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*United States Marine Corps
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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GENERAL ALPHONSE JUIN

A CASE STUDY IN LEADERSHIP AND COALITION WARFARE

(ITALY 1943-1944)


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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (to be completed)

Title: General Alphonse Juin, a case study in leadership and coalition warfare (Italy 1943-1944).

Author: Chef de bataillon Ludovic Danigo, Troupes de Marine, France

Thesis: Although little known, the successful contribution of French forces under the command of General Alphonse Juin to the Italian Campaign during World War II was of critical importance to the Allied war effort. It enabled the reemergence of a unified France under arms and served as a spectacular example of effective combat leadership in coalition warfare.

Discussion: The successes the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) achieved in Italy have been relegated to the backstage, masked behind the epic gesture of the liberation of France by De Lattre's French First Army and Leclerc's Second Armored Division. As pointed out by his biographer Jean Lacouture, General de Gaulle has been rather elusive on the significance of Juin's troops' contribution and how they supported and strengthened his theories as leader of the Free French movement. Due to the relative obscurity into which the FEC's achievements sunk, their efforts will now be examined in order to analyze if the actions taken at the operational level of war effectively changed the strategic relationship between France and the other Allies. The lessons to be drawn from General Juin's experience as Commanding General of the FEC are not merely of historical interest, but they give insights to the enduring dynamics and tensions inherent in coalition warfare.

Conclusion: The first decisive steps to reintegrate the French forces among the Allies were taken in Italy. General Juin's operational achievements were instrumental in the process of reestablishing France as a credible ally. A successful French commitment in the Italian Campaign was a prerequisite for General de Gaulle to allow France to come back around the table and to have a word in the fight that lay ahead, especially in the liberation of mainland France. The French participation in the Italian Theater of Operations exemplifies how military achievements can be a powerful leverage in support of a policy. Interestingly enough, parallels can be drawn between the Italian Campaign and most recent military operations involving French troops under American leadership. During Operation Desert Storm, like today in Afghanistan, France has insisted on acting in an area of operations of its own. This characteristic of French military commitments, which has sometimes been perceived as a reluctance to act under the United States' shadow, rather exemplifies France's enduring concern for independence and sovereignty.

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PREFACE

“It would be a deception, one of which our country would terribly suffer, to give credit for the liberation’s achievement to one unique party and one unique clan.” Marshall Juin, *Memoirs*.

In the preface of his memoirs, Marshall Alphonse Juin warned that over-simplified accounts of France’s struggle for its liberation during World War II would be an insult to all those who had fought. To some extent, Juin has not been heard and the complexity of the French internecine struggles during World War II has sometimes been forgotten in the name of a more exalted and simplistic version of history.

Far from still occupied mainland France, far from their native “*bled*” or from their North African garrisons, the soldiers of the “*Armée d’Afrique*” fought during the Italian Campaign of 1943-44 in the first major commitment of the French Forces on European soil since the defeat of 1940. Their sacrifices have still not been properly recognized for several reasons.

First, the nature of the operations in Italy, far less attractive than the dashing offensives in France and Germany, has contributed to the backwater reputation of the whole campaign. The Italian Campaign was a protracted one, aimed at tying down as many German divisions as possible in the Italian peninsula in support of the operations in Northern Europe. Above all, the campaign exemplified the competing priorities amongst the Allies, especially the United States and Great Britain. As such, the campaign is often remembered as an example of the difficulties associated with coalition warfare. France was an additional element in that complex, multinational equation.

Second, the units engaged in Italy were not the early “Free French” formations. They were units that had remained faithful to the Vichy Regime and to Marshall Pétain’s government, until early November 1942. In the aftermath of World War II, France was still collectively

traumatized by the experience of collaboration with the Nazi occupiers. Many preferred to ignore the fact that obedience to Vichy authority did not necessarily mean complete collaboration. Marshall Juin, for instance, remained faithful to the Vichy Regime until November 1942, but consistently worked towards the goal of resuming the fight against the Germans throughout that entire period.

Lastly, as a sad consequence of the French decolonization process, the collective memory of the Moroccan “*goums*”, Algerian and Tunisian “*tirailleurs*” contributions was reduced to an exotic “cliché” about colonial troops. Due to that flawed “collective memory”, this work constitutes for me an obligation of recognition and remembrance to those who so selflessly gave their lives for France.

My interest in the French Expeditionary Corps during the Italian Campaign of 1943-44 comes from a missed opportunity. As a student at the *cours supérieur d'Etat-Major* (French Army Staff College), I was unable to participate in a planned staff ride to Italy. So, I started studying the campaign on my own. Although unfamiliar with the construct and execution of the campaign, the figure of Marshal Juin as a renowned leader was familiar to me. The class of 1968 at the French military academy, the *Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr* was named in his honor. He was as such a prominent officer in the hall of fame of the French Army. To be honest though, I had little knowledge of what he had actually achieved and no deep insights to his character, leadership, or personality. It was only after reading Jean Christophe Notin's book, *Italie, les victoires oubliées de la France*, published in 2004, that I gained an appreciation for the crucial role that he played.

My research conducted on the joint campaign *Operation Diadem*, the last battle for the conquest of Rome, gave me an opportunity to deepen my knowledge on the topic. One specific

aspect of this operation drew my attention. I was fascinated by the conduct of Juin within the coalition and how he eventually won a position of influence among his partners, thus reestablishing the credibility of the French Forces. Moreover, the American and French military cooperation during that campaign constitutes a little known but important chapter of the common history of our two nations.

There are numerous sources that focus on the French-American military relationship. The primary sources, especially the memoirs of both Marshall Juin and General Mark Clark, gave me insight into their rapport building process throughout the campaign. With regards to the secondary sources, I have had to deal with different perspectives, as the English speaking authors, to the notable exception of John Ellis, Dominick Graham, and Shellford Bildwell, mostly emphasize the purely British- American relationship.

Finally, I also would like to gratefully acknowledge that I am indebted to my mentor Mr. Robert B. Bruce, PhD, for his interest in my work and his critical advice, to Mr. Roger Cirillo, PhD, who shared with me his deep knowledge of the campaign and with whom I had the pleasure to exchange views. Ms. Andrea L. Hamlen, and Ms. Stase Rodebaugh from the Leadership Communication Skills Center, had the patience to correct my English and to make it intelligible. I am also deeply grateful to LtCol Minter B. Ralston IV, USMC my faculty advisor from the Expeditionary Warfare School and my friend, for his help and encouragement throughout my work. Last but not least, my wife Valérie and our six children were a great and enduring support and let me encroach on our family time to conduct my research.

INTRODUCTION

Although little known, the successful contribution of French forces under the command of General Alphonse Juin to the Italian Campaign during World War II was of critical importance to the Allied war effort. It enabled the reemergence of a unified France under arms and served as a spectacular example of effective combat leadership in coalition warfare.

The Allied Campaign in Italy is often described by American and British historians as “a hollow victory”, one that was tarnished by personality conflicts between the leaders of the coalition. In France’s collective memory, the accomplishments of her own forces have likewise not held the place of esteem they deserve.¹ The successes the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) achieved in Italy have been relegated to the backstage, masked behind the epic gesture of the liberation of France by De Lattre’s French First Army and Leclerc’s Second Armored Division. As pointed out by his biographer Jean Lacouture, General de Gaulle has been rather elusive on the significance of Juin’s troops’ contribution and how they supported and strengthened his theories as leader of the Free French movement.² Due to the relative obscurity into which the FEC’s achievements sunk, their efforts will now be examined in order to analyze if the actions taken at the operational level of war effectively changed the strategic relationship between France and the other Allies. In that respect, the lessons to be drawn from General Juin’s experience as Commanding General of the FEC are not merely of historical interest, but they give insights to the enduring dynamics and tensions inherent in coalition warfare.

The FEC’s efforts in Italy were of critical importance to the effective implementation of de Gaulle’s overall policy of reaffirming France’s position among the Allies. General Juin’s department as an operational commander within the United States Fifth Army constituted a splendid example of leadership in coalition warfare. It not only helped to reassert France’s

sovereignty among the Allies, but it also inaugurated a new relationship between the French and American forces that is still relevant today.

Part I: Setting the Stage, the Context of the Preparation of the French Expeditionary Corps (22 October 1942- November 1943):

The Allied Perspective: the “French Problem”:

In October 1942, when the first secret meeting between American and French officials to discuss whether France would break the Armistice of 1940 and join the Allies’ side took place, France was still divided between different and sometimes intermingled factions.³ On one side, Marshal Pétain made “the gift of his person to France” with a view to spare the suffering of his fellow Frenchmen. According to the Armistice of 1940, mainland France’s territory was only half occupied and the Vichy government was allowed to maintain limited military forces in order to protect its colonial possessions. The bulk of these forces were stationed in North Africa. On the other side, the “Free French” movement, or “Fighting France” as General de Gaulle liked to call it, was comprised of those forces who answered his call on 18 June 1940. The French military was similarly divided. The faction with Pétain was known as the “*Armée d’armistice*” and recognized the Vichy Regime as France’s legitimate government. The Gaullist movement held the “Free French Forces”, who considered the Armistice of 1940 an act of treason.

