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The United States Special Operations Command Civil Military Engagement Program – A
Model for Military-Interagency Low Cost/Small Footprint Activities

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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
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
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ABSTRACT

Future threats to United States security vary from conventional state actors to unconventional forces, global terrorist groups, environmental challenges, and transnational criminal organizations (TCO). The threats are increasingly networked adding new dimensions of complexity that challenge the United States ability to strengthen economic and security partnerships abroad. The current United States political, economic, and social climate place an enormous burden across the elements of national power specifically the United States military. The services continue to navigate sequestration and reduced defense budgets resulting in reduced training and exercise opportunities, force restructuring, and readiness challenges. As the threats, fiscal uncertainty, and conflicts continue to grow more dynamic and complex, the United States military must identify and assess new venues by which it will remain relevant, maintain global access, affirm commitments to allies and partners, and invest in capabilities that enhance national security interests abroad. The Department of Defense (DOD) with our Unified Action Partners have and continue to explore low cost, small footprint activities. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has postured itself to lead this effort by developing innovative approaches to prepare and operate within ambiguous environments, and simultaneously build lasting partnerships with our Unified Action Partners and allies.

In his posture statement to the 113th Congress on 5 March 2013, the Commander of USSOCOM, Admiral William H. McCraven presented USSOCOM Strategy 2020. SOCOM 2020 nests its efforts in the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review. USSOCOM 2020 depicts a global Special Operations

Forces (SOF) network uniquely suited to implement guidance laid out in the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), January 2012, and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), and Chiefs of Mission (COMs). The development and implementation of SOCOM 2020 seeks to enhance global military capacity through a series of SOF networks that include the interagency, foreign allies, and partners.¹

Admiral McCraven's statement acknowledges the diverse missions and environments that the SOF network engages in on a daily basis. These include executing direct action operations, building partnership capacity, conducting security force assistance, and the difficulties associated with implementation of this strategy in the current fiscal environment, while simultaneously preserving the force and families, and developing and implementing an acquisition methodology to support global Special Operations. The posture statement specifically addresses the Civil Military Engagement (CME) program and that the activities of Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE) directly support the USSOCOM 2020 public diplomacy and interagency efforts to diminish and counter current and emerging challenges.

The CME program addresses capability gaps that exist between conventional military forces and other agencies within the United States government. The CME program bases its efforts on maintaining a persistent presence to facilitate continuous military and intergovernmental interaction, engagement with United States partner nation government entities, academia, and the non-governmental community through institutional and educational initiatives. The purpose of the CME Program is to develop

¹ Admiral William H. McCraven, Commander United States Special Operations Command Posture Statement Before 113th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 2013

relationships and familiarity with processes, terminology, and planning support as well as provide the knowledge and context to those that implement strategic options.

This thesis will demonstrate that the USSOCOM CME program is uniquely tailored to execute low cost, small footprint military activities in conjunction with Unified Action Partners and partner nation organizations to implement the Nation's Defense Strategy. The CME program serves as a model for effective United States government cooperation needed to traverse stark fiscal realities and force reductions and affirm United States ability to maintain and sustain influence through the 21st Century. Unified Action Partners (UAPs) in the terms of this paper refer to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.² The thesis does not explore individual departmental roles and responsibilities. When referring to UAPs, the intent is to view UAPs as a network of government agencies supporting the diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements of national power as they work to further United States' security goals and mutual interests across the globe. This thesis does not cover multiple stake holder capabilities within the United States elements of national power, nor will it address in detail the important and vital role that numerous Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), or allied counterparts play in our national security. It assumes that these are essential in furthering United States goals and interests. Rather it will describe the capability of the CME program in broad terms as a force

² Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1*, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), xiii.

multiplier for Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), Chiefs of Mission (COMs), Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), and the IA. The thesis will cover broad policy issues. It will not cover specific service and departmental structures and policies of organizations across the elements of national power as this would broaden the scope of this thesis. Additionally, this thesis neither agrees nor disagrees with the principles contained with past, current or proposed policies as they change over time and different administrations. Rather it seeks to reinforce existing guidance found in national strategic documents such as the NSS and DSG in the context of the future environment. The thesis will demonstrate that the USSOCOM CME program, one of many tools across a broad set of options, provides a unique capability to bridge gaps with UAPs and partner nations addressing the security challenges facing the nation

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians for their consistent dialogue on this topic and candid input. They all possess a unique understanding of topics associated with the Civil Military Engagement Program. To all my JAWS Seminar 2 counterparts, thank you for the perspectives and experiences which allowed me to think through and formulate thoughts in addressing or adding to the body of knowledge of the challenges, we as military professionals will be called upon to help solve.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the officers and Soldiers of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne), who through their tireless and selfless performance continue work to anchor our Nations security interests through the Civil Military Engagement Program. Globally deployed, often taken for granted, these men and women continue their selfless service at enormous personal sacrifice. Let us not forget the civilians and families who support them.

Most of all I would like to extend my gratitude to my wife. Throughout my career she endures and provides me unconditional support to serve, never asking anything in return. Her patience and understanding keeps me grounded to a simple maxim, “the decisions one makes commensurate with rank, has consequences for the sergeant in the trench.”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1:	1
Introduction	1
CHAPTER 2:	1
Defining The Environment.....	14
Trends.....	15
External Threats.....	18
Civil-Military Relations.....	20
Interagency.....	21
Department of Defense.....	23
Bureaucracy.....	24
CHAPTER 3:.....	29
Civil-Military Engagement Program.....	29
CHAPTER 4:.....	37
Case Studies.....	37
Vietnam.....	38
CENTCOM: CMSE-Jordan.....	41
PACOM: CMSE-Bangladesh.....	46
CHAPTER 5:.....	51
Recommendations.....	51
Education and Training.....	51
Advanced Education.....	54
Opportunities.....	55
CHAPTER 6:.....	57
Conclusion.....	57
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	59

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The nature of the security environment, political volatility, and fiscal constraints are driving the military services to adapt. The national and military strategic documents released over the last four years are driving the thinking of planners and strategists across the services to balance capabilities for the future while maintaining or even reducing costs. The National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS), National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011 (NMS), the Defense Strategic Guidance 2012 (DSG), and the United States Special Operations Command 2020 (USSOCOM) assert that the Joint force maintain defense commitments, strengthen alliances and partnerships across all regions, deter and defeat aggression, and protect the homeland, establish new global partnerships, and strengthen goals and institutions through global engagement. The 2011 NMS conveys the ways the military would advance national interests as directed by the 2010 NSS. The NMS, in conjunction with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), provides guidance, objectives, and directs the United States military to, “leverage capabilities and forward presence, and to play a supporting role in facilitating U.S. government agencies and other organizations’ efforts to advance the Nation’s interests.”¹ The 2012 DSG clarifies that building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. The DSG states, “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”² The

¹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The National Military Strategy of the United States*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2011).

² POTUS/SECDEF, *Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 2012.

USSOCOM Civil Military Engagement Program (CME) nests its efforts within these strategic documents to coordinate, plan, resource, and execute missions in support of the global Special Operations Forces (SOF) network. The USSOCOM CME program is a low cost, innovative, small footprint approach to confront challenges facing the United States. The CME program seeks to bridge capability gaps with Unified Action Partners (UAPs), allied, and partner nation activities, and can be viewed as a best practice to understanding and appreciation for the integration, synchronization, and coordination across the elements of national power to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

The USSOCOM CME program is a Program of Record (POR). A POR is a means by which the military departments develop and implement capabilities in pursuit of their missions. POR guidance is found in Department of Defense Issuance (DODI) Number 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, December 8, 2008. Subsequent revisions establish a simplified and flexible management framework for translating approved capability needs and technology opportunities, based on approved capability needs, into stable, affordable, and well-managed acquisition programs that include weapon systems, services, and automated information systems (AISs).³ The approval process for PORs varies across the services and depends on the capability a service seeks to establish. Generally, PORs reflect resource allocation decisions by a service in response and in accordance with the DSG. The POR budget review and approval process and program managers must be capable of withstanding congressional oversight, and serves as a record adhering to the laws and directives of the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process.

³ U.S. Department of Defense. *DODI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System*. Washington DC: Department of Defense, December 8, 2008.

A review of the USSOCOM CME program provides context to other military operations such as the Defense Departments stabilization operations in the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia. USSOCOM retains the responsibility to lead Defense Department efforts in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the CME Program is a Counter Terrorism Line of Effort. USSOCOM's approach to the future security environment is informed by anticipated fiscal challenges and finite resources available to meet the growing number of challenges and threats facing the United States. In an effort to address these challenges, USSOCOM directed the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade to establish platforms to enhance its global Special Operations Forces network and to bridge gaps with our Unified Action Partners. The CME program is planned and executed by the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) with the active component Special Operations Civil Affairs (CA) force. Specifically, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) conducts operations under a USSOCOM POR to address existing civil and military coordination and communication gaps within USSOCOM priority countries. USSOCOM leverages the CME Program to facilitate Special Operations Forces (SOF) counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stabilization operations globally, while simultaneously executing major combat operations in Afghanistan. The CME program provides a low cost, small footprint activity that saves manpower and money in the fiscally constrained environment.

The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade solely executes the USSOCOM CME program. From 2004 to 2010 there was discussions, debates, and studies directed by the Department of Defense and senior United States Army leadership as to whether the best placement of the CA force reside within the Conventional Force (CF) or as a Special Operations Force (SOF), in light of the fact that the majority of the United States Army's CA capability resides within the Reserve

Component (RC). The high operational tempo placed strain across both the active and reserve components. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade had dual missions; support the war effort and remain engaged globally as part of the Special Operations Forces network. The reserve component mission was to perform pivotal roles in the stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however many units had already reached deployment thresholds mandated by law. The increased demand for reserve component CA forces resulted in amalgamated training venues and organizations for mobilized reservists. The result of these circumstance brought about readiness challenges and increasing disparity of training and education standards between the active and reserve CA force. By 2005, the United States Army advocated for the active CA force remains under the Special Operations community.

Studies and cost benefit analysis through multiple staffs determined that moving the CA force organizationally did not enhance CA integration into Conventional Forces (CF) and would be detrimental to the ongoing war efforts. In October 2006, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker directed that all Army active civil affairs be administratively assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and all RC CA units be administratively assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), which would report to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC).⁴

The result of the split of Army active and reserve civil affairs force continues to generate questions as to the proper alignment of the CA force. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) made recommendations to balance the total force to achieve success in protecting and advancing the nation's interests including language that supported the expansion of CA capacity:

Ineffective governance can create areas that terrorist and insurgents can exploit. Circumstances are ripe for violent ideologies to spread among a population when governments struggle to provide basic services, justice and security, or the

⁴ Kathleen H. Hicks and Christine E. Wormuth, *The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 36.

conditions for economic opportunity. Civil affairs address these threats by serving as the vanguard of DOD's support to US government efforts to assist partner governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. Because of their linguistic and culture skills, civil affairs personnel often serve as liaison to reduce friction between our military forces and the civilian population.⁵

Throughout this period, USSOCOM directed the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade deploy teams to designated priority countries as a means to test and validate civil military engagement concept to bridge interagency gaps and assess partner nation capacity in the areas of governance, economic development, and security. Through coordination with the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), active component CA teams use their core tasks of Civil Information Management (CIM), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), Nation Assistance (NA), Population Resource Control (PRC), and Support to Civil Administration (SCA) as a means to gain access to conduct persistent presence activities. The initial intent was to gain access within designated and permissive environments and areas of interest that were deemed important to the GCC, TSOC commanders and staffs, and Chiefs of Mission (COM). The follow on effort of these CA teams was to coordinate and synchronize CA activities among Unified Action Partners (UAPs). Feedback from deployed CA teams was that there was a lack of training and education to operate successfully in the seams between Conventional Forces (CF) and UAPs. This information was channeled to USSOCOM through the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, in its effort to remain under the Special Operations community, developed concepts to address these shortcomings. The resulting effort is the USSOCOM CME Program. The CME program provides the training, education, and funding for a persistent engagement model that

⁵ Department of Defense, *US Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010.

enables the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade to address and narrow civil military capability and information gaps among GCCs, TSOCs, and UAPs at the active component tactical and operational level.

