," *Journal of Management* 20, no. 2 (1994): 331.

⁹Information under this section is derived from Peter Drucker, *The Effective Executive* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). Individual sentences and paragraphs are not cited unless directly quoting from the book.

material that contributes to this monograph is how effective executives handle mediocrity and underperformance by subordinates.

Drucker states that effective executives first understand that mediocrity, regardless of the number of people, does not equate to one good person. Drucker further goes on to state that it is the “duty of the executive to remove ruthlessly anyone – and especially any manager – who consistently fails to perform with high distinction.”¹⁰ Drucker describes how retaining such an underperforming person is unfair to an organization and other subordinates who perform well. Keeping the underperforming person, Drucker goes on to say, is a senseless cruelty to that particular individual and to the organization.

The case study Drucker used to highlight the ruthless firing of an underperforming manager was that of General George C. Marshall and how he managed general officers during World War II. Drucker described how General Marshall insisted that any general officer be immediately relieved if he was less than outstanding. However, General Marshall stated clearly that the relief did not mean that the general officer was not fit for the organization. The relief simply meant that the general officer was not ideal for the particular job from which he was relieved. The relieved general officer could still be a good candidate for another ideal job.

Drucker’s principle of an effective executive ruthlessly removing an underperforming individual implies that in taking such action toward a senior leader can and does lead to a more effective organization. Drucker’s use of General Marshall and World War II as examples also demonstrates such implication; removing an ineffective senior leader leads to a more effective organization.

¹⁰Drucker, *The Effective Executive*, 89.

Vicious Cycle Theory

The vicious cycle theory describes a negative relationship between senior leader succession and subsequent organizational performance. The negative relationship exists because the departure of a senior leader is believed to cause disruption to a struggling organization. The disruption leads to poorer performance, leading to removal of another senior leader, thus repeating the vicious cycle.¹¹

Oscar Grusky: Field Manager Succession in Major League Baseball (MLB)¹²

Oscar Grusky conducted a study in 1963 examining 16 professional baseball teams in two time periods, 1921-41 and 1951-58. Grusky specifically looked at the rates of administrative succession and organizational effectiveness. After the study, Grusky concluded that there was a negative correlation between rates of administrative succession and organizational effectiveness. This means that the more an organization changed or relieved its field manager, the more the organization's performance declined. In addition, Grusky also concluded that there was a negative correlation between the change in the rate of administrative succession and a change in organizational effectiveness. This means that if the team kept the new field manager longer, the organization's performance improved. To clarify, Grusky did not state that constantly relieving the baseball field manager led to the team's poor performance. Grusky merely concluded that there was a negative correlation between relieving the baseball field manager and the team's performance. Grusky states that there is a vicious cycle in which the team performs poorly and, consequently, the field manager is relieved. The relief leads to disturbance, which leads to further

¹¹Oscar Grusky, "Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness," *American Journal of Sociology* 69 no. 1 (July 1963): 21-31.

¹²Information under this section is derived from the article "Managerial Succession and Organization Effectiveness" by Oscar Grusky. Individual sentences and paragraphs are not cited unless directly quoting from the article.

decline in team performance. The cycle comes right back around to relieving the new field manager.

The Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate Grusky's findings. The Table 1 depicts the number of successions during the two time periods along with the average team standing at the end of each season. The Table 2 shows the team's effectiveness as related to the length of tenure for the new field manager.

Table 1. Measure of succession and effectiveness for sixteen professional baseball organizations over two time periods.

Team	Number of Successions			Average Team Standing (16 teams)		
	1921-41	1951-58	Both	1921-41	1951-58	Both
Phillies	7	3	10	7.2	4.8	6.5
Giants	1	1	2	2.7	3.4	2.9
Cardinals	10	4	14	3.0	3.8	3.2
Braves	7	3	10	6.3	6.9	5.3
Pirates	6	3	9	3.2	6.9	4.2
Cubs	8	3	11	3.5	6.2	4.4
Dodgers	4	1	5	4.9	2.2	4.2
Reds	7	3	10	4.9	4.9	4.9
Athletics	0	4	4	4.8	6.6	5.3
Nats	6	3	9	4.2	6.8	4.9
Yankees	2	0	2	1.8	1.2	1.6
White Sox	8	2	10	5.6	2.9	4.9
Red Sox	8	2	10	6.0	3.9	5.4
Indians	6	1	7	3.9	2.6	3.6
Browns	9	5	14	5.6	6.8	5.9
Tigers	4	4	8	3.9	5.4	4.3

Source: Oscar Grusky, "Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness," *American Journal of Sociology* 69 no. 1 (July 1963): 23.

Table 2. Relationship between change in average length of managerial tenure and average team standing from period I to Period II for fifteen professional baseball teams.

Change in Average Managerial Tenure	Change in Average Team Standing	
	Increased Effectiveness	Decreased Effectiveness
Tenure longer	2	0
Tenure about same	4	1
Tenure much shorter	0	8

Source: Grusky, "Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness," 23.

In an effort to explain the correlation between rates of administrative succession and organizational effectiveness, Grusky identified 10 variables or organizational factors that influence organizational effectiveness. They are 1) organizational effectiveness, 2) manager's expectation of replacement, 3) managerial role strain, 4) rate of succession, 5) style of supervision, 6) internal stability, 7) morale, 8) clientele support, 9) availability of objective assessment of effectiveness, and 10) discrepancy between authority and responsibility. The way in which each variable impacts each of the others is noted in the Figure 1. These impacts are what Grusky proposed as the network of interrelations of the variables. The direction of the arrows indicates the direction of influence.




Figure 1. Grusky's 10 variable interrelationships on organization performance.

Source: Grusky, "Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness," 26.

If a team is ineffective, then clientele support (baseball fan support) and profitability decrease. This results in strong external pressure for managerial change, which, in effect, leads to increased managerial role strain. The external influence tends to increase the perceived discrepancy between managerial responsibility and actual authority. At the same time, the availability of objective performance standards decreases managerial control and thereby contributes to role strain. The greater the managerial role strain, the higher the rate of succession. The higher the rate of succession, the stronger the expectation of replacement when the team performs poorly. Frequent managerial change produces important dysfunctional consequences within the team by affecting supervision style and disturbing the informal network of interpersonal relationships. New policies and new personnel create the necessity for restructuring primary relationships. The resulting low primary-group stability produces low morale and may

contribute to the team's ineffectiveness. This action thus leads to low clientele support, which leads to lower profit. The consequent continued drop in profitability induces pressure for further managerial changes. This in turn produces additional disruptive effects on the organization, and again, the vicious cycle continues.

To put it another way, when a field manager changes, it upsets the old patterns of behavior. New organizational policies change the internal structure of the team. The members are forced to adapt not only to the new manager's way of doing things, but also to the new informal coalition that inevitably develops. Frequent managerial change can produce dysfunctional consequences within the team by affecting supervision style and disturbing the informal network of interpersonal relationships. The resulting low primary group stability produces low morale and may thereby contribute to team ineffectiveness. Declining fan support stimulates a greater decline in team morale and performance. The following consequent ticket sales drop, pressuring the owner to change the field manager. This in turn produces additional disruptive effects on the team, and the vicious cycle continues.

Margarethe Wiersema: CEO succession in corporation¹³

In the private sector, when a company does well, the CEO receives the credit. However, when the company does poorly, the CEO is often blamed and the board of directors fires the CEO. Investor and shareholders often view the CEO as the primary driver of a company's performance. Margarethe Wiersema wrote an article in Harvard Business Review in December 2002 in which she presented a case that most companies do not perform any better after dismissing their CEOs than in the years leading up to the dismissals. She further argued that CEO dismissal creates an organizational disruption that causes deep and lasting scars for the company.

¹³Information under this section is derived from the article "Holes at the Top: Why CEO Firings Backfire" by Margarethe F. Wiersema. Individual sentences and paragraphs are not cited unless directly quoting from the article.

Wiersema compared a CEO dismissal to that of a self-inflicted wound instead of a silver bullet that can cure the problems.

