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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Recommendations for Improving FBI Joint Counterterrorism Operations

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ABSTRACT

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FBI is leading the way by focusing on improving leadership development through new training initiatives to develop and educate its leaders. With the successes achieved through the deployment of Special Agents in support of joint counterterrorism operations with the military, the FBI enhances its ability to conduct investigative activity in defense of the United States. To execute this mission, and in addition to the Agents deployed with the military, the FBI embeds liaison officers at the Combatant Commands via formal agreements. However, during a time of increased Congressional oversight and the continued threat of terrorist attacks against interests of the United States, the FBI is now facing the expectation to become more administratively and operationally efficient with fewer resources while preventing terrorist attacks. This expectation also requires the FBI to ensure that the right person is in the right position to fulfill its counterterrorism responsibilities as assigned by the Executive Branch.

Without improvements to the FBI's existing system of assigning leaders to match the needs of the organization, the ability to fulfill these responsibilities, as set forth in the 9/11 Commission Recommendations and National Strategy for Counter Terrorism, the FBI risks being divided into separate agencies, failing to inform decision makers, and misses opportunities to prevent acts of terrorism. As the FBI continues to make significant progress to meet the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to improve counterterrorism operations, the FBI can enhance its efficiency and effectiveness by providing a formalized career path for counterterrorism leaders to develop expertise in all levels of management. The research conducted in this study identifies a recommended course of action that will significantly enhance these operations with the U.S. military.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The relationship between the FBI and the U.S. military is evolving from simple requests for information to deployments to high-threat environments in order to protect the United States from acts of terrorism. Although the FBI devotes considerable resources to the development of leadership and professional education for all levels of leadership, a formalized system that enables the organization's priorities to be matched with people and positions is needed. As the FBI continues to make significant progress to meet the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to improve counterterrorism operations, it can enhance its efficiency and effectiveness by providing a formalized career path for counterterrorism leaders to develop expertise in all levels of management.

The impact of not having a formal assignment and career guidance process for FBI leaders to develop expertise at all levels of management risks the dividing of the FBI into separate agencies, failing to inform decision makers, and jeopardizing the execution of counterterrorism operations. These potential consequences can be mitigated through specific actions within the existing FBI organization.

To address this process, components of existing systems utilized by corporations, the Diplomatic Security Service, and the USMC, can be used to create a formalized career path that enables FBI leaders to accrue diversified experiences that hone the skills necessary to lead and manage counterterrorism operations alongside the military. This model will enable the FBI to meet the demands of a constantly evolving terrorist threat, and improve joint operations.

Within this study, there are seven specific recommendations for FBI Executive Management to consider:

- Develop a career path for Counterterrorism Supervisory Special Agents.
- Create a Career Assignment Unit for all CT Supervisory Special Agents.
- Require supervisors who are awarded a sabbatical at a military staff-level college to complete a tour with a military component within three years of graduation.
- Move the oversight of all COCOM Liaison Officers, with the exception of JSOC, to a Military Liaison & Support Section in the International Operations Division.
- Augment existing COCOM staff by one GS-14 SSA and one SIA.
- Assign a COCOM LNO team to the U.S. Cyber Command.
- Assign an LNO to the Central Intelligence Agency, Associate Director for Military Affairs.

Through the implementation of the recommendations supporting a whole-of-government approach, the FBI can streamline its operations to meet the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and obligations of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, to ensure the timely identification of threats, fulfill existing agreements with the Department of Defense (DoD), and provide for a thoroughly experienced CT leadership team in the tomorrow's FBI.

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

As set forth in the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, the 9/11 Commission identified specific failures of the FBI, to include: not obtaining necessary personnel to staff the counterterrorism mission, failing to employ an effective counterterrorism strategic analysis capability, and not having an effective intelligence collection effort.¹ While the FBI shifted considerable resources to increase staffing levels of Agents assigned to counterterrorism operations, and developed a dedicated career path for non-supervisory Agents, the 9/11 Commission also recommended the inclusion of management in the recommended actions to be taken:

A specialized and integrated national security workforce should be established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.² Agents and Analysts should specialize in one of these disciplines and have the option to work such matters for their entire career with the Bureau. Certain advanced training courses and assignments to other intelligence agencies should be required to advance within the national security discipline.³

In June 2011, the President of the United States signed the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSCT). The NSCT emphasizes the need of all U.S. departments to work together as a force multiplier in support of the instruments of National Power to disrupt and dismantle terrorist organizations.⁴ By adhering to the intent of the 9/11 Commission and direction provided by the NSCT, the FBI can leverage the intent of these expectations to establish a dedicated career path for counterterrorism supervisors that will instill a deep expertise based on a system of formalized career assignments and guidance.⁵ Through the development and use of a formalized system, the FBI will ensure that supervisors working counterterrorism

matters will have their experiences and skills matched to positions leading to the SES level, and enable the organization to survive the tenure of numerous FBI Directors.⁶

Within the FBI, the implementation of a formalized system will enable FBI resources to be properly allocated in support of counterterrorism operations as described by FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) management, in order to “Create a formal, agile, threat-based structure which drives collection and counterterrorism operations; and better inform the FBI’s decision makers regarding the top threats so they may better manage the strategy and CT resources against those threats.”⁷ With a formalized system, future decision makers responsible for the development of CT strategy will meet identified counterterrorism job requirements.

FBI leaders currently rely on an informal system, using advice from peers, to serve as the basis to make career changing decisions. While this informal system provides individuals with a wide degree of latitude to gain diverse experience, the FBI is not necessarily matching individuals with the relevant skill sets required for positions supporting the military. Due to the experiences required by the DoD, positions with the military are professionally demanding, and require specific experiences and abilities in order to effectively support joint FBI-military counterterrorism operations. As the FBI continues to make significant progress to meet the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to improve counterterrorism operations, it can enhance its efficiency and effectiveness by providing a formalized career path for counterterrorism leaders to develop expertise in all levels of management.

This study considers the role of the FBI in joint counterterrorism operations with the military, the current system the FBI uses to select and place leaders, the impact of that system on joint operations, analyzes and compares alternative leader placement systems, and proposes a recommended solution for the FBI to enhance its operational effectiveness.

BACKGROUND

Role of the FBI in Joint Counterterrorism Operations with the Military

The FBI has a long history of working with the military, beginning in the 1930s, when military instructors taught Special Agents how to conduct “raids” in order to effect the arrest of dangerous criminals.⁸ During World War I, operations between the military and FBI did not go smoothly due to a lack of coordination between the two organizations.⁹ During the Interwar period before the Second World War, joint operations became more effective as a result of the centralized coordination of investigations between the FBI, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Army G-2 resulting in improved communications between the agencies.¹⁰ During this period, certain members of USMC received training from the FBI on how to conduct investigations, and the FBI performed counterterrorism-related activities with the military under “Division V” which was also known as National Defense at FBI Headquarters.¹¹ Former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover corresponded with the armed services, to include the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and expressed appreciation for assistance provided to the FBI in various matters.¹²

After the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the FBI was prepared to act swiftly in support of the military to prevent potential attacks against military installations by conducting counterterrorism operations within 48 hours of the attack.¹³ By 1980, FBI Executives were thrust into an unexpected role when they received a brief from the Joint Staff on Intelligence Requirements in support of a second attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran after the failure of Desert One. The Joint Staff requested assistance with developing information relevant to the rescue, and information about Iran held by U.S. citizens that could be used to support the effort.¹⁴ While the FBI’s assets were not used due to the cancellation of the second rescue,

the request emphasized the recognition by the military that FBI assets can support future operations. Although the military was deliberately re-structured after the failure of Desert One, it was not until the attacks of 9/11 that the FBI began to fully assess and reorganize its counterterrorism efforts to support military operations.