The CME effort uses United States active component CA forces to identify existing or potential sources of instability by which to develop approaches that address stability and security in specific countries and regions. This is accomplished through pre-deployment activities to identify threats, understand existing or planned development and partner capacity programs, and conduct planning efforts with the supported unit or agency prior to deployment. When deployed, CA personnel seek to integrate into the supported unit or agency in order to conduct assessments, engage in key leader engagements, develop planning initiatives with the short and long term programs, and execute activities in conjunction with military and United States and Host Nation agencies to forward United States national interest. The ability of the CA personnel to network with key personnel, and identify the relationships and factors associated with implementing programs along lines of effort seeks to frame the problems, provide clarity on potential redundancy, or other factors not considered in addressing a problem. These efforts facilitate coordination with and in support of other United States government, Department of Defense, and Special Operations Forces planning elements to proactively and preemptively prevent indigenous support to violent extremists and their networks. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade civil affairs teams deploy as scalable, modular, regionally aligned Theater Civil Military Support Elements (TCMSEs) and Civil Military Support Elements (CMSEs). TCMSEs and CMSEs nest their activities and planning efforts in GCC, TSOC Campaign Support Plans (CSPs), United States Embassies Mission Strategic Resource Plans (MSRPs), and UAPs operational objectives. TCMSEs and CMSEs seek to identify, reduce, and mitigate the civil

vulnerability of local and regional populations. Their efforts work in conjunction with United States Government and Host Nation (HN) planning and programming activities to influence specific areas, regions and locales, in an effort to increase HN, intergovernmental, non-governmental legitimacy, capacity and capability.

The task to integrate mutual interests between the United States military and UAPs is often easier said than accomplished. Roger Spiller, a Ph.D. in history, was an associate professor at the Combined General Staff College, and a founding member of the Center for Strategic Studies Institute argues that expectations of military and UAP cooperation are not harmonious.

The lack of collaboration between American policy makers and soldiers tends to create a false picture of what might be expected from the mission about to be launched. All parties, civil and military, have tended to overestimate how much of any given problem military force can solve. One repeatedly sees the assumption that policy makers and soldier's alike make that exercising sufficient force alone would obviate the need for expertly understanding the problem.”⁶

A logical extrapolation is the assumption that the United States military and the interagency work affably with one another to project power to further the security interests of the United States. On the contrary, experience has provided numerous examples of the United States military and UAP shortcomings. For example, the President disseminates the Unified Campaign Plan (UCP) every two years delineating GCC missions, responsibilities, and areas of responsibility. The yearly NSS provides the strategic guidance of global interests and objectives. However, the Secretary of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) often depicts idealistic objectives that the Joint Force does not possess. Even under the best of circumstances, when missions and objectives of the United

⁶ Roger Spiller, *Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 5-7, 284.

States are clear, the mission, goals and objectives change due to the pace of change within the global environment. The United States directs its goals and interests toward adversaries or actors in order to influence the environment in its favor.

There is, and continues to be, a plethora of literature, studies and debates on the success and failures of internal United States government military and UAP cooperation. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., depicts his concept of soft power as a means to obtain what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.⁷ The book, *American Civil-Military Relations*, offers unique perspectives and analysis of Samuel P. Huntington's defining book, *The Soldier and the State*, concerning the relationships between military and civilian leadership and the interactions between them.⁸ One aspect I interpret from the literature and research regardless of the debate is that military and UAP cooperation is essential to further U.S. goals and interests abroad. Interpretations of policy and the implementation of means, resources, and capabilities continue to be sources of tension and often serve as obstacles to coordination and synergy. For example, the 2012 DSG illustrates the rebalance of military capabilities and capacity to the Asia-Pacific. The shift in policy creates concern from the United States allies and partners in Europe. The effects span the diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains as the United States military and UAPs compete for limited resources, attempting to establish a way forward while reaffirming United States commitments. Tensions manifests itself in the actual or perceptions attributed to organizational cultures, mandates, policy, personal ideology, and roles and responsibilities among organizations, personnel and budgets. An example is the 2012 DSG shift to the Asia-Pacific, sequestration, and the recent Budget Control Act (BCA). These events

⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success In World Politics*: (New York: Perseus Book Group, 2004), 5.

⁸ Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*: (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

prompt national deliberation to reconsider United States defense strategy and global posture. It assumes the elements of national power work closely to leverage capabilities and capacity. However, in reality serves as a pretext for creating stove pipes significantly limiting coordination and communication across the elements of national power.

Consider the cultural and organizational differences of the United States military and UAPs in terms scope and requirements. From an interagency perspective, the United States Department of State deploys some 250 diplomatic missions in the form of embassies, consulates, special missions, and membership in international organizations to advance United States goals and objectives with less than optimal budgets. Gabriel Marcella provides an interagency perspective regarding the United States military.

It possesses a unified military command system that covers all regions of the world, the homeland, and even outer space. It is the leader of an interlocking set of alliances and agreements that promotes peace, open trade, and the principles of democracy, human rights, and protection of the environment.”⁹

The underlying principle is that multiple stake holders within the United States government share the burden of integrating and synchronizing their activities.

The United States military and other elements within the United States government possess their own unique decision making processes often leading to internal and external tension. The Secretary of State charges the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) to coordinate and implement policy and strategy of the United States to ambassadors on global political affairs, diplomacy, and security. The Department of State mission is to “integrate

⁹ Gabriel Marcella, “Affairs of the State,” *In The Intragency and National Security* (U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 3.

diplomacy and defense, and forge strong international partnerships to meet shared security challenges of the United States.”¹⁰

From a military perspective, the guiding documents that address the challenges of coordination, interoperability, and efficiencies within a country team can be found in a multitude of hierarchal documents such as the NSS, NMS, and DSG. These strategic documents serve to guide the military’s thinking in addressing a future characterized by uncertainty, complexity, change, adaptation and persistent conflict. The DSG addresses that Joint Forces take necessary planning steps to address numerous priorities.¹¹

In 2012, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, disseminated his Mission Command White Paper. As a guiding document, it describes Joint Force commanders as an integral component of understanding the problems facing the United States in a dynamic and complex environment, envisioning end states, and visualizing the nature and design of an operation. The underlying theme for the Joint Force is to build trust and partnerships in order develop adaptive leaders and organizations capable of understanding complex problems through shared experiences, doctrine, education, and training.¹² While the document focuses specifically on the military, the military cannot solely meet these challenges such as terrorism or regional conflict alone; it must be adaptive and inclusive in incorporating the other elements of national power to efficiently harmonize activities in support of advancing national goals.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) describes potential operational concepts through which the Joint Force of 2020 will defend the nation against a wide range of

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/index.htm> (accessed September 17, 2013)

¹¹ POTUS/SECDEF, *Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 2012, 6.

¹² General Martin E. Dempsey, Mission Command White Paper, 3 April 2012, 5.

security challenges. Its purpose is to guide force development toward Joint Force 2020. The concept proposes a process of operational adaptation that can apply universally to all joint operations despite the wide diversity those operations may take. This approach is based on: understanding each operational situation on its own terms, in its unique political and strategic context; arranging some combination of combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities based on this understanding; and assessing the effects of operations and adjusting the operations accordingly.¹³

In response to the national guidance, the United States Special Operations Command published the *Special Operations Forces 2020: The Global SOF Network*, in May 2013. The vision therein seeks to, build a Global SOF network of United States government partners and partner nations; Provide Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and Chiefs of Missions with improved special operations capacity; and Align structures, processes, and authorities that enable the network.¹⁴

An overlying edict in each of these documents describes a broad set of national security challenges in a continually changing environment and that the ability for the Joint Force to adapt is paramount. An underlying theme found within *SOCOM 2020* is that it must finish the current fight in Afghanistan, and be prepared to confront emerging crisis and conflicts, natural or manmade. In order to accomplish this USSOCOM postures Special Operations Forces to coordinate and synchronize with Joint Forces in order to apply the appropriate military capabilities in conjunction with UAPs. This vision serves as the backdrop for the CME program.

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Joint Force 2020*, Washington, DC. September 10, 2012, 8.

¹⁴ United States Special Operations Command, *Special Operations Forces 2020: The Global SOF Network* (Joint Special Operations University Press, MacDill AFB, Florida. May 10, 2013), 18.

This thesis will demonstrate that the USSOCOM CME program is uniquely tailored to execute low cost, small footprint military activities to improve the cooperation, understanding, and integration necessary to bridge information and capability gaps. The CME program serves as a model for effective United States government cooperation to traverse stark fiscal realities and force reductions and affirm United States ability to maintain and sustain influence through the 21st Century. UAPs in the terms of this paper refer to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other United States Government departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.¹⁵ The thesis does not explore individual departmental roles and responsibilities. When referring to UAPs, the intent is to view UAPs as a network of government agencies supporting the diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements of national power as they work to advance United States' security goals and mutual interests across the globe. This thesis assumes multiple stake holders such as non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), or allied counterparts play a vital role United States national security. Rather it describes the capability of the CME program in broad terms as a force multiplier for Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), Chiefs of Mission (COMs), and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). The thesis seeks to reinforce existing guidance found in national strategic documents such as the NSS and DSG in the context of the future environment. The thesis will demonstrate that the USSOCOM CME program, one of many tools across a broad set of options, provides a unique capability to bridge communication and coordination gaps with UAPs and partner nations addressing the security challenges facing the nation.

¹⁵ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), xiii.

Chapter 2 defines the future operating environment followed by a brief overview of the USSOCOM CME in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 uses case studies to demonstrate the CME program as one part of the military element of national power. Chapter 5 concludes with observations and recommendations that effectively argue that the USSOCOM CME is an effective low cost, small footprint activity in an era of constrained resources.

CHAPTER 2

Defining the Environment - Problem

Over the last decade, the whole of government approach to United States security interests harnesses the traditional diplomatic, informational, military, economic (DIME) elements of national power to address a broad spectrum of security threats and to ensure the safety of the United States and the American people.¹ No single organization can effectively accomplish the daunting tasks of advancing the Nations goals and objectives in the future operating environment. Rather, the military and other elements of the United States government must collectively maintain current relationships, establish new relationships, and seek venues to create environments conducive to addressing these challenges. The United States must look to develop relationships with our relevant Unified Action Partners (UAPs) that encompasses joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other United States Government departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector to achieve unity to determine opportunities to share information, coordinate, and collaborate. Bridging United States military and government coordination gaps requires a glance into the complex perceptions among stake holders to understand the environment. Consideration must account for host, partner nation, or adversaries have votes to the internal and external relationships and that define the environment. This chapter discusses perceptions and physical challenges as problem sets that inhibit synchronization and collaboration among the military and UAPs. The intent is

¹ The Joint Special Operations University Press. *Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual* (April 2011). MacDill AFB, Florida. April 2011 Second Edition, 1-2.

to outline the challenges, thereby establishing a base of knowledge to demonstrate how the Civil-Military Engagement (CME) program narrows the gap at the tactical and operational level in subsequent chapters.