Wiersema examined all instances of CEO turn-over in the 500 largest public companies in the United States in the 1990s. The data showed that nearly 71 percent of CEO departures were the result of involuntary action (either direct dismissal or early retirement). Wiersema examined firm performance data in three ways. She first compared the firm performance in the two years prior to CEO dismissal with performance two years afterward. Second, she compared performance with industry averages for the same periods. Finally, she compared the companies that dismissed their CEO with companies that retained their CEOs.

Following are Wiersema's research findings. The operating earnings as a percentage of total assets averaged 11.2 percent before dismissal and 11.8 percent after dismissal (statistically indifferent). The return on assets averaged 2.6 percent before dismissal and 2.4 percent after. Company performance relative to the industry average also failed to improve significantly after bringing in a new CEO. In addition, company performance lagged behind that of companies with routine CEO successions. Wiersema was unable to find any financial data that showed positive effects of CEO dismissal.

Ritual Scapegoating Theory

The ritual scapegoating theory asserts no relationship between senior leader succession and subsequent organizational performance. No relationship exists because the senior leader is only one of many factors that impact an organization's performance. The senior leader succession is simply a symbolic act that has no impact on an organization's performance.

Gamson & Scotch: Scapegoating in Baseball¹⁴

In response to Grusky's study, William A. Gamson and Norman A. Scotch wrote an article in *Journal of Sociology* in 1964, providing a counter-argument to Grusky's conclusion. Gamson and Scotch did not dispute Grusky's data; they disputed his conclusion. Grusky concluded that there was a negative correlation between the rate of manager succession and the organization's effectiveness. Grusky described the relationship between the two as reciprocal and not one way. Once the data were further examined, Gamson and Scotch concluded that the rate of managerial succession was really the result of scapegoating and not necessarily the direct result of organizational effectiveness. Simply put, Gamson and Scotch concluded that there was no conclusive evidence that a field manager affected team performance. The "scapegoating" explained the correlation between effectiveness and rate of managerial succession.

The ritual scapegoating no-way causality theory assumes that the field manager has little effect on the team's performance. In the long run, the policies of the general manager and other administrative staff (front office) are far more important. The recruitment of talent through a well-organized scouting and farm system is most important in the long run. The field manager, who only makes day-to-day tactical decisions, has minimal responsibility in such functions. In the short run, the talent (the baseball players) is most important in determining the team's performance. The firing of the field manager is a classic example of ritual scapegoating. It is a convenient, anxiety-reducing act, which the participants in the ceremony regard as a way of improving performance, even though real improvement can come only through long-range organizational decisions.

¹⁴Information under this section is derived from the article "Scapegoating in Baseball" by William A. Gamson and Norman A. Scotch. Individual sentences and paragraphs are not cited unless directly quoting from the article.

Gamson and Scotch further went on to describe all the stakeholders in continuing the myth that the field manager impacts the organization's effectiveness. If the field manager cannot accept responsibility for the team's failure, then he cannot accept credit for its success. If the general manager, scouts, and ball players do not continue the myth, then they have to accept the failure as partly or wholly theirs. Lastly, relieving the field manager pleases the fans, which keeps the ticket sales up.

To validate the theory, Gamson and Scotch framed Grusky's data in a different way. Gamson and Scotch looked at the managerial succession that occurred in the middle of the season. They then compared the team's performance before the relief and after the relief, only looking at that season, which they deemed appropriate because the mid-season changes were assumed to be most disruptive. Second, limiting the comparison to one season eliminated other factors that influenced the team's performance (players tend to change out after the season and not during the season). The team's win-loss record was used as the measure of performance. The common sense theory would be that performance improves. Grusky's theory would state that performance decreased. However, the scapegoat theory would state that there would be no change. Gamson and Scotch's findings are noted in Table 3.

Table 3. Team performance after changing manager, 1954-61

Comparison	Improvement	Deterioration
Two weeks prior vs. time of dismissal	4	18
Time of dismissal vs. two weeks after	15	7
Two weeks prior to dismissal vs. two weeks after dismissal ¹⁵	1	17
Two weeks before dismissal vs. post dismissal record	13	9
Two weeks before dismissal vs. record from two weeks after dismissal until end of season	12	10

Source: William A. Gamson and Norman A. Scotch, "Scapegoating in Baseball," *American Journal of Sociology* 70, no. 1 (July 1964): 72.

¹⁵This comparison refers only to those eighteen teams whose performance was declining at the time of dismissal.

Gamson and Scotch's findings illustrate that when a field manager was relieved, the team's performance was in decline. Once the team's record was compared before and after the relief, generally more teams improved after the dismissal than before the dismissal. The population size and the difference between the numbers of teams that improved compared to the number of teams that declined were too small to have a statistically significant answer. However, the data shows that more teams' performance improved than declined. This can easily eliminate Grusky's conclusion that organizational effectiveness would decline.

Here is how Gamson and Scotch explain any sign of immediate success after relieving a field manager. They compared it to that of a Hopi Indian rain dance. Generally speaking, the Hopi Indian dance occurs during a drought season. Chances are that rain is likely after a long drought season. In that sense, a field manager generally gets relieved after a losing slump. Eventually the slump ends and the team begin to improve. The new field manager receives the credit for the team's improvement.

Although Gamson and Scotch's study did not produce conclusive results, they eliminated Grusky's conclusion. Gamson and Scotch attributed the team's improvement after relief as simple logic and chance and concluded that a field manager does not significantly impact the team's performance.

M. Craig Brown: Head Coach Succession in National Football League (NFL)¹⁶

In 1982, M. Craig Brown wrote an article in *Administrative Science Quarterly* further exploring the arguments made by Grusky and Gamson and Scotch. The conventional wisdom held that replacing the leader would lead to organizational improvement. Brown considered Grusky's argument that, due to its disruptive nature, relieving the leader would have a negative

¹⁶Information under this section is derived from the article "Administrative Succession and Organizational Performance" by M. Craig Brown. Individual sentences and paragraphs are not cited unless directly quoting from the article.

impact on organizational effectiveness. Brown also looked at Gamson and Scotch's argument that managerial succession had no causal impact and the act was better characterized as ritual scapegoating. In his study, Brown analyzed data for 26 teams in the National Football League (NFL) from 1970-78. Brown conducted regression analysis and concluded that a dramatic slide in performance leads to a coach's exit, and under the successor there is a recovery similar to that in teams that declined steeply but did not dismiss their coaches.

Brown first set out to identify the variables that would affect the team's overall performance/effectiveness. Effectiveness was measured as the number of games won. Brown initially came up with 10 variables to test. Among those variables were the percentage of games won during the previous season, the number of off-field organizational officials, the number of middle management officials, the removal of the coach during the current season, the removal of the coach the prior season, and player turnover. Brown conducted multiple regression analysis for 26 teams over a 9-year period. Multiple regression analysis generally explains the relationship between multiple independent variables and one dependent variable. The initial analysis revealed the following four variables as having the most statistically significant impact on a team's performance. They were past season winning percentage, player turnover, head coach succession during the current season, and head coach succession during the previous season.

There was a positive correlation between the past season winning percentage and the team's performance. This confirmed the common saying that the best predictor of future performance is past performance. There were negative correlations between the remaining three variables (coach succession in the past season, coach succession in the current season, and player turn-over) and the team's performance. This initial regression analysis tended to verify Grusky's finding that there is a negative correlation between a team's performance and leader succession.

Brown then re-ran the numbers using only the four variables mentioned above. Brown ran four separate equations calculating a team's performance in the following four ways: 1) only

factoring in the previous season's record; 2) factoring in the previous season's record and current season's head coach succession; 3) factoring in the previous season's record, current season's head coach succession, and previous season's head coach succession; and 4) factoring in the previous season's record, current season's head coach succession, and player turn-over. The result is shown in Table 4.

Table 4. GLS estimates of regressions of current performance on earlier performance and succession and turn-over variables.¹⁷

Variables	Equations			
	1	2	3	4
A. Past season % games won	0.330	0.250	0.210	0.118
B. Current season succession (1=yes)		-10.179	-10.898	-7.188
C. Past season succession (1=yes)			-4.233	
D. Number of new players on roster				-1.013
Intercept	33.360	43.735	40.369	62.604
R ²	0.274	0.318	0.314	0.382

Source: M. Craig Brown, "Administrative Succession and Organizational Performance: The Succession Effect," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (March 1982): 9.