Recognizing the need to expand the FBI's ability to improve its operations with the military, permanent positions with the military at the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) were established after 2001 to improve communication between the DoD and the FBI.¹⁵ This relationship has directly facilitated the deployment of more than 1,000 Special Agent deployments to Afghanistan since 2001, and 1,300 deployments to Iraq since 2003 as of December, 2011.¹⁶

The importance of the relationship cultivated between the FBI and the military as a result of these deployments was emphasized by Director Mueller in 2007:

For the past four years, hundreds of FBI employees have been embedded with the military in Iraq and Afghanistan on a rotating basis. Being where the action is enables us to identify, evaluate, and resolve terrorist threats, faster and more efficiently than ever before. FBI personnel working in the Middle East often comment on the high level of cooperation and camaraderie between the military and the FBI. ...In theater, there is no time for turf battles. There is no room for political pressure. There is but one focus: keep each other safe, and to keep America safe.¹⁷

While the deployments are voluntary, many Agents deploy multiple times due to the extreme job satisfaction they experience when working with the military.¹⁸ These deployments provide Agents with operational experience that lasts for a career, and includes opportunities to learn how the military conducts its operations against terrorist organizations. At the same time, the military leverages the experience of the Agents to further their counterterrorism activities:

We have joined forces to interrogate detainees, collect biometric data, analyze pocket litter and explosive devices, and investigate terrorist financing. For example, agents and linguists work in tandem with military personnel to interview detainees and collect fingerprints and DNA samples...soldiers and special agents can quickly find out whether

suspected terrorists have ties to the United States. Agents and analysts also exploit evidence from detainees to connect cases, individuals, and organizations. Our agents may travel with the military to conduct nighttime raids, collect intelligence, and secure terrorist safe houses.¹⁹

This unity of effort is critical to the safety of the United States and its interests, and is an outstanding example of utilizing a whole-of-government approach to preventing acts of terrorism. Although the successes of the FBI in preventing terrorism are noteworthy, the question, “What can the FBI change now to improve the success of future joint counterterrorism operations with the military?” is relevant when examining the process used to place leaders within military commands. These leaders work alongside the military to assist with the enhancement of datasets held by the DoD on potential conflict areas. These areas are commonly referred to by the military as “Battlespace.”²⁰ The military commander uses these datasets to prepare for entering an operational environment, including knowledge of the area and the people that live and transit it, and people’s connections to relevant individuals and organizations.²¹

One of the many ways the military obtains datasets is through the use of task forces. Two such entities are the Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Combating Terrorism (JIACG/CT) at the COCOMs. FBI personnel assigned to the JIACG/CT provide staff support and are desired by the Secretary of Defense to be, “knowledgeable, staff-experienced individuals at the GS-14/15 level.”²² The FBI personnel assigned to the COCOM include a GS-15 FBI Liaison Officer (COCOM LNO) and an Intelligence Analyst (IA), both of whom work to support the FBI’s priorities and facilitate the exchange of information, which then furthers military operational readiness. While the duties of the COCOM LNO are varied, the scope of responsibility emphasizes the importance that the DoD places on its relationship with the FBI, and highlights the need for the FBI to use a formal career path to ensure individuals are able to have the appropriate qualifications to execute their duties, regardless of position.²³ With an

understanding of the military's expectations for the FBI leaders assigned to positions focused on counterterrorism such as the COCOMs, knowledge of how the FBI selects and places its leaders supporting the priorities of the FBI is essential to improving future joint operations with the military.

Current System of Selecting and Placing FBI Leaders

For the purpose of this study, the words "leader, manager, and supervisor" are considered to be synonymous with a Special Agent serving in a position responsible for the administration, personnel, and programs within the FBI. Prior to discussing the framework for the assignment of leaders within the FBI, a basic understanding of how the system of promotion is connected to the assignment of supervisors is critical.

Prior to graduation, new Special Agents submit their preference to work in one of five career paths: Criminal, Cyber, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Counterterrorism. Once assigned to a path, the new Agents are permitted to gain investigative experience in other paths as their schedule permits at their first Field Office. Within each path are specific educational and experience requirements that the Agent completes which demonstrates his or her competence within a period of approximately five years. To be promoted from a GS-13 to a GS-14, a Special Agent requests to enter the Management Program as a Relief Supervisor. As a Relief Supervisor, the Agent learns the basics of Field Office administration from his or her supervisor in a mentor program. After serving one year in this position, and with at least six years of investigative experience, the Agent may participate in the GS-14 or 15 Leadership Skills Assessment (LSA) or remain in the Relief Supervisor Program. The LSA is a practical examination administered by an independent third-party to assess the ability of the candidate to

demonstrate the competencies required of an FBI supervisor, using scenarios executed through telephonic encounters with role players. The LSA does not assess the candidate's level of knowledge or expertise with specific FBI policies, procedures, or investigations.

Once a passing grade has been obtained on the LSA, the Agent may apply for jobs either in the Field or with a Headquarters Division, such as the Los Angeles Field Office or at the Counterterrorism Division (CTD), via an electronic database. Within the database, vacant positions post for a period of two weeks, which limits the time for a candidate to become aware of the vacancy and submit an application. On the application, Agents must provide two different examples of experience for each of the required competencies. These competencies may include Leadership, Interpersonal Ability, Collaboration, Organizing and Planning, Problem Solving/Judgment, Flexibility/Adaptability, Initiative, and Communications.²⁴ Additional examples reflecting experience with Complex Counterterrorism Investigations, Complex Criminal Investigations, Crisis Response, Task Forces, or other areas may also be required.

Prior to the review of the candidate's applications by a panel of supervisors, known as the Local Career Board (LCB), each candidate is reviewed by the FBI Human Resources Division to ensure the candidate's most recent Performance Appraisal Review is "successful" or higher. The overall average of the LCB's rankings yields a final order of candidates. Typically, the highest ranked candidate is then endorsed by the senior management official for the division. Since the LCB is reviewing the competency examples as written by the candidates, an otherwise well-qualified candidate may be ranked lower simply due to an inability to articulate experiences in the format expected by the LCB. Once an Agent is selected to a GS-14 or higher management position, he or she is no longer affiliated with a specific career path.²⁵

A similar process exists for promotion to GS-15, or “Senior Manager,” which requires passing the GS-15 LSA. A prerequisite for the position of Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC) of a Field Office is the successful completion of tours in the Field, at Headquarters, and with the Inspection Division. To be selected for a Senior Executive Service (SES) position, the candidate is expected to complete a tour as an ASAC, be selected by an SES board, and complete an interview with the FBI Director. Throughout the process of applying for any promotion, the Agent is free to apply for any job vacancy for which he or she is eligible.