Trends

The United States not only faces the challenges of advancing security interests abroad, but also contends with challenges such as diminished hegemony in the world and the widening civilian military gap. The Cold War model guiding foreign policy for the previous 50 years no longer fits the emerging global environment since 9/11.² The Cold War model asserts that nation states use traditional machines, weapons, armies, policy and diplomacy to conduct war. Today, the United States is faced with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of modern competitor states, violent extremists, regional instability, transnational criminal activities, and competition of resources. This coupled with the current United States fiscal environment, downsizing of the armed forces, a decade of war, and perceived inability to diffuse crises such as Syria has given rise to the perception that the United States may no longer be the sole super power.

The shift towards national pluralistic environment today poses competition among peer competitors such as China, India, and a resurgent Russia. China exerts economic influence globally in its pursuit through infrastructure projects throughout Africa and South America in its quest to secure resources, simultaneously creating greater capabilities and capacity of its military. India, the world's largest democracy, is expected to grow its economy level of \$1.7 trillion in from 2011 to \$7 trillion in fifteen years, placing India in the third position in the global GDP rankings by the end of 2025, behind only China and

² Joint Staff J7, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), *Decade of War Volume I: Enduring Lessons from The Past Decade of Operations*, Joint Staff J7-Decade of War Lessons Learned Working Group, CJCS (JCOA, Suffolk, VA, 2012), 2.

the United States.³ Complete congruence of U.S. and Indian national security objectives is unlikely, however areas of convergence include United States support to India's critical role as a leader in maintaining regional stability, understand the sensitivity and expectations of United States and Indian key issues such as the role of Pakistan and Iran, and that expectations that India will maintain the foreign policy tradition of nonalignment. In June 2001, President George Bush and President Vladimir Putin met to discuss strategic partnerships based on cooperation over issues of common interest such as combatting terrorism and coloration on economic issues. Despite the initial goodwill the United States and Russian relations have deteriorated over the past decade. Distracted by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia continues to exert influence regionally affecting United States national interests.⁴ Ballistic Missile Defense is a contentious issue among Russia, the United States, and NATO. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) approach to missile defense in Europe is based on the Aegis SPY-1 radar and Standard SM-3 missile interceptor to augment defense of the U.S. homeland, against prospective longer-range ballistic missiles from Iran which is expected to expand throughout the Mediterranean and a supporting radar in Turkey to radars deployed on land in Romania and Poland.⁵ The response results in increased rhetoric and a phased array of Soviet radar sites throughout Russia. A resurgent Russia continues to advance its interests in involving itself in the Syrian crisis as a key stakeholder and negotiator and demonstrates capacity in

³ Arvind Panagariya, "India: A Global Economic Power," The World Financial Review, <http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=1131> (accessed January 29, 2014).

⁴ Lauren T. Winchester, *A Unilateral U.S. and a Resurgent Russia: U.S.–Russian Relations 2000–2008*, (Carnegie Mellon University: Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2009), 5.

⁵ Steven Pifer, "Missile Defense in Europe: Cooperation or Contention?," May 2012, under "The Brookings Institute Arm Control and Non-Proliferation Series," <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/05/08-missile-defense-pifer> (accessed January 29, 2014).

the cyber realm by directly or indirectly influencing events in the 2008 war over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which attributed Russia by effecting essential services such as power and banking. These competitor states pose challenges to United States interests. Therefore, it is important that small footprint activities among military and civilian agencies work together to advance national interests among partners and allies globally.

The empowerment of small groups or individuals, state or non-state sponsored, through the proliferation of the internet, social media, and personal electronic devices and the pace of information availability shifts the communication paradigm.⁶ The United States must fight and win in the information domain to maintain strategic communication by supporting its obligations to support global commitments, provide leadership into the 21st Century, and as required maintain the status as the world's most capable and relevant military. The United States is unmatched in relative combat capabilities often to the detriment other instruments of national power. For example, the Koran burnings in 2012 demonstrate that the United States military closely guards information. The inability to get ahead of the disinformation of adversaries and increased attacks on personnel did not explain that it was a means to interdict detainees from conveying information among themselves by writing on pages on the Koran.⁷ During the 2006 Lebanon War, the initial Israeli military response to Hezbollah was widely seen as justified, but as time progressed and Hezbollah successfully manipulated print, broadcast, and online media, the world increasingly saw images of civilian casualties (both doctored and real) and the tide of

⁶ Joint Staff J7, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), *Decade of War Volume I: Enduring Lessons from The Past Decade of Operations*, Joint Staff J7-Decade of War Lessons Learned Working Group, CJCS (JCOA, Suffolk, VA, 2012), 11.

⁷ Ibid, 12.

public opinion turned de truth and often manipulate communication for their benefit.⁸ The CME program seeks to engage indigenous personnel on the human level, assess attitudes and perceptions, coordinate activities with host nation agencies and UAPs in order to plan activities that hope to get ahead of disinformation of adversaries.

The military-civilian gap in the post 9/11 era poses a major impact to the United States advancing national interests by changing perceptions regarding the military, war and sacrifice. The civilian-military gap does not infer that the military is the sole means to secure national interests. Diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts are the main avenue by which the United States advances interests. However the military is often used to compliment the other elements of national power through humanitarian assistance, strengthening alliances with allies and partners, assisting in building partnership capacity, and crisis response. The relationship between the military and civilians continues to widen thereby creating a gap in common understanding of the United States military and its purpose. A Pew research poll of the military-civilian gap reveals that:

- Only about one half of one percent of the U.S. population has been on active military duty at any given time during the past decade of sustained warfare. Some 84% of post-9/11 veterans say the public does not understand the problems faced by those in the military or their families. The public agrees, though by a less lopsided majority—71%.
- Some 83% of all adults say that military personnel and their families have had to make a lot of sacrifices since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks; 43% say the same about the American people. However, even among those who acknowledge this gap in burden-sharing, only 26% describe it as unfair. Seven-in-ten (70%) consider it “just part of being in the military.”
- The public makes a sharp distinction in its view of military service members and the wars they have been fighting. More than nine-in-ten express pride in the troops and three-quarters say they thanked someone in the military. But a 45% plurality say neither of the post-9/11 wars has been worth the cost and only a quarter say they are following news of the wars

⁸ Ibid, 12.

closely. And half of the public say the wars have made little difference in their lives.

- At a time when the public's confidence in most key national institutions has sagged, confidence in the military is at or near its highest level in many decades. However, just 58% believe the military operates efficiently. Among veterans of all eras, 66% say the military runs efficiently.⁹

The CME program and its associated activities will serve as a vehicle to narrow gaps with UAPs, simultaneously through informational and interaction can positively shape the perception of the military through engagement with other allies and partners as opposed to being perceived solely as an instrument for combat operations.

External Threats

Security challenges to the United States are fluid and complex. Globalization, specifically in regards to commerce and information overload has diminished the role of the nation state. The result serves to magnify a host of additional factors such as political instability as exemplified in Syria and Egypt, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), ideological global and regional terrorism, proliferation of weapons, and violent extremist networks. The threats vary from state, non-state, and transnational actors. The ability of these actors to engage in partnerships and alliances continues to expand and contract. The speed by which these partnerships and alliances can operate, often as a conglomeration with mutual interests, make it difficult for the United States to develop a cogent and effective whole of government strategy. A country's borders no longer solely define the scope or breadth that the conflict can reach. Within this environment, illicit actors or adversaries seek to erode, undermine and destabilize governments and their

⁹ Pew Research Center, "War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era- The Military-Civilian Gap," Pew Research, October 2011, <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/10/05/war-and-sacrifice-in-the-post-911-era/> (accessed January 29, 2014)

institutions. They seek to impose their will and power among the increasingly urbanized population using direct violence, threats of violence, ideology, or economic means. The type and level of violence these adversaries employ is not constrained by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which was created by nations to prevent the undue suffering and destruction in the prosecution of war.¹⁰ Potential adversaries are not encumbered by traditional conceptions of time and space, frequently operating on many levels from tactical through strategic. The use of the cyber domain spans regional and international boundaries making it increasingly difficult to develop plans that are proactive as opposed to reactive and static. The nature of these networked threats add new complexities exacerbating United States military and interagency aims to clearly define the problem or the conditions it seeks to address in its national and defense strategies. A disturbing notion to consider is that many of these networked threats interests and ties can be found operating within the United States in some capacity. “To understand and counter these threats, the United States elements of national power must work across bureaucratic lines, develop new organizational constructs, and establish enduring relationships that are not wedded to parochial norm.”¹¹

Civil-Military Relations

Joint Publication 1 defines interagency coordination as the cooperation and communication that occurs between departments and agencies of the United States Government (USG), including DOD, to accomplish an objective.¹² The Department of

¹⁰ About.Com. Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac_2.htm (accessed September 7, 2012)

¹¹ Douglas M. Fraser and Renee P. Novakoff, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 69, 2nd Quarter 2013, 35

¹² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), XV.

Defense (DoD), as a critical element of the larger United States government effort, must work diligently to meet security challenges. However, differences within organizational cultures between the military and its partners are both a source of cooperation and antagonism. A brief discussion of respective organizational cultures is needed to understand the challenges in mitigating the seams and capability gaps between the United States military and other elements of the United States government. There are numerous theories and perspectives relating to organizational culture. In the context of the discussion, the organizations have their own cultures. Traditionally, culture was used to explain differences between societies. It is also a means to look at an organization. The military and interagency retain their own sets of values, experiences, and structures which define their respective identities. This shared identity, organizational culture provides stability, direction, and value to its participants. “Culture as a meaning establishes boundaries between those who share in the culture and those who do not.”¹³ For example there are differences among the agencies that form a county team; the Department of State (DoS) focuses on political and diplomatic lines of effort, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) focuses on the economic and development of a country, and the military primarily focuses on long term security. The level of integration and collaboration, both internally and externally among these separate organizational cultures is dependent on bridging organizational culture barriers to advance United States goals and interests.

¹³ Anthony J. DiBella, Organization Theories, Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 69, 2nd Quarter 2013, p15

Interagency

The National Security Act of 1947 mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government. The act created many of the institutions that Presidents found useful when formulating and implementing foreign policy, including the National Security Council (NSC).¹⁴ The council includes the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, the Departments of Defense, the CIA and other members within the United States government that meet on a regular basis to discuss long term and near term security matters. Since its' inception serving as a coordinating body for security matters, the NSC has evolved into an organization that actively engages in negotiations with foreign leaders and implementing the President's decisions.¹⁵ NSC stake holders formulate policy and strategy of the United States and cover a broad spectrum of theories to address security challenges ranging from deterrence, containment to active engagement with partners and allies. Throughout its history the United States has actively engaged in stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations, however these operations have grown in the number and scope as demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. "During the Cold War, the United States averaged one major intervention about every 10 years. In the decade following the Cold War, there was an intervention about every two years."¹⁶ S&R operations bring the military and interagency within one another's operational domains often creating friction resulting at times in visceral debates of who has primacy, resources, budgets, logistics, and strategic communications. The CME

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NationalSecurityAct> (accessed September 8, 2013)

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NationalSecurityAct> (accessed September 8, 2013)

¹⁶ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 3.

program seeks to harmonize these debates at the tactical and operational level by framing problems, providing context of the relationships associated to a problem, and advising UAPs of the civil operational picture in order to nest CME activities with those of the supported commander or agency as a small footprint, low cost alternative to large scale military involvement.