In Table 4, the team's performance (Y) is calculated as follows.

Equation 1. $Y = 33.360 + .330 \times \text{Past season \% game won (A)}$

Equation 2. $Y = 43.735 + .250(A) - 10.179 \times \text{Current season succession (B)}$

Equation 3. $Y = 40.369 + .210(A) - 10.898(B) - 4.233 \times \text{Past season succession (C)}$

Equation 4. $Y = 62.604 + .118(A) - 7.188 (B) - 1.013 \times \text{Number of new players on roster}$

For example, a team that had a record of 10-6 (62.5%) in the previous season, fired its coach during the season and hired 10 new players is likely to end the season with an 8-8 record (52.66% rounded down to 50%). That same team would end the season with a 9-7 record

¹⁷Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported.

(59.85% rounded down to 56.25%) if it did not fire the head coach. The difference a head coach makes for a season is approximately 1.5 games.

Again, this study affirmed Grusky's notion that there is a negative correlation between head coach succession and a team's performance. However, what is interesting is the level of impact that the head coach's succession has on a team's performance. The multiple regression analysis demonstrated that comparison of the previous season's record to the team's performance had an R^2 of .274. Comparison of the previous season's record and relieving the head coach in the current season to the team's performance had an R^2 of 0.314. The difference is only 0.04. In other words, relieving the head coach during the current season only explains 4 percent of the team's performance. The previous season's record explains 27.4 percent, and the remaining 68.6 percent is explained by factors other than relieving the head coach or the previous season's record.

Brown then decided to further break down the head coach succession into insider and outsider succession, as well as during season and between seasons succession. Due to the extremely low number of outsider successions during a season, Brown analyzed insider and outsider succession between seasons and during the season in general. The results are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. GLS estimates of regression of current performance on earlier performance, turn-over and succession conditions.¹⁸

Variables	Equation	
	1	2
A. Past season % game won	0.271	0.147
B. Number of new players		-0.995
C. During season succession (1=yes)	-20.693	-17.440
D. Insider between season succession (1=yes)	-0.672	0.334
E. Outsider between season succession (1=yes)	-6.295	-3.092
Intercept	39.239	60.205
R ²	0.366	0.430

Source: M. Craig Brown, “Administrative Succession and Organizational Performance: The Succession Effect,” 11.

The above result confirms Grusky’s finding that insider succession was less disruptive than outsider succession. However, it disproved Grusky’s minor assertion that outsider succession was more disruptive than mid-season succession. An interesting note is that, once player turnover was factored in, insider succession played a positive role in determining the effectiveness of a team.

In an effort to observe how much difference a head coach makes in a team’s performance, Brown analyzed teams that fired their head coaches with teams that retained their head coaches. In an effort to compare apples to apples, Brown compared teams with a similar performance decline in both groups (teams that retained, teams that fired).

¹⁸Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported.




Figure 2. Performance of within-season succession teams and a matched group of non-succession teams.¹⁹

Source: M. Craig Brown, “Administrative Succession and Organizational Performance: The Succession Effect,” 12.

A losing record team (team with less than a 50% winning record) that fired its head coach recovered to a level slightly below the team’s record the previous season and tapered to that level the following season. A losing record team that retained its head coach had a similar recovery pattern. For example, Team A and Team B with 7-9 records the previous year started the season with 3-5 records. Team A fired its head coach and Team B retained its head coach. Both Team A and Team B will perform about 4-4 for the remainder of the season to end with 7-9 records. For winning record teams, the recovery for teams that retained their head coaches was much better than for the teams that fired their head coaches. For example, Team A and Team B with 10-6 records the previous year started the season with 2-6 records. Team A fired its head

¹⁹t-1 = season before succession. B = just prior to succession. A = after succession. t+1 = season after succession.

coach and Team B retained its head coach. Team A is likely to perform 6-2 to finish the season with an 8-8 record as opposed to Team B that performs 7-1 and finishes 9-7 for the season.

Brown's overall study favors Grusky's argument. Brown's multiple regression shows the negative correlation between head coach succession and team effectiveness. However, the impact that a head coach has on team performance is about 1.5 games per season. The R^2 in multiple regression analysis is too low to conclude the level of impact a head coach has on an organization with statistical confidence. When Brown compared similar teams that retained their head coaches as opposed to teams that fired their head coaches, the end result was about the same. The teams that retained coaches performed slightly better than the teams that fired their coaches.

Insider Succession Theory

The idea behind the theory that inside succession results in less organizational disturbance is that a successor from inside the organization is more familiar with the organization and its members than a successor from outside the organization. In addition, the inside successor is more likely to have a similar organizational thinking model. Therefore, the organization is less likely to react drastically to the insider succession. This results in better organization performance after inside succession than from outside succession.

Succession in Baseball Revisited²⁰

In 1979 Michael Patrick Allen, Sharon K. Panian, and Roy E. Lotz wrote an article in *Administrative Science Quarterly* highlighting their study on organization performance from senior leader succession. Allen, Panian, and Lotz examined major league baseball teams' performance and field manager succession. Allen, Panian, and Lotz further broke down the succession into four types: inside succession during season, inside succession between seasons,

²⁰Information under this section is derived from the article "Managerial Succession and Organizational Performance: Recalcitrant Problem Revisited" by Michael Patrick Allen, Sharon K. Panian, and Roy E. Lotz. Individual sentences and paragraphs are not cited unless directly quoting from the article.

outside succession during season, and outside succession between seasons. The study concluded that field manager succession between seasons correlated with improvement in team performance. The outside field manager succession correlated with decline in team performance.

Allen, Panian, and Lotz examined the major league baseball teams from 1920 to 1973. Allen, Panian, and Lotz studied the impact of field manager succession on team's performance. The team's win-loss percentage was used as the team's performance. The results of the finding are listed in Table 6.

Table 6. Type of Managerial Succession and Team Winning Percentage during Current Season and Prior Season

Type of managerial succession	Current Season	Prior Season
None (n=620)	0.513	0.512
Inside between seasons (n=37)	0.513	0.492
Inside during season (n=35)	0.479	0.501
Outside between seasons (n=118)	0.478	0.456
Outside during season (n=57)	0.452	0.480
Multiple (n=36)	0.445	0.471

Source: Michael Patrick Allen, Sharon K. Panian, and Roy E. Lotz, "Managerial Succession and Organizational Performance: A Recalcitrant Problem Revisited," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (1979): 175.

Overall, the teams that had no succession performed better than teams that replaced their field manager. In addition, the team that had inside succession performed better than team with outside succession whether the succession occurred during season or in between season. Lastly, the team with multiple succession performed the worst.

Most people would be tempted to compare the outside succession and inside succession by simply calculating the improvement or decline in team's performance from previous season to current season. Such calculation includes every variable that attributes to a team's performance (frequency of managerial succession, rate of personnel turnover, team's previous season performance). The analysis of variance on type of managerial succession is only about 5 percent

of the variance in team performance for both in between seasons and during season. Allen, Panian, and Lotz utilized a statistical technique known as covariance adjustment to resolve such a matter. Covariance adjustment technique “adjusts the difference in team performance during the current season by the type of managerial succession for the differences in team performance during the prior season.”²¹ The results of their finding are listed in Table 7.

Table 7. Unadjusted and Adjusted Effects of Managerial Succession upon Team-Winning Percentage

Type of managerial succession	Unadjusted effects	Adjusted effects
None (n=620)	0.013	0.004
Inside between seasons (n=37)	0.013	0.017
Inside during season (n=35)	-0.021	-0.023
Outside between seasons (n=118)	-0.022	0.006
Outside during season (n=57)	-0.048	-0.036
Multiple (n=36)	-0.055	-0.037

Source: Allen, “Managerial Succession and Organizational Performance: A Recalcitrant Problem Revisited,” 176.