To gain an understanding of the mentality of France’s military forces at that time, one must first recognize the difficult choices faced by the officers who pledged to serve her. The defeat of 1940 and the ethical dilemmas that followed it traumatized the French military leadership. Some leaders made the early choice of joining de Gaulle, who at that time was perceived as a felon, sentenced to death in absentia by the Vichy Regime. Others felt it was their duty to remain loyal to the legal government of France while preparing to resume the fight

against the invader.⁴ Either option was excruciatingly painful and required unimaginable sacrifices on the part of the officers, their friends and their families.

In that framework, the Allies perceived the French political situation as an incredibly complex problem which would at some point sour the special relationship between President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. For the United States, the legal government of France was in Vichy. The United States therefore maintained a diplomatic relationship with Petain's regime. De Gaulle, the self-proclaimed leader of Fighting France, was not granted more than a military recognition, for his legitimacy in the eyes of the French people had not been proven yet.⁵ The issue of France's political leadership became more acute with the preparations for *Operation Torch*, the Allied invasion of French North Africa. Petain gave no sign of cooperation to the Allies who were, in turn, still looking for some sort of legitimate authority to deal with. "Who is France?" was the question. There was no simple answer.

In President Roosevelt's view, *Operation Torch* was as much a political move as a military operation. He hoped to find a "Frenchman of great stature," who would unify divided France and enable a large scale French rally under the banner of the United Nations.⁶ Considering that the political issue of the government of France was to be solved once victory was achieved, President Roosevelt's view was to make the best use of the French forces. He completely disregarded the possibility of sovereign French leadership and was not keen on dealing with the French as an autonomous, independent ally. In that respect, *Operation Torch* was short of being fully successful. The German reaction to *Operation Torch* was to invade the unoccupied southern part of mainland France. This in turn, had the positive but unintended consequence of triggering the unification process of the two factions of the French forces and the last hopes of seeing the Vichy's Regime resume the fight against the Nazis were swept aside. In

that context, the problem of finding a “Frenchman of great stature” had been largely unresolved and was even worsened by the rivalry between the French leaders.

Two candidates were always at the forefront. In the eyes of the Americans, General Henri-Honoré Giraud (see biography in Appendix C) initially appeared as the only French commander able to negotiate with the Allies.⁷ He was very popular in the North African Theater, but he did not hold sway over the Free French Forces because he represented the Vichy establishment in the eyes of the Gaullists. Furthermore, General Giraud lacked political vision. However, this deficiency worked to his favor with President Roosevelt, since it kept the issue of France’s sovereignty off the table. Giraud’s main goal was the rearmament of the French Army. In his eagerness to take part in the fight, his sole focus was on the military and operational aspects. As such, he was the main architect of the Anfa Agreement signed on 24 January 1943, which made the American commitment to rearm the French a reality.⁸

General de Gaulle, by contrast, possessed a political vision. All his efforts were aimed at the restoration of French sovereignty which had been shattered by a shameful armistice (see biography in Appendix C). He was however, given little credit as a reliable partner. General de Gaulle had been Prime Minister Churchill’s early “protégé”, as he felt he would need a strong French ally in the aftermath of the war. By 1942, Churchill’s initial enthusiasm of had been dampened by de Gaulle’s insistence on French independence; the issue of knowing who the “Frenchman of great stature” was going to be still remained.⁹ De Gaulle’s aim was to play the middle with both Allies, but he was never the manageable partner that both Roosevelt and Churchill were looking for. To be accepted, he had to render his leadership, not to say himself, essential to the Allied war effort.

By the end of the campaign in Tunisia in February 1943, the rearmament of the French forces had effectively started, but the political imbroglio was far from being solved.¹⁰ The Allies were still faced with the difficult issue of picking the “right Frenchman” between Giraud and de Gaulle. However from a solely military perspective, significant steps had been made. France had neither the political unity nor the material means to weigh-in on the conduct of the war but thanks to the Anfa Agreement, French forces were rapidly preparing to join the fight.

The French Perspective: Overcoming the Dependency, Forging Unity:

“But how short France found her sword to be, at the moment the Allies launched their attack upon Europe!”¹¹ Charles de Gaulle.

In the French ranks, the prospect of fighting the Germans was a common bond shared by both sides. Unfortunately, there was still a great deal of bickering between the two factions. After the Tunisian Campaign, the Free French and the *Armée d’Afrique* units were physically co-located, but the task of unifying those two forces was anything but easy. Each side claimed patriotism as its own virtue. The Gaullists, in spite of their relatively small numbers, played on the moral argument of having never quit the fight against the invader. The *Armée d’Afrique* was a much larger formation and argued that its objective had always been to resume the fight, while abiding by their oaths as military professionals.¹²

Even after their commitment in Tunisia, the French forces were, by and large, held in low esteem by the Allies. They were generally viewed only as a valuable auxiliary force. The Tunisian Campaign, where the units of the *Armée d’Afrique* fought alongside with the Allies under General Juin’s command, proved the Frenchmen’s will to fight. It also made their shortage in modern equipment plain for all to see. In the eyes of their American partners, it was

of the utmost importance to train and equip the French forces to the standards of modern warfare before envisioning any large scale employment.¹³

In that framework, the equipping and training of the French units constituted an essential aspect of the French forces' rallying process. The United Kingdom had equipped most of the early Free French formations, but there were several reasons why the United States took on responsibility for the larger rearmament of all French forces in Northern Africa. In 1943, the United States was the only nation able to provide material on the scale required. There was also a sense of reciprocity for what France had provided to the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in 1918.¹⁴ Notwithstanding, an overall lack of confidence towards the French leaders remained, for President Roosevelt felt he could not fully trust Giraud and de Gaulle.¹⁵ The American president's suspicion caused the rearmament program to be used as a mechanism to exert a certain level of US control over the French Army.¹⁶

This "mechanism" was best exemplified through the issue of the combat service support. The rearmed French units were organized according to American standards and were fully dependent on American logistics.¹⁷ The logistics issue ultimately constituted the most powerful lever in the hands of the American leadership to bend the Frenchmen, especially de Gaulle, to their will. As he precisely recalls in his war memoirs:

They (the Allies) never consulted us, as from government to government, on any of their intentions. By policy or expediency, they thought to make use of the French forces for goals they themselves had determined on, as if these Forces belonged to them, and in justification citing the fact that they had contributed to their armament and supply.¹⁸

The main challenge for the French leadership, and that was clear from the very beginning in de Gaulle's mind, was to keep that logistical dependency from turning into a larger strategic dependency.

Part II: General Juin, the Right Person at the Right Place

General Alphonse Juin, Caught in the Turbulence Zone:

"These are times where it is always harder to know where lies one's duty than to do it."

Alphonse Juin

As France joined the allied war effort, the role of General Juin proved at several times essential. His career during the troubled years of 1940-43 exemplified the difficult ethical choices confronting many French officers. Juin's reputation, character, and personal history were known in the French Army (see biography in appendix). He was a heroic veteran of World War I and fought bravely against the Germans in 1940. The Allies however still viewed him with some suspicion due to his role in the Vichy Regime, and was perceived as a faithful *Vichyiste*. He indeed had been freed from German custody and appointed in French North Africa upon Vichy's authorities' request. What appeared as accepting favor from the Nazis left some doubt about his willingness to join with the Allies.¹⁹ Juin had been kept unaware of *Operation Torch*, but in spite of the tension, he played a critical role in preventing the confusion that followed the surprise of the landings in French North Africa from degenerating into a large, armed opposition to the American troops.²⁰

As the Commanding General of the French land and air forces in North Africa, he was caught in the "frontline" and once again faced difficult choices. He had to preserve French sovereignty in North Africa in compliance with the mission he received from the legitimate political authority, but at the same time he was working diligently to join the Allies in their fight against Nazi Germany. His hope of seeing Vichy's regime use *Operation Torch* as an opportunity to reunite the two factions of the French military disappeared with the German invasion of unoccupied southern France. Undaunted, on 11 November 1943 he ordered all

French troops to join the Allies, with a clear objective in mind: resume the fight against the Axis and preserve the unity of the French forces.²¹

Having been involved in the reunification process, Juin was well aware of the division in the French ranks and he accurately predicted the bickering between the Gaullist's and Giraud's factions that followed. He tried to stay away from any political involvement, for what he witnessed at Algiers in the summer of 1943 left him with a sense of wastefulness at a time when unity of all the Frenchmen was deeply needed.²² He also understood how much this situation weakened the overall position of France among the Allies. This became a crucial issue, for the Supreme Allied Command made the decision to have the FEC take part in the upcoming operations in Europe without any French oversight on their employment.