The asymmetrical threats in today's security environment coupled with traditional United States military activities require more involvement by the military outside of non-combat environments. The relationship between the interagency and military can be characterized through a strategic, operational, and tactical lens. From a strategic perspective, the underlying theme is one of civilian control of the military. Richard H. Kohn, a Professor Emeritus at the University of North Carolina, known for his work and emphasis on American military history generally, emphasizing national security and military policy, strategy, and the connections between war, the military, and American society states, "the relative power between the military and civilian has shifted over time, imperceptibly and sometimes inadvertently, while at the same time, the military's understanding of civilian control and its willingness always to accede to, and comply with, civilian policies and decisions lessened."¹⁷ At the operational level the interagency is looking internally to define its role in today's contemporary environment. There is a consensus that the country's national security interagency process is inefficient due to its regulatory, budgetary, legislative, bureaucratic policies, and cultural perceptions. These act as barriers to effective interagency operations regardless of personalities, party affiliation, and administrations of personnel within the interagency.

¹⁷ Richard H. Kohn, *American Civil Military Relations, The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 274.

The interagency has not effectively operationalized the various departments to meet the security challenges of the new environment and places accountability that the contemporary interagency system was devised over sixty years ago for a different era when national security was primarily a function of military capabilities wielded by the Department of Defense in overseas missions.¹⁸

This notion attempts to define the current state of the interagency as a legacy system founded after World War II. Tactically, there are differing perceptions across the interagency about values, ideology, roles, responsibilities, whether to operate in a combat or non-combat environments, disparity of budgets, resources, policy constraints, sub-cultures within departments and conflicting interpretation of policy and strategy.

There is progress to address the perceptions of interagency internal organizational culture. The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), initiated by Secretary Clinton was an attempt to do for the DoS what the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was supposed to do for the DoD: provide a comprehensive plan to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of State and USAID in delivering results for the American taxpayer, by modernizing their capabilities and aligning their efforts as core pillars of America's civilian power.”¹⁹ The QDDR questions current structure of the interagency and whether changes are necessary to become more efficient in addressing both internal and external coordination required to meet the challenges facing the country. An implied edict in the QDDR is that coordination between the DoS and DoD is crucial.

¹⁸ Geoffrey C. Davis and John F. Tierney, *Interagency Journal of the Simons Center*. Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Vol 3, Issue 1, Winter 2012, p 3

¹⁹ Mark Edwards and Christopher Lamb, *Interagency Journal of the Simons Center*, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Vol 3, Issue 1, Winter 2012, p 8

Department of Defense

The preponderance of organizational structure in DOD consists of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It also includes the Unified combatant commands, U.S. elements of multinational commands (such as NATO), 17 field agencies (such as Defense Intelligence Agency), 10 field agencies (for example Tri-Care), and other organizations (National Guard Bureau) that are responsible to provide military forces to deter war, failing that to wage war, and protect the citizens of the United States. Each organization retains its unique culture. These cultures define themselves through their respective histories, values, assigned mission, artifacts (uniforms worn), vision, experiences, shared goals, and measured outcomes. The culture guides the organization's development to maintain, adapt, and control the environment in which they exist. While DoD represents a network of unique institutional cultures, it is the ability to identify, select, recruit, and train its members (civilians) and transform them into a shared community that defines the military culture. The values and standards by which the military culture adheres to is deemed higher than that of public writ large and serves as a means to maintain the discipline necessary to conduct itself in accordance with its mission.

A major dilemma for DoD is its ability to keep pace with dynamic security environment while maintaining vestiges of its culture. As articulated previously, there was a period of time when DoD discouraged the participation of the military in S&R operations, but the new environment dictates the increased use of the military in these operations and across the elements of national power domains. This places the military and interagency in an environment that demands working with one another, often leading

to friction and adaptation to the conditions of the environment and in accordance with strategies laid out by the NSS, NMS and DSG. The services management or approach to the demands are often seen as a competition, leading to unnecessary levels of parochialism.

Compounding the problem are competing interests within the service cultures themselves. For example, the United States Army announced an initiative to regionally align brigades with each of the six Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), comprised of the active, reserve component, and the National Guard in order to capitalize on its wartime experience and maintain an expeditionary nature. The decision to align brigades with each of the global combatant commands is a novel idea. Benefits such as improved operations, planning, and partnering resulting from cultural and language proficiency, decreasing costs associated with overseas security operations, and a more refined focus on areas of strategic significance is seen as an advantage of implementation. However, the training and use of enablers, the lack of an adaptive personnel system, a threat toward "unit favoritism," and the lack of a clearly defined training focus are each potential pitfalls that, if not addressed, could result in the long term failure of an otherwise excellent idea.”²⁰ This creates a challenge for the Army that will be called upon to defend allocating resources and funds to create and sustain conventional regionally aligned brigades when there currently exists forces such as civil affairs (CA), military information support operations (MISO), and Special Forces (SF). Regional alignment duplicates existing capabilities, depreciates the level of training and education necessary to operate in complex environments on a persistent basis, and continuity operating with UAPs.

²⁰ Griffin, Steve. “*Regionally Aligned Brigades: There’s More to this Plan Than Meets the Eye.*” Small Wars Journal. Vol 8. No 9 (September 19, 2012). <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jml/art/regionally-aligned-brigades-theres-more-to-this-plan-than-meets-the-eye> (accessed September 11, 2013)

Bureaucracy

The culture and societal perceptions effecting military and interagency cooperative arrangements is transcended by the cornucopia of bureaucracies that must be navigated to achieve unity of effort in meeting today's security challenges. "The IA is not a body of fixed structures. Rather it is loose and often undefined process of multiple structures and cultures that is often personality and situational dependent for its success to an extent normally unfamiliar to military personnel."²¹ There is a lack of professional military education to prepare military personnel to work within the vast array of interagency departments, agencies and organizations as well as host nations, partner nations, international organizations (IOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) organizational structures, nor is there a comprehensive manner to teach the subtle yet important dynamics of agreements, programs, treaties and legislation used in the interagency process. Joint Interagency Coordination Centers (JIACs), Interagency Task Forces (IATFs) are found within GCCs and subordinate military units in an attempt to bridge capability gaps and ensure coordination occurs. These efforts result in varying degrees of effectiveness in achieving operational and strategic intent. More often military personnel rely on personal experiences and education, military and civilian to traverse the bureaucracy.

It is within this environment that USSOCOM uses the CME program as a low cost, small footprint activity to bridge perceptions and capability gaps. Building trust requires time and commitment. Persistent engagement based on mutual trust and understanding

²¹ J The Joint Special Operations University Press. *Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual (April 2011)*. MacDill AFB, Florida. April 2011 Second Edition, 1-3.

best positions the force to build relationships among UAPs, allies and partners. Breaking through the barriers of bureaucracy, information hoarding, lack of relevancy and complacency are all vital to becoming a more efficient and effective organizations. It is upon this premise that the CME program is grounded in. Its scalable nature, training and education of its members allow it greater opportunities to integrate with other planning efforts across the spectrum of actors and personalities. The CME program aims to operate within the complex environments, simultaneously building lasting partnerships among UAPs and allies in support operational and strategic guidance. USSOCOM executes the program through use of Title 10 Authorities, Sections 164 and 167. These sections charge the USSOCOM Commander to build strategy that compliments the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and 2012 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). Title 10, Section 164 directs responsibility, organization, employment, chain of command and command functions of combatant commanders to the President and Secretary of Defense for missions assigned. Title 10, Section 167 assigns additional responsibility on the USSOCOM Commander to develop strategy, doctrine and tactics, prepare and submit budgets for programs, and to train and assign forces as required by Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).

USSOCOM 2020 depicts:

A global Special Operations Forces (SOF) network uniquely suited to implement guidance laid out in the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), January 2012 and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and the Chiefs of Mission (COMs). The development and implementation of the SOCOM 2020 seeks to enhance its global force capacity through networks with the interagency, foreign allies, and partners.²²

²² Admiral William H. McCraven, Commander United States Special Operations Command Posture Statement Before 113th Congress Senate Armed services Committee, 5 March 2013

USSOCOM 2020 sees itself nested within the larger United States public diplomacy efforts. Others may disagree, there is a perception that DOD public-like activities have not been institutionalized for fear it could overwhelm or dilute other United States public diplomacy activities. However, USSOCOM and the geographic combatant commands maintain one enduring and fairly defined program that is very similar to public diplomacy activities. It includes the "Trans Regional Web and Magazine Initiatives" (TRWI and TRMI) and named "VOICE" operations.²³ These programs cost \$225 million in 2012, half of what the DOS spends annually on public diplomacy programs.

The contrast between one robust program and the lack of broader Institutionalization is best explained by the varying identities, incentives, and missions of different military organizations. The military services have resisted institutionalizing public diplomacy-like activities to avoid diluting their long-standing missions, but the combatant commands, and especially SOCOM, have embraced such missions in response to their changing role in executing US foreign policy.²⁴

USSOCOM 2020 acknowledges the diverse missions of a Special Operations Forces (SOF) network. The SOF network activities range from executing direct action operations, building partnership capacity, conduct security force assistance, preserve the force and families, and the acquisition of technology and equipment to support the SOF network in a fiscally constrained environment. USSOCOM 2020 notes the CME programs direct support for public diplomacy and interagency efforts to reduce communication and coordination gaps. The elements that are addressed in this chapter

²³ Russell Rambaugh and Mathew Leatherman. *The Pentagon as Pitchman: Perception and Reality of Public Diplomacy* (Stimson, Wagngton, DC.), 3.

²⁴ Ibid

reveal a recognition of the challenges military professionals face and serves as context in describing the USSOCOM CME program, the structure and mission.

CHAPTER 3:

CIVIL MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM

When a crisis threatens United States national interests, generally the actions of the military and Unified Action Partners (UAPs) take different paths. UAPs are under considerable pressures to provide information, advice, and resources to the national leadership from the perspective managing a crisis with a long term approach. The military, on the other hand, has a comparative advantage to respond quickly with resources and a support infrastructure for short periods of time. The nexus between the military and UAPs creates friction and manifests in the form of parochialism over the mission, perceived agendas, authorities, and policy objectives in the short term management of the crisis. This is self-defeating because the time needed to address military and UAP concerns adequately often takes time, alienating those in need.