Table 7 results show that inside succession is clearly less disruptive than outside succession. The result also illustrates that outside succession carries a larger increase in improvement between seasons and less decrease in decline during season.

Outsider Succession Theory

The theory that outside succession results in more strategic change is derived as follows. The outside successor is more likely to bring new ideas and beliefs into the organization. This increases the diversity of thinking and ideas at the top level of the organization, allowing for greater decision-making autonomy to the successor. At the same time, the outside successor is

²¹Michael Patrick Allen, Sharon K. Panian, and Roy E. Lotz, “Managerial Succession and Organizational Performance: A Recalcitrant Problem Revisited,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24, no. 2: 176.

less committed to prior plans and procedures. All of these actions combined allow the outside successor to implement more strategic changes.

Margarethe Wiersema: Outside Succession²²

In 1992, Margarethe F. Wiersema wrote an article in *Journal of Management Studies* highlighting her study on leaders and their influence on organizations. The study specifically looked at the impact of senior executive succession in a private sector corporation and its subsequent corporate strategy. The study concluded that outside succession was likely to implement significant strategic change, whereas inside succession was likely to implement less significant strategic change.

Wiersema used the following methods. She selected 146 random multi-business firms from 1,000 of the largest manufacturing firms in 1981 as listed by *Forbes* magazine. Out of 146 firms, Wiersema identified 86 firms as having senior executive²³ succession in the time period 1977-81. Wiersema used the remaining 60 firms as a non-succession control group. Of the 86 firms, she identified 52 firms that had inside succession and 34 that had outside succession.²⁴ Wiersema used change in a firm's specialization ratio over five years as the corporate strategic change. The specialization ratio measures the percentage of revenue attributed to the largest or core business. Positive percentage change indicates that the firm increased its share of revenue

²²Information under this section is derived from the article "Strategic Consequences of Executive Succession Within diversified firms" by Margarethe F. Wiersema. Individual sentences and paragraphs are not cited unless directly quoting from the article.

²³Wiersema's study used the president as opposed to chief executive officer (CEO) as the senior executive position. When the top management team consists of chairman-CEO and president, some succession can occur where the current CEO goes into semi-retirement and still retains the title of chairman but passes on the title of CEO to the current president. As a result, the succession within the office of CEO could include transference of the title to someone who is already a member of the firm's current top management team.

²⁴Wiersema defined inside succession as the successor being promoted from within the organization. Wiersema defined outside succession as the successor being hired from outside the organization.

from its original core business. Negative percentage change indicates that the firm decreased its share of revenue from its original core business. The results of Wiersema's finding are listed in Table 8.

Table 8. Changes in corporate strategy within the firm

	Mean (%)	Range (%)	Standard Deviation
Total sample (n=146)			
Pre-succession	(6.5)	(100) – 83	24.9
Post-succession	(13.8)	(100) – 64	35.0
All succession (n=86)			
Pre-succession	(3.9)	(60) – 83	22.9
Post-succession	(12.9)	(100) – 37	32.9
Insider succession (n=52)			
Pre-succession	(5.3)	(47) – 37	14.2
Post-succession	(7.2)	(100) – 30	24.5
Outsider succession (n=34)			
Pre-succession	(2.6)	(60) – 83	32.5
Post-succession	(22.0)	(100) – 37	41.3

Source: Margarethe F. Wiersema, "Strategic Consequences of Executive Succession Within Diversified Firms," *Journal of Management Studies* 29, no. 1 (1992): 83.

Wiersema's study and analysis clearly demonstrated that firms with outsider succession had greater change in specialization ratio. Prior to succession, firms with outsider succession and firms with insider succession did not differ significantly on their specialization ratio; -2.6% and -5.3%. However, after succession, firms with outsider succession had much greater change in specialization ratio than the firms with insider succession; -22.0% and -2.6% respectively.

KOREAN WAR

General Overview

On 25 June 1950, at 0400 hours, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel commencing the start of Korean War.²⁵ The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) launched full scale invasion in five columns and quickly defeated four Republic of Korea (ROK) divisions and a regiment.²⁶ Immediately following the invasion, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces.²⁷ The government of DPRK refused to comply and continued with military operation in the ROK. On 27 June 1950, U.S. President Harry S. Truman authorized General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander of U.S. Forces Far East (USFFE), the use of U.S. air and naval assets against NKPA below the thirty-eighth parallel. Then, on 30 June 1950, President Truman authorized General MacArthur use of all available forces to repel the NKPA's invasion.²⁸ The UNSC recommended establishment of a unified command in Korea. President Truman appointed General MacArthur to Commander in Chief of United Nations Command (UNC) and appointed Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker as the Commander of Eighth United States Army (EUSA).²⁹

²⁵Michael Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1494-2007* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008), 698.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Spencer C. Tucker, Jinwung Kim, Michael R. Nichols, Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr., Priscilla Mary Roberts, and Norman R. Zehr, *Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000), 869.

²⁸Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, 698.

²⁹Roy K. Flint, Peter W. Kozumplik, and Thomas J. Waraksa, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War* (Wayne, NJ: Avery, 1995), 77.

The first U.S. ground combat troops, Task Force Smith, arrived at the Korean peninsula on 1 July 1950. Task Force Smith's first battle was at Osan, south of Seoul. The ground operation was not a success. Throughout the month of July, the Eighth Army conducted series of delaying action as more U.S. and other allied troops under UNC arrived to the Korean peninsula. The delaying action continued until the Eighth Army setup a perimeter along Nakdong River by 4 August 1950, marking the beginning of Nakdong Bulge Campaign (better known as Pusan Perimeter).³⁰

After a month and a half of the bloody but successful Nakdong Bulge Operation, General MacArthur authorized Operation Chromite, a daring amphibious operation into Inchon.³¹ The X Corps, consisting of U.S. 7th Infantry Division (augmented with 8,600 ROK troops) and the 1st Marine Division, landed at Inchon beaches (25 miles west of Seoul) on 15 September 1950.³² On 16 September 1950, Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan Perimeter, conducting offensive operations northward. On 26 September 1950, the elements of both X Corps and Eighth Army connected in Suwon (south of Seoul) and liberated Seoul the next day.

By end of September 1950, the NKPA was no longer an effective organized force south of thirty-eighth parallel.³³ President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave cautious approval to General MacArthur to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and pursue the NKPA.³⁴ On 9 October 1950, UN forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel conducting offensive operations to the north. By 19 October 1950, I Corps, 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st ROK Division captured Pyongyang,

³⁰Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, 699.

³¹*Ibid.*, 700.

³²*Ibid.*

³³Flint, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*, 85.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 87.

DPRK's capital.³⁵ By 25 October 1950, the UN forces were in sight of the Yalu River (a border between the DPRK and the People's Republic of China [PRC]).³⁶

To General MacArthur's shocking surprise, marking a serious intelligence failure, the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) crossed into the Korean peninsula repelling UN force's advance northward. Throughout November 1950, General MacArthur did not believe that the CCF had the capability to conduct full-scale offensive operation.³⁷ In addition, due to air reconnaissance restriction north of Yalu River, UNC's intelligence miscalculated CCF strength by over 120,000.³⁸ As a result, General MacArthur continued to push UN forces northward. By 21 November 1950, the U.S. 7th Infantry Division became the first American unit to reach the Yalu River.³⁹ By end of November 1950, General MacArthur realized the overwhelming CCF his unit was facing. General MacArthur ordered both Eighth Army and X Corps to withdraw as necessary to prevent envelopment.⁴⁰

By 5 December 1950, the UN forces fell south of Pyongyang. Then on 23 December 1950 Lieutenant General Walker, Eighth Army Commander, died in an auto accident north of Seoul.⁴¹ Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway succeeded Lieutenant General Walker taking

³⁵Flint, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*, 91.

³⁶Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, 701.

³⁷Flint, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*, 96

³⁸Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, 701.