Juin was caught in the middle of the political turmoil. As he stressed, in a letter addressed to both de Gaulle and Giraud: "these are times where it is always harder to know where lies one's duty than to do it."²³ His position as a military commander was not one of passive neutrality, for the political developments directly impacted his role as an operational commander. He thus understood the critical role he had to play in preserving the unity of the French Forces and made the call for a unified leadership: "one boss, one flag." Juin's appreciation of the situation in June 1943 was clear. Unifying "Fighting France" was the sole condition for France's resurrection as a great nation and in those times of tension only the military had the discipline and the structure to foster unity. He also understood that such an endeavor could not be realized without the political and strategic vision that, in his mind, de Gaulle was able to promote.²⁴

Juin's appreciation of his role needs to be highlighted, for it exemplifies the clear delineation between the strategic and operational levels of war. In his view, Giraud's sole focus on military victory prevented him from understanding the strategic picture and especially the

position of France among the Allies. Giraud would have agreed to anything, even on relinquishing his own autonomy, as long as he was given the material means to fight. De Gaulle, who was very picky on any national matter, had in contrast embraced a larger view and measured any decision by the yardstick of reestablishing France as an independent and sovereign nation.²⁵

For Juin, the gap between the approaches of de Gaulle and Giraud constituted the main difference between a statesman and a soldier. He felt both personalities could well have complemented each other, had their characters not been so incompatible. Juin's insistence on demanding a clear national chain of command, which resulted in him sending a letter of resignation to both generals in July 1943, showed his desire for an "authentically French" war effort policy.²⁶ Juin's sound understanding of the dynamics between the strategic and operational levels proved critical to his effectiveness within the coalition. As he was to play a prominent role in the upcoming fight, he clearly understood his role as an essential link between sometimes diverging interests.²⁷ Viewed macroscopically, General Alphonse Juin was the right person, at the right place and at the right time to take operational command of the newly formed FEC.

General Juin enjoyed a special relationship with de Gaulle and that relationship played a key role in the months ahead. Both were graduates from the same class at Saint-Cyr military academy. They knew and appreciated the value of each other. Juin as a General of the Army outranked de Gaulle who was only a Brigadier General. However, the subject of military seniority was never an issue between the two. De Gaulle held Juin in high esteem, even though they made different choices in 1940. Juin would later write that de Gaulle's dissent in 1940 constituted an exception in the long French military tradition of obedience. De Gaulle was already engaged in politics whereas Juin would remain a soldier in the full meaning of the

term.²⁸ The operational ability of Juin was for that matter no secret to de Gaulle. He considered him to be the most capable French officer in North Africa and as such, the most able to achieve unity.²⁹ Since Giraud had not shown any interest or skill in political matters, Juin acknowledged that de Gaulle embodied the political power France needed and to which he owed obedience.³⁰

When Juin officially assumed command of the FEC on 18 May 1943, the French political climate was still very tense. A compromise was found to reconcile the Gaullists and Giraudists factions, with the creation on 3 June 1943 of the French Committee for National Liberation (FCNL), co-chaired by de Gaulle and Giraud.³¹ In addition to the French national issues, the FEC's preparation "took place at a time of two great debates among the Allies that vitally affected [Juin's] work, but in which he personally had no say."³² First, the strategic decisions regarding the upcoming operations in Italy were a purely Anglo-American issue and France never took part in the debate. Second, the critical issue – at least for the French- of how the FEC would be employed appeared of secondary importance to the Allies. Juin had to deal with this frustration, and he understood that changing anything in that process would require a great deal of patience and diplomacy.³³

The rearmament and training program of the FEC was Juin's primary concern. Unfortunately, the program became an increasingly political one due to de Gaulle's irritating nature. By October 1943, de Gaulle took the upper-hand in his contest against Giraud for assuming the political direction of France. De Gaulle assumed the presidency of the FCNL, and left Giraud with the honorific title of Commander in Chief. Still worried by what he incorrectly believed was de Gaulle's desire for a dictatorship in France, President Roosevelt assumed that the de Gaulle would use the rearmed French forces for his own political gains. In de Gaulle's view, the newly equipped units had to be preserved for the liberation of mainland France. The

commitment of the FEC in Italy, still considered as a secondary theater of operation, was at that point almost contradictory to de Gaulle's aim. However, the American equipping and training of the FEC effectively removed the decision of their commitment from de Gaulle's hands.

Juin thus found himself in a paradoxical situation. The equipment and training program boosted the morale of his men, but at the same time it created a state of dependency that ran counter to the overall national, political goal. This delicate position was worsened by what was perceived as arrogance by the French leaders. As an example, during his preparatory visit to the Fifth Army in Italy, General Giraud commented to General Mark Clark that his command post was too far away from the front-line. He argued that during World War I and during the campaign in 1940, he was never further than one or two miles from the forward line of his own troops. An annoyed General Clark replied: "Yes, General [...] as I recall, you were taken prisoner on both of those occasions."³⁴ The French were definitely not in a position to give lessons to their Allies.

A Step by Step Strategy to Gain Confidence, the Challenges of Coalition Warfare
(25 November 1943- April 1944):

The circumstances of Juin's arrival in Naples on 25 November 1943 symbolized the limited consideration the Allies gave to France at that time. No staff delegation of the US Fifth Army was waiting for him at the airfield.³⁵ Yet, months later, Juin and his FEC would play a critical role in the operational design of the last drive on Rome and arouse the admiration of the Allied commanders. What happened over the course of this five month period exemplifies Juin's understanding of the dynamics of the coalition in Italy. Juin had to be patient and he was confident that, "step by step", he would play a greater role within the XV Army Corps, encompassing the Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army. (See Order of Battle in Appendix B.)

He understood that matters of prestige were paramount within the coalition, but he made the choice not to unduly focus on issues of etiquette that were of no importance in comparison to the overall goal of reestablishing France's credibility. Juin was senior to and outranked Clark. He however fully recognized Clark's authority and reverted to a lower rank, feeling that a French general portraying himself as an Army commander would be ill-perceived amongst the Allies. The same consideration also led on 27 November 1943 to the official naming of the French forces as French Expeditionary Corps instead of French First Army.³⁶

As the FEC became more of a presence in the Italian theater of operations, there was still some doubt over the combat effectiveness of French troops. The clouds caused by the events of 1940 were still in the air. Furthermore, Juin's FEC was primarily composed of Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian divisions. "*Les Africains*", as they were nicknamed, were considered as elite within the French Army.³⁷ In the eyes of the Allies, however, the value of these colonial troops had not yet been proved outside of their North African garrisons. In addition, an overall prejudice with regards to the value of native Berber and Arab troops still existed on behalf of their Americans and British counterparts.³⁸ As a result, Juin issued clear guidance with regards to the behavior of his troops, insisting they had to be impeccably dressed and showing the best frame of mind.³⁹

Juin was confident in the military value of the FEC. His greatest fear was actually to see his corps committed piecemeal as reinforcements, leaving him the role of an advisor to the Fifth Army staff. In his mind, such a scenario was still envisioned by General Mark Clark at that time.⁴⁰ In addition to impugning French pride, Juin felt such an option would limit his corps effectiveness. Juin was a master in mountain warfare and the rugged terrain in Italy was not really different from the area he had successfully fought in as a young captain during the 1925

Rif Campaign in Morocco.⁴¹ He believed that his troops were perfectly fit for the type of combat they would face and thus decided to adopt a “low profile” attitude until the demonstration of the quality of the French corps was made. He then would be able to earn a specific niche -“un *créneau operationnel*”- for the FEC, thus showing France was back in the fight as a worthy ally. To that end, Juin’s order of the day, dated 25 November 1943, was crystal clear:

In the coming day France that is fighting and France that is suffering, in a word, France, and our Allies, have their eyes fixed on the little French Army in Italy and its first battles. Be worthy of the glorious mission of salvation confided to you!⁴²

Whether General Clark actually had a strong negative prejudice against the French units is a matter of speculation. Neither he nor Juin emphasized the issue in their respective memoirs. More likely, Clark was indifferent. As with most of his fellow officers, Clark probably valued success more than anything else and after all, the French were still the losers of 1940.⁴³ Clark, however, initially considered Juin as a “weakling”, for one of their first meetings took place in the immediate aftermath of *Operation Torch*. At that time, Juin had the difficult task of preserving the French forces’ cohesion, as he was waiting for clear orders from Vichy regarding his conduct towards the American forces. Juin’s firmness of character and resolve did not appear to General Clark, and in his eagerness he made a hasty initial judgment he would later consider a mistake.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, Clark was now more than willing to facilitate the integration of his French reinforcements. Juin actually never bore a grudge against Clark for the Naples airfield “incident”. It simply reinforced his conviction that the FEC would have to work hard to emerge from obscurity. At that time, the French troops were a more than welcomed reinforcement for the Fifth Army’s seasoned troops. Clark was pushing for the first FEC units to arrive as early as possible in theater. He placed a priority on the arrival of the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division (DIM), under command of General Dody because of its high state of combat readiness. The 3rd

Algerian Infantry Division (DIA), under the command of General de Monsabert, was to follow the 2nd DIM to Italy by the end of December 1943.⁴⁵

After costly initial gains, when the Allies reached the “Winter Line” south of Monte Cassino, they encountered an even stronger enemy resistance (see Map 1 and 2 in Appendix A). General Clark was looking to husband the combat power of his army in order to attempt a decisive breakthrough in the German defensive line. The fresh French troops of the FEC provided him with that opportunity. He was provided a useful tactical tool, but that did not mean he would yet take into consideration Juin’s view on how to conduct the battle. Instead, Clark emphasized the interoperability issues that the introduction of a new foreign unit in his army would generate.⁴⁶ Interestingly enough, Juin recalls in his memoirs how his first visits to the 2nd DIM, as the division reinforced General Lucas’ VI Corps, did not seem welcomed. It appeared to him that, by and large, Americans leaders did not appreciate seeing a French general interfering with their conduct of operations. General Juin acknowledged that Lucas’ reaction was legitimate, and that in similar circumstances, the French behavior would have been exactly the same.⁴⁷

On 1 December 1943, the 2nd DIM was the first element of the FEC to be committed in the Italian Theater. The division relieved in place an exhausted US 34th Infantry Division and took its position in one of the most difficult portions of the area of operations. By 11 December 1943, the 2nd DIM held the line in the Mainarde ridge area. The division was soon to seize Monte Pantano, a key piece of terrain overlooking the Mignano Gap, where the US 45th Infantry Division was engaged in a fierce fight (see map 3 in appendix A.) During three weeks, the 2nd DIM spearheaded violent assaults into forbidding terrain and in bad weather. The results were meager in terms of geographical gains and the casualty rates severe (see map 4 in Appendix A and casualties’ figures in Appendix D). The French troops had however gained confidence, as

they inflicted harsh blows on the Germans. More importantly, they also gained the respect of their American allies for their bravery in combat.