Efforts to integrate the United States military and UAPs is found in strategic guidance such as National Security Directives, Presidential Decision Directives, and Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Organizations such as the Department of State's Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the United States Agency for International Development's (USAIDs) seeks better coordination with the military by establishing deliberate coordination mechanisms and venues within their organization. The Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (DCHA/CMC), created in 2005 seeks to foster civilian-military cooperation in support of development objectives acting as the lead agency in many case for crisis and long term development. DCHA/CMC seeks to optimize application of USAID's unique development expertise to shape USAID/DoD cooperation in steady state, prevention, stabilization, transition,

reconstruction and humanitarian assistance activities to strengthen host nation effectiveness.¹ DCHA/CMC represents the focal point for USAID interaction with US and foreign militaries. The DCHA/CMC conducts planning, training, education and outreach to United States, other UAPs, and foreign militaries in areas of common interest including humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention and mitigation, disaster management countering violent extremism, counter-insurgency, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and security sector reform. The CME program augments DCHA/CMC and other UAPs as a military partner in addressing crisis. It leverages relationships established through persistent engagement activities as opposed to military forces that do not have relationships or an understanding of the environment being propelled into a crisis, thus alleviating trust issues and miscommunication.

The military in-turn has spent time developing the foundation of Unified Action as articulated in Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Unified action seeks to, “synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g., the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.”² It is within this context that the USSOCOM Civil Military Engagement (CME) program seeks to leverage better communication and coordination among the United States government and other key players, UAPs, both in CONUS and abroad on a persistent versus episodic basis.

¹ U.S. Department of State, “Office of Civil-Military Cooperation,” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/partnership-opportunities/us-military/office-civilian-military-cooperation> (accessed January 29, 2014)

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), xiii.

USSOCOM Directive 525-38, 2 November 2012 provides guidance and responsibilities for the conduct of executing the CME program. CME is a USSOCOM funded, Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs (SOF CA) executed program, which provides an indirect-line-of-operation capability through persistent civil-military engagement, in specific countries and regions to shape the civil dimension of the operational environment.³

CME is executed by active component SOF CA Civil Military Support Elements (CMSEs). These elements are scalable and modular, deploy for persistent, non-episodic engagements at the request of Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), a Chief of Mission (COM), or a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) in support of theater campaign plans (TCPs). Its small footprint, and the training and education of CA personnel, that make the CMSE ideal to operate in sensitive or high risk austere environments. The education and training by CMSE elements allows access to missions and activities not normally entrusted to other military forces. A trained CMSE reduces the military signature within a country, possess knowledge of the environment, are trained in force protection, have in depth knowledge of the culture and sensitivities within a country, and able to use their language abilities. The knowledge and skills when applied to operational and tactical activities allow better integration into other embassy, host nation, and UAP activities. CMSE composition provides flexibility for the CMSE to adapt to new roles and responsibilities, and task organize to meet the required level of engagement and missions. A CMSE attempts to implement theater strategic and United States foreign policy objectives by coordinating CME tactical and operational lines of effort with the activities and programs of an embassy or supported commander.

³ United States Special Operations Command. *Military Operations: Civil Military Engagement (CME)*. USSOCOM Directive 525-38 (USSOCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, November 2, 2012), 3.

The core activities of CME are population centric within a specific country, region, or area of interest to:

- (1) Gain and maintain access to areas of interest.
- (2) Establish enduring relationships and networks with populations and key stakeholders.
- (3) Address critical civil vulnerabilities, such as ethnic conflict, that could be exploited by destabilizing factors or groups. Address whether the civil vulnerabilities are natural or man-made.
- (4) Plan, coordinate, facilitate and execute SOF specific programs (Unconventional Warfare support), operations, and activities, synchronizing short-to-mid- term objectives with mid-to-long term USG objectives.
- (5) Conduct activities by, with and through host nation (HN) authorities, USG partners, intergovernmental organizations (IGO), and non-governmental organization (NGO), private entities, or international military partners to deny support to violent extremist organizations or networks and enable indigenously-sustainable stability and development.
- (6) Increase USSOCOM, GCC, TSOC, U.S. Country team and USG situational awareness. Provide understanding of key areas and populations and enable future operations planning through civil information management (CIM).⁴

The CMSE is the lowest level of the program designed to achieve tactical to operational level objectives. The objectives are defined as tactical or operational by the supported commander, ambassador, or agency such as USAID. Requests for CMSE support is generated through a TSOC or an embassy that are forwarded to USSOCOM, down to the active component CA brigade. A CMSE plans, coordinates, and executes Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) in support of the prescribed vision and line of efforts designated by the COM or supported commanders. An explanation is necessary to distinguish the difference between civil-military operations (CMO) and CAO. CAO differs from CMO. CMO refers to the range of possible activities that are considered based on the desired level of civilian support, availability of resources, and inadvertent interference by the local population. The purpose of CMO is to

⁴ United States Special Operations Command. *Military Operations: Civil Military Engagement (CME)*. USSOCOM Directive 525-38 (USSOCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, November 2, 2012), 4.

facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, from 1994–1995, the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, MG David Meade and the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commander, BG Richard W. Potter, Jr., used elements of the 10th Mountain Division and Special Forces by to conduct activities to restore security and civil infrastructure systems throughout the major cities, power nodes, and opening lines of communication.⁵

CAO is conducted by civil affairs soldiers to integrate United States civil and military actions while conducting support to civil administration (SCA), populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), and civil information management (CIM).⁶ CIM is a process that helps commander to develop and understand the civil component of the operational environment (OE). The civil considerations that may influence common operational picture is comprised of taking into consideration manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. CMSE's collect information, provide the commander with information on the civil component and use CIM, an interactive database geospatial program, to develop and analyze data that can be incorporated into the running estimate to help the commander and staff clearly understand the status of the civil environment within the OE. CAO seeks to (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other agency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector;

⁵ The Joint Special Operations University, *Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education (Report 06-02, April 2006)*, by James F. Powers, Jr.

⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 8, 2008), x.

and (3) involve the application of functional specialty skills, for example a veterinarian, that are normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil military operations.⁷ CA personnel use their respective medical expertise to enhance GCC Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAPs) to enhance partner nation health care capacity and reduce the threat of disease by collaborating with local medical professionals, interagency partners and local authorities. These activities include local immunizations of children, establishing optometry clinics, and inoculation of animals (animal husbandry).

The next level within CME program is the Regional Civil Military Support Element (RCMSE). An RCMSE is TSOC directed CME deployment to two or more countries to look holistically at a sub region, coordinate and synchronize multiple CMSE efforts, execute CAO, and provide CIM analysis. A Theater CMSE (TCMSE), the largest but scalable element, provides the TSOC commander with a dedicated capability to plan, coordinate and execute a theater CME program. It possesses a planning and CIM capability, is responsible for the fusion and reach back with UAPs in order to develop and incorporate CME program objectives into TCP and Country Action Plans. The TCMSE ensures that these objectives are clearly communicated at every level.

All active component Soldiers who enter the civil affairs regiment undergo a rigorous assessment and selection process followed by a twelve month basic qualification course grounded in CAO, language, culture, negotiations, and basic interagency processes and structures. Upon graduation, assignment to the 95th CA BDE, a subordinate unit under the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) seeks to leverage the language

⁷ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Field Manual 3-05.40 (Washington DC; Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011), 1-2.

skills by assigning soldiers to one of the five regionally aligned battalions. The 95th CA BDE is the only unit with the authority to train, equip, deploy, and conduct CAO under the USSOCOM CME program. The regionally aligned battalions support combatant commanders through the five Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) and are currently deployed to as many as 23 countries, with more slated. Special Operation Command Korea (SOC-KOR) and Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) currently do not have CMSE due to lack of capacity within the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade.

CME elements conduct thorough pre-deployment training focusing on the ability to integrate with disparate SOF, conventional forces (CF), UAPs and specific force protection standards. The training enables CME personnel to deploy to high risk, austere environments if required by the mission, gain access to areas where other UAPs support is difficult in order to conduct infrastructural assessments, key leader engagements, humanitarian assistance and civil reconnaissance. CME soldiers immerse themselves in United States interagency and academia venues that concentrate and convey political science, economic, public administration, and negotiation and mediation skills. The aim is to develop personnel capable of analyzing complex social systems to map, understand, and articulate civil dynamics to CCDRs, COM, supported commanders, and other agencies within the United States country team in an effort to provide better communication and coordination of ongoing United States activities to forward national interests. The purpose of the education and training seeks to provide CMSE personnel capable of analyzing complex issues and making recommendations useful to supported commanders and agencies in the dynamic, ever changing global environment.

Unlike Army funded Major Force Programs (MFP-2) that are used to support conventional forces, CME is a baseline MFP-11 program. MFP-11 funding was a result of

difficulties associated with operational readiness and interoperability among special operations in the 1980s, specifically highlighted by OPERATION Eagle Claw and the failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages inside of Iran. Shortly thereafter, Congress established the United States Special Operations Command in 1987 and allocated a separate line of funding to DOD for SOF to develop, acquire equipment, materials, supplies, and services. MFP-11 funding provides the resources necessary to provide highly trained, rapidly deployable joint force to GCCs and capable of conducting global operations and essential for the viability and sustainability of the CME program.

On average USASOC receives approximately \$1.5 billion of MFP-11 funds per fiscal year. The 95th CA BDE is allocated \$8 million per fiscal year by USSOCOM through USASOC to execute the CME program and is only 1% of the USASOC total budget.⁸ Funding is complimented by other sources for operational needs that have the appropriate fiscal authority to fund CME activities. This can include, but not limited to Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA), and various counterterrorism sources.⁹ The current MFP-11 funding allows the regionally aligned battalions under the 95th CA BDE to execute CME globally as depicted in Figure 2.

⁸ Interview with Major Pernell Robinson, Comptroller (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, November 1, 2013), cited with permission from Colonel James Brown.

⁹ United States Special Operations Command. *Military Operations: Civil Military Engagement (CME)*. USSOCOM Directive 525-38 (USSOCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, November 2, 2012), 9.

AFRICOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM
Mali	Bangladesh	Qatar	Bosnia	Guyana
Senegal	Sri Lanka	Tajikistan	Romania	Honduras
Nigeria	Nepal	Jordan	Kosovo	Guatamala
Niger	Cambodia	Lebanon		Peru
Morocco	Indonesia	Yemen		
Djibouti	Thailand			
Mauritania				
Chad				

Figure 2

CME is scalable and modular, deploys for persistent, non-episodic engagements, and relative low cost allows for continuous military and UAP communication and coordination of effort in support of United States national interests. The CME program is an example of military capability providing the knowledge and context to those that require support and implement options in ongoing or emerging operations. The relationships, communication, and planning ability to execute indirect and persistent approaches, bridges parochial walls between the military and UAPs.

CHAPTER 4:

CASE STUDIES

From the Mexican War of 1846 through both theaters of World War II to present day operations in Afghanistan, the fact remains that armies of all types must plan for and execute civil-military operations (CMO) as part of the overall political-military campaign.¹ The United States military continues to play an active role in a whole of government approach to complex problems today and in the future. The environment today demands low cost, small footprint capabilities that bridge the information and organizational culture seams in the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic communities of interest. This chapter serves as a reference to understand the context CME program plays in the conduct of tactical and operational missions that often result in strategic effects. It does not discount the efforts or compete with the Interagency Tasks Forces (IATFs) that exist at each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). Rather, this chapter serves to highlight the Civil Military Engagement (CME) programs interaction between civil affairs and Unified Action Partners (UAPs) resulting from operational experience and through institutional learning.