As a direct result of focused efforts by the FBI, supervisors are provided with several educational opportunities to develop their individual leadership and managerial skills.²⁶ Since the current system enables supervisors to change positions at their discretion after completing a minimum tour ranging between twelve and twenty-four months, the FBI does not have the ability to direct and plan for the future movement of supervisors throughout the FBI, otherwise referred to as “force-flow.”²⁷ By establishing a formal career path for supervisors, the FBI will be able to improve the efficiency of counterterrorism operations by encouraging individuals to apply for targeted positions, while satisfying the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and increasing promotional competitiveness.²⁸ In the case of the FBI’s interaction with the military, the need for the right person to be selected is more important than ever when joint operations require success to save lives.

IMPACT OF CURRENT SYSTEM ON OPERATIONS

How the FBI assigns its leaders to work with the military while facing an ever changing enemy operating across international borders, will determine the future course of effectiveness of counterterrorism operations. Today’s battlefield is evolving from fighting uniformed enemies

inside sovereign borders into one that is extremely complicated. FBI leaders working counterterrorism matters with the military require a higher degree of experience and skill to confront asymmetric crises.²⁹ As an organization, the FBI recognizes the challenges of conducting counterterrorism operations in an otherwise undefined battlefield:

Just as there is no clearly defined enemy, there is no clearly defined battlefield. No country is immune. The war zone stretches from Baghdad to Britain and from Battery Park to Bali. And while globalization has made the world smaller, technology has given terrorists a multitude of weapons, from dirty bombs and IEDs to mobile phones and the Internet.³⁰

Conducting counterterrorism operations on the battlefield of the future requires FBI leaders engaging in counterterrorism efforts with the military to have the best education and a formalized process to ensure the needs of both the FBI and military are met. This future battlefield includes the threat posed by jihadi-trained individuals, approximately 80 percent of whom were previously incarcerated by the military in Iraq, and who have been released and have re-joined Al-Qaida.³¹ This threat goes beyond Iraq with the recent February, 2012 merge of Al-Shabaab in Africa with Al-Qaida.³² As the FBI moves forward with leadership development in the post-9/11 world, it is important for the FBI to ensure its leaders have the requisite expertise to facilitate counterterrorism operations. With the expansion of operations with the military to the African continent, the requirements for FBI leaders set forth in the current DoD agreement require the FBI to provide its leaders with the resources needed to gain expertise, including a career path system.

During military operations, the FBI COCOM LNOs are typically requested to provide information that is pertinent to the battlespace during the planning stages of operations. However, if the LNO or other supervisors do not possess the correct experience, significant

delays can occur which can negatively impact military operations.

In support of Operation Odyssey Dawn in 2011, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed to conduct initial attacks against Libyan forces.³³ While military operations were already underway, the FBI began interviews similar to those performed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to obtain information held by persons in the United States about the area of operations.³⁴ However, the subsequent dissemination of this information to the military, for action as appropriate, did not occur until the FBI initiated its activities in the United States five to six weeks after operations commenced.³⁵ To prevent future delays in disseminating intelligence which impacts the ability of the military commander to understand the battlespace, the FBI needs to ensure that the leadership structure supporting the military is adequate, and appropriate mechanisms are in place to ensure the centralized reporting of intelligence. To ensure that FBI decision makers are informed and the military is adequately supported, the correct competencies and experience must be sought from every counterterrorism leader.

In recent postings to fill two vacant LNO positions, examples requiring the candidate to articulate experience include the competencies of Leadership, Interpersonal Ability, Initiative, Problem-Solving, Judgment, Counterterrorism, Communications, and working in a Task Force environment.³⁶ Although the candidate must demonstrate a degree of experience in counterterrorism investigations as required by the competency, his or her experience may be limited to just the two examples for that competency. In contrast, an individual who is able to draw from many different experiences can articulate examples of success in counterterrorism work for more than one competency. The postings also do not reflect any required experience in counter-espionage, as specified in the agreement with the Department of Defense.³⁷

With the current system, if one candidate outranks others based on the scores obtained

from their competencies other than counterterrorism, he or she can still be selected. Therefore, applicants selected for positions in support of the military may lack the requisite counterterrorism, counterintelligence, or supervisory experience needed for the position as stated by the current agreement with the DoD.³⁸ According to a COCOM LNO, skills that are necessary in order to be successful are not always reflected in the posting. These skills include operational planning, which are largely learned “on the job.”³⁹ Without a system to promote the career progression for leaders with deep expertise in counterterrorism, the FBI is operating contrary to the 9/11 Commission recommendations and jeopardizes its ability to execute National Security operations in accordance with the NSCT. Arguably, in spite of the current placement system’s shortcomings, the FBI continues to demonstrate a large degree of success with counterterrorism operations. How well does the FBI system meet the objective of placing leaders in comparison with other systems to develop its counterterrorism management team? In order to determine which areas the FBI can improve upon, an analysis of the systems in use by large companies, other federal law enforcement, and the military will be discussed.

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE LEADER PLACEMENT SYSTEMS

Corporate Methodology

In the corporate world, the successful upward mobility of an individual within a company depends on “leadership momentum” to promote the transition of the individual to leadership positions. Leadership momentum is, “the feeling among a group of people that their lives are intertwined and moving toward a recognizable and legitimate goal. It begins with competent

leadership and a management team dedicated to aggressive managerial development and opportunities.”⁴⁰ Such opportunities are associated with the process of grooming new leaders for positions of greater responsibility. This process is often referred to as “Talent Management,” or “Succession Planning.” Regardless of definition, both take into account the needs of the organization to cultivate, develop, and promote leaders through a wide range of experiences.

Talent Management is a focused process designed to attract, cultivate, and retain individuals whose personality, skills, and experiences meet the needs of the organization while promoting an employee-centered culture.⁴¹ This definition provides a generalized overview of the concept, and entails the use of specific procedures to ensure the “smooth continuity” of exceptional employees into positions across the organization to satisfy specific job specialties, and enables the individual, the position, and organization to succeed.⁴² With the current career assignment process in the FBI, Talent Management is served typically by mentors who select individuals they are familiar with. Although this is a “win” for an individual with access to a successful Executive-level mentor, it is unfortunate as the organization may rely on the placement of personnel due to relationships rather than look to previously unidentified leaders with pertinent skills. By establishing a Career Assignment Unit focused on Talent Management, the FBI will provide “career course correction” to those individuals displaying Executive potential and opportunities to develop the leader’s weaker skills and diversified experiences. When Talent Management is used in conjunction with Succession Planning, an ethos is established which fosters the longevity and success of the organization.