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰Flint, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*, 100.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 101.

command on 26 December 1950.⁴² By 4 January 1951, Seoul fell again and UN forces fell back about forty miles south of Seoul.⁴³

After consolidating and reorganizing south of Seoul, the UN forces conducted offensive Operation Wolfhound and Operation Thunderbolt. By early February, the UN forces secured Inchon, Kimpo airfield, and set a foothold near Han River.⁴⁴ The UN forces fended off the CCF counter offensive then pursued forward with Operation Killer and Operation Ripper. By mid-March 1951, the UN forces moved into deserted Seoul.⁴⁵ In early April, 1951, the UN forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and established the Kansas line, approximately 10 miles north of the thirty-eighth parallel.⁴⁶ Then on 11 April 1951, President Truman relieved General MacArthur of his command.⁴⁷ General Ridgeway took over as the new command of UNC and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the EUSA.⁴⁸

For the remainder of the war, the two opposing armies defended along the hills along Kansas-Wyoming Lines, near the thirty-eighth parallel.⁴⁹ Finally, on 27 July 1953, both sides agreed to an armistice agreement bringing the Korean War to an end.⁵⁰

⁴²Flint, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*, 101.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid., 104.

⁴⁵Ibid., 106.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., 109.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., 114.

⁵⁰Ibid., 120.

Methods

Sample and Data Collection

The organization's performance was measured by achieving strategic objectives, friendly casualties, Medal of Honor recipients, territories gained, and public opinion.

Strategic Objectives

The strategic objectives were those given from higher echelon prior to taking command. The monograph gathered the directives given from the National Security Council to determine the strategic guidance/objectives given to the respective commanding generals. If the strategic objectives/guidance changed during the commanding general's tenure, the monograph noted those additional changes. The percentage of strategic objectives achieved was then calculated by the total number of strategic objectives achieved divided by total number of strategic objectives given. This monograph will interpret higher percentage as higher organization performance.

Friendly Casualties

The friendly casualty was calculated by taking average monthly casualties divided by the average monthly total troop strength level. The friendly casualty figures were derived from a database provided by The National Archives and Records Administration. The National Archives and Records Administration nor the Department of Defense, Directorate for Information and Operations and Reports had monthly total troop levels available. However, the *Korean War Almanac* had total troop level figures for 30 June 1951, 30 June 1952, and 31 July 1953. The date closest to the respective commanding general's time in command was used to estimate the average total number of troops. The monograph first took the casualty figure for the time period that correspond with each commanding general's time in command. The casualty figure was then divided by the number of days the respective general was in command than multiply by 30.416 (average number of days in a month) to arrive at the average monthly casualty figure. For the

UNC the U.S. casualty figures for all four services were used. For EUSA, U.S. casualty figures for Army and Marines were used.

The monograph used average monthly casualties divided by average monthly total troop level to have a more equitable comparison between commanding officers. Simply comparing total casualty figures puts the general officer who had more troops or served in command longer at a disadvantage. The monograph did not use allied nations' casualties due to the unavailability of the data in monthly figures. This monograph will use lower casualty percentage as higher organization performance.

The Medal of Honor

The Medal of Honor recipient rate was calculated by taking average monthly number of Medal of Honor recipients by the average monthly total troop strength level. The Medal of Honor recipient figures were derived from *Encyclopedia of the Korean War: a Political, Social, and Military History*.⁵¹ The monograph first took the Medal of Honor recipients for the time period that correspond with each commanding general's time in command. The Medal of Honor recipients figure was then divided by the number of days the respective general was in command than multiply by 30.416 (average number of days in a month) to arrive at the average monthly casualty figure. For the UNC, the Medal of Honor recipients for all four services were used. For the EUSA, the Medal of Honor recipients for Army and Marines were used.

The monograph used average monthly Medal of Honor recipients divided by average monthly total troop level to have a more equitable comparison between commanding officers. Simply comparing total Medal of Honor recipients put the general officer who had more troops or served in command longer at a disadvantage. This monograph will use a higher Medal of Honor recipient percentage as higher organization performance.

⁵¹Tucker, *Encyclopedia of the Korean War: a Political, Social, and Military History*.

Territories Gained

The monograph calculated the territories gained by measuring the percentage of combat division days that a unit gained ground, lost ground, and neither gained nor lost ground (neutral). The U.S. combat divisions were identified by the divisions outlined in Appendix I of *Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social and Military History*⁵² by Spencer C. Tucker. This monograph followed the daily battle chronology outlined in *Korean Battle Chronology*⁵³ by Richard E. Ecker and *The West Point Military History Series: Atlas for the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*⁵⁴ by Thomas E. Griess.

The “gained day” was calculated as a day that U.S. combat division gained ground during combat. The monograph also calculated the division combat days as ones during which the U.S. division lost territories and days that the U.S. divisions neither gained nor lost territories. The monograph then calculated the percentage of division combat days that the respective commanding general gained territory by dividing the total division combat days during the respective commanding general’s time in command. The monograph used the same manner to calculate the territory lost days and territory neutral days. This monograph will use higher territory gained combat division days percentage; higher territory neutral combat division day’s percentage; and lower territory lost combat division days percentage as higher organization performance.

⁵²Tucker, *Encyclopedia of the Korean War*.

⁵³Richard E. Ecker, *Korean Battle Chronology: Unit-by-Unit United States Casualty Figures and Medal of Honor Citations* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2005).

⁵⁴Thomas E. Griess, *The West Point Military History Series: Atlas for the Arab-Israeli Wars, The Chinese Civil War and the Korean War* (Wayne, NJ: Avery, 1986).

Public Opinion

The Gallup Polling Company conducted over 30 different polls dealing with the Korean War from 25 June 1950 to 11 December 1953.⁵⁵ Throughout this period, there was one poll question that was asked consistently four times. The question was, “In view of the development since we entered the fighting in Korea, do you think the U.S. made a mistake in deciding to defend Korea, or not?” This question was asked on 4 October 1950, 22 January 1951, 2 April 1952, and 17 November 1952. The respondents had three options; yes, no, no opinion.

If the Gallup Polling Company conducted more than one poll during the respective commanding general’s time in command, then the monograph used the average of the polls. This monograph will use lower percentage of “yes” and higher percentage of “no” as higher organization performance.

Shortfalls / Flaws

The first and the biggest shortfalls to the method described above is that this monograph examined only one war with seven different commanders at two different levels. The sample size was too small to give any statistically significant conclusion. Expanding the sample size to include multiple wars adds more commanding generals at senior levels and dilutes the ability to make like-kind comparisons. For example, the nature of the World War II was different from the Korean War, which was different from the Vietnam War. The monograph encountered the difficulty of gathering necessary sample data when trying to increase the sample size by including lower echelon command.

The next shortfall to this monograph’s method is that there is more to an organization’s performance or effectiveness than meeting strategic objectives, friendly casualty, Medal of Honor recipients, territories gained, and popular public opinion. This monograph recognizes that there

⁵⁵George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1972), 920-1159.

are more variables that contribute to an organization's effectiveness and performance. These include but are not limited to training level, strength and morale of the troops, discipline level of the troops, enemy casualties, support from local populace and government, and much more. This monograph lacked the sufficient means and methods to measure the many variables listed above in a timely manner.

Friendly Casualties

By the time armistice treaty was signed on 27 July 1953, the United Nations Command had 73,494 troops killed in action with 932,539 troops stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK).⁵⁶ The U.S. troops accounted for 32 percent of total United Nations forces; the ROK troops accounted for 63 percent of total United Nations forces; and remaining allied nations accounted for 4 percent of total United Nations forces. The casualty percentage to the total United Nations troops for each nation that sent troops to United Nations Command was approximately the same as their troop percentage. This monograph used U.S. casualties only because this monograph found U.S. casualty data that were broken by dates. The U.S. casualty data allowed this monograph to attribute the exact casualty figure to a specific commanding general. However, this monograph was not able to find similar casualty data for ROK troops or the other 17 nations that provided military troops to United Nations Command. This monograph only represents 32 percent of total friendly casualties.

This monograph did not use the actual average monthly number of total troops in the Korean War Theater. In order to make better accurate comparison of one commanding general to another, this monograph sought out the total number of troops serving in the Korean War Theater for the time period respective to the commanding generals. However, this monograph did not find such data. This monograph did find total troop number for three specific dates – 30 June 1951, 30

⁵⁶James I. Matray, *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War* (New York: Greenwood, 1991), 552-553.