The chapter covers one non CME historical example to illustrate the importance of cooperation between the military and other elements of national power to demonstrate that civil-military cooperation is vital to forward national interests . Two CME activities, Jordan and Bangladesh, provides a snapshot of challenges faced by the military and UAPs in two GCCs areas of responsibility.

¹ The Joint Special Operations University Press. *JSOU Report 06-2: Civil Military Operations and Professional Military Education*. MacDill AFB, Florida. April 2006. Forward by LTC Michael C. McMahon.

Vietnam, 1962-1974

The United States military experience in Vietnam provides an example of civilian and military integration efforts in fighting the insurgency that had been going on since the late 1950's.² During the early American involvement in Vietnam War, General William Westmoreland, the Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV), sought to negate the VC influence in South Vietnam by relying on civilian agencies to conduct influence activities. "However, prior to 1967, U.S. stability operations were entirely uncoordinated with different civilian agencies all running separate operations. While they were theoretically coordinating with the military through the U.S. embassy, this was not the reality. For the military, battlefield realities forced pacification strategies to take a backseat to war fighting operations."³ President Lyndon Johnson sought to rectify the lack of coordination by appointing the interim National Security Advisor, Robert Komer, to develop a strategy to unify civilian and military efforts under a single command. With Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's support, the result was the creation of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) in November 1966. Expectations was that Kromer produce results in 90-120 days. OCO disbanded in March 1967 due to its lack of military resources, lack of coordination between the military and government agencies, and the inability to hire the civilians. In May 1967, however, Komer became one of the most influential U.S. government representatives in Vietnam by being appointed the rank of ambassador. "On May 9, 1967, Johnson signed National Security Action

² Jeremy Patrick Wright, "Civil Affairs In Vietnam," Center For Strategic and International Studies (January 28, 2009): 1
<http://www.bing.com/search?q=csis+report+on+cords+in+vietnam&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=csis+report+on+cords+in+vietnam&sc=0-17&sp=-1&sk=&cvid=8cdc425b03514244bfe0dbaf01b87cc3> (accessed October 5, 2013).

³ Ibid.

Memorandum 362 assigning MACV responsibility for pacification in Vietnam. Ambassador Komer was then assigned to MACV to serve under General Westmoreland as his Deputy in charge of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).”⁴ The position provided Komer the ability to pull together the various U.S. military and civilian agencies involved in the pacification effort, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State (DoS), the United States Information Services, the United States Department of Agriculture, and elements of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). United States military or civilian province senior advisers were appointed, and CORDS civilian-military advisory teams were dispatched throughout South Vietnam's 44 provinces and 250 districts.

Operationally, Komer consolidated disparate military and civilian pacification projects into six programs: 1) The New Life Development program provided economic aid to villages; 2) The Chieu Hoi Program encouraged VC to defect; 3) The Revolutionary Development Cadre Program encouraged good governance programs at the local level; 4) The Refugee Support Program assisted refugee relocation; 5) The PSYOP Program provided support for the Chieu Hoi and other anti VC campaigns; and 6) The Public Safety Program that focused on increasing the size and capabilities of the National Police Force.⁵

CORDS projects and activities fall under one of the six programs. The projects and activities passed a thorough assessment for success in attempts to determine whether efforts and activities were sustainable and feasible, to nest with the counterinsurgency effort providing

⁴ Jeremy Patrick Wright, “Civil Affairs In Vietnam,” Center For Strategic and International Studies (January 28, 2009): 1
<http://www.bing.com/search?q=csis+report+on+cords+in+vietnam&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=csis+report+on+cords+in+vietnam&sc=0-17&sp=-1&sk=&cvid=8cdc425b03514244bfe0dbaf01b87cc3> (accessed October 5, 2013).

⁵ Ibid

security for the South Vietnamese population. Under the CORDS system, the efforts of United States military and civilian interagency elements saw improvements along many fronts. The CORDS program was effective in increasing the size of the police force through a training program referred to as “Project Takeoff.” Analysis of sources of instability and Viet Cong (VC) recruitment resulted in determining a source of tension centered on competing ideals of land ownership. Vietnamese farmers views wanted land ownership under a communist system better than not having influence under the government of South Vietnam. “CORDS petitioned the government of South Vietnam to pass a law forbidding any single farmer from owning more than thirty-seven acres of land. The remaining land was then parceled out in three-acre shares to every family in South Vietnam.”⁶ The CORDS efforts complimented USAID’s work sending an average of \$222 million per year from 1955-1965.⁷ The CORDS program produced results in other areas such as furthering democratic institutions, infrastructure, and healthcare reform. Its success lies in that it effectively brings the military and interagency to coordinate, synchronize, and execute activities under the oversight of a single entity to support the vulnerable Vietnamese population. However, CORDS was only one part of a failed comprehensive strategy. Diminished public opinion in the United States attributed to South Vietnamese corruption, the cost in terms of money and casualties, and reasons for the conflict is a reason for the collective atrophy of civil-military partnering after the war. The CORDS program provides a large scale country perspective. It also accounts for the small military and civilian activities at the tactical

⁶ Jeremy Patrick Wright, “Civil Affairs In Vietnam,” Center For Strategic and International Studies (January 28, 2009): 8
<http://www.bing.com/search?q=csis+report+on+cords+in+vietnam&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=csis+report+on+cords+in+vietnam&sc=0-17&sp=-1&sk=&cvid=8cdc425b03514244bfe0dbaf01b87cc3> (accessed October 5, 2013).

⁷ Richard W. Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” research paper, National War College, 2006, 3.

and operational level and serves as an analogy of the importance for thorough coordination and communication, and unity of effort to advance national goals.

CENTCOM: CMSE-Jordan

In early 2012, the ambassador to Jordan, Stuart E. Jones, approved the integration of a civil military support element (CMSE) into the United States Embassy in Jordan as an extension of the Civil Military Engagement (CME) program after a joint planning session between representatives from Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Jordan Mission.⁸

CMSE-Jordan conducted a home station analysis of the situation in Jordan and determined that a preponderance of their efforts would be to identify sources of civil vulnerabilities that ranged from identifying ethnic and religious tensions to assessing the status of public services capable of handling the increase in displaced persons in and along the border of Syria and Jordan. CMSE-Jordan arrived in country in March 2012. Recommendation from USIAD country team representatives directed CMSE-Jordan to coordinate and integrate their efforts with the Regional Refugee Coordinator (RefCoord) from the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) is confirmation that their initial evaluation of civil vulnerabilities.

PRM serves as the lead U.S. government agency for coordinating refugee response. PRM works with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to coordinate and manage U.S. government contributions to these organizations and ascertain their alignment with U.S.

⁸ Colonel James Brown, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Brent Bartos, November 24, 2013, (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina), cited with permission from Colonel James Brown.

government policies.⁹ As the conflict in Syria continued to deteriorate, the influx of refugees from Syria to Jordan placed enormous strain on the Jordanian government. The Zaatari Refugee Camp based outside Mafraq City in the Mafraq Governorate had a planned capacity to accommodate 100,000 refugees. Throughout March to April of 2012, the growing Syrian refugee population in Jordan required daily assistance, exceeding Jordan's ability to operate the camps effectively, placing enormous strain on refugee security and infrastructure. By the end of 2012 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the number of Syrians in Jordan at 140,000.

CMSE-Jordan and PRMs initial efforts work with UNHCR and other international organizations met resistance due to being associated with Department of Defense (DoD) in a refugee response. To mitigate the militaristic perception, PRM conducted a series of meetings with stakeholders to minimize DoD involvement to limited small infrastructure projects in conjunction with the Jordan government and Jordan Armed Forces (JAF), if resources were scarce. CMSE-Jordan, like other CMSE elements uses the civil affairs methodology, a six step planning process, to identify and target underlying conditions of stability and engagement, other than those already identified by the government of Jordan.¹⁰ The approach assists to identify gaps and coordinate the necessary resources for the refugee problem set. In the assessment phase, CMSE-Jordan developed a civil common operational picture (COP) for the country team. First, CMSE-Jordan through coordination with PRM assessed the Jordanian bail-out system to screen refugees. The screening process identifies refugees with surety by a friend or relative, then releasing the refugees into the community. The process became backlogged, stranding

⁹ Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/j/prm/about/index.htm> (accessed October 6, 2013)

¹⁰ William J. Hackenbracht, "Achieving Civil-Military Unity of Effort: Jordan Case Study," Interagency Journal Vol. 4, Issue 2, (Summer 2013), 43.

refugees at checkpoints and exceeding the resources of the Jordanian government to transport and lodge refugees. The overcrowded conditions placed strain on the local communities leading to the second aspect of developing the COP. At the request of the Mafraq governor and Jordanian officials, CMSE-Jordan determined that the planned refugee postured to accommodate 100,000 plus the 300,000 population of Mafraq governate creates conditions exceeding the local government water, food, sanitation, and medical capabilities as well as generate animosity with Jordanians and refugees seeking local employment opportunities. The action enabled the first assessments to the TSOC commander of situation occurring within Jordan as well as access and engagement necessary to prepare for future engagements in the area. CMSE-Jordan in conjunction with other country team bureaus, USAID, Central Command (CENTCOM), and Jordanian government developed information products to inform refugees on the process and procedures at Jordanian border checkpoints and within the camps.

The decide phase of the CA methodology is characterized by CMSE-Jordan coordination with SOCCENT and CENTCOM advocating the need to increase the amount of Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs funds administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) from \$10,000 to \$75,000. The intent was to nominate programs and minimal cost projects, synchronizing the Jordanian government, UNHCR, and other United States government plans to alleviate the strain on resources and infrastructure.¹¹ The flexibility of funding is essential in mitigating refugee impacts on local Jordanian resources. From a medical context, CMSE-Jordan through its continuing assessment was able to report issues and concerns to USAID. The efforts resulted in CMSE-Jordan and

¹¹ W William J. Hackenbracht, "Achieveing Civil-Military Unity of Effort: Jordan Case Studay," Interagency Journal Vol. 4, Issue 2, (Summer 2013), 45.

USAID collaborating with the Jordanian Ministry of Health to identify 22 medical clinics to assist in processing refugees and that the northern water distribution network was vulnerable to overuse and contamination. Another benefit from the collaboration is the perception that the United States military component was seen as a trusted element in the activities of the embassy, allowed greater access to information by engaging other UAPs, and allowed the CMSE to continue to develop an understanding of potentially larger problems and make recommendations to the ambassador. The concept ensures that any plan of utilizing United States government resources be compatible and nested with ongoing long term strategic and development plans of the United States Embassy Jordan. CMSE-Jordan partners with the Jordanian Special Operations Forces (JORSOF) Civil Military Company (CIMIC) in its approach to working by, with and through host nation organizations. The effort solidifies the relationships established during the multi-national exercise Eager Lion 12, where CMSE-Jordan instructed displaced civilian operations to JORSOF. What had been an episodic relationship with the Jordanian military is now a persistent presence with senior Jordanian civilian and military officials.