The first consequence of the 2nd DIM's accomplishments was the commitment to the frontline of the FEC as a whole. Even before the 3rd DIA was fully deployed in Italy, General Clark ordered the FEC to relieve the US VI Corps on the line. Thus, on 3 January 1944, General Juin officially assumed command of the most eastern sector in the Fifth Army's area of operations between the US 2nd Corps and the British Eighth Army. Despite the symbolic aspect of the French making the junction between Americans and British, Juin was not yet in a position to influence the operational design of the upcoming winter offensive against the Gustav Line. At least he had an opportunity to demonstrate his skills in mountain warfare, which eventually proved critical in the conduct of the campaign.

While this first combat victory was being earned, a new clash occurred between Giraud and de Gaulle that directly impacted the conduct of the campaign in Italy. The issue was over which French division would be next to reinforce the Fifth Army. De Gaulle was pushing to send the 1st Free French Division, which was still equipped with British equipment. Giraud instead proposed sending the 9th Colonial Infantry Division (DIC), which had been rearmed according to the American model after the Anfa Agreement. Although Commander in Chief, Giraud had no authority to make such a decision, for it was the responsibility of the committee chaired by de Gaulle. Besides the delay that reequipping a new division to American standards would generate, the issue of whom the Allies had to deal with was at stake again.⁴⁸

On 16 December 1943, a decree passed that granted the French National Defense Committee overall authority regarding the prosecution of the war. This decree was a significant move since it reasserted the French state's authority over its military. It also meant that the Anfa

Agreement, which had originally been conceived as a personal deal between President Roosevelt and Giraud, was now to be dealt directly with the French legitimate authority, specifically General de Gaulle. This decision finally resolved the de Gaulle/Giraud debate in favor of the more politically savvy de Gaulle.

For General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was still in charge of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations at that time, these matters were crucial ones. The French divisions, as they were proving their value, were needed for the operations in Italy and he had neither time nor inclination to suffer French quibbling. Having shown his determination and having won a position of preeminent power, de Gaulle demonstrated a deep comprehension of the planning issues Eisenhower faced, and proved to be an effective counterpart. On 30 December 1943, Eisenhower, in spite of any official statement from his government, said to de Gaulle: "I have to tell you in fact, I will not recognize any other authority in France than yours."⁴⁹ Giraud being effectively set aside, the clear chain of command that General Juin called for was now in place.

Meanwhile, Juin had drawn some conclusions on the planning and the execution of the operations within the Fifth Army. He appreciated Clark's command style of not being overly directive and leaving the details of execution to his subordinates. He however noticed that the tactical schemes envisioned by Fifth Army took little account of the difficulty of operations in mountainous terrain.⁵⁰ General Juin doubted of the victorious outcome of the planned "head on assault" directed on the stronghold of Monte Cassino. In his mind, the Allied tactics and material strength that had granted victory in Libya could not be successfully applied in Italy. The mountain ranges of southern Italy were a formidable obstacle for the American and British armored divisions and prevented them from being properly deployed in such terrain.

For Juin, the only viable course of action was a breakthrough in the less accessible and therefore less defended portions of the terrain, followed by a wide envelopment of the Gustav Line. He thought the enemy defensive system could not be broken by uncoordinated frontal assaults. Field Marshall Kesselring, the German Tenth Army commander, had the advantage of being able to commit his reserve whenever the situation on the frontline required due to his interior lines of communications. With regards to the winter offensive plan, General Juin insisted that the Atina Region, in the depth of the French sector, was the key node in the enemy's interior lines and that it should constitute a primary objective. He tried to make his point to General Clark, but no change would be made to the plan.⁵¹ The FEC was a supporting effort to the Fifth Army's main effort in the Liri Valley, the causeway to Rome. The FEC was to seize the heights of Monte Majo, Costa San Pietro and Mona Casale in order to draw away the German reserves on the northern flanks of Monte Cassino. These actions had to be coordinated with the main effort towards Monte Cassino's stronghold and the amphibious assault on Anzio, which was planned for 22 January 1944.

The winter offensive against the Gustav Line was a strenuous one. The hopes of a decisive breakthrough towards Rome vanished after the failure to exploit the successful landings at Anzio. As the FEC covered the right flank of the Fifth Army, little progress was made in the Liri Valley, and Monte Cassino became a symbol of heroic resistance for Nazi propaganda.⁵² From January to March 1944, three assaults were launched against Monte Cassino. None of them proved successful. Despite the setbacks to the campaign, during this period Juin continued to forge his own reputation as a reliable commander and the FEC's reputation was enhanced as well.

The fight for “le Belvédère” from 25 January to 4 February 1944 exemplified the fighting spirit of the men under General Juin’s leadership. The FEC’s mission was to seize the Belvédère Heights in order to cover a renewed assault by the US 34th Infantry Division against Monte Cassino (see Maps 5, 6 and 7 in Appendix A). British troops gained a narrow bridgehead on the Garigliano River to the west of the Fifth Army’s area of operation. The FEC envelopment of the ridges North of Monte Cassino’s would create a double pincher around Monte Cassino and relieve some pressure off the main effort. In other circumstances, given the nature of the terrain to be conquered, Juin confessed he would have considered the task unfeasible. He thought he would sacrifice his troops in an “outflanking movement conducted at rifle range”.⁵³

In spite of Juin’s doubts on the soundness of the maneuver, executing the plan was both a matter of honor and loyalty towards General Clark, whom Juin felt was deeply concerned about the situation in the Liri Valley.⁵⁴ By executing the attack despite his reservations, Juin earned the confidence and the admiration of General Clark. Between the two men, from this moment on, there was more than a professional relationship tainted with political considerations and prejudice. There was now a true friendship between peers, founded in mutual respect. The Belvédère would be the scene of some of the fiercest fighting in the whole Italian campaign and constituted one of the pivotal moments of the French participation.

As the winter offensive came to an end and after the fruitless bombing of the Monte Cassino monastery on 15 March 1944, Juin saw in the Allies’ failure a validation of his own ideas on how the battle should be conducted. He also saw it as a sad demonstration of the Allies’ overreliance on firepower and numerical superiority. On one hand, General Clark was increasingly engaged in a competition against his British counterpart. He had considered the bombing of Monte Cassino a terrific blunder and as the stalemate continued he was bending

towards Juin's view.⁵⁵ On the other hand, Juin himself reached the point where he would not accept future plans that contradicted his conceptions.⁵⁶

Part III: The French Expeditionary Corps' Useless Victories?

"France Wins the Diadem" (11 May 1944- 22 July 1944):⁵⁷

As the preparations for a renewed spring offensive started, Juin felt it was time for him to play his hand. In order to mass forces on a much narrower front Lord Alexander, commanding the 15th Army Group in Italy, ordered a complete reorganization of the Allied forces. The FEC was once again deployed in the junction between the British Eighth Army and the US Fifth Army. This time, the FEC was south of Monte Cassino with its most advanced elements occupying the narrow bridgehead north of the Garigliano River.

After his first reconnaissance in this new area of operations and without waiting for the upper echelon's guidance, Juin ordered his staff to work on a plan to break through the supposedly impassable terrain of the Aurunci Mountains. This time, he would seize the initiative and put forth a plan of his own based on his sound tactical judgment, his *coup d'oeil*, that undoubtedly differentiated him from the average commander.⁵⁸

His memorandum regarding the "future operations of the FEC in the Aurunci Mountains" dated 4 April 1944, provided the basis for the Fifth Army plan. Initially, General Clark's plan was to give to the FEC a limited role in the breakthrough, leaving the US II Corps in charge of the most prestigious task of conducting the last drive towards Rome. When Brigadier General Brann, Clark's chief of operations, briefed the initial scheme of maneuver to the Frenchman, he was surprised by Juin's firm opposition to the American's initial concept of operations. He was also "shaken" by the boldness of Juin's scheme of maneuver, for it envisioned a penetration in an area that many, on both sides, considered as unsuitable for offensive operations.⁵⁹ If Alexander

was still dubious over the French chances of success, Clark was more confident, for he now had a much clearer idea of the skills of Juin's soldiers in mountain warfare.⁶⁰ If Juin succeeded, it would also open the road to Rome for the Fifth Army and there is little doubt that this prospect was dear to Clark.⁶¹

Eventually, "the obstinate Frenchman was allowed to have his way."⁶² After more than five months of uninterrupted operational engagement, Juin's position within the coalition had indeed changed. He was now credible and no one could challenge his ability as a commander. Furthermore, the FEC had grown to four divisions. The 4th Moroccan Mountain Division and the 1st Motorized Infantry Division (DMI), formerly known as the 1st Free French Division, finally reached the Italian theater in late March 1944. In addition to the growing numerical involvement in Italy, the 1st DMI was a strong symbol of the reunited French forces and the first example of *Armée d'Afrique* and former Gaullist formations fighting under the same command.