June 1952, and 31 July 1953. Although the snap shot troop level at the three specific dates was not ideal, it was more telling than comparing raw casualty number from one commanding general to another.

From the beginning of the war until the end of December 1950, X Corps was not part of EUSA. However, when calculating the friendly casualty, this monograph included all Army and Marine casualties that occurred during respective commanding general's time in command. This monograph fully recognizes that Lieutenant General Walker had no direct control over X Corps and its troops. However, this monograph included such data due to the difficulty of extracting and assigning specific casualties to respective unit and its respective commanding general.

Territories Gained

Similar to flaws in calculating friendly casualty, this monograph only calculated U.S. ground troop performance. In addition, only the units that were identified with nine U.S. division headquarters were factored in the calculation. Independent regiments such as 5th RCT or 187th Airborne Infantry RCT were not factored in the calculation. Also similar to flaws in calculating friendly casualty, this monograph did not factor X Corps being separated from EUSA from beginning of the war to end of December 1950. When calculating EUSA performance, all of the X Corps performance was attributed to EUSA.

Each day that units in U.S. divisions gained ground counted as a "gained territory" days regardless of the distance. This same principle was applied to the days that units in U.S. division lost days. For example, if 9th Infantry Regiment of 2nd Infantry Division gained 10 yards a day for five days and lost 1,000 yards on the sixth day then the events is computed as five days of "gained territory" days and one day of "lost territory" day. This monograph was not able to ascertain the amount of distance each unit gained or lost from the research data. Also, if United Nations units other than U.S. units lost ground then, relieved by U.S. units who then gained

ground resulted in calculation of “gained territory” days but not the “lost territory” days because U.S. unit did not lose territory.

The monograph did not factor in combat action (offensive nor defensive) when it determined the territory gained, lost, or neutral days. This monograph treated the days that U.S. division unit gained territory fighting the CCF and NKPA the same as the days that U.S. division unit gained territory without any enemy action. The same manner applied to the days that U.S. division lost territory and maintained its territory. If the U.S. division successfully repelled an attack and did not gain nor lose territory that day was counted as “neutral territory” day. In the same manner, if the U.S. division was on reserve or did not participate in any combat, that day also counted as “neutral territory” day.

Data

United Nations Command

From 8 July 1950 to 27 July 1953, United Nations Command had three commanding generals. They are General Douglas MacArthur who commanded UNC from 23 July 1950 to 11 April 1951; General Matthew B. Ridgeway who commanded UNC from 11 April 1951 to 12 May 1952; lastly General Mark W. Clark who commanded UNC from 12 May 1952 to 27 July 1953.⁵⁷ President Harry S. Truman relieved General MacArthur on 11 April 1951.⁵⁸ General Clark succeeded General Ridgeway when General Ridgeway became Allied Supreme Commander.⁵⁹

⁵⁷Paul M. Edwards, *Almanacs of American Wars: Korean War Almanac* (New York: An imprint of InfoBase Publishing, 2006), 537.

⁵⁸Flint, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*, 108.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 117.

Strategic Objectives

From the start of Korean War on 25 June 1950 to the signing of Armistice agreement on 27 July 1953, there were three major strategic objectives in the Korean War. The first strategic objectives given by President Truman shortly after 25 June 1950, which was also highlighted in the UNSCR, was a re-establishment of the international boundary at the thirty-eighth parallel.⁶⁰ Then in early October 1950, President Truman gave approval to General MacArthur to pursue NKPA north of the thirty-eighth parallel, which shifted the strategic objective to reunifying the Korean peninsula.⁶¹ Lastly, in early December 1950, after meeting with British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, President Truman adjusted the strategic objective in Korea to contain “the CCF while negotiating to terminate the conflict.”⁶²

General MacArthur faced all three strategic objectives mentioned above during his time in command in UNC. He accomplished one of the three strategic objectives, which was repelling the NKPA north of the thirty-eighth parallel and re-establishing the pre-conflict international border between North and South Korea. General MacArthur did not achieve the strategic objective of reunifying the Korean peninsula nor achieving the armistice agreement. This resulted in General MacArthur’s strategic objective achievement rate at 33%.

However, both General Ridgeway and General Clark only faced the third strategic objective. General Ridgeway did not achieve getting the armistice agreement while General Clark achieved it. Therefore, the both generals strategic objective success rate is 0% and 100% respectively.

⁶⁰Flint, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*, 76.

⁶¹Ibid., 87.

⁶²Ibid., 102.

Table 9. UNC Strategic Objective Achievement Rate

	Strategic Objectives Achieved	Strategic Objective Achievement Percentage
General MacArthur	1 of 3	33%
General Ridgeway	0 of 1	0%
General Clark	1 of 1	100%

Source: Author produced.

Friendly Casualties

During General MacArthur's time in command at UNC, there were total of 17,868 troops killed in action. The casualty figure equates to the monthly average of 1,874. General MacArthur's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 253,250. This resulted in a casualty rate of 0.74 percent.

During General Ridgeway's time in command at UNC, there were total of 8,236 troops killed in action. The casualty figure equated to a monthly average of 633. General Ridgeway's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 265,864. This results in casualty rate of 0.24 percent.

During General Clark's time in command at UNC, there were total of 6,532 troops killed in action. The casualty figure equated to monthly average of 452. General Clark's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 302,483. This results in casualty rate of 0.15 percent.

Table 10. UNC Casualty Rate

	Total Casualties	Monthly Average	Average Monthly Troops	Casualty per troops
General MacArthur	17,868	1,874	253,250	0.74%
General Ridgeway	8,236	633	265,864	0.24%
General Clark	6,532	452	302,483	0.15%

Source: Author produced.

Medals of Honor

During General MacArthur's time in command at UNC, there were total of 58 Medal of Honor recipients. The recipient rate equated to a monthly average of 0.2. General MacArthur's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 253,250. This resulted in a Medal of Honor recipient rate of 0.0024 percent.

During General Ridgeway's time in command at UNC, there were total of 40 Medal of Honor recipients. The recipient rate equated to monthly average of 0.1. General Ridgeway's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 265,864. This resulted in a Medal of Honor recipient rate of 0.0012 percent.

During General Clark's time in command at UNC, there were total of 33 Medal of Honor recipients. The recipient rate equated to monthly average of 0.08. General Clark's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 302,483. This resulted in a Medal of Honor recipient rate of 0.0008 percent.

Table 11. UNC Medal of Honor Recipients

	Total Medal of Honor	Monthly Average	Average Monthly Troops	Medal per troops
General MacArthur	58	0.20	253,250	0.0024%
General Ridgeway	40	0.10	265,864	0.0012%
General Clark	33	0.08	302,483	0.0008%

Source: Author produced.

Territories

During General MacArthur's time in command at UNC, there were total of 729 territory gained division days; 378 territory neutral division days; and 532 territory lost division days. This equated to territory gained division days at 44 percent; territory neutral division days at 23 percent; territory lost division days at 32 percent.

During General Ridgeway's time in command at UNC, there were total of 574 territory gained division days; 2,174 territory neutral division days; and 56 territory lost division days. This equated to territory gained division days at 20 percent; territory neutral division days at 78 percent; and territory lost division days at 2 percent.

During General Clark's time in command at UNC, there were total of 25 gained division days; 2,833 territory neutral division days; and 26 territory lost division days. This equated to territory gained division days at 1 percent; territory neutral division days at 98 percent; and territory lost division days at 1 percent.

Table 12. UNC Territory Gain Percentage

	Gained	Neutral	Lost
General MacArthur	729/44%	378/23%	532/32%
General Ridgeway	574/20%	2,174/78%	56/2%
General Clark	25/1%	2,833/98%	26/1%

Source: Author produced.

Polls

During General MacArthur's time in command at UNC, *The Gallup Poll* conducted two public opinion polls asking U.S. general public "if you think the U.S. made a mistake in going into the war in Korea."⁶³ The average of the two polls show that 35 percent of the respondents said yes; 52 percent of respondents said no; and 14 percent of respondents replied no opinion.