Succession Planning is the, “attempt to plan for the right number and quality of managers and key-skilled employees to cover retirements, death, serious illness or promotion, and any new positions which may be created in future organization plans.”⁴³ If the FBI identifies successors

for critical National Security Branch counterterrorism positions, such as the COCOM LNOs, it will be able to more efficiently align resources in support of the strategic goals outlined in the NSCT. This re-alignment is similar to the goals of large companies and how they develop and employ leaders to improve profit margins.

Several large companies, to include Proctor & Gamble (P & G), which is well known for consumer brands such as BraunTM, CrestTM, DuracellTM, IamsTM, MetamucilTM, PampersTM, PumaTM, and VicksTM use Succession Planning.⁴⁴ P & G is recognized as one of Twenty Best Companies for Leadership in 2010, a Top 50 Company for Diversity in 2010, and a Top 50 Company for Executive Women in 2011.⁴⁵ The overall success of the company is attributed to focused Talent Management and Succession Planning. “Our success depends entirely on the strength of our talent pipeline, which we build from within and manage with a disciplined process led by the CEO and the Senior Leadership Team.”⁴⁶

P & G leadership uses certain techniques to facilitate this leadership pipeline to include: a database used to search for talent in support of global initiatives; providing their employees with basic training; and proactively engaging the individual in career development by, “plotting moves that will build ‘career development currency’ [and] into moves to ‘destination jobs’ so that job assignments are seen through a career development lens.”⁴⁷ Although the FBI provides basic training to its leaders, it will benefit from the examination of other industries as examples of how to utilize a proactive process designed to promote momentum within the leadership pipeline.

While Proctor & Gamble is only one company, its success as a corporation serves as an example of how the corporate world utilizes a formalized process to guide future leaders while meeting the needs of the organization. Through the use of a formalized career path system,

providing career guidance, and using existing data held by the FBI Human Resources Division, the FBI will be able to identify, cultivate, and promote leaders which meet the qualification requirements desired by the Secretary of Defense and the FBI.

With the documented success of Talent Management and Succession Planning in the corporate world, resulting in the development of individuals who are qualified and competitive for Executive Management, it is vital that the FBI implement a similar process that will encourage the development of leaders aspiring to Executive-level counterterrorism leadership positions. With a formalized career path focusing on Talent Management and Succession Planning through assignment to key counterterrorism positions, emerging FBI Executives will gain the requisite skills needed to lead the FBI and its resources in countering the threats of tomorrow. The question remains though, “How will implementing a career path for counterterrorism supervisors assist in the development of future FBI Executives who need a deep expertise in National Security matters?”

Executive Development includes specific activities designed to expand mindsets, in addition to the behaviors, skills, and experience of the individual.⁴⁸ As described by James Bolt, developing exceptional leaders depends on twelve critical success factors, of which the following four factors are identified by this study as requiring review with the current FBI system:⁴⁹

1. Executive Development needs to be linked to a strategy. Efforts are directly tied to the strategy of the organization and clearly show how those efforts address business challenges and achieve strategic objectives.⁵⁰ Since the FBI is aggressively implementing mandatory training of supervisors in leadership and management skills, and the 2011 re-alignment of CTD calls for a structure that drives counterterrorism operations and better informs FBI decision makers, linking the concept of a counterterrorism career path with formalized career guidance complements this

factor.⁵¹

2. A Strategy and a System. There is a strategy and long-term plan for executive development, to include programs and efforts that are part of a continuous system and not independent of other ad hoc events.⁵² By designing a specific career path, FBI supervisors would be assured that moves within the leadership framework are by design, rather than in response to a specific event. Additionally, the identification of the planned movement of counterterrorism supervisors within the system, and identification of leaders with critical experience and skills will enable the FBI to operate proactively in support of joint operations.

3. High-Potential Identification and Development. The organization has a specific mechanism to identify “High-Potential” talent and accelerate the development process. If an organization does not develop a future pool of talented candidates, the organization cannot succeed.⁵³ As a result of superior performance within each step in the career path, corroborated by statistical accomplishments and 360-degree reviews, individuals with exceptional ability can be identified and provided additional opportunities within the FBI, intelligence community, foreign partners, and the military to enhance competitiveness. Just as the military recognizes superior performance by leaders through meritorious promotions, the FBI can benefit from a similar system.

4. Succession Management. There is a system whereby the right Executive is in the right position at the right time. A critical component to this factor is the concurrence among top management about which types of executive skill sets are needed, and are able to be specifically named, especially in times of emergency.⁵⁴ By implementing the career path process and providing career guidance, the FBI will have the ability to identify future vacancies, provide guidance to individuals with the experience and skills needed to best fill the vacancies, and

enables the highest levels of FBI management to know exactly which person is needed in a specific location to fulfill the counterterrorism mission. This system significantly bolsters the current selection process, which relies on informal relationships and the ability of the individual to demonstrate experience through their writing proclivity.

Since the examples for each competency in the application package are written by the Agent in an attempt to persuade the LCB that they are the best qualified candidate for the position, is the LCB really picking the best candidate or the best writer? In *Breaking the Leadership Mold*, Dr. Rosie Steeves suggests,

One of the worst misjudgments that an executive can make in assessing talent is...mistaking narcissism for competence... 'Narcissists are biased to take more credit for successes than is legitimate, and biased to avoid acknowledging responsibility for their failures and short comings for the same reasons that they claim more success than is their due.' The net result is that they look good to their peers and bosses, but turn out to be a negative force in the companies.⁵⁵

While legal actions have helped shape and define the existing promotion process, the element of bias and opportunity for the “wrong” personality to be placed into a position responsible for supervising or conducting joint operations with the military remains as long as there is a lack of a formalized career path and career guidance process. Additionally, success in executing the duties of one position, such as moving from a counterterrorism unit at CTD to a violent crime squad in the Field to meet the current requirement for promotion, does not necessarily guarantee success at the next promotion level, such as a CTD Unit Chief, COCOM LNO, or Legal Attaché.⁵⁶

Since the focus of this study is how the FBI can improve upon the placement of leaders, a comparison of how other federal law enforcement agencies place its leaders is necessary.

Diplomatic Security Service

Within the Department of Justice, the FBI is not the only agency without a supervisory career path. As of the date of this study, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) lacks a formal system of assigning and counseling its leaders.⁵⁷ Of the federal law enforcement agencies queried, the Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) model for career development provides some options that may be compatible for use in an FBI counterterrorism management career path system. This agency is used for comparison as DSS Special Agents are in frequent contact with the military while stationed overseas, and DSS Liaison Officers are assigned to several COCOMs. For background purposes, DSS Agents enter service as an FS-6 (GS-9 equivalent) and are considered to be in a supervisory position at the FS-3 (GS-13) and FS-2 (GS-14), both of which are competitively selected.⁵⁸ At the Executive Level, Agents may be promoted to Official Consular or Ministerial Consular which are considered Senior Foreign Service, the equivalent of the SES in the FBI.⁵⁹ Agents submit “bids” indicating their preference of duty for the next assignment one year prior to the end of their current assignment, either in the summer or winter.⁶⁰