On 11 May 1944 the spring offensive, codename *Diadem*, was launched. The "battle of the Garigliano", as it is known in French military history, was the crowning achievement of Juin's leadership and of the overall recovery process of the French forces (see map 8 to 10 in appendix A). Juin's patience and determination finally paid off. In his orders, he emphasized the importance of speed and boldness, which in his mind, lacked in all the previous offensives. By 13 May 1944, the breakthrough was achieved. The Gustav Line, which stalemated the Allies since late December 1943, collapsed. The events entirely vindicated Juin's views for the plan was executed almost exactly as he had envisioned. On 5 June 1944, General Clark entered Rome, the first European capital city to be liberated during World War II.⁶³

Back in Algiers, Juin's success was quickly exploited at the political level. In de Gaulle's view, French military successes were an instrument of policy. As such, the role the FEC took in

the battle for Rome helped him reinforce his legitimacy. As he learned of the French successes in Italy, de Gaulle proclaimed the French National Liberation Committee's name would be changed to the Provisional Government of the French Republic.⁶⁴ This was a shrewd political move. De Gaulle believed that, after the success in Italy, he could not be marginalized anymore by the United States and Britain. With the invasion of mainland France getting closer, he would be able to impose himself as a legitimate authority. In his memoirs, de Gaulle would describe, without specifically mentioning it, the critical role played by the FEC and how it complemented his own objectives as a political leader:

Military valor, virtue of arms, service and suffering of the soldiers – without these no country can stand upright or struggle to its feet. Our race has always been able to furnish such riches in abundance. But there must be a national soul, a will, an action, which to say a policy.⁶⁵

Beyond the Bitter End, an Appraisal of Juin's Legacy:

After the great success of *Operation Diadem* against Monte Cassino and the liberation of Rome on 5 June 1944, the campaign in Italy continued but was overshadowed by the beginning of operations in Northern Europe. The end of the campaign was a bitter one for General Juin, even though his position within the 15th Army Group was now fully cemented. After eight months in operations his FEC would be disbanded to constitute the core of the French First Army that was to take part to *Operation Anvil*, the invasion of southern France.

De Gaulle had made no secret of his intention of preserving French forces for the liberation of mainland France. Juin reasoned in military terms, de Gaulle reasoned in political ones. This might have been the greatest point of discontent between Juin and his classmate from Saint-Cyr with regards to the Italian Campaign. Juin thought the victory in Italy should be exploited towards central Europe. As he explained in a personal letter to de Gaulle, maintaining the momentum of the Allied forces in Italy would, in his mind, achieve greater results than

Operation Anvil and might well shorten the war. He thus warned that the whole campaign would be remembered a “useless victory”. Juin, however, remained in strict obedience to the political power that de Gaulle was now wielding.⁶⁶

The seizure of Sienna and the ceremony organized there to honor the FEC on Bastille Day 1944 would be the last significant event of Juin’s leadership. This ceremony along with the awards Juin received, most notably the Distinguished Service Medal, told a lot about his achievements. He reestablished the honor of the French military and regained their credibility as an ally able to bring a significant contribution to the war effort. Hence, in contrast with Juin’s own assessment of the Italian Campaign, and also in contrast with de Gaulle’s elusiveness on the topic, it is more than fitting to remember Juin’s significant role in France’s recovery process.

In spite of the anticlimactic ending, Juin’s experience in Italy provides enduring lessons on leadership at the operational level of war, and on the particular skills required in coalition warfare. First and foremost, Juin considered himself as a soldier and would, in all circumstances, remain faithful to the principle of obedience to the legitimate political authority. In so doing, he effectively played a buffer role between the strategic and the tactical levels of war. Given France’s situation in 1943-44, such a proper understanding was critical to foster unity and to avoid further internecine struggles between Frenchmen. Without the initial steps towards unity taken by Juin in North Africa and Italy, the participation of French forces in the liberation of their country would probably have been more chaotic.

Another aspect of Juin’s achievement lies in his sound comprehension of the dynamics of a coalition. The golden rules of humility and determination he applied to himself when joining the Allied forces in Italy are still relevant today. The current United States joint doctrine on Multinational Operations, Joint Publication 3-16 (JP 3-16), actually emphasizes the importance

of respect, rapport, mutual knowledge and patience in dealing with military partners.⁶⁷ Juin's case study gives credit to these tenets of multinational operations. However, whereas JP 3-16 addresses the issues of coalition warfare from a leading nation's perspective, Juin's experience provides a vivid example of their application from a contributing nation's perspective.

Even with a common enemy, France and its Allies indeed did not consider the commitment of French troops in Italy from the same standpoint. This gap between the perspectives of the nations forming a coalition has to be remembered as a key feature of any multinational endeavor, for there are always peculiar national goals behind the overall objective of a coalition.⁶⁸ For France, the primary objective was to recover from the wounded honor of 1940 and to reaffirm its sovereignty by taking a decisive part in the liberation of its territory. For the United States and the United Kingdom, the commitment of French troops was a way of sharing the burden of the war effort.

In this regard, given the diverging views between France and its Allies, the personal relationship that General Clark and General Juin were able to build was pivotal to the effectiveness of the whole Fifth Army. Certainly, General Clark had to be patient to fully benefit from the Frenchman's contribution. On the other hand, Juin had to demonstrate a great deal of humility to cope with his subordinate position within the coalition. Their relationship was built over time and Clark would later confess how he completely changed his mind about Juin. "How could I explain he had become one of my best friends?" he wrote in his memoirs.⁶⁹ In retrospect, Juin's humility, which contrasts starkly with de Gaulle and Giraud's arrogance, appears as his greatest virtue. Juin's unmatched skills as an operational commander were indeed largely backed up by his tact and perseverance in dealing with his Allied counterparts (see letter from General M. Clark in Appendix D). As such, he would be regarded by his American colleagues as "the

most efficient and able of all the French Generals who actually commanded Allied troops in combat during the war.”⁷⁰ Not only did Juin restore the French prestige in the eyes of the Allies, but he also inaugurated a new era of the French-American military relationships.

Juin’s initial positioning within the coalition was an uncomfortable one. He was the first to really experience, as a military leader at the operational level of war, the consequences of the protracted humiliation France had undergone between 1940 and 1943. Prior to those fateful days of June 1940, the French military had been perceived as one of the most powerful organizations among the western nations. Less than thirty years earlier, officers like him had equipped and trained American troops as they arrived in France in 1918. Juin himself had shortly been posted to the “*Mission militaire française près de l’Armée Américaine*” at the end of World War I. As such, he was in charge of training the AEF’s liaison teams to the French units.⁷¹ The situation was now completely reversed. Juin, who had always demonstrated the utmost fighting spirit, as he joined the Fifth Army in Italy, found himself in the position of a second-string military leader.

This must have been a traumatizing experience to him but it also amplified his will to fight, for the honor of France was at stake. The moral factor indeed played a critical role in the FEC’s effectiveness during the campaign. The contribution of the FEC to the overall campaign, in an area of operation of its own, demonstrating its cohesion under French command, acted as a force multiplier. By granting to the French a role they considered worthy, General Clark not only served the Allied cause but also the French national interest. Juin and his FEC could not change the course of history and miraculously blot out the consequences of the defeat of 1940 but their actions undoubtedly helped France to “struggle to his feet.”

CONCLUSION

The first decisive steps to reintegrate the French forces among the Allies were taken in Italy. General Juin's operational achievements were instrumental in the process of reestablishing France as a credible ally. A successful French commitment in the Italian Campaign was a prerequisite for General de Gaulle to allow France to come back around the table and to have a word in the fight that lay ahead, especially in the liberation of mainland France. The French participation in the Italian Theater of Operations exemplifies how military achievements can be a powerful leverage in support of a policy. There are many seminal lessons to be drawn from Juin's command of the FEC, first with regards to the dynamics of a coalition but also with regards to the peculiarities of the French-American military cooperation. Interestingly enough, parallels can be drawn between the Italian Campaign and most recent military operations involving French troops under American leadership. During Operation Desert Storm, like today in Afghanistan, France has insisted on acting in an area of operations of its own. This characteristic of French military commitments, which has sometimes been perceived as a reluctance to act under the United States shadow, rather exemplifies France's enduring concern for independence and sovereignty.⁷²

Taking an historical perspective on the issue helps understand how this specific feature of the French modern history and foreign policy has emerged. In the present case, General de Gaulle's legacy, and his "*certaine idée de la France*" is often remembered with mixed feelings; especially in the United States. For military officers, French and American alike, General Juin's experience, however, provides relevant insight on how political and military objectives are being conciliated at the operational level of war. The history of the FEC within the Fifth Army constitutes an important, but often ignored, chapter of the historical French-American alliance.

Today, with the prospect of a “long war”, Juin’s experience has to be kept in mind, for the temptation of expedient solutions are often more attractive than the protracted effort and the patience required in strengthening alliances and building effective coalitions.