During the development and detect phase, CMSE-Jordan seeks to sustain relationships with USAID, PRM, and the country team simultaneously working to build credibility with UNHCR and NGO representatives. The CMSE uses tactical operations to nominate contingency projects to mitigate UNHCR shortfalls that in turn led to participating in bi-weekly Syrian refugee meetings with host nation officials and international community donors. These efforts, coupled with attending the weekly U.S. Syrian Working Group, chaired by the U.S. Ambassador to Jordan, were instrumental in facilitating the establishment of the CENCTOM Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) Jordan.¹² This organizational framework provides information

¹² William J. Hackenbracht, *Achieving Civil-Military Unity of Effort: Jordan Case Study*. InterAgency Journal Vol. 4, Issue 2, (Summer 2013): 46.

relevant to DoS and DoD operational planning efforts and SOCCENT and CENTCOM situational awareness.

The deliver phase is executed through contingency projects to address and mitigate civil vulnerabilities through deliberate planning with the country team, USAID, SOCENT, CENTCOM and coordination with UNHCR, and civilian and military Jordanian government officials. The relationships between CMSE-Jordan and UAPs allows for the enablement to identify, procure, and deliver humanitarian assistance.

During the evaluation phase, the intent is to determine if objectives are being met. CMSE-Jordan in conjunction with USAID and PRM, assessed the effectiveness of CMSE delivered contingency projects and engagement efforts with the Jordanian military and government officials.¹³ CMSE-Jordan's assessment of the Zaatari Refugee Camp identified the refugee influx exceeded the pace of construction resulting in poor living conditions. The Mafraq governate was overwhelmed medically, and sanitation conditions across the congested refugee laden northern border areas posed significant health risks. CMSE-Jordan identified projects to mitigate the civil vulnerabilities. CMSE-Jordan coordinates with the United States embassy's public diplomacy office to link its contingency projects through the dissemination of public press releases and ribbon cutting ceremonies, while placing Jordanian government at the forefront. The CMSE projects are tangible examples of U.S. assistance that the U.S. Ambassador along with representatives from PRM and USAID used to demonstrate and highlight U.S. commitment.¹⁴

¹³ William J. Hackenbracht, *Achieving Civil-Military Unity of Effort: Jordan Case Study*. InterAgency Journal Vol. 4, Issue 2, (Summer 2013): 48.

¹⁴ Ibid.

The transition phase illustrates the ability of CMSE-Jordan to work by, with and through United States government and Jordanian officials and organizations allowing continued persistent presence. The activities of the CMSE-Jordan provide information to the RCMSE that can then be utilized to frame complex issues that state level problems may be linked on a greater scale. The RCMSE analysis is valuable in that the TSOC commander has the appropriate information to make decisions. In support of an operational CENTCOM CMOC Jordan, CMSE-Jordan transitioned a number of initiatives along the Syrian border to the organization including OHDA funded latrines, transferring excess property (lighting and tents) through coordination with the Defense Logistics Agency. CMSE-Jordan efforts also result in what has become a persistent as opposed to episodic engagement activity. The CMSE capability augments the overall ambassador's, CENCTCOM, and Jordanian civil-military efforts. Rotations of CMSE-Jordan personnel occur every 8 months and are networked with other CMSE elements within the CENCTOM area of responsibility (AOR) such as Turkey, Lebanon and Qatar. As demonstrated by CMSE-Jordan, the CME program enables the interagency to anchor civil-military strategy within the NSS through the deployment of small footprint elements.¹⁵ As part of the global SOF network, the CME program avoids a large scale military signature and the flexibility to integrate activities better with UAPs in a resourced constrained environment. The following figure represents the initial CMSE-Jordan costs incurred while establishing operations and the rise of costs attributed to supporting operations in Jordan during the beginning and continual refugee crisis. (See Figure 1)

¹⁵ William J. Hackenbracht, *Achieving Civil-Military Unity of Effort: Jordan Case Study*. InterAgency Journal Vol. 4, Issue 2, (Summer 2013): 50.

CMSE-Jordan	
FY 12	FY 13
\$201K	\$430k

Figure 1

The costs reflect the pre-deployment training, supplies, transportation, deployment, lodging, and operational costs for a four man team for a year. The cost reflects a maximum return for a small investment of personnel and the capability brought to bear on a complex problem. The mission, although in its early stages appears to have established the rapport necessary for continued civil-military relationship with one of the United States closest allies in the Middle East.

PACOM: CMSE-Bangladesh

On November 15, 2007, Cyclone Sidr made landfall in southern Bangladesh resulting in an estimated 4,000 deaths, the displacement of over three million people, and far-reaching damage across 30 of the country's 64 districts with an estimated economic damage exceeding \$2.3 billion.¹⁶ On November 16, the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, Geeta Pasi, made a declaration of a disaster and the U.S. government provided \$19 million in assistance, which included two USAID disaster assessment teams and humanitarian support from DoD through the U.S.S. Kearsarge. In January 2008, CMSE-Bangladesh augmented the USAID disaster assessment teams. The length of time between the event and deployment is associated to the approval process for deployments. An appeal for capability goes from the embassy to USPACOM and SOCPAC. Once validated the request for forces (RFF) is sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for consideration and to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade via the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) for feasibility. Once a CMSE is identified and prepared to deploy, there is a period

¹⁶ United States department of State, Embassy of the United States: Dhaka, Bangladesh, http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/cyclone_sidr.html (accessed 18 October 2013).

and approval by the Secretary of Defense. Once SECDEF signed the deployment order (DEPORD), CMSE-Bangladesh deployed to Bangladesh. CMSE-Bangladesh assists the United States Bangladesh embassy and USAID by being allowed to shadow host nation government forces and USAID, evaluating the government of Bangladesh disaster response capacity, identify civil vulnerabilities in the affected areas, conduct immediate impact Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response (HADR) projects, and inform UAPs on government rehabilitation and reconstruction projects.

The CMSE-Bangladesh assessments was critical to assist in the development of the common operation picture (COP). CMS-Bangladesh was authorized to accompany Bangladesh military and police units in areas otherwise denied to United States government personnel due to extensive training in force protection measures. The aim was to provide information concerning the civil domain, assisting UAPs to develop short and long term plans. The plans address the government of Bangladesh attempts to address systemic challenges linked to the vulnerability of populations living within the coastal areas of Bangladesh.¹⁷ The initial CMSE-Bangladesh efforts laid the foundation for continued persistent United States military presence operations. For example, CMSE-Bangladesh assessments determined that the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was taking advantage of the disaster within the effected populations in coastal Bangladesh by providing resources such as money through Muslim donors, medical aid, and espousing anti-Bangladesh government rhetoric. The activities of WAMY sought to potentially destabilize the region or act as recruiting mechanism for extremists' ideals by taking advantage of a poor situation and thereby create future problems for the United States in the future. Through direct observation and interviews with the local populace, CMSE-Bangladesh was able

¹⁷ Colonel James Brown, The 95th Civil Affairs Command Working in a 3D Environment: Building Cohesion, United States Army Special Oerations Command (Airborne), 6 October 2013, slide 6.

to confirm that WAMY was influence in these areas was contradictory to providing basic needs of the populace. Although recognized as an educational outreach forum for Muslim communities and as a charitable organization, WAMY claims to seek coexistence with the West. According to the Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, WAMY has a comprehensive program for supporting the Jihad and association with espousing violent ideology.¹⁸ The actions by WAMY create a perception of a competitive social support network undermining the Government of Bangladesh, and allow WAMY to exercise freedom of movement within the affected areas where there was little or no government presence.

To counter the potential effects of WAMY's exploitation of civil vulnerabilities, CMSE-Bangladesh work by, with and through host nation officials, USAID and embassy personnel and nongovernmental actors to plan a coordinated response. The planning effort intent was to raise the credibility of the Government of Bangladesh with the local populace through proposed use of Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDCA) to construct and maintain Multi-Purpose Cyclone Shelters at the cost of \$8,018,500 throughout the affected areas.¹⁹ The analysis through assessments determined that the people of Bangladesh lacked faith in the ability of the government to provide basic public health services. The proposals were in accordance with Title 12 of the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act. The proposals allow the use of funds by DoD to fund programs through the DOS to conduct military-to military contacts, support military operations to combat terrorism, extend and enhance authority for security and

¹⁸ Steven Emerson, "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Congressional Statement," http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing3/witness_emerson.htm (accessed January 30, 2014).

¹⁹ Colonel James Brown, The 95th Civil Affairs Command Working in a 3D Environment: Building Cohesion, United States Army Special Operations Command (Airborne), 6 October 2013, slide 7.

stabilization assistance.²⁰ The nomination of the program met intent of advancing U.S. security interests by promoting regional stability and building governance capacity to address conflict, instability and sources of terrorism also known as the Community Policing and Security Framework to Combat Extremism project.

The significance of the multi-purpose shelters is to reduce future risks to the population during natural disasters, create a venue to deepen the Government of Bangladesh's nascent community-based policing approach enhancing and strengthening its national security framework, and increase the ability of the government's capability to patrol, monitor and provide adequate security in sparsely governed and ungoverned areas. The multi-purpose shelters also serve as community centers, medical clinics and schools. The cooperation between CMSE-Bangladesh, host nation government departments and security forces, and United States interagency personnel demonstrates the continued United States commitment to Bangladesh and supports the GWOT to deter tacit and active support for VEOs, erode support to violent extremist ideology, enable partnership capacity, establish relationships and trust among a partner nation, provide an appreciation and understanding of the relationship between natural and man-made problems, and assure future activities and access.

CMSE-Bangladesh also facilitated training between the U.S. and Bangladesh Coast Guard. The United States country team coordinated for boats and established coastal centers resulting in the Bangladesh governments' ability to reach populations in isolated areas. Simultaneously CMSE-Bangladesh trained the coast guard personnel on basic medical

²⁰ United States Congress, 110th Congress Public Law 181," <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ181/html/PLAW-110publ181.htm> (accessed January 30, 2014)

procedures, search techniques, and civil-military operations. These initiatives resulted in improving the Bangladesh government ability to reach vulnerable populations, build capacity, and bring the government closer to its people. The below data reflects the longer term presence of the CMSE and corresponds to the initial reaction of the CMSE to support operations to maintaining an enduring presence in Bangladesh. (Figure 2) The budget reduction beginning in FY13 reflects that the shelters already being built, thus requiring only sustainment of funds to conduct persistent engagement.