There are two components to the process of assigning DSS Agents to positions, one based on the needs of the overall organization, and the second on the needs of the position. For the first component, the process utilizes two Career Development Officers (CDOs) to manage the Agent pool by alphanumeric designator.⁶¹ Although the CDO does not provide career advice to the Agent, the CDO does process the Agent’s bid request, and if the Agent is offered one of his or her bid preferences, the expectation is that the bid will be accepted. While the Agent is permitted to submit a bid, the Agent is expected to actively “lobby” for a position via direct or indirect contact with the Regional Security Officer and Deputy Chief of Mission at the desired

location, and with the International Programs Office.⁶²

FBI Agents enter service at the GS-10 level and currently have limited opportunities to gain experience outside of their initial assignment. These opportunities consist of intra-division transfer to a different squad, specialty transfer (i.e. a Certified Special Agent Bomb Technician or Language ability needed in another geographic area), arduous duty transfer (i.e. voluntary transfer to a remote area such as Pierre, South Dakota), competing for promotion, or receiving a transfer to an office of preference based on seniority. The DSS model is preferable to the FBI model as it allows supervisors the opportunity to gain experience that meets the needs of the organization while still considering the preferences of the individual during the process.

In the FBI, the current transfer and promotion process is not based on the submission of bids but does rely on the ability of the Agent to engage with peers, supervisors, and Executives to obtain career advice potential job placement. This informal system of career counseling is used to gain awareness of anticipated opportunities for promotion prior to the formal posting of vacancies, rather than on a scheduled rotation such as the one used by the DSS.

The second component of the DSS system involves the use of a panel, comprised of FS-1 or higher-ranking supervisors. The panel reviews vacant positions in the organization and the input received from DSS Headquarters concerning individuals who are preferred for a particular position.⁶³ While this system appears to be methodical and has visibility on the movement of supervisors, the average time spent by the panel reviewing a position is under two minutes.⁶⁴ In contrast to the current system in use by the FBI, the DSS system strongly considers the needs of the organization over the needs of the individual rather than waiting for the individual to seek a lateral move or promotion to a new position.

To account for the full career path of the counterterrorism specialty from new supervisor

to Executive, and promote a culture of sustainable expertise, an existing model outside of federal law enforcement provides valuable insight into how leaders are guided and placed while meeting the needs of the organization. One of the existing models that is especially applicable to this study is within the Department of Defense – the United States Marine Corps.

USMC Process

For this purposes of this section of the study, the words “leader and supervisor” will be associated with a commissioned officer in the USMC, who meets specific academic and physical requirements and is appointed to serve for a minimum period of time depending on the source of the commission. In each of the branches of the U.S. military, the armed forces have the luxury of knowing how many officers are entering the leadership pipeline, and how quickly they will be moved through it, since the numbers are set forth by law and established policies.⁶⁵ Consequently, the management of these officers is considerably easier than in the FBI, whose leaders select which positions they will apply for until retirement.

The assignment of USMC officers into their positions is the responsibility of the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and is administered by Manpower Management Officer Assignments (MMOA) for Ground and Aviation positions.⁶⁶ Officers assigned to MMOA are known as “Monitors.” The mission of the MMOA is to, “assign, counsel, and reclassify the Active Duty Officer Corps,” while the mission of the Monitor is to, “place the right officer, in the right job, at the right time...so that the Corps can accomplish its mission,” which includes officers from the ranks of Second Lieutenant through Flag Officer.⁶⁷ Since manpower is the most expensive resource in the USMC due to benefits, payroll, training, and retirement, the USMC takes the mission of placing officers very seriously.⁶⁸

The Monitor accomplishes this mission by combining the components of “Art and Science” to balance organizational and individual needs to ensure mission success.⁶⁹ The first component, “Art,” includes the available budget (of which the USMC spends approximately \$400 million annually for movement of personnel), unit and individual stability, career progression, desires of the command, and the officer’s family needs.⁷⁰ The second component, “Science,” involves the needs of the overall USMC, seniority of the individual, the preference of the individual, and the variety of positions available based on specialty.⁷¹ Overall, the Monitor ensures the officers are competitive for promotion and schools, which lead to command opportunities in the USMC by reviewing the officer’s evaluation, ensuring the officers have what they need to move up, and act as a third party by working for the officer and the institution.⁷²

One of the key tools available to the Monitor is the data collected by the USMC as a result of selection and promotion boards. This data is extremely useful to the Monitor as he or she is able to provide the officer with quantitative data to support future career decisions. For example, in Fiscal Year 2011, of the 236 Colonels screened for 59 command vacancies, 86% of the selectees have evaluations associated with a combat tour, 95% completed a command tour as a Lieutenant Colonel, and 78% held a Joint Duty position.⁷³ A junior officer, deciding whether or not to take a Joint Duty position, is now equipped with data provided by the Monitor reflecting the true impact of choosing the next job if he or she seeks to be in command.

A second tool is referred to as “Relative Value,” which is a number derived from the officer’s evaluation and ranking among peers plus a review of the narrative section to check for uncorroborated performance marks, making the overall evaluation a “Complete Report.”⁷⁴ This tool enables a senior officer to give a junior officer the same numerical rating as another on an evaluation, but permits differentiation among peers. For example, two officers may be ranked

3.80 on a 4.0 scale, but one is ranked one of fifteen officers of the same rank in the command, and the other two of fifteen. The Relative Value forces the rating official to provide professional counseling to the junior officer, who now is aware of how his or her performance relates to others in the unit, and what actions are necessary to improve the ranking in the future.

When comparing the USMC model with the FBI, the Agent is free to apply for any eligible job and the Human Resources Division is responsible for the orders once the Agent has been selected and approved for the new position. The use of a “Monitor” to advise the Agent of anticipated openings and recommendations within a counterterrorism-specific career path is very compatible with the FBI. The position can act as a filter to discourage Agents from applying for positions that are not in their career path, thereby enabling the LCB to select from candidates focused on their development and progression within the counterterrorism profession.

There is significant value in the FBI adopting a process similar to the one used by the USMC. Incorporation of the USMC model enables CT supervisors to receive advance notice of job opportunities, receive objective career advice based on quantitative data obtained from selections and promotions, and clearly appreciate the consequences of applying for positions that are not necessarily reflective of their goals or those of the FBI. More importantly, the use of a formula similar to the Relative Value and a Monitor will enable the FBI to provide supervisors with a more accurate assessment of their progress along the CT Career Path towards the goals of the organization and their own professional development.

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION

Integrated Concept

As a result of comparing law enforcement, corporate, and military career placement models in this study, the most practicable solution to improve the FBI process is to utilize ideas from each of the systems. By disseminating a job preference bid sheet, such as the one in use by the DSS, counterterrorism leaders will be able to express their desires for future assignments as they move through positions involving domestic terrorism, international terrorism inside U.S. borders, extraterritorial cases involving international terrorism, and in key overseas posts to gain increased expertise in National Security matters. By utilizing existing FBI resources within the Human Resources, Counterterrorism, and Training Divisions to develop a leadership specific career path for Counterterrorism supervisors, a Career Assignment Unit can employ the techniques in use by corporations and the USMC to manage talent and provide for succession planning. Incorporating these models will enable the FBI to more effectively and efficiently place the right person in the right job without altering the existing LCB process, and develop a cadre of leaders who have broad and substantive National Security experience.