During General Ridgeway's time in command at UNC, *The Gallup Poll* conducted one public opinion poll asking the U.S. general public "if you think the US made a mistake in going

⁶³Gallup. *The Gallup Poll*, 960-961.

into the war in Korea.”⁶⁴ The result of the poll shows that 51 percent of the respondents said yes; 38 percent of respondents said no; and 14 percent of respondents replied with no opinion.

During General Clark’s time in command at UNC, *The Gallup Poll* conducted one public opinion poll asking U.S. general public “if you think the US made a mistake in going into the war in Korea.”⁶⁵ The result of the poll shows that 43 percent of the respondent said yes; 37 percent of respondent said no; and 20 percent of respondent replied with no opinion.

Table 13. UNC Public Opinion Poll

	Do you think the US made a mistake in going into the war in Korea, or not?			
	Yes	No	No Opinion	Net Favorable
General MacArthur	35%	52%	14%	17%
General Ridgeway	51%	38%	14%	-13%
General Clark	43%	37%	20%	-6%

Source: Author produced.

Eighth United States Army

From 13 July 1951 to 27 July 1953, Eighth United States Army had four commanding generals. They were Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker who commanded EUSA from 13 July 1950 to 23 December 1950; Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway who commanded EUSA from 26 December 1950 to 10 April 1951; Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet who commanded EUSA from 14 April 1951 to 10 February 1953; and lastly Lieutenant General

⁶⁴Gallup. *The Gallup Poll*, 1052.

⁶⁵Ibid., 1102.

Maxwell D. Taylor who commanded EUSA from 11 February 1953 to 27 July 1953.⁶⁶ Lieutenant General Walker died in an auto accident on 23 December 1950.⁶⁷

Strategic Objectives

During his command at EUSA, Lieutenant General Walker faced the first two strategic objectives mentioned earlier. Lieutenant General Walker achieved the objective of repelling the NKPA north of the thirty-eighth parallel and re-establishing the pre-conflict international border between north and South Korea. Lieutenant General Walker did not achieve the objective of reunifying the Korean peninsula. This resulted in a strategic objective achievement rate of 50 percent.

Lieutenant General Ridgeway faced the third strategic objective during his command at EUSA. Lieutenant General Ridgeway did not achieve securing the armistice agreement with DPRK or PRC. This resulted in a strategic objective achievement rate of 0 percent.

Lieutenant General Van Fleet faced the third strategic objective during his command at EUSA. Lieutenant General Van Fleet did not achieve securing the armistice agreement with DPRK or PRC. This resulted in a strategic objective achievement rate of 0 percent.

Lieutenant General Taylor faced the third strategic objective during his command at EUSA. Lieutenant General Taylor achieved securing the armistice agreement with DPRK and PRC. This resulted in a strategic objective achievement rate of 100 percent.

⁶⁶Edwards, *Korean War Almanac*, 537.

⁶⁷Flint, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War*, 101.

Table 14. EUSA Strategic Objective Achievement Rate

	Strategic Objectives Achieved	Strategic Objective Achievement Percentage
Lieutenant General Walker	1 of 2	50%
Lieutenant General Ridgeway	0 of 1	0%
Lieutenant General Van Fleet	0 of 1	0%
Lieutenant General Taylor	1 of 1	100%

Source: Author produced.

Friendly Casualties

During Lieutenant General Walker's time in command at EUSA, there were a total of 13,155 troops killed in action. The casualty figure equated to a monthly average of 2,455. Lieutenant General Walker's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 163,507. This resulted in a casualty rate of 1.50 percent.

During Lieutenant General Ridgeway's time in command at EUSA, there were a total of 3,768 troops killed in action. The casualty figure equated to a monthly average of 1,092. Lieutenant General Ridgeway's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 229,291. This resulted in a casualty rate of 0.48 percent.

During Lieutenant General Van Fleet's time in command at EUSA, there were a total of 11,533 troops killed in action. The casualty figure equated to a monthly average of 523. Lieutenant General Van Fleet's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 246,583. This resulted in a casualty rate of 0.21 percent.

During Lieutenant General Taylor's time in command at EUSA, there were total of 2,599 troops killed in action. The casualty figure equated to a monthly average of 476. Lieutenant General Walker's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 276,581. This resulted in a casualty rate of 0.17 percent.

Table 15. EUSA Casualty Rate

	Total Casualties	Monthly Average	Troops	Casualty per troops
Lieutenant General Walker	13,155	2,455	163,507	1.50%
Lieutenant General Ridgeway	3,768	1,092	229,291	0.48%
Lieutenant General Van Fleet	11,533	523	246,583	0.21%
Lieutenant General Taylor	2,599	476	276,581	0.17%

Source: Author produced.

Medal of Honor

During Lieutenant General Walker's time in command at EUSA, there were total of 43 Medal of Honor recipients. The recipient rate equated to a monthly average of 0.26. Lieutenant General Walker's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 163,507. This resulted in a Medal of Honor recipient rate of 0.0049 percent.

During Lieutenant General Ridgeway's time in command at EUSA, there were total of 12 Medal of Honor recipients. The recipient rate equated to a monthly average of 0.11. Lieutenant General Ridgeway's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 229,291. This resulted in a Medal of Honor recipient rate of 0.0015 percent.

During Lieutenant General Van Fleet's time in command at EUSA, there were total of 57 Medal of Honor recipients. The recipient rate equated to a monthly average of 0.08. Lieutenant General Van Fleet's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 246,583. This resulted in a Medal of Honor recipient rate of 0.0010 percent.

During Lieutenant General Taylor's time in command at EUSA, there were total of 8 Medal of Honor recipients. The recipient rate equated to a monthly average of 0.05. Lieutenant General Walker's estimated average monthly troops available in theater were 276,581. This resulted in a Medal of Honor recipient rate of 0.0005 percent.

Table 16. EUSA Medals of Honor

	Total Medal of Honor	Monthly Average	Monthly Troops	Recipient per troops
Lieutenant General Walker	43	0.26	163,507	0.0049%
Lieutenant General Ridgeway	12	0.11	229,291	0.0015%
Lieutenant General Van Fleet	57	0.08	246,583	0.0010%
Lieutenant General Taylor	8	0.05	276,581	0.0005%

Source: Author produced.

Territories

During Lieutenant General Walker's time in command at EUSA, there were total of 190 gained division days; 378 territory neutral division days; and 300 territory lost division days. This equated to territory gained division days at 22 percent; territory neutral division days at 43 percent; and territory lost division days at 35 percent.

During Lieutenant General Ridgeway's time in command at EUSA, there were total of 532 gained division days; 0 territory neutral division days; and 210 territory lost division days. This equated to territory gained division days at 72 percent; territory neutral division days at 0 percent; and territory lost division days at 28 percent.

During Lieutenant General Van Fleet's time in command at EUSA, there were total of 602 gained division days; 4056 territory neutral division days; and 78 territory lost division days. This equated to territory gained division days at 13 percent; territory neutral division days at 86 percent; and territory lost division days at 2 percent.

During Lieutenant General Taylor's time in command at EUSA, there were total of 4 gained division days; 951 territory neutral division days; and 4 territory lost division days. This equated to territory gained division days at 0.4 percent; territory neutral division days at 99.2 percent; and territory lost division days at 0.4 percent.

Table 17. EUSA Territory Gain Rate

	Gained	Neutral	Lost
Lieutenant General Walker	190/22%	378/43%	300/35%
Lieutenant General Ridgeway	532/72%	0/0%	210/28%
Lieutenant General Van Fleet	602/13%	4056/86%	78/2%
Lieutenant General Taylor	4/0.4%	951/99.2%	4/0.4%

Source: Author produced.

Polls

During Lieutenant General Walker's time in command at EUSA, *The Gallup Poll* conducted one public opinion poll asking the U.S. general public "if you think the U.S. made a mistake in going into the war in Korea."⁶⁸ The result of the poll showed that 20 percent of the respondents said yes; 65 percent of the respondents said no; and 15 percent of the respondents replied no opinion.