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
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
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
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Appendix A – Maps


Source: Clark Mark W. (General), *History of the Fifth Army. Part I to*










MAP NO. 4
GAINS of the WINTER LINE CAMPAIGN
 ——— line of 15 Nov 1943
 - - - - line of 15 Jan 1944
SCALE
 MILES
 2 1 0 1 2





MAP NO 6
 ALLIED STRATEGY
 in ITALY.
 January 1944
 SCALE
 MILES
 0 10 20 30







MAP NO. 8
FIFTH ARMY
PLAN OF ATTACK

YARDS 1000 0 1 2 3
MILES 0 1 2 3

[Symbol] PHASE I
 [Symbol] PHASE II
 [Symbol] PHASE III





MAP NO. 11
 ADVANCE OF FIFTH ARMY
 29 May 1944
 Scale: 1:50,000
 Legend:
 - - - - - German Positions
 - - - - - German Units
 - - - - - German Weapons
 - - - - - German Troops
 - - - - - German Equipment
 - - - - - German Supplies
 - - - - - German Communications
 - - - - - German Transport
 - - - - - German Logistics
 - - - - - German Intelligence
 - - - - - German Reconnaissance
 - - - - - German Security
 - - - - - German Defense
 - - - - - German Attack
 - - - - - German Retreat
 - - - - - German Evacuation
 - - - - - German Surrender
 - - - - - German Capture
 - - - - - German Destruction
 - - - - - German Abandonment
 - - - - - German Relinquishment
 - - - - - German Surrender
 - - - - - German Capture
 - - - - - German Destruction
 - - - - - German Abandonment
 - - - - - German Relinquishment

Appendix B

Source: *The Allied Armies in Italy from 3rd September, 1943 to 12th December, 1944*. A supplement to the London Gazette of Tuesday 6th June 1950.

Order of Battle for 15th Army Group, 11th May 1944

(General Sir Harold Alexander)

FIFTH (U.S.) ARMY (General Mark Clark)

HQ IV (U.S.) Corps	909 Parachute Battalion
36 (U.S.) Infantry Division	

II (US) Corps (Garigliano sector)

85 (U.S.) Division	88 (U.S) Division
I Armored Group	

VI (U.S.) Corps (Anzio Beachhead)

3 Infantry Division	I Special Service Force
34 Infantry Division	I (Br.) Infantry Division
45 Infantry Division	5(Br.) Infantry Division
I (U.S.) Armored Division	

French Expeditionary Corps (Aurunci Mountains sector)

I Motorized Infantry Division	I Group Tabor
2 Moroccan Infantry Division	3 Group Tabor
3 Algerian Infantry Division	4 Group Tabor
4 Moroccan Mountain Division	2 Armored Group

EIGHT ARMY (General Oliver Leese)

10 (Br.) Corps (Apenine sector)

2 New Zealand Division	Hermon Force (King's Detachment Guard, 12 L.)
12 South African Motorized Brigade	Italian Motorized Group
24 (Br.) Guards Brigade	II Canadian. Infantry Brigade Group
2 (Br.) Parachute Brigade	

13 (Br.) Corps (Cassino and River Rapido sector)

6 (Br.) Armored Division	78 (Br.) Infantry Division
4 (Br.) Infantry Division	8 (Ind) Infantry Division
I (Br.) Guards Brigade	I Cdn. Armored Brigade

I Canadian Corps

5 Canadian Armored Division	25 Tank Brigade
I Canadian Infantry Division	

2 Polish Corps (Took over Monte Cassino sector 27th April)

3 Carpatian Infantry Division
5 Kresowan Infantry Division
2 Polish Armored Brigade

Appendix C – Biographies

Alphonse, Pierre Juin. Marshal of France



Alphonse Juin was born in Bône, in French Algeria, on 16 December 1888. Son of a Gendarme¹, Victor Juin, he grew up in a modest middle class family. Due to his father tempered and disciplined character, Alphonse Juin developed a strong sense of duty and integrity. At the age of 21, he enlisted in the French Army and one year later he passed the entrance exam to the *École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr*, the French military academy. During his time at Saint-Cyr, Juin developed a strong bond with Charles de Gaulle, one of his classmates. In 1912, he graduated first of his class. Regardless their future disagreements especially on the Algerian independence of 1962, Juin was always “*tu*” to de Gaulle, whereas other famous French officers, such as de Lattre de Tassigny, remained “*vous*”. After graduation Juin chose to serve in North Africa and joined the *Premier Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens* as a young lieutenant.

In 1914, Juin was commanding his native Algerian troops campaigning in Morocco. When World War I broke out, he was sent with his unit to the Western Front in France. On 15 March 1915, during the battle of *Pertes-Les-Hurlus*, he was gravely wounded. As a result of this wound, he lost the use of his right arm and henceforth used to salute with his valid left hand. After recovering from his injury in Morocco, he asked to return to the front line and refused staff assignments, for he considered his duty to lead troops into battle. From December 1916 to July 1918, he took part in the fiercest battles of the Western Front with Moroccan native soldiers. By the end of the war, he was briefly assigned as liaison officer to the American Expeditionary Force.

After the war, Juin was selected to attend the *École de Guerre* in Paris. Having successfully completed this important phase of his military education, he chose to serve in Africa again. Consequently, he served directly under some of the most famous French officers of his time: Lyautey, Pétain and Giraud. By 1925, he participated in the Rif War, the pacification campaign against Abd-El-Krim’s insurgency. During these years of fighting in the difficult terrain of Morocco, while commanding native Moroccan troops, he developed a mastery of mountain warfare. This specific skill, along with his deep insight on commanding North African troops, would later prove critical in his conduct of the operations in Italy.

On 26 December 1938, Juin was promoted Brigadier General. He took command of the 15th Motorized Infantry Division, one of the best in the French Army at that time, on 4 December 1939. During the fateful days of June 1940, he conducted successful defensive operations against German “panzer” units in the vicinity of Gembloux, Belgium. His division effectively delayed the Germans, but was ultimately encircled at Lille, France. Juin was captured and held in captivity in Germany. The time he spent in captivity was one of the most difficult of his life. In his mind, the French defeat was the direct consequence of the lack of offensive spirit and of the overall failure of the French military leadership to evolve.

¹ The *Gendarmerie* is a French military force charged with police duties.

Upon request of the Vichy Government, he was ultimately released from custody on 15 June 1941. He then took command of the French Land and Air Forces in North Africa. During that time, in violation of the 1940 armistice, Juin continued to implement a secret policy of equipping and training French troops with a view to resume the fight against Nazi Germany. Although he was completely unaware of Operation Torch, the invasion of Algeria and Morocco by British and American forces in November 1942 ultimately provided him with an opportunity to join the Allies. On 11 November 1942, in contradiction to the orders received from Vichy, he ordered all French troops under his command to allow the Allied landings.

Henceforth Juin worked relentlessly to preserve the unity of the French military and to restore the French military's pride. He took part in the 1942-1943 Tunisian campaign as the commander of the French forces. However, the campaign in Italy constituted Juin's greatest military achievement. As commander of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC), he was subordinate to General Mark Clark, commanding the US Fifth Army. Juin's expertise in mountain warfare proved critical to the Allies campaign in the Italian Peninsula. Juin's great tactical and operational skills were fully demonstrated during Operation Diadem, the last battle for Rome from May to June 1944. Juin's insight, perseverance, and character earned him the respect and admiration of peers and commanders alike. He consistently worked to demonstrate that French military virtues had not vanished with the defeat of 1940. He proved, for instance, extremely firm discipline, especially when the Moroccan *Goumiers* were accused of raping and pillaging.

As the FEC was disbanded to create the core of the First French Army under General de Lattre de Tassigny, Juin was appointed Chief of Staff of the French forces and represented France at the San Francisco Conference. After World War II, he returned to North Africa as the Resident General in Morocco. Juin also served at senior positions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and assumed command of Central Army Group Europe (CENTAG) until 1956. On Bastille Day 1952, Juin was promoted to Marshal of France. Additionally, he was elected a member of the *Académie Française*,² in recognition of his talent as a writer.

Juin retired in 1962, deeply affected by de Gaulle's decision to grant independence to Algeria. Although he made his view of French Algeria public, Juin never abandoned his commitment to discipline and obedience. Alphonse Juin was French Army's last Marshal of France to die while holding the title. His last words on 27 January 1967 were for his fallen brothers in arms of the Italian campaign, as he whispered "*Garigliano...Cassino, que c'est beau...*" Marshal Juin is buried at *Les Invalides* in Paris.

Sources:

- René Chambe, *le maréchal Juin, Duc du Garigliano*.
- Bernard Pujot, *Juin, Maréchal de France*.
- Anthony Clayton, *Three Marshals of France, leadership after Trauma*.

² The *Académie Française* is the pre-eminent French body on matters pertaining to the French language.

General Mark Wayne Clark



Mark Wayne Clark was born on 1 May 1896 in Madison Barracks, New-York State. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy West Point in 1917. Shortly thereafter he served in France with the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). He was wounded in action in the Vosges Mountain in Eastern France. During his convalescence, Captain Clark was transferred to the General Staff Headquarters of the First United States Army until the end of hostilities, and then served with the Third Army in Germany.