In the Career Assignment Unit, at least two experienced CT Supervisory Agents function as Monitors. Supervision of the Monitors will require a Unit Chief at the minimum to efficiently administer the unit, conduct liaison with senior management in the Director's Office, CTD, Human Resources, International Operations, Training, and other divisions. Just as the military requires a three-year "pay-back" tour for attending professional military education, the unit can work with FBI supervisors to complete their post-education tour in support of a position working with the military to enhance the effectiveness of collaborative counterterrorism efforts. The allocation and funding to fill these positions may be found within the existing Headquarters

Staffing Initiative, and provides additional opportunities for leaders within the CT Career Path.

By creating a “Monitor” position that requires completion of field and headquarters tours in counterterrorism and following a career path plan, the FBI will have dedicated supervisors in a position to view vacancies across the entire organization and provide sound recommendations to the individual. The Monitor position will improve the efficiency of LCBs as candidates will have confidence gained from making informed decisions obtained through awareness of future positions which are relevant to the needs of the FBI and their career goals. As a result of this confidence, LCBs will benefit by not having to read application packages from individuals who are not adequately prepared for positions outside of their career path or individuals seeking final positions below the Executive level. If an individual chooses to apply for a position against the advice of the Monitor, he or she will have the knowledge that they will not be as competitive as other candidates, but still retain the right to apply on their own volition.

As the new Career Assignment Unit focuses on addressing the needs of supervisors in the counterterrorism career path, lessons learned from the use of the system will support data for use in the development of a functional model for the other disciplines within the National Security Branch. Constructive or adverse information derived from the lessons learned might include a low number of supervisors using the Monitor system. While this is a distinct possibility, once supervisors become familiar with the system, the same informal network in use to obtain career advice will instead promote the use of the Career Assignment Unit.

One of the first tasks is to work with the existing Leadership Development Institute in order to develop a survey for dissemination to all Supervisory Special Agents and members of the SES working counterterrorism matters. On the survey, Agents indicate their desired date of transfer out of their current position, possible date of retirement, and when they anticipate

applying for position of a higher or similar pay-grade. Important to include in the survey is an opportunity to express preferences for future positions, specifically if the individual is seeking promotion to the Executive level. The data collected from the survey will be used to forecast “force flow” of the FBI’s leadership cadre in order to identify future gaps in key positions and manage the overall career path process. This unit would not be responsible for the oversight of COCOM LNOs and other positions with the military as the administration needs to fall under a Section sized element.

Creation of a Military Liaison & Support Section (MLSS) to adequately address the requirements of the COCOM LNOs and liaison with Flag Officers is needed to improve counterterrorism operations, and will provide additional opportunities within the counterterrorism career path. The current organizational and reporting structure of the FBI can be modified to centralize the flow of intelligence and information with the COCOMs. Since the majority of the duties associated with all of the COCOMs (with the exception of JSOC) are similar to those performed by Legal Attachés, and the majority of counterterrorism operations with the military occur outside of the Continental United States, the MLSS needs to report to a Deputy Assistant Director in the International Operations Division (IOD). Integration of these assets into the IOD will provide the opportunity for counterterrorism leaders to be guided to Legal Attaché and Assistant Legal Attaché posts in countries requiring a higher degree of counterterrorism expertise than a supervisor outside of the counterterrorism career path.

The MLSS Executive is responsible for conducting liaison at the Flag Level and provides for efficient administration and operation of the military-related activities. Since the CTD Fly Team is engaged in support to the military and other overseas operations, this unit will also report to the MLSS Section Chief to serve as “surge” support for the LNOs and overseas

counterterrorism operations involving the military. These positions may include deployments with key crisis response elements such as Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) or Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF). Since the number of SES positions is limited, the position may need to be filled with an Acting Section Chief until proof of concept is demonstrated. If necessary, one of the existing FBI SES positions with the Central Intelligence Agency, specifically Community Human Intelligence, can be used to focus efforts with the CIA Associate Directorate of Military Affairs.

A Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (SIA, GS-15) and one IA for each of the respective COCOMs will also report to the Section Chief to centralize the reporting for the LNOs. The duties and responsibilities of this Intelligence Fusion Cell will provide support to ensure relevant intelligence and information is analyzed, disseminated, and tracked. The SIA will be able to closely coordinate activities with the International Operations Division Fusion Cell, which presently processes a significant amount of intelligence associated with Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Creating this cell is in alignment with FBI priorities and provides FBI Executive Management with improved visibility on all requests received from the military, avoids duplication of effort, and ensures intelligence that is relevant to one, some, or all of the COCOMs. The centralization of this intelligence function will better inform FBI decision makers of operations that may impact activities and priorities in the United States and overseas.

Administratively, the section will also have a Liaison Coordination Unit responsible for receiving reports from the Field and other Headquarters Divisions to track liaison, training activity, and other related matters involving the military to identify areas requiring re-allocation of resources and ensuring future mission success via lessons learned.

The placement of a COCOM liaison team to USCYBERCOM is critical as attacks and

intrusions targeting the United States increase, requiring an associated increased need for enhanced coordination and de-confliction of cyber-related operations.⁷⁵ With the addition of this LNO team, the MLSS can serve as the platform for other future opportunities to enhance joint counterterrorism operations with the military through closer coordination with the Intelligence Community and within the FBI through a joint CTD, IOD, Cyber Division element.

Impact of the Recommended Solution on Future Operations

With the implementation of the recommendations, the FBI will clearly demonstrate a high level of commitment to 9/11 Commission, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the Department of Defense by aligning its priorities and strategies to support National Security objectives. The recommended solution will facilitate the cross-functional development of necessary counterterrorism skills, and enhance the timely exchange of information and intelligence between the FBI and the military which is critical to the success of joint counterterrorism operations which influence foreign policy decisions. Streamlining the FBI's organizational structure in support of a whole-of-government approach to military operations will proactively communicate progress to interagency partners by supporting a motivated and specialized National Security workforce in concert with the vision of FBI Director Mueller:

Our greatest weapon against terrorism is unity. Unity between the FBI and the military, between federal agencies and the intelligence community, and between law enforcement and the citizens we serve. That unity is built on collaboration and connection. It is built on the idea that, together, we are smarter and stronger than standing alone.⁷⁶

The solution permits Agents to choose from a variety of position that enable them to utilize their experience and skills to effectively work with the military in planning, conducting investigative activity, and executing operations while developing a cadre of future Senior and Executive leaders with expertise in counterterrorism.

CONCLUSION

With budgets decreasing, hiring freezes in effect, significant reductions in military strength on the horizon, and the globalization of terrorists moving across traditional sovereign boundaries, it is imperative that the FBI re-align existing resources to promote more efficient whole-of-government operations. By using a formalized career path system for counterterrorism leaders, the FBI will develop the expertise of its leaders in a manner already accomplished with its Agent and Intelligence Analyst workforce. The use of a system ensures the FBI fully meets the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission while fulfilling the requirements set forth by the Executive Branch in executing the National Strategy for Counterterrorism.