During Lieutenant General Ridgeway's time in command at EUSA, *The Gallup Poll* conducted one public opinion poll asking the U.S. general public "if you think the U.S. made a mistake in going into the war in Korea."⁶⁹ The result of the poll showed that 49 percent of the respondents said yes; 38 percent of the respondent said no; and 13 percent of the respondents replied no opinion.

During General Van Fleet's time in command at UNC, *The Gallup Poll* conducted two public opinion polls asking the U.S. general public "if you think the U.S. made a mistake in going into the war in Korea."⁷⁰ The average of the two polls showed that 47 percent of the respondents

⁶⁸Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 942.

⁶⁹Ibid., 960-961.

⁷⁰Ibid., 1052, 1102.

said yes; 38 percent of the respondents said no; and 17 percent of the respondents replied no opinion.

The Gallup Poll did not conduct any public poll asking the U.S. general public “if you think the U.S. made a mistake in going into the war in Korea”⁷¹ during Lieutenant General Taylor’s time in command at EUSA.

Table 18. EUSA Public Opinion Poll

	Do you think the US made a mistake in going into the war in Korea, or not?			
	Yes	No	No Opinion	Net Favorable
Lieutenant General Walker	20%	65%	15%	45%
Lieutenant General Ridgeway	49%	38%	13%	-11%
Lieutenant General Van Fleet	47%	38%	17%	-10%
Lieutenant General Taylor	*	*	*	*

Source: Author produced.

Analysis

United Nations Command

Directly comparing UNC performance during General MacArthur’s time in command at UNC with UNC performance during General Ridgeway’s time in command at UNC illustrates that the UNC performed better at achieving strategic objectives, earned more Medals of Honor, and had higher favorable public opinion during General MacArthur’s time in command at UNC. The UNC performed better at having lower friendly casualties and gained more territories during General Ridgeway’s time in command.

Directly comparing UNC performance during General MacArthur’s time in command at UNC with UNC performance after President Truman relieved General MacArthur shows that the

⁷¹Ibid., 920-1159.

UNC performed better at receiving more Medals of Honor, gaining more territories, and having higher favorable public opinion during General MacArthur's time in command at UNC.

Of the five variables measured, the two variables with highest correlation were the variable between the number of friendly casualties and the number of Medal of Honor recipients. The correlation coefficient between the two variables was 0.78 with R-square of 0.63. In other words, there was a positive relationship between the number of friendly casualties and the number of Medal of Honor recipients. When the number of friendly casualties went up, the number of Medal of Honor recipients also went up.

Table 19. UNC Commanding General Comparison

	General MacArthur	General Ridgeway	All Post MacArthur General
Strategic Objective	33%	0%	50%
Friendly Casualties	0.74%	0.24%	0.19%
Medals of Honor	0.0024%	0.0012%	0.0009%
Net Territories Gained ⁷²	12%	18%	9%
Public Poll	17%	-13%	-10%

Source: Author produced.

When the commanding general succession resulted from relief, the following result occurred. The strategic objective achievement decreased by 100 percent; friendly casualties decreased by 68 percent; Medal of Honor recipients decreased by 52 percent; net territory gained division day increased by 54 percent; and net favorable public opinion decreased by 176 percent.

When the commanding general simply changed out command from the scheduled timeline (General Clark's succession from General Ridgeway) the following result occurred. The strategic objective improved by 100 percent; friendly casualty rate decreased by 37 percent;

⁷²Total territory gained division combat days minus total territory lost division combat days.

Medal of Honor recipients decreased by 35 percent; net territory gained division day decreased by 100 percent; and net favorable public opinion decreased by 54 percent.

Table 20. UNC Changes in Commanding General Comparison

	General MacArthur to General Ridgeway	General Ridgeway to General Clark
Strategic Objective	-100%	100%
Friendly Casualties	-68%	-37%
Medals of Honor	-52%	-35%
Net Territories Gained	54%	-100%
Public Poll	-176%	-54%

Source: Author produced.

Eighth United States Army

Directly comparing EUSA performance during Lieutenant General Walker's time in command at EUSA with EUSA performance during Lieutenant General Ridgeway's time in command at EUSA revealed that the EUSA performed better at achieving strategic objectives, earned more Medals of Honor, and had higher public opinion polls during Lieutenant General Walker's time in command at EUSA. The EUSA performed better at having less friendly casualties, and gaining more territory during Lieutenant General Ridgeway's time in command at EUSA.

Table 21. EUSA Commanding General Comparison

	Walker	Ridgeway	Van Fleet	Taylor
Strategic Objective	50%	0%	0%	100%
Friendly Casualties	1.50%	0.48%	0.21%	0.17%
Medals of Honor	0.0049%	0.0015%	0.0010%	0.0005%
Net Territories Gained	-13%	43%	11%	0%
Public Poll ⁷³	45%	-11%	-10%	*

Source: Author produced.

⁷³Net Favorable Percentage.

Table 22. EUSA Changes in Commanding General Comparison

	Walker to Ridgeway	Ridgeway to Van Fleet	Van Fleet to Taylor
Strategic Objective	-100%	0%	100%
Friendly Casualties	-68%	-55%	-19%
Medals of Honor	-69%	-31%	-49%
Net Territories Gained	442%	-74%	-100%
Public Poll	-124%	-14%	*

Source: Author produced.

General Ridgeway Comparison

The Korean War gives unique perspective to measure an organization's (UNC and EUSA) performance under the same person, General Matthew Ridgeway. When then Lieutenant General Ridgeway succeeded Lieutenant General Walker as CINC at EUSA, Lieutenant General Ridgeway was an outsider. When General Ridgeway succeeded General MacArthur as CINC at UNC, General Ridgeway was an insider. The direct comparison of General Ridgeway's performance at EUSA and UNC shows that the UNC performed better on friendly casualties. The EUSA performed better on gaining more territory, earning more Medals of Honor, and having more net favorable public opinion poll.

Table 23. General Ridgeway Comparison

	EUSA (Outsider)	UNC (Insider)
Strategic Objective	0	0
Friendly Casualties	0.48%	0.24%
Medals of Honor	0.0015%	0.0012%
Net Territories Gained	43%	18%
Public Poll	-11%	-13%

Source: Author produced.

Comparing the changes in organization performance after the succession gives additional insight. When an outsider succeeded in an organization (in EUSA when Lieutenant General Ridgeway succeeded Lieutenant General Walker), the organization performed better on friendly

casualties, net territory gained division days, and public opinion poll. When an insider succeeded in an organization (in UNC when General Ridgeway succeeded General MacArthur), the organization performed better on Medal of Honor recipients.

Table 24. Changes in General Ridgeway Comparison

	EUSA	UNC
Strategic Objective	-100%	-100%
Friendly Casualties	-68.3%	-67.8%
Medals of Honor	-69%	-52%
Net Territories Gained	442%	54%
Public Poll	-124%	-176%

Source: Author produced.

CONCLUSION

The academic and private sector studies on organization impact from senior leader succession were inconclusive. However, although each study either supported or contradicted each other, the individual studies themselves provided conclusive data supporting their respective theory. These theories are that 1) there is a positive correlation between organization performance and senior leader succession; 2) there is a negative correlation between organization performance and senior leader succession; and 3) there is no correlation between organization performance and senior leader succession. The study of the Korean War and the analysis of senior commanding generals at UNC and EUSA tend to support all three theories.

After President Truman relieved General MacArthur, the UNC under subsequent commanding generals performed better in two out of five categories this monograph measured and worse in three out of the five categories this monograph measured. When comparing the unit performance difference from two different types of succession (relief vs. natural), the succession resulting from relief fared better in two out of five categories this monograph measured, and worse in two out of five categories this monograph measured. The most definitive result this

monograph found was that contrary to inside succession theory, the outside succession fared better than inside succession. General Ridgeway performed better in three out of five categories this monograph measured when he succeeded as an outsider as opposed to one out of five categories this monograph measured when he succeeded as an insider.

The reader should keep in mind that each of the categories measured have equal value to each other. In addition, the monograph highlighted the shortfalls and flaws in what is measured and how they are measured.

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