Between the wars, General Clark served in a variety of staff and training roles. From 1921 to 1924 he served as an aide in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War. He was promoted to major on 14 January 1933, more than 15 years after his promotion to captain. He graduated from the General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1935. As World War II broke out in Europe, now Lieutenant-Colonel Clark was an instructor at the Army War College in Washington, D.C. With the US entry into the war, he was promoted two grades to Brigadier General and assumed the role of Assistant Chief of Staff (G-3) at General Headquarters, United States Army.

In October 1942, Clark became Deputy Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in the North African Theater. As such, he was one of the key players in the planning and execution of Operation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa. In order to negotiate the surrender or the cooperation of the Vichy government, he executed a dramatic submarine trip to Algeria for a secret meeting with French officials.

His responsibilities expanded considerably when he was appointed commander of the US Fifth Army. As such, he thus took part in the campaign in Italy as part of the 15th Army Group, under the command of Lord Alexander, a British General officer. His Fifth Army conducted a major landing at Salerno in September 1943. As the front stalemated in Italy, Clark had an increasingly sour relationship with his British counterparts. Conversely, he established a strong friendship with General Alphonse Juin, his French subordinate. Juin considered Clark to be “clairvoyant and energetic” and appreciated his inspiring leadership. General Clark’s Italian campaign culminated with the liberation of Rome, the first liberated capital city within the Axis. The Liberation of the “eternal city” was Clark’s “great prize” after several months of frustrating campaign in the Italian peninsula’s difficult terrain.

After World War II, General Clark assumed command of U.S. troops in Austria and later in continental United States. During the Korean War, in May 1952, he took command of all United Nations troops. He held that assignment until after the armistice was signed in July 1953. General Clark retired the same year. He then served as president of The Citadel, the military college in Charleston, South Carolina, from 1954 to 1966. His writings include *Calculated Risk* (1950), an account of his experience of World War II, and *From the Danube to the Yalu* (1954). General Clark died in Charleston on 17 April 1984 two weeks before his eighty-eighth birthday.

Sources:

- Mark Blumenson, *Mark Clark, the Last of the Great World War II Commanders*.
- Britannica online

General Henri Honoré Giraud



Henri Honoré Giraud was born in Paris on 18 January 1879. He graduated from the *École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr*, the French military academy, in 1900. As a junior officer, he served in North Africa until he left for World War I in 1914. In command of native North African troops, he was seriously wounded in August 1914, during the battle of Guise. At that time, he was captured by the Germans but escaped two months later and returned to France via the Netherlands.

During the interwar years, he was transferred to Morocco. Like General Juin, he took part in the Rif pacification campaign. For his actions during the campaign, especially during the capture and surrender of Abd-El-Krim, the insurgents' leader, he was awarded the *Légion d'Honneur*, the highest French military individual award. He was promoted to Brigadier General in 1936, when he opposed then Colonel de Gaulle and his concept of decisive use of tanks in modern warfare.

When World War II began Giraud was assigned as a member of the Superior War Council. He took command of the Seventh Army when it was sent to the Netherlands on 10 May 1940. He conducted effective delaying actions against German armored division but was ultimately captured by German troops at Wassigny in the Ardennes region on 19 May 1940. He was held in custody for two years in Königstein Castle near Dresden, a place used as a prison for French senior commanders.

Eventually, Giraud successfully conducted a daring escape from Königstein. He learned German and memorized a map of the surrounding area; through various ruses, he eventually managed to reach France, where he became famous for succeeding twice in escaping from German custody. In a letter to Pétain, Giraud expressed his intention not to oppose the Vichy regime. In turn, Vichy's government stubbornly refused to return him to the Germans, and Giraud was able to live under Vichy's supervision in unoccupied southern France.

Due to his reputation, he was identified as a reliable partner by the Allies. They thus sought his support in 1942. Giraud agreed to facilitate an Allied landing in French North Africa, if only American troops were used, and if he or another French officer was the commander of the operation. The purpose for these demands was to maintain French sovereignty and authority within North Africa. Despite he did not Giraud secretly reached French North Africa via Gibraltar and met with allied authorities.

General Giraud was essential to the American strategy, as President Roosevelt was looking for a Frenchman of great stature able to assume the command of French military forces under the Allies' banner. In President's Roosevelt view, dealing with Giraud was also a way of countering de Gaulle, who was perceived as a potential dictator for France. As such, General Giraud was the primary architect of the Anfa Agreement that enabled the rearming of French forces by the United States. As France joined the Allies' side, General Giraud was competing for leadership against the more politically savvy General de Gaulle. In January 1943, at the

Casablanca Conference Giraud and de Gaulle however publicly agreed they pursued the same goal of bringing France back into the Fight. A temporary agreement was found and de Gaulle, who wanted to assume a political position, allowed Giraud to serve as commander-in-chief, for he was the more militarily qualified of the two.

De Gaulle progressively marginalized Giraud within the newly formed *Comité Français de Libération Nationale* (CFLN). Giraud's sole focus on military matters prevented him from seeing the larger political picture allowing de Gaulle to gain an advantageous position, even in the eyes of the Allies. When de Gaulle assumed presidency of the CFLN, he offered Giraud to hold the honorific position of General Inspector of the French Armed Forces. Giraud perceived de Gaulle's offer as an insult to his stature and competence. He chose instead to retire. General Giraud died in Dijon, mainland France, on 11 March 1949. He is buried at *Les Invalides* in Paris

Source:

- Official website of the *Ministère de la Défense et des anciens combattants* (French departement of Defense and of War Veterans). Available at: <http://www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr>
- Jean Christophe Notin, *Italie, 1943-1944, les victoires oubliées de la France*.
- Marcel Vigneras, *Rearming the French*.

Charles de Gaulle



Charles de Gaulle was born on 22 November 1890 in Lille in a Roman Catholic, patriotic upper-middle-class family. In 1910, he passed the entrance examination to the *École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr*, the French Military Academy, and joined the same class as General Juin. Upon graduation in 1913, as a young Second Lieutenant, he joined the 33rd infantry regiment commanded by Colonel Philippe Pétain.

During World War I, Charles de Gaulle fought at the battle of Verdun and was wounded three times. Taken prisoner by the Germans, he spent more than two years in captivity, and made five unsuccessful attempts to escape. After World War I, he entered the *École de Guerre* and was appointed in 1925 to the staff of the Supreme War Council by Marshal Pétain. He served subsequently as a member of the occupation Force in Germany. From 1929 to 1931, he served in Lebanon. In 1932, in France, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and held a staff assignment for four years at the National Defense Council.

Between the two World Wars, de Gaulle proved to be a very prolific writer and critical thinker. He was among the first to address the issue of modernizing the French Army. His 1934 study titled *Vers l'armée de métier* (*The Army of the Future*), advocated for a small professional army, highly mechanized and mobile, in preference to the static theories exemplified by the Maginot Line. As such, de Gaulle drew some criticism from certain senior officers, especially Pétain, his former mentor. He was nevertheless promoted Colonel in 1937.

At the outbreak of World War II, de Gaulle commanded a tank brigade attached to the French Fifth Army. In May 1940, he had the opportunity to put his theories on tank warfare into practice. Described by his superiors as “an admirable, energetic, and courageous leader”, he achieved remarkable tactical success in leading armored counterattacks against the Germans. During the campaign of 1940, he temporarily assumed command of a brigade in the 4th Armored Division, and retained the rank of Brigadier General for the rest of his life.

On 6 June, he served Prime Minister Paul Reynaud as Undersecretary of State for Defense and War. When the Reynaud government was replaced 10 days later by Marshal Pétain, who intended to seek an armistice with the Germans, de Gaulle left for England. On 18 June 1940, he broadcast from London his first appeal to his fellow Frenchmen to continue the war under his leadership. Henceforth, he became known as “the man of 18 June”. On 2 August 1940, the Vichy’s regime tried and sentenced him in absentia to death, deprivation of military rank, and confiscation of property.

De Gaulle started his wartime career as a political leader under great strain. He was virtually unknown in both Britain and France and only few French had actually heard his 18 June appeal to continue the struggle against Germany. De Gaulle was however a man of conviction and his perseverance, or obstinacy in the eyes of his allied counterparts, were instrumental in the process of “struggling France to her feet”, as he later wrote in his memoirs.

After Operation Torch in November 1942, de Gaulle managed to strengthen his position and incrementally achieved international stature that he had been looking for since 1940. In 1943, he moved his headquarters to Algiers, where he became initially co-president of the *Comité Français de Libération Nationale* (CFLN) with General Giraud. De Gaulle politically outmaneuvered General Giraud and ultimately reinforced his legitimacy as France's representative among the Allies. He succeeded in embodying the French resistance or "Fighting France" as he liked to call it, in the eyes of the Allies and more importantly in the eyes of the French people.

Charles de Gaulle played a critical role in the administration of liberated France. However, in January 1946, disgusted with politics, he resigned and retreated into solitude to ponder the future of France. In 1958, at the favor of the dramatic events in Algeria, he was called back to assume the role of French President. As such, he granted independence to Algeria in 1962, a policy that Marshal Juin, his classmate from *Saint-Cyr* strongly opposed. A talented writer and spirited public speaker, a constant advocate of France's grandeur and historical role, Charles de Gaulle's ideals have deeply influenced the French foreign policy during the second half of the 20th century. In 1969, in accordance with his word, Charles de Gaulle resigned the presidency following the rejection of his proposed reform of the Senate and local governments in a nationwide referendum. De Gaulle then retired to his hometown in *Lorraine*, where he died suddenly on 9 November 1970. General de Gaulle is buried in *Colombey-les-Deux-Églises*.