This career path system will increase the level of expertise, provide predicative planning for movement of leaders within the FBI counterterrorism specialty, and provide opportunities to provide for Talent Management, Succession Planning, and Executive Development in order to cultivate future National Security leaders. Additionally, the formalized process will enhance collaboration with the military by systematically ensuring leaders engaged with the military are properly supported and meet the expectations of the duties and responsibilities set forth by the Secretary of Defense.

Future topics that require additional research and discussion include performing cost analyses of budgeted transfer expenses associated with the current system in comparison with the recommended solution in this study; performing analysis of data contained within the numerical performance review ratings, experiences, skills, and certifications of individuals selected for key positions and the Senior Executive Service in the FBI; and determining a measurement of effectiveness for joint counterterrorism operations in lieu of traditional statistics such as arrests and convictions.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Authorized Edition*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004. Pages 76-77.

² Ibid, pp.426-427

³ Ibid, p. 426. The recommendations were codified as law in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Section 2001, which states, “(4) The Director shall (A) establish career positions in national intelligence matters for agents, analysts, and related personnel of the Bureau; and (B) in furtherance of the requirement under subparagraph (A) and to the maximum extent practicable, afford agents, analysts, and related personnel of the Bureau the opportunity to work in the career specialty selected by such agents, analysts, and related personnel over their entire career with the Bureau.” The entire Act may be accessed via http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf

⁴ National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Washington, DC, June 2011, p. 2 and 7. On page 2 the strategy states, “U.S. CT efforts require a multidepartmental and multinational effort that goes beyond traditional intelligence, military, and law enforcement functions. We are engaged in a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that harnesses every tool of American power—military, civilian, and the power of our values...” On page 7, the strategy emphasizes the need for a whole-of-government approach, “To succeed at both the tactical and strategic levels, we must foster a rapid, coordinated, and effective CT effort that reflects the full capabilities and resources of our entire government. That is why this Strategy integrates the capabilities and authorities of each department and agency, ensuring that the right tools are applied at the right time to the right situation in a manner that is consistent with U.S. laws.” Throughout the strategy, the theme of supporting the Rule of Law is present with multiple references to bringing suspected terrorists to justice.

⁵ U.S. Congress. Senate. Judiciary Committee. *Hearing on Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation*. U.S. Federal News Service, Washington, D.C., March 27, 2007. Page 2, accessed via <http://www.proquest.com> Testimony from Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Committee, states in his conclusion, “Much work remains to be done and this Committee intends to fulfill its obligation to the American people to carefully examine all of these issues...I want the FBI to be the best that it can be, and oversight is part of the formula that is needed for achieving the improvements we need.”

⁶ National Commission, p. 425

⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Counterterrorism Division Realignment, Washington, DC: 2011. Accessed via internal systems.

⁸ Steiner, William B. Colonel, USMC. Personal correspondence, FBI course book dated January, 1941, Lecture No. 14, page 3. Accessed at the USMC Gray Research Center Archives, Quantico, Virginia on 01/09/12. Colonel Steiner was assigned to USMCHQ, Division of Plans and Policies (Intelligence) between August, 1940 and July, 1942.

⁹ Ibid, Lecture No. 46, p. 128

¹⁰ Ibid, Lecture No. 46, p. 129

¹¹ Ibid, Lecture No. 3, p. 12

¹² Butler, Smedley. General, USMC. Personal correspondence, letters dated 10/15/1938, 06/21/1939, and 01/18/1940 respectively. Accessed at the USMC Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia on 01/09/12. Review of the entire file revealed FBI Director Hoover and the Commandant not only exchanged pleasantries, but acknowledged appreciation for exchanging information involving the military and criminal activity which supported the Commandant’s robust tour of the United States delivering speeches to various civic, political, military, and social organizations.

¹³ Collins, Frederick L. *The FBI in War and Peace*. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. 1943, pp. 245-246. The author, a war correspondent and world traveler, interviewed then FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and was given unprecedented access to the FBI. By nightfall on December 8th, 1941, the FBI had arrested over 1,700 persons across the United States and Hawaii. The operation, which was pre-approved by the U.S. Attorney General, highlights the ability of the FBI to plan, prepare, and act swiftly during a time of national crisis.

¹⁴ Richelson, Jeffrey T. *The US Intelligence Community, Fifth Edition*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008, p. 161.

¹⁵ Mueller, Robert. Text of speech delivered to the National Defense University, “FBI and Military: Combining Forces to Keep America Safe” FBI Press Office March 28, 2007. Accessed via <http://search.proquest.com/docview/469294074?accountid=14746>

¹⁶ Internal email FBI International Operations Division (IOD), Afghanistan-Iraq Fusion Cell, to the author dated 12/23/11. The Fusion Cell oversees the selection, deployment, and administration of FBI personnel deployed to, and stationed in, the two countries.

¹⁷ Mueller, p.1

¹⁸ IOD, p.1

¹⁹ Mueller, pp.1-2

²⁰ USMC, MCDP 1-0, *Operations*. Quantico, Virginia. Page 4-3. Battlespace is defined in this publication as, “the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and accomplish the mission. The battlespace is not fixed in size or position. It varies over time, and depends on the environment, the commander’s mission, and friendly and enemy actions. It is also normally comprised of an Area of Operations, an area of influence, and an area of interest.”

²¹ USMC, MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*. Pages 2-3.

²² Marriott, William P. *Memorandum for the Executive Secretary for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Counter-Terrorism)*. Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated December 24, 2003. Cover page.

²³ Ibid, cover and attachment, p. 1. The duties of the COCOM LNO position include: Integrating counterterrorism plans and operations in accordance with Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 39 and 42; Provide technical guidance and policy expertise to the Combatant Commander and his staff concerning Counter-Terrorism aspects of national security policy (e.g. Counter Espionage/Counter-Intelligence); Provide FBI Counter-Terrorism perspective and input to support the Combatant Commander; On behalf of the Combatant Commander, communicate theater Counter-Terrorism strategy and initiatives to the FBI, other agencies of the Counter-Terrorism policy community, and integrate feedback from that community into pertinent combatant command processes; Assist in the planning and execution of ongoing combatant command combating terrorism and regional security initiatives; Foster interagency Counter-Terrorism coordination in planning and implementing combating terrorist programs by stressing integration of national, strategic, and operational goals; Assist in the development and interagency staffing, on behalf of the combatant command, of policy recommendations; Develop background information, tactics and approaches for presenting combatant command and DoD policy positions in-house, in the interagency arena, to the press and for congressional relations; and anticipate potential policy implementation problems, assesses impact and possible reaction and drafts policy memoranda and position papers for interagency staffing. The qualifications for the COCOM LNO include academic and professional experience at senior level to include knowledge of current U.S. CT policy objectives and programs to assess the relevancy and implications of global CT and Counter-Espionage developments and events affecting the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, and knowledge of FBI CT department goals, objectives, programs, and relations to provide expert analytical and advisory services that are responsive to the specialized needs of the combatant command.