CMSE-Bangladesh				
FY 09	FY 10	FY 11	FY 12	FY 13
\$312k	\$259k	\$258k	\$258k	\$139k

Figure 2

Summary

The CME case studies provide a range of activities designed to influence specific countries and regions, by executing activities in coordination with and in support of other United States government, DoD, and SOF elements, in an attempt to identify and frame complex problems, assess the requirements and capabilities to apply to a short or long term issue, and make recommendations that can link tactical and operational considerations to national strategic interests. The case studies while viewed from a crisis point of view, do not account for the persistent long term efforts being conducted by CMSE elements globally. They are meant to demonstrate that by working through UAPs, persistent presence, and proactively supporting national interests, it serves as a platform to preemptively mitigate indigenous support to violent extremists and their networks. The CME programs overarching tool in meeting national interests is the deployment of modular and scalable task organized CMSE. CMSEs in coordination with UAPs, host nation, indigenous, and civilian partners seeks to build local and regional capability

and capacities to prevent support to violent extremists and their networks by identifying civil vulnerabilities and developing a shared understanding of the dynamics contributing to conflict.²¹

The CMSE anchors the civil military strategy within a whole-of-government approach led by the GCC, TSOC, and Chief of Mission by enabling operational access, characterized by persistent engagement, horizontal and vertical integration, and habitual contact with relevant populations, serving as a bridge to narrow the gap between military and civil cooperation and harmonize activities in the whole of government approach to complex problems. While the CMSE is given broad direction and tasks from the TSOC, the CMSE ensures its efforts are nested in DoD, USAID, and other interagency objectives and are mutually supporting and complimentary to the overall engagement strategy for the country. CMSE activities cross a broad spectrum of operations to include civil information management, influence and shaping operations in support of larger scale campaigns, civil reconnaissance, and key leader engagements that bridge tactical to appropriate goals. Currently operating in over 20 countries, the success of CMSE operations has resulted in an increased demand signal for more CMSE capabilities across the GCCs to serve as platforms to deploy to countries, gain access to vulnerable populations, assess host nation and UAPs capabilities in responding to crises and enduring problems, establish relationships, and assist in coordinating and synchronizing activities to advance national interests. The CME program bridges organizational culture gaps and serves as a model for low cost, small footprint activities to further U.S. goals and interests. Its value is in its people, that are trained and educated, possess language and regional expertise,

²¹ Colonel James Brown, “The 95th Civil Affairs Command Working in a 3D Environment: Building Cohesion” (presented as the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade Command Briefing, United States Army Special Operations Command (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC, October 6, 2013, slide 6).

that can adeptly respond quickly or over long duration to analyze the complexity both inter and intra-state on problems that inhibit United States goals and interests.

CHAPTER 5:

Recommendations

The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), Chiefs of Mission (COM), and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) recognize the importance of having CMSE support through the CME program in the planning and execution of national policy objectives within their regions. The CME capability requires a continued effort to sustain and improve its ability to bridge seams in the United States governments approach to hard problems in a constrained fiscal environment.

Education and Training

The mission of civil affairs is to support commanders by engaging the civil component of the operational environment through civil affairs operations, civil military operations or other tasks directed to achieve U.S. objectives. Inherent in the mission is to sustain legitimacy of the mission and the transparency and credibility of the U.S. government before, during, or after military operations regardless of the setting.²²

Educated and trained soldiers are essential to well executed CME. The experiences of multiple deployments hone the skills and attributes of soldiers necessary to operate alongside the interagency in ambiguous environments. In essence, the success of the CME program is dependent on the mechanisms that produce a Soldier capable of effectively operating in the human domain. The assessment and selection process of active component soldiers seeks to maintain quality personnel desiring to enter the civil affairs regiment. Its foundations are built on taxing the mental capabilities of candidates to determine their comfort with uncertainty and their

²² Jeffrey S. Han and Brion D. Youtz, "Grains of Truth: The Role of Civil Military Support Elements in Special Operations," *Special Warfare* 25, no. 3 (July – September 2012): 41.

ability to operate in a decentralized environment. Assessment and selection is accomplished through an amalgamation of exhaustive mental and physical events. Physical fitness events are continual graded events to pre-determined standards in order to tax mental acuteness. Administrative tests such as the Defense Language Aptitude Test (DLAB), the Wonderlic Personnel Intelligence Test (WPIT), the Minnesota Multifacet Personality Inventory (MMPI), psychological evaluations, and written assignments determines if a candidate possesses the attributes and maturity necessary to engage at the tactical and operational levels in pre and post conflict environments. Additionally, the process aims to determine whether a candidate is trainable; the ability to operate under stress and grasp broad subjects and dynamics of organizational cultures. A typical CMSE deployment appears routine on the surface in its lack of notable achievements, especially if viewed from standardized reporting mechanisms, coordination meetings, key leader engagements or site visits.²³ Rather, it is the subtle, unquantifiable ability of CMSE Soldiers that are capable of building and establishing rapport that is important to build trust among people and organizations.

Upon successfully completing the assessment and selection process the Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) pipeline which provides the venue for base line education of CA knowledge and skills. CAQC has transformed from a 4 week course to a 42 week course to include language training. Screening occurs throughout the course. Training culminates in a field exercise to test students ability to place knowledge into practice, exercise the proper planning of CA tasks, display their familiarity with interagency organizations and processes, conduct civil information management, and demonstrate negotiation techniques. The cumulative

²³ Jeffrey S. Han and Brion D. Youtz, "Grains of Truth: The Role of Civil Military Support Elements in Special Operations," *Special Warfare* 25, no. 3 (July – September 2012): 41.

information of academic and field testing allows cadre to assess whether a student possesses the acumen, adaptability, responsibility, flexibility, and maturity necessary to work within the environment by adeptly moving from the tactical to strategic level, negotiate the various personalities and organizations, to successfully integrate and operate as a small, low footprint activity to a supported commander or ambassador. From this context the assessment, selection, and training process must be sensitive to emerging requirements from the field.

Advanced Education

Advanced educational opportunities for active CA Soldiers are limited. After successful completion of the CAQC, the Army assigns soldiers to units; attend their respective intermediate level of education such as the Combined General Staff College for officers and the Senior Leaders Course for NCOs with the time period between CAQC graduation and additional educational opportunities ranging from 5 to 6 years. Additionally, there are limited available educational opportunities provided by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Active CA Soldiers take advantage of existing opportunities such as the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) and National Defense University, symposiums and conferences however, spaces are limited. On average six CA officers attend NPS. 2011 saw the first non-commissioned officer attend NPS. Additionally, the operational deployment tempo prevents CA Soldiers from competing for allocations. These forums serve as opportunities that go beyond typical Service school curriculum, provide strategic context to global events, and expand the scope and knowledge necessary to understand the dynamics associated with U.S. policy and strategy.

The areas of negotiations, social and behavioral sciences, and economics requires attention in order to better educate CMSE personnel. The curriculum within the basic civil

affairs qualification course and development of post qualification courses must be mapped out to broaden knowledge needed to confront the challenges associated with a contemporary world. The basic course curriculum produces the generalist capable of operating at the tactical and operational level to influence or shape strategic decisions. In essence the problem solvers. Advanced education initiatives should focus on producing personnel that can accurately identify problems and make informed recommendations. It is recommended that junior and senior leaders in conjunction with the proponent look holistically at the educational requirements needed by the civil affairs force to meet this intent and ability for it to properly plan, synchronize, and coordinate military efforts with the vision and intent laid out in the national security hierarchical documents. Additionally, the force must leverage and expand its current relationships with academia and organizations through universities, forums, and symposiums. An educational roadmap needs to be developed for the active force to include the lessons garnered from traditional CA mission sets and CMSE deployments and their relationship to the whole of government approach in seeking to achieve U.S. national objectives. The educational roadmap will guide and direct the venues in which the CA force can participate and be flexible as to adapt to changing conditions, include a mechanism for reach back to the schoolhouse and deployed force, and a system to assess whether the educational initiatives meet the requirements of the force. The road map must also lay out and match the education requirements in accordance with the grade/ranks of its personnel with existing authorizations across the force. The rank should seek to match the education level required to be an effective contributor at the tactical through strategic level. The road map assures that education and experience at each level prepares soldiers for both advancement within the community and the Army.

Opportunities

The CME program provides a unique opportunity to broaden persistent engagement concepts, and to foster better integration among the military and interagency in advancing national interests. Better integration serves to reduce organizational barriers and bureaucracy to harmonize activities laid out in national documents, in the era of an uncertain fiscal environment and reduced capabilities. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne), directed by LTG Cleveland, the Commander, United States Army Special Operations Command, was directed to establish an organization to better inform Theater Special Operations Commands as well as the Geographic Combatant Commands and Chiefs of Mission.²⁴ The organization known as the Civil Military Advisory Group (CMAG) is in its nascent stages as a national-level body for civil-military information sharing, coordination, and planning efforts that may influence in strategy development. The CMAG envisions future United States Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) requirements for a standing organization that works with communities of interest on integration of civil and military capabilities across the spectrum of conflict and all GCCs. CMAG purpose is to incorporate civil-military planning capabilities to inform relevant partners in the interagency, academia, host nation, inter-governmental and non-governmental sectors. The CMAG serves as a national level civil-military operations center (CMOC) seeking to reduce inefficiencies of organizations, establish and sustain enduring relationships, integrate and synchronize efforts in times of crisis and routine operations. Currently, GCC efforts are regionally focused and do not have a single focal point of civil-military information and must coordinate through a multiplicity of organizations and agencies. It is the recommended that

²⁴ Colonel James Brown, The 95th Civil Affairs Command Working in a 3D Environment: Building Cohesion, United States Army Special Operations Command (Airborne), 6 October 2013, slide 10.

USSOCOM and USASOC continue to support the CMAG and that the CA regiment provide the best qualified personnel to manage the CMAG. Over time the CMAG acts as a repository for information and resources by bridging seams between Unified Action Partners (UAPs) and the military by breaking down organizational culture barriers and creates unity of effort in the economically constrained environment.

CHAPTER 6:

Conclusion

The United States Special Operations Command Civil Military Engagement Program, one of many tools across a broad set of options, serves as a best practice in a constrained fiscal environment, providing a small footprint, low cost capability seeking to narrow communication and coordination gaps. The CME program nests its efforts in the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Defense Strategic Guidance.

The CME program, through the Civil Military Support Element (CMSE), facilitates continuous military and civilian interaction, including partner nation government entities, academia, and the non-governmental community through institutional, educational, and development initiatives. The program is preventative by nature by providing a capability nested under a strategic focus to build partner nation capacity, synchronize and coordinate United States developmental efforts through persistent presence activities, and maintains the relationships needed to enhance strategic and campaign planning efforts for key decision makers. The capability exists within the context of the Chief of Staff of the Army's prevent, shape, win framework.

The proper application of CME assists in the development of a strategy by seeking to conduct support and shaping operations in campaign planning. The robust and focused efforts afforded by the CME program support U.S. defense strategy in the several ways. First, it reduces the military and governmental organizational barriers to unified action by establishing enduring relationships. These relationships build trust and confidence among key stake holders across the elements of national power. These relationships enable cross communication of the operational environment and assist in developing cogent planning efforts to achieve national interests.

Second, the CME program supports United States Defense Strategy as a low cost, small footprint capability in establishing and strengthening partnerships with host nation, partner nations and friends. The CME program addresses the civil considerations that are a factor in all types of military operations including offense, defense, stability, and support. The civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on operations in progress however; they also include larger, long-term diplomatic, informational, and economic issues at higher levels. At the tactical level, they directly relate to key civilian areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events within an area of operations. Discounting these can tax the resources for follow-on elements. The world's increasing urbanization means that the attitudes and activities of the civilian population in an area or environment can and often will influence the outcome of military operations. Civil considerations of the environment can either help or hinder friendly or enemy forces. The difference lies in how a supported commander, ambassador, or UAP has taken time to learn the situation and its possible effects on operations or long term developmental initiatives. The key is the ability to gain and maintain operational access to semi-permissive and unstable regions of the world.

Third, the CME program seeks to frame complex problems, provide clarity of information to the senior leadership, and make recommendations that otherwise are filtered or diluted through hierarchal planning efforts. The CME program does not displace the Political Advisor (POLAD), the intelligence community, or UAPs roles. CME seeks to provide civil and military decision makers' an understanding of the dynamic environment, to include enemy and friendly activities, misunderstood social-cultural undercurrents at the tactical and operational levels. In this way, CMSEs play a direct role in developing the common operational picture required for planning efforts directed at achieving United States national objectives.

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