Sources:

- Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle, the Rebel, 1890-1944*.
- Charles de Gaulle Foundation website : <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org>

Appendix D- Chart and document

1- Casualties of the French Expeditionary Corps at the end of the campaign in Italy:

Source: Paul Gaujac, *Le corps expéditionnaire français en Italie*.

Unit	Killed in action	Wounded in action	Missing in action	Total
Services and general reserve units	1953	6778	935	7274
Moroccan Goums	598	4386	8	2998
1 DMI	673	2066	-	2739
2 DIM	1396	6744	315	8455
3 DIA	1068	4529	679 *	6276
4 DMM	889	3389	151	4429
TOTAL	6577	23506	2088	

* Among them, 460 missing in action during the fight for le Belvédère.

2- Letter from Mark W. Clark, commanding officer of the Fifth Army to General Juin, commanding officer of the FEC:

Dear General,

It is extremely difficult for me to find the words I need to express my feelings of sadness and great personal loss at the thought of the departure of the C.E.F. and its great leader. I am losing not only the invaluable support of four of the finest divisions ever to do battle, but also the sound opinions and knowledgeable advice of a sincere and good friend.

For me, it has been a deep source of satisfaction to see how the vital part played by the French troops of the Fifth Army throughout our Italian campaign against the common enemy has been universally acknowledged. During these long months, I have had the real privilege of seeing for myself the evidence of the outstanding calibre of the French soldiers, heirs of the noblest traditions of the French Army. Nevertheless, not satisfied with this, you and all your people have added a new epic chapter to the history of France; you have gladdened the hearts of your compatriots, giving them comfort and hope as they languish under the heavy and humiliating yoke of a hated invader.

The energy and utter disregard for danger consistently shown by all members of the C.E.F., along with the outstanding professional skills of the French army officer, have aroused admiration in your Allies and fear in the enemy. From the banks of the Garigliano where your first successes set the tone which was to characterize the whole offensive, then pushing on to Rome through the mountains, crossing the Tiber and pursuing the enemy relentlessly to Sienna and to the hills dominating the valley of the Arno, France's soldiers have always accomplished everything that was possible and sometimes even that which was not.

Now, when you are leaving us, I send you my most heartfelt wishes for new successes along the road back to your great and beloved country which shows so much fortitude during these testing times.

With my deepest gratitude for the tremendous contribution that you have made to our joint victories, my dear General,

Yours with the deepest respect"

Mark W. Clark

Source: <http://www.montecassinobelvedere.com/index.php?page=Clark>

ENDNOTES

¹ Jean Christophe Notin, *La campagne d'Italie, les victoires oubliées de la France, 1943-1945* (Paris: Perrin, 2002.)

² Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle, the Rebel, 1890-1944* (New-York: Norton, 1990), 461. "Strangely enough this [the successes of the French Expeditionary Corps in Italy] did not appear of the first importance to the Author of the *memoires de guerre* (Charles de Gaulle), who has much less to say about how the conduct of Juin and his men in Italy supported and strengthened his theories than the diplomatic and psychological aspects of the matter."

³ Marcel Vigneras, *United States Army in World War II, special studies, Rearming the French* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989) 14.

⁴ Alphonse Juin (Maréchal), *Trois siècles d'obéissance militaire, 1650-1963* (Paris : L'esprit du livre éditions, 2009), Chapter VI.

⁵ Johannes Steele, *Men Behind the War: a Who's Who of our Time* (New-York: Sheridan House Publishers, 1943), 229.

⁶ Milton Viorst, *Hostile Allies, FDR and Charles de Gaulle* (New-York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), 97.

⁷ Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, 13.

⁸ *Ibid*, 36-38.

⁹ Victor Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), 83.

¹⁰ Lacouture, *De Gaulle, the Rebel*, 444-445.

¹¹ Charles de Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle* (New-York: Da Capo, 1967), 580.

¹² Notin, *Les victoires oubliées de la France*, 48.

¹³ Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, 28.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 6-12.

¹⁵ Notin, *Les victoires oubliées de la France*, 29-30.

¹⁶ Julie Le Gac. *Le corps expéditionnaire français en Italie (1943-1944) : une alliance asymétrique* (Revue Historique des armées. #258 /2010, available at : <http://rha.revues.org/index6923.html>).

¹⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁸ De Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs*, 597.

¹⁹ Martin Blumenson, *Mark Clark, the Last of the Great World War II Commanders* (New York: Cogdon and Weed, 1984), 73.

²⁰ Anthony Clayton, *Three Marshals of France, Leadership after Trauma* (London: Brassey's, 1992), 70.

²¹ Bernard Pujot. *Juin, Maréchal de France* (Paris : Albin Michel, 1988), 128-130.

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- ²² René Chambe, *Maréchal Juin, « duc du Garigliano. »* (Paris : Presses de la Cité, 1968).
- ²³ Pujo, *Juin*, 157.
- ²⁴ Alphonse Juin (Maréchal), *Mémoires, Alger, Tunis, Rome* (Nancy : Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1959), 201-202.
- ²⁵ De Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs*, 305-306.
- ²⁶ Juin, *Mémoires*, 211.
- ²⁷ Ibidem, 195-196.
- ²⁸ Juin, *Trois siècles d'obéissance militaire*, 80.
- ²⁹ De Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs*, 611.
- ³⁰ Chambe, *Maréchal Juin*, 207-208.
- ³¹ De Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs*, 426 and 438-441.
- ³² Clayton, *Three Marshals of France*. 77
- ³³ Pujo, *Juin*, 168.
- ³⁴ Mark Clark, *Calculated Risk, the Story of the War in the Mediterranean* (New-York: Harpers and Brothers Publishers, 1950), 230.
- ³⁵ Juin, *Mémoires*, 248.
- ³⁶ Notin, *Les victoires oubliées de la France*, 152.
- ³⁷ Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, *Tug of War* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), 297. It is also interesting to mention that Juin, as he graduated first of his class at Saint-Cyr, choose to serve in Algeria and joined the *1er Régiment de tirailleurs algériens*.
- ³⁸ Graham and Bidwell, *Tug of war*, 297.
- ³⁹ Chambe, *Maréchal Juin*, 255.
- ⁴⁰ Juin, *Mémoires*, 249.
- ⁴¹ Clayton, *Three Marshals of France*, 83.
- ⁴² Juin, *Mémoires*, 243-244.
- ⁴³ Graham and Bidwell, *Tug of War*, 298.
- ⁴⁴ Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 121.
- ⁴⁵ *History of the Fifth Army*, Part III, 10.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.

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- ⁴⁷ Alphonse Juin, *La campagne d'Italie* (Paris : Editions Guy Victor, 1962), 42.
- ⁴⁸ Layton Funk Arthur, *Charles de Gaulle, the Crucial Years, 1943-1944* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 209-214.
- ⁴⁹ Funk Arthur, *The Crucial Years*, 214.
- ⁵⁰ Juin, *La campagne d'Italie*, 49.
- ⁵¹ Notin, *Les victoires oubliées de la France*. 221
- ⁵² Trumbull Higgins, *Soft Underbelly* (New York: The Mac-Millan Company, 1968), 153.
- ⁵³ Juin, *Mémoires*, 269.
- ⁵⁴ Pujol, *Juin*, 173-174.
- ⁵⁵ Notin, *Les victoires oubliées de la France*, 269.
- ⁵⁶ Juin, *Mémoires*, 87.
- ⁵⁷ Graham and Bidwell, *Tug of War*.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid, 303.
- ⁵⁹ Juin Alphonse, *la campagne d'Italie*, 97.
- ⁶⁰ Higgins, *Soft Underbelly*, 161.
- ⁶¹ Clayton, *Three Marshals of France*, 84.
- ⁶² Graham and Bidwell, *Tug of War*, 304.
- ⁶³ Clark, *History of the Fifth Army*, part V. 54; "The operations of the FEC during the period 11-19 May form one of the most spectacular and most important parts of the entire drive on Rome. Large bodies of troops had been moved through terrain which the Germans deemed impassable and had arrived at their objectives in fighting condition. The Gustav Line had been broken, and the Hitler Line was so outflanked by our dominance of Mount d'Oro and our threat to Pico that it could not long remain tenable. The advance of the FEC south of the Liri was of inestimable value to the British drive up the Liri Valley, and also greatly assisted the progress of II Corps along the coast to the left. Together with II Corps the FEC had by 19 May carried out almost all the operations directed by General Clark in his Field Order No. 6."
- ⁶⁴ Harry C. Butcher, (Capt, USNR), *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New-York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 540.
- ⁶⁵ De Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs*, 611.
- ⁶⁶ Pujol, *Juin*, 205.
- ⁶⁷ Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational operations*, 07 March 2007. I-3
- ⁶⁸ Parameters, *Alliance and Coalition Warfare*. Summer 1993, pp. 74-85.
- ⁶⁹ Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 4-5.

⁷⁰ William D. Leahy, (Fleet Admiral), *I was There* (New-York: Mac Graw Hill Book Company, 1950).

⁷¹ Pujo, *Juin*, 39.

⁷² Parameters, *Alliance and Coalition Warfare*.