²⁴ FBI Headquarters, Human Resources Division, internal unclassified document accessed 02/14/12.

²⁵ LeFevre, Avatar. *Telephonic interview with the author on 01/03/12*. Agent LeFevre, at the time of this paper, was serving as Acting Unit Chief of the FBI Special Agent Employee Development Unit, part of the Human Resources Division.

²⁶ Schwein, Richard. “Transforming Leadership in the FBI: A Recommendation for Strategic Change.” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. Accessed via: <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA467278/>. Schwein’s Thesis focuses on the need to create specific training pipelines for leaders in the FBI. Most of the recommendations contained in the thesis were adopted and implemented by the FBI Training Division, Leadership Development Institute.

²⁷ Schwein, Richard. *Telephonic interview with the author on 12/23/11*. FBI Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division.

²⁸ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 426

²⁹ Sloan, Stephen. *The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism*. Joint Special Operations University and Strategic Studies Department, MacDill AFB, Florida: 2011, page 1. The author is the Lawrence J. Chastang Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Studies, Office of Global Perspectives, University of Central Florida. Dr. Sloan is a Senior Fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department and received his PhD. in Comparative Politics at New York University.

³⁰ Mueller, p.1

³¹ Cigar, Norman. *Al-Qaida, The Tribes, and The Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq’s Unstable Triangle*. Middle East Studies Occasional Papers, Number 2, September. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011. Page 101.

³² Kouri, Jim. “Al-Shabaab And Al Qaeda Formally Merge In Somalia Report, Says Report.” Eurasia News & Analysis, February 15, 2012. Accessed via <http://www.eurasiareview.com/15022012-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-formally-merge-in-somalia-says-report/>

³³ Hanson, Marshall A. Captain, USNR (Ret). “Navy: Forward Deployed Responders.” *The Officer*, Vol. 87, Issue 4, Jul/Aug 2011 edition. Washington, DC: The Reserve Officers Association. Accessed via <http://search.proquest.com/docview/884788303?accountid=14746>

³⁴ Hakim, Danny and Madigan, Nick. “Immigrants Questioned By FBI.” *The New York Times*, Section B, Page 12, March 22, 2003. New York: New York Times Company. Accessed via <http://search.proquest.com/docview/432334523?accountid=14746>

- ³⁵ Brennan, Sean. *Telephonic interview with the author, 12/15/11*. At the time of this paper, Agent Brennan was the Unit Chief of the Counterterrorism Fly Team, and was the team leader for the Libya Threat Group formed after commencement of military operations.
- ³⁶ FBI Internal Job Posting, accessed by the author on 02/01/12 for the AFRICOM and JSOC COCOM LNO positions.
- ³⁷ Marriott, cover and page 1.
- ³⁸ Ibid
- ³⁹ Pagan, Jesus. FBI CTD COCOM Liaison Officer. Telephonic interview conducted on 01/05/12.
- ⁴⁰ Hickman, p. 131
- ⁴¹ Gold, Jeff, Richard Thorpe, and Alan Mumford, ed. *Gower Handbook of Leadership and Management Development*. Burlington, VT: Gower Publishing, 2010, p. 253.
- ⁴² Ibid, p. 255
- ⁴³ Ibid, pp. 255-256. According to the authors, Succession Planning also includes terms of identifying successors for key posts and then planning career moves and/or development activities for these potential successors; processes need to be designed around purpose, population, principles, processes and players, with senior manager engagement and HR championing.
- ⁴⁴ [www.pg.com](http://www.pg.com/en_US/brands/all_brands.shtml) Information was obtained from: http://www.pg.com/en_US/brands/all_brands.shtml
- ⁴⁵ Ibid, http://www.pg.com/en_US/company/purpose_people/leadership_development.shtml
- ⁴⁶ Ibid
- ⁴⁷ Gold, p.257
- ⁴⁸ Bolt, James F. *The Leader's Role in Growing New Leaders*, in Goldsmith, Marshall, Baldoni, John, and Sarah McArthur. *The AMA Handbook of Leadership*. New York: American Management Association, 2010, Chapter 7, p. 62. James Bolt is the founder of Bolt Consulting and has executive experience at Xerox. He is a writer and editor for the *Harvard Business Review*, was selected by the *Financial Times* as one of the top experts in executive and leadership development, and was named by Linkage, Inc. as one of the top 50 Executive Coaches in the World.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 63
- ⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 63
- ⁵¹ FBI Internal Correspondence, Counterterrorism Division Re-Alignment, dated February, 2011.
- ⁵² Goldsmith, p. 66
- ⁵³ Ibid, p. 67
- ⁵⁴ Ibid, pp. 67-68
- ⁵⁵ Steeves, Rosie. *Breaking the Leadership Mold: An Executive's Guide to Achieving Organizational Excellence*. Canada: Josey-Bass. 2010, p.219. The inserted quote from the author is taken from a publication authored by Hogan, R. Raskin R. & Fauxini, D. titled *The Dark Side of Charisma*. Dr. Steeves has a PhD. in Human Development from Fielding Graduate University and an MA in Engineering from Cambridge University. Her 35 years' experience in the leadership development field, working with both CEOs and senior executives of Fortune 500 companies to pursue aggressive growth strategies.
- ⁵⁶ Schwein, p.1
- ⁵⁷ Browning, Robert. *Telephonic interview with the author on 01/04/12*. At the time of this paper, Agent Browning was serving as the Special Agent-in-Charge of the Columbus, Ohio BATFE Field Office. Agent Browning has served in all levels of management with the BATFE, to include service on selection and promotion boards.
- ⁵⁸ Harris, Josh. *Interviewed by the author on 01/05/12*, at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. At the time of this paper, Agent Harris has been with the Diplomatic Security Service for approximately ten years and has served overseas in various capacities.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid, p.1
- ⁶⁰ Ibid, p.1
- ⁶¹ Ibid, p.1
- ⁶² Ibid, p.1
- ⁶³ Ibid, p.1
- ⁶⁴ Ibid, p.1
- ⁶⁵ Leed, Maren. *The Ingenuity Gap: Officer Management for the 21st Century*. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Washington, DC: 2010, p. 5.
- ⁶⁶ Hudson, Kevin. *Interviewed by the author on 02/06/12*, at Quantico, Virginia. Colonel (Select) Hudson is in charge of the USMC Aviation Assignment Section (MMOA-2) and oversees eight officers responsible for the placement of approximately 9,000 USMC officers. Col. Hudson provided the author a copy of the Fiscal Year 2012 "MMOA Roadshow" brief. The information in this citation was provided verbally by Colonel Hudson and from pages 3-6 of the brief.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 7
- ⁶⁸ Ibid, interview only.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 8

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Ibid, interview only.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 14

⁷⁴ Ibid, interview only.

⁷⁵ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Select Intelligence. *Hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, World Wide Threats*. 112th Cong., 2nd sess. Federal News Service, Washington D.C. Accessed via <http://www.nexis.com> , pp. 3 and 32.

⁷⁶ Mueller, p.